dc.contributor |
Graduate Program in Philosophy. |
|
dc.contributor.advisor |
Voss, Stephen, |
|
dc.contributor.advisor |
İnan, İlhan. |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Arslan, Aran. |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-03-16T11:54:59Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-03-16T11:54:59Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2019. |
|
dc.identifier.other |
PHIL 2019 A77 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16139 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
This thesis is a critique of Jaakko Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning. I argue that Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in particular and his reconstruction of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in general fails to be successful in two ways: First, the logical formula which contains an instantiated term (henceforth, instantial term) that is introduced by the rule of existential instantiation in the ecthesis part of a proof of an argument is not even a proper singular proposition whose relation to its object is supposed to be immediate. It is not a proper singular proposition because its truth conditions are general, i.e., it makes a general statement about a class of individuals of the sort instantiated- a statement whose analysis is based on quantifiers. Second, I show that certain proofs in mathematics- those in the form of reductio ad absurdum- are not captured by Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics either. |
|
dc.format.extent |
30 cm. |
|
dc.publisher |
Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2019. |
|
dc.subject.lcsh |
Mathematics -- Philosophy. |
|
dc.title |
A critique of Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning |
|
dc.format.pages |
viii, 51 leaves ; |
|