

**KADRO AND KEMALİŞM:**  
**A Search For an Ideology in The**  
**Early 1930s**

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Submitted to the Institute for Atatürk's Principles and the  
History of Turkish Renovation in the History of Turkish  
Renovation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Master of Arts.

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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:**

I would like to thank Professor Reşat KAYNAR, for both encouraging me to select this topic and for making it possible for me to interview İsmail Hüsrev TÖKİN who is the last living member of the Kadroists. I would also like to thank İsmail Hüsrev TÖKİN for the interview.

My greatest debt is to my advisor Dr. Nevin COŞAR who checked the thesis many times. Completion of this study would not have been possible without her patience. I am grateful to Professor Zafer TOPRAK who gave much excellent advice. I would also like to thank Professor Şevket PAMUK for reading the manuscript, and kindly offering the necessary advice for satisfactory completion of my thesis.

I would also like to thank Frank WATERHOUSE, for correcting my English and also to Miss. Necla DİLEKTAŞLI for helping me with the computer.

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ABSTRACT

KADRO AND KEMALISM:

A Search For Ideology in the Early 1930s

by

Mustafa Uğur DALAK

The primary reason for the present research questioned whether the political, economic and social philosophy of Kadro influenced Kemalism, or Kemalism used Kadro to implement the political directions of the single party regime at its inception.

Kadro's philosophy which may be defined as a superficial combination of Marxism, nationalism and fascism was expounded in the early 1930s by a group of radical intellectual. Kadro's theses and its problematical relationship with Kemalism (which it was developed as a modernizing pragmatic ideology emanated from the Tanzimat era) were treated within a theoretical approach using the conceptual framework of populism, modernisation and co-optation.

Populist policy of Kemalism in the 1930s was for a classless and united society within the single party regime as state capitalism, namely etatism was still

being maintained. Kadro was attempting to combine the post-revolutionary anti-imperialist and capitalist rhetoric of the 1920s with the populism of 1930s. The claim of Kadro in 1932 is to contribute to the reproduction of the Kemalist ideology and put it into a mature (doctrinaire) form. This contribution was a 'peculier hybrid' of Kemalism, in other words a kind of endeavour to give a strict "authoritarian/totalitarian" mixture of a socialist-fascist form to it. However, Kemalist leaders did not want any ideology other than that of their own. Moreover, Kadro's very strong anti-West/liberal leanings in both political, cultural and economic aspect were not compatible with the Kemalist prospects. Therefore, it is not possible to assume that Kadro had influenced the Kemalist single party regime. With these stances it is difficult to imagine that Kadro could have been tolerated by Atatürk.

The reason why Kadro's cessation was dealt with comprehensively between Kadro and the ruling Kemalist elite was to show the enormous disparity in their views on political revolution, ideology and civilization. In order to understand the closure of Kadro hermeneutical interpretation was used to analyse the relevant data, including Atatürk's message, published in Kadro. Furthermore, relevant parts of Yakup Kadri's book named "Zoraki Diplomat" and the interview with İsmail Hüsrev, was also used.

## ÖZET

**KADRO ve KEMALİZM:**

**1930'ların Başında Bir İdeoloji Arayışı**

by

**Mustafa Uğur DALAK**

"Kadro siyasal, iktisadi ve sosyal görüşleriyle Kemalist ideoloji üzerinde etkili mi oldu; yoksa tek parti rejiminin siyasal hedeflerinin gerçekleşmesinde Kemalizmin bir aracı olarak mı kullanıldı" argümanı bu çalışmanın anahtar sorusunu oluşturuyor. 1930'ların başında Marksizm, milliyetçilik ve faşizmi yüzeysel bir sentezle buluşturan Kadro'cu felsefe ile, 1920'lerden itibaren radikal/pragmatik bir ideoloji olarak gelişen Kemalist ideolojinin bağdaşan noktaları popülizm kavramının teorik çerçevesi içinde çözümleniyor.

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"Historical knowledge is the answer to definite questions, an answer which must be given by the past; but the questions themselves are put and dictated in the present by our present intellectual interests and our present moral and social needs." <sup>1</sup>

## PREFACE

In the 1980s after fascimilies of the Kadro journal were made public<sup>2</sup> a considerable increase was observed in the research of Kadro.<sup>3</sup> With the exception of some monographic studies which dealt with Kadro's important

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1) Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944, p. 195.

2) Kadro journal's fascimiles were published (in 3 volumes) by Cem Alpar in Ankara İktisadi Ticari ilimler Akademisi, between 1978-80.

