A critical assessment of Hume’s and al-Ghazālī’s views on critique of causation

Abstract

This thesis shows the similarities and differences between the views of al-Ghazālī and David Hume on causation. Such a comparison is interesting because, long before Hume, the Islamic philosopher al-Ghazālī had taken up the issue of necessary causality. Although al-Ghazālī’s and Hume’s respective views on causation evince some striking parallels in their empirical contention, there are some notable differences as well. Both philosophers reject the view that the connection between empirical events and objects is of logical necessity. They use the negative argument that the necessary connection between any two natural objects or events cannot be perceived and cannot be justified rationally. However, to give an ultimate reason for the theory of causality, al-Ghazālī, unlike Hume, makes reference to God. In other words, he defends occasionalism, in order to establish God’s omnipotence and the possibility of miracles. On the other hand, according to Hume, we cannot give an ultimate justification for the theory of causality. Moreover, the thesis claims that al-Ghazālī’s argument against the necessary connection is an ontological claim, i.e. his conclusion is that there are no real causal connections in nature. But Hume seems to suspend judgment on the ontological question of whether there really are causal connections in nature. In other words, Hume’s argument is epistemological, insofar as reason cannot discover such causal relations between such events. All in all, this study focuses on both philosophers’ arguments against the necessity of natural causation.