CRIMINALIZING THE DANGEROUS OTHERS IN ISTANBUL: THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE FEAR OF CRIME IN THE 2000S

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Title: Criminalizing the Dangeous Others in Istanbul: The Middle Class and the Fear of Crime in 2000's

Istanbul has undergone a significant securitization process in recent years. This process has transformed the spatial organization of the city and brought with it the expanded use of control devices in everyday life. This process of securitization that has been realized through public and private channels was accompanied by a wave of street crime that broke out in 2003.

This thesis analyzes the public and political debates around this wave of urban crime and the reference points drawn in these debates by various actors. These reference points were found to be closely related to the concepts of class and ethnicity and to the accelaration of the spatial segregation along class lines in the 2000's. The transformation of the significance of the issue of urban crime was accompanied by the development of the private security sector.

Based on the research conducted for this study, this thesis shows that status and security are complementary elements rather than mutually exclusive factors for the middle classes of Istanbul, who differentiate themselves from the urban poor not only through their socio-economic position, but also through their imagined position in the dichotomy between the criminal and the victim.

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Başlık: İstanbul'da Tehlikeli Ötekileri Suçlulaştırmak: 2000'lerde Orta Sınıf ve Suç Korkusu

İstanbul geçtiğimiz yıllarda ciddi bir güvenlilikleştirme sürecine girmiştir. Bu süreç şehrin mekânsal örgütlenmesini dönüştürmüş ve beraberinde kontrol gereçlerinin günlük hayatın içinde artan şekilde kullanımını getirmiştir. Kamusal ve özel kanallarca meydana getirilen bu güvenlilikleştirme sürecine 2003'te ortaya çıkan bir sokak suçları dalgası eşlik etmiştir.

Bu tez sokak bu sokak suçları dalgasının etrafında şekillenen kamusal ve siyasi tartışmaları ve bu tartışmalarda çeşitli aktörler tarafından belirlenen referans noktalarını inlemektedir. Bu referans noktalarının sınıf ve etnisite kavramlarıyla ve sınıfsal çizgiler paralelinde mekânsal ayrışmanın 2000'lerde ivme kazanmasıyla yakından ilişkili olduğu görülmüştür. Şehir suçları meselesinin öneminin dönüşümü ile eş zamanlı olarak özel güvenlik sektörü de gelişmiştir.

Bu çalışma için yürütülen araştırma sürecine dayanarak, bu tez kendilerini şehir yoksullarından sadece sosyo-ekonomik pozisyonlarıyla değil, suçlu ve kurban ikiliğinde kendilerine biçtikleri konum itibarı ile de farklılaştıran İstanbul'daki orta sınıflar için güvenlik ve statünün karşılıklı dışlayıcı etmenler olmaktan ziyade birbirini tamamlayan öğeler olduğunu göstermektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Istanbul has entered into a process of securitization in recent years. The securitization of the city was not confined to public initiatives which can be traced in the installation of CCTV systems or the establishment of new bureaus in the police department, as individuals and firms have also begun to securitize their environment through private measures in an increasing manner. Accompanying this securitization process, an insecurity discourse has been formed around the issues of criminality, ethnicity and poverty, projecting specific kinds of offender profiles. This thesis identifies public officials, media, private security firms, advertising companies and real estate developers as the main actors in the enhancement of this insecurity discourse and analyzes the various ways in which they affect the fear of crime in Istanbul through their mediation of criminal events and trends.

In recent years wide segments of the middle classes around the world have begun to take their own security measures. The middle class demand to live in gated communities and spend time in protected environments first arosed in the US and spread to the other parts of the world following 1980s. This issue attracted a great deal of attention in academia. The first generation of scholars focused on gated communities and private provision of security in the US.[1] As gated communities and secured neighborhoods began to be formed in other parts of the world, there emerged a debate on whether this development could be explained as a consequence of the

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[1] For some examples, see Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (London: Verso, 1990); Setha Low, *Behind the Gates: Life, Security and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

globalization of capitalism or not. Some scholars argued that local particularities ruled out the primacy of neo-liberalism.[2]

Gated communities in Turkey were constructed to fulfill the demands of the upper-middle classes in the first place. However, in recent years they have begun to have an appeal for the middle classes as well. Gated communities in Istanbul also attracted academic attention. The functions of these communities in terms of class formation, display of status and security perception have been highlighted by various sociologists.[3] The relationship between space, security and class has also been studied by scholars from urban planning and architecture.[4]

Gates and walls are the most visible features of the securitization process which also includes a non-spatial dimension. The usage of alarm systems and CCTV mechanisms has expanded rapidly in last ten years. There has been also a boom in terms of hiring private employees for living and working spaces. The private

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[2] Georg Glasze, Chris Webster and Klaus Frantz, eds. *Private Cities : Global and Local Perspectives* London; New York : Routledge, 2006; Georg Glasze and Abdallah Alkhayyal, "Gated Housing Estates in the Arab World: Case Studies in Lebanon and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia," *Environment and Planning B* 29, no.3 (2002), pp. 321-336; Theresa Caldeira, *City of Walls : Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

[3] For accounts that emphasize the functions of class formation and status display, see Hatice Kurtuluş, "İstanbul'da Kapalı Yerleşmeler: Beykoz Konakları Örneği," in *İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayrışma: Mekansal Dönüşümde Farklı Boyutlar*, edited by Hatice Kurtuluş (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2000), pp. 161-186; Kurtuluş, "Bir "Ütopya" Olarak Bahçeşehir," in *İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayrışma: Mekansal Dönüşümde Farklı Boyutlar*, edited by Hatice Kurtuluş (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2000), pp. 77-127; Şerife Geniş, "Producing Elite Localities: The Rise of Gated Communities in Istanbul," *Urban Studies* 44, no. 4 (2007), pp. 771– 798; Aslı Didem Danış and Jean François Perouse, "Zenginliğin Mekanda Yeni Yansımaları: İstanbul'da Güvenlikli Siteler," *Toplum ve Bilim,* no.105 (2005), pp. 92-123. For an account that emphasize the role of security demand, see Ayfer Bartu and Biray Kolluoğlu, "Emerging Spaces of Neoliberalism: A Gated Town and a Public Housing Project in Istanbul," *New Perspectives on Turkey,* no.39 (2008), pp. 5-46.

[4] Evrim Özkan and Senem Kozaman, "Gated Communities: As an Efficient Force in the Fragmentation Process of Istanbul," 42nd ISoCaRP Congress, (2006); Lale Berköz, "İstanbul'da Korunaklı Tek Aile Konutları: Konut Kalitesi ve Kullanıcı Memnuniyetinin Belirlenmesi," *İtüdergisi/a: Mimarlık, Planlama, Tasarım* 7, no.1, (2009), pp. 110-124; Ebru Firidin Özgür, "Sosyal ve Mekansal Ayrışma Çerçevesinde Yeni Konutlaşma Eğilimleri: Kapalı Siteler, İstanbul, Çekmeköy Örneği," *Planlama* 4, (2006), pp. 79-95; Tüzin Baycan Levent and Aliye Ahu Gülümser, "Production and Marketing of Gated Communities in Istanbul," 44th European Congress of European Science Association, Regions and Fiscal Federalism, (2004).

provision of security through other means like the installation of alarm systems and

employment of guards besides spatial isolation also provoked some academic

interest.[5]

Another global urban security trend in the neo-liberal period was the spread

of tough policing with a zero-tolerance approach which was developed by Giuliani in

New York. Rather than being a natural spill over, this process was also affected by

private actors and capital interests.[6] Following this trend, police departments in

various cities of Turkey were reorganized and Turkey developed its own version of

the tough on crime approach sensitive to its particular needs, like controlling and

pressuring PKK supporters. As the historical legacy of racism has affected the

reformation of crime policy in the US, the civil war with the PKK and especially the

Kurdish migrants whose numbers in large cities have boomed in last twenty years

has affected the reorganization of police in Turkey. This reorganization process has

been understudied in terms of academic production.[7]

One of the common points that relates these seemingly independent

securitization practices is that they are all done in the name of managing personal or

collective risks. It is well known that risk, with all the negative connotations that the

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[5] Sibel Yardımcı and Zeynep Alemdar, "The Privatization of Security in Turkey: Reconsidering the State, the Concept of 'Governmentality' and Neoliberalism," *New Perspectives on Turkey,* no.43 (2010), pp. 33-61; Evren Balta Paker, "Güvenlik Endüstrisi ve Güvensizliğin İnşası: Bir Toplumsal Paranoyayı Anlamak," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.115 (2009), pp. 204-225. Also see Tanıl Bora's comments on "Özel Güvenlik ve 'Polis Toplumu'." Bora, *Medeniyet Kaybı: Milliyetçilik ve Faşizm Üzerine Yazılar* (Istanbul: İletişim), pp. 223-231.

[6] Katharyne Mitchell and Katherine Beckett, "Securing the Global City: Crime, Consulting, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 15, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 75-100.

[7] For some exceptions see, Biriz Berksoy, "Neo-liberalizm ve Toplumsalın Yeniden Kurgulanması: 1980 Sonrası Batı'da ve Türkiye'de Polis Teşkilatları ve Geçirdikleri Yapısal Dönüşüm," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 109 (2007), pp. 35-64; Zeynep Gönen, "Neoliberal Dönemde Suçlulaştırma ve İzmir Asayişi'nin Yeniden Yapılandırılması," *Toplum ve Kuram*, no.3 (Summer 2010), pp. 55-81. Also see Bora's comments on "Devletin Polisi, Polisin Devleti" and "Polis Partisi." Bora, *Medeniyet*, pp. 203-219 and 219-223.

term brings with it, have a fundamental role in the late modern life.[8] From the international workings of insurance companies to "not in my backyard" campaigns, different social risks are defined and different risk categories are reproduced in almost every area of life. Among many others, Mary Douglas claims that besides the objectivity and the scientificity that risk evaluation and management practices seem to carry, they have economic and political dimensions.[9] Of course, the northern migrants in Sao Paolo, the black youth in the U.S., the urban poor in Europe, the Kurdish migrants in Istanbul who have constituted popular risk categories and targets of criminalization in different contexts have their differences, but they are all socially marginal categories who lack the chance to be employed in formal economy.

Another related point here is that the rise of this new concern with risk and the obsession with securitization came out at a particular phase of history. The replacement of the Fordist system by neo-liberalism at this particular historical point brought with fundamental transformations in capital-labour relations and in the proportions of production and service sectors in the economy. According to many scholars, the rise of neo-liberalism created a "surplus population" whose labor is no longer needed for production and the penal system has replaced mechanisms of social policy as the classical method of governing social marginality.[10]

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[8] For futher information on the concept of risk, see Mary Douglas, *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory* (London: Routledge, 1992). For a related debate on risk society, see Ulrich Beck, "Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research Programmes," in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, edited by Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon (London: Sage, 2000), pp. 211-230; Athony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (California: Standford University Press, 1991); Giddens, "Risk and Responsibility," *The Modern Law Review* 62, no.1 (January 1999), pp. 1-10.

[9] Douglas, *Risk.*

[10] Among others see, Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western, "Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy," *Punishment and Society*

Securitization and Fear of Crime

In criminology, there are two approaches to the fear of crime.[11] First is the

Real-World Thesis, which emphasizes the importance of experience, assuming that

people in higher risk categories will be more scared, independent from other

variables like media exposure. The second is the Cultivation Thesis, which

emphasizes the constructed dimension of fear of crime, focusing on various ways in

which audience traits affect receptivity regarding fear of crime. Although the effect

of the media in terms of shaping the thoughts of individuals regarding crime cannot

be denied, this thesis argues that there are other mediators which cannot be

overlooked. The advertisements of insurance companies, real estate developers who

are dedicated to creating a market for "safe spaces" and private security companies in

search of higher sales for guarding services, security hardware and software which

point to criminal themes also affect the way in which individuals assess the risks

surrounding them. Fear of crime is not only an economic but also a political issue.

Garland argues that politicians are not different from the mainstream media in terms

of their motivations to promote 'moral panics'; because it "creates emotional energy"

3, no. 1 (2001), pp. 43-59; Alessandro De Giorgi, *Re-Thinking the Political Economy of Punishment: Perspectives on Post-Fordism and Penal Politics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); De Giorgi, "Toward a Political Economy of Post-Fordist Punishment," *Critical Criminology*, no.15 (2007), pp. 243-265; Loic Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neo-liberal Government of Social Insecurity* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009); Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality* (Malden and Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); Wacquant, "The Militarization of Urban Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis." *International Political Sociology*, no. 2 (2008), pp. 56–74; Jonathan Simon, *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Simon, *Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[11] For a detailed analysis of these two approaches, see Ronald Weitzer and Charis E. Kubrin, "Breaking News: How Local TV News and Real World Conditions Affect Fear of Crime," *Justice Quarterly* 21, no.3 (September 2004), pp. 497-520.

and "collective excitement."[12] Thus, it should be remembered that political figures and government officials also have a stake in enhancing fear.

Central to the securitization process described are fear of crime and the risk assessments of individuals, enhancing the demand for security commodities and ensuring acceptance of increases in budget of police department and authorities of police officials. However, urban dwellers lack the chance to reach to direct information regarding criminal events in their environment. Forming thoughts regarding general criminal trends independently from the effects of fear cultivating actors is even more difficult. Thus, our knowledge of crime and criminal trends depend on others. This thesis argues that with their different interests and agendas, media, police and private actors who sell 'security' constitute a *mediating filter* through which criminal events are given their presentational shape and analyzes the characteristics and the internal working of this filtering mechanism.

Sources and Methodology

This study is based on a wide range of sources and research. A general screening of mainstream newspapers was necessary to grasp the media's approach to the issue of urban criminality and the nature of coverage during the wave of urban crime in mid-2000s. The research conducted for this thesis included the screening of the first seven pages of all issues of *Hürriyet* newspaper published between 2000 and 2009; all weekend extras of the same newspaper; all issues of the daily extra of *Hürriyet*, named Istanbul published between 2000 and 2003 (the final date the extra was published), the first pages of all issues of *Milliyet* between 2000 and 2003 and

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[12] David Garland, "On the Concept of Moral Panics," *Crime, Media and Culture* 4, no. 9 (2008), pp. 9-30.

first ten pages of selected issues from *Zaman, Milliyet* and *Sabah* published between 2000 and 2009.[13]

Hürriyet was chosen to be the primary object of research for this study for various reasons. Firstly, most of the informants stated that they were *Hürriyet* readers in mid-2000s. Secondly, *Hürriyet* is a newspaper targeting middle-class readers in big cities. 65% of all *Hürriyet* issues were purchased in the city centers of three biggest cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) in 2006.[14] Finally, *Hürriyet* is an important newspaper in the media, having 41.5% share of all newspaper advertisements and selling around 516,000 issues daily in 2006.[15] *Milliyet* had a very harsh stance (maybe the harshest stance in the mainstream media) towards the declaration of a general amnesty in 2000, by criticizing the amnesty with the headline *Müjde Rahşan Katiller Serbest* (Good News Rahşan Murderers are Free). Thus, it needed to be checked whether it had a different approach to crime in the years following the general amnesty. The First ten pages were given priority for research; because these are the pages in which crime stories and reports are covered in general.

In order to understand the transformation of the approach of public officials and state agencies to the issue of urban criminality the activity reports of the Turkish National Police (TNP hereafter), magazines named *Çağın Polisi* and *Polis Bilimleri*

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[13] Newspapers in this last group were not screened in detail for the whole period (as this is not a one-person job and exceeds the scope of research that can be conducted for a master thesis); but issues that were published at the time of remarkable events (like Canıdemir case mentioned above or the enforcement of amendments in Turkish Capital Law) were screened.

[14] Hurriyet Corporate. *2006 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

[15] Hurriyet Corporate. *2006 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

Dergisi, press releases of the related institutions (from Istanbul mayorship to the National Security Council), the websites of the TNP and Istanbul governorship were screened for this research. In order to see whether there was a change in the significance of urban criminality in political debates, I screened the 2002, 2007 and 2011 election manifestos of the mainstream political parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) and the texts of parliamentary debates related to urban security.

The last group of sources used in this thesis is related to the securitization of everyday life in Istanbul through private means. It was necessary to look at the company profiles and advertisements of firms involved in the security business to see the development of the private security sector and industry in Turkey. This research also proved to be useful for understanding their approach to and presentation of criminal trends and the nature of crime.

Finally, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with a sample group that consisted of middle class professionals living in Istanbul. The interviews were conducted between September 2010 and April 2011, mostly in the informants' residences. This gave me a chance to get in various kinds of gated community developments and to talk to also with private security guards employed in these places. Some significant details regarding this research process can be found below.

Some Remarks on the Research Process

In the research process of this thesis, 22 interviews were conducted with 33 individuals who can be described as professionals belonging to the new middle classes of Istanbul. Their position in the socio-economic structure is different from that the upper classes; as they do not possess the means of production. Their position

is also different from the working class in the sense that they are not employed in manual labor. The rise of this new middle class is directly related to the globalization of neo-liberal economic policies, which have transformed the relations between capital and labor all over the world and led to the globalization of culture of consumption. In this thesis, the term class refers to a socio-economic and cultural process, not only related to processes of production but also to consumption and life-style.

Six of the individuals interviewed for this study were using different security commodities -alarms systems and monitoring services- but resided in non-gated housing units. 27 of the informants lived in gated residential communities and most of them also had extra security mechanisms and services.

Trying to find out how the fear of crime has been transforming the everyday-lives of middle class individuals in Istanbul, I had to enter into an area considered sacred or exclusively private by some people through asking questions about their fears, insecurities and worries. These are powerful senses which might provoke reaction or even communicative closure. I tried to soften this privacy/secrecy barrier by devoting time to chatting about everyday life before beginning the interview to establish a familiarity zone. This chatting period differed according to the personalities of the informants and to the time they planned to spend in this activity, varying between half an hour and two hours. Still, I do not claim to present precise and absolute accounts regarding fear of crime felt by the informants. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Let me explain the importance of this privacy barrier with reference to an interview. I had an interview with a couple living in a gated community in Ataşehir.

Semra, a 57-year old retired teacher, and Fehmi, a 61-year old retired insurance specialist, gave me a late-afternoon appointment. When we finished the interview, they invited me to join them for dinner. Although they were armored up with an alarm system, card access gates surrounding their home, guards in their garden; their references to criminality and fear while talking about living in Istanbul were not exceptionally high during the interview. After the dinner, I began to collect my stuff in order to leave. These people with accounts that can be considered as moderately fearful insisted me on my staying over for my own security. Semra said: "How can a girl at your age find the courage to take a bus at this late hour? Stay here, because we will feel terrible if something bad happens to you now."[16] As I also insisted on leaving at that "late" hour (around eight o'clock), we reached to an agreement and Fehmi drove me home.

I relate to this experience here not only to point out to the difficulties of working with the concept of fear; but also to show possible shortcomings of survey method in estimating the fear of crime. If they were to answer questions in a survey regarding fear, these people probably would be considered as moderately fearful; as they stated that they did not fear to walk alone in the street at night, although they did not fear because it was not in their daily routine. The role of fear in shaping daily routines is hard to identify through survey questions. The "location" of the street matters; so does the gender and age of the walker. The streets surrounding their home might be considered safe by some people who think that those streets in other neighborhoods, Osmanbey-Şişli in this particular example, are not. Moreover, people

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[16] Semra and Fehmi, interview by the author, semi tape recording, Istanbul, Turkey, 28 December 2010. Apartment flat belonging to Fehmi's brother Necmi in the same gated community that Semra and Fehmi lives in, Ataşehir, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Senin yaşında bir kız gecenin bu saati hangi cesaretle otobüse binecekmiş? Burda kal, şimdi senin başına bir şey gelse biz mahvoluruz."*

might claim that they see streets as safe, but their risk assessment regarding different age and sex groups might still be high.

Another point which should be made here is related to gender. Interviewing couples together had the advantage of establishing a kind of checking mechanism. They tend to interrupt each other and it was easier to overcome this privacy barrier. While Semra was saying that she was "not afraid of specific groups of people for being in that group, let's say gypsies" during the interview, Fehmi intervened and said: "What about our trip to Çanakkale? My wife is not a liar of course, but she is trying to be polite." Asked what happened in Çanakkale, he continued: "We were visiting our son who has been living there. It was late spring and there was this wonderful smell in the air. We were driving with windows were open. While we were passing through a Gypsy neighborhood, this egalitarian woman was begging me to shut the windows and to lock the doors."[17]

On the other hand, interviewing couples together has disadvantages related to gender roles. While fear is associated with femininity, boldness is associated with masculinity in many societies.[18] Some of the men who were interviewed with their spouses were disturbed when their spouses began to talk about feeling insecure at home (in the past or currently). This results from the construction of man as security provider. Thus, some of the male informants interrupted the speech of their wives

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[17] The same interview. The original transcription of the cited interview passage is presented in the following. *"Çanakkale gezisine ne diyeceksin? Yanlış anlama, eşim yalancı falan değil tabi, fakat kibar davranmaya çalışıyor (...) Bizim oğlanı görmeye gidiyorduk Çanakkale'ye. Ama böyle bahar sonu falan nasıl güzel bir koku var. Camlar açık gidiyoruz böyle. Çingene mahallesinin birinden geçerken, bu eşitlikçi hanımefendiyi görecektin nasıl yalvarıyor camları kapat, kapıları kilitle diye."*

[18] Rachel Pain, "Gender, Race, Age and Fear in the City," *Urban Studies* 38, nos. 5-6 (2001), pp. 893-913.

with phrases as "you would tell me, if you were afraid that much" during the interviews.

Organization of the Thesis

In Chapter 2, some points related to the literature are remarked and significant approaches to crime and fear of crime are discussed. Specific importance is given to the concepts of the "fear of crime feedback loop"[19] developed by Lee and the "crimino-legal complex"[20] developed by Young, as they are helpful to understand the complexity of the filtering mechanism which presents criminal events and trends to the public after processing and selecting them and to acknowledge the roles of different actors like insurance companies, private security firms, police departments, newspapers and TV channels acting in their own different interests. This chapter does not cover all of the scholarly works mentioned throughout the thesis, but provides an introductory framework.

In Chapter 3, the relationship between the media and fear of crime is analyzed. There are different claims regarding the relative importance of media resources in the literature. Some scholars give primary importance to local news, others emphasize the importance of reality crime programming and crime dramas which blur the line between fact and fiction.[21] For most of the middle class security consumers interviewed for this thesis, the claimed primary source of information

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[19] Murray Lee, *Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety* (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2007).

[20] Alison Young, *Imagining Crime: Textual Outlaws and Criminal Conversations* (London: Sage Publications, 1996).

[21] For the first account, see Weitzer and Kubrin. For the second account, see Sarah Eschholz, Mark Gertz and Ted Chiricos, "Television and Fear of Crime: Program Types, Audience Traits and the Mediating Effect of Perceived Neighborhood Composition," *Social Problems* 50, no.3 (August 2003), pp. 395-415.

regarding criminal events was national news. Informants also referred to newspaper articles regarding general criminal trends.

The research conducted for this thesis shows that the newsworthiness of urban criminality in the eyes of journalists working for mainstream newspapers boomed in 2003 and the popularity of the issue decreased after reaching its' peak in 2005. By 2008, it was difficult to find petty-theft reports or cases covered in mainstream newspapers. Another telling finding of this research is that there was a very significant increase in the attention of the mainstream media in sex-related crimes between 2000 and 2008.

The relationship between fear of crime and the media has been studied for a long time in media studies and fear of crime literature. With studies that analyze the roles of public officials and politicians in terms of generating support for law and order policies in the U.S., the relationship between these actors and fear of crime in the U.S. also has been a well-studied topic.[22] The same cannot be said for Turkey. The first part of Chapter 4 analyzes the transformation of the Turkish National Police into a claims-maker, continuously underlining the assumed malfunctioning of the system. This chapter also covers the extension of the political debate to include criminality. The research conducted for this thesis shows that petty-crime became an important component of the political debate, especially after 2005. During their election propaganda in 2007, all mainstream political parties gave exceptional attention to the issue of urban criminality.

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[22] For some elegant examples see, Jonathan Simon, *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Simon, *Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); Katherine Beckett, *Making Crime Pay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

As some scholars point out, insurance companies, security hardware and software providers, real estate developers who specialize on "safe spaces" like gated communities and private security firms have a direct interest in the escalation of fear of crime.[23] Chapter 5 analyses the development of security sector in Turkey. In the first part, marketing strategies and advertisements of security commodities are discussed in parallel to the presentation of an analysis regarding the expansion of markets for security-related commodities in Turkey. The second part of this chapter analyses the emergence and development of the private security sector in Turkey.

Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the rise of gated communities in Istanbul. The first part of this chapter looks at the dynamics affecting this process. It is argued that taking the role of state agencies like TOKİ (Mass Housing Administration of Turkey) it is impossible to see the rise of gated residential developments in Istanbul as a "private" trend. The second part of this chapter presents one of the most significant contributions of this study by showing the link between security and status.

Based on in-depth interviews conducted with gated community residents, it is argued that what differentiates the middle classes of Istanbul from the urban poor is not only their socio-economic position, but also their imagined position in the dichotomy between the criminal and the victim. This criminal imagination which marginalizes and stigmatizes certain groups is reproduced through the utilization of culture, which makes it possible for middle class professionals to claim that they are

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[23] For some examples see, Mark Neocleous, *"Security, Commodity, Fetishism," Critique* 35, no. 3 (2007), pp. 339-355; Lee, *Inventing*; Mitchell and Beckett.

"essentially different" from marginalized and stigmatized groups, especially Kurdish migrants and Gypsies. This racialization through culture seems to contribute to the reproduction of the social and physical distance between these stigmatized groups and middle classes.

The conclusion presents an evaluation of the findings of previous chapters and some recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

SOME REMARKS ON THE LITERATURE AND

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Fear of crime has been a social phenomenon studied by various disciplines, from urban sociology to media studies. This chapter does not aim to elaborate on every study that will be mentioned in different chapters in the following or to document the historical development of the scholarly works on fear of crime, but to give the reader a general opinion on the literature related to fear of crime in general and to clarify the analytical framework of this study.

The concept of class is an important component of this thesis because one of the main objects of this study is to understand the approaches of the middle class professionals living in Istanbul to the issue of urban criminality. On the other hand, this thesis does not attempt to provide a political economy of punishment or insecurity because rather than looking at the macro relations between imprisonment and macro economic variables,[24] it invites the reader to take a closer look at the significance that criminality might gain for class relations.

This thesis has a multi-dimensional approach to class, recognizing the fact that class is more than just a socio-economic position; but also a cultural process. [25]

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[24] For a very well conducted analysis of the political economy of punishment and control in neo-liberal period, see Alessandro De Giorgi, *Re-Thinking the Political Economy of Punishment: Perspectives on Post-Fordism and Penal Politics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). For other examples see, De Giorgi, "Toward a Political Economy of Post-Fordist Punishment." *Critical Criminology*, no.15 (2007), pp.243-265; Dario Melossi, "Security, Social Control, Democracy and Migration within the 'Constitution' of the EU." *European Law Journal* 11, no.1 (January 2005), pp. 5-21.

[25] As it is well known, it was E. P. Thompson who led the way for this wider understanding of class. Edward Palmer Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1968). For an account on Indian middle-class contructed through an analysis that includes cultural patterns and consumption, see Mark Liechty, *Suitably Modern: Making Middle Class Culture in a New Consumer Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

Classes, of course, have their roots in the material world, being formed through relations of production; but this material dimension of class relations should not make one blind to the political and cultural aspects of class relations. As will be seen better in the following chapters, what differentiates the middle classes of Istanbul from the lower classes is not only their socio-economic positions or capacity for consumption, but also their imagined position in the dichotomy between criminals and victims.

Speaking of class relations, let me explain how this study approaches the term middle class. The distinction between the working class and the bourgeoisie is more or less clear. The former makes a living through selling her/his labor and the latter makes profit from this trade by her/his advantageous position in terms of possessing the means of production. The professional middle classes diverge from these two as they are constituted by white-collar workers whose importance has boomed with financialization and the rise of the service sector. Thus, the specific position of the middle class as a distinct category derives from the fact that people who constitute this class have a distinct position in the production process (trading other capacities than mere manual labor, like professional expertise and knowledge for making a living).

After clarifying the question of with whom this thesis deals with, let me briefly explain what makes this class special in terms of urban fear. As argued by many scholars, spatial segregation along class and race lines have accelerated in recent years because middle classes all around the world have begun to escape from their traditional locations of accommodation, seeking shelter from the criminal

upsurge tainting the city.[26] They are the engine of private securitization, providing an almost endless demand for products directly and indirectly related to security, projected as vital necessities.

There have been three main approaches to criminality and punishment in academia. The first of these approaches is based on Emile Durkheim's work which is constructed around the question of what criminality means for social order. The second classical line takes inspiration from *Punishment and Social Structure,* written by Rusche and Kirchheimer, who developed a Marxist understanding of punishment, emphasizing the relationship between material conditions and punishment, by arguing that the prison population is related to the labor need of the capitalist system.[27] Finally, Foucault's studies on prison, exclusion practices and discipline which points out to the way in which the emergence of disciplinary power and bio-power changed the organizational principles of life.[28] As Garland points out, crime and punishment are complex social realities which cannot be fully comprehended by using only one of these approaches.[29] Rather than being mutually exclusive ways of analyzing the issues of criminality and punishment, these approaches complete each

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[26] Among many others, see Caldeira; Glasze, Webster and Frantz; Charlotte Lemanski, "A New Apartheid? The Spatial Implications of Fear of Crime in Cape Town, South Africa," *Environment and Urbanization* 16, no.2 (2004), pp. 101-112; Low, *Behind*; Edward J. Blakely And Mary Gail Snyder, *Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States* (Washington D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 1997); Thomas Sanchez, Dawn M. Dhavale and Robert E. Lang, "Security Versus Status?: A First Look at the Census's Gated Community Data," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 24, no. 3 (March 2005), pp. 281-291.

[27] Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Sturcture* (New Jersey: Transaction, 2003, originally published in 1939 by Columbia University).

[28] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995); Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*. *Edited by Paul Rabinow.* New York: Penguin, 1984.

