

Syrian Women in Antep:
Labor, Forced Migration and Violence

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Declaration of Originality

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Abstract

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This thesis analyzes the intersectionality of labor, forced migration, gender, racism and violence, and how these intersections have an impact on the labor processes of the Syrian women living in suburban neighborhoods of Antep. It examines the everyday life intersectionality of the economic, social, political, cultural and class dynamic processes and structures in which the Syrian women are embedded, and how those processes are articulated with each other, by focusing on the daily labor processes of Syrian women involving in the informal home-based piecework labor market of Antep. With articulation of women into the labor market- in addition to domestic works like childcare, elderly care, domestic labor and so on which the current gender regime imposes on women- the burden of women has increased. In cases where husbands or males in the household work intensely, the women take the responsibility of outside work such as grocery shopping, medical visits, paying bills and so on which makes them invisible in urban life- unable to enter a certain kinds of public spheres- and visible in some certain spheres like the hospital. This research also reveals that racism, social oppression and violence against women in the name of honor has increased. As all these processes push the women into the home, this thesis aims at making visible the women subjectivities and agencies against the approaches and methods in a struggle for defining the Syrian women as “victim” and “suffering”. Being inside emerges as one of the tactics of Syrian lower-class women who are formally recognized under temporary protection status but live the refugee experience, to protect themselves and survive.

35,000 words

Özet

Antep’te Suriyeli Kadınlar: Emek, Zorunlu Göç ve Şiddet

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Bu tez çalışması; emek, zorunlu göç, toplumsal cinsiyet, ırkçılık ve şiddetin kesişimselliğini ve bu kesişimselliklerin Antep’in varoş mahallelerinde yaşayan Suriyeli kadınların emek süreçlerine etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Antep’in ev içi parça başı kayıt dışı emek piyasasına dahil olan Suriyeli kadınların günlük hayatlarındaki emek süreçlerine odaklanarak, kadınların içinde bulunduğu ekonomik, toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel ve sınıfsal dinamik süreç ve yapıların günlük hayat akışındaki kesişimselliğini ve birbirlerine nasıl eklemlendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Emek piyasalarına eklemleme ile mevcut toplumsal cinsiyet rejiminin kadına yüklemiş olduğu çocuk, yaşlı, ev içi emeğe ek olarak- kadınlar üzerindeki yük kat ve kat artmıştır. Eşleri ya da hanedeki erkeklerin yoğun çalışması durumunda, kadınlara bir de alışveriş, hastane işleri, fatura yatırma gibi bazı ev dışı işleri de eklenmektedir. Bu; onların, kentte görünmez olmaları ve belli kamusal alanlara girememelerine ama aynı anda hastane gibi bazı belli başlı alanlarda da görünüyor olmalarına sebep olmaktadır. Bu çalışma, diğer bir taraftan da namus üzerinden kadınlar üzerindeki toplumsal baskı, şiddet ve ırkçılığın arttığını ortaya koymaktadır. Tüm bu süreçlerin kadınları ev içine itme gücü olduğu gibi, onları “kurban”, müzmin “mağdur” sıfatlarıyla anlamaya çalışan yaklaşım ve yöntemlere karşı kadınların öznelliklerini ve failliklerini de görünür kılmaktadır. Ev içinde olma, geçici koruma altında tanımlanan fakat mülteci deneyimine sahip Suriyeli alt sınıf kadınların kendilerini koruma ve hayatta kalma taktiklerinden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

35.000 kelime

To the women of Aleppo and Antep

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Glossary of Non-English Terms

hadji	pilgrimage in Islam
muhacir	immigrant, with an Islamic reference implying the immigrants who had migrated from Macca to Medina

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFAD	Afed ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency)
DGGM	Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate General of Migration Management)
GTO	Gaziantep Ticaret Odası (Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPR	International Middle East Peace Research Center
IOM	International Organization of Migration
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
YUKK	Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu (Law on Foreigners and International Protection)
SSAP	Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdaresi (Housing Development Administration of Turkey)
TurkStat	Turkish Statistical Institute
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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*I ask nothing more
Than to die in my country
To dissolve and merge with the grass,
To give life to a flower
That a child of my country will pick,
All I ask
Is to remain in the bosom of my country
As soil,
Grass,
A flower.*

Fadwa Tuqan, *Call of the Land*

Introduction

We live in a world with a wide range of borders from international to domestic, ethnic to religious, political to economic borders and so on. These borders are, time to time, *bargainable*, today the borders are *coercive*, as never before, for all disadvantaged groups especially for denizens, irregular migrants, refugees or asylum seekers. Since, even if they are able to pass the concrete borders in one way or another, they can hardly have mobility within class, racial, ethnic, religious, political, social borders. They spend all their lives in an effort to survive within the complexity of all these invisible borders. For irregular migrants, refugees or asylum seekers, the visible borders have become more concrete and even taking the form of wall in conflict regions such as the wall built by the US along its southern border with Mexico, the Israeli-built wall snaking through the West Bank, India-Bangladesh border fence, and even within the national territory, such as the walls separating Shi-ite and Sunni neighborhoods of al-Shula and Al-Ghazaliyah in Baghdad (Brown, 2010, pp. 7-18 , and 564 kilometers security wall built along Turkish-Syria border by the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ of Turkey (TRTHaber, 2018 . The international borders have been transformed in a sense that they become more visible. Each nation-state has their particular justification to build these walls, however there is also a common dimension of their assertions which is that they strive to protect themselves from the irregular migrant, political and economic refugees.

Starting from 1980s, the idea that central state power has become dispersed strengthened (Rhodes, 1997). The world was imagined as a globe with fluid borders through which capital, labor, commodities are fluid and can globally circulate. Technological developments played an important role in border passages and narrowing the globe. There was a wishful belief that almost everything can flow from and to every corner of the world. However, following the US occupation of Iraq (2003 and subsequently the change in global policies, the belief that the state power is getting less and less came to an end. Migration of people became an issue in the global politics. Following violence, conflict, war, poverty and natural disasters almost all over the world, migration “issue” has become more acute within this context and reveals the violence of a bordered world more than anything else. Thus, we can argue that migrants and their embodied hardships uncover the limits of global democracy. The “globalized” world has a series of paradoxes in concerning labor issues. After once Sri Lankan female laborers cross the borders in a legal way and arrive in Gulf countries for domestic work, they have almost no chance to turn back to their own countries without the approval of their sponsors. Whereas, a Bangladeshi laborer produces the commodities of global brands of Mango, Benetton, Primark, Loblau, whose global brands circulate all over the world, whereas the Bangladeshi laborers spend all their lives crossing the walls of Rana Plaza even not imaging any other life or world (Mahdavi, 2011, pp. 125-147). Philippine migrant women as domestic workers have been employed in more than hundreds of countries across the world (Parrenas, 2000). To understand all this mobility and immobility at the same time, it is crucial to determine the way we approach migration.

Migration has been studied by almost all disciplines. Economists developed micro-macro theories of new economics, dual-labor market theory and historical-structural approaches. Sociologists conceptualized the gaps that economists fell short of explaining, by theorizing push-pull, network theories, family reunification etc. Political scientists conducted further studies which contributed to the debate by focusing on the role of nation-states in the international arena, mostly on security of the nation-states (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 31). As the boundaries of one aspect of migration can intersect with other, migrants may have a diverse range of reasons and motives to migrate

from one place to another. For instance, those whose motive is family reunification can easily become a labor-force of the labor market immediately after the migration (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 12). All these fragmented set of theories subordinate the other sides and dynamics of the migration, therefore, fail to explain the motives or consequences of migration when employing the tools of one discipline alone. Faist (2003, p. 49) claims that all these approaches and theoretical categorization, indeed, do not contradict each other, although one-by-one they are all one aspect of the multi-sided, multi-dimensional process of migration. It is only possible to reach a meaningful conclusion by considering all theories and their effects to each other (Öner & Ihlamur-Ömer, 2012, p. 26). Massey also stated that the reason behind the different approaches of migration theories, indeed, is their emphasis on different sides of the migration, therefore eventually the approaches of these disciplines are not contradictory with each other. Nevertheless, they should be considered as integral approaches (Massey, 1999). According to Castles, migration should be conceptualized as “an integral element of contemporary social transformation processes” (Castles, Özkul, & Cubas, 2016, p. 10). He defines migration as a process which have impacts on all dimensions of social existence. It develops its own sophisticated dynamics (Castles, Özkul, & Cubas, 2016). Therefore, it is a necessity to look deep into the particular social dynamics of each migration.

Starting from 2011, Turkey has been going through the biggest immigration experience in its history. It has had substantial demographic, socio-economic, political and cultural impacts on both the hosting communities and the immigrants. The Syrian uprising and ensuing war in Syria and Turkish involvement underlie the biggest migration to Turkey. Anti-regime movements asking for political change in Tunisia and Egypt changed the course of events from 2010 onwards in the Middle East and affected Syria as well. The arrests of and mistreatment against more than a dozen of children aged between 15 and 17 triggered the events in Syria. These children were charged as they painted anti-regime graffiti on the walls of their school in the southern Syrian city of Dar’a, on 6 March 2011 (Taştekin, 2016, pp. 21-22). Immediately after protests and demonstrations started, the state embarked on suppressing these movements. In 6 months, the protests and demonstrations against the

Assad regime have transformed into violent conflict and later into a civil war which led to a large number of Syrian people escaping from the violence by fleeing to the neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. The first Syrian refugee group immigrating to Turkey, which consisted of 252 people, arrived at Turkey on 29 April 2011 (Demokrasi Günlüğü, 2011 . In the following days, the Turkish government kept the visa liberation agreement signed between Syria and itself in 2009 and defined its policy as *open border* and literally opened the borders for Syrian people and settled them in camps built firstly in Hatay, and then other border cities. As the crises and conflict in Syria got deeper, number of the Syrian refugees immigrating toward the neighboring countries increased. Therefore, particularly Turkey, and the other countries in the region encountered with a flow of a significant number of Syrian refugees. The open border policy came to an end in 2015. With the Re-admission Agreement between Turkey and the EU, a certain number of restrictions were applied to mobility of migrants and refugees.

Even though the migration of Syrians relatively decreased after 2015, as of July 2019, Turkey officially hosts 3,634,378 Syrian refugees, 3.7% of whom live in camps, while the remaining 97.3% is living in non-camp settlement (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019 , which is equal to more than half of the Syrian refugees who have left their country (more than 6,4 million. Turkey hosts the largest population of Syrian refugees at 51% of the total number of Syrian refugees. Turkey is followed by Lebanon with 16%, Jordon with 10%, and Germany, Iraq, Egypt, Sweden and other countries have been hosting respectively 8%, 4%, 2%, 2% and 7% (Erdoğan M. M., 2017, p. 4 . It indicates that the significant percentage that Turkey hosts led to social, political and economic consequences in Turkey. Based on the recent figures on the Syrian refugees living in Turkey, the Syrian refugees constitute 4.41% (TÜİK, 2019 of Turkey's population. Among the Syrians, 54,1% is male, whereas 45,9% is female. The percentage of those who are under 18 is 46.4%. A considerable amount of the Syrian refugees living in Turkey are women and children under 18 (70.1% (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019 .

The Syrians' immigration to Turkey has impacts on the domestic and international policies of Turkey and as well as the state and society relations. It

has also implications in the labor market of Turkey, particularly in the informal labor market. This thesis, therefore, attempts to explore these implications and changes in the informal labor market by putting the agency of Syrian female migrants at the center of the research.

The number of studies focusing on Syrian migration has therefore increased. The initial research areas have a more policy-oriented scope that mostly concentrates on legal and political conditions of the Syrian refugees. In a similar vein, the studies regarding the labor market are mainly empirical and focus on the unemployment rate, wage differentiation and scale. A significant number of Syrian refugees are integrated into the informal labor market. The current extent of the informal sector in Turkey necessitates concentrating on research based on numeric data. Hence, the most recent literature regarding Syrian labor has mostly focused on the impact of integration of Syrian refugees into the labor markets and economies in Turkey. These studies (Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015, p. 7 (Ceritoglu, Yunculer, & Torun, 2017, p. 15 (Balkan & Tumen, 2016 (Lordoğlu & Aslan, 2015 (Ünlütürk Ulutaş, *Syrian Migrants in Turkish Labour Market*, 2017 (Esen & Oğuş Binatlı, 2017 mainly focus on the main impact of the integration of the Syrian workforce into the labor market. They conclude that there are wage differentiations depending on the sectors, (formal or informal and specific informal sectors such as labor-intensive sectors and increasing possibility of the exclusion of the local female laborers and low-skilled male laborers from the informal labor market. Due to the lack of extensive publicly-available official data regarding the employment and income status of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, the studies on the impacts of the employment and wages may have contradictory results (Sunata, 2018 . Further studies (Akgündüz, Van den Berg, & Hassink, 2015 (Oytun & Gündoğar, 2015 examine the relationship between the food prices, housing rents and unemployment, Syrian migration and integration into the labor market. They analyze how the Syrian refugees' integration into the labor market has changed the structure of the employment in the labor market by empirically showing how the employment rate of the unregistered, female, part-time and unskilled local workers decreased, and the employment of registered and male local laborers increased (Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015 . Some researchers (Erol, et al., 2017 (Ünlütürk Ulutaş, *Syrian Migrants in Turkish Labour Market*,

2017 (İçduygu & Diker, Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers, 2017 (Özcan, 2016 (Kaya, 2016 draw attention to the conditions that the Syrian refugees are exposed to, and the limited rights and services that they have access to due to the lack of and delay in the process of legal status. All these studies reveal a variety of conditions and positions of the Syrian refugees in the Turkish labor market.

In the literature on Syrian labor in Turkey, gender is rarely taken as an analytical tool. The Syrian women are either studied as a subtitle under the heading of migrant labor or approached using a gender-blind methods. Gender-blind studies on refugees or migrants depict them as mostly male. However, they are also investigated by gender and forced migration studies. These studies (Barın, 2015 (Özden & Ramadan, 2019 demonstrate the social, political and legal challenges the women face within the processes of access to health, education or other services and their legal rights, and women's perspectives on life in Turkey. This thesis also aims to study Syrian female labor through a gender sensitive approach. Besides those mentioned above, several reports and studies argue that the violence plays a significant role in shaping the daily livelihood of Syrian women. Following the war, throughout the forced migration process into Turkey and the problems with the host society, the Syrian women, as being a disadvantaged group, became more and more vulnerable to gender-based, legal, political and societal violence. Another aspect of violence is studied by Kivılcım and Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2015 . They investigated the legal violence as another implicit dimension of social violence, and its reflections on Syrian women and LGBTI refugees. In 2017, they, together with Freedman (2017 edited a book in which the legal framework is criticized of being gender blind. These studies, along with Kivılcım's article on legal violence (2016 discuss the legal violence those migrant women are exposed to and its reflections on the experiences of women in all other social dynamics. These studies also show that forced, early marriages and religious marriages are other forms of societal violence Syrian women are exposed to. Another crucial study exploring the conditions of Syrian women is conducted by Özüdoğru (Özüdoğru, 2018 . The study investigated the Syrian refugee women living alone in Adana and how they are oppressed by the local community due to their being alone, without a man, and therefore perceived as a

threat against the local women. How they get stigmatized by the host community is analyzed through the study (Özüdoğru, 2018). Besides these studies analyzing the domination over the Syrian refugee women, the resistance and survival strategies of the Syrian women are also examined. The study of Herwig (2017) focused on the Syrian women's strategies of resistance against the domestic violence, assault and harassment. Toward the studies placing the women as fragile or victims, Herwig problematized forced, polygynous and early marriage and moreover, claims that the women consulted those methods as survival strategies. They employ these strategies to protect their families and themselves from falling into, in a sense, more violent position (Herwig, 2017, pp. 183-188). Being inspired by these studies, this thesis also attempts to include violence as a significant determinant of the analysis to understand the dynamic labor processes that the Syrian women are involved in.

There is only a couple of studies that embrace feminist methodology and concentrate on Syrian woman labor in rural and urban production: one is *The Syrian Woman Labor in the Agricultural Production: Bitter Lives on Fertile Lands* (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar, 2018) and the other is *The Other of Others: Syrian Women in the Labor Force Market of Denizli* (Ünlütürk Ulutaş & Akbaş, 2018). Both studies reveal that the Syrian women labor is shaped and captured by both the patriarchal and capitalist relations and at the same time, social exclusion, which is reproduced and strengthened through this process. Those women also experience the relations of domination based on gender, ethnicity and class hierarchies not only in the employment process but also in the relations of neighbors and social services (Ünlütürk Ulutaş & Akbaş, 2018, p. 305). These two studies stand out the classical labor studies since they do not take the female labor for granted, yet they include social conditions and relations that women are embedded in. Both attempt to make the Syrian female labor visible and extend the literature of female migrant labor which is analyzed considering the social conditions and dynamics. I hope to contribute to the current literature by bringing home related production activities in our analysis. Dwellings can also be seen as places where women construct them as workplaces for paid work and as a shield to protect themselves from outside. The home is not taken as a production place and a part of the informal labor market in the Syrian labor studies. When we look at the other studies focusing

on informal workshop and home-based work, the studies such as *Money Makes Us Relatives* on women's labor in urban Turkey (White, 1994), *Homeworkers in Global Perspective* including a variety of studies on home-based workers of Mexico, Lahore, Brazil, Iran and so on, (Boris & Prügl, 1996) and *Home to Work* on homework in the United States (Boris, 1994) are substantial works. These studies indicate that homework also plays a significant role in the production processes particularly for global market, and at the same time devaluing the women's labor. I also plan to integrate this understanding of home as a place of production to this study on Syrian female migrant labor.

I decided to study on the labor process of Syrian migrant women in their daily life in the city of Antep, which is economically, geographically and historically important and has a distinctive feature compared to other cities by having the Syrian civil society and a considerable number of Syrian laborers as an industrial city. The proximity also played a significant role in Syrians' freely traveling back and forth till 2015 (due to the open border policy) (Özden & Ramadan, 2019, p. 34). The historical ties of Antep and Aleppo and the similarity of the two cities trigger the sensitive reasons of Syrian people's immigration to Antep. All these features led me to look into the city of Antep as a field. The main objective of this study is to understand and answer the questions: what are the interrelations and intersections of flexible labor, forced migration, womanhood and other social dynamics? How do gender, labor, forced migration, violence and racism interrelate, intersect and transform? How do all these processes affect and transform the ways that migrant women construct their subjectivities? What are the strategies that the migrant women develop against the social, political, cultural, class and socio-economic structures they are embedded in?

To be able to answer these questions, one should take into consideration the relations between the host society and Syrian female migrants as much as it plays out in the labor relations, since the relations between these two communities can easily shape and affect the ways in which the labor relations are organized. We need to take this into consideration because the networks and informal relations become more and more important both in the host country

and informal labor market. However, to avoid a reductionist understanding, the relations between these two communities will be approached from *positionality* perspective.

The Syrian refugees are represented by the mainstream national and local media as “victims”, “criminals”, “rapists”, “prostitutes” and so on. Within the host community, racism and hate speech against the Syrian people are triggered by those representations. After a while, both media representations and hate speech in the society circulate into a vicious circle. The image of Syrian refugee depends on relationality with local people. Regardless of the refugee, the locals’ social, economic, political, ethnoreligious belongings are played out in the ways in which refugees are represented. To see the differentiations based on the position, the relationality between the Syrian people and locals should not be taken as a fixed form but as a process through which the relationality is constructed and contextually diversified. The image and the meaning of being Syrian refugee may easily differ for business-owners, landowners, shopkeepers and on the other hand, for the workers or lower-class. Even within these groups and within the Syrians, as a result of different relationalities and contexts, the form and meaning of “hostility” or “rivalry” or “solidarity” or “gladness” may substantially change or transform or diversify. Therefore, I will analyze the labor processes of Syrian women through which processes intersect with the racism and violence they are faced with, by relationally and contextually approaching them. Particularly, Syrian women mostly encountered with discrimination and “othering”, “externalization” through the processes of “racial” and “sexist” othering. It is necessary to analyze those encounters from the point of view of relationality and contextuality which enables us to see the processes (not moments that can change, transform and diversify depending on the context, time and space. *Positionality* is one of the main concepts to use as an analytical tool in order to understand the diversification of the being “Syrians” in the eyes of the *positionally* different local groups.

The visibility of Syrians in the public spheres is almost systematically targeted by some groups. In addition, the lack of policies in intercepting all this hate speech and assaults paves the way for *restricted* and *excluded* or *externalized* lives of Syrians in Turkey. In this social environment, the multi layered forms of racism and social exclusion they encounter become main concepts

and realities to understand the Syrian refugee “issue.” The integration processes into the society and labor market become an important area to be explored from this point of view.

The objective of this thesis research is to link the following dynamics: anti-refugee violence, current gendered labor regime, Syrian patriarchal relations and state-society relations in Turkey. By this way, it tries to contribute the current literature by widening the interrelated areas, contexts and relations between different factors to include the intersections of the labor mainly with forced migration, gender, racism and violence. By investigating the intersections and interrelations of legality, gender, forced migration, labor, violence and racism, the labor processes of Syrian female migrants will be analyzed in their daily lives from their own perspectives. Another crucial objective of this study is to problematize the Syrian refugee women’s “fragile” position both in society and in the informal labor market. Against common sense, this thesis highlights the survival strategies, narratives and tactics of Syrian migrant women. Social and economic differences within these women will be highlighted in this study.

I conducted a field research in the suburban neighborhoods of Antep. In-depth interviews and observations of participants are used primarily, alongside legislative documents, official statistical data, media coverages and reports of NGOs. This research has, mostly, a qualitative approach since the main objective is to examine the migration and working experiences of Syrian refugee women in Turkey, from their perspectives and expressions. I conducted in-depth interview with 21 Syrian women, based on a semi-structured questionnaire whose focus was on their experiences of forced migration, including the processes of social and economic situation and activities of the family through the forced migration and settlement in Antep, and their relationality with the local people in the neighborhood. Additionally, I had the chance to meet and socialize with several other Syrian and local women, men and children during the one-month period I spent in Antep. Apart from the neighborhood I studied, I also got the chance to have informal interviews and conversations with the textile manufacturers and small-sized enterprise owners, alongside the employees of some NGOs who are in service for the refugees in Antep. I have participated in conferences, meetings and activities of NGOs

regarding the Syrian refugees' social and legal rights and limits. In these activities, I met with a range of Syrian women from different classes and experiences.

The snowball sampling research method has been used to reach the potential participants, the targeted sample. Therefore, to avoid any bias that the snowball may lead, I preferred to diversify the participants' key demographic info such as ethnicity, age, marital status, education and from the women living with their nuclear families to those living in extended families. To diversify the ethnic origins of the participants, I tried to reach women from all main three ethnic components of Syria: Kurdish, Turkmen and Arabic. The total number of Syrian women I interviewed with was 21, 15 of whom natively speaks in Arabic, whereas 5 and 3 were Turkmen and Kurdish, respectively and knew sufficient Turkish to communicate with me. Two Syrian female translators alternately accompanied me during the interviews and most of the time I spent in the neighborhood. The women I interviewed with live in Düztepe and Tepebaşı suburban neighborhoods of Antep. Whereas Düztepe has originally been populated by Kurds, Alevis and Kurdish Alevis from Turkey, Tepebaşı hosts mostly the lower class from a range of groups with no significant ethnoreligious diversity. Most of Alevi residents of Düztepe have migrated into this neighborhood after the violent attacks on Alevis of Maraş neighboring city, at the end of 1970s. However, the demographic structure of the neighborhood has changed with the arrival of Syrians, as the original residents moved to a better neighborhood and rent out their homes to Syrian refugees.

Surprisingly, some Syrian Arabic speaking women were eager to talk in Turkish with me. In case they got stuck, the translator helped us. In the chapters I analyzed the results of my research and fieldwork, I preferred to reflect the responses and statements of the women directly, as they expressed by their own words and accent. Since, I strongly believe that any correction may change the meaning and those are the natural sounds that I would like to transfer to you accurately.

Beside the fieldwork, I have also examined the legislative documents on Syrian refugees and the process through which the legislation has been shaped and transformed. Moreover, I analyzed the reports, meeting documents and

media coverage on Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce (GTO, in order to understand how and on which purposes the capital owners and the state apparatus come together and work for. The statistical data was acquired from official sources of the Directorate General of Migration Management (GIGM, Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat, and official reports from Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD. For the historical background of the legal status and forced migration experiences of the Syrians, particularly Syrian women, I benefited from various studies and articles, through which I will express both the historical evolution and current situation of the legal status, migratory background of Syrians.

I will briefly present an outline of the thesis chapter-to-chapter. In the second chapter, an explanation and the chronological evolution of legal status and current legal status- “temporary protection” including the rights, services that the Syrian can access such as work permit, education and so on, a certain aspect of criticism on the limitations and practical implications of the regulation will be submitted. I will continue to clarify the relationship and negotiations between the state and the capital owners through the process of making legal status by investigating the reports and meetings of the GTO in order to better understand the settings in which the migrant labor is embedded. As a second part of this chapter, an overview of Turkey’s labor regime and the general features of the informal labor market of female migrants in Turkey and particularly the labor regime and migration in Antep will be depicted.

In the third chapter, I will compose and furnish a theoretical and conceptual framework which helps me to deeply analyze the findings of the study on the current conditions of the Syrian female migrants working in informal home-based piecework labor market of Antep. After discussing the theoretical approaches to female labor, an intersectional and distinctive theoretical framework will be detailed to understand the female labor.

The fourth chapter will try to depict a general picture of being a Syrian lower-class woman in the suburban neighborhoods of Antep. I attempt to address the fears of violence, racism and oppression experiences of the women and their intersectionality with the female labor. I will illustrate how they feel in society, and how they encounter with the local community by focusing on the relations between the Syrian refugee women and host community. The role

of the fear of violence and gender-based domination will be concentrated on to understand their working behaviors, particularly, working at home.

In the fifth chapter, after providing a brief socio-economic, cultural and class background of Syrian women in the pre-war period, I will start to submit the findings of the fieldwork study by focusing on the women's labor processes at home and in the neighborhood based on, mainly, gender and forced migration. Through this fieldwork chapter, the forced migration experiences, life in the neighborhood, their relationship with their neighbors, their articulation into the informal labor market, which pieces and activities they engaged in will be introduced by referring to bargaining patriarchy, social networks, invisible labor, informality and flexibility as analyzing concepts. I will also discuss the women's subjectivities by focusing on how they differentiate themselves from the other women and the countless interwoven burdens of the migrant women.

As concluding remarks, finally, I will present an overview of the thesis by highlighting the main results and findings of my research.

Governing Migrant Labor: State, Legality and Local Capital

This chapter discusses the governing of migrant labor in Turkey in general. In order to understand the governing of the migrant labor market, we need to look into two dynamics. One is the legal status and the second one is the current labor regime in Turkey. This chapter will prioritize the Syrian migrant labor agency in relation to these two local dynamics of Turkey. To analyze the content and the making of legal status is very significant to understand within which legal and social context the migrant labor is shaped, restricted and the migrant labor agency constructs itself and develops tactics to survive in this environment.

§ 2.1 Legal status

Since 2011, the legal status of the Syrian refugees has been transformed and evolved. In order to understand the conditions, they have been exposed to it is very significant to investigate the transformation of their legal status. At the very beginning of their crossing the border, the Syrian refugees were welcomed as *guest* by the Turkish government. However, since the term *guest* is not equivalent to a migrant or refugee status or concept neither in international law nor in domestic law, Syrians' access to rights and services were

shaped significantly depending on *arbitrary*¹ implementations of the Turkish government rather than a legal basis. The legal framework was contextualized with the Regulation of Temporary Protection in 2014. By this legal status, certain rights and services were entitled and provided for Syrians. However, with the process of legal recognition, the *temporariness* that began with the Syrians' recognition as *guest* was both legalized and consolidated. In the post-2015 period, as the *temporariness* became *permanent*, both the government policies changed, and the social reactions increased. The work permit and right to acquire citizenship for Syrians were provided by the government. However, the numbers of those who acquire these rights remain low. Since the rights are restricted by several criteria which make almost impossible to utilize for many Syrians. Moreover, government has not developed an integration policy for Syrians in Turkey, yet. Therefore, the Syrian refugees, today, live in a *permanent temporariness* due to the limitations on their legal status (Karakılıç, Körükmez, & Soykan, 2019, p. 1 .

The immigration of Syrians to Turkey triggered a new era both for the Syrian people and Turkish society starting from 2011. At the very beginning of the process, the ambiguity on the Syrian immigrants' status has been the most debated issue in different circles. Were they guests? Migrants? Refugees? Or only Syrians? They were guests for the Turkish government, *muhacir* for Islamic organizations, refugees for the NGOs, Syrians for the Turkish people or all at the same time. It depended on the position of the definer. Therefore, it is very vital to explore the evaluation of the legal status of the Syrians in Turkey chronologically by focusing on the Turkey's migratory regime and policies which got transformed almost year by year.

Turkey is one of the countries who has been a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and thereafter also a party to its 1967 Protocol by retaining a geographical limitation to its ratification of the convention (Resmi Gazete, 1968 . Therefore, only those who flee from Europe to Turkey and at any risk of persecution due to their ethnicity, religion, nation, political views and so on, are given a refugee status. The applications of those

1 Or "business-friendly" implementations which will be analyzed and explained in the following pages to understand the intention of the government, therefore the evolution of the legal status of the Syrian refugees.

who migrate from non-European countries are evaluated and determined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and among those whom determined as to be refugee were resettled by UNHCR in third countries (Resmi Gazete, 1961).

On March 2012, the Turkish government declared that the Syrian guests are defined as *foreigners under control of temporary protection* based on the Article 10 of the 1994 Regulation (Erdoğan M. M., 2017, p. 13). However, since 2011 with the influx of immigrants from Syria, after a long time of “statue ambiguousness” - in other words lack of a legal framework- the Turkish authorities have expanded the services and protections over the years, but the immigrants were not able to obtain a regular refugee status, instead, they were classified as beneficiaries of temporary protection. In April 2013, a new law, namely the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (YUKK which regulates the rights of the foreigners living in Turkey in a more coherent way contrary to the existing legislation, made major changes in Turkey’s asylum system. Based on the YUKK, a new agency, the Directorate General of Migration Management (GIGM under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established in order to regulate the status of the asylum seekers and cope with all necessities and problems of the new legal status framework. YUKK defines four types of protection status one of which is the *refugee* status well-known as those who are coming from only European countries due to the geographical limitation on Geneva Convention of 1951, as mentioned above. Those who meet the conditions of being refugee but come from non-European countries are defined as “conditional refugees”. As a third category, the “subsidiary protection” includes those who cannot be defined as refugee or conditional refugee but, in any case of refoulement, are in potential danger of being exposed to death penalty or torture, inhuman or dishonorable treatment and at the same time who are unable or unwilling to benefit from the protection system of their origin-countries’ law (Resmi Gazete, 2013).

However, the determination process of this status necessitates a certain amount of time. Therefore, the influx of Syrian refugees -due to the significant number of people who have immigrated in a short period of time- makes it practically almost impossible to register them under the subsidiary protection and get them in a status determination process (Erdoğan M. M., 2017, pp. 11-

12 . The foreigners who demand international protection from Turkey are given the status of refugee, conditional refugee or subsidiary protection by the GIGM after the evaluation of their application. Since it is almost impossible to evaluate the application of the Syrians who immigrate to Turkey for protection as an individual application their applications are taken under the process of temporary protection (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016 . The content of the temporary protection has been arranged and detailed in a period from 2013 to October 2014. As a fourth status, “temporary protection” came in force on 22 October 2014, defined as:

The authorities provide for refugees’ basic needs and furnish social services, translation services, IDs, travel documents, access to primary and secondary education, and work permits. Applicants for protection may be obliged by the authorities to live in designated reception and accommodation centers or in a specific location, and to report to the authorities in a certain manner or at certain intervals...Most current asylum seekers are placed under temporary protection for settlement in another country rather than being accepted as refugees for settlement in Turkey (Library of Congress, 2016 .

