Abstract:
This thesis gives a methodological appraisal of the major research paradigms in cognitive science by making their heuristics explicit. The way their heuristics is made explicit and the appraisals given is based on Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes. The emphasis, however, is not on empirical progress but on heuristic type. Assuming that all the methodologies considered have equal empirical progress, it is argued that their heuristics differ when it comes to Lakatos’s "continuity" and "autonomy" norms. This shows that computationalism and interactivism are methodologically on a par and have the strongest heuristics, whereas pure dynamical modelling has the weakest. Radical embodied cognitive science’s model-based approach has medium heuristic strength, whereas the theorybased approach has weak heuristic strength. The thesis demonstrates that Lakatos’s philosophy of science is relevant and effective when it comes to methodological issues in cognitive science. Since its finer distinctions reveal methodological constrains that are usually missed in the current debates regarding explanation and methodology in philosophy of cognitive science, it must be considered as an essential addition to the existing approaches to these issues. An attempt to modelling heuristic types based on the interactivist model of autonomy is also provided.