3) It is generally accepted that the Kadroist school has a significant place in Turkish political and intellectual thought. It was formed around the journal Kadro which was published between the years 1932-35. Comprehensive research in the field of social science since the 1960s placed Kadro on the academic agenda. Another reason that made Kadro popular was the activities of some who became known as the 'New Statists', or 'New Kadroists'. They were involved with the journals Yön and Devrim during the 1960s. Çağlar Keyder pointed out this continuity as such: "The movement around the journal Kadro was a forerunner of Third-World ideologies and contained an astonishingly complete catalogue of all the arguments which again became current in the 1960s." Çağlar Keyder, State and class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, Verso, 1987, p. 243.

specific aspects<sup>4</sup> such as etatism, elitism, the Third World theory, and nationalism, the Kadro's (over all) relationship with Kemalism is still treated as a speculative matter. Consequently, in terms of these aspects no conclusive result has yet been reached up to date.

There are possibly two reasons for this: The first stems from the eclectic structure of the philosophy/ideology which was put forward by Kadro.<sup>5</sup> Second, the ideology of Kemalism, which Kadro attempted to systematize and participate in, is still problematic. It is obvious that a comprehensive analysis of the relationship (which was of a conflicting type to a great extent) between Kadro and Kemalism cannot be succesful without the clarification of what Kemalism is and what it is not. For Kemalism, despite numerous studies, is still open to

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4) See, for detailed comparison of the dependency and Kadroist theories Haldun Gülalp, "Nationalism, Statism and the Turkish Revolution: An Early 'Dependency' Theory", Review of Middle East Studies, No: 4, 1988. pp. 71-84. As an elite movement see, İlhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, "Bir Aydın Hareketi:Kadro" Toplum ve Bilim, No:24, (Winter-1984), pp. 35-67. As a nationalist "left" movement see, Merdan Yanardağ, Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro Hareketi, Yalçın Yayınları, İstanbul, 1988.

5) Kemal Karpas argues that "Kadro's philosophy in fact was a superficial combination of Marxism, Nationalism and Corporatism (plus elitism). The Turkish Revolution, in the view of Kadro ideologists, was a struggle against capitalism and imperialism, and a part of the world-wide struggle for economic liberation." Kemal Karpas, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a multi-Party System, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1959, p. 70.



interpretation, because exhaustive research into its sources and documents have not yet been completed. Hence, a new examination of Kadroist theses and resolution of the above mentioned problematic relationships are the main objectives of this study.

Therefore, this research posits the question as to whether the political, economic and social philosophy of Kadro influenced Kemalism, or whether Kemalism used Kadro to implement the political directions of the single party regime in its formation. In attempting to answer this elusive question the thesis will be looking at such concepts as populism, etatism, revolution and the different views held by Kadro and Kemalism towards the formation of the single party regime.

This study is divided into two parts: The first part attempts to analyse, political and economic developments in the 1930s in Turkey on a theoretical basis which paved the way for the Kemalist single party regime and the emergence of the Kadro movement. Furthermore, the main aspect of the Kemalist ideology and Kadro philosophy will be evaluated in this part. The second part examines mainly the conflicting relationship between the ruling political elites and Kadroists vis-a-vis the above posited question.

## PART ONE

### CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

When we attempt to understand such points as the role of political thoughts or participants, which determine the model of the regime, and the place of ideology, we must take into consideration some predominant aspects of the political tradition and the socio-economic heritage (or in other words indigenous factors) which have continued in the Turkish Republic since the Tanzimat and especially the Second Constitutional Period.

In addition to the political tradition and the socio-economic factors, a comprehensive understanding of the world conjuncture (external factors) which affects the internal developments, should enlarge the scope of work. Thus, in this present work, the single party regime and populist, etatist policies must be analysed from the points of view of these aspects.

Kadro was predominantly a political and economic journal. During the 1930s one hardly came across a publication which could be qualified as being a pure literary journal. The basic problem of the intelligentsia of that time remained the development of theoretical approaches

which would direct official politics regarding their own socio-economic problems. Kadro also evaluated cultural, educational and philosophical problems from a political point of view. As a prominent author of Turkish literature, Yakup Kadri (as well as Şevket Süreyya and Burhan Asaf) was responsible for the cultural policy of Kadro. In this sense Kadro had an important place in 1930s intellectual publications.<sup>6</sup>

The chief members of staff of Kadro, Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin), Vedat Nedim (Tör), Burhan Asaf (Belge), Şevki (Yazman) influenced by the Socialist Russian Revolution. The crucial impact of the socialist system was in the 1930s, when planned efforts accomplished a take off in heavy industry and in agricultural production (unlike the European capitalist countries, whose economies in the wake of 1929 Great Depression were in disarray). Hence, in terms of state intervention and 'social mobilisation' aspects, both Socialist and Fascist/Nazi regimes (movement regimes) were impressive in the 1930s.