Based on the guiding principles of the UNHCR and, in the same vein, the EU Council Directive, the temporary protection, in the case of an influx of the refugees where it is almost impossible to evaluate the individual refugee status, becomes an exceptional way of protection of the migrants (Baklacioğlu & Kivilcim, 2015, p. 13 . The GIGM also explains that the temporary protection is an urgent and temporary precaution that can be decided by the Council of Ministers, in case that individual international protection application mechanism cannot work effectively in a mass migration case. However, as the UNHCR and the EU Council Directive limits the period of the temporary protection, Turkey has not submitted any time limitation regarding the *temporariness* of the temporary protection. This limitation of the temporariness is completely left to the Council of Ministers (Baklacioğlu & Kivilcim, 2015, pp. 13-14 . It also includes and guarantees the international law standards and three main criteria such as, open border policies without any religion, sect and

ethnicity discrimination, non-refoulement, supply of the necessities. According to the regulation, all procedures and processes regarding the foreign people who are forced to leave their origin countries and unable to return, come to the borders in mass to seek for an urgent and temporary protection, are held by the Council of Ministers. The regulation covers such topics as the rights and obligations of the foreigners, registration process, the criteria of their stay and the limitation that can be applied to their rights. Those who are evaluated under this regulation are supplied firstly health services, social aid and services, translation, education and similar services as much as possible in the cities they live in.

On 15 January 2016, the Regulation on Work Permit for Foreigners under Temporary Protection came into force, but with a certain amount of limitations (Resmi Gazete, 2016). Firstly, an application for the work permit can be done by the employer or by the beneficiary on condition that s/he is self-employed. Additionally, the regulation makes the employer pay at least a minimum wage to the foreign workers. Each workplace cannot employ the foreign employees more than 10% of the total number of employees, unless the employer justifies that there is no Turkish citizen who is able to do that work. The beneficiaries can work only in the cities where they register for the temporary protection. Moreover, the most essential limitation is that the work permit can be applied 6-months after registration to temporary protection. Turkey, within the scope of its responsibilities arising from international law, ensures the temporary protection for the Syrian people, and provides them access to basic needs and protects them from refoulment (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016). Since the end of 2016, the number of Syrian people who have been given work permit is 31,185 as of March 2019 (Mülteciler Derneği, 2019). Considering the huge number of registered Syrians in Turkey as 3,634,378 (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019), the limitations and procedures of the regulation, providing a wide range of motion mostly to the employers, mainly contribute to the incorporation of Syrians into the informal labor market.

Erdoğan (2014, p. 15) evaluates the regulation of temporary protection as a regulation enabling the Syrian immigrants to benefit from certain services and rights without acknowledging them refugees. However, the rights of the asylum seekers are not taken as a compulsory and legal responsibility, but as a

reinforcement based on the host-country's potential. Although the regulation includes some open-ended parts and some uncertainties regarding the obligations of the state, it is very vital at least, to determine the legal status of the Syrians in Turkey. However, since the Syrians do not have a legally efficient status, they easily become vulnerable to a wide range of abuses and exploitation. This vulnerability is caused by and reinforced through the informal and flexible characteristics of Turkey's recent labor market. The influx of massive number of Syrians to Turkey intensified the employment regime structured in the informal and precarious labor market of Turkey. Moreover, it caused the precarity to become a norm in the labor market. To survive and become one of the labor components of the labor market, the asylum seekers are forced to keep silent and be undemanding. Therefore, they become more and more vulnerable to be abused, denigrated, precarious and insecure (Alpman, 2018, pp. 339-342 .

In a similar vein, yet from another aspect, Kivilcim (2016) also investigated the impacts of the above-mentioned regulation on the Syrian female refugees. The Syrian women have been surrounded with similar political, economic, cultural and social dominations and oppressions with the Syrian male refugees. However, since the implications and effects of the regulation and gender-blind international and national migration law differ, the Syrian women experiences deepen, stratified and diversified through the gender relations. Furthermore, the law generally assumes the individual as male by overlooking the differences of women, which leads to a vicious circle in which the women are forced to face with extreme conditions and develop their own survival strategies.

Kivilcim (2016, p. 193) investigated the "damaging effects of a hostile legal context" particularly on Syrian refugee women. Although the evolution of the legal status and uncertainty have serious impacts on the Syrian refugees regardless of gender, the results and influences of the damages have never been the same when it is observed through the lens of gender. Kivilcim, conceptualized *legal violence* as *damaging effects of a hostile legal context* and approached it as it includes "the forms of violence imposed and amplified by legal inaction" (Kivilcim, 2016, p. 201). She claimed that due to the uncertainty of the legal status, the Syrian female immigrants were forced to marry Turkish

men as a survival strategy (Kivilcim, 2016, p. 201 . Due to the poverty and economic difficulty they are experiencing, some Syrian families give consent to “child marriage” for the purpose of cutting the expenses of the household. Regarding the sexual abuse of Syrian immigrant women, Kivilcim asserted that no measures have been taken although the prevention of these women from sexual abuse and violence was proposed in the Turkey’s National Assembly (Kivilcim, 2016, p. 203 .

Kivilcim explains how the temporary protection regulation, which provides *access to the labor market*, has certain limitations:

The Temporary Protection Regulation is explicitly liberal with its terminology and does not provide ‘rights’ but rather regulates ‘access to services’. Concerning ‘access to the labor market’, Article 29 of the Regulation indicates that the procedures and principles concerning the work of persons under temporary protection will be determined by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security after the proposal by the Council of Ministers, with specific restrictions based on geography and sector. The Council of Ministers took no decision on this issue until 2016; ‘Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees Under Temporary Protection’ was issued on 15 January 2016. This Regulation covers Syrians who have completed their registration procedure and it provides that they will be able to apply for a work permit 6 months after they obtain a temporary protection status (Kivilcim, 2016, p. 204 .

By evaluating the influence of this regulation on Syrians women, she proposed to explore the Syrian refugees’ position in the labor market from the current legal perspective. The government did not make any regulation regarding the conditions that the Syrian refugees’ labor was embedded in, which itself made possible to present Syrian refugees’ labor as flexible, cheap and exploitable for the labor market of Turkey. This is part of a wider national understanding through which flexibility of the labor market was established as a main object of Turkey’s National Economic Development Plan (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development 2014 in addition to the National Employment Strategy (Republic of Turkey Ministry Labor and Security 2014 (Kivilcim, 2016, p. 205 . As the flexibility can easily appropriate the disadvantaged groups who

have less bargaining power or none at all, law or the legal status of refugees and immigrants becomes the most vital impetus to “protect” or, by limitations and inactions, “present” them to the service of the capital owner class. Rittersberger-Tılıç emphasizes the necessity to consider the irregular migrants as labor migrants “who are without or possess only very limited rights, but also constitute a flexible workforce that can easily integrate or disintegrate into the labor market” (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2015, p. 89). Therefore, she claims that their position in the labor market should be investigated by taking into consideration “their immigration status and rights to housing, health and social welfare” (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2015, p. 89). Even though the Syrians are defined neither as irregular migrants nor refugees, but they are under temporary protection, they have been squeezed. Their position in the labor market is also to be analyzed through the legal status and the relationality between this position, working conditions and making the legal framework.

§ 2.2 Making of legal status

The general approach to the making process of legal status is that the status is imposed directly by the state. However, in case of Syrian refugees’ legal status, the general framework of the legal rights and services of Syrians were negotiated between the government and the local capital owners of Antep. Therefore, the legal context depending on anti-labor and anti-refugee structure favors the capital owners. To shed light on this structure it is important to understand the working conditions and working environment of Syrian refugees. Since this pro-local capital framework determines in which conditions the migrant labor is shaped.

It was a long process from the promulgation of the Regulation on YUKK (April 2013 to the promulgations of the Regulation on Temporary Protection (October 2014 and the Regulation on Work Permit (January 2016 through which the content and context of the temporary protection were assigned and arranged. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate this period by focusing on the links and relations between the state and the other involving institutions.

In the making process of the regulations, a large number of crucial consultations and meetings were held with several institutions such as UNHCR and International Organization of Migration (IOM) (Erdoğan M. M., 2017, p. 11).

At this point, beside the national strategic plans and reports, it is vital to explore the relationality and negotiations between GTO-as a main institution that participated in the making process of the legal framework of Syrian refugees- and the government. This helps to understand how the legal status of Syrians is constructed based on these negotiations through which the government authorities and the members of GTO who have gathered several times. It is also very crucial to understand and analyze the regulation process of Syrian migrants by focusing on the state's role in managing migrant labor according to the needs and priorities of the capital. To understand the links and relations between the state's managing strategies and the capital's needs, and how such links and relations are utilized to produce a business-friendly environment; I, particularly, present the reports and activities of GTO regarding the Syrian migrants. Since those reports and activities are having a significant impact on the transformation of the legal status. The reports of GTO regarding Syrian people living in Antep reveals that the transformation of the legal status of Syrian people has a parallel development with the relationship between the business world and the state. Therefore, to understand this relationship it is necessary to analyze the reports of the GTO.

The "Common Mind Report" written and published by GTO in 2014, starts with emphasizing the economic loss and surplus costs due to the fact that there has been violence, war and conflicts in Syria so that the exporters of Antep cannot transit through Syria. Therefore, the report demands from the state additional incentives for the producers and exporters who endure these costs. One of the most important points concerns the work permit of Syrian migrants in this report. The involvement of Syrian migrants into the employment life makes it possible to submit job opportunities particularly to educated, middle-class professionals. Regarding the labor-force, it is highlighted that considering the current situation, approximately 10% of the Syrians are participating in the labor-force, even there is a substantial Syrian labor-force flow to Antep. According to the report, the Syrians, who have a wide range of economic activities from self-employed groups to ordinary laborers, are often

informally employed by the employers due to both their *conscientious* feelings and needs labor-force. These informal practices clearly increase the danger of running asylum seekers with low and insecure wages.


The report emphasizes Antep has one the biggest economies in Turkey and its economy is growing substantially. When its needs are considered, it has the potential to employ Syrian immigrants in some specific business sectors. Some solutions, therefore, asked for Syrians to *work temporarily in legal frameworks without breaking the peace in the labor market*. This temporary work permit is believed to prevent informality, which indeed prevents unfair competition for cheap labor among the capital owners. The report suggested the government cover the social security costs of the Syrian employees. The temporary work permit should be in force until the end of the war in Syria. A system that prevents the Syrian migrants claiming rights and compensation while they will be returning to their homes should be established in accordance with international law. The report also demands the employment of the Syrians to be conditioned on a certain proportion of the total number of employees to the Syrians who will work in the companies against the danger of breaking the working peace. Regarding the current legal situation, the report states that the current work permit procedure for foreigners requires a passport, so it takes a long time to employ. The report claims that the government did not take their earlier suggestions into consideration that those who have already registered and resided in Turkey for at least six months would be given permission to work without any procedure. Moreover, the report believes that the implementation of these actions will solve the problems of the employment of the Syrians to a great extent. The next step, according to this report, should be to assign Syrians based on their professions, through the establishment of new employment agencies (Gaziantep Ticaret Odası, 2014).

This report was presented to the Deputy Prime Ministers (Bülent Arınç and Beşir Atalay and the Minister of Labor and Social Security (Faruk Çelik in a meeting with the participation of 12 non-governmental organizations and 3 universities, under the leadership of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce. The Deputy Prime Minister, Atalay, stated that he would put it on the agenda of the first meeting of council of ministers, while Çelik immediately decided

to start working on the suggested solutions that were highlighted in the report for participation of the Syrians in working life (Gaziantep Ticaret Odası, 2015 .

This report was published on February 2014 and submitted to the government. On October 22, 2014 the Temporary Regulation was issued. The number of registered Syrian migrants under the temporary protection has substantially increased from 2013 to 2014 and from 2014 to 2015 thanks to the regulation, as it can be seen in the available official figures (Table 1.1 The rate of the Syrians under the temporary protection had increased consistently through 2018, therefore, we can easily see the effects of the report shaped by the demands, needs and priorities of the capital (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019 .

Table 2.1 The Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Years



SOURCE Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, July 2019

The Work Permit Conference for Foreigners under Temporary Protection was held in the GTO meeting hall in partnership with the GTO, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, United Nations Refugee Organization (UNCHR and International Middle East Peace Research Center (IMPR. In the conference, the Chairman of GTO, Eyüp Bartık, defined their actions and needs as follows:

We have learned an important lesson and prepared a significant report in 2014. We have talked to relevant ministries and made all the necessary arrangements to prevent informal employment. As a result of this, 10% threshold work permit is granted. However, since these numbers

are not enough for us, we need to put this on the agenda again. In Gaziantep, there are 350 thousand registered Syrians now, which corresponds to 15 percent of the Gaziantep population (Gaziantep Ticaret Odası, 2016 .

In the same conference, Veysel Ayhan, the President of the International Middle East Peace Research Center stated:

We gather here to provide the government with the necessary information about the ways and methods that should be implemented in the employment process of Syrians. There were negative expectations and criticisms that the Syrian crisis would be reflected negatively on the Gaziantep economy. The results turned out to be the contrary. With the employment of the Syrians, the economy has grown even further. To develop our economy even more, the cake needs to get bigger. I think the meeting we will hold will be very beneficial for this matter (Gaziantep Ticaret Odası, 2016 .

Since the number of Syrian migrants under temporary protection had increased to a certain extent but not a great extent, another report, titled as Syria Inside: Common Mind Report, prepared on August 2015 by GTO, emphasizing the similar suggestions and solutions. The report starts with the negative economic effects of the Syrian Civil War on the Turkish exporters. It, additionally, mentions that Turkish companies investing in Syria stopped their activities. The report also demonstrates the employment of Syrians in the informal sector and highlights that inflation rates are above the country average in the border cities where Syrians live. Despite these, the Syrians living in Turkey, especially in Antep, provided high economic inputs in different levels and criteria, according to the report. Therefore, it is concluded that the influences of the Syrians on the economy should be assessed in a “cost-opportunity” perspective through which the solutions should be created. On the other hand, in case of workplace accidents involving Syrians, there is a risk that employers would face with high penalties because they cannot be legally insured, and unfair competition arises between the companies informally employing Syrians and those who are not. The report suggests that the need for a new labor-force in the provinces can be met with the Syrians in the business sectors that

require unskilled labor, particularly where local people do not prefer to work. However, the involvement of the Syrians in the labor market should be in a formal framework for the peace of working and for the diminution of the informal economy. The report repeats its main suggestions. Some part of them were included in the regulation of temporary protection, however they have not completely implemented yet, which leads to social and economic losses for capital owners.

These reports and meetings held by the GTO with participation of NGOs show the links and alliances between the business world and the state regarding the Syrian migrants and how and for which purposes they are regulated. Those reports and meetings triggered the government for legal arrangements and regulations by taking into account these demands and priorities of the local capital. It can also be claimed that these suggestions of the reports are directly and exactly applied to the processes of shaping the legal framework of the Syrians' status. Once again, in the case of Turkey, the employment and workplace rights and the Syrians' legal status have shaped for the sake of business-friendly labor market. Moreover, the Syrian labor migrants have gained the temporary protection status, not only their working and workplace conditions, but also almost their whole lives hang on by a hair. After the implementation of temporary protection status, the GTO, to a large extent, changed and turned its attention to the Syrian capital-owners. GTO had set a meeting with the vice Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek to discuss and submit a report indicating the current economic problems of business world and the problems of the Syrian entrepreneurs. On March of 2017, the intention of GTO on the Syrian capital-owners was clearly defined by Hıdıroğlu, the President of GTO, as:

We are serving to 981 members registered to our Chamber. As a Chamber, we have created a Syrian Desk to strengthen the integration and support those members, and to guide them in their economic activities. Now, we are working on a project to support Syrian investors, attract the investors to our city and bring their foreign customers to our economy (Haberler.com, 2017).

GTO, after dismantling the labor issue which they believed was one of the most important obstacles to provide competition around the region; focused

on the Syrian capital-owners to strengthen their own power by utilizing the experiences and the networks of the Syrian investors in the business world of the Middle East. In parallel with these developing relations, a considerable amount of large and small sized enterprises were held by the Syrians in Antep.

§ 2.3 Migrant female labor and informal labor market in Turkey

To be able to analyze the governing of migrant labor in Turkey, one needs to look at the current labor regime in Turkey that the refugees encounter upon their arrivals. Contrary to a widespread belief that the informal labor market enlarged with the arrival of the Syrians, Syrian labor is articulated to the labor regime easily as a result of the business-friendly legal rights and the current labor regime of Turkey. Therefore, it is vital to reveal the certain dynamics and settings of labor regime into which the Syrian migrant labor incorporates.

Toksöz (2012, pp. 109-110), grounded the historical background of informalization in Turkey as a long-term result of *economic growth without employment* through which the export oriented industries, to compete with the global market, focused on decreasing the cost by developing relations with the subcontractors and outsourcers in the production processes. As the number of subcontractors increases, informality in Turkey becomes 32,4%, today. (TÜİK, 2018).

After 1980, Turkey's integration into neoliberal globalization has started within the frame of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program (SSAP) which located and constructed the primary goals on labor exploitation (Güler-Müftüoğlu, 2013, p. 34). The political attitudes towards subsequent resistance of the workers, the successive crises, development plans, the strategy and action plan create flexibility which is the permanent and main objective both in the production process and in the labor market. Furthermore, all the political, social and economic developments followed a path which more and more amplified this fracture.

On the one hand, neoliberal policies, through flexibility, articulate the women into the informal sector. On the other hand, woman participation to the employment is pre-determined, because the neoliberal policies have already limited the social rights such as privatization of the nursery, nursing

home and so on. All these developments and regulations made it less costly for women to do these jobs within their homes, so that they can work in a more flexible, yet unqualified, insecure and precarious ways. By these means, domestic burdens of educated, working, middle-class women are transferred to uneducated, lower-class women. In recent years, a large number of immigrant women have been engaged in home-oriented labor such as childcare, domestic work and elderly care.

The contribution of all the economic, political and social downward processes and transformations in the recent years to Turkey's heritage of structural incapability of creating job opportunities- despite a growing population- creates a precarious, insecure, flexible, discriminative working life in Turkey. Turkey has a complex and non-labor-oriented working life, which proves that "the biggest burden of neo-liberal policies and globalization always falls on the lowest and the poorest masses" (Breman & Linden, 2014, p. 928 .

In the 1990s, Turkey became one of the stomping grounds of immigrants. Some of them immigrated to Turkey for job opportunities while others used it as a transit country. İçduygu, (2006) categorized the irregular migration to Turkey beginning from the 1990s based on "three historical developments" (p. 675 . The first is the "immigration crisis in Western Europe" which caused an "increasing transit migration to Turkey" (p. 676 . Therefore, Turkey hosted several immigrants from Asia, Africa and the Middle East arrived in Turkey with official documents intending to settle in a third western country. The second historical development is the "collapse of the communist regimes in the Eastern Europe" (p. 676) which made a massive number of people, particularly women from Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, immigrate for finding jobs. Thirdly, "influx of asylum-seekers and refugees" was as a result of the oppressive Middle Eastern and neighboring countries' (Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq political regimes and the foreign military intervention (İçduygu, *The Labour Dimensions of Irregular Migration in Turkey*, 2006, p. 676 . Therefore, all this increasing mobility brought the new labor force to Turkey and Turkey transformed from a labor-exporting country to a labor-importing country (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar, 2018, p. 251 . Even though the migrant women were popularized as "sex workers", there are also many precious studies on them claiming they have been working at certain informal

sectors such as domestic work, entertainment and tourism (Eder S, Kaşka S. 2003 (İçduygu, 2004. Parallel to the neoliberal transformation, as the need for the family care and domestic work by the middle-class urban families has risen, the demand for the cheap labor of female migrants has dramatically increased. Those migrant women mostly entered in a legal way with a tourist visa and then, kept working even their tourist visa duration has expired which made them an “undocumented migrant” (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar, 2018, p. 252 . Dedeoğlu and Bayraktar (2018, p. 253 interpreted that the *working without work permit* was the main determinant of their position in the labor market, and how they can reach and integrate into which economic activities. Migrant labor force has been mostly confined by the irregular migratory regime of Turkey which transformed, in a sense, with the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2011 (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar, 2018, p. 253 .

§ 2.4 Labor regime and migration in Antep

Antep hosts the fourth largest population of Syrians, 444,724 (12,2% of the Syrians living all over Turkey following İstanbul, Urfa and Hatay respectively (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2019 . The total population of Antep is 2,028,563 (2018 (TÜİK, 2019 . One sixth of this population is Syrian. Antep province has two urban districts, namely Şehitkamil and Şahinbey, whose population constitutes 83% (TÜİK, 2019 of the whole province. Therefore, most of the people of Antep live in a compact space. Antep is historically known as one of the important commercial and industrial centers of Turkey. However, another aspect that we need to focus on to understand the current dynamics of Antep is that the city is historically a migrant city. As a migrant city, Antep had encountered the first migration wave as a part of the urbanization history of Turkey beginning from 1950s and gradually raised in the 1970s. However, a significant immigration flux persisted through the 1980s. As a result of the new economic policies based on liberalization and globalization, urbanization movements accelerated in this period. In the following years, the conflicts and clashes in the region and economic inadequacy led to a substantial immigration from nearby cities such as Maraş, Kilis, Urfa, Siirt, Adıyaman and the rural areas of Antep itself to the centrum (Geniş, 2011, p. 367 .

Therefore, throughout the 1990s, a considerable amount of Kurdish and Alevi population were forced to migrate from their hometowns and settle in Antep's suburbs. The city, as an economic and cultural center of the region, has always experienced human mobility. The recent human mobility that Antep society experienced was the forced migration of the Syrians. The demographic structure of Antep is, to a large extent, shaped mainly after 1980s and the second structural change realized after the arrival of the Syrian refugees beginning from 2011.

Antep is taken as a *success* story in the studies thanks to the *industrial developments* particularly in 1990s and the following years. However, the economy of Antep has been predominantly producing intermediate goods. Therefore, it had difficulty to compete with global markets depending on cheap labor force (Hoşgör, 2011, p. 491). In parallel to the informalization process, the informal sector in Antep has grown and created *chances* to the disadvantaged groups to be appropriated. Based on the changing class conditions, women started to involve in new employment *opportunities* such as domestic labor, baby-sitting, in addition to pistachio opening, knitting, embroidery and lace works (Gültekin & Kuzu, 2011, p. 522). Hoşgör (2011, p. 499) emphasized the argument that the female employment did not increase in the process of export-oriented industrialization after 1980. Beside the employment of a limited number of high-educated women into the formal economy, the female employment in the informal economy was higher than the male employment. In other words, the women have been marginalized through the development process. The participation of the lower-class women of Antep who left the school or completed only primary school to the formal economy has been limited and those women were mainly the migrant women. They were generally integrated into the home-based informal economy and labor force as a cheap labor in an insecure and precarious way. They had mostly engaged with pistachio opening and home-based piecework for the garment industry of Antep (Hoşgör, 2011, p. 502).

In Antep, the “feminization of poverty” (Pearce, 1978) can easily be observed. The exclusion from the labor market due to the structured unemployment, flexible and irregular working, and weakening links characterize working poverty. Particularly women, as a result of reproduction activities they are

involve in, are the significant part of working poverty. The oxymoron that the high ratio of female participation, whereas no difference in economic situation of women is defined as *feminization of poverty*. Labor division based on gender, the invisibility of female labor, the different forms of women's participation in employment, the ability to reach the resources and opportunities are among the factors which sustain the poverty (Gültekin & Kuzu, 2011, p. 528 . The enrichment of neoliberal cities is a whole package within which we can easily see the patterns of poverty and increasing social exclusion (Yüksel, 2011, p. 379 , which are the most dynamic social structures that the Syrian women are embedded in, today.

Female Labor and A Critical Reading of Intersectionality

This chapter discusses the main approaches to female labor and a critical reading of intersectionality which has already been an ongoing debate within feminist theory. Female labor has been studied more and more with the rise of feminist movements after 1970s in the Western world. In parallel to the rise of feminist movements in Turkey, particularly in 1980s, the number of studies on female labor has increased. On one hand, the studies on female labor (Delphy, 1980 (Hochschild & Machung, 1990 (Bryson, 2003 were mostly concentrated on the invisible domestic work and child-rearing of women in the private sphere. On the other hand, the gendered division of labor and gender relations have been fundamentally problematized and re-conceptualized to show how this invisible domestic labor of women, *second shift* or *double burden* reinforces the interrelationships between the patriarchy and capitalism.

Neoclassical economics is based on the idea that people can be assumed as employed as soon as they contribute to “the production of the commodity or service that can only be sold in the market itself” (Burkett, 2011 . Attributing women’s labor at home as a part of reproduction, this approach completely ignores a significant dynamic of the female labor which is fulfilled at home shaped by the gendered division of labor. The economic activities of woman at home are regarded as non-market, secondary and insignificant activities. It

restrains women within the private spheres using a gender-blind methodological approach (Özkaplan, 2009, p. 16 . The neoclassical approach is also criticized by feminist economists that the neoclassical studies substantially concentrated on the activities of the male. Even though women are included in this line of researches, but in a way which “equalizes” women with men as if the difference is mainly dependent on sex difference, and women is taken as a fixed category. Although the studies are implemented to display the disadvantaged position of the women in the labor market, they were one-sided and analytically inadequate to explore through which ways and how this disadvantaged position and conditions socially emerged and constructed.

The feminists contributed to the neoclassical analysis of labor by emphasizing the requirement of examination of labor within and among all social relations and dynamic structures. According to feminist analysis, the existing facts and changes within the labor markets can only be understood through the integrality of those social values and relations (Dedeoğlu, 2000, p. 139 . The invisible and unpaid female labor has been discussed by feminist movements and literature since the 1970s. Institutions like family and marriage have been severely criticized by the feminists that those were taken as the spheres or places where the exploitation of the women labor is fulfilled and disguised. Female labor, as an area of study, is focused on by the Marxist and socialist feminists. They study on relationship of female labor with the capitalism and patriarchy (Hartmann, 1979 . Marxist feminists focus on the capitalist power relations and explain the gender dimension of exploitation. They also reveal the subordination of women through class relations and exploitation. While this has been the case for the Marxists, socialist feminists scrutinize the causes and effects of both capitalism and patriarchy on female labor. Their mutual relationship fosters each other to understand and analyze the female labor (Ramazanoglu, 1981 (Eisenstein, 1981 (Hartmann, 1979 .

The reproductive roles of women in the private sphere vary from raising children to domestic labor spent in the household and have a significant impact on women’s work life. In parallel to women starting to work outside, since the men do not participate in domestic labor at all or participate in a small scale, the burden of women is doubled. The concept of double burden implies that the whole responsibility of reproduction at home is undertaken by

women and even they work in a paid job, the responsibilities of mother and wife do not significantly change (Dedeoğlu, 2000 .

These studies questioned the obstacles of female employment as well as the gendered division of labor within the household, internalized traditional gender roles, the reasons and dynamics through which women articulate to the labor market in a flexible and more precarious ways. The difficulties, discriminations and inequalities, such as wage differences, working hours, violence in the working life that women are exposed to, have been academically and publicly demonstrated. As the integration of women into the work force is already restricted by the current gender regime, the position of women in the work life can easily be shaped through similar gender roles, which can be visible by the analysis of the cooperation between the capitalism and the patriarchy. These relations and processes conceptualized as “capitalist patriarchy” or “patriarchal capitalism” (Eisenstein, 1981 , “gendered division of labor” (Young, 1981 . The female labor understood by feminists shows how economic activities are already embedded in existing gendered social structures and processes. This analysis reveals the social interwoven, intersectional and interrelated processes and structures, and how those intersectional processes emerge and shape.

Third-wave feminism rejected the essentialist approach on a unified category of women. It objected to “the assumption that all members of a particular race, class, gender, or sexual orientation share common characteristics” (Snyder, 2008, p. 187 . While third-wave feminists were against the universalist assertion that “all women share a set of common experiences”, they did not ignore this concept of experience at all (Snyder, 2008, p. 184 . By destroying the “the unified category of women”, they highlighted personal narratives grounded on “an intersectional and multi-perspectival version of feminism” (Snyder, 2008, p. 175 . Butler (1999, pp. 19-20 also criticized the universalistic approach and states “...the insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of women has effectively refused the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘woman’ are constructed”. Beside the distinguishing features of women, feminist theory underlined the differences among women. It helped to reveal how these differences also produce the patriarchy. Initially, the black women and the women from ethnic

minorities criticized the white woman assumption of the radical and Marxist feminists, depending on the understanding that the inequalities among the women also stem from ethnic and racial inequalities and discrimination (Ramazanoğlu, 1998). The women's subjectivities are taken not as a fixed form or category but an integrality of all their experiences based on their race, class and ethnicity. This intersectional analytical approach will also be applied in the analysis of migrant female labor in Antep.

To make visible the distinctiveness of Syrian refugee women's labor compared to the Turkish or Kurdish or middle-class Syrian women of Antep, it is necessary to explore *combined effects of all dimensions* or categories. We cannot take gender, race or refugeeism as identity, as if they are fixed forms or categories or dimensions, in order "not to reduce the intersectionality to a theory on identity", however, we need to take the intersections of all these social processes into consideration (Crenshaw, 1994, p. 94). Based on the critics on female labor theorization and the debates on theorization of migration, intersectional approach paves the way to understand both the distinctiveness of and distinctions among Syrian refugee women living in Antep. The objective of this study is not to emphasize the double or triple- or the number of the dimensions we explore- subordination of those women, however, to analyze how and through which ways social processes, such as mainly forced migration, female labor, gender and social violence intersect, interact and change.

§ 3.1 Intersectionality and female labor

Intersectionality originating from black feminism is a concept which has become widespread in the feminist theory to highlight the interwoven systems of oppression on women (Carastathis, 2014, pp. 304-305). There are several studies in feminist literature which discuss the ways in which gender class ethnicity and race are implied in women's subjectivities. Weldon's (2008, s. 192) understanding of intersectionality, which is "...a concept confronts an important dimension of social complexity" and "the interaction between social structure such as race, class and gender", is used as a base in this study. Intersectionality "explores how these systems mutually construct one another" (Collins, 1998, p. 63). The interrelationship among these structures should be

kept in mind. In addition, it is important to remember that they are unfixed and dynamic structures and processes.

The theory of intersectionality is criticized by some feminists in approaching the identities as they are only “a sum of the identities” (Bora, 2017) such as race, gender, ethnicity, class. The intersectionality, according to Bora (2017), analyzes the identities without making the social facts and power structures constructing those identities visible. Therefore, intersectionality is nothing more than claiming the double or triple or more times the discrimination while unable to see how exploitation is constructed and operated (Bora, 2017). Bora (2017) emphasizes the sufficiency and adequacy of gender analysis to examine the social dynamics. She questions the need for intersectionality as an analysis tool, since she believes that gender is *a useful category* of social analysis. Through gender analysis, it can be already explored all the why’s and how’s of exploitation or subordination processes that women are embedded in. To Bora (2017), womanhood, lesbianhood and manhood are not the identities but they are the interrelated mechanisms of domination on women.

According to Bora (2017), one of the most dangerous traps of intersectional theory is reductionism, which homogenizes and essentializes concepts and/or categories. It is possible to fall into this trap and reduce these social structures into fixed and unified categories by recognizing them as identities. To construct such identities unavoidably creates outgroups of others and excluded ones. The criticism of Bora on intersectionality is very crucial. However, in this thesis, I also attempt to embrace intersectionality theory which takes the social categories as dynamic domination mechanisms rather than fixed identities as Bora claims. Class, race, sexual orientations and other social categories are also ought to be approached as interrelated and contextual rather than identity, which makes it possible to see all interrelated processes. Intersectionality, compared to the inherent tendency of identity discourses to homogenizing and essentializing, provides us the “complexity, situatedness and openness of social positionings” (Zavos, 2010, p. 16). Conceptualizing female labor only in relation to the capitalist and patriarchal ideologies whilst ignoring different subjectivities of women makes us overlook the *integrality* of the social phenomenon.

