Abstract:
This thesis extends Kit Fine’s exact semantics and account of counterfactuals to nonhabitual, non-predictive indicative conditionals. First, I provide Fine’s exposition of exact semantics and his extension to counterfactuals. Later, I introduce a notion of context into the semantics and provide the truth-conditions for indicative conditionals by employing this notion of context. Afterwards, I turn to the logic of indicative conditionals under exact semantics and discuss the principles and inference rules which raise disagreements between variably strict and strict conditionals accounts. The account I provide shows its promise by validating a plausible combination of principles and strikes a balance between variably strict and strict conditional theories. I discuss certain principles in logic of indicative conditionals under exact semantics in detail and show how the present account validates the plausible combination of them. In the end, I draw comparisons between the viable theories for indicatives and the present one, and argue that the present account takes the advantage in several respects.
