Özet:
The purpose of this study is to provide a conceptual analysis of secularism as a constitutional principle specifically in the context of constitutional democracies. For these purposes, the critique of the concept is reviewed and various conceptions of the concept that are widely accepted in the literature are scrutinized. As an alternative to the existing conceptions, this study proposes secularism as autonomy as a new conception of secularism which better reflects the constitutional legitimacy and purpose of the concept. Based on this conception, it is argued that secularism in constitutional democracies is a constitutional principle that is adopted directly as a consequence of the legitimacy claim of a constitutional democracy: the claim to recognize and ensure individual autonomy of its citizens. The constitutional state, therefore, by nature a secular state that is legitimated through secular procedures. After this conception is proposed, the argument is deepened by an analysis of the relationship between secularism, autonomy, and legitimacy. It is demonstrated that autonomy plays a central role in constitutional democracies both historically and conceptually and secularism as a constitutional principle is adopted in order to reflect this relationship. Finally, secularism as autonomy is analyzed in three levels of analysis it exists and/or affects: the constitutional level, the legal/political level, and the informal public sphere.