[29] David Garland, *Punishment and Modern Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

other, because by raising different questions, they attempt to shed light on different aspects of the very same phenomenon.

Another differentiation can be made between what might be termed grand - scale studies analyzing the macro process by which insecurity and fear have become important components of the human condition in "late modernity" and empirically grounded studies that take specific actors and/or issues into consideration. Zygmund Bauman's account regarding the rise of the search for security in relation to the loss of community,[30] the analysis of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck regarding the organization of life around the concept of risk in "late modernity,"[31] are among the most preeminent of these grand-scale studies.

Loic Waquant's analysis regarding the punitive upsurge in the U.S. and criminalization of poverty in other contexts like Latin America and Europe,[32] Jonathan Simon's works on the transformation of parole and the culture of fear in the U.S.,[33] Katherine Beckett's work the generation of public support for punitiveness at the expense of rehabilitation in relation to media coverage and the political agenda setting in the U.S.[34] are elegant examples of the multi-dimensional analysis of crime and punishment which takes various factors into consideration through empirical research.

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[30] Zygmund Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

[31] Giddens, *Modernity*; Giddens, *Risk*; Beck, *Risk Society*.

[32] Wacquant, *Punishing*; Wacquant, *Urban*; Wacquant, *Militarization.*

[33] Simon*, Governing*; Simon, *Poor*.

[34] Beckett, *Making*.

Arguing that what differentiates human-beings from other species in terms of fear, Yi-Fu Tuan claims that "if we had less imagination, we would feel more secure."[35] This imaginational aspect of fear and the extent to which this imagination might be conditioned began to receive academic interest, especially after the publication of *Policing the Crisis* which examined how the mainstream media's interest in and coverage of mugging cases in Britain of the early 1970's contributed to the construction of the issue of urban crime as an emergent crisis.[36] Some scholars have pointed out the roles of insecurity discourses promoted by the mainstream media and politicians in normalizing and distributing criminal images.[37] Alison Young coined the term "crimino-legal complex" in order to refer to the aggregate sum of cultural, political and legal pieces which provide a frame for the individuals constituting the society (of victims) to imagine crime. Murray Lee also emphasizes this imaginational aspect of crime in an attempt to present a "genealogy of fear of crime." As pointed out by many scholars, including Young and Lee, fear of crime has an imaginational aspect, but individual imagination generally is conditioned by the accounts of others; because urbanites living in "massified" cities lack the advantage of gaining first-hand information regarding crime.

According to many scholars, mainstream media and state agencies have a primary position in terms of shaping public perceptions regarding criminal trends and

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[35] Yi-Fu Tuan, *Landscapes of Fear* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp.6.

[36] Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978).

[37] Young, *Imagining*; Lee, *Inventing*.

the nature of crime through filtering information regarding these issues.[38] Beckett claims that the drug problem in the U.S. transformed into an emergency in terms of public opinion by the development of a bi-partisan political rhetoric that recognized the significance of the issue during the 1980 presidential elections.[39] On the other hand, having a "strictly constructionist"[40] approach, assuming that the minds of individuals who constitute the public are tabula rasa and that people believe in whatever they see and read in the media might be as naïve as ignoring the imaginational aspect of fear of crime. According to Garland, the most important precondition of increased public receptiveness regarding law and order policies, which were presented as necessary for providing the security of the society, has been the cultural transformation of the American society which was marked by the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal, especially when the middle class is taken into consideration.[41] Thus, the construction of the criminal filter, which mediates criminal trends and the nature of crime, by different actors does not necessarily mean that the society will always use the reference points drawn in this filter.

The first part of this thesis examines the insecurity discourses promoted by different actors. The fact that this part depends on a kind of discourse analysis does not indicate that this study aims to present a strictly contrustructivist view. Instead, this study shows how constitutive actors provide reference points for individuals to

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[38] Young, *Imagining*; Lee, *Inventing*; Hall et al.; Beckett, *Making*.

[39] Beckett, *Making,* p. 54.

[40] David Garland,"The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent Law and Order Policies," *British Journal of Criminology* 40, no.3 (2000), pp. 347-375.

[41] Ibid. pp. 370-372.

imagine crime along lines that are closely related to socio-economic assumptions and conditions and ethnicity. The argument here is that these insecurity discourses have been normalized due to their fitting with the experiences and imaginations of middle class professionals and with certain stereotypes.

Apart from literatures on crime and fear, this study is informed by several approaches to racialization and criminalization. Many scholars have pointed out the fact that what is intrinstict to racism is "essentialism."[42] The details of discussions related to racialization and racism will not be furthered here, but it should be pointed out that there is a strong academic support for the claim that culture can be utilized as much as nature (with reference to genes or biological differences) for the racialization of different groups of people.

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[42] For some very good examples see, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: from the 1960's to the 1990's* (New York: Routledge, 1984); Verena Stolcke, "Talking Culture: New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe," *Current Anthropology* 36, no.1 (February 1995), pp.1-24; Alana Lentin, "Replacing 'Race,' 'Historicizing 'Culture' in Multiculturalism," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 4 (2005), pp. 379-396; Etienne Balibar, "Is There a Neo-Racism?." In *Race, Nation and Class: Ambigious Identities*, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 83-89.

CHAPTER 3

THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND FEAR OF CRIME

This chapter deals with the role of the mainstream media in shaping the frame through which people imagine crime in the 2000s. The media is a vast ocean consisting of various items, like books, TV programs, radio programs and so on. This chapter is based on research and analysis of just a small part of this vast ocean, which I can sample only symptomatically. In the absence of a scholarly literature and research regarding the relationship between the media and fear of crime in Istanbul (and also in Turkey), it can be considered as an important step despite the limitedness of its scope.[43]

In the first section, some remarks regarding different items in the media, identified to be primarily related to fear of crime are presented. This chapter is primarily based on newspapers' role in constructing the frame of criminal

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[43] Ömer Özer's book named *Medya, Şiddet, Toplum* can be seen as a partial exception; because this book was intended to analyze the role of the mainstream media in cultivating violence in the society. It is an exception because it presents a detailed analysis regarding the perspectives of news reporters, violent coverage in TV series and national news. However, it is still a partial exception; because the book is based on an analysis of a *moment* (the first five days of August 2005), ignoring the historical context that resulted with the emergence of this particular moment, the socio-economic dimension of fear of violence which has been constructed as a class-specific reality and finally lacking differentiation between types and forms of violence. Making this differentiation is important because the affects of a war happening far away cannot be claimed to be the same as those triggered by a case of robbery or rape happening in the middle of the city in habited by the receiver. It can be argued that both strengthen the sense of insecurity and fear of crime as they are both violent cases indicating human's capacity for violence; but the proximity of two cases, and thus their affect on fear, would be different. Ömer Özer, *Medya, Şiddet, Toplum* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007). Erhan Erdonmez also spent effort to analyze the relationship between fear of crime and the mainstream media. Trying to test the validity of cultivation thesis, Erdonmez conducted a survey including questions like "what is your primary source of information regarding crime?" and "how afraid are you from one to five?" As argued elsewhere in this thesis, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to assess the level of fear felt by individuals with survey methodology. Another deficiency of this study is that while covering theoretical literature developed in the USA well, Erdonmez ignored to ask how crime has been covered by the Turkish media, whether there have been any changes in the type and heaviness of this coverage, whether there is a difference between types of crimes in terms of affecting fear. In the absence of all these important questions, Erdonmez concluded that fear of crime is independent from the media. Erhan Erdönmez, "The Effect of Media on Citizens' Fear of Crime in Turkey" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Texas, 2009).

imagination; yet the coverage of violent crimes in the national news and discussion programs based on real cases and trends, the boom of crime dramas in recent years have been too important to be left aside. Thus, it is necessary to look at these issues first. In the second section, the mainstream media's role in the upsurge of the wave of urban crime based on purse-snatching and the ways in which the mainstream media comprehended and defined the problem of urban insecurity are analyzed. In the last section, an evaluation regarding the power of the media and its limits regarding crime are presented.

Some Remarks on Different TV Programs and Newspapers

News and Other Programs Based on Real Criminal Cases

National and local news have been given importance by scholars studying the effects of the media on the fear of crime. Special emphasis has been devoted to local news, because what is broadcasted on the local news is generally proximate to viewers and local news tend to cover cases of crime and violence more in relation to national news.[44] This thesis does not intend to find out whether there has been a difference between the effects of these two sources. Istanbul has such a central place in Turkey that national news almost function as local news for this case, as they cover criminal conduct in Istanbul with a specific emphasis.

Ömer Özer, a scholar from media studies, points out that national news cover a great deal of violent visuals, primarily related to cases happening in Istanbul and argues that there is not much of a difference between news mediums in terms of

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[44] Eschholz, Chiricos and Gertz.

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covering visuals related to violence.[45] Analyzing the content of national news broadcasted by some mainstream TV channels (Show, Stv, Star)[46] at the beginning of August 2005, Özer stated that the time and emphasis devoted to violence were very significant.

Programs about everyday life which are produced by business channels also play a part in the exaggeration of urban fear. *Yakın Plan* (Close Shot) which is prepared by NTV aims to analyze the problems of everyday life with the help of "experts." Thus the program covered the issues of mugging, street children and generally crime in Istanbul by presenting a chance for the police officials to reach the public. It is important to note that Turkey was taken as a country with a huge criminal problem in the program.[47] Certain neighborhoods were marked with

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[45] Özer.

[46] At that time Star was owned by Aydın Doğan who had purchased the channel after the outbreak of a chain of scandals, related to white-collar crimes committed by some of the members of the Uzan family, former owner of the group, which resulted with the retreat of the family from the media and politics. Doğan Group was also in possession of an important group of mainstream newspapers and TV channels, like *Milliyet, Posta, Radikal, Hürriyet* and Kanal D TV channel. Doğan Group had terminated the job contracts of some columnists like Bekir Coşkun and Emin Çölaşan in the mid-2000s, probably afraid of becoming marginalized because of the criticisms issued by these writers against the government. However, the tension between the Doğan Group and the government did not come to an end with these moves and actually escalated in the following years. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister, declared an open boycott against the newspapers owned by the group in August 2008. "İftiracı Gazeteleri Evinize sokmayın," *Yeni Şafak*, 20 September 2008. Following a tax scandal, the Doğan Group was given an enormous cash fine, the payment of which made the group lose some of its power in the Turkish mainstream media. The Doğan Group eventually sold *Milliyet* and *Vatan* in 2011. Show TV has been owned by Çukurova Group which cannot be labeled as pro-government or anti-government. Samanyolu TV has been a conservative news channel broadcasting programs with religious references. For further analysis of the issue of media ownership in Turkey, see Alev Söylemez, *Medya Ekonomisi ve Türkiye Örneği* (Ankara: Haberal Eğitim Vakfı, 1998). For an analysis regarding the transformation of the Turkish media and the tendency of statism of the mainstream media see; Nilgün Gürkan Pazarcı, "Türkiye'de Gazetecilerin Gözlükleri/Medyanın Dönüşemeyen Kodları," in *Medya ve Toplum*, edited by Savda Alankuş (Istanbul: IPS İletişim Vakfı, 2003), pp. 149-169.

[47] Talking about rape and homicide Celal Pir says that "it happens everywhere, but why does it happen *more* in our country? Is there a legal gap in our system causing this difference?." "Yakın Plan," NTV, 14 April 2008. As a matter of fact homicide rates are relatively low in Turkey, the case is the same for rape. Stefan Harrendorf, Markku Heiskanen, Steven Malby, *International Statistics for Crime and Justice* (np: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 2010), p.38-40. Although we should suspect that reporting is very low in case of rape in Turkey, lowering

criminal activity especially, when the issue was mugging or murder by tiner addicts.[48] The program also contributed to the establishment of a correlation between tough policing and crime rates.[49] Finally it was possible to find the "usual suspect" in discussions regarding football violence.[50]

<div align="center">Television Series and Crime Dramas[51]</div>

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a content analysis regarding TV series. However, it is necessary to elaborate on some aspects of these programs, especially those related to crime. Eschholz et al. point out that there is a pressing need in fear of crime literature to analyze the role of TV series in shaping ideas regarding nature of crime and criminal trends; because there is a scarcity of recent

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the statistics regarding crime; homicide is a crime which does not escape from statistic and which cannot be manipulated by the officials while reporting.

[48] "They (street gangs) can also stab us or you with a knife if they are not confronted." "They do not know how a person is raised. They do not know the pain of a family who loses their son. It is the moment which is important for them. We should ask ourselves whether they strengthen if we change our ways when we see them." "There are some criminal triangles in the edges of Istanbul." Latter, we learn that "Esenler, Bağcılar, Gaziosmanpaşa, Tuzla, Pendik, Kartal - especially *varoş* areas –"require special attention. The author also criticizes the fact that thinner addict children except for the offender will be released. "Yakın Plan," NTV, 4 January 2010. In this case we do not know whether the speaker prefers incapacitation or rehabilitation. Cuneyt Ozdemiroglu was much more open in his preference of incapacitation over rehabilitation after a mentally ill person stabbed one of his friends. He was criticizing the legal system for releasing a dangerous person just for being mentally ill on TV. "5N1K," CNNTürk, 26 August 2010.

[49] "Yakın Plan," NTV, 12 November 2009 (program on the expansion of the police cadres). "Yakın Plan," NTV, 24 February 2004 (program about the police report which claimed that crime rates in Istanbul increased after the authorities of the police were limited in parallel to the EU reforms).

[50] "Yakın Plan," NTV, 21 May 2007. One of the guests, Kemal Dincer, claims that the offenders in football games are *uneducated people who migrated to Istanbul* and the ticket prices must be increased to exclude this group of people in order to establish "quality" in stadiums.

[51] The author of this thesis watched every one in ten (1,11 and so on) episodes of Arka Sokaklar, Behzat Ç., Hırsız-Polis and CSI:New York to get an understanding regarding criminal types, trends and places presented in these series with highest ratings and also popular among the informants.

studies.[52] This is more so for Turkey where the fear of crime literature already has been underdeveloped. TV series are fictional programs watched for entertainment, not for acquiring information. However, the line between reality and fiction can be blurred in some cases, especially when TV series claim to represent reality or when they are perceived to do so.

There has been a boom of police series in TV in recent years in Turkey.[53] A part of them (*Kanıt- The Evidence, Şeytan Ayrıntıda Gizlidir-The Devil is Hidden in the Details* etc.) were related to qualified criminal cases, solved by high technology. However, most have been related to the activities of the police dealing with crime in everyday life. The one which has gotten the highest rating in recent years, *Arka Sokaklar* (Back Streets), claims to represent "the reality of Turkey." It is important to note that in order to use the equipment of the police, these police series work in cooperation with them. The close relationship between the police and the TV series has spilled over to other areas as well. The crews of *Arka Sokaklar* (Back Steets)*, Adanalı* (From Adana)*, 24 Saat* (24 Hours) and *Gece-Gündüz* (Day-Night) voluntarily took part in the public relations campaigns of the police department which were developed for increasing the credibility of the police on the eyes of the public.

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[52] Eschholz, Chiricos and Gertz, pp. 395-415. Also see; Joost De Bruin, "Young People and Police Series: A Multicultural Television Audience Study," *Crime,Media,Culture* 6, no.3 (January 2010), pp. 309-328.

[53] Alacakaranlık (2003), Hırsız-Polis (2006), Ah Polis Olsam (2010), Yılan Hikayesi (1999), Çaylak (2003), Kod Adı (2006), 24 Saat (2004), Kanıt (2010), Şeytan Ayrıntıda Gizlidir (2004), Adanalı (2007), Behzat Ç. (2010), Komiser Nevzat: Kanun Namına(2007), İz Peşinde(1989), Gece-Gündüz (2008), Cinlerle Periler(2001), Parmak İzi(2003), Arka Sokaklar (2007), Dedektif Biraderler (2008), Karakolda Ayna Var(2000), Ateş Ve Barut (2008), Kollama (2008), Umut Yolcuları (2010), Korkusuzlar (2007), Çemberin Dışında (2008), Adak (2006).

In most police series, citizens are presented with an image of the police that exerts violence and threat[54] for the sake of establishing social order, for their own good. Beating and insults are presented as normal and necessary. Criminals rarely speak Turkish without a heavy accent and most of them do not shave.[55] Some neighborhoods are declared to be "criminal" and thus unauthorized searches in those neighborhoods are presented as legitimate and necessary.[56]

Newspapers

We also see the traces of the insecurity discourse in newspapers. On the one hand, there are columnists who declare a "state of emergency," blaming certain groups for the criminal activities in Istanbul.[57] Apart from that, newspaper readers are faced with the manipulation of statistics[58] and sometimes misinformation of the readers due to the ignorance of the statistics which indicate a trend in the different

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[54] For example, in the 168th episode of the *Arka Sokaklar* a police officer threatens the suspect with killing him and he says that nobody will know about the event as he burns the ID card of the suspect. In the same episode, another suspect is threatened to be shot by a police officer who tries to make the suspect talk. "Arka Sokaklar," Kanal D, 30 August 2010.

[55] This is also the case for public relations videos of the police. In 2010 video which is entitled as "*Suç Değil Sevgi İşle*", prepared by the public relations branch of the Police Department, all the criminals we see have beards or moustache and without exception they are dark haired and skinned.

[56] To give an example; talking about Tepebaşı, the police chief says that "this neighborhood is criminal already; so shake them well." "Arka Sokaklar," Kanal D, 6 December 2010.

[57] Doğan Heper, "Göçü Önle, Suçu Önle," *Milliyet*, 05 July 2007; Fatih Altaylı "Meydan İtlere Kaldı," *Sabah*, 09 November 2005; Emin Çölaşan, "Asayiş Berkemal," *Hürriyet*, 11 February 2007; Ertuğrul Özkök, "Hadi Biz Abartıyoruz Peki Ya Onlar?," *Hürriyet*, 18 March 2008.

[58] "Mağaza Hırsızlığı 1.5 Milyar Euro'yu Buldu, Türkiye Dünya 4'üncüsü Oldu," *Hürriyet*, 28 November 2010. While looking at the headline which can be translated as "shoplifting has reached 1.5 billions, Turkey is the fourth in the world", one will probably think that the rate of shoplifting is so high in Turkey that the country is the fourth in the world, although the report points out to the annual increase of shoplifting.

direction that is claimed by the newspaper.[59] Özer points out that there is not much of a difference between different newspapers in terms of covering violent issues. However, the facts that violence does not need to be related to urban crime and different newspapers have different approaches to crime should not be forgotten.[60] As is seen in the analysis below in detail mainstream newspapers have been important factors contributing to the rise of public sensitivity regarding street crimes in the 2000s and to the construction and reproduction of the frame of criminal imagination through which people imagine crime.

<div align="center">The Upsurge of the Wave of Urban Crime in Istanbul</div>

Crime and violence have been popular topics for news mediums all around the world for years. However, attention needs to be paid to historically specific dimensions of crime coverage. The media do not always cover similar cases with similar emphasis. The newsworthiness of criminal cases not only depends on the extremity or violence of cases; but also on the context.

The media has a defining power in the sense that it defines the environment in which people live and reproduces these definitions regarding the nature of crime and crime trends through publication and broadcasting. Moral panics triggered by muggings in Britain in the beginning of 1970s or by school violence in the USA in the late 1990s are well analyzed examples indicating the degree to which crime

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[59] "Özel Güvenlik Sektörü Yatırımcıların İştahını Kabartıyor," *Zaman,* 08 March 2007. In this news entitled "Private Security Sector Is Wheting the Apetite of Investors", the newspaper claims that "It was reported that the *rise in crime rates of homicide, mugging and robbery in metropoles like Istanbul, Adana, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa* was leading to the increase of the market share of the private security sector every year." Looking at the turn over in the sector, one cannot deny that the private sector was in an upwards trend (for further information, see Chapter 5). However, it is difficult to say that this upwards trend resuled from an increase in the crime rates in metropoles. In fact, there was a steady decline in crime rates following 2006. Republic of Turkey, *TC. İçişleri Bakanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu.* Ankara, 2010.

[60] Özer.

coverage might be related to the context.[61] Crime is as old as law, but the meaning attached to crime and its comprehension and definition are historically bounded. As pointed out by Hall et al., it is not that nobody killed a third person (intentionally or consciously) for money in England before 1972, but it was in this year that the British media imported the term "mugging" to define these cases and mobilized people living in Britain around the issue by constructing a crime wave around this particular crime.[62]

The aim of this section is to analyze the coverage of urban crime in Istanbul by the mainstream media in the 2000s. This section is based on a research process that included the screening of the first seven pages of all issues of *Hürriyet* newspaper published between 2000 and 2009, all weekend extras of the same newspaper, all issues of the daily extra of *Hürriyet*, named Istanbul published between 2000 and 2003 (the final date the extra was published), the first pages of all issues of *Milliyet* between 2000 and 2003 and first ten pages of selected issues from *Zaman, Milliyet* and *Sabah* published between 2000 and 2009.[63] *Hürriyet* was chosen to be the primary object of research for this study for various reasons. Firstly, most of the informants stated that they were *Hürriyet* readers in the mid-2000s. Secondly, *Hürriyet* is a newspaper targeting middle-class readers in big cities. 65 % of all *Hürriyet* issues were purchased in city centers of the three biggest cities (Istanbul,

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[61] Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts; Donna Killingbeck, "The Role of Television News in the Construction of School Violence as a 'Moral Panic'," *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture* 8, no.3 (2001), pp. 186-202. Also see Beckett, *Making*.

[62] Hall et al.

[63] Newspapers in this last group were not screened in detail for the whole period (as this is not a one-person job and exceeds the scope of research that can be conducted for a master thesis), but issues that were published at the time of remarkable events (like the Canıdemir case mentioned above or the enforcement of amendments in Turkish Capital Law) were screened.

Ankara and Izmir) in 2006.[64] Finally, *Hürriyet* was an important newspaper in the media; with 41.5% share of all newspaper advertisements and selling around 516,000 issues daily in 2006.[65] *Milliyet* had a harsh stance (maybe the harshest stance in mainstream media) towards the declaration of a general amnesty in 2000, by criticizing the amnesty with the headline *Müjde Rahşan Katiller Serbest* (Good News Rahşan, the Murderers are Free). Thus, it needed to be checked whether it had a different approach to crime in the years following the general amnesty. The first ten pages were given priority for research; because these are the pages in which crime stories and reports are covered in general.

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the Turkish media transformed the issue of urban crime into an emergency in the mid-2000s, escalating the fear of crime by constructing a wave of urban crime centered on purse-snatching. Purse-snatching was not a legal category of criminal conduct but a type of extortion before this transformation which in the end resulted in the legal definition of snatching as a crime in its own right. Besides lacking a legal definition, the term "kapkaç" (purse-snatching) was used by the media to define a wide array of cases, including non-relevant ones. Newspaper coverage of cases of urban crime accelerated after Canıdemir case; in which a university student was killed by being thrown out from a moving train after his phone was taken by force in November 2004. The case was an absolute match with the legal and linguistic definition of

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[64] Hurriyet Corporate. *2006 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

[65] Hurriyet Corporate. *2006 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

extortion and murder;[66] but the media, including conservative newspapers like *Zaman*, declared Canıdemir a "snatching victim."[67]

Figure 1 below shows the number of snatching, robbery, extortion and theft cases covered in the first page of *Hürriyet* between 2000 and 2009. Each case was counted as one, so this figure does not represent the coverage all news related to these crimes in the first page of the newspaper since replications were not counted.[68]

Source: Data collected by research (newspaper screening).

Figure 1: The number of snatching, robbery, extortion and theft cases published in

the first page of *Hürriyet* newspaper

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[66] The word used for snatching in Turkish is *kapkaç; kap* means grab or snatch, *kaç* means run.

[67] "Kapkaççılar Telefonunu Vermeyen Üniversiteli Genci Trenden Attı," *Zaman,* 05 November 2004; "Trende Kapkaççı Dehşeti," *Hürriyet,* 04 November 2004.

[68] The declarations of public officials or politicians regarding these crimes, reports and comments about these crimes prepared by the newspaper that were published in the first page were not included in this figure. Replications were also omitted; because a particular case can be covered over and over again depending on the nature of the crime, the identity or popularity of the victim or the offender and so on. However, coverage of both groups of issues was found to be consistent with the trend seen in the figure.

As seen in Figure 1, *Hürriyet*'s coverage of snatching, robbery, extortion and theft cases accelerated at the end of 2004, following the Canıdemir case. It is not that snatching was away from the gaze of journalists before this date. It was a continuously reported and commented on crime in the local extra of the newspaper, Istanbul, between 2000 and 2003. However, the cases of snatching and extortion were not seen to be newsworthy enough for the newspaper to be covered in the first page in general before this date. It was not only *Hürriyet* that covered the issues of street crime and robbery with an increasing emphasis in the mid-2000s; different TV channels and newspapers also began to underline the issue of "snatching terror" that was claimed to make life in Istanbul unbearable.[69] The issue of urban crime had entered to the agenda of the mainstream media by 2003 and it was to have this enormous popularity till 2008.

Newspapers contributed to the recognition of urban crime as an emergent problem that needed to be dealt with by highlighting cases of snatching and robbery, by locating these cases on the first pages of their issues and by defining the assumed gravity of the problem of insecurity in reports and columns. Journalists often underlined the assumed upsurge of street violence and sexual crimes. Increased coverage of violent crime by newspapers and its increased broadcasting by TV channels were also referred to as the proof of an increase in violent crime by the journalist themselves. As the media has been assumed to be a mirror reflecting real life as it is by journalists, the coverage of cases of violent crimes on the national

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[69] For some of the newspaper articles related to this type of coverage, see "Kapkaç Terörünü Masaya Yatıran Uzmanlar Çok Yönlü Tedbir İstedi (The experts discussing the snatching terror wanted multidimensional precautions)," *Zaman,* 17 April 2004; "Suç Cehenneminden Ana Baba Kucağına (From the hell of crime to the warmth of the family)," *Sabah*, 04 March 2006; "Meydan İtlere Kaldı," *Sabah,* 09 December 2005. Fatih Altaylı also had an interview with a 12 year old kid who was claimed to be deceived to be a petty-criminal by snatching gangs on TV. "Teke Tek," ATV, 12 March 2006.

news in an increasing manner has been treated as the indicator of a criminal upsurge, the proof of the claim that Istanbul became a sin-city. Thus, the media itself promoted the belief that social realities acquire a sense of reality through publication and broadcasting which was assumed to be proportionate to their importance in real life. Let us look at an article written by Bekir Coşkun, a columnist working for *Hürriyet* at that time, to see how scary the calls for the recognition of urban crime as an emergency could be. While he was criticizing the release of 12,000 inmates from prisons because of the re-organization of the capital law, he claimed:

> Dead bodies are getting collected from cars, (empty) yards in the mornings. They are even killing kids. It is an epidemic to rob, to kidnap, to murder people, to break into houses, to shed blood, to destroy… There have not left any house that has not been robbed, any street in which a (crime) of extortion has not been conducted, a pavement which has not been tainted with blood in cities. Newspapers-televisions are full with news regarding innocent people who were kidnapped, raped, stabbed, murdered. (…) For the best, do not go out of (your) home. You should sit (stay) at home, doors-windows tightly closed. Sit (and) wait. *They will come to (your) home anyway.''[70]*

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that newspapers not only reported cases of criminal conduct, but constructed a frame through which people imagined crime. As analyzed in Chapter 6, most of the informants interviewed for this thesis had not been victimized or witnessed criminal conduct, yet they had concrete opinions regarding the ethnic or linguistic traits of perpetrators, they identified some places – all of which being neighborhoods consisting of *gecekondu*s with the exception of

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[70] (Translated by the author, emphasis original) Bekir Coşkun, "Evde Bekleyin Gelecekler… (Wait at home, they will come)," *Hürriyet,* 01 February 2005. The original text of the cited article is in the following. "*Sabahları otomobillerin içinden, arsalardan cesetler toplanıyor. Çocukları dahi öldürüyorlar. İnsan soymak, kaçırmak, öldürmek, evleri basmak, kan akıtmak, yok etmek bir salgın... Soyulmadık ev, gasp yapılmamış sokak, kan bulaşmamış kaldırım kalmadı kentlerde. Gazeteler-televizyonlar kaçırılmış, ırzına geçilmiş, bıçaklanmış, öldürülmüş masum insanların haberleriyle dolu (...)En iyisi siz evden çıkmayın. Kapı-pencere sıkı sıkı, evde oturmalısınız. Oturup bekleyin. Zaten eve gelecekler.*"

Beyoğlu – as dangerous places populated by criminals or people with criminal tendencies, *even though they had never been there*. When asked the approach of who would scare them or make them anxious while walking in the street, most of the informants pictured a dark male in his thirties with a heavy Eastern (Kurdish) accent, dressed badly. This thesis argues that the mainstream media may have played an important role in the reproduction of this criminal stereotype by identifying migration as the primary reason for the upsurge of urban crime,[71] by stigmatizing *gecekondu*s[72] as illegal places populated by people with illegal tendencies, by picturing a criminal type with certain traits in many visual ways like newspaper illustrations or criminal characters in TV series. The large group subjected to criminalization in general was the lower classes, yet there was a specific criminality attached to Kurdish migrants in this larger group. To give an example; in a report titled "Who Is This Snatcher?", prepared with the guidance of the Police Department, published in the weekend extra of *Hürriyet,* being migrated from Eastern or South-Eastern Anatolia was located at the top of the list defining the characteristics of purse-snatchers.[73]

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[71] Metin Heper, "Göçü Önle, Suçu Önle (Prevent the migration, prevent crime)", *Milliyet*, 05 July 2007.

[72] The word gecekondu defines rapidly built houses on public lands by migrants who came to the big cities from different geographies. The construction of gecekondus accelarated following the 1980s, partly because of the accelaration of migration and partly because of the political ignorance of governing parties in terms of implementing the enforcements against gecekondu-dwellers required by the laws for electoral support. Sürhan Cam points to this acceleration by stating that the proportion of gecekondu-dwellers began to constitute more than half of the population in the 2000s, while this rate had been around 25% in 1980. Sürhan Cam, "Neo-liberalism and Labour within the Context of an 'Emerging Market' Economy- Turkey," *Capital & Class* 26, no.2 (Summer 2002), p. 104. Also see, Çağlar Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no.1 (March 2005), pp. 124-134; Cihan Tuğal, "The Greening of Istanbul," *New Left Review*, no. 51 (May-June 2008), pp. 65-80.