This thesis attempts to adopt an intersectional approach to the study of female Syrian labor. The classical studies of labor on Syrian refugees in Turkey tends to create a dichotomy between local working groups and these refugees from Syria, as if they are two separate homogeneous groups. This dichotomizing approach neglects the commons of these two groups while also ignoring the differences within themselves, therefore, it undermines the relationality of the analysis. The studies examining the Syrian people as a separate category are analyzing them by the breakdown of sector, quality, age, sex and education, thus, exclude a different range of encounter, interaction and conflict processes in daily life. To analyze solely the production processes at the workplaces means ignoring other social structures and processes. Özar and Ercan (2000, p. 43) also state that to understand and analyze the structures peculiar to capitalism in a trustworthy way, we need to have the knowledge of concrete areas including these mechanisms. In other words, we need to analyze the variables such as class, gender and race among which the *non-critical economy*¹ does not see any multi-interaction or theoretically excludes. Otherwise, Antebian local women's guarantor role of Syrian refugee women²³⁴ to make them able to enter the labor market of home-based piecework, for receiving pistachio from the vendor cannot be explained through the classical theorization methods. With

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- 1 Referred to "an umbrella concept including all types of explanations which do not integrally approach to economic facts and question the relations between the empirical ones and the facts." (Ercan & Özar, 2000, p. 22)
 - 2 "They want guarantor. My neighbor guaranteed for me, because some stole." ("Kefil istiyorlar. Komşularım bana kefil oldu, çalanlar oluyor çünkü." Aisha, November 7, 2017)
 - 3 "They want guarantor to crack walnut, pistachio, otherwise they do not give. Both Syrians and Turks. I learned from my upstairs neighbor." ("Kefil istiyi ceviz, fıstık kırmaya, kefil olmazsa vermiyiler. Suriyeli de oluyi Türk de oliyi. Yukardaki üst komşumdan öğrendim." Jamila, November 24, 2017)
 - 4 "I go and take. The neighbors bring, my neighbors were bringing. I saw them cracking. I said whether they can ask for me, because it is not given to everyone, they want contact, they want a guarantor. The woman came with me was Turkish. I have only one that Syrian neighbor, but they do not crack. She went and guaranteed me." ("Ben gidip alıyorum. Komşular getiriyiler ya benim komşularım getiriyidi. Onlardan gördüm, ben de dedim beni de gidip söyler misiniz, çünkü her şeye vermiyiler, yani şey istiyiler yani bir tanış, kefil istiyiler. Valla benlen giden Türk. Suriyeli komşu bir şu var. Onlar da kırmıyiler. İşte o gitti bana kefil oldu." Huda, November 26, 2017)

the one-dimensional approach of classical theories, the relationality and the solidarity among the suburb's women of Antep cannot be seen, theorized and analyzed. If it cannot be theorized and analyzed, the relationship between these groups would be reduced to a dichotomy of rivalry and/or hospitality. To have an analytical understanding over the labor markets, it is necessary to establish a dynamic reconstructed relationship between a certain theoretical framework that diagnoses the social structures and the concrete social settings (Ercan & Özar, 2000, p. 42). To develop a multi-layered theoretical framework, I conceptualize migrant female labor through intersectionality.

By analyzing the intersections of the main dynamic structures and processes of Syrian refugee women embedded in, it can be therefore, investigated how they construct their own subjectivities within their personal narratives. This group of women is diverse and comprises of those who speak Turkish fluently while others speak a little or can't speak Turkish at all. They vary from young to old. Their family sizes vary from nuclear to extended. Some of them have experienced an intense patriarchal regime while some of them faced relatively alleviated ones. Some of them have husbands or at least some male individuals in their extended families while some of them do have not. They have different experiences of internal and external migrations. They are coming from different socio-economic classes. These differences can be extended. Therefore, to reveal the substantial dynamics of forced migration and female labor, women's own narratives, in which their subjectivities are constructed, should be examined.

In this study, the concept of labor is theorized as a part of everyday life, so that intersectionality of female labor with other processes can be analyzed. Otherwise, the distinctive characteristics of these women would be invisible. As feminist approach emphasizes the significance of analyzing the female labor through the social relations and dynamic structures, labor cannot be taken as a unilateral process in which the women are getting exploited. Calling it *exploitation* or *double exploitation*, giving figures, numbers, amounts, taking labor as if it is only amount, numeric value, time, place, but not analyzing the relations or intersection with other processes those women have already been in, makes us ignore the critical points of how it works. Otherwise, assuming labor as a limited and unilateral concept, without its relationality, makes us

overlook the gender regime of related group or community and forced migration aspects; how the labor processes and labor regime transforms, intersects with or internalizes the current gender and migration regimes.

Encountering Racism, Gendered Violence and Labor in Antep

In this chapter, I will try to give an insight of being a lower-class Syrian woman in Antep and its implications. The most remarkable distinctiveness of being a Syrian refugee woman living in suburban neighborhoods of Antep is their feeling and experience of fear. Compared to the local Kurdish and lower-class women who have been also integrated into the informal labor market through similar processes to be explained in the next chapter, beside forced migration experiences, fear is an integral part of their subjectivity, even though the women sometimes did not openly express this. This chapter argues that violence stemming from the anti-refugee racism in Antep against the Syrian refugees is gendered, collective and generative. Fear is played out in debates around honor, particularly against Syrian refugee women. Fear is uninterrupted and continuous because it may happen anywhere and anytime. Fear of violence plays an indicative role in the organization of labor relations and particularly in shaping and restricting the space of work. “We are afraid” Amina¹ said when I asked her why they do not prefer to work outside, and

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- 1 Amina was dealing with the shoe-cleaning/decoration/boxing at home with her 16-year-old daughter who spend almost all her time at home because of “we are afraid”. Amina was not one of the women I interviewed with since she did not tend to speak more, but I had chance to chat with her and her children, from time to time, while I was spending time around the neighborhood.

even the response of my “why” was also “we are afraid”, nothing more. However, as I spent more time in the neighborhoods and interviewed with the women, I believe that I could comprehend what “we are afraid” means and stands for in the lives of the Syrian refugee women.

The Syrian women, I interviewed with, living in Antep’s suburban neighborhoods usually worked in shoe-cleaning, shoe-boxing, shoe decoration, shoemaking, handiwork on pullover, steel wool, making olive, opening pistachio, cracking walnut and cracking-or-picking almond at their homes. All, except three women, had already been engaged in similar piecework in Aleppo before the war, such as tailoring, shoe-cleaning, shoe decoration, shoemaking, embroidery on pullovers, muslins, sweaters, t-shirts and so on. They, except one, differentiated the piecework in Antep from the one in Aleppo², to satisfy the necessity of gaining an economic source. While working in Aleppo was to fill in the leisure time, in Antep she works out of necessity. They also emphasized the income differences. However, one of the women stated that she got involved in piecework in Aleppo in order to survive. She has been still doing piecework at home to struggle against the hardships of life conditions in Antep. In order to understand the ways these women integrate into the labor processes and the social environment in which they are embedded, this chapter attempts to analysis the determinants of this environment.

Anti-refugee racism forms the main setting of the relations between the host-society and Syrian refugee women of Antep. Anti-refugee racism has two main steps, one of which is the social exclusion process. Through this process, the refugees are excluded and made invisible. The other one is the violence which may happen when the Syrians’ visibility increases. Social exclusion and violence include racist assaults. Syrianness will be illustrated as an exclusionary signifier based on the narratives of the women. Furthermore, how it creates social distance and the role of language in the process of constructing distance will be narrated. Therefore, it is significant to look into the encounter sites where the exclusion and violence occur and how they intersect with the

2 Why they -had to- involve in those production activities, the differentiation of working in Aleppo and Antep will be addressed in the next chapter.

labor processes. Within the anti-refugee racist environment, it is vital to understand how the women prefer to be invisible, as a survival strategy, by restricting their mobility to their homes and neighborhoods. Hence, they work at their homes and restrict their paid labor to the neighborhood.

§ 4.1 Syrianness as an exclusionary signifier

When I come here, for instance in this neighborhood, as a woman, while walking through the street, everyone says ‘filthy Syrian, you donkey Syrian’ to us. Women also say like that, we asked them what we did to them. They say you did nothing, but ‘we do not like you.’ They say so, we faced with those so many times. The children throw stone to us and say ‘you are donkey, you are Syrian’ to us. In the Vatan neighborhood. Here, we did not face with serious thing but, we faced with several cases in Vatan. While I was going to my daughter, the children encounter us and throw stone. We feel offended. You don’t know what happened to us, God forbid that from your country, however, you may also have something like that. Everyone may have. We didn’t do that by our hands, we had to come here, so we are not guilty. We became a burden in your country³ (Reyhane, November 18, 2017)

As Reyhane tells her experiences of “insult” through “being Syrian”. According to her, “being Syrian” is likely to become a “swearword”. Even if “being Syrian” became a “swearword” in certain cases, however, “for whom” is also an important point to be analyzed based on how the Syrians and locals interrelated with each other. Farida also explained her story of “being insulted” as:

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- 3 “Buraya gelince mesela bu mahallede kadın olarak dışarda ya da caddede yürürken herkes mesela bize ‘Suriyeli pis, Suriyeli eşşek’ diyor. Kadınlar da öyle derler, biz de onlara soruyoruz biz size ne yaptık, hiç bir şey yapmadınız ama biz sizi sevmiyoruz. Bize öyle derler çok böyle karşılaştık. Çocuklar böyle taş alıyorlar siz ‘eşşek’ siz ‘Suriyeli’ Vatan mahallesinde. Burada daha büyük bir şey olmadı, ama vatan da çok karşılaştık. Kızımın yanına giderken çocuklar bizle karşılaştılar, taş attılar. Bize zor geliyor. Ya bizim başımıza öyle geldi, siz de bilmiyorsunuz ülkenize Allah etmesin ama öyle bir şeyler gelebilir. Herkesin başına gelebilir. Biz elimizle yapmadık bunları, mecburen geldik, ondan suçumuz yok. Sizin ülkenizde yük olduk.” (Reyhane, November 18, 2017)

Recently, we were going to somewhere close, around here, with my neighbor, Turkmen neighbor. While we were passing from somewhere, next to the auto washing, we were speaking in Arabic. A young man started to ridicule me with my speaking Arabic. My neighbor shut him up and said ‘how dare you to ridicule’ in Turkish. There was a stove seller, he was also Turkish, he also reprehended him as saying ‘how you dare to speak like that to a woman on your mom’s age’. Turkish people defended us. He was a worker there; I think he was dismissed. Then they started to apologize. We always pass there.⁴ (Farida, November 24, 2018)

§ 4.2 Syrianness and social distance

One of the statements of the women that stood out was “we were not treated badly by anyone, but we feel like we are outsider”⁵ when we initially started to talk about their feelings of living in this society. Even they have not been treated in a negative way, they felt as “outsider”, which can be understandable through the concept of “social exclusion” which implies the integrality of economic, spatial, cultural, political and discursive exclusion processes in which those who are exposed to *social exclusion* are insulated and otherized from the rest of the society (Deniz, Ekinçi, & Hülür, 2016, pp. 28-29 . As the conversation continues, besides “feeling like an outsider”, another feeling significantly became apparent, which is “feeling contempted”. One of the women defined it

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- 4 “Geçenlerde buralarda yakınlarda bir yere gidiyorduk kendi komşumla komşum türkmeni beraber bir yerden geçerken arapça konuşuyorduk, oto yıkmanın yanında geçiyorduk. Genç bir adam benimle dalga geçmeye başladı konuşmamla komşum işte onu susturdu nasıl dalga geçersin diye türkçe. Bir tane yanda sobacı vardı o da türktü o da onu azarladı annen yanında bir kadına nasıl böyle konuşursun diye. Türkler bizi savundu. O işçiydi orda kovdular galiba onu ve özür dilemeye başladılar. Sürekli ordan gelip geçeriz ama.” (Farida, November 24, 2018)
- 5 “Kimseden bir şey görmedik, ama kendimizi yabancı gibi hissediyoruz” used anonymously by some of the women.

as “from their looks, we can get what they mean, even we don’t understand what they speak”⁶. With more details, this feeling is explained by Salisa as:

Every person who migrates has difficulty. Here is abroad, I know that I, myself, have no rights at all since here is not our homeland. I feel I am contempted here. I feel both in the sense of psychological and economical. If the foreman is Turkish and not a good person, he makes the workers feel contempted. If the landowner is Turkish, we also feel contempted. The landowner says, ‘get out of from home, if you do not like it’. We understand what he means from his looks, he looks like ‘you are contempted’.⁷ (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

And continued with the main reason why they do not feel “comfort” here in Turkey, as “here, we feel both comfort and not, in any case, our name is ‘refugee’.”⁸

Hamide, also, expressed the “feeling of being contempted” through:

I have Turkish neighbors, but no communication with them. In my previous neighborhood, my neighbors were good, but I want to say hello to the neighbors living here but their looks...when we get together and talk, in case of any noise, they pound the wall. They look at us like we are contempted. I want to say hello, but they look at us like we are contempted.⁹ (Hamide, November 4, 2018)

6 “Bakışlarından ne demek istediklerini anlıyorduk, konuştuklarını anlayamasak bile.” (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

7 “Her göç eden insan zorluk çeker. Burası gurbet ve vatanımız olmadığı için hiç bir hakkımız olmadığını biliyorum burada kendimin. Ezildiğimizi hissediyorum burada. Hem psikolojik hem de ekonomik olarak hissediyorum. Usta Türk olup birinde çalıştığında usta Türk olup iyi bir insan değilse ezik hissettiriyor çalışanları. Ev sahibi Türk olduğu zaman onda da ezilme hissediyoruz. Beğenmiyorsanız bu evden çıkın diyor. Bakışlarından anlıyoruz, bakışları siz eziksiniz gibi.” (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

8 “Burada yaşam hem rahatız hem değiliz, ne olursa olsun burada adımız mülteci.” (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

9 “Türk komşularım var, ama hiç ilişkim yok. Eski evde komşularım iyiydi ama buradakilere selam vermek istiyorum ama onun bakışları...toplanıp konuştuğumuzda ses çıkınca hemen

Another expression of Hamide's feeling of living in this society is as follows "My homeland, so many things have changed. We used to feel like heroes there. However, here, we feel weak."¹⁰ The feelings of living in this society were mostly verbalized as and identified with "outsider", "contempted" and "weakness" which also indicate the "positions" and the conditions within those "positions", that the Syrian refugee women are embedded in.

4.2.1 *Language*

The Syrian Arab women claimed that not knowing Turkish language make them claim "we are like deaf" and "we are mute", since they do not understand the language locals speak. Firdevs, as a Syrian Turkmen woman, defined knowing the language is also one of the factors that determine the difficulty level of their experiences in the host-society. Sevde put it in a such way "we have no communication. We do not communicate since we cannot speak the language. If we could speak, may be, we would communicate"¹¹ which shows how the language have an impact of the social distance. As a way of narrowing the social distances Syrian women believe speaking Turkish can help them, as Dana explained:

It's like they don't want to knit up with us. I don't know since they never took a step, and maybe because we cannot speak their language. I know a little bit Turkish; my son and my husband know. I have difficulty when I go out, I want to learn so much.¹² (Dana, November 4, 2018)

duvara vuruyorlar. Buradakiler bize ezik gibi bakıyorlar. Selam vermek istiyorum ama bize ezik gibi bakıyorlar." (Hamide, November 4, 2018)

10 "Vatanım, çok şey değişti. Orada kendimiz kahraman gibi hissederdik. Ama burada zayıf hissediyoruz." (Hamide, November 4, 2018)

11 "Biz kendi halimizdeyiz onlar kendi halinde. Dil olmadığı için anlaşıyoruz. Dil olsa belki." (Sevde, November 3, 2018)

12 "Sanki onlar bizimle kaynaşmak istemiyor gibi. Bilmiyorum onlar hiç bir adım atmadıkları için, bir de belki dil olmadığı için. Çok az türkçe biliyorum, oğlum, eşim biliyor. Dışarı çıkınca zorlanıyorum çok, öğrenmek istiyorum." (Dana, November 4, 2018)

Being unable to speak the same language may make Syrian Arab women feel like “we could understand each other in case someone made a joke. Even here there are many Syrians, but Turkish people are much more than Syrians. I cannot be myself, here we cannot understand each other.”¹³ as Salisa emphasized. This indicates how the language influences their feelings and experience of being “outsider”.

However, in many other cases, the function of the language may transform into the way of understanding the hate speech and racist assaults of the host community. Therefore, in these cases the language can easily extend the social distance.

On the other hand, what makes them “deaf” or “mute” may make them develop a solidarity among the Arabic speaking Syrians and Turkish speaking Syrians, such as Syrian Kurds and Turkmen. Syrian Arabs may ask for the help of Turkish speaking neighbors, whereas they stated that they had less communication before the war in Syria.

§ 4.3 Violence

It is important to highlight that although these women are refugees *de facto*, they aren’t considered as refugees officially. They experience forced migration, but they are formally recognized as foreigners under temporary protection, which leads them to experience forced migration conditions. Yet, the solutions and reliefs are designed for those under temporary protection. Even current legal status alleviated their concerns. Throughout the years they have lived in Turkey, their legal status has transformed and evolved¹⁴. Salisa said:

[H]ere, I don’t feel safe. I don’t know whether we will go back or stay. What if suddenly the president of Turkey says the Syrians should return, what do we do. Therefore, I don’t feel safe. What if they take my

13 “Komşular bir şaka yaptığında birbirimizi anlayabiliyorduk. Burada suriyeliler çok olsa da Türkler çok. Kendim olamıyorum burada anlaşıyoruz burada.” (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

14 Discussed in Chapter 2: Governing Migrant Labor: State, Legality and Local Capital.

husband to the army both here and there, because he is young, so I don't feel myself safe.¹⁵ (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

Therefore, temporariness and uncertainty cause “violence of uncertainty” that Eder conceptualized for the irregular female migrants throughout the 1990s, mostly from the post-Soviet world. According to her, “the slippery ground of both economic and legal fronts created the ambiguity” (Eder, 2015, p. 148 for those women. In the case of Syrian women refugees, even though they have a certain legal status, they are still concerned about their status being temporary. This uncertainty easily showed up as rumors like “Syrians will be deported” which is instrumentalized both by the Justice and Development Party (AKP (Evrensel, 2019 and the opposition parties (Posta, 2017 (GazeteDuvar, 2018 (Sözcü, 2018 in the domestic and foreign politics, and more dangerously, the local people to suppress the Syrian people by making them afraid. The *permanent temporariness* of the Syrians position in Turkey, on one hand, can disturb the locals since, as time passed, they believed the Syrians would not return anymore and would become permanent. On other hand, it may make the Syrians fear of deportation, especially, after the debates on the citizenship. The lack of general, comprehensive politics and long-term legal rights and status on Syrian refugees, can easily inflame the nationalist and racial reflexes of the locals in case they encounter the Syrians specifically in the spaces which are already unjustly and unequally structured for the local disadvantaged groups. The overlapping disadvantages of those groups can stimulate their anger or uneasiness towards the Syrians, which is the easiest way to create their own “others”.

It can be said there are cases in which the dichotomy of “us” and “them” becomes sharper and polarized, but this is not an absolute or unique form of relationship between and among the locals and Syrians. However, analyzing the factors that sharpen this distinction or dichotomy, or evolve different relationalities toward this dichotomy would be an important step on the path to

15 “Burada kendimi güvende hissetmiyorum. Dönecek miyiz kalacak mıyız bilmiyorum onları. Bir anda Türkiye başkanı Suriyeliler gitsin derse biz ne yaparız. Ondan güvenli hissetmiyorum. Hem burada hem Suriye’de askere alırlarsa eşimi çünkü yaşı genç ondan kendimi güvende hissetmiyorum.” (Salisa, November 3, 2018)

social cohesion and peace. This dichotomy is not enough to explain the all relationality and more importantly, it takes the relations as unique and unchanged forms regardless the process and context within which these relations fulfill. We cannot categorize all kinds of relations between the Syrian and locals into the dichotomy of “us” and “them”. However, it is very crucial to explore how a certain kind of relation can easily transform into the antinomy of “us” and “them”. Therefore, racism and other economic, social, political, cultural relations between and within these two groups should be intersectionally examined in order to understand both the transformation and unchanging processes.

4.3.1 *Physical Violence*

One of the serious physical violence narratives that I was told belonged to Dana and her husband who was stabbed by their Syrian neighbor’s landowner. Dana was harassed by a man-she thought he was drunk- in the street, which made her stay in the house. “I cannot dare to go out. Now, I recently started to feel safe. I did not go out for 10 days. This is the first time I have encountered something like that, I was shocked.”¹⁶ she said. She locked herself in the house and did not consult anyone, which reminds me one of the statements of Safiye’s husband; “we cannot claim our rights”¹⁷. Deniz, Ekinçi and Hülür, in their study on the daily life of Syrian people living around Antep and Kilis, defined the event of “the murder of the Antebian landowners by a Syrian tenant in the neighborhood of Ünalı” (Haberler.com, 2014 as a turning point which made the Syrian people stay in their homes and made themselves invisible due to the fear of violence (Deniz, Ekinçi, & Hülür, 2016, pp. 109-115 , as in the case of Dana, the fear or exposure of violence or physical abuse made the Syrian women prefer to be invisible by confining themselves to the home or the neighborhood- in certain aspects- as relatively safer spaces.

16 “Dışarı çıkmaya cesaret edemiyorum. Şimdi yeni yeni güvende hissetmeye başladım. İlk 10 gün hiç çıkmadım, ilk defa öyle bir şeyle karşılaştım, şaşırdım.” (Dana, November 4, 2018

17 “Hakkımız yerde kalıyor.” (the husband of Safiye

Since the husband of Dana knows conversational spoken Turkish, he was called by their Syrian friends to make them communicate with their landowner for the purpose of solving the conflict between the landowner and the tenants, a Syrian family. However, the conflict turned into a stabbing case. Dana's husband was stabbed by the landowner of another Syrian family. The result was again, another open-ended and uncertain example of "we cannot claim our rights".

The story of Zainab's son, Harun, also shows us another dimension of child work, which is generally examined as a part of economic necessities. Zainab said:

He wanted to work, he said he would work, not go to school. Why didn't he want to go to the school? While I was living in the previous neighborhood, in Yavuzlar, there, a Turkish slit the Syrian's throat, killed the boy. My son also heard about this, did not go. It was just above our street. The man was likely a psycho, a vagrant, slit the boy's throat for money. You can even find on the Internet, there are news. My son heard about it and didn't want to go to the school. He said, 'I won't go, if I do then they could do the same thing to me, I won't go.' I said, 'don't be afraid, the school is so close to us, the school is on this street.' It was so close, he didn't go. Whatever I did, he didn't go. Then, now, while we were registering for the new identities, they asked why the son is not going to the school. My son said, 'I want to work'. Then, he worked again. Now they want him to go to school but he does not go. He says I cannot handle it; he is 13 years old now. He says he cannot handle it anymore.... Therefore, my son didn't go to the school. He works at tailor. He is an apprentice. For example, he takes stuff, carries stuff, like that.¹⁸ (Son of Zaynab, Harun

18 "Çalışmak istedi, ben çalışcam ben okula gitmiyecem dedi. Nasıl gitmeyi istemedi, ben eski mahallede otururken, Yavuzlarda otururken, orda Türkiyeli Suriyeli çocuğu idam yapmıştı, boğazından kesmişti, öldürmüştü çocuğu. Benim oğlum da onu duydu, gitmedi hemen bizim sokağın üstü. Adam sapık mıydı neydi, serseridi çocuğu para için boğazını kesti. Hatta internete baksan söyler, haberlerde var. Oğlan onu duydu, gitmek istemedi. Ben gitmem dedi beni

Harun quit going to the school immediately after the news of the beheading of a Syrian boy (Milliyet, 2016) at a very close place around the neighborhood. As his mother explained above, they could not convince him to go back to school, therefore he started to work with their neighbor who is a foreman, and her mother said, “my son is going and coming with them”¹⁹. Working at neighbor’s tailor shop, and going-and-coming with them, Harun made himself “safe”.

Another similar narrative came from Mustafa, the son of Firdevs. Firdevs explained the reason of why her son, Mustafa, has not been going to school as he had gone to Syria for the Eid visit, his grandma and grandpa spoilt him too much so when he turned back, he did not want to go back to school and he decided to go to work with his father and started work at his father’s job. However, when I had chance to chatted with Mustafa, he told me that he has been bullied at school by a group of teenagers who had intimidated other children as well. Working with his father, Mustafa constructed a relatively *safe* space for himself. As to be highlighted in the following chapter, Syrians’ feeling of *fear* in this society is another dimension determining their labor pattern in Antep, which is mostly constructed on the “proximity” both in the sense of kinship relations and distance closeness.

The son of Hafsa was beaten by his teacher, after that he did not want to go to school, the last time I saw Hafsa, she was trying to change her son’s school, but she could not due to the residence limitation which does not allow to change the school outside the neighborhood. Through the period I spent time in the neighborhood, Hafsa’s son was not going to school and instead was hanging out with his mother. The children also were influenced by the

de sonra böyle yaparlar dei, gitmem. Ben dedim korkma yani okul çok yakında bize yani, bizim okul bu sokaktan...çok yakındı gitmedi. Ne kadar şey yaptım gitmedi. Sonra da şimdi işte yeni kimlikleri çıkarttığımız da dediler bu oğlun niye okula gitmiyi, dedi ben çalışmak istiyim dedi oğlum. Sonra da gene çalıştı işte. Şimdi zaten okula istiyiler de kendi gitmiyi. Çözemem diyi, şimdi artık 13 yaşında oldu. Çözemem diyi...Onun için oğlum okula gitmedi. Terzide çalışıy. Yer çırak, yerde yani, eleman yerde. Mesela işte şu işleri kaldırıy öbürüne veriyi, böyle.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

19 “Oğlum kendilerinle beraber gider kendilerinle beraber gelir.” (Zainab, November 7, 2017)

violence directly or indirectly and even they decided to find safer spaces on behalf of themselves.

4.3.2 *Invisible violence through “honor” of the Syrian women*

Due to the current racism-nationalism and social discrimination against Syrian women through “honor”, women have been concerned about accusation of dishonor. As they stated “Syrian” as a word is being used to insult themselves by the local people and becomes a swearword. The image of Syrian women, as to be indicated in the next chapter that can be identified with prostitution, the Syrian women themselves were also complaining of this image and differentiate themselves from those “bad” women.

The local women have the tendency to see the Syrian refugee women as a “rival” and “threat” based on the belief of their husbands being stolen. Therefore, a process of oppression and discrimination throughout the “honor” of the Syrian women is held by the locals. Firdevs explained this “phenomenon” like:

They are both good and bad, we say we are going to the doctor. As soon as we turn our backs, they immediately say ‘they are going for prostitution’, even as I turn around, they say ‘Syrians, all do the same work’. They talk behind me.²⁰ (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

Therefore, the Syrian women behave in a very careful way, and they are also afraid of behaving in a dishonorable way, hence dote on their children and especially their young girls, which is summed up by Melika as:

He does not let the girls go out. They cannot work outside, go to work. He says no, what are they going to do? He gets afraid due to their being young girls. We trust them; however, they are ignorant, they can be

20 “İyisi de var kötüsü de var, doktor ihtiyacımız var gidecez arkamızı döner dönmez hemen diyiler bunlar orospuluğa gidiyi arkamı dönmeden suriyeliler diyor hep aynı işte çalışiyiler hemen arkamdan konuşiyiler.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

cheated easily. They do not understand what the world is...²¹ (Melika, November 20, 2018)

Firdevs, living in Düztepe since 2014, introduced me to her neighbors. Once, she took me and my translator, Adela, to one of her Syrian neighbors, she told us that her next-door neighbor's son has been following us. She said "as we are going out everyday like that, they are getting curious of where we are going, what we are doing"²² Furthermore, as a result of inside reflection of this surveillance pressure, once we were late in heading back home, Firdevs asked me to come to her home with her since her husband gets angry at her in case she gets home after him, but in case I would be with her she believes at least she can be free of being beaten by her husband. Then, we went to home and I was to explain the situation, why Firdevs got late. He was obviously tense, but as Firdevs foresaw, he solely listened to what I said and did not utter a word.

One of the Turkish female neighbors of Selma reproached the Syrian women by accusing them of saying "Turkish women are like shit, men are like turkish delight"²³ behind the Turkish women. Selma answered as "those who say like that are whores"²⁴. That case displays the tension between the local women and the Syrians, and how the Syrian ones have been dominated through the process of becoming dishonorable.

§ 4.4 How they encounter with locals (from racism to solidarity)

Bauman claims the tension that arises from the obligation to open space up for the newcomers and the necessity of outsiders to find space for themselves, made the both sides exaggerate the differences. The established have substantially more resources to take actions depending on the rising "bias" against the outsiders, whereas the outsiders are not only the different and foreign, but also

21 "Dışarı kızlara hiç izin vermiyor. Sokakta işlemycek, işe gitmesinler. Yok der ne işleri var, genç kızlar diye korkar. Güven yok değil, ama cahiller tez kanarlar. Anlamıyler dünyanın ne olduğunu..." (Melika, November 20, 2018)

22 "Biz böyle her gün her gün çıkıp gidiyok ya, nereye gidiyik, napiyik bakiyiler..." (Firdevs, sometime during the fieldwork)

23 "Türk kadınları bokum gibi, erkekleri lokum gibi." (Selma, November 17, 2018)

24 "Bu hangi Suriyeli diyorsa o orospudur." (Selma, November 17, 2018)

seen as “invader” and “occupant” who do not deserved to be “there” (Bauman, 2002, p. 60 . “You occupied everywhere, at least don’t occupy here” one of the local Kurdish women complained about a Syrian woman, when she pushed her a little bit due to the crowdedness on bus. The encountering of the locals and Syrian women is, generally, fulfilled through the spatial bases. I have heard many arguments in which, locals positioned against the Syrian people and insult them, whereas another local positioned on the side of Syrians, against the locals taking side against the Syrians. Dana also express that:

I cannot say only one thing, there is both good and bad in everything in society. Some of them look in a very bad way as if they want to beat us. I am very comfortable here. Normally, the Syrian women’s image is bad. However, I have not experienced a bad thing. I heard something like ‘you are not good, you came to our homeland, ruined our life.’²⁵
(Dana, November 4, 2018

At the same time, the same women also told me of several events through which they were discriminated and insulted. Therefore, in the following narratives, I will categorize the encounter spaces and explore how they positioned and interrelated based on those spaces and the positions of both the locals and Syrians in this relationality which can be changed and diversified depending on from racism to solidarity.

§ 4.5 Sites of confrontations

4.5.1 *Hospitals*

The elder sister of Firdevs called her to talk with me and consult me whether there is any mechanism to complain and report the ill-treatment they were

25 “Tek bir şey söyleyemem, toplumda herşeyin iyisi de var kötüsü de var bazısı bakışı çok kötü bakışı bile dövecekmiş gibi. Burada çok rahatım. Normalde Suriyelilere karşı kadınları çok kötü bir imajla anıldı. Ama bana karşı kötü bir şey öyle bir şey olmadı. Siz iyi değilsiniz bizim vatanımıza gelmişsiniz, yaşamımızı mahvetmişsiniz gibi şeyler duydum.” (Dana, November 4, 2018

exposed to in the hospitals and she said “they behave as if we are dogs”²⁶. The most frequently used argument by the locals against the Syrian women particularly in the hospitals, public transportation and markets, bazars- where they become visible more than other parts of the urban landscape was “you are giving so many births”. The second “accusation” was “you occupied everywhere” which helps us to considerably understand the spatially based unrest of the locals towards the Syrian people. As explained in the second chapter, the temporary protection status of the Syrians’ provides them a certain amount of rights and access to some services. There are dissident arguments over whether they have Kızılay cards²⁷ or not. Some says that they have while others say that they don’t. I asked those who doesn’t have such a card. They, particularly younger women, think that it is because they have only one child. According to them, this card is not provided for those who have only one child. I heard from several women that they were supposed to have at least 3-4 children to obtain a Kızılay card. Although they are accused and insulted by the locals for having too many children, as one of the criteria to obtain Kızılay card, it is obligatory to have at least 4 children and not to be involved in formal employment (Kızılay, 2017 , they are, in a sense, forced to have at least 3 or 4 children to get a Kızılay card. I interviewed with some women who stated that they received the card as soon as they had their 3rd or 4th babies. It shows how the legal regulations have a prominent role over the women’s burden. Those who are above the certain age or have children 18+ aged cannot receive the salary, since they are evaluated in the category of those who are “able to work” by the state authorities. However, at this point, the most vital issue is that those people fled from the war and violence which led them to be exposed to extreme conditions and situations during the war and the forced migration processes. Therefore, almost all I met have a range of illness or chronic diseases that make them unable to work and for some, even keep routine daily activities. Selma explained their experiences in the hospitals as follows:

26 “Köpek gibi davranıyorlar.” the elder sister of Firdevs.

27 Commonly known as “Kızılay card”. ESSN- Emergency Social Safety Net (SUY- Yabancılaraya Yönelik Sosyal Uyum Yardımı. For details, please see <http://www.kizilay.org.tr/kizilaykart/>

I told you before, we came here, he got badly sick, he has high blood pressure, one of his kidneys does not work. Everyday, everyday, he has to go to the hospital. Since my Turkish is better than my husband, I go to the hospital. It was very difficult when we initially arrived, they shouted us, the doctors shouted us. For instance, when we go to the health care center, they shouted us. I mean, they mistreat us. Some talk too much, for instance, complain about us. ‘Why are you coming here everyday?’ ‘OMG, as if we are all meant to be reserved for Syrians!’, ‘Syrians are always sick’...I feel offended. Once, I had already had a quarrel with one of the health care centers. I said, ‘are Syrians coming for no reason?’. If one catches the flu, all other members of the family also catch the flu. For example, they get sick. If one of my children gets sick, I have 3, the other snivels, the other coughs, the other gets a sore throat. Look, look, they say it seems like the Syrians go to the hospital for no reason.²⁸ (Selma, November 17, 2018)

Aisha also explained the treatment they were exposed to:

We feel like outsiders, they insult us, call us ‘filthy Syrians’. The drivers say, ‘the Syrians’ money is precious [as if ours isn’t]. They insult us in the hospitals, the nurses say, ‘you annoy us, you crowd the place up.

