Aristotle’s De Anima II.5 in the light of the Literalism–Spiritualism debate

Abstract

This thesis aims to offer a detailed and critical reading of a section of De Anima, namely of DA II.5, which appears to occupy a central place in a modern debate between literalist and spiritualist interpreters of Aristotle’s theory of sense perception. Taking sides in principle with the literalist interpretation of Aristotle, the present thesis argues that Aristotle has an understanding of physiology, especially in his theory of sense perception, which is not so alien to today’s conception of it as opposed to what his spiritualist interpreters suggest. In this regard, the second chapter presents an expository analysis of the modern controversy and explores Myles Burnyeat’s spiritualist reading of an analogy between sense perception and thinking that Aristotle establishes in DA II.5. The third chapter argues first that it is unlikely, at least in principle, that Aristotle would have a conception of physiology in which spiritual alterations in a sentient subject are employed to account for sense perception, on the grounds that he has significant ties with a physiological tradition that originated from the theories of the earlier Greek natural philosophers. Second, by offering an alternative reading of the analogy of DA II.5, the chapter tries to demonstrate that contrary to what Burnyeat argues, the analogy does not introduce two kinds of alterations: ordinary and spiritual. Last, it attempts to show that DA II.12, instead of confirming spiritualism, does in fact support the main contention of the present thesis that in Aristotle there is only one kind of alteration: ordinary alteration.