

THE MARSHALL PLAN IN TURKEY,
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE
PLAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE REPUBLIC

Thesis submitted to the
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

by
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2007

ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Burcu Birinci, for the degree of Master of Arts from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History to be taken September 2007.

Title: The Marshall Plan in Turkey, a Critical Evaluation of United States Interests in the Plan and Effects of the Plan on the Republic

The aim of this thesis is to draw general implementation process of the Marshall Aid in Turkey and show the reasons for and the results of the Marshall Plan related to its implementation policy. What the United States demand from the Marshall Plan and from it's highway policy and how it affected Turkey's economic and social development process gave the direction to the study. In this context, the paper analyses the position of the United States in the period, the theoretical support of the Marshall Plan, modernization theory, the first aid package of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan implementation in several sectors, the highway construction policy throughout the Plan, and it's outlook on the social sphere. The research follows three turning points in the general Marshall Plan process and in its Turkey implementation from focusing on the agricultural development to supporting the defense sector and to making the private sector flourish. Following these transformations, the paper investigates the actors that carried out this project to obtain several benefits for them instead to improve countries as is presented in modernization literature. Sources for the study include Assembly minutes, reports, the national and US archives of this period, newspapers, magazines, and secondary sources. This paper underlines the fact that the Marshall Plan did not convert the whole country into an American satellite without any decision-making process of internal actors; it did not devastate the country –instead many benefits were provided in various spheres-; or, it was not a compulsory process but the result of mutual negotiations. This thesis researches thoroughly the immediate benefits of the United States from the projection of such a Plan leaving the internal politics aside.

(TÜRKÇE ÖZET)

Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde yüksek lisans derecesi için Burcu

Birinci tarafından Eylül 2007'de teslim edilen tezin özeti

Başlık: Türkiye'de Marshall Planı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin bu Plan'dan Beklentilerinin Eleştirel bir Değerlendirmesi ve Plan'ın Cumhuriyet'e Etkileri

Bu tezin amacı, Türkiye'de Marshall yardımının genel uygulama sürecini ortaya koymak ve uygulama tarzıyla ilişkili olarak Marshall Plan'ının sebeplerini ve sonuçlarını göstermektir. "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Marshall Plan'ından ve onun karayolu siyasetinden neler bekledi ve bu, Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve toplumsal gelişim sürecini nasıl etkiledi?" sorusu çalışmaya yön vermiştir. Bu bağlamda, metin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin o dönemdeki konumunu, Marshall Planı'nın kuramsal destekleyicisi olan Modernleşme kuramını, ilk yardım paketi Truman Doktrini'ni, Marshall Planı'nın çeşitli sektörlerdeki uygulamasını, Plan kapsamındaki karayolları inşa siyasasını, ve Plan'ın toplumsal alandaki görünüşünü incelemektedir. Araştırma, genel olarak Marshall Planı sürecinde ve özel olarak onun Türkiye uygulamasındaki tarımsal gelişmeden savunma sektörünü desteklemeye ve özel sektörü geliştirmeye odaklanan üç dönüm noktasını takip etmektedir. Bu dönüşümleri takiben, metin, Marshall Plan'ı uygulayıcılarının, modernleşme literatüründe sunulduğu gibi ülkeleri geliştirmekten ziyade kendileri için pek çok fayda sağlama amacıyla bu projeyi gerçekleştirmelerini araştırmaktadır. Bu çizgideki bir araştırmayı ortaya koymak için meclis tutanakları, raporlar, dönemin ulusal ve Amerikan arşivleri, gazeteler, süreli yayınlar ve ikincil kaynaklar araştırılmıştır. Bu metin, Marshall Planı'nın, yerli aktörlerin hiçbir karar verme süreci olmaksızın tüm bir ülkeyi bir Amerikan uydusu haline getirmediklerinin; Plan'ın ülkeyi harap etmediğinin –aksine çeşitli alanlarda pek çok faydalar sağlamıştır; yada zorunlu bir süreç olmayıp aksine karşılıklı uzlaşmanın ürünü olduğunun altını çizmektedir. Ne var ki bu tez, iç politikayı bir kenara bırakmak suretiyle, böylesi bir Plan'ın tasarlanmasından Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dolaysız çıkarlarının/ beklentilerinin neler olduğunu araştırmaya talip olmuştur.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Post-Second World War era has great importance today because it has such a continuous effect on today's political, economic, and social conditions. Almost the entire world suffered from the war bitterly and a new situation in the world, with the emergence of a new leading actor in world affairs, the United States of America, after the war. For political and economic reasons, after the Second World War, the world was defined by bipolarity, by a power struggle between Western/USA and the Soviet Union camps. During the war and after it, assistance and aid initially determined the two sides and their supporters/ piled countries around them; only these two players who really mattered at least for twenty years and especially the United States played huge roles in shaping world politics using them. Modern propaganda methods, guerilla fights, economic struggle, nuclear threat avoiding the hot battles, and financial aid were the tools of the Cold War period.

Emerging from the Second World War as a hegemonic, perhaps the only considerable hegemonic power, the United States of America developed the Marshall Plan to provide the maintenance of it's and world's capitalist system, to internationalize the capital, that is, to reconstruct the capitalist system on an international scale, to expand and reinforce the dependency relationships and the American way of life, to realize the first practical model case of the modernization theory –that is the theoretical justification of the United States-based power relations in the social sciences sphere- and the intervention concept. This study focuses on the United States' benefits from carrying out the Marshall Plan instead of on the

Turkish authorities' policies during the period. Also, this perspective of the Marshall Plan's implementation in Turkey is researched more from the angle of highway construction in the thesis. Its economic and social consequences are examined, also, its obstinately insisted lifestyle is comprehended. The political analysis of the Marshall Plan according to the Cold War requirements is mainly left outside of the framework of this thesis because the existing literature is usually based on this sphere while it sidelines economic and social evaluations.

The aim of this thesis is to draw a portrait of the general implementation process of the Marshall Aid in Turkey in the Cold War period with a critical evaluation and show the reasons for and the results of the Marshall Aid related to its implementation policy. This thesis will search for answers to some questions about this plan like the meaning and covert purposes of the Marshall Plan, the economic interests of the United States in the project, the meaning of the highway construction, new transportation policy, and entrance of tractors to the country, whether the aid was really a savior for a declining and an undeveloped country, and the effects of the aid program in social spheres. Mainly, the study asks what the United States want from the highway policy of the Marshall Plan and how it affected Turkey's economic and social development process. The Marshall Plan did not convert the whole country into an American satellite without any decision-making process of the internal actors nor did it devastate the country –instead many benefits were provided in various spheres and in some areas this project gave a win-win result for both countries. This thesis thoroughly examines the immediate benefits of the United States from the projection of such a Plan.

For the Turkish Republican history, the Marshall Plan (European Reconstruction and Development Plan) is the most characteristic model of the post-

Second World War era; also, today it continues to be given reference. The Plan prepared one of the biggest preparatory haste for the Turkish Republic and the United States relationship, foreign aid process, and dependence on the importation. Besides, it had a big role in the social transformation of the era. Also, especially the implemented politics in agriculture and transportation were among the accelerating elements of the urbanization movement in Turkey and of its great problems due to its irregular structure. The lack of attention generally to the subject and specifically to its social consequences in the academic sphere played big role in choosing the research area.

Although the subject's generally important aspects will be discussed, this study focuses on one implementation aspect of the Plan. The agriculture, transportation, mining, defense, and the private sector constituted the principal areas of the Marshall Plan in Turkey. However, transportation has been chosen as a special case, because, it is one of these areas which could show the implementation aims of the Plan most clearly and also thorough which the dependency relations and the illustration of the social transformation could be observed so easily.

To clarify the American aim in the post-Second World War era assistance programs, the highway construction after the Second World War and its economic and social transformations in the framework of the Marshall Plan in Turkey, Republican archives, journals of the National Assembly, official reports, American archives, reports of governmental agencies involved in the administration of the program, newspaper and periodicals archives of the era, and the archives of the General Directorate of Highways were searched thoroughly. Primary sources are the main materials of the study. *Ulus, Akşam, Vatan, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Yeni Sabah* and *Istanbul Ekspres* constitute the main daily newspapers. Critical voices of the era,

the journals *Geveze* and *Başdan* are chosen to look at the criticisms of the Marshall Plan and American policy; also, several foreign periodicals were used. Forty-seven quarterly reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Marshall Plan in Turkey and then of the Ministry of Finance of the American Economic Assistance to Turkey gave the basic data and details of the implementation process. Because they present detailed data of the assistance and the specific areas and equipment of the cumulative aid, the reports are the main sources of the implementation section of this thesis. Moreover, many secondary sources written on the subject inside and outside the country were analyzed in detail and diverse viewpoints were absorbed.

The study constitutes of seven chapters including introduction and conclusion. Following the introduction, in the second chapter, the situation of the world of the era and modernization theory, –the theoretical basis of the Marshall Plan and the United States for the new world order in the social sciences which was constructed after the Second World War-, developmental economy concept and the dependency relationships brought by it, the emergence of the intervention phenomena, social sciences and the field studies literature providing the needed means to facilitate this phenomena, and the Marshall Plan because of its having been the first actual model case of this theory, are analyzed.

The third chapter, which introduces the Marshall Plan general, will examine the Truman Doctrine as the initiator of American assistance –which was interestingly implemented only in Greece and Turkey- and the operating organizations and mechanisms of the Plan. Although the United States supported many countries during the Plan, post-war American aid declared to the public opinion and performed in the framework of a specific project began with the Truman Doctrine. The special consideration and assigned roles for Turkey and Greece needed to be understood

because once the Marshall Plan was put in practice, against the initial reject, Turkey was included later and only after the its repeated demands. At the beginning, this point seems to create a contradiction given that the two projects were interrelated. Hence, the possible other reasons also are examined, in addition to the belief that one of these plans mainly was based on the military purposes while the other was based on the economic recovery. Moreover, this section discusses the organizations instituted to implement the project. They were implemented the Plan accordingly and the conditions and transformations in the mentality of the Plan also changed the bodies of these organizations. Last, the aid forms of the Marshall Plan will be touched on in this chapter.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Turkey. Where the aid went, how it was used, and how it was perceived in the spheres of agriculture, mining, defense, and private business and the technical assistance program are discussed. The implementation areas and the implementation practices will show the presented solution of the Marshall Plan for Turkish economic development.

The highway construction policies of the 1950s, the special research area of the study, are the topic of the fifth chapter. Three main American reports were prepared before the aid program to determine its content. The Thornburg Report and the Barker Report and written specifically on highways, the Hilts Report will be analyzed in this context because, the nine-year highway construction program of the General Directorate of Highways was prepared and the Directorate itself was founded in the light of these reports. Constructed highways according to the recommendations of the Marshall Plan and a highways-based transportation policy would become the new vision of Turkey. The needed equipment for the road

construction, oil, and the motor vehicles of the highways-based development policy would also provide the basis of the essentiality of the importation in the country. An analysis of the motor vehicles that constituted the main vein of the import process, spare parts, and oil providers would be all aspects of the subject. In addition, the local firms, to which the importation rights and franchisers were given, put forth different contrary points.

Finally, the social consequences of the American aid and the new development model presented by the highway mission constitute the content of the sixth chapter. The urbanization problem became one of the greatest social problems of Turkey from the 1950s. The agricultural modernization and highway policies of the Marshall Plan had an accelerating effect in the creation of this problem. In addition, recommendations on subjects from bringing up children to cooking demonstrate that the Marshall Plan contributed not only to economic development but also efforts were made to introduce a new lifestyle. The United States, as the originator of the Plan targeted the possibly broadest geography and they used propaganda as far as possible, making it a condition of the assistance agreements with countries. More than 260 movies and documentaries were imported and shown, brochures about lifestyles were distributed, live programs on radio were presented. In this way, the Plan was presented as “aid” in the world public opinion. However, this study will focus on the United States’ long-term interests in its so-called “aid” function.

CHAPTER II

A NEW WORLD ORDER WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES

2.1. The Hegemony of the United States

The United States emerged as the country most benefitted from the Second World War most; it was paramount industrially, had almost half of the world's gold reserves and foreign exchange and almost three quarters of the gold.¹ Its only rival, Russia had immense natural resources, a disciplined population, and huge land armies. Against these reserves, post-Second World War Europe was badly in need of economic recovery. While Britain, France, and Germany had been crippled, Japan had been knocked out as a dominant power in Asia.

Both the American wealth and production surplus and the economic decline of the other countries required that the United States find markets for its industrial goods and to create and preserve a cost-effective trade system for this goal. However, buyers, the importers of its goods, were in ruin. Hence, by 1947 the United States made a big change in its policy of isolationism; a reformulation resulted in a shift in the purposes, objectives, and methods of the foreign assistance.² It was seen as a new departure in American foreign policy: the country's interest was unprecedentedly linked with other world actors' economic and political considerations.³ In the

¹ Caner Ertuna, "The Evolution of Western Economic 'Aid' in the Post-war Period: Theory and Practice" (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1982), pp. 5-7.

² James Madison Garrett III, *Assistance to Turkey as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy, With Emphasis on Military Assistance: 1947-1955* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 3.

³ Harry Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 6.

beginning, it seemed imperative to support these countries and the differentiated foreign policy and public opinion from isolationism to interventionism of the United States facilitated this process. Michael Hogan calls this process of the turning of the 1930s isolationist Americas unto the leading power rendering the era the “American century” because of the search for a new economic system at home and abroad; that is, its domestic economy led its foreign policy from neutrality to intervention to establish the needed stability and reconstruction.⁴

As a second angle in the economic explanation, Europe had been dependent upon and became indebted to the United States during the First World War and it had paid this debt until the 1930s. According to economists, this debt payments and damages and the lack of a leading power in the interwar period were seen as the main reasons for the Great Depression in 1929.⁵ To avoid the reoccurrence of the same situation after the Second World War, the United States declared that it erased the debts and shouldered responsibilities and burdens of the new aid programs as the new leader of the Western world and the creator of a new balance of world power.⁶ Thus, the demand for post-war construction assistance came from the United States itself as well as from Europe. The United States started the war aid during the Second World War in 1941 with The Lend-Lease Bill (*Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama Kanunu*).⁷ Turkey’s debts were cancelled on May 7, 1946.⁸

⁴ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1, 2, 26.

⁵ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *20. Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi*, trans. Ayşe Edirne, (Istanbul: Sabancı University Pub., 2002), p. 127.

⁶ Barbara Dwyer McFadyen, *The Truman Doctrine: Its Origin and Evolution* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1967), p. 597.

⁷ Although because of Turkish-German relationships this war aid was interrupted for a short period, it restarted soon after. See E. Betül Çakırca, “1946–1950 Arasında Türkiye ve ABD Yardımları” (MA Thesis, Istanbul University, 2001), p. 29.

With the Lend-Lease agreement at the end of the Second World War through the Bretton Woods agreements to a post-war world economy based on multilateral trade and full convertibility, the United States sought a new world economic system.⁹ At the end of 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference was gathered with 37 countries. At the conference, the International Monetary Fund, International Reconstruction and the Development Bank were founded and the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade was accepted to regulate the international economy under the leadership of the United States to build the new world economic system after the ruins of the Second World War, to escape from the results of the First World War, and to internationalize capital freely from problems.¹⁰ The premises of that time were that economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union could be provided, there would be no need for huge military expenses, private foreign capital investments and the World Bank credits could facilitate the transition to peace period and it could provide a multilateral international trade and payment system.¹¹ These regulations in the economic sphere found a repercussion in the social sciences by modernization theory.

⁸ For the agreement text, see Prof. Dr. Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, 1991), pp. 143-147.

⁹ Hogan, p. 17.

¹⁰ Owen and Pamuk, pp. 127-128.

¹¹ Zafer Z. Başak, *Dış Yardım ve Ekonomik Etkileri, Türkiye 1960-1970* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Press, 1977), p. 36.

2.2. Theoretical Tool to Provide the Ideological Justification of the Intervention, Modernization Theory

The United States of America, which undertook the representation of the Western world after the Second World War, organized the new world politics; also, the production of its ideology was carried out by the modernization theory in the intellectual sphere. Modernization Theory is a social transformation approach that came out of the American social science circles after the Second World War; it supposed the modernization of all of the countries of the world by accepting the West as the ideal-type and it presented the United States as the paradigm of the modernity.¹²

At the time, a new world system began to be shaped, many new nation-states were founded, the non-Western world was superseded by rapid population increase, the opportunities of political upheld was transferred to institutions producing social knowledge, and hence area studies in the social sciences became important. The modernization theory had the audacity to rehabilitate the societies and countries of the world by its proposed recipes consecrating the Western image and the American model. Although this approach was criticized first by the advocate of the dependency theory and by several others beginning from the 1960s, its values are still a worthwhile area of investigation with the manifestation of continued belief in them and supported for them in the social sciences, and they live in thought production. Hence, it needs detailed reevaluations periodically.

The main basis of modern Western thought is the perception of linear history. Also, the development of thought is based on this linear line of history defining time

¹² Fahrettin Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş* (İstanbul: Yöneliş Press, 2002), pp. 25-26.

and space in a progressive evolution in which different countries are at different stages and pass along a similar line of development. Based on these assumptions, modernization theory seeks to define and determine the unavoidable process of traditional societies to achieve modernism.¹³ Developmentalism was invented to transform traditional societies into modern, rational nations. Thus, this perspective accepts the other as “tradition” and has a superiority claim on it as a hegemonic system. Indeed, the concept of modernization owns the progress of social change and corresponds to the social, economic, political and cultural transformations of the non-West world on the way to Westernization.

The clearest characteristic of modernization theory is to categorize countries, peoples, or civilizations within developed-underdeveloped dichotomy. The founders of the theory, the Western world, describe themselves as developed and civilized on the linear time line of history as it should be and they define the “other” as underdeveloped, undeveloped, or developing nations which have the task of following the traces and development processes of the Western image, the American model, to proceed on the same line. As Kristin Ross writes, “the most important promise of modernization is its moving ahead on a straight line...All societies will resemble us; at the end, all of them will reach the same stage or same level with us; all possibilities of the future, at least for the West, are living now, in this very day.”¹⁴ By abstraction, the history, historical originality, is always put into parentheses. In its universalistic approach, modernization theory and its founder saw the power of defining and governing in itself; thus, it defines the underdeveloped nation which are

¹³ N. Abercrombie, S. Hill and Bryan Turner, *Dictionary of Sociology*, 2. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 158.

¹⁴ Kristin Ross, *FastCars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 5.

able to achieve the Western development level with the help of international mechanisms and the theory perhaps displays a know-it-all posture in front of history, as such.¹⁵

Although the United States ideologically presented this approach and assistance phenomena as a favorable hand given with a self-sacrificing and liberal desire, in fact, *it was the effort to prepare old colonies-new nations open for American goods*.¹⁶ Particularly, modernization theory provides the required tool for the United States' economic and political interests in the new world system and became known for its immediate political connotations more than any other social theory. About the role of modernization theory-perspectived studies after the Second World War Trak writes that “too few theories became a means of politics as clearly as the modernization theory.”¹⁷ Thus, modernization as a social change theory carried the social sciences, at least in the United States, onto the world stage in an unprecedented manner and involved social scientists in state politics again. Baritz describes them as the “servants of the power.”¹⁸

In the course of events, as mentioned, the decolonization period and the construction of a new world order based on the controlling of these new regions by new tools of foreign aid and several unseen mechanisms which were costly to the old colonial powers, the Europeans, but very functional for the United States. First, to reconstruct Europe and then to add the old-connotated colony and the newly

¹⁵ Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, pp. 186-188.

¹⁶ Harry Harootunian, *İmparatorluğun Yeni Kılığı: Kaybedilen ve Tekrar Ele Geçirilen Paradigma*, trans. Erkan Ünal (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2006), p. 4.

¹⁷ “Çok az kuram modernleşme kuramı kadar açık bir şekilde bir politika aracı olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.” See Ayşe Trak, “Gelişme İktisadının Gelişmesi: Kurucular,” *Yapıt Toplumsal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, no. 5 (July 1984), p. 55.

¹⁸ Cited in Harootunian, p. 3.

underdeveloped regions into the world system without any problem, social scientists started the development discussion. Indeed, this concept of *development* was accepted instead of *progress* term, of which ideological content increasingly became apparent.¹⁹ Supporters of the theory presented terms like “industrialization”, “growth”, “Westernization”, and “modernization” as synonyms, always carrying the connotation of progress. They did not attribute any wrong to terms, accepted any change in history as “development,” and presented this term as neutral.²⁰

As is well known, the Western type of modernity is based on the Age of Discovery and then the politics of exploitation/ colonization. *Modernization* is “a kind of social life nourished in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, encountered its real appearances at North America, and expanded or obstinately insistent to the non-Western world from then on.”²¹ The centrality of reason, knowledge’s becoming a means of domination, the universality of knowledge and goodness, the freezing of history in the West, ethnocentrism for non-Western world and the so-called enlightenment mission determined the mental turning points and backbones of modernization theory.²²

In addition, in the nineteenth century, classical progress theories and evolutionary approaches determined the Western agenda and they accepted the non-Western world, which was accepted even ontologically as *primitive*, as a space in which practical exploitation practice. However, by the First World War this

¹⁹ Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, p. 18.

²⁰ Peter F. Sugar, “Economic and Political Modernization: Turkey,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (New Jersey: Princeton University Pr., 1964), p.146.

²¹ Ross Poole, *Morality and Modernity* (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), p.10.

²² Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, p. 93.

discourse was damaged and it was partly abandoned by time of the Second World War and it no longer represented the Western identity. This ethnocentrism and the colonization politics were criticized repeatedly until these politics cost too much for the Western world. Thus, in the new universalization politics premised to set the old colony places free to the degree that could be controlled under the name of “decolonization movement”. Many new (underdeveloped) states emerged that needed to be modernized;²³ they had great population densities and they carried the risk of linking to the communist bloc outside Western capitalist system. Hence, the new agenda of the USA became the growth problem to develop the underdeveloped countries.

Reciprocally, the ruling elites of the non-Western countries also demanded to be articulated to the new capitalist growth process generated in the “development” paradigm. Thus, the modernizers and those who demanded development became the two main actors of the international political scene. To be sure, a point is always considered is that the new world system was not a total dependency relationship but the result of a mutual negotiation and agreement. However, these claims are presented because the rules and the tools were set by modernizer that is the USA in this new world order.

Also, by the practical consequences of the development perspective, which was foreign aid in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the development politics of America and the development problem of the non-Western world first came onto the formal agenda article of modern Western thought. Truman’s “Point-Four Speech” and later on, the expansion of the Marshall Plan to cover the non-Western world, were the signs of the new practice. These years

²³ Alexander J. Groth, *Major Ideologies. An Interpretative Survey of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism* (New York: John Willey Pr., 1971), p. 141.

became the setting for many new agencies on the way to the development of the non-Western world. For Turkey, the aid missions for equipment and training to modernize the Turkish peasant, transportation and some other elements, and the American Military Aid Program to modernize the Turkish army moved in this direction within the framework of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Academic writings in the United States to justify the American assistance and the social science practices in the non-Western world and the preparatory reports of American advisors for the assistance, such as the Thornburg Report,²⁴ are the most prominent examples of this approach in the Marshall Plan implemented in Turkey. As will be discussed, the developmentalist perspective prevailed in these analyses guiding the economic and political activities of the United States. Consequently, a social sciences paradigm was being used in the service of the United States economic interests. While thinkers spoke about the development of a country in history, while they drew up a development plan for them to flourish, these recipes carried hidden economic aims with them. Delightfully arguing the case for being modern and developed, in fact, this development literature serves to provide the required infrastructure and public relations of the new consumption of capitalist materialism.

Politics and science were strongly tied to each other. The political processes of the modernization perspective and hegemony relationships greatly contributed to produce the necessary knowledge to generate the mechanisms for maintaining the capitalist system. The situation is a clear example of Paul-Michel Foucault's knowledge-power relationship theory which holds that intelligence agencies actually directed knowledge production by their provided funds and they financed empirical

²⁴ See Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army As a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, No. 1 (October, 1960), pp. 19-44. Also see Max W. Thornburg, Graham Spry, and George Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949).

studies about the Third World. Thus, in the process, the social sciences were transformed into a well-financed knowledge production mechanism that undertook duties to overcome the national and international problems of the Welfare State.²⁵ The transformation processes of non-Western countries became the central matter of the social sciences and especially the American social sciences after 1945.

The new system created many sub-disciplines in the social sciences such as the sociology of development, the politics of development, the communication of development, and the economy of development. The economy of development literature generally, and its main economists Roy F. Harrod, Evsey Domar, and Walt W. Rostow, emphasized economic growth and development by it,²⁶ suggesting the diffusion of technology, capital and culture from the advanced Western countries to the underdeveloped ones thorough economic and technical assistance and capitalist investment to reach economic growth target.²⁷

The economy of development and modernization theory illustrate underdevelopment by the “internal dynamics” of countries. In this regard, development is defined by economic growth and the success of developed countries while the underdevelopment is blamed as the own fault of the non-Western countries, their lack of capital; failure to invest, save, produce; as well as various psychological qualities such as the lack of methodological thought. Therefore, foreign source

²⁵ Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, p. 51.

²⁶ Their economic model shaped period’s perspective to a great extent. See Roy F. Harrod, *Towards a Dynamic Economics* (London and New York: MacMillan and St. Martin Press, 1966). Also, see Evsey Domar, *Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

²⁷ Leyla Şen, “The US Foreign Aid Policy and Institutionalization of Dependency in the Periphery in the Post-WWII Era: Turkey and India Compared (1947-1973)” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Bilkent University, 2003), p. 40.

entrance, foreign aid and intervention were presented as the forcibly required elements of development.

Some of the classic texts schematizing development models and showing ways of economic growth and of capitalist expansion are Walt Whitman Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto*, and "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth."²⁸ As an apparent example of knowledge production-politics relations, the former study was prepared with the support of the CIA and in its comparative method, the study defined underdevelopment by referring to the developed and from the perspective of the developed.²⁹ The proposed five stages of growth were based on the experience of the industrialized West. Also, he recommended that the countries undergoing the development process lose their traditional ties and live the development process to be generated in the framework of the United States-organized world politics.³⁰

The other theoretician of the modernization paradigm, Talcott Parsons, developed a structural-functional approach constituting an evolutionary transformation in an *order* search.³¹ As the main premise of modernization theory, the structural-functional approach proposes that societies can only develop when they enter the universal process from tradition to the modernism. Similarly, Parsons put forward an evolution scheme based on the modern America of the era and

²⁸ See Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and W. W. Rostow, "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth," *The Economic Journal* 66, no. 261 (1956).

²⁹ Tolga Tören, "Yeniden Yapılanan Dünya Ekonomisinde Marshall Planı: Türkiye Örneği" (MA Thesis, Marmara University, 2006), p. 13.

³⁰ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth...*, p. 27.

³¹ Talcott Parsons, "The Present Status of 'Structural Functional' Theory in Sociology," in *The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honour of Robert K. Merton*, ed. Lewis A. Coser (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 73.

accepted Western values as the basic dynamic of societies' modernization. Although he tried to avoid a development scheme which had only linear characteristics, in the end, he presented a cultural quality peculiar to the West as a normative and model element for all societies. In this regard, Parsons reproduced Max Weber's division of "the West and the rest."

Parsons' post-war studies basically contributed especially to creating the main framework of the modernization paradigm. In the 1950s, he convinced the modernization tendency's expansion to the whole wide world. In addition, he was also a teacher who trained many leading academics of the theory. The followers of Parsons, academics with a strong link with the above mentioned intelligence organizations and thinkers on the ways of transformation of the traditional to the modern are Daniel Lerner, Richard D. Robinson, Alex Inkeles, Neil Smelser, and Samuel S. Eisenstadt. These individuals all followed the traces of Max Weber but departed from his pessimistic perspective shaping instead an optimistic modernization theory.

Daniel Lerner wrote the classic text of modernization theory, *The Passing of Traditional Society*.³² Studying the modernization processes of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, and Egypt, he suggested that modernization is a universal process in which all societies of the world will pass. He differentiated the modern societies, societies in the passing stage and the traditional societies according to literacy rates, urbanization types, media involvement and political participation.³³

Another considerable text showing the modernization perspective of Daniel Lerner and that of another similar thinker, Richard D. Robinson, is their associated

³² See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society, Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

³³ Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society...*, p. 71.

article, “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force.” The article contributes to the general understanding of the modernizing perspective of the United States and its approach to Turkey in terms of the modernization of the army under the Marshall Plan. While the article evaluates dominant army tradition of the Ottoman Empire in detail, it claims that the policies of the Republican era were a breaking point from the old military tradition, emphasizing the civilian role and getting the military return to their barracks, contrary to the politics of many other modernizing countries. Hence, by 1948, the Turkish army lost its traditional modernizing and change advocator power because of the lack of an imminent foreign threat to the army, the isolation of the military organization from political activities, the successful innovations of civil actors, the deliberate reduction of the importance of military development by civil leadership, and a military hierarchy that rewarded years of service instead of merit.³⁴ The military was no longer *the pushing force* of modernization in Turkey as it had been in Ottoman times.

According to the article, by the 1948 and the arrival of American aid, the Turkish army had regained its modernizing perspective and mission. Before conscriptions, the most complicated machine most of the soldiers had ever seen was a wooden plow; too few knew the difference between a hammer and screwdriver.³⁵ Supporting this claim, Rustow notes that a private passed from the technological level of wooden plow and oxcart to that of jeep, gun, and armored vehicles as soon

³⁴ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” p. 28.

³⁵ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” pp. 26, 28-29; and Richard D. Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic Assistance Programs in Turkey,” *Report to the American Universities Field Staff, Southwest Asia Series* 5, No. 2, Grosse Pointe, Michigan (January 17, 1956,) p. 6.

as he was conscribed to the army.³⁶ The American aid program provided the stimulus needed for the revival of the Turkish military corps and these thousands of “ignorant” men learned much more than the maintenance of tools and how to use the modern machines. Indeed, in the modernization process, this education increased the their “absorbance capacity” of both the men and society and they gained new personalities.³⁷ According to the writers, when these young people returned to their villages they could no longer bear the poverty of civilian life standards and moved to introduce innovations and progress. Adding a development force to this modernization perspective and American military aid, Lerner and Robinson exaggerate their importance and claim that this process triggered cumulative social transformations as well. With this new knowledge, the generations began to divert mentally; therefore, the traditional large families collapsed and nuclear families began to be constructed. Moreover, these young people left their villages, leaving their traditions totally and moved to urban areas creating the urbanization movement in Turkey.³⁸ The article has considerable importance, because it shows the direct link between modernization theory and American foreign aid in Turkey. As will be seen, the preparatory reports of the Marshall Plan, such as the Thornburg report, draw a similar portrait in visioning Turkey.

Another supporter of the modernization perspective, Alex Inkeles, was the leader of the “Social and Cultural Dimensions of Economic Development” research project at Harvard University International Relations Center with the supports of

³⁶ Dankward A. Rustow, “The Military: Turkey,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds., Ward and Rustow (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 387.

³⁷ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” p. 35. Meanwhile, the authors covertly claim that at the coup d’état of 1960, there was the impact of this military mission, of “raised level of aspirations” and “capacity for absorption”.

³⁸ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” pp. 34-35.

Ford, Rockefeller, and National Science Foundations, the National Mental Health Institute and the American Air Force Scientific Research Bureau. He also wrote with David H. Smith at the end of this project the well-known study *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*.³⁹ As can be clearly understood, his main effort was to show the transformation ways of the individual, and thus society, from traditional to modern.

Similarly, Neil J. Smelser contributed to the theory by his normative regulation approach for the modernization processes of the non-Western societies.⁴⁰ Among these thinkers' main intellectual aims and projects, there are the presentation of the modernization process in distinct gradual stages, claiming a universalistic and an unavoidable approach in these evolutionary schemes, determination the Western experience as an imitation model, and the transformation of traditional societies to the so-called modern, Westernized type of lives. Also, like economists of this kind, their recipes in the social sciences field try to justify the intervention and American foreign politics in the international arena. Besides, relationships of these studies with several information institutions are another indication of this process.

Samuel S. Eisenstadt was also among the pioneering actors of the theory. Although he tried to present a more sophisticated model and sometimes criticized the modernization perspective in his later writings, he mostly shared the main paradigms of modernization theory and the superiority of the Western intellectual thought to be

³⁹ See Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

⁴⁰ See Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: An Application of Theory to the British Cotton Industry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

followed.⁴¹ His comparative method allowed for linear definitions according to the historical stages explanation. He also approved of the local elites' relations with missionaries and colonial powers to obtain knowledge, expertise and the desire for change. That is, he recommended that change come from external, foreign powers to reach the model, thought and material sources instead of from internal source.⁴²

Subsequently, the modernization perspective aimed to transform the world societies according to American and Western interests. This process required actual data about the "undeveloped" regions. Hence, area studies took central place in academic circles. The apparent political motive behind area studies was the need of America's, new world leadership's for the knowledge of different regions' current facts and experts. The Social Sciences Research Center, the coordination council of seven big American social science associations, prepared a report titled "World Regions in the Social Sciences" in 1943 stating that "...the urgent need for social scientists to know different regions of the world comes in the second rank just after the need for army and navy officers to know actual and potential battle areas..."⁴³

Although individual reasons differed for researches as a service to the state and contribution to their formations, the results facilitated the perpetuation of the dominant paradigm. To be sure, there could have been motives such as the elimination of poverty and inequality from the world in the emergence of development theories'; however, an intellectual's moving or not with a political goal

⁴¹ He saw the societies' change after Industrial Revolution as an improvement towards social, economic and political systems developed in Western Europe and North America. Samuel Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall Pub., 1966), p. 1.

⁴² Harootunian, pp. 50-51.

⁴³ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Alan Araştırmalarının Öngörülme Sonuçları," in *Soğuk Savaş & Üniversite –Savaş Sonrası Yılların Entelektüel Tarihi*, ed. Noam Chomsky, trans. Musa Ceylan (Istanbul: Kızılirma Press, 1998), p. 209.

in mind is different from his/her intellectual productions in service to a political goal or practice.⁴⁴

From the institutions' scheme, the foremost universities, among them Washington, California, Wisconsin, Harvard, Yale, Michigan, and Columbia, received the most support from federal research-development funds from the leadership of Massachusetts Institute of Technology⁴⁵ and placed at the center of knowledge-power relationship as such. As Bruce Cumings stated, while on average 15 percent of university incomes came from the federal government, by 1952, 96% of social sciences state funds started to come from the army and then the Ministry of Energy and Defense, the National Science Foundation, and the National Research Council.⁴⁶ Also, prominent charitable foundations of the United States munificently supported the social scientists and historians in the 1960s and the 1970s to produce this imagination. In this way, the Rockefeller, Ford Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Social Sciences Research Council⁴⁷ supported scientists studying in non-Western countries. Documents, their confidentiality of which was cancelled, showed that the interconnection of the foundation, university, and state intelligence agencies expanded throughout the social sciences⁴⁸ and that more than

⁴⁴ Hayriye Erbaş, "Gelişme Yazını ve Geleceği," *Doğu Batı*, No. 8, Ankara (1999), p.13. For example, Mehmet Türkay classifies the approach of the development economists as academic/intellectual tended, conjuncturel/ pragmatic, and ideological/ political. Mehmet Türkay, "Gelişme İktisadının Bir Disiplin Olarak Ortaya Çıkışı," *Gelişme İktisadı Kuram-Eleştiri –Yorum*, eds., Tamer İşgüden, Fuat Ercan, Mehmet Türkay (İstanbul: Beta Basın Yayım Dağıtım A.Ş., 1995), pp.112-139, cited in Tören, *Yeniden Yapılanan Dünya Ekonomisinde...*, p. 11.

⁴⁵ For a listing of the 15 universities that took the largest amount of financial support from federal research funds, see Lewontin, "Soğuk Savaş ve Akademinin Dönüşümü," in *Soğuk Savaş & Üniversite...*, p. 56.

⁴⁶ Bruce Cumings, "Bölge Araştırmaları ve Uluslar arası Araştırmalar," in *Üniversiteler ve Amerikan İmparatorluğu – Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Sosyal Bilimlerde Para ve Siyaset*, ed. Christopher Simpson, trans. Musa Ceylan (İstanbul: Kızılirmal Press, 2000), p. 176.

⁴⁷ Wallerstein, "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi...", p. 222.

⁴⁸ Simpson, "Introduction," in *Üniversiteler ve Amerikan İmparatorluğu...*, p. 25.

75 percent of the annual budgets of universities' International Research Centers (like BASR⁴⁹ and BSSR⁵⁰) came from these relationships.⁵¹ For instance, the Ford Foundation granted a total of 270 million dollar to 34 universities between 1953 and 1966 for region and language research.⁵²

American engagement in the intellectual arena was also maintained in Turkey. In education, English replaced French as the most popular second language; the impetus was given to the Americanization of Turkish education⁵³ to transform Turkish education system according to the American model, into a more practical direction instead of theoretical. For instance, the first Business Administration department was opened at Istanbul University by Harvard University, with the support of the Ford Foundation. Initially, Erzurum University was founded according to the plan of an American mission with a United States-type educated agriculture faculty in the Marshall Plan content; also, Middle East Technical University began giving classes according to the American system in these years. The technical assistance of the Marshall Plan was also devoted to these cultural relations subject to sending experts to Turkey and educating Turkish people in the United States in the American universities' perspectives. The assistance of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and other American agencies to the education arena of Turkey were also presented. Many institutes, distinct lectures in universities, model high schools were

⁴⁹ Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research.

⁵⁰ American Universities Bureau of Social Science Research.

⁵¹ See Irene L. Gendzier, "Tekrar Çal Sam - Kalkınma Pratiği ve Savunusu," in *Üniversiteler ve Amerikan İmparatorluğu...*, pp. 85-116.

⁵² Cumings, p. 171.

⁵³ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 13.

prepared in this regard.⁵⁴ While one way of the explanation is to applause American intervention and assistance that brought development to the country, helping academic thought to flourish, and carrying libertarian opportunities away from authoritarian- totalitarian dictates, the United States economic and political aims in the new capitalist world system was another side of the coin that should not be ignored.

In the course of events, this domination of the modernization theory did not last forever. Modernization theory began to be criticized by the end of the 1960s because its short-term promises had not been realized, the gulf between development programs and local conditions was never closed and its “dirty relationships” with political mechanisms were revealed. Initially, the historical dimension was added to the studies instead of the typical and universal explanations of structural-functionalism. Afterwards, a real challenge came with criticism of the optimistic theses of modernization theory of the possibility of underdeveloped countries catching up to the West. Beginning from the Dependency Theory of Andre Gunder Frank,⁵⁵ who was the leading critic of developmental economy and modernization theory; the center-periphery relationship and world systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein;⁵⁶ and the “new exploitation” definition of neo-Marxism, modernization theory lost its domination. They opposed the definition of underdevelopment by the

⁵⁴ For the illustration of the subject, see Prof. Dr. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa bir Bakış (1800-1959)* (Ankara: Doğuş Press, 1959), pp. 50-55.

⁵⁵ For his detailed criticisms, see Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1967); and *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

⁵⁶ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974). Immanuel Wallerstein noticed early that the post-war world was related more to profit, than to success or help.

internal dynamics of countries and growth models in a linear historical process, arguing instead that underdevelopment was the product of external dependency structures and the center states' exploitation of the periphery in the globally-organized capitalist system. However, later developments as globalization system without an apparent subject⁵⁷ have shown that these criticisms have been unable to abolish the modernization theory's supported values. Because, the measures of the qualities of a modern individual, a modern and traditional distinction despite ongoing criticisms, and emphasis on the roles international intervention mechanisms actively play in the modernization process have remained. Globalization, seems a continuity of the nineteenth century Western universalism and modernization theory after 1945.

As discussed in this brief summary of the meaning, process, actors, theoreticians, and criticisms of the modernization theory, this social science phenomena contributed to the realization of the intended political and economic goals in the new world order. The United States produced knowledge within the framework of the theory to present the world its way of development; indeed, it used the theory to obtain certain benefits from these regions. Similarly, the Marshall Plan was presented in the context of this perspective of giving foreign assistance to provide development in countries while the perspective basically concealed the interest relations of the movement.

In this regard, modernization theory is not the tool with which to evaluate the Marshall Plan; however, it provides the theoretical base for Americans to apply the project. This new and unseen colonization was carried out with democracy, peace

⁵⁷ The most basic distinguishing characteristics of globalization from modernization theory is the effort to make privately American and generally Western world politics unseen, the presentation of the process as a natural evolution and an unavoidable process and its purification from a subject to construct a so-called homogenization while in fact founding "domination". See J. Arnason, "Ulusçuluk, Küreselleşme ve Modernlik," trans. M. Küçük, *Birikim*, no. 49 (1993), p. 37; also, see Fahrettin Altun, "Küreselleşme: Söylem ve Gerçek," *Tezkire* 18, Year 9 (2000-2001), pp. 92-98.

discourses and modernization theory. Modernization theory played a role in the creation of the ideological discourse which the capitalist system required to reproduce itself. It contributed to the formulation of the “intervention” as “aid” and to legitimate it by that.⁵⁸ The theory elaborately strived to hide the capitalist materialism which shaped the social change and development theory.

⁵⁸ Tören, p. 213.

CHAPTER III

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN TURKEY: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

3.1. The Truman Doctrine

3.1.1. The Course of Events

“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”
Harry Truman, “Message of the President to the Congress”

Among the signposts of the beginning of the Cold War era, were former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech on March 5, 1946, George Kennan’s and Harry Truman’s “Containment” policy,⁵⁹ and the Truman Doctrine.⁶⁰ These discourses and activities addressed the United States’ approach to the Soviet Union. Although there are debates on the issue of the starting event of the Cold War, it can be said that it was the Korean War militarily, the foundation of the NATO institutionally, and the Truman Doctrine politically and economically.

⁵⁹ Because of his position in the State Department, initially George Kennan wrote an article on “containment policy” as Mr. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review* 25 (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.

⁶⁰ Aid to Greece and Turkey was the first move toward putting into effect the Truman Doctrine for the containment of aggressive communism. Price, p. 3. Also, Thomas A. Bailey, who was commissioned by the National War College in Washington to undertake an inspection tour of Europe in the summer of 1947 stated that the Truman Doctrine as an early invocation of the containment policy, “which proved to be the major opening defensive-offensive shot in the Cold War against a steadily encroaching Communist power.” See Thomas A. Bailey, *The Marshall Plan Summer* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 9.

The importance of the Truman Doctrine for Turkey comes from its pioneering role, from the designation of Turkey as an ally with the Western camp against the Soviet bloc. At the time, Turkey saw this option without any alternative. In March 1945, the Soviet government had officially denounced its Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, which had been signed in 1925. Also, at the dawn of the Cold War, the Soviet Union made specific demands from Turkey such as the revision of the Montreux Treaty, for a share in the control of the Dardanelles, the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the establishment of Soviet bases along the straits, and the retrocession of the Eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan (they had returned Turkey in 1921) to Russia.⁶¹ General demands included the removal of British troops from Greece and the right to continue to occupy northern Iran. Khrushchev interpreted this situation as “Beria and Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.”⁶²

However, there were other factors in this alliance. At this point, the government demanded to obtain in the process that to make sure the United States and other Western powers would not support Soviet demands, to obtain Western financial support which would make it possible to maintain the mobilization of Turkish armed forces, to construct an effective alliance with the West based on security guarantees, and to ensure long-term protection against possible Soviet aggression.⁶³

⁶¹ For a detailed discussion, see Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Press, 1968), pp. 277-293.

⁶² William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 120; and Oral Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1965* (Ankara: Ankara University Pub., 1969), p. 342.

⁶³ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994* (Ankara: Imge Pub. House, 2000), p. 275.

First, after the war Turkey needed aid from the outside to recover its economy and army; meanwhile, the geological-strategic importance and natural resources of Turkey set the United States of America into action to bring Turkey onto its side; the strategic location of Turkey had long made it the object of the Great Power rivalry. The rivalry had been evident during Second World War, and it continued into the post-war period.⁶⁴ Also, since the eighteenth century Turkey had been turning toward the West as a result of its Westernization ideology. If it needs an ally it would be sought in the Western camp.⁶⁵ Therefore, because of a shared enemy with the United States, the aid factor, Turkey's strategic and economic importance, and its Westernization policy, Turkey took part on the side against Soviet Union in the Cold War period, at least until the 1960s. In the Democrat Party period, relations were very close especially because of the United States' involvement in Turkish domestic affairs through the aid factor, but after that time, due to several crises and the Cold War's general decline, Turkey was able to begin playing bi-sided politics.

On the other hand, there was a more urgent need for aid and intervention in the Greece; thus, the Truman Doctrine was implemented in both countries. The emphasis here is the Marshall Plan, which came after the Truman Doctrine; it was a more carefully announced, better constructed, of longer term program;⁶⁶ and it had some different goals from those of the Truman Doctrine.

The distribution of assistance in the period to only two countries, Greece and Turkey, needs to be investigated. In the wartime and its aftermath, mostly Britain supported Turkey, Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East countries;

⁶⁴ McFadyen, pp. 77-78.

⁶⁵ "Because of its geostrategical site and Westernized style of foreign politics, Turkey was a convenient and eager country to be the United States' front base in that period." Çakırca, p. 116.

⁶⁶ McFadyen, p. v.

however, on February 21, 1947, the British Government declared that “as of March 31, it would be obliged to discontinue the financial, economic, and advisory assistance which it has been giving to Greece and Turkey.”⁶⁷ In fact, after the war, Britain left its immediate imperial objectives in the region to the United States and this case was its marking point of the passage of the power from Europe to the United States. Thus, the U.S. came out of the war as the leader of the capitalist camp, filling the places of Britain and France in the world hegemony, giving special importance to set control on economy politics of its dominated countries by the facilitation of its foreign aid plans.

On March 3, 1947, the Greek Government sent an urgent appeal to the United States for financial and economic assistance; it also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece would be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy. The need was declared to restore Greece as a self-supporting, self-respecting democracy after the destruction of its economy through four invasions and enemy occupation, as well as through the guerilla activities of the civil war led by the Communists.⁶⁸ At various times during 1947, the Turkish government also applied to the United States for financial aid.⁶⁹

Consequently, U.S. President Truman delivered a speech before a joint session of the U.S. Congress on March 12, 1947, insisting on these points of

⁶⁷ United States Department of State, “Statement by Acting Secretary Acheson,” *Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Collection of State Papers, The Department of State Bulletin Supplement*, Vol. 16, no. 409 A (Washington: US Government Printing Office, May 4, 1947), p. 835. After British troops withdrew, an extreme leftist group came to power in Greece.

⁶⁸ United States Department of State, “Message to the President and the Secretary of State from the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,” *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, (March 3, 1947), pp. 827-828.

⁶⁹ United States Department of State, “Statement by Acting Secretary Acheson,” *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, (March 3, 1947), p. 835.

assistance as imperative if Greece was to survive as a free nation, as there was no other country for them to turn to, as the survival of integrity of Greece was of grave importance, as if Greece fell under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon Turkey would be immediate and serious, and confusion and disorder would spread through the entire Middle East. He declared that “should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East,⁷⁰” it was thought that these two countries would fall behind the “iron curtain” without the Truman Doctrine. Also, in a supporting statement detailing the president’s speech, before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Acting Secretary Dean Acheson described the assistance as the principal aim of their foreign policy to preserve their own freedoms, for their national security.⁷¹ Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Will Clayton maintained this process in a speech with the emphasis to the economic situation.⁷² All of them gave great importance to the urgent situation of Greece because the conditions in Turkey were much better.

Finally, the Truman Doctrine was implemented on May 22, with the decision of 400 million dollars in aid, 300 million dollars for Greece, 100 million dollars for Turkey; and the civil and military assistance and training of Turkish and Greece personnel in the United States.⁷³

In the implementation process, the 100 million dollars in aid to Turkey was divided into 48.50 million dollar for the Land Forces, 26.75 million dollars for the

⁷⁰ United States Department of State, “Message of the President to the Congress,” *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, (March 12, 1947), pp. 829-832.

⁷¹ United States Department of State, “Speech by Dean Acheson at Cleveland,” *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington D.C.: US Dept of State, 1947), p. 994.

⁷² United States Department of State, “Statement by Under Secretary Clayton,” *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, pp. 838-842.

⁷³ Dr. A. Haluk Ülmen, *Türkiye-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947*, no. 14 (Ankara: Political Science Faculty Foreign Affairs Institute Pub., 1961), pp. 109-112.

Air Forces, 14.75 million dollars for the Navy, 5 million dollars for military supplies, and 5 million dollars for the development of highways –initially to finish its 215 km. Highway development had a special importance in the legitimization of the aid because the Turkish aid program was declared as being only for military purposes. Hence, there was an imperative to base the highway construction on the military purposes. The solution was found as strategic ways to transport military forces and equipment to key points. This was the highway from the Iskenderun harbor to the eastern provinces of Kars and Erzurum as a main supply route for the Third Army and the airfields in the East.⁷⁴ In this pen, according to George McGhee, former United States ambassador to Turkey, all of the money went to road construction machines and the American highway experts' wages. On the other hand, the stone, cement and native labor force was provided by the Turks (as a general practice of American aid). Meanwhile, intense training programs were given in the army; at the Turkish military schools the whole emphasis was given to using, upkeep and mobilizing the new American aid equipment.⁷⁵

After the first packet of the aid, it was clearly understood that there was still need for the continuation of supports. Afterwards, this was converted into the Marshall Plan.

⁷⁴ Garrett, p. 198. However, a State Department officer at the time, Charles Pool Kindleberger explained this military assistance of the Truman Doctrine in Turkey as “to a great extent, building a network of roads which brought strong economic benefits.” He even stated that the Doctrine was “a lot to build military roads...but there was nothing much being done.” See Charles P. Kindleberger, *Marshall Plan Days* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 98, 123 and 107, respectively.

⁷⁵ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-Nato Middle East Connection : How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), p. 43.

3.1.2. Its Reasons

There are several interpretations of the purpose of the Truman Doctrine. In his statement, Acheson warned that Soviet pressure on the Straits, Greece, and Iran could open three continents to Soviet influence.⁷⁶ Truman stated that after the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, his most important decision was this aid act.⁷⁷ A Chief of the Military Aid Mission asserted that “the present aid program would help to stop the Russians, now the taking of Turkey would be an expensive proposition for the Soviet Union.” A United States Air Force general declared that the expended money would bring big dividends to America.⁷⁸ Also, from the political viewpoint, the United States declared that cost of generating assistance could be compared to the possible huge cost of Turkey’s and Greece’s fall under Soviet domination.⁷⁹ James Madison Garrett III devoted his Ph.D. dissertation to support that the Doctrine was military assistance, an instrument of the United States foreign policy; also, between 1950 and 1952, the foreign assistance effort changed from concentration on economic recovery and expansion to concerns with defense.⁸⁰ According to Oral Sander, in the case of Turkey, economic concerns were considered important in the military sphere. While an American soldier’s annual cost was 3511 dollars, Turkish soldier’s was 105 dollars that the United States assisted the Turkish army as a bastion against the

⁷⁶ Garrett, p. 65.

⁷⁷ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Pub., 2000), p. 98.

⁷⁸ Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 3.

⁷⁹ The State Department, “Draft, Report on Communist Expansion,” *Truman Doctrine: “Important Relevant Papers” folder, Joseph M. Jones Papers*, Washington D.C., 1947, p. 5.

⁸⁰ Garrett, pp. 7, 100, 256.

