Turkish-US security relations 1945-2003: a game-theoretical analysis of the institutional effect

Abstract

This study aims to test the relevance of the neo-institutionalist theory in Turkish-US security relations by using a game-theoretical model. If successful, such an undertaking would provide one with tested theoretical generalizations about the place of institutions (in our case, NATO) in Turkish-US security relations, imply policy-making alternatives to remedy the power asymmetry between the two actors, and help pinpoint problematic issues in the bilateral relationship. This study has looked at the salient issues in Turkish-US security relations from 1945 to 2003. Its key findings suggest that NATO as an institution moderates relative gains made by the parties, and this effect is independent from domestic or international structural changes. The power asymmetry between Turkey and US results in an uneven distribution of relative gains that is particularly evident in problematic issues like the Middle East, US military aid to Turkey, and the presence and activities of US forces in Turkey. The findings of this study suggest that further institutionalization would moderate the distribution of relative gains in both issues.