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Meno’s paradox and the possibility of inquiry

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dc.contributor Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor Sidiropoulou, Chryssi. Panahee, Mohammad Raziq. 2023-10-15T17:55:27Z 2023-10-15T17:55:27Z 2022
dc.identifier.other PHIL 2022 P36
dc.description.abstract Plato in his Meno puts forward a challenge against the possibility of inquiry. This challenge has two stages, at one, Meno’s questions challenge the possibility of inquiry in the case of how different kinds of knowledge about one thing are related to each other, at another, Socrates’ argument is supposed to show that either possessing or lacking knowledge about an object entails that one cannot inquire into it. In this study, I present a reading arguing that these two are different challenges; the former is based on strict Socratic requirements on knowing and the latter brings up a puzzle whether inquiry is possible in a general sense. In addition to this, I will analytically discuss and evaluate different possible formulations of Socrates’ argument, some are valid while others are invalid. But before discussing these topics, I will present and evaluate the accounts of Aristotle, Dominic Scott, and Gail Fine in terms of how they understand and solve Meno’s Paradox. I will also investigate whether and how Ilhan Inan’s theory of conceptual curiosity and the specification of the object of one’s curiosity can provide any help to the puzzle of the possibility of inquiry in the Meno.
dc.publisher Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2022.
dc.subject.lcsh Plato. Meno.
dc.subject.lcsh Inquiry (Theory of knowledge)
dc.subject.lcsh Philosophy, Ancient.
dc.title Meno’s paradox and the possibility of inquiry
dc.format.pages vi, 83 leaves

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