Soviet Union.⁸¹ It was said to preserve “capitalism” against the new and developing socialist system, and to try to revive world trade; also, political stability was considered to be dependent upon economic recovery.⁸² The project was also interpreted as a means of staving off a post-war depression in the United States, to close the “dollar gap” and to solve the problem of overproduction.⁸³ To sum up, McFadyen is in explaining the Doctrine as a new American foreign policy in the economic, military, and political spheres. It is not possible to separate them from each other and each should be considered separately.⁸⁴

3.1.3. An Evaluation

In the U.S. Congress, more than a hundred questions were asked and the Truman Doctrine was criticized. First, the United Nations was by-passed, was not notified or consulted. Second, the United Nations might lose interest in its cooperative efforts if America took on world-wide responsibilities and commitments (that was answered as United Nations became powerless in effectiveness because of the Soviet membership⁸⁵). Third, why the International Bank for Reconstruction and

⁸¹ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* (Ankara: Ankara University Political Science Faculty Pub., 1979), pp. 11, 95-96.

⁸² Ertuna, p. 7.

⁸³ Geoffrey Roberts, “Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 8, Soviet and East European History (1994), p. 1374; and “The Forthcoming Conference in Paris,” *Soviet News*, June 26, 1947.

⁸⁴ McFadyen, p. 46.

⁸⁵ Garrett, p. 7. At the formation of the institution especially two points had been considered: to become the United Nations a total world organization including not only big countries but also as much as countries; and to form a “big countries group” (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain and China) in the institution as powerful as opposing and intervening in the threats against the world order and peace. See Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, p. 184.

Development -World Bank or Export-Import Bank were called to compensate some of these loans. Fourth, it could cause war with the Russia if Russia interpreted the proposed assistance as an unfriendly and overt act. Fifth, it was a legacy of British imperialism. The question arose of whether the United States would undertake Britain's role in the region. Sixth, it could strengthen autocratic governments in Turkey and Greece. Seventh, during the war, Turkey had remained neutral, even helped the Nazis, so it was a betrayal to the United Nations' mission. Finally, the Armenian problem in Turkey was given as a reason not to assist.⁸⁶ Answers were given on the basis of urgency, contribution to democracy, and providing stability and orderly political processes by economic aid against totalitarian regimes.

On the Turkish side, the worry was about the articles of the Assistance Act, especially the third article, which said

to permit free access of the United States government officials for the purpose of observing whether such assistance was utilized effectively; to permit representatives of the press and radio of the United States of America to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance...to give full and continuous publicity within their respective countries as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of the United States economic assistance carried on pursuant to the Act.⁸⁷

Hence, control rights even were at the hands of the representatives of press and radio. That is, American media representatives had a somewhat higher status than that of Turkish government authorities. In the very tiny voices of criticisms of the press, measurements for investigation into both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were interpreted as a new "*Düyun-u Umumiye*" (Public Debt

⁸⁶ Ülmen, pp. 102-104; Garrett, p. 8; and the United States Department of State, "Questions and Answers Relating to the Greco-Turkish Aid Bill," *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, (April 3, 1947), pp. 866-895.

⁸⁷ Section III of the "Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey."

Administration),⁸⁸ although there was huge support in general claiming that most of the Turks were both aware of the Soviet threat and convinced that it could be successfully resisted.⁸⁹

On the other hand, the Truman Doctrine served as the harbinger of many programs designed to contain the expansionist pressures of the Soviet Union⁹⁰ and to create buffer areas supported with military assistances against communism. It was the forerunner of the Marshall Plan and contributed to the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹¹ For Turkey, the Truman Doctrine marked a turning point in its search for post-war security: it was no longer isolated but in the Western camp.

3.2. The Marshall Plan

3.2.1. Beginning of a Comprehensive American Project

When the United States did not see the post-Second World War era's initial solution to the world economy, the Bretton Woods system, adequate by itself for its different purposes, followed the intervention policy. As mentioned, the Truman Doctrine was put first on the table and continued for some time in Greece and Turkey. Especially for Turkey it was based on military assistance, but also Europe's

⁸⁸ Ülmen, p. 100.

⁸⁹ It should not be forgotten that because of the Act, there was a kind of censorship on the press with the imperative of mostly declaring the program positively. See Garrett, p. 238 for affirmative explanations.

⁹⁰ McFadyen, p. 615.

⁹¹ McGhee, pp. 30-34.

economic situation was very critical. Europe's economy had been destroyed and it needed to rise to a self-sufficient level in coal and agriculture again, to "the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance."⁹² It was feared that otherwise there would be revolution, economic, political, and social disintegration, and this would have immediate effects on the U.S. domestic economy.⁹³

Successively the Truman Doctrine and The European Development Program began to stand against the communist threat by strengthening Western Europe economically. The content of this program, the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program was declared to the world in the "Harvard Speech" of the United States Secretary of State George Marshall on July 5, 1947.⁹⁴ The United States' 80th Congress accepted the Foreign Assistance Act of Public Law 472 on April 3, 1948 and The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was founded in April 1948.

The Paris Conference, known as The Sixteen Powers Conference, was gathered in July 1948, after an unsuccessful attempt to get the Soviet Union to join, to fix the recipient countries' needs and a cumulative 18 billion dollar was accepted as assistance. With this conference, the Marshall Plan was expanded to nineteen

⁹² Imanuel Wexler, "The Marshall Plan in Economic Perspective: Goals and Accomplishments," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, ed. Martin A. Schain (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 148.

⁹³ William L. Clayton, "GATT; The Marshall Plan, and OECD," *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no. 4 (December 1963), pp. 496-97; and see William C. Cromwell, "The Marshall Non-Plan, Congress and the Soviet Union," *The Western Political Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (December 1979), p. 443.

⁹⁴ He took the Nobel Prize for this project. For the text of the speech, see United States Department of State, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery, remarks by the Secretary of State," *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 415, (June 15, 1947), pp. 1159-1160, or http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-06-15&documentid=0&studycollectionid=mp&pagenumber=1 [April 26, 2007], also for other American documents see, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, Vol. 3 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 197-514.

countries to include Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Holland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Trieste, Canada, and Turkey. The urgent and critical nature of the situation was stressed. The Committee of European Economic Cooperation was founded at this conference and it prepared a report and presented it to the U.S. government on September 22 outlining a four-year program for economic recovery in the participating countries.⁹⁵ Initially, the Marshall Plan put three conditions in the implementation: a cost ceiling of 18,000 billion dollar (it counted 13 million in practice), a time limit of four years, and a definite objective of reconstruction in the shortest possible time and at the lowest possible cost to the United States.⁹⁶ It was mainly in three forms of direct aid grants (on condition of use in approved areas) and loans (on condition of beginning to pay from 1952), indirect aid (to regulate trade), and technical assistance.

3.2.2. Its Reasons

Again there are various opinions about the reason and goal of the Marshall Plan, but because it was a more comprehensive project than the earlier Truman Doctrine and especially because it was much more influential on Turkey, these debates become more important. The most naive perspective was that the Plan was a symbol of American generosity and humanitarianism, which could not exist in politics.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Price, p. 37.

⁹⁶ Kindleberger, p. 12.

⁹⁷ Scott Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program," *The Journal of American History* 65, no. 4 (March 1979), p. 1043.

As discussed above, Clayton refers to its importance in relation to the United States' domestic economy. Wexler asserts that although it is perceived as an instrument of American foreign policy, with reference to the Cold War, it was essentially an economic enterprise with the aim of pursuing specific economic tasks and to reaching specific economic goals. He sees its real success in its long-term impact. For what it did, was to lay a firm basis from which the European nations could generate their own economic momentum and reach a point of self-sustaining economic growth.⁹⁸ The determined target was to increase the economic activities to a gratifying level without unusual foreign assistance as soon as possible and provide its permanence. The U.S. was in agreement that these targets could not be reached without American aid.⁹⁹

In another way, it was seen as an exportation a version of capitalism modeled on the United States to Europe, enslaving Europe to American capital, and it was thought that truly American-style mass consumption would not come to Europe for at least another decade if there was no Plan. The architects of the Marshall Plan did not see their role as redefining capitalism so much as selling it.¹⁰⁰ Barry Eichengreen interprets the process in reasonable terms, saying that "in a sense the Marshall Plan defined the divide between East and West...by defining the East-West conflict as a choice between plan and market."¹⁰¹ According to Robert Shapiro, the Second World War turned the United States into a superpower in world affairs and it signaled the

⁹⁸ Wexler, p. 147-151.

⁹⁹ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ James E. Cronin, "The Marshall Plan and Cold War Political Discourse," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, pp. 283-286.

¹⁰¹ Barry Eichengreen, "The Market and the Marshall Plan," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, p. 133.

shift in the American public opinion away from isolationism. With the high level of public support for the Marshall Plan and with the perceived success of the Plan and other American policies, the American public was supportive of the foreign aid proposals and policies initiated by its political leaders.¹⁰²

In brief, the Marshall Plan should be regarded as a “naive” application of foreign aid which contained the nuclei of all of the later “aid” programs related to their sources, forms and channels. It was conceived in the extraordinary post-war circumstances with a transfer of a huge amount of public resources in the form of grants to a large extent under a definite plan. The Plan was the first of its kind in world history, except for war times;¹⁰³ in one way, its importance stems from this. In another way, it was of pivotal significance in crystallizing the East-West conflict in Europe, as a fuller elaboration of the Truman Doctrine and a design to erect an economic and political bloc to contain Soviet expansion and to curb the influence of the Communist parties in the West European countries.¹⁰⁴ as a big step to construct the Cold War policy.

In addition, the Economic Cooperation Administration mission described among the reasons for the Marshall Plan that countries in poor condition tend to totalitarian regimes; if the situation continued to deteriorate, whole U.S. trade would be harmed because the exports were the backbone of the country’s national economy. If Europe stopped being a market for the U.S. capital, this would bring a crises to the

¹⁰² Robert Shapiro, “The Legacy of the Marshall Plan: American Public Support for Foreign Aid,” in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, pp. 267-269.

¹⁰³ Ertuna, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁴ Cromwell, pp. 422-423.

U.S. economy.¹⁰⁵ Hence, building a strong Europe and a bigger market for U.S. products was clearly a benefit to the United States. They also state the aim of the Marshall Plan as creating European development by ensuring goods could only be imported from United States with dollars.¹⁰⁶ It was thought that while such a comprehensible plan to assist Europe was expensive, it would be cheaper in the long run.¹⁰⁷ The American Senate Foreign Affairs Committee prepared a report explaining that,

American assistance is not for others' interests. The United States of America is neither an alms-giving institution nor is the economic aid the result of American people's generosity. The technical assistance is a means of processing foreign politics of the United States of America and developing its national interests abroad.¹⁰⁸

The discussions continue on this point that although the United States initiative is remembered for its altruism, it was clearly a policy to benefit the United States even in its initial offer,¹⁰⁹ a demand for an economically healthy Western Europe for American national security Under-secretary for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton said the U.S. aid objective should be the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European society, not the combating of communism¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1947/kasim1947.htm> [September 18, 2006].

¹⁰⁶ Republic of Turkey, *Marşal Planı ve Siz* (Ankara, 1950), pp. 7-8.

¹⁰⁷ The State Department, "European Recovery and American Aid, Report by the President's Committee on Foreign Aid," Clark Clifford Papers, Washington D.C., 1947, p. B2.

¹⁰⁸ Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Technical Assistance and Related Documents*, 1956, p. 4, cited in Prof. Dr. Sami Güven, *1950'li Yıllarda Türk Ekonomisi Üzerinde Amerikan Kalkınma Reçeteleri, Hiltz Raporu, Thornburg Raporu, Barker Raporu* (Bursa: Ezgi Pub. House, 1998), p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Grose, "The Marshall Plan –Then and Now," in *The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy*, ed. Peter Grose (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997), p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Price, p. 22.

because this project has its background as the needs for and interest in the people of the United States to big markets in the world.¹¹¹

3.2.3. Turkish Participation

Different from the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan started with the European countries initially. For a long time, the U.S. tried to contain the Soviet Union as well, basing its roots in Europe and only after some time and with persuasion was it expanded to include Turkey. In the beginning, Turkey's demand to be added to the plan was rejected. When Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmeddin Sadak returned from the Marshall Plan negotiations in 1948, he reported that Turkey had been rejected although it had requested 615 million dollars in aid. The American experts had explained that while Turkey had been the capacity to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe, it had not been destroyed in the war, had not been occupied, had had no guerilla activities, and had received both British and American assistance during Second World War,¹¹² had enough gold and foreign exchange reserves for the following fifteen months and to finance the essential requirements of her civilian economy, and the effectiveness in its industry was above its prewar level, showing a surplus in its foreign trade and with its stable money.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Diane B. Kunz, "The Marshall Plan Reconsidered, A Complex of Motives," in *The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy*, p. 8.

¹¹² Erol Mütercimler, Mim Kemal Öke, *Düşler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası* (Istanbul: Alfa Press, 2004), pp. 26, 29.

¹¹³ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 4. Turkey's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to 245 million dolar at the time. See Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*, p. 229. Also, Hershlag interpreted Turkey's easier transition to a peace from the war economy than many other countries by its etatism policy. See Z.Y. Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy* (London & New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 16; and *Turkey, An Economy in Transition* (The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen, 1958), p. 177.

But in reality, the Turkish army had been mobilized since the beginning of the Second World War and this had put a severe strain upon the national economy¹¹⁴ and there were only outmoded German weapons in its hands. First, its force needed to be reduced, affectionated and mobilized.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, Turkey was added to the plan and signed the bilateral Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United States on July 4, 1948¹¹⁶ and the National Assembly approved this Agreement by 5253 numbered law on July 8, 1948.¹¹⁷ In Turkey, the American Credits Committee (Amerikan Kredileri Komisyonu) was founded to operate the necessary works of the Marshall Plan in Turkey by the February 11, 1948 and July 15, 1948 dated decisions of the Council of Ministers.¹¹⁸ This approval was enthusiastically welcomed by Turkey as seen from

¹¹⁴ United States Department of State, "Statement by Acting Secretary Acheson," *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, pp. 835-838. Also, post-war situation created widespread poverty without even finding the basic necessities. See Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 3, Session 1, 19 December 1946, p. 308; also, United States Department of State, "An Evaluation of the Development of Democratic Processes in Turkey since 1945," *General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947-50*, Document No. 59, 20 June 1949.

¹¹⁵ McGhee, p. 22. Mission's report was a five-year term of aid to modernize the armed forces and during that time, reduce the military forces by two-thirds.

¹¹⁶ Turkey signed the first agreement, "Economic Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and the United States," on April 16, 1948.

¹¹⁷ Uslu., p. 98. Followingly, innumerable bilateral agreement were signed between the two countries to institute strategical bases, observer and listener facilities, information gathering agencies in Turkey. Oral Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*, p. 253.

¹¹⁸ The Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 0301801021164810 and 03018011159216. Also many other archival documents show that authorization was given to government officials like Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Bülent Yazıcı, etc. and lists of importation equipments from the Marshall Plan funds were determined the main agenda of the Council of Ministers in Turkey in the Marshall Plan years. For example, see the Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 0301801021218717, 0301801021234914, 0301801021218913, 0301801021222316, and 0301801021218914.

the responses when the first aid package for the country was approved in the United States' Congress.¹¹⁹

Although this short delay seemed contrary to U.S. aims for the country and early participation in another similar program (of the Truman Doctrine), it seems that this maneuver was calculated to justify the activity to both domestic and foreign political actors. In fact, Turkey was in search of an alliance and pursued military and economic aid. Also, Europe needed food and raw materials. Turkey was accepted in the aid program to develop its agriculture and increase exports to Western Europe while importing industrial products from there. In this regard, the Marshall Plan in Turkey was defined for the economic development instead of reconstruction, as was the case in the European countries.¹²⁰ Therefore, investment projects received focus in Turkey. Likewise, the aid to Turkey was justified in the United States Congress and in front of people although Turkey had not entered the Second World War and its budget was still functioning. The economic assistance of the United States to Turkey was distributed as economic aid to support national defense activities, military common use items, technical assistance, American agricultural products production surplus aid, and appropriations from counterpart funds to several sectors.¹²¹

The evidence suggests that if the reason had been to activate economies and maintain capitalism, there would be no direct need to support undeveloped countries like Turkey. Thus other reasons, such as politics and social reasons, come to be

¹¹⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Inaugural Address of President Ismet İnönü, Term 8, vol. 7, Session 2, 1 November 1947, p. 4.

¹²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Organization of International Economic Cooperation Administration, *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 4 (Ankara: State Prime Ministry Press, 1950), p. 7.

¹²¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 25, 1955, p. 7.

questioned. It can be concluded that Greece and Turkey were a totally different concept from the others, other recipient European countries.¹²² Here the importance of the search for implementation differences in different countries to pursue the covert purposes of the aid program can be seen. Direct intervention, integration unto the world capitalist economy, formulating the country as a reserve power for Western needs, the demands of the United States government in return were a bit different in Turkey than the other countries, and this point needs further detailed investigation to reach fair conclusions.

3.2.4. Period of the Plan in Turkey

Formally, the Marshall Plan aid was maintained for four years between 1948 and 1952. However, as the reports show until 1960, “the Marshall Plan in Turkey” continued until the end of 1962. Focus was given to the defense aspect after the Korean War, then, it was maintained under the “American Economic Aid to Turkey” title until the end of 1962.¹²³ The United States Government Assistance to foreign governments was extended generally until December 31, 1964. Although the former US ambassador George McGhee made a huge assertion stating that 26-year Truman Doctrine –it can be termed the Truman-Marshall Plan- ended in 1975 with the

¹²² Ahmet Mendi, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri, Truman Doktrini, Marshall Planı ve Türkiye” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Istanbul University 2002), p. 152.

¹²³ Mr. Başak wrongly claims that the Marshall Plan ended in 1952 and he evaluates the aid from then to today as general foreign aid. However, it was the first project and it was extended in 1952 for a longer period. In fact, the plan started to continue; for instance: the Zonguldak mining project in Turkey was planned in two stages, the first stage was from 1948-1952 and the second stage was from 1952-1957. Also, the organizations, assistance forms, world policy in general and discourses support this claim; for the general speaking, it can be said that the Marshall Plan began in 1948 and continued until 1960; only, after this date it can be stated about other types of American assistances to world countries.

destruction of the south Vietnam.¹²⁴ However, it could be said that by the 1960s, the Cold War policy and Turkey's approach to the era had begun to change; on the Western side, that time coincided with the criticism of the modernization theory because of the political crises in the world, because its positivistic goals had not been realized, and because soiled knowledge-power relations were revealed. In addition, the economic aspects of the end of welfare state, the great burden on the American domestic economy, led to the end of the Plan.

3.2.5. Settling into Operation of the Marshall Plan

In Turkey, the cooperation agreement of July 4, 1948, composed of eleven articles, gives some clues about the Marshall Plan implementation policy. Because the United States felt itself completely free to put arbitrary conditions on recipient countries, the Cooperation Act carried many expansions of right for the United States while it limited the actions of the Turkish government.¹²⁵

Accordingly, the U.S. Government undertook the assistance to Turkey on the condition that Turkey would use the aid dollars and its national resources according to the agreements and aims of the Plan and take the necessary measures to provide that.¹²⁶ The agreement brought conditions to facilitate the growth of the private sector, to limit government intervention to it, and to rely on market decisions and price mechanisms. In this regard, Henry Hazlitt suggested obstructing aid to be used

¹²⁴ McGhee, p. 34.

¹²⁵ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 2.

¹²⁶ For this and other articles of the agreement see Fahir Armaoğlu, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması," in *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, pp. 165-180.

for social security, anti-capitalist propaganda, increases in wages. This suggestions were put into the agreements of the Plan.¹²⁷

One another important condition of the agreement was that the Turkish government would facilitate the transfer/ exportation of equipment needed in the United States. This covered not only the goods in the country, but also put the condition that although the material needed by the US was outside the country, Turkey would cooperate with the United States to obtain it. One of the most detailed articles on the transfer of required equipment to the United States demands all facilitation for this process and had questions rise for the economic burdens of the agreement to Turkey. Subsequently, the Turkish government would facilitate the travels of American people to the participant countries; moreover, it would recognize the diplomatic exemption for Economic Cooperation mission members.

According to another condition of the agreement, if one of the parties demanded the repeal of the agreement, the articles would be valid until six months later (this condition was determined for two years for the article about the preparation of information for American-needed materials). Likewise, the continuation of responsibility for some time was provided although the agreement ended.

The Turkish government also was to give all details for the implementation of the program to the American authorities; it would also provide the necessary information that the United States required to get its needed materials. In addition, all of the explanations about the program would be delivered to the public every three months; they would be published in the press in detail. Both the U.S. and Turkish

¹²⁷ Henry Hazlitt, "Amerikan Yardımları Avrupa'yı Çıkamazdan Kurtarabilir mi?" *Akşam*, 18 February 1948, pp. 4, 5, and 7.

governments would follow and support the program; that is, the press was to support and declare the American programs in Turkey according to the agreement article of the Marshall Plan. The American mission recommended strong cooperation between workers and state officers, press and government, and among the whole nation to support the Plan.¹²⁸ Similar to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan put some censorship on the press and public opinion and made criticism difficult.

In this regard, a world forum on the radio was devoted to the Marshall Plan at an early date.¹²⁹ In this 24-hour radio “town meeting” of the world,

following the one-hour broadcast from each of eighteen nations –the first half an hour for high-level state authorities and the rest was for the common people–, each of them should have an additional fifteen minutes during which some chosen spokesman could summarize the feelings and the expressions of its people, and finally, in the last one and a half hour, the Marshall Plan text would be read.¹³⁰

Public relations really mattered throughout the program. The United States used all possible propaganda means (films, brochures, etc.) to present the Marshall Plan as an altruistic aid and for the total benefits of recipient countries. One another means in this strategy was the Marshall Plan filmography.¹³¹ From counterpart funds budget, more than two hundred and sixty films were shot in and for many countries

¹²⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Marşal Planı ve Siz*, p. 30.

¹²⁹ Also, other speeches and reactions were carried through the means of radio and press. See The State Department, “Report on Radio Reaction to Acheson’s Speech,” *Joseph M. Jones Papers*, Washington D. C., 1947, p. B1.

¹³⁰ The Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 0300152311.

¹³¹ <http://www.marshallfilms.org> [November 15, 2006]; and <http://www.sellingdemocracy.org> [November 15, 2006].

as well as Turkey between 1948 and 1953.¹³² Among them, seventeen were shot also in Turkish and they were specifically about Turkey in the Plan.¹³³

On the other hand, the Turkish press was watched closely and censored as closely as possible.¹³⁴ Besides the Turkish authorities, the American officers put great importance on these tiny voices of opposition, followed each case closely, and took any measure necessary to prevent them as well.¹³⁵

Only some leftist press publications like *Geveze* (Talkative) and *Başdan*,¹³⁶ and partially *Yeni Sabah* published anti-American articles. In this way, *Yeni Sabah* interpreted this Turkish-American agreement in August, stating that Turkey was totally restricted in economic and trade fields, recognizing the limitless rights to American capitalists. It also clarified that the agreement first would be evaluated and criticized.¹³⁷ Also, *Geveze* published anti-American articles against the Marshall

¹³² David Reynolds interpreted this attempt as “the largest peacetime international propaganda operation.” See David Reynolds, “The European Response, Primacy of Politics,” in *The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy*, p. 27. The Marshall Plan films were produced between 1948-1953 under the aegis of four successive chiefs of the Marshall Plan Motion Picture Section: Lothar Wolff, Stuart Schulberg, Nils Nilson, and Albert Hemsing. <http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2006/nr06-131.html> [November 3, 2006].

¹³³ For instance, “Jets Over Turkey” [Tepkili Uçaklar Türk Semalarında], “The Marshall Plan at Work in Turkey,” “Turkish Harvest,” [Türk Hasadı], “Turkey and the Land” [Türkiye ve Toprak], “The Village Tractor” [Köy Traktörü], and “Yusuf and His Plough” [Yusuf ve Sabanı].

¹³⁴ For example, even one simple word of the Turkish government’s supported newspaper *Ulus* on September 11, 1948 became an important subject of the Prime Ministry because it was put without the consultation of the government authorities and it could give harm to the United States partizanship. See the Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 03010845647.

¹³⁵ The periodical *Başdan* claims that although there was no censorship in the law, in reality it did exist that “a pamphlet against American Aid was seized while it is still in the printing machine.” See *Başdan*, October 12, 1948.

¹³⁶ Among their collaborators are Sabahattin Ali, Aziz Nesin, Mim Uykusuz, who had all been associated also with other critical leftist publications of *Marko Paşa*, *Merhum Paşa* and *Zincirli Hürriyet*.

¹³⁷ “...In the economic and commercial fields we are being encircled in the full sense of the word. We will recognize numerous rights to American capitalists. In trade we will follow a full-fledged open door policy. The countless and boundless concessions granted to Americans...All this for 10 million dollar.” See “Antlaşmanın Analizi,” *Yeni Sabah*, August 10, 1948.

Plan. It questioned whether the Plan would mean something similar to the old-onerous capitulations¹³⁸ and likened its benefits to the country to Turkey being a colony.¹³⁹ Also, the paper invoked that Turkish people and intellectuals to its perspective, the deficits of the Marshall Plan, emphasizing that the United States left farmers to starvation by prohibiting the sale of tobacco and other products to the old customers of European countries, deemed Turkish people to eating barley for months with the exportation of wheat. Moreover, this publication explained the Plan as being the mine of a few American money magnates' seeking market for their products.¹⁴⁰ It also claimed that "American Aid raised the cost of bread and sugar, the high rate of tuberculosis among the Turkish population, a famine in the Black Sea coast areas, and the intervention of "American police" in Turkish administrative affairs."¹⁴¹

In this regard, while press freedom was talked about particularly for Plan-supportive newspapers like *Tan* and *Tanin*, pride was felt regarding the closure of opposition papers like *Geveze* and *Başdan* and American officials honorably reported these attacks.¹⁴² The proprietor and editor of *Geveze*, Remzi Gürcan, was placed under arrest for printing offensive matter calculated to encourage rebellion.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ *Geveze*, "Kapitülasyonlar Geri mi Geliyor Merak Ediyoruz," August 15, 1948.

¹³⁹ *Geveze*, October 6, 1948.

¹⁴⁰ *Geveze*, September 15, 1948.

¹⁴¹ *Başdan*, October 12, 1948.

¹⁴² Edwin C. Wilson reported in these words that "I have the honor to report that alleged communist Sabahhattin Ali's bitterly satiric weekly *Marko Paşa* was suppressed by court order on May 16...it was filled with satirical attacks on the American aid program," claiming the aid will lead country to American mandate. United States Department of State, "The Foreign Service of the United States," *Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, 1947-1952*, Document No. 314, 22 May 1947.

¹⁴³ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, 1947-1952*, Document No. 682, 26 November 1948, p. 3.

However, as a general approach, the Turkish government and press demanded that the assistance be increased. Without having a self-confident posture they tried to gain American friendship and made also people to appropriate this view. Although there was the impact of the Turkish-American agreements in terms of supporting the Marshall Plan and the hidden censorship of the press, the Turkish press started this kind of provocative articles at an earlier date.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, U.S. reports on the Turkish aid program honorably presented this American-supported public opinion, a press conference of the Prime Minister stating appreciation for them and the annual message of İnönü stating the unanimous ratification of the aid agreement.¹⁴⁵

3.3. Administating Organizations of the Marshall Plan

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Mutual Security Agency, the Foreign Operations Agency, the International Cooperation Agency, the Agency for International Development were the operating elements of the Marshall Plan. According to the transformations of American foreign policy and the international capitalist agenda, the implementation organizations of the Marshall Plan were also transformed. Then Foreign Assistance Act of the United States directed the establishment of a

¹⁴⁴ E. Betül Çakırca, Preface, v. In this regard, the reelection of Truman as president was celebrated with great enthusiasm in supporter newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Son Telgraf*, *Ulus*, *İstanbul Ekspres* on November 4, 1948. *Cumhuriyet* interpreted the event, stating that “the United States will play a more powerful role in international relationship through the tested man”; *Son Telgraf* said, “Truman’s election has enabled the entire world to draw a deep breath. Stability has been insured.”

¹⁴⁵ The Department of State, *Second Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, Washington, 1947, p. 39.

headquarters for the new agency in Washington, a coordinating office in Europe, and a special mission in each participating country.¹⁴⁶

As mentioned, following the Marshall Speech of June 5, 1947 and the Foreign Assistance Act of the United States Congress, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was founded on April 16, 1948 to gather the recipient countries and to create coordination in the implementation. Besides this general framework, the Economic Cooperation Administration was founded independent of the State Department to determine the relationship of every participant country with the United States one by one and to administer the aid in each country.¹⁴⁷

By 1951, the Marshall Plan had undergone its most important transformation. The ECA was abolished and instead, the Mutual Security Agency was founded. The authorities explained the shift in the institutions of the Marshall Plan implementation by saying that the unsustainable world conditions and increasing aggression led the “peace-loving” countries to tighter cooperation also in the military field as well as in the economic field; thus, the American assistance reformulated its objectives and approached to the military in 1951 becoming the MSA instead of former the Economic Cooperation Administration.¹⁴⁸ In this way, “national defense” began to take the lion’s share of the Marshall Plan funds. That is, the plan as a whole was interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War which changed the total content of the Plan and put armament at the center.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Price, p. 68.

¹⁴⁷ Price, p. 93; Hogan, pp. 28, 30.

¹⁴⁸ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 10, 1952, p. 7.

¹⁴⁹ Kindleberger, p. 88.

From then on, assistance for defense took one of the largest shares in the total aid and the reports reserved a special and beginning section for its detailed analysis. Also, assistance sharing began to be decided according to the defense requirements. First, the industrial sectors which produced goods for the defense sector were assisted. Likewise, after 1952, the first priorities in the Marshall Plan passed from agriculture and highways to national defense and then to the private sector. Table one shows this shift in the Marshall Aid while there had been no special resource allocation for the defense sector before that date:

Table 1. Distribution of Aid for Turkey in the 1951-1952 Fiscal Year

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Indirect Aid	Total
National Defense		14,000,000	14,000,000
Machine and Chemical Ind.	2,000,000	2,500,000	4,500,000
Agriculture	6,200,000	7,260,000	13,460,000
Public Health	1,000,000		1,000,000
Public Roads	3,500,000		3,500,000
Water Works		650,000	650,000
Airfields		819,000	819,000
Etibank	7,300,000	10,245,000	17,545,000
Sümerbank		3,063,000	3,063,000
Soil Products Office	2,500,000		2,500,000
Market (Oil)		8,963,000	8,963,000
Total	22,500,000	47,500,000	70,000,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 10, 1952, p. 7.

In 1953, other organizations appeared in the Marshall Plan or in the European Development and Reconstruction Program, the Foreign Operations Agency and then the International Cooperation Agency. Likewise, the developmental aid separated from the military concerned aid and while the former was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the latter passed to the Ministry of Defense.¹⁵⁰ Foreign capital investment and the private sector were greatly supported in this period. In 1961, the

¹⁵⁰ Başak, p. 39.

Agency for International Development replaced the others.¹⁵¹ Also, the umbrella organization OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) shifted to OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1960, removing “Europe” and adding “development” in the title.

For the Marshall Plan reports, 1960 showed a difference implying the end of the Marshall Plan, but the continuation of general American assistance from then on. The reports constitute 47 volumes until the date of December 31, 1962. However, from the 42nd volume they began to be published by the Ministry of Finance instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in semi-annually periods instead of quarterly, and were entitled “United States Economic Assistance to Turkey” instead of “Marshall Plan in Turkey”. In addition, they just summarized the cumulative assistance in the forms grants, technical cooperation, agricultural surplus, counterpart funds, and development and loan funds instead of public and private assistance sectors and their details.

The changes in the names reflect the shifts in the goal and content of the Plan. The first four-year period determined Turkey as an agricultural country and raw material exporter to the world while it mainly imported manufactured goods. In the second period, the Cold War put its mark on the relationships and security, military, and defense came to the fore. Thus, Turkey was determined as a frontier police station for the United States and the Western camp and the assistance was concentrated in its military sector and for the modernization of its army. The third and last transformation in the organization created a new situation with its own tools leaving this agricultural role a little behind and giving preference to the growth of the private sector and the assembling industry.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Finance, *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 45 (Ankara: Prime Ministry State Press, 1961), p. 5.

3.4. Marshall Plan Aid Allocation Forms

The Marshall Plan used various tools to appoint assistance to the recipient countries, among them direct aid, indirect aid and technical assistance determined the U.S. objectives in the Plan. Their content, timing and amount indicate the United States' goal from the Marshall Plan.

3.4.1 Direct Aid

3.4.1.1. Loans

Direct aid in the form of loans was given in long-term credit through the agency of Export Import Bank of the United States. Then Turkish state would begin to repay the interest of the loan in 1952 (it has three percent if in dollars, and four percent if in the local currency) and the capital beginning from 1956.¹⁵² Initially, Turkey took 38 million dollar of the 49 million dollar of 1948-1949 term aid and 35 million dollar of the 130 million dollar of 1949-1950 term aid as loans.

3.4.1.2. Grants

In appearance, grants was donated without a contribution. However, there were many constraints in this arrangement. First, like all of the Marshall aid, the grant part was also given as goods, not cash. This indication shapes the very form of the Marshall Plan. That is, the Plan was based on the export of American and some European goods and manufacture in addition to its apparent aim to develop and

¹⁵² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 16.

reconstruct the country. As was mentioned, after the Second World War, the United States had great reserves and a surplus of products. To maintain its production and industrial economy, it needed to sell them. With most of the funds of the Marshall Plan, the products needed for highway construction, agriculture, irrigation, defense, etc. were imported from the United States.

The second most important condition was that the dollar equivalent of the price of these products, service, and technical assistance had to be deposited in a special account in Turkish Central Bank called “counterpart funds” with local currency, as was also the case in special resource and drawing rights.¹⁵³ Even before the Marshall Plan this procedure had been applied. In the Truman Doctrine, 36.4 million liras, the equivalent of five million dollars contribution for road construction, had been agreed to be deposited as well as other allocations.¹⁵⁴ According to the presentations, this money had a beneficial effect on decreasing inflation in countries, and on financial stabilization; also, they would be used in production and development. However, the United States regarded this money as belonging to its government. Ten percent of these counterpart funds were directly the property of the United States government for meeting the administrative costs of the ECA mission and other implementation organizations and for the purchase of strategic materials needed for the United States’ stockpiling program. The remaining 90 percent was for the internal financing of the development program and for military development

¹⁵³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 13.

¹⁵⁴ United States Department of State, “Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Turkey Regarding a Highway Program in Turkey,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document No. 867.154/ 11-1247, 11 December 1947.

matters developed jointly by the Turkish and the United States governments which the American mission considered necessary.¹⁵⁵

In fact, for the release of counterpart funds in the Turkish Central Bank, the government prepared projects using them in development programs. However, these projects had to pass through the OEEC's and the ECA's approval; hence, the United States did not allow the use of budget outside of its intended projects. Moreover, these funds were released with similar conditions as the loans as a debt to the United States.¹⁵⁶

As a consequence, Turkey was only able to purchase U.S. products with this so-called aid and the same amount of money was taken from the state budget. Also, the liberation of counterpart funds was given as credit with a four percent interest rate. It seems that the U.S. did not spend any money on this Plan; moreover, they maintained their internal capitalist economic system while making the Turkey and some other countries dependent on credits and American goods. That is, "the United States had not granted aid to the participating country, but had merely sold its commodities for local currency."¹⁵⁷

3.4.1.3. Conditional Aid

Conditional aid was literally the amount of money taken from the United States equivalent to the counterpart funds owing of another country for this one;

¹⁵⁵ "Military Aid," *Zafer*, May 24, 1952. While this rate was 95 / 5 percent at the beginning, it changed to 90 / 10 in 1954. *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 11.

¹⁵⁶ *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 11.

¹⁵⁷ Kindleberger, p. 78. Kindleberger was a State Department economist on Germany beginning in 1945.

however, this amount was entered into the account of this country's debt to the United States.

3.4.2. Indirect Aid

3.4.2.1. Drawing Rights

This form was developed to promote export and import between European countries to revitalize their economies. In this regard, a certain share for buying and selling was determined for each European country included in the cooperation. For instance, when Turkey bought some equipment from Germany, it blocked the equivalent amount of money of this products in local currency in the Central Bank; then, this giver country, Germany, gained the right to buy the same amount of its needed products from the United States in the form of Marshall Aid. Drawing rights were cancelled at the end of the 1949-1950 period. Instead, from July 1, 1950, the European Payment Union was founded to regulate trade between the European states.¹⁵⁸ This small share for European trade development immediately left its place to only American imports by the recipient countries. Tolga Tören schematizes drawing rights and conditional aid as follows:

¹⁵⁸ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 3, 1950, p. 11.




Figure 1. Form of drawing rights

Source: Tolga Tören, *Yeniden Yapılanan Dünya Ekonomisinde...*, p. 51.

As a condition, unused drawing rights in its period were cancelled. Therefore, states spent their shares on the cost of making up the gap in their payments. Thus, this type of aid gave way to excessive usage and economic burden on countries.¹⁵⁹

3.4.2.2. Starting Credit

On September 19, 1950, the European Payment Union was founded between member countries to facilitate exchange between European countries. The U.S. made some contributions to the countries structurally indebted to the Union in the name of “starting credit.” Turkey took 25 million dollars as starting credit in the condition of loans (fifteen-year termed with 2.75 percent interest).

¹⁵⁹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 21.

3.4.2.3. Special Source

Another source of aid for the Union member countries was a United States given credit for countries that did not make the gold payment to the European payment Union. (Member countries could only use their quotas if they pay some amount of gold to the Union.)

3.4.3. Technical Assistance

This assistance of know-how and personnel included sending a member of a staff to the United States, receiving an expert from the United States, and obtaining technical equipment. Countries could take technical assistance either in loan or grant conditions; that is, the country would pay the project cost beginning from 1952 or it took it as grant and deposited its counterpart in its Central Bank.¹⁶⁰ The travelling costs of the Turkish people went to the United States for technical training was compensated by Turkish state and the travel and living costs of the experts coming to Turkey came from the counterpart funds, as was the case. Hence, the needed money mainly came from the state budget, while the Americans gave the technical training.

¹⁶⁰ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER IV

THE MARSHALL PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN TURKEY, THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

Among the major American aid-sponsored projects in Turkey, there were the organization and training of the Turkish armed forces, the supply of military equipment and weapons; the supply of modern farming equipment, the improvement of farming methods, the expansion of irrigation; the modernization of the Zonguldak coal mines, iron and chrome mining, the production of electric power; financial and technical support to construct highway networks, harbor, and military facilities; a technical assistance program; and the purchase of definite consumption goods (oil products, construction equipment, chemical products and spare parts), etc.

All these sectors contributed in the development of the Turkish economy as well as the growth of the American economy and the reconstruction of the world capitalist system. The Marshall Plan presented a development model for Turkey in this “Golden Age”; but, this model was in accordance with the United States’ priorities and vision.

Although a general discussion of the Marshall Plan implementation in Turkey will be presented and the details of the program will be analyzed, this chapter focuses on the subject to pinpoint the more defective sides of the Plan and the deviated aims and practices of the Plan from its general discourse of being an aid and assistance for peace-loving countries.

4.1. Agriculture

4.1.1. The General Allocation of Funds to Agriculture

Agriculture was one of the most crucial areas for the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Turkey. For the United States-projected international capitalist system and the continuity of the capital accumulation process, at least for the first period of the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1952, Turkey was chosen as an agricultural country in the integrated world capitalist system and agricultural modernization and irrigation equipment were given to improve the production as such. The agriculture program was suitable for this role and with the main theme of Turkey's capitalist accumulation process. For the actors of the Plan, agriculture in Turkey had to be modernized to achieve effective production and be constructed in a continuous relationship with the U.S. intervention. Thus, Turkey would provide the needed agricultural products for market and for European countries and the United States; in addition, it would provide the needed market for the over-production of the United States. While Turkey was practicing the etatism principle and had put industry as the locomotive sector in the development process before the war, this shifted to agriculture as a condition of the United States assistance. Developing agriculture provided a stronger integration with the world economy for Turkey instead of former statist policies. On the other hand, the huge importance given to agriculture in the first years of the Plan shifted to other areas, to defense and to the service sectors in the last years in accordance with the changed role assigned to Turkey.

For this reason, the agriculture sector demonstrates some interest relations in

the Marshall Plan. The mechanization of agriculture, artificial fertilizers, modern agriculture techniques, and easy and cheap credit for the farmers were the slogans of the Plan. The backwardness and low production of agriculture in Turkey was explained as there being too much hand power, insufficient mechanized vehicles, not using scientific methods, undeveloped irrigation works and highway network.¹⁶¹ Already, these listed reasons explain not only the agriculture sector but also the whole Marshall Plan in Turkey, its aims and implementation areas. Also, giving the importation permission to the private sector and credit to the farmers provided Turkish capital to expand by cooperating with American capital.

In the general implementation of agriculture program of the Marshall Plan, 34.2 percent of the direct aid and 21 percent of the general aid was allocated for agriculture until the end of 1950. Of them, 40.1 percent was for tractors and 11.4 percent was for their spare parts. Additionally, sources for wheels, calcium chloride, and all equipment in full sets were provided for tractors. Thus, the percentage becomes much more in total amount.¹⁶²

By the end of 1958, 96,665,000 dollars of the Marshall Plan had been used for agriculture to purchase agricultural modernization products, mainly tractors and artificial fertilizers. Mainly being direct aid to import equipment from the United States, only 1,411,000 and 1,508,000 dollars drawing rights were used as indirect aid to purchase various agricultural equipment from European countries in the 1948-1949 and 1949-1950 period allocations.

¹⁶¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 21.

¹⁶² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 5, 1950, pp. 9-10.

Table 2. Allocated Aid for Agriculture Sector until the End of 1959

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Drawing Rights	Special Source	Total
1948-1949	22,148,000	1,411,000		23,559,000
1949-1950	14,626,000	1,508,000		16,134,000
1950-1951	9,594,000			9,594,000
1951-1952	7,300,000		7,260,000	14,560,000
1952-1953	5,730,000		1,000,000	6,730,000
1953-1954	9,757,000			9,757,000
1954-1955	8,771,000			8,771,000
1955-1956	8,101,000			8,101,000
1956-1957	2,163,000			2,163,000
1957-1958	3,310,000			3,310,000
Total	91,500,000	2,919,000	8,260,000	102,679,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 9, 10, 11, 14, 18, 23, 28, 31, and 36.

4.1.2. Tractors

Tractors were the main elements of the Marshall Plan, in all its sector. In the details of all development spheres such a transportation, irrigation, mining besides agriculture, we see the purchase of tractors under the Marshall Plan. Of the first quarter's credit of 10 million dollars, 7 million dollars were allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture in the first year and devoted to the purchase of tractors and their spare parts from the United States.¹⁶³ Also, spare parts indicate the great project that came with the Marshall Plan. In this small amount, it constituted about 15 percent of the total expense in this industry relationship. This percentage could not be

¹⁶³ *Akşam*, July 6, 1948.

underestimated and gives the clue as to what the Marshall Plan tried to establish in Turkey. As simple basic data, the usage of 1,425,000 dollars from the allocation of the 1948-1949 period, the usage of 7,575,000 dollars from the allocation of the 1949-1950 period, and total agricultural equipment orders until 1957 show the shares in the agriculture sector:

Table 3. Agricultural Usage of 1948-1949 Period's Allocation

Kind of Good	Amount in \$
Agricultural Equipment	562,000
Spare Parts	156,000
Tractors	579,000
Transport	128,000
TOTAL	1,425,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 24.

Table 4. Agricultural Usage of 1949-1950 Period's Allocation

Kind of Good	Amount in \$
Tractors	3,600,000
Agricultural Equipment	2,390,000
Spare Parts	1,500,000
Tractor Inner and Outer wheels	50,000
Wheel Repair Equipment	25,000
Calcium Chlorure	10,000
TOTAL	7,575,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 2, 1950, p. 9.

Table 5. Ordered Agricultural Equipment by the Marshall Plan Until 1957

Kind of Equipment	Order number
Tractor	7919
Plough, Tractor drawn	12,407
One-way	4032
Grain drill	7192
Cotton planter	4115
Disk-Harrow	7413
Cultivator	3432
Meadow and reap Machine	269
Combine	3642
Tresher	488
Plough, Animal Drawn	2943
Trailer	4044
Hoe	1962
Rake	672
Cotton Selector	33
Duster	3350
Flame Machine	1012
Mobile Repair Shop	6
One Way Chest	809
Centrifuge	694
Motopump	423
Baler	61
Rod-Weeder	104

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 29, 1956, p. 29.¹⁶⁴

According to the Barker report, there were 3200 tractors in Turkey when European Cooperation Administration assistance became available early in 1949 and as a result of the increase, the number likely to be in operation by the middle of 1951 was estimated at 10,000.¹⁶⁵ In addition, the Central Statistical Office's Survey results on tractors and other agricultural vehicles and machines between 1955 and 1959

¹⁶⁴ Also, available data can be found in DIE, *Summary of Agricultural Statistics*, 1958; and Reşat Aktan, "Mechanization of Agriculture in Turkey," *Land Economics* 33, no. 4 (November, 1957), p. 276.

¹⁶⁵ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 73.

show another rapid increase in tractors, reached to 41,896 in 1959.¹⁶⁶ As a summary, tractor numbers were 1156 in 1945, 16,585 in 1950, 42,136 in 1960, 105,865 in 1970, and 325,225 in 1977.¹⁶⁷

The imported tractors were used in certain areas which the United States determined, again in accordance with the role determined in the world capitalist system for Turkey. The focus was on agriculture and raw materials producers and especially cereal crops and cotton. In the first five years, Turkey was obliged to provide 500,000 tones of cereal crops for Europe.¹⁶⁸ Thus, by September 1950, 60 percent of the Marshall Plan tractors were sold in cereal crop regions and 40 percent of them were sold in the Aegean and Çukurova regions. Almost all of the tractors were separated for these areas and to cultivate these certain products. While the Marshall Plan importation brought this distribution of tractors, other purchasing generally maintained this process. The approximate number of tractors in 1948 and 1951 show the increase in tractors and their places. As the table shows, where the tractor usage level was quite low, the tractor increase level was quite high there; also, the introduction of tractors was launched especially in Çukurova, in cotton and cereal crops production place:

¹⁶⁶ Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Central Statistical Office, *Tractor Survey Results, Agricultural Machinery and Equipments, 1955-1959*, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ DIE, No. 846, T. 24-25.

¹⁶⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 14, Session 3, Sitting 23, 24.12.1948, pp. 282-313.

Table 6. Tractor Numbers in Turkey in 1948 and 1951

City	1948	1951	1959
Adana	650	2200	5398
Amasya	10	121	417
Ankara	53	541	2710
Antalya	23	418	1181
Aydın	134	948	3013
Bursa	30	165	1085
Denizli	23	305	561
Diyarbakır	6	123	307
Edirne	42	255	1235
Eskişehir	87	471	1268
Hatay	23	290	1170
İçel	125	340	1229
İstanbul	96	158	668
İzmir	75	689	2566
Kırklareli	42	170	791
Kırşehir	5	106	544
Konya	54	475	3264
Manisa	75	702	2393
Maraş	20	101	456
Samsun	56	173	654
Tekirdağ	62	489	2027
Urfa	10	194	660

Source: For the 1948 and 1951 data, *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 8, 1951, p. 16; also, for 1959 data, Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Central Statistical Office, *Tractor Survey Results, Agricultural Machinery and Equipments, 1955-1959* (Ankara: Ankara Printing House, 1960, p. 8.

Because the United States determined where tractors and other agricultural equipment would be used, they basically demanded that they not be used in tobacco production. Thus, tobacco is a controversial case of the Plan. As is known, tobacco was one of the most prominent import goods of Turkey. However, not to be a competitor for Virginia tobacco of Turkish tobacco, the U.S. limited tractors use in Thrace and Eastern Anatolia initially and banned tobacco exports to European

countries.¹⁶⁹ Their recommendation with the Plan was to quit the expertise in tobacco production. However, beforehand in the exportation process, the preference had been on the American side. The best quality leaf had been sold chiefly to the United States, where it was blended with domestic tobaccos. In Turkey, poorer qualities had been consumed locally.¹⁷⁰ Again, the case indicates that the Marshall Plan was projected to flourish the United States economy by determination of in which areas Turkey would produce, would develop, and to which point it would develop.¹⁷¹

Many different steps caused the consequence of U.S. domination of the agricultural economy of Turkey in the period. American tractors and other agricultural appropriations of the Marshall Plan were imported by chosen firms and sold in the market at a 25 percent profit, 20 percent advance payment and in 6 installments. The Agricultural Bank gave credit to farmers who wanted to buy tractors with 2.5 percent interest. The Bank also gave other loans (at about 6-7 percent interest) to farmers to facilitate their production or to get fuel for their tractors. The financing of these credits of the Bank came from counterpart funds. On the other hand, European imported tractors were sold at a 30-35 percent profit, with advance payment or payment in a very short time. Although this payment plan was facilitated later on, the interest rate was determined as three percent, again in a

¹⁶⁹ However, the United States tried to get rid of the subject, emphasizing the general cooperation between the two countries. See United States Department of State, "US-Turkish Relations," *Foreign Relations, Secretaries Memoranda of Conversation, 1947-1952*, Document No. 707, 9 September 1948.

¹⁷⁰ The Report of a Mission sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with the government of Turkey, *The Economy of Turkey, An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 60.

¹⁷¹ As mentioned, leftist critical press agency *Geveze* (The Tatler) criticized this step harshly inviting Turkish people to stand up against the United States which "condemned seven million Turkish farmers to starvation by opposing the sale of Turkish tobacco." See *Geveze*, September 15, 1948.

contrast to the American goods' advantages. Also, putting many requirements for European made agricultural equipment made their sales difficult.¹⁷² Hence, this system completely opened the path for American goods to be sold in Turkey and gave apparent superiority to them.

The tractor trademarks survey in Turkey clearly displays this fact. While most of the tractors were of American origin, 33 percent of existing tractors in 1959 were the product of the main American firms of Ford, Fordson Major, Caterpillar, Oliver, Minneapolis Moline, John Deere, and Mc. McCormick.¹⁷³ Also, the Fordson Major had one of the greatest shares and the market was in the hands of American firms.¹⁷⁴

Under these conditions, as mentioned, supplements and spare parts dependency were part of the crucial aspects of the Plan. Calcium chloride as an anti-freeze in tractor wheels and increased the lives and powers of the wheels. Thus, it was imported from the United States as a Marshall Plan product. However, the wheels had to be bought with calcium chloride water. It was not a necessary but a useful item; instead of explaining and teaching some of its benefits, forcing the purchase of the wheel was another way of expanding importation to the country and

¹⁷² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 5, 1950, p. 12.

¹⁷³ Central Statistical Office, *Tractor Survey Results...*, p. 4, "Country Situation Report: Turkey," in *Country Series: Turkey* (Washington: 1955), p. 63; and Metin Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi 1954-1997* (Ankara: Tasarımhane, 1998), pp. 13, 20-21. Özdemir explains the preference for the import American tractors as the condition of American assistance of to buy American products whether it was good or bad. Among the equipment taken in 1952, only 1 percent was from Europe while the other was from the United States. See İlhan Tekeli- Selim İlkin, "Türkiye'de Demiryolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasından Karayolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasına Geçiş (1923-1957)," in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2003), p. 416. Also, see Bahattin Akşit, *Köy, Kasaba ve Kentlerde Toplumsal Değişme* (Ankara: Turhan Press, 1985), p. 30.