[73] "Kim Bu Kapkaççı?," *Hürriyet Pazar*, 28 November 2004.

It is also important to note that the mainstream media criminalized Kurdish migrants without explicitly mentioning them. The word "Kurdish" itself was exempt from the lexicon of the mainstream media; Kurdish people were not recognized as such but referred to with the term "Eastern originated." According to sociologist Cenk Saraçoğlu, this non-recognition is proof for the claim that the Turkish mainstream media does not stigmatize and criminalize Kurds.[74] The linguistic relationship between "Eastern originated" and "Kurdish" is similar to the one between "Dark Continent" and "Africa"; so this implicitness cannot make the claim that mainstream media does not criminalize Kurdish migrants grounded.

The mainstream media not only contributed to the reproduction of criminal stereotypes with certain traits, but also defined the nature of urban crime in relation to criminal motivations. Journalists emphasized the issue of preference over the deteriorating life conditions of the lower classes while elaborating on the issue of urban crime. In this logic, the possibility that snatchers were resorting to criminal conduct because of the lack of other means of making a living was overruled, because criminals were portrayed as rational actors who recognize the marginal utility of taking a short-cut to wealth in the absence of deterrent punitive measures. Emre Aköz, a columnist writing for *Sabah* newspaper, gave an example of this understanding by claiming that:

> "Our primary problem is not 'miserable criminals'; (it is) organized criminal groups, in other words gangs. They do trainings for extortion, snatching and robbery. They educate little children. They recruit personnel from the unemployed. They divide streets, neighborhoods

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[74] Cenk Saraçoğlu, *Şehir, Orta Sınıf ve Kürtler: İnkar'dan "Tanıyarak Dışlama"ya* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2011).

into plots. They are not typically unemployed people. They have jobs; (like) robbery, extortion."[75]

As seen in this example, petty-crimes were projected as being committed by professionals by the mainstream media, which tended to emphasize the issue of preference over socio-economic conditions. Petty-criminals were portrayed as rational actors choosing the easy way out.

The second point which is related to the preference emphasis is that petty-criminals were positioned outside the boundaries of normality. They were differentiated from the rest of society, which was imagined to be consisted of possible victims. As criminologist Alison Young points out, the dichotomy between criminals and victims is often comprehended as a battle between black and white. [76] This way of comprehension that equates the sides of this dichotomy with the evil and the good results in the positioning of the criminal outside society, which is assumed to be made up of law-abiding citizens. With this positioning and marginalization, it

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[75] (Translated by the author, emphasis original) Emre Aköz, "Polis Sayısı Yeterli mi? (Is the number of the police officers enough?)" *Sabah,* 13 February 2005. The original text of the article is in the following. *"Çünkü asıl meselemiz 'gariban' suçlular değil; örgütlü suç grupları; yani çeteler. Bunlar gaspın, kapkaçın, hırsızlığın talimini yapıyorlar. Küçük çocukları eğitiyorlar. İşsizlerden eleman devşiriyorlar. Caddeleri, mahalleleri parselliyorlar. Onlar tipik 'işsiz' değil. Onların işi var: Çalmak, gasbetmek."*Another columnist who emphasized the issue of preference over socio economic conditions was Bekir Coşkun who argued that white collar crimes, committed also by politicians, led the way for the moral degeneration of the society by claiming that: "*Murders, robberies, snatching, extortion...* All this will increase even more and you will not be able to go out into the streets in big cities. *Because the children have grown up.* They; have grown up while watching huge bucks of the ones governing the state, watching that thieves are in the most respected positions, hearing one could not become a man (!) without picking and stealing over and over again. Now they are just doing what the most respectful (!) people have done. *They are stealing...They are thieving... They are snatching...They are running...* Do not be fooled by the empty talk (claiming that the children are getting involved in petty-crimes) "*because of economic reasons...*" of those who are shamed for being role models of the kids. In the first years of the republic when the society was in the poorest situation, even envying at another person's property was taint. Then you glorified (respected to, gave authority to) thieves, robbers. The children have seen this. Now they have grown up..." (Translated by the author, emphasis original) Bekir Coşkun, "Çocuklar Büyüdüler (The children have been grown up)," *Hürriyet*, 20 December 2005.

[76] Young.

becomes possible to see petty-criminals as people "so different from the rest of the society" (as the rest of the society is assumed to be consisted of honest people; victims and possible victims) and to claim that they are not "typically unemployed people" as some journalists did.[77]

The analysis of the mainstream media carried out for this thesis tends to show that petty-criminals were portrayed to be morally degenerated people lacking the intention or capacity to follow the behavior codes that are assumed to be respected by the rest of the society by the mainstream media. Here, it is necessary to note that the importance different newspapers attached to the role of moral degeneration for leading to the wave of urban crime was different. While *Hürriyet* tended to point out the inefficiencies/lack of authority of the police department, *Zaman* tended to emphasize moral degeneration and even pointed out to the assumed set-back of religiosity as the main reason for the upsurge in urban crime. However, as the discussion below will help to illustrate, both tended to assume that petty-criminals were so different from the rest of the society.[78]

The comprehension of the relationship between criminals and the rest of the society as a battle between evil and the good and the moral degeneration attached to petty criminals by the actors that fabricate the frame of criminal imagination, including the media, led to the erosion of the line between different crimes. The sympathy towards petty-criminals was replaced by the idea that s*uçun büyüğü küçüğü olmaz* (literally the phrase means "there are no major or minor crimes," from

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[77] Emre Aköz, "Polis Sayısı Yeterli mi?" *Sabah,* 13 February 2005.

[78]"Kim Bu Kapkaççı?" *Hürriyet Pazar*, 28 November 2004; "Meclis Ülkedeki Sosyal Çöküntüyü Araştırsın (The parliament should investigate the social corruption in the country)," *Zaman,* 24 May 2005; "Kapkaç Terörü Dini Eğitimin Yetersizliğinden Kaynaklanıyor (The snatching terror results from the inadequacy of religious education)," *Zaman*, 04 April 2005.

a wider angle it can be interpreted as "breaking the law is violating the moral code that binds the society and should be punished no matter how insignificant the crime is for the public order to be sustained").

This situation aggravated the marginalization of the *gecekondu*s which had already been marked with a social distance constructed through culture; because it strengthened the sense that *gecekondu*-dwellers had a tendency to break the law. Even before the 2000s *gecekondu*-dwellers were assumed to be so different from the middle classes, not only economically, but also culturally because they were assumed to lack culture or to have distinct cultures that included the elements of incivility and violence.[79] However, with the rise the wave of urban crime in the 2000s their marginal position sharpened. The argument here is not that Istanbulites began to see the dichotomy between criminals and the rest of the society as a battle between evil and the good only after the turn of the century; but that they began to *see* this dichotomy more and more with the rise of the wave of urban crime and that the marginality of *gecekondu*s transformed from unlawfulness into criminality in this process.

The second result of the underlining of moral degeneration and comprehension of the dichotomy between criminals and the rest of the society as a battle between good and the evil is that the line between violent and non-violent offences began to be blurred. It can be said that there had been a kind of sympathy towards young petty-criminals before the upsurge of the wave of urban crime. The Republic of Turkey had declared a general amnesty in 2000. Rahşan Ecevit, a

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[79] Ayşe Öncü, "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of 'Middleness' in the Era of Neo-Liberalism," in *Istanbul Between the Global and the Local*, edited by Çağlar Keyder (New York: St. Martins, 1999), pp. 117-145; Sema Erder, *Kentsel Gerilim: Enformel İlişki Ağları Alan Araştırması* (Istanbul: Um:ag Yayınları, 1997).

political figure herself and the wife of Bülent Ecevit who was the prime minister at that time, played an important role in this development and she legitimized this amnesty by pointing out to the misery of poor children who had been sentenced to nine years penal servitude for stealing *baklava* (a kind of desert) just to eat. Rahşan Ecevit was not alone in having this kind of a sympathetic approach to petty-criminals; mainstream media also shared this sympathy for young petty-criminals, blaming the justice system for being excessively punitive for these types of offences before the rise of the wave of urban crime, despite the fact that the declaration of a general amnesty was criticized harshly by the very same media.[80] With the rise of the wave of urban crime, the line between petty-crimes and violent crimes began to be blurred and this sympathy was replaced with a firm stance pointing out to the possibility that one who had broken the law for committing a petty-crime might be encouraged to commit other kinds of crimes in the absence of the necessary punishment. TV series covered stories of petty-criminals who became sex offenders when they found the chance. The idea that thieves were taking drugs to be reckless before robbing houses, thus becoming potential sex offenders and murderers, became widespread with the coverage of newspapers in this direction.[81]

Some academics also had a role in the erosion of the boundaries separating criminal categories and the demonization of petty-criminals through the media. Here, one should make a differentiation between two groups of cases. Some academics gave declarations and interviews which might directly have contributed to this development to different news mediums. In a half-page interview with a mainstream

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[80] "Baklavadan Sonra Şimdi de Çokokrem Çetesi," *Milliyet,* 20 January 2002.

[81] "Kim Bu Kapkaççı?," *Hürriyet Pazar,* 28 November 2004.

newspaper, conducted after the murders of several old people by criminals who had forced them to make changes in their wills, Halil Ibrahim Bahar underlined the importance of moral degeneration and the erosion of social bounds with references to the concept of risk society to explain the dangers surrounding the modern individual and commented that:

> For Turkey, what is the example of the Deed Gang (the criminal organization that murdered old people after forcing them to make changes to their deeds) yet…The number of registered crimes committed in Turkey is 1 million. In England, which has a population near to that of Turkey, 6 million registered crimes are committed (annually). But the lowness of registered crime in Turkey is not important. The really important point is that (the rate of violent crimes) is very high. Because of this (the highness of violent crime in Turkey compared to England) an English (woman/man) is much more secure (living) surrounded with 6 million crimes. Because he/she knows that the thief will not murder him/her after stealing his/her money, the insurance will cover his/her loss. But they are killing people in Turkey after stealing their money, (and/or) phone, and what is more after raping them. Thus the criminal does not leave the victim as witness, destroys him/her (in Turkey).[82]

Evaluating whether Turkey had a bigger problem of violent crime than Britain is not among the objectives of this study. Moreover, this study argues that criminal statistics are not reliable sources for evaluating the violence exerted in a society, because they do not mirror the realities regarding crime one by one due to the issues of reporting, recording and classification. Still, it should be noted that the rape rate per 100,000 population was 2.5 for Turkey and 25.6 for Britain, similarly assault

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[82] "Tapu Çetesi Daha Ne Ki… Daha Çook Şiddet Suçu Yaşayacağız (What is the example of the Deed Gang yet… We will experience so many other violent crimes)," *Hürriyet,* 22 June 2008. The original text of the interview published by the newspaper is in the following. *"Türkiye açısından Tapu Çetesi örneği ne ki daha... Türkiye'de yılda işlenen kayıtlı suç sayısı 1 milyon. Türkiye'ye yakın nüfusa sahip İngiltere'de yılda 6 milyon kayıtlı suç işleniyor. Ama Türkiye'de kayıtlı suçun azlığı önemli değil. Asıl önemli nokta, şiddet suçlarının çok fazla olması. Bu nedenle bir İngiliz, 6 milyon suçun içinde daha çok güvende. Çünkü hırsızın, parasını çaldıktan sonra kendini öldürmeyeceğini, sigortanın zararını karşılayacağını biliyor. Ama Türkiye'de insanın parasını, telefonunu çaldıktan, bir de tecavüz ettikten sonra öldürüyorlar. Yani suçlu, mağduru tanık olarak bırakmıyor, yok ediyor."*

rates in these countries were respectively 192.7 and 1365.3 in 2006.[83] Turkey has serious rates of non-reporting, which might be actually enormous for rape rates because of the importance attached to honor.[84] The argument here is not that Turkey was/is a safer country than Britain; but that there are no data to substantiate Bahar's claim that Turkey became a country with an exceptionally emergent problem of violent crime grounded.

The second way in which academics contribute to this development was related to the coverage of their declarations by the mainstream media. Journalists take comments from various resources but use only some parts of these comments. *Sabah* asked specialists what they thought about the rise of snatching statistics and prepared the text below by using these interviews:

> Psychiatrist (and) associate professor Armağan Samancı, who claimed that rises in the commitmenting of crimes against public order in Turkey have various dimensions said, "The first reason (for this rise) is that there has not been a (value) system for young people to get inspiration from, to affect their value judgments in recent years. The second dimension is that family structures have eroded. The family is not able to defeat popular culture of pursuing sexuality, money, fame and pleasure through the easiest way". Associate professor (and) the head of Istanbul Bilgi University Sociology Department Arus Yumul said; "We believe we can solve our problems only by violence." Psychiatrists (and) associate professor Kültegin Ögel who claimed that urbanization is the biggest reason for the increase in crime (rates) made the comment that, "In *varoş*s (neighborhoods consisted of illegally constructed houses by migrants, the term is similar to *gecekondu* but it is also used to refer to people, the culture or the behavior pattern attributed to them) the parent has no control over the

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[83] Harrendorf, Heiskanen and Malby, p.40.

[84] According to Galma Jahic and Aslı T. Akdaş Mitrani who analyzed the issue of non-reporting in Istanbul by using the data of the first international crime victims survey conducted in the city in 2005, the rates of non-reporting in Istanbul were very high compared to other big cities in Europe. Galma Jahic, Aslı T. Akdaş Mitrani, "International Crime Victim Survey 2005: Criminal Victimization in Istanbul Households," *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* 5, (2010), pp. 190-198. However, there are no studies or research on rates of non-reported rape.

child. (Thus) It is easier for the child to get in criminal organizations, to be directed (by criminals)."[85]

The probability that socio-economic conditions might play an important role in this statistical rise is absent in this text. A complex social problem is reduced to just one of its dimensions (cultural corruption and moral degeneration) and this reduction is given a kind of academic seriousness, a higher level of reliability as it is constructed upon the statements of specialists who may actually criticize this kind of reduction.

Last but not the least, the mainstream media presented several solutions for the elimination of urban crime which was constructed as an emergent problem with which to be dealt. Explanation and definition of a social problem determines the possible solutions to be presented. If one is to identify the lack of necessary legal and policing measures and portray petty-criminals as rational actors who make use of this claimed to be malfunctioning system, as outlaws outside the boundaries of normality defined by the society, rather than "typically unemployed people" who have limited chances of making a living and resort to criminal conduct to sustain themselves, the issue of urban crime becomes to be defined as a *criminal* problem that can be dealt through penal mechanisms and tough policing rather than a *social* problem that can be dealt through social measures aiming to improve the living conditions of the lower classes.

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[85] "İstanbul'da Hızla Artan Suç Oranları Korkutuyor (Rapidly increasing crime rates in Istanbul are getting scary)," *Sabah*, 15 February 2005. The original text of the cited passage is in the following.*"Türkiye'de asayiş suçlarında meydana gelen artışların çeşitli boyutlarının olduğunu söyleyen Psikiyatr Doç. Dr. Armağan Samancı, 'Birinci nedeni son yıllarda gençlerin yönleneceği, değer yargılarını oluşturacakları bir sistem yok. İkinci boyut ise, aile yapıları yıprandı. Aile, sokaktaki cinsellik, para, şöhret ve kolay yönden hazza ulaşma kültürünü yenemiyor' dedi. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölüm Başkanı Doç. Dr. Arus Yumul ise, 'Sorunlarımızı sadece şiddet yoluyla çözebileceğimize inanıyoruz' dedi. Suç artışlarındaki en önemli nedenin kentleşme olduğunu söyleyen Psikiyatr Doç. Dr. Kültegin Ögel de, 'Varoşlarda anne babanın çocuk üzerinde kontrolü yok. Çocuğun suç örgütleri içine girmesi yönlendirilmesi daha da kolay oluyor' yorumu yaptı."*

As analyzed above, several issues of the major dailies were screened for the research process carried out for this thesis. Based on this research data derived through the screening of over 30,000 pages, it is possible to say that the mainstream media avoided approaching the issue of urban crime as a social problem, portraying petty-criminals as rational professionals. Migration, lack of punitive measures, lack of the authorities of the police and moral degeneration were identified as the primary factors leading to the upsurge of the wave of urban crime. Thus, the solutions offered by the media were related to these issues. The enforcement of more punitive measures for petty-crimes and for crimes against the public order, prevention of migration, enforcement of the police (in terms of enlarging the authorities of the police or increasing of the quantity or the quality of the numbers of security officers) were commonly supported measures that were assumed to be required by the emergent nature of the "city terror." These measures included certain references to the "scholarly myths"[86] produced in the USA regarding crime prevention. In the general account of *Hürriyet*, as Istanbul was accepted to have "become the New York of the 1960's", as *gecekondu* neighborhoods were assumed to be "Harlems constructed in the middle of Istanbul"[87], the city was claimed to be a sin-city

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[86] As analyzed by Wacquant, many scholarly myths were produced around Broken Windows Theory following the decline of violent crime rates in New York. The securitization of New York through private and public initiatives, the enforcement of tough policing measures and combating of petty-crimes and behaviors suspected to indicate criminality were some of the measures taken in New York under the leadership of mayor Giuliani. These measures were claimed to be primarily responsible for the decline in violent crime rates in the city. Wacquant names these as scholarly myths because this approach to crime found support and has been reproduced in the academic world; despite the fact that there has been empirical evidence (as the facts that crime rates were already in decline before these measures were taken and that there was a similar trend of decline in states that did not take these measures) indicating that the decline of violent crime rates in New York was very little related to the enforcement of these measures. Wacquant, *Punishing*.

[87] Ertuğrul Özkök, "Ey Hırsızlık Mağdurları (You the victims of theft)," *Hürriyet,* 6 February 2005.

"waiting for its Giuliani"[88] who would take decisive steps regarding street crime. By emphasizing the lack of decisive measures, like those taken by Giuliani in New York, this penal approach to crime contributed to the escalation of fear of crime, as it underlined the malfunctioning of the state and portrayed Istanbul as an unlivable city lacking good government.

The mainstream newspapers also presented suggestions related to personal solutions to manage the risk of victimization. While Istanbul was defined as becoming a sin-city by all of the mainstream newspapers, the individual was responsibilized to secure his/her own life through personal measures. The means of this individual securitization, from security commodities like alarm systems to gated communities, were advertised side by side with news related to urban insecurity. As analyzed further in Chapter 6, gated communities have been marketed as safe shelters for the middle classes, providing the spatial defense that is assumed to be required for having a secure life in Istanbul and as securitized places populated by a community that excludes people with criminal tendencies. The deepening of the criminalization of the lower classes by newspapers through coverage was accompanied by the rise of the demand for gated communities, and with the acceleration of spatial segregation based on class lines.

Gated community advertisements in newspapers, which before had been located on a couple of pages dedicated to ads and announcements began to spill onto other pages following 2003. In addition to this change of location, the size of the advertisements also increased. Moreover, the mainstream newspapers began to publish real estate extras after 2005. Here, it should be pointed out that these extras

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[88] Sevil Atasoy, "Giulianisi'ni Bekleyen İstanbul (The Istanbul waiting for its Giuliani)," *Hürriyet,* 7 April 2007.

do not contain news and advertisements about different kinds of construction projects targeting different classes; they specifically cover gated community projects targeting middle class consumers. The share of the construction sector in the advertisement income of *Hürriyet* has increased a lot in recent years; the income of the newspaper from construction advertisements was 72,958 US dollars in 2005,[89] this income reached to 127,000 US dollars in 2007.[90] Companies in construction and decoration sector in total spent 138 million Turkish liras for advertisement in 2009. This sum reached 227 million liras in 2010 with a 65 per cent growth (the highest among all sectors).[91] Of course, the gated community is only one part of the total construction; but the research conducted for this thesis reveals that it is the most advertised part. Thus, the mainstream newspapers covered advertisements of gated community projects that offered a safe life isolated from the criminality of the lower classes in an increasing manner.

As seen in Figure 1, *Hürriyet*'s coverage of snatching, robbery, extortion and theft cases in the first page of the newspaper declined after 2005. The third pages of newspapers are generally related to criminal issues, but cases of and reports and comments on street crime spilled into other pages of the newspaper (into pages between 4 and 8) following 2004. There was also a set-back in terms of this expansion. Petty-crimes had lost their newsworthiness by 2008. This raises an important question: has crime in general lost the primary place it gained during the

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[89] Hurriyet Corporate. *2006 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

[90] Hurriyet Corporate. *Faaliyet Raporu 1 Ocak-31 Aralık 2007*. Available [online]: http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/faaliyet_raporlari.asp [12 February 2011].

[91] Hurriyet Corporate. *Yönetim Kurulu Faaliyet Raporu: 1 Ocak-31 Aralık 2010 Hesap Dönemi*. Available [online]: www.hurriyetkurumsal.org.tr [13 April 2011].

wave of urban crime? Has the mainstream media plainly stopped taking the issue of urban insecurity as an emergent problem?

In order to answer these questions, one needs to elaborate on other types of crimes. Figure 2 below shows the numbers of sex related crimes published on the first page of *Hürriyet*.[92] Since the beginning of the 2000s, the newsworthiness of these crimes for the newspaper has increased enormously.[93] Thus, besides the portrayal of petty-criminals as probable sex offenders, there has been an increased interest in sex-related crimes themselves.

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[92] Declarations of public officials or politicians regarding these crimes, reports and comments about these crimes prepared by the newspaper that were published in the first page were not included in this figure. Replications were also omitted; because a particular case can be covered over and over again depending on the nature of the crime, the identity or popularity of the victim or the offender and so on. However, coverage of both groups of issues was found to be consistent with the trend seen in the figure.

[93] It should be noted that this coverage might have accelerated following the murder of a teenage girl, Münevver Karabulut, by his boyfriend in 2009. The case was not a sex-related crime itself; but it was sexualized due to the age and the gender of the victim. This case was heavily covered by newspapers and TV channels for almost a year in every detail.

Figure 2: Numbers of sex-related crime cases (rape, attempted rape, sexual harassment and sexual abuse of children) published in the first page of *Hürriyet* newspaper (2000-2008)

This issue is important because most of the informants interviewed for this thesis emphasized that they were not afraid to lose some of their possessions due to victimization and that what scared them was violent crime, including sex-related crimes, with references to the saying *cana geleceğine mala gelsin* (a phrase that can be translated as the loss or damage of property is preferred over personal damage or loss of life). In other words, it has been sex-related crimes, kidnapping and assault that turn parents (the most scared group of informants) into armored up protectors organizing their lives on the basis of security, as analyzed in detail in Chapter 6. Thus, the renewed interest of the mainstream media in sex-related crimes can be claimed to be an important factor contributing to urban fear, keeping the issue of urban insecurity hot even after the wave of urban crime constructed around snatching came to an end.

Evaluating the Power of the Media and Its Limits

This chapter documented the increased interest of the mainstream media in different types of crimes in the 2000s. The mainstream media contributed to the reproduction of criminal stereotypes, the stigmatization of the *gecekondu* neighborhoods, to the responsibilization of the individual for providing his/her own security, which will be analyzed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. This increased interest and coverage regarding crime being documented, a question reveals itself: "how does this great media interest in crime affect the receivers' (consumer of the products of mainstream media) ideas regarding urban crime?"

Determining whether there has been a change in receivers' conception regarding the nature of crime or criminal trends in relation to the change of the crime coverage of the media is extremely difficult, if not impossible (at least until someone actually discovers a time machine). It can be said that if the first victimization survey trying to assess the level of fear of Istanbulites had been carried out before 2005, this difficulty would have been eroded. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, survey methodology has many problems of its own. It is very difficult to determine the fear felt by an individual by asking him/her to give a number to his/her fear of walking in the dark. In an attempt to overcome the problem of the absence of necessary data, one can ask people to state how afraid they were before the outbreak of this media frenzy (in early the 2000s) in order to compare these statements with informants' answers to the question of how feared they are now, but time itself changes how people see things.

This thesis does not claim that the media totally determines how individuals think about crime or that receivers of the messages distributed by the media strictly take these as absolute truths. However, the mainstream media has an important definitional power, as it is the primary source of acquiring information regarding crime. Individuals may interpret and react to issues covered by the media differently (for example, Eschholz et al. state that whites who think that more than 25% per cent of the people living in their neighborhood are affected more by TV coverage of violent crime than others),[94] but it is primarily the mainstream media that determines which issues will be subjected to this individual evaluation. Moreover, the mainstream media provides reference points for individuals to think about crime. These reference points make it possible for a middle-class individual lacking victimization experience to have concrete opinions regarding the personal traits of criminals and to mark *gecekondu* neighborhoods as nests of crime, lacking the experience of visiting these places. As analyzed in detail in Chapter 6, many informants emphasized the issue of preference over socio-economic conditions for explaining criminal motivations, suggesting congruency with tendencies in the media.

The research carried out for this thesis offers persuasive circumstantial evidence that the media contributes to the reproduction of the frame of criminal imagination by portraying criminal types, defining the nature of crime, marking some groups/places as criminal and by suggesting what should be done (personally and publicly) to control the risk of victimization. However, the contribution of the mainstream media to the construction and reproduction of the frame of criminal

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[94] Eschholz, Chiricos and Gertz.

imagination cannot be isolated from other factors and actors. Reporters take raw

information regarding crime after it is processed by public officials. Moreover,

public officials and politicians also have a definitional power (that defines the nature

of crime, crime trends and criminals themselves) and an agenda setting function

regarding crime, as analyzed in Chapter 4. Thus, the media should be seen as one

mediator among many.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTRIBUTIONS OF MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC

OFFICIALS TO THE ESCALATION OF URBAN FEAR

Politicians and public officials have an important role in shaping the

insecurity discourses through which middle-classes imagine crime. As mentioned in

the previous chapters, urbanites more or less depend on the accounts of others people

while forming their opinion about the nature and perpetrators of urban crime and

criminal trends, because they have a limited chance of acquiring first-hand

information through victimization or being witness to a criminal activity in the

"massified" city. Apart from everyday conversations about crime conceptualized as

"crime talk"[95] by Caldeira, which contributes to the circulation of criminal images

and trend perceptions, the primary source of getting information about crime and

criminals is the media for urbanites. The power of the media in shaping criminal

imaginary and perception of middle classes of Istanbul was analyzed in the previous

chapter.

The declarations and comments of mainstream politicians and public

officials have a constitutive role in terms of shaping the discourses of urban

insecurity. This chapter provides a closer look to the roles of politicians and

institutions in escalating urban fear and their contribution to the construction of the

frame through which middle classes of Istanbul imagine crime. As will be seen in

following chapters, there are many similarities between politicians' approach to

crime and those of the middle-classes, especially in terms of understanding

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[95] Calderia.

criminality as an issue of preference, attributing criminality to gecekondus on the basis of their illegal status indicating the capacity or inclination of gecekondu-dwellers for criminal conduct and finally holding Kurdish migrants, whose population in Istanbul has increased a lot in recent years, responsible for the criminal outbreak. This chapter does not argue that the middle classes of Istanbul see crime and criminal trends in the city completely as suggested by politicians and public officials. It is not logical to argue that the middle classes believe whatever police officials declare in their speeches, as most of the informants interviewed for this thesis criticized the attitudes and conduct of the police as an institution. Instead, this chapter documents how significant the issue of urban criminality became in the 2000s and attained a kind of bi-partisan character as a problem that is recognized by all mainstream parties.

Fear of crime is a double edged sword for the state. On the one hand, fear of crime reassures the legitimacy of the existence of state authority. It deepens the necessity for the state as security provider, which prevents the social life from transforming into a Hobbesian jungle. Thus, the fear of crime can be manipulated by different public institutions in order to legitimize their actions or to extend their authorities. However, *a just amount of fear* needs to be felt by the general population for the state to maintain its authority; because an excessive increase in fear of crime may bring with the questioning of the capacity and capability of the state to provide security, the very first condition of its existence.[96]

As the state is more than an idea but also consists of actors and institutions functioning in the bureaucratic field, the responsibility and cost of establishing this

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[96] For a wider analysis of this delicate balance, see Lee.

delicate balance is dispersed to institutions. However, there are institutions which

constitute what might be called condensation points related to fear and security.

These are public institutions related to the public order, like the police, and those

related to the overall management and coordination of state agencies on different

units, from district governorship to the prime ministry. However, one should be

careful not to reduce the state capacity of affecting fear of crime to these

condensation points. Social policy institutions may also act with securitization

rationality and promote fear of crime.[97]

Bureaucratic and political actors have the capacity of triggering the outbreak

of a crime wave. Because of their tasks and functions, they have privileged access to

information regarding criminal trends. They can affect the threat perception of

society by sharing some of this information or in the opposite way, by contributing to

the creation of an ambiguous atmosphere around urban criminality through

withholding information. Public officials have not only privileged access to

information, but also to publicity. Their declarations and comments have a higher

chance of getting publicized than those of an ordinary person. The coverage

possibility of their comments regarding criminality on TV is also higher than those of

an ordinary person. Finally, public officials and politicians have an agenda setting

function; they can also activate public sensitivity about the issue of crime through

their meetings, electoral campaigns, and so forth.

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[97] For an analysis of the functional overlapment between these two groups of public institutions in the U.S. after the collapse of the ghetto see; Wacquant, *Punishing*. Heavy coverage of drug surveys conducted by the Ministry of Education in Turkey can be seen as an example of what might be termed as the penalization of the "left hand" of the state.

According to Beckett, the rise of public sensitivity regarding urban security cannot be isolated from the discourses promoted by politicians.[98] The issue of urban crime has a very strong generating capacity, because of its sensitive function in legitimizing state authority. Thus, when a wave of urban crime (actual or perceived) overlaps with the rise of a public discourse supporting a more punitive legal system and/or a tougher policing mechanism, it can easily be adopted by other political parties targeting mainstream-voters.

