Is language a prerequisite for belief? An alternative approach to false-belief understanding and meta-representation

Abstract

Positioning belief within the discussion of philosophy of mind is one of the major issues in this thesis. I find most of the theories developed in this area to be somewhat process-blind and one-sided, such as the ones I investigate within the body of my project: Davidson and Armstrong. Developing a mono system philosophy of mind understanding that attributes all importance to language causes major problems within the discussion, as well as ignoring a way much more crucial aspect: falsebelief understanding. In order to shed more light on the process of belief acquirement, I refer to studies in the field of developmental psychology. The comparison of non-human animals and human babies is crucial for my project since I find strong resemblance between them in terms of mental capabilities until certain ages of the babies. Developmental psychology studies point out to a more crucial mental capability rather than language, false-belief understanding, and stress the importance of a dual system understanding of mind. I leverage this approach within my project and try to blend these findings with philosophical approach by importing Heidegger`s understanding of Dasein and its everydayness. Heidegger opens a gate for me to discuss dual system of mind, which explains the complex belief mechanism distinguishing human beings from other animals with meta-representation and this, in turn, is the mental capacity for developing false-belief understanding.