A critical history of the concept of progress: Salvaging the repressed normative content

Abstract

This study revisits the concept of progress for the purpose of excavating and laying bare its normative content. The critical examination of its conceptual history enables me to delineate two ideal-types of progress which can be differentiated from one another based on their level of affinity with the utilitarian logic and instrumental rationality of market relations characteristic of modern bourgeois society. Auguste Comte's unilinear and scientific conceptualization of progress displays contiguity with the economic and social conditions following the dissolution of the ancien régime and works predominantly to contain the contradictions that posed a threat to the well-being of the bourgeois society. Tapping into the irrational elements of civil society, Kant posits two distinct areas of progress - moral and civilizational, the relations between which are shown to be marked with tension and contain a dynamic and dialectical dimension. Following this typological analysis, I explore Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of progress and do so by investigating his diagnosis of modernity as a period of nihilism. I show that Nietzsche rejects both Comte's and Kant's theorization of progress on account of their stark incompatibility with the model of agonistic individuality that Nietzsche judges to be the sole antidote for overcoming nihilism. In the final chapter, I direct my attention to Theodor Adorno's determinate negation of the concept of progress, which is argued to extend beyond the predominantly individualistic and abstract nature of Nietzsche's criticisms and develop a socially engaged and concrete idea of progress by sharpening its critical edge and rejuvenating its repressed emancipatory aspects.