The seeming middle ground : concessions of a realist

Abstract

This project scrutinizes philosophical positions that have both realistic and relativistic tendencies in order to show how the precarious relationship between truth and reality can be stabilised through an endorsement of a particular brand of realism, which arises from a stance that I call the middle ground. The middle ground is a position that situates itself between traditional metaphysical realism and a particular version of antirealism that stems out of this tradition. The middle ground is characterised first by its rejection the traditional metaphysical realist’s notion of a God’s-eye view on reality converging on a single and absolute reference point, and second by its acceptance, as a given, that interpretation plays a significant role in our conceptions of both truth and world. Key in this project is the concern for the roll of limiting radical differences in our accounts of reality. I examine how it is that Michael Lynch, Bernard Williams, and Frank Farrell put forth their explanations of how we can philosophically account for, and explain, differing accounts of reality. The particular brand of realism that arises from this stance toward the middle ground is metaphysically, ontologically, and semantically dependent on subjective input, but not entirely. There is no one particular picture that accounts for this novel and generically nameless brand of realism. Numerous pictures can describe this stance towards truth, world, and subjectivity. It is my claim that Lynch, Williams, and Farrell are exemplary advocates of this brand of realism that aims to situate itself in the middle ground.