Trope theory and resemblance

Abstract

According to the resemblance nominalist view, objects have properties with respect to their resemblance relations. Groups of objects that resemble each other constitute a resemblance class and every resemblance class corresponds to a property. So, objects have no nature, no structure or properties independent of their resemblance relations. In this respect, resemblance comes first ontologically in resemblance nominalism. On the other hand, in trope theory, objects are regarded as bundles of their particular properties. These particular properties, namely tropes, are nothing but their particularized nature. They are minimally propertied particulars and every trope confers just one character to its object. If objects resemble each other, this means that their tropes resemble each other. Therefore, the resemblance relations of objects are coming from the particularized nature of their totality of tropes. Throughout my thesis, I have compared the resemblance classes of objects with the resemblance classes of tropes. It seems that since objects have many properties and resemble each other in many respects, to express properties based on the resemblance relations of objects causes certain problems. However, the problems that arise for the resemblance classes of objects do not affect the resemblance classes of tropes. Since tropes as being particularized can resemble each other in just one respect, the resemblance between objects can be explained in terms of their resembling tropes without being exposed to any of those problems.