In defense of ordinary objects: a study in common sense ontolog

Abstract

In this thesis I defend a common sense view regarding the ontological status of ordinary objects. It is a defense against philosophers who have believed and argued for the idea that the manifest objects of everyday human life are nothing but collections of fundamental particles. I discuss two important arguments against the existence of ordinary objects. First, I present various objections all of which stem from the problem of vagueness and I show that there are many solutions available for a proponent of ordinary objects. According to the other argument that I discuss in my thesis, ordinary objects are causally redundant which gives us a good reason to abandon them from our ontology. As I show in this work there are several reasonable responses to such an argument. One can easily resist it at no great cost and still maintain that objects like tables, vases or computers are causally efficacious. I believe it is possible to create a non-reductionist ontology which gives a reasonable account not only for scientific activity but also for everyday human life without making any revisions or needing paraphrases in order to understand what folk believe. This thesis is to be seen as a contribution to such an endeavor.