It is not only politicians who have this agenda-setting function; public institutions and bureaucrats also have a mobilizing power in terms of urban fear. Public agencies may use their capacity of escalating fear in pursuit of extensions in their budget, or authorities. These pursuits can bring claims-making agencies into conflict with others that oppose these claims.[99] Major changes in state policy, like budget shrinkage efforts or democratization efforts, can be expected to give rise to this kind of institutional conflicts.

Here, it should be mentioned that the rise of penal policies and tough policing strategies in a country through the constitution of urban crime as a public sensitivity is related not only to internal developments. Some authors argue that the stigmatization and criminalization of marginal socio-economic, ethnic and cultural groups in many contexts perfectly suits with neo-liberal economic rationality and that

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[98] A good example indicating the agenda and priority setting capacity of politicians can be seen in the transformation of drugs issue from being one issue among the many into a huge problem to be dealt by Republicans and Democrats alike with 1980 presidential elections in the U.S. As documented by Beckett, Law and Order rhetoric might be developed by conservative politicians, but once drugs issue was constituted as a public sensitivity democrats were quick to follow suit. Beckett, *Making*, pp. 54.

[99] An example of this institutional conflict from the U.S. is given by Beckett, who points to the appeal of heads of law enforcement agencies to congress with the claim that their efforts to join the battle against crime and drugs were being thwarted by public agencies related to administration, primarily by the Office of Management and Budget. Beckett, *Making*, p. 63.

the criminalization of poverty has functioned to maintain the existing socio-economic order.[100] On the other hand, countries have particularities of their own. The legacy of social policy in Europe, the collapse of the ghetto in the U.S., Brazil's search for democracy, apartheid in South Africa have shaped these countries' ways of dealing with the issue of urban crime.

A related point is the issue of emergencies. As mentioned above when it overlaps with an authoritarian political rhetoric which would keep it on the agenda, urban insecurity may transform into an "emergency" requiring rapid and even harsh measures in its own right. However, urban insecurity is also related to other insecurities, fears and anxieties. Economic crisis, terrorist attacks, civil insurgences may function as catalysts that trigger urban fear and crime reporting.[101]

Politicians, Public Officials and Fear of Crime in Istanbul

Politicians and public officials can be said to contribute to the escalation of urban fear by pointing out to the worrying rise of petty-crimes,[102] the insensitivity of urbanites in terms of stepping in (by informing the police and by intervening to cases that they become witness),[103] the reluctance of the people to take necessary personal

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[100] Wacquant, *Punishing*.

[101] Richard L. Block, "Fear of Crime and Fear of the Police," *Social Problems* 19, no.1 (Summer 1971), pp. 91-101.

[102] Kadir Topbaş, the mayor of Istanbul, claimed that "the rise of robbery and snatching cases in the city is a serious threat and (it) is worrying for the future", "Topbaş: İstanbul'da Hırsızlık ve Kapkaç Endişe Verici," *Hürriyet*, 17 February 2005.

[103] Gökhan Aydıner, TNP general director, claimed in an interview: "Events happening around are sat by, no warning attitude is presented to the victimized or to those who might get victimized in the future. We only search ways for solutions when we themselves or one of our relatives get victimized. For the society to be peaceful and secure, all of our citizens are required to watch their environment, protect their rights and damages caused by crimes should be prevented." (translated by the author) "Artık 175000 Polisin Cebinde Sanığa Okunması Zorunlu Haklar Bildirgesi Var," *Hürriyet*, 20 March 2005.

measures (including hiring private security guards)[104] and by claiming that Istanbul ceased to be a livable city because of urban crime[105] on several occasions. As might be expected, there was a difference of attitude between opposition parties and the government in terms of emphasizing urban insecurity.

As the issue of urban crime escalated and began to be publicized and commented on continuously in the media, especially after the widely published Canıdemir case in which a university student was robbed and killed in a train, the government took a defensive stance and the AKP politicians began to give careful declarations regarding urban crime. As mentioned in the previous chapter, following this peak point of the wave of urban crime, the government began to be accused of incompetency and reluctance in its struggle against crime, leaving the streets to criminals. Taking this defensive stance, the AKP government accused the media of exaggerating the issue of street crime and for terrorizing the public.[106] It is not that the government denied that there was an increase in petty-crimes, but that the government tried to transfer the burden of the crime wave by holding moral corruption, insensitivity of citizens and the media responsible. In addition to the

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[104] Muammer Güler, the municipal governor of Istanbul, "Neden?," NTV, 11 February 2005.

[105] After becoming a snatching victim herself, the CHP Istanbul deputy Zeynep Damla Gürel declared: "Istanbul has a serious security problem. Istanbul became an unlivable, insecure city in terms of extortion, snatching, violence events, drugs." (translated by the author), "CHP'li Vekile Kapkaççı Şoku," *Zaman*, 10 March 2007. Also see the related speech of Ali Özpolat, a deputy of the CHP, in the parliament. Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 22, session 57, vol. 74, 10 February 2005. This issue was also emphasized in election declarations prepared for 2007 elections of the CHP and the MHP.

[106] See Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech at the AKP group meeting in the parliament. The AKP. 16Mart 2005. *Grup Konuşmaları 16 Mart 2005.* Available [online]: http://www.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/tbmmgrup/2005_03_16%20grup%20konusmasi.doc [17 May 2011].

denial of responsibility, the government refused to share detailed data regarding criminal trends with the public.[107]

In 2005, criminal acts were re-defined with the re-organization of the legal system. For example, purse-snatching which was not treated as a crime on its own but as a form of extortion before became a legal category. Years later, in 2008, Beşir Atalay, minister of interior at that time, accepted that this re-organization brought a different classification system and affected crime trends, claiming that:

> Secondly thoughts have been declared in the direction that there has been a constant increase in crimes related to general public order, like snatching, theft or primarily in crimes related to the public order of the cities, which have been put emphasis on, (which) especially interests our city centers. Let me state this firstly: there are opinions that there happened a very fast increase, a very fast rise in 2005-2006 compare to the years of the 2000s. I will also provide written, detailed information on the matter (later). There is a new arrangement in classification and analysis of crime, enforced in the year of 2005. This is generally known but is has too many details. In other words, some things which did not enter the records as criminal conduct are becoming to be regarded as criminal conduct. There are very tiny examples of this. In other words, even the details of the reporting of a parent, a father whose child did not come home that day. In those increases (the assumed increases in urban criminal trends) this (the re-organization of the capital law) has a contribution…[108]

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[107] We can say that there has been a relative improvement following 2008 as the TNP began to publicize its activity reports. However, activity and performance reports publicized by the TNP do not provide detailed information regarding criminal trends. It is possible to regard these pile of data as "packaged information" rather than raw data with reference to the concept of "packaged news"; because several crimes are missing from the lists included in these reports (like rape rates which increased with a mean annual change of 7.8 from 1996 to 2006 according to the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Harrendorf, Heiskanen and Malby, pp. 40. Additionally, the reports do not give detailed information regarding the victims and perpetrators (like nationality, education, occupation). Until 2009, reports of the TNP were not publicized. Moreover, data relevant to criminal trends was not accessible even for parliamentarians. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Istanbul deputy of the CHP, and Erkan Akçay Manisa deputy of the MHP issued question motions, asking Beşir Atalay, the minister of interior at that time, why he had not been presenting data or explaining whether crime rates increased or not; both of the motions were left unanswered. See the written question motion issued to the presidency of the parliament by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, docket number: 7/3438, period and year: 23/2, the date of arrival to the presidency: 06 May 2008; the written question motion issued to the presidency of the parliament by Erkan Akçay, docket number: 7/3762, period and year: 23/2, the date of arrival to the presidency: 22 June 2008.

[108] (Translated by the author) The Answer of Beşir Atalay to the questions regarding the increase of crime rates in the Plan and Budget Commission of the parliament, quoted in the written question motion issued to the presidency of the parliament by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, docket number:

The important point here is that Beşir Atalay did not share this comment until 2008 and even this late-coming comment itself was not that public at all, as Beşir Atalay made this explanation during a meeting in the Plan and Budget Commission, not in a press conference or during an interview.

This defensive stance taken by the government also was affected by the claims of the opposition. The MHP and the CHP accused the government of being "soft on urban crime" along with being "soft on terror." Canan Arıtman, a CHP deputy, harshly criticized the re-organization of the capital law for making things difficult for the victims, by limiting the spaces in which killing intruders was accepted as self-defense to bedrooms. As will be analyzed later in this chapter, the MHP and the CHP both promised to take a "decisive, determined" stance against crime in their 2007 election manifestos claiming that the security of life and property ceased to be protected in big cities. One said this, another said that, but it became the issue of urban criminality that everyone was talking about. In this political popularity of the issue, the institution of Turkish National Police (TNP) played an important role. In a way, it can be said that it was TNP, which transformed the issue of urban crime from one problem among many to a distinct emergency against which every politician was developing a project.

Police as a Claims-making Actor

7/3438, period and year: 23/2, the date of arrival to the presidency: 06 May 2008. Beşir Atalay did not make a declaration to deny this speech and left the written question motion unanswered. The original text of this declaration is in the following. *"İkinci konu olarak üzerinde sıkça durulan, özellikle şehir merkezlerimizi daha çok ilgilendiren, tabii, kapkaç, hırsızlık gibi genel asayişle ilgili veya ağırlıkla şehir asayişiyle ilgili suçlarda hep artış olduğu yönünde düşünceler serdedildi. Önce şunu ifade edeyim: 2000'li yıllarla mukayesede, 2005-2006'da çok hızlı bir artış, çok hızlı bir yükselme olduğu yönünde görüşler var. O konuda ben yazılı bilgi de sunacağım ayrıntılı. Suç tasnif ve değerlendirmesinde 2005 yılında yapılan yeni bir düzenleme var. Bu, genelde biliniyor aslında, ama çok ayrıntısı var. Yani, daha once suç vasfında kayıtlara girmeyen bazı şeyler suç vasfı taşır hale geliyor. Çok küçük örnekleri var bunun. Yani, işte, çocuğu o gün eve gelmeyen velinin, babanın başvurusunun ayrıntılarına kadar inen. O yükselmelerde bunun bir payı var."*

This thesis argues that the Turkish National Police emerged as a claims-making actor, affecting urban fear in 2000s. The argument here is not that the TNP had never been a claims-making actor before 2000 or that it innovated the way of playing on fear in 2000s, but that police officials, police chiefs and the TNP as an institution, disturbed by the re-organization of the legal system for adjusting to the European legal standards and the re-organization of their authorities in the process of democratization, pointed out the rising insecurities (primarily terror and urban crime) to legitimate their claims. Apart from wages, working conditions and over-time, which can be seen as occupational problems, members of the TNP had two criticisms regarding the system. First, they criticized the Turkish legal system for not being punitive enough. Secondly, they criticized the legal system for limiting the authority of the police in a way that prevents the police from struggling against crime effectively.

A general amnesty was declared for all convicts except those convicted for thought crimes and crimes against the state in 2000. This much criticized development strengthened the understanding that the Turkish legal system was not punitive enough. 4,000 police officers working *Çevik Kuvvet* (a special forces unit) organized a demonstration on 12 December 2000 and protested the murder of two police officers in an attack. In this demonstration police officers not only cursed terror, but also protested the general amnesty, lack of sympathy to the police and restrictions regarding the use of force.[109] With this much publicized event, the police officers collectively declared their opposition to the amnesty. The criticism of the police regarding the punitiveness of the legal system was not confined to the issue of

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[109] "Kızgın Polis de Sokağa Döküldü," *Hürriyet*, 12 December 2000. For this particular event and also for the transformation of the police in general, see Berksoy, *Neoliberalizm.*

amnesty. The police also criticized the softness of sentences and functioning of the judicial system with a phrase that became very popular in the media: "We catch, they (judicial authorities) release" (biz yakalıyoruz, onlar bırakıyor).[110] This criticism escalated while the Capital Law was getting re-organized in mid-2000's and even led Cemil Çiçek, the minister of justice, complain: "We hear from the police: 'we capture the prosecutor releases'. This is similar to a cleaner's saying 'I am cleaning everyday (but) the street is getting dirty anyway.' There cannot be such an approach."[111]

In reaction to the re-organization of the legal system, some police chiefs came up with extreme ideas, like Saim İşlek, the police chief of Düzce Municipality, who argued that identity cards should be colorized to mark criminals. İşlek issued his criticism and legitimated his suggestion as in the following:

> (Everyone) has been obsessed with how to make things more comfortable for criminals, (everyone) from the literate to the philosopher. Actually the project of rehabilitating criminals has been shelved (;) we will almost make them *baş tacı* (very beloved, respected person). It (rehabilitation project) has lost its deterrence, because if you transform prisons into free luxury hotels, you will be accused even with service fault soon (,) do not worry. Actually you can not see anyone taking sides on this issue. Why does it turn out to be like this (?) How does an action without supporters stay continuously in the agenda and in an effective way (?) Are we losing our minds (?) Sirs(,) let us evaluate ways out and find solutions while the turn is near, (before) it is too late to do something (,) before the danger spreads into all organs. Actually you are all supporters of this idea of mine I know. But, as if there is an incubus upon us, we cannot pipe up, we have the concern that "it should not be against human rights!" (…) Before danger take us captive, while we still have control

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[110] Ahmet H. Aydın, "Polisin Güncel Sorunları: Bir Neden-Sonuç Analizi," *Polis Bilimleri Dergisi* 5, no.3 (2003), pp. 1-12.

[111] "Mazereti Bırak Hırsızı Yakala," *Hürriyet*, 28 February 2005. The original text of the passage in Cemil Çiçek's interview is in the following. *"Polisten şunu duyuyoruz: 'Biz yakalıyoruz, savcı serbest bırakıyor.' Bu temizlik işçisinin, 'Ben her gün temizliyorum sokak yeniden kirleniyor' demesine benziyor. Böyle yaklaşım olmaz."*

(,) we should shout our struggle for not becoming the Heaven of criminals not just in our country (,) but to whole world.[112]

Another issue of disturbance was related to the authority of the police. Police chiefs and the spokesperson of the TNP argued that laws were clipping the wings of the police in their struggle against crime. While advocating for the extension of authorities, these actors often made references to the extension of the authorities of the security forces in "democratic countries" after 9/11 and underlined the liveliness of the threat of terror for Istanbul.[113] However, the authority demand of the police was not confined to the issue of terror; the police continued this campaign even after an amendment which extended the authorities of the police was made into the Law of Struggle with Terror in 29 June 2005. This was such an amendment that Cemil Çiçek, minister of justice, felt the need to declare that he was also worried about the authorities given to the police with this amendment but a balance between security

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[112] Saim İşlek, "Bırakalım Suçlular Cenneti Olsun, Öyle mi?," *Çağın Polisi*, no.39 (2004), p. 16-17. One can ask; who reads a police magazine? However, this article was also cited in mainstream newspapers like "Kimlikler Suça Göre Renkli Olsun," *Hürriyet,* 27 March 2005. The original text of the cited passage is presented in the following. *"Hep suçluları nasıl rahat ettiririz saplantısına düşülmüş, okumuşundan filozofuna kadar. Aslında suçluların ıslahı projesi rafa kalkmış, onları neredeyse başımızın tacı yapacağız. Caydırıcılığını kaybetmiş, çünkü cezaevlerini adeta konforlu ücretsiz otellere çevirirseniz, yakın zamanda hizmet kusuru davalarına da maruz kalırsınız merak etmeyin. Aslında kimsenin bu meseleye taraftar olduğunu göremezsiniz. Niçin böyle olmaktadır. Taraftarı bulunmayan bir faaliyet nasıl sürekli gündemde ve etkili bir şekilde diri durmaktadır. Yoksa aklımızı mı yitiriyoruz. Efendiler yol yakınken, iş işten geçmeden tehlike bütün uzuvları kaplamadan hal çarelerini düşünelim ve çözüm üretelim. Aslında bu fikrime hepiniz taraftarsınız biliyorum. Ama, adeta üzerimizde Karabasan çökmüş, sesimizi çıkartamıyoruz, "İnsan Haklarına Aykırı" olmasın! endişesini taşıyoruz. Belki 10 yıldır bu ve benzeri konularda sohbetlerimde hararetle savunduğum tezler var, işte bunu ifade etmek istiyorum. Tehlike bizi esir almadan, kontrol bizdeyken suçlular cenneti olmama mücadelemizi sadece ülkemizde değil tüm dünyaya haykırmalıyız."*

[113] For example, İsmet Çalışkan, the spokesperson of TNP, reminded that the detention period was extended to 28 days in Britain and claimed that they would have a relief if detention period was extended in Turkey too. "Gözaltı Süresi Uzarsa Rahatlarız," *Hürriyet*, 30 December 2005.

and freedom needed to be established.[114] In 2007, Hüseyin Çalışkan, the

spokesperson of the TNP, declared:

> Before the commitment of (a) crime the Law of Responsibilities and
> Authorities of Police (PVSK) is practiced, after commitment of (a)
> crime the Capital Judgment Law (CMK) steps in. In the new
> structuring process, some amendments were made in CMK,
> amendments had to be done in PVSK in parallel to this but
> unfortunately have not been done. We identified the amendments that
> need to be done. You know, I had declarations on this matter before.
> About crime prevention, some additional authorities and
> responsibilities need to be given to the police. What are these? The
> authority to take finger prints is required to be expanded for
> preventing the happening of other crimes or identifying the perpetrator
> of crime. There are also troubles about the issue of search. Written
> order of the competent authority is required even in cases in which
> delay is inconvenient, the constitution contains this article. As this is
> the case some troubles have been occurring especially about
> preventive search."[115]

Struggle with the fear of crime is one of the institutional tasks of the police; however

it can be said that the TNP itself promoted this fear in the 2000s. Members of the

TNP underlined the threat of crime in an attempt to oppose the re-organization of the

legal system and to advocate for the extension of the authorities of the police. With

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[114] Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 22, session 122, vol.126, 29 June 2006.

[115] Hüseyin Çalışkan's speech at press conference dated 19 January 2007, quotted in "Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Sözcüsü Sayın İsmail Çalışkan'ın Yapmış Olduğu Basın Açıklamalarından Derlemeler," *Çağın Polisi*, no. 63 (2009), pp. 33-36. It should be mentioned that this declaration was not an exception; Hüseyin Çalışkan made similar declarations in other press conferences. The original text of the speech is presented in the following. *"Suç işlenmeden önce Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanunu (PVSK) uygulanmakta; suç işlendikten sonra da Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu (CMK) devreye girmektedir. Yeni yapılanma süreci içerisinde CMK'da bazı değişiklikler yapıldı, buna paralel olarak PVSK'da değişiklikler yapılması gerekiyordu ama maalesef yapılmadı. Bizler yapılması gerekli olan değişiklikleri tespit ettik. Biliyorsunuz daha önce de bu konuda bazı açıklamalarda bulunmuştum. Suçun önlenmesi konusunda polise mutlaka bazı yetki ve görevler daha verilmesi gereklidir. Nedir bunlar? Başka suçların işlenmesini önleyebilmek veya suçun failini tespit edebilmek için parmak izi alma yetkisinin genişletilmesi gerekmektedir. Arama konusunda da bazı sıkıntılar bulunmakta. Gecikmesinde sakınca olan halde bile yetkili merciin yazılı emri gerekiyor, Anayasada bu hüküm var. Hal böyle olunca özellikle önleme amaçlı arama konusunda bazı sıkıntılar meydana gelebilmekte."*

this pursuit, the TNP contributed to the escalation of urban fear in two ways, by keeping the issue of urban crime in the public agenda -through press conferences, interviews, comments on TV- and by spreading the understanding that the police cannot protect the citizen because of legal arrangements. By underlining the claim that police officers were not able to fight crime, the TNP itself promoted the idea that the urbanites were not safe.

Stigmatization and Criminalization

Politicians and public officials contributed not only to the escalation of fear, but also shaped the contours of the frame through which the middle-classes imagined crime by stigmatizing *gecekondu*s and pointing fingers to them for explaining the outbreak of urban crime.

Following the AKP's rise to power in the 2002 elections, there was a widespread expectation in the media that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would conduct a populist policy providing benefits to people living in *gecekondu*s in a way that contradicted the principles of equity in return for political support. Considering the history of populism in Turkey and the organizational structure of the Islamist movement, it can be said that journalists had reason to have such an expectation. However, once in government, the AKP began to conduct pro-business policies at the expanse of the poor, trying to establish a discursive balance to maintain the electoral support of the lower classes.[116] With this shift the AKP itself began to hold people living in *gecekondu*s responsible for their living conditions. For example; the

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[116] For a detailed analysis of how Islamist mobilization in Istanbul transformed into a pro-business conservatism, see Tuğal.

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minister of justice Cemil Çiçek claimed that "We have not pronounced the word of gecekondu amnesty, we would not. I have never acted with populist policies (;) I do not say words like this (,) too. We, as government, are against illegal construction, opportunism. They gained fortunes with illegal buildings, people became billionaires. I have been (a) politician for years (even) I do not have such a fortune."[117]

The AKP not only held the *gecekondu*-dwellers responsbile for their living conditions, but also stigmatized them in an attempt to generate support for urban renewal policies, as seen in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech at the 1st Housing Convention:

> "There are those who try to arouse pity for them (the gecekondu-dwellers whose houses are destroyed by force in urban renewal projects). (Those who try to arouse pity for gecekondu-dwellers say:) 'Look (these) *misérables* only had a house, (and) they demolished it too...' How can they be (called) *misérable*s (?) There is an occupation (going on) there. The one you call *miserable,* look flat(s) (are) sold for 200 YTL installments (per month), he/she can go and buy from there. No. Ghettos are being created and imagine what has been going on here."[118]

Here, Erdoğan referred to the illegality of the *gecekondu*-dwellers and impled that these people who violated public lands did this on purpose after rationally-

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[117] (Translated by the author) "Kaçak Ev, Yapanın Başına Yıkılacak," *Hürriyet,* 27 March 2004. The original text of the quotted part of this speech is presented in the following. *"Gecekondu affi lafını bile etmedik, etmeyiz. Popülist politikalarla hiç hareket etmedim, ben böyle söz de söylemem. Biz hükümet olarak kaçak yapılaşmaya, fırsatçılığa karşıyız. Kaçak yapılarla servet edindiler, insanlar trilyoner oldular. Yılların siyasetçiyim benim böyle bir servetim yok."*

[118] (Translated by the author, emphasis added) The AKP. 9 April 2006. Konut Kurultayı…*Başbakan Erdoğan: Bir Ay İçinde Artık Toplu Konut Adımının Atılmadığı Bir Vilayet Kalmayacak*. Available [online]: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haber/5452/konut-kurultayi-basbakan-erdogan-bir-iki-ay-icinde-artik-toplu-konut-adimin [18 April 2011]. The original text of the cited passage of this speech is presented in the following. *"Acındırma gayreti içinde olanlar var. 'Zavallıların bir evi vardı, bak onu da yıktılar'... Nereden zavallı oluyor. Orada bir işgal var. Zavallı dediğiniz, bak 200 YTL taksitle daire satılıyor, gitsin oradan bir daire alsın. Yok. Gettolar oluşturuluyor ve bu gettolarda nelerin olduğunu düşünün."*

calculating the marginal utility of breaking the law and invited the audience to imagine what kinds of other illegalities these people were involved in.

It is also important to note that Erdoğan's approach to *gecekondu*s was not a uniform approach free of contradictions. He continued to emphasize that he had been living in a *gecekondu* neighborhood and thus knew the problems of the people living there,[119] while he stigmatized and attached criminality to these places.

Kadir Topbaş, the mayor of Istanbul, also emphasized this issue of *preference* over socio-economic conditions as criminal motivation. While commenting on urban criminality, he declared that; "An excuse like 'people are desperate, they are forced to resort to these ways '" cannot "be put into words by anyone;" as "a morally upright person would not behave in this way no matter what."[120]

The AKP was not the only party attaching criminality to *gecekondu*-dwellers. As it is analyzed later in this chapter, the mainstream political parties brought the issue of urban insecurity onto their agendas for the 2007 elections. In this way, they actually contributed to the rise of urban fear by keeping the issue hot within political debate. In addition to making references to the outbreak of urban criminality in a way that contributed to the escalation of urban fear, mainstream political parties contributed to the stigmatization of Kurdish immigrants living in big cities, Istanbul being the first, through their election propaganda. It is difficult to say that mainstream political parties explicitly associated crime with Kurdish migrants

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[119] "Başbakan Erdoğan TOKİ Töreninde," *Hürriyet,* 30 April 2006.

[120] "Topbaş: İstanbul'da Hırsızlık ve Kapkaç Endişe Verici," *Hürriyet,* 17 February 2005. The original text of the speech is presented in the following. *"Sorunu 'sosyal sorunların yansıması' olarak görebilirsin, ama ahlaklı bir insan her şeye rağmen bu tip hareketlere girmez. Ne kadar sıkıntılı olsa da doğruluğu, dürüstlüğü, karakteri buna müsaade etmemeli. (...)İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Topbaş, "söz konusu suçları işleyenler için 'insanlar çaresiz, bu yollara başvurmak mecburiyetinde kalıyorlar' gibi bir mazeretin kimse tarafından dile getirilemeyeceğini" belirtti."*

living in *gecekondu*s in election declarations. However these declarations contain many references to the criminality of certain groups. In the election manifesto of the CHP, terror and public order were integrated in one chapter. These two issues were presented as complementing each other. The first of the measures promised to be taken by the MHP on the issue of public order was the development of measures about interior migration. It was migrants to whom the responsibility of outbreak of urban criminality was attributed in an implicit manner by all these declarations. Another point that needs to be mentioned here is the presentation of AKP's Project of the Protection of Children Under Risk in the chapter related to the public order in the election declaration document of the party. This preference of locating a project which could be labeled as a part of social policy on paper among security measures only makes sense when stigmatization of the deprived people living in streets with references to criminality is taken into consideration.

Apart from politicians, public institutions also contributed to the criminalization of certain groups. *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council, NSC hereafter) meeting in 18 April 2005 was declared to gather for discussing the issue of urban criminality. According to the press release related to this meeting which had been expected with enthusiasm by the journalists, "the reasons of and problems created by interior migration, especially in big cities, were covered, the importance of immediately enforcing measures which" would "bring solution to the problems of cities giving and receiving migration" was "emphasized."[121] In this case, one can say that NSC attached criminality to interior migrants by agenda-setting; and

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[121] Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği. 18 April 2005. *18 Nisan 2005 Toplantısı Basın Bildirgesi.* Available [online]: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2005/18nisan2005.htm [21 December 2010].

actually pointed a finger *only* against interior migrants by putting emphasis only on interior migration in a meeting which aimed to discuss the issue of urban crime.

Here, it is also necessary to point out the stigmatization of certain categories of people through governmental projects, on the national and local levels. For example, the Istanbul mayorship published reports on social risks which constructed "gypsies" and "migrants" as risk categories. As pointed out by Bartu and Kolluoğlu, this identification of risk categories itself functioned to "nurture the emergency discourse"; as these reports claim that places inhabited by these groups should be "rehabilitated" by urban renewal projects for not becoming (more) dangerous for the urban life.[122]

Another group of actions that contributed to the stigmatization of gecekondu neighbourhoods and the interior migrants who live there was the conduct of extreme operations in these neighbourhoods by the Istanbul Police Department. Four people died and ten were injured in an operation conducted by the police against those who were in a death fast and suspected to support an illegal organization in Küçük Armutlu, a *gecekondu* neighbourhood.[123] Another example of extreme operations was the narcotics operation conducted in 2006, by *1500* police officers in Sarıgöl, another *gecekondu* neighbourhood which was densely populated by Kurdish migrants.[124] Questioning whether these operations were cases of the use of excessive force or not, or whether their extremity was required or not is not among the

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[122] Ayfer Bartu Candan and Biray Kolluoğlu Kırlı, "Neoliberalizm ve Yerel Yönetimler Bağlamında Kentsel Dönüşüme Nasıl Karşı Durulabilir?" *İstanbul,* no. 60 (2007), p.70.

[123] "Polis K. Armutlu'ya Girdi: 4 Ölü 10 Yaralı," *Hürriyet,* 6 November 2001.

[124] "1500 Polis Sabaha Karşı Mahalle Bastı," *Hürriyet,* 24 February 2006.

objectives of this study. The important point regarding these cases for this thesis is that this extremity contributed to the imagination of these places as exceptional spaces of unruliness existing outside the boundaries of normality by the middle-classes. In this way, these extreme operations contributed to the stigmatization and criminalization of Kurdish migrants living in *gecekondu*s of Istanbul.

The Rise of a Political Consensus in an Extremely Polarized Country

Looking at the debates related to human rights and security policies in the parliament in 2004 and 2005, one cannot miss the tendency of deputies to emphasize human rights in relation to judicial arrangements. In this atmosphere, the Turkish Capital Law and the Law of Capital Judgment were reorganized with references to human rights and long-delayed necessities of society.[125]

In 2007, just three years after this reorganization on behalf of human rights and the necessities of the people, an important amendment was made to the Law of Responsibilities and Authorities of the Police, numbered 2559. With this amendment, Article 16 of the Law, which defined the authority of the police to use force was *redefined for the first time* since the Law had come into force in 1934. The

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[125] For example, presenting his party, the AKP Yozgat deputy Bekir Bozdağ advocated on behalf of the re-organization of the Law of Capital Judgment as in the following: "(The point) that we should criticize here, should not be why this matter was put emphasis on today, in the process of the European Union, actually, we should criticize ourselves on the point that why such beauties, such changes, such benefactions have not been taken to a good point by changes, by transformations until today. This parliament is about to materialize what has been delayed, but, what has been the necessity of the society and the nation, the state. (...) Let us assume, no matter Turkey becomes a member of the European Union or not; are these arrangements which are being made necessary for the children of this nation, for Turkish people, are not (they) required, are not (they) necessities; (they are) required and (they are) necessities. (...) The most important modification and change in this law is that our people have been given legal and judicial assurances in the areas of human rights, individual rights and freedoms.(...) For this, this law, is a law that takes the rule of law one step further than it is today in Turkey." (Translated by the author), Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi,* term 22, session 26, vol. 66, 3 December 2004.

authorities of the police to use force were not only redefined, they were redefined in the widest manner and the police have been given the authority to "decide and prefer instruments and devices and the level of force to be used for defusing resistance within his/her authority to use force".[126]

Looking at this picture a question arises itself: How did Turkey get here in three years? How did the same parliament and government that re-organized the legal system in line with the needs of the people suspend the very same rights and freedoms they had advocated three years earlier? Without taking the transformation of the police into an important claims-making actor and the transformation of the issue of urban crime into an issue to be dealt with into consideration, these questions cannot be answered. Moreover, one cannot answer these questions while ignoring the facts that politicians for various reasons contributed to the escalation of the fear of crime and that their choices also began to be limited with this escalation.

