A reconciliation of two approaches to freedom :|neo-republicanism and Marxism

Abstract

Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner argue that neo-republican freedom, which is freedom as non-domination, is a negative conception of freedom. It is an alternative to all accounts of positive freedom and the liberal understanding of negative freedom. However, such an understanding of freedom implicitly requires certain virtues from individuals. One has to construct himself as an equal to others. Also, one has to act in a way that does not reproduce the ideologies that support domination. For those reasons, freedom as non-domination requires a certain degree of self-realization and there is an exercise-concept aspect of it. Contrary to what Pettit and Skinner think, that concept makes neo-republican freedom a form of positive freedom. Such an analysis annihilates a possible categorical difference between Marxist freedom and neo-republican freedom. Then, the implications of freedom as non-domination in work-life necessitates a transformation in property relations. Because capitalism inevitably produces domination relationships between capitalist and worker. On the other hand, Marxist freedom necessitates a social structure free from all sorts of domination. Therefore, Marxist freedom and neo-republican freedom converge at one point.