Bernard Lewis described the economic and the political developments and the emergence of the Kadro movement in the wake of World economic depression as follows: "The

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6) See: Zafer Toprak, "Fikir Dergiciliğinin Yüz Yılı," in Türkiye'de Dergiler Ansiklopediler (1849-1984), Gelişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, pp. 34-53.

world crisis of 1929 opened a new phase in the economic and social development of the Turkish Republic. The pressure of economic necessity impelled the Turkish state to undertake more extensive economic activities, and led it, in 1931, to adopt etatism as a central plank in its programme; at the same time, the rise of dictatorship and of dictatorial movements in several of the European states discredited political as well as economic liberalism, and made it easier for the Turkish state to acquire and exercise the new political powers that went with its new economic responsibilities. The new policy does not seem to have been inspired by any new ideological trends, or to have been directly due to any external theoretical influences. The crisis had, however, brought a certain revival of anti-Western and anti-capitalist feeling in Turkey; the new economic co-operation with Russia brought some renewal of the comradeship of the early years of the Republic. It was in these circumstances that a new ideological trend appeared in Turkey, known by name of Kadro..."<sup>7</sup>

The principal aim of Kadro was complete development via industrialisation and technological modernisation. In terms of these aspects Kadro can be classified within the

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7) Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Second ed. Oxford University Press, London, 1968, pp. 469-70.

mobilisational perspective.<sup>8</sup> Fascism and National Socialism (Nazism) now emerged as being new alternatives to liberalism.<sup>9</sup> Despite the great historical differences (the socialist and fascist/Nazi system) the idea of the superiority of the state and excessive state intervention into economic and social life were the common characteristics of these regimes. It may also be claimed that the spectacular rise of 'authoritarian' regimes and their economic performances were very attractive to the

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8) According to L. C. Mayer, "Social mobilization refers to the process of inducting the population into the sociopolitical process and gathering the resources of society for the purposes of the socio-political system. Since development involves increasing the capacities the system, including the advancement of technology and the building of industry, the imperatives of development include the diversion of resources from consumption to capital accumulation. Long-term gain necessitates short-term sacrifice. Yet, most populations appear to be more present oriented than future-oriented, and market forces do not produce the requisite policies of austerity as individual and group interest prevail over community or systemic interests. Hence, as David Apter pointed out years ago, the early stages of modernization require an authoritarian system with the capacity to command the co-optation and allocation of the resources of society for long range goals" Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance, Sage Publications, Newbury Park California, 1989, pp. 246-47.

9) "After Weber's death, the idea of the supremacy of the state became associated with theories of the corporate state as established notably in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany itself. In the process, corporatism became a theoretical synonym for fascism. This association was unfortunate so far as later application of the term to European politics was concerned. Corporatism inevitably bore connotations of totalitarian dictatorship obviously irrelevant to the type of interest representation that emerged in the advanced industrial countries" Martin Staniland, What Is Political Economy? A Study Of Social Theory and Underdevelopment, Yale University Press, 1985, p. 89.

newly established Republican regime as well.<sup>10</sup>

The political importance that Kadro attached to the Kemalist single party regime in terms of nationalism and Etatism with Haldun Gülalp's comment on this matter is as follows. "The launching of an industrialization programme by the newly established Kemalist regime, soon after the war of independence was won, led to its interpretation as an anti-imperialist programme. Its implementation in the form of statism led to its interpretation as a 'classless' programme. These two aspects made for the interpretation of the regime as 'progressive'."<sup>11</sup>

Because of the Turkish Revolution's need for self justification the sui-generis character of the Republican regime was over-emphasized starting from the Republic and especially in the single-party era. Great emphasis was put on Turkey as having a national entity separate not only from the rest of the world but also from its Ottoman

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10) Çağlar Keyder pointed out this fact: "In the case of Turkey, the model, its administrative structure and ideological underpinnings, derived directly from the contemporaneous experience of European fascism. At the time, all of the southern European states, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, were dominated by varieties of fascist political systems, with Italian fascism providing the innovative laboratory." See, Çağlar Keyder, op.cit., pp. 107-8. However, despite the mentioned partial effects of fascist political systems the single party regime of Turkey cannot be labelled as fascist in terms of its essential structure. See also, Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, Cem Yayınevi, 2nd, ed., İstanbul, 1989, passim.

11) Haldun Gülalp, op.cit., pp. 70-76

past. In the view of Recep Peker, the Turkish revolution has nothing to do with the other revolutions; it is completely original. In this matter (esp. in terms of regime) Peker refers to the Atatürk's words "We resemble ourselves". 12

In order to legitimate the new regime, the Republican elite changed the legitimating symbols and traditional values. Through cultural reforms the influence of tradition and religion was lessened on society. Besides the above mentioned claims about the unique character of the new regime, the Turkish Republic emerged as a product of the Second Constitutional era's thoughts and developments.

