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Dijital Arşivi

Epistemic truth versus non-epistemic truth: toward a revised version of the correspondence theory of truth

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dc.contributor Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor Baç, Murat.
dc.contributor.author Durmuş, Deniz.
dc.date.accessioned 2023-03-16T11:55:07Z
dc.date.available 2023-03-16T11:55:07Z
dc.date.issued 2007.
dc.identifier.other PHIL 2007 D87
dc.identifier.uri http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16184
dc.description.abstract This thesis defends the idea that truth is a non-epistemic notion that consists in some correspondence relation between our propositions and external reality. Taking into account the criticisms brought to the classical versions of the correspondence theory of truth, I aimed to contribute a new version of the theory developed by Goldman and Alston that avoids these criticisms. In doing that, I first explained the classical correspondence theory and presented these criticisms under the formulation of Inaccessibility of Reality Argument (IRA). The objection from inaccessibility of reality provided a ground for some philosophers to refute the non-epistemic truth and endorse the epistemic truth instead. An important task of my thesis is to show that the move toward an epistemic account of truth is not justified. I completed this task in two steps. First, I showed that the nonepistemic truth is not inaccessible since we do have some access to external reality and we are able to check whether our propositions correspond to reality. I supported my position by an exposition of Alston’s alethic realist account and Goldman’s fittingness notion of truth. Second, I presented the difficulties with the epistemic notion of truth and claimed that it does not bring us any closer to truth than the nonepistemic truth does.
dc.format.extent 30cm.
dc.publisher Thesis (M.A.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2007.
dc.relation Includes appendices.
dc.relation Includes appendices.
dc.subject.lcsh Truth -- Correspondence theory.
dc.subject.lcsh Epistemics.
dc.title Epistemic truth versus non-epistemic truth: toward a revised version of the correspondence theory of truth
dc.format.pages viii, 64 leaves;


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