¹⁷⁴ Richard Robinson confirms the situation, "Turkey limited tractor importation only with a few European model and trademark and the mission politically forced it to purchase them directly from the United States. As a result, dozens of American machines were imported creating very complex spare part and maintenance problems. For a while, even technical assistants were brought [imported] from the United States." See Richard D. Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic..." pp. 7-8. Also, "inability to maintain and repair and a scarcity of spare parts all created problems with the introduction of tractors into the villages and towns." See Defne Jones, "Economic Assistance to Turkey from Europe and The United States" (MA Thesis, Bilkent University, 2004), p. 47.

export income of the United States.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, a similar situation could be seen in a rule that stipulated that agricultural equipment had to be bought in full sets. That is, any farmer purchasing a tractor at the same time had to purchase a certain amount of machinery to go with it.¹⁷⁶ The reason was presented to gain full effectiveness from the equipment; however, it gave the real benefit to the sellers.

At the same time, spare parts created another problem at the beginning. Initially, the machines and tractors were imported but the same amount of spare parts was not and they could be found on the black market only with difficulty.¹⁷⁷ Also, because the people were completely foreign to the machines, this lack of information formed problems of wrong usage and breakage. Thus, by the lack of spare parts and repairing possibilities, the machines went out of order in a short time and began to be sold as scrap metal.¹⁷⁸ The general discourse of “ways became tractor garbage and machine cemetery¹⁷⁹” came out in this period for this reason, besides the other fact that in certain areas already old materials, items no longer in use, were sent to Turkey.¹⁸⁰ To solve the problem, the Marshall Plan directors obliged the import firms to open repair shops; also, for this reason and to import spare parts, they transferred

¹⁷⁵ As supporter of these movements had to accept, finding all spare parts of them, repairing them, and learning their usage were so difficult, costly and needed too much foreign exchange. See Yılmaz Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü, Otomotiv Sanayi Nasıl Kuruldu* (İstanbul: Milliyet Press, 1996), p. 133.

¹⁷⁶ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 73.

¹⁷⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 26, Session 4, 9 December 1953, p. 111.

¹⁷⁸ For the shortage of repair shops, see Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 10, vol. 5, Session 1, 19 February 1955, p. 258; and for their discarding Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 10, vol. 10, Session 2, 20 February 1956.

¹⁷⁹ “Yollar traktör çöplüğüne ve makine mezarlığına döndü.”

¹⁸⁰ Garrett, p. 259.

source to these firms, again creating a work area for private capital, for certain chosen firms.¹⁸¹

Richard Robinson discusses the agricultural program and its shortcomings as follows:

As an American economic adviser expressed to me in 1949, the aim of this agricultural development program was to increase the production as soon as possible and thus to provide Western Europe's needed foodstuffs. Initially neglected socio-economic problems caused the damages that threaten the affectivity of the program. The maintenance of the equipment and fuel and spare parts provided required great care. Therefore, the complaints raised that most of the new machines passed to the hands of rich landlords and this dragged the villager-farmer people into a bad situation...Also, when tractors exhausted the pasturelands in the countryside, the conflict between shepherds and farmers also got sharpened.¹⁸²

That is, the conflict between herders and farmers became escalated as the new tractors ate away at the pastureland in the country side. This movement had begun earlier as a result of the Land Distribution Law* of the Republican Party in 1945 which distributed pastures to landless villagers; however, after the mechanization of agriculture it tremendously increased, leaving almost no place for animal grazing.¹⁸³

Moreover, technical and socio-economic problems, initially all but ignored, immediately threatened the program. So was the complaint that most of the new machinery was going into the hands of those who could afford to buy it, namely the wealthy landlords, thereby placing the mass of village-farmers in a very vulnerable position.

¹⁸¹ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 6, Session 65, 16 April 1951, pp. 203–206.

¹⁸² Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", pp. 6-7.

¹⁸³ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 3, Session 1, 20 December 1946, p. 325; Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 16, Session 3, 27 February 1949, p. 856; and Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 20, Session 3, 20 February 1953, p. 571.

At an official ceremony held on May 2, 1949 on the Dolmabahçe dock in Istanbul to welcome the first consignment of agricultural equipment purchased from the United States in the context of the Marshall Plan, officials declared their support for the small producer in distribution, and this discourse was repeated on several occasions. However, rather the big landowners obtained these agricultural equipment, tractors, seeds, etc.,¹⁸⁴ while the small farmers who owned less than five acres did not benefit from them.¹⁸⁵ Also, this relation type opened the path for bribery and using politicians as mediators throughout the country.¹⁸⁶

As a result, small farmers had to join together and buy tractors to cultivate the lands of big land owners. Instead of production for their own livings, the small farmers were forced to produce for the market in this new system of mechanization brought by the Marshall Plan.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, they went into debt and in the end, became the supporters of the capital accumulation process of the big land owners, who could easily integrate into the world capitalist economy and into the new agricultural system. It could be deduced that the Marshall Plan, although it did not start the process, facilitated and supported landlordship in Turkey; it supported big capital against the small producer-farmer.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ Cavit Oral, “Ziraat Durumu ve Marshall Planı,” *Türk Ekonomisi*, no. 72 (June 1949), pp. 136–137.

¹⁸⁵ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p.23.

¹⁸⁶ Yozgat deputy Faik Erbaş brought the subject onto the General Assembly agenda stating examples of this decay although the Minister of Agriculture Nedim Ökmen insisted on the support of small farmers. For the discussion, see Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 6, Session 1, Sitting 6, 16.4.1951, pp. 204-207.

¹⁸⁷ Then, “while the weak was small land owner, the strong was tractor owner entrepreneur.” İlhan Tekeli, *Bağımlı Kentleşme, Kırdan ve Kentte Dönüşüm Süreci* (Ankara: Mimarlar Odası Pub., 1977), p. 30. Also, Tütengil argued this was a new “farmer type.” Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *İctimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları* (Istanbul: Istanbul Pub. House, 1961), p. 50.

¹⁸⁸ For the exploration of passing to big business body in agricultural area came with new relationships around tractor ownership, see H. Gençça, I. Kapil, S. Duman, C.K. Mann, *Introducing*

Signs of this process could be seen from agricultural relationships as mentioned and from trading processes as it will be detailed in private sector section, because, also in economy, the Marshall Plan facilitated big companies, especially Koç Trade Joint-Stock Company and Çukurova Holding Company at the head, to grow in importation and franchising. Deputy Kemal Zeytinoğlu questioned the importation of Marshall Plan agricultural equipment by the Agricultural Equipping Institution, how they chose the traders to give the importation rights to. The discussions in the General Assembly by this opportunity raised the implications that preferential treatment was being given to some traders in this relationship.¹⁸⁹ On another occasion, Kayseri deputy Mehmet Özdemir questioned in a National Assembly session the considerations of the Agricultural Equipping Institution while selling the imported tractors, plows and other agricultural equipment and the working system of this office. He also criticized the process of sales in which farmers gave huge amounts of money to apply, waited for months and could be refused to giving equipment.¹⁹⁰ These repeated discussions and criticisms support that the Marshall Plan appropriations also created some unequal distributions inside the country.

Moreover, because of this mechanization process, small landowners had to leave their lands and migrated to the cities to find new job opportunities seasonally or totally, which started off the mass urbanization movement in Turkey after 1950s.

New Agricultural Technology on the Anatolian Plateau, U.S. Aid, Economic Staff Papers (January 1973).

¹⁸⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 14, Session 3, Sitting 23, 24 December 1948, pp. 282–313.

¹⁹⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 16, Sitting 1, Session 18, 17 December 1951, pp. 201–204.

4.1.3. Soil Products Office Sharing

Besides the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Supply Agency, appropriations to the agriculture sector were also implemented thorough the Soil Products Office. Until 1958, the Bureau took 43,897,000 dollar in aid from the Plan.¹⁹¹ These appropriations were used to import wheat and flour, tractors, trucks, cranes, spare parts and other equipment; to develop the meat and fish industries; packaging, cereal crops storage, and cold air facilities. In many cities like Istanbul, Trabzon, Sinop, Zonguldak, and Samsun, cold air facilities were opened.¹⁹² New equipment was put in usage to upgrade fishing from for subsistence level to production for the market; fish exportation and transportation ships were put into action.¹⁹³ Again, the Marshall Plan supposed Turkey's sales of fish and animal resources to the American markets and for European reconstruction.

Each small detail supports the general thesis that the Marshall Plan was put into practice to create benefits for the United States and the world capitalist system. In the fishing area, the use of the imported equipment shows this fact. According to the Marshall Plan requirements, buyers had to inform the importing firm about their use areas for the equipment and the firm provided the goods it deemed suitable. Also, the firm could take the equipment back if it wants; moreover, if buyers took the equipment with credit, they could not own the equipment until they had paid all of

¹⁹¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 24, 1955, p. 8; and *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 28, 1956, p.8.

¹⁹² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 7, 1951, p. 57.

¹⁹³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 22, 1955, p. 35.

the credits.¹⁹⁴ This rule was valid also for other agricultural machines, that the ownership of the equipment was not given to the farmer until he had paid off his debt.

4.1.4. Agricultural Surplus Commodities

Another important part of the Marshall Plan agriculture program in Turkey was agricultural surplus commodities. Beginning from 1954, the United States adopted a new approach to sell its own agricultural surplus commodities, at which point the Marshall Plan's mission of market creation for the United States production surplus became more apparent. Initially, because of the dry harvest year Turkey had had a bad harvest in 1949. Thus, according to the Marshall Plan implementators, Turkey was in scarcity of food and 127,706 tons of wheat was imported that year.¹⁹⁵ However, Turkey sold 63,000 tone wheat, 214,726 tons of barley, 65,000 tons of ray, 5360 tons of corn, and 9948 tons of oat to various European countries just one year later, in 1950 and was the fifth greatest wheat exporter country in 1953.¹⁹⁶ Again afterwards, Turkey mainly began to import crops and other agricultural products from the United States as a part of the Marshall Plan and the American agricultural production surplus program while it also continued to export raw materials, its own agricultural products, to other countries after 1954. Although these matters show that

¹⁹⁴ Republic of Turkey, Düstur, "Marshall Yardımı Gereğince Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Tarafından Memlekete Getirtilecek Olan Her Türlü Su Mahsulleri Avcılığı Ve Sanayine Ait Vasıta Ve Malzemenin Satış Ve Tevziine Dair Yönetmeliği Yürürlüğe Koyan Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı", 3rd Series, vol. 31, 1949–1950, pp. 2085–2089.

¹⁹⁵ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 132.

¹⁹⁶ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 18, Session 2, 27 February 1952 and Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 10, vol. 10, Session 2, 20 February 1956, p. 343.

Turkey was not in dire need of these products from the Marshall Plan, they were imported because the United States needed a market for its products and surplus to maintain its own capitalist economy. Hence, they implemented the Marshall Plan on Turkey and other countries.



Figure 2: A Picture of American-sent Wheat



Figure 3: A Picture of American-sent Wheat

Source: United States, Agency for International Development, “Wheat in Turkey,” in *Spring Review: New Cereal Varieties*, vol. 7, USAID, 1969, pp. 2, 8.

Between 1954 and 1962, Turkey and the United States signed 16 agricultural product agreements amounting to 374,223,000 dollars.¹⁹⁷ Their Turkish lira counterpart of 985,276,742 was deposited in the Central Bank and they could only be released according to the agreement conditions of where they would be appropriated and in which proportion between the two countries, by four percent annual interest payments to be paid over 26 years. And then, 63 percent of the money were released for the government to use in economic development programs.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Ministry of Finance, *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 42, 1960, p. 12.

¹⁹⁸ Ministry of Finance, *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 8.

4.1.5. Several Benefits of the United States

Again the question is asked: “Who benefited from the Marshall Aid?” The United States sold (not granted) its products; it saved the same amount of money from the state budget either to put in counterpart funds or as a credit at certain interest rates with the claim that they would use them for the development of the economy. Apparently, these funds were used to support the Agricultural Bank and farmers; however, even this move helped the American economy to flourish, creating purchasing power for imported goods. In fact, this money was used for the areas in which the United States showed a benefit for itself, like extracting raw materials, accessing new markets, and benefiting from natural resources.

Therefore, the directors of the Marshall Plan aimed at numerous things with the agriculture sector of the Plan in Turkey. First, they provided Turkey as an agricultural and raw material exporter country in the international division of labor and provided the needed agricultural products for European countries. Moreover, they guaranteed the capital accumulation process by creating markets for the production surplus of the United States. Hence, while the ground for expanding the agricultural production for the market and Turkey’s capital accumulation process was tied to agricultural products and raw material exportation, it was guaranteed to provide the needed agricultural production for the European countries under the content of the Plan and utilized the over-production of the American capital. Besides, with the mechanization of the agriculture, it was aimed to cheapen the labor power and provide the needed cheap working force in the international division of labor.¹⁹⁹ Also, much of the equipment for agriculture was sold to Turkey and the country

¹⁹⁹ Tören, p. 137.

became mainly dependent on the United States for spare parts and side products of machines. Then, giving the import permits and franchising rights for the agriculture machines and spare parts to the private sector created new unequal distributions inside the country and constructed an integral relationships between Turkish and American capital.²⁰⁰ Last, giving loans to farmers also strengthened this capital relationship and debt-dependency on the United States. Hence, although the so-called modernization theory aimed to help the countries to develop, in fact, it provided certain economic, social, and political benefit for the United State in the Marshall Plan process.

Accordingly, the production in Turkish agriculture increased because the spread of the use of power equipment increased the area of cultivated land to a marked degree.²⁰¹ These rapid production increases were materialized after the Second World War without the requirement of huge investments because only in that period were the limits of cultivable land in Turkey reached,²⁰² while about 55 percent total expansion was indicated in cultivable areas.²⁰³ That is, the increase in the effectiveness went hand in hand with the expansion in cultivation areas, such as mentioned in the case of the vanishing pastureland. In this regard, the Marshall Plan reports indicate that between 1948 and 1952, grain production increased 37 percent,

²⁰⁰ It was compulsory for importer firms to purchase spare part at the amount of 10 percent of the equipment. See State Archives General Directorate, Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 03001805068, the November 13, 1948 dated Protocol for the importation and sale conditions of agricultural equipments, p. 3.

²⁰¹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 74.

²⁰² Şevket Pamuk, “1820-2005: İktisadi Büyümede Dünya Nereye Geldi? Türkiye Nereye?,” in *Bilim Teknoloji, Cumhuriyet newspaper*, 23 February 2007, p. 15.

²⁰³ Owen and Pamuk, p. 144.

cultivation area increased 23 percent, industrial products increased 112 percent and its cultivation area increased 60 percent.²⁰⁴

However, on the one hand, the Turkish authorities were somewhat blind to this reality while celebrating the American intervention while on the other hand, the American authorities insisted on benefiting from the situation as if it was totally their own succeeds. The controls on imports and the increase in the harvests improved Turkey's position in trade considerably at the end of 1953. The U.S. ambassador in Ankara was the first spokesman of this optimism. Neglecting the extraordinary conditions of the 1950-1953 period²⁰⁵ and the role of the newly expanded agricultural lands with the facilitation of mechanization, the high level production was presented as totally the result of American assistance.²⁰⁶ Turkey and the Democrat Party government used all advantages of extreme optimism for the near economic future of the country, claiming that with the Democrat Party era, the countryside had begun to catch-up. These approachments to agriculture and private sector in the Marshall Plan's content was in the intersection of American and Democrat Party's priorities.

4.1.6. Water Works, Irrigation Projects

Another implementation area, water works, was the extension of the agricultural program of the Marshall Plan. Thorough the mediation of the Ministry of Public Works (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı) and State Water Works Office (Devlet Su

²⁰⁴ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 13, 1952, p. 15.

²⁰⁵ Kindleberger explored similar attention in the first years of the Plan stating that "the success of the Plan was exaggerated by the change from a bad harvest in 1947 to an average one in 1948." See Kindleberger, pp. 257 and 262.

²⁰⁶ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 15.

İşleri), the Marshall Plan aimed to increase the agricultural production with the development of irrigation.

According to the Thornburg report, the irrigation system would greatly increase the production of the farms now short of water for a large part of the year,²⁰⁷ and the greatest need in this project was for competent engineering²⁰⁸ to determine irrigation types to develop agriculture by expanding plantation areas, increasing the diversity of crops and to provide drinking water for public health –while the priority was given to agricultural development.

To reach this goal, the authorities worked to utilize from rivers, drain swamps, and stop floods. The ECA mission awarded the projects on irrigation to many American and European firms through the agency of their chosen franchisers as the result of one bilateral agreement on January 4, 1950.²⁰⁹ Thus, conveniently with the Marshall Plan's target, this awarding process brought front a similar practice of the Marshall Plan: they supported the United States and the European countries in the plan, on the one hand, and the capital accumulation process of the franchisers in Turkey, deepening the unequal distribution of resources inside the country on the other hand.²¹⁰

In the irrigation context, projects on the Menderes plain, the Meriç river and the underground water in Tarsus, Konya, and Menemen were considered. The Aegean region and inner Anatolia had leading places in using the resources, because they concentrated on grain and cotton production. The increase of production in these

²⁰⁷ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 186.

²⁰⁸ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 220.

²⁰⁹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 2, 1950, p. 16; and vol. 9, 1951, pp. 63-67.

²¹⁰ Tören, p. 154.

areas was demanded within the framework of the Marshall Plan as the determined role for Turkey in the world capitalist system. Thus, the irrigation projects mainly concentrated on these regions. Imported tractors, excavators, scrapers, etc. were used in these regions in which cereal crops and cotton were being produced, like the improvement and construction work for irrigation in Konya, Manisa, Eskişehir, Aydın, Adana, Susurluk, Maraş, and Çanakkale. Totally 14 articles of work were defined in this area of The State Water Works Office; also, while 1,470,000 dollars equipment of direct and indirect Marshall aid were devoted to these projects, a 22,459,000 Turkish lira domestic subsidy was determined for the state.²¹¹

The Meriç River improvement project was among the first of the irrigation projects. The Meriç River Stable Committee was founded by Turkey, Greece, and ECA representatives and the American Harza Engineering Company took the work.²¹² American, Turkish, and Greek financing was used in the project. To carry out another prominent improvement irrigation project on the Menderes Plain, the work was awarded to the American Tippetts Abbet Engineering Company for 149,000 dollars.²¹³ Also, some projects on underground water were carried out to secure drinking water. The experts of the American World Mining Consultants Incorporation²¹⁴ researched on Tarsus, Menemen, Kacova and Konya regions and the construction of reservoirs were planned.²¹⁵

²¹¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 65.

²¹² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 7, 1951, p. 23.

²¹³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 2, 1950, p. 17.

²¹⁴ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 16, 1953, p. 16.

²¹⁵ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 14, 1953, p. 16.

In this way, until the end of the 1957-1958 period, resources totaling 6,431,000 dollars were transferred to the irrigation projects from the Marshall Plan. 2,816,000 dollars of this allocation was given as direct aid and 3,615,000 dollars were from indirect aid. Table 7 shows the details of this allocation:

Table 7. Marshall Plan Allocations for the Irrigation Sector between 1949 and 1958

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Drawing Rights	Special Source	Technical Aid	Total
1949-1950	410,000	1,060,000		25,000	1,495,000
1950-1951		440,000			440,000
1951-1952			650,000		650,000
1952-1953	500,000		440,000	1,000,000	1,940,000
1953-1954	206,000				206,000
1955-1956	200,000				200,000
1956-1957	1,100,000				1,100,000
1957-1958	400,000				400,000
Total	2,816,000	1,500,000	1,090,000	1,025,000	6,431,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 9, 10, 14, 20, 28, 30, 36.

Irrigation projects aimed to drain 491,000 hectares of swamp land, to save 686,000 hectares land from floods, to water 25,000 hectares land, and increase the watering land areas to 205,000 hectares.²¹⁶ Land leveling and irrigation projects that began in this period ended in 1968.

4. 2. Mining

From the Industrial Revolution to the twenty-first century, underground resources such as lignite, chrome, iron, but especially coal and oil have been industry, energy, power, hegemony, and war. Turkey was central to a country rich in

²¹⁶ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, pp. 65-66.

underground resources. With the foundation of the Mining Research and Exploration Institute (*Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü*) in 1935, Turkey began regular explorations and geological work. Hence, in an American project such as the Marshall Plan, mining was one of the main sectors of its Turkey implementation because Turkey was the reserve power in the Western development.²¹⁷

The aim was the extraction and export of raw materials, coal and other resources, to serve to the uses of the United States and Europe. Coal was one of the most essential elements for Western industry and emphasis on this area shows the goal behind American aid in forming Turkey as the resource provider in their development. Americans pursued a strong building and rebuilding activity in the mining sphere and this area became one of the most important job facilities for American and European firms through the Marshall Plan, supporting the capital accumulation process in Europe and in the United States, it provided needed raw materials for them, and approached Turkey's capitalist development process with the export of raw materials.²¹⁸

The Marshall Plan allocated resources to the following institutions in the mining sector: Etibank, Sümerbank, The Turkey Iron-Steel Administration (*Türkiye Demir-Çelik Kurumu*), The Mining Research and Exploration Institute (MTA), The State Monopolies (*TEKEL*), Turkish Petroleum Incorporation (*Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı- TPAO*), and Turkey Cellulose-Paper Company.

The goal was to increase the exportation of the required sources, mainly coal, for the usage of the United States and European countries. In the Plan process, with the partnership of the Mining Research and Exploration Institute and an American

²¹⁷ Tören, p. 125.

²¹⁸ Tören, p. 172.

sounding company, mining studies were carried out in Zonguldak. Projects were prepared to increase the efficiency in the mining basin. The Ereğli coal facilities took the largest amount from Etibank allocations in the context of the Marshall Plan. Indeed, Zonguldak coal was probably the largest project undertaken in Turkey until that time. Studies for lignite, iron, chrome, lead, gold, silver, and antimony production constituted other areas in the mining sphere of the Marshall Plan in Turkey. The Soma, Tunçbilek, Değirmisaz and Ağaçalı lignite mines; the Divriği iron mine; the Palu chrome; Keban and Bolkardağ lead; Turhal antimony, and Ergani copper mines were covered by the program.

The mining project of Turkey was planned in two periods, 1948-1952 and 1952-1957. Although the Marshall Plan was initially declared for a four-year period, this project was a clue that a longer development and intervention program was planned, at least for Turkey. A huge amount of money was allocated to this sector. For the period of 1948-1952, the Marshall Plan accepted to give 56,783,000 dollars for the 73,793,000 dollars project. Again, the state budget was also used for this program. In addition, between 1949 and 1953, 25,589,876 dollars were allocated to Etibank as indirect aid to purchase the needed equipment from the European countries. The largest amount of these allocations was reserved for coal, for the Zonguldak coal facilities. Totally, until 1957, 48,579,675 dollars of direct aid and 25,589,876 dollars of indirect aid were used for mining, mainly in the Ereğli coal administration. Still, funds were used for the importation of mining machines and equipment.

A government document exemplifies the huge amount of the national budget in the Marshall Plan-lead sectors. It illustrates the Marshall Plan allocation for the mining sector in Turkey and comparatively great state allocation for mining

development projects, stating that 239,031,392 Turkish lira were given by the Marshall Plan direct and indirect aids, 365,883,589 lira were taken as credit from European firms and 1,007,532,811 lira were used from internal sources.²¹⁹

The first project was to increase the coal produced by the Zonguldak basin from 5,180,000 to 7,400,000 tones. The aims in this project were to increase the amount of extracted coal and export it to help the development of European countries and to satisfy the foreign exchange need; and to increase the extraction in a shift in mines and thus, to decrease the cost.²²⁰

Increasing the yearly extraction would be carried out by the mechanization of the underground facilities, modernizing the above-ground equipment, increasing the capacity of the power line between the mine and the railway line, building a modern coal washing facility, and the construction of another electric power station.²²¹

In lignite production, the goals were to increase the yearly extraction from the of Soma mine, from about 240,000 to 620,000 tones, of Tunçbilek mine from about 285,000 to 540,000 tones, of Değirmisaz mine from about 250,000 to 310,000, and of Ağa lı mine, which had not been worked since the first World War, to 300,000 tones. Lignite was similar in importance in the Marshall Plan to electricity. It was planned as a substitute for coal inside the country. That is, to export the good quality coal to the United States and Europe, lignite was supported in the Marshall Plan to be used in Turkey. They explain this self-interest as a service to the

²¹⁹ The Prime Ministry Republican archives, Document No. 03001734665.

²²⁰ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 40.

²²¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 48.

development of Europe and with the increase of foreign exchange in the country.²²² In this regard, Export Import Bank gave 500,000 dollars credit to Turkey besides the Marshall Plan funds and the state budget. We see the justification of this maneuver in the Thornburg report criticized the usage of Zonguldak coal in the national industry facility in Karabük and suggests that the exportation of coal would be more beneficial for Turkish people, stating that the Karabük factory used heavily on the already insufficient coal deduction of Zonguldak which was needed for exportation to foreign countries as well as fuel for heating in Turkey.²²³ Similarly, the report both opposed huge energy facilities and their being in the hands of the state seeing the over-production of electrical energy production as “dangerous.”²²⁴

As another part of the Marshall Plan funds in the mining sector, Sümerbank took 1,835,000 dollars for the revision of coke factory and 1,680,000 dollars for the Sinter installation to remove sulfide from the mine between 1949 and 1951. Similarly, the Turkey Iron and Steel Facilities took 4,048,000 dollars in loans between 1952 and 1958 to increase steel production capacity from 180,000 to 600,000 tons. The Mining Research and Exploration Institute took 2,184,000 dollars in aid to import drilling machines. Of these funds, between 1951 and 1955, 1,733,010 dollars were direct and 450,990 dollars were indirect aid. Because of the need for salt in Western countries, some resources were allocated for the State Monopolies to

²²² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 51.

²²³ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir*, pp. 205-207. This determination serves two things: the Thornburg committee and American/ new world system interests both demanded securing the Turkish coal and other mines and raw materials for their own development and placed Turkey as an agricultural country and opposed the development by industrialization by criticizing the use of coal in an industrial facility. Moreover, while the Thornburg report generally gives the priority to highways instead of railways in the transportation sector, it affirms the use of coal in locomotives (while it opposed using it in factories) which carried this coal to the port cities for exportation.

²²⁴ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 129.

increase salt production in Çamaltı and Yavşan saltbeds. 1,335,000 dollars were allocated from the Marshall Plan funds for this aim in the form of 840,000 dollars indirect and 495,000 dollars in direct aid. While this amount was used to import equipment and provide work and profit area for foreign firms, the state budget paid for other expenses in the project. The Turkish Petroleum Incorporation took 1,517,000 dollars for importing machines. Last, the Turkey Cellulose Paper Factory took 235,000 dollars in 1957 for the importation of cellulose and certain raw materials. In the 1957-1958 period, funds for mining were transferred into Turkey Coal Facilities (*Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri*) and was the only energy portfolio left at Etibank. Total mining appropriations of the Marshall Plan in Turkey through Etibank were as follows:

Table 8. The Marshall Plan Indirect Aid to the Mining Sector through Etibank

<i>in \$</i>	Drawing Rights	Special Source	Amount
1949-1950	Ereğli Coal Facilities		9,437,932
1949-1950	Garp Lignites		1,901,644
1949-1950	Divriği Iron Facility		780,000
1949-1950	Transportation		200,000
1949-1950	Facility Equipment		349,357
1949-1950	Mine Pole		184,058
1951-1952		Ereğli Coal Facilities –Energy Program- Lignites	9,695,000
1951-1952		Garp Lignites	550,000
1952-1953		Energy Program	4,020,000
1952-1953		Facility Equipment	491,733
Total			27,609,724

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 9, 10, and 14.

Table 9. The Marshall Plan Direct Aid to the Mining Sector through Etibank until June 30, 1957

I) Ereğli Coal Mining Opr.	Usage	II) Western Lignite Mining Opr.	Usage
Electro Mechanization Equip.	6,446,000	Soma Development Equipment	888,000
—300 Multiple	6,306,000	Tunçbilek/Değirmisaz Dev. Equip.	1,037,000
Port of Zonguldak	2,380,000	Soma Washery	214,000
Kozlu Mines	560,000	Open Facility Extension	429,000
Washeries	-	Tunçbilek Open Facility	3,649,000
Road Building Machinery	110,000	Değirmisaz Open Facility	1,540,000
Suspension Mine Equipment	50,000	Tunçbilek Washeries	-
Transformers	536,000	Tunçbilek Conveyor(PA)	130,000
Miscellaneous Orders	3,365,000	Total	7,887,000
Spare Parts	237,000		
Zonguldak Mine	-		
a) Kozlu Crane Facility	220,000	III) Divriği Iron Ore Mining Opr.	Usage
b) Transfer Stations	95,000	Divriği Iron Ore Mining Opr.	1,004,000
c) Steel Bridges	130,000	Total	1,004,000
Facilitation Equipment	532,000		
Miscellaneous Material	220,000	IV) Ergani Copper Mining Opr.	Usage
Technical Assistance	166,400	Spare for Plants	6,110
Total	21,353,400	Electric Furnace	14,700
		Cobalt Recovery(Techn. Assis.)	10,000
		Total	30,810
V) Murgul Copper Mining Opr.	Usage	IX) Survey and Control	Usage
Compressor	-	Survey and control	3,821,000
Murgul Extension	401,000	Total	3,821,000
Sulphuric Acid Sealine	100,000		
Murgul Extension	178,000		
Total	679,000	X) Miscellaneous	Usage
		Mine Pole	4,700,000
		Operational Equipment	1,614,602
		Recoveries	171,000
		To Various Fac. (1955/56)	
VI) Keçiborlu Sulfur Facility	Usage	a) EK-GL-EB	805,000
Sulfur Refinement Equipment	25,673	b) EK-GL-EB-ÇA-MB	2,075,000
Total	25,673	c) KK-BS-GK-EB-MB	178,000
		d) MB-EB-KK-	499,000
VII) Eastern Chrome Min. Opr.	Usage	Advance for Fac. From 1956/57	
Geophysical Instruments	12,000	a) EK-GL-MB-EB-GK	299,000
Total	12,000	b) GL-EB-MB-GK-KK	195,000
		c) MB-EB-GL-GK-KK-EK	263,000
VIII) Power Program	Usage	d) EK-CA-MB	200,000
Sarıyar Powerhouse &Power Trans. Line	14,752,000	Advance for Fac. (1956/57)	
Kandilli-Vaniköy power line	6,609,000	a) GL-GK-EB-MB	200,000
Umraniye-Silahtar and Bosphorus Jump	1,039,000	b) GL-EB-KK	234,000
Bursa-Eskisehir Trans. line	248,921	Machine Maintenance Specialist	20,000
Connection of 12 Cities	734,000	Total	11,453,602
Total	23,382,921	Freight	1,857,000
		CUMULATIVE TOTAL	71,506,406

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 31, 1957, pp. 15–19.

In the mining sector, the project was divided into two branches. The important mines like coal, steel were in the hands of state production; for the small-sized and less important mines, the private enterprise was encouraged. Likewise, the Marshall Plan allocated resources for private enterprise in the mining sector and regulated this arena and relationships in the country capital. For instance, the Ereğli Port Project contract was awarded to the Ari Construction firm in Istanbul with the close cooperation of American construction and engineering firms.²²⁵ Several mines like those for asphalt, bauxite, sulfide, and meerschauum amounted to a 116,904,500 tons reserve in the country and they were subjected modernization through the Marshall Plan in the hands of the private sector.²²⁶

As mentioned, the Marshall Plan funds were used only to buy equipment and thus it opened (almost the greatest one in mining in the Marshall Plan content) work and profit opportunities for U.S. capital; also, certain European and Turkish firms involved in the projects and the Marshall Plan created new capital relationships inside and outside the country. German, British, American and Dutch firms took huge projects in the Turkish mining sector. Also, Turkey was determined as a raw materials exporter in the world capitalist system division while this exportation policy was coincided with local authorities' priorities.

²²⁵ United States Department of State, "Memorandum to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Concerning 'Ereğli Port Project' and other Possible Construction Activities in Turkey," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document No. 216, Enclosure No.1 Despatch No. 3875, dated 2 October 1948, from the American Consulate General at Istanbul, Turkey.

²²⁶ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 36.

4.2.1. Oil Nuance

The places of and relationship between mines and oil were very carefully drawn. Post-Second World War years saw the transition to the United States-based world hegemony. This also meant a shift from coal to oil dependency in the world. As mentioned, from the industrial revolution times the coal had been the center of industrial production and development. However, coal largely became an imported material from abroad and the symbol of European leadership. When the United States found its first oil wells (before there had been small surface amounts), it made oil its hegemonic symbol and the backbone of its industry and living/income. As has been seen in the Marshall Plan's Turkey implementation, Turkey was chosen as a raw material exporter to Western/ developed countries with its rich underground resources. The increase in the lignite and electric production was supported to leave the coal for developed countries, for themselves. Coal continued to be crucial in industry. However, as the new actor, oil played a different role in this process. Turkey was also chosen as an oil importer country in this mechanized development system and the required processes were introduced to deepen this dependency on oil, especially in the highway transportation sector.

The use of oil increased greatly; for instance, in the first years of the Marshall Plan the reason for this expansion was explained as resulting from the increase in air transportation, in motor vehicles on sea and land, electric facilities working with diesel oil, the importation of several oil agricultural machines that used kerosene or diesel, the use of oil instead of coal in ships, an increase in the asphalt

needs for the new highway construction project.²²⁷ The following table shows the increase in the use of oil products through the years:

Table 10. Petroleum Consumption in Turkey

<i>1.000 Tone</i>	1938	1948	1952
Airplane gasoline	4	24	62
Autmobile gasoline	50	131	210
Kerosene	47	86	140
Diesel oil	43	83	140
Mazout	26	36	100
Metallic oil	10	15	25
Asphalt	3	10	75
Paraffin and other	1	3	10
TOTAL	184	388	762

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p.16.

Thus, the Marshall Aid allocated only a small amount for oil importation; a certain amount for oil exploration in the southeast region of the country. This small amount in the needs of Turkey opened a big path in front of a huge amount of importation and it was also shown as an aid to the development of the country. Just 3,000,000 dollars were allocated from the 1948-1949 funds to purchase petroleum products.

4.2.2. Energy

The energy sector is another indication of the United States' determination of a role for Turkey in the world capitalist system as an agricultural country, and as an exporter of basic raw materials required by the United States and Western countries.

²²⁷ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 61.

In this regard, the Marshall Plan facilitated this process by emphasizing these basic sectors, supporting them, and attempting to make this process somewhat eternal and indispensable for Turkey.

At first glance, supporting electrical energy seems contrary to the determined agricultural role of the country. However, the aim in the energy projects of the Marshall Plan was to expand the use of electricity as an energy resource inside the country instead of good quality coal and at the same time, increasing the production of the Ereğli coal facilities and thus increasing coal exports. Hence, this aid was projected to create an alternative power for Turkey and to take the most and best quality coal for itself at the time when the coal had great and crucial importance for industrial and hegemonic countries.

According to the Thornburg report, primary sources like coal fields, deposits of lignite, and hydroelectric power were abundant for a highly productive economy in Turkey.²²⁸ In 1945, the source for the energy used in electric generation came from 78.2 per cent from coal, 10.3 per cent from lignite, 4.5 per cent from water power, 4.4 per cent from fuel oil, and 2.6 per cent from wood and miscellaneous sources.²²⁹ Thornburg saw the five-year development plan and its related articles on mega projects on power and energy as a waste of available capital and suggested a review of the present national network plan by competent American engineers²³⁰ because of the need for electrical energy in the country and because it was essential especially for the future development of northwestern Anatolia.

²²⁸ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 132.

²²⁹ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 135.

²³⁰ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 245.

Following this perspective, the aim in the Plan was the expansion of the use of electric in the country and increasing the production of coal for export. Initially, the project of constructing electric lines between power stations in western Anatolia was expected to save good quality coal equal to 510 million kilowatt/ hour. Also, a 211 million kilowatt/ hour, 137,000 tons, savings was the aim of the construction of the Seyhan Hydro-electric Power Plants. The projects about electrical energy included; a power transmission line from the Çatalağzı power station to Istanbul passing thorough Adapazarı and İzmit; founding a hydraulic power station in Sarıyar and linking it to Istanbul power transmission lines in Adapazarı; another power line from Sarıyar to Ankara and Kırıkkale; also, a power line between Çatalağzı and Karabük.²³¹

In the Marshall Plan, the cost of the projects in electrical energy was calculated as 56,000,000 dollars. However, until the end of 1960, the Marshall Aid allocated 25,404,000 dollars for energy in the construction of power lines, that is, the import of equipment for them from the United States; the remaining amount was paid from the state budget. The following table shows details of the Marshall Plan allocation for the energy sector:

Table 11. Marshall Plan Allocations for Energy Sector

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Indirect Aid	Total
Sarıyar Powerhouse & Power Trans. Line	14,752,000	2,000,000	16,752,000
Kandilli-Vanıköy power line	6,609,000		6,609,000
Umraniye-Silahtar and Bosphorus Jump	1,039,000		1,039,000
Bursa-Eskisehir Trans. line	250,000	20,000	270,000
Connection of 12 Cities	734,000		734,000
Total	23,384,000	2,020,000	25,404,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 101; and vol. 31, 1957, p. 18.

²³¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, pp. 45-46.

In addition, 260,000 dollars was allocated to the Electrification Surveys Department (*Elektrik İşleri Etüt İdaresi*)²³² to make the research of “Türkiye’de Mevcut Elektrik Santralleriyle Elektriklenme Planı Etüdü” and “Türkiye Elektrifikasyonu Şebeke Analizöründe Etüd Edilmesi.”²³³ However, as the rule, the Marshall Aid only meant to import certain equipment from the United States and partly from Europe. Thus, the Electrification Surveys Department used this resource to import sounding equipment for research projects. The remaining cost for these studies came from the budget again.

Another research project for electric resources was given to the U.S. Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, the orders for the needed equipment for these projects were given to several chosen American firms; Seyhan dam and irrigation project was regulated by the American firm International Engineering Co. Inc.²³⁴ Another American engineering firm participated in the construction of the Çatalağzı-Istanbul power line. These and several other examples again show that the Marshall Plan provided work and profit sources for United States capital; also, by choosing franchisers and corporation, it provided work and profit source for certain Turkish firms; moreover, it opened the way to the corporation of American/ European and Turkish capital and brought U.S. capital to invest in Turkey. That is, the Marshall Plan installed various paths to integrate Turkish capital into the world capitalist system and maintain U.S. economy and hegemony.

The Marshall Plan demanded that the growth of heavy industry be prevented in Turkey, but gave permission for light consumption industry. Foreign capital both

²³² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 68; and vol. 39, 1959, p. 11.

²³³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 18, 1954, p.18.

²³⁴ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, pp. 45-46.

sold its products in the country and obtained profit by building corporations in the assembling industry of their goods in the Marshall Plan years. One early example of this process is that the American General Electric Company built the first Turkish-American corporative light bulb assembly plant in Turkey in 1950.²³⁵ Sixty percent was owned by its parents in the United States, twenty-five percent by İş Bankası (Labor Bank) and fifteen percent by a wealthy Turkish industrialist.²³⁶

4.3. Defense

Harry Truman emphasized the urgency of the mobility of Turkish army in the speech to the U.S. Senate. He supported the aid to Turkey for this very reason, to survive against aggressive countries. The Turkish army had to increase mobilization by reducing its size and equipping itself with modern technology and machines.²³⁷ The criticism of the American side was the excessive size of the Turkish army. Their declared aim in the aid for defense purposes was to create a smaller, better educated, better equipped mobilizing force. For this goal, it was aimed to substitute human power by motor vehicles, to create a work area and market for production surplus for the United States industry.

Apart from the cultural and social transformation aspects of the Marshall Plan, this military point had equal or more importance and the Plan tried to create an

²³⁵ Vehbi Koç's story about the foundation of this factory see Yılmaz Çetiner, pp. 113-115; also, <http://www.koc.com.tr/tr-TR/Corporate/History/History4.htm>. [February 3, 2007]. Opposition to the Marshall Plan in Turkey criticized this attempt because of this and similar free flow (enter and exit) of American capital activities gave harm to the Turkish economy. See, Geveze, September 15, 1948.

²³⁶ Morris Singer, *The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1938-1960: Economic Development in the Context of Short-term Public Policies* (Ankara: Turkish Economy Society, 1977), p. 62.

²³⁷ United States Department of State, "Message of the President to the Congress," *Aid to Greece and Turkey...*, pp. 829-832.

army linked to it from then on. Because of the continued Soviet threat, Turkey had to maintain its military at the same level and numbers as in the War; the American assistance was to reduce this burden. Moreover, during the Democrat Party government the Marshall Aid was congratulated as the path towards the full modernization of the Army. Thus, one of its most urgent needs for aid was seen in the area in local authority and the American existence was accepted willingly especially until the 1960s. Likewise, the American military mission in Turkey provided the most effective land force on the European continent against the Soviet Union giving Turkey an important place for its foreign policy.

The Truman Doctrine had been military aid to construct a defense shield with Turkey and Greece against the “aggressive” Soviet Union and to support “peace-loving” countries against collapse in the hands of Soviet Union. Thus, Turkey took funds for its defense sector before the beginning of the Marshall Plan. At as early a yeas as 1948, both the Turkish army officers and the American officers of the military mission in Turkey were satisfied with the equipment and response.²³⁸ The post-Second World War American aid was introduced with the Truman Doctrine. As mentioned, 100 million dollars in aid were given only for military purposes in that period.

On the other hand, the Marshall Plan was initially for the economic reconstruction and recovery of Europe after the ruins of the Second World War. For the first and main four-year section of the Plan, the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission carred out the program, allocating the resources to different economic sectors. However, by 1952, the Marshall Plan changed its agenda.

²³⁸ United States Department of State, “First Call of the Appointed Ambassador of the Turkish Republic,” *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949*, Document No. 682, 17 August 1948.

Although, it had been planned to be concluded by 1952, military purposes, the Korean War and the escalating Cold War determined the agenda of American foreign aid. As mentioned, the European Cooperation Administration was transformed into the Mutual Security Agency related to this subject. Hence, supporting and strengthening the defense industry and defense sector in the Marshall Plan created new and continual work and profit opportunities for American capital, for its defense industry by armament.

From this time on, some great part of the aid allocated to Turkey was used for defense purposes. In the Marshall Plan quarterly reports, defense initially appeared in a section under the heading miscellaneous subjects while it took the special and primary part in the opening section from 1952. The Mechanical and Chemical Industries Administration (MKE) and the Ministry of National Defense used this aid in Turkey. 9,774,667 dollars were appropriated for the Mechanical and Chemical Industries Administration between 1951 and 1958; and 90,442,000 dollars for the Ministry of National Defense for the renewal of its machines with American-imported ones between 1950 and 1955. 6,346,000 dollars of the allocation to the Industry was direct aid, 1,500,000 dollars of it was indirect aid, and 1,928,667 dollars were technical equipment. From the allocated resource to the Ministry of National Defense, 76,422,000 dollars were direct aid and 14,000,000 dollar were indirect aid. Indeed, this indirect aid was a “special source” which meant again, differently from drawing rights, the import of equipment from the United States. Table 12 and 13 show the details of these allocations:

Table 12. Funds for Mechanical and Chemical Industries Administration

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Indirect Aid	Technical	Total
1951-1952	2,000,000	2,500,000	1,204,667	5,704,667
1952-1953	1,300,000	1,500,000	724,000	3,524,000
1953-1954	1,181,300			1,181,300
1954-1955	410,000			410,000
1957-1958	40,000			40,000
Total	4,931,300	4,000,000	1,928,667	10,859,967

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 10, 14, 18, 32.

Table 13. Funds for the Ministry of National Defense

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Indirect Aid	Total
1950-1951	13,822,000		13,822,000
1951-1952	4,000,000	14,000,000	18,000,000
1952-1953	33,600,000		33,600,000
1954-1955	25,000,000		25,000,000
1957-1958	13,180,000		13,180,000
Total	89,602,000	14,000,000	103,602,000

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 10, 14, 16, 23, 32.

The United States gave 351,700,000 dollars of aid to Turkey until the end of 1951; while until the end of fiscal year of 1959, the military assistance alone reached 114,461,967 dollars. Also, the defense sector took one of the largest shares from the release of counterpart funds. 2,957,208,000 dollars were released to be used for defense purposes. Table 14 shows all releases of counterpart funds until 1962:

Table 14. Individual Release Agreements of the Counterpart Funds

Individual Release Agreements	Agreement Date	Amounts TL.
I-National Defense Sector:		
1-Mechanical and Chemical Industries Ins.	18.10.1951	5,500,000
2-Petty Officer Program	20.12.1951	10,640,000
3-Additional Military Aid Program	28.12.1951	72,884,000
4-Equivalent of Certain military expenses of the fiscal year 1951	28.12.1951	80,000,000
5-Additional Military program of 1952	05.08.1952	100,000,000
6-Additional Military Program of 1953	05.08.1953	111,400,000
7-Additional Military Program of 1954	16.09.1954	115,920,000
8-Additional Military Program of 1955	29.12.1955	108,600,000
9-Additional Military Program of 1956	10.08.1956	91,520,000
10-Additional Military Program of 1957	30.09.1957	104,796,000
11-Additional Military Program of 1958	25.09.1958	170,000,000
12-Army Education Program	20.01.1959	43,000,000
13-Aid for 1959 Fiscal Year	21.06.1959	110,000,000
14-Additional Military Program of 1959	18.09.1959	520,000,000
15-Aid for 1960 Budget	04.07.1960	500,000,000
16-Aid for 1961 Budget	26.07.1961	363,300,000
17-Aid for 1962 Budget	30.06.1962	449,647,000
<i>Section Total</i>		2,957,207,000
II- Public Sector:		
1-The Agricultural Bank	22.10.1950	15,339,000
2-Public Roads and Water Works	01.12.1950	56,997,000
3-Etibank	26.02.1951	42,352,000
4-Technical Cooperation	Annual	88,477,000
5-Agricultural Census	20.07.1951	1,000,000
6-Immigrants	10.08.1951	30,000,000
7-Ministry of Agriculture	20.12.1951	34,300,000
8-Ankara Hospital and Nurse Training School	20.12.1951	1,000,000
9-Tuzla (Saltworks) roads	20.07.1951	404,000
10-Statistics	05.08.1951	1,000,000
11-Minerals Research and Exploration Ins.	15.05.1953	1,000,000
12-Technical Cooperation	26.03.1960	96,293,000
13-Earthquake Relief	07.07.1953	4,000,000
14-State Railways	27.02.1953	3,864,000
15- State Economic Enterprises	1959-1961	400,000,000
16-Public Roads 1962 Budget	13.07.1962	120,000,000
17-Mudi Program	25.06.1952	2,520,000
<i>Section Total</i>		898,546,000
III-Private Enterprise Sector:		
1-Private Enterprise Projects financed prior to establishment of Industrial Development Bank	Various	17,255,000
2- Marshall Plan Private Enterprise Fund of Industrial Development Bank	10.08.1951	114,500,000
3-Capital Participation Fund of Industrial Development Bank	01.03.1961	40,000,000
4-Technical Cooperation Projects	26.03.1960	64,178,000
5- Industrial Export Working Capital Fund (IDB)	13.04.1961	32,000,000
6- Special Working Capital Funds	18.04.1961	59,000,000
<i>Section Total</i>		326,933,000
Total		4,182,686,000

Source: *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, pp. 21-23.

Once again, aid was used for the importation of equipment from the United States. Moreover, the funds for the Mechanical and Chemical Industries Administration were only to change its old equipment with new American products. In this process, Europe was the United States' great contributor and fellow; however, the main actor was the United States and the Marshall Plan funds indicated the shift from a Europe-centered world to an American-centered one. In this regard, for the first four-year period, the Marshall Plan began as a project for European reconstruction and it saved a resource for only two years under the name of drawing rights also to revitalize the exchange between European countries. However, this relatively small amount of drawing rights ended and mainly the United States-related aid Plan continued. The huge amount of direct aid in the defense sector is another indication of this process. The defense industry was one of the largest industries in the United States and its strength secured the hegemonic power of the U.S. in the world. Therefore, it kept this sector for its own. At the beginning, the Truman Doctrine served its aims in the maintenance and development of the defense industry. Also, when the Economic Cooperation Administration was transformed into the Mutual Security Agency in 1952, this process was renewed and strengthened again.

As a consequence of the United States-based defense aid including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO, the Turkish military was reorganized according to the United States' system. Besides, after the 1948 United States' education system was accepted in the Turkish Staff Officers' Colleges and numerous officers were sent to the United States for education. On the point of logistics, the United States made the military equipment that was used in the Turkish army. In addition, the army's appearance was also imported from the United States.

For instance, 13,822,000 dollars of resource of the Ministry of National defense in the 1950-1951 period were used to purchase boats, cloth, coats, raincoats, shoes, and horses from the United States.²³⁹ The organizational body was also changed to be congenial with the American army and the Presidency of General Staff was engaged to the Ministry of National Defense. The Turkish army became a parallel with that of the United States in all aspects.²⁴⁰ In this sphere, a new market for American production surplus was created.

It should not be forgotten that economic market creation was anchored in the fight with communism in the Marshall Plan implementation. As mentioned, the General of the Air Forces, who commanded the air mission of the Marshall Plan in Turkey, stated that “We could get much more for the dollars we spent in Turkey than we could in any other country. The Turkish people have a cooperative and common aim spirit. The money will certainly return to the United States with great profits.” Indeed, according to the consensus of high-level American army members in Ankara, to stop a Soviet man in Turkey for a couple of weeks or some more would certainly pay for American equipment. This short delay could be crucial in the Western defense strategy.²⁴¹

On the other hand, the implementation practice per se created unpleasant situations although critical voices were muted. To transform and modernize the army and in fact, to get one of the strongest fortress in Turkey, many steps were taken. However, for instance, the existence of American advisers in the Turkish army

²³⁹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 11, 1952, p. 14.

²⁴⁰ Metin Yılmaz, “Marshall Yardımı ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri” (MA Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2000), pp.181–197; also, William Hale, *Türkiye’de Ordu ve Siyaset: 1789’dan Günümüze*, tr. Ahmet Fendi (Istanbul: Hil Press, 1996), p. 92.

²⁴¹ Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 2.

created some problems. Another area of discontent from the viewpoint of personal relations was the great differences between military officers, and the wide disparity of pay received by American and Turkish soldiers. In some cases, American noncoms received more than Turkish generals, and obviously lived on a comparable level.²⁴² Also, their domination in the army was clear. As Robinson and Lerner write, if an American team sees an imperfect situation in equipment or in training, they “advise” the control officer; if the officer does not follow the advice, the case is reported to Ankara and then the Americans “set into action without waiting.”²⁴³

Additionally, as mentioned, surplus arms, old materials, items no longer in use by or being considered for discard by the U.S. forces were sent to Turkey to put the U.S. storage surplus to use.²⁴⁴ Then, when American diplomats received criticism about the low-quality of the equipment in the military aid program, they claimed that the weakness of the Turkish economy could not bear the cost of high-quality arms.²⁴⁵

NATO membership was another situation showing both the willingness of Turkey to cooperate and the criticisms of conditions. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949 and was based on the common defense principle for all members. Turkey submitted its first unsuccessful application for membership in May 1950, expressed its intention to become a member that would be the first country to

²⁴² Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 5.

²⁴³ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” p. 31.

²⁴⁴ Garrett, p. 259. While the spare parts problem created machine garbage in tractor field, old items created similar uselessness for the defense sphere and the seaways.

