Abstract:
In this thesis I examine understanding, a cognitive phenomenon which for many philosophers has a distinct epistemic standing than that of knowledge. Understanding, it is assumed, requires some cognitive abilities that are not required for having knowledge and understanding can be achieved in the absence of knowledge. In analysing the nature of understanding it is customary to compare it with the nature of knowledge and in this comparison, philosophers use a propositional model of knowledge. I will argue that while a simple propositional model of knowledge is insufficient to account for our complex epistemic relation with the world, propositional models do not exhaust models of knowledge. After introducing main features of model-based approach to scientific theorizing, I will investigate the strategies of separating knowledge from understanding, taking this account of scientific knowledge as my point of departure. I will show the impossibility of achieving understanding without knowledge and vice-versa. Next, I will review Grimm’s account of understanding according to which understanding is a form of non-propositional knowledge. I will argue that his account of a priori knowledge is problematic, and we should not take it as our point of departure in dealing with understanding natural phenomena. Lastly, I will examine the ramifications of these arguments on questions concerning scientism and democracy and suggest some threads for further research.
