Sense perception and the self

dc.contributor	Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor	Voss, Stephen,
dc.contributor.author	Koçak, Ayşe Özge.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-16T11:55:07Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-16T11:55:07Z
dc.date.issued	2007.
dc.identifier.other	PHIL 2007 K63
dc.identifier.uri	http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16182
dc.description.abstract	This thesis aims at analyzing the content of perceptual experience with a view to understand whether non-conceptual perceptual content is possible. To do so, the definition and the function of perception are evaluated to discern what perception really amounts to in our daily life. The notion of sensation as non-conceptual mental content is criticized in order to emphasize the role of perception in our experience. Two distinctions regarding concepts are introduced: 1) between the concept of self and the concepts about the objects of perception; 2) between linguistic and nonlinguistic concepts. With these distinctions, how perceptual content cannot be nonconceptual is illustrated. The concept of ‘self’ is put forth as the minimal requirement for perception to occur, without which it is not possible to have perceptual content at all.
dc.format.extent	30cm.
dc.publisher	Thesis (M.A.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate the Social Sciences, 2007.
dc.subject.lcsh	Perception (Philosophy)
dc.title	Sense perception and the self
dc.format.pages	vii, 39 leaves;