Ineffability and interpretation in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of art

Abstract

In contemporary philosophy, there is tension between ineffabilist and interpretivist theories of art. The ineffabilist claims that the discontinuity between art and non artistic practices implies the impossibility of interpretation of works of art. The interpretivist claims that the continuity implies the possibility of interpretation. Whereas the former cannot account for sense-making relation to art, the latter cannot explain the specificity of artistic mediums. Outside this dilemma, Wittgenstein provides an account of interpretation compatible with the discontinuity. A comprehensive reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for this third view has not yet been provided. The resolution of the tension into this view consists of the following arguments: Wittgenstein’s rejection of the immediacy of artistic experience, the separability of artwork and the effects of artwork, and the possibility of private experience imply a non-metaphysical conception of the ineffability of artistic experience. This account consists of the indescribability and the peculiarity of artistic experience indexed to time, person, and artwork. Wittgenstein’s claims in the asymmetry between the contextuality of meaning and the noncontextuality of artwork, the biconditional relation between non-practical aesthetic stance and interpretive stance, the distinction between external comparisons and internal relations in artistic experience, the dual aspect of seeing-as, and the cultural sense of aspect perception reveal the conditions for the possibility of interpretive stance. It implies that interpretation is textual and historical narrative contextualization. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s compatible account of ineffability and interpretation in artistic experience transcends the false dilemma of ineffability and interpretation.