²⁴⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politika* (Ankara: Imge Pub. House, 1990), p. 49.

answer the United Nations' call.²⁴⁶ Until its acceptance in 1952, it frequently re-applied.²⁴⁷ This first rejection created a shock in the country.²⁴⁸

Turkey based all of its foreign policy to tie itself to the West tightly and adopted to join all military, economic and political institutions in this regard as a principle for itself. As Fuad Köprülü mentioned on the NATO occasion “this alliance is a national policy for us.”²⁴⁹ They equated NATO with the United States and even with their national politics.²⁵⁰ Also, Adnan Menderes declared that in all circumstances they would do the same thing (July 29, 1950).²⁵¹ Moreover, for the Turkish ruling elite, NATO gained a general frame characteristics shaping American existence militarily, economically and socially. United States economic mission chief in Turkey, Leon Dayton described the situation, remarking that “the acceptance of another country into the intimate affairs of a country, whereas it enters into all

²⁴⁶ Mütercimler and Öke, p. 81.

²⁴⁷ According to the unclassified American documents, Turkish ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish Ministers for Foreign Affairs Necmeddin Sadak and Fuad Köprülü made many attempts and held conversations with the United States authorities to confirm the close cooperation with the United States at every possible chance and to gain the acceptance to NATO. See United States Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” *Foreign Relations, Secretaries Memoranda of Conversation, 1947-1952*, Document No. 1317, 19 September 1950; “Cooperation between the United States and Turkey,” Document No. 1570, 12 November 1950; “Turkish-American Relations,” Document No. 909, 12 April 1949; also, “US-Turkish Relations,” Document No. 707, 9 September 1948.

²⁴⁸ This situation and willingness to enter the organization had great repercussions in the press. For example, see “Atlantik Paktının Genişletilmesi,” *Akşam*, August 11, 1950; “Atlantik Paktına Girmek Zaruridir,” *Vatan*, August 10, 1950; Cavid Oral, “Türkiye ve Marshall Yardımı,” *Hür Ses*, January 7, 1951; and “İyi bir Demokrasi,” *Yeni Sabah*, August 8, 1950. Observing this anxiety, American ambassador in Turkey offered either including Turkey to NATO or forming a Mediterranean group including Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran and US to his government. See, General Records of the Department of State, *Telegram on Present Status of the Turkish Economic Situation from American Embassy Ankara to the Secretary of the State*, Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1947-58, Document No. 59, 31 March 1949.

²⁴⁹ Quoted in Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*, p. 333.

²⁵⁰ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, p. 83.

²⁵¹ Namık Behramoğlu, *Türkiye-Amerikan İlişkileri: Demokrat Parti Dönemi* (Istanbul: Yar Press, 1973), p. 10.

aspects of public life, is so unprecedented;”²⁵² however, Turkey enthusiastically accepted this.

However, the global situation radically changed with the outbreak of the Korean War. The participation in the war was widely supported by the press and by the public opinion of Turkey generally with only a few criticisms on the subject because it opened the first doors in the alliance, to the membership. This relieved the administration of the need to define Turkey’s strategic location. Funds were now to incorporate Turks and Greeks into NATO.

Only one week after the decision to send a 4500-person Turkish brigade to Korea (the first Turkish troops to be sent abroad since the foundation of the Republic), they put forward a formal request to join the alliance of NATO that they had rejected before. In 1951, Truman was convinced and decided for the full membership of Turkey and Greece.²⁵³ NATO membership was officially approved at the Council of Lisbon in February 1952 with the rules of establishment of NATO air and naval bases on Turkish soil, at Incirlik, Karamürsel, Çiğli, and Diyarbakır; radar stations at Karamürsel, Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, Belbaşı and Diyarbakır; also, naval centers at Iskenderun and Yumurtalık.

On the opposition front, the only criticism was methodological not essential, because the Democrat Party had made the decision without passing it through the Assembly. According to Faik Ahmet Barutçu’s memoirs, Western envoys visited Nihat Erim of the Republican Party and said that it was required for them to declare a

²⁵² Cited in Price, p. 211.

²⁵³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, pp. 117-119.

view similar to that of the government about the subject if they wanted to enter NATO.²⁵⁴

Generally the Turkish side demanded the partnership with the Western camp, deeper cooperation, and more assistance. Although the United States had enormous benefits from the implementation of such a program in Turkey, the process was by no means two-sided.

4.4. The Private Sector

Securing the maintenance conditions of the capitalist system constituted one of the hidden aims behind the Marshall Plan. Aid to Turkey and its private sector was planned to realize this aim. In Europe, aid was directly transferred to the private sector. However, Turkey's conditions did not permit this because of the etatism background and the limited resources of the private sector. Although the Marshall Plan and American economic perspective aimed to encourage the private sector and all the reports at the beginning of the Plan emphasized this point, the allocations for highway construction, mining, electrical energy, cement production, and to the service sector show that the assistance generally helped the state enterprises. Hence, the Marshall Plan funds were mainly distributed to public institutions in Turkey; but in spite of this, the main aim of the maintenance of capitalism was realized through indirect ways of franchising, dealership, and awarding the contracts in Turkey. Also, encouragement of the private sector gradually increased during the Plan.

In the Marshall Plan years, the extension of 2,000,000 dollars transfer of drawing rights by Denmark to Turkey in the period of the 1949-1950 for the

²⁵⁴ Kazım Öztürk (ed.), *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: TBMM IX. Dönem* (Ankara: TBMM Foundation, 1998), p. 964, quoted in Mütercimler and Öke, p. 100.

development of the cement industry in Izmir was the first allocation of resources for the private sector. In the cement industry there were two projects at hand: one running factory in Kartal, Istanbul and its improvement; and one factory construction in Izmir.²⁵⁵ Of this 2,000,000 dollars allocation, 200,000 were used for the Istanbul factory and the remaining was for the Izmir factory construction. In addition, 500,000 dollars were allocated to Aslan and Eski Hisar contractor cement joint-stock company in Istanbul according to the November 30, 1950 dated decision to build a cement factory in Darıca and Zeytinburnu.²⁵⁶ Justifying this stage, the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission Chief stated that the government could hardly find the necessary money to rule the country by general taxation and all efforts should be given to bringing private capital to the country –for example, bringing private capital to the cement industry.²⁵⁷

Before the official declaration of the Plan, measures were taken for this process the private sector growth and the facilitation of foreign capital investment. Initially, the Third Development Plan after the War covered many investments in state industrialization. However, this was abandoned at 1947 and a new plan was prepared according to American interests, placing industrialization forth in line after highway transportation, and the agriculture and energy sectors,²⁵⁸ “giving a much

²⁵⁵ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 3, 1950, p. 9. When the Marshall Plan President of Turkey Performance Committee Russell Dorr, who traveled in the country for some time for observation, declared this opening as a great success in his speech at the opening of the Izmir International fair. See “Marshall Yardımının Arttırılması,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 19, 1950 and “Ege Mıntıkasına Marshall Yardımı,” *Ulus*, September 19, 1950.

²⁵⁶ The Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 0301301021248916.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Russell Dorr, January 4, 1950, cited in Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 7.

²⁵⁸ Although this and other attempts as Laws for the encouragement of Foreign Investment was a departure, Hershlag started the movement from an earlier date seeing them as a transition and a combination of etatism and liberalism and giving the share also to the Republican Government to remove the etatist regime’s restrictions although the radical change came with Democratic rule.

greater measure of integration of agriculture within the general scheme, and envisaging a large degree of foreign financial aid.²⁵⁹” Subsequently, supporting the private sphere and limiting state intervention were put on the table.

Through the years, the private sector’s shares in the Marshall funds were as follows:

Table 15. Marshall Plan Allocations for the Private Sector to the Ministry of Economy and Trade between 1949 and 1958

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Drawing Rights	Special Source	Total
1949-1950	8,250,000	2,000,000		10,250,000
1950-1951	10,372,000			10,372,000
1951-1952			8,963,000	8,963,000
1952-1953	2,200,000		2,100,000	4,300,000
1953-1954	16,271,000			16,271,000
1954-1955	32,142,760			32,142,760
1955-1956	39,000,000			39,000,000
1956-1957	30,435,000			30,435,000
1957-1958	50,000,000			50,000,000
Total	188,670,760	2,000,000	11,063,000	201,733,760

Source: *Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 9, 10, 20, 23, 28, 31, 36.

As can be seen, the share of the sector gradually increased in the plan especially after 1953. This data proves that after the agricultural project of the first years, the private sector’s growth took prominence in the American project.

Private enterprise and aids to the private sector became a discussing point of the Plan. Initially, the share of the private sector came from the franchising and importation rights for the Marshall Plan products, afterwards from the assembling

Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, p. 17; and Hershlag, *Turkey, An Economy in Transition*, p. 184.

²⁵⁹ Hershlag, p. 181.

sector, not from industry.²⁶⁰ First, because it was mainly the importation of certain manufactured products from the United States, it was not a great support for internal production and national industry. Second, this section touched off intra-nation controversies and determined a new and huge amount of the unequal redistribution of resources inside the country. Nevertheless, the Plan created another hierarchy and conflict of interests by distributing the importation rights and credits to run the business unequally between domestic firms. Thorough this part of the Plan, international and national authorities preferred some people of the country over others and deepened the inequalities. Discussions of these appropriations in the Assembly and press, and the privileged situations of chief companies²⁶¹ show that governments supported their partisan companies. The big holding companies of 2000 took their places in the market beginning from the Marshall Plan years.

With the decision of the Council of Ministers, some Marshall Plan funds were allocated to private entrepreneurs. For instance, according to a July 25, 1951 dated decision, 100,000 TL were granted to Talat Kılıçoğlu to operate his fruit juice company in Istanbul; 215,000 TL were granted to Şaban Dilaver to import machines to be used in irrigation, swamp drainage and road works in Erzurum; and Mustafa Kömürcü acquired funds from the Marshall Aid to support his private hydro-electrical power station.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 2, vol. 34, Session 4, 22 February 1969, p. 541; and Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 10, vol. 10, Session 2, 20 February 1956, p. 372.

²⁶¹ Deputy Kemal Zeytinoğlu questioned the importation process of agricultural machines and importation rights of choosing and denying criterias of traders. See Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 14, Session 3, Sitting 23, 24 December 1948, pp. 282–313.

²⁶² The Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 030130102126591, 03018021265912, and 030102688074, respectively. Also, many officers were sent abroad to consult for and determine the allocation of aids, to demand aid for some areas by Turkish State decision. The documents of their sending and giving their daily wages see, for example The Prime Ministry

Firms that sought to import in the Marshall Plan content were considerable in the process. As mentioned before, by 1950, the five percent profit share of these firms from imports increased to 25 percent, which is a quite high percentage and determinant in the capital accumulation process.²⁶³ Moreover, for the importation and sale of agricultural equipment by the allocated credit to the Ministry of Agriculture this profit percentage was raised to 35 percent, which was a remarkably higher share.²⁶⁴

To support the private sector, the American Mission directed its efforts towards banking, researching the demands of the small sectors and providing opportunities for them. For this work, in the Marshall Plan years, Turkey Industrial Development Bank (*Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası*- TSKB) was founded on July 2, 1950, to develop the institutional infrastructure for the private sector.²⁶⁵ After that time, the newly arranged Private Enterprise Fund of the Marshall Plan was transferred to the Bank; however, the Mission's control of the accounts was maintained; initially, 54,500,000 dollars were appropriated into this fund. It was to allocate as credit for certain private industry sectors and entrepreneurs.

One of the required conditions determining the firms that would receive the Marshall Aid funds among the applicants was that the entrepreneurs must have the necessary capital and experience, and enjoy a good reputation to qualify as

Republican Archives, Document No. 08018010211810814, 080180102123528, 0301801115856, 030180102180602, 03001875498, and 03001875497.

²⁶³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 4, 1950, p. 11.

²⁶⁴ See State Archives General Directorate, Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 0301801021237214 and 03001805068, the 13.11.1948 dated Protocol for the importation and sale conditions of agricultural equipments, p. 4.

²⁶⁵ Its initial capital was 93.4 million Turkish Lira; while 19 million Lira of it came from private domestic sources, 20 million Lira from IBRD loan, and 54.5 million Lira from Marshall Plan counterpart funds. See Leo Tansky, *US and USSR Aid to Developing Countries, A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R.*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 49.

undertakers to execute the project, for their enterprises and must be in a condition to be able to take sufficient references on this point from leading national and foreign banks.²⁶⁶

These requirements blocked small firms from the competition in the market. That is, the criteria to apply for the funds show that small companies under a certain level were eliminated from this type of capitalist production process. Moreover, the fund was given to 277 applicants among 1706 firm applications until the date of December 31, 1959;²⁶⁷ this also shows that more detailed analysis and a hidden unequal distribution of funds occurred in this process.

On the other hand, the preparatory reports for the Marshall Plan in Turkey proposed that the private sector should specialize in areas such as food materials production/ food canning, the manufacture of simple agricultural tools, simple consumption materials and it should be in cooperation with the United States capital.²⁶⁸ The Thornburg report states this point exclusively.²⁶⁹ Thus, the production spheres of the companies accepted to the fund was another indication of this selectiveness from the point of view of Turkey's role in the determined world capitalism development process. According to the Plan (through the guidance of preparatory reports), the Marshall Plan Private Enterprise Fund, which the Turkish Industrial Development Bank managed, could allocate its credits to the following preferable industrial branches:

1. Cotton processing;

²⁶⁶ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, pp. 41-42.

²⁶⁷ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 25, 26, 27,..., 42, related pages.

²⁶⁸ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 227.

²⁶⁹ "If the big food production of Turkey will be realized, it is necessary sufficient storage facilities with cooling, processing, and packaging works...A cooperated Turkish-American enterprise helps this industry to work..." Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir?*, pp. 210-214.

2. wool washing and combing;
3. vegetable oil processing, especially olive and cotton seed oils;
4. vegetable and fruit processing facilities;
5. bonito processing and production;
6. cold air storage for food;
7. sponge production;
8. *simple* agriculture equipment production, all kinds of machine spare parts and irrigation facilities;
9. agricultural equipment repair ateliers;
10. medicine for botanical ills and insecticides;
11. automobile, truck, and tractor wheels patching facilities;
12. fishing and fish canning;
13. egg packing-conserving facilities;
14. lumber creosoting;
15. box-barrel production;
16. medical equipment;
17. *small* electrical power plants;
18. linen-hemp plant processing, combing, dying;
19. trade ships, sea trade;
20. mining.²⁷⁰

In this regard, totally 69,800,902 dollars in loans in 1955 was given following to sectors:

²⁷⁰ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, pp. 42-43.

Table 16. Approved Credits of Turkish Industrial Development Bank until 1956
(Turkish Lira)

Industry Group	Number	Amount of Credit
Foodstuff industries	44	13,998,034
Alcoholic drinks	3	1,186,920
Textiles	22	16,745,698
Timber and wood manufscured products	5	220,964
Leather and its products	1	30,000
Cellulose	1	73,400
Chemistry	22	8,250,062
Rock, soil, glass, çini	17	18,320,266
Mining	7	3,776,032
Machine supplies	6	1,272,450
Transportation means	6	1,423,427
Repair and maintenance work-shops	86	2,027,126
Miscellaneous industries	10	2,486,524
Total	230	69,810,903

Source: *Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 25, 1955, p. 10.

Nevertheless, the 37 percent share for repair and maintenance ateliers in the accepted credit-given firms indicates a huge part of machine and equipment importation in the aid period and its operating inside the country. This list demonstrates that, on the one hand, the share of the private sector means the share of more imports from the United States, the importation of its products; on the other hand, when the national production industry was promoted, it was again supported in the areas in which the United States and Western countries could get their needed raw materials and the production of agricultural products, animals and meat, mine, fish, etc.

Moreover, appropriations to the Ministry of Economy and Trade for market needs provided the direct support of the Turkish capital accumulation process to make the needed importations. Funds were appropriated mainly to import truck and jeep, autos, medicine, wheel, and fuel oil.²⁷¹ Sümerbank, Petrol Ofisi, TARIŞ,

²⁷¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 6, 1951, p. 31.

Çukobirlik, Odalar Birliği, Yaş Meyva ve Sebze Kooperatif Birliği, Madenciler Birliği were the main groups which benefitted from the private sector aid. Interestingly, at the top of the list there were fuel oil firms with oil importation and especially the Mobil Oil company. 10,000,000 dollars was for oil while 6,394,000 dollars was for private companies in the year 1956-1957. Indeed, the amount of oil importation signifies the special emphasis given to highway construction by the Marshall Plan from the beginning. Also, operations in agriculture, energy and mining sectors that were in all sectors of the aid facilitated this approach by importing mainly equipment operating with oil and producing energy and raw materials to send to the West. The following table illustrates these allocations:

Table 17. Marshall Plan Appropriations for Market Needs through the Ministry of Economy and Trade and Importation Rights

Importer Firm	Material	Allocation
Petrol Ofisi	Tin Panel	1,600,000
Petrol Ofisi	Fuel Oil	3,606,000
Mobil Oil	Fuel Oil	3,415,000
The Shell	Fuel Oil	1,247,000
BP	Fuel Oil	910,000
Türk Petrol	Fuel Oil	822,000
Çukobirlik	Steel	638,996
Çukobirlik	Embroidery Canvas	350,000
Çukobirlik	Tin	200,000
Çukobirlik	Sud costik	350,000
Çukobirlik	Industry Machine Supplementaries	45,000
Çukobirlik	Paint and Supplementary Chemicals	100,000
TARİŞ	Embroidery Canvas	200,000
TARİŞ	Bkromad dös	50,000
TARİŞ	Tricloretilen	50,000
TARİŞ	Carbonate	50,000
TARİŞ	Zırnık	50,000
TARİŞ	Sud costik	400,000
TARİŞ	Industry Machine Supplementaries	15,000
Odalar Birliği	Medicine Raw Materials	310,754
Odalar Birliği	Woolen Cotton Textiles and Paint	400,000
Odalar Birliği	Paint and Supplementary Chemicals	900,000
Odalar Birliği	Kraft Paper	100,000
Odalar Birliği	X ray Film	250,000
Odalar Birliği	Industrial Chemicals	300,000
Odalar Birliği	Medicine Raw materials	200,000
Odalar Birliği	Enüsilin	50,000
Odalar Birliği	Industry Machine Supplementaries	500,000
Kauçuk Sanayi	Sud Raw Rubber	350,000
Kauçuk Sanayi	Kord fabric	50,000
Yaş Meyve & Sebze Koop. Birl.	Rubber	500,000
Yaş Meyve & Sebze Koop. Birl.	Aluminium	110,000
Yaş Meyve & Sebze Koop. Birl.	Plastic Raw Material	200,000
Dernekler	Truck Inner and Outer Wheels	1,900,000
Dernekler	Truck Spare Parts	1,000,000
Ciasan	Kraft Paper	275,996
Sümerbank	Leather	849,900
Türkiye Madenciler Derneği	Mining Equipment and Suplplementary	250,000
İzmir Çimento Fabrikası	Kraft Paper	50,000
Türk Al Batarya	Zinc Tube	3,000
Bereç San. L.	Zinc	27,000
Bakır Levha Sanayi	Zinc	20,000
Total		22,695,646

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 33, 1957, p. 35.

Once more, it should be considered that for Turkey the Marshall Plan meant mostly the importation of equipment from the United States and providing the market for American production surplus, support for the private sector's capital accumulation process, and job areas for its human resources; it did not only consist of innocent aid for altruistic purposes and the maintenance of peace and peace loving countries, as was announced at the beginning. As a result of these activities, the positive value of imports to Turkey increased from 62.3 million TL in 1950 to 540.6 million TL in 1952 and it became the most indebted country's of the European Payment Union in December 1952 while its Central Bank faced bankruptcy according to its foreign trade accounts.²⁷²

4.4.1. The Hilton Hotel

The Hilton Hotel case is another example of private enterprise funding by the Marshall Plan. The plan reports separated a special place for the explanation of the construction of the hotel. The hotel was planned as a place for American experts and advisers coming Turkey in the Plan process to stay.

Indeed, Turkey needed a 300-rooms modern hotel for ECA mission members, technical assistance advisors, and American and foreign visitors. The Marshall Plan actors put the Hilton Hotel project on the table. The Project was entrusted to the U.S. architects Skidmore, Owings and Merrill's firm and the Turkish Sedat H. Eldem firm. According to the decision, 210,000 dollars from the 1950/1951 Marshall Plan funds were allocated to the Sedat Eldem firm in payment for work requirements. The

²⁷² Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 15.

Turkish Pension Fund initially paid 13,500,000 Turkish Lira and the hotel was completed with 22,943,000 Turkish Lira from this budget. At the end, the U.S. building contractor firm Julis Berger and Duckerhoff Widmann built the hotel and it was given for 20 years to the Hilton Hotels International corporation to run. Although the state budget paid almost all of the expenses, many American capital and firms benefited from this small project and the result was presented as a victory of the Marshall Aid and a step on the way of Turkey's development and modernization.

210,000 dollars were appropriated for the hotel construction. It was the first example of American-Turkish partnership in this sector. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, the United States capital made many investments in the country as another indicator of the Plan's benefits to the United States. These investments were mainly made in the sphere in which the Marshall Plan was used. On the other hand, the Marshall Plan had Turkish capital to approach labor-intensive and low-profit areas and special areas of the production of raw materials like mining to provide the United States and Europe capital's needs.

4.5. Various Subjects

4.5.1. Public Health

4.5.1.1. Malaria

In the area of public health, the Marshall Plan had only two targets, malaria control and the reconstruction of a hospital although its claim and discourse

comprised many life aspects. 851,000 dollars from the 1949/1950 funds, 1,855,000 dollars from the 1950/1951 funds, and 1,264,000 dollars from the 1951/1952 funds were allocated for the fight against malaria. In addition, the state allocated 3,571,000 Turkish Lira from the budget for this project.²⁷³ As a rule, all this money was spent to the buy necessary equipment such as vehicles, spare parts, and pesticides from the United States and Europe.

Interestingly, the reports give only employment objectives to the reason for this malaria fight. The justification was that the workers missed two weeks in a year and the expenses of the cure harmed the economy and productivity.²⁷⁴ As the result of the efforts, the number of the working men and sowing increased. The American mission stated that imports to the health sector would provide 75,000,000 Turkish Lira annual saving in the Turkish economy.²⁷⁵

4.5.1.2. The Ankara Hospital and the Nurse Training School

The second health area case was the reconstruction of the Ankara Red Crescent Hospital, its maternity hospital and the nurse training school. 1,000,000 TL was released from the counterpart funds as a result of a Turkish-American agreement dated December 20, 1951. Also, the Turkish state appropriated 6,300,000 TL from the national budget to buy the necessary building and hospital equipment. The constructions concluded in 1954 and seemingly, the national budget compensated the expenses totally although it was presented as another success of the Plan.

²⁷³ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 11, 1952, p. 53.

²⁷⁴ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 129.

²⁷⁵ Republic of Turkey, *Marşal Planı ve Siz*, p. 28.

4.5.2. Immigrants

In 1950 millions of Turks was banished from the Bulgaria and the Turkish government opened the borders to about 500,000 of them. However, when the authorities could not solve the settlement and living problems of these people, the Marshall Plan authorities helped. As the consequence of August 16, 1951 dated agreement, 30,000,000 TL was released from counterpart funds; in addition, Turkish Association for Aid to Immigrants and Refugees (*Türkiye Göçmenlere ve Mültecilere Yardım Derneği*) devoted 8,000,000 TL for this settlement program while the government made an undefined contribution to it. Land was distributed; also, equipment and credits were given to 37,351 Bulgarian family farmers and craftsmen. The details of the allocation are shown in Table 18:

Table 18. Allocations for Bulgaria Immigrants

Built Houses		31,619 numbers
Distributed Land	18,429 Family	954,374 dönüm
Given Credit to Farmers	17,276 Family	24,226,078 Turkish Lira
Given Seeds	19,219 Family	8,407,622 Kilo
Given Credit to Craftmen	2253 Family	1,000,327 Turkish Lira

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 19, 1954, p. 44.

4.5.3. Miscellaneous Subjects

Although the subjects like oil, defense, and malaria control took part under this heading in the Marshall Plan reports, later they were moved to a special place with better finances in accordance with their increasing importance. Mainly two allocations were placed under the sphere of miscellaneous subjects: statistical machines and mapping equipment. Seemingly, they are very tiny areas in comparison

with other sectors; however, their appearance in the Plan and the distribution of a considerable budget to them demonstrates their importance for the American authorities and they were in accordance with the field study literature's aims of getting the most data from other landscapes and their social beings. In this regard, 302,000 dollars were allocated to purchase the required mapping equipment and 462,000 dollars of cumulative aid were given for the purchase of the statistical machines.

In sum, there were other different institutions to allocate funds in the Marshall Plan, like Şeker Bank, the Ministry of National Education, the State Police Headquarter, and the big city municipalities. But, their effect and amount was very small in general allocations and as usual, they were used to import various supplies from the United States.

4. 6. Technical Assistance

The technical cooperation of Turkey with the United States under the Marshall Plan began in 1949 to help the urgent economic development of the country and thus raise the living standards by allowing Turkey to benefit from American know-how and technology, and the source for this assistance reached at 42,200,000 dollars in 1962.²⁷⁶ Hence, it was tried to provide the required base to put American production surplus into use by making American technology and production methods prevalent in Turkey.²⁷⁷ Americans assert that, in the program, first the equipment was sent, but afterwards they required teaching how to use them and technical training

²⁷⁶ *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 6.

²⁷⁷ Tören, p. 198.

programs started. Also, the areas to transfer the funds for technical assistance and their intensity transformed in the process in accordance with the general shift in the Marshall Plan process in Turkey, with the changing paths of the capital accumulation process. The cumulative technical assistance allocation was as the following in the Marshall Plan:

Table 19. Technical Assistance Program According to Working Areas

Activity Area (1.000 Dollar)	1949-1961	1961	1962	Total
Research, Education and Publication	670	90	132	892
Soil and Water Resources	2140	300	269	2709
Dev. of Agri.l Product & Stock Raising	1663	101		1764
Agricultural Economy	40	15	29	84
Agricultural Marketing and Production	71	56	144	271
Household Economy and Village Youth	60			60
Forestry	345	61	115	521
Fishing	47			47
Field Equipment, Machine, etc.	682			682
I- Agriculture - Section Total	5718	623	689	7030
Mine and Minerals	415	20	268	703
Energy and Communication	1397	17		1414
Manufacturing	51			51
Marketing and Distribution	205	3	110	318
Industrial Management	341	109	65	515
Equipment and Maintenance	30	18	63	111
Industry Assistance Commission	126		35	161
Other	779	604	458	1841
II-Industry - Section Total	3344	771	999	5114
Highways	1204			1204
Railways	477			477
Port Administrations and Development	633	8	35	676
Ship Administrations	21	17	29	67
Air Transportation	3520	236	205	3961
Other		75		75
III-Transportation - Section Total	5855	336	269	6460
Labor Unions	131	43	94	268
Apprentice Training on the Work	165	80	129	374
Work Management Relations	16			16
Evaluation of Human Force	31			31
Other	105	62	21	188
IV-Labor-Work - Section Total	448	185	244	877
V- Health and Purification	365			365
Vocational Education	1598	489	378	2465
Vocational and High Education	2842	266	286	3394
General Education Services	2034	444	778	3256
VI- Education - Section Total	6474	1199	1442	9115
Works in Definite Ind. Branches or Act.	1886	95	99	2080
Organization and Administration in the Government Level	448	283	189	920
Personnel Management	5		203	208
Organization & Management of Definite Ministries	100	32	42	174
State Finance	148			148
General Services	2			2
Various Institutes and Offices	1717			1717
Statistic	116		194	310
Other	128			128
VII-Public Administration - Sect. Total	4550	410	727	5687
VIII- Development of Society	81			81
IX- Other	4204	891	1166	6261
Grand Total	31,039	4,415	5,536	40,990

Source: *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 46, 1962, pp. 8-9.

Changes in the resource allocations reveal shifts in the Marshall Plan and show that the technical cooperation program mainly gained importance in the U.S. assistance after 1960. In this regard, the 1962 share in the agricultural technical assistance was 1,078,000 dollars while the total of fourteen years' share was 7,419,000 dollars. Also, the industrial sector began to take a bigger share after 1960 in the technical assistance program. In the transportation sector, the main technical assistance allocation was used before 1960, while the sector in general took the largest share from the technical assistance program. The education sector took the largest part from the technical program because of the nature of the sphere, which needed technical training instead of equipment importation. Also, it is important to note that the weight in the allocation was on vocational education appropriate to the economic targets of the Marshall Plan. For the projects in public administration, again after 1960 larger allocations were made and especially the works in definite industrial branches or activities. Also, 220,131,625 TL were released from the Counterpart Funds as the result of an agreement dated March 26, 1960 for technical cooperation projects.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 23.

CHAPTER V

TRANSPORTATION

5.1. A Brief History

To examine the development of highways, İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin's three-staged analysis would be beneficial. The highway policy of the nineteenth century is the beginning era for this evaluation. At the time, railways had superiority over highways. The stimulus behind railway construction was the integration to the world economy and becoming an open market for the world in general. It was necessary to pass from caravans (with camels, horses) to railways.²⁷⁹ The Ottoman Empire required a technological transportation and information network for a strong central state in the age of military and administrative reforms of the nineteenth century.

In this regard, first the Izmir-Aydın railway line was constructed between 1856-1866 in Anatolia. This railway line was chosen because this construction was the decision of imperial powers not the Ottoman Empire's itself and because of the integration to the world market. The Izmir-Aydın line was a port and tree-type line, it was carefully independent from the network of railways through the Empire; thus, it was an obstacle to the integration of the domestic market.

In the highway realm, the 1866 *Turuk-u Maabir Nizamnamesi* ordered the construction of highways, it documents passing from caravan to car.²⁸⁰ From this

²⁷⁹ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Türkiye'de Demiryolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasından Karayolu Öncelikli Ulaşım Politikasına Geçiş (1923-1957)," in *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2003), p. 372.

²⁸⁰ Tekeli and İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 373.

beginning date to the Republican regime, in the program of highways, priority was for network type and eastern Anatolia, where the railway had not developed. Unlike, the Marshall Aid period, at that time a backward technology of highways was financed domestically whereas a state-of-the-art web of railways was built according to foreign investment's interests. The entrance of foreign investment to highway construction was at a later date, although there had been attempts to provide it before (for instance, at 1909 a franchise was given to France). From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic about 18,335 km of roads were left; its 6943 km of the road was passable in all seasons²⁸¹ and this length of paved road reached 23,054 in 1948.²⁸²

The period from the Republican era to the Second World War was the second stage in this process. In this period, railway construction was transformed into network-type and the kilometers of track lengthened constantly; also, the railways passed to a state-owned enterprise and all of them were nationalized. In the first years of the Republic, the basic theme of the transportation policy for the authorities was railway because it was seen as a symbol of national integration. According to the big land-owners, Anatolia notables and traders, the railway construction gave big stimulus, but it was far from meeting their demands of spider web lines as they had stated at the First Economic Congress. Highways were seen as complementary to the railways; that is, national highways were not in competition with the railways, but they were to go where the rails could not reach. The Roads and Bridges Law was accepted in 1929, dividing the roads into national roads and city roads. Railway construction was centralized, whereas the highways were left to city administrations. Some measures were taken in this regard. For example, a free zone was established

²⁸¹ Republic of Turkey, *Highways Statistical Bulletin*, 1957, p. 1.

²⁸² Nazım Berkşan, *Yol Davamız Nerede? Dün 1300-1920, Bugün 1920-1950, Yarın....*, (Ankara: Akın Press, 1951), p. 3.

by the Ford Motor Company as a foreign private investment to produce vehicles in 1928;²⁸³ however, it was closed after a short time because of the world economic crash. Basically, toward the end of this period, the need for highways became urgent.

The last stage, which is the main consideration in this research, is the post-second World War era. After 1948, the policy of the national government was a highway system competing with the railways, machine construction instead of hand-made, roads for heavy highway vehicles instead of small cars.²⁸⁴ But initially, it was feared from that this competition would harm the railways, so it was planned that the transport enterprise would be state owned until the American aid program came on to agenda. However, after Second World War, it became the first developed area of the private sector, employing Turkish manpower, private contractors, and local materials.²⁸⁵ The required tar was supplied by Karabük and the asphalt came from Raman.²⁸⁶

First in 1942, Turkish-English cooperation began for the construction of Mersin-Ulukışla, Tarsus-Iskenderun highways and Iskenderun port as the first technical foreign aid of the era. A fifteen-year program was developed both for highways and railways in 1946 as a result of the Inter-Ministry Road Conference. In this program, road needs were determined according to military, economic, and cultural factors.²⁸⁷ There were three kinds of roads: roads open all seasons, state

²⁸³ For detailed analysis of the case see, Aslı Odman, “A Premature Attempt at Global Capitalism. Ford Motor Company’s Assembly Plant in Tophane/Istanbul. 1927-1944” (Ph.D. dissertation, Boğaziçi University, September 2003).

²⁸⁴ Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 411.

²⁸⁵ Department of State, *The Turkish Aid Program*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948, p. 7.

²⁸⁶ Tütengil, p. 22.

²⁸⁷ For details, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* (Ankara: Middle East Technical Uni., 1974), pp. 78-101.

highways, and city roads. After the Second World War, highway transportation became a part of Turkey's development policy. The policy gradually passed from development through the state sector, domestic finance and development with industrialization to the private sector, foreign finance and development with agricultural modernization.

In addition, American loans were used first in this highway program, but this program was transformed after the beginning of the American Assistance; it was transformed into a nine-year staged program. The roads project began on December 1, 1947, at the time of the arrival of the American Public Roads Group in Turkey. Afterwards, the development of highways was presented as an example of successful foreign aid project.

5.2. American Assistance in the Course of Events

The Truman Doctrine was accepted in July 1947 and five million dollars of a total 100 million dollars aid was earmarked for highway construction. Strategic roads between Iskenderun and Erzurum were part of the military aid program and after the Marshall Plan, its scope was widened. The transportation investments not only gave importance to highways over railways, but they, were seen as an independent variable in the development. The highway development program began with military justification,²⁸⁸ but then passed beyond this level to include economic and social reasons. Although military concerns were considered, it is clear that the stimulus behind the road construction of the U.S. administration in Turkey was mainly economic the beginning; turning over the administration of road construction from

²⁸⁸ Thus, the roads to carry military forces and equipment to strategical points was presented as the reason, McGhee, p. 48.

the War department to the Public Roads Administration immediately after the beginning of the Truman Doctrine (after military justification of the action) also demonstrates this point.²⁸⁹

Until Henry Ford implemented mass automobile production after Second World War, there was no strong emphasis on highway vehicles. In 1920, Ford Company produced only about 1,074,366 vehicles.²⁹⁰ However, afterwards, the five billion ton/mile freight transportation capacity of the highways was raised to 62 billion ton/mile while railway capacity decreased from 23.7 billion passenger/mile to 12 million passenger/ mile; also, passenger transportation by bus increased from 9.5 billion to 26 billion.²⁹¹ General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler were among the most powerful companies in the United States, economically as well as politically. Therefore, U.S.-made highways in Third World countries came on to the agenda in the period.

The highway construction project was one of the biggest domination plans of the United States in the new world system. Controlling world oil reserves, the United States created or at least tried to create a system of superiority making countries dependent on oil, highway construction equipment, machines, experts, and vehicle importation. This sector had also great importance in the Marshall Plan because it

²⁸⁹ United States Department of State, "Provision of Assistance to the Turkish Ministry of Public Works by the US Public Roads Administration under the Turkish Aid Program," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document No. 3, 18 September 1947; "Unclassified," Document No. 34, 11 December 1947; and Document No. 16 of 18 October 1947 stating that "the responsibility for the execution of the Turkish highway program should be placed in the Public Roads Administration and withdrawn from the Department of the Army as hitherto planned."

²⁹⁰ "Motor vehicles developed with sudden expansion after Second World War and the world-wide troubling period began for railways until 1970s." See Ismet Ergün, *Türkiye'nin Kalkınmasında Ulaştırma Sektörü* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Economy and Administration Faculty Pub., 1985), p. 51.

²⁹¹ State Planning Organization, *Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, Ulaştırma Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu, Demiryolu Ulaştırması Altı Komisyonu Raporu* (Ankara, 2001), pp. 19-20.

created long-term benefits with small and short-term assistance and effort.

Agriculture was another great pen in the Plan, but, naturally, it gave benefits to the United States in the process and some years after of the Plan. When the policy of the country, Turkey, changed (or turned again to development with industrialization) it became no longer possible to sell agricultural equipment or tractors in such huge numbers. On the other hand, when they constructed highways all over the country and shaped the social and geographical planning according to it, it maintains almost forever. The U.S. authorities found the highway program as an instance of the advantages of aid after it concluded.²⁹² Also, the highway policy helped to render the country an integral part of the world transportation system.

Similarly, after the Second World War, highway programs were implemented in many decolonized countries (seemingly, the twentieth century method of exploitation). This projection of the United States was not limited to Turkey. The indoctrinations and directions of American experts affected all so-called “Third World” countries and the world’s most developed highways were constructed in these underdeveloped regions. Highways developed by killing the dynamism of the railways and American-made vehicles rapidly increased. For example, the Cochabamba Santa Cruz highway in Bolivia was constructed by the recommendation of the United States Bureau of Public Roads and Export-Import Bank credits in 1943. It went down in history as the most expensive single project abandoning the railway system in the country. The Atlantic highway in Guatemala was constructed by American recommendation, U.S. International Cooperation Administration credits, and debts from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development again going

²⁹² United States Department of State, *The Turkish Aid Program*, p. 8.

parallel with railway line and gradually abolishing it.²⁹³ Again, littoral and Pan American highways in El-Salvador were built according to an American expert's advice and with World Bank credits in 1952. In addition, highways in Columbia were planned according to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development committee "Currie Report" and with World Bank credits in 1950. From then on, Columbia annually imported 10,000 trucks on average and oil usage rapidly increased.²⁹⁴ Similarly, for Turkey, oil usage increased gradually in the Marshall Plan years. It was 348,000 tons in 1948, 854,000 tons in 1952, and 1,155,000 tons in 1956 while its rate of increase was 331 to 100.²⁹⁵ Afterwards, there was also the matter of how Turkey was going to pay for the vastly increased imports of petroleum called for by the mechanization of the army and agriculture, and the stepped-up importation of vehicles to run on Turkey's new highways. Nicaragua, Venezuela and other countries experienced similar stories of American expert recommendations on the improvement in highways and stopping the railway construction and building the most expensive highways in the world.

²⁹³ Güven, p. 19.

²⁹⁴ Güven, *1950'li Yillarda...*, p. 21.

²⁹⁵ *Petrol Haberleri Bülteni* 95 (September 1957), p. 7.




Figure 4. Guatemala Railway-Highway Map
Source: Güven, 1950'li Yillarda..., p. 20.



Figure 5. El-Salvador Railway-Highway Map
Source: Güven, 1950'li Yillarda..., p. 18.

5.3. Preliminary American Advisory Reports for the Marshall Plan in Turkey

During the American involvement in the Turkish highway transportation policy, three documents, the Thornburg Report, the Barker Report, and the Hilts Report, determined American policy in Turkey. Turkey's economy, transportation, industrialization and general development politics were developed by American committees' indoctrinations and directions, like Thornburg, Barker, Hilts committees and reports, and in relation with their determination for Turkey in the international division of labor. The American reports responded to the question of "How will Turkey develop?" with the American viewpoint and according to American interests. These reports were main sources displaying the United States' plans for Turkey's role in the world capitalist system. Thus, all of these reports were "reference papers for later decision-making processes for the U.S. policy makers,"²⁹⁶ and effective documents designed the United States foreign aid, its allocation, extent and amount and the gathering of preliminary information. The perspectives in all of these reports are similar only with some nuances.

The Economic Cooperation Administration considered these reports and in a cumulative project prepared its report stating the increase in fertilization, mechanization in agriculture, a likewise increase in agricultural production, and the export of Turkish agricultural production to Western Europe. It also focused on mining, especially that of chrome, which was crucial for the strategic aims of the United States.²⁹⁷ In the process, Turkey had to accept the criticisms and modification attempts of the American observers of this kind to transform the country.

²⁹⁶ Şen, p. 351.

²⁹⁷ United States, Economic Cooperation Administration, *European Recovery Program, Country Study: Turkey* (Washington: US, GPO, 1949), pp. 2-3.

5.3.1. The Thornburg Report

After Second World War, the Twentieth Century Foundation undertook considerable projects to contribute to the development of underdeveloped countries as a general consequence of the modernization perspective. For this reason, in 1948, Max Weston Thornburg, the representative of this foundation, the head of Turkey's Economic Investigation Bureau, the head engineer of Standard Oil, and later the Petroleum Adviser of the state Department of the United States, Graham Spry, George Soule and some other specialists stayed for months in Turkey, preparing an elaborate report on Turkey's current situation, possible areas for the American Aid, and suggestions to the state to effectively use the aid.²⁹⁸ The Turkish press applauded their coming and M.W. Thornburg was called a "Great Turkish Friend."²⁹⁹

Before the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the Twentieth Century Foundation chose Turkey as a case in an essentially economic survey, because of the strategic significance of Turkey and the inevitability of both needs and demands for American assistance abroad. Turkey was crucial for America's interests. Apparently, it is inevitable for America's political interests because of its geographical position against any possible Communist encroachment. The Thornburg report indicates that economic and social motives to transform Turkey into an America-like country had an equal or bigger role in this approaching.³⁰⁰ Signs of this urgency lie in the aid

²⁹⁸ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, The Twentieth Century Fund , (New York: 1949); and *Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir?* trans. Semih Yazıcıoğlu (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Press, nd.) This report was prepared to evaluate the current situation of Turkey and its needed areas for the American aid.

²⁹⁹ Also, his later visit to report five-year American assistance was again enthusiastically welcomed, See *Istanbul Ekspres*, January 1, 1954 and January 16, 1954, p. 1.

³⁰⁰ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, foreword.

process. The Truman Doctrine was implemented only for Turkey and Greece. Just after that, the Thornburg committee began its research even before the announcement of the Marshall Plan. That is, the focus on Turkey began first and at an early date. These two events show the United States' emphasis on the country. In contrast, at the beginning of the Marshall Plan, Turkey did not take place in the project; although it applied to the United States several times, the U.S. seemed reluctant because this project was for the economic recovery of Europe, and only after appeals and discussions was Turkey accepted. A detailed analysis unfolds the similarity between the two situations.

The Thornburg report is an overview of the situation and an excessive example of American intervention to the Turkish economy. It presents a theoretical framework rather than concrete numbers, data, and statistics because the report analyzed Turkey's economic and social nature from the perspective of rebuilding the country according to the international division of labor in the capitalist development process. Hence, the Thornburg report first presents views on the land and people of Turkey and its strategic position. After evaluating the history of the Turkish republic in first two chapters, the report discusses the situation in agriculture, transportation and communication, mining and manufacture, energy resources and development, and the economy in monetary terms. These categories show the effect of the report on the Plan. The distribution of the Marshall Aid in Turkey was just realized under these categories of using and developing the natural resources to increase the obtaining of raw materials for the use of Europe and the United States. The report concludes with the Suggestions (the United States Assistance to Turkey) chapter.

American experts had great developmentalist viewpoints on Turkey. This report was carried out to determine the necessary areas for aid in Turkey. However,

even the opening paragraph presents a pessimistic perspective of the reality of the country:

The Western visitor to modern Turkey is likely to be unprepared for what he finds. His mental images of the land and the people are colored by such words as “Oriental” or “Middle East”; he has absorbed romantic stories of mosque and muezzin, of harem, veiled ladies, fretwork balconies and magic carpets. History had told him of the “Terrible Turk” who under the Ottoman Empire ruled large parts of Eastern Europe and the Holy Land, and finally was driven back into Asia Minor during the nineteenth century.³⁰¹

This beginning follows a similar ending that

No contrast within the cities is more sharp than that between town and country. Turkey is four fifths rural and agricultural; her 40,000 villages have scarcely changed for a thousand years. Here one sees the oxcart with the spokeless wheel portrayed in Sumerian sculpture of 3000 B.C., the ancient wooden plow, the huts often barely visible and nestled together in some location where their owners could be safe from surprise attack through centuries. Little but ox or the donkey would serve to carry the peasants or their goods, since there are no rural roads of consequence and many of the so-called roads are mere trails. The impression one carries away from Turkey is that of a thin layer of modernity imported from abroad and imposed from above, with great will and vigor, upon a population the larger part of which is still steeped in medieval or even ancient ways of life.³⁰²

As mentioned before, the Thornburg report is a brief example of the implementation of the modernization perspective in the thoughts of “developed” actors on Turkey. The Thornburg mission defined Turkish society according to the linear time of history and referring to the “developed.” Thornburg accepted Turkey in such a backward situation even at the beginning of his research and constructed a development theory on it to promote private enterprise to use the natural resources effectively and forming Turkey’s industry based on agriculture, reasoning that it was

³⁰¹ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 3.

³⁰² Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 4.

an agrarian society and this industry needed minimum cost.³⁰³ The suggestion of the American mission to Turkey to escape from this backwardness was to eliminate etatism.

Also, Thornburg wrote his views in a separate study about Turkey.³⁰⁴ After describing the economic conditions of Turkey and etatism in this book, he emphasized the importance of private enterprise. Because this aid comes from the United States, its economic understanding would be presented as the solution and it promoted private enterprise.³⁰⁵ The Thornburg report was opposed to etatism and the promotion of the private sector. It presented development by the private sector as a prerequisite of American aid. According to Thornburg, there was a huge gap in the Turkish economic outlook of combustion-engine plane Turkey and oxcart Turkey.³⁰⁶ On the one hand, agricultural methods left from the time of Hittites were implemented; on the other hand, as a result of the Republican industrialization attempts, twentieth century heavy industry techniques had been introduced.³⁰⁷ Thornburg views the former as a totally backward; furthermore, he said that Turkey had not lived the Iron Age yet. Agriculture was technically backward; the output was

³⁰³ A dissertation made by Edwin Scott Overman in the Ohio State University under the name of *American Aid and the Economy of Turkey* imitated Thornburg's view, based his study completely on his findings (even by making quotations for pages without indicating the writer), and reached this conclusion of great potentialities of an agricultural industry in Turkey. See Edwin Scott Overman, *American Aid and the Economy of Turkey* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1953), p. 5.

³⁰⁴ Max Weston Thornburg, *Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Ekonomik Durumunun Tenkidi*, trans. Nail Artuner (Ankara: TC. Agricultural Bank Press), 1950.

³⁰⁵ Thornburg, *Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Ekonomik Durumunun Tenkidi*, pp. 88-89.

³⁰⁶ His another interesting example to view this situation is that: "It is an anomaly that a nation which lacks simple and efficient irrigation systems, local foundries or the facilities for making modern agricultural implements should be sending young engineers abroad to study gas turbine design, supersonics and catalytic chemistry." Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 186.

³⁰⁷ For a detailed analysis of etatism principle in Turkey and suggestions of Thornburg report on this subject see Sugar, "Economic and Political Modernization: Turkey,"... pp. 168-175.

extremely low; marketing products was difficult because of the lack of roads and transportation vehicles. Thornburg regarded the latter as an exaggeration and useless in such a situation.

His first suggestion to bridge this gap was “building and maintenance of a nation-wide all-weather road network.³⁰⁸” The second recommendation was “the creation of light industries of miscellaneous variety.³⁰⁹” Then, his suggestions were to promote private enterprise, using American technical know-how and capital, facilitating laws for foreign investments, removing political risks, and attracting foreign investors by giving them equal status with domestic producers.³¹⁰ The development of private enterprise was the key factor of the recommendations section. Thornburg presented the requirements to enter the private undertaking into the country with its all details. The Thornburg report put for Turkey a leveled industrialization under the leadership of private sector and corporation of the United States instead of planned heavy industry under the leadership of state.³¹¹

In addition, he gave much attention to the need for American experts in all areas. Thornburg asserted the greatest need of the Turks, which they could not fill by themselves and for which they needed American assistance, was trained advisers, good managers, competent technicians, and industrial and commercial know-how.³¹² The report limited state provided works to infrastructure services, putting the purchase of engineering services and equipment from American consultancy

³⁰⁸ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 186.

³⁰⁹ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 187.

³¹⁰ Singer, p. 57.

³¹¹ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir?*, pp. 92, 96, 119, and 137.

³¹² Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 254.

companies as a condition.³¹³ Also, the repeated advice was the corporation of Turkish and American capital and investment suggesting the development of Turkey by American capital. In this regard, its insistent recommendation and contribution for the issuing of a foreign capital law found a response in Turkey in the way of integrated dependency. Again, new markets were created for American firms and efforts were made to involve American know-how and methods in production processes and technical training.

In this study, Thornburg looked for aid and development areas of public works, transportation, agriculture, mining, oil, energy, and the iron and steel industries. The report also came at the front scene in determining all details about Turkey's conditions and solutions to its problems. The report left nothing to private initiative. The sentence "before an intelligent program of such work can be devised for Turkey, the more basic program of what Turkey is going to produce, and where, and how it is going to be moved, must have begun to take definite form"³¹⁴, constitutes a clear example of this approach.

Consequently, the Thornburg report determined the basic need areas for Turkey and, as analyzed in the implementation chapter, this report was considered strictly. Thornburg's summary for Turkish industry openly recommended giving industrialization up and approaching to the imports.³¹⁵

On the other hand, as mentioned before, American interests in Turkey in the Marshall Plan project largely coincided with local ruling authorities' targets. Also, the Thornburg report began with two premises of that the Turkish government and

³¹³ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, pp., 218, 224, 227.

³¹⁴ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 219.

³¹⁵ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 227.

Turkish people themselves strongly demanded an efficient U.S. assistance and Turkish national interests were in accordance with U.S. national interests.³¹⁶ That is, if Turkey wanted to benefit from the Marshall Aid, it should accept American views and follow American-drawn economy politics; also, this and other similar reports show the path and threatened Turkey in a way. On the other hand, as repeatedly mentioned, this process was not one-sided. Some internal interests also motivated similar practices, the Democrat Party was based on these social forces. Indeed, Thornburg made analyses and recommendations congenial with the Democrat Party's goals, which were American-supporting and had interests of landlordship and integration to the international capitalist system. In this regard, it is not surprising that the Turkish government authorities invited these committees and the Turkish press received the Thornburg committee with open arms. One research, stating Thornburg's coming again to Turkey in 1955 as government advisor and his definition of the negativities of 1954 as a normal stage of development, implies that Thornburg's discourses resembled with commercial capital organized in the Democrat Party and with big landlords' discourses.³¹⁷

To be sure, this developmentalist perspective was also shared by many officials and people in Turkey and this gave the impetus to the Plan to be a great success for a capitalist development project. As a very brief example, Republican Party President of the Ağrı City Administration Council Rıfat Tokar wrote a letter to the Party General Secretary to demand more tractors from the Marshall Plan allocations for Ağrı city. He explained the need, which recall Thornburg's perspective, with the words "...here farmers dig the soil with wooden plow left from

³¹⁶ Thornburg, Spry, Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 14.

³¹⁷ Tören, p. 129.

the days of Adam with difficulty...” and demanded double the number of tractors for the city.³¹⁸

Nevertheless, Thornburg and his colleagues issued many big explanations and judgments beyond the economic situation of Turkey and recommendations for economic development. On the one hand, they defined the country in basic Orientalistic terms, on the other hand, they expanded their suggestions to all aspects of Turkish life in the way of the expansion of the American way of life. The report stated the suggestion of selling American periodicals at newspaper-sellers that Turkish people urgently need education in the advertising area because the beginning of a more suitable life is in the minds of people. If carefully selected American books and magazines would present to usage better, a great service would have been carried out. He continues that American popular literature reflects the speedily and easy acceptance and practicing of the new productions, innovative information and thought and it creates this to a degree. Then, a transfer opportunity would be found not only for their capital but also for their customs and ideals.³¹⁹

In the transportation sphere, the Thornburg report presented various definitions and recommendations. Statements in this regard approved the general effort to integrate Turkey into the world capitalist system tightly creating a great share for U.S. capital, investments and corporations.

