A strong value-neutral theory of autonomy

Abstract

Manipulation and oppressive socialization are among the most senous issues of the contemporary debates on autonomy. Procedual theories of autonomy focus on the way our beliefs are formed and don't rule out or necessitate having certain norms for autonomy to obtain. In this sense, procedural theories are contentneutral. However, these theories are limited to an analysis of our mental structure and preference formation. Thus, they lack analytical tools to account for the relation between autonomy and social phenonmena like oppressive socialization. Substantive theories, on the other hand, associate heteronomy in such cases with the presence or absence of certain norms and values, albeit in problematic ways. While substantive theories bite the bullet and approach the problem of oppressive socialization in a more serious way, they do it at the expense of losing value-neutrality and defining autonomy in an arbitrary way. In this work, an alternative social theory of autonomy is propounded in order to explicate the problem of oppressive socialization in the context of autonomy. By employing the method of "via negativa", a definition of autonomy is reached by showing what it shouln't be. Various works of philosophers like Gerald Dworkin, Harry Frankfurt, John Christman, Natalie Stoljar, Sigurdur Kristonsson are criticized in order to reach an alternative which doesn't have their common defect, namely epistemic individualism, a concept further developed within the context of autonomy by Peter Nelsen. In this context, indispensability of a power relations oriented analysis for a social theory of autonomy is stressed. While contentneutrality is preserved, it is demonstrated that achieving various degrees of autonomy is mainly determined by social conditions and attainment of these conditions may require radical social change. This is how a strong content-neutral approach, a seeming oxymoron is turned into a plausible theory.