Abstract:
This study examines Turkey’s Middle East policy in the 1950s, which was the most problematic and conflictual decade of the Cold War. The dynamics of the great power global politics and regional politics will provide the context of this analysis. In this context, the developments in the region, i.e., the Middle East Command, the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, the Baghdad Pact, the Suez Crisis and the Arab-Israeli War, the Turkish-Syrian Crisis, the United Arab Republic, the coup d’etat in Iraq and the crises in Lebanon and Jordan, and the policies of both Turkey and the states in the region regarding these developments will be examined. The approaches of the opposition in the Turkish parliament and the press will also be discussed to reflect the positions of these domestic actors regarding Democrat Party’s Middle East policy. Moreover, as political relations, Turkey’s economic and military relations with the Middle East states will be analyzed. The analysis will mainly be based on archival documents, i.e., the archives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the archives of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and the newspapers and journals. This study attempts to make a contribution to the literature with its content and different approach. After these analyses this study concludes that Turkey’s Middle East policy and the developments in the region can not be understood only from the perspective of the great powers because all the individual states in the region had their country-specific dynamics and interests that they sought to maximize. In addition to providing security, to provide economic development and social support were the main inseparable motives of the states in the region. Thus, throughout the 1950s, the states in the region, including Turkey, tried to harmonize their foreign and domestic policies.