What created this emergency basis for the re-organization of the authorities of the police was the rise of an insecurity discourse which pointed to a "crime wave" regarding street crimes, especially extortion by glue-sniffers, paint thinner-addicts and bag-snatching. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, there was a crime wave that was pointed at insistently by the mainstream media. The issue became more complex as officials from the Police Department came out as claims-makers following the restructuring of the legal system between 2004 and 2005. The political sensitivity of the issue also transformed political debates on crime in the face of 2007 elections, as discussed below. For the first time in the history of the Turkish

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[126] For the text of the law before the amendment in 2007, see Republic of Turkey, *Resmi Gazete*, no.25657, 1 December 2004. For the amended version of the law, see Republic of Turkey, *Resmi Gazete*, no. 26552, 14 June 2007. Articles organizing the authority of the police to use force of both versions in English are presented in Appendix-A.

Republic, the issue of urban criminality on the basis of petty-crimes became a major component of political discourse and maneuvering.

Despite the fact that there was an extreme political polarization in society, as indicated by the outbreak of the so-called Republican Meetings in April 2007 (the sometimes massive demonstrations attended by self-identified people protesting against the possible presidency of R. T. Erdoğan or another conservative politician with the anxiety that it might be harmful for the assumedly secularist character of the regime) a consensus was achieved by mainstream political parties on the issue of public order prior to 2007 elections in practice. Here, the argument is not that the mainstream political parties were in absolute harmony of opinion regarding the mechanisms to be used for providing the security of the population.

According to the 2007 election manifestos, the CHP was against the utilization of private security as the primary security provider, while the AKP claimed that the expansion of private security had been easing things for the police, thus contributing to the securitization of big cities. However, all of the mainstream political parties recognized urban insecurity as a major problem that required urgent and decisive measures. It was primarily migration and migrants that mainstream political parties pointed fingers at in order to explain the rise of the wave of urban criminality. Finally, all these political parties offered different variations of tough policing and community policing for solving the issue of urban insecurity, avoiding pointing out to alternative solutions, like (better) rehabilitation or improving the living conditions of those to whom they attach criminality. While their positions in the extremely polarized political atmosphere were so different, the mainstream political parties approached the issue of urban crime with so many common points

that it is possible for this thesis to claim that there emerged a de facto political consensus among them.[127] The new perceptions, drawn from election materials, shall be enumerated here in order to make the surprising consistencies in position across party lines more visible:

· *Numbers of public security officials are not enough to create a secure environment and thus should be increased to struggle with crime more efficiently:* The AKP claimed that the numbers of the police would be increased "in a way that there would be one police for (a) population two hundred and fifty of persons." The CHP promised to increase "both the numbers and the quality and efficiency of security forces." The MHP declared that the state would employ "security guards" to work at night in order to fight crimes against the public order if it was to come to power.

· *The security forces should be empowered more than the existing situation:* The AKP declared that the party had taken important "steps on the issues of reinforcing the legal infrastructure and the powers of security forces during its' government," emphasized the amendment of the Law of Responsibilities and Authorities of the Police as an action indicating the decisiveness of the party to fight with crime and promised that "the Police and the Gendarmerie" would "be strengthened even more in terms of both human resources and technology, equipment and supplies." The MHP promised to extend "the capacity and authority of security units for making criminal analysis." The CHP declared that the "necessary environment for the Police Department to conduct its' task in the most effective way" would

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[127] Translated versions of the public order chapters of election declarations prepared by the AKP, the CHP and the MHP referred here can be found in Appendix-B, Appendix-C and Appendix-D in order.

"be established, all necessary administrative, financial and technical conditions" would "be provided."

· *The society and security forces should merge in the struggle with crime:* The AKP pointed out to the close cooperation between the "powers of school-family-security forces" in terms of preventing criminal events related to the youth. The CHP promised to revise the system of public security services in a way that would be based on active participation of the citizen, presenting a project similar to neighborhood watch and community policing. The MHP declared "a total war" against "city terror, crime and criminals" and promised to develop methods about the effective help of the public opinion and to establish a mechanism by which the citizen would be informed about physical precautions.

· *Increased punitiveness is necessary to combat urban crime:* The AKP pointed out to recent legal arrangements which enforced the judicial system and promised to watch over the system about the application of these laws. According to the AKP, the system had been made punitive enough with these recent amendments. The CHP claimed that it was not punitive enough and promised to "change the Capital and Capital Judgment laws" and to "prevent the release of captured bag-snatchers and thieves back to the street just after" their capture. MHP made no references to the increase in the punitiveness of the system in the chapter of Pubic Order. However, it promised "to construct an even balance between crime and punishment" and even to resort to the services of pshycologists, pedagogs and sociologists "to track ex-convicts in their social life to abolish their tendency of committing

crime" – a promise that actually means the extension of parole mechanism to post-imprisonment life of all convicts in the name of prevention.[128]

· *Youth delinquency is an important problem that should be dealt with new measures:* Even the AKP, whose claims regarding the rise of criminality might threaten its success in the elections, as it was the governing party, responsible for controlling criminal trends prior to elections, claimed that "violence tendency and drug addiction among young people and the phenomenon of street children" was becoming widespread. The CHP claimed that high schools had turned "into places in which young people gained bad habits" claiming that "1 of 10 students was carrying (a) knive or gun. While 7,7% of the students were defining themselves as member of a gang, 30% were exerting violence" according to official data. In terms of solutions, the AKP pointed out to its Project of Protecting Children Under Risk, while the MHP and the CHP emphasized reformation and occupational education.

Looking at the election declarations, it can be said that while the MHP and the CHP emphasized the argument that it had become impossible to talk about security of life and property in big cities and claimed that the government of the AKP was indecisive or incapable of coping with the re-emergence of terror as an important problem and with the so-called criminal boom, as opposition parties. The AKP had a defensive approach, pointing out legal arrangements carried out in recent months and

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[128] The MHP had already declared its' opposition to the reorganization of the Capital Law, claiming that the reorganization was decreasing the punitiveness of the legal system. MHP Araştırma Geliştirme Merkezi. 5 April 2005. *AKP Adaleti Hakkında MHP Raporu*. Available [online]: http://www.mhp.org.tr/raporlar_adalet.php [17 February 2011].

to the projects which would be put into practice, despite recognizing that crime was transforming the everyday life of urbanites. The AKP did not openly put the blame on the media for presenting an unrealistic picture regarding urban crime, but held the media responsible by declaring that: "The media effect related to the phenomenon of crime will be put emphasis on. How it (crime) is perceived is as important as crime itself. Behaviors that create feelings of panic, fear and insecurity related to crime in the society will be struggled, effort will be spent to provide the cooperation and support of the media."[129]

The only objection to the amendment of the Law of Responsibilities and Authorities of the Police was made by Mehmet Nuri Saygun, the CHP Tekirdağ deputy in the name of his party, who criticized the articles defining the authority of the police to use force and the categories of persons whose finger prints would be taken by the police. Saygun argued that this would be understood as an attempt to keep files on a large group of people by the public, no matter whether the objective was this or not, and the practice would be undemocratic.[130] The striking point regarding Saygun's objection is that the democratic deficiencies of the amendment were not referred to in the CHP's election propaganda prepared almost at the same time as this speech. As the party was struggling to appeal to swing voters with a "decisive" approach on criminality which promised to "provide all necessary administrative, financial and technical conditions for the police" and to establish "the

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[129] "*Suç olgusuna ilişkin medya etkisi üzerinde önemle durulacaktır. Suçun kendisi kadar nasıl algılandığı da önemlidir. Suçla ilgili olarak toplumda panik, korku ve güvensizlik duygusu yaratan davranışlarla mücadele edilecek, medyanın işbirliği ve desteğinin sağlanması konusunda çaba gösterilecektir.*" The AKP, 2007 Seçim Bildirgesi, p. 82.

[130] Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 22, session 119, vol. 161, 1 June 2007.

necessary environment for the Police Department to conduct its task in the most effective way," the CHP itself was claiming to be "tougher on crime."

This thesis does not claim that mainstream politicians invented a kind of law and order approach for the sake of promoting political authoritarianism in the 2000s. It claims that as the wave of urban crime, also promoted by politicians themselves for various reasons -like legitimizing urban regeneration policies or increasing their electoral support-, overlapped with the re-organization of the legal system, which transformed the police into a very insistent claims-making actor continuously underlining the malfunctioning of the system, the issue became a public sensitivity with an enormous publicity.

Urbanites were bombarded with comments, criticisms and projects related to urban crime in this process. The issue of urban criminality was transformed into an "emergency," warning the citizens that they were not safe. This situation was aggravated by the existence of a related emergency; terror. The discourses of terror and urban criminality were often intertwined; both were issued as the proofs of the malfunctioning of the state. Finally, politicians and public officials not only contributed to the escalation of fear, they pointed fingers at particular groups, holding them responsible for this unfortunate outbreak. As will be seen in other chapters, by promoting certain ideas (like "the police captures, the justice releases") and criminal types, they shaped the frame through which the middle classes imagine crime.

CHAPTER 5

SECURITY COMMODITIES AND PRIVATE SECURITY

This chapter deals with the marketing and consumption of security

commodities in Istanbul, what might be termed as the securitization of the city

through private channels. Although it is useful to draw a distinction between private

and public initiatives on paper, the line between them is more blurred than this

differentiation might indicate. The rise of private securitization initiatives has been

promoted by the state through different mechanisms. As analyzed in the previous

chapter, central and municipal governmental institutions and public officials have

pointed out to the responsibility of individuals in terms of providing their own

security and actively promoted the consumption of certain security commodities,

especially of those designed to be consumable by a wide range of classes, like steel

doors, alarm systems, CCTVs and even guns.

Security is one of the most vital needs of human beings. It is this vital face of

security that provides an amazingly fertile ground for the security industry to market

security commodities. The security industry has an interest in the rise of insecurity,

no matter perceived or real. As Neocleous puts it:

> To make a profit, the security industry must sell security. And to sell
> security, it must first help generate insecurities... Like any industry,
> the security industry interpellates consumers as sovereign subjects -
> the customer is king. But it simultaneously interpellates them as
> fearful and insecure. In so doing, it plays a key role in the fabrication
> of a much wider culture of insecurity… It thus offers a 'solution' to
> fear and insecurity in entirely commodified forms. What is generated
> is a need for security - a need recognized by capital only as a need that
> can be satisfied by this or that commodity - and so the production of
> more and more commodities marketed in 'security' terms.[131]

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[131] Neocleous, p. 350.

This chapter explores *how* the security industry has contributed to the rise of insecurity in Istanbul. In the first part, security commodities, the consumption of which is explicitly related to the risk assessments of individuals and targets consumers from a wide array of socio-economic classes are analyzed. In the second part, an analysis of the development of private security sector is presented.

Explicit Security Commodities and "Scary Advertising"

The market for security commodities consists of a wide array of goods and services. Consumption of some security commodities is explicitly related to the risk assessments of potential consumers. Locks, home insurances, alarm systems are commodities of this kind the function of which is confined to reinforcing the (perceived or real) security of the consumer for relatively small amounts of money. These security commodities can be marketed to a wide range of consumers from different classes as their prices are relatively moderate compare to the employment of guards or living in a gated community. Advertisements and commercials produced for the marketing of these items aim to touch *directly* on the perceived insecurity of the receiver. This is why they are termed as scary advertisements in this study.

The planned outline of this thesis did not include such a section, but the more interviews that I made the more difficult it became to neglect the impact of the advertisements of these commodities on the imagination of Istanbulites regarding the issues of criminality and insecurity. Most of the informants referred to the last series of TV commercials prepared for the Anadolu Insurance Company when asked whether they remembered any commercials related to the issues of criminality in Istanbul. One of the informants, Bilal, a 45 year-old engineer who has been living in a gated community in Ataşehir, referred to these Anadolu Insurance commercials just

at the beginning of the interview when asked only about his ideas regarding criminality in Istanbul: "The crime levels in Turkey are high already and Istanbul is the capital city of crime. There is this commercial on TV, the one with a punk who talks about how many houses he can rob. I'm sure you know it. It tells how many houses are getting robbed in an hour… a good example showing the situation we have to live in."[132]

In this campaign, TBWA Istanbul produced two commercial videos which are similar in style for Anadolu Insurance in 2009. Satisfied with the impact of these videos which were actually prepared for cinema campaign, Anadolu Insurance decided to broadcast them as TV commercials, expanding the array of targeted receivers. One of these commercials, named Squirrel Necmi, is related to auto theft. In the final part, it reminds us that "absolutely fifteen auto thefts occur within two hours in Turkey." The other commercial, named Infiltrator Tahir, which is related to theft, also has a numeric final: "Absolutely twenty homes get robbed within two hours in Turkey."

This numeric emphasis can be seen as a part of the advertisement policy of the company. In 2008, a newspaper ad designed in white in black with a similar emphasis, also prepared for the same company, was published one-page size in mainstream newspapers: "Last year a thief burgled into a house in every 6 minutes in Turkey. Tens of thousands of people had not thought that might happen to them." The reality might be more complex than projected in this manner. These

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[132] Bilal, interview by the author, tape-recording, 3 February 2011, Aslı's home in a gated residential development in Göztepe, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passageis in the following. *"Türkiye'de suç oranları zaten yüksek, İstanbul gene suçun resmen başkenti. Televizyonda bir reklam var, görmüşsündür; serserinin biri kaç saatte kaç ev soyabileceğini falan anlatıyor. Mutlaka görmüşsündür. Bir saatte kaç ev soyuluyor onu da anlatıyor… Valla ne şartlarda yaşıyoruz, onu gösterdiği için iyi bir örnek."*

advertisements inform the receiver neither about the percentage of those cases with victim faults, for which the losses would not be covered by insurance companies, nor about the significance of the numbers presented within general criminal trends. Numbers might be manipulated or separated from general trends, but they are numbers in the end. It might be this numeric emphasis which stimulates a sense of "preciseness" that made the campaign successful in terms of providing recognition.

Estimating the role of perceived urban insecurity in generating demand for home insurance is not among the objectives of this study.[133] As seen in the case presented above, insurance companies not only have interest in the rise of perceived urban insecurity, but also actively contribute to the promotion of it. Insurance companies have not confined themselves to marketing usual services as home insurance; they developed new packages which would correspond to different "needs" arousing from the rise of perceived urban insecurity. Anadolu Insurance Company pioneered the expansion of bag-snatching insurance in Turkey, starting with December 2001. Garanti Insurance entered this market in 2004 and in two years it achieved to sell over 250.000 bag-snatching insurance documents. This issue will not be furthered here, but it might be suggestive to point out to the facts that premiums received for accident and personal accident insurances increased in a steady manner from 2003 to 2008 and the percentage of these premiums among all insurance premiums also increased without rupture in this period.[134]

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[133] Neither activity reports of companies nor database of Turkish Statistics Institute provide accessible data related the share of home insurance or theft insurance in the category of general damages. Even with the relevant data, it would still be difficult to show the role of fear in creating demand for home insurance; because it is a matter of requirement not a matter of preference for mortgage debtors to buy home insurance.

[134] Turkish Statistical Institute. *Premiums Received and Claims Paid by Insurance Branches.* Available [online]: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=35&ust_id=10 [24 March

Another group of commodities and services the consumption of which is explicitly related to the risk assessments of individuals is electronic alarm systems and monitoring services. Some of the informants have been clients of these services and there were also former clients among the informants. Alarm systems are seen as deterrent items against intruders. They might be used as primary security devices –as used by middle classes who lack the necessary motivation or capital to consume other forms of security like gated accommodation- or might be purchased for increasing the perceived security of individuals who get armored up with various security devices and services as additional mechanisms. This sector emerged out of nowhere in late 1990s and has been marketing its services to an increasingly eager group of possible clients among the middle classes of Istanbul. Pronet is the most referred to firm among those that provide electronic security by informants. It has also been using scary advertisements and TV commercials directly related to offences.

A 2007 TV commercial of the company starts with the images of a young, dark male next to a child and a woman who are asleep. The male figure turns out to be an intruder with potential to do harm to these unaware victims, although he leaves just taking some of the items in the home with him. This commercial is defined in detail here because it presents a good example of scary advertisements which aim to promote the consumption of commodities with small prices but supposedly vital functions.

Pronet was established primarily with the task of marketing alarm systems and monitoring services in 1995. The company had 3,000 subscribers in 2000. It had over

2011]. The mortgage factor makes it difficult to estimate the motives of home insurance clients, as it is an obligation rather than preference for mortgage debtors to buy certain insurance packages.

50,000 subscribers in 2009. The number of subscribers is over 70,000 today and the company has control over 40% of the whole market for alarm systems with monitoring services.[135] The growth of the company has been going hand in hand with the upsurge of perceived insecurity in Istanbul. Some of the former and current subscribers of electronic alarms with monitoring services points out to a snowball effect while explaining why they preferred to get such a service. Not only the advertisements but also the consumption of these security commodities contributes to the escalation of fear. Referring to late 2000's, Suzan, a 51-year old education specialist living in an apartment building in Harbiye, says that:

> Those people in Dolapdere were getting involved in organized crime. They were all informed about each other. Just five hundred meters from here is the street which was the bag-snatching champion of Istanbul. After a point, I began to see more and more of those alarm boxes in the neighborhood. We also got one installed, and even persuade a friend to subscribe. It is cheap, you know. You think why I should not give this money, if giving it will bring some peace to my life. But after a while it began to harm my nerves. That beep noise… And one day they (officials from the monitoring company) called me to tell that someone broke in my apartment. I came back to home in a rush, but all the worry was for some kind of misunderstanding. That is how I cancelled it and bought this non-alarming alarm box instead.[136]

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[135] The numbers are taken from sources in the following; "Evlere Ofislere 24 Saat Gözaltı," *Hürriyet*, 16 March 2000; "İş Hayatına Asistanlık Yaptığı Boston'da Başladı," *Ekonomist*, 15 November 2009; "Sen Yat Uyu Ben Cüzdanını Alıp Çıkacağım", *Hürriyet,* 09 November 2010; Pronet. *Hakkında.* Available [online]: http://www.pronet.com.tr/#/HAKKINDA [11 March 2011].

[136] Suzan, interview by the author, tape-recording, 12 December 2010, apartment flat belonging to the informant, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: "*Bu Dolapdere'deki insanlar örgütlü suç işine girmişlerdi. Hepsinin birbirinden haberi vardı. Bak buradan beş yüz metre ötede bir sokak var, orası İstanbul'da kapkaç şampiyonuydu. Bir noktadan sonra, sokakta bir sürü alarm görmeye başladım. Biz de taktırdık, hatta başka bir arkadaşa da taktırdık. Zaten üç-beş para bir şey, biliyorsun. İnsan biraz da olsa huzur bulacaksam, niye şu kadarcık parayı vermeyeyim diye düşünüyor. Ama bir süre sonra sinirime dokunmaya başladı. O biiip sesi. Sonra, bir gün aradılar; işte efendim evinize biri girdi. Telaş içinde eve döndüm; sonra da efendim neymiş, yanlışlık olmuş. İşte böylece de iptal ettirdim.*"

Steel doors and locks also can be considered among commodities explicitly related to security and presented to the consumption of different classes. The printed advertisement strategy of Kale Group needs to be mentioned here. The Kale Group made a strategic preference in terms of deciding the location of its advertisements in mainstream newspapers. It was the most consistent advisor paying for advertising on the third page of *Hürriyet* newspaper between 2003 and 2009.[137] The third pages of most newspapers were devoted to crime news and stories and *Hürriyet* is not an exception. Thus, advertisements of the Kale Group for a range of commodities from locks to doors were printed side by side news of rape, murder and theft. Advertisements of the Kale products were commodity-centered, contrary to offence centered ads mentioned above. However, this strategic preference of location also can be seen as indicating a scary marketing strategy. In 2007, the Kale Group took a step further and began to advertise through a series of caricatures based on dialogues between a thief and the figure of a key, the mascot of the company, in third, fourth or fifth pages of *Hürriyet*. The Kale Group not only adopted an advertisement strategy related to fear of crime, but also adopted itself to provide different security commodities; like steel doors, safe cases, retina screening systems and card passing systems. The market share of Kale Kilit was 65 per cent in 2008. In 2011, this rate increased to 70 per cent. The annual turnover of all companies in Kale Group rose up to 250 million dollars in 2010 from 58 million liras in 2003.[138]

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[137] This limitation of period by the year 2009 should not indicate that there was a rupture or there emerged a reverse trend following this date. Screening of Hürriyet for this study was limited to years between 2000 and 2009.

[138] The numbers are taken from sources in the following; "80 Trilyonluk Kale'yi 'Çoban Sadık' Yarattı," *Hürriyet*, 15 September 2003; Kale Endüstri Holding. *Kale Kilit'te İkinci Kuşak Yönetimde*. Available [online]: http://www.kalekilit.com.tr/Kale-Kilit-te-2--Kusak-Yonetimde-_3_74 [23 January 2011]; Kale Endüstri Holding. 18 March 2011. *Kale Endüstri Holding Yaşam Alanlarında*

While marketing these commodities which are explicitly and only related to security, private companies promote the escalation of urban fear. It is not only the scary advertisement strategies that are based on cases of offences, but also the promotion of the idea that "nothing is enough" to create an absolutely secure environment for the individual that escalates the urban fear. The point that none of them is really enough to secure the consumer is a currently emphasized theme in advertisements. "Thieves are opening our doors, no matter what their price and quality is, without difficulty in seconds" (*hırsızlar fiyatı ve kalitesi ne olursa olsun kapılarımızı zorlanmadan açıyor*), "grids are closing all ways out for exit in a moment of fire or earthquake" (*parmaklıklar bir deprem veya yangın anında çıkabileceğimiz tüm yolları kapatıyor*), "dogs that we see as members of our family are deactivated by poisonous meat" (*ailemizin bir ferdi olarak gördüğümüz köpekler önlerine zehirli et atılarak etkisiz hale getiriliyor*), "in cases of fire, doors prevent out from getting out as they swell" (*yangın durumunda kapılar şiştikleri için dışarı çıkmamızı engelliyor*), "insurance puts back stolen or lost properties, but it fails to put back memories and values" (*sigorta çalınan ya da kaybolan eşyaları yerine koysa da, anıları ve değerleri yerine getiremiyor*), "we can not forget the trauma trigerred by the experience of a theft or extortion while we were at home" and "when it is our children who experience this (victimization) the (negative) effects can be much more serious" (*biz evdeyken yaşanan hırsızlık veya gaspın yarattığı travmayı unutamıyoruz, bunu bir de çocuklarımız yaşadığında etkileri çok daha büyük*

Güvenliği Bütünüyle Sahipleniyor. Available [online]:
http://www.dha.com.tr/haberdetay.asp?tarih=18.05.2011&Newsid=149190&Categoryid=9 [23 January 2011].

olabiliyor), [139] "thieves deactivate alarms by water" or even worse "dance in their music" …[140]

Thus, the individual is left with only one choice; to consume more and more, because "nothing is enough." The escalation of urban fear with the contribution of these scary advertisement strategies seems to generate demand for security commodities and services explicitly and only related to security. Despite their success at generating demand, these scary advertisements have the potential to do harm to the psychology of receivers and to make them organize their life around principles of security more and more.[141]

Private Security Services

Like other security-related markets, the creation of demand for private security services necessitates the promotion of insecurity and the responsibilization of the individual for providing his or her own security. On the other hand, provision of private security services differs from the growth of other security-related markets because of the specific place this service has in legitimating the authority to use force

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[139] These are phrases used in a Pronet commercial. We also see the protrayal of children and women as victims in this commercial. The speech of the speaker in this commercial who claims that "insurance puts back stolen or lost properties, but it fails to put back memories and values" is accompanied with the photographs of a child and a woman. Pronet. *Güvenliğiniz İçin Mutlaka İzleyin*. Available [online]: www.pronet.com [11 March 2011].

[140] The first phrase is used by the thief in the Anadolu Insurance commercial named Infiltrator Tahir. The second theme is used in the Anadolu Insurance commercial named Squarrel Necmi.

[141] The affects of the escalation of urban fear can be more traumatic for the urban poor who lack the opportunity to secure their lifes through consumption, as consuming more and more is presented as the only way of being secure and of providing the security of "the beloved ones" (referring to children and women, often portrayed as potential victims whose security depends on the preferences of man who is held responsible for providing their security).

by the state. Refering to the accounts that announce the beginning of "a new area"

looking at the growth of private security sector Neocleous states:

> It is this use of security contractors, expansion of profits and increasing number of employees working 'in security' that has led many to argue that we have entered a new area of state sovereignty (…)The 'privatization' of security is almost universally taken to be indicative of a shift in the logic of sovereignty."[142] Instead, "reading the security industry through the idea of the security fetish" makes it possible to "treat the industry as a partner to the state, a partnership increasingly organized around the ideology of security.[143]

Parallel to the upsurge of insecurity discourses, private security services have

become a big sector in Turkey today. Figure 3 shows the numbers of officially

registered people employed in the security sector. Figure 4 shows the turnover in the

private security sector. The private security sector consists of private security

activities, security systems service activities, investigation activities.

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[142] Neocleous, p.345.

[143] Ibid., p.349.

Figure 3: Numbers of people employed in the security sector in Turkey (2005-2010)

Figure 4: Turnover in the security sector in Turkey (2005-2010)

The upwards trends in Figure 3 and Figure 4 beginning with 2005 result from the organization of private security services legally (in other words, the establishment of the sector in legal terms) in 2004. After this development, foreign firms also entered into this sector which was developing at an enormous speed. To give an example, Securitas, a Swedish security company, bought DAK Security and Kare security in 2006 and became an important player in the sector with over 7.000 employees by 2010.[144] Today, there are 1.306 private security companies given activity permission by the state, 436 of these companies provide services in Istanbul. Moreover, there are 461.973 private security guards with identity cards who can be employed as private security guards.[145]

Before 2004, the right to establish security units was given only to establishments whose insecurity would threaten the economy of the country, like banks, according to the Law No. 2495, dated 1981. In 1999, an exceptional arrangement was made for Istanbul by the Istanbul Governorship with the declaration of a security paper. According to this new arrangement, all institutions became entitled to employ employees who "can control entries and exits and notify susceptible situations to public security forces."[146] Nihat Kubuş, former director of Istanbul Narcotics Department and businessman in the private security sector, stated that "in 1999, when Erol Çakır was the governor, events like Mavi Çarşı happened. And the governorship entered into a kind of search thinking 'what to do to be

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[144] Securitas. *Securitas Türkiye*. Available [online]: http://www.securitas.com/tr/tr/About-Securitas/Securitas-Turkiye/ [14 February 2011].

[145] Turkish National Police. *Özel Güvenlik Kurumları ve Özel G. G. İstatistikleri*. Available [online]: http://ozelguvenlik.pol.tr/teskilatistatistik.asp [22 April 2011].

[146] Sibel Yardımcı, "Kuşatma Altında Gündelik Hayat: Özel Güvenlik, Kent Yaşamı ve Yönetimsellik," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.115 (2009), p. 230.

everywhere'."[147] This is a statement indicates the degree to which the state has been seeing the private security sector as a *partner*. The traces of this partnership can also be seen in the legal arrangements organizing the rights and authorities of private security guards. Private security guards are regarded as *public officers* in the appliance of the Turkish Capital Law in judicial processes about crimes committed against them and crimes committed by them on duty.[148]

The private security sector is not only *seen* as an extension of the state and constituted such by laws, it *works* as an extension of the state in terms of reproducing safe/unsafe behavior norms. In the personal safety manual prepared by Securitas, "joining to demonstrations, which are open to danger, like meetings where crowded groups are present, no matter they are organized with permission or not, or being in the locations that these (demonstrations) are being held" is given place at the top of the list titled "things that should not be done for the provision of personal security". It is presented as the number one condition of providing individual security. So being docile citizens who avoid from joining to demonstrations, including the ones permitted by the authorities, is even more important than "carrying money, keys and other precious items in a way that will get the attention of potential thieves."[149]

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[147] Nihat Kubuş, "Türkiye'nin Özel Güvenliği," *İstanbul*, no.59 (May 2007), pp. 90-91. It is important to note that Nihat Kubuş was the executive assistant of the Istanbul governor while this security paper was being declared. The original text of the cited interview is presented in the following. *"1999 yılında, vali Erol Çakir iken Mavi Çarşı Yangını türünde olaylar gelisti. Valilik de 'ne yapsak da her yerde olabilsek' şeklinde bir arayişa girdi."*

[148] M. Bedri Eryılmaz, "Özel Güvenlik," in *Almanak Türkiye 2005: Güvenlik sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, edited by Ümit Cizre (Istanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2006), p.130.

[149] Securitas. *Kişisel Güvenlik Rehberi.* Available [online]: http://www.securitas.com/tr/tr/Haberler/Securitas-Yaynlar/ [12 January 2011]. The original text of the related passage of the security manual is presented in the following. *"Kişisel Güvenliğin Sağlanması İçin Yapılmaması Gerekenler: 1. İzinli/izinsiz düzenlenen, kalabalık toplulukların bulunduğu, tehlikeye açık miting vb. gösterilere katılmak ya da düzenlendiği mekanda bulunmak(.) Çevrenizde meydana gelen olağandışı olayları önemsememek. 2. Para, anahtar ve diğer kıymetli eşyaları*

Another point that needs to be mentioned regarding this partnership is the transfer of human capital from public to private sector, which also contributes to the blurredness of the line between private and public spheres.[150] Erol Çakır, who was the governor of Istanbul when the security paper easing the way for the employment of security guards was declared, himself began to run a business in the private security sector after his retirement. The transfer of security directors from public to private institutions accelerated after Law No. 5188 organizing the private security sector came into force in 2004. Between 2001 and 2005, 479 security directors quit their jobs in the police department on their own will.[151] It can be said that the state has also promoted this transfer process, as it eased the way for public officials to establish private security firms and to become security guards with legal arrangements.[152]

Yardımcı and Alemdar emphasize the importance of formal and informal connections between public and private actors resulting from these "transfers" in promoting irregularities, like excessive use of force. Symbolic capital of these transferred actors enables them to "bypass regular procedures by using their symbolic capital."[153] Yardımcı and Alemdar claim that excessive use of force is also

potansiyel hırsızların dikkatini çekecek şekilde taşımak. 3. Sizi takip eden/ gözetleyen bir kişinin hareketlerinizi veya yolunuzu kolayca tahmin edebileceği güzergâhları kullanmak."

