Models, causes and capacıtıes: A new account for laws of nature

Abstract

Humans have reached a consensus about the regularity of nature. However, we have not reached a consensus about what grounds that regularity yet. My thesis tries to address the question of what grounds the regularity of nature. Some philosophers argue that the regularity is in no need of a metaphysical grounding: Regularities in nature are the laws of nature. Other philosophers argue that some regularities in nature are not laws of nature and non-accidental regularities, which are the laws of nature, are indeed in need of a metaphysical grounding: Laws of nature are grounded in the modality-supplying entities. An intriguing figure in this discussion is Nancy Cartwright because Cartwright occupies the middle ground. My thesis argues that Cartwright’s account of laws of nature is incomplete, and I try to amend her account by grounding it on a firm metaphysical base. My dissertation tries to expand the discussion about regularities and laws of nature by explicating whether Cartwright’s scientifically oriented theory, with a special focus on her idea of “capacities”, can be combined with “causal properties” that can be reliably measured. I conclude with a discussion of how the non-accidental regularities in nature cannot ontologically depend on causal properties either for their existence or for their identity.