Abstract:
This thesis asks how reformist politicians in Iran advance their interests in the face of resistance by the country’s tutelary institutions. It focuses on the Majlis (Parliament), because it sits at the intersection of the regime’s dual – divine and popular – sovereignty, where there exists the greatest potential for conflict and therefore the greatest incentive for tactical behaviour. Temporally, it looks at 2000- 2004, when the reformists controlled both the legislature and executive, but still found their popular mandate obstructed. Spanning the parliamentary objectives of legislation, supervision and re-election, I identify key episodes at which resistance to reform was anticipated or apparent and which therefore required a tactical response. I then chart the mechanisms by which reformists negotiated these obstacles and identify critical junctures at which their outcomes were decided. I find that victories are possible but partial. Reformists can at best coopt otherwise hostile elites into acquiescing with a more democratic politics; at worst they can highlight resistance to such a politics and invite comparisons between the legitimacy of elected versus unelected institutions. However, the consolidation of any gains requires the cooperation of the very tutelary institutions that oppose them. Beyond explaining how reform succeeded and failed within the Islamic Republic, my findings contribute to the wider discussion on hybrid regimes, showing that reform movements succeed where they can leverage the power of association between contentious issues and consensus issues, and fail at the moment this chain breaks.