Ali Kazancıgil clarifies this continuity as such: "The Kemalist movement, following the Young Turk regime brought drastic changes the Turkish polity. But it was definitely not a social revolution, and there were no insurrections in cities or rural areas. This 'revolution from above' did not need mass mobilization. Commoners participated in the Kemalist movements as soldiers and not as revolutionaries. Kemalism constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Young Turks, in so far as its major concern was the state, considered as the unique mediating mechanism and source of legitimacy in

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12) See for details, Recep Peker, İnkılap Dersleri, 4th. ed., İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 34.

the society, prevailing over market relations. It also had to relay on officials, legitimating symbols and certain traditional values of the former regime, until it could impose a newly defined legitimacy."<sup>13</sup>

### A Theoretical Approach To Populism:

Populism is found within the original and objective circumstances which were produced by delayed capitalism. In terms of the aforementioned aspects both Kemalism and Kadro can be considered within the populist paradigm which had been prevalent in the countries that experienced delayed-capitalism and industrialization. The delayed development phenomenon and its political associations (within the dependency paradigm) have been broadly analysed as referring to populist and corporatist authoritarianism. There are (in developmental terms) similarities between the experiences of Latin American, peripheral European countries and some Third World societies.

James Malloy a leading scholar dealing with the delayed development problem argues that: "This pattern of development took place during the end of the nineteenth

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13) Ali Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism" in Atatürk founder a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1981, pp. 48-9.; See also Zafer Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi", in Türkiye Tarihi, (Vol. 3), ed. Sina Akşin, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1988, p. 193.



and the beginning of the twentieth century in response to stimuli emanating from the more industrialized capitalist states of the Western Europe and the United States. As a result, the various nations of the region were integrated into an international capitalist market system where they functioned mainly as suppliers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods. For the most part, economic growth and modernization in the region were the results of an outward-oriented growth model which overemphasized development of the export sectors of the local economies."<sup>14</sup>

In the late-developing societies of Europe, were the pre-eminence of the state (and authoritarianism accompanying it) was both partly a historical legacy and partly a result of a weak "national bourgeoisie" making liberal, private enterprise style of development unworkable.<sup>15</sup> In rhetoric, the populists rejected both capitalism and socialism and advocated a third path to a development peculiar to each nation. In terms of political economy, populism advocated a system of 'neo-mercantalism' or 'state capitalism'.

Hence, in the broadest sense populism can be defined from

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14) James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern", in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, pp. 6-89.

15) Martin Staniland, op.cit., p. 88.

two main points. Firstly, as a concept of political/social science; secondly, as a category of political economy. In terms of conceptual aspects some questions arise i.e. whether it is primarily an ideology or a movement or both; or is populism a sort of 'recurring mentality' appearing in different historical and geographical contexts as the result of a special social situation faced by societies.<sup>16</sup>

Populism, has generally been defined as an 'amorphous' concept by scholars. However, some common features of populism, (most of which were shared by both Kadro and Kemalists) are described by Peter Worsley as follows:

a- The proposition that socio-economic classes are not the crucial social entities that they are in developed countries: They are held not to exist, or to be vestigial remnants of colonialism or 'feudalism', or to be merely incipient (and with social engineering, can be prevented from emerging). The class struggle is therefore an irrelevant conception.

b- The major antagonisms are those between society as a whole (the 'nation') and the outside world, particularly

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16) Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, eds, The Macmillan Company, 1969, p. 3.

the ex-colonial Powers.

c- The Party is the agency of liberation, and the Party-State the agency of development. The strategy of modernization is primarily via heavy industry or even secondary industry.

d- The unity of the nation is expressed in the single-party, and sometimes elaborated into a philosophy which links Party, nation, village-life, and self-activity into an ideological complex.<sup>17</sup>

Worsley finally tries to define populism by referring to Edward Shills, who condenses all the particular dimensions of populism under two principles: the notion of the supremacy of the will of the people, and the notion of the direct relationship between people and government. Adopting Shills definition Worsley arrived at (as a higher level of abstraction), 'an ideal type'; populism in its specific historical forms being 'an instance of the species'. According to Worsley, the populist syndrome, then, is much wider than its particular manifestation in the form or context of any particular policy, or of any particular class of polity:

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17) Peter Worsley, "The Concept of Populism", in Populism: Its Meaning..., pp. 212-50.

democracy, totalitarianism, etc. 18

### KADRO vis-a-vis POPULISM and KEMALISM

In contemporary political literature, populism is a typological category directed towards a social movement and a certain intellectual viewpoint. It aims to understand the ideological and the political attitude of different strata of the petite-bourgeoisie in different countries at different times. In these late developing countries the intelligentsia claim another social role.

19 In terms of this aspect a continuity can be seen between the intelligentsia of the Second Constitutional era and single party period. The intelligentsia of the Second Constitutional era were not only dealing with theoretical politics, but also actually governing the country.

Theoretically, the Republican regime was backed up by the will of the people. However, it is a fact that in the legacy of Kemalism people have always been under the patronage of the state elites. Therefore, it can be argued that both Kadro and the Kemalists, were compatible with populism, and shared the same tradition

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18) Ibid., pp. 244-45.

19) See, Zafer Toprak, "Popülizm ve Türkiye'deki Boyutları", in Tarih ve Demokrasi (Tarık Zafer Tunaya'ya Armağan), Cem Yayınevi, 1992, p. 62.

favouring the state over the people.