[150] The fact that former public officials participate in the private sector as businessmen should not be seen as something peculiar to Turkey. Two significant examples of transfers, which also contributed to the export of zero-tolerance policies developed in New York to the world, are the formation of private security firms by the fathers of zero-tolerance: William J. Bratton, former New York Police Chief, and Rudy Giluliani, former mayor of New York. Mitchell and Beckett.

[151] "Emniyet'te Beyin Göçü," A_ksiyon,_ no. 541 (April 2005).

[152] For the Law No. 5335, see Republic of Turkey, _Resmi Gazete_, no. 25798, 27 April 2005. For the Law No. 6215, see Republic of Turkey, _Resmi Gazete,_ no. 27903, 12 April 2011.

[153] Yardımcı and Alemdar, p.43.

related to "the self-perception of security guards as some sort of policeman." There is a third factor that should be added to this list: the ambiguities in legal arrangements. The authorities of the private security guards are identified in Law No. 5188; but these authorities are defined in an uncertain way. As mentioned above in judicial processes regarding crimes that they commit or for the crimes committed against them on duty, their legal status is equal to public officials. Resisting a security guard and resisting a police officer have the same legal consequences. Thus, it is not only themselves who perceive private security guards as "some sort of policeman."

Apart from their ambiguous position in front of the law, security guards have a liminal position in the eyes of the middle-classes, who secure themselves with their services. With their low class position, they are among those against whom the gates have been constructed. Most of the informants express that they are sure about the reliability of the security guards employed by their site management office, but have reservations about others. Perihan (a 37-year old teacher who lives in a gated community) stated that:

> Actually they (private security guards) might be more dangerous than poor people. Because they see things here… A prosperous, beautiful world beyond their reach… Ordinary poor people do not normally see this world. This might be a temptation for some of them. I do not accuse the ones here, they are nice guys. But how much money does an ordinary security guard earn? 300, 500 liras or something... Then why would not he take 100 liras from a thief in return for cooperation?[154]

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[154] Perihan, interview by the author, half tape-recording, 24 February 2011, home of the informant in a gated community in Kartal, Istanbul. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Aslında, fakir insanlardan daha tehlikeli olabilirler. Çünkü burda bir sürü şey görüyorlar. Ulaşamayacakları, zengin, güzel bir dünya… Sıradan fakir insan normalde bu dünyayı görmüyor. Bu, tabi, bazılarını yoldan çıkarabilir. Yani buradakileri demiyorum, onlar düzgün çocuklar. Ama, bi güvenlik kaç para kazanıyor, Allah aşkına? 300, 500 lira bir şey. Hal bu iken, neden 100 lira alıp hırsızın biriyle işbirliği yapmasın?"*

Thus, the everyday working environment of private security officials which is located just in the barrier separating different groups of people seems to be uncertain.

CHAPTER 6

GATED COMMUNITIES IN ISTANBUL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLEX

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND STATUS

This chapter deals with the rise of gated communities as modes of middle-class accommodation in Istanbul. In the first section, three of the questions that provoked academic attention in the literature and the discussions that aroused around these questions will be presented. In the second section, different waves of gated community expansion in Istanbul and public and private actors contributing to these waves will be analyzed. In the last section, the demand side of the issue will be elaborated with an analysis of how the middle class identity has been reproduced through the securitization of everyday life and stigmatization of different groups.

Three Related Debates in Gated Community Literature

The expansion of gated communities all around the world provoked the rise of three questions related to each other in the academic world. As gated communities provoked academic attention from different disciplines, from human geography to city planning, there is a vast literature on this subject. Of course, arguments and debates in the literature have not been confined to the debates around the three questions presented in the following; but these were identified as the most relevant among many others for this study.

The first question is related to the extent to which this phenomenon has been global. Some scholars point to the transformations triggered by the rise of neo-

liberalism for explaining the gating upsurge in different cities;[155] some others

emphasize the importance of particular factors, like the experience of apartheid in

South Africa or the civil war in Lebanon, leading to the rise of gated communities as

popular units of middle class accommodation in particular societies. [156] The second

question has been why gated communities have become popular units of

accommodation for the middle classes of different societies. There have been heated

discussions regarding the role of the search for security (or escape from insecurity) in

promoting the demand for gated communities. While some scholars, like Setha Low,

emphasize the importance of fear in stimulating demand for gated communities,

some others follow Blakely and Snyder, who separate gated communities into three

categories as lifestyle communities, prestige communities and security zone

communities, arguing that people have been moving out to these different residential

developments according to their different personal motivations and needs. [157] Finally,

the question of how the expansion of gated communities affects "public space" has

attracted academic interest on this subject. Some scholars point out that the

acceleration of spatial segregation with the expansion of gated communities has been

transforming the public space on unequal terms.[158] On the other hand, Glasze et al.

criticized this emphasis on public space on the literature, claiming that "… 'public

space' and 'privatization' are extremely vague analytical categories… It often

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[155] Miao Xu and Zhen Yang, "Theoretical Debate on Gated Communities: Genesis, Controverseries, and the Way Forward," *Urban Design International,* no.13 (Winter 2008), pp. 213-226.

[156] Caldeira; Glasze, Webster and Frantz; Lemanski.

[157] Low, *Behind*; Blakely and Snyder; Sanchez, Dhavale and Lang.

[158] Caldeira; Davis.

remains unclear what exactly is privatized; how privatization is carried out; and what, specifically, is wrong with privatization."[159]

The Upsurge of Gated Communities in Istanbul: Trends and Actors

Walls and gates are historically familiar objects for Istanbulites who live in a city which is constructed upon the remnants of walls built on Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman periods for protection. What has changed since the 1980s is not the usage of walls and gates as security objects, but the expansion of those groups of people who use them.

The first wave of gated communities in Istanbul were generally constructed on "former mansion lands" and aimed "primarily to provide accommodation" for upper-class Istanbulites.[160] The second wave began with the establishment of multi-functional gated communities, constructed on bigger sizes of land, targeting upper and upper middle classes. Kemer Country, which was established in Göktürk in the late 1980s, was one of the pioneers in this respect. Another important project was Alkent 2000 which "would be taken as a model for similar projects later."[161] The upsurge of the construction of vertical gated residential developments and the expansion of targeted consumer groups beginning in 2000s can be identified as a third wave. With this last wave, housing in gated communities has become accessible for the lower segments of the middle class. In addition to the development of

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[159] Glasze, Webster and Frantz, p.2. For another critic see; Bill S. Bowers and Tony Manzi, "Private Security and Public Space: New Approaches to the Theory and Practice of Gated Communities," *European Journal of Spatial Development,* no.22 (November 2006), pp. 1-17.

[160] Orhan Esen, "Nizamiyeli Cemiyetlere Dair Bir Vaka Analizi - Göktürk: Temel Parametreleri," *İstanbul,* no.59 (2007), pp. 98-101.

[161] Danış and Perouse, p.97.

different projects which provide accommodation for thousands of people in vertical developments, sales of these units have been eased with the adoption of mortgage system by Turkey in this third wave. Besides the construction of housing projects planned with gates, there has been a parallel "gating" trend. With this trend, housing projects which were originally non-gated began to be enclosed by walls or fences due to the demands of their residents.[162]

Looking further at the supply side of this process, one sees that private contractors and public institutions have been working in cooperation. The state has not only been "watching" this process or intervening to a minimal degree in order to control, it has actively promoted the spatial segregation and securitization of living spaces since 1980s. Bahçeşehir, Ataköy and Ataşehir were satellite city projects developed directly by Emlak Bank, a public institution, affiliated with the prime ministry. These satellite city projects also stimulated the construction of gated residential developments by private contractors around housing units constructed by Emlak Bank, as the necessary infrastructure projects had already been realized by the state in these locations.

The authorities and responsibilities of public institutions related to housing were reorganized in the 2000s. According to the Mass Housing Administration (MHA hereafter), "58th and 59th governments of the Republic of Turkey accelerated social housing and urban regeneration practices, taking action with an Urgent Action Plan. In the following four years, institutional structure of the MHA was developed and the authorities of the institution were expanded with legal arrangements. The estate portfolio of the MHA was also expanded with the abalienation of totally 64.5

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[162] Ibid, p. 94.

millions meter squares of lands…"[163] The MHA identifies social housing in terms of providing accommodation for lower income groups as its primary task and this has been a point of emphasis in the interviews conducted with the MHA officials by the media, in the documents prepared by the institution and in the speeches of government representatives.

An examination of the data related to the activities of the MHA in Istanbul reveals that public lands which were abalienated to the institution have been used by the MHA in a manner that accelerates spatial segregation and securitization in two ways. Firstly, lower income groups have been banished from the city through urban regeneration projects. Secondly, the MHA has provided a serious supply of gated residential developments itself. Between 2005 and 2010, the MHA finalized the construction of 26,037 housing units in Istanbul. 20,559 of these units are designed as gated residential developments surrounded by walls and gates.[164] Another public institution effective in transforming of urban relations in Istanbul is Kiptas (Istanbul Konut Imar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S), an institution of the Metropolitan Municipality. Kiptas has led to the construction of more than 50,000 housing units in

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[163] (Translated by the author) Mass Housing Administration. *TOKİ Kurum Profili 2009-2010,* p.9. Available [online]: www.toki.gov.tr/docs/yayinlar/TOKI'11_TRK.pdf [15 March 2011], p.9. The original text of the passage is in the following. *"58. Ve 59. T.C. Hükümetleri bir Acil Eylem Planı ile harekete geçerek, Ocak 2003'ten itibaren sosyal konut ve kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarına hız vermiştir. Bunu izleyen dört yıl süresince TOKİ'nin kurumsal yapısı geliştirilmiş ve yetkileri yasal düzenlemelerle genişletilmiştir. Toplam 64,5 milyon metrekarelik arazinin devriyle TOKİ'nin arsa portföyü de genişletilmiş, böylece İdare'nin kendi kaynaklarını kullanarak projeler geliştirebilmesi amaçlanmıştır."*

[164] 13,117 of these unites were constructed in gated residential development projects, realized through Emlak Konut Real Estate Investment Trust INC. or in partnership with construction firms on the bases of revenue sharing. 7,442 units, also gated and walled, were developed under the title of administrative housing projects. TOKI constructed 2,736 units in projects grouped as housing and social buildings, 678 units for lower income groups and 2064 units for urban regeneration. Central Housing Administration of Turkey. *İstanbul İli Toplu Konut Uygulamaları.* Available [online]: http://www.toki.gov.tr/programlar/ihale/c_illist.asp?x_ilkodu=34 [18 March 2011].

different projects, from gated residential developments equipped with the latest security items and private security services to social housing units providing accommodation to lower income groups.[165]

The rise of an anti-urban discourse around the issues of disorder and criminality also has been promoted by these institutions. As Danış and Perouse explain: "What is interesting is the fact that some state institutions, like some companies affiliated with the Metropolitan Municipality also adopted this catastrophe discourse (…) To see how strongly this anti-urban discourse was adopted by some public actors, which should actually be the supporters of urban integration; it is enough to have a look at the advertisements of Kiptas, even those of TOKI (MHA)."[166]

In addition to these advertisements contributing to the escalation of urban fear, officials of public initiatives related to mass housing have also contributed to the stigmatization and criminalization of *gecekondu* neighborhoods by pointing them out as criminal places in an effort to legitimize urban regeneration projects, which have been criticized for actually being projects aimed at the purge of undesired elements from the city centre. For example, the general manager of MHA claimed: "The *gecekondu* atmosphere destroys even the psychology of young people who

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[165] Detailed data regarding the numbers of different categories of housing projects has not been publicized by the institution. However, the general manager of the institution, İsmail Yıldırım, accepted the fact that Kiptas failed to provide social housing projects in an interview, claiming that: "There has been a change in the system of Kiptas when MHA projects started. There has been a decrease in social housing projects. It is not that we do not construct any but it is not enough. This results from our failure to find estates. All estates which could be purchased by municipalities began to be managed by the MHA. Thus, I think that Kiptas should give more weight to social housing projects." *Yeni Şafak,* 10 April 2011.

[166] (Translated by the author), Danış and Perouse, p.100. *"Şaşırtıcı olan, İBB'ye bağlı bazı şirketler gibi, bazı devlet kuruluşlarının da bu felaket söylemini benimsemiş olmasıdır (...) Bu kent karşıtı söylemin, kentsel bütünleşmenin destekleyicisi olması gereken bazı kamusal aktörlerce nasıl hararetle benimsendiğini görmek için KİPTAŞ'ın ve hatta TOKİ'nin reklamlarına bakmak yeterlidir."*

have no choice but to live there. The *gecekondu* is a structure that transforms the approach of the people to the state and nurtures terror and illegal formations on a large scale. We have to get rid of *gecekondu*s both for them and for the future of the country."[167]

According to their accounts, the MHA and the Kiptas have realized gated community projects in order to raise funds for the realization of social housing projects. The activities of these public institutions have affected competition in the luxury housing sector and have been resented by construction firms, whose representatives claimed that these activities of public initiatives have hindered the competitiveness of the sector and that these institutions can resort to other ways for raising funds, like developing estates.[168]

It is also important to note that there have been cases of non-gating based on legal and administrative decisions regarding the "public" character of some gated residential developments. After Alkent 2000, a gated residential development constructed by a private company was regarded as *mahalle* (district in Turkish administrative system) in the 2001 elections, Dursun Baran, a resident of the community, filed a lawsuit against the management of the community and based on

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[167] (Emphasis added) *Hürriyet*, 15 September 2006. The original text of the quotted speech is presented in the following. "*Gecekondu ortamı orada yaşamak zorunda kalan gençlerin psikolojisini bile bozuyor. Gecekondu insanların devlete bakışını bozan bir yapıdır ve büyük ölçüde terörü, illegal oluşumları besler. Hem onlar için hem de ülkenin geleceği için gecekondulardan kurtulmalıyız.*"

[168] The president of the construction sector commission of MUSIAD (The Association of Muslim Industrialiasts and Businessmen), Mahmut Asmalı, referred to this resentment as in the following in his speech at a meeting organized by the association dated 08 January 2001: "There are important obstacles for the competitiveness of the construction sector created by public institutions, besides bureaucracy… Institutions like the TOKI and Kiptas should only produce social housing projects and give up producing luxury housing (projects). They should prepare the infrastructure of the estates in locations appropriate for luxury housing and realize their sale and give weight to estate production. Necessary funding for the construction of social housing projects can be raised in this way. In this way the competitiveness of the sector would not be hindered by public initiatives at least." *Zaman*, 09 February 2011.

the court decision the gates surrounding the community were removed.[169] Another example of non-gating was Bahçeşehir, which was constructed by Emlak Bank as a satellite city consisting of gated residential developments. As Bahçeşehir became a municipality in 1999, the gates surrounding the community were removed. The residents organized in smaller units and re-gated their residences in a manner that would not break the law (they did not put barriers in streets and kept the scale of the gating at a minimum). However, the status of amenities like the lake and green fields changed and these places became public. With this change, people coming from the surrounding gecekondu areas began to use these amenities. Under the "pressure" created by the complaints issued by Bahçeşehir residents, Bahçeşehir Municipality re-gated the lake and green fields to provide exclusivity for the residents who could enter into these areas with identity cards.[170] Although we can talk about cases of non-gating, we can not say that these are numerous enough to indicate a trend. Moreover, the residents of gated communities who should remove the gates surrounding their homes according to administrative and legal decisions have found alternative ways to gate themselves as seen in Bahçeşehir example.

There have been two important issues that aroused reaction in the process of transformation of urban life in Istanbul; environmental destruction and urban regeneration. Several associations and institutions protested TOKI and private construction companies on these bases.[171] The Chamber of City Planners not only

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[169] "Yargıtay'dan Boran'ı Umutlandıran Karar", *Sabah*, 28 October 2010.

[170] "Bahçeşehir'e Varoş Yasağı," *Hürriyet*, 3 August 2007. The administrative status of Bahçeşehir changed again in the 2000s, as it became a *mahalle* (neighbourhood) attached to Başakşehir Municipality.

[171] Febayder (Fener Balat Ayvansaray Association for Protecting the Rights of Homeowners and Renters and Social Assistance) and İmece (The Sociey's Movement for Urban

developed critiques and reports about these issues, but also filed lawsuits.[172] However, protests and usage of legal mechanisms regarding urban renewal projects have not produced any concrete results.

Elaborating the relationship between global consumption culture and urban transformations, Ayşe Öncü points out to the rising trend of escape followed by the upper and upper middle classes of Istanbul in the late 1990s.[173] This process has similarities with "white flight" in the U.S. in terms of the discourses accompanying it; "garden cities" promise the comfort of freedom from the troubles and the dirt of the city. This trend of escape from the city is referred as "middle-class flight" in this thesis which deals with the case of Istanbul. Although "white flight" in the U.S. and "middle class flight" in Turkey have their similarities, these two processes emerged in different historical and social contexts. The legacy of slavery and the organization of life according to the color line have affected trends related to racial policies and assumptions in the U.S. As is analyzed later in this section, the absence of such a history of biological racism and color line in Turkey does not necessarily mean that transformation of urban life in Istanbul has been going on independently from racialization.

It would be naïve to ignore the role of neo-liberal policies on transforming the urban life in Istanbul. It was the "American model of architectural planning" that gave inspiration to the real estate developers in Istanbul, who sometimes realized

Development) are significant platforms in this regard. For further information see the websites of these initiatives,see (www.febayder.com) and (www.toplumunsehircilikhareketi.org).

[172] For further information about the chamber and the lawsuits filed by them, see the website of the chamber (http://www.spo.org.tr).

[173] Ayşe Öncü, "'İdealinizdeki Ev' Mitolojisi Kültürel Sınırları Aşarak İstanbul'a Ulaştı," in *Mekan, Kültür, İktidar: Küreselleşen Kentlerde Yeni Kimlikler*, edited by Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005).

projects based on the projects of those residential developments in the U.S. one by one. It has been "professionals consisting the new middle class" that have provided an important part of the demand for these last stops of escape. Finally, the discourses accompanying this trend of spatial segregation, like "the rising disorder and criminality in Istanbul," have similarities with their counterparts in other countries, like the U.S. or Brazil.[174] However, it would be equally dangerous to ignore the particularities of the case in Turkey, which has experienced a civil war that transformed both the social, economic and ethnic composition of urban dwellers of Istanbul and the relations between them. Looking at the the supply and organization side, it is impossible to see this process as "purely private." Public actors have played an important role in the emergence and promotion of this "middle-class flight."

About the particularities of the Istanbul case, the different composition of actors affecting this process should be mentioned. Analyzing the process of spatial segregation and securitization in Los Angeles, Mike Davis points out to the clashes between homeowners' associations and developers in shaping this process.[175] In Istanbul, there has been a different composition of actors involved in the process and there emerged a clash of interests between private developers and public institutions related to housing.

Securing Life, Reproducing Class

As was seen above, the construction of gated residential developments has accelerated in recent years, and securitized housing has become accessible for larger

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[174] For an analysis of the case in the U.S., see Low, *Behind*. For the Brazilian case, see Caldeira.

[175] Davis.

parts of the middle classes. What about the demand side of the issue? And what is the role of the urban insecurity discourse in creating demand for this particular mode of accommodation?

In the literature, there has been a debate on whether it is security concerns (search for security) or life-style (search for status) that motivates the middle classes in their preference for gated communities. Blakely and Snyder categorize three groups of gated communities based on "the importance of social values in residents' choice of a gated community", lifestyle communities, prestige communities and security zone communities, identifying social values effective in these choices as "sense of community", "exclusion", "privatization" and "stability."[176] They use the term security zone communities to refer to projects which are surrounded by fences, walls or barricades after the completion of their construction as non-gated projects with the initiative of residents. In another study, gated communities in the U.S. are differentiated as those "based on status" and those "motivated by concern for security" with a similar logic.[177] How much sense does it make to approach the development of gated communities in Istanbul with these concepts?

If we are to look at the amenities and functions of different gated community projects, we see that public and private institutions have been realizing projects targeting different groups of people. If we were to adopt the model of analysis developed by Blakely and Snyder, based on the amenities and services presented, we would label Kemer Country a life style community, as it has been marketed with a "concept of life," presenting its residents a wide array of activities, including playing golf. With this kind of mentality, Uplife Park would be labeled a

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[176] Blakely and Snyder.

[177] Sanchez, Dhavale and Lang.

prestige community, as the amenities it provides are relatively limited. Finally, it be concluded that the development of security zone communities were limited in Turkey, since there have not been any demands on a scale large enough to trigger public campaigns or law suits as in the case in the U.S.[178] However, all these three categorizations would be misrepresentations of reality.

Drawing a line between security and status is very difficult in the case of Istanbul, because rather than being mutually exclusive or separate factors, these two motives are related to and reinforce each other in a complex way. Most of the gated community residents whom I interviewed have been living in developments which would be labeled as "prestige communities" based on the amenities included in these projects. In the prestige communities described by Blakely and Snyder, "commonality is based on almost entirely on economic class and status."[179] The same cannot be said for gated community developments populated by the middle classes of Istanbul. I did not intend to calculate the fear of informants with survey tactics, like asking them to give a number to their fear of walking in the dark from one to five. I listened to their stories, experiences and tried to understand how much their lives have been affected by security concerns and what security means for them. Most of the informants share the perception that Istanbul has become an unlivable city because of insecurity. Their estimations regarding criminal trends and stigmatizations of different groups, mostly Kurds but also Gypsies and African migrants, are found to be independent from their experiences of victimization. Most

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[178] It is not possible to reach data regarding the gating process in Istanbul. Gates are not among the housing facilities that are counted by the Turkish Statistics Institution.

[179] Blakely and Snyder, p.74.

of them have never been victimized; but still think that there is an upwards criminal trend in Istanbul.

Here it is important to emphasize the importance of two factors. First is the role of media in escalating urban fear. As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the most popular statements used by the middle classes to refer to crime and criminal trends is "we see that every day on TV." Another source of information that contributes to the escalation of urban fear in Istanbul appears to be what is conceptualized as "crime talk" by Caldeira. The victimization experiences of friends and strangers are reproduced day by day in chats in a way that helps the middle classes to "imagine crime".

For almost half of the informants, security has been the "organizing principle of life." These informants are not different from the rest in terms of their socio-economic positions or their life-styles; what makes the difference is "the children." When asked about her thoughts regarding public transportation, Özge, a 32-year old teacher living in a gated community, said that she had not used public transportation in four years - since they moved to Istanbul. Looking at my surprise, she explained:

> Yes, I have not used public transportation since we moved to Istanbul, including boats sailing in the Bosporus. It is not that we do not go out. We go to shopping centers on the European side, to historical monuments. When you have a kid, motherhood becomes your primary aim of being. I cannot leave Cansu (her 6-year old daughter) at home and go out for pleasure on my own; neither can I use public transportation with her. There are all kinds of people in Istanbul, you know. Let alone big issues like kidnapping, what if some pervert squeezes my girls' butt? What will I do? How will I explain what pervert is to my daughter? (...) Yes, I am okay when she plays in the garden on her own; because we live together with good people here. People like you, people like me. Moreover, this place is very secure. There is no need to be afraid of intrusions by people with bad

intentions. It is not that I am not worried about the future. Thinking about ten or fifteen years later I am really worried; because she will be grown up without seeing the bad side of the world. She will not have the necessary experience to defend herself. At some point she will be on her own. Thinking about the future drives me crazy, but I do not know how else to live.[180]

Analyzing the growth of gated communities in Istanbul, Hatice Kurtuluş argues: "The difference of these settlements from traditional middle class suburbs has been identified as their 'closedness to the public' and the 'deepening need of security' which requires this (closedness). (…) However, when the phenomenon is approached with different tools of analysis, it is revealed that there are serious differences between classic suburbs and gated settlements in terms of economic, cultural, social and legal (issues)."[181]

According to Kurtuluş, rather than search for security, factors like reproducing social capital, "belonging to an elite community" and "buying a life-style" have been predominant in affecting the residents' choice of gated communities

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[180] Özge, interview by the author, tape-recording, home of the informant in a gated residential development in Kartal, Istanbul Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Evet, gerçekten, İstanbul'a geldik geleli toplu taşıma kullanmadım, Boğaz'da gezen tekneler de dâhil. Yani dışarı çıkmıyoruz değil. Karşıda alışveriş merkezlerine, tarihi yerlere falan gidiyoruz. Çocuğun olduğunda, ister istemez, annelik bir şekilde varlık sebebin oluyor. Cansu'yu evde bırakıp kendi başıma gezmeye gidemiyorum, o varken de otobüse falan binemiyorum tabi. İstanbul'da bin türlü insan var. Biliyorsun. Yani kaçırma falan gibi büyük senaryoları bırak, biri kızımın poposunu mıncırsa ne olacak? Ne yapacağım? Kızıma, sapık nedir, bunu nasıl açıklayacağım? (...) Tabi, bahçede kendi kendine oynarken takmıyorum; çünkü zaten iyi insanlarla beraber yaşıyoruz burada. Senin, benim gibi insanlar. Ayrıca, burası zaten çok güvenli. Kötü niyetli birileri gelir, içeri dalar diye korkmama gerek kalmıyor. Ama on on-beş sene sonrasını düşünmek bile istemiyorum; çünkü dünyanın kötülüklerini görmeden büyüyecek bu çocuk. Kendini nasıl koruyacağını bilmek için yaşaması gerekenler var; bunları bilmeden büyüyecek. Yani bir noktada kendi başına kalacak biliyorum. İlerde nasıl olacak diye düşünerek kafayı yiyorum; ama başka nasıl yaşanabilir onu da bilmiyorum."*

[181] (Translated by the author) *"Bu yerleşimlerin, ilk bakışta geleneksel orta sınıf alt kentlerinden farkı, "kamuya kapalılık" ve bunun nedeni olarak görülen "derinleşen güvenlik ihtiyacı" olarak vurgulanmaktadır. (...) Ancak olguya farklı analiz araçlarıyla yaklaşıldığında, klasik alt kentlerle kapalı yerleşmeler arasında ekonomik, kültürel, sosyal ve hukuksal olarak da ciddi farklılıklar olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır."* Kurtuluş, *Beykoz,* p. 162.

in Istanbul.[182] One of the main arguments of this thesis is that there exists a cordial

relationship between securitization and the reproduction of the middle-class. Rather

than being mutually exclusive factors, the search for security and search for prestige,

community or life-style reinforce each other for the middle classes of Istanbul; as

urban criminality has been associated with squatter settlements and inner city

neighborhoods inhabited by stigmatized groups, the securitization of everyday life

actually overlaps with the reproduction of class position. What differentiates the

community behind the gates from *gecekondu* dwellers is not only their purchasing

power, but also their imagined positions in the dichotomy between victims and

criminals.

The expression of socio-economic differences in cultural terms in a way that

marginalizes and essentializes migrants can be seen in the production of stereotypes

through caricatures, like "*hacıağa*"[183] and "*maganda*"[184], as analyzed elegantly by

Öncü.[185] In another important study, Sema Erder points out to the essentialization of

migrants living in *gecekondu*s by middle class residents living in a nearby area by

references to culture in the 1990s.[186] Following Öncü, who points out the historical

specificity of the stereotypes, this thesis argues that there has been a change in the

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[182] Kurtuluş, Beykoz, pp. 162-163.

[183] The term *hacıağa* was coined in the 1940s to define the merchants who moved to Istanbul from Anatolia. As Öncü explains the popular reflections on these group of people of portrayed the image of a man who has lots of money but lacks manners. The male image portrayed through the streotype of *Hacıağa* makes referances to religion but this is a fake religiousity. Öncü, *Istanbulites,* p.123-127.

