Abstract:
This thesis defends the idea that truth is a non-epistemic notion that consists in some correspondence relation between our propositions and external reality. Taking into account the criticisms brought to the classical versions of the correspondence theory of truth, I aimed to contribute a new version of the theory developed by Goldman and Alston that avoids these criticisms. In doing that, I first explained the classical correspondence theory and presented these criticisms under the formulation of Inaccessibility of Reality Argument (IRA). The objection from inaccessibility of reality provided a ground for some philosophers to refute the non-epistemic truth and endorse the epistemic truth instead. An important task of my thesis is to show that the move toward an epistemic account of truth is not justified. I completed this task in two steps. First, I showed that the nonepistemic truth is not inaccessible since we do have some access to external reality and we are able to check whether our propositions correspond to reality. I supported my position by an exposition of Alston’s alethic realist account and Goldman’s fittingness notion of truth. Second, I presented the difficulties with the epistemic notion of truth and claimed that it does not bring us any closer to truth than the nonepistemic truth does.
