On the nature of the semantics-pragmatics distinction

Abstract

In linguistics and philosophy; syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are typically held to characterize some complementary yet distinct aspects (i.e. explanans) in a language with respect to some related significance (i.e. explanandum) such as meaning, language comprehension, communication, and cognition. In the last decades, the question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction in a principled way has become one of the most noteworthy, but equally most contentious, question in philosophy of language and in philosophy of linguistics. This dissertation questions the nature and the extent of the endeavors for drawing the distinction in a principled way in order that it outlines methodological warrants for a better understanding of the distinction. In this respect, the dissertation argues for the deflationary stance which contends that semantics and pragmatics are stipulative categories under which more fundamental theories underlying them are trivially abridged. For this matter, the dissertation critically analyzes the object-level interpretations of the distinction on the basis of some assumptions (derivativeness, integrity, autonomy, sharpness, and cursiveness) and the assumption schema (the Aspect Distinction Assumption) on which these object-level interpretations typically rest. Accordingly, the dissertation takes issue with the substantiality of the distinction by deflating its alleged significance in substantivizing some adopted explanandum about a given language.