Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to present the argument that the financial crises, since the 1990s in the emerging market countries, are an outcome of their commitment to integration with the global financial markets through financial liberalization which lacks an effective and sufficient regulatory and supervisory system. Within the scope of this study, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Thailand crisis of 1997, and Turkish crisis of 2000-2001 are shown as examples of the IMF̕s failure in dealing with crisis management and crisis prevention. Based on the idea that understanding the underlying causes of each crisis mayserve to prevent similar crises in the future, the first part of the study provides aliterature view on the first-generation models, the second generation models and the third generation models which conceptualize different points of views regarding the causes at the root of crises.The second part of the study provides different perspectives on the role of theIMF in crisis management and in providing stability, aiming to provide the argument that the IMF̕s approach to the crises in emerging markets is always the same in the context of the liberalization argument and the Fund̕s bureaucratic structure. The reminder of the study is on the Mexico crisis of 1994, the Thailand Crisis of 1997, and the Turkish Crisis of 2000-2001. The aim of the county analysis is to provide a perspective on to what extent the previous crisis are relevant inunderstanding the role of the IMF in the Turkish Financial Crisis of 2000-2001. They are analyzed in detail in the context of pre-crisis conditions leading up to the crises and the role of the IMF in dealing with them. This analysis reveals that the crises were neither solely the consequences of contradictory macroeconomic and fiscal polices by national governments, nordeterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals; the capital account liberalizationwhich had been accompanied with a rapid deregulation process and undermined by the IMF, were at the root of the crises. In this respect, it is argued that the IMF hasan important role in triggering Turkish financial crisis of 2000-2001 by underestimating both domestic political and economic difficulties culminated through premature financial liberalization and neglecting the experiences in Mexico and Thailand. The study concludes that the IMF plays a triggering role in the recurrence ofemerging market crises since it applies the same prescriptions, because of its strong commitment to the basic principles of the Washington Consensus.