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- 28 “Evelden mesela dedim sana, burya geldik çok çok rahatsız oldu, tansiyon var böbrekleri bir tane durmuş, her gün her gün, hastaneye alatecek kendini benim türkçem kocamdan daha güzel yani ben giderim. ilk geldiğimiz zaman çok zordu, bize bağırdırlardı, doktorlar bize bağırdırlar, mesela sağlık ocağına giderik bize bağırdırlar. Yani bize ihanet yaparlar. Bazı bir çok konuşurlar mesela sana ihanet yaparlar. ‘Sen her gün burda ne geziyisin?’, ‘Yarabbi sanki bizim işimiz verilmiş hep Suriyeliler’, ‘Suriyelilerin hep birileri haste’... İnsanın zoruna geliyi. Zaten bir kere sağlık ocağıyla döğüştüm ben yazın dedim bu suriyeliler geliyiler boşa mı geliyiler. Yani insan grip olursa aile hepsi grip olur. Meselan hasta olurlar. Benim çocuklarım bir tane grip olursa mesela 3 tane, diğer bir tane burnu akıyı, diğer bir tane öksürüyi bir tane boğazı, üç tane elletirim. Bak bak sanki suriyeliler boşu boşuna sebepsiz gidiyor diyorlar.” (Selma, November 17, 2018)

They also interfere in our children after you've given birth.²⁹ (Aisha, November 7, 2018)

Since those Syrian families fled from the war, they, except the smaller children who were born in Turkey after migration, all had experienced the war conditions. Some were somehow hurt or their family members, relatives were killed or wounded. I, myself, heard about several cyst cases, many diseases. Particularly, there were also children who were born during the war, defined by Zainab pointing her little daughter as "this was born to war"³⁰ after she told the day she gave birth she said "keep away those days from us"³¹. Her daughter has some psychological problems, problems with her memory. She immediately forgets whatever she is supposed to learn, even though she is 7 years old. All these health problems compelled them to go to the hospital more frequently than ordinary people. More so, as they are crowded families, as Selma explained the issue above. On the other hand, as people who are to share the same health care center with Syrians and the employees of those centers can easily get angry towards the Syrians through the arguments or accusations highlighted above, without taking into consideration of their distinctive positions arising from the war and forced migration conditions.

Regarding the "issue" of the Syrian women's giving "too many births", Zainab made her own points of giving birth and the ill-treatment towards themselves in the hospitals or health care centers as:

If this child is born, I won't give more. I mean, I won't give birth [again]. I will have 4, if I have 2 girls and 2 boys, it is enough then. I have only one girl now, since she is only girl, I said I would like to have one more girl. My daughter is single, pity, my daughter is alone, I love girls. It's not known yet, it is only two-month, it's [gender] not known yet. When I went to this maternity hospital...there, the nurse says to

29 "Yabancı gibi hissediyoruz, hakaret ediyorlar, 'pis Suriyeliler' diyorlar. Sofor suriyelilerin malı kıymetli diyor. Hastanelerde hakaret ediyorlar, hemşireler hep kafamız şişti doluştunuz buraya. Doğurduğun çocuğa da karışiyiler." (Aisha, November 7, 2018)

30 "Bu savaşın içine doğdu." (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

31 "O günler gitsin, gelmesin." also anonymously used by some other women.

Syrian women like ‘you are like wolves’ and ‘you know nothing other than yacking and also you know nothing other than giving birth’ she says. When they talk like that, we feel offended. I mean, now... there's a woman there, and she said ‘I have five daughters but no son. I want a son or nothing else’ she said. ‘so that I'm giving birth, may God give me a son.’³² (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

Moreover, at hospitals, the Syrian women occasionally encounter with the translators asking for money for the translation services which is supposed to be free for Syrian refugees.³³

4.5.2 *Markets, bazars, grocers*

Firdevs told me that when she first came to Antep - even though she was literate- since she did not know the Turkish currency, one of the grocers located in the neighborhood deceived her by getting more money than the shopping costs. However, she noticed the situation after a while, when she could understand the currency.

Particularly, in the cases in which Syrian people are positioned as “customer”, the Syrian people may become the “favorite” costumer in the eyes of the store, or grocer owners located in the neighborhood. However, this “empathy” towards Syrians may immediately change, if the Syrians become the

32 “Bu çocuğum da doğarsa ondan kere getirmem. Doğurmam yani. 4 tane var o zaman çocuğum 2 kız 2 oğlan olursa yeter. Bir kızım var şimdi ben tek diyerekten ben bir çocuk yani bir kızım daha olsun dedim. Kızım tek yazık ya, kızım tek yalnız ben kız severim. Daha belli değil iki aylık daha belli değil. İşte bu doğum hastanesine gittiğimde...orda hemşire şöyle yapıyı Suriyeli kadınlara aynen diyi ‘kurt gibisiniz’ diyi ‘car car konuşmadan başka da bir şey bilmiyisiniz bir de doğurmaktan başka da bir şey bilmiyisiniz’ diyi. Bak işte böyle söylediklerinde bizim de zorumuza geliyi. Yani şimdi sonuçta... oraya bir kadın geldi, kadın dedi ki benim beş tane kızım var hiç oğlum yoktur. Bir oğlum olsun başka bir şey istemiyim diyi. Onun için doğuruyim ki belki Allahım bana bir oğlan verir diyi.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

33 Or in a similar vein, even they got messages from the state authorities in which it was strictly emphasizing the coal that is distributed is completely free of charge; the men who carried the coal may asking for extra money from the Syrian women and in case they rejected to give, the men did not distribute the whole sacks of coal. If they accept to pay money, they give extra sacks. Those kinds of groups can be easily derived from the vulnerability of the Syrian refugees.

owner of the market or grocer. In this case, the Syrian becomes the “rival” who can “steal” from both the local and Syrian customers. Firdevs told me of a tragic event which happened in Düztepe neighborhood. An armed clash occurred between the local store owner and the Syrian one, consequently, the Syrian market owner was forced to close his market. However, this could be the optimistic scenario for Syrians, if the market was not plundered by both the other Syrians and locals, before the closure.

The owners of the clothing shops I talked to during my fieldwork, were very satisfied with the Syrian people living in Antep, since they stated that the Syrians composed the biggest part of their customer profile, as they also felt the “general displeasure” towards the Syrians around the city.

4.5.3 *Neighborhood*

4.5.3.1 Neighbors

“As a Syrian refugee, I behave faintheartedly. We communicate through the body language, I only approach [them] if they behave well, I can barely approach”³⁴ Hafsa stated in order to explain her experiences and relations with the local neighbors, in general. She, obviously, expressed her “hesitation” and “caution” towards her neighbors.

When I asked Zainab whether there is anything she wants to ask me at the end of the interview, she voiced in a concern that one of her Turkish neighbors claimed “it is asked to the landowners of the Syrians, if they are pleased with the tenants, then they can stay, but if they are not, then that family will be deported”³⁵, which strongly shows us how “Syrian refugees” and their “fear of deportation” are instrumentalized by the local people, neighbors, to oppress the Syrian people- as emphasized in the previous chapters- as a local reflection of what and how the AKP, and the other opponent political parties instrumentalize in the domestic and foreign politics.

34 “Suriyeli göçmen olarak çekine çekine davranıyorum. İşaretle anlaşıyoruz. Onlar iyi davrandıkça ancak yaşatabiliyorum.” (Hafsa, November 8, 2018)

35 “Ev sahibine soracaklar, eğer kiracından memnunsan, kalacaklar, memnun değilse, o aileyi gönderecekler.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

In case where the Syrians within themselves become “rivals”, for instance, towards an aid distribution, they may easily compete, therefore, the pre-existing relationalities or “commonalities” among them, can transform and corrupt through the aid distribution process which is not built on the “rights based” approach. Selma compared her local neighbors to the Syrians in general through a certain case:

Those who are comrade, were more comrade than the Syrians. If any aid comes, they may hide it. They hide it, for instance, yesterday they were registering for the aid, I said that they registered for aid, I saw the neighbors gone, I said I could not go, my husband did not let me go, he himself also did not go. I thought to tell the neighbors. Yesterday, they came here and brought a blue card. They asked whether there are any Syrian people around here, and they distributed the cards. The woman told them that they were no Syrian here, no one is here so on. To me, I lived in three neighborhoods, within these three neighborhoods, I saw the Turkish people better than the Syrians. I mean the women of.³⁶ (Selma, November 17, 2018)

Selma, as an Arabic Syrian woman, surprisingly was speaking in Turkish fair enough to communicate with me. As long as Adela, my translator, tried to translate what I said to Selma, Selma insistently replied in Turkish in Antebian accent. Actually, me and Adela was shocked in front of this young woman, since she was not even allowed to go out by her husband. Therefore, we could not make sense how she succeeded to speak Turkish in a very limited space and time. Finally, we learnt that her neighbors help her to learn Turkish as much as they came to her home. “the neighbors came to me, were speaking, I

36 “Yoldaş olan mesela Suriyelilerden daha yoldaştlar. Bir şey gelirse mesela yardım gelirse bir şey gelirse sanki dersin saklarlar. Sakliyeler meselan ben evel gündü yardım yazıyıldı, ben dedim eşim geliyik komşuları görüm gidiyim, yazma var, ben gidemem kocam beni bırakmayı o da gitmez ben dedim yazık aleme söyliyim, Evel gün buraya geldiler, mavi kagıt getirdiler. Suriyeli var bize söyleyin kartları dağıtmışlar. Kadın söylemiş yok burda yok burda kimse yoktur bilmem ney yani. Böyle sana söyliyim. Bana göre 3 mahallede oturdum, 3 mahalleden Türkleri Suriyelilerden daha iyi gördüm. Kadınları yani.” (Selma, November 17, 2018)

learned from them...they taught, helped me. They were coming everyday, 'this is pillow, this is bed' by showing"³⁷ Selma told how she learned Turkish with the help of her neighbors.

4.5.3.2 Landowners

With the influx of the Syrians, several empty "houses" were filled by the Syrians in the suburban neighborhood of Antep or the landowners moved to a relatively "better" houses and rented their homes to the Syrians. However, as a well-known fact, the rents increased with the arrival of the Syrians, which sometimes led the locals to blame the Syrian refugees on the rising rents. Firdevs described her landowner as a "good" person, however she added "we pay their rent, take care of the home, why wouldn't they be good, but in case we were late to pay the rent, we see what would happen then"³⁸. Once, she also dramatically expressed the relationality as "the good one is us, if we pay, but if we get late a couple of days, then..." which explains how the relationality based on the interest depends on the "continuity" of "exploitation of Syrians". In case the Syrians can regularly pay the amount that the landowners demand, "Syrians are good", however, in case of vice versa, Syrians can easily fall a victim to nationalism, hate speech, racism or xenophobia.

Another case which displays the tension between the Syrian tenants, landowner and local neighbors comes from Zaynab:

Not only me, they do not like Syrians at all. Now, we moved up-stairs, another Syrian family moved to the downstairs [flat] again. They made so many rumors like 'you give your home to Syrians,' 'we do not let you live here' so on. I ignored them all, talked to the landowner. My landowner told me to disregard them. She said they could not do anything whether they called the police. They even told me that they could call the police and they could dismiss me so on. Then, I told to the landowner, I said, 'I plan to move from here, the neighbors are doing like

37 "Komşular bize gelirlerdi, konuşurlar onlardan öğrendim...bana öğrettiler yardım ettiler. Her gün gelirlerdi, bu yastık, bu döşek göstererek." (Selma, November 17, 2018)

38 "Kirasını veriyok, evine bakıyok, neden iyi olmasın, ama bir kirayı geciktirelim, o zaman gör." (Firdevs, sometime during the fieldwork)

that to me'. My landowner said, 'you cannot move anywhere as long as I do not eject you.' She said 'I am pleased with you; you are taking good care of the house. There is a difference from the tenant to tenant.' Every time she comes to the house, she looks around at what I did to her house, what changed, whether I painted the house. They did not want the tenants living down-stairs, they are Arabic, they do not know Turkish at all as we know. I mostly help the woman for translation. They did not want them either. They did not want them at the very most. Since we are Turkmen, they did not do that much thing to us. However, they did not want them at all. Look, everyday, they find an excuse, one day they say the children were screaming, the children of the woman have never shut up, this is child, the children are small, how could the woman make them shut up. They may be ill, how can she shut them up? And also, the identity card is an old one, so the woman cannot take them to the doctor. Now the woman will register for a new identity card, then she can take them to the doctor as she wants. She could not register yet, she consulted, set an appointment. Waiting for a response, waiting for a message on her phone.³⁹ (Zaynab, November 7, 2017)

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- 39 "Tek bana değil, suriyelileri tüm sevmiyorlar. Şimdi biz yukarı üst kata çıktık, alt kata yine suriyeli geldi, onda biraz çok şey yaptılar yani dedikodu yaptılar ki sen suriyeli kodun seni burda oturtmazdık şöyle böyle diye. Ben hiç dinlemedim, ben evsahibimlen konuştum. Ev sahibim dedi hiç kendileriyle muhattap olma dedi. Yani şey yapamazlar dedi, dedi isterse polis getirsinler, hatta bana da söylediler yani polis getirtiriz seni attırırık şöyle böyle diye. Sonra ben ev sahibiyle konuştum, bak ben burdan çıkmayı düşünüyüm böyle böyle yapıyı komşular dedim. Ev sahibim sen bir yere çıkamazsın ben seni bir yere çıkarmadığım sürece sen bir yere çıkaman dedi. Ben senden razıyım dedi, eve iyi bakıyın, sonuçta kiracıdan kiracıya da fark var. Her gelmesinde zaten evine bakar durur eve ne yapmışım evi netmişim, boyaladım mı. Aşağıdaki kiracıları da hiç istemediler onlar da araptır, bizim gibi türk hiç bilmiyiler. Tercüman olarak çokluk ben yani ben çokluk zamanlarda kadına ben yardımcı olurum. Onları da istemiyorlardı, en çok da onları istemiyorlardı. Şimdi biz türkmen olduğumuz için fazla o kadar bize şey yapamadılar. Ama onları hiç istemiyiler. Bak, her gün bir bahane buluyiler, bir gün çocuğu bağıriymiş çocuğini hiç susmuyormuş kadının, çocuk bu küçük çocuk yani kadın nasıl şey yapsın, belki hasta yani sustursun yani. Bir de kimlik eski kimlik olduğu için doktora da götürmeyi kadın. Şimdi yeni kimliği çıkartacak kadın ondan sonra istediği gibi doktora götürtebilir. Çıkartamadı daha işte başvurmuş randevu almış. Cevap bekliyor, mesaj bekliyor telefonuna." (Zainab, November 7, 2017)

4.5.4 Rumors

When the women were asked if they had any comment or question for me at the end of the interview, some immediately asked “will they send us back to Syria?” It was obvious that they had serious concerns and were afraid *to be deported*, which proves how much they feel *discomfort* due to being *temporary* in Turkey. Some women directly asked, “are they going to send us?”, or “if we do not acquire the citizenship, they will be deporting us, do you have any idea on that? Even, the woman who gushed over Turkey’s acceptance of themselves, was in concern of this “deportability” of the Syrian people. All these feelings of fear, concern, uneasiness regarding *deportability*, and the feeling of being *temporariness* have been reproduced by the rumors all around them and made them more and more uneasy. Zainab talked about her fears of deportation through the statements below:

What I ask you is whether everyone tells the truth regarding our return. We are so afraid of that. On other issues, thank God. Cross my heart, everybody is talking. Those who are working at Kızılay. Nevertheless, we are so happy that he [Erdoğan] won and did not deport us. If Kılıçdaroğlu had won, we would be gone. By now, he would have thrown us to Syria. Everybody has a house here, everybody opened factories here. Honestly, I don’t know what would happen.⁴⁰ (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

§ 4.6 Invisibility as a way of survival

In the study of Deniz, Ekinci and Hüllür, the Syrian women, as a survival strategy disguise their Syrian identity by tying their headscarves as Turkish women

40 “Benim sana sorduğum şu ki yani herkes doğru mu söyliydi bizim burdan geri dönmemizi. Biz ondan çok korkuyok, başka çok şükür. Valla herkeş söylüyorlarmış. Bu Kızılayında çalışanlar. Gene de çok sevindik kendi kazandı, bizi şey yapmadı diye. Şimdi o Kılıçdaroğlu kazansaydı biz gitmiştik. Şimdiye bizi Suriye’ye atmıştı. Herkeş burda ev aldı, herkeş burda fabrika açtı. Valla nasıl olacak bilmiyim.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

do. (Deniz, Ekinci, & Hülür, 2016 . In a similar vein, during my fieldwork, although I did not observe or hear this type of disguise, other similar strategies, particularly by Turkmen and the Kurdish women who know Turkish were consulted to protect themselves from the insults and violence. Huda explained her first strategy of survival as pretending not to have heard what others said. She stated “we don’t give into them; we don’t want the trouble”⁴¹.

Turkmens can pretend as if they are Turkish thanks to their knowledge of Turkish by disguising of their Syrian identity, mostly when they get involved in locals through public transportation or bazars. Firdevs once overheard a conversation among the locals during her trip on public transportation. They were complaining about Syrians. She pretended as if she was a local and even interfered into the “issue” and “justified” the locals’ arguments on the Syrians.

Syrian Kurdish women were not that much disposed to disclose their “national” or “ethnic” identity, and moreover, they may gloss over by introducing themselves as Turkmen relying on their knowledge of Turkish. At the beginning of the conversation with the Kurdish women, they did not tend to reveal their identity but when we started to talk about how they knew or learned Turkish, it suddenly appeared that they were Kurdish. However, I paid attention not to broach those subjects if they have no tendency or intention to speak about it. Therefore, there were also other women who presented themselves as Turkmen but were not actually Turkmen.

Due to the all processes explained throughout this chapter, all these Syrian women preferred to be at home or at most in the neighborhood to become invisible from the rest of the city. Thus, they also took participation in economic activities which can be fulfilled at home. They, themselves, preferred to be at home both as a protection and survival strategy. Düztepe, compared to Tepebaşı gave much more “chance” to the Syrians to have time around the neighborhood or getting involved in pistachio opening thanks to the neighborhood’s including more social networks and solidarity among the neighbors. However, as soon as these networks and solidarity are restricted and wither, the Syrian women stay at home more.

41 “Çok şeylerine uymuyuk, yani diyiik başımızı ağrıtmıyık.” (Huda, November 26, 2018)

In this chapter, I attempted to show how the fears of violence, racism and oppression experiences of the women played a significant role both in the labor process of Syrian women and in their daily life. Through anti-refugee racism and gender-based domination- honor- Syrian women have been oppressed by the host community. These women, to protect themselves and survive in this racist and violent environment, preferred to restrict themselves, except the necessary functional cases, at their homes or in their neighborhoods. Therefore, their incorporation with the informal labor market is also shaped and restrained by this *preference*. Invisibility appears as one of the most important survival tactics of Syrian women against the social environment structured by anti-refugee racism and gender-based violence. Therefore, in the following chapter, I try to show how this social environment and their survival tactics intersect with the labor processes they involved in.

Labor Processes at Home and in the Neighborhood

In this chapter, I, firstly, try to provide a brief socio-economic, cultural and class background of Syrian women in the pre-war period. Then, I will focus on the women's labor processes at home and in the neighborhood. Along with this chapter, the forced migration experiences, life in the neighborhood, their relationship with their neighbors, their articulation into the informal labor market, which pieces and activities they engaged in will be introduced by referring to bargaining patriarchy, social networks, invisible labor, informality and flexibility as analyzing concepts. At the end of the chapter, I will also discuss the women's subjectivities by focusing on how they differentiate themselves from the other women and the countless interwoven burdens of the migrant women.

Through the pre-war period in Syria, the socio-economic structure of the lower-class women in the society was substantially shaped depending on the classical patriarchy. The employment of women was limited and prevented both by the sociocultural norms and practices, and some certain legal regulations (Buecher & Aniyamuzaala, 2016, p. 4). The middle-class women in Syria have undertaken the "white collar" jobs by 40%, which might change based on the geographic areas because of the educational, class and cultural differences. Whereas, in the rural areas, the women mostly engaged in agricultural labor force by 59%. The labor participation of women increased in public sector but only for the women who are relatively high-educated, whereas the

women with lower education had only chance in the informal sector (Buecher & Aniyamuzaala, 2016, p. 12 . The participation rate was high in public sector for educated urban women. They worked as teachers, midwives, delivery nurses and so on. Women in Syria participated in “gendered occupational segregation” in parallel to social and cultural norms (Callahan, et al., 2017, pp. 56-57 . In the same vein, as a result of patriarchal structure and gender relations in society, the labor of lower-class women has been evaluated as a part of social order and life flow. Therefore, most of the women could easily internalize this as a reality and see the invisible unpaid labor as their natural duties which being a housewife necessitates. Due to the *sectarianism* and *state feminism* in pre-war period of Syria, there was a positional difference between Sunni or women from rural and disadvantaged areas and Alevi or Shiita and urban women (Abu-Assab, 2017, pp. 17-19 .

Aleppo, being a commercial and industrial hub of the country historically, had paved the way for the lower-class women to work at home as pieceworkers. The Syrian women I interviewed with were from Aleppo and some of them have worked at home as pieceworkers at least once in their lives. Most of these women were from the suburban neighborhoods of Aleppo city. Regarding the socio-economic life in the pre-war period, almost all said that they had better conditions in Aleppo. They used to pay almost nothing for bills. The rent of the houses and cost of living were fair enough for them to pay and afford, while some of the women had lived in their own houses. Therefore, they mostly emphasized the comfort of life and dwellings in Aleppo comparing Antep. They also highlighted that even though women did not work, the income of men was enough for the families to live on. They frequently repeated that a woman does not work in their society.

As soon as we started to talk about the labor conditions, hardships in Antep and particularly going back to Syria, what forced migration means for them, how they feel and define it, suddenly appeared, even if it has been 3 to 6 years since the women immigrated to Turkey. The most remarkable statements were “we came from nothing”, “we had nothing when we initially arrived”, “we come up through the ranks”, “we came only with our clothes on

our back”¹. When these statements are taken into consideration, involuntary nature of the migration and the element of displacement can be seen in the experiences of Syrian refugees. First arrival process was evaluated anonymously as “hard” and “miserable”. By their own words, “[w]e did not arbitrarily come here”². They also highlighted the violence and fear of death by saying “we had neither safety of life nor livelihood, a bomb exploded next to our home”³. Some of them even lost their family members, one lost her husband, the other woman’s husband got hurt by the armed attacks of ISIS. Zainab conveyed her conditions during the war:

Our neighbors, relatives were killed during the bombing. They died in the war, during the bombing. I experienced so many things. I experienced so many things. How can I say? It was like I was living at this home, a bomb exploded at our back street, it was like we saw the death, and came back. I mean it is very difficult, when it is bombed by the airplanes, the school just across my home was bombed. I don’t know, we saw the death, and came back from there. She was living next to the cemetery, and there was a school next to the cemetery, the school was also bombed, that day I was going to the bazaar, a bomb was dropped. It is like that, we had so many things, we passed from between those bombs.⁴ (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

Answers to the question on whether they would like to go back to Syria in case the war is over were striking: “it will be homesickness again”, “it means starting over”, “the same things will happen again”. These answers show the difficulties of the forced migration. It means starting over for them. By starting over they

1 Anonymously used by most of the women I interviewed with.

2 “Buraya keyfimizden gelmedik” anonymously said.

3 “Ne yaşam ne maddi durum kaldı, bomba düştü evin yakınına.” (Sevde, November 3, 2018)

4 “Komşularımıza işte tanıdıklarımız vuruşta gitti. İşte zaten bu savaşta gitti bombalarda. Ben çok şeyler geçirdim. Ben çok şeyler geçirdim. Ben nasıl diyim, ben sanki bu evde oturuyom gibi arka sokağımıza bomba düştü, sanki ölümü gördük geldik. Yani çok zor, uçaklarla bomba attığında, bizim hemen evin karşısında okul vardı ya okulu vurdu. Yani bilmiyim ölümü gördük geldik orda. Bu zaten mezarlığın yakınında oturiyidi, mezarlığın yanında da okul vardı zaten okulu da vurdular o gün ben pazara mı gidiyodum, bomba düştü. İşte böyle çok şeyler geçirdik, o bombaların arasından çok geçtik.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

mostly referred to finding an appropriate home and especially relatively decent jobs for their male members of household.

Beside the main reason of forced migration from Syria to Turkey, which is the war conditions, the accompanying specific reasons were mainly economic factors and family reunification. Antep is a substantial industrial center in the region so that it has a pull effect on Syrians. Yet, it is also a center of attraction since it has had historical, cultural and commercial relationships with Aleppo. Syrian Kurdish women already knew a little bit of Turkish since they engaged with this language before, through their relatives who emigrated from Turkey to Aleppo. When they were forced to immigrate to Antep, they found a chance to improve their Turkish. As a city, according to these women's narratives, Antep resembled Aleppo in terms of architecture, shops and so on. Women of Düztepe stated that Düztepe is like Hamidiye, one of the suburbs of Aleppo, where they emigrated from. It is a well-known fact that the İnönü Street of Antep, which is now full of the Syrian craftsmen, was a place that previously known as the *Iranian Bazaar*. It had been covered by Iranian shops. These shops were replaced by the Syrians because they have already had a historical connection with those craftsmen and streets.

Some women have also emphasized the importance of the living conditions, regarding the expensiveness of İstanbul and İzmir compared to Antep as they heard from their relatives living in those cities. Moreover, some of their relatives have turned back from those cities due to the high living standards.

§ 5.1 Work as life

Every migration is, at the same time, an economic migration, even if it begins as a forced migration. This illustrates the interwoven processes of the social dimensions. It shows how the migration can diversify through the process of economic concerns. It does not make sense to strictly categorize and dichotomize migration through voluntariness and non-voluntariness but taking them within an integrality (Faist, 2003, p. 48). The successive economically motivated migrations of Nesrin and her family indicate that it is not possible to analyze this social phenomenon unilaterally, without exploring its intersections with other aspects and/or dimensions.

Among my interviewees, only three of the women had migration experiences within Turkey more than once. Others have immigrated directly to Antep. The women who had more than one migration experience within Turkey, told that their husbands found a job in Antep easier than the other regional cities, such as Maraş, Adana, Mardin and Malatya. They emphasized that the job opportunities of Antep are better compared to these cities. Nesrin told their continuous migration as follows:

First, we were in Maraş, then we came here. Since there were no job opportunities there, we cannot pay the rent without a job. Here I have sisters-brothers. They help me in any case. They help us to find home and job. They said you can work and manage yourselves. We have stayed in Maraş for 3 years. My husband was working at a construction site. Then, we went to Mardin, and worked in the field there. We were planting corn seeds. Then, we went to Maraş again. Then, we came here, we could not continue there because of the rent so on. We came here. We went to a camp; they said no place available and we came here. A camp of Maraş... We cannot afford the rent because of no job. Affording electricity, water, rent, children's needs, we could not endure, we could not breathe there. We directly came to this house.⁵ (Nesrin, November 23, 2018.

The feeling aroused from constant migration is also described by Nesrin as:

We left our homes; we lost our lives the future of the children are lost. We cannot live, settle in one city. When we settle, no job left, we had to make the children leave their schools and go somewhere else, then

5 “Önce Maraş’taydık, sonra buraya geldik. Orda iş kalmadığı için tek başına kirayı veremem iş olmadan. Burda kardeşlerim var. Onlar böyle bir durum olursa bana yardım ederler. Evi bulup işi bulup bize yardımcı oldular. Siz çalışıp kendinizi idare edebilirsiniz dediler. 3 yıl kaldık Maraş’ta. Eşim inşaatta çalışıyordu. Sonra Mardin’e çıktık. Orda arazide, tarlada çalıştık. Mısır ekiyorduk. Sonra tekrar Maraş’a gittik. Sonra buraya geldik orda devam edemedik kira falan. Buraya geldik. Kampa gittik orda yer kalmadığını söylediler ve buraya geldik. Maraş’ın kampına. İş olmadığı için kirayı veremiyorduk. Elektrik, suyu, kirayı vermek, çocukları yaşatmak, dayanamadık çok boğulduk orda. Direk bu eve geldik.” (Nesrin, November 23, 2018)

we cannot settle there. In this season, children, people, families come to Antep and settle in Antep, their children go to the school, they continue at school, but my children got scattered from one place to another. This is a very tiring life.⁶ (Nesrin, November 23, 2018)

She got exhausted due to the hardships of multiple migration experiences. In each one, she had to set up her home again and again. Therefore, consequently she summarized her situation as “I have just got rid of the war here”⁷. By “here” she meant Antep -for that time- the last station for her and her family. She had relatively better conditions in Antep. In the same vein, Malika shared similar feelings. She experienced another difficulty, a conflict with her ex-landowner and domestic living conditions. Therefore, they both had the same feeling of *already getting rid of the war*, which also shows how experiencing more than one migration seeking for job opportunities and places to live makes people feel like experiencing a war.

Among the Syrian women, one of the known reasons of why and how the Syrians settled in Düztepe is based-on some rumors that the residents of the Düztepe neighborhood were helping the Syrians. For Tepebaşı, the women mostly stated that they moved there with the advice of their relatives or to be close to their relatives, whereas some claimed that they can barely find an affordable empty home here. In the earlier stages of life in Turkey, as a survival strategy, almost all families lived with their relatives or other close families in a very small, one or two roomed houses. Through time, they have separated their houses and start to live as nuclear families for several reasons. They relieved in terms of their economic situations to some extent. They had more

6 “Evimizden çıktık hayatımız kayboldu, çocukların geleceği de kayboldu. Bir şehirde oturamıyoruz, yerleşemiyoruz. Yerleştiğimizde iş kalmıyor, çocukların okulu bırakıp başka bir yere gitmek zorunda kalıyoruz, yerleşemiyoruz bir yerde. Bu dönemde, çocuklar, insanlar, aileler Antep’e geliyorlar, yerleşiyorlar, çocukları okula gidiyorlar, devam ediyorlar okula, ama benim çocuklarım mahvoldu bir yerden bir yere. Çok yorucu bir hayat.” (Nesrin, November 23, 2018)

7 “Burda yeni savaştan çıktım ben.” (Nesrin, November 23, 2018)

children and severe conflicts among those (and adults occurred. Huda described it, saying “it was crowded, they had [other families] 5 children. We moved here, when the number of children increased in the shared home.”⁸

The prevalence of informal jobs and employment in Turkey, particularly in Antep⁹, facilitates the articulation of the disadvantaged groups to the informal labor market. Since, home-based piecework is a flexible production process in the informal sector of Antep, it has already been widespread among women of Antep to work at home as a pieceworker. Mostly Kurdish and lower-class women of Antep’s suburbs are the main components of the informal labor market of home-based piecework. They are mostly engaged in cracking, opening and picking pistachios, cracking walnuts or almonds. With the arrival of Syrian people in Antep beginning from 2011, the informal labor market has also articulated the lower-class Syrian refugee women living in suburbs of Antep, but through discriminatory and exploitative practices, such as lower wages, worse working conditions and so on. In this case, the neighborhood and the Syrian males’ working sector are also one of the main determinants of the Syrian women’s economic activities. On the one hand, the current economic activities and working conditions of the local women around the neighborhood can ostensibly help to understand the ways in which the Syrian women can also engage in the informal labor market. On the other hand, a set of new conditions and distinctions can immediately appear through the socially and politically vulnerable position of Syrian women.

§ 5.2 Irregularity: Flexible and uncertain

The most outstanding and de facto characteristics of the integration process of the Syrian refugee women into the informal home-based labor market is irregularity- both as a result of flexible characteristics of neoliberal production processes and labor market and uncertain dynamic characteristics of both female labor and Syrians’ status. Therefore, all women I interviewed with have

8 “Bereket kalabalık oldu, 5 uşağı, çocuklar çok olunca buraya çıktık.” (Huda, November 26, 2018)

9 Discussed in Chapter 2: Governing Migrant Labor: State, Legality and Local Capital.

been still working, worked for a while or have just given a break to work for a range of reasons that I will be highlighting below. All these processes of entry to, break and exit from the informal labor market enabled us to understand the relationality and intersectionality of labor with other dynamics that influence the lives of Syrian refugee women, particularly those who settled in Antep.