[184] The term *maganda* has been used in reference to the "aesthetic anormality" of gecekondu-dwellers. The term was coined in the late 1980s and this streotype represents the "absolute other," so different from the rest of the society. The *maganda* is portrayed as the "animal inside us," with a tendency for violence and an inhumane greed for sexual pleasure. Öncü, *Istanbulites,* p. 135-140.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Erder, *Kentsel*.

middle class conception of migrants with the 2000s. "Unlawfulness" attached to urban migrants as seen in the stereotype of *maganda* has been transformed into "criminality" with the rise of urban insecurity discourse. Middle-class professionals tend to stigmatize and criminalize migrants, specifically those living in nearby neighborhoods. When asked whether they knew any places where criminality was higher, informants mostly referred to the nearest *gecekondu* neighborhood, besides Tarlabaşı/Beyoğlu, which is a common point of reference. The most criminal neighborhood is Ümraniye, according to the accounts of Ataşehir residents, while it is Fikirtepe for those living in Göztepe, despite the fact that most of them have never been in these places. Moreover, informants tend to emphasize the issue of preference over socio-economic factors in criminalizing *gecekondu* neighborhoods. Utilizing this neo-liberal imaginary, which holds the individual responsible for his or her success, rather than considering the socio-economic factors limiting the preferences of the individual, middle-class professionals construct a link between the outlawness of *gecekondu*s as accommodation units and the criminality they attach to *gecekondu* dwellers. Rather than developing in an isolated way, independent from the insecurity discourses promoted by politicians and the mainstream media, this rationalization seems to owe a lot to these discourses. When asked what she thinks about the rates of recidivism for petty-crimes, Perihan (a 37-year old teacher who lives in a gated community) says:

> Do you know what they do to dogs that accidentally bite a sheep while playing in the village? They shoot them. It is not that Turkish villagers are cruel or anything. It is a necessity; because once a dog gets the taste of blood it will bite again and this time it will not be an accident. The system in Turkey is very problematic. They are freeing the criminals and shutting down innocent people with meaningless accusations for political reasons. It all starts with the system. They have let these people invade public lands. Constructing apartments on

the lands of the state they have been gaining millions in an unlawful manner. *They got the taste of blood*. And if you do not stop them, they will not stop on their own. By letting them getting away with every sort of outlawness, the system promotes these criminals and does harm to normal citizens.[187]

Aslı, a 43-year old artist living in a gated community in Göztepe, expresses her

views as in the following:

> Do you know that story about Hazreti Ömer (a religious historical figure)? While he was walking around, he heard crying noises coming from a home. He entered into this home to look at what was wrong inside. There were children crying around their mother who was cooking something. Ömer approached the women and asked why the children were crying. The women said that they were crying because of hunger. Ömer asked why she had not given a meal to the children and then he saw that the women was cooking stones to deceive the neighbors who had insisted on giving them a meal. It is extremely difficult to find people like this in the world of today. I am sure there are those poor people who are cultured and proud enough to stay away from criminal activities even if they are hungry, but I do not think that they live in Fikirtepe. Because there is this criminal structure there… An honest person would not survive in a place like that.[188]

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[187] Perihan, interview by the author, half tape-recording, 24 February 2011, home of the informant in a gated community in Kartal, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Köyde böyle oynarken falan yanlışlıkla bir koyunu ısıran köpeklere ne yaparlar biliyor musun? Vururlar. Hani zalim olduklarından falan değil. Lazım çünkü bu; çünkü kopek bir kere kanın tadını alınca bir daha ısırır ve tabi bu defa bilerek. Türkiye'de sistem çok sorunlu. Suçluları sokağa salıveriyorlar, masum insanları da saçma sapan suçlamalarla, politik sebeplerle içeri atıyorlar. İşte bunlara da sistem sebep oluyor. Bu adamların devletin arazisini işgal etmesine göz yumdular. Bunlar böyle yamuk yumuk işlerle, devletin arazisine yaptıkları apartmanları sata sata, milyonlar kazandılar. Kanın tadını aldılar, anlatabiliyor muyum? Şimdi sen bunları durdurmazsan, bunlar kendi kendine durmaz. Her yaptıklarının yanlarına kalmasına izin vererek, sistemin kendisi bunları besliyor ve normal vatandaşları mağdur ediyor."*

[188] Aslı, interview by the author, half tape-recording, 7 November 2010, home of the informant in a gated residential development in Göztepe, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Hazreti Ömer'le ilgili bir hikâye vardır, bilmem duydun mu? Bir gün etrafta dolaşırken, Hazreti Ömer bir evden ağlama sesleri duymuş. Ne olup bitiyor bakmak için içeri girmiş. Evde yemek pişiren annelerinin etrafında ağlaşan çocuklar varmış. Ömer kadına yaklaşmış ve bu çocuklar niye ağlıyor diye sormuş. Kadın da demiş açlıktan ağlıyorlar. Ömer de kadın demiş neden şu pişirdiğinden vermeyip ağlatıyorsun çocukları. Bunu derken görmüş ki kadın komşular yemek vermek için ısrar etmesin diye bunları kandırmak için ocakta taş kaynatıyor. İşte böyle insan bulmak çok zor bugünün dünyasında. Eminim fakir ama kültürlü, açken dahi başkasının malına el uzatmayacak kadar gururlu insanlar da var. Ama bence Fikirtepe'de bunlardan yok. Çünkü yani orasının öyle bir suç yapısı var ki, namuslu biri zaten orda barınamaz."*

Another significant comment is made by Hasan, a 62-year old engineer who also lives in a gated community.

> Wolves like misty air. Do you know that phrase? Microbes among humans are very similar to normal microbes. They like dark, humid, putrefactive places. Dolapdere, Kasımpaşa, Ümraniye… These are places inhabited by lower families. That is why they are the nests of crime.[189]

While associating the rise of urban criminality with *gecekondu* neighborhoods, the middle classes use different references in stigmatizing different groups of people. Some of the informants make references to "genes" and "biological differences of different human groups" while talking about the Roma whose criminality has been seen as "ahistorical." Africans have been also stigmatized in a similar manner by some of the informants. For example, Bilal, a 53-year old chemical engineer living in a non-gated development protected by alarms and cameras, says:

> Why would an African come to Turkey, a country falling into pieces because of unemployment? If he had wished to work in an honest job, he would go to somewhere else where he could find a job more easily. They are engaged in many kinds of criminal activities, selling drugs the most predominant. They work on a global scale, you know.[190]

Middle-class professionals criminalize different groups on different scales and in different ways. Kurdish migrants living in *gecekondu* neighborhoods have been

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[189] Hasan, interview by the author, tape-recording, 27 January 2011, home of the informant in a gated residential development in Ataşehir, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: "*Kurt bulutlu havayı sever. (...) Bak, insanın mikrobu da işte bildiğimiz normal mikroba çok benzer. Nerde karanlık, nemli, çürümüş bir ortam var; orasını çok sever. Dolapdere, Kasımpaşa, Ümraniye… Bunlar tabi düşük ailelerin yaşadığı yerler. Ondan suç yuvası oluyor buralar.*"

[190] Bilal, interview by the author, tape-recording, 3 February 2011, Aslı's home in a gated residential development in Göztepe, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: "*Ya zaten Allah'ın Afrikalısı niye Türkiye gibi işsizlikten kırılan bir ülkeye gelsin? Adam namusuyla çalışacak olsa, iş bulmanın kolay olduğu başka bir yere gider. Bir sürü kirli işe bulaşıyorlar, en çok da uyuşturucu. Biliyorsun küresel çalışan adamlar bunlar.*"

stigmatized and criminalized in a specific way. First of all, Kurds are the most

referred to group, pointed out in relation to the rise of urban crime by the informants.

Secondly, references to "genes" are exempt from the accounts of informants who

criminalized them. Thus, they have been criminalized in a different way. The

absence of biological references does not make these accounts less racial, because

racialization also can be realized with different references and rationalizations.

"*Culture can also function like a nature*"[191] in terms of reproducing racial lines and

dominations.

Istanbul is not the only case in the world in terms of the criminalization and

stigmatization of lower class groups by middle classes with reference to their

"culture" or "lack of culture." There are similarities between stigmatization of

nordestinos in Sao Paulo and stigmatization of Kurdish migrants in Istanbul.[192] In

both of these processes, a certain group of people whose living conditions are lower

than those who stigmatized them has been racialized with references to culture on the

grounds of criminality. In both cases, these stigmatization processes have been

accelerated by the rise of insecurity discourses and accompanied by the upsurge of

gated communities. However, the context in Turkey, which experienced a civil war

between the state and the Kurdish population, has been different from the context in

Brazil, which has been struggling for democratization, and created particular

difficulties for the integration of Kurdish migrants to urban life which was beginning

to be defended against their "occupation." *Nordestinos* have no ethnic or linguistic

differences with the middle classes of Sao Paulo. Kurds have a different language

and a different identity. Moreover, they have been claiming their right to participate

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[191] Balibar, p. 22.

[192] Caldeira.

in urban life as "Kurds" by emphasizing their differences in recent years. Talking in Kurdish in public and celebrating Newroz as a Kurdish holiday can be seen as two examples of individual and collective claims-making.

There has been a parallel terror discourse accompanying the discourse of urban security in Istanbul. As mentioned above, Turkey has experienced a civil war which has been continuing at a lower density in recent years. Thus the criminalization and stigmatization of Kurds has not been confined to urban insecurity discourses in the classical sense. The issues of national security and urban security often converge in the stigmatization of Kurdish migrants in Istanbul. In the middle class imagination, Kurds are not only "bag-snatchers," but also "terrorists." In Hasan's speech below the blurred nature of these lines can be seen in crystallized manner:

> Kurds are rebellious people, you know. The values of obeying rules, respecting authorities… Their cultural structure does not include these. In the east, they are revolting against the integrity and foundational principles of this country. Here, they are revolting against the laws and authorities by petty-crimes. No, I would not like to have a Kurdish neighbor unless he was very well educated and cultured. Otherwise, how can you know that he was not a terrorist or a gangster who got rich by organizing a bag-snatching group? [193]

Cenk Saraçoğlu, who analyzed the perceptions of middle-class in Izmir regarding Kurdish migrants, points out a similar stigmatization process.[194] However, his main

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[193] Hasan, interview by the author, tape-recording, 27 January 2011, home of the informant in a gated residential development in Ataşehir, Istanbul, Turkey. The original transcription of the cited interview passage: *"Kürtler isyankâr adamlar biliyorsun işte. Kurallara uymak, kurumlara saygı duymak… Bunlar yok ki onların kültüründe. Doğuda, bu ülkenin bütünlüğüne, temel değerlerine karşı ayaklanıyorlar. Burada, işte böyle suçlar işleyerek, kanuna, çeşitli kurumlara karşı ayaklanıyorlar. Yani hayır, çok eğitimli ve çok kültürlü insanlar olmadığı sürece Kürt komşum olsun istemem. Öteki türlü zaten adamın terörist ya da kapkaç çetesi kurarak zengin olmuş mafyatik bir tip olmadığını nasıl bileceksin ki?"*

[194] Saraçoğlu.

argument that the exclusion of Kurds through the recognition of their differences by the middle class "emerges independently" from state policies and mainstream media, based on "everyday experiences" and "constitutes a challenge" to the state and the mainstream media which produce assimilationist discourses contradicts one of the main arguments of this thesis, which points to the roles of different actors in escalating this recognition and exclusion practices which are legitimized by the insecurity discourses.

As seen above, the middle class professionals may lack the necessary victimization experience to construct racial criminal images; but they *still* construct these images and stigmatize Kurds, even in the absence of experience. As analyzed in Chapter Four, public officials have not been as explicit as the middle classes in terms of pointing fingers at "Kurds." However, this lack of explicitness does not indicate that recognition and exclusion of the Kurds by the middle-classes have not been affected by state discourses. As pointed out in Chapter Three, the mainstream media contributes to the construction and circulation of various essentialist attitudes regarding criminalized groups. Thus, contradictions in the discourses produced by these two groups of actors do not necessarily indicate that they do not affect the processes of stigmatization, racialization and criminalization. On contrary, they provide a framework for the middle classes "through which to imagine crime."

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis examined how significant fear of crime and insecurity have become for the middle classes living in Istanbul following the 2000s. As seen in the first part of this thesis, the mainstream media gained an increasing interest in urban criminality which can be seen in the place and time devoted to the coverage of criminal cases on TV and newspapers. Apart from the intense media coverage of petty-crime cases during the wave of urban criminality, there was an increase in the interest of mainstream media on sex-related offences. The mainstream media not only reported criminal cases, but presented comments and reports regarding the nature of crime and criminal trends in Istanbul. Public officials, from mayors to police officials, also have contributed to the transformation of urban criminality into a significant emergency that requires urgent and decisive solutions by underlining the malfunctioning of the system.

One of the most interesting findings of this thesis is that there emerged a de facto political consensus among mainstream political parties in an extremely polarized environment in the face of the 2007 elections. The mainstream political parties, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, devoted exceptional emphasis to the issue of urban criminality in their election manifestos. The fact that the 2002 and 2011 election manifestos of the same political parties lack this emphasis on crime shows that the significance of urban criminality has historical particularity.

This thesis could have been written without taking so many actors into consideration in detail. If there had already been a developed literature regarding fear

of crime in Istanbul in the neo-liberal period, it might have been possible for the author to summarize the main arguments in the literature. However, it was necessary for this thesis to analyze the transformation of discourses regarding urban criminality in detail, because in the absence of a developed literature on urban fear in Istanbul, skipping these parts would be overlooking the rise of this renewed media interest in criminality, the much publicized emphasis of the police as an institution on the malfunctioning of the justice system, the emergence of a bi-partisan political approach to urban crime. These actors who have the capacity to shape public debates regarding criminality constructed a discursive frame which excludes alternative assumptions and arguments. In this discursive frame, migration was pointed out as the main source of the assumed criminal boom. However, migration itself was separated from its roots; the historical process in which large groups of people became migrants trying to make a living in big cities, sometimes –as in the case of forced migration of Kurds- because of the push directly created by the state itself- was overlooked. The living conditions of the Kurdish migrants living in *gecekondu*s were presented to be irrelevant and the issue of urban criminality was often approached with references to "culture."

This frame of criminal imagination also emphasized the issue of preference over socio-economic relations while explaining criminal motivations. Petty-criminals often were projected as rational actors who recognize the marginal utility of breaking the law. This "professionalization" and "demonization" of petty-criminals contributed to the positioning of them outside the society, which is assumed to be made up of possible victims. As the probability that deterioration of socio-economic conditions of the urban poor might play a significant role in the wave of urban

criminality was excluded from the public debate, the issue of urban criminality was reduced to a problem of culture and morality.

As all kinds of deviant attitudes and criminal conducts became to be regarded as reflections of moral corruption, indicating the capability of the offender to disrespect social contract, lines separating different categories of illegal conducts began to be blurred. This erosion between different categories of illegality seems to deepen the marginality of the *gecekondu*-dwellers and to provide the necessary ground for the generation of support for urban regeneration projects on paper, because their illegal occupation of public lands began to be interpreted as the proof of their capacity for other kinds of criminal activities, like crimes against persons, by public officials and politicians. The stigmatization and criminalization of the urban poor and the marginalization of socio-economic explanations in the political and public debate related to the issue are all the more telling; if one takes the transformation of socio-economic relations in neo-liberal area which purged large segments of the working class out of formal production processes. The wave of urban crime in Istanbul was located in this larger process of change; however it is not possible to understand why it broke out at a particular historical moment and lost its significance in five years with macro explanations.

This thesis did not argue that people tended to see criminality absolutely as presented by this frame of criminal imagination constructed by the actors mentioned above. However, these actors provided reference points for society to think about crime and played important roles in the distribution of certain believes and myths regarding urban criminality.

These constitutive actors shaped the discourses of insecurity and deployed responsibility to the individual to provide his/her own security. Thus, the rise of the significance of urban criminality in public discourse occurred in parallel with the rise of private security measures, in other words with the commodification of security. On the other hand, it is very difficult to see this process as "privatization" of security and the retreat of the state from classical forms of social control, because private security has been constructed as a hybrid market dependent on the state and functioned as an extension of the state rather than an alternative to it.

It is extremely difficult to determine how this process in which urban insecurity became an important issue in public debate exactly affected the approach of the middle classes living in Istanbul to the issue of crime. It is not possible to construct a correlation between the transformation of the significance of crime in public debate and the increasing demand of the middle classes to secure themselves, through consumption, through organizing their everyday routines and through closing themselves in gated communities. Still, it is possible to say that the middle classes make use of the reference points drawn by the actors mentioned above and that the rise of the securitization demand of the middle classes occurred in parallel with the transformation of the significance of the issue of criminality in public debates.

The transformation of the issue of urban crime in public discourse seems to legitimize social stratification and spatial segregation along class lines, because middle classes constitute themselves as a society of victims, attributing criminality to lower class groups in a racializing manner. Middle-class individuals, who secure themselves with almost all possible means, tend to stigmatize and criminalize certain

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neighborhoods, mostly those consisted of *gecekondu*s. Middle class professionals differentiate themselves from the urban poor not only through their socio-economic position, but also through their imagined position in the dichotomy between victims and criminals, which is often perceived as a struggle between good and evil. What has been the primary motivation of middle classes in preferring to reside in gated communities has been a hot debate in the literature and in scholarly debates security and status are assumed to be mutually exclusive factors. This study makes an important contribution in these regard by showing that security and status might be complementary factors, because as seen in the example of gated community residents in Istanbul, middle classes reproduce their class positions by securing their everyday lives.

Middle-class professionals criminalize certain places and point fingers at certain groups of people with regards to urban criminality, mostly lower class groups that are claimed to be *biologically or culturally so different* from themselves. Different from their approach to African immigrants and the Roma, most of the informants interviewed for this thesis avoided making references to genes or biological differences while attaching criminality to Kurdish migrants. They often referred to the "essential cultural difference" of Kurds and criminalized Kurdish culture. It is this essentialization of culture that makes these accounts racial. This tendency to essentialize Kurdish culture with references to criminality seems to increase the social distance between the middle-classes and Kurdish migrants in Istanbul.

The analysis of the development of gated communities in Istanbul presented in this thesis makes another significant contribution to the literature on spatial

segregation by showing that state agencies and public actors may have a very significant role in affecting the trends of urban accommodation. The flight of the middle classes to the gated communities in Istanbul cannot be seen as a private trend or as a challenge raised by the middle classes against the authority of the state by providing their security on their own, because state agencies, in the leadership of the MHA (TOKİ) and Kiptaş, themselves were found to be directly and heavily involved in the development of gated communities in Istanbul despite their claims regarding the principle of social housing.

The transformation of the issue of urban crime in public debates has changed so much in the everyday life of Istanbulites in last ten years. The physical characteristics of the city also have undergone an enormous change with urban renewal projects, boom of gated communities and defensive space arrangements. Despite the variety of the resources used in this thesis, there are very important issues related to the rise of urban fear in Istanbul which could not be dealt with within the scope of this study. How have these securitization processes and criminalization practices affected the lives of *gecekondu*-dwellers? How has the increased media interest on sex-related crimes transformed gender related social pressures? Why did the wave of urban crime come to an end after 2007? These questions and many others wait to be answered. Although it leaves so many important questions unanswered, the thesis you have read is an important step in terms of giving the academic attention that this really important process of transformation deserves.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A- ARTICLES ORGANIZING THE AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE POLICE IN 2007

Before the amendment, parts of article 16 of the Law No. 2559 defining the authority to use gun were as in the following: "Police is authorized to use gun in cases written below: a) for self-defense; b) to disrupt an attack against the honor and life of a third person, if there are no other ways to disrupt; c) when (persons) who were caught *in flagrante delicto* (red-handed) because of a crime requiring severe punishment and present in custody or persons who had been convicted and arrested with any offence and whose arrest or transportation and dispatching were ordered and entrusted to the police flee or attack the police with this intention, if warnings have not been obeyed and no other ways can be found to prevent flight and attack; d) when preventing attacks against the position or the gun in her/his hand or the police station or persons given to or submitted to her/him for the preservation of which he/she is responsible has not been possible with other means; e) in crimes requiring severe punishment and *in flagrante delicto,* if no other ways can be found to capture a suspicious person going out and escaping from that place while the place in which the criminal is hiding is getting searched; f) if it is not possible to capture a suspect or convict related to a crime requiring severe imprisonment and searched by the security escapes while he/she is attempted to be captured and not obeys stop warning; g) when the order of surrendering the instruments convenient for attacking or resisting the police and guns has not been followed immediately (and) resisted or the gun and instruments surrendered before have been attempted to be taken back; h) if police's conduct of his/her job has been actually resisted individually or collectively or hindered by attack; i) if the authority and functioning of the state has been transgressed with guns."[195]

After the amendment this authority was redefined as, "Police is authorized to use gun: a) within the framework of using the right of self-defense; b) Against the resistance which he/she cannot defuse with physical force and material power, with the aim of breaking this resistance and in limit to break (this resistance); c) with the aim of providing the capture of persons about whom arrest, detention, bringing with force or capture orders were given or the suspect in case of *in flagrante delicto.*"[196]

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[195] (translated by the author) Republic of Turkey, *Resmi Gazete*, no.25657, 1 December 2004.

[196] (translated by the author) Republic of Turkey, *Resmi Gazete*, no. 26552, 14 June 2007.

APPENDIX B- THE ISSUE OF URBAN (IN)SECURITY IN THE 2007
ELECTION MANIFESTO OF AKP

The English Version of the Chapter Titled "Huzur ve Asayiş"

(Peace and Public Order)[197]

*Creating an environment in which our people live without fear, (feeling) secure
about his/her property and life, able to save his/her property as he/she wishes, able
to use his/her rights and freedoms without any anxiety, able to develop and realize
himself/herself, is the fundamental element of our government policy.*

*Meeting with democracy and security demands of our nation simultaneously
and in a way that (they) complete each other is our main goal. Peace and security in
real sense is only possible in a society in which freedom and justice are experienced
properly.*

The AKP has taken important steps on the issues of reinforcing the legal
infrastructure and the powers of security forces during its' government which has
almost reached to years.

The Law of the Responsibilities and Authorities of the Police (*Polis Vazife
ve Salahiyet Kanunu/PVSK*) was amended with the aim of increasing the
effectiveness in preventive security tasks.

In a way that supports security in general, private security services have been
given a legal ground, re-organized with a civilized approach.

New arrangements have been made for (providing that) sport games take
place in an environment of peace, security and sportsmanship.

It has been targeted to increase the numbers of the police in a way that there
is one police for (a) population of two hundred and fifty of persons. In this direction
(,) the number of police schools was increased to 27 from 20 with the opening of
seven new police schools. Thus, the number of the police officers joining to the
organization has been increased to over 11,000 from 4,000.

Technical and administrative capacity of the police and the gendarmerie
regarding criminal investigation have been developed, thus the enlightenment rate of
crimes has been increased.

With the aims of intervening in events in the fastest way, presenting the
fastest and the most effective security service to our citizens while paying attention
to personal rights and freedoms, avenues, streets and arenas of our cities were taken
under visual security surveillance by using mobile communication technology. The
project was extended to 58 cities and 36 districts.

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[197] (Translated by the author, emphasis original) Excerpt from the AKP, 2007 Seçim
Beyannamesi, pp. 79-82.

The Project of Creating Computer Supported Crime Maps and the Conduct of Crime Analysis has come into service for identifying the places, times, condensation periods and sensitive spaces for crimes committed in places under Gendarmerie responsibility and for making preventive security activities more effective. Another application which will be useful in this extent is the *Project of Identity Notification System.*

During the AKP government, as a reflection of the strong connection we established between security and social fabric, *the Project of Society Supported Security Service* has been put into practice for providing the active participation of institutions, civil society organizations and our citizens in crime prevention activities.

In the period ahead our efforts towards providing the peace and security of our people will be intensified with an increasing decisiveness and with policies and programs to be put into effect. In this respect, simultaneously with a strong social policy, preventive security will be given weight.

Preventive security authorities of general security (officers) will be re-defined with legal arrangements to be done, their working conditions and over time work will be dealt with a realist approach. The Police and the Gendarmerie will be strengthened even more in terms of both human resources and technology, and equipment and supplies.

For the police to do his tasks of preventing danger and crime, investigating crimes committed and catching the perpetrators more efficiently education of the police and the conduct of procedures that does not require professionalism like giving of driver's license, passport and license will be passed over to relevant civilian administrative units.

With the passing over of the protection of public buildings, establishments and bridges to private security organizations, the employment of more numbers of police with the task of preventing crime and danger will be provided.

Laws will be practiced in a decisive way, the practices of municipal and district governors and police chiefs and personal and their performance regarding providing security will effectively be inspected and evaluated.

Primarily in big cities, *the Strategy of Struggle with Crimes against Public Order*(,) which was prepared for struggling with crimes against public order that affect the everyday lives of our people(,) will be developed and put into practice

Within the framework of the Strategy of Struggle with Crimes against Public Order, civil dressed *Security Teams* (Güvenlik Timleri) and mobile *Thunderbolt Teams* (Yıldırım Ekipleri) will be established for intervening to crimes immediately in cities and catching the perpetrators red-handed.

The Project of Criminal Analysis Center, which will function on the basis of scientific principles and in which all data related to crimes will be observed and evaluated, security force counter strategies and tactics will be developed, will be put into practice. The intelligence capacity of security forces will be increased, and the effective coordination of intelligence will be provided too.

Violence tendency, drug addiction, the phenomenon of street children which are getting widespread in young people will be carefully put emphasis on, the

analysis of the problem in all dimensions with the conduct of social and academic studies, the development of precautions about the issue that powers of school-family-security forces to be in close cooperation and consultation will continue. Within this framework, *the Project of Protecting Children Under Risk* will be put into practice.

The 112 Urgent Help Call Center Project(,) which foresees that our citizens will be able to ask for help by calling only one number in urgent situations and the unification of call centers of the Police, the Gendarmerie, the Coastal Police, the Firefighters and ambulance, will be put into practice.

(We) will pass to dense technology use in recording, registration, and control services related to traffic, rule breaking will be punished in the most severe way and the *Zero Tolerance* approach will be adopted.

Media effect related to the phenomenon of crime will be put emphasis on. How it is perceived is as important as crime itself. Behaviors that create feelings of panic, fear and insecurity related to crime in the society will be fought, effort will be spent to provide the cooperation and support of the media.

Collective activities will be realized about taking physical and social measures that will provide (the ground for) effective struggle with crime with municipalities, *muhtar*s, institutions of education and instruction, school family unions, civil society organizations, private security organizations, other relevant institutions and establishments and media establishments.

By putting education programs targeting the practice of arrangements made in the areas of Capital and Capital Judgment Law into practice, the working of Republican Prosecutors and security forces closer and in (a) unity of understanding will be encouraged.

Security Chapter of the Original Document

Huzur ve Asayiş[198]

İnsanımızın korkusuz yaşadığı, canından ve malından emin olduğu, malını dilediği gibi tasarruf edebildiği, hak ve özgürlüklerini hiçbir endişeye kapılmadan kullanabildiği, kendisini geliştirip gerçekleştirebildiği bir ortam oluşturmak, yönetim politikalarımızın temel unsurudur.

Milletimizin demokrasi ve güvenlik taleplerini eş zamanlı olarak ve birbirini tamamlar bir şekilde karşılamak ana hedefimizdir. Gerçek anlamda huzur ve güvenlik, özgürlüğün ve adaletin tam anlamı ile yaşandığı bir toplumda mümkündür.

AK Parti, beş yıla yaklaşan iktidarı döneminde güvenliğin gerek yasal altyapısı gerekse güvenlik güçlerinin etkinleştirilmesi konusunda önemli adımlar atmıştır.

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[198] (emphasis original) the AKP, 2007 Seçim Beyannamesi, pp. 79-82.

Önleyici kolluk görevlerinde etkinliğin artırılması amacına yönelik olarak Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanununda değişiklik yapılmıştır.

Genel güvenliği destekleyici nitelikte olmak üzere, özel güvenlik hizmetleri çağdaş bir anlayışla yeniden ele alınarak yasal zemine kavuşturulmuştur.

Spor müsabakalarının huzur, güven ve centilmenlik ortamı içinde yapılması için yeni düzenlemeler yapılmıştır.

Polis sayısının iki yüz elli nüfusa bir polis düşecek şekilde artırılması hedef alınmıştır. Bu doğrultuda yedi yeni polis okulu açılarak polis okullarının sayısı 20'den 27'ye çıkarılmıştır. Böylece, bir yıl içinde teşkilata katılan polis memuru sayısı 4.000'den 11.000'in üzerine çıkarılmıştır.

Polis ve Jandarma'nın suç soruşturmasına ilişkin teknik ve idari kapasitesi geliştirilmiş, bu sayede suç aydınlatma oranı yükseltilmiştir.

Olaylara en kısa sürede müdahale etmek, kişi hak ve hürriyetlerini ön planda tutarak yurttaşlarımıza en hızlı ve etkin güvenlik hizmeti sunabilmek amacıyla, mobil iletişim teknolojisi kullanılarak, kentlerimizin cadde, sokak ve meydanları görüntülü güvenlik denetimine alınmıştır. Proje, 58 il ve 36 ilçeye yaygınlaştırılmıştır.

Jandarma sorumluluk bölgesinde işlenen suçların yerleri, zamanları, yoğunlaşma dönemleri ve hassas bölgelerin belirlenmesi ile önleyici kolluk faaliyetlerine etkinlik kazandırılması amacıyla *Bilgisayar Destekli Suç Haritalarının Oluşturulması ve Suç Analizlerinin Yapılması Projesi* hizmete girmiştir. Bu kapsamda yararlı olacak bir başka uygulama da *Kimlik Bildirim Sistemi Projesi*'dir.

AK Parti iktidarında, güvenlik ile sosyal bünye arasında kurduğumuz güçlü bağın bir yansıması olarak, suçun önlenmesi faaliyetlerine kurumların, sivil toplum örgütlerinin ve vatandaşlarımızın aktif olarak katılmasını sağlamak amacıyla, *Toplum Destekli Güvenlik Hizmeti Projesi* uygulamaya konulmuştur.

Önümüzdeki dönemde artan bir kararlılıkla ve etkinleştirilecek politika ve programlarla, halkımızın huzur ve güvenliğini sağlamaya dönük çabalarımız yoğunlaştırılacaktır. Esas olan suçluların yakalanması değil, suç işlenmesini önlemektir. Bu kapsamda, güçlü bir sosyal politika ile eş zamanlı olarak, önleyici kolluğa ağırlık verilecektir.

Genel kolluğun önleyici kolluk yetkileri, yapılacak yasal düzenlemelerle yeniden tanımlanacak, çalışma koşulları ve fazla mesaileri gerçekçi bir yaklaşımla ele alınacaktır. Polis ve jandarma, gerek insan kaynakları gerekse teknoloji, teçhizat ve malzeme bakımından daha da güçlendirilecektir.

Polisin tehlike ve suçu önleme, işlenmiş suçları soruşturma ve faillerini yakalama görevlerini daha etkin bir biçimde yapabilmesi amacıyla polis eğitimi ve profesyonellik gerektirmeyen sürücü belgesi, pasaport ve ruhsat verme gibi işlemlerin yürütülmesi ilgili sivil idari birimlere devredilecektir.

Kamu binaları, tesisler ve köprülerin korunması özel güvenlik teşkilatlarına devredilerek, suçu ve tehlikeyi önleme görevinde daha fazla sayıda polisin görevlendirilmesi sağlanacaktır.

Yasalar kararlı bir biçimde uygulanacak, vali ve kaymakamlar ile güvenlik amirleri ve personelinin uygulamaları ve güvenliği sağlamaya ilişkin performansları etkinlikle denetlenecek ve değerlendirilecektir.

Büyük kentlerimiz başta olmak üzere, halkımızın gündelik yaşamını etkileyen asayiş suçlarıyla mücadele amaçlı hazırlanmış olan *Asayiş Suçlarıyla Mücadele Stratejisi* geliştirilerek hayata geçirilecektir.

