The case of Egypt: an analysis of the process from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 military intervention

Abstract

The fall of Mubarak as a result of mass demonstrations was a historic moment for Egypt and it meant “breaking the fear barrier” for the Egyptian people. After the transition period under the rule of the SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Morsi came to power as the first democratically elected President of Egypt. The expectations were really high and there was a substantial amount of support for him in the society. However, in one-year period of his Presidency, an opposition against Morsi emerged and it grew through time. In the first anniversary of his Presidency, large protests were organized and the crisis ended in a military intervention in July 2013. This thesis aims to analyze the reasons why the process in Egypt evolved from “January 25 Revolution” to July 2013 military intervention. It mainly focuses on the reformulation of the alliances between different actors under the impact of the conjuncture and some crucial events. Moreover, it explains how and why different political groups that were so motivated initially for manifesting their political will through elections could support the Army against the first democratically elected President in such a short amount of time. Changes in the attitudes and policies of different actors take our attention to the events emerged in this short period, especially the ones happened in the Morsi period. It seems that some events negatively affected the views of different political groups towards the President Morsi and they led to recalculations of strategies of the actors and formation of new alliances to change the political context through new mechanisms. Morsi, as an unexperienced leader, made some controversial and untimely decisions and attempts which caused opposition among people so that his policies became one reason for the growing resentment in the society. Among these policies, the November 22 Declaration and the constitution-making process came into prominence. They were accepted as the signs of the tendency of the President Morsi towards authoritarianism. These two breaking points implied the loss of conditional support given by some groups in the second round of the Presidential elections. The Salafist Nour Party remained as the only ally for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in that process. The following months witnessed the breaking of the alliance between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to the ideological differences between the two groups, some disagreements about the policies and the Saudi impact on the Salafists made the end of the alliance inevitable. The role of Salafists was significant because their participation in the opposition camp changed the dynamics in the country and increased the legitimacy of the protests against Morsi. After that, the military played the decisive role implying the end of the Morsi period. It strengthened the place of the military in the political affairs. It became the last ring of the chain of military interference with the political issues. Thus, the military and the Salafist Nour Party appeared as the most critical actors in the process. Apart from that, the thesis points out the impact of the historical prejudices towards the MB and the role of identity for determining the credibility of Morsi in Presidency. The historical prejudices and identity factors made his credibility limited so the opposition was activated in such a short amount of time. As a result, the reasons for the evolution of the process were a combination of different factors that needed a step-by-step analysis as we have done in this thesis.