5.2.1 *How to enter*

The Syrian women I interviewed with have been living in two suburban neighborhoods of Antep, named Düztepe and Tepebaşı. Tepebaşı has a relatively small Syrian population compared to Düztepe. Those who live in Tepebaşı neighborhood did not engage in opening pistachios but the piecework that they can access easily without exiting from their neighborhood. The duty of gathering and distributing the pieces was generally undertaken by adult men or elder children working at the atelier or factory. Those women whose husbands or elder children bring the pieces from their workplaces, in some cases, distributed them to her own female neighbors. The males of the family represented the outside. They distributed the home-based piecework. On the other hand, as Düztepe locals, mostly Kurdish women, engaged in opening pistachio, cracking walnut, cracking or picking almond, they have already integrated into the home-based informal labor market, since there are small shops, selling those nuts located in their suburb neighborhood, women can reach in a “safe” and easy way. Thus, Syrian women living in Düztepe may easily observe these processes, while the local women carry the sacks or open them. They could observe the men¹⁰ who carry the nuts for the pieceworkers. They could enter the informal labor market of opening pistachio or other related nuts. Therefore, in case that the pieces can be obtained within the borders of the neighborhood, women can move to the extent that the neighborhood spreads.

10 While I was walking around the neighborhood, I also saw pistachio seller man walking around and carrying pistachio to the women with his hand truck.



Figure 5.1 A photo from the neighborhood of Tepebaşı

When the neighborhood of women is changed, the type of piecework can also be changed, because of proximity, not going out of the neighborhood. The sacks of pistachio or nuts can be heavy or carrying may be costly, and more importantly, safety is prioritized to survive in a foreign country by the Syrians as a refugee or outsider.



Figure 5.2 A photo from the neighborhood of Düztepe

To enter the informal opening pistachio labor market, every newcomer needs a guarantor from the neighborhood who had worked before or have already been working with that pistachio seller. Social networks help us to understand how the Syrian women integrated themselves into the informal labor market

of opening pistachio piecework. All women, except one, got involved in opening pistachio through with their neighbors' being guarantor for them, mostly the neighbors from the locals. This shows how the neighborhood relations are foregrounded in the social relations for socio-economic integration of Syrians. However, this concept cannot explain all the experiences of Syrian women. Reyhane told me that, since they had no local connection to be a guarantor, her daughter talked to the pistachio seller, and told their situation and poor conditions, so the seller man decided to test them. They had no connections with neither Syrians nor local people to provide them a reference to enter this opening pistachio job. They were helpless and powerless in bargaining, which shows that they can accept any conditions the seller demands. The Syrian candidates who had no connections with anyone who could be a guarantor for themselves had to play for "sympathy" of the sellers. However, there is also a risk that the seller can move or shut down the shop and the Syrian women cannot get their money since they cannot trace the seller due to their absence of accessing a variety of services and inability of mobility.

Those who have a certain salary from Kızılay said that this salary is hardly enough to rent a house and pay the bills of electricity and water. Therefore, males above a certain age in the households began working in the informal textile and/or construction sectors of Antep, which are based-on irregular and flexible production processes. This irregularity and flexibility may cause insufficient incomes, job losses and they may suffer from a variety of illness and diseases. In these cases, paid labor of women becomes necessary. In some cases, even the labor of male children aged 12+ is also needed for the survival of the family. It can be said that, for Syrians, the articulation of women to the informal labor market is a parallel process with the "vulnerability" of Syrian men in the informal labor market in a different way. Where the state and legal status became inadequate for Syrians to survive, the labor of male children above 12 aged and women, respectively, was resorted to as a survival strategy. One of the very primary strategies of the Syrian families against the decline in the household income was applying to the females' incorporation into the informal labor market. The main impetus of women's articulation into the informal labor market is *occupational downward mobility* process of the men, through which all the work experiences, education, features and skills the men

have almost disappeared as a result of the forced migration. Even though they were an experienced tailor in Syria, all their experiences and skills are ignored, thus, most of them were working as ironers in Antep.

Women mostly defined their works as contributive and supportive activities. They think that the extreme conditions necessitate their help, which is actualized by production activities at home, to the men in family, who are regarded as the breadwinners. For the Syrian refugee women, the meaning of doing piecework at home to satisfy their needs differed from leisure time activities. Some has engaged in just to get rid of the feeling of boredom due to being at home the whole day. Some, having infants, said that they work to satisfy their children's basic and secondary needs, in other words, for their nutrition and school expenses.

During my conversation with the husband of Safiye, while talking about his wife's working at home, "I could have put those girls to work, if I could" he said showing his two little girls aged 2-3 moving around. "We have to survive and have no choice. They asked me why my son is not going to the school. You come, you make them go to the school" he furthered to emphasize his helplessness and need.

5.2.2 *Weakness of networks and solidarity*

Whereas most of the women articulate to the labor market through neighborhood relations, in case of Malika, the networks or solidarity among the family and relatives can get easily corrupted. "My sisters and brother do not call me in winter, because they know that I need help, I need coal"¹¹, Malika said. Due to the poverty, people can experience similar poor conditions and the same fragility as their neighbors or relatives do. Therefore, they cannot access a resource pool to share in order to support each other (Bora, 2007, p. 102 . As transportation is costly and women are not able to leave the neighborhood by themselves, they can barely visit their relatives living in other neighborhoods. This weakens their relationship. In the absence of social relations and solidar-

11 "Kendi kardeşlerim beni kışın aramıyor, onlardan kömür isterim deydi." (Malika, November 20, 2018)

ity, women consult to other mechanisms, such as going to food bank, collecting woods from the constructions to light the stove for heating, setting up a tab at the grocery by overtaking the feeling of “shame” on their shoulders. Malika said that she goes to the food bank as she cannot rely on her relatives or social environment and continued as:

I go to the food bank here, sometimes I don't cook, in winter, I get from food bank. If there is any food after Turkish people took it, I take it. He does not work in winter, what can I do. I ashamedly go, but what can I do, I go for the children. I have to go.¹² (Malika, November 20, 2018)

I heard similar stories from other women, while we were talking about their experiences during the war and internal displacement conditions. They said, “our neighbors did not give us even a bucket of water”, “our aunts dismissed us from their home”, “my mother-in-law dismissed us” and so on. Several similar narratives of “not let us be/live there”¹³ were voiced by these women. They tended to compare their experiences of the internal displacement to the ones in Turkey, therefore, any help from locals or from any Turkish institutions or associations valued positively by them. “What could we do, if they didn't accept us here. Nevertheless, thanks, may God bless them, they accepted us. We muddle along.”¹⁴ said Zaynab. They regard their internal displacement experiences under the war conditions as a point of reference, against the migration experiences in Turkey. Some expressed the comfort of living in Turkey. It can be also asserted that the corruption among the kinship or social relations, stemming from the war conditions, can continue during the migration experiences due to the poverty and “fragile” positions they all are in. They were hurt by the corruption of their kinship or social relations. It has hurt their

12 “Aş evine burda giderim bazen yemek pişirmem kışın o yemekten alırım. Türkler aldıktan sonra kalırsa alırım yemek. Kışın işlemiyi napim. İnsan utana utana gidiyor ama napim çocuklar için gidiyim. Mecburluktan gidecen.” (Malika, November 20, 2018)

13 Originally expressed as “bizi orada komadılar” or “bizi sığdıramadılar”.

14 “Burada da bizi kabul etmeselerdi biz ne yapacaktık? Gene de sağolsun allah razı olsun bizi kabul ettiler. Gene iyi gene iyi kötü geçinip gidiyik.” (Zaynab, November 7, 2018)

feelings toward other Syrians and strengthened the feeling of loneliness among both the locals and the Syrians.

The networks vary depending on the relationships that Syrian women established with the locals. One of the Syrian Turkmen women, Salima, initially got involved in piecework through a Turkmen woman living in Antep. Salima encountered her at the health center, developed a relationship through Turkmenness. Syrian Turkmen women had extended social relationships thanks to the assertion of having an ethnic tie to the Turkish people. Besides, they know Turkish. But this is, most of the time, not the case for Syrian Arab women. Even the Syrian Turkmen woman was aware of the disadvantaged position of Syrian Arab women, as one of the Syrian Turkmen women, Firdevs said:

“[t] here are other Syrians living in worse conditions. Since we know Turkish, it was not that difficult for us. But if you do not know the language, then it is very difficult.”¹⁵ (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

To be able to speak Turkish distinguishes the level of discrimination and insults among the Syrian women. For non-Turkish speaking women, mostly Arab women, it becomes harder to handle especially their functional activities such as grocery shopping and medical visits. Since they have difficulty to communicate, the host community may react easily which lead them to encounter with more insulting reactions. Rashida explained her medical visits:

Normally, there are translators at hospitals. We call them, but of course, by money. Some do not accept money but most of them do. One has to beg of translators to come. It is very hard. Since the doctors do not understand us and vice versa, they get angry and tell us that we should bring translator with us.¹⁶ (Rashida November 22, 2018)

15 “Bizden daha beterleri var. Dil bildiğimiz için fazla sıkıntı yaşamadık. Ama dil bilmezsen zor çok.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

16 “Normalde hastanede terciman var onu çağırırız ama tabiki para karşılığında bazıları almazlar ama çoğu alıyor. Zaten bunun için görevli gelmesi için yalvarıyorsun çok zor. Doktorlar anlamadıkları için biz de onları anlamadığımız için sinir oluyolar bize onun için yanınızda tercüman getirin diyorlar.” (Rasida, November 22, 2018)

On one hand, not knowing the language can make their functional activities difficult or almost impossible. On other hand, language cannot be the ultimate solution for the social inclusion or communication between host community and Syrian women, but one of the steps to be taken in the long distance of social cohesion. As indicated in the previous chapter, even the women who are able to speak Turkish can experience the social exclusion or racism in the host society.

5.2.3 *Where and how to work*



Figure 5.3 A group of Syrian women cracking-and-picking almond (by Mira Jerrah)

Almost all women I interviewed emphasized that normally women do not work in Syria. The statements define their reasons to work were as follows: “Women do not work in Syria, we came here and became involved in pistachio, walnut cracking. We wanted to contribute a little bit, everything is expensive here, rent, water, electricity”¹⁷ “I have never worked in Syria. Normally, no woman works in our society”¹⁸, “if you do not work here, you cannot eat, you have to work”¹⁹, “I had no idea what the work is, because I have never worked there, but I have to here. The home rent, life, we have to, otherwise we cannot afford that much expensiveness”²⁰. The general answer to why they involve in piecework is necessities, due to the narrow circumstances. What makes possible for women to do piecework is that this activity is done inside the home and is controlled by men. Women’s working inside their home is deemed acceptable. Besides, pieces are owned by men and restricted to the neighborhood. Malika’s statement of “I wish my daughters were boys so that they could work” by pointing her daughters, also shows the necessity of women’s working at home and the substantial socio-economic difference between working inside and outside. Those 3 girls aged between 16-19 have opened pistachio with their mother and been charged with the all domestic works of the household. However, the value of home-based work is not equal to the value of work outside done by men. Home-based work is not even called as work since it is done by women and children who already socio-economically belong to the home.

Those whose husbands work from morning till night may undertake some outside responsibilities, such as buying groceries, paying bills and taking children to the school and hospital, even taking the men to hospital when they get

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- 17 “Bizim Suriye’de avrat çalışmaz, biz burda geldik fıstık var, ceviz var. Biz de biraz yardım edelim yani burda her şey pahalı, kira su, elektrik.” (Selma, November 17, 2017)
- 18 “Suriyedeiken hiç çalışmazdım. Bizde kadın çalışmaz normalde.” (Hamide, November 4, 2017)
- 19 “Bura çalışmazsan yiyemezsin, mecbur çalışcan...” (Leila, November 23, 2017)
- 20 “İş ne olduğunu bilmezdim, orda hiç çalışmadım çünkü, burda mecbur kaldığım için. Ev kirası yaşam mecbur kaldık, yoksa yetmezdi bu pahalılıkta.” (Farida, November 24, 2018)

sick. This leads them both to become invisible in the urban life by not involving themselves in some places of the urban landscape and showing up in some public spaces such as hospital and bazaar. Lack of Turkish language, -even they did not directly talk about it- fear, the possibility of harassment, insult, and patriarchy²¹ are the most important reasons prevent them from going out. In addition to these, when they get involved in home-based work, they rarely go out, almost only for relative visits or some obligations such as going to Kızılay, UNHCR so on. Dana stated that “you cannot go out that much, I do not need to go out. It keeps you; you have to complete the work. I did not go out so much but, I did not feel I am tied to [the home]. Only as a feeling. I used to get dressed and go out, but now I feel I am tie to work”²². The socially accepted places that the Syrian women can be (or had to be visible are mostly schools, hospitals and bazaars around the neighborhood. Almost all of them stated that in case they were to go to the outside of the neighborhood, their husbands or men in the family had to accompany them.

Since the Syrian immigrants have limited and temporary rights, they are forced to be involved with the informal labor market through which both male and female immigrants are exploited. Most of these women’s husbands, had some previous experiences in textile and footwear sectors. They have been dealing with similar jobs in Antep, but in precarious ways. It is also known that the shoe industry in Antep has emerged with the arrival of the skilled and cheap Syrian workers (Milliyet, 2017 . Furthermore, one of the medium-scale clothing shop owners, I had chance to talk about Syrian labor demand-supply, said that whilst the textile sector was in fact getting narrowed, thanks to the Syrian skilled and cheap workforce, it kept its power.

Women engaged in home-based work become more and more vulnerable due to their limited bargaining power to recover their working conditions and positions in the labor market (Beneria & Roldan, 1987 . When it comes to the

21 The dynamic structures behind those reasons will be explained detailed in the following pages.

22 “Dışarıya çok çıkamıyorsun, hiç çıkmamam lazım, bağlıyor o işi bitirmen gerekiyor. Çıkmazdım çok fazla ama kendim, bağlı hissetmezdim, sadece düşünce olarak, giyinip çıkardım, ama şuan kendimi bağlı hissediyorum işim var diye.” (Dana, November 4, 2018

Syrian women forced to emigrate from their country, this limited bargaining power gave its place to almost an absolute power of the vendors. When the women were asked if there is any wage difference between them and the locals, they say “[w]e don’t know, [local women] do not tell us”.²³ However, after a while, they started to complain about the sellers. Many of them claimed that the sellers “stole our wages”²⁴ by saying “they stole the half of the wage we are supposed to earn from stitching accessories on sweaters and shoes. We were trimming the leftovers of jeans. He also did not pay us”²⁵. Firdevs also stated:

I have experienced once; he did not give my 40 million [liras]. It was 180 but he gave me 140 liras. He said, ‘that is it’. I left the rest to Allah. When first arrived, we were cracking for 7, yet I knew that they were cracking for 10.²⁶ (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

Whereas next-door neighbor, who has migrated to Antep a couple of months after Firdevs’s migration, interrupted her by claiming “[w]e were cracking for 4-5 million. There was a hadji. He made us to crack in return of 3 million”²⁷ which further displays the tactics of the vendors to utilize the disadvantaged groups as much as they can. The pricing likely depends on the arbitrary decisions of the vendor. However, their arbitrary decisions are based on the position of the Syrian people in the necessity scale or poverty levels, therefore, there has been a treatment difference, even, between Syrians’ time of arrival and integration into the labor market. Since the vendors knew well to what extent the newcomers could not reject the jobs or prices. Over time, as the rights and the services that they can obtain have been regulated formally and at least their formal status was declared and recognized, they started to benefit from a certain rights and services.

23 “Bilmiyoruz, bize söylemiyorlar.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

24 “Paramızı yedi” as anonymous idiom used by most of women.

25 “Ayyakkabı, kazağa boncuk paramızın yarısını yediler. Kotun fazla yerlerini kesiyorduk. Bu da paramızı yedi, vermedi” (Firdevs, November 8, 2017)

26 “Bir şeye şahit oldum, 40 milyonumu yedi, 180 di bana 140 lira verdi, işte bu kadar dedi, allaha havale ettim dedim. İlk geldiğimizde 7’ye kırardık biliyordum ki onlar 10 a kırardı.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2017)

27 “Biz 4-5 milyona kırıyorlardı. Hacı vardı o bize 3 milyona kırdı cevizi.” (the next door neighbor of the Firdevs)

The vendors have been using tactics for profit maximization by using the advantages of the *ethnic labor market*. One of these is a well-known tactic: selling cheaper to Syrians compared to the local workers. Another way to pay them less is to give them more pieces for the same amount of money. For instance, the pistachio seller gave 25 kilograms to locals whereas 35 kilograms to Syrian women in return for the same wage. “When I took the sack on my shoulders I said, ‘what is this?’ it was heavier than the usual” Firdevs told me. Malika also described the situation as:

The seller gives the money as soon as we complete the work, but money is not money, it was only 9 tl, recently rised to 10 tl. 10 tl for 35 kilos. They give [us] 10 tl for 25 kilos. He knows that the Syrians need the work, he puts more kilos to us.²⁸ (Malika, November 20, 2018)

The difference in payments depends on not only the criteria of the discrimination among the ethnicities, but also the time of first arrival among the most disadvantaged groups. The emphasis on the necessity done by the Syrian women was a well-known fact for the vendors or sellers who utilized from them as cheap labor.

5.2.4 *Bargaining with patriarchy*

One of the concepts I will refer in order to explain the home-based characteristics of the integration of Syrian women into the informal piecework labor market is *bargaining with patriarchy*. This, for the Syrian refugee women, makes it possible to work but only within the limits of the home. The limits include both the home and the neighbourhood, depending on the availability of the piecework. Women “strategize within a set of concrete constraints” (Kandiyoti, 1988, p. 274 which is identified as *patriarchal bargains* by Kandiyoti. As Kandiyoti claims, concentrating on *patriarchal bargains* in a narrow sense instead of a general concept of patriarchy makes one to “reach useful aspects providing detailed analysis on transformation processes” (Kandiyoti,

28 “Dükkan bitirdiği gibi verir parayı, parası neykine 9 milyon daha yeni 10 milyon oldu. 35 kilos 10 tl. Onlara 25 kiloya 10 veriyor. Biliyor Suriyeliler mecbur koyveriyor bize.” (Malika, November 20, 2018)

2015, p. 143 . In this case *patriarchal bargains* is also one of dimensions explaining the home-based piecework of Syrian refugee women. In a traditional structure, women cannot work. However, due to the forced migration experience of the Syrian refugees through which males encounter with *occupational downward mobility* and inadequate social and legal rights and services, the female labor is needed. Yet, it becomes acceptable way through the *patriarchal bargains*. In this case, the *concrete constraints* that surround the women's paid labor at home or their mobility power extend to the neighborhood. In order to survive, men can precariously work outside, women, bargaining with patriarchy also work but only at home.

"He does not feel strong here [because his extended family is in Syria]"²⁹ said Firdevs to emphasize her husband's declining dominance over herself compared to the times they were in Syria. As discussed before, pre-existing gender regime of the Syrian people living in Aleppo's suburbs and rural areas was basically male dominated. In a classical patriarchal suburban family, women are substantially responsible for the domestic work and childcare, whereas elder men are charged with the protection and maintenance of their family. Most of the women, coming from the extended families, had been living together with their husbands' families in Syria. For some, it was difficult to live with the men's family. "We had been in a same house for 8 years, with sisters-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law. We had lived in 3-room house all together. We had lived with 8 brothers-in-law together. Each has 3 or 4 children. It was difficult, children were fighting. We could not even taste what we eat or drink; a crowded family."³⁰ These expressions of Safiye shows how it could be hard to live in an extended family. "We were hardly living with my mother-in-law. We were somehow living, handling. Housework, children, my work did not end. I wake up in the morning and work until I sleep. We were

29 "Arkası kalabalık değil tabi burada." (Firdevs, November 8, 2017)

30 "Evdeydik, 8 sene bir evdeydik, eltiler, kaynanam kaynatam 3 oda hepimiz beraber yaşadık. 8 kaynımız beraber otururuduk. 3 er 4 er çocuklar var. Zor olurdu, çocuklar kavga ederdi. Yediğimizden içtiğimizden bir tad alamazdık, kalabalık aile." (Safiye, November 5, 2017)

with the family, so there was so much work to do.”³¹ “Now, it is my home. Why is my life good? Now, this home became mine. It is my life for example, I can clean whenever I want. I cook whenever I want. No one says you talked like that, your kids made a mess. I mean the life became my life.”³² Extended families fragmented in time, as soon as they earn money, and living together gets harder and harder especially for women and children. Fragmentation was not absolute as they continued to live close in the neighborhood. Those women who came from an intense patriarchal structure/relationship, may, to some extent, get rid of the dominance of elder women or men of the extended family. With the nuclear family, women were relieved as the womanhood was left to them, at least among their own home. Those women who also took part in home-based piecework in Syria, mostly in suburban neighborhoods of Aleppo, generally could not obtain the income from their work. Even in some cases, their husbands did not have any power to control their own incomes because of the power of the elder brothers in the extended family. Women who were engaged in piecework in their pre-marriage period had to give their earnings to the males of their own family. Firdevs was to spend her earnings for her father’s recovery whereas Zaynab even did not take any money from her elder brother and by her own words “they did not give even 1 kurus. I had worked years and years”³³. “I worked too much, I got bored, bored”³⁴ as an expression of the boredom of Zaynab in her maidenhood, since she consumed all her energy and strength.

When they were asked for what they spend their income from the piecework they get involved, there were similar responses: those who had small kids indicated the needs of children “so that the children do not want anything

31 “İşte kaynanamla külfetle oturuyorduk işte. Walla işte geçiniyidik. İdare ediyidik. Ev işi, çocuklar, eşim bitmezdi ki, sabahleyin kalkardım, yatana kadar iş tutardım. Orda aile içindeydik ya. İş çok ya” (Huda, November 26, 2017)

32 “Şimdik evim yani, hayatım şimdik niye güzel şimdik bu ev benim evim oldu, benim hayatım mesela temizliycem isterim temizlerim isterim temizlemem, yemek ben ne istersem pişiririm. Mesela kimse demez ben böyle konuştum sen böyle konuştun. Çocukların kirlettiler, yani hayat benim hayatım oldu.” (Selma, November 17, 2017)

33 “Tek bir kuruş bile vermediler. Yıllarca çalıştım.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

34 “Ben çok yaptım, bıktım, bıktım.” (Zainab, November 7, 2018)

else”, “so that the children do not get stuck on something”³⁵. The answers of those who don’t have small kids mostly emphasized their general “necessities”³⁶ to survive. Women said that they received the money and spent it for the needs of their children and home, such as curtains, kitchenware, vacuum cleaners and so on. Equipment like vacuum cleaners, which is generally not bought by men since their income suffices only in renting a house and paying the bills, can reduce the workload of a woman responsible for the housework. Women tend to perceive their participation in piecework as a necessity instead of a job. This perception makes it acceptable for the society, in particular, the males of the society. It is done, they persuade themselves, to survive the conditions of the migration, to challenge poverty for the sake of the household.

5.2.5 *Why to break*

The reasons why they quit the job vary. A range of diseases from diabetics to arthralgia, pregnancy, having a little baby or more than one little child to be cared are examples. Sometimes women may quit because they face with the social discrimination, especially toward their children. For example, Malika who quitted the opening pistachio job because the pistachio seller man hit her 3-year-old son while they were playing around. She turned back to work with him after giving a one-year-break. Among the women, there were also those who have worked for a while and then quit because they got pregnant or were breast feeding, or the man who brought the pieces got dismissed or quit his job or their husbands did not allow them to work. It is very difficult for those women to think of working outside, as childcare, housework and current gender regime do not allow it. They preferred to work in this way, inside the home, so that they can easily integrate into the existing labor processes. Among the women, only two have experienced working outside. One of them got divorced and had a little daughter, yet, she had the chance to leave her with her parents. However, after she got married for the second time, her husband did not want her to work outside, so she began to work with her parents who have already been integrated into the home-based piecework. Another widowed

35 Mostly presented by the women with small kids.

36 “mecburiyet”, “mecbur” were the anonymous words of the conversations.

woman living with her extended family, had worked at an atelier for a while. However, she had to quit this job due to the housework and her mother in need of her care. Both women kept working inside home, as they needed to earn money; and they had to quit working outside, since their care was needed by their home. This demonstrates how the income of women is considered secondary and contributory income.

These women, in one way or another, had to deal with unpaid labor. Beside domestic works, they care for children, elders and the disabled ones. All women I interviewed with, except one, have more than one child. Hamide was never been married and she is living with her sister's extended family. She was not responsible for the domestic labor due to her older age, nevertheless, she voluntarily or involuntarily has undertaken the care of her sister's disabled granddaughter. The importance of childcare came out with my question whether they would like to work outside the home, they immediately asked me "who will be caring for the children, home?"³⁷ with faces full of concern. However, some young women had tendency to conditionally work outside. Yet, the closeness of the workplace is prioritized. Zaynab continued to explain:

Nope, they do not allow. Children. I would go and work, if I did not have small child, but if it is close. If it is on my street here, he does not say anything, but places like the town center or Ünalı, absolutely not... turn back home. We cannot go by ourselves, no one accepts, not only my brother, my husband, in my family no one accepts.³⁸ (Zaynab, November 2017)

There were also Syrian women³⁹ who have been working outside, mostly in the garment sectors. According to what I have observed and what I have heard from other women, these women are either widowed or divorced, living in a

37 "Evde çocuklara kim bakacak?" (Sevde, November 3, 2018)

38 "Yok komazlar. Çocuklar zaten, küçük çocuğum olmasa gider çalışırım da ama yakın yerlerde olduğu zaman. Yok bizim bu sokaklarda olursa bir şey demez ama çarşı gibi böyle unaldı gibi kesinlikle, ...geri kapıya. Biz kendimiz gidemeyiz, hepsi kabul etmezler tek abim değil, eşim ailem kimse kabul etmez." (Zaynab, November 2017)

39 Since the target of this study was the women worked/working at home as a pieceworker, those women were not interviewed directly, however observed throughout the fieldwork.

single-parent home without a male. In the case of a lack of male or any children aged +12 who are “able” to work in the household, since there is a need for primary income, women may work, generally at the informal garment sector with their male family members or with their distant male relatives. In the absence of male members, they at least can work at any place inside the neighborhood. The Syrian women in the informal labor market have always been under protection of and accompanied by the Syrian male member(s) of family or kinship, which is entailed by the current gender regime of the Syrian society living in Antep. More importantly, the perception of Syrian women in Antep (or Turkey includes them requiring the protection of Syrian men.⁴⁰

§ 5.3 Syrian femininity and labor in Antep

Syrian refugee women gain decency through bodily and spatial invisibility in Antep. The women were concerned about the wrong impressions that the Turkish society may have because of misrepresentations and generalizations. They accepted that there were “bad” Syrian women, such as women engaged in prostitution, women with intense make-up, so on. However, they complained about their own image in the eyes of the Turkish society that they are generalized and represented as the “bad” ones. Selma told me:

There are some Syrians, their husbands, for example, go to work, they, themselves put on makeup, chew gum. They sit outside, they, for example, wear skinny things. They hang around by the window in front of the door. I witness so many Syrians, while their husbands were about to come, they immediately enter their home and cook the meal. He asks what they have done. They say I was at home and did not do anything. I do not wear makeup. Only Saturdays and Sundays when my husband comes early. Only those two days I make up. I do not remember wearing makeup outside neither in Syria nor in Turkey. While my husband is not with me, I do not wear makeup. Even with my

40 In this point, the fears of the Syrian people play a significant role which has already illustrated and analyzed in Chapter 4: Encountering Racism, Gendered Violence and Labor in Antep.

mother or with my mother-in-law. I do not wear makeup with anyone.

Only with my husband.⁴¹ (Selma, November 17, 2017)

Even though they do not differentiate themselves from the ones who do not take part in those production processes at home, they occasionally say “she tried but she could not”⁴² for their close female relatives. Those who had worked hard before they got married emphasized their skillfulness at those ages. By saying “I do everything”⁴³ as they tended to do anything to survive, at the same time, they also implied their skillfulness to do everything.

5.3.1 *Paid Labor*

Women have also played active roles in the construction of their subjectivities by using power-engendering strategies. We need to highlight the woman’s strengthening efforts toward the man’s power at home, although it is theoretically explained through the survival strategies. Otherwise, evaluating and understanding the women’s integration into paid works leads to a one-sided analysis. Beside the survival strategies, women may get into those paid production activities to be more independent to make their own consumption decisions or for their children’s needs that men tend to consider unnecessary. Once, I met Firdevs around the neighborhood while she was going to a dress shop to pay her debt after she received her payment earned from the pistachio

41 “Bazı suriyeliler var, bazı kocaları mesela işe gidiyiler kendileri makyaj koyuyorlar, sakız koyuyorlar ağızlarına, dışarda oturiyiler, böyle dar giyişler mesela, pencerede durişler, kapının önünde durişler, kocam gelmek üzere eve, ben çok suriyeli görürüm, kocası gelmek üzere, hemen içeri girirler yemeği yaparlar sorar nere geldin, walla evde oturdum bir şey yapmadım. Ben hiç makyaj koymam yüzüme. Sadece Cumartesi Pazar makyaj yaparım eşim erken çıkar, sadece bu iki gün ben makyaj yaparım. Dışarda hiç hayatımda hatırlamam ne Suriye de ne de türkiye de. Kocam benlen beraber delken ben yüzüme makyaj koydum, hatta anam beraber kaynanam beraber kimseyle beraber koymam. Sadece eşimle beraber.” (Selma, November 17, 2017)

42 “O denedi ama beceremedi, yapamadı.” (Aisha, November 7, 2018)

43 “Her şeyi yaparım.” (Aisha, November 7, 2018)

opening. By saying “it does not work depending on a man forever”⁴⁴, she emphasized the changing power relations among the household members, specifically in relation to the men of the household. Safiye said, “You become stronger if you work, you can buy everything; but if you do not work, I ask for my husband if I intend to buy something. I have worn the same pullover for 3 years”⁴⁵. On the one hand, through home-based piecework, Syrian women played active roles in contribution to the survival of the household, on the other hand, particularly for those whose husbands somehow work and receive at least a certain amount of (regular or irregular salary, get stronger against the traditional power of men in the household. Zaynab said, “For example, in case I need something, I have not asked my husband, I can buy with my own money. My husband cannot say anything, only says you worked so you bought it; you bought it with your own money. You worked, go and buy whatever you want”⁴⁶. Selma said, “Especially now, women want, for example, to change these curtains. If I ask my husband, he says it is not time to buy. For example, I need kitchen equipment, if I ask my husband, he is a man, I mean he is not like a woman, he does not want to buy something for the home.”⁴⁷

Motherhood has started to be considered more important since the war erupted, as they traditionally were the main protector of the children. It is important to remember that the children are seen as the future and the continuation of the family. Women appear as a main actor dedicating herself to her children. Motherhood and their woman subjectivity are closely related with the earning livelihood for the children and the order of the house. The products and commodities they paid their earning for were mostly to satisfy their

44 “Hep erkeğin eline bakmayla olmuyor.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

45 “Çalışınca daha güçlü oluyorsun her şeyi alabilirsin, çalışmazsan kocamdan istiyorum bir şey alacağsam. Ben bir kazağı 3 yıl giydiğimi bilirim, durumumuz da yoktur.” (Safiye, November 5, 2017)

46 “Mesela bana bir şey gerek olsa hiç herife demem kocama demem kendi paramla alabilirim o zaman kocam bir şey diyemez, derki çalıştın sen de aldın der. Yani sen kendi paraynan aldın. Çalıştın der git ne istiyisen al.” (Zaynab, November 7, 2017)

47 “Hele şimdi, kadınlar isterler meselan ben bu perdemi değiştirecem hani şimdi eşime söylesem der bana şimdi vakti değil, mesela ben mutfak eşyası lazım, eşime söylediysem adam yani kadın gibi değil istemez yani böyle eve getirmek için” (Selma, November 17, 2017)

children's and home's needs. The care labor also has an emotional dimension toward both the children and the husband or whom the female cares for and therefore is mostly seen as motherhood and wifehood. The emotional labor is also another dimension of constructing their subjectivities. Safiye was telling her working sons' situation with misty eyes:

They go at 7:30, in the evening they come at 8:30. It is not on the machine, it is manual work. Mustafa weekly gets 150, the other's has already increased to 125 since two weeks, before it was 100. They get too much tired; they are too thin for their age. They are all skin and bones.⁴⁸ (Safiye, November 5, 2018)

Hamide who has been caring for her sister's disabled granddaughter was also concerned for her and was successively asking me questions for her to make any recovery on her situation. Nesrin was also worried about the future of her children as "For now, my children learning Turkish is important for me. My concern now is for their future."⁴⁹ While Hamide indicated the reason of her illness "even if they [her children] are late just a minute, their boss complains. I got ill from worrying about them."⁵⁰

48 "7 buçukta giderler (çalışan iki oğlu akşam 8 buçukta gelirler çocuklar. Makinede değil elde yapılan bir şey. 150 kağıt alır haftada Mustafa, diğerininki 125 olmuş iki haftadan beri önceden 100 kağıttı. Çok yoruluyorlar yaşlarına göre çok zayıflar bir görsen 1 deri 1 kemik." (Safiye, November 5, 2018)

49 "Şu an önemli olan benim için çocuklarımın türkçe öğrenmesi. Yani şuan ileri için gelecekleri için derdim olan şey bu" (Nesrin, November 23, 2018)

50 "Bir dakika bile işe gitmeseler ustaları onlara laf ediyor. Onlara çok üzüldüğüm için hastalandım." (Hamide, November 4, 2018)



Figure 5.4 Entrance of a home of Syrian family living in Düztepe

Turning a space into a home is substantially overtaken by women or females of the household due to the current gender regime of Syrian society. At the

very beginning of the migration, as stated by “we came from nothing”⁵¹, they mostly had not even had clothes beyond the ones they were wearing. They settled in basements, shops, places without kitchens or bathrooms, empty places with garbage so on. Once they settled, they hurried to make this place home. This task, to a large extent, was undertaken by the women in the family. They even filled the cushions and the seats with the usable materials they collected from dumps. Zeynep said, “Previously, there were a flock of sheep or goats living in that house. I lived in a basement. I have lived that basement for 4 or 5 years”⁵². Whereas Selma told her sister’s story like this: “There was a grocer, there was only a small counter and a tap. She rented that place. There was a toilet inside. A tap there, made home there and lived there.”⁵³

While they mostly emphasized their home-based work as a contributory and a supportive activity for the household income or breadwinner; some added, “I was up to the eyes in pistachio work for one and a half years, so that we don’t need anyone”⁵⁴, “What shall I do? Should I beg?”⁵⁵, “I do not want to remain indebted to a stranger”⁵⁶, “I feel comfortable, since I support my husband, my family, and I am not in a stranger’s debt”⁵⁷ and “Working without being in need of someone else, and as much as I meet the children’s needs, is good.”⁵⁸ Instead of “asking for charity”, “begging” or “being indebted”⁵⁹, they prefer working. The “safe” way of working is home-based work. By this means, they both protected themselves from the rumors done by mainly local and

51 Anonymously said by some of the women I interviewed with.

52 “Önceden benim oturduğum evde davarları korlarmış, bodrum ha bodrumda oturdum. Ben o bodrumda dört sene mi beş sene oturdum orda.” (Zaynab, November 7, 2018)

53 “Bakkal vardı, bakkalın içinde şey vardı, küçük bir tezgah ve bir musluk, o da ev tuttu. İçinde tuvaleti var, tezgahı var, şurda bir musluk, ev etti kendine oturdu.” (Selma, November 2018)

54 “1,1 buçuk sene fıstıktan alnımızı kaldıramadım. Kimseye muhtaç olmayalım diye.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

55 “Ne yapayım? Başkasına el mi açayım?” (Huda, November 26, 2018)

56 “Ele borçlu kalmak istemiyim.” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

57 “Eve ve kocama destek olduğum için kendimi rahat hissediyorum, bir yabancıya borçlu kalmayacağım için” (Salisa, November 2, 2018)

58 “Başkasına el açmadan çalışmak iyi, çocukların da ihtiyacını gördükten kere güzel” (Firdevs, November 8, 2018)

59 Mentioned by some of the women I interviewed with.

Syrian people, much more patriarchal pressure, and differentiated themselves from those who beg at the streets and put themselves in a more honorable place. On one hand, they rejected the “victim” role of the women and avoided victimization of themselves. They developed power-engendering strategies, even if they were limited by *concrete constraints*. On other hand, this also indicates the poverty in which almost all their family and relatives are embedded, the lack of proximity networks and collapse of support networks. Within a such social environment, the women manipulated and negotiated the patriarchal relations in order to survive.