Asayiş Suçlarıyla Mücadele Stratejisi kapsamında kentlerde suçlara anında el koymak ve failleri özellikle suçüstü halinde yakalamak üzere sivil kıyafetli *Güvenlik Timleri* ve mobil *Yıldırım Ekipler* oluşturulmaktadır.

Suçlara ilişkin tüm verilerin sürekli olarak izlenip değerlendirmeye tabi tutularak, kolluğun mukabil strateji ve taktiklerinin geliştirileceği, bilimsel esaslara göre çalışacak *Suç Analiz Merkezi Projesi* uygulanacaktır. Güvenlik kuvvetlerinin istihbarat kapasiteleri arttırılacak, istihbaratın daha etkin koordinasyonu sağlanacaktır.

Gençlerde yaygınlaşan şiddet eğilimi, madde bağımlılığı, sokak çocukları olgusu üzerinde önemle durulacak, bu amaçla sosyal ve akademik çalışmalar yapılarak sorun bütün boyutlarıyla analiz edilmeye, okul-aile-güvenlik kuvvetlerinin yakın işbirliği ve danışma içinde bulunmaları konusunda gerekli önlemler alınmaya devam edilecektir. Bu çerçevede, *Risk Altındaki Çocukların Korunması Projesi* uygulanacaktır.

Yurttaşlarımızın acil durumlarda tek bir numaraya telefon ederek yardım isteyebilmelerini ve Emniyet, Jandarma, Sahil Güvenlik, İtfaiye ve Ambulans çağrı merkezlerinin birleştirilmesini öngören *112 Acil Yardım Çağrı Merkezi Projesi* hayata geçirilecektir.

Trafiğe ilişkin kayıt, tescil ve denetim hizmetlerinde yoğun teknoloji kullanımına geçilecek, kural ihlalleri en şiddetli bir biçimde cezalandırılacak ve *Sıfır Tolerans* yaklaşımı benimsenecektir.

Suç olgusuna ilişkin medya etkisi üzerinde önemle durulacaktır. Suçun kendisi kadar nasıl algılandığı da önemlidir. Suçla ilgili olarak toplumda panik, korku ve güvensizlik duygusu yaratan davranışlarla mücadele edilecek, medyanın işbirliği ve desteğinin sağlanması konusunda çaba gösterilecektir.

Suçla etkin mücadeleyi sağlayacak fiziki ve sosyal tedbirler alınması konusunda belediyeler, muhtarlar, eğitim ve öğretim kurumları, okul aile birlikleri, sivil toplum örgütleri, özel güvenlik teşkilatları, ilgili diğer kurum ve kuruluşlar ve basın kuruluşları ile ortak çalışmalar gerçekleştirilecektir.

Ceza ve Ceza Usul Hukuku alanında yapılan düzenlemelerin uygulanmasına yönelik eğitim programları yürürlüğe konularak, Cumhuriyet Savcıları ile kolluğun daha yakın ve anlayış birliği içinde çalışmaları özendirilecektir.

APPENDIX C- THE ISSUE OF URBAN (IN)SECURITY IN THE 2007
ELECTION MANIFESTO OF CHP

English Version of the Related Part of the Document, from the Chapter Titled
"Terör, Güvenlik, Huzur" (Terror, Security, Peace)[199]

>   *(We) will pass over to the practice of 'New Security System in Cooperation with the Society'*

>   *The primary and inalienable responsibility of the state is to provide the peace and security of the citizen. With a decisive, effective model that includes social and economic measures, we will make terror cease to constitute a problem.*

        The commitment of "providing the life of the citizen without any pressure or effect" which was identified in the foundational philosophy of our Republic, will be put into practice with the application of "New *Security System* Cooperation with the Society." In this extent,

- The protection of fundamental principles of the Republic and within these limits (the protection of) democratic social structure,
- United on the principle of trust in the citizen and the society, the provision of the citizen's trust in the state and a revision which will provide the full establishment of public authority,
- The effective transformation of interior security practices to include social, political, economic and cultural dimensions,
- The establishment of a secure environment in which fundamental rights and freedoms can be used in civilized manner,
- The establishment of mechanisms like neighborhood councils, application offices in big cities, in a way that will provide the recognition of public opinion and tendencies and social dynamics,
- The establishment of the integral struggle approach and will as dominant with the support of all state institutions, the society and the media, with the abandonment of only "armed struggle" approach in struggle with terror,
- The authorization of *muhtar*s to play a more effective role
- The solution of administrative, financial and structural problems, primarily education, of security forces will emergently be taken as fundamentals.

Under the government of CHP (life) in metropoles will be peaceful

Under the government of the CHP streets will not be left to bag-snatchers, homes will not be left to thieves! We promise you a peaceful and secure life in the streets, in your home, in your school, in your work place.

>   *Our women, our girls, our elderly parents will be saved from bag-snatching terror…*

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[199] (Translated by the author, emphasis original) The CHP, *Pusula 2007*, pp. 9-12.

Cities will become spaces safe to go out day (or) night.

In cooperation with the society, we will provide (a) merger between the society and the police.

There has been a big increase in the AKP period in petty crimes too, no security of property and life has been left in big cities. The citizen become to question his or her trust to the state

Efficient, professional police (officers) have been dismissed during the AKP government, security organizations become the ground for tariqa struggles.

The prevention of bag-snatching and robbery cases which have become regular cases, the protection of the citizen's security of life and property, is the primary task of the state. The state which does not do this, cannot be said to do its' job. The current situation is this, too.

In the CHP government, the citizen's security of life and property will be the most important priority.

With this objective, capital and enforcement laws will be changed; the release of captured bag-snatchers and thieves back to the street just after will be prevented.

Criminal organization which transform children into crime machines will be destroyed.

According to official data, 1 of 10 students carries (a) knife or gun. While 7,7% of the students define themselves as members of gangs, 30% exerts violence… This dread picture will improve fastly.

In the first level Children Reformatories will be expanded; priority will be given to the reintegration of children by pedagogical support and occupational training. Under the duration of government, with the combined effort of our education, development and employment projects, there will be striking set-backs in child criminality.

The victimization of our children and our young people by drugs, their temptation for (criminal) organizing, the high-schools becoming of spaces in which bad habits are gained absolutely will be prevented.

Social projects like sports, arts, travel and research will be developed, also by getting the contributions of local governments for the children and the youngsters to appraise their free times, our childrens productivity and creativity will be supported.

In the CHP government, the security of the society will be provided by security forces of te state.

The trend in which private security companies has become the primary element of security will be terminated, these companies will be supplementary elements of security as they should be.

Police stations will be re-created with a new approach.

The practice of transparent police office will be expanded, unrulinesses will be prevented; the citizen will be assured to go to police stations without hesitation.

With the aim of protecting the citizen both the numbers and the quality and efficiency of security forces will be increased. The employment of civilian and women officers in police stations will be increased, (a) major part of security forces working in bureau tasks will be shifted to public security and patrol services.

In addition to the reinforcement of motorized forces, *on foot patrol* teams will be created as a new practice, peace and security in streets and pavements of big cities will be provided by all manner of means.

Security officers' working without being rotated for a long time in a certain district and merging with neighbourhood society will be provided.

In big cities, peace and security will be provided with participatory structuring towards the people

Neighborhood councils for democratic participatory service

Neighbourhood councils will be established in our cities with the aim of the (provision) of the society's making claims on problems generated by public services, primarily security, for them to be able to transmit (these problems) to responsibles and authorities in all levels with their own contribution and participation and the provision of the solution together with neihgbourhood residents. In neighbourhood councils, the headman or headmen of the district will absolutely participate. When it is demanded, district governorship will provide space and personal for Neighbourhood Councils.

Appeal Offices for the Government with Democratic Participation

We will establish Appeal Offices in every district governorship and municipal governorship for (making) the citizens able to transmit their problems and needs on different matters to responsible institutions and establishments at any level, at any time without getting etrapped in bureaucratic obstacles. In case of need and demand, we will provide the establishment of these offices on neighbourhood basis.

These offices will be open for 24 hours, predominantly public officials will be working (there) and they will be the first door of appeal for citizens on issues as the transmission of the demands of our people searching for solutions to relevant institutions no matter what the reason is, the tracting of functioning, the solution of problems, the provision of the arrival of results to applicants and the tracking of the effects generated by the process.

Municipal/ District Governorship Coordination Centers

For the coordination of public services on the level of cities and big districts, we will establish Municipal/ District Governorship Coordination Centers for the solutions of problems transmitted to the Neighbourhood councils and Appeal Offices and for tracking practices without rupture and rapidly.

"Constant Communication and Interaction System" between Society and the State

With a system consisted of muhtarlık (district headship), the Neighbourhood Councils, Appeal Offices and Municipal/ District Governorship Coordination Centers, we will provide that the concept of publci relations put into practice, not literally but materially, by providing constant communication and interaction between the state and the society in all public services.

The Muhtarlık system will be given the importance it deserves as "the public service unit in the last edge point"

Muhtars' playing of a key role for the provision of the security and peace of the society will be provided

In big cities, the size of neighbourhood muhtarlıks will be narrowed with the seperation of big neighbourhoods, an in time (they) will be organized with a top limit of 10 thousand population. Muhtar's will be made to play a key role in the provision of the security and the peace of the society by knowing the residents of their neighbourhoods one by one.

Responsibilities and spellers of neighborhood muhtars will be increased, it will be provided that muhtarship work as a "edge local service unit."

The muhtars will also be given effective roles in the Neighbourhood Councils. The neighbourhood muhtars will have a say in the Municipal Councils, village muhtars will have a say in the General City Council.

The Village Law will be changed.

Better management of villages, better functioning of village muhtars in terms of being the representative of the state in the village , the re-accomplishment of village watchmen which already exist in the Village Law in necessitated villages will be provided.

The personal benefits of muhtars will be improved

The wages of muhtars will be increased to the level of minimum wage, their social security premiums will be paid by the state.

Financial and social rights and working conditions of security personal will be improved

The police will be given all opportunities for effective functioning.

Necessary environment for the Police Department to conduct its task in the most effective way will be established, all necessary administrative, financial and technical conditions will be provided.

Personal benefits and working conditions of the police will be improved.

The standard of living of the police will be increased, (his or her) peace will be provided; psychological support will be given for him or her to continue his or her difficult task.

Politization (of the police) and any (kinds of) religious infiltration to the Police Department will not be permitted.

The Police Department will be made to stay excluded from all kinds of political sturcturing; it will be disinfected from all kinds of interest relations, "narrow minded and bigot" infiltrations, all kinds of organized enclosures.

The families of our martyrs, soldier, gerdarmerie and police, our veterans will be taken care of.

Financial and institutional arrangements will be made to provide that the families of our martyrs and our veterans live healthly and safely for the rest of their lives and the education of their children at every level will be secured.

<center>Original Version of the Related Part[200]</center>

<u>CHP iktidarında tüm metropollerde huzur içinde yaşanacaktır.</u>

CHP iktidarında sokaklar kapkaççıya, evler hırsıza teslim edilmeyecek! Sokakta, evinizde, okulunuzda, işyerinizde huzur ve güvenlik içinde bir yaşam vaat ediyoruz.

Kadınlarımız, kızlarımız, yaşlı ana babalarımız kapkaç teröründen kurtarılacak… Kentler, gece-gündüz güvenle sokağa çıkılan alanlar olacak.

Toplumla işbirliği içinde polis-halk kaynaşmasını sağlayacağız.

AKP döneminde adi suçlarda da büyük bir artış olmuş, büyük şehirlerde can ve mal güvenliği kalmamıştır. Vatandaş devlete güvenini sorgular hale gelmiştir.

AKP iktidarı döneminde liyakatli uzman polisler görevlerinden uzaklaştırılmışlar, güvenlik örgütleri tarikat çekişmelerinin alanı haline gelmiştir.

Sıradan bir vaka haline gelen kapkaç ve hırsızlık olaylarının önlenmesi, vatandaşın can ve mal güvenliğinin korunması, devletin asli görevidir. Bunu sağlamayan devlet, görev yapmıyor demektir. Bugünkü durum da budur.

CHP iktidarında, vatandaşın can ve mal güvenliği en önemli öncelik olacaktır.

Bu amaçla, ceza ve infaz yasaları değiştirilecek; yakalanan kapkaççı ve hırsızların tekrar sokağa bırakılmaları önlenecektir.

Çocukları suç makinesi haline getiren suç çeteleri çökertilecektir.

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[200] (emphasis original) The CHP, *Pusula 2007*, pp. 9-12.

Resmi verilere gore her 10 öğrenciden 1'I kesici alet ya da silah taşıyor. Öğrencilerin %7,7'si kendisini bir çetenin üyesi olarak tanımlarken %30'u şiddet uyguluyor… Bu dehşet verici tablo hızla iyileştirilecek.

Çocuk Islah Evleri ilk aşamada yaygınlaştırılacak; pedagojik destek ve meslek öğretimiyle çocukların topluma kazandırılmasına öncelik verilecektir. İktidar süresi içinde, eğitim, kalkınma ve istihdam projelerimizin ortak etkisiyle, çocuk suçluluğunda çarpıcı gerilemeler sağlanacaktır.

Çocuklarımızın ve gençlerimizin uyuşturucu kurbanı olmaları, çeteleşmeye heves etmeleri, liselerin kötü alışkanlıklar kazanılan yerler olmaları kesinlikle önlenecektir.

Çocukların ve gençlerin boş zamanlarını değerlendirmeleri için, yerel yönetimlerden de katkı alınarak, spor, sanat, gezi, araştırma gibi sosyal projeler geliştirilecek, çocuklarımızın üretici ve yaratıcı olmaları desteklenecektir.

CHP iktidarında, halkın güvenliği devletin güvenlik güçlerince sağlanacaktır.

Özel güvenlik şirketlerinin giderek asli güvenlik unsuru olması eğilimi sonlandırılacak, bu şirketler –olması gerektiği gibi- yardımcı güvenlik unsurları olacaktır. Bu şirketlere duyulan ihtiyacın azalması, iktidarımızın güvenlik anlayışının başarısı olacaktır.

Semt karakolları yeni bir anlayışla yeniden oluşturulacaktır.

Şeffaf karakul uygulaması yaygınlaştırılacak, kuralsızlıklar önlenecek; vatandaşın karakollara çekinmeden girmesi sağlanacaktır.

Vatandaşın korunması amacıyla güvenlik güçlerinin hem sayısı, hem de niteliği ve etkinliği artırılacaktır. Karakollarda sivil ve kadın memur istihdamı artırılacak, büro işlerinde çalışan güvenlik güçlerinin büyük bölümü asayiş ve devriye hizmetlerine kaydırılacaktır.

Motorize güçlerin takviyesi yanında, yeni bir uygulama olarak *yaya devriye* timleri oluşturulacak, büyük kentlerde sokaklarda ve kaldırımlarda güvenlik ve huzur mutlaka sağlanacaktır.

Güvenlik görevlilerinin belirli bir bölgede rotasyona uğramadan uzunca bir sure görev yapması ve semt halkıyla kaynaşması sağlanacaktır.

Büyük kentlerde, halka dönük katılımcı yapılanmayla huzur ve güvenlik sağlanacaktır.

Demokratik katılımcı hizmet için Semt Konseyleri.

Şehirlerimizde, başta güvenlik olmak üzere, kamu hizmetlerinden kaynaklanan sorunlara halkın sahip çıkması, kendi katkı ve katılımıyla bu sorunların her düzeydeki sorumlu ve yetkililere iletilebilmesi ve çözümün semt sakinleriyle birlikte elbirliğiyle sağlanması amacıyla *semt konseyleri* oluşturulacaktır. Semt

Konseyleri'nde, o semtin muhtarı veya muhtarları da mutlaka görev yapacaktır. İstenildiğinde, kaymakamlık Semt Konseyleri için mekan ve eleman sağlayacaktır.

Demokratik katılımlı yönetim için Başvuru Büroları.

Yurttaşların çeşitli konulardaki sorunlarını ve ihtiyaçlarını, her an, her düzeydeki sorumlu kurum ve kuruluşlara bürokratik engellere takılmaksızın aktarmak amacıyla, her kaymakamlık ve valilikte Başvuru Büroları oluşturacağız. İhtiyaç ve talep halinde, bu büroların semt temelinde kurulmalarını da sağlayacağız.

Bu bürolar, 24 saat açık kalacak, kamu görevlileri ağırlıklı olarak çalışacak ve nedeni ne olursa olsun sorunlarına çözüm arayan insanlarımızın dileklerinin ilgili kuruluşlara aktarımı, işleyişin izlenmesi, sorunlarının çözümü, sonucun başvuru sahiplerine intikalinin sağlanması ve sürecin yarattığı etkilerin takibi konularında yurttaşların ilk başvuru kapısı olacaktır.

Valilik/Kaymakamlık Koordinasyon Merkezleri.

İller ve büyük ilçeler düzeyinde kamu hizmetlerinin koordinasyonu için de, Semt konseyleri ve Başvuru Büroları'ndan iletilen sorunların çözümü ve uygulamanın takibinin kesintisiz ve süratle yerine getirilmesi için Valilik /Kaymakamlık Koordinasyon Merkezleri Kuracağız.

Halk ile devlet arasında "Sürekli İletişim ve Etkileşim Sistemi".

Yerel hizmet birimi olarak Muhtarlık, Semt Konseyleri, Başvuru Büroları ve Valilik-Kaymakamlık Koordinasyon Merkezleri'nden oluşan bir sistemle tüm kamu hizmetlerinde, devlet ile halk arasında 24 saat sürekli iletişim ve etkileşim sağlanarak, halkla ilişkiler kavramının sözde değil, özde hayata geçirilmesini sağlayacağız.

Muhtarlık Sistemi, "en uçtaki kamu hizmet birimi" olarak hak ettiği öneme kavuşacak.

Muhtarların, halkın güvenliği ve huzurunun sağlanmasında kilit bir rol oynamaları temin edilecektir.

Büyük kentlerde, mahalle muhtarlıklarının boyutları büyük mahalleler bölünerek daraltılacak, zaman içinde nüfusu 10 bin nüfusu geçmeyecek şekilde düzenlenecektir. Muhtarların, Kendi mahalle sakinlerini bire bir tanıyarak, halkın güvenliği ve huzurunun sağlanmasında kilit bir rol oynamaları temin edilecektir.

Mahalle muhtarlarının görev ve yetkileri artırılacak, muhtarlığın bir "Uç yerel Hizmet Birimi" olarak çalışması sağlanacaktır.

Muhtarlara, Semt Konseyleri'nde de etkin roller verilecektir. Mahalle muhtarları, Belediye Meclislerinde, köy muhtarları ise İl genel meclislerinde söz sahibi olacaklardır.

Köy Kanunu değiştirilecektir.

Köy kanunu değiştirilerek köylerin daha iyi yönetilmesi, köy muhtarlarının köyde devletin temsilcisi olma işlevini daha iyi yerine getirmesi, Köy Kanunu'nda var olan köy bekçilerinin ihtiyaç duyulan köylerde yeniden hayata geçirilmesi sağlanacaktır.

Muhtarların özlük hakları iyileştirilecektir.

Muhtarların aylıkları net asgari ücret düzeyine çıkarılacak, sosyal güvenlik primleri devlet tarafından ödenecektir.

Güvenlik personelinin mali ve sosyal hakları ile çalışma koşulları iyileştirilecektir.

Polise, etkin görev için her türlü olanak sağlanacaktır.

Emniyet Teşkilatı'nın görevini en etkin şekilde yapabilmesi için gerekli ortam oluşturulacak, gerekli tüm idari, mali ve teknik koşullar sağlanacaktır.

Polisin özlük hakları ve çalışma koşulları iyileştirilecektir.

Polisin yaşam düzeyi yükseltilecek, huzuru sağlanacak; zor görevini sürdürmesi için daha etkili psikolojik destek verilecektir.

Emniyet Teşkilatı'nda siyasallaşmaya ve hiçbir tarikatçı sızmaya izin verilmeyecektir

Emniyet Teşkilatı, her türlü siyasi yapılanmanın dışında tutulacak; her türlü çıkar ilişkilerinden, "bağnaz ve yobaz" sızmalardan, her türlü örgütlü kuşatmalardan arındırılacaktır.

Asker, jandarma ve polis şehitlerimizin ailelerine, gazilerimize sahip çıkılacaktır.

Şehitlerimizin ailelerinin ve gazilerimizin hayat boyu sağlıklı ve güvenli yaşamlarının, çocuklarının her kademedeki eğitimlerinin güvencesini oluşturacak mali ve kurumsal düzenlemeler yapılacaktır.

APPENDIX D- THE ISSUE OF URBAN (IN)SECURITY IN THE 2007
ELECTION MANIFESTO OF MHP

English Version of the Chapter Titled "*Asayiş*" (Public Order)[201]

The establishment of an environment that will provide the establishment of peace and security in the society, giving a sense of public authority in every corner of the country and without discriminating among persons; state's use of the authority it takes from laws in a protective and kind approach and citizen's feeling secure in every point of life constitutes the principal of our security understanding.

The public order and security picture in front of Turkey is scary in all aspects. There has not been security of life and property left, Turkey has become heaven of crime and criminals.

The "Action Plan" which was prepared with the aim of struggle with city terror, crime and criminal will immediately be put into practice.

A total war will be fought in struggle with city terror, crime and criminals. The "Action Plan" which was prepared with this aim will immediately be put into practice.

The prevention of terror and public order events before they happen with the conduct of researches on economic, social and other factors giving sustenance to lack of public order and terror will be our primary goal. Measures will be developed about interior migration, poverty, corruption, social, political and cultural developments disrupting the national and moral atmosphere, deforming family structure.

The capacity and authority of security units for making criminal analysis will be extended, thus preventive security service, will be given emphasis.

Public order events, happening especially in big cities, will be prevented, measures will be taken to abolish threats against security of life and property of the citizen.

Security guards will be employed at night to prevent public order at events.

In this respect, security guards with the technical equipment necessary for the task will be employed to work between 22:00 and 06:00, security camera system will be expanded.

For the prevention of crime before it transforms into action methods will be developed about the effective help of the public opinion, the citizens will be informed about physical precautions.

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[201] (translated by the author, emphasis are original). MHP, *Milli Duruş ve Kararlılık Belgesi,* 2007, pp. 25-28.

With the re-definition of the authorities and responsibilities of institutions in the field of interior security, the conduct of service in harmony will be provided (the system) will be made to function with modern methods.

An effective coordination will be provided between units in institutional structuring, in intelligence activities, in information flow and in struggle with crime, in the appointment and promotion of security personal merit will be primary.

Staffing that stains the honorable members of the police will be broken and poisonous centers which erode the organism of our police department will be defused.

The work conditions of Turkish police will be improved in a way that protects the honor of the occupation and objectivity.

All measures will be taken to improve the work conditions (occupational, psychological and financial) of the Turkish police who fight a front-line war against unruliness and crime in a way that protects the honor and objectivity of the occupation.

Working hours, length and conditions absolutely will be fixed and improved.

With the revision of legal regulations organizing the field of responsibilities and authorities of the police, new regulations will be made in the framework of providing efficiency in relation to the provision of security.

Security compensation, 230 YTL per month, will be given to members of security forces.

"Security compensation" in the amount of multiplication of "5000" determinants with monthly official coefficient (about 230 YTL) will be given to members of the security forces.

The reintegration of children who have committed crimes or have criminal tendencies to the society will be provided by education and professionalization in cooperation with their families, if they have; if (they do) not, by mechanisms of generating protection and rehabilitation.

Within the framework of data and information automation; gathering, classification, analysis, storing and making appropriate for re-use of information and documents that will be acquired in different levels of interior security and judiciary without fault and the processing of raw data that already exists in different data to become useful and obtaining information in demanded quality and scale from these, their processing, and drawing conclusions about the future from these will be provided.

Legal regulations of private security will be taken hold on (and) will be re-arranged according to the needs of the country.

Traffic terror which causes huge loss of life and property will be prevented.

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For the prevention of traffic terror which causes huge loss of life and property, adjustment of roads according to international standards, expansion of education activities related to the prevention of driver faults reactivation of traffic control and punishment and development of auto-control system will be provided.

Original Version of the Related Part[202]

Toplumda huzur ve güvenin sağlanması, kamu otoritesinin yurdun her köşesinde ve kişiler arasında ayrım yapılmaksızın hissettirilmesini; devletin yasalardan aldığı yetkiyi kollayıcı ve müşfik bir anlayış içinde kullanmasını ve vatandaşın hayatın her alanında güvende olduğunu hissetmesini temin edecek bir ortamın tesisi güvenlik anlayışımızın esasını oluşturmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin karşısındaki asayiş ve güvenlik tablosu her bakımdan ürkütücüdür. Can ve mal güvenliği kalmamış, Türkiye suç ve suçlular cenneti haline gelmiştir.

Şehir terörü, suç ve suçlularla mücadele amacıyla hazırlanan "Eylem Planı" süratle uygulamaya sokulacak.

Şehir terörü, suç ve suçlularla mücadelede topyekûn bir savaş verilecektir. Bu amaçla hazırlanan "Eylem Planı" süratle uygulamaya sokulacaktır.

Asayişsizliği ve terörü besleyen ekonomik, sosyal ve diğer etkenler üzerinde araştırmalar yapılarak terörün ve asayiş olaylarının gerçekleşmeden önlenmesi esas hedefimiz olacaktır. İç göç, yoksulluk, yolsuzluk, milli ve manevi iklimi ve dengeyi bozan, aile yapısını deforme eden sosyal, siyasal ve kültürel gelişmelerle ilgili tedbirler geliştirilecektir.

Kolluk birimlerinin suç analizi yapma kapasitesi ve yetkinliği artırılacak, böylece önleyici kolluk hizmetlerine ağırlık verilecektir.

Özellikle büyük kentlerde yaşanan asayiş olayları önlenecek, vatandaşın can ve mal güvenliğine ilişkin tehditleri ortadan kaldıracak tedbirler alınacaktır.

Asayiş olaylarını önlemek için gece güvenlik görevlileri istihdam edilecek.

Bu kapsamda, 22.00-06.00 saatleri arasında görev yapacak gerekli teknik donanıma sahip güvenlik görevlileri istihdam edilecek, güvenlik kamera sistemi yaygınlaştırılacaktır.

Suçun teşebbüse dönüşmeden önlenmesi için kamuoyunun etkin yardımına ilişkin yöntemler geliştirilecek, vatandaşlar fiziki tedbirler konusunda bilinçlendirilecektir.

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[202] (emphasis are original). MHP, Milli Duruş ve Kararlılık Belgesi, 2007, pp. 25-28.

İç güvenlik alanındaki kurumların yetki ve sorumlulukları yeniden tanımlanmak suretiyle, hizmetin uyum içinde yerine getirilmesi sağlanarak, çağdaş yöntemlerle çalışır hale getirilecektir.

Kurumsal yapılanmada, istihbarat faaliyetlerinde, bilgi akışında ve suçla mücadelede birimler arasında etkili bir eşgüdüm sağlanacak, güvenlik personelinin atama ve terfilerinde liyakat esas alınacaktır.

Şerefli emniyet mensuplarını şaibe altında bırakan kadrolaşma kırılacak ve emniyet teşkilatımızın bünyesini kemiren fesat odakları etkisiz hale getirilecektir.

Türk polisinin görev şartları meslek onurunu ve tarafsızlığını koruyacak şekilde iyileştirilecek.

Kanunsuzluk ve suça karşı adeta bir cephe savaşı veren Türk polisinin görev şartlarının (mesleki, psikolojik ve maddi) meslek onurunu ve tarafsızlığını koruyacak şekilde iyileştirilmesi için her önlem alınacaktır.

Çalışma saatleri, süresi ve koşulları behemehâl düzeltilecek ve iyileştirilecektir.

Polisin görev ve yetki alanını düzenleyen mevzuat gözden geçirilerek, güvenliğin teminine ilişkin etkinlik sağlanması çerçevesinde yeni düzenlemeler yapılacaktır.

Güvenlik Mensuplarına aylık 230 YTL güvenlik tazminatı verilecek.

Güvenlik mensuplarına "5000" göstergenin memur aylık katsayısı ile çarpımı tutarında (yaklaşık 230 YTL) "güvenlik tazminatı" verilecektir.

Suç işleyen ve suça meyilli çocukların varsa aileleriyle işbirliği yapılarak eğitilmeleri, meslek edinmeleri suretiyle, ailesi olmayanların ise korunmaya alınması ve rehabilite edilmesi suretiyle topluma kazandırılmaları sağlanacaktır.

Veri ve bilgi otomasyonu çerçevesinde; iç güvenlik ve yargının değişik kademelerden elde edilecek bilgi ve belgelerin hatasız olarak toplanması, tasnif edilmesi, incelenmesi, depolanması ve yeniden kullanıma hazır hale getirilmesi ve halen değişik birimlerde mevcut olan ham verilerin kullanılabilir hale getirilmesi ve bunların içinden istenen nitelikte ve ölçekteki bilgilerin elde edinilmesi, işlenmesi ve bunlardan geleceğe yönelik sonuç çıkartılması sağlanacaktır.

Özel güvenlik mevzuatı ele alınarak ülke ihtiyacına göre yeniden düzenlenecektir.

Büyük can ve mal kaybına yol açan trafik terörü önlenecek.

Büyük can ve mal kaybına yol açan trafik terörünün önlenmesine yönelik olarak; karayollarının uluslararası standartlara uygun hale getirilmesi, sürücü hatalarının önlenmesine ilişkin eğitim faaliyetlerinin yaygınlaştırılması, trafik denetim ve cezalarının etkinleştirilmesi ve otokontrol sisteminin geliştirilmesi sağlanacaktır.

Figure 1: Numbers of snatching, robbery, extortion and theft cases published in the first page of *Hürriyet* newspaper (2000-2008)

Figure 2: Numbers of cases of sex-related offences (rape, attempted rape, sexual harassment and sexual abuse of children) published in the first page of *Hürriyet* newspaper (2000-2008)

Figure 3: Numbers of people employed in the security sector in

Turkey (2005-2010)

Figure 4: Turnover in the security sector in Turkey (2005-2010)

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