According to the Thornburg report, a developed highway transportation system was a key for every possible advance in Turkey including fields such as agriculture, industry, improvement of health, education and other social and political goods. Thornburg’s feelings where that the American highway program could do

³¹⁸ “Burada insanları toprağı adem zamanından kalma tahta sabanla ve güçl kle kazıyorlar.” The Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Document No. 490011345454.

³¹⁹ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, pp. 224-225.

more to improve the Turkish economy than all the Sümerbank projects combined and this feeling helped to determine the framework of the road project of Turkey.³²⁰

However, the report claimed that railroads and highways were Turkey's most backward equipment.³²¹ In another article he mentioned that

Within the political boundaries of Turkey are a hundred 'little Turkeys,' each economically isolated from the rest and usually producing only a fractional part...of its potential. Obviously the strength of Turkey cannot approach the sum of its parts until they can be added together. Until this be done no surplus will be produced as an increment to the national wealth, no local industries based upon such surplus will be possible, no purchasing power will be created to enable expanded and diversified consumption, and no substantial improvement in the standard of living can be expected.³²²

Indeed, as mentioned and well known, in the last century of the Ottoman Empire a railway system was developed in Turkey. Because it was for trade, a tree-type railway system developed mainly around port-cities. Afterwards, the Republican era adopted railway construction as one of the main signs of development. Thus, this tree-type construction expanded to the whole country as a network system. However, Thornburg underrated this process, saying "Turkey has, properly speaking, no railway *system* at all" because he saw the existed railway lines and road systems made according to strategic and military purposes instead of economic ones.³²³ However, although they needed many modifications and expansion, especially when it compared with the United States and European countries, they were the leading

³²⁰ United States Department of State, "Unclassified," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document No. 34, 11 December 1947. The document expresses that "the department with Public Roads Administration's help and Max Weston Thornburg's advices prepared an agreement to be submitted to Turkish government."

³²¹ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 76.

³²² Max Weston Thornburg, "Turkey: Aid for What?," *Fortune*, October 1947, p. 172.

³²³ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, pp. 76-77.

aspects of the Republican modernization project.³²⁴ Indeed, the Thornburg report recommended development by highway transportation and did not accept any step for the improvement of the railway system. It went so far as to threaten Turkey by pulling the American assistance out of the country if another method implemented by its opposition to the credit which Turkey had demanded from the American Export-Import Bank for a locomotive production factory:

Turkey has requested a loan from the Export-Import Bank in which appears one item of nearly 14 million dollar for a factory to build locomotives at the rate of 125 a year. An essentially agricultural country which has not yet begun to build its own steel plows and modern farm wagons is not yet ready to build locomotives. As long as Turkish authorities are thinking in these terms, our dollars and manufacturing machinery can be used much better at home.³²⁵

For the length of Turkish roads at the end of 1940s and in 1950s, there were divergent but close estimations. The Thornburg Report stated its data as:

At the beginning of the aid era, there were about 15,000 miles of roads in the country according to the Minister of Public Works. Only 380 miles of these are surfaced with asphalt or stone, and 150 miles are treated with tar. Another 6800 miles of road are surfaced with water bound macadam and reputed to be in fair condition...Only about half the national road mileage is capable of being traversed with safety by ordinary motor vehicles...Of the interior part of the centrally administered road system, 4650 miles are listed by the government as “passable, though traveling is difficult.” The remainders, besides another 12,000 miles under local jurisdiction, are “passable by carts during the dry season only.”³²⁶

³²⁴ Contrastingly, Thornburg accepts this aspect of the Republic several times in other places of his same study as the layer of modernization imposed by the Republican elites.

³²⁵ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, pp. 218-219.

³²⁶ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 82.

On the other hand, the Barker report said that in 1949, of about 43,000 kilometers of roads, most of them were in poor or impassable condition. The national highway system, about 21,600 kilometers in length, consisted of 500 kilometers of asphalt, 7400 kilometers of passable macadam, 4700 kilometers of ruined macadam, 4500 kilometers of primitive trails. In addition, there was an estimated 21,800 kilometers of provincial roads of all types.³²⁷ Also, the Minister of Public Works declared highways that there were 23,054 kilometers and roads in general 43,500 kilometers in 1948.³²⁸ In short, only about half the national road mileage was capable of being traversed with safety by ordinary motor vehicles, as seen in the table:

Table 20. Road Situation of Turkey between 1923 and 1956

Years	Total km.	Asphalt	Stabilized	Good Macadam	Bad Macadam	Smoothing	Crude
1923	18,335	-	-	6943	6942	2450	2000
1939	40,932	279	-	10,039	7918	12,736	9960
1945	43,511	805	-	11,464	7772	13,385	10,085
1949	44,186	1383	2830	10,692	7275	10,598	11,926
1952	49,801	1778	10,318	10,338	3907	10,577	12,743
1956	56,876	3563	23,014	5666	2335	8856	13,174

Source: Süleyman Barda, *Münakale Ekonomisi* (Istanbul: Ismail Akgün Pub., 1958), p. 281.

For the development of the Turkish road system, American loans were used after the Marshall Plan for the nine-year staged program. For this program, Thornburg concluded his opinions, stating that “the road program will be a test of Turkey’s real intentions about economic development.”³²⁹ Moreover, the road program would be a test for the implementation of the Marshall Plan and it was

³²⁷ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 125 and *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 29.

³²⁸ *Yol Davamız*, p. 206; Ministry of Public Works, *25 Cumhuriyet Yılında Bayındırlık İşleri*, Ankara, 1949, pp. 8, 11.

³²⁹ Barda, p. 86.

possible for the American side that they had waited the inclusion of Turkey into the Plan until they saw that the Turkish government and public opinion applauded the American aid and accepted modernization by its hand apparently in the road program.

In the road planning, the United States government benefited from Thornburg's observations. For example, to assure significant Turkish contribution in food and coal by the fall of 1948 by calling Thornburg to Washington; also, it was underlined that "the American Agricultural attaché in Ankara should be fully advised of the Department's expectation with regard to Turkey's producing food for Europe."³³⁰ Thus, in the end, the highway mission was presented as a good example of the implementation and assistance to Turkey. It afforded an ideal subject for a case study of the program in general as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.³³¹

In industry, for manufactured goods, the Thornburg report underlined the imports instead of the import-substituting industry and production in the country, claiming that importing was cheaper and more appropriate for the Turkish people instead of making huge investments on industrialization. For instance, for the textile industry, the report states that for this period, people would benefit from using imported goods in the place of domestic manufacture.³³² Thornburg maintains his discourse also in opposition to industry involving cellulose, chemicals, machines, the modernization of port facilities, airlines, communication vehicles suggesting just constructing small facilities for assembling oxcarts, plow, simple tools for which the

³³⁰ United States Department of State, "Relationship Between the Turkish Road Program and the Marshall Plan," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document No. 18, 21 October 1947.

³³¹ Garrett, p. 2.

³³² Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir*, p. 112.

parts were also imported; and factories for vegetable, fruit, meat; and fish conserved by drying.³³³

Opposing almost all national industrial production in Turkey, the Thornburg report makes an interesting point. As was analyzed, tractor imports was one great sphere in the Marshall Plan. At least until the middle of the 1950s, the United States decided that Turkey's agricultural modernization would provide nutrition and raw materials for the world capitalist system. Thus, the Marshall Plan allocations were distributed to cultivate the land more effectively and to provide a market for U.S. products. In this regard, tractor importation reached extreme levels in Turkey in each sector of the Marshall Plan. Although the importance of tractors was emphasized by U.S. mission to the Turkish authorities and people, Thornburg challenged their opposition to the tractor factory project in Turkey, explaining that the need of Turkey for tractors had not reached a difficult level and they could import 3000 tractors more cheaply than their production investments. It is not difficult to say that constructing a factory was not limited to 3000, after this urgent need, this facility would continue to produce for years and thousands of tractors; that is, in continuity, import would not become cheaper. But more importantly, he openly made a recommendation for Turkey that implied their hidden aims and interests.

Oppositions to any kind of industrial production in Turkey continued throughout the whole report. The Thornburg committee rejected the Karabük facilities, steel production, chemical production or any kind; that is, besides the opposition and fund allocation for new projects, it even recommended the abolition

³³³ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey an Economic Appraisal*, p. 173. It should be remembered, the Turkish Industrial and Development Bank allocated funds in the Marshall Plan content just for sectors suitable to these recommendations.

of the existing state industrial institutions of Turkey, such as Sümerbank and Karabük.

In short, the elimination of statism and planning, the promotion of the private sector and foreign capital, the limitation of state investments to only infrastructure and public works was the United States-recommended development model seen in this report.

5.3.2. The Barker Report

At the beginning of 1949, a series of conferences was held between the Turkish government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. As a result of negotiations between the Bank and the government, a committee of fifteen people was chosen. They came to Turkey for field work and made observations for three months, and then they prepared a report on Turkey's existing situation and its development plan. Because its leader was the American businessman, World Bank specialist, and trade consultant James M. Barker, it was called informally the Barker Report. Some economists, one specialist in transportation and communications, one specialist in energy and power and a consultant on industry and mining, two specialists in agriculture, one specialist in public health, one in public administration, one in finance, one area specialist and research assistant, and secretaries constituted the committee because the report had claim on all these basic aspects of Turkish economic development.

The report includes an introduction about the aims and goals of the research and two main parts about the existing situation, resources and economic problems of Turkey. It includes a five-year development plan proposal. These propositions were

on the topics of coordination on economic policies and activities, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry and mining, transportation, communications and power, encouragement of private initiative, education and public health, public administration, financial organization and policy, international economic position, and lastly an economic development program and its financing.

The report declared itself “free of personal or political bias or prejudice and its single purpose as to promote the economic development which the Turkish people fervently desire.”³³⁴ As its general framework and suggestions, it seems that it got closer to this goal than the other reports although the general and overall mentality and suggestions did not differ so much. Three main premises of report’s conclusion were that first because the per capita income was low, the attainment of important basic essentials at low cost should be handled before luxury goods. Second, since there was a relatively small amount of capital but much human power, projects based on human power instead of capital should be preferred. Last, since only limited foreign exchange was available, projects that required little foreign exchange but a high proportion of domestic funds should have preference over those needing a high proportion of foreign exchange.³³⁵

Although this report was written in the Marshall Plan times, its premises deviated a bit from the program’s contents and initially seemed more realistic. However, mechanization was chosen as the main development method and this process eliminated all these premises; that is, high cost goods were purchased increasingly, projects based on large amounts of capital were chosen, like using

³³⁴ Report of a Mission sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with The Government of Turkey, *The Economy of Turkey, An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), xix.

³³⁵ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 42.

imported machines in road constructions instead of human power, and machine and spare parts dependency and therefore the foreign exchange dependency increased rapidly. Although the government followed this report in some sectors, mainly the Thornburg and Hilts reports led the internal development projects in Turkey.

The report also departed from the Thornburg report in its perspective on state enterprises. Thus, although it preferred the private enterprise as a general American understanding, it evaluated Turkish condition in their own context, approaching them more realistically, and evaluating Turkey's past performance in a much more favorable light. The point neglected in the state enterprise was that private capital had not enough power for big investments and Turkey had a somewhat sophisticated state enterprises. For instance, Sümerbank and Etibank were state economic enterprises operating outside the government budgets³³⁶:

The important point for purposes of that, although Sümerbank and Etibank are nominally subject to centralized control, they frequently make investment decisions on their own initiative without obtaining higher-level consideration of the merits of their proposed use of funds in relation to the other investment needs of the economy.³³⁷

Indeed, the most prominent premises of the report were on the agriculture sector because it saw the development leap of Turkey in that sector. The report gave the top priority to agriculture in the allocation of public investment resources because, according to them, it provided the greatest opportunity for increased productivity and because it was an essential prerequisite for industrial development in Turkey.³³⁸ That is, a similar scenario was going on, the committee determined

³³⁶ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 257.

³³⁷ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 49.

³³⁸ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 264.

Turkey's role as agricultural country providing basic raw materials in the international division of labor. In this regard, the report called for suggested industrial sectors for Turkey after agriculture such as food processing, light metal work, light machine and tool production, construction materials, leather processing, light chemicals, ceramics and pottery, village handicrafts, and woodworking, while the development of luxury goods, heavy machine and metal works industry, heavy chemical industry, cellulose and paper industry was discouraged.³³⁹ While both the Barker and Thornburg reports did not approve of a complex chemical industry for Turkey, Thornburg opposed even the nitrate (fertilizer) factory that Sümerbank offered for annually 60,000 tons production on the grounds that Turkey did not have need of such kind of production and Barker accepted them as exception as such.³⁴⁰

As an example of its premises on the use of abundant human power and limited sources, the report declares that when labor is cheap and tractors and fuel are expensive, mechanization is uneconomic on farms smaller than 200 or 300 hectares. Thus, 7000 tractors was estimated as needed on farms in this category; however, already the number of tractors had reached 10,000 by the year 1951 while there had been only 3200 tractors by 1949 and 1200 of them were in very poor condition. The fear was that the landowners would decide to farm their land themselves, thus displacing the peasants and creating a serious problem of social adjustment. This outcome was already in evidence in Adana.³⁴¹ As mentioned, Richard D. Robinson explored this point, stating that because of the high cost of purchasing machines, their maintenance and spare parts problems, mainly landlords owned them and strong

³³⁹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 107.

³⁴⁰ Güven, pp. 98, 114.

³⁴¹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 74-75.

complaints rose about undesirable situations that occurred among agricultural villagers.³⁴²

On the other hand, the Barker Report claimed that Turkey had no adequate mechanism to guide investment into the most appropriate fields.³⁴³ This acceptance justified the American intervention to the economy again getting closer to the general view. Because the state could not allocate the resources effectively, U.S. mission and foreign experts would determine the “most appropriate” fields for the benefit of the country.

In its evaluation and suggestions, interesting points appear. Instead of a total rejection of industrialization, the Barker Report brought a more moderate approach, defending the emphasis first on agriculture to industrialize. As mentioned, it recommended agricultural development by itself, stating that the proposition to Turkey is not to abandon the industrialization; however, the speediest path to led this goal was through giving bigger importance to agricultural development;³⁴⁴ it recommended stress on the development of agriculture not as an alternative but rather as a necessary base for further industrialization.³⁴⁵ They even stated the primary emphasis on the two areas of greatest need in Turkey according to this mission: agriculture and the training of technical, administrative and managerial

³⁴² Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” pp. 6-7.

³⁴³ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 33.

³⁴⁴ For this point and for a general evaluation of the report, see Reşat Aktan, “ ‘Barker Raporu’nda Ziraatimizi İlgilendiren Görüş ve Tavsiyeler,” in *Zirai Davalarımız, Türkiye Ziraatine Ait Görüşler*, TMMO (Unity Ziraat Engineerings Society) (Ankara: Erbaş Press, 1962), p. 127. Also, for an analysis and affirmative reaction of the report, see the speech of Turkey Grand National Assembly Zonguldak Deputy Abdurrahman Boyacıgiller, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 18, Sitting 1, Session 43, 21 February 1952, pp. 427-433.

³⁴⁵ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, xxiii.

personnel.³⁴⁶ However, until then, according to the specialists, little effort had been spent on the three million farm families who produced hardly more than their own requirements and did no benefit from the country's economic development.³⁴⁷

In the agricultural sector, the report projected all points of the Marshall Plan fund allocation sectors. They underlined the significance of mechanization, irrigation, agricultural credit, price supports, farm-to-market transportation, standardization, grain storage, forestry and fisheries. It seems that although the premises of the Barker Report mainly were left aside by the American mission members, the agricultural program of the Marshall Plan followed these recommendations and carried out their projects on agriculture. Hence, three main reports were prepared in the course of the Marshall Plan on the existing situation in Turkey and to give recommendations on how to allocate funds for the benefit of both countries. In this regard, while the Hilts Report determined the highway construction program, the Barker Report set the rules of the agricultural program, and the Thornburg Report gave the general approach to the country, other remaining areas of the program and main framework of the Plan. Also, clearly these reports written according to areas most needed by the United States' economy and politics to benefit from Turkey and Turkish people.

In its suggestions, the report drew up a program for economic development. It saw comprehensive planning in Turkey as neither desirable nor possible;³⁴⁸ thus, it did not formulate a comparable program for the private sector of the economy since it was not possible. The report recommended a development project on the possible

³⁴⁶ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, xxiii.

³⁴⁷ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 57.

³⁴⁸ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 251.

smallest scale instead of a comprehensive program. The mission's judgment was that at "Turkey's present stage of development and with the limited resources available to it, economic progress can best be accelerated by a variety of small projects spread widely over the country and designed to raise the living standards of large segments of the population in a relatively short time."³⁴⁹ In this way, it suggested reductions in public works, transportation, industry, and power and to give the focused energy to the agricultural jump. Transportation was given emphasis because it was thought that private capital would make little investment in this area of basic services. Roads would make a major contribution to the development of agriculture and to the expansion and more efficient operation of private industry, mining and trade. More than one-third of the recommended government development expenditures were allocated to the various areas of transportation. However, the Barker Report criticized this point and suggested a reduction in the transportation expenditures because of the limited resources available.

The report's provision for the transportation sector for the considered period was that after the completion of the first stage of the national highway program, emphasis should be shifted to the feeder roads urgently needed by the rural population. Because the mission primarily considered agricultural production, they recommended the improvement and construction of village and farm-to-market roads, and improvement in the rail and coastal shipping of farm products. "The rugged terrain, lack of skills, and *the necessity of importing all equipment, fuel and vehicles* have made the development of highways slow and difficult,"³⁵⁰ according to the Barker mission. Also, general expenditures on railways, ports and shipping

³⁴⁹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 275.

³⁵⁰ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 124, the emphases are belongs to me.

should be cut; that is, the railway maintenance and renewal program should be carried forward instead of new railway construction projects.³⁵¹ These suggestions were the consequences of the report's general vision of avoiding comprehensive jumps and taking small and mediate steps.

The report gave importance to transportation, communications and power “because they all provide auxiliary services important to the development of agriculture, industry, mining and domestic and foreign trade.”³⁵² It also appreciated their provision of cheaper and faster movement of farm commodities to markets, the prevention waste through spoilage, and making industrial goods more accessible.³⁵³ Moreover, “reducing the psychological barriers to the spread of scientific knowledge and modern ideas, thereby facilitating economic growth as well as cultural and political development”³⁵⁴ was the report's strongly considered point of importance. For the sociological interpretation of the subject, the mission therefore underlined the prevention of roads and communications in the spread of knowledge and modern ideas into village life.³⁵⁵

To summarize, the Barker Report recommended a slow down in the railway construction program, the completion of the nine-year national highway program emphasizing feeder roads in the long-run; and completion of ports, shipping and airlines program with moderate budgets and without exaggeration, and the

³⁵¹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 130.

³⁵² IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 121.

³⁵³ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 121.

³⁵⁴ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 121.

³⁵⁵ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, pp. 81-82,.

establishment of a Transportation Coordination Commission as an advisory board in new competition arena.³⁵⁶

The most prominent characteristic of the Barker Report is that it did not draw a developmental approach placing Turkey in the position of a greatly undeveloped Asian country; however, the report gave detailed analyses on each sector of the economy and suggestions for their rehabilitations. It suggested that “at Turkey’s present stage of development and with the limited resources available to it, economic progress can best be accelerated by a variety of small projects spread widely over the country and designed to raise the living standards of large segments of the population in a relatively short time.”³⁵⁷

Overall, it was repeatedly emphasized that Turkey was an agricultural country and should develop by agriculture. Huge industrial facilities, a speedy industrialization would not have any effect on raising the living conditions of the people or give any benefit to them.

5.3.3. The Hilts Report

The American Highway Committee prepared a report titled “the Highway Situation of Turkey”³⁵⁸ to present to the Turkish Republic Ministry of Public Works as a recommendation for Turkish highway development and the place of the U.S. aid program in it. It was called the Hilts Report because the committee, which worked in

³⁵⁶ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, pp. 130, 132.

³⁵⁷ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 275.

³⁵⁸ *Türkiye’nin Yol Durumu, Türkiye’ye Yardım Programı ile ilgili Amerikan Yol Heyeti Tarafından Bayındırlık Bakanlığına Sunulmak Üzere Hazırlanmıştır*, February 1948.

Turkey for four months³⁵⁹ and took 1,700,000 dollars from the 1948-1950 Marshall Plan allocations, was under the presidency of M. Hilts, the Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Public Roads. The Turkish Ministry of Public Works invited M. Hilts through the mediation of Vecdi Diker, an engineer who was in the United States at the time. The report was published in February 1948 and an alliance was signed between the Ministry of Public Works and the U.S. Highway Aid Mission. The report suggested improvements with American financial and technical cooperation.

Of the three reports prepared, as discussed, the Thornburg and Barker Reports were general reports on the main areas for U.S. aid. The third one, the Hilts Report focused on highway construction. It shows that the U.S. authorities gave special importance to this mission.

The report defined this priority as follows: “A well planned and completed highway system is necessary for any country’s welfare and progress...Food production and distribution, education opportunities and industrial enterprises, the development of potential services and even national independence and security are directly affected by well-established highways.”³⁶⁰ At this point, the report recommended the foundation of an independent General Directorate of Highways and ten regional directorates dependent on it. This recommendation was accepted.

The report included detailed suggestions on organization, financing, planning and programming, equipment, engineering standards, and security. The foreseen highway was a 35,000 km all-season system of land transport, state roads to connect

³⁵⁹ The Committee came to Turkey in December 1947, <http://www.byege.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1947/aramlik1947.htm> [March 3, 2007].

³⁶⁰ The Hilts Report, *Türkiye’nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 7.

all of the main population centers. There were details about budget, organization, and other areas in the report.

According to the suggestions, the financing of the construction of highways would be provided by Grand National Assembly allocations, road taxes, customs payments for the importation of vehicles, spare parts, oil, and anything related to highways, and license payments for vehicle registration and operation. The state had already taken these payments, but they were to be used for different purposes. The report rightly stipulates that all these payments related to roads should be spent on roads themselves.³⁶¹

The report's most beneficial suggestions in the method were for highways open all seasons, suitable for going and coming at the same time, and constructed with leveled construction or stage construction system (thus it could be widened according to later needs). Likewise, the maximum amount of mobility in the shortest possible time and with the minimum amount of expenditures would be secured.

The Hilts Report suggested that mechanization would reduce construction costs by 30-50 percent, works would be completed earlier, worker shortages would not create any problem, and technical elements would receive priority.³⁶²

Contrastingly, the Barker Report recommended that because human power was abundant and capital was limited, the other alternative should be chosen.³⁶³ However, as mentioned, mechanization was preferred because of its benefits for the United States economy and the maintenance of the world capitalist system.

³⁶¹ The Hilts Report, *Türkiye'nin Yol Durumu...*, pp. 22-25.

³⁶² The Hilts Report, *Türkiye'nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 48.

³⁶³ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 126.

The report considered Turkey's present and future road needs. Its core sentence was "four types of transportation means (land, air, railroad, and sea) should be coordinated rationally both for civil and national security reasons."³⁶⁴ Highway construction was not the final goal but a solution to the country's transportation problems. Contrastingly, the rest of the report and also the *raison d'être* of the report was the approval effort of the superiority of highways over railways and any other transportation system.

The report mentions the railway situation in Turkey, stating that the construction of a railway network to compensate collective transport needs had been completed successfully the short span of 23 years and railway construction was preferred over highway construction. It recommended the only attempt in the railway transportation to lengthen it to Van and then to focus on highways.³⁶⁵ The report presented that the development of transportation capacity was realized with the expansion of the railway network as it had been in the United States before motor vehicles entered the transportation system. However, because of the cheapness and speed of road transport, railways mainly had been abandoned in the United States.³⁶⁶ Indeed, these statements carry their own rejection; because, in contrast to the United States, Turkey did not produce its own motor vehicles. They entered the transportation system by importation. However, railway cars and their steel equipment could be produced inside the country. Highway construction meant the import dependency on the United States and other foreign countries. Hence,

³⁶⁴ The Hilt Report, *Türkiye'nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 27.

³⁶⁵ The Hilt Report, *Türkiye'nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 26.

³⁶⁶ The Hilt Report, *Türkiye'nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 27.

transportation did not become cheaper by switching from railways to highways, even today.

While the report limits the need for railway construction only to the extension to the city of Van, it recommended 35,000 kilometers of highway, comparing Turkey to Colorado, a state with the same land area in the United States. So many problems are hidden in this comparison. While the Thornburg and Barker reports and generally American vision opposed the industrialization process in Turkey and recommended that it remain an agricultural country importing the necessary products from abroad. In recommending a slow and partial development, they showed their ambitions in the highway sector, presenting the highway system as development itself. The reports carry the premise that Turkey was 75 year behind Colorado at the time, but it suggests the same length of highway for Turkey.³⁶⁷

“The present situation” in the report demonstrates that there was interior demand for highway construction and efforts in this direction had begun much earlier, with the first formal signing of the *Turuk-u Maabir Nizamnamesi* in 1866 and then road program of 1946. However, the focus of U.S. aid on this sphere was not a response to this demand and effort, but the product of America’s own interests.

5.4. Foreign Capital and Oil Laws

Two great consequences of the Thornburg Report and other American advising reports, besides their recipes for the implementation of the Marshall Plan, were their contribution to the passage of the Foreign Capital Law (*Yabancı sermaye kanunu*) and Petroleum Law (*Petrol kanunu*). An American mission under the

³⁶⁷ Güven, p. 14.

leadership of C. Randall and U.S. government oil adviser Max W. Ball provided recommendations for these laws opening the country to American firms. Thus, these American reports provided the legal, economic and financial infrastructure of transformations in the Turkish economy. Both laws passed rapidly through the National Assembly in 1954.³⁶⁸

Several concessions to promote private and foreign capital activity in Turkey started with the Marshall Plan.³⁶⁹ Before the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment was passed in 1947 and amendments were made in 1950 and 1951.³⁷⁰ However, these attempts were not seen as sufficient and the government significantly increased its support of foreign investments in the new law of 1954.³⁷¹ On the other hand, the new Petroleum Law³⁷² “granted extensive rights of prospecting and exploitation to foreign concessionaries.”³⁷³ That is, they created the structural elements for the foreign existence in Turkey.

³⁶⁸ As the press (especially the government partizans) generally supported the process, *Istanbul Ekspres* interpreted it as a considerable turning point in the development program of the country. See *Istanbul Ekspres*, January 4, 1954; however, also some criticisms were raised in these cases. *Geveze* mentioned the survey of American businessman of Turkey for business possibilities, the setting up of an electric bulb factory in this connection, another survey of Americans for iron and steel industries, textiles, tea, cement, port construction, road and dam building with the cooperation of Turkish capitalists, the American government’s dollar guarantee for American capital investment in Turkey, and Turkish government’s decree for foreign capital’s free taking out of American firms’ profit without any restriction; then, it listed the deficits of this process as arbitrary benefiting of American capitalists from Turkish farmers, workers, the general public and the riches of the country and smuggling of Turkish money out of the country reaching billion dollar calling Turkish people to oppose the American influence. See *Geveze*, September 15, 1948. Also, this guaranty of investing in Turkey and taking the capital abroad whenever the firm wants was given at a very early date, although the certain law came in 1954. See *Akşam*, August 25, 1948.

³⁶⁹ ECA, *Turkey: Country Study...*, p. 13; *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, pp. 39-45.

³⁷⁰ Republic of Turkey, Law No. 5821, 7.8.1951, *Resmi Gazete* No. 7880, 9.8.1951. This guarantee of investing in Turkey and taking the capital abroad whenever the firm wants was given at a very early date, although the final law came in 1954. See *Akşam*, 25 August 1948.

³⁷¹ Republic of Turkey, Law No. 6224, *Resmi Gazete* No. 8615, 23.1.1954.

³⁷² Republic of Turkey, Law No. 6327, 8.3.1954, *Resmi Gazete* No. 8659, 16.3.1954.

³⁷³ Hershlag, *Turkey, An Economy in Transition*, p. 190.

5.5. Other Transportation Means

5.5.1. Railways

As mentioned before, Turkey's first railway lines were built, owned and operated by foreign companies. However, the Republican government gradually absorbed the foreign-owned lines;³⁷⁴ thus, the railway system was largely built by Turkish engineers with Turkish contractors and labor, built and owned by the state after the foundation of the Republic. The whole railway system came under state ownership in 1934 under etatism principle. The railways were suitable to central control while highways represented a decentralizing element.

In the Ottoman Empire period, initially, tree-type railway lines around the port cities of Anatolia had been constructed because of commercial needs. Also, in the Middle East the railway construction had been a symbol of prestige, had military and economic goals, and had been the tool of the imperialist project of the European powers. However, the railway transportation system changed its nature after 1923. Giving the greatest attention to the railways in the transportation system, the new goal of the government was to construct a nation-wide railway network system to connect the most distant places of the country. Prime minister Ismet İnönü described the government policy at the time as every day one more kilometer of railway.³⁷⁵ The railway network was presented as a part of both a national defense and national

³⁷⁴ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 123.

³⁷⁵ "Ben bir şey bilirim: ne olursa olsun, her gün bir karış daha ray döşemek!" cited in Ümit Sariaslan, *Demir Ağlardan Örümcek Ağlarına: Cumhuriyet Demiryolculuğu ve Sonrası* (Istanbul: Otopsi, 2004), p. 124.

economy policy, and a development role in the social life was attributed to it.³⁷⁶

Although Turkey's railway system was far behind its European counterparts in the 1930s, its progress was more rapid than in other countries and its length was almost doubled between 1924 and 1939.³⁷⁷

Prior to 1946 the government had centered its attention on railway development and roads had been neglected. After 1948, however, a comprehensive rehabilitation and development program was undertaken with the assistance of United States highway experts for public roads,³⁷⁸ determining the highway as the sole alternative while railways were left aside then. Ismet Ergün claims that the railways made huge contributions to the economic development; however, the other transportation means developed later could not reach the same assistance level. That is, the difference of the effectiveness of other transportation means from the railways' was so small compared to the railways' effectiveness difference from its predecessors.³⁷⁹

While Süleyman Barda lists the advantages of highway transportation over railway transportation as mobility, cheap cost at short distance, and speed, he lists the disadvantages as expensiveness at long distances and heavy goods' transport, and high rate of accidents.³⁸⁰ He concludes that by the year 1958, the railway lines

³⁷⁶ Tütengil, pp. 28-29.

³⁷⁷ In 1939, railway line lengths per square kilometer were nine meters in Turkey, 66 meters in Italy, 134 meters in Great Britain, and 32 meters in the United States. *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1950 and Herschlag, *Turkey An Economy in Transition*, p. 303.

³⁷⁸ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 21.

³⁷⁹ Ergün, p. 24.

³⁸⁰ According to the 1956 data (in which traffic accident rates were first calculated), traffic accidents of that year cost 5.5 million dollar, that is about 6-7 percent of the annual national budget for the country; the accident number in 1957 was 7816 while the death number was 1329. The accident number for each 10,000 vehicles was 572, injured number was 597, and death number was 97; and statistical data were only about 65 percent of the real numbers. Also, spare part shortage seemed one

maintained their importance and advantages in the transportation system.³⁸¹

Similarly, Hershlag compares the two systems, stating that the current costs of railway transport were lower and the country possessed coal but no adequate sources of oil; while he lists the advantages of highways over railways as short construction time, available materials, and easy-solving of the spare parts problem. However, construction materials and spare parts seemed easy to get in highways thorough importation; Hershlag's perspective is close to the developmental thought neglecting that although production needed a longer time period it had advantageous over importation in the long run.³⁸² In a well-organized network system, these two transportation means, in fact all transportation means, would alternate and support each other. However, in the Turkish case, also in the case of other so-called "underdeveloped" countries, focusing on one means was preferred for the sake of abolishing the others.³⁸³

of the main reasons of these accidents. See Republic of Turkey, *1956 Traffic Accidents*, Ankara 1958, p. 88; Republic of Turkey, *1957 Traffic Accidents*, Ankara, 1959, p. 85; Republic of Turkey, *Highways Statistical Bulletin*, 1958, p. 18; and Republic of Turkey, *1955 Traffic Accidents*, Ankara, 1956, p. 86.

³⁸¹ Barda, pp. 256-260. The book presents a detailed and comparative monograph on the transportation means, their economic dimensions and histories in Turkey. The study should especially be considered because it was written at the end of nine-year highway program; therefore, it reflects the successes and failures of the program concluding that projected expenses had been transgressed much but the demanded road network and traffic potential could have not been reached without it.

³⁸² Hershlag, *Turkey, An Economy in Transition*, p. 301.

³⁸³ Also, today's many Assembly discussions bring up this point of the disintegration in the transportation sphere as a result of U.S. assistance. DSP (Democratic Leftist Party) Istanbul Deputy Perihan Yılmaz mentions the divergence of the General Directorate of Highways from the Ministry of Transportation according to the Hiltz Report and the creation of broken and rival means signifying that 75 percent of highway and railway network was constructed parallel to each other demolishing the railway system and reminding the consideration in the policy as international automotive, oil, petrochemistry and construction firms' interests. Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 21, vol. 2, Session 26, 30 November 1999. In addition, this and other minutes discussed the subject and criticized the Marshall Plan on the consequences of great traffic accident rates, oil, spare part and vehicle importation burden on the economy, environmental pollution, being the highest number of trucks in the Europe in Turkey [about 675,000 in Turkey, about 250,000 in Europe in 2006], and the decline of passenger-carrying railways to 2 percent while highways take 96 percent. See CHP Şanlıurfa Deputy Mahmut Yılmaz, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 1, Session 55, 25 March 2003; The Minister of Transportation Binali Yıldırım, Republic of

While between 1930 and 1940, 2484 kilometers of railway were laid in Turkey, it dramatically fell to 374 kilometer between 1940 and 1950, and 288 kilometer between 1950 and 1960.³⁸⁴ Also, the transportation share of railways, 42 percent in passengers and 78 percent in cargo, decreased to 3.1 percent in passengers and 4.6 percent in cargo in 1999 through a steady regression.³⁸⁵ On the other hand, share of highways in passenger increased to 95 percent and in cargo to 90 percent in this year.³⁸⁶

In the content of the Marshall Plan, four railway lines were projected in the countryside and initially their expenses were allocated more from drawing rights. The Kozlu-Çataldere-Ereğli and Çataldere-Armutçuk railway lines was planned to transfer the coal of Armutçuk to Ereğli. The Maraş-Köprübaşı and Narlı-Gaziantep-Karkamış lines would avoid the south line to pass from Syria on the road to Iraq. The Erzurum-Sarıkamış line would facilitate the transport of feeding animals of Kars. The Elazığ-Van line would construct a railway link with Iran. The following table shows the limited allocated budget for railway construction in Turkey:

Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 1, Session 91, 10 June 2003; CHP Bursa Deputy Kemal Demirel, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 2, Session 7, 15 October 2003; CHP Bursa Deputy Kemal Demirel, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 3, Session 12, 2 November 2004; CHP Bursa Deputy Kemal Demirel, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 3, Session 72, 17 March 2005. On the other hand, after years, some government authorities followed the tradition defining the aim of the American assistance of the date positively as finding market to post-Second World War surplus industrial goods and construct the highway network in the strategically important Turkey for the Cold War in the General National Assembly discussions; see, CHP Antalya Deputy Nail Kamacı, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 4, Session 97, 3 May 2006.

³⁸⁴ The Ministry of Transportation, *Ulaştırma 50. Yıl* (Ankara: 1973), p. 42; and The Ministry of Transportation, *10 Yılda Türkiye Nafıası 1923-1933* (İstanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat Türk A.Ş., 1933), p. 5.

³⁸⁵ <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ulastirm/oik592.pdf>, State Planning Organization, *Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, Ulaştırma Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu...*, p. 10.

³⁸⁶ <http://www.kgm.gov.tr/asps/KGM/tarihce.pdf>, p. 50 [May 13, 2007].

Table 21. Marshall Plan Allocations for Railways between 1949 and 1958

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Drawing Rights	Special Resource	Position Initiale	Total
1949-1950	300,000	11,758,000			12,058,000
1950-1951	1,660,000	3,500,000		1,360,000	6,520,000
1952-1953	326,450		5,100,000		5,426,450
1954-1955	2,200,000				2,200,000
1955-1956	2,750,000				2,750,000
1956-1957	2,046,000				2,046,000
1957-1958	600,000				600,000
Total	9,882,450	15,258,000	5,100,000	1,360,000	31,600,450

Source: *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 12, 16, 23, 28, 31, 35.

5.5.2. Airlines

Also in the scope of the Plan, limited funds were appropriated for other transportation means in Turkey. In the airports realm,³⁸⁷ the construction program included the organization of Yeşilköy, Esenboğa, and Adana fields according to the international standards and the construction of required land facilities receiver stations, control towers, etc. for the İzmir, Afyon, Konya, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, and Erzurum fields. The first allocation for the construction of airfields was 803,000 dollars in the 1950-1951 period.³⁸⁸ Until the end of 1952-1953 period, 2,125,000 dollars were allocated from the Marshall Plan direct and indirect funds for the construction and renovation of airfields to buy tractors, trucks, and construction equipment.³⁸⁹ However, this construction project was planned to cost 65 million TL;

³⁸⁷ The first state airlines, Devlet Hava Yolları was instituted in 1933 and the airline between Ankara and Istanbul was initiated on February 17, 1934. Hershlag, *Turkey an Economy in Transition*, p. 306.

³⁸⁸ *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 6, 1951, p. 16.

³⁸⁹ *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 13, 1952, p. 23; *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 19, 1954, p.16; *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall*

to be sure, the main budget again belonged to the state while the Marshall Plan took its prestige rights. Also, 1,061,000 dollars were allocated for Turkish Airlines to import various spare parts.³⁹⁰ By 1957, internal flights carried to 28 cities. Limited but constant allocation continued during the Marshall Plan for airfield construction. Accordingly, the approximate annual numbers of assistance for air transportation were as follow:

Table 22. Marshall Plan Allocations for Airfields between 1950 and 1959

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Special Resource	Total
1950-1951	803,000		803,000
1951-1952		819,000	819,000
1952-1953	453,000	50,000	503,000
1953-1954	315,000		315,000
1954-1955		2,125,000	2,125,000
1955-1956	422,000		422,000
1956-1957	277,000		277,000
1957-1958	530,000		530,000
1958-1959	639,800		639,800
Total	3,439,800	2,994,000	6,433,800

Source: *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 10, 13, 14, 19, 28, 33, 36, 38.

5.5.3. Seaways

In comparison, seaways in general began to flourish from 1934 onwards when the state's activities increased significantly to develop shipping. From the Marshall Plan funds, ports took the main share in the seaways sphere. In the Marshall Aid program, the construction of Zonguldak port was included. It was explained that the port could meet that time's need for existing vehicles. However, because the need

Plan in Turkey, vol. 23, 1955, p. 18; and *The Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 14, 1953, pp. 20–21.

³⁹⁰ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 38, 1959, p. 28.

for coal and steel inside and outside of the country would increase and because the deduction would also increase, the port would become insufficient. While this Plan was carried out in the reconstruction and development of participating countries, resources were allocated for future requirements although there were huge existing needs and already insufficient ports. In a total development program this foresight is crucial; however, at this point this explanation implies that coal was essential for the United States and world capitalist system and the Turkey was a “reserve power” in this development. Thus, as a means of integration to foreign markets, the reconstruction of Zonguldak port became an urgent project carried out with Marshall Plan funds. According to the agreement in 1949, 9,093,000 dollars were determined for the project. The amount was compensated about equally by U.S. funds and the national budget.³⁹¹

In addition, 1,863,000 dollars were allocated to the Maritime Bank by the end of 1957.³⁹² Also, ship renovation was a target of funds.³⁹³ Of the 51,600,000 dollars budget government program, 13,169,005 dollars were given from the Marshall Plan.³⁹⁴ Some ships and maritime equipment were imported from the United States and European countries with this fund. However, in the area, the United States allowed Turkey only to buy the old-fashioned and second-hand ships from Europe and the United States in order to prevent significant development in the country and

³⁹¹ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 40.

³⁹² *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 24, 1955, p. 8; *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 28, 1956, p. 8; and *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 36, 1958, p. 6.

³⁹³ Ship demand was the setting for much correspondence between Turkish and American parties. See Department of State, “Turkish Government Desire to Purchase Ships,” Document No. 867.85/ 6-347, 3 June 1947; Department of State, Document No. 867.85/ 10-1447, 15 October 1947; also, Department of State, Document No. 867.85/ 10-2847, 28 October 1947.

³⁹⁴ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 1, 1949, p. 41.

also to put its old equipment into use.³⁹⁵ Nevertheless, merchandise transport significantly improved after 1955 by these measures.³⁹⁶

Furthermore, 1,948,000 dollars allocated for the Post Telephone and Telegraph Agency of Turkey were counted in the transportation funds to import electric equipment and machines.³⁹⁷

5.6. Public Roads Policy

In the highway realm, Nine Year Highway Program and the Law founding the General Directorate of Highways (*Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü Kuruluş Kanunu*) in 1950 in the Ministry of Public Works³⁹⁸ (which became the legal document of the Hiltz report) determined this part of the transportation policy of Turkey after the Second World War, after the U.S. assistance to Turkey. The agreement for the nine years program was signed in 1948 according to the recommendations of the Hiltz report. “The leveled construction system” including upkeep was a novelty introduced with the report.³⁹⁹ For the nine-year Highway Program, because the United States was against long-term plans, the old fifteen years program was changed. U.S. and Turkish authorities declared the importance of a strong highways network as ensuring economic, agricultural, and commercial

³⁹⁵ “Kırk Yıllık Tekneler”, *Akşam*, November 6, 1950.

³⁹⁶ Republic of Turkey, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, No. 27, May 1956, p. 34 and No. 52, June 1958, p. 13.

³⁹⁷ *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 24, 1955, p. 8; *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 28, 1956, p. 8; *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 31, 1957, p. 8; *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 33, 1957, p. 34; and *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 34, 1958, p. 33.

³⁹⁸ Law No. 5539, 11 February 1950.

³⁹⁹ Tütengil, p. 21.

development; increasing the mobility of the military for national defense; the expansion of knowledge, educational institutions; the raising of the cultural level; cheapening the transportation costs of exports; facilitating in health protection and social assistance; benefiting the tourism; and increasing the living standards.⁴⁰⁰ In the end, the nine year “National Highway Program,” broken into three-year stages of improvement, reconstruction and maintenance, was accepted.

As mentioned, after the Second World War, the governments launched a variety of programs in the transportation field. However with the transportation project of the Plan, the aims were to build the Turkish capitalist development process according to the international division of labor, to provide access to the needed grains and productions of the United States and European countries under the content of the Plan, and to meet the military needs of the Cold War era.⁴⁰¹

Agriculture and transportation, also mining and transportation, could not be separated in the Marshall Plan. Modern equipment and highways in good quality were the required for sufficient agricultural production and for cheaper and faster movement of farm commodities to markets. Besides its own development characteristics and its own industrial relationships, transportation was the main sector in the Marshall Plan because of its great role in other sectors, as in agriculture and mining. American advisors, reports, and intellectuals emphasized always the importance of road transportation for the development of the country, but not the general development of the transportation system (while the emphases should have

⁴⁰⁰ Berksan, p. 14.

⁴⁰¹ Tören, p. 156.

been on transportation in general, the repeated emphasis on roads raises some questions).⁴⁰²

Interestingly, in the highway sector the national budget took almost the whole burden while the project was attributed to the Marshall Plan. While in the highway project the United States invested about forty million, about 33 percent of the total cost, the Turkish government invested approximately 77 percent, more than twice of that amount; this was the general tendency for the other spheres as well. As mentioned before, this was a characteristic of the Marshall Plan. The assistance was implemented in the basic sectors of the economy and it ascribed all the achievements in the period of the Plan as its own, as in the cases of the Hilton Hotel and the Bulgarian immigrants. If it is reformulated, the Marshall Plan determined the amount of appropriated funds as well as where and how national resources would be used.⁴⁰³

Annual Marshall Plan allocations for highway construction were as follows:

Table 23. Marshall Plan Highway Allocations between 1948 and 1960

<i>in \$</i>	Direct Aid	Drawing Rights	Position Initial	Total
1948-1949	5,000,000			5,000,000
1949-1950	9,000,000	251,000		9,251,000
1950-1951	4,500,000			4,500,000
1951-1952	3,369,000			3,369,000
1952-1953	4,200,000		1,313,000	5,513,000
1953-1954	6,200,000			6,200,000
1954-1955	7,057,000			7,057,000
1955-1956	830,000			830,000
1956-1957	2,458,250			2,458,250
1957-1958	500,000			500,000
1958-1959	650,000			650,000
1959-1960	44,684			44,684
Total	43,808,934	251,000	1,313,000	45,372,934

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vols. 9–41; and Highways Statistical Bulletin 1957, p. 25.

⁴⁰² Supporting this point, Robert Kerwin states that “improvement in Road Transportation is probably the most fundamental project that could be undertaken at the present time to promote the economic development of Turkey. See Robert W. Kerwin, “The Turkish Road Program,” *Middle East Journal* 4, no. 2 (April 1950), p. 196.

⁴⁰³ Tören, p. 162.

Moreover, while in 1950 public roads expenses were 2.90 percent of the national budget, gradually increasing, this amount became 9.31 percent in 1958.⁴⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the allocated budget for highway construction and maintenance did not pass 16 million TL until 1949. However, this budget greatly expanded after that date under the influence of the Marshall Plan's notion of highways. The state highways finance tables show this expansion:

Table 24. Financing for State Highways

Million TL	Internal Finance	External Finance	Total
1949	63	14	77
1950	66	28	94
1951	92	15	107
1952	186	20	206
1953	220	38	258
1954	191	39	230
1955	299	39	338
1956	342	39	381
1957	431	39	470

Source: *Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey*, vol. 9, 1951, p. 57 and Barda, *Münakale Ekonomisi*, p. 290. In general, the Marshall Plan contributed some 20 percent of annual total investment. Respectively, 14, 26, and 13 million TL in 1949, 1950, and 1951 foreign finances corresponded to the Marshall Plan aids.

Likewise, the Marshall Plan emphasized highway construction and mainly ways suitable to its benefit aims, as can be seen in Figure 6:

⁴⁰⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Highways Statistical Bulletin*, 1958, p. 36.

As can be seen, Marshall Plan's preference in the highway construction was to connect agricultural production and mining centers to the port areas and to Ankara and Istanbul. Instead of the integration of Turkish agriculture and mining by Turkish industry, by industrial development in the country, the United States wanted to integrate Turkish agriculture and mining to Western industry.⁴⁰⁵ All sectors and practices and especially the highway construction project in the Marshall Plan serviced this goal. This policy helped Turkish economy to cooperate more with world economy and world capitalist system in this development program.

This map also shows that although the national goal was in this way, the Marshall Plan did not take into principal consideration the creation of a total inside country integration and spider-web highway network in the country against discourses. However, it is clear that with the highway construction and maintenance, an increase in the economy's expansion in time (being open for 12 months) was demanded and it was presented as an independent variable in the development.

5.7. General Evaluation

Considerable funds were spent on transportation after the establishment of the Republic; also, the entire transportation program largely was confined to railroad expansion, shipping facilities, and a few roads which had a direct bearing on the military needs of Turkey. Overman writes that the "concentration of the population and most of the economic activity in areas that are more easily accessible to this natural transportation medium was both logical and expedient."⁴⁰⁶ Thus, the existing

⁴⁰⁵ Sami Güven explains this approach as a semicolonial development model. See Güven, p. 144.

⁴⁰⁶ Overman, pp. 140-141.

situation of roads in Turkey was really poor and needed rehabilitation. As mentioned, roads were generally usable only in fair weather and even then not for all kinds of vehicles. The total length of roads was about 44,000 in 1948 and became 60,000 in 1975.⁴⁰⁷

A comparison with other countries also indicates this fact:

Table 25. Comparable Table of Highways per square kilometer in 1948 and 1955

Countries	Meter Highway Per km ² in 1948	Meter Highway Per km ² in 1955
Britain	1210	1240
France	1100	1306
Italy	1050	1631
Germany	1240	1707
Czechoslovakia	750	997
Romania	580	750
Yugoslavia	270	320
Bulgaria	340	436
Greece	170	197
Iran	16	
Afghanistan	12	
Turkey	17	60

Source: Berksan, *Yol Davamız*, p. 13; Barda, *Münakale Ekonomisi*, pp. 292-293; and *25 Cumhuriyet Yılında Bayındırlık İşleri*, p. 13.

In addition, the importance of a developed and organized highway network of good quality cannot be rejected. Of course, the development of the transportation system brought many benefits to the country and integrated the regions. The realist Turkish writer Refik Halit Karay described his exile memories in his book *Gurbet Hikayeleri* (Foreign Place Stories). While describing their transfer from Sinop to Çorum (a journey to 307 kilometers) which took nine days because of the lack of highway facilities, he stated that “lack of transportation vehicles caused that villagers sold their forty eggs for one kuruş and resulted in the decaying of the stocks of grain

⁴⁰⁷ DIE, No. 825, p. 262. Its exact numbers are that 44,186 in 1948 and 59,516 in 1975.

in buildings because they could not be transferred; on the other hand, Istanbul dwellers were eating bread from heath.⁴⁰⁸ In addition, according to a survey by the United States Public Roads Administration to Turkey, at least 10 percent of the current wheat production in Turkey was lost to spoilage because of the absence of transport facilities.⁴⁰⁹

Of course, nobody can claim an absolute opposition to the development of highway transportation. However, since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the state had focused on other transportation means, especially on the railway. Although Thornburg claimed the opposite, a developed railway system could have met many requirements.

⁴⁰⁸ “Ulaşım araçlarının olmayışı köylülerin kırk yumurtayı bir kuruşa satmalarına ve ulaştırılamadıkları için hububatın binalarda çürümesine sebep oldu; öte yandan, İstanbul halkı süpürge otundan yapılan ekmekleri yiyordu.” Refik Halit Karay, “Kırk Paraya Kırk Yumurta,” in *Gurbet Hikayeleri* (Istanbul: Semih Lütfi Pub., 1940), pp. 117-118.

⁴⁰⁹ The Hilt Report, *Türkiye’nin Yol Durumu...*, p. 26.




Figure 7. Railway Map of Turkey in 1949
Source: Barda, *Münakale Ekonomisi*.

On the other hand, highways improved transportation but in spite of other alternatives. The U.S. benefited in many ways from this choice. What the Turkish authorities could not have seen was not that highways were a development mean but that highways should not be the single system uncoordinated with other transportation means.⁴¹⁰ Lack of coordination in the transportation system left the railways and seaways behind while roads flourished.⁴¹¹ The three Plan-periods between 1963 and 1977 also show this lack of foresight that, although the Marshall Plan ended, the government continued to make on average 66 percent investment in highways while it made only 19 percent for railways, nine percent for seaways, and six percent for airways.⁴¹²

Reducing the preference of Turkey on transportation system to a single sub-system, there became no consistent transportation politics that covered all transportation sub-spheres together and developed each according to the others.

