Logicism and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems

dc.contributor	Graduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisor	Kılınç, Berna.
dc.contributor.advisor	Karatay, Ali.
dc.contributor.author	Polat, Berk.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-16T11:54:54Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-16T11:54:54Z
dc.date.issued	2016.
dc.identifier.other	PHIL 2016 P76
dc.identifier.uri	http://digitalarchive.boun.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16117
dc.description.abstract	The view of logicism which dates back to eighteenth century when Leibniz thought that mathematical statements are nothing more than identity statements is the view that mathematics is reducible to logic. This idea brings with it several commitments about the epistemological and ontological aspects related to the nature of mathematics. In this study, the common argument that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems destroyed logicism once and for all will be considered and in the end it will be concluded that logicism is open to many interpretations, some of which can remain compatible with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
dc.format.extent	30 cm.
dc.publisher	Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2016.
dc.subject.lcsh	Logic, Symbolic and mathematical.
dc.title	Logicism and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems
dc.format.pages	viii, 47 leaves ;