Abstract:
This thesis is a study on the significance of analyticity, in particular, on the controversy between Carnap and Quine regarding analyticity. The analysis follows an historical order of Carnap's two periods: syntax and semantics. I argue that Carnap's conception of analyticity is different between these two periods. In the period of syntax, Carnap attempts to give a method for the specification of analytic sentences that will capture all and only truths of logic and mathematics. I argue that he does not aim to demonstrate how these truths are justified, and hence his conception of analyticity is methodological rather than epistemological. I then discuss Quine's objections in "Truth by Convention" and show that they are against the epistemic significance of analyticity and hence cannot be directed to Carnap. Yet there is a problem; Carnap formulates the analytic/synthetic distinction supposing that the logical/descriptive distinction is at hand. Despite this problem, my analysis will support the conclusion that Carnap's investigations illuminate the structure of scientific theories. In the period of semantics, Carnap's conception of analyticity gains an epistemic significance: analytic truths are true by virtue of linguistic convention. Quine argues against this conception in two aspects: the specification of analytic truths needs an account of synonymy and the epistemic corollary of this conception is mistaken. The emphasis in philosophical discussions is given to the problem of synonymy. However, I will conclude that the historical analysis made in this thesis shows that the basis of the problem is the latter, which is epistemological.