To sum up, working at home, being invisible emerges as both survival, protection and power-engendering strategies for Syrian refugee women. Through all these interwoven processes discussed above, these women have the chance to develop survival strategies and empowerment potential. The empowerment process is to be taken as a process with its booms and busts, not as a linear process. Manhood also transforms, reproduces and becomes violent towards the empowerment of women, and hence endeavors to suppress and dominate the women as never before. However, in the survival process of the household, Syrian women emerges as a main actor.

Conclusion

This thesis analyzed the labor processes of Syrian refugee women, living in the suburban neighborhoods of Antep, through these concepts: the intersectionality of labor, forced migration, gender and social violence. By focusing on the daily labor processes of Syrian refugee women involving in informal home-based piecework labor market of Antep, the study discussed the everyday life intersectionality of the economic, social, political, cultural and class dynamic processes and structures in which the Syrian refugee women are embedded, and how those processes are articulated with each other.

In some cases, being a refugee is identified with being “the poorest”, whereas for women it can be identification as “prostitute”. The most frequently ongoing othering process is the discrimination, subordination and oppression processes through the “honor” of Syrian women of Antep’s suburban neighborhoods. Towards these processes, one of the survival and protection strategies of the Syrian women was to confine themselves to their home and become invisible to the rest of the city, except essential movements such as going to the hospital, market, related institutions or taking their children to school- almost all these activities are already fulfilled within the neighborhood. On the one hand, in their struggle for survival, they got involved in the informal market of home-based piecework, on the other hand, by becoming invisible, they protect themselves from outside violence and oppression.

Syrian refugee women, generally, are employed in the piecework including the pieces and activities such as shoe-cleaning, shoe-boxing, shoe decoration, shoemaking, handiwork on pullovers, steel wool, making olives, opening pistachios, cracking walnuts and cracking-or-picking almonds. The transportation of pieces is, mostly, done by men. While some women's husbands provide the pieces from the ateliers or factories they are working at, some receive them from those women whose husbands brought from their workplace. Those who work in the pistachio labor market have relatively more space to move within the neighborhood to obtain the pieces from the pistachio sellers who have a small shop in the neighborhood. In some cases, those sellers can also carry the pistachios with their wheelbarrows. Therefore, women only participate in the piecework reproduction process at their homes or in the neighborhood.

There are several determinants and basic concepts of the socio-economic life of the Syrian refugee women in Antep which were examined in this thesis, in detail. They are forced migration, bargaining with patriarchy, fear of violence and racism, the informal labor market which facilitated the entry of Syrian women and countless burden of women including childcare, elderly care, disabled care, domestic work based on gender relations of the society.

These women already had countless burdens on their shoulders as they are, first of all, women. Being a mother, wife, daughter and/or sister directly affects their position in production activities. "Women's different roles such as wives, daughters and mothers shape their contribution to industrial production....gender relations and roles not only determine women's place in society but also facilitate women's access to industrial work" (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p. 32). Women's labor, therefore, is a more fundamental issue. Yet, when it comes to the immigrant women, there are added burdens. "The ideologies reinforcing the perception of migrant women as 'mothers' and 'wives', facilitate the disguise of substantial roles of migrant women in the labor-force." (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 276). *Double burden* of women including both childcare and invisible work at home and paid activities is not enough to explain the countless burdens of the lower-class Syrian refugee women. Extra burdens like making any space into a home, the extreme efforts of women in giving a new meaning to "home," illness due to the war conditions, pregnancy, having a baby or more than one child to be cared for, all rested on the shoulders of the women.

“They are, surely, burdened more than us”¹ the husband of Reyhane dramatically told me in a manner of recognizing my efforts to hold an interview with Syrian women and surely, her wife, regarding their labor. After a while, throughout our conversation with him and later interview with her wife, I learned he had had an operation and has been unable to work, which indicates the reason behind his statement. All women had responsibility of the housework and childcare, parallel to the pre-existing gender regime. Through forced migration, women whose husbands work from morning till night, had to take the responsibility of grocery shopping, taking the children to school and so on, however these movements are fulfilled around the neighborhood.

The most striking statements to tell their forced migration experiences were: *we did not come here for no reason, we came from nothing, we had nothing when we initially arrived, we came up through the ranks, we came only with our clothes*. The forced characteristics of the migration process was specifically emphasized by women both to highlight their extreme experiences and *involuntary* feature of their migration *choice*. They, moreover, stressed the violence and fear of death due to the constant war conditions of Syria. One of the distinctive experiences of the Syrian women, different from the experiences of other migrant or refugee women, is that the Syrians experienced the forced migration, but they were recognized as temporary. This made them vulnerable and open to the social oppression and through the rumors and even threats by the neighbors in their daily life.

Some of the them had more than one migration experience in Turkey. Those who directly settled in Antep when they immigrated found more time to adapt compared to those who were exposed to migrations more than once. Socio-economic conditions may be the biggest determinant of the migration decisions within Turkey. One of the women who experiences more than one migration due to the economic conditions described her migration experiences as worse than the war, which also shows that each migration is an economic migration and migration as a social phenomenon is better examined by multi-dimensional approaches.

1 “Bizden çok onlara iş düşüyor tabi” (The husband of Reyhane, November 18, 2018)

To be forced to migrate made the Syrian people experience downward mobility based on the Syrian males' occupational status. The total income of men in the household could not meet the families' necessities. In this point, the wage labor of the woman, as well as the children, was needed by the household. The women generally defined their work as support, help and/or contribution to the male or males in the household, not as a main income.

Another concept I consulted to understand the home-based characteristics of the Syrian women's integration into the informal piecework labor market is patriarchal bargaining, through which Syrian families, particularly men, accepted and conditionally confirmed that the women should work inside their homes. *Inside* covers both their home and the neighborhood depending on the availability of work. These women bargained with men on integrating to working life but restricted their paid labor to home or their mobility power extended to the neighborhood.

Based on the current gendered roles of women in the society as mother, wife and daughter, the Syrian women have countless burdens like domestic work, childcare, elderly care and, if any, disabled care. In case their husbands or the men in the household intensely work, women take the responsibility of outside work such as grocery shopping, medical visits, paying bills and so on which makes them both invisible in urban life- unable to enter certain kinds of public spheres- and visible in some spheres like the hospital.

The widespread nature of the current informal home-based piecework labor market also facilitated the entry of Syrian women into the labor market. The Kurdish and lower-class of Antep suburban neighborhoods' women have already been dealing with this piecework. To enter the informal opening pistachio labor market, every new immigrant needs a guarantor from the neighborhood with whom the pistachio seller is familiar and can trust. The neighborhood emerges as one of the crucial social networks both to integrate the Syrian women into the informal labor market of opening pistachio piecework and to protect the informal labor market itself.

The most striking distinctive experience of Syrian women different than the other local women engaging in the piecework at home is the fear of violence and racism. The fear of overt or covert forms of violence became the main analytical tool to understand the various facets of daily experiences and

labor processes of the Syrian women living in suburban neighborhoods. As a main impetus, the fear of violence and racism made them retreat into their homes or at most their local neighborhoods. The research, moreover, revealed that the social oppression and violence in the name of honor against women has increased in the neighborhood. Through the rumors of local women, the Syrian women have been oppressed and dominated which restricted their mobility. This also affected and reflected in the construction process of the women subjectivities.

The Syrian women complain about the generalization of the image internalized by the local community. They accept that there are *bad* Syrian women, such as women engaged in prostitution, women with intense make-up so on. However, they complain that their own image in the eyes of Turkish women and men are generalized and represented as the *bad* ones. Therefore, they emphasize their differences from those *bad* women while constructing their subjectivities.

Since the employment of women is not acceptable for their society, working on home-based piecework is legitimized by those women with the idea that they wouldn't need someone else. Instead of asking for charity, begging or being indebted, they prefer working. The safe way of working is home-based work. They protect themselves from both rumors and patriarchal pressure. They also differentiate themselves from those who beg at the streets and put themselves in a more *honorable* place. They reject the *victim* role of the women and victimization of themselves, thus, they developed power-engendering strategies, even if they were limited by "concrete constraints", they manipulate and negotiate the patriarchal relations in order to survive. Beside the survival strategies, women may get into those paid production activities to be more independent to make their own consumption decisions or for their children's needs the men presume as unnecessary. They may spend the money to buy some household goods which alleviate the burden of women like invisible domestic labor. They sometimes highlight their skills that the piecework necessitates and their being hard-working and skills to handle all kinds of piecework.

Those women who had lived with their extended families and came from an intense and classical patriarchal structure in Syria tend to compare their

experiences in Turkey to the ones in Syria. Since they remained as nuclear families and obtained relative autonomy at least within the household regarding the *feminized* tasks. They could at least control the household work and children as they wished. This situation may even have influences on the women's decisions and demands regarding turning back to Syria. Whereas some women emphasize the economic-emotional dimensions of refolement, and the striking feature of forced migration emerged when they straddled between resettlement and refolement. Almost all women had internal migration experiences within Syria. They tend to compare their internal displacement experiences to the ones in Turkey, therefore, any *help* from locals or from any Turkish institution or association makes them feel grateful.

Syrian Turkmen or Kurdish women have relatively extended social relations thanks to the claim of having an ethnic or national tie to Turkish people and knowing Turkish. Turkmen and Kurdish women can hide their Syrian identity by speaking Turkish with an Antep accent on public transportation and other public spheres. However, most of the time, Arab Syrian women are more likely to suffer from social exclusion, even the Syrian Turkmen woman are aware of the more disadvantaged position of Syrian Arab women in the society of Antep. Knowing Turkish makes a difference in terms of the level of discrimination and insulting experiences among the Syrian Turkmen, Kurdish and Arab women. Turkish language leads them to develop a solidarity among the Arabic speaking Syrians and Turkish speaking Syrians, such as Syrian Kurdish and Turkmen Syrians. Syrian Arabs may ask their Turkish speaking neighbors for help to communicate with the local people or institutions, although the Syrian Arab women had less communication with Turkmen or Kurdish women in Syria during the pre-war period.

The Syrian female refugee labor cannot be understood and analyzed by looking at the relationalities of only patriarchy, capitalist forms (informal flexible labor market and the state (legal processes. The forms of violence and racism entail the women engendering new survival tactics and engaging with power relations. The Syrian women, as a disadvantaged group both in terms of gender and experiencing refugeehood recognized as "temporary," on the one hand, are more vulnerable to discrimination, abuse, hate-speech. On the other hand, among all those power relations, they have their own survival and

self-protection tactics. The most important one is invisibility by insulating themselves in their homes or their local neighborhood which is relatively safer for them.

As this study presents all these results and findings, some limitations should also be noted. This study is based on the narratives of the Syrian refugee women of Antep and observations of limited encounter moments. However, there is a need for ethnographic studies to better understand the processes (not only moments through which the transformations and changing dynamics can explicitly be observed and analyzed. The fieldwork of this study is limited to Syrian refugee women working in the informal labor market of home-based piecework. For further studies, the research can be enriched by extending the field scope to the local women, Syrian men and intermediary actors in the informal labor market of piecework.

SURİYELİ
SIĞINMACILARLA İLGİLİ
YAŞANAN SORUNLAR
VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ

[Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu]

[Şubat 2014]

SUNUŞ

Suriye’de Mart 2011’den bu yana süren trajediden en fazla etkilenen ve Suriye vatandaşlarına insani yardım sağlamada en özverili davranan ülke, Suriye ile güçlü tarihi, kültürel ve ekonomik bağları olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti olmuştur.

Yaklaşık 3 yıla yakın bir süredir devam eden çatışmalar nedeniyle başta ilimiz olmak üzere bölgemize “geçici koruma” statüsü altında önemli sayıda Suriyeli gelmiş ve Gaziantep’in; Nizip, İslahiye, Karkamış Kamplarında yaşayanların sayısı 34.000’e ulaşmıştır.

Kamplar haricinde Gaziantep Merkez ve ilçelerinde kalan kayıtlı Suriyeli misafir sayısı ise AFAD kaynaklarına göre 105.000’e ulaşmıştır. Bu verilere, kayıt yaptırmayan Suriyeliler de eklendiğinde bu rakamın 200.000’in üzerinde olduğu yerel yönetimler tarafından dile getirilmektedir.

Yaşanan bu gelişmeler kapsamında, Gaziantep Valiliği ve Koordinasyon Valiliği işbirliğinde özellikle AFAD, yerel yönetimler ve çeşitli kamu-özel kuruluşların destekleri ile yürütülen çalışmalar, bu krizin yönetilmesinde çok önemli bir rol almıştır. Bu vesile ile özverili çalışmalar için minnet ve takdirlerimizi sunarız.

Bu önlemlerin yanı sıra; özellikle yaşanan olayların büyüklüğü ve sürecin uzaması birçok problem ve riski de beraberinde getirmektedir. BM tarafından, 2014 yılında yaklaşık 2 milyon Suriyelinin daha komşu ülkelere sığınacağı, yaklaşık 2 milyon 250 bin kişinin de ülke içinde çatışma bölgelerinden kaçarak diğer bölgelere yerleşeceği tahmin edilmektedir. 2014 yılında Türkiye’ye gelen Suriyeli göçmenlerin sayısının 1,5 milyonu bulacağı da diğer bir beklentidir.

Mevcut bu durum doğrultusunda, Gaziantep Ticaret Odası Meclisi özel “Suriye” gündemi ile toplanmış ve seçtiği Komite öncülüğünde ilimizdeki Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ile bir araya gelerek değerlendirmeler yapmıştır. Bu Toplantılarda, alınacak önlemler hususunda bir deklarasyon yayınlanmasına ve başta Başbakanımız olmak üzere ilgili tüm mercilere başvurulmasına karar verilmiştir.

Nitekim hazırlanan bu rapor, aşağıda imzası bulunan Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının bu problem ve risklere yönelik görüş ve önerilerini içermektedir. Bu alanlarda ivedilikle atılacak adımların, ilimiz ve bölgemizin yaşadığı sıkıntıların bir nebze de olsa bertaraf edilmesi ve gelecek için gerekli tedbirlerin alınmasına ön ayak olması en büyük temennimizdir.

Bu gibi olağanüstü durumlarda ortaya çıkan sorunları orta ve uzun vadede, sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik boyutlarıyla ele alacak ve çözebilecek bir modele ihtiyaç vardır. Şu an savaş dursa dahi Suriye’de insani ve iktisadi altyapının yok olması, Suriyeli misafirler ile ekonomik, kültürel ve insani ilişkilerimizin uzun yıllar süreceği anlamına gelmektedir. Bu raporun amacı, Suriyeli misafirlerle ilgili bir strateji dokümanı ve eylem planı oluşturmaktır. Dolayısıyla Suriyelilerin kente, topluma ve ekonomiye makul derece ve biçimlerde entegre edilmesi şu an yaşamakta olduğumuz ve giderek büyüyen sorunları ortadan kaldıracaktır.

Suriyeli misafirler ile ilgili genel olarak karşılaşılan sorunlar 4 ana başlık altında toplanmaktadır;

- 1- Güvenlik
- 2- Ekonomi
- 3- Sağlık
- 4- Eğitim

Yukarıda sıralanan konular Raporda başlıklar halinde ele alınmış ve mevcut durum ile öneriler sıralanmıştır.

Gaziantep halkı yaşanan problemlere rağmen insani bir görev yapmanın bilinci ile birçok fedakarlığa göğüs germektedir. Buradaki temel beklenti, bu problemlere yönelik daha geniş ve orta vadeli planların yapılması ve uygulamaya geçirilmesidir.

Suriye'deki bu savaşın bitmesi ve Suriyelilerin evlerine dönmesi en büyük temennimizdir. Komşu ülkelerle barış içinde yaşamak başta güvenlik olmak üzere bölgenin sosyo-ekonomik gelişimi anlamında büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Barışın en kısa zamanda tesis edilmesi temennisiyle yürüttüğümüz bu çalışmanın faydalı olmasını diler, saygılar sunarız.

Gaziantep Ticaret Odası

Gaziantep Üniversitesi

Gaziantep Ticaret Borsası

Güneydoğu Anadolu İhracatçı Birlikleri

Gaziantep Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Odaları Birliği

Gaziantep Organize Sanayi Bölgesi

Gaziantep Kent Konseyi

25 Aralık Küçük Sanayi Sitesi Yapı Koop.

TMMOB Mimarlar Odası Gaziantep Şub.

TMMOB İnşaat Müh. Odası Gaziantep Şub.

TMMOB Elektrik Müh. Odası Gaziantep Şub.

TMMOB Makine Müh. Odası Gaziantep Şub.

Zirve Üniversitesi

Hasan Kalyoncu Üniv.

Gaziantep İnşaat Mühendisleri Derneği

SURİYELİ SİĞİNMACILARLA İLGİLİ YAŞANAN SORUNLAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ

GÜVENLİK

Suriyeli misafirlerin beraberinde getirdiği temel sorunların başında güvenlik gelmektedir. Bu konudaki tedirginliğin en önemli nedeni, sınırı geçen Suriye vatandaşları arasında terör, hırsızlık, gasp gibi yasa dışı faaliyetlerde bulunanların mevcudiyeti ve bu suç işleme oranının artma tehlikesidir. Çoğunlukla herhangi bir belge ile gelemeyen Suriyelilerin kimlikleri tespit

edilememekte, Gaziantep'te başlatılan bir uygulama ile sadece beyana göre kayıt edilme esası uygulanmaktadır.

Muhtarlar özellikle kayıt sisteminde etkin rol almalı ve mahallelerindeki Suriyelileri kayıt için AFAD ve kolluk kuvvetlerine bildirmelidir

Suriyeliler için sağlıklı bir kayıt sistemi oluşturulmalı

Bilgi ve istatistikleri daha sağlıklı hale getirmek adına bu kaydın Türkiye'ye girişte çok sıkı bir sistem ile oluşturulması gerekmektedir. Suriyeli misafirlerin ülkeye girdikten sonra ikamet ettikleri muhtarlıkların kayıt sistemlerinde ayrı bir başlık altında tasnifi ve bu tasniflerin tek bir bilgi havuzuna aktarılması, hem kayıt hem de Suriyelilere hizmet götürmeye çalışan kurumların işini kolaylaştıracaktır. Muhtarlar özellikle bu sistemde etkin rol almalı ve mahallelerindeki Suriyelileri kayıt için AFAD ve kolluk kuvvetlerine bildirmelidir. Aynı zamanda Suriyeliler ile ilgili emniyette özel bir birimin oluşturulması, Suriyelilerin yanısıra yerel halkın da müracaat noktası olması anlamında elzem bir husustur.

Suriye plakalı araçlar için kayıt sistemi oluşturulmalı

Bir diğer geçici kayıt işlemi Suriye plakalı araçlar için ele alınmalıdır. Halihazırda Gaziantep'te 5000'den fazla Suriye plakalı araç bulunmaktadır. Bu araçlara geçici – misafir plakalar verilmesi, araçların kayıt altına alınmasını ve takibini sağlayacaktır. Trafik sigortalarının yapılmasının şart koşulması ve TÜV muayene istasyonlarında yılda bir muayene yapılması alınacak diğer önemler arasındadır.

Bu konudaki en kalıcı çözüm, mevcutlara şehirlerde geçici plakaların verilmesi, sınırdan yeni girecek olanlara ise geçici plakaların sınır kapılarında takılması olacaktır.

Gaziantep'in yüz yıllardır inşasına çalıştığı kimlik, konum, kültür ve tahayyülün Suriye'deki savaşa dahil olmak isteyen radikal grup ve hareketlerce yok edilmesine karşı durulmalıdır.

Gaziantep güvenli liman olmaya devam etmeli

Güvenlik ile ilgili önemli ve son nokta da, Gaziantep'in radikal unsurların merkezi olmasından özellikle kaçınılması ve bu yönde kendi kontrol ve baskı mekanizmalarını kullanması gerektiğidir. Zira Gaziantep, Suriyeli sığınmacılar için güvenli bir yerdir. Fakat Gaziantep'in yüz yıllardır inşasına çalıştığı kimlik, konum, kültür ve tahayyülün Suriye'deki savaşa dahil olmak isteyen radikal grup ve hareketlerce yok edilmesine de karşı durulmalıdır. Bu yöndeki bir karşı duruş, Gaziantep'in kendi barışçıl tarih ve kimliğiyle de uyumaktadır. Özellikle Kent olarak Gaziantep'in gelecekteki iç barışının yolunun bundan geçtiği unutulmamalıdır.

Kısacası, Gaziantep, sivil insanların güvenli limanı pozisyonunda ısrarcı olmalıdır; ne yapacağı, nasıl davranacağı, hangi ittifak ve angajmanlara gireceği tahmin edilemeyen ve sökülüp atılması imkansızlaşacak radikal unsurlardan mümkün mertebe kentsel bir tavır olarak uzak durmalıdır.

Son olarak, halihazırda Gaziantep'te Suriye muhaliflerinin oluşturduğu "Geçici Hükümet" kurma çalışmaları devam etmektedir. Bu konuda yaşanan en büyük tedirginlik, bu oluşum ile birlikte Gaziantep'in hedef olma riskidir. Bu kapsamda ülke olarak izlenen politikalarda bu hususun özellikle değerlendiriliyor olması en önemli temennimizdir.

EKONOMİ:

Gaziantep'in Suriye'ye olan ihracatı artıyor

Suriye'de yaşanan olaylar nedeniyle, Ülkemiz ile Suriye arasındaki siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler, son üç yılda büyük oranda bozulmuş olsa da, Türkiye ve Suriye arasındaki ticaretin devam ettiğini söylemek mümkündür. Savaşa rağmen Suriye'de hayat ve ticaretin devam ediyor olması bunun temel nedenidir. Nitekim Gaziantep'in Suriye'ye ihracatı 2010 yılında 133 milyon dolar iken 2013'te 278 milyon dolar olmuştur. Bu artışın temel nedeni, Gaziantep üzerinden Suriye'ye giden insani yardımlardır.

Transit geçişte Suriye'nin kullanılamaması dış ticarete maliyetleri artırıyor

Suriye üzerinden uluslararası pazarlara yapılan ihracat, krizden en çok etkilenen unsurların başında gelmektedir. Halihazırda Gaziantep'te ihracatçı transit geçişte Suriye'yi kullanamamakta, Suriye üzerinden geçiş yaptığı ülkelere farklı ulaşım yolları ile ulaşarak artı maliyetlere katlanmak zorunda kalmaktadır. Örneğin; Suudi Arabistan'a Gaziantep'ten yapılan ihracat 2012 yılında % 20 oranında artmışken, 2013'te % 0.03 oranında azalmıştır. Mısır'a yapılan ihracat 2012 yılında % 111 oranında artarken 2013 yılında % 25 azalmıştır. Bu maliyetlere katlanan üretici/ihracatçılara ek teşvikler sağlanmalıdır. Aksi takdirde ilimiz ve bölgemizin ekonomik gelişimi ciddi yaralar alacaktır.

Gaziantep'te ihracatçı transit geçişte Suriye'yi kullanamamakta, artı maliyetlere katlanmak zorunda kalmaktadır. Bu maliyetlere katlanan üretici/ihracatçılara ek teşvikler sağlanmalıdır.

Suriye'de yatırım yapan Gaziantep'te girişimciler zor durumda

Olaya yatırımlar açısından bakıldığında; Suriye'de özellikle Halep'te yatırım yapan Gaziantep'te girişimcilerin faaliyetleri tamamen durmuş ve fabrikalarında önemli hasarlar meydana gelmiştir. Bu yatırımcılar birçok yerel ve ulusal mercilere başvurularına rağmen hiçbir yanıt ve destek alamamışlardır. Halihazırda Suriye'de yatırım yapan 10'u aşkın firma bu yönde mağduriyet yaşamaktadır. Yatırımcılar yanında orada depo, irtibat ofisi gibi birimler açmış birçok firmamız vardır. Öncelikle bu firmaların oradaki zararları tespit edilmeli ve bu firmalara SGK, Vergi, KDV gibi alanlarda avantajlar sağlanmalıdır.

Gaziantep'teki Suriyeli yatırımcılara bakıldığında, kriz öncesi 2010 yılında 16 Suriyeli firma Odamıza kayıtlı iken 2013 yılı sonunda bu rakam 46'ya ulaşmıştır.

Sığınmacılar çalışma hayatına dahil edilmeli

Ticari ilişkilerin yanı sıra ekonomi başlığında değinilebilecek en önemli husus, Suriyelilerin çalışma izinleridir. "Çalışma izni verilmediği takdirde, hükümet, yerel yönetimler, STK'lar ve bölgedeki halk olarak ülkemize ve ilimize sığınanlara ihtiyaçlarına cevap verme çalışmalarının ne ölçüde sürdürülebilir ve yönetilebilir?" sorusu gündeme gelmektedir. Bu sorun, önemli sosyo-ekonomik problemlerin çıkma olasılığını gösteren bir husustur.

Suriyelilerin çalışma hayatına dahil olmaları ile ilgili olarak iki yönlü bir değerlendirme bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan biri, çalışmadan sadece 'balık vererek' beslemek yerine, zaten çoğunun bildiği 'balığı' başka bir denizde tutmalarının önünü açmak. Bu kapsamda, özellikle profesyonel meslek sahibi, eğitilmiş, orta sınıflar başta olmak üzere, Suriye'den gelen sığınmacılara hizmet götürme dahil çeşitli alanlarda iş imkanı sağlanabilmektedir. Olayın diğer bir yönü, Suriyelilerin çalıştırıldıkları takdirde çalışma barışının bozulması ve ülkemize olan göçün kalıcı olma tehlikesidir.

Çalışmadan sadece 'balık vererek' beslemek yerine, zaten çoğunun bildiği 'balığı' başka bir denizde tutmalarının önünü açmak gerek.

Mevcut duruma bakıldığında, Suriyelilerin yaklaşık %10' u işgücüne katılmaktadır. Gaziantep'te ciddi manada bir Suriyeli işgücü girdisi bulunmaktadır. Serbest meslek mensubundan düz işçisine kadar geniş bir yelpazede bulunan Suriyeliler, işverenler tarafından hem vicdani duygular hem de işgücüne olan ihtiyaçlarından dolayı zaman zaman kayıt dışı olarak çalıştırılmaktadır. Kayıt dışı uygulamalar, Suriyeli sığınmacılar düşük ve güvencesiz ücretlerle çalıştırılması tehlikesini de açık bir şekilde artırmaktadır.

Olaya ihtiyaçlar açısından bakıldığında, Ülkemizin en hızlı büyüyen iller arasında bulunan Gaziantep'te özellikle bazı iş kollarında, Suriyelilere iş imkanı sağlayacak bir potansiyel bulunmaktadır.

Bu kapsamda, çalışma barışı bozulmadan yasal çerçevelerde Suriyelileri geçici süreli çalıştırmanın yolları bulunmalıdır. Yabancı statüleri baki kalmak kaydıyla geçici çalışma izinlerini içeren bu strateji, bu nüfusun sağlık ve eğitim hususundaki sıkıntılarını da ciddi derecede azaltacaktır. Verilecek iş ve geçici çalışma izinleri aynı zamanda kayıt dışılığın önüne geçecektir.

Geçici çalışma izninde takip edilebilecek yol: Devletimizin Suriyeli çalışanların sosyal güvenlik (sağlık) masraflarını karşılaması olacaktır. Geçici çalışma izni, savaşın bitmesi ile sona ermeli ve Suriyelilerin evlerine dönerken müktesap hak ve tazminat taleplerinin önüne geçecek bir sistem, uluslararası hukuk ilkeleri de göz önüne alınarak oluşturulmalıdır.

Suriyelilerin çalışmasının, çalışma barışını bozma tehlikesine karşı firmalarda çalışacak Suriyelilere yönelik toplam çalışanların belli bir oranında olmak koşulu getirilebilecektir.

Hali hazırda Suriyelilere uygulanan çalışma izni prosedürü, genelde uygulandığı gibi pasaport gerektirmekte ve uzun bir süreci kapsamaktadır. Kayıt yaptıran ve en az altı aydır ülkemizde ikamet edenlere herhangi bir prosedür aranmadan çalışma izni verilmesi yönünde çalışmalar başlatılmış fakat henüz uygulamaya geçmemiştir.

Bu çalışmanın uygulamaya geçmesi Suriyelilerin istihdamındaki problemleri önemli ölçüde çözecektir. İş ve işçi bulma kurumuna benzer merkezler oluşturularak Suriyelilerin mesleklerine göre işyerlerine tasnif edilmesi, atılacak bir sonraki adım olabilecektir.

