The political economy of sovereign wealth funds :|the globalization paradox

Abstract

One of the many results of global financialization in the twenty-first century is the transformation of the traditional understanding of sovereignty. In the case of sovereign wealth funds (SWF), states commodify their sovereignty in new economic investment institutions that can invest internationally on their behalf. SWFs, however, are not a recent phenomenon. The first SWF was created in 1953 as an entity to manage oil revenue surplus investment in an off-shore office; this London office was later established as a public government institution, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) (Kuwait Investment Authority [KIA], 2020). Despite not being a new institution, it was only at the turn of the twenty-first century that SWFs gained momentum in their creation. Consequently, it attracted the attention of economists and politicians alike. As the total asset pool of SWFs increases in size and importance, making them potential tools for public and macroeconomic policy, questions around their governance, transparency, and sustainability, also increase. Questions that can only be answered by understanding the factors that result in the heterogeneity amongst SWFs. This thesis aims to answer this question by looking beyond the typologies set by multilateral international institutions to regulate and standardize wealth funds and present a comprehensive mutually constitutive categorization by also including their domestic political economies and the economic needs they serve to satisfy, and their relationship with and the influence of their domestic political regimes on SWF management styles and legitimacy.