Abstract:
In this thesis I examine, explicate, and defend an epistemology of perception which does justice both to the sentient and to the sapient aspects of human perceptual knowledge. Following Kant and Dretske, I distinguish simple, ‘non-epistemic’ seeing which is characterized as the differentiation of perceptible particulars by sensory means, from ‘epistemic’ seeing within which judgment—as ascription of features to perceived, localized particulars—is essential. I show that such a distinction between two aspects of human perception is vital for a proper understanding of our ability to acquire perceptually grounded beliefs (true or false) via sensory and cognitive means. Following Kant in conceiving empirical knowledge as a result of the co-operation of our faculties of ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’, I employ Dretske’s information-theoretic terminology to explicate an account in which such a co-operation may occur. Disregarding or neglecting the distinction between simple and epistemic seeing, I then argue, is a source of philosophical catastrophe; resulting in relativistic or skeptical conceptions of empirical knowledge which are far from doing justice to our actual, fallible, and— most of the time—reliable ability to acquire knowledge of particulars within our ambient, perceivable environment.