Kaçakçılığın önüne geçilmeli

Suriye'deki iç karışıklığın getirdiği diğer bir sorun, kaçak satışlardır. Özellikle akaryakıt sektöründe, kaçak akaryakıt nedeniyle satışlarda %30'a varan oranlarda düşüş mevcuttur. Sınırdan alınacak önlemlerle bu kaçakçılığın önlenmesi önem taşımaktadır.

Bir diğer ekonomik yansıma, enflasyon oranlarıdır. İlimizde özellikle Suriyelilerin gelişi ile konut fiyat ve kiralari hızla artmış ve şehrimiz %8,8 enflasyon ile ülke ortalaması olan %7,4'ün üzerine çıkarak, en yüksek artış gösteren il olmuştur.

Son olarak ülkemizin Suriye'nin ekonomik geleceğinde oynayacağı role değinmek istiyoruz. Komşu ülke Suriye ile tarihi ve kültürel bağları olan, sıkı bir ekonomik işbirliği tesis eden ve böylesine bir fedakarlığa katlanan ülkemiz, Suriye'nin yeniden inşasında aktif ve öncü bir rol almalıdır. Bu yönde politikalar ve stratejiler geliştirilmeli ve temel adımlar belirlenmelidir. Bu konuda, Cenevre Konferansı sonrası Suriye'nin geleceği ile ilgili uluslararası toplumun bakışı doğrultusunda pozisyon alma inisiyatifi geliştirmek gerekebilir. Her yönüyle olayın külfetini çektiğimiz bu meselede orta ve uzun vadede nasıl geri dönüşler alacağımızı planlamamız gerekmektedir. Nitekim ilimizde bu yönde adımlar atan başta ABD ve Avrupa ülkeleri olmak üzere çeşitli ülkeler bazı organizasyonlar altında yoğun çalışmalara başlamıştır. Bu çalışmalar yakından takip edilmeli ve ülkemiz aleyhine olacak angajmanların da önüne geçilmelidir.

Bu konuda ilimizdeki Meslek odaları ve STK'lar geleceğe dönük projeler geliştirmeli ve bu projeler devlet tarafından desteklenmelidir.

SAĞLIK

Suriyeli misafirlerin beraberinde getirdiği bir diğer temel sorun sağlık hizmetleri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Kamplarda devlet tarafından verilen sağlık hizmetleri kontrol altında tutulmaktadır. Kamp dışında ise özel hastaneler haricinde (bazı özel durumlar istisna olmak koşuluyla) kamu hastanelerinden gerekli hizmet ücretsiz olarak alınabilmektedir.

Çocuk felcini yok etmişken, aşığı bile kaldırmışken bu hastalık tekrar gündeme gelmiş, aynı zamanda kızamık grubu hastalıklar da yeniden ortaya çıkmıştır. 2013 yılında en çok kızamık görülen il Gaziantep olmuştur.

Diğer taraftan tedavi edici sağlık hizmetleri bakımından iki gruptan birini savaş cerrahisi oluşturmaktadır. Savaşta yaralanıp ameliyat olan ve yoğun bakımda kalanlar çok ciddi rakamlara ulaşmıştır. Örneğin Kilis'in ameliyatlarının yaklaşık yüzde 50-60'ını bu ameliyatlarda oluşturmakta, Gaziantep'teki kamusal hastanelerin yoğun bakımlarındaki Suriyeli oranı ise

yüzde 40'ları bulmaktadır. Yoğun bakımlar haricinde genel olarak, sağlık sistemimiz yaklaşık özelde yüzde 10, kamuda ise yüzde 40 oranında Suriyelilere hizmet vermektedir.

Gaziantep'te bulunan ve tüm Bölgeye hitap eden Dr. Ersin Arslan Hastanesi'ndeki yanık merkezi de, bu olağanüstü durum nedeniyle mevcut taleplere cevap vermekte zorlanmaktadır. Bu Merkez ivedilikle genişletilmelidir.

Hali hazırda Gaziantep'in sağlık sistemi içerisinde kamusal yatırım sıkıntısının çekildiği bir dönemde, yoğun bakım ve benzeri birimlerin önemli bir kısmının Suriyelilere tahsis edilmiş olması, sıkıntıyı arttıran ve önlem alınmasını gerektiren bir husustur. Devlet hastanelerinin kapasitelerin artırılması alınabilecek önlemlerden biri olmakla beraber, bu hastaların özel hastanelere de sevk edilmesinin önünün açılması gerekmektedir. Temelde bu konuda, Suriye'deki çatışmalarda yaralananların şehirlere getirilmeyerek sınırda oluşturulacak bir hastanede tedavi edilmeleri daha sağlıklı bir çözüm olacaktır.

Konu ile ilgili diğer bir sorun, kayıtlı olmayan sığınmacıların sağlık hizmetlerinden yararlanmada yaşadığı sıkıntılardır.

Kayıtlı kayıtsız mahallerde yaşayan Suriyelilerin tespiti yoluyla sığınmacı nüfusun kayıt altına alınması, öncelikle sağlık açısından, yani özellikle hamile, bebek, çocuk, aşılama, aile planlamasının takibi gibi temel sağlık hizmetlerinin verilmesi ve kayıt altına alınması açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bu konuda Suriyeliler için ana-çocuk sağlığı merkezi benzeri bir birim de kurulabilecektir.

Halk arasında tedirginlik yaratan diğer bir alan kimyasal silah kullanım olasılığıdır. Her ne kadar bu konuda uluslararası alanda mutabakat sağlanmış olsa da gerekli tedbirlerin alınması ve kamuoyunun bilgilendirilmesi önem taşımaktadır.

Diğer temel bir sorun, **toplum sağlığı** açısından. Geçtiğimiz aylarda Gaziantep'te başlatılan çocuk felci aşısı kampanyası kapsamında ilimiz ve Suriye'ye komşu sınır kentlerde 0-5 yaş grubunun tamamına çocuk felci aşısı yapılmıştır. Çocuk felcini yok etmişken, aşısı bile kaldırmışken bu hastalık tekrar gündeme gelmiş, aynı zamanda kızamık ve şark çıbanı grubu hastalıklar da yeniden ortaya çıkmıştır. 2013 yılında en çok kızamık görülen il Gaziantep olmuştur.

Burada ortaya çıkan temel sorun, sağlık bakımından gelecek nesillere risk yaratan bazı sonuçların ortaya çıkmış olması. Bulaşıcı hastalıklar açısından dezavantajlı grup olan Suriyeli sığınmacıların aşılanmaları ve hastalanmaları durumunda sağlık kurumlarına başvurmalarının sağlanmasına yönelik stratejilerin geliştirilmesi ile riskli bölge/mahalle çalışmalarının yapılması, bu çalışmaların sürekliliği açısından önem arz etmektedir.

Aynı zamanda sağlık konusunda toplumda var olan endişe üzerinde de durmak gerekmektedir. Bu endişeler ve eksik bilgiler kimi zaman insanları yanlış yönlendirmekte ve gerçek dışı söylentilere neden olmaktadır. Yetkili makamların yapacağı düzenli bilgilendirmeler bu noktada alınacak temel önlemdir.

Halk arasında tedirginlik yaratan diğer bir alan kimyasal silah kullanım olasılığıdır. Her ne kadar bu konuda uluslararası alanda mutabakat sağlanmış olsa da gerekli tedbirlerin alınması ve kamuoyunun bilgilendirilmesi yanında sağlık, kolluk kuvvetleri, itfaiye gibi birimlerde çalışanların eğitimi ayrı bir önem taşımaktadır.

Son olarak, savaş yaşamış, göç etmiş, sağlıksız koşullarda yaşayan dezavantajlı bu gruba hizmet veren sağlık ekibinin hem nicelik olarak hem de nitelik olarak zenginleştirilmesi gereklidir. Yeterli sayıda hekim, ebe, hemşire, sağlık memuru, teknisyenin yanı sıra diş hekimi, psikolog, fizyoterapist, vb. sağlık çalışanları ile ekibin güçlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

EĞİTİM

Suriyeli misafirlerin önemli bir kısmını ilkökul, ortaokul ve lise çağındaki gençler oluşturduğu için eğitim önemli bir konu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Kamp içinde açılan okullarda eğitimler devam etmekle birlikte özellikle kamp dışında yaşayanların eğitimi bir iki girişim haricinde yapılamamaktadır. Şehirlerde ikamet eden Suriyelilerin yalnızca yüzde 10'u eğitimlerini sürdürme şansına sahip olmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türk okullarına erişim sadece pasaport, polis kaydı veya ikamet izni olanlarla sınırlı olmakta, eğitim dilinin Türkçe olması da çoğu öğrenci için müfredat takibini imkansızlaştırmaktadır.

Bilindiği gibi, Suriyeliler ülkeye giriş yapmaya başladığında, bunun geçici bir durum olacağı düşünülüyordu. Bundan dolayı, büyük çoğunluk Türkçe öğrenmeye ilgi duymadı. Ancak, sürecin

Suriyeli çocuklara verilen eğitimlerin, en kısa sürede hem Suriyeli hem de Türk öğrencilerin birlikte karma eğitim alacağı bir sisteme (1 yıl Türkçe hazırlık öngörülebilir.) dönüştürülmesi gerekmektedir.

uzaması, Suriyeliler arasında (yetişkinler de dâhil olmak üzere) Türkçe öğrenme talebini artırmış durumdadır. Bu talebi karşılamak anlamında yetişkinlere Türkçe eğitimi sağlayan merkezler oluşturulmalıdır.

Bu tespitler ışığında, şu anda sınırlı sayıda eğitim çağındaki Suriyeli çocuklara verilen eğitimlerin, en kısa sürede hem Suriyeli hem de Türk öğrencilerin birlikte

karma eğitim alacağı bir sisteme (1 yıl Türkçe hazırlık öngörülebilir.) dönüştürülmesi gerekmektedir.

Bu çocukların Türkçe eğitim almalarının önünün açılması, eğitim çağındaki çocukların ve gençlerin eğitimlerini yarım yamalak sürdürmesine engel olacaktır. Suriyeli çocukların eğitimlerinin kent ve sistem içinde toplumsallaştırılması gerekiyor. Bu konu iki nokta hayatiyet arz ediyor: 1) Suriyeli sığınmacıları kendi mahallelerinde, zor koşullarında kendi kaderleri ve her daim Suriye'deki durumu, hayatı hayal ederek yaşamakla baş başa bırakmak, bu kitlenin çok yakın zamanda **gettolaşmasının** önünü açmaktır. Ki, bu çok daha muazzam ve çözümlü çok zor olan bir olguyla karşı karşıya bırakır bizleri. Bunun her türlü maliyeti tahminlerin üzerinde olur ve hiç de hesaplanmayan sonuçlar doğurur. Bu nüfusun şu an gettolaşmasının önünü tıkayacak tek yol yukarıda anılan politikaların acilen uygulanmasıdır. İlk ve orta öğretim ile ilgili son husus, halihazırda Suriye müfredatı kapsamında kullanılan başta tarih olmak üzere Arapça kitapların incelenmesi ve ülkemiz aleyhine olan bilgilerin çıkartılmasıdır.

Suriyeli sığınmacıları kendi mahallelerinde, zor koşullarında kendi kaderleri ile baş başa bırakmak, bu kitlenin çok yakın zamanda gettolaşmasının önünü açmaktır.

Eğitim konusuna yükseköğretim açısından bakıldığında, örneğin Gaziantep Üniversitesi'ne lisans, yüksek lisans ve doktora başvurusu yapan yabancı sayısı, Suriye'de savaşın patlak vermesi ile kat kat artmış, buralara yatay geçiş yapmak isteyen öğrencilere, üniversitede görev yapmak isteyen akademik personeller de eklenmiştir.

Üniversitelerin karşısına çıkan en büyük sorun öğrencilerin pasaportunun ve/veya not belgelerinin olmamasıdır. Tahmin edileceği üzere, insanlar savaş koşullarında herhangi bir plan ya da hazırlık yapmadan evlerini terk etmek zorunda kalmakta ve başka bir şehirde nispeten daha düzenli bir hayata geçiş yaptıktan sonra yükseköğrenimlerine devam etmek üzere girişimde bulunmaktadırlar. Suriye uyruklu olarak, Bakalorya sonuç belgesi ve pasaport ya da Suriye Koordinasyon Merkezi tarafınca verilen tanıtım kartı ile yapılan incelemeler sonucu Suriyeli öğrenciler üniversitelere yerleştirilmektedir.

Ayrıca YÖK tarafından 2012-2013 akademik yılı ve 2013-2014 akademik yılına mahsus olmak üzere alınan karar ile;

- *Suriye’de eğitim gören T.C. uyruklu ve Suriye uyruklu vatandaşlara yönelik, olağanüstü durumdaki kaynaklı, Suriye’de herhangi bir yükseköğretim kurumunda eğitim alıyor ve savaş sebebiyle eğitimine devam edemiyorsa, bu durumda Üniversitelere yazılı beyan ile yalnızca eğitim-öğretim döneminde geçerli olmak üzere “misafir öğrenci” statüsü ile kabul edilmektedir.*
- *Öğrenci Suriye’de herhangi bir yükseköğretim kurumunda eğitim alıyor ve savaş sebebiyle eğitimine devam edemiyorsa bu durumda Üniversitelere yatay geçiş başvuru evrakları ile başvurmakta ve YÖK tarafından belirlenen kontenjanlar kapsamında bu başvuru değerlendirilmektedir.*

Bu kapsamda, geçerli bir pasaporta sahip olmayan öğrenciler, İlimiz Valiliğince verilen tanıtım kartları ile hem özel öğrenci hem de transfer öğrenci olarak başvuru yapabilmektedirler.

Tanıtım kartı alabilmenin şartı ise pasaportun olmaması ve aile olarak ilimizde ikamet edilmesidir. Bu durumda pasaportu olmayan ve ailesi ile ikamet etmeyen öğrenci, üniversitelere başvuru yapamamaktadır. Her öğrencinin ailesiyle buraya yerleşmesini istemek ve beklemek zaten kısıtlı olan barınma koşullarını daha da zorlayacaktır. En azından transfer öğrencileri için mevcut diğer evrakları göz önünde bulundurularak üniversitede okuyacağı için tanıtım kartı verilmeli ve öğrenci her ay güncellenen derse devam durumuyla izlenmelidir.

SONUC

Mevcut bu tespitlere istinaden alınacak önlemlerin hayata geçirilmesinin temel koşulu, koordinasyon ve işbirliğidir. Bu koordinasyonu sağlayacak olanlar ise karşılaşılan problemlerle ilgili alanlarda çalışan devlet yetkilileri yani karar mercileri ve Meslek odaları, yerel yönetim, STK’lar gibi yerel inisiyatiflerdir.

Çok ivedi bir şekilde, bu koordinasyon Gaziantep’te sağlanmalı, bütün problem ve öneriler masaya yatırılarak kısa-orta ve uzun vadeli stratejiler geliştirilmeli ve uygulanmalıdır. Karşılaşılan bu olağanüstü durum, günlük plan ve önlemlerle yönetilmeye çalışıldığı takdirde, ülkemizi ve bölgemizi savaş sonrası da dahil olmak üzere sıkıntıya sokacak birçok sonuçla baş başa bırakacaktır.

Bizler olayların içinde yaşayan ve tüm sıkıntılara göğüs germeye çalışan kişiler ve kurumlar olarak bu önerilerimizin dikkate alınmasını temenni eder, barışın en kısa zamanda sağlanması temennisiyle kamuoyuna saygıyla arz ederiz.

Appendix B “Common Mind Report” on Council of Ministers

Ortak Akıl Raporu Bakanlar Kurulunda

Gaziantep'e yaşayan Suriyeli misafirlerle ilgili sorunlar ve çözüm önerilerini içeren "Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu" bakanlar kuruluna taşınıyor.

Gaziantep Ticaret Odası önderliğinde 12 sivil toplum kuruluşu ve 3 üniversitenin katılımıyla oluşturulan Suriye Çalışma Grubu'nun hazırladığı Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu Başbakan Yardımcıları Bülent Arınç ve Beşir Atalay ile Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı Faruk Çelik'e sunuldu.

Atalay konuyu ilk bakanlar kurulu gündemine taşıyacağını söylerken, Çelik ise Suriyeli misafirlerin çalışma hayatına katılımları yönünde raporda yer alan öneriler için çalışmalara başlanması kararını aldı.

Gaziantep Ticaret Odası Başkanı Eyüp Bartık, Meclis Başkanı Ali Yener, Gaziantep Ticaret Borsası Meclis Başkanı Selami Memiş ve Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Odaları Birliği Başkanı Ömer Küsbeoğlu'ndan oluşan heyet geçtiğimiz hafta başında basın toplantısı ile deklare edilen "Suriyeli Misafirlerle İlgili Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri- Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu"nu toplantının hemen ardından bakanlar düzeyinde Ankara'ya sundu.

Heyet, Büyükşehir Belediye Başkan Adayı Fatma Şahin, Gaziantep Milletvekilleri Mehmet Erdoğan, Derya Bakkak, Halil Mazıcıoğlu ve Mehmet Sarı'nın eşliğinde raporu Başbakan Yardımcısı Beşir Atalay ile Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı Faruk Çelik'e sunarak birer toplantı yaptı. Toplantılarda Suriyeli misafirlerle ilgili kentte yaşanan sorunların çözümüne getirilen öneriler tek tek tartışıldı ve yol haritası belirlendi.

Faruk Çelik : Mevzuat düzenlemesine derhal başlıyoruz

Heyetin Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı Faruk Çelik ile yaptığı toplantıda özellikle raporda Suriyeli işgücünün geçici çalışma izinleri ile ekonomiye kazandırılması önerisi tartışıldı. Gaziantep Heyeti temelde istihdam sorunu çözülürse diğer sorunların da çözüleceğini, toplum psikolojinin daha rahat yönetileceğini dile getirerek çözüm için Çelik'ten destek talebinde bulundu.

Bakanlıklar düzeyinde üzerlerine düşeni yerine getireceklerini belirten Bakan Çelik, "Bu hepimizin sorunu. Raporda zikredilen sorunların çözümlerine yönelik mevzuat düzenlemesine derhal başlayacağız" dedi.

Beşir Atalay: Raporu bakanlar kurulunda gündeme getireceğim

Heyet Başbakan Yardımcısı Beşir Atalay'a çözüm için çalışmaların mutfakta yapılmasının daha sağlıklı sonuçlar vereceğini belirterek, Gaziantep'te bir koordinasyon merkezinin oluşturulması gerektiğini ve sorunların çözümüne yönelik her türlü adım için hazır olduklarını söyledi.

Gaziantep'in bu işe organize bir şekilde yaklaşıyor olmasını takdirle karşılayarak bunun bir avantaj olduğunu söyleyen Başbakan Yardımcısı Beşir Atalay ise, "Suriyelileri geçici sığınmacı olarak mütalaa ettiğimiz müddetçe sorunu çözemeyiz. Raporunuzu Bakanlar Kuruluna taşıyarak yeni düzenlemeler için elimizden geleni yapacağız" dedi.

İÇİMİZDEKİ SURİYE

[Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu-2]

[Ağustos 2015]

SUNUŞ

Komşumuz Suriye’de 2011 Mart ayından bu yana süren iç savaş ve insanlık dramı binlerce kişinin ölümüne, milyonlarca kişinin de yerinden edilmesine neden olmuş ve olmaya da devam etmektedir. Şiddetten etkilenen Suriyeliler ülkelerini terk etmek zorunda kalmakta ve milyonlarca insan, başka ülkelere sığınarak yaşam mücadelesi vermeye çalışmaktadır.

Sığınan ülkelerin başında Suriye ile 877 km. sınırı ve güçlü tarihi, kültürel, ekonomik bağları olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti gelmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 29 Nisan 2011 tarihinde sığınmacılara kapısını açtı ve o tarihten bu yana yaklaşık 2 milyon Suriyeli ülkemize sığındı. Uluslararası hukuk teamülleri uyarınca, Türkiye’nin açık kapı politikası sonucunda, ülkeye kabul edilen Suriye vatandaşlarına “geçici koruma” statüsü verilmiştir. Başka bir ifade ile Suriye’deki durum normale dönene kadar Türkiye’de bir anlamda “misafir” konumunda barındırılmaktadır.

Yerinden edilen, göç etmek zorunda kalan 4 milyonu aşkın Suriyelinin yüzde 45’i “geçici koruma” statüsü altında Türkiye’de bulunmaktadır. Resmi rakamlara göre ülkemizdeki 1,8 milyon Suriyelinin büyük bir kısmı da başta Gaziantep olmak üzere bölgedeki sınır illerinde yaşamaktadır ve Suriyeliler ile yaşamak toplumu sosyo - ekonomik olarak önemli derecede etkilemektedir.

Yaşamı ekonomik, kültürel ve güvenlik olarak etkileyen mevcut bu durum karşısında Gaziantep Ticaret Odası Meclisi 04 Aralık 2013 tarihinde özel “Suriye” gündemi ile toplanmış ve bir komite oluşturmuştur. Oluşturulan Komite, 12 sivil toplum kuruluşu ve 3 üniversitenin katılımıyla bir **ORTAK AKIL RAPORU** hazırlayarak kamuoyuyla paylaşmış, Gaziantep Milletvekillerinin ve Bölgedeki Ticaret ve Sanayi Odalarının desteği ile Başbakan Yardımcısı Beşir Atalay ile Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı Faruk Çelik’e sunmuştur.

Suriyeli misafirlerle ilgili sorunları eğitim-sağlık-ekonomi-güvenlik olmak üzere 4 ana başlıkta toplayan, sadece sorunları tespit etmekle kalmayan, bu problem ve risklere yönelik görüş ve çözüm önerilerini de içeren bu rapor hem yerli ve yabancı medyanın, hem siyasilerin hem de kamuoyunun oldukça dikkatini çekmiştir.

Geçtiğimiz son 2 yıldan buyana yurtiçinden veya yurtdışından birçok kurum ve kuruluş Suriye krizine ilişkin incelemeler yapmakta ve raporlar hazırlamaktadır. **Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu’nun en önemli özelliği, raporun süreçten birebir etkilenen sivil inisiyatif tarafından gerçekçi bir bakış açısı ile, hiçbir siyasi görüşün etkisi altında kalmadan hazırlanmış olmasıdır.**

Suriyeliler ile aynı mahallede yaşayan, aynı hastanede tedavi gören, aynı caddelerde dolaşan, aynı parkta çocuklarını oynatan, aynı restoranda yemek yiyen, aynı marketlerden alışveriş yapan, aynı işyerinde çalışan ama aynı dili konuşan, aynı toplumsal değerlere ve yaşam şartlarına sahip kişiler tarafından hazırlanan bu rapor; **“aynı özellikler” ile “ayrı özellikler” arasında çatışma değil uyum kurulması temeline oturtulmuştur.**

Raporun hazırlanmasından bu yana geçen 18 aylık süreçte bazı öneriler dikkate alınarak gerek yasal düzenlemeler yapılmış gerekse bazı özel uygulamalar hayata geçirilmiştir. Örneğin Suriye plakalı araçlara geçici plaka verilmesi gibi. Ancak bu rapor hazırlandığında Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyeli sayısı 18 aylık süreçte resmi rakamlara göre yüzde 100 artış göstermiş, raporda savunulan Suriyelilerin kente, topluma ve ekonomiye makul derece ve biçimlerde entegre edilmesi noktasında arzu edilen başarı elde edilememiştir.

Dolayısıyla raporun güncellenme gereği ortaya çıkmıştır. Şubat 2014'te hazırlanarak kamuoyuyla paylaşılan raporun ardından geçen 18 aylık süreçte ekonomi-güvenlik-sağlık-eğitim başlıklarında neler yaşandı, hangi öneriler hayata geçirildi, nasıl ilerleme kaydedildi bu raporda yer verilmiş olup, **ilk rapordan farklı olarak bir de turizm başlığı eklenerek yaşanan sürecin turizme etkilerine de değinilmiştir.** Öte yandan raporda Suriyelilerin bölgedeki diğer illere etkisini içeren verilere de yer verilmiş bu nokta Adıyaman, Şanlıurfa, Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Kilis ve Osmaniye illerinin Ticaret ve Sanayi Odalarının desteği alınmıştır.

Şu an savaş dursa dahi Suriye'de insani ve iktisadi altyapının yok olması, Suriyeli misafirler ile ekonomik, kültürel ve insani ilişkilerimizin uzun yıllar süreceği farkındalığı ile; bu gibi olağanüstü durumlarda ortaya çıkan sorunları orta ve uzun vadede, sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik boyutlarıyla ele alacak ve çözebilecek bir modele ihtiyaç olduğunu savunan bu raporun amacı, Suriyeli misafirlerle ilgili bir strateji dokümanı ve eylem planı oluşturmaktır.

Türkiye halkı yaşanan problemlere rağmen insani bir görev yapmanın bilinci ile birçok fedakârlığa göğüs germektedir. Buradaki temel beklenti, bu problemlere yönelik daha geniş ve orta vadeli planların yapılması ve uygulamaya geçirilmesidir.


Suriye'deki bu savaşın bitmesi ve Suriyelilerin evlerine dönmesi en büyük temennimizdir. Komşu ülkelerle barış içinde yaşamak başta güvenlik olmak üzere bölgenin sosyo-ekonomik gelişimi anlamında büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Bu bağlamda barışın en kısa zamanda tesis edilmesi temennisiyle yürüttüğümüz bu çalışmanın faydalı olmasını diler, saygılar sunarız.

Gaziantep Ticaret Odası

MEVCUT DURUM

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (UNHCR) Temmuz 2015 verilerine göre 2011 yılından bu yana Suriye'deki şiddetten etkilendiği için başka ülkelere sığınanların sayısı 4.015.065 kişiye ulaşmıştır. Bu insanların % 45'i Türkiye, % 30'u Lübnan, % 16'sı Ürdün, % 6'sı Irak ve % 3'ü de Mısır'a sığınmıştır. Kuzey Afrika ülkelerine göç edenlerin sayısı ise 24.055 kişidir. Avrupa ülkeleri ise zor durumdaki milyonlarca Suriyeli'den sadece 311.349'unu ülkelerine kabul etmiştir. Bunların % 49'u da Almanya ve İsveç'tedir.



Ülkelerinden ayrılmak zorunda kalan Suriyelilerin demografik olarak dağılımlarına baktığımızda ise % 50,5'nin kadın, % 49,5'nin ise erkek olduğu ve yarısından fazlasının da 18-60 yaş aralığında olduğu görülmektedir.

Türkiye'deki 1,8 milyon Suriyelinin 265 bini, 10 ildeki 25 Geçici Barınma Merkezlerinde yaşamakta. Ülkemize sığınan Suriyelilerin yüzde 85'i ise neredeyse Türkiye'nin her ilinde halkla iç içe yaşam mücadelesi vermekte.

Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin İllere Göre Dağılımı

İL	Geçici Barınma Merkezi Mevcudu	Barınma Merkezi Dışındaki Kayıtlı Mevcut	Toplam
HATAY	14.873	229.617	244.490
GAZİANTEP	53.191	258.568	311.759
ŞANLIURFA	106.716	300.000 (tahmini)	406.716
KİLİS	34.877	76.599	111.476
MARDİN	10.201		
KAHRAMANMARAŞ	17.761		
OSMANİYE	9.198	16.802	26.000
ADİYAMAN	9.689	8.959	18.648
ADANA	11.172		
MALATYA	7.784		
GENEL TOPLAM	264.942		

AFAD Ağustos 2015 verilerine göre Gaziantep ve ilçelerinde kayıtlı toplam 311.759 Suriyeli bulunmaktadır. Bunların yüzde 17'si yani 53.191'i Gaziantep'teki 5 adet Geçici Barınma Merkezlerinde yaşamakta. Barınma merkezlerinde kalan kadın sayısı 25.969, erkek ise 27.222'dir. Gaziantep'te kamp dışında kalan toplam Suriyeli sayısı ise 258.568'dir.

Gaziantep ve ilçelerinde Barınma Merkezleri dışındaki kayıtlı Suriyeliler

	Kayıtlı Suriyeli Sayısı
Gaziantep Merkez	221.198
Şahinbey	160.099
Şehitkamil	54.759
Diğer	6.340
Nizip Merkez	25.791
İslahiye Merkez	11.579
TOPLAM	258.568

SURIYELİ SİĞINMACILARLA İLGİLİ YAŞANAN SORUNLAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ

Şubat 2014'te hazırlanan Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu sorunları ve çözüm önerilerini Güvenlik-Ekonomi-Eğitim ve Sağlık başlıkları altında toplamıştı. Bu raporda aynı ana başlıklar altında gelinen nokta incelenmiş olmakla birlikte, turizm konusu ayrı başlık altında değerlendirilerek, Gaziantep ve bölge turizminin Suriye iç savaşı ve terör örgütlerinin yarattığı kaostan nasıl etkilendiği ve bu konuda alınması gereken önlemlere yer verilmiştir.

1- SURIYELİ SİĞINMACILARIN BÖLGE GÜVENLİĞİNE ETKİLERİ

Suriyeli misafirlerin beraberinde getirdiği temel sorunların başında güvenlik gelmektedir. Bu konudaki tedirginliğin en önemli nedeni, sınırı geçen Suriye vatandaşları arasında terör, hırsızlık, gasp gibi yasa dışı faaliyetlerde bulunanların mevcudiyeti ve bu suç işleme oranının artına tehlikesidir.

1.1. Suriyeliler için sağlıklı bir kayıt sistemi oluşturulmalı

Sağlıklı bir kayıt sisteminin güvenlik açısından önemini ilk raporumuzda belirtmiştik. Aradan geçen süre zarfında kayıt işlemini daha sıkı bir şekilde parmak izleri alınarak yapıldığı, bu konuda mobil kayıt turlarının devreye sokulduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Tır mobil kayıt merkezleri aracılığı Gaziantep'te 160.099 Suriyelinin kayıt altına alındığı bilinmektedir. Ancak TC Cumhuriyeti topraklarındaki Suriyelilerin yüzde 100'nün kayıt altına alınmadığı bir gerçektir.

1.2. Suriye plakalı araçlar için kayıt sistemi oluşturulmalı

“Halihazırda Gaziantep'te 5000'den fazla Suriye plakalı araç bulunmaktadır. Bu araçlara geçici – misafir plakalar verilmesi, araçların kayıt altına alınmasını ve takibini sağlayacaktır. Trafik sigortalarının yapılmasının şart koşulması ve TÜV muayene istasyonlarında yılda bir muayene yapılması alınacak diğer önemler arasındadır” şeklindeki, Suriye plakalı araçlara geçici/misafir plaka verilmesi, araçların kayıt altına alınarak takibinin sağlanması yönündeki 1.Ortak Akıl Raporumuzda yer alan bu öneri Karayolları Trafik Yönetmeliğinde yapılan değişiklik ile uygulamaya alınmıştır.

Karayolları Trafik Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik 22/11/2014 tarih ve 29183 sayılı Resmi Gazete' de yayımlanmış olup, yapılan bu değişiklikle Karayolları Trafik Yönetmeliğine (KTY) 51' inci maddeden sonra gelmek üzere “Ülkelerindeki olağanüstü haller nedeniyle ülkemize giriş yapan yabancılara ait araçlara geçici trafik belgesi ve tescil plakası verilmesi” başlıklı 51/A maddesi eklenmiştir.

Yönetmelikte yapılan değişiklik gereğince 03/04/2015 tarihinden itibaren Suriye Arap Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlarının beraberinde getirdikleri araçlarına geçici trafik belgesi ve tescil plakası verilmesi işlemleri trafik tescil şube veya bürolarındaki görevliler tarafından yapılmaktadır.

Kayıt altına alınan Suriye plakalı araçlara il kodundan sonra geçici tescil olarak **SAA 001'den SZZ 999'a** kadar sıralı plakalar veriliyor. Uygulama Suriye plakalarının alınıp yerine Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde araçlara takılan plakaların verilmesi şeklinde yapılıyor. Suriyelilerin Arapça düzenlenmiş plakaları ülkelerine dönmeye karar verdiği zaman iade edilecek. Geçici Türk plakası alan Suriyelilerin araçlarına sigorta işlemi de yapılıyor

Mayıs-Temmuz 2015 döneminde Gaziantep trafiğine çıkan **3 bin 100 Suriye plakalı araca geçici** Türk plakası verildi. Gaziantep genelinde 5 – 6 bin arasında Suriye plakalı aracın olduğu tahmin ediliyor. Şanlıurfa'da ise bu rakam 1.299'dur.

