Unraveling in two sided matching markets

dc.contributor	Graduate Program in Economics.
dc.contributor.advisor	Mumcu, Ayşe.
dc.contributor.author	Dur, Umut Mert.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-16T12:00:31Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-16T12:00:31Z
dc.date.issued	2009.
dc.identifier.other	EC 2009 D87
dc.identifier.uri	http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16395
dc.description.abstract	This thesis aims to investigate the role of the restriction on workers preferences, that not all firms remain acceptable when all information about market is clear, on unravelling in two-sided matching markets. The model builds upon Halaburda (2007) by introducing an important modification. In this paper, some of the firms are not considered as acceptable in the second round. In the literature risk aversion, similarity of preference and costly search are revealed as the possible reasons of unravelling. Even if these reasons are not present, I have found that restriction on preferences of workers can lead to unravelling in some markets.
dc.format.extent	30cm.
dc.publisher	Thesis (M.A.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2009.
dc.relation	Includes appendices.
dc.relation	Includes appendices.
dc.subject.lcsh	Matching theory.
dc.subject.lcsh	Labor economics.
dc.title	Unraveling in two sided matching markets
dc.format.pages	vi, 60 leaves;