The moral self. An exploratory study of moral agency and conceptions of self

Abstract

The main question directing this thesis is concerned with the implications of the nature of the self on the one hand and the conceptions that individuals have of their selves on the other for their moral judgement, their moral behaviour and their theory of morality. This aim is pursued along two main lines of enquiry. The first line is concerned with a conceptual clarification of the terminology used in the description and evaluation of moral agency as well as a broad overview of some of the most influential conceptions of self. The second line of enquiry is a critical exploration of the argument from a theory of relational self to a procedural moral theory. The results of this enquiry indicate that a relational theory of self as exemplified by Martin Buber and Arne Naess lays the foundation for a particularistic and dialogical moral theory, which focuses on the procedural aspects of moral agency and the role of authenticity therein.