2. EKONOMİK ETKİLER

Suriyeli sığınmacılar sadece tüketici değil

Türk hükümeti ve Türk halkı, Suriye’de yaşanan drama oldukça misafirperver ve cömertçe cevap vermiş, hükümet kamplarda yaşayan binlerce sığınmacıya yüksek standartlarda bir yaşam sunmak için 6 milyar doları aşan harcama yapmıştır. Bu tutum dünya üzerinde Türkiye için bir gurur kaynağı ve güçlü bir ulusal devlet imajı oluşturmakla birlikte ekonomimiz için yarattığı külfet de göz ardı edilemez. Ancak bu külfet paylaşılmadığı müddetçe yardımın sürdürülebilirliği de mümkün olmayacaktır.

Bu durumun yanı sıra, ihracatçılarımızın transit geçişte Suriye’yi kullanamaması, Suriye’de yatırım yapan Türk firmaların faaliyetlerini durdurması, Suriyelilerin çalışma hayatına kayıtdışı bir şekilde dahil olması ve sığınmacıların yaşadığı sınır kentlerinde enflasyon oranlarının ülke ortalamasının üstünde olması gibi olumsuz ekonomik etkilerle karşı karşıya olduğumuz bir gerçektir.

Suriyeli sığınmacıların ekonomik açıdan oluşturduğu sorunların çözümüne Suriye’den gelen insanların sadece birer tüketici ve yardım bekleyen insanlar olarak kabul edilerek politikaların bu yönde üretilmesi olarak yaklaşmak doğru değildir. Çünkü, Gaziantep başta olmak üzere Türkiye’deki bazı Suriyeli sığınmacılar değişik kriter ve ölçüde yüksek iktisadi girdi sağlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla sığınmacıların ekonomi üzerine etkilerini maliyet-fırsat perspektifinden değerlendirerek çözüm üretmek en doğru yaklaşımdır.

Bu bağlamda Suriyeli sığınmacıların özelde Gaziantep genelinde bölgemiz ekonomisi üzerinde yarattığı olumlu/olumsuz etkileri şu şekilde sıralayabiliriz.

2.1. Uluslararası pazarlara ulaşım da maliyet artışı: Suriye üzerinden uluslararası pazarlara yapılan ihracat, krizden en çok etkilenen unsurların başında gelmektedir. İhracatçılarımız transit geçişte Suriye’yi kullanamamakta, Suriye üzerinden geçiş yaptığı ülkelere farklı ulaşım yolları ile ulaşarak artı maliyetlere katlanmak zorunda kalmaktadır.

Bu maliyetlere katlanan üretici/ihracatçılara ek teşvikler sağlanmalıdır. Aksi takdirde ilimiz ve bölgemizin ekonomik gelişimi ciddi yaralar alacaktır.

Euro bölgesindeki ekonomik daralma, Rusya ve Ukrayna’da yaşanan krizler de göz önünde tutulduğunda, Suriye üzerinden transit geçiş ile ulaşılan Suudi Arabistan, Ürdün, Lübnan, Yemen gibi ülkeler Türkiye ihracatı için önemli pazarlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ancak yapılan ihracatın krizin başladığı 2011 yılından bu yana seyri incelendiğinde, çok daha yüksek bir potansiyelin varlığı söz konusu iken ihracat oranlarındaki artışın sınırlı kaldığı, arzu edilen düzeye çıkarılamamış olduğu görülmektedir.

Gaziantep ihracatı, 1000\$

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015*
Suudi Arabistan	242.657	289.361	300.707	348.203	234.255
Ürdün	24.520	19.978	34.479	35.693	20.652
Lübnan	21.515	20.319	39.294	47.950	18.314
Yemen	12.939	18.229	27.250	31.312	12.385

Kaynak: TÜİK

*Ocak-Haziran 2015

2.2. Suriye ihracatındaki istikrarsızlık: Suriye’de yaşanan olaylar nedeniyle, ülkemiz ile Suriye arasındaki siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerin son dört yılda büyük oranda bozulmuş olmasının bölge ticaretine de olumsuz yansımaları olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Son 10 yıllık süreç incelendiğinde; 2005 - 2010 döneminde her yıl artan bir ivme ile devam eden Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye ihracatında 2011 yılından itibaren düzensizlikler başlamıştır. Krizin başladığı yıl % 12 kayıp yaşayan ihracat 2012 yılında %69’luk daha sert bir düşüş yaşamıştır. İnsanı yardımların etkisi ile de ihracat 2013 yılında %105’lik bir artış göstermiş olmasına rağmen, 2014 yılından itibaren artış oranında düşüşler başlamıştır. 2015 yılının ilk 6 aylık döneminde ise bir önceki yılın 6 aylık dönemine göre sadece %2,3’lük bir ihracat artışı gözlenmiştir.

Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye olan ihracatı

	İhracat 1000 Dolar	Değişim (%)
2010	1.844.605	
2011	1.609.861	-12
2012	497.960	-69
2013	1.024.473	105
2014	1.800.962	76
2015*	741.505	2,3

Kaynak : TÜİK

*Ocak-Haziran 2015 dönemi

Gaziantep’in Suriye’ye olan ihracatında da Türkiye ihracatındaki seyir görülmektedir. Gaziantep’in Suriye’ye ihracatı krizin başlangıcının ardından 2012 yılında %45’lik sert bir düşüş yaşarken, 2013 yılında insani yardımların etkisi ile % 417’lik bir artış kaydetmiştir.

Türkiye’deki en fazla Suriyeliyi misafir eden Adıyaman, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Hatay, Osmaniye ve Kahramanmaraş illerinde de durum pek farklı değildir.

İl	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014 Ocak-Haziran	2015 Ocak-Haziran
Adıyaman	971.991		540.218	2.102.381	1.183.207	1.068.681
Gaziantep	96.193.807	53.279.443	275.805.658	360.207.908	154.225.798	184.449.198
Hatay	96.978.595	56.759.033	122.035.536	224.845.458	85.181.889	123.011.063
Kahramanmaraş	12.088.741	1.547.526	6.127.590	8.384.913	3.737.025	3.731.911
Şanlıurfa	53.864.420	3.174.373	37.448.337	32.773.031	11.587.387	30.800.760
Kilis	16.205.268	5.141.019	10.537.540	26.967.674	11.162.394	14.656.304
Osmaniye	31.109.145	526.001	3.024.807	1.248.872	950.406	216.061

Kaynak : TÜİK

Türkiye’nin kamplarda yaşayan Suriyelilere ve Suriye içine yaptığı insani yardımların büyük çoğunluğu yerel firmalar üzerinden sağlanmaktadır. Tüm dünyadan Suriye’ye giden yardım malzemeleri de sınır illerindeki firmalar tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Bu durum özellikle tekstil, gıda alanlarında faaliyet gösteren firmalar açısından fırsat yaratmakla birlikte, istikrar arz etmemektedir. Dolayısıyla da firmalar sağlıklı bir yatırım ve üretim planlaması yapamamaktadır.

2.3. Suriye’deki yatırım faaliyetlerinin durması: Suriye’de özellikle Halep’te yatırım yapan Gaziantep’li girişimcilerin faaliyetleri tamamen durmuş ve fabrikalarında büyük hasarlar meydana gelmiştir. Bu yatırımcılar birçok yerel ve ulusal mercilere başvurularına rağmen hiçbir yanıt ve destek alamamışlardır.

Hâlihazırda Suriye’de yatırım yapan Gaziantep’li 10’u aşkın firma bu yönde mağduriyet yaşamaktadır. Yatırımcılar yanında orada depo, irtibat ofisi gibi birimler açmış birçok firmamız vardır. *Öncelikle bu firmaların oradaki zararları tespit edilmeli ve bu firmalara SGK, Vergi, KDV gibi alanlarda avantajlar sağlanmalıdır.*

2.4. Kayıtdışı ekonomi ve sığınmacıların çalışma hayatına dahil edilmesi: Suriyeliler, işverenler tarafından hem vicdani duygular hem de işgücüne olan ihtiyaçlarından dolayı zaman zaman kayıt dışı olarak çalıştırılmaktadır. Kayıt dışı uygulamalar, hem Suriyeli sığınmacıların düşük ve güvencesiz ücretlerle çalıştırılmasına ve çocuk işçiliğine sebebiyet vermekte, hem de yerel halka verilen maaşların da düşmesine neden olarak yerel çalışanlar arasında rahatsızlık yaratmaktadır. Suriyelilerin yoğun olarak yaşadığı sınır illerindeki işsizlik oranının Türkiye ortalamasından yüksek seyrettiği de görülmektedir.

	TRC1 Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis	TRC2 Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır	TR63 Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye	TÜRKİYE
2011	15,4	8,2	13,3	8,6
2012	12,4	6,8	12,6	8,2
2013	8,1	16,7	13,3	8,7
2014	8	17,4	15,4	9,9

Öte yandan Suriyeli mültecileri çalıştıran iş yerlerinde kaza olması durumunda yasal olarak bu kişiler sigorta ettirilemediklerinden, işverenlerin yüksek cezalarla karşılaşması riski doğmakta hem de kayıt dışı işçi çalıştıran firmalar ile çalıştırmayanlar arasında haksız rekabet doğmaktadır. Nitekim; Son dönemlerde SGK müfettişlerinin işyerlerine yaptığı denetimlerde yasalar müsaade etmediği için kaçak işçi durumuna düşen Suriyeliler nedeni ile işverenlere ağır cezai uygulamalar yapılmaktadır. Bu durumun suçlusunun işveren olmadığı açık ve net ortada iken böyle bir uygulamanın ekonomik kaybının da doğru analiz edilmesi gerekmektedir.

Bölge illerinde yeni işgücüne olan ihtiyaç özellikle yerel halkın çalışmayı tercih etmediği vasıfsız işgücü gerektiren iş kollarında Suriyeliler ile karşılanabilir. Ancak Suriyelilerin işgücü piyasasına dahil edilmesi, çalışma barışının bozulmaması ve de kayıt dışı ekonomiyi büyütmemesi için yasal bir çerçevede olmalıdır.

Bu noktada Suriyelilerin çalışma barışını bozmadan nasıl çalışma hayatına dahil edileceği Gaziantep Ortak Akıl Raporu'nda açıkça belirtilmiş, yetkililere iletilmiş ve kamuoyu oluşturulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu raporda da aşağıdaki şekilde yinelenen önerimiz kısmen 22 Ekim'de resmi gazetede yayınlanan **"Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliğinde"** yer bulmakla beraber henüz uygulamaya geçmemiş olması, hem sosyal hem de ekonomik kayıplarımızı artırmaya devam etmektedir.

İş piyasasına erişim hizmetleri

MADDE 29- (1) Geçici korunanların çalışmalarına ilişkin usul ve esaslar, Bakanlığın görüşü alınarak Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığının teklifi üzerine Bakanlar Kurulunca belirlenir.

(2) Geçici koruma kimlik belgesine sahip olanlar, Bakanlar Kurulunca belirlenecek sektörlerde, iş kollarında ve coğrafi alanlarda (il, ilçe veya köylerde) çalışma izni almak için Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığına başvurabilir.

(3) Yabancıların çalışmayacağı iş ve mesleklere ilişkin mevzuatta yer alan hükümler saklıdır.

(4) Geçici korunanlara verilen çalışma izinlerinin süreleri, geçici korumanın süresinden fazla olamaz. Geçici koruma sona erdiğinde, bu kapsamda verilen çalışma izni sona erer.

(5) Geçici korunanlara verilen çalışma izni, Kanunda düzenlenen ikamet izinleri yerine geçmez.

Suriyelilere çalışma izni verilmesinin gerekçesi ve uygulama önerisi birinci raporumuzda aşağıdaki şekilde yer bulmuştur:

... çalışma barışı bozulmadan yasal çerçevelerde Suriyelileri geçici süreli çalıştırmanın yolları bulunmalıdır. Yabancı statüleri baki kalmak kaydıyla geçici çalışma izinlerini içeren bu strateji, bu nüfusun sağlık ve eğitim hususundaki sıkıntılarını da ciddi derecede azaltacaktır. Verilecek iş ve geçici çalışma izinleri aynı zamanda kayıt dışılığın önüne geçecektir.

Geçici çalışma izninde takip edilebilecek yol: Devletimizin Suriyeli çalışanların sosyal güvenlik (sağlık) masraflarını karşılaması olacaktır. Geçici çalışma izni, savaşın bitmesi ile sona ermeli ve Suriyelilerin evlerine dönerken müktesap hak ve tazminat taleplerinin önüne geçecek bir sistem, uluslararası hukuk ilkeleri de göz önüne alınarak oluşturulmalıdır.

Suriyelilerin çalışmasının, çalışma barışını bozma tehlikesine karşı firmalarda çalışacak Suriyelilere yönelik toplam çalışanların belli bir oranında olmak koşulu getirilebilecektir.

Hali hazırda Suriyelilere uygulanan çalışma izni prosedürü, genelde uygulandığı gibi pasaport gerektirmekte ve uzun bir süreci kapsamaktadır. Kayıt yaptıran ve en az altı aydır ülkemizde ikamet edenlere herhangi bir prosedür aranmadan çalışma izni verilmesi yönünde çalışmalar başlatılmış fakat henüz uygulamaya geçmemiştir.

Bu çalışmanın uygulamaya geçmesi Suriyelilerin istihdamındaki problemleri önemli ölçüde çözecektir. İş ve işçi bulma kurumuna benzer merkezler oluşturularak Suriyelilerin mesleklerine göre işyerlerine tasnif edilmesi, atılacak bir sonraki adım olabilecektir.

2.5. Enflasyonist baskı ve gayrimenkul sektöründeki fiyat artışları: Suriyeli sığınmacıların bir diğer ekonomik yansıması ise enflasyon oranlarıdır. Talep arttıkça temel gıda ve ev fiyatları yükselmiş ve sınır illerinde hayat pahalılığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Gaziantep ve bölge illerinde enflasyon Türkiye ortalamasının üstünde seyretmektedir. 2011 yılında Türkiye’de enflasyon %10,45 iken Gaziantep, Adıyaman ve Kilis illerinin yer aldığı TRC1 Bölgesinde enflasyon % 11,68 olarak gerçekleşmiştir. Suriyelilerin Gaziantep başta olmak üzere bulundukları bütün illerde ev kiralari Türkiye ortalamasının oldukça üstünde seyretmektedir.

Kira artış oranı

Yıl	Türkiye artış oranı (%)	TRC1 artış oranı (%) (Gaziantep,Kilis,Adıyaman)
2010	3,96	5,34
2011	4,71	4,49
2012	5,46	8,35
2013	6,5	14,24
2014	7,34	15,54
2015*	7,58	14,4

Kaynak: TÜİK

*Temmuz

2.6. Bölgedeki Suriyeli yatırımcıların artması: Türkiye’ye gelen Suriyelilerin sadece kırsal ve alt gelir grubundan oluşmadığı, yatırımcı ve tüccar Suriyelilerin de ülkemize yerleştiği görülmektedir. Ortadoğu ülkeleri ile son derece iyi bağlantılara sahip Suriyeli tüccarların Türkiye’den ticaret yapması, Türkiye mallarını sahip oldukları iş bağlantıları üzerinden Ortadoğu pazarına ulaştırmaları ekonomiye olumlu yansımalar olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Her ne kadar Suriye’den Türkiye’ye büyük bir sermaye akışı olmasa da Suriyelilerin özellikle bölgede ticari faaliyete ve üretime katılmak üzere çok sayıda firma kurduğu görülmektedir.

Bu firmaları Gaziantep Ticaret Odası verilerine göre incelediğimizde 2013 yılından itibaren sayılarının hızla arttığını görmekteyiz. Suriye iç savaşından önce GTO’ya kayıtlı 12 Suriye uyruklu firma varken bu sayının 2014’te 347’ye, Ağustos 2015 itibari ile de 471’e ulaştığı görülmektedir.

Bu firmaların faaliyet alanlarına göre dağılımına bakıldığında ise gıda ve tekstil sektörlerinde yoğunlaştıkları görülmektedir.

Gaziantep Ticaret Odası’na kayıtlı Suriye uyruklu firma sayısı

YIL	FİRMA SAYISI
2011 öncesi	12
2011	20
2012	31
2013	122
2014	347
2015	471

Kilis Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası'na kayıtlı Suriye uyruklu firma sayısı 70, Şanlıurfa'da 56, Antakya'da ise 250'dir.

Suriyeliler ayrıca, sınır illeri başta olmak üzere Türkiye genelinde Odalara kayıtlı olmayan firm, bakkal, lokanta gibi küçük çaplı, Suriyelilerin kendi alıştikları tarzda ürünleri sattıkları dükkânlar açmaktadır. Fakat bu işletmelerin birçoğunun kaçak olması yerel esnaf arasında haksız rekabet ortamı doğurmaktadır. Gaziantep'te bu şekildeki küçük esnaftan sadece 26'sının Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Odaları Birliği'ne kayıtlı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

2.7. Suriye'nin ekonomik geleceğinde Türkiye'nin rolü : Mevcut durumda Suriyelilerin bölge ekonomisi üzerinde yarattığı etkilerin olumlu yanları olmakla birlikte olumsuzlukların büyük oranda daha fazla olduğu açıktır. Öte yandan bu süreçte atılacak her adımın ülkemizin Suriye'nin ekonomik geleceğinde oynayacağı rol düşünülerek atılması gerekmektedir.

Bu bağlamda Suriye ile bugünkü siyasi ilişkilerin durumu savaş sonrasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin temelini oluşturacağından politika yapıcılarının buna hassasiyet ile yaklaşması gerektiğine dair uyarımız ilk raporda aşağıdaki şekilde yer bulmuş olup, bu konuda geç kalınmaması gerektiğinin altını bir kez daha önemle çiziyoruz.

Komşu ülke Suriye ile tarihi ve kültürel bağları olan, sıkı bir ekonomik işbirliği tesis eden ve böylesine bir fedakarlığa katlanan ülkemiz, Suriye'nin yeniden inşasında aktif ve öncü bir rol almalıdır. Bu yönde politikalar ve stratejiler geliştirilmeli ve temel adımlar belirlenmelidir. Her yönüyle olayın külfetini çektiğimiz bu meselede orta ve uzun vadede nasıl geri dönüşler alacağımızı planlamamız gerekmektedir. Bu konuda ilimizdeki Meslek odaları ve STK'lar geleceğe dönük projeler geliştirmeli ve bu Projeler devlet tarafından desteklenmelidir.

3. SAĞLIK SİSTEMİNDE YARATTIĞI ETKİ

Suriyeli misafirlerin beraberinde getirdiği bir diğer temel sorun sağlık hizmetleri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Kamplarda yaşayan Suriyeliler sağlık hizmetleri almada sıkıntı yaşamamaktadır. Kamp dışındaki Suriyeliler ise kayıt yaptırımları durumunda devlet hastanelerinden ücretsiz şekilde faydalanabilmektedir. Sınır illerindeki devlet hastaneleri toplam hizmet kapasitesinin yaklaşık % 40'ını Suriyelilere sunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu illerdeki hastanelerde kapasite sorunu yaşanmaktadır. Özel hastaneler ise % 10 oranında Suriyelilere hizmet vermektedir.

Gaziantep'teki polikliniklerden bugüne kadar 1.399.893 Suriyeli faydalanmış olup 76.298 Suriyeli de kamu hastanelerinden yatarak tedavi, 53.130 kişi de ameliyat hizmeti almıştır. Bu süreçte doğum sayısı ise 10.564 olarak gerçekleşmiştir.

Adıyaman'daki kamu hastanelerinde tedavi gören Suriyeli sayısı 16.420 olarak gerçekleşirken ameliyat hizmeti alan Suriyeli sayısı 413, doğum sayısı ise 767 olmuştur.

Suriyeli sayısının neredeyse il nüfusu kadar olduğu Kilis'te ise son iki yılda polikliniklerden faydalanan sığınmacı sayısı 157.860, ameliyat sayısı 23.047, doğum sayısı ise 4.393 olarak gerçekleşmiştir.

Hali hazırda Gaziantep'in sağlık sistemi içerisinde kamusal yatırım sıkıntısının çekildiği bir dönemde, yoğun bakım ve benzeri birimlerin önemli bir kısmının Suriyelilere tahsis edilmiş olması, sıkıntıyı arttıran ve önlem alınmasını gerektiren bir husustur.

Diğer temel bir sorun, **toplum sağlığı** açısından. Birinci raporun hazırlandığı dönemde Gaziantep'te başlatılan çocuk felci aşısı kampanyası kapsamında ilimiz ve Suriye'ye komşu sınır kentlerde 0-5 yaş grubunun tamamına çocuk felci aşısı yapılmıştır. 1 Ocak 2014'ten bu yana çocuk felci aşısı (Oral palio aşısı) doz sayısı 17.858'e ulaşmıştır.

Çocuk felcini yok etmişken, aşırı bile kaldırmışken bu hastalık tekrar gündeme gelmiş, aynı zamanda kızamık ve şark çıbanı grubu hastalıklar da yeniden ortaya çıkmıştır.

Burada ortaya çıkan temel sorun, sağlık bakımından gelecek nesillere risk yaratan bazı sonuçların ortaya çıkmış olması. Bulaşıcı hastalıklar açısından dezavantajlı grup olan Suriyeli sığınmacıların aşılanmaları ve hastalanmaları durumunda sağlık kurumlarına başvurularının sağlanmasına yönelik stratejilerin geliştirilmesi ile riskli bölge/mahalle çalışmalarının yapılması, bu çalışmaların sürekliliği açısından önem arz etmektedir.

Gaziantep'te 1 Ocak 2014'ten 8 Ağustos 2015'e kadar olan zaman zarfında 6.663 Suriyeli çocuğa çeşitli aşılar yapılmıştır. (Kızamık 105; 4'lü Karma aşı (DaBT+IPA) 2.275; Suçiçeği 865; Hepatit A 9.757; PPD 2.279, Td 2.944, KKK (doz sayısı) 6.376, OPA (Oral palio aşısı) doz sayısı 17.858, KPA 8.322, Hepatit B 4.786, 5'li Karma Aşı 7.935, BCG (doz sayısı) 2.561)

Aynı zamanda sağlık konusunda toplumda var olan endişe üzerinde de durmak gerekmektedir. Bu endişeler ve eksik bilgiler kimi zaman insanları yanlış yönlendirmekte ve gerçek dışı söylentilere neden olmaktadır. Yetkili makamların yapacağı düzenli bilgilendirmeler bu noktada alınacak temel önlemdir.

Son olarak, savaş yaşamış, göç etmiş, sağlıksız koşullarda yaşayan dezavantajlı bu gruba hizmet veren sağlık ekibinin hem nicelik olarak hem de nitelik olarak zenginleştirilmesi gereklidir. Yeterli sayıda hekim, ebe, hemşire, sağlık memuru, teknisyenin yanı sıra diş hekimi, psikolog, fizyoterapist, vb. sağlık çalışanları ile ekibin güçlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

4. SURIYELİ SİĞINMACILARIN EĞİTİM İHTİYACI

Suriyeli misafirlerin önemli bir kısmını ilkököl, ortaokul ve lise çağındaki gençler oluşturduğu için eğitim önemli bir konu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Şu an Gaziantep'te eğitim çağında 63 bin 607 Suriyeli çocuk bulunmaktadır. Bunların 4 bin 500'ü kent merkezinde Milli Eğitime bağlı okullarda olmak üzere toplam 32 bin 803'ü eğitim görmektedir.

Eğitim alan 32 bin Suriyeli çocuklar kent merkezinde Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğüne bağlı okullar dışında 39 geçici eğitim merkezinde eğitim görmektedir. UNICEF, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve çeşitli sivil toplum kuruluşlarının desteklediği geçici eğitim merkezlerinde 1.114 Suriyeli öğretmen çalışmaktadır.

Bugüne kadar Suriyeli 1.736 yetişkin de Halk Eğitim Merkezinde çeşitli branşlarda eğitim aldı.

Gaziantep Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü'nün 3 yıllık çalışma planında Suriyeli öğrenci sayısının 78 bine ulaşması öngörülmektedir.

Eğitim gören Suriyeli çocukların il ve sınıflarına göre dağılımı;

	Gaziantep*	Adıyaman	Kilis	Şanlıurfa***	Osmaniye
Okul Öncesi	1.516	259	2.213**	2.090	
İlk Öğretim	16.610	1.885	9.747	22.974	3.000
Ortaöğretim	6.737	1.020	4.223	9.916	
Lise	3.440	387	2.194	4.127	
TOPLAM	28.303	3.551	18.377	39.107	

*Gaziantep'te 4.500 Suriyeli de kendilerine tahsis edilen Milli Eğitime bağlı okullarda eğitim görmektedir.

**Kilis'teki okul öncesi eğitim olan Türk öğrenci sayısı 2.020

***Şanlıurfa'da 144 Suriyeli çocuk da özel eğitim sınıfında eğitim almaktadır.

Ortak Akıl Raporu-1 hazırlandığı sırada okul çağındaki Suriyeli çocukların sadece yüzde 10'unun eğitime erişebildiği düşünüldüğünde geline nokta iyi olmakla birlikte yeterli değildir. Çünkü Suriyelilerin makul derecede topluma entegrasyonunu sağlamanın birinci şartı en temel insan hakkı olan eğitim hakkının sağlanmasıdır. Suriyeliler yaşadıkları toprakların toplumsal kurallarını ve dilini öğrendikçe iki toplum daha uyumlu ve hoşgörülü bir yaşam süreceklerdir. Bu noktada Türkçe öğrenmenin gerekliliği ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Bilindiği gibi, Suriyeliler ülkeye giriş yapmaya başladığında, bunun geçici bir durum olacağı düşünülüyordu. Bundan dolayı, büyük çoğunluk Türkçe öğrenmeye ilgi duymadı. Ancak, sürecin uzaması, Suriyeliler arasında (yetişkinler de dâhil olmak üzere) Türkçe öğrenme talebini artırmış durumdadır. Bu talebi karşılamak anlamında yetişkinlere Türkçe eğitimi sağlayan merkezler oluşturulmalıdır.

Bu tespitler ışığında, şu anda sınırlı sayıda eğitim çağındaki Suriyeli çocuklara verilen eğitimlerin, en kısa sürede hem Suriyeli hem de Türk öğrencilerin birlikte karma eğitim alacağı bir sisteme (1 yıl Türkçe hazırlık öngörülebilecektir.) dönüştürülmesi gerekmektedir.

Bu çocukların Türkçe eğitim almalarının önünün açılması, eğitim çağındaki çocukların ve gençlerin eğitimlerini yarım yamalak sürdürmesine engel olacaktır. Suriyeli çocukların eğitimlerinin kent ve sistem içinde toplumsallaştırılması gerekiyor.

Yükseköğretimde Suriyeliler

Eğitim konusuna yükseköğretim açısından bakıldığında, dil ve akademik gereklilikleri karşılamak şartıyla Suriyeli gençler Türkiye'deki üniversitelere başvurabilir. Türkiye'de okumak isteyen öğrencilerin her üniversite tarafından düzenlenen Yabancı Öğrenci Sınavı'nı (YÖS) geçtiğini göstermesi gerekmektedir.

Sınır illerindeki Üniversitelere lisans, yüksek lisans ve doktora düzeyinde başvurusu yapan yabancı sayısı, Suriye'de savaşın patlak vermesi ile kat kat artmıştır. Şu an Gaziantep'teki devlet ve vakıf üniversitelerinden toplam 1.056 Suriyeli öğrencinin eğitim aldığı tespit edilmiştir. Bu rakam Şanlıurfa'da 85, Osmaniye'de ise 300'dür. Üniversite eğitimine dahil olan öğrenciler dil problemi yaşamamak için daha çok eğitim dili İngilizce olan bölümleri tercih ettikleri görülmektedir.

5. TURİZM

Önce Suriye’deki iç savaş, ardından terör örgütlerinin şiddet faaliyetleri Türkiye’nin güneydoğu sınırındaki iller için güvenlik tehdidi oluşturmuş ve hem ekonomik hem de sosyal kayıplara neden olmuş ve olmaya da devam etmektedir.

Dolayısıyla, son yıllarda tarihi ve kültürel değerleri, modern konaklama tesisleri ve gastronomisi ile önemli bir destinasyon haline gelen Gaziantep turizmde de Suriye krizi ve ardından yaşanan bazı olayların yarattığı güvenlik tehdidinden dolayı kayıplar yaşamaya başlamıştır. Sınır kapılarından giriş yapan yabancı turist sayısı 2014 yılında % 53 düşmüştür. Sınır kapılarından giriş yapan yabancı turist sayısı 2015 yılının ilk 6 aylık döneminde ise % 44 gerilemiştir. Aynı dönemde konaklayan yabancı turist sayısında ise % 46 gerileme görülmüştür. Yıl sonunda bu rakamın daha da düşeceği tahmin edilmektedir.

SINIR KAPILARINDAN KARA,HAVAVE DEMİRYOLU İLE GİRİŞ YAPAN TURİST SAYISI			
YILLAR	YERLİ TURİST SAYISI	YABANCI TURİST SAYISI	TOPLAM
2010	66.012	58.143	124.155
2011	82.625	69.506	152.131
2012	88.523	125.274	213.797
2013	68.322	150.102	218.424
2014	149.310	70.189	219.499

Konaklayan Turist Sayıları				
YILLAR	YERLİ	YABANCI	TOPLAM	Değişim (%)
2010	203.044	32.927	235.971	
2011	228.203	47.103	275.306	17
2012	253.043	48.327	301.370	9,5
2013	244.926	38.641	283.567	-6
2014	307.594	123.146	430.740	52
2014*	141.094	72.454	213.548	
2015*	157.723	39.192	196.915	-8

*Ocak-Mayıs dönemi

SONUC

Türkiye'nin kapılarını açtığı Suriyeliler görünen o ki ya çok uzun yıllar sonra ülkelerine dönecek ya da hiç dönmeyecekler. Dolayısıyla yerel halkın bu durum karşısında göstermesi muhtemel tepkiyi önlemek, toplumsal bir kaosa sebebiyet vermemek için kapsamlı bir Suriyeli mülteci politikasına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. 1 Kasım genel seçimlerinin ardından kurulacak olan hükümetin önceliklerinden biri bu konu olmalıdır. Suriyeli sığınmacılar meselesi siyasi tartışmalardan bağımsız bir şekilde ele alınmalıdır.

Bu noktada; Suriyelilerin tamamının kayıt altına alınması, sağlık ve eğitimde ek kapasite inşası, çalışma izni düzenlemesi, Suriyeli nitelikli insan gücünün Türkiye'de kalışının teşvik edilmesi, yerel otoritelere inisiyatif verilmesi, yerel ile merkez arasında koordinasyon sağlanması, sınır illerinde Suriyeli kanaat önderleri grupları oluşturulması, sınır illerinde yeni imar alanları açılması ve bu illerdeki yükün azaltılması, uluslararası yardımın artırılması, sınır kontrollerinin artırılması, ve olası asayiş sorunlarına etkin çözüm geliştirilmesi yönünde ilgili makamlar ivedilikle harekete geçmeli.

Appendix D Key Demographics of Syrian women participants

No. of participant	Nickname	Ethnicity	Age	Marital status	City in Syria	No. of children	No. of years immigrated
1	Sevde	Arab	25	Married	Aleppo	3	4
2	Salise	Arab	22	Married	Aleppo	3	4
3	Hamide	Arab	55	Single	Aleppo	0	5
4	Dana	Arab	26	Married	Aleppo	3	6
5	Safiye	Turkmen	32	Married	Aleppo rural	6	3
6	Aisha	Turkmen	42	Married	Aleppo	5	5
7	Zainab	Turkmen	32	Married	Aleppo	3	6
8	Firdevs	Turkmen	38	Married	Aleppo	4	6
9	Hafsa	Arab	40	Married	Aleppo rural	4	5
10	Selma	Arab	29	Married	Aleppo	5	6
11	Reyhane	Arab	48	Married	Aleppo	9	6
12	Dina	Kurdish	25	Married	Aleppo	3	5
13	Malika	Kurdish	38	Married	Aleppo	5	5
14	Rashida	Arab	32	Married	Aleppo	4	4,5
15	Leila	Turkmen	60	Married	Aleppo	8	4
16	Saira	Arab	22	Married	Aleppo rural	4	5
17	Farida	Arab	48	Widow	Aleppo	6	3
18	Jamila	Arab	64	Widow	Aleppo	10	6
19	Sakina	Arab	32	Married	Aleppo	1	3,5
20	Huda	Kurdish	35	Married	Aleppo	5	4
21	Nesrin	Arab	32	Married	Aleppo	6	6

Appendix E The Map of Antep indicating the Düztepe and Tepebaşı neighborhoods



SOURCE Google Maps

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