Populist policy of Kemalism in the 1930s was for a classless and united society within the single party regime as state capitalism namely etatism was still being maintained. Kadro was attempting to combine the post-revolutionary anti-imperialist and capitalist rhetoric of the 1920s with the populism of the 1930s.

Hence, the idea, asserted by some scholars that the single party regime distinguished populism (halkçılık) from etatism (devletçilik), seems to be vague while Kadro insisted that etatism should be directed towards populism. It should be born in mind that Kadro did not use the concept of people. Kadro employed the concept of nationhood which (in terms of social aspect) has semantically rather abstract connotation. <sup>20</sup> The Republican intelligentsia growing up with the mottos of "how can this country be saved and developed and these people be civilised?" underestimated the people and the pure intellectuals, developing jackobean, Kadroist tendencies and "dynamic forces." <sup>21</sup>

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20) On this matter see: İlhan Tekeli-Gencay Şaylan "Türkiyede Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi", Toplum ve Bilim, no: 5-6, 1978, pp. 85-86.

21) See, Taha Parla, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 31-33.

## CO-OPTATION

Another essential premise of this thesis is that Kadro's relationship with the ruling political elite developed mainly within a conflicting framework. In other words, Kadro's ideas (action) would not have been accepted, but co-opted, by the ruling political elite from the beginning of its publication.

It will be argued that the Kadroist school was allowed to function as an intellectual alternative within the limitations determined by co-optation. The principles of co-optation and appointment are two important concepts that have to be comprehended in order to understand Turkish political culture. These concepts portray a political tradition of society which is directed from above by the state. This tradition of politics, according to Murat Belge, was inherited from the Ottoman Empire after its collapse and continued in the Turkish Republic. In this political tradition, institutions and concepts were not allowed to form a mechanism of control from the below to the above.<sup>22</sup>

It can be seen that a system of patronage was beginning to emerge in the early days of the Republic. A better

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22) Murat Belge, "Yahya Kemal ve Osmanlı'da Siyasi Gelenek", Toplum ve Bilim no: 28, (Winter-1985), p. 20.

example of the continuance of co-optation and appointment was the 1923 election, resulting in the elimination of the Second Group from the Grand Turkish Assembly.<sup>23</sup> The beginning of Kadro's publication and its relationship with the ruling political elite during its years of publication between 1932-35, and the story of cessation, like the free party experience of 1930, clarify this situation.

The Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) was founded by the initiative of Atatürk. Unlike the Free Party, Kadro (despite the alleged approval of Atatürk and İnönü) met with some difficulty from the Secretary General of the RPP during the permission process. In his memoirs Yakup Kadri asserts that, members of the parliament were unaware of the principles of the RPP, which he says made him publish Kadro.<sup>24</sup>

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23) In May 1921, Mustafa Kemal formed a group within the National Assembly. Due to the opposition of the Unionists and Enver Pasha's clique (and, for preventing Enver's chances of a possible acceleration in the case of a military defeat) Mustafa Kemal aimed to give a cohesive form to his followers. The Second Group was formed as a reaction to this development by the opponents of Mustafa Kemal whose main aim was possibly limiting his power in the Assembly. See for details of this matter, E.J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926, Leiden-E.J.Brill, 1984, pp. 128-32. Concerning the details of the Enver Paşa matter see: Ahmet Mumcu, Tarih Açısından Türk Devriminin Temelleri ve Gelişimi, 6th. ed, İnkılap ve Aka Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1981, p. 55.

24) "I went to Recep Peker and said 'I want to publish a journal to enlighten the members of parliament and the public on the principles of the RPP' 'What good

According to the thesis, which Kadro expressed at every occasion through its various contributors there was no one except Atatürk and İnönü amongst the leadership of the RPP who believed in a revolutionary method and ideology. The other leaders were always described contemptuously with the label of 'bureaucrat'. Kadro, however, in terms of ideological suggestions was not taken seriously by the ruling political elite. Tökin expressed the view (in the interview with him), although committed to the Turkish revolution, they were always seen as communist by Celal Bayar and some other leading figures of the regime.

Hence, Kadro clashed with all the other political elites by defending its own opinions about the Turkish Revolution, and ideology.<sup>25</sup> After Kadro's publication stopped, Kadroists continued to complain about the lack

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will it do?' he asked. I said 'Kadro means, a group of leading people of a political party! Recep Peker then claimed that 'It is our duty not yours'! After this refusal I visited Atatürk, explaining to him the reason why I wanted to publish a journal. And Atatürk gave me permission. When İnönü's attention was drawn to this he was happy."

See: Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri, İstanbul, İ.T.İ.A., 1973, pp. 82-83.