Moreover, seeing the lacks and needs of the Second World War and new organized world system, the Turkish authorities and people accepted the importance of road development in the country. In this regard, the government's own demands and efforts to allocate funds, build and develop a national highway program should be considered as its own decision and a success of the country, although a subtle American promotion was in effect. However, the highways rehabilitation program of the U.S. gave the road system a significant place among the means of transportation

⁴¹⁰ Ergün, pp. 54-55. The monographic study of İsmet Ergün introduced the economy-politic of transportation and its considerable role in development in Turkey.

⁴¹¹ <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ulastirm/oik592.pdf>, p. 11; and Singer, p. 61. In 1938, railway's share was about 66 percent in investment and highway's was about 14 percent while the former fell to about 16 percent in 1952 and the latter rose to about 58 percent. V. Eldem, "Turkey's Transportation," *Middle East Affairs* (October 1953), p. 325.

⁴¹² Cited in Ergün, p. 59.

for the first time.⁴¹³ In the economic assistance to Turkey, highway construction was preferred over other transportation alternatives, eliminating mass transportation systems on behalf of private vehicles.

The traffic patterns of the cities, for example, Istanbul, show this transformation. For instance, until 1948, it was possible to go from Yenikapı to Bebek by street car, a kind of miniature rail-line. However, this system was pulled up from the city and the same level of mass transportation system has not been today, in 2007, comparing with today's population. Also until the 1960s, Turkish films show that only one or two vehicles passed by on city roads every couple of minutes. The roads were opened at the cost of dismantling street cars, the main mass transportation system in Istanbul, while there were still few cars even ten years later. The Barker Report propped this reality up stating that "there were, in 1949, only 11,300 trucks, 2540 buses and 7950 automobiles in Turkey. Traffic density is not likely to increase quickly since all mechanized vehicles, spare parts and fuel must be imported,"⁴¹⁴ but a huge construction program was maintained in spite of that. The following two tables gives similar information on the number and change in the number of highway vehicles over years:

⁴¹³ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 122.

⁴¹⁴ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 126.

Table 26. Numerical Development of Highway Vehicles between 1939 and 1979

Vehicle Types	1939	1946	1950	1955	1960	1970	1979
Automobile	5,713	3,649	13,405	28,599	45,767	137,771	658,667
Truck	4,352	5,417	15,404	30,250	57,460	70,730	162,667
Pickup	-	-	-	-	-	52,152	147,138
Bus	1,297	1,213	3,755	6,671	10,981	15,980	29,313
Minibus	-	-	-	-	-	20,916	62,178

Source: Highways Statistical Yearbook 1976, Summary Tables of State Statistical Office Transportation Statistics (1976-1979); and Barda, *Münakale Ekonomisi*, p. 283.⁴¹⁵

In 1955, 18,172 automobiles, 14,049 trucks, and 2921 buses were of American origin.⁴¹⁶ Highway transportation vehicles were imported in the 1950s and about fifty percent of them were from the United States; afterwards, their numbers greatly increased in the 1960s and 1970s by the construction of assembling factories in the country. The United States assistance mechanisms had a multi-sided role in this subject. As mentioned, the Plan provided great benefits for foreign capital as well as creating new orderings and inequalities in local capital. The U.S. authorities and Turkish elites reciprocally chose each other and expanded economically. The story of Vehbi Koç's partnership with Ford and Fiat in the automotive assembling industry and with Pirelli and Uniroyal in tire importing industry and then the foundation of the Tofaş, Otosan and Oyak-Renault factories in Turkey reflects these stages and certain local actors in the process.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ These American and Turkish data give a somewhat different amount because the change in numbers in one-year period is relatively high. However, an approximate number can be drawn from the tables.

⁴¹⁶ Of total highway vehicles of 1955, 35,142 were American origin, 15,757 were Britain, 6869 were German, 4370 were other Western origin, and 3382 were unknown origin. See United States Department of Commerce, *Investment in Turkey*, Washington, 1956, p. 117.

⁴¹⁷ For the whole story of automotive sector, see Yılmaz Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü, Otomotiv Sanayi Nasıl Kuruldu* (Istanbul: Milliyet Press, 1996). On the other hand, in the agriculture sphere the situation was similar and some local corporations became the assemblers of foreign tractors as Ford,

In addition, trucks and tires cost more than twice as much in Turkey as in the United State and European countries, but they had an estimated average life only one half to two-third as long.⁴¹⁸ According to the specialists, Turkey was at best certain to face a serious problem of foreign exchange in maintaining and expanding its present supplies of motor equipment, tires, spare parts, fuel and oil.⁴¹⁹ According to the 1950 industry and place of employment census, repair shops, spare part and oil sale shops considerable increased. Besides, with the mechanization of army, agriculture and the increase of the importation of vehicles operating on the new highways of Turkey, paying for the imported oil, which gradually increased, became a great problem.⁴²⁰

In the evaluation of the United States' interests in the Marshall Plan implementation in Turkey, the transportation system brought great benefits to the U.S. capitalist expansion, for their production markets, for sending American goods to the most remote places, and also for obtaining the products it needed. In the first section, there was the construction process itself. In the process of the construction of highways in underdeveloped countries and in Turkey, almost fully (99 percent for Turkish construction⁴²¹) American equipment was imported as tractors, bulldozers, etc.; U.S. engineering firms were awarded contracts for road construction projects;

Massey-Ferguson, McCormick, etc. See "Country Situation Report, Turkey," in *Country Series: Turkey* (Washington: 1955), pp. 51-64.

⁴¹⁸ According to State Planning Organization's investigation, a 995 lira truck wheel in Germany was sold for 2273 liras for Turkey, and a 112 lira automobile wheel was sold for 227 liras. See Güven, p. 135; cited from Bülent Ecevit, *Ulus*, March 25, 1968. Of these automobile wheels, 450,000 dollars were distributed to job members and private people through firms in 1954. See *İstanbul Ekspres*, January 22, 1954.

⁴¹⁹ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 135.

⁴²⁰ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 8.

⁴²¹ "99 percent of equipment was taken from the United States, the development of Turkish highways became dependent on the American economy through road machines and parts." Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyet'in Harcı*, p. 416.

U.S. experts advised the method and process of the construction. New opportunities were provided for Americans.

In the second rank, the highway-based economy in Turkey continuously imported vehicles and oil from the United States automotive and oil monopolies. They came out of the war greatly strengthened and were searching for new markets. This also maintained the steady dependency; the multinational automotive monopolies firstly sold their products with credits and then with the facilitation of national law, they built their assembling industries in the country marking of involvement of the greatest sphere multinational corporations in Turkey.⁴²²

From asphalt paving equipment, to road construction machines, trucks, automobiles, wheels, and oil, this transportation system was wholly foreign dependent. For the third section, the United States gained a great opportunity to sell products other than those related to highways. After the 1950s, there was an unprecedented increase in the consumption of American goods in underdeveloped countries. Their method was to abolish the pre-capitalist relationships in a country, to scatter the closed village economies, and then introduce American goods there.⁴²³ And last, while the United States tried to take over world hegemony in the economic, political, military, and social spheres, it gave the underdeveloped countries the production of their required agricultural and raw materials with a cheap labor force. Hence, the sophisticated highway network systems were used to get the best products of countries speedily to the port cities and airports for their usage. Overall, the highway construction was an indispensable means for multilayered benefits for the

⁴²² Güven, pp. 129-130.

⁴²³ Güven, p. 145.

United States capitalism. It should be emphasized time and again that the Plan provided Turkish economy to flourish but suitable with American interests.

Last, while the importance of roads was introduced with economic explanations, also social and cultural justifications were frequently invoked. Indeed, there were social aspects of the Aid with high political implications. Therefore, the social aspects of the aid, the effects of tractors and highway construction (similar to nineteenth century railway construction) should be considered initially. They paved the way for big transformations in the countries, with sometimes devastating results for society, economy, and army.

However, the American side and the supporters of American assistance in the country attributed them developmental roles. As mentioned, both the Barker and Thornburg Reports mentioned this aspect of spreading the modern way of life by road construction. While the Barker Report accompanied improved roads with the greater mobility of goods and people and ideas resulting with the spread of scientific knowledge and modern views toward cultural and political improvement,⁴²⁴ the Thornburg report linked every possible advance of the agricultural, industrial, social, and political areas to transportation.⁴²⁵

Cavit Orhan Tütengil prepared a monographic study on highway construction in Turkey especially after the Second World War. He attributes a huge developmental effect to highways on the economic, political and social life of the country without considering the foreign goals. While he mentions that increasing transportation was to make raw materials reach to German companies, he continues

⁴²⁴ IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 121.

⁴²⁵ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, p. 76.

that whatever its reasons, it brought development.⁴²⁶ Tütengil gives great importance to highways in Turkey in the increased communication between village and city, in the change of the villages socially, and the weakening to family ties and tradition.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁶ Tütengil, p. 45.

⁴²⁷ Tütengil, pp. 117, 121-122, 130, and 144.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL MEASURES BROUGHT BY THE MARSHALL PLAN

This chapter is devoted to two separate social measures of the Marshall Plan. First, it will be examined a subject closely related with the Marshall Plan implementations and highway policy, the urbanization phenomena. Second, a different case study about Marshall Plan health brochures will be evaluated to display the connection between the modernizing perspective and the Marshall Plan implementation.

6.1. Urbanization Problem

In the sociological literature, the 1950s marked an important transformation in Turkey. After that period, the urbanization problem, urban-rural dichotomy, and different possible solutions to handle the shaking social shift occupied the social sciences. There is a massive sociological literature about the problems of immigration, the break up of large families, and too rapid urbanization which could be related to the Marshall Program's effects.⁴²⁸ Before 1950, 18.3 percent of the population lived in countryside; however, after that time urban population

⁴²⁸ For some of these discussions, see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Kemal H. Karpat, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal Dönüşüm*, trans. Abdülkerim Sönmez (Ankara: Imge, 2003); Erol Tümerterkin, *Türkiye'de İç Göçler* (Istanbul: TAŞ Press, 1968); Erol Tümerterkin, *Türkiye'de Şehirleşme ve Şehirselleşme Fonksiyonları* (Istanbul: Istanbul University Pub, 1973); Yakut Sencer, *Türkiye'de Kentleşme, Bir Toplumsal ve Kültürel Değişme Süreci* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Pub., 1979).

increased rapidly and in 1990, 59 percent of the population was living in cities.⁴²⁹

The 1940-1960 population distribution shows the first launch of this process:

Table 27. Change in Urban Population of Turkey

	Urban Population	Rural Population	Total Population
1927	2,236,085	11,412,185	13,648,270
Percentage	16.4	83.6	100
1940	3,214,471	14,606,479	17,820,950
Percentage	18	82	100
1950	3,883,865	17,063,323	20,947,188
Percentage	18.5	81.5	100
1960	6,867,024	20,842,807	27,809,831
Percentage	25.1	74.9	100

Source: Ruşen Keleş, *Türkiye’de Şehirleşme Hareketleri (1927-1960)*, Türk İktisadi Gelişmesi Araştırma Projesi, 1961, p. 5. (Places with population greater than 10,000 are counted as “urban.”)

According to this data, while the urban population increased on average by 20 percent between 1927 and 1950, it increased by 79.4 percent between 1950 and 1960.⁴³⁰

This period was not experienced smoothly and the problems have not been solved yet. Urbanization was the result of the rapid immigration from the countryside to the cities. Because of the socio-economic conditions, immigrants had to resort to substandard housing on the outskirts of the cities. The *gecekondu* (literally build at night) problem and “*gecekondu* culture” created great discussions and catastrophes at the same time, especially in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Housing and infrastructure insufficiency were the main problems. *Gecekondu* activity created almost irremediable problems in Turkey. According to the 1970 data, there were

⁴²⁹ DIE, *Statistical Indicators, 1923-1992* (Ankara: 1994).

⁴³⁰ Ruşen Keleş, *Türkiye’de Şehirleşme Hareketleri (1927-1960)*, *Türkiye’de Şehirleşme Hareketleri (1927-1960)*, Türk İktisadi Gelişmesi Araştırma Projesi, 1961, p. 6.

195,000 shantytown houses (32.5 percent of the total house number) in Istanbul and 150,000 houses (25 percent of the total) in Ankara; this means that 45 percent of the population lived in squatter settlements in Istanbul and of 65 percent in Ankara.⁴³¹

The causes of the migration from villages to the cities are generally explained by a push-pull factors in the social sciences literature. The reasons pushing people from villages and also the reasons pulling people to the cities are gathered to create migration stories. Mainly, the lack of jobs in the countryside and new job opportunities in the urban areas caused the migration. The mechanization in the agriculture left the villagers out of work; also, land division by inheritance decreased the amount of land and the income per person. On the other hand, the newly founded and expanded cities gave these people jobs in the service sector and in the factories. The urbanization phenomenon was not a problem by itself. However, in Turkey, and in similar countries, this process came with housing crises and great problems in the social life of the country.

This beginning date of the 1950s is no coincidence because, the migration phenomena from villages to the cities came on the scene with the flow of American capital to the agricultural sector. The Marshall Plan appropriated funds to mechanize agriculture and created a cheap labor force for the maintenance of the world capitalist system. Çağlar Keyder interprets the situation: “during the early 1950s, capitalism began to irreversibly dominate Turkish agriculture.”⁴³² Also, the Marshall Plan appropriated huge funds for the construction of highways inside the country.

⁴³¹ At later dates, infrastructure problem increasingly continued on the state agenda as that the infrastructure need of big cities became the most important service problem and it had the most expensive solution. State Planning Organization, (1973), p. 851.

⁴³² Çağlar Keyder, “Paths of Rural Transformation in Turkey,” *ESA Working Paper*, no. 11, Boğaziçi Uni. Administrative Sciences Faculty (January 1980), p. 3.

Moreover, a worry of the Marshall Plan implementation actors was the mobilization of the labor force according to the international division of labor. For instance, the Thornburg report supported this occurrence, giving priority to simple machine manufacturing and the food industry. He suggested that the labor force required in the industry should be provided from the countryside as the result of mechanization. That is, by the mechanization in agriculture, they aimed to increase effectiveness, and to provide the labor force required for industry,⁴³³ as stated in the Thornburg report as “the result of free time increasing is to pull abundant labor to the industry area, to use workers in factories.”⁴³⁴

The migration process was experienced in two different ways. Either some members of the families, men, found temporary jobs in cities or they totally sold their properties to more wealthy families and migrated to the city centers permanently. Initially, the first way was more popular. However, as Robinson also states, this situation created many social problems, among them damage to the families in the countryside because of the long-term absence of men, housing problems, increases in abortion, the growth of illnesses. The second option also engendered serious problems in housing and municipality services. With the lack of irrigation, electricity, sewer systems, and garbage collection, the cities were surrounded by constantly enlarging suburbs made of shantytowns.⁴³⁵ The urbanization movements in Turkey clearly tended either to create an imbalance between regions or to enlarge

⁴³³ Tören, p. 130.

⁴³⁴ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, pp. 84, 121.

⁴³⁵ Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 12.

the existing imbalances.⁴³⁶ From this time on, the gap between the eastern and western regions and the cities greatly deepened.

American intellectuals also gave a big share in the process to the modernization of the army as part of the United States assistance. According to them, the new military education taught young men to use tools and machines at least at minimal levels. The general viewpoint was that “the enterprising draftee returning to his village may become the founder of the first mechanical repair shop or garage.”⁴³⁷ Moreover, as a result of the aid program, young men returned to their villages after serving two years in the army, and a sense of frustration stimulated them to apply their army-acquired skills to promote civil innovation and “progress” to transform the village.⁴³⁸ They also played a great role to this process, as mentioned, to challenge the traditional relationships in the family, between fathers and sons. The acquisition of new skills by many younger men while in the army caused an increasing number of them to challenge the status quo, and this change and the increasing possibility of geographical mobility broke the paternalistic structure of family authority. Nuclear families grew with more mobility.⁴³⁹ According to Robinson, the Turkish population lived in places close to the highways. From then on, hundreds and thousands of villagers frequently travel led to market towns just to spend the day, to sit in coffeehouses and talk, and to go to the local cinemas. He

⁴³⁶ Keleş, p. 22.

⁴³⁷ Rustow, p. 387.

⁴³⁸ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” p. 35.

⁴³⁹ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares...,” p. 35; also see Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 12.

closely related this geographical mobility to the increasing social and mental mobility.⁴⁴⁰

Indeed, the facilitating and mediating factor in this process was the new transportation opportunities. The development of highways paved the way for the urbanization process and the last fifty years have to be seen in the light of this movement. The Thornburg report described Turkey as “four-fifth of Turks lives in villages and are concerned with agriculture; 40,000 villages have not changed in a thousand years...totally isolated.”⁴⁴¹ With the new transportation system and as a result of the huge social transformation, Anatolia villages were no longer isolated. What mainly promoted the mobility of the Turkish population, migration and cultural diffusion was the highway program sponsored by the United States.⁴⁴²

With the mechanization of agriculture and the accelerated highway construction activities, social, political and cultural consequences emerged as urbanization, immigration, shanty-towns, poverty, etc. The Marshall Plan cannot be claimed as the main initiator of the urbanization (wrong urbanization) process; however, it is clear that the Marshall Plan and its policies had a facilitating and accelerating effect on it.

⁴⁴⁰ Daniel Lerner defines the effects of roads in the expansion of Turkish people' mobility, see *The Passing of Traditional Society*, 1,4, 5 chapters.

⁴⁴¹ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, p. 4.

⁴⁴² Robinson, “Impact of American Military and Economic...,” p. 12.

6.2. Expansion of the Target: Marshall Plan Brochures

This thesis has investigated the Marshall Plan implementation in Turkey and suggested that the Marshall aid exceeded its boundaries from being an economic assistance program and to being a long-term (almost eternal) intervention relationship that influenced many more aspects of Turkish people's lives. In this regard, the American mission even attempted to teach the Turkish people very basic elements of life such as prenatal caring and child care. They declared this practice as enlightening people and distributed health brochures to villages.⁴⁴³ Among many brochures of this kind, some of the more interesting ones will be evaluated.

The U.S. mission treated the Turkish people as if they had never gave birth or raised children. As a continuity of the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods, the American-made modernization theory and its practical reflections led to the view that Turkey and many other countries were underdeveloped/ undeveloped (and then developing) and needed to be enlightened and modernized.

Very clearly, the Thornburg report, which drew the main framework of the Plan, constantly underlined this aspect. The report evaluated the existing situation in Turkey on two strict and opposite lines. While it condemns the farming methods and living conditions at remaining from ancient times, it criticizes unnecessary heavy industry and space era technologies in this form. The mission claimed that the Turkish people had a very backward living style ignorant of all modern achievements; thus, the American mission would bring great benefit to the country.

⁴⁴³ For example see, Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, no. 4 (Ankara, 1951), p. 3.

Similarly, Lerner and Robinson appreciated the American mission and claimed that they would have a hard time teaching basic items to the Turkish people.

These two examples are not extreme points, but determined the content of the Marshall Plan and American intervention policies. With the facilitation of real-politics, the modernization approach was practiced in Turkey and several other countries. Therefore, observing the other, hidden, and tiny aspects of the Plan will contribute to understanding the era. The Marshall Plan health brochures had an effect as such.

To be sure, these small booklets included very small pieces, but even these tiny words draw important inferences. First of all, the pamphlets begin with the same statement from George Marshall's Harvard speech: "Our policy is not to fight with any country or a country's doctrine; we try to prevent hunger, poverty, hopelessness, and chaos." In this way, the brochures explained their reason of being with humanitarian terminology.

6.2.1. Prenatal Care

The health brochures mainly supported marriage, reproduction, pregnancy, and child rearing. This perspective had been in Turkey for some time and the U.S. mission gave support although it had slightly different motives. "Prenatal Care" underlined the importance of child rising not to wipe our family off the face of the earth and not to exhaust our family lines.⁴⁴⁴ This responsibility of having children to

⁴⁴⁴ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, p. 5.

increase the population is explained as the most important national duty,⁴⁴⁵ because, the greater the population of the country, the better for defense. Also, all of the mines would be worked, all lands would be planted, and defending the country would be easier because of the increase in soldiers, strength of the army.⁴⁴⁶

It should be remembered that the American mission also explained its fight against malaria in Turkey in terms of working effectiveness as people with malaria could not work for two weeks a year and the expenses of the cure burdened the economy and damaged the productivity. Consequently, the number of working men increased. This very pragmatic explanation of a health matter was an attempt to introduce economic thinking to replace other values. Similarly, defending the population increase and giving importance to prenatal care and child care frankly because of national defense requirements, economic needs like mining and agriculture raises questions. Especially, this reasoning became even more problematic when it is thought that because of the borders and closeness with the Soviet Union, Turkey and the Turkish army were thought of as a defense and fighting force of the United States against the communist bloc. Also, Turkey was chosen in the Marshall Plan/ new world capitalist system as a source of basic raw materials –the main mines and agricultural products- to the United States and European countries and as a spare force of European development.

The prenatal care brochure explained the matters in a very simple way in a perspective that the booklets were distributed to villages and the village people were deeply ignorant and did not know even the most basic terms and cases. In this regard,

⁴⁴⁵ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, p. 7.

⁴⁴⁶ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, pp. 8-9.

the section “which points should be considered while marrying?” explains that a new born child resembles his/ her forbearers; white-skinned parents had white-skinned children, a dark-skinned child resembles its dark-skinned parents. Also, some illnesses, such as alcoholism passes from parents to children. Therefore, the pamphlet recommends that first the man/ woman should be healthy and then they should choose their partners according to this criterion. Contagious diseases should be guarded against thoroughly, because *robust children* were the nuclei of this health program. Robust children would be very valuable for their countries and parents; with this consideration in mind, the country’s population would become stronger and more robust.⁴⁴⁷

The brochure explained the symptoms of pregnancy, the craving of certain foods, nourishment, clothing, hygiene, work and the need for resting of the pregnant woman, her sexual relationship with her husband, giving birth and the period of confinement after childbirth (*loğusalık*). On all these points, the booklet gives the simplest details and proposes a modern, enlightened, conscious perspective.

It gives special importance to getting specialist help in each segment of the pregnancy. Although the shortage of hospitals in the country is known, childbirth in hospitals is strongly recommended. In the medical examination section, the brochure suggests a period of monthly examination for the first seven months and examination every fifteen days after the seventh month of the pregnancy.⁴⁴⁸ However, as known this intensive schedule would only have been appropriate in recent times in terms of comprehension, techniques, and medical opportunities. It seems that it was extremely

⁴⁴⁷ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁴⁸ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, pp. 19-21.

inappropriate and unrealistic for 1950s' Turkey. This extremism was not seen in other areas of content. As mentioned, the focus was on professional support; however, considering the conditions of the country, the brochure also gave information on childbirth in homes. It also interprets the number of children and recommends at least two years between children. To provide this interval, the booklet recommends the preservation methods in consultation with a doctor.⁴⁴⁹

6.2.2. Child Care

Another brochure is about child rising. It opens the subject by warning against ill-care and ignorance and shows with an illustration (see Fig. 8) that robust children remain on the sifter while the powerless children fell from it. To be sure, this sifting ratio is problematic itself. This suggested modern world gave a place for robust people considering the material conditions primarily and sidelining the moral and spiritual aspects; however, there is no space here to discuss this great philosophical matter and it is enough to state that the booklets give their messages with their contents as well as with their pictures.

⁴⁴⁹ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, p. 62.




Figure 8

Source: Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Çocuğun Büyütülmesi*, no. 5 (Ankara: 1951), p. 6.




Figure 9

Source: Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Gebelerin Bakımı*, no. 4 (Ankara: 1951), p. 11.

The pamphlet gives information on the nourishment of children and several useful foods for them. “How should the children be fed?” “How many meals?”

cleanliness of children, their sleep and resting, their protection from illnesses, certain vaccinations, their protection from accidents and injures, teaching them new information, and teaching them to walk are the main topics of the brochure. As can be seen, the brochure attempted to teach every detail and the simplest parts about child rising. Again, this approach infers from a prejudiced attitude that the people did not even know these basic matters. This Project, in general, is an overlaying of “better” practice as knowledge erasing earlier practices.

For instance, in the illnesses section, it is stated that “there is something called a ‘germ’ (*microbe*) and this causes illnesses.”⁴⁵⁰ It continues with giving information on the prevention of and cure of them. In addition, the last section of the pamphlet carries the name “Child’s Daily Program.” It continues that “to raise children healthy and well everything should fit its exact times. What the children will do at each hour of a day is listed below. This is called the daily program.”⁴⁵¹ After that, is a list stating the time when parents should wake up their children, when they should wash their faces, when they should play with them, when they should get them to drink milk, etc. Last, the brochure ends with this statement and picture, say everything:

“Although it seems difficult to raise children according to this method, when a human wants to, he/she can succeed. Also, in a time period, this useful and good custom will pass from mother to daughter and it remains in the country.”⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Çocuğun Büyütülmesi*, no. 5 (Ankara, 1951), p. 34.

⁴⁵¹ Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Çocuğun Büyütülmesi*, pp. 54-55.

⁴⁵² Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Çocuğun Büyütülmesi*, p. 56.



Figure 10

Source: Marşal Planı Sağlık Broşürü, *Çocuğun Büyütülmesi*, no. 5 (Ankara: 1951), p. 56.

6.2.3. Epidemic Diseases

Another small book is about epidemic diseases. This has rather different content. This is not a brochure to distribute to each part of the country but a book published with the helps of the American mission. It came out of the volunteer and home nurse's aide courses opened in Ankara in 1950. It does not contain so much interpretation but gives information on certain epidemic diseases and their cure, among them typhoid fever, scarlet fever, measles, smallpox, chicken pox, whooping cough, influenza, meningitis, diphtheria, tetanus, malaria, and tuberculosis. Again, it

begins with very basic information on the subject, like the definition of germ, virus, etc.⁴⁵³

These dictations and “enlightenment” demonstrates that the mentality, which founded the Marshall Plan, portrayed Turkey as backward and tried to grasp every aspect of its life with their own ways or in the way that most useful for their interests. First of all, besides their content and suggested methods the distribution of brochures of this kind to the villages carries huge meaning. It shows that the Marshall Plan had goals other than its economic aid for the economic development.

The promotion of the American lifestyle was another consequence or the goal of the Marshall Plan. As mentioned, a promoter of American politics, Max Weston Thornburg also emphasized this aspect in his report. The report stated the need to help Turkish people to try to live in the American way and benefit from American magazines and popular literature for this aim.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵³ Dr. Necati Selvi, *Salgın Hastalıklar* (Ankara: Doğu Ltd. Press, 1952), p. 5.

⁴⁵⁴ Thornburg, Spry, and Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, pp. 224-225.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

7.1. Total Marshall Plan Allocations

From 1948 to June 30, 1959, the United States allocated 1,207,434,000 dollars to Turkey from the Marshall Plan funds. 988,076,000 dollars of this aid constitutes direct aid, 195,402,000 dollars indirect aid, and 23,936,000 dollars in technical assistance. As mentioned, after 1960, although the aid of the United States to Turkey continued, it took on the name American Economic Assistance to Turkey instead of the Marshall Plan.

The allocations of Marshall Plan funds according to year are displayed below in two tables:

Table 28. Marshall Plan Allocations Extended to Turkey between up to September 30, 1959
(1000 dollar)

Type of Aid	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	1956-57	1957-58	1958-59	TOTAL
I-Direct Aid												
a) Grant	1216	16,160	37,200	11,300	33,600	46,000	55,000	55,000	55,000	70,000	100,000	480,476
b) Credit	38,000	34,840		11,200			20,000	25,000	25,000			154,040
c) Cond.	9784	7503										17,287
d) C.U.I.			7800		12,000	30,000	25,600	19,100	24,000			118,500
e) Agr.Surp.							29,423	29,850	68,900	52,000	37,700	217,873
TOTAL	49,000	58,503	45,000	22,500	45,600	76,000	130,023	128,950	172,900	122,000	137,700	988,176
II-Indirect Aid												
a) Grant		71,522		47,500	21,400							140,422
b) Credit			55,000									55,000
TOTAL		71,522	55,000	47,500	21,400							195,422
III-Technical Aid												
a) Grant		1000	800	1000	2190	2700	600	2200	3346	4500	4500	22,836
b) Credit		1100										1100
TOTAL		2100	800	1000	2190	2700	600	2200	3346	4500	4500	23,936
Grand Total	49,000	132,125	100,800	71,000	69,190	78,700	130,623	131,150	176,246	126,500	142,200	1,207,534

Source: *American Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, pp. 26-27.

Table 29. Marshall Plan Allocations in Turkey between 1948-1963
(Million dollars)

US Fiscal Year	Grant	Loan	Conditional	Technical Cooperation	Agricultural Surplus	Development Loan Fund	TOTAL
1949	-	24	9.8	-	-	-	34
1950	13.1	49.8	7.5	1.6	-	-	72
1951	49	-	-	0.8	-	-	50
1952	57.4	11.2	-	1	-	-	70
1953	56.4	-	-	2.1	-	-	59
1954	75.8	-	-	2.9	-	-	79
1955	66.6	20	-	4.1	-	27	117
1956	82	25	-	2.2	-	15	124
1957	30.5	25	-	3.4	-	69	128
1958	70	-	-	4.5	10	52	137
1959	100	-	-	4.5	25.2	35	164
1960	83	-	-	4.4	-	35	122
1961	90	-	-	4.4	135.6	26	256
1962	58	-	-	4.9	-	127	190
1963	55	-	-	1.4	41.3	1	99
TOTAL	886.8	155	17.3	42.2	212.1	386	1699

Source: *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 47, 1962, p. 18.

The United States foreign aid for Turkey was composed of direct and indirect aid. As is known, direct aid was used to import goods from the United States. The authorities also defined direct aid as assistance to increase the import potential of Turkey by 1960⁴⁵⁵, to increase Turkey's production, Turkey's food and certain raw materials to a point that it could obtain manufactured goods from Western Europe. Also, the aid shifted more from grants to credits, especially after 1960. Indirect aid, which meant the imports and exports with European countries, constituted the small amount of total allocation and it ended at an early date. It seems that they were just for appearance, not to contradict the discourse of the European reconstruction and development aim; however, the huge direct aid amount and the implementation type of the aid, just to import products from the United States, indicates that the Marshall Plan was founded to create benefit mainly for the United States economy and its world system.

⁴⁵⁵ *American Economic Assistance to Turkey*, vol. 42, 1960, s.6

As researched thoroughly, the great majority of the aid to Turkey was used for the administration of underground resources, the realization of an energy program, the mechanization of agriculture, the equipping of the existing businesses with modern vehicles, the rapid improvement of highways, the renovation of transportation vehicles, and consequently the increase of the national defense power. While it integrates Turkey strictly with the world capitalist economic system, it develops American-interested growth model in the country; also, because international and internal priorities and interests coincided, the government accepts the Plan with open arms.

The foreign aid of developed countries to underdeveloped ones did not exceed one percent of their annual budget. In its first three years, U.S. assistance cost approximately 1.3 billion dollars, “which was less than one percent of the American national income in the year 1950.”⁴⁵⁶ Thus, it seems that the Marshall Plan was not a greatly extended project in reality and in practice and did not create a huge burden on the U.S. although it meant a great deal for recipient countries. Moreover, this aid formulation helped the United States economy run and progress. Hence, it was great in discourse and it formed unbreakable ties between the two countries cleverly; the United States gave a small hand and instead took great advantages from these aid processes.

While generally products were sold to Turkey by American and European producers during the Plan and while the exported American goods created a certain type of reliance on them, projects for the mining sector opened the path to constant resource taking, and highway construction opened a sales corridor for the import of petroleum, vehicles, and spare parts. The Marshall Plan played a role in the

⁴⁵⁶ Office of Public Affairs, *Our Foreign Policy*, Department of State Publication, No. 3972, 1950, p. 48.

internationalization of capital, in the concretization of modernization theory's proposed politics and in the capitalization of Turkey.⁴⁵⁷ The United States intervention may not have developed the country rapidly, but the infusion of American aid was an important factor in helping to save Turkey for the West.⁴⁵⁸

7.2. Domestic Acceptance and Motives for the Marshall Plan

This study has investigated American interests in the Marshall Plan implementation in Turkey; however, it should not be forgotten that the process was a reciprocal relationship, mostly with the consent of domestic authorities.

By the Second World War, the world had entered a new age and Turkey saw so many structural transformations domestically and internationally. However, on the Turkish side, what puts its mark on the immediate post-Second World War period is the Democrat Party era. At this time, Turkey first experienced a continuous multi-party system. This decade has been evaluated by scholars as the democratic triumph of the country. This decade is also remembered for the unbreakable Turkish-American cooperation.

Politically, the reciprocal benefit relation displayed itself. The flow of American assistance bolstered the Democratic administration and prolonged its terms of Office; that is, the assistance and its so-called "benefits" were identified with the Democrat Party contributing to the government left at the power.⁴⁵⁹ On the other hand, although the Marshall Plan began in the Republican Party era, the full impact

⁴⁵⁷ Tören, p. 209.

⁴⁵⁸ Thomas Bailey's this interpretation for Greece can easily be extended for Turkey. See Bailey, p. 217.

⁴⁵⁹ Robinson, "Impact of American Military and Economic...", p. 10.

of the aid was not felt in Turkey until after the change of administration in 1950, because the government change gave the maximum maneuver sphere to the American advisors for reform. In the Cold War period, we see that the Democrat Party administration heartily collaborated with the United States and strongly chose it as an ally, placed against the Soviet Russia. Only after the 1960s, with problems like Cyprus, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Opium problem did questions rise about American partisanship.⁴⁶⁰ Also, after years, government authorities followed the tradition of defining the aim of the American assistance of the time positively as finding a market for surplus industrial goods after the Second World War and constructed the highway network in the strategically important Turkey for the Cold War in the General National Assembly discussions.⁴⁶¹

The Turkish Great National Assembly last discussed the foreign policy of the Democrat Party government on February 25, 1960. During the ten-year governance of the Democrat Party between 1950 and 1960, basically, foreign policy shaped the country and government because, at that time in world history, the international situation was a great determiner in the world; many big countries were destroyed and the small ones mostly became smaller; two superpowers tried to determine many details of the countries of almost the whole world.

The ratio of internal decisiveness is debatable, especially when the Democrat Party government is considered. One way to see the internal actions and decisions is to look at, if there is any, difference between two different, or successive, governments' behaviors. As mentioned, the Republican Party and the Democrat

⁴⁶⁰ Then, government authorities began discussions on that the foreign aid opened the path for new imperialism. See Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 3, vol. 1, Session 1, 10 November 1969, p.107; and Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 2, vol. 4, Session 1, 22 February 1966.

⁴⁶¹ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 22, vol. 4, Session 97, 3 May 2006.

Party were fake opposites. They were totally harmonious on foreign policy; also, the Republican Party's weak opposition was guided by the United States.⁴⁶² According to Öke and Mütercimler, there were four stages of the Republican Party's opposition: attacks on the Korean War; then general detente and only soft criticism about methodology; another attack period after the 1957 economic crisis and 1958 Iraq revolution; and, lastly in 1960 which was the ending period of Democrat Party.⁴⁶³ Except the first stages it seems true, because their opposition to the Democrats and the Korean War was again methodological, they were against the taking of the decision without passing it through the National Assembly, without their consent; but there was not considerable attack about the content of the event, criticism on sending troops. Also, the general similarity between the two parties' politics, especially foreign policy, can easily be seen. This could show that they were not so independent and did not act as the determiner, but played their role in a given conjuncture.

In addition, the Democrat Party won the election on May 14, 1950. Only in August 10, 1950 did the Party give the first franchise on Turkish oil to an American firm; in-country investment permission was given to foreign capital.⁴⁶⁴ In January-March 1951, a decision about the construction of the Adana airport was given –that is the first indication of Incirlik base;⁴⁶⁵ two American warships were anchored at Dolmabahçe; American war delegations of Middle East gathered in Istanbul and there was declaration that white bread would be made with flour coming from the

⁴⁶² That Republican Party opposition was under the permission of the United States: İnönü and Menderes came together at 1959 in the United States' embassy, and after this secret meeting the United States founded a new base at Trabzon. See Behramoğlu, p. 153.

⁴⁶³ Mütercimler and Öke, p. 381.

⁴⁶⁴ Behramoğlu, p. 21.

⁴⁶⁵ Behramoğlu, p. 26.

United States. The Turkish-American culture agreement was signed on March 14; American Aid Commission continued its research in Eskişehir; twenty-one American journalists came to Turkey and a military parade was organized for them. As remembered, according to one article of the Truman Doctrine, American journalists could freely come to the country and make research and report on whether the aid was being used properly, they had the right to take any information and make complaints to the States.⁴⁶⁶

Furthermore, pursuing the aid, Turkey entered into a nuclear adventure, accepted the Middle East commandership, sent troops to Korea, etc. Apart from the agency role of the government in the foreign policy, the critical evaluation of the movements should also be considered. Three separate events showed how destructive Turkey's reaction could be for the old, regional affiliations in favor of the linkage to the West.

First, Turkey assumed its Western-based pose over the Palestine problem. Turkey was the first Islamic country to recognize the existence of Israel only nine months after its foundation, and gave permission for its Jewish-origin citizens to immigrate to the country.⁴⁶⁷ Until the Truman Doctrine was declared the country had supported the policies of Arabic countries. However, after it began to take aid from the United States, it began to change its policy on the subject. It started to have fluctuating and problematic relations with the Arab countries and the region.⁴⁶⁸ On the other hand, before the creation of strategic relations with the region, the Baghdad Pact, Menderes changed his move and cut the diplomatic relations with Israel to

⁴⁶⁶ Behramoğlu, p. 7-8.

⁴⁶⁷ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası* (Ankara: Sevinç Press, 1972), pp. 19-22.

⁴⁶⁸ Bağcı, p. 13.

show that they were on the side of the Arab world; however, it did not work and was not convincing so much.

Second, in the de-colonization period, Turkey did not offer any political support for the newly independent African and Asian countries. The first Asian conference with political intention to discuss the Indonesian problem was gathered in 1949. However, Turkey was the sole Asian country that did not attend the meeting. It did not even send an observer. They rejected the participation on the grounds of Turkey's being a "European state."⁴⁶⁹ That is, the government openly declared to that it had become part of the old-imperialism in this matter and was praised for this.

Third, Turkey participated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 with delegate Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. However, Turkey again took the opposite side and criticized nonalignment and supported a common defense alliance against communist expansionism. It opposed newly independent African and Asian countries' opposition policy to the Cold War and the superpowers/ imperial world. Again, in a dispute in Algeria between the Algerians and France, Turkey favored the side of France and did not recognize Algeria.⁴⁷⁰

Interestingly, the newly founded republic did not develop any new policies for the Middle East politics. In all these three matters of before and during the Democrat Party government, Turkey chose the Western side. It had created great problems with its hinterland and its cultural origins; it was a real-political decision and it worked for a while. Also, governments afterwards continued these policies; already, it can be said that the Democrat Party's foreign policy were followed by subsequent governments. However, the destructive results of this approach were seen

⁴⁶⁹ Bağcı, pp. 44-46; and Sander, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*, p. 336.

⁴⁷⁰ Kürkçüoğlu, pp. 122-123.

in the Democrat Party's ruling period. Turkey's interests in the region were seen as identical to the country's own security interests in the Cold War situation.

Contrastingly, Turkey attracted the antipathy and antagonism of the region; thus, the Baghdad Pact ended without even starting healthily. The countries no longer trusted Turkey's leadership role.

In domestic politics, looking at the economy would give an idea about the posture of the government in the foreign policy. The Democrat Party came into the government with many promises about improving the economy, especially in favor of peasants. This stimulus started the era, but it was seen soon that in the economy, the country mostly depended on foreign assistance and there was success in benefiting from it mostly. Turkey was a good recipient for the United States aid and in this reciprocal benefit relation, the situation expanded positively in the Democrat Party era. Turkey always welcomed the assistance pleasantly and worked to increase it constantly.⁴⁷¹ Although the Aid decreased in general, it was maintained increasingly for Turkey. In 1954 the country took additional funds. James Madison Garrett III says that even in comparison to Greece there was no condition for Turkey; its share was bigger than the aid extended to Israel and Egypt.⁴⁷² Generally in the 1950s, the assistance to Europe declined rapidly; only in Greece, Turkey, and Spain was it continued until the 1960s.⁴⁷³ Until that date, Turkey displayed great fellowship for the United States.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷¹ United States Department of State, "Turkey's Desire to Adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty; Inadequacy of ECA Fund Allocations to Turkey," *Foreign Relations, Secretaries Memoranda of Conversation, 1947-1952*, Document No. 1292, 25 August 1950.

⁴⁷² Garrett, p. 25.

⁴⁷³ H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Crowell, 1963), pp. 311-312.

⁴⁷⁴ *Istanbul Ekspres*, January 31, 1954 and February 24, 1954. Also, when foreign capital and oil law drafts came to the General Assembly, opposition press criticized the process as being dependency

The Democrat Party used the conjuncture at least until 1957 to give general prosperity to the country. With its relation to welfare state policies, increasing prosperity and developments in the economies of the United States and other countries, the post-Second World War era is called the “Golden Age” in the world and in Turkey. However, when the Marshall Aid was slowed down, the country entered economical crisis. The Turkish government saw American aid as the basic source for the country’s development and closed budget deficits with the aid. The American intervention was a bilateral mechanism instead of one-sided domination relationship. It proved that even in the economy, the country was dependent on the international order, and so much dependent on the foreign aid that did not create real economic measures for internal affairs. Thus, a gap consisted in the economy and the government chose foreign aid to close this gap.⁴⁷⁵

The literature of the domestic policy of the Democrat Party is full of references to its initiatives and differentiated implementation, sometimes populist policies. We see this decisiveness in Adnan Menderes’s personality and character. Definitely, Turkey could not become agency but was a good beneficiary. The Menderes government saw the sole salvation in the total integration although it used different tricks, like coming closer to the Soviet Union and playing a guiding role in the Middle East, to take its demand in the best way. Turkish politicians succeeded at benefitting from conjunctures, but they did not create conjuncture or become active agents.

to the United States and American circles determined it as the first opposition against them; on the other hand, government and its agencies tried hard to eliminate this opposition. During his visit to the United States, Celal Bayar repeatedly declared the integrity of American-Turkish interests and there being no opposition in the country. See *Istanbul Ekspres*, February 15, 1954.

⁴⁷⁵ Mütercimler and Öke, pp. 396-97.

According to Wallerstein there is a hegemonic power in all eras with a leading economy, dominant military force and power to realize whatever it wants. A hegemony comes out only after a great world war, a hegemonic rivalry. First, the world must be destroyed and reconstructed. Also, in the last resort the military power determines the hegemony. However, although its main need is military power, it is destroyed in a short period because, almost all of the economic investments are made to the military and it is destroyed by those who make investments in productive sectors.⁴⁷⁶

Hence, although it was short-termed, the post-Second World War era's hegemonic power was the United States. It had the strongest military power in the world with the leading economy at least until the 1960s. Therefore, we know that the United States was the determiner of the period in its affairs. Also by memorizing this hegemony phenomena, for Turkey's foreign policy it can be said that usually the United States shaped it due to its demands and Democrat Party could not have become the determiner in most cases; also, the foreign policy of Turkey determined the country's many decisions domestically, too.

That is, on the one hand the U.S. demands on Turkey to place the country in the world capitalist system shaped the Marshall Plan content; on the other hand, Turkish capital and authorities who wanted to engage into this system determined this relationship. The United States part, as an American embassy document states, regarded "Turkey as a most important bulwark in the struggle for the objectives in which both American peoples believed and intended to keep the close association

⁴⁷⁶ For a detailed discussion see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

they had already achieved.⁴⁷⁷” However, Westernization and American partisanship in the era reached extreme levels in Turkey. As theater artist Cüneyt Gökçer tells, when they prepared to stage *Madam Butterfly*, it was not allowed by the high level authorities in the Marshall Plan years because, in the opera, a woman-chasing American officer deceives a Japanese girl and when he leaves the girl, she commits suicide. The authorities decided that this story would offend their friend and ally America.⁴⁷⁸

7.3. General Evaluation of the Plan

Apart from searching thorough American interests from an assistance program and from criticisms of plan’s mainly being an interest area for its actors instead of pure assistance and aid program, its acceptance in recipient countries, here in Turkey, and its effects on the development are the other side of the coin.

An important question is what if the Marshall Plan had not been. This discussion is common in the political literature. In 1947, Henry Hazlitt wrote a book called *Will Dollars Save the World?* In this study, he decided that they would not.⁴⁷⁹ Also, revisionist economists Harold van B. Cleveland and Alan S. Milward suggested in their studies that the Marshall Plan was not necessary.⁴⁸⁰ On the other

⁴⁷⁷ United States Department of State, “Farewell Call of Turkish Ambassador,” *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949*, Document No. 964, 15 June 1949.

⁴⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, August 8, 1989 cited in Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası* (Istanbul: Belge Press, 1999), p. 47.

⁴⁷⁹ See Henry Hazlitt, *Will Dollars Save the World?* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1947).

⁴⁸⁰ See Harold van B. Cleveland, “If There Had Been No Marshall Plan...,” in Stanley Hoffman and Charles Maier (eds.), *The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 59-64; and Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (London: Methuen, 1984).

hand, supporters of the United States policy did not see any other way out. Charles Kindleberger's certain answer to that discussion was the opposite one, honoring the United States and stating that "the United States tried hard after World War II to avoid the World War I pitfalls of war debts and reparations." Another state officer, Thomas A. Bailey, applauded the Marshall Plan as "life-saving,"⁴⁸¹ and Tony Judt gave the certainty of a "Yes" to this question.⁴⁸²

As Zafer Z. Başak states that a mechanical approach on the way that the increase in investments would bring the development that was dominant in the developmental economy area at the end of the 1950s, was in conflict with the fact and experiences that it was impossible to create development in a short period as such.⁴⁸³ Thus, a serious and consistent economy politics was more important than foreign aid in the development process.

Stelios Zachariou explained that for Greece, although the objective of the Marshall Aid was to stimulate economic recovery, market economies and secure commercial frontiers, most of the aid given to Greece was devoted to other purposes, to the struggle for survival. Its problems were the civil war and the lack of a stable political government capable of enforcing economic policy designed to help the country regain a firm economic footing; also, the fear of Greece falling into the Communist sphere of influence, causing a possible domino effect throughout the Middle Eastern region, concerned the policy planners in Washington; moreover, Greece remained economically dependent on foreign aid even after the conclusion of

⁴⁸¹ Bailey, p. 240.

⁴⁸² Tony Judt, "Introduction," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, p. 5.

⁴⁸³ Başak, p. 61.

the Marshall Plan, due to guerilla campaigns and not having industrial infrastructure sufficiently.⁴⁸⁴ A similar conclusion can be made for Turkey.

For the Turkish case, it is questionable whether these transportation and agriculture technologies would have taken place if the Plan had not been. Was there not any alternative for Turkey to develop by itself? However, increasing inflation, rapidly accumulated debt burden, shortages in the supply of producer and consumer goods, budgetary and current account deficits in the second half of 1950s, also the increase of 3.6 times in total debt and 6.5 times in the external debt exceeding one billion dollar⁴⁸⁵ indicates that at least for Turkey foreign aid could not reform the economy completely. Also, following the course of events, Turkey attempted industrial development through etatism before the Second World War with the aim of maintaining it. However, the Marshall Plan suggested pulling up all established facilities without trying a new departure and focusing on agricultural production as before. Only after a conjectural change was the Marshall Plan directed towards supporting the private sector, and the assembling industry in Turkey witnessed an economy policy transformation. Also, agricultural production could not provide the necessary capital for a new take off as projected.⁴⁸⁶ These realizations coincided with the unrealized premises of modernization and developmentalist perspective's projections in the world. Therefore, in general terms it can be concluded that the Marshall Plan even distracted Turkey from its industrial path and after took its needs,

⁴⁸⁴ Stelios Zachariou, "Struggle for Survival: American Aid and Greek Reconstruction," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, pp. 153-163.

⁴⁸⁵ Z. Y. Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy* (London & New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 18-19; also, Başak, p. 66.

⁴⁸⁶ Barker Commission saw development leap of the country in agriculture. See IBRD Report, *The Economy of Turkey*, p. 264.

allowed again the process, but again in relation with its interests of assembling industry.

In the 1930s, Turkish authorities had opposed entering the international division of labor, and the capitalist world system as an agricultural country dependant on advanced countries while they became the great advocator of agriculture-led development in the 1950s.⁴⁸⁷ In this relationship, the United States gave Turkey the role of the food and raw materials depot of the world,⁴⁸⁸ “regarded Turkey as the potential 'breadbasket' of West European countries;”⁴⁸⁹ however, the Turkish authorities had already demanded this role and not more. At the very beginning of the Marshall Plan, the Minister of Transportation Kazım Gülek stated in a declaration that “when the resources developed, Turkey would become the food and coal granary of the world,”⁴⁹⁰ while, Mardin’s deputy honorably stated in a National Assembly session on American assistance that “if we continue with such speed, our country will be the grain cellar of Europe.”⁴⁹¹

As a result of the activities in the 1950s, Turkey reached a stage that enabled it to advance to the next stage, which was the establishment of intermediaries as well as durable consumption good industries. With the reorientation of the development strategy in the 1960s, the role of agriculture as the locomotive sector in economic

⁴⁸⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 24, Session 4, 23 February 1950, pp. 1111-1112; and Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 8, vol. 16, Session 3, 27 February 1949, p. 342.

⁴⁸⁸ General Records of the Department of State, *Report of American Postwar Economic Assistance Programs to Turkey*, Records of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Document No. 59, 27 February 1950, NARA.

⁴⁸⁹ Şen, p. 75.

⁴⁹⁰ *Hürriyet*, August 26, 1948.

⁴⁹¹ Mardin’s Deputy Kemal Türkoğlu, Republic of Turkey, *Journal of TBMM Records*, Term 9, vol. 18, Sitting 1, Session 43, 21 February 1952, p. 411.

development changed into the complementary one. In this regard, “while the locomotive sector of the development policy was agriculture in the 1946-60 era this was reoriented as industrialization in the 1960-73 era.”⁴⁹² The first four year of the Plan determined Turkey as an agricultural country; in the following couple of years, military and security concerns took precedence; in relation, passing to a guided industrialization supporting private sector and foreign investment followed this process. All in all, the Marshall Plan tried to establish structural mechanisms facilitating these stages in the country.

In such a great project the United States had some interests, attempted to shape the course of events from its considerations, and it did not offer assistance “without seeking to re-create the recipient nation in pretty much its own image.”⁴⁹³ In fact, it can be considered as normal and fair from many angles. Indeed, this thesis attempted to reveal where these interests hide and how they were projected in the implementation.

To be sure, it should not be exaggerated an individual action’s role to shape all the world’s history of approximately a quarter of a century, but it is important to be sure that its role was not left hidden. Also, it should not be forgotten that the U.S. Aid Mission of the post-Second World War era was a foreign intervention, not a production of the country’s own resources or something that functioned by itself.

⁴⁹² Şen, p. 346.

⁴⁹³ Singer, p. 55.

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THE MARSHALL PLAN

Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
Harvard University Commencement,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 5, 1947

Mr. President, Dr. Conant, members of the Board of Overseers, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position. But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than has been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer

or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile, people in the cities are short of food and fuel, and in some places approaching the starvation levels. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products- principally from America- are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide are as must be able and willing to exchange their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the reviva l of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit there from politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it

may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome. I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgement. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?

Thank you very much.

Appendix D: European Economic Cooperation Agreement and its Supplements that Countries under the Content of the Marshall Plan with Each Other and with the United States

No. 212 –Türkiye, Avusturya, Belçika, Danimarka, Fransa, Yunanistan, İrlanda, İzlanda, Lüksemburg, Norveç, Hollanda, İtalya, Portekiz, Birleşik Kırallık, İsveç, İsviçre hükümetleri ve Almanya'nın Fransa, Birleşik Kırallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri işgali altındaki mntakalar başkomutanları arasında imzalanan Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesi ile eklerin onanması hakkında Kanun

Date: July 8, 1948

[Resmî Gazete Declaration: July 13, 1948 – No. 6956]

Law No. 5252

Madde 1 –Türkiye, Avusturya, Belçika, Danimarka, Fransa, Yunanistan, İrlanda, İzlanda, Lüksemburg, Norveç, Hollanda, İtalya, Portekiz, Birleşik Kırallık, İsveç, İsviçre Hükümetleri ve Almanya'nın Fransa, Birleşik Kırallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri işgali altındaki mntakalar Başkomutanları arasında 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde Paris'te imzalanan Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesi ve ekleri kabul edilmiş ve onanmıştır.

Madde 2 – Bu kanun yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

Madde 3 – Bu kanunu Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.

10/7/1948

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesi

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Komitesi ikinci devre toplantısının nihai senedi

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Komitesi tarafından 22 Eylül 1947 tarihinde kabul edilen genel raporda tasarlanan Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliğinin şekillerini tâyin etmek maksadiyle ve bilhassa anılan raporun 113 üncü bendinde derpiş olunan teşkilâtı kurmak üzere Avusturya, Belçika, Danimarka, Fransa, Yunanistan, İrlanda, İzlanda, İtalya, Lüksemburg, Norveç, Hollânda, Portekiz, Birleşik Kırallık, İsveç, İsviçre ve Türkiye Hükümetleri, Almanya'daki Fransa, Birleşik Kırallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İşgal Bölgeleri Başkomutanlarını da bu çalışmalara katılmaya çağırarak;

Paris'te 15 Mart 1948 de Temsilcileri araciyle, bu yolda gereken çalışmalara girişmişlerdir.

Bu çalışmalar 16 Nisan 1948 de sona ermiş ve aşağıdaki belgelerin ihzarına münce olmuştur:

1. Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesi;
2. Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilâtının hukuki ehliyeti imtiyaz ve muafiyetleri hakkında 1 sayılı ek Protokol;

3. Teşkilâtın malî rejimi hakkında II. sayılı ek Protokol;

Aynı zamanda aşağıdaki kararlarda kabul edilmiştir:

1. Teşkilâtın görevleri hakkında karar;
2. Teşkilât ile Birleşik Devletlerin Avrupa'daki özel temsilcisi arasındaki münasebetler hakkında karar;
3. Teşkilâtın İçtüzüğü hakkında karar;
4. Teşkilâtın ilk bütçesine ait ödeneklerin ne yolda sağlanacağı hakkında karar;
5. Teşkilâtın ara ödeneklerinin ne yolda sağlanacağı hakkında karar;

6. Teşkilât memur ve mensuplarının tabi olacakları nizamlar hakkında karar;
7. Teşkilâtın Konseyinin ilk toplantı yeri hakkında karar;

Yukarıda anılan bütün Hükümetler ve makamlar Sözleşmenin 24 üncü maddesinin B fıkrasında derpiş edildiği şekilde, geçici olarak yürürlüğe konmasından itibaren Teşkilâtın başlangıç çalışmalarına derhal katılmak hakkına malik olacaklardır.

Sözleşmeyi imzalıyacak olan işbu Nihai Senedin âkıdaları tasdiknamelerini tevdi eder etmez Teşkilâtın asil üyesi itibar olunacaklardır.

Bu maksatla yukarıda anılan Hükümetler ve makamlar temsilcileri işbu Nihai Senedi imzalanmışlardır.

Paris'te, 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde, her iki metin de aynı derecede muteber olmak üzere, Fransızca ve İngilizce tek nüsha olarak hazırlanmış ve tasdikli suretlerini diğer âkıdalarla tevdi edecek olan Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin arşivlerine teslim edilmiştir.

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesi

Avusturya, Belçika, Danimarka, Fransa, Yunanistan, İrlanda, İzlanda, İtalya, Lüksemburg, Norveç, Hollanda, Portekiz, Birleşik Krallık, İsveç, İsviçre, Türkiye Hükümetleri ve Almanya'daki Fransa, Birleşik Krallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İşgal Bölgeleri Başkomutanları:

Birleşmiş Milletlerin gayelerine ermek, şahsi hürriyetleri muhafaza etmek, umumi esenliği artırmak için kuvvetli ve müreffah bir Avrupa ekonomisinin esas olduğu ve böyle bir ekonominin sulhun idamesine medar olacağını nazarı itibara alarak;

İktisadiyatlarının birbirine tabi ve her birinin refahının değerlerinin refahına bağlı olduğunu kabul ederek;

Avrupa'nın refahının yeniden kurulmasını ve idamesini ve harbin yaptığı tahribatın izalesini yalnız Akıd Taraflar arasında yapılacak sıkı ve devamlı bir işbirliğinin mümkün kılacağını takdir ederek;

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Komitesi genel raporundaki prensipleri mevkii tatbika koymaya ve bunun tâyin ettiği gayelere erişmeye ve bu meyanda, Akıd Tarafların istisnai mahiyette harici bir yardımdan âzade olarak, şayanı memnuniyet bir faaliyet seviyesine mümkün olduğu kadar, çabuk ermelerini ve bu seviyede tutunmalarını mümkün kılacak sağlam iktisadi şartların tesisine, aynı zamanda dünya ekonomisinin istikrarını sağlamaya mâtuflar gayretlere istirake karar vererek;

Bu gayelerin tahakkuku için ekonomik kuvvetlerini birleştirmeye, hususi iktidar ve kabiliyetlerinin mümkün olduğu kadar tam bir surette istimali hakkında anlaşmaya, istihallerini artırmaya, tarım ve endüstri teşhizatlarını yenileştirmeye ve tekâmül ettirmeye, mübadelelerini artırmaya, karşılıklı ticaretlerine mâni teşkil eden hailleri tedricen azaltmaya, el emeğinin tam olarak kullanılmasını müsait kılmaya ve ekonomilerinin istikrarını ve aynı zamanda millî dövizlerine olan itimadı yeniden kurmaya veya idame ettirmeye azmederek;

Amerikan Milletinin, yapılmaması, hedef tutulan gayelere tam mânasiyle erişmeyi imkânsız kılacak olan yardımı yapabilmek için ittihaz ettiği tedbirlerle ifadesini bulan cömert arzusunu kaydederek;

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliğinin muvaffakiyeti ve Amerikan yardımının tesirli bir şekilde kullanılması için lüzumlu müesseseleri kurmaya ve şartları yaratmaya ve bu hususta bir Sözleşme akdine karar vererek;

Usulüne uygun bulunan yetki belgelerini ibraz eden ve aşağıda imzası bulunan temsilcileri seçerek mütaakıp hususlar hakkında mutabık kalmışlardır.

Madde – 1

Âkîd Taraflar, karşılıklı ekonomik münasebetlerinde sıkı bir işbirliği yapmayı kabul ederler.

Müşterek bir kalkınma programının hazırlanma ve tatbikını kendilerine ilk vazife olarak tâyin ederler. Bu programın gayesi, Âkîd Tarafların mümkün olduğu kadar çabuk ve istisnai mahiyette bir haricî yardımdan âzade kalarak, memnuniyet verici bir Ekonomik İşbirliği seviyesine erişmesini ve bu seviyede tutunmalarını mümkün kılmak olacaktır. Bu maksatla, bilhassa, Âkîd Tarafların ihracatlarını mümkün olduğu nispette iştirak etmeyen memleketlere doğru inkişaf ettirmek hususundaki ihtiyaçlarını gözönünde bulunduracaktır.

Bu gayelerin tahakkuku için, Âkîd Taraflar ferdi gayretleri ile ve yardımlaşma zihniyeti içinde aşağıdaki vecibeleri yerine getirmeyi taahhüt ederler ve aşağıda Teşkilât namı ile anılacak olan bir Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilâtı kurarlar.

FASIL: I

Genel vecibeler

Madde – 2.

Âkîd Taraflar, müşterek kalkınma programının tahakkuku için, en uygun şartlar dâhilinde teknik ve teçhizatlarını tedricen modernleştirmek suretiyle ve gerek ana vatanda gerek denizasını memleketlerde malik oldukları kaynakları kullanarak ferden olduğu kadar müştereken de istihallerini inkişaf ettirmeye enerjik bir surette çalışmayı taahhüt ederler.

Madde – 3.

Âkîd Taraflar, Teşkilâtın çerçevesi dâhilinde, sık sık ve lâzım olduğu nispet ve zamanda, her birinin program veya tahminlerini ve dünya ekonomisinin genel şartlarını nazarı itibara alarak istihsal, mal ve hizmet mübadelesi için umumi programlar tesbit edeceklerdir.

Her âkîd Taraf bu genel programların gerçekleşmesini temin için bütün gayretini sarfedecektir.

Madde – 4.

Âkîd Taraflar, en geniş mikyasta ve bilmüzakere, karşılıklı mal ve hizmet mübadelelerini inkişaf ettireceklerdir. Aralarında mümkün olduğu kadar suretle çok taraflı bir ödeme rejimine varmak için sarfedilen gayretlere devam edecekler ve karşılıklı mübadele ve ödemelerini mâni teşkil eden halen mevcut tahdidatı imkân hâsıl olur olmaz kaldırmak maksadiyle bunları hafifletmek hususunda işbirliği yapacaklardır.

İşbu maddenin tatbikında, Âkîd Taraflar, gerek birbirleriyle gerek iştirak etmeyen memleketlerde mevcut ekonomik ve malî münasebetlerindeki hâd muvazenesizlikleri azaltmak veya bunlardan kaçınmak hususunda, hepsi ve her biri için mevcut lüzumu nazarı itibara alacaklardır.

Madde – 5.

Âkîd Taraflar, bu Anlaşmanın gayelerini yerine getirmek hususunda uygun görecekları bütün vasıtalarla aralarındaki iktisadi bağları sıkılaştırmayı taahhüt ederler. Tesisi, bu gayelere ulaştırabilecek vasıtalarından Gümrük Birlikleri veya serbest mübadele sahaları gibi benzeri rejimler üzerindeki halihazır çalışmalarına devam edeceklerdir. Âkîd Taraflardan aralarında daha şimdiden bir Gümrük Birliği prensipini kabul etmiş bulunanlar bunun mümkün olduğu kadar süratle tesisini temin edeceklerdir.

Madde – 6.

Âkîd Taraflar, Havana şartı prensiplerine tevfiikan kabili tatbik ve mütevazın çok taraflı bir mübadele rejimi meydana getirmek üzere kendi aralarında ve aynı niyetlerle mütehalli diğer memleketlerle, tarifeleri indirmek ve mübadelelerin gelişmesine hail değer mânileri azaltmak için işbirliği yapacaklardır.

Madde – 7.

Her bir Âkîd Taraf, iş ve mübadele hacmında müstakar ve yüksek bir seviyeyi idame etmenin veya ona erişmenin ve enflasyon tehlikesini önlemenin veya bununla mücadele etmenin lüzumunu nazarı itibara alarak parasının istikrarı ve maliyesinin muvazenesi ve aynı zamanda uygun bir kambiyo kuru ve sureti umumiyede para sistemine olan itimadı tesis ve muhafaza hususunda iktidarında olan her türlü tedbirleri alacaktır.

Madde – 8.

Âkîd Taraflar, mevcut el emeğini en tam ve en tesirli bir şekilde kullanacaklardır.

Millî el emeğinin tam çalıştırılmasını sağlamaya gayret edecekler ve diğer bütün Âkîd Taraflar topraklarındaki kullanılabilir el emeğine müracaat edebileceklerdir. Bu son halde işçilerin yer değiştirmelerini kolaylaştırmak ve onların, tatmin edici ekonomik ve sosyal şerait altında yerleşmelerini temin etmek için müşterek bir anlaşma ile lüzumlu tedbirleri alacaklardır.

Sureti umumiyede Âkîd Taraflar, şahısların serbestçe yer değiştirmelerine mâni hailer tedricen azaltmak hususunda işbirliği yapacaklardır.

Madde – 9.

Âkîd Taraflar ödevlerinin ifasını kolaylaştırmak hususunda teşkilâtın talep edeceği bütün malûmatı temin edeceklerdir.

FASIL: II.

Teşkilât

Madde – 10.

Üyeler

İşbu Sözleşmenin Âkîdaları Teşkilâtın âzasıdırlar.

Madde – 11.

Gaye

Teşkilâtın gayesi, sağlam bir Avrupa ekonomisini, üyelerinin Ekonomik İşbirliği yolu ile sağlamaktır. Teşkilâtın ilk vazifelerinden biri bu Anlaşmanın birinci faslında gösterilen taahhütler mucibince Avrupa Kalkınma programının muvaffakiyetini temin etmektir.

Madde – 12.

Vazifeler

Teşkilât, kendisine tanınan veya tanınacak olan salâhiyet hudutları dâhilinde aşağıdaki vazifeleri ifa ile ödevlendirilmiştir.

a) İlgili Tarafların müşterek faaliyet sahası dâhilinde, 11 inci maddenin derpiş ettiği gayenin elde edilmesi için lüzumlu tedbirlerin alınması ve tatbiki; âzaların ferdi faaliyetlerini kolaylaştırmak, harekete getirmek ve tanzim etmek;

b) İşbu Anlaşmanın tatbikını kolaylaştırmak ve ona nezaret etmek. Tatbik keyfiyetini temin edecek tedbirleri almak: Bu maksatla, haricî yardımın olduğu kadar millî kaynakların da en iyi şekilde kullanılmasını sağlayabilecek nezaret ve kontrol mekanizmalarının kurulmasını sağlamak;

c) Avrupa Kalkınma programının tatbiki hususunda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine kararlaştırılacak yardımı ve malûmatı vermek ve tavsiyelerde bulunmak;

d) İlgili tarafların talebi üzerine Avrupa Kalkınma Programının en iyi şekilde tatbikına lüzumlu olabilecek Milletlerarası Anlaşmaların müzakerelerine yardım etmek.

Teşkilât, aynı zamanda kararlaştırılacak her türlü görevi üzerine alabilir.

Madde – 13.

Yetkiler

Teşkilât, 11 inci maddede tarif edilen gayesine ulaşmak için:

- a) Üyelerin tatbik edecekleri kararları alabilir;
- b) Kendi üyeleriyle veya üye olmıyan memleketlerle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetiyle ve Milletlerarası Teşkilâtla anlaşmalar akdedebilir;
- c) Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine, diğer hükümetlere ve Milletlerarası Teşkilâta tavsiyelerde bulunabilir.

Madde – 14.

Kararlar

Kararlar, hususi konular hakkında Teşkilâtça başka türlü karar verilmemişse, bütün üyelerin karşılıklı muvafakatiyle alınır. Âzadan birinin bir meselede ilgisi olmadığını beyanla karara iştirakten istinkâf etmesi diğer âzalar için mecburi olan bu kararların alınmasına mâni olamaz.

Madde – 15.

Konsey

- a) Bütün kararlar bütün üyelerden müteşekkil bir Konseyden sâdır olur.
- b) Konsey, üyeleri arasından her sene bir Başkan ve iki İkinci Başkan tâyin eder.
- c) Konseye bir İcra Komitesi ve bir Genel Sekreter yardım eder. Konsey, Teşkilâtın işlerinin icabettirdiği bütün teknik komite ve diğer teşekkülleri kurabilir. Bütün bu kurullar Konseye karşı mesuldurlar.

Madde – 16.

İcra Komitesi

- a) İcra Komitesi, her sene Konsey tarafından seçilen yedi âzadan teşekkül eder. Çalışmalarına Konseyin talimatına ve tâyin edeceği hattı harekete uygun olarak devam eder. Ve bunlar hakkında Konseye hesap verir.
- b) Konsey, her sene, İcra Komitesi üyeleri arasından bir Başkan ve bir İkinci Başkan seçer. Aynı zamanda, her sene, vazifelerini tasrih edeceği bir Genel Sözcü tâyin edebilir
- c) Teşkilâtın İcra Komitesinde temsil edilmeyen her üyesi, kendi menfaatlerini alâkadar eden meselelerin bu Komitede müzakerelerine ve karara bağlanmasına iştirak edebilir.

Teşkilât üyeleri, İcra Komitesinin müzakerelerinden, gündem ve tutanak özetlerinin zamanında kendilerine tebliği suretiyle haberdar tutulacaklardır.

Madde – 17.

Genel Sekreter

- a) Genel Sekretere bir birinci ve bir ikinci Genel Sekreter muavini yardım eder.

b) Genel Sekreter ve Genel Sekreter Muavinleri Konsey tarafından t yin edilirler. Genel Sekreter Konseyin emri altındadır;

c) Genel Sekreter, Konseyin, İcra Komitesinin ve icabettiđi takdirde diđer Kurulların ve Teknik Komitelerin oturumlarına istişari reyle iřtirak eder. Bu Komiteler ve kendini temsil ettirebilir. Konseyin ve İcra Komitesinin m zakerelerini hazırlar ve aldıkları kararların icrasını talimat ve iřaretlerine uygun olarak temin eder.

Genel Sekreterin g revleri iřbu S zleşmenin ekinde zikredilen tamamlayıcı h k mlerin mevzuunu teřkil eder.

Madde – 18.

Sekreterlik

a) Genel Sekreter, Teřkil tın faaliyetine l zumlu memurları t yin eder. İdare memurlarının t yini Konseyin tasvibiyle yapılıır. Memurlar T z đ  Konseyin tasvibine arz edilir.

b) Teřkil tın Milletlerarası mahiyeti dolayısıyla, Genel Sekreter ve memurlar, Teřkil t  zalarından veya Teřkil t dıř H k met veya makamlardan talimat istemiyecekler ve kabul etmiyeceklerdir.

Madde – 19.

Teknik Komiteler ve diđer kurullar

15 inci maddenin (C) fıkrasında derpiř edilen Teknik Komiteler ve diđer Kurullar Konseyin emri altındadır. Bunlar en ilgili  yeler tarafından teřkil edilirler ve iřlerini diđer ilgili  yelerin l zumu h linde bu  alıřmalara iřtirak edebilmelerini temin edecek řekilde tanzim ederler.

Madde – 20.

Diđer Milletlerarası Teřekk llerle M nasebetler

a) Teřkil t, Birleřmiř Milletler ve onun esas ve t li organları ve ihtisas kurumları ile m tekebil gayelerine uygun iřbirliđini temin hususunda gerekli m nasebetleri kurar.

b) Teřkil t aynı zamanda, diđer Milletlerarası Kurullarla da m nasebette bulunabilir.

Madde – 21.

Teřkil tın merkezi

Teřkil tın merkezi, ilk oturumunda Konsey tarafından tesbit edilecektir.

Karar verdikleri takdirde Konsey, muhtelif Komiteler veya diđer Kurullar, Teřkil t merkezinden bařka bir yerde toplanabilirler.

Madde – 22.

Hukuki yetki, imtiyazlar ve muafiyetler

a) Teřkil t, her  zasının arazisi d hilinde iřbu S zleşmeye Ek ‘. numaralı Protokolun derpiř ettiđi řartlar d hilinde faaliyette bulunmak ve gayelerine ermek i in muhta  olduđu hukuki yetkiden istifade eder.

b) Teřkil t ve memurları ve  zasının temsilcileri, mezk r Protokolda tarif edilen imtiyaz ve muafiyetlerden istifade ederler.

Madde – 23.

Malî Rejim

a) Genel Sekreter işbu Sözleşmeye Ek II. numaralı Protokolda tesbit edilen malî nizamlar mucibince hazırlanmış senelik bir bütçeyi ve hesapları Konseyin tasdikına arzeder;

b) Teşkilâtın malî senesi 1 Temmuzda başlar;

c) Teşkilâtın masrafları üyeler tarafından deruhte edilecek ve yukarda zikredilen Ek Protokolun hükümleri mucibince taksim edilecektir.

FASIL: III.

Nihai Hükümler

Madde – 24.

Tasdik ve yürürlüğe girme

a) İşbu Sözleşme tasdik edilecektir. Tasdiknameler Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine tevdi edilecektir. Sözleşme, imzalayanlardan en az altısının tasdiknamelerini tevdi etmesiyle yürürlüğe girecektir. Sözleşme, tasdik keyfiyetini sonradan yapacak her âza için, tasdiknamenin tevdiinden itibaren yürürlüğe girecektir.

b) Bununla beraber, imzalayanlar Sözleşmenin tatbikını geciktirmemek maksadiyle yukardaki fıkra da derpiş edilen şartlar dâhilinde yürürlüğe girinceye kadar, bunu muvakkaten ve kendi anayasa kurallarına göre, imzası anından itibaren tatbik sahasına koymayı kabul ederler.

Madde – 25.

Katılma

En az on tasdiknamenin tevdiinden itibaren imzalamıyan herhangi bir Avrupa Devleti Teşkilât Konseyinin muvafakatiyle ve Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine hitaben yapılacak bir ihbarla Sözleşmeye katılabilecektir. Katılma Teşkilât Konseyinin muvafakati tarihinden itibaren muteber olacaktır.

Madde – 26.

Vecibelerin ademi ifası

Eğer, Teşkilât âzasından biri işbu Sözleşmeden mütevellit vecibeleri yerine getirmekten fariğ olursa, Sözleşme hükümlerine uymaya davet edilir. Eğer bu âza kendisine verilen müddet zarfında bu davete icabet etmezse, diğer âzalar, Teşkilât dâhilinde işbirliklerini onsuz devam a müştereken karar verebilirler.

Madde – 27.

Çekilme

Her Âk ı d Taraf Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine bir sene önceden haber vermek suretiyle işbu Sözleşmenin kendisine tatbik edilmesine nihayet verebilir.

Madde – 28.

Tasdiknamelerin, katılma ve çekilmelerin tebliği

Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, tasdiknameleri, iltihat veya çekilme ihbarı vesikalarını alır almaz bundan bütün Âk ı d Tarafları ve Teşkilâtın Genel Sekreterini haberdar edecektir.

EK

Genel Sekreterin vazifeleri hakkında tamamlayıcı hükümler

Genel Sekreterin 17 inci maddede t yin edilen vazifeleri aŗağıdaki tamamlayıcı h k mlerin konusunu teŗkil eder.

1. Konseye ve İcra Komitesine teklifler sunabilir.
2. Teknik Komiteler Baŗkanlığı ile mutabık kalarak, l zum g r ld ė  vakit, komiteleri toplamak ve bunların sekreteryasını temin etmek i in gerekli k dbirleri alır. L zumu halinde onlara, Konseyin ve İcra Komitesinin talimatını tebliğ eder.
3. 15 inci maddenin C fıkrasında zikredilen diėer kurulların  alıŗmalarını takip ve l zumunda onlara Konseyin ve İcra Komitesinin talimatı tebliğ eder.
4. 20 nci maddenin h k mlerine g re ve Konseyin ve İcra Komitesinin talimatına uygun olarak, diėer Milletlerarası Teŗkil tla m nasebet tesisi i in l zumlu tedbirleri alır.
5. Teŗkil tın iyi iŗlemesi i in l zumlu ve Konsey ve İcra Komitesi tarafından kendisine tevdi edilen b t n vazifeleri deruhte eder.

Bu maksatla, bu hususta gerekli sal hiyeti haiz aŗağıda imzaları bulunan temsilciler, iŗbu S zleŗmeyi imza etmiŗler ve m h rlerini basmıŗlardır.

Paris'te 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde, her iki metin de aynı derecede muteber olmak  zere, Fransızca ve İngilizce tek n sha olarak hazırlanmıŗ ve tasdikli suretlerini diėer  k dlara tevdi edecek olan Fransa H k metinin Arŗivlerine teslim edilmiŗtir.

Teŗkil tın Hukuki Yetkisi, İmtiyaz ve Muafiyetleri hakkında, Avrupa Ekonomik İŗbirliė 
S zleŗmesine Ek

1. Numaralı Protokol

Avrupa Ekonomik İŗbirliė  S zleŗmesini imzalayan H k metler ve makamlar:

S zleŗmenin 22 nci maddesi h k mlerine g re Avrupa Ekonomik İŗbirliė  Teŗkil tının,  yesi bulunan memleketler topraklarında vazifesini g rmek ve gayesine ulaŗmak i in l zumlu hukuki yetkiden faydalandıė nı, ve gene Teŗkil tın, memurlarının ve aynı zamanda  yelerinin temsilcilerinin ek bir Protokolda tarif edilen imtiyaz ve muafiyetlerden istifade ettiklerini nazarı itibara alarak;

Aŗağıdaki hususlar hakkında mutabık kalmıŗlardır:

FASIL : I.

ŗahsiyet, ehliyet

Madde – 1.

Teŗkil t h kmi ŗahsiyeti haizdir. Teŗkil t akit yapmak, gayrimenkul ve menkul malları temell k ve feraė etmek ve d va etmek ehliyetine sahiptir.

FASIL : II.

Mallar, sermayeler ve matlubat

Madde – 2

Teŗkil t, malları ve matlubatı, bulundukları yer neresi ve zilyedleri kim olursa olsun, Teŗkil tın sarıh bir surette vazge tiė  haller m stesna, hari  ez memleket muafiyetinden istifade ederler. Bununla beraber, vazge me, icrai tedbirlere ŗamil olamaz.

Madde – 3

Teşkilâtın bulunduğu binalar masundurlar. Mal ve alacakları, nerede bulunursa bulunsun ve vazilüyedleri kim olursa olsun, taharri, el koyma, müsadere, istimlâk veya diğer bütün idari, adlî ve kanuni, icrai tazyik şekillerinden muaftırlar.

Madde – 4

Teşkilâtın evrakı ve sureti umumiyede ona ait veya onun elinde bulunan her türlü evrak, nerede bulunurlarsa bulunsunlar, masundurlar.

Madde – 5

Hiçbir malî kontrol, tahdidat veya moratoryuma tabi olmadan:

- a) Teşkilât her türlü döviz elinde bulundurabilir ve herhangi bir para ile hesap açtırabilir.
- b) Teşkilât, sermayesini bir memlekettten diğerine veya herhangi bir memleket içinde serbestçe transfer edebilir. Ve elinde bulunan bütün dövizleri her nevi paraya tahvil edebilir.

Madde – 6

Teşkilât, emvali, gelirleri ve diğer malları:

- a) Her türlü doğrudan doğruya vergiden muaftır. Bununla beraber. Teşkilât umumi hizmetler mukabili olan vergilerden muaf tutulmasını talep edemez;
- b) Resmî istimali için yapılan ihracat ve ithalât üzerine mevzu tahdidat, memnuniyet ve her türlü gümrük resminden muaftır; bununla beraber, resme tabi olmadan ithal edilen bu malların ithal edildikleri memleketin arazisi üzerinde satılamıyacakları tabiidir. Meğer ki, bu satış ithal memleketi Hükümetinin kabul ettiği şartlar dâhilinde yapılmış olsun;
- c) Neşriyat hususunda da ithal ve ihraç tahdidatı ve memnuiyeti ve gümrük resimlerinden muaftır.

Madde – 7

Teşkilât esas itibariyle menkul ve gayrimenkul malların bedelinden mütevellit istihlâk vergilerinden ve satış resimlerinden muafiyeti talep etmeyecek ise de resmî istimali için bedeli tutarının bu nevi vergi ve resimleri ihtiva edecek mühim mubayaatta bulunduğu takdirde, üyeler her imkân buldukları vakit bu vergiler ve resimler tutarından tenzil veya iade etmek maksadiyle gerekli idari tedbirleri alacaklardır.

FASIL : III.

Ulaştırma kolaylıkları

Madde – 8.

Teşkilât, âzası bulunan her memleketin arazisi üzerinde, posta, kablogram, telegram, radyotegram, telefoto, telefon muhaberatı ve diğer muhaberat üzerindeki harç ve tarife rüçhanları ve matbuat ve radyoya verilen haberler üzerindeki tarifeler bakımından hiç olmazsa diğer Hükümetler ve diplomatik heyetlere bahşedilen muamele kadar müsait bir muameleden istifade edecektir. Teşkilâtın resmî muhaberatı ve diğer resmî muvasalatı sansüre tabi tutulmayacaktır.

FASIL : IV.

Üyelerin temsilcileri

Madde – 9

Teşkilâtın, belli başlı ve tâli kurulları nezdindeki üye memleketlerin temsilcileri vazifelerinin devamı müddetince toplantı mahaline gidip gelirken muadil derecedeki diplomatik ajanların istidafe ettikleri imtiyaz, muafiyet ve kolaylıklardan istifade edeceklerdir.

Madde – 10

Bu imtiyaz, muafiyet ve kolaylıklar, üyelerin temsilcilerine şahsi faydaları için değil, Teşkilâtla olan münasebetleri nispetinde vazifelerinin serbestçe ifasını temin gayesinde bahşedilmiştir. Bu itibarla, üyelerden hiçbirisi kendi düşüncesine göre adaletin tecellisine mâni olduğu ve kaldırılması muafiyetin bahşedilmesi sebebine zarar vermediği hallerde, mümessiline bahşedilen muafiyeti kaldırmakta yalnız haklı değil aynı zamanda vazifelidir.

Madde – 11.

9 uncu maddenin hükümleri bir temsilcinin, tebaası bulunduğu veya temsilcisi olduğu veya bulunmuş olduğu memleket makamlarına karşı tatbik edilemez.

Madde – 12.

Bu fasla göre, «mümessil» kelimesi, bütün delege, muavin, müşavir, teknik mütehassıs ve temsilci heyet kâtiplerine şâmindir.

FASIL:V

Memurlar

Madde – 13

Genel Sekreter, işbu fasıl hükümlerinin tatbik edileceği memur sınıflarını tâyin eder. Genel Sekreter bunların listelerini Konseye arz ve bilâhara bütün üyelere tebliğ edecektir. Bu sınıflara dâhil memurların isimleri zaman zaman üyelere bildirilecektir.

Madde – 14

Teşkilâtın memurları:

- a) Resmî sınıfları dâhilinde icra ettikleri harekât hususunda hariç ez memleket muafiyetinden istifade ederler; vazifelerinin hitamından sonra da bu muafiyetten istifadeye devam ederler;
- b) Teşkilâtın aldıkları ücret ve aidat bakımından diğer belirli beynelmilel teşkilât memurlarının faydalandıkları vergi muafiyetlerinden aynı şartlar dâhilinde istifade ederler>
- c) Kendileri olduğu gibi, eşleri ve beslemeye mecbur oldukları aileleri efradı ve muhacereti tahdit için konulmuş hükümlere ve yabancıların kayıt formalitelerine tabi değildirler;
- d) Kambiyo kolaylıkları bakımından, mahallî Hükümet nezdindeki diplomatik heyetlerin mümessil rütbedeki memurlarının istifade ettikleri imtiyazlardan istifade ederler;
- e) Kendileri ve eşleri ve beslemeye mecbur oldukları aileleri ifradı, milletlerarası buhran zamanlarında diplomatik heyetlerin vatanlarına dönmek hususunda istifade ettikleri kolaylıklardan istifade ederler;
- f) İlgili memlekette vazifelerine başladıkları anda zâti eşya ve mobilyelerini ithal hususunda gümrük muafiyetinden istifade ederler.

Madde – 15

14 üncü maddede derpiş edilen muafiyet, istisna, imtiyaz ve kolaylıklarından başka, Genel Sekreter, kendisi için olduğu kadar eşi ve sagir çocukları için de, beynelmilel hukuk mucibince diplomatik misyon şeflerine tanınan imtiyaz, muafiyet, istisna ve kolaylıklarından istifade edecektir.

Madde 16

İmtiyaz, muafiyet ve kolaylıklar, memurlara kendi şahsi faideleri için değil Teşkilâtın menfaati için bağışlanmıştır. Genel Sekreter, muafiyetin, adaletin infazına mâni olduğu ve bu muafiyetin kaldırılmasının Teşkilâtın menfaatlerine hâlel getirmediği hallerde, bu muafiyeti kaldırabilir ve kaldırmalıdır. Genel Sekreter ve muavinleri için muafiyetin kaldırılmasına Konsey salâhiyetlidir.

Madde – 17

Teşkilât, işbu fasılda sayılan, imtiyaz, istisna ve kolaylıkların mahal verebileceği suiistimalleri bertaraf, zâbıta nizamâtını temin etmek ve adaletin iyi eşlemesini kolaylaştırmak üzere her zaman üyelerin mensup bulundukları yetkili makamlarla işbirliği yapacaktır.

FASIL : VI

Teşkilâtın vazifelendirilmiş mütehassısları

Madde – 18

Fasıl V de kastedilen memurlardan başka, mütehassıslar, Teşkilât tarafından vazife ile gönderildiklerinde, seyahat müddeti dâhil bu vazifenin devamı müddetince, vazifelerini yapabilmelerine lüzumlu imtiyaz, muafiyet ve kolaylıklardan istifade ederler.

Bunlara:

- a) Tevkif, hapis ve eşyalarına elkoyma muafiyetleri;
- b) Vazifeleri sırasında yaptıkları hareketler hususunda hariç ez memleket muafiyeti;
- c) Her türlü evrak ve vesikaları masuniyeti dâhildir.

Madde – 19

İmtiyaz, muafiyet ve kolaylıklar eksperlere şahsi istifadeleri için değil Teşkilâtın nefine olarak tanınmıştır. Genel Sekreter, adaletin tecellisine mâni olacağını ve kaldırılması teşkilâtın menfaatlerine zarar vermiyeceğini düşündüğü bütün hallerde bir ekspere tanınmış olan muafiyeti kaldırabilir ve kaldırmalıdır.

FASIL : VII

Ek Anlaşmalar

Madde – 20

Teşkilât, işbu Protokolü bir veya birkaç âzanın hususi şartlarına göre tanzim etmek gayesiyle, bu âza veya âzalarla ek Anlaşmalar imza edebilir.

Bu maksatla aşağıda imzası bulunan, gerekli salâhiyeti haiz temsilciler işbu protokolü imza etmişlerdir.

Paris'te 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde, her iki metin muteber olmak üzere Fransızca ve İngilizce tek nüsha olarak hazırlanmış ve tasdikli suretlerini diğer Âkıdlara tebliğ edecek olan Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin Arşivlerine tevdi edilmiştir.

Teşkilâtın Malî Rejimi hakkında Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesine Ek

II NUMARALI PROTOKOL

Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Sözleşmesini imzalayan Hükümetler ve makamlar:

Sözleşmenin 23 üncü maddesinin, Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilâtının malî rejimi hakkında bir Ek Protokol yapılmasını derpiş ettiğini nazarı itibara alarak;

Aşağıdaki hususlar hakkında mutabık kalmışlardır.

Madde – 1

Bütçe

Genel Sekreter, en geç her senenin 1 Mayısına kadar mütaakıp bütçe süresi için müfredatlı sarfiyat tahminlerini Konseyin Tetkik ve tasvibine arzedecektir. Sarfiyat tahminleri fasıllarda toplanmıştır. İcra Komitesinin müsaadesi hariç, fasıldan fasıla münakale memnudur. Bütçe tasarısının katî şekli, teferruatı itibariyle, Genel Sekreter tarafından tâyin edilecektir.

Üyelerin temsilcilerinin seyahat masrafları, ikamet tazminatı normal olarak üyelere aittir. Konsey Teşkilât tarafından tavzif edilecek oldukları hususi görevlerin ifasından mütevellit masrafların bazı temsilcilere tadiyahesine, bazı hallerde müsaade edebilir.

Madde – 2

Ek Bütçe

Şartlar icabettirdiği takdirde, Konsey, Genel Sekreterden ek bir bütçe tanzimini talep edebilir. Genel Sekreter, Konseye, sunulan kararların icabettirdiği masrafların tahminini takdim eder. Mütemmim sarfiyatı icabettiren bir karar ancak Konseyce mütekabil masrafların kabulü halinde, Konsey tarafından tasdik edilmiş addedilir.

Madde – 3

Bütçe Komisyonu

Teşkilâtın üyelerinin temsilcilerinden müteşekkil bir Bütçe Komisyonu Konsey tarafından tesis edilecektir. Genel Sekreter, bütçeyi Konseye takdim etmeden evvel mütekaddim bir tetkik için bu komisyona arzedecektir.

Madde – 4

İştirak hisselerinin hesabında kullanılan esaslar

Tasdik edilen bütçe masrafları, Konseyin tasdik ettiği bir bareme tevfikân Teşkilât âzaları tarafından verilecek aidatla karşılanır.

Genel Sekreter, âzalara hisse tutarlarını tebliğ ve bu hisseleri tesbit ettiği bir tarihte tediye davet eder.

Madde – 5

İştirak hisselerinin ödenmesi için kabul edilen para

Teşkilâtın bütçesi, Teşkilât merkezinin bulunduğu memleket parası üzerinden tanzim edilir; üyelerin iştirak hisseleri bu para ile tediye edilecektir. Bununla beraber Konsey, üyeleri iştirak hisselerinin bir kısmını Teşkilâtın vazifelerini ifa için muhtaç olduğu her hangi bir para ile ödemeye davet edilebilir.

Madde – 6

Mütedavil sermaye

Konsey, hisselerin tesbit ve tadiyahesine kadar âzayı lüzumunda, hisselerin tediye edilmesi icabeden para veya paralarla mütedavil sermaye avansında bulunmaya davet edecektir. Bu avanslar, aynı bütçe

müddeti sırasında, hisseden tenzil suretiyle ödenir. Avans tutarları, hisselerin tesbitinde kullanılan kıstasa göre tâyin edilirler.

Madde – 7

Hesabat ve Denetleme

Genel Sekreter Teşkilâtın bütün vâridat ve sarfiyatının doğru bir hesabını tanzim ettirir.

Konsey, yenilenmesi kabil olmak üzere ilk görev müddeti üç sene olan hesap murakıpları tâyin eder. Bu murakıplar Teşkilâtın hesabatını, bilhassa sarfiyatın bütçe tahminlerine uygun bir şekilde yapılmış olup olmadığını tetkik edeceklerdir.

Genel Sekreter, hesap murakıplarına, vazifelerinin ifasında muhtaç olabilecekleri bütün kolaylıkları gösterecektir.

Madde – 8

Malî Nizamname

Genel Sekreter, tasdik zumnında Konseye Teşkilâtın kurulmasından sonra mümkün olan en kısa müddet zarfında, işbu protokolda anılan prensiplere tevfikân ve Teşkilâta sağlam ve iktisadi bir malî idare temin edecek surette hazırlanmış bir malî nizamname sunar.

Madde – 9

İlk Bütçe

İstisnai olarak, Genel Sekreter, Sözleşmenin yürürlüğe girmesinden en geç iki ay içinde ve yürürlüğe girme tarihinden 30 Haziran 1949 tarihine kadar olan müddet için bir ilk bütçeyi ve mütedavil sermaye avansları baliğine mütaallik teklifleri Konseye arzedecektir.

Yukarda yazılı olanları tasdik hususunda aşağıda imzaları bulunan ve bu konuda salâhiyetler kılınan yetkili temsilciler bu protokolu imza etmişlerdir.

Paris'te, 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde, her iki metin mutaber olmak üzere Fransızca ve İngilizce tek nüsha olarak hazırlanmış ve tasdikli suretlerini diğer Âkıdlara tebliğ edecek olan Fransa Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin Arşivlerine tevdi edilmiştir.

Appendix E: Economic Cooperation Agreement Signed between the United States and Turkey

No. 213 – Türkiye ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasında 4 Temmuz 1948 tarihinde imzalanan Ekonomik İşbirliği antlaşması ve eki ile aynı tarihte teali edilen mektupların onanması hakkında Kanun

Date: July 8, 1948

[Resmi Gazete Declaration: July 13, 1948 – No. 6956]

Kanun No: 5253

Madde 1 – Türkiye ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasında 4 Temmuz 1948 tarihinde imzalanan Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması ve eki ile aynı tarihte teati edilen mektuplar kabul edilmiş ve onanmıştır.

Madde 2 – Bu kanun yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

Madde 3 – Bu kanunu Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.

10/7/1948

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti:

Avrupa memleketlerinde ferdi hürriyet prensiplerini, hür müesseseleri ve hakiki istiklâl iade ve idame etmenin, sağlam iktisadi şerait tesisine, müstakar beynelmilel iktisadi münasebetlere ve Avrupa memleketlerince, fevkalâde haricî yardımdan vereste sıhhatli bir iktisadiyat başarılmasına geniş ölçüde bağlı bulunduğunu teslim ederek;

Kuvvetli ve müreffeh bir Avrupa iktisadiyatının Birleşmiş Milletler gayelerinin tahakkuku için esaslı olduğunu kabul ederek;

Bu şeraiti başarmanın muteber kambiyo rayiçleri tesis ve idame ve ticaret engellerini bertaraf etmeği sağlamak üzere mümkün olan her türlü teşebbüsler dâhil olmak üzere, kuvvetli bir istihsal gayretine, haricî ticaretin genişlemesine dâhilde malî istikrar tesis veya idamesine ve iktisadi işbirliğinin geliştirilmesine dayanan ve bu hususta işbirliği eden bütün memleketlere açık bulunan, kendi kendine yardım ve karşılıklı işbirliği gayesine mâtufl bir Avrupa Kalkınma Plânına lüzum gösterdiğini nazarı itibara alarak;

İşbu prensiplerin tahakkuku zımnında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin, aynı şekilde düşünen diğer milletlerle birlikte, 16 Nisan 1948 tarihinde Paris'te imza edilen Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Mukavelesine iltihak eylediğini –ki mezkûr mukavele gereğince müziler ilk vazifeleri olarak bir Müsterek Kalkınma Programı hazırlamak ve tatbik etmek hususunda teşebbüse geçmeyi kararlaştırdılar- ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin mezkûr Mukavenenin ahkâmı mucibince tesis edilen Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtına dâhil bulunduğunu mütalâa ederek;

İşbu prensiplerin gerçekleştirilmesi zımnında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin, münferit ve müşterek gayretleriyle fevkalâde haricî ekonomik yardımdan vâreste olabilmelerini mümkün kılmak için müşterek bir Avrupa Kalkınma Programına iştirak eden milletlere Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından yardım teminini derpiş eden 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununu kabul eylemiş olduğunu da düşünerek;

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin, 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun gayeleri ve siyasetlerine iltihakını esasen ifade etmiş bulunduğunu nazarı itibara alarak;

1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanunu gereğince Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetince yardımın yapılmasını, Türkiye Cumhuriyetince bu gibi yardımın kabulünü ve

Müşterek Avrupa Kalkınma Programının ayrılmaz bir cüzü olarak Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin kalkınmasını temin maksadiyle iki Hükümetin münferiden ve birlikte alacakları tedbirleri tanzim eden Anlaşmaların tesbiti arzu eylediklerinden;

Aşağıdaki hususlarda mutabık kalmışlardır.

Madde – I.

1. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin veya Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetince gösterilen herhangi bir şahsın müessesenin veya teşekkülün emrine, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından istenebilen ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri hükümeti tarafından tasvip olunan yardımı âmade kılmak suretiyle, Türkiye Cumhuriyetine yardım etmeyi deruhte eyler. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti işbu yardımı 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanunu ile, bunu tadil eden ve tamamlayan mevzuat ve müteferri tahsisat kanunlarının ahkâmı mucibince ve bunların vazettikleri bütün kayıt, şart ve nihayet verme ahkâmına tabi olarak temin edecek ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine ancak işbu kanunlar gereğince temini müsaade edilmiş malları, hizmetleri ve diğer yardımı âmade kılacaktır.

2. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, münferiden ve Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilâtı kanalından ve 16 Nisan 1948 de Paris'te imzalanan Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Mukavelesine tevfikân hareket ederek bir Müşterek Kalkınma Programı yoluyla sürekli sulh ve refah için Avrupa'da elzem olan iktisadi şeraiti süratle başarmak ve bu şekilde bir müşterek kalkınma programına katılan Avrupa memleketlerini, işbu Anlaşmanın müddeti zarfında fevkalâde haricî ekonomik yardımdan vâreste bir hale gelmelerini mümkün kılmak için katılan diğer memleketlerle birlikte devamlı gayretler sarfedecektir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Mukavelesinin umumi vecibelere ait hükümlerini yerine getirmek üzere teşebbüse geçmek, Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtının çalışmalarına faal olarak iştirak ve 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun maksatları ve siyasetlerine iltihaka devam etmek hususundaki niyetini tediyeleler.

3. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti tarafından Türkiye Cumhuriyetine yapılan ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleriyle, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine ait ülkeler ve topraklar haricindeki sahalardan tedarik edilen yardım hususunda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti işbu tedarikâtın makul fiyat ve şartlarla yapılmasını temin ve mezkûr yardımın tedarik edildiği memlekete bu suretle âmade kılınmış olan dolarların, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti ile mezkûr memleket arasında yapılmış herhangi bir Anlaşmaya uygun bir surette kullanılması hususunda tertibat alınması zımında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti ile işbirliği yapacaktır.

Madde II.

1) Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetlerinden elde edilen yardımın kullanılmasıyla âzami bir kalkınma temini maksadiyle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti aşağıdaki gayeleri temin için âzami gayret sarfedecektir.

A) Tasarrufunda bulunan bilûmum kaynaklardan müessir ve amelî bir surette istifadeyi temin maksadiyle, aşağıdaki zikrolunanlar dâhil olmak üzere, gereken tedbirleri almak veya idame etmek:

1) İşbu Anlaşma gereğince temin edilen yardım ile elde edilen mallar ve hizmetlerin işbu Anlaşmaya ve mümkün olduğu nispette, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti tarafından yardım yapılması lüzumunu destekliyen, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından temin edilmiş cetvellerde tasrih edilen umumi gayelere uygun maksatlara kullanılmasını temin için gereken tedbirler;

2) Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtı tarafından tasvip edilen müessir bir takip sistemi vasıtasıyla bu gibi kaynakların kullanımının müşahadesi ve tetkiki, ve;

3) Mümkün olduğu nispette, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlarına ait olup Amerika Birleşik Devletleri dâhilinde veya Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine ait ülkeler veya topraklar dâhilinde bulunan matlubatı ve bunlardan mütevellit kazançları tesbit, teşhis ve Müşterek Avrupa Kalkınma Programını gerçekleştirmek yolunda münasip şekilde istifadeye tahsis maksadiyle alınacak tedbirler. Bu fıkranın hiç bir hükmü işbu tedbirlerin yerine getirilmesi için bir yardımın

ifası zımmında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine veya işbu matlubatın tasfiye edilmesi hususunda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine herhangi bir vecibe tahmil etmemektedir.

B) Sınai ve zirai istihsalin sağlam bir ekonomik esas dairesinde gelişmesini ileri götürmek; Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtı vasıtasıyla tespit edilmesi muhtemel olan istihsal hedeflerine ulaşmak; ve Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin talebi üzerine, mezkûr Hükümete, mümkün olduğu takdirde kömür ve gıda maddeleri istihsalinin artırılması için projeler de dâhil olmak üzere, mühim bir kısmı işbu Anlaşma mucibince yapılan yardım ile teşebbüs edilecek Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından ittihazı mutasavver muayyen projelere mütaallik tafsillatlı teklifleri bildirmek;

C) Parasına istikrar vermek, muteber bir kambiyo rayici tesbit veya idame etmek, Hükümet bütçesini tevzin etmek, dâhilde malî istikrar yaratmak veya idame etmek ve umumiyetle kendi para sistemine karşı olan itimadı iade veka idame etmek; ve

D) 1. Katılan memleketler arasında ve diğer memleketlerle mütazayit bir mal ve hizmet mübadelesini teshil ve teşvik için ve kendi aralarında ve diğer memleketlerle ticarete engel olan resmî ve hususi maniaları azaltmak için diğer katılan memleketlerle işbirliği yapmak.

2. Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtı Mukavelesinin 8 inci maddesinin katılan memleketlerde mevcut olan insan kuvvetinden tesirli ve tam bir surette istifadeye mâtuf gayesini göz önünde tutarak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, işbu Anlaşma maksatlarının tahakkuku yolunda katılan memleketlerin herhangi birindeki insan kuvvetinden mümkün olan âzami faydalanmayı istihdaf eden Beynelmîl Mülteci Teşkilâtı ile müştereken yapılan teklifleri müsait bir şekilde mütalâa edecektir.

3. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti hususi ve resmî ticari teşebbüsler arasında, rekabeti takyit, piyasalara iştiraki tehdit veya inhisarcı kontrolları teşvik edici beynelmîl ticarete tesir eden ticari usul veya tertiplere – işbu usul veya tertipler netice itibarıyla Müşterek Avrupa Kalkınma Programının tahakkukuna müdahale eyledikleri takdirde – mâni olmak üzere münasip gördüğü tedbirleri ittihaz edecek ve diğer katılan memleketler ile işbirliği yapacaktır.

Madde – III.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti, içlerinden birinin talebi üzerine, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri vatandaşlarının teklif ettiği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun 111 (b) (3) faslına tevfikân münasip para transferi garantileri verebileceği Türkiye Cumhuriyetine mütaallik projeler hakkında istişarede bulunacaklardır.

2. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti böyle bir garantiye tevfikân her hangi bir şahsa Birleşik Devletler dolârı olarak tediye bulundığı takdirde, yukarda bahsolunan fasıl gereğince Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine tahsis veya transfer edilen herhangi bir Türk lirası meblâğının veya Türk lirası kredilerinin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin mülkü olarak tanınacağını Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti kabul eder.

Madde – IV.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri kaynaklarındaki noksanlıklar veya muhtemel noksanlıklar neticesi olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletlerince ihtiyaç duyulan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti menşeli malzemenin, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti arasında uyuşulacak makul satış, mübadele, takas şeraiti dairesinde veya diğer şekilde, uyuşulan müddet devamınca ve miktarlarda ve bu kabil malzemenin dâhili istihlâki ve ticaret maksadiyle ihracı için Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin makul ihtiyaçları gereği veçhile nazarı itibara alındıktan sonra, stok ittihazı veya sair maksatlar için Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine transferini kolaylaştırır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dâhilinde bu kabil malzemenin mütezayit istihsalini teşvik ve bu kabil malzemenin Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine transferi hususunda herhangi bir engeli bertaraf etmek de dâhil olmak üzere, bu fıkranın hükümlerini gerçekleştirmek üzere lâzım gelen hususi tedbirleri alacaktır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin talebi üzerine, işbu fıkranın hükümlerini yerine getirmek üzere lâzım olan teferruatlı tertibat için müzakerata girişecektir.

2. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin bu husustaki talebi üzerine, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerince ihtiyaç duyulan malzemenin geliştirilmesi ve transferlerine mütaallik 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun 115 (B) tâli faslının 9 uncu fıkrasının ahkâmının yerine getirilmesi için münasip tertibatın tâyini zımında müzakereye girişecektir.

3. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin bu husustaki talebi üzerine menşeleri Türkiye Cumhuriyeti haricinde olan malzeme hususunda, münasip hallerde, işbu maddenin 1 ve 2 nci fıkralarının derpiş eylediği gayelerin temini zımında işbirliği yapacaktır.

Madde – V.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerikan vatandaşlarının katılan memleketlere ve katılan memleketler dâhilinde seyahatlerinin teşkilâtlandırılmasını ve geliştirilmesini teşvil ve teşvik için, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti ile işbirliği yapacaktır.

Madde – IV.

II. İki Hükümet, içlerinden birisinin talebi üzerine bu Anlaşmanın tatbikınca veya bu anlaşmaya tevfulan yapılan işler ve tertiplere mütaallik herhangi bir mesele hususunda istişare edeceklerdir.

II. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti:

A) Bu Anlaşmanın hükümlerini ve Avrupa Ekonomik İşbirliği Mukavelesinin umumi vecibelerini yerine getirmek üzere Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tarafından tasavvur veya kabul edilen projeler programlar ve tedbirler hakkında tafsilâtı malûmatı;

B) Bu Anlaşma gereğince anılan paralar, mallar ve hizmetlerin sureti istimali hakkında bir beyan dâhil olmak üzere, bu Anlaşmaya tevfulan yapılan işlere dair her üç ay zarfında verilecek tam izahatı;

C) Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin, 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanunu gereğince yapılan işlerin mahiyet ve vüsatını tâyin ve bu Anlaşma tahtında verilen veya derpiş edilen yardımın tesirliliğini ve umumiyetle müşterek kalkınma programının kaydettiği terakkiyi takdir etmek için ihtiyaç hissedebileceği Türkiye İktisadiyatı hakkındaki malûmat ile birlikte Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtından temin ettiği malûmatı ikmak için lâzım gelen herhangi başka bir ilgili malûmatı;

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile istişareden sonra, işar edeceği şekilde ve fâsılalarla Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine bildirecektir.

III. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine madde IV de zikri geçen Türkiye menşeli malzemeye dair, mezkûr maddede meşrut kılınan tertiplerin ihzar ve tatbiki için lüzumlu malûmatı elde edebilmesi için yardım edecektir.

Madde – VII.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti, müşterek Avrupa Kalkınma Programının ve bu programı gerçekleştirmek üzere yapılan muamelelerin gayelerine ve kaydettikleri terakkiye dair geniş neşriyat yapmanın karşılıklı menfaatleri iktizasından olduğunu teslim ederler. Program gayelerinin yerine getirilmesi için elzem olan müşterek gayret ve karşılıklı yardım hissini geliştirmek üzere, programın kaydettiği terakkiye dair geniş malûmat yapmanın arzuya şayan olduğu teslim edilir.

2. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti bu kabîl malûmatın yayımını teşvik edecek ve neşriyat vasıtalarının emrine âmade tutacaktır

3. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, gerek doğrudan doğruya ve gerek Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtı ile işbirliği yaparak bu kabîl malûmatın yayımını teşvik edecektir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, bu kabîl malûmatı neşir vasıtaları emrine âmade tutacak ve bu kabîl

yayım için münasip kolaylıklar sağlanmasını temin etmek üzere her türlü ameli tedbirler ittihaz eyliyecektir. Bundan başka Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, diğer katılan memleketlere ve Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtına, İktisadi Kalkınma Programının kaydettiği terakki hakkında tam malûmat sağlayacaktır.

4. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, alınan paralar, mallar ve hizmetlerin sureti istimaline dair malûmat dâhil olmak üzere, bu anlaşma gereğince yapılan işlere dair tam izahatı her üç ay zarfında bir Türkiye dâhilinde yayımlayacaktır.

Madde – VIII.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin bu Anlaşma gereğince deruhde eylediği vecibeleri Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde ifa edecek olan bir Hususi İktisadi İşbirliği Misyonusunu kabul etmeye muvafakat eyler.

2. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti nezdindeki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Büyük Elçisinin gereği veçhile ihbarı üzerine, Hususi Misyona ve Hususi Misyona Personeli ve Avrupa'daki Birleşik Devletler Hususi Temsilcisini, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti nezdindeki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Büyük Elçiliğine ve bu Elçiliğin mümasil rütbeli personeline bahşedilen imtiyazlardan ve muafiyetlerden faydalanma itibariyle, mezkûr Büyük Elçiliğin bir cüzü sayılacaktır. Bundan başka, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Kongresinin Harici İktisadi İşbirliği Müsterek Komitesi üyelerine ve memurlarına münasip cemilekâr muameleler yapacak ve onlara vazifelerinin tesirli surette ifası için lâzımgelen kolaylıkları ve yardımı bahşedecektir.

3. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, doğrudan doğruya ve Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilâtındaki temsilcileri vasıtasıyla, Hususi Misyona, Avrupa'daki Birleşik Devletler Hususi Temsilcisi ile maiyetine ve Müsterek Komite üyeleri ile memurlarına tam işbirliği sağlayacaktır. Bu kabil işbirliği, bu Anlaşma gereğince yapılan yardımın ne suretle kullanıldığı dâhil olmak üzere bu Anlaşmanın tatbikını müşahade ve tetkik için lâzımgelen bütün malûmatın ve kolaylıkların sağlanmasını temin etmektir.

Madde – IX.

1. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti, (Düşman emval ve menafiine taallûk eden tedbirlerden gayri) Hükümet tedbirleri neticesi olarak ortaya çıkan zarar ve ziyana karşı tevizat verilmesi için, İki Hükümetten birisinin kendi tebaalarından biri namına öteki Hükümet aleyhine desteklediği her hangi bir mutalebeyi Beynelmilel Adalet Divanının kararına arzilemeyi kabul ederler. Bu kabil Hükümet tedbirleri, 3 Nisan 1948 den sonra öteki Hükümet tarafından alınan ve öteki Hükümetin gerekli yetkiyi haiz makamları ile yapılmış mukaveleler veya o makamlarca bahsedilmiş imtiyazlar dâhil olmak üzere, öyle bir tabaanın emval ve menafiine tesir eden tedbirlerdir; İki Hükümetten birisinin bu fıkraya tevfikân öteki Hükümet tarafından desteklenen mutalebat hususundaki taahhüdünün, her bir Hükümet bakımından, Beynelmilel Adalet Divanı Statüsünün 36 ncı maddesi mucibince Divanın mecburi kazasına şimdiye kadar bahşettiği fiilî tanıma kaydü şartlarının cevaz ve hududu ile mukayyet olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Bu fıkranın hükümleri, İki Hükümetten her hangi birisinin, şayet mevcutsa, Beynelmilel Adalet Divanına müracaat hususundaki diğer haklarına, veya muahedelerden, anlaşmalardan veya hukuku düvel prensiplerinden mütevellit hakların ve vazifelerin iki Hükümetten biri tarafından ihlâl edildiği isnatlarına dayanan mutalebatın desteklenmesine ve serdedilmesine hiçbir veçhile hâlel vermiyecektir.

2. Bundan başka, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti, bu kabil mutalebatın, Divanı Adalet yerine, karşılıklı şekilde uyuşulacak olan herhangi bir hakem mahkemesine havale edebileceğini kabul ederler.

3. Bundan başka, iki Hükümetten hiçbirinin, kendi tebaası, mutalebenin ortaya çıktığı memleket idari ve adli mahkemelerinde faydalanabileceği bütün tesviye çarelerine başvurmamakça, bu maddeye tevfikân bir mutalebeyi desteklemeyeceği kabul edilir.

Madde – X.

Bu Anlaşmada kullanılan «Katılan memleket» tâbiri:

(I) 22 Eylül 1947 de Paris'te Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Komitesinin raporunu imzalamış bulunan herhangi bir memleket ile, o memleketin beynelmilel bakımdan mesul bulunduğu ve o memleket ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti arasında imzalanan İktisadi İşbirliği Anlaşmasının tatbik edildiği topraklar, ve.

(II) (Almanya'nın işgal bölgelerinden herhangi birisi, beynelmilel idare veya kontrol altındaki sahalar, ve Triyeste Serbest Toprağı veya Triyeste Serbest Toprağının bölgelerinden birisi dâhil olmak üzere) kısmen veya tamamen Avrupa'da bulunan herhangi diğer bir memleket ile onun idaresi altında bulunan tabi sahalar demektir. Böyle bir memleket Avrupa İktisadi İşbirliği Mukavelesinin taraflarından birisini teşkil ettiği ve bu Anlaşmanın gayelerini gerçekleştirmeye mâtuf bulunan bir müşterek Avrupa Kalkınması Programına bağlı olduğu müddetçe «Katılan memleket» sayılacaktır.

Madde – XI.

1. İşbu Anlaşma Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin tasdikına sunulacak ve tasdik edildiği Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetine tebliğ olunduğu gün yürürlüğe girecektir. Bu maddenin 2 ve 3 üncü fıkraları ahkâmına tabi olmak şartıyla. Anlaşma 30 Haziran 1953 e kadar yürürlükte kalacak; ve 30 Haziran 1953 ten en az altı ay önce iki Hükümetten biri ötekine Anlaşmaya mezkûr tarihte son vermek niyetinde bulunduğu dair yazılı tebligatta bulunmadığı takdirde, Anlaşma ondan sonrası için böyle bir tebligat yapıldığı tarihten itibaren altı ay geçinceye kadar yürürlükte kalacaktır.

2. Anlaşmanın yürürlük süresi esnasında iki Hükümetten biri bu Anlaşmanın dayandığı esas mülâhazalarda önemli değişiklikler vukua geldiği mütalâasında bulunursa öteki Hükümete olveçhile yazılı tebligatta bulunacak ve iki Hükümet bunun üzerine işbu Anlaşmanın tezyili, tadili veya Anlaşmaya son verilmesi üzerinde uyuşmak üzere istişarede bulunacaklardır. Şayet, bu kabil tebligattan üç ay sonra iki Hükümet ahval ve şeraite göre yapılacak teşebbüs üzerinde uyuşmamışlarsa, içlerinden biri ötekine işbu Anlaşmaya son vermek niyetinde bulunduğu dair yazılı tebligatta bulunabilir. O zaman, bu maddenin 3 üncü fıkrası hükümlerine tabi olmak şartıyla bu Anlaşma:

A) Ya son verme niyeti hakkındaki böyle bir tebligat tarihinden altı ay sonra, veya;

B) Böyle bir tebligat tarihini takiben Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin yapmaya devam edebileceği her hangi bir yardım hususunda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine ait vecibelerin yerine getirilmesini temin etmeye kâfi geleceği kabul edilebilecek olan daha kısa bir devreden sonra, hitam bulacaktır. Ancak IV üncü madde ve VI ncı maddenin 3 üncü fıkrası, son verme niyeti hakkında böyle bir tebligat tarihinden itibaren iki sene sonraya kadar ve fakat 30 Haziran 1953 ten daha geç olmamak üzere, yürürlükte kalacaktır.

3. Bu Anlaşmaya tevfikân müzakere edilen tâli Anlaşmalar ve tertipler bu Anlaşmanın sona erme tarihini mütaakıp yürürlükte kalabilir, ve bu gibi tâli Anlaşmalarla tertiplerin yürürlük devresini bizzat kendi hükümlerini tanzim edecektir.

III üncü maddenin 2 nci fıkrası mezkûr maddede bahsi geçen garanti tediyatı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti tarafından yapılabildiği müddetçe yürürlükte kalacaktır.

4. Bu Anlaşma iki Hükümet arasında uyuşulma suretiyle her hangi bir zamanda tadil edilebilir.

5. Bu Anlaşmanın eki Anlaşmanın ayrılmaz bir cüz'ünü teşkil etmektedir.

6. Bu Anlaşma Birleşmiş Milletler Umumi Kâtipliği nezdinde tescil edilecektir.

Yukarıdaki hükümleri tasdikan işbu maksat için usulen yetkilendirilmiş olan iki taraf mümessilleri İşbu Anlaşmayı imzalamışlardır. Her iki metin de asıl olmak üzere, Türkçe ve İngilizce dillerinde iki nüsha olarak 1948 Temmuzunun dördüncü günü Ankara'da yapılmıştır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti
Namına
N. Sadak

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti
Namına
Edwin C. Wilson

EK

1. Akyankalır tesirli surette kullanılması için tedbirler ittihazına taallûk eden madde II. nin (A) I fıkrası icaplarının, Anlaşma gereğince verilen mallar hususunda, bu kabil malların korumak ve onların gayrimeşru veya uygunsuz pazarlara veya Ticaret Kanunlarına sapmasını önlemek üzere müessir tedbirleri ihtiva edeceği kabul olunmaktadır.

2. Madde II'nin (c) I fıkrasında bütçeyi tevzin etme vecibesinin kısa bir devre esasındaki açıkları menetmiyeceği ve fakat nihayetülemir bütçenin tevzinini istilzam eden bir bütçe siyaseti mânasını tazummun eyliyeceği kabul olunmaktadır.

3. II nci maddenin 3 üncü fıkrasında zikri geçen ticaret usullerinin ve ticaret tertiplerinin:

A) Herhangi bir maddenin alım, satım veya kiralaması hususunda başkalarıyla muamele yaparken riayet edilecek fiyatları, kayıtları veya şartları tesbit etme;

B) Teşebbüsleri hâkimiyetleri altındaki herhangi bir arazi piyasasında veya ticari faaliyet sahasından hariç tutmak veya bu kabil piyasa veya faaliyet sahasını tahsis veya taksim etme, veya müşterileri tahsis etme, veya satış kontenjanları veya mubayaa kontenjanları tesbit etme;

C) Muayyen teşebbüslere karşı farklı muamele yapma;

D) İstihsali tahdit veya istihsal kontenjanı tesbit etme;

E) Teknolojik veya patenteli veya patentesiz ihtiram gelişmesini veya tatbikını Anlaşma vasıtasıyla menetme;

F) İki Hükümetten birisi tarafından bahşedilen patente, alâmeti farika veya telif hakkı tahtındaki hakların istimalini, kendi kavanin ve nizamâtına göre, bu gibi bahışların sahası dâhilinde bulunmıyan meseleler, veya aynı şekilde bu kabil bahışlara mevzu teşkil etmiyen mahsullere veya istihsal şartlarına, istimal veya satışa tesmil etme; ve

G) İki Hükümetin uyuşarak ilâve edebilecekleri diğer usuller, mânasına geldiği kabul ediliyor.

4. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinin, ancak münasip tahkikat veya tetkikattan sonra, madde II nin 3 üncü fıkrasına tevfikân muayyen ahvalde teşebbüse geçmekle mükellef olduğu anlaşılmaktadır.

5. Madde III ün 1 inci fıkrasında atıf yapılan projelerin, 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun III (b) (3) faslı mucibince, İki Hükümet tarafından tasvip edilen projeler olduğu kabul edilmektedir.

6. Madde IV – deki «dahilî istihlâki için Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin mâkul ihtiyaçları gereği veçhile nazarı itibara alındıktan sonra» ibaresinin ilgili malzemededen mâkul miktarda stoklar idamesine şâmil bulunacağı ve «ticaret maksadiyle ihracat» ibaresinin takas muamelâtına şâmil bulunabileceği kabul olunmaktadır. Madde IV. gereğince müzakere edilen tertiplerin, tkos yığınları tasfiye edildiği takdirde, bir beynelmilel ticaret teşkilâtı için Havana'da kabul edilen beyannamenin 32 nci maddesi prensiplerine tevfikân istişare sağlanması münasip olacağı da kabul olunmaktadır.

7. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetinden, madde VI. nin (A) 2 fıkrası gereğince, tâli projeler veya ifşası meşru ticari menfaatlara halel verecek mahrem ticari veya teknik malûmat hakkında tafsilâtlı malûmat vermesi istenmiyeceği kabul olunmaktadır.

8. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetinin, madde VIII – in 3 üncü fıkrasında bahsi geçen tebligatı yaparken, kendileri için tam diplomatik imtiyazlar talebedilecek memurların sayısını amelî olduğu nispette tahdit etmenin şayanı arzu olduğunu gözönünde tutacağı kabul olunmaktadır. Madde VIII – in tatbikına mütâallik tafsilâtın icabettiği zaman iki Hükümet arasında görüşme mevzuu olacağı da kabul edilmektedir.

9. Madde IX – un 2 nci fıkrasına tevfi kan varılabilen herhangi bir Anlaşmanın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Senatosu tarafından tasdika tâbi olacağı kabul edilmektedir.

10. Türkiye'ye hibe suretiyle yardımda bulunmak mevzuubahis olduğu takdirde 1948 tarihli Ekonomik İşbirliği Kanununun ve bunu muaddil ve mütemmim kanunların ve bu kanunlara tevfi kan yapılan tahsisat kanunlarının hükümleri mucibince mahallî parayı yatırmak için gereğinin yapılmasını sağlayacak Anlaşma tadilatı üzerinde her iki Hükümetin istişare edecekleri kabul olunmaktadır.

Letters

American General Consulate

Ankara, July 4, 1948

Ekselâns,

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ticari tertiplerin âtide mezkûr sahalarda dâhilinde tatbikına mütaallik olarak iki Hükümetimiz mümessilleri beyninde ahiren cereyan etmiş bulunan mükâlemelere atıf yapmak ve işbu mükâlemeler neticesinde varılmış olan Anlaşmayı aşağıda teyit etmekle şerefyabım:

1. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Garbî Almanya, Triyeste Serbest Toprağı, Japonya yahut Cenubi Kore'deki herhangi bir sahada işgale veya murakabeye iştirak eylediği müddetçe Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti mezkûr sahaların emtia ticaretine, Amerika Birleşik Devletleriyle Türkiye arasında 1 Nisan 1939 da imza edilmiş olan Ticaret Anlaşmasında muharrer, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri emtia ticaretinin en fazla müsaadeye mazhar milletinki muamelesini görmesine mütaallik hükümleri veyahut, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri, 30 Ekim 1947 tarihli Gümrük Tarifeleri ve Ticaret hakkında Umumi Anlaşmaya Âkîd Taraflar bulundukları müddetçe mevzuubahis Anlaşmanın, mezkûr ticaretin en fazla müsaadeye mazhar milletinki muamelesini görmesine dair olan ve şimdi veya bilâhara tadil edilen Anlaşmanın hükümlerini tatbik etmeyecektir. Ticaret Anlaşmasının en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesi hükümlerinin tatbikına dair bu fıkra mevcut taahhüdün Gümrük Tarifeleri ve Ticaret Umumi Anlaşmasında mukarrer olup en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesinin ademi tatbikına cevaz veren istisnalara tabi olacağı kabul edilmektedir; Şu kadar ki, bu cümlede hiçbir şey mezkûr istisnaların tatbiki hakkında Umumi Anlaşmada tasrih edilen muameleye ittibai gerektirdiği şekilde tefsir olunmayacaktır.

2. Yukardaki 1 numaralı fıkra muharrer taahhüt ancak mezkûr fıkra adı geçen herhangi bir saha, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti emtia ticaretine mütekabilen en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesi tatbik ettiği müddetçe ve ettiği nispette o sahanın emtia ticareti hakkında hüküm ifade edecektir.

Bu hususa, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti (Tarifeler ve Ticarete dair Genel Anlaşmanın prensipleri gereğince kemmi tahdidatın tatbikında en ziyade müsaadeye mazhar devlet muamelesi dâhil olmak üzere) bu gibi mıntıkların Türkiye emtia ticaretine en ziyade müsaadeye mazhar devlet, muamelesini temin etmeleri için icabı arayacaktır.

3. Yukardaki 1 ve 2 numaralı fıkralarda muharrer taahhütlere, burada mevzuubahis olan sahalara ithalat yapmak hususunda elyevm tesirli veya ehemmiyetli gümrük maniaları mevcut bulunmadığı gözönünde tutularak girilmektedir. Bu gibi gümrük maniaları vazolunduğu takdirde mezkûr taahhütlerin; bir Milletlerarası Ticaret teşkilâtı tesisine mütaallik Havana Beyannamesinde zikrolunan ve gümrük tarifelerini mütekabil menfaat esasına müsteniden tenkis etmekte bâhis bulunan umdelerin tatbikını haleldar etmemesi kabul olunmaktadır.

4. Yukardaki 1 numaralı fıkra mevzuubahis Garbî Almanya, Japonya veya Cenubi Kore sahalarında geçen para için yeknasak bir kambiyo rayici olmamasının, bu sahaların ihracatına dakik surette hesaplanması müşkül olan bir bilvasıta prim verme tesirini yapabileceği takdir edilmektedir. Böyle bir hal devam ettiği müddetçe ve Amerika Birleşik Devleti Hükümetiyle yapılacak müşavere, meseleye, tarafeynin muvafakat edeceği, bir hal çaresi temin edemezse

mevzuubahis prim vermenin Türkiye’de müesses sanayiın maddeten zarardide ettiği veya etmek tehlikesi gösterdiğini veyahut millî sanayiın tesisine mâni olacağını veya teessüsünü maddeten geciktireceğini Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tesbit eylediği takdirde verilen primin muhammen miktarını karşılayacak derecede bir Muvazene Vergisini bu gibi emtia üzerinde tarh eylemesini 1 numaralı fıkradaki taahhülle mütebayın düşmediği kabul olunur.

5. Bu noktadaki taahhütler 1 Ocak 1951 tarihine kadar meriyette kalacak ve her iki Hükümetten biri diğerine, bu taahhütleri o tarihte hitama erdirmek niyetinde olduğunu 1 Ocak 1951 den en az 6 ay evvel tahriren bildirmediği takdirde mezkûr taahhütler 1 Ocak 1951 den sonra vâkı olabilecek tahrirî bir fesih ihbarı tarihinden itibaren 6 ay geçinciye kadar meriyette kalacaktır.

Yüksek saygılarımın lûtfen kabulünü rica ederim. Ekselâns.

Ekselâns

Necmettin Sadak
Sivas Milletvekili
Dışişleri Bakanı
Ankara

Edwin C. Wilson

*T. C.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Ankara, July 4, 1948

Ekselâns;

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki ticari tertiplerin âtide mezkûr sahalar dâhilinde tatbikına mütaallik olarak iki Hükümetimiz mümessilleri beyninde ahiren cereyan etmiş bulunan mükâmelere atıf yapmak ve işbu mükâlemeler neticesinde varılmış olan Anlaşmayı aşağıda teyit etmekle serefyabım:

1. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Garbî Almanya, Triyeste Serbest Toprağı, Japonya yahut Cenubî Kore’deki herhangi bir sahada işgale veya murakabeye iştirak eylediği müddetçe Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti mezkûr sahaların emtia ticaretine, Türkiye ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasında 1 Nisan 1939 da imza edilmiş olan Ticaret Anlaşmasında muharrer, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri emtia ticaretinin en fazla müsaadeye mazhar milletinki muamelesini görmesine mütaallik hükümleri veyahut, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetleri, 30 Ekim 1947 tarihli Gümrük Tarifeler ve ticaret hakkında Umumi Anlaşmaya Âkid Taraflar bulundukları müddetçe, mevzuubahis Anlaşmanın, mezkûr ticaretin en fazla müsaadeye mazhar milletinki muamelesini görmesine dair olan ve şimdi veya bilâhara tadil edilen Anlaşmanın hükümlerini tatbik eyleyecektir. Ticaret Anlaşmasının en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesi hükümlerinin tatbikına dair bu fıkra da mevcut taahhüdün Gümrük Tarifeleri ve Ticaret Umumi Anlaşmasında mukarrer olup en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesinin ademi tatbikına cevaz veren istisnalara tabi olacağı kabul edilmektedir. Şu kadar ki, bu cümlede hiçbir şey, mezkûr istisnaların tatbiki hakkında Umumi Anlaşmada tasrih edilen muameleye ittibai gerektirdiği şekilde tefsir olunmayacaktır.

2. Yukardaki 1 numaralı fıkra da muharrer taahhüt; ancak mezkûr fıkra da adı geçen her hangi bir saha, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti emtia ticaretine mütekaabilen en fazla müsaadeye mazhar millet muamelesi tatbik ettiği müddetçe ve ettiği nispette o sahanın emtia ticareti hakkında hüküm ifade edecektir.

Bu hususta, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti (Tarifeler ve Ticarete dair Genel Anlaşmanın prensipleri gereğince kemmî tahdidatın tatbikında en ziyade müsaadeye mazhar

devlet muamelesi dâhil olmak üzere) bu gibi mıntıkların Türkiye emtia ticaretine en ziyade müsaadeye mazhar Devlet muamelesini temin etmeleri için icabını arıyacaktır.

3. Yukardaki 1 ve 2 numaralı fıkralarda muharrer taahhütlere burada mevzuubahis olan sahalara ithalât yapmak hususunda elyevin tesirli veya ehemiyetli gümrük mâniaları mevcut bulunmadığı gözönünde tutularak girilmektedir. Bu gibi gümrük mâniaları vazolunduğu takdirde mezkûr taahhütlerin; bir milletlerarası ticaret teşkilâtı tesisine mütaallik Havana Beyannamesinde zikrolunan ve gümrük tarifelerini mütekabil menfaat esasına müsteniden tenkis etmekten bâhis bulunan umrelerin tatbikını helalder etmemesi kabul olunmaktadır.

4. Yukardaki 1 numaralı fıkrada mevzuubahis Garbî Almanya, Japonya veya Cenubî Kore sahalarında geçen para için yeknasak bir kambiyo rayıcı olmamasının, bu sahalanın ihracatının dakik surette hesaplanması müşkül olan bir bilvasıta prim verme tesirini yapabileceği takdir edilmektedir. Böyle bir hal devam ettiği müddetçe ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümetiyle yapılacak müşavere, meseleye tarafeynin muvafakat edeceği, bir hal çaresi temin edemezse mevzuubahis prim etmek tehlikesi gösterdiğini veyahut millî sanayiın tesisine mâni olacağını veya teessüsünü maddeten geciktireceğini Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti tesbit eylediği takdirde verilen primin muhammen miktarını karşılayacak derecede bir muvazene vergisi bu gibi emtia üzerine tarheylemesinin 1 numaralı fıkradaki taahhülle mütebayın düşmediği kabul olunur.

5. Bu notadaki taahhütler 1 Ocak 1951 tarihine kadar meriyette kalacak ve her iki Hükümetten biri diğerine, bu taahhütleri o tarihte hitama erdirmek niyetinde olduğunu 1 Ocak 1951 den en az 6 ay evvel tahriren bildirmediği takdirde mezkûr taahhütler 1 Ocak 1951 den sonra vâkı olabilecek tahriri bir fesih ihbarı tarihinden itibaren 6 ay geçinceye kadar meriyette kalacaktır.

Yüksek saygılarımın lûtfen kabulünü rica ederim, Ekselâns.

Ekselâns Edvin C. Wilson,
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Büyük Elçisi

Ankara
Necmeddin Sadak

Appendix F: Law about the Establishment and Function of General Directorate of Highways

General Directorate of Highways

Law about It's Establishment and Function

Date: February 11, 1950

[Resmi Gazete Declaration: February 16, 1950-No. 7434]

Düstur : 3rd Series, Volume 31, Page 804

Law No. 5539

I- Genel hükümler:

Madde 1 - Bayındırlık Bakanlığına bağlı, tüzelkişiliği haiz olmak ve katma bütçe ile idare edilmek üzere Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü kurulmuştur. Bu idareyi Genel Müdür temsil eder.

II - Görevler:

Madde 2 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973 - 1737/1 md.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün görevleri şunlardır:

A) Bu kanunda tarif olunan Otoyol, Devlet ve il yolları ağına giren yol güzergahlarını ve bunların değişikliklerini hazırlayıp, imar mevzuatı kapsamına giren yerlerde İmar ve İskan Bakanlığının onayına sunmak, imar mevzuatı kapsamı dışında kalan yerlerde doğrudan doğruya tayin ve tespit etmek, hazırlayacağı programlar uyarınca yol ve köprüleri inşa ve ıslah etmek, onarmak ve emniyetle kullanılmalarını sağlayacak şekilde sürekli bakım altında bulundurmak ve bu konularda gerekli eğitim yapmak,

B) Bütün yol ağlarının inşa sı, onarımı, bakımı ve diğer hususlar hakkında teknik esaslarla vasıf ve şartları tespit etmek,

C) Yolların kullanılmasına, teknik emniyet ve korunmasına ait esas ve kaideleri tespit etmek, yürütmek ve uygun göreceği yol işaretlerini tesis etmek,

D) Bu maddede sayılan işler için lüzumlu harita, etüt ve proje işlerini yapmak ve yaptırmak,

E) Genel Müdürlüğün çalışmalarına ait bilgileri toplamak, basmak, yayınlamak,

F) Yolların yapım, ıslah, onarım ve bakımına, emniyetle işlemesine gerekli garaj ve atölyeleri, makine ve malzeme ambarları ile depolarını, servis ve akaryakıt tesislerini, laboratuvarları, deneme istasyonlarını, tarihi yol ağlarına ait köprü ve diğer bütün yan tesisleri, yol boyu inkişafı ve ağaçlandırılması için lüzumlu fidanlıkları, dinlenme yerlerini, bakım ve trafik emniyetini sağlayacak bina ve lojmanları, verici telsiz istasyonları ile gerekli muhabere şebekelerini, Genel Müdürlüğün görevlerini daha verimli şekilde yönetimine yarayacak diğer her türlü sosyal tesisleri, hazırlayacağı ve hazırlatacağı plan ve projelerine göre yapmak, yaptırmak, onarmak, donatmak, işletmek, kiralamak ve bakımlarını sağlamak,

(1) Bu Kanunun düzenlediği atama usulüne dair konularda 23/4/1981 tarih ve 2451 sayılı Kanunun 2 - 5 inci maddelerine bakınız.

G) Bu maddede belirtilen görevlerin yapılabilmesi için lüzumlu her türlü alet, edevat, taşıt ve makineler ile donatılarını, bunların işletilmesi ve onarılması için gerekli bütün malzemeyi seçmek, sağlamak, gerekenleri imal etmek veya ettirmek, depo etmek, onarmak, gerekli ambar, atölye ve tesisleri donatmak ve işletmek,

H) Genel Müdürlüğün görevleri içinde bulunan işlerin, yapılması; trafik akımının emniyetle ve kolaylıkla sağlanması için gerekli (arazi dahil) her türlü binalı ve binasız taşınmaz malları kamulaştırmak, satın almak, kiralamak, kanunlarına göre geçici olarak işgal etmek,

İ) Otoyol, Devlet ve İl yolları ile ilgili diğer kanunların tahmil ettiği işleri yapmak.

Madde 3 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973-1737/1 md.)

Bu kanunda yazılı işler Genel Müdür tarafından yürütülür. Genel Müdür bu işleri yetki ve sorumluluklarıyla birlikte kısmen veya tamamen Genel Müdür yardımcılarına, Daire Başkanlarına, Genel Müdürlüğe bağlı müstakil ünite amirlerine, Bölge Müdürlerine ve bunların yardımcılarına yaptırabilir.

Ancak bu husus Genel Müdürün sorumluluğunu ortadan kaldırmaz.

III- Kuruluş :

Madde 4 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973-1737/1 md.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü: Genel Müdürün İdaresi altında üç Genel Müdür Yardımcısı ve beş Müşavir ile,

Merkezde:

Otoyolları Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Etüt ve Proje Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Yapım Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Bakım Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Köprüler Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Makine ve İkmal Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Plan ve Proje Dairesi Başkanlığı,

İdari İşler Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Personel Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Denetim Kurulu Başkanlığı,

Hukuk Müşavirliği,

Savunma Sekreterliği,

Organizasyon ve Metod Müdürlüğü,

Saymanlık Müdürlüğünden,

Taşrada:

Bölge Müdürlükleri, Otoyollar Müdürlükleri ile Makine ve İkmal Grup Şefliklerinden,

Teşekkül eder.

Madde 5-7 - (Mülga: 30/5/1973-1737/3 md.)

Madde 8 - Hukuk Müşavirliği aşağıda yazılı işleri görür:

A) Genel Müdürlüğe ait davaları her safhasında kovuşturmak,

B) Memurların vazifelerinden doğan kanuni kovuşturmalara müteallik işlemleri yapmak,

C) Genel Müdürlük hizmetleriyle ilgili olmak üzere ait olduğu kuruluş tarafından hazırlanan kanun, tüzük ve yönetmelik projelerini,

D) Genel Müdürlük kuruluşunun tertip ve tanzim edeceği her türlü bağitları ve şartname projelerini,

E) Genel Müdürlük kuruluşu ile başkaları arasında her türlü uyumsuzlukları,

F) Genel Müdürlükçe sorulacak işleri, İnceleyip hukuki mütalaasını bildirmek. Bu işlerin görülebilmesi için icabında bağıtlı avukat da kullanılabilir.

(Ek: 2/10/1963 - 341/1 md.) Genel Müdürlük hukuk müşaviri ve avukatları mahkemelerle icra dairelerince takdir edilecek vekalet ücretinden Maliye Bakanlığı Baş hukuk Müşavirliği ve Muhakemat Genel Müdürlüğü teşkilatı gibi faydalanırlar.

Madde 9 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973 - 1737/1 md.)

Genel Müdürün teklifi üzerine, Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün merkez ve taşra kuruluşlarını, hizmetin gerektirdiği şekilde düzenlemeye ve taşra kuruluşlarının yerlerini ve sınırlarını tespit etmeye Bayındırlık Bakanı yetkilidir.

Madde 10 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü kuruluşuna ait aylıklı memurların kadrosu bu kanuna bağılı (1) sayılı cetvelde gösterilmiştir.

Madde 11 - Bu kanuna bağılı (2) sayılı cetvelde yazılı kadrolar Bayındırlık Bakanlığı kuruluş kadrolarından çıkarılmış ve bunun yerine (3) sayılı cetveldeki kadrolar Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Yapı ve İmar İşleri Başkanlığı kadrolarına eklenmiştir.

Madde 12 - Genel Müdür, Bayındırlık Bakanının inhası üzerine müşterek karar ile ve Genel Müdür Yardımcısı, Daire Başkanları, Hukuk Müşaviri ve Bölge Müdürleri Genel Müdürün teklifi ve Bayındırlık Bakanının onaması ile tayin, nakil,terfi edilir. Bunların dışında kalan aylıklı memurlarla bütün hizmetlilerin tayin, terfi ve nakilleri Genel Müdür tarafından yapılır. Saymanlık Müdürü ve Saymanlık Müdürlüğü memurları Maliye Bakanlığınca tayin olunur. (1)

Madde 13 - Karayolları Genel Müdürü, merkez ve taşra kuruluşunda aylık veya ücretle çalışmakta bulunan her hangi bir memur veya hizmetliyi, ifası Genel Müdürlüğe ait bir iş için orada Genel Müdürlük kuruluşu ve açık bulunup bulunmadığı ile kayıtlı olmaksızın kadroda gösterilen ödenek ile ve tayindeki usulüne uyularak merkez veya taşrada dilediği yerde kullanabilir.

Madde 14 - (Mülga: 30/5/1973-1737/3 md.)

IV - Yol Ağları:

Madde 15 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973-1737/1 md.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğüne ait yollar 3 sınıfa ayrılmıştır:

A) Otoyollar,

B) Devlet yolları,

C) İl yolları,

A) Otoyollar: Üzerinde erişme kontrolünün uygulandığı Devlet yollarıdır. Genel olarak otoyollar ücretlidir. Bunlardan alınacak ücretin tespiti ve zaruri hallerde ücretsiz olması uygun görülen kesimlerinin tayini Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün teklifi üzerine Bayındırlık Bakanına aittir.

B) Devlet yolları: Önemli bölge ve il merkezlerini deniz, hava ve demiryolu istasyon, iskele, liman ve alanlarını birbirine bağlayan birinci derecede anayollardır.

(1) Bu hükmün uygulanmasında ek 5 inci maddeye bakınız.

C) İl yolları: Bir il sınırı içinde ikinci derece önemi haiz olan ve şehir, kasaba, ilçe ve bucak gibi belli başlı merkezleri birbirlerine ve il merkezine ve komşu illerdeki yakın ilçe merkezlerine, Devlet yollarına, demiryolu istasyonlarına, limanlara, hava alanlarına ve kamu ihtiyacının gerektirdiği diğer yerlere bağlayan yollardır.

Bu üç sınıfa ait yol ağları kamu yararı, Milli Savunma ihtiyaçları ve bu ağların gelişmesine tesir eden ekonomik amiller göz önünde tutulmak suretiyle Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü tarafından tespit ve Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Yüksek Fen Kurulunca incelendikten sonra, Bayındırlık Bakanının onayı halinde uygulanır. Düzeltmeler, değiştirmeler ve eklemeler de aynı usule bağlı olarak yapılır.

Madde 16-18 - (Mülga: 30/5/1973-1737/3 md.)

V - Gelirler:

Madde 19 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973 - 1737/1 md.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün gelirleri şunlardır:

1. Devlet bütçesinden yapılacak yardımlar,
2. Her türlü bağışlar ve diğer çeşitli gelirler,
3. Faizler,
4. Lüzumu kalmayan veya hurdalaşan yol makine ve atölyeleriyle eşyasının ve taşınmaz malların satışlarından elde edilen gelirler,
5. Müteahhitlere sözleşmeleri gereğince verilecek malzeme, alet, edevat, depo, arazi ve vesaire nin kira bedelleri,

6. Taahhütlerini kısmen veya tamamen yerine getirmeyen müteahhitlerden alınacak gecikme ve saire tazminatı ve müteahhitlerin irada kaydolunan teminat akçeleri,

7. Geçiş ücretli olan yol, köprü ve tünellerin her çeşit gelirleri,

8. Akaryakıtlardan alınan gümrük resimleri.

Madde 20 - (Değişik: 30/5/1973-1737/1 md.)

19 uncu maddenin 7 numaralı bendinde yazılı gelirler, aynı mahiyetteki yol, köprü ve tünellerin yapım, bakım, onarım ve işletmesinde kullanılmak üzere bir taraftan Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü bütçesinde açılacak özel bir tertibe gelir, diğer taraftan da bütçe cetvellerinin ilgili projelerine Maliye Bakanlığınca ödenek kaydolunur. Bu ödenekten yılı içinde sarf edilmeyen kısmı ertesi yıla, yukarıdaki esaslar dairesinde, devren gelir ve ödenek kaydolunur. (1)

Madde 21 - (Mülga: 25/2/1952-5889/8 md.)

Madde 22 - Genel Müdürlüğün gelirleri her türlü resim ve vergiden muaftır.

(Ek: 8/6/1965-626/1 md.) Teşkilat Kanununun 2 nci maddesi gereğince Genel Müdürlüğün yapacağı inşaa ve tesisler için ithal edilecek motorlu, motorsuz makine, (Binek arabaları hariç), cihaz ve vasıta, alet - edevat ve bunların yedek parçaları ve lastikleri her türlü vergi, resim ve harçlardan muaftır. (2)

VI - Çalışma esasları: (3)

Madde 23 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü 15 inci maddeye giren yollara ait olmak üzere, her yıl sonunda üç yıllık Devlet yolları yapım ve bakım programını hazırlar ve Bayındırlık Bakanının onamasıyla bu programı uygular.

(1) Bu maddenin 2001 mali yılında uygulanmayacağı 20/12/2000 tarih ve 2001 Mali Yılı Bütçe Kanununun 68/g (10) maddesi ile hüküm altına alınmıştır. (R.G.:30/12/2000 tarih ve 24273 mükerrer sayılı)

(2) Bu madde ile tanınan ithalde alınan vergi, resim ve harç muafiyeti 6/5/1986 tarih ve 3283 sayılı Kanunun birinci maddesiyle kaldırılmıştır.

(3) Bu bölümün uygulanmasında ek 1, 2, 3, 4 üncü maddelere bakınız.

Madde 24-25 - (Mülga: 30/5/1973 - 1737/3 md.)

Madde 26 - Mevcut yolların bakımı, ıslahı ve platformunun genişletilmesi ve husule gelen arızaların giderilmesi 2490 sayılı Artırma, Eksiltme ve İhale Kanununun 50 inci maddesinde yazılı kayıt ve şartlara bağlı olmaksızın emaneten yaptırılabilir. Bu işler için gerekli malzeme, ilan edilmeksizin idarece pazarlıkla satın alınabilir.

Emanet suretiyle yapılan yapım, bakım ve onarma işleri için mutemetlere (10 000) liraya kadar avans verilebilir. Ancak (1000) liradan fazla avanslar emanet işleri keşif bedelinin % 5 ini geçemez.

Madde 27 - Yolların inşaa ve onarımı için yabancı memleketlerden tedarikine zaruret görülen her türlü makine, gereç, avadanlık ve yedek parçalar yapan fabrikalardan, önceden Bayındırlık Bakanının muvafakati alınarak, 2490 sayılı kanun hükümlerine göre teşkil edilecek komisyonlar tarafından satın alınabilir. Bu alımlarda 2490 sayılı Artırma, Eksiltme ve İhale Kanununun diğer hükümleri uygulanmaz.

Madde 28 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünce eksiltmeye konulan işlere girecek

isteklilerden, bu işlere girmek için aranacak mali ve teknik yeterlik ve sair şart ve niteliklerin esasları Bayındırlık Bakanlığınca belirtilir.

Madde 29 - Genel Müdürlük, lüzumlu gördüğü merkezlerde tamir atölyeleri açabilir. Bu atölyeler dışarıdan da iş alabilir. Genel Müdür bu atölyelerin her birine yılları bütçelerinden en çok elli bin liraya kadar döner sermaye vermeğe mezundur. Bu atölyelere verilecek sermayenin toplamı bir milyon lirayı geçmez. Atölyelere verilecek döner sermayeden ancak umumi işletme masrafları ödenir. Bunların memur ve daimi hizmetlilerinin kadroları Genel Müdürlüğün memur ve daimi hizmetli kadroları arasında gösterilir. Her türlü aylık, ücret, özlük hakları ile başka masrafları bütçenin ilgili tertiplerinden ödenir. Safi hasılat veren atölyelerin bu hasılatı kendilerine tahsis olunan döner sermayelerinin üç misline balığ oluncaya kadar sermayelerine eklenir ve fazlası Genel Müdürlük bütçesine irat kaydolunur.

Döner sermaye işlemlerinden atölye müdürü ve sorumlu sayman birlikte sorumludurlar.

Döner sermayeden yapılan sarfiyat, Umumi Muhasebe Kanunu ve Artırma, Eksiltme ve İhale Kanunu hükümleriyle Sayıştay vizesinden müstesnadır.

Nakit ve ayniyat hesap işleri döner sermayeli idareler için mevcut olan hesap ve ayniyat usullerine göre yürütülür.

Madde 30 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün ihtiyacı olup ta üzerinde sabit tesisi bulunmayan milli emlake ait arazi isteği üzerine Hazinece parasız olarak Genel Müdürlüğe tahsis olunur. (1)

Madde 31 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü ikinci maddenin (F) fıkrasında yazılı tesislerden; servis istasyonları, akaryakıt satış yerleri ve garajlar 29 uncu maddedeki esaslara göre döner sermaye ile işletilebilir.

Madde 32 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü aşağıdaki fıkralarda yazılı hak ve yetkilere de sahiptir: (2)

(1) Bu hükmün uygulanmasında ek 6 ncı maddeye bakınız.

(2) Bu maddede belirtilen parasal sınırların; 26/10/1988 tarih ve 3484 sayılı Kanunun 1. maddesi ile; günün şartlarına uygun biçimde yıllık bütçe Kanununda belli edileceği hükmüne bağlanmıştır.

A) Bir sözleşme mevcut olsun olmasın, Genel Müdürlük ile Devlet daireleri ve müessese ve teşekküller veya gerçek veya tüzelkişiler arasında çıkan ve henüz kaza mercilerine, hakeme veya icraya intikal etmemiş olan uyuşmazlıkların sulh yoluyla hallinde,

B) Anlaşma veya sözleşmelerin değiştirilmesinde veya bozulmasında,

C) Maddi ve hukuki sebeplerle kovuşturulmasında veya yüksek dereceli merci ve mahkemelerce incelenmesini istemekte fayda umulmayan dava ve icra kovuşturulmasından vazgeçilmesinde veya bunların sulh yoluyla hallinde,

Tanınacak veya terkin edilecek hak ve işin tazammum ettiği menfaatlerin,

1000 liraya kadar olanları Genel Müdürün kararı,

1001 liradan 10 000 liraya kadar olanların Bayındırlık Bakanının kararı,

10 001 liradan fazla olanları Danıştayın muvafık mütalaası üzerine alınacak müşterek karar ile Muteber olur.

Madde 33 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü Bayındırlık Bakanının onaması ile Devlet yolları yapımı ve gerekli makine ve malzemesi için her yıl ödenecek miktarı o yıl gelir tutarının yüzde 50 sini geçmemek şartıyla 5 yıla kadar gelecek yıllara geçici yüklenmelere girişebilir. (1)

Madde 34 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, Bakanlar Kurulu kararıyla iç istikrazlar akdine yetkilidir.

VII - Müşterek hükümler:

Madde 35 - Genel Müdürlük Disiplin Kurulu Genel Müdür Yardımcısının başkanlığı altında daire başkanları, hukuk müşaviri ve personel işleri müdüründen teşekkül eder.

Bu Kurul, tayinleri Genel Müdürlüğe ait memurların disiplin işleri ile meşgul olur. Tayinleri Bayındırlık Bakanlığına ait memurların disiplin işleri Bakanlık Disiplin Komisyonunda görülür.

Madde 36 - Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğünün bütün malları ve döner sermayeye ait bütün kıymetler Devlet malı hükmündedir. Bu mallar ve kıymetler aleyhine suç işleyenler Devlet malları aleyhine suç işleyenler gibi ceza görürler.

VIII - Çeşitli hükümler:

Madde 37 - (Mülga: 9/2/1951 -5716/1 md.)

Madde 38 - 1525 sayılı Şose ve Köprüler Kanunu ile ek ve değişikliklerinin ve 3611 sayılı Nafia Vekaleti Teşkilat Kanununun Şose ve Köprüler Reisliğine ait, bu kanuna aykırı, hükümleri kaldırılmıştır.

Madde 39 - Bu kanunun gerekli görülen hükümlerinin uygulanma şekilleri bir tüzükle tespit olunur.

(1) Bu maddede sözü edilen taahhüt işlerinde kullanılmak üzere, 9/3/1954 tarih ve 344 sayılı, 3/2/1956 tarih ve 6655 sayılı, 26/2/1958 tarih ve 7090 sayılı, 12/6/1959 tarih ve 7362 sayılı Kanunlarla; son olarak da 29/5/1961 tarih ve 307 sayılı Kanunla bono çıkarma yetkisi verilerek faizleriyle birlikte yıllık miktarı (100) milyon, tamamı (430) milyon liraya çıkarılmıştır.

7090 ve 7362 sayılı Kanunlarla, yukarıda verilmiş olan bono çıkarma yetkisinin kullanılmayan kısmı iptal edilmiştir.

Ek Madde 1 - (11/9/1957 - 7054 sayılı ek kanunun 1 nci maddesi hükmü olup, ek madde haline getirilmiştir.)

Karayolları Umum Müdürlüğü, görevleri dahilindeki işlerden umumi hükümler dairesinde ihalesi mümkün görülmeyen yol, köprü ve tüneller Maliye Vekaleti'nin mütalaasına istinaden İcra Vekilleri Heyetinden karar alınmak suretiyle 2490 sayılı Artırma, Eksiltme ve İhale Kanunu ile 1050 sayılı Muhasebei Umumiye Kanununun 83 ve 135 inci maddeleri hükmüne tabi olmaksızın fenni liyakatleri ve iktidarları Nafia Vekaletince kabul edilmiş yerli veya yabancı uzman ve firmalara veya icabında bu firmalardan birine pazarlıkla yaptırmaya, işletmeye salahiyyetlidir.

Ek Madde 2 - (11/9/1957-7054 sayılı ek kanunun 2 nci maddesi hükmü olup, ek madde haline getirilmiştir.)

Birinci maddede yazılı işlerin inşaat ve kontrol masrafları nakit veya Hazine bonosu ile ödenir.

Ek Madde 3 - (11/9/1957 - 7054 sayılı ek kanunun 3 ncü maddesi hükmü olup, ek madde haline getirilmiştir.)

Karayolları Umum Müdürlüğünce bu tesislerin amortisman, bakım ve işletme masrafları gibi bircümle masrafları karşılığı olarak belli bir müddet için mürur iye alınır.

Mürur iyenin kimlerden, ne miktarda, neye göre ve ne kadar bir müddet için alınacağı Maliye ve Nafia Vekaletlerince müştereken hazırlanıp İcra Vekilleri Heyetince tasdik olunacak bir tarifede gösterilir.

Lüzum hasıl olduğu takdirde tarifede aynı usul ile gerekli deęıştirmeler yapılabileceęi gibi iktisadi icaplara müsteniden keza aynı usul ile mürur iye istisna ve muaflıkları da ihdas olunabilir.

Bu mürur iyeler Karayolları Umum Müdürlüğü Bütçesinin varidat kısmında açılacak hususi bir maddeye irat kaydolunur.

Ek Madde 4 - (30/5/1973-1737/2 md. ile gelen Ek 1 inci md. hükmü olup madde numarası teselsül ettirilmiştir.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü; Devlet Daire ve kuruluşları ile kamu tüzel kişileri, dernekler ve dięer kurum ve kuruluşlar tarafından vaki olacak görevler ile ilgili hizmet taleplerini, kendi imkanları nispetinde, yapılacak anlaşmalar esasları dahilinde ve karşılıkları adı geçen kuruluşlarca veya dię yardımcılarından karşılanmak şartıyla yerine getirmeye, ayrıca bu kanunda belirtilen yol ağlarının emniyeti bakımından yol giriş ve çıkışlarının düzenlenmesini sağlayacak konaklama tesisleri ve akaryakıt satış istasyonları gibi çeşitli tesislerin yapıl-

masına dair ilgililerin taleplerini, yukarıda belirtilen esaslara uygun olarak karşılamaya yetkilidir.

Bu suretle elde olunacak paranın gelir ve ödenek kaydı, bu işlerden önce de harcama yapabilme yetkisi, maddeler arası aktarma ve ödenekten harcanmayan kısmının ertesi yıla devrine ait esaslar Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü Bütçe Kanunlarında gösterilir.

Ek Madde 5 - (30/5/1973-1737/2 md. ile gelen Ek 2 nci md. hükmü olup madde numarası teselsül ettirilmiştir.)

Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü; özel bir meslek bilgisine ve ihtisasına ihtiyaç gösteren geçici işlerde, zaruri hallere münhasır olmak üzere, Bakanlar Kurulu kararıyla sözleşmeli yerli ve yabancı personel çalıştırabilir.

Ek Madde 6 - (30/5/1973-1737/2 md. ile gelen Ek 3 üncü md. hükmü olup madde numarası teselsül ettirilmiştir.)

İl yolları ağına giren taşınmaz mallar, üzerindeki tesisler ile birlikte ilgili idareler tarafından Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğüne parasız olarak devir ve temlik olunur.

Geçici Madde 1 - Yol işleri ile ilgili olarak Bayındırlık Bakanlığınca girilmiş taahhütler ve bağitlanmış sözleşmelerle, yol işlerinde kullanılmakta olan her türlü menkul mallar ve dięer mevcutlar bütün hak ve vecibeleriyle Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğüne devredilir.

Geçici Madde 2 - Umumi Muhasebe Kanunu gereğince Hazinece Bayındırlık Bakanlığına tahsis edilmiş olup bu kanunla kurulan Genel Müdürlüğün işleriyle ilgili bulunan

gayrimenkullar parasız olarak Hazinece bu Genel Müdürlüğe temlik olunur. Bu gayrimenkulların devir ve ferağ işlemleri her türlü harç ve resimden muaftır.

Geçici Madde 3 - (Mülga: 25/2/1952 - 5889/8 md.)

Madde 40 - Bu kanunun 12 nci maddesinde yazılı tayin işleri 28/2/1950 tarihinde, diğer maddeleri 1/3/1950 tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

Madde 41 - Bu kanunu Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.

Figure 1. One Advertisement from June 3, 1948 Dated *Hürriyet*.

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Figure 2. Another Advertisement from July 19, 1948 dated *Akşam*.

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