25) "The Kadro died as a result of the suspicions of Marxism and Communism which it aroused as soon as it started discussing social classes, and tried to analyze Turkey's economic and social problems from a socio-political viewpoint." Kemal Karpaz, op.cit., p. 71.



of understanding of the RPP Leaders.<sup>26</sup> As can be seen from previous experiences, enforcing the system of co-optation would have been impossible for Kadro. (This matter will be discussed in the last chapter)

According to some scholars, Kadro had become the victim of hostile groups (landlords, local notables, the circle of iş Bankası, etc.) because it threatened their interests.<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, the reason for Kadro's cessation has still not been dealt with comprehensively in terms of the contradiction between Kadro and the Kemalist view of ideology, civilization and cultural aspects. These aspects of the relationship between the Kadroists and the ruling Kemalist elite will be discussed throughout the thesis esp. where the Atatürk's message is discussed (it was submitted to the Kadro journal on the 10th anniversary of the Republic.<sup>28</sup>

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26) Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, op.cit., in Atatürkçülük..., pp. 83-84.

27) See, Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 1993, p. 168.

28) Hermeneautical interpretation will be the method used in the analysis of the related documents. For a clearer understanding of the above problematic relationship a definite contact must be established between the ideas of Mustafa Kemal and the Kadroists. In this context, Atatürk's message (Published in Kadro, No: 22, October, 1933, p. 2.) will be given great consideration. So far this message has not been evaluated in terms of its 'real meanings'. For hermeneautical method see footnote 98.

## CHAPTER II.

KEMALİST IDEOLOGY/SINGLE PARTY RULE AND KADRO.

The Third Congress of the RPP constituted a turning point in Turkey's political life. Before this congress for seven and- a- half years the Republican regime was consolidating its power and two unsuccessful attempts were made in order to establish a multi-party system.<sup>29</sup> Kemalism which was symbolised by "six arrows", was included in the Republican Peoples Party's programme in the 1931 Third Grand Congress of RPP and became the official ideology of the state.

However, Kemalism, as a nationalist ideology, began to have an identity of its own in the 1920's. Deep roots of Kemalism can be traced back to the Second Constitutional period. Feroz Ahmad pointed out this fact as follows: "Despite the original character of Kemalism, it did have antecedents for both its ideas and its social foundations. It would be unhistorical to conceive (ahistorically incorrect M.U. Dalak) of such an ideology without recognising the contribution of the Young Turk era (1908-18), when some of the ideas refined by Mustafa Kemal were first put forward and discussed. Nor must we forget that Kemal Paşa (Atatürk M.U.Dalak) played an

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29) See, Mete Tunçay, op.cit., Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Yönetimin Kurulması, p. 308.

active role during the decade when the Ottoman empire was undergoing a most rapid and radical transformation. He witnessed and engaged in the debates of the period, and later some of the most prominent intellectuals and ideologues -Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, to mention only two of the most important- joined the Kemalist movement and participated in the development of its ideology." 30 It must therefore be considered that Kemalism, from the 1920s up to the 30s, developed steadily and was incorporated into the RPP programme. Thus, the point in question in the 1930s is the elaboration of Kemalism.<sup>31</sup>

Furthermore, with respect to a total break from the heritage of Ottoman reformism, Kadro, represented a very radical stand point, rejecting all the western heritage. Such as in terms of understanding the concept of 'contemporary civilisation' Kadro was different from Kemalism. Nonetheless, the old ideal of western civilization had not lost its value for Atatürk at any time. Contrary to the Kadroist approach Atatürk's slogan of "contemporary civilization" mostly referred to the

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30) Feroz Ahmad, 'The Political Economy of Kemalism', in, Atatürk Founder of..., op.cit., p. 145.

31) In the constitutional amendment of 1937 six principles of the RPP were incorporated into the Turkish Constitution. See, Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", in Atatürk Founder of..., op.cit., p. 89.; Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Vol. 3, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1992, pp. 21-22.

West.<sup>32</sup> Thus, Kemalism, to the great extent, remained as a Western oriented Positivist ideology (secular, rationalist) that accelerated the Ottoman pace of modernization.<sup>33</sup> From these aspects Kadro's stand point was different from that of Kemalism.

Kemalist ideology and its principles have been evaluated from many different aspects most of which conflicted with each other. For example, according to Reşat Kaynar, 'Kemalism is the ideological principle of the Turkish Republic'. It is not a subjective doctrine but a practical and a pragmatic ideology taking into account the problems facing Turkey's (or rather the regime's) political and economic 'reality' forever.<sup>34</sup> Because of the above mentioned pragmatic character Kemalism was

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32) İnönü Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor, ed. Abdi İpekçi, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1968, p. 38.

33) "In this period starting with the Young Ottomans (Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Şinasi) and Jeune Turks following the line of the Second Constitution (İttihat ve Terakki) a western ideology gained importance in particular: Positivism. This cannot be considered as a mere coincidence. The Ottoman intelligentsia and bureaucrats were busy searching for a magic wand through which they can explain and transmit the superiority of the West to us. However, Positivism and its conceptualisation of science have the merits of both being able to explain the superiority of the West and of not being involved with Christianity. With the idea of social harmony it was satisfactory for the petite-bourgeoisie which was amenable to any kind of reconciliation in terms of class." Taner Timur, op.cit., pp. 101-102.

34) For the definitions of Kemalism see, Enver Ziya Karal, 'The Principles of Kemalism' op.cit., in Atatürk Founder of...., p. 11. İsmet İnönü also evaluates Atatürk as a pragmatic leader see, İnönü Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

described as unsophisticated by some authors.<sup>35</sup>

For instance, Metin Heper defines Kemalism as a soft ideology: "It may be surmised that if Atatürkist thought was an ideology at all, it was a 'soft' ideology at best an antidote to the hold of religion on society. If it was an ideology, it was so only in the sense the ideologues took ideology, not a quality or type of thought, but a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions. Republicanism removed the obstacle -the personal rule of the sultans- that lay before a society which was expected in due course to generate its own goals, which were embodied in nationalism. Populism, secularism, and revolutionism- reformism constituted the techniques that were going to be used to generate those goals..." In the view of Metin Heper, etatism was simply an economic programme that was deemed appropriate during the World Depression of 1930.<sup>36</sup> Thus, there is no doubt about the ideological character of Kemalism. However, it can be argued that Kemalist ideology was not a dogmatic

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35) "Kemalism offers a limited guiding vision of what the Turkish state and society could be but it is not ideology in a formal sense. Atatürk's advisors were not men of profound intellectual convictions and neither they nor Atatürk himself entertained any suspicions that these were basic defects in the contemporary capitalist Western civilisation which they so greatly admired." Sami M. Akural, "Kemalist Views on Social Change", in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1984, p. 146.

36) Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, The Eothen Press, London, 1985., pp. 64-65.

type doctrine. 37

### The Nature of the Kemalist Single Party Regime and Kadro:

A prominent political scientist Maurice Duverger argued that: "The example of Turkey...seems to demonstrate that the technique of the single party, applied with discernment, makes it possible gradually to build up a new ruling class and the independent political elite which alone make it possible to establish at some date an authentic democracy."<sup>38</sup>

Duverger's definition, which can be considered as an early modernist approach, would have been accepted by scholars in order to explain the character of the single party regime. On the one hand, this retrospective approach does not completely fit the political reality of the single party period in terms of both the willingness of the rulers and the appropriateness of the conditions -which would be decided by the rulers- to establish a 'genuine' democracy.

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37) Ergun Özbudun referred to the exchange between Yakup Kadri and Atatürk: "My general, this party has no doctrine...Of course it does not, my child; if we had a doctrine, we would freeze the movement." Özbudun, op.cit., "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", in Atatürk Founder of...., p. 88.

38) Quoted from Walter F. Weiker's, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey, The Free Party and Its Aftermath, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973, p. 1.

On the other hand, in terms of a democratic aspect, modernist approaches are self-contradictory as well. In other words, because of the overestimated role attributed to modernist ideology, the democratic aspect of modernization -which is supposed to be the main goal of this process- is ignored for the sake of modernization. As an example of this Walter Weiker studied Kadro's relationship with Kemalism vis-a-vis a modernist paradigm. As a consequence of this approach, Weiker did not hesitate to evaluate Kadro's pure authoritarian prospect in accordance with the Kemalist worldview, which does not oppose procedural democracy. 39

However, the total irrelevance of Kadro to democracy is not taken into consideration. "That the RPP was very sensitive about its primacy as the interpreter of the revolution and its ideology became clear as early as 1931 in relation to what was known as the Kadro movement. In January, 1931, a writer-teacher named Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) delivered a lecture in Ankara on "The ideology of the Revolution," in which, according to the report in the RPP daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, he opposed democracy as 'an outmoded system which has never in all its history produced the ideal regime it envisioned.' So much attention did the lecture and the report attract that

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39) See for Atatürk's understanding of the democracy, Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M.Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1969, pp. 29-31; 406.

Şevket Süreyya was invited to develop his ideas further, and when a short essay he wrote received a favorable response from Atatürk himself, it was reproduced as a pamphlet and soon fell into the hands of the press..."<sup>40</sup>

Ergun Özbudun as adopting Clement Moore's classification, puts Turkish single party regime's ideology into the tutelary category also. However, his definition is more careful: "A tutelary ideology is one which combines an instrumental function with the goal of a partial social transformation... Repeating an often-stated Kemalist maxim, it aimed at putting Turkey on a level with 'contemporary civilization', making it a modern, strong, fully independent nation-state. It did not dream about creating a totally new society or a new type of man, as did totalitarian ideologies." <sup>41</sup>

Contrary to the Kadroist approach, as İsmet İnönü confirmed, Atatürk's slogan of "contemporary

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40) Weiker analyses the political development during the years 1930-46 within the paradigm of modernization in his book 'Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey' This study possibly has the best catalogue of data which are employed to set up a 'political history' that concerns Kadro's relationship with the ruling Kemalist elite that is analyzed/criticized in this thesis. Walter F. Weiker, op.cit., pp. 222-223.

41) Ergun Özbudun, op.cit., "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", in Atatürk Founder of..., p. 90.



civilization" mostly referred to the West.<sup>42</sup> Thus, Kemalism, to the great extent, remained as a Western oriented positivist ideology (secular, rationalist) that had accelerated the Ottoman pace of modernization.<sup>43</sup> From this aspect Kadro's stand point was different from that of Kemalism as well.

#### The Ideological Quality of The Theory of Modernisation:

The studies of the theories of modernisation changed with the fact that the political and social developments in the "Third World countries" had not followed the

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42) İnönü Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor, ed. Abdi İpekçi, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1968, p. 38.

43) "In this period starting with the Young Ottomans (Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Şinasi) and Jeune Turks following the line of the Second Constitution-İttihat Terakki a Western ideology gained importance in particular: Positivism. This cannot be considered as a mere coincidence. The Ottoman intelligentsia and bureaucrats were busy searching for a magic wand through which they can explain and transmit the superiority of the West to us. However, Positivism and its conceptualisation of science have the merits of both being able to explain the superiority of the West and of not being involved with Christianity. With the idea of social harmony it was satisfactory for the petite-bourgeoisie which was amenable to any kind of reconciliation in terms of class." Taner Timur, op.cit., pp. 101-102.

presupposed pattern in terms of theory.<sup>44</sup> Owing to the political and social developments which happened in the 'non-Western' countries, this made criticism of the modernisation theories possible. According to the accepted conceptual framework, among these societies, there are many more countries which are very different from each other in terms of their histories and social structures. What unites all of these countries is that they are in "a syndrome of development". Economic and political independence from foreign dominance and industrialisation has become the common and almost inevitable desire of those countries. The resolutions that are generally accepted as a result of the rapid social change viewed as development are put forward by the "populist" ideologies in these societies.

For this reason, it is an appropriate approach to take up the concept of populism first and then determine the economic, political and cultural outlooks of the populist ideologies in the non-Western countries to be able to

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44) The theory of modernisation which surfaces to explain social change as a special form of positivist consideration which rests upon the claim that there is a one-to-one (isometric) relationship between "real world" and theory i.e. to reflect the real reality and the meaning of this theory in terms of "the theory of social structuralisation" becomes clarified by the fact that this theory carries an ideology of status quo accepting a way of life institutionalised in the 1950s as being totally good. On modernist approaches and for its detailed critics see: Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1990, pp. 39-55.

understand the place and quality of ideologies in the periods of change of non-Western societies.<sup>45</sup>

#### Populism in the Single Party Period:

At the beginnig of 1930, the period of integrating social classes around the Kemalist ideology had been started by the RPP. The determinant model which embodied the single party regime was populism, adopting the solidarist approach and rhetoric.<sup>46</sup> According to changing political circumstances, Atatürk had given populist tenet various (ranging from socialist leanings to solidarism) contents since the 1920s. During the single party regime populism was very skillfully used.

The 1931 Republican People's Party programme, reflected an elitist kind of populism which can defined at best

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45) See, Levent Köker, *ibid.*, p. 57

46) Zafer Toprak argues that two strands of populism could be seen in Turkey. The first is the 'intellectual' one and this ends with the single party era. It is a 'petite bourgeois' intellectual populism which emerged because of the delayed and disharmonious structure of capitalist development, and has both conservative and radical elements; it looks for national values in the countryside while rejecting the city. It pretends to be solidarist and ignores the social classes... Thus, the populist period which ranged from 1908 to the 1950s was predominantly intellectual and it was unique to the countries that developed on the periphery of the world's central capitalist development... The populism which developed from 1950 onwards is politically oriented due to democraticization. Zafer Toprak, *op.cit.*, "Popülizm ve...", pp. 56; 63.

with the slogan of 'for the people, with or without the people'<sup>47</sup> Both in 1931 and 1935 the Party programmes (these were very similar in terms of their main contents) previous anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist overtones of populism were dropped.

During this period populism was used both in order to suppress the social strife as justification of the single party system and also for the unification of the intelligentsia. Hence, a populist language and rhetoric, of 'a democracy special to Turkey' was adopted. Paul Dumond pointed out: "Since Turkish society was classless, it was not necessary to have parties defending sectoral interests; the RPP acted as the spokesmen for all groups, representing the entire nation."<sup>48</sup> The political participation of people is almost impossible in this system. This was a part of the tradition inherited from the Unionists (ittihatçılar) by the Republican regime.

It is obvious that the concept 'people' refers to an

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47) See, Ali Kazancıgil, op.cit., "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism" in Atatürk founder a Modern State, p. 51.

48) Paul Dumont, op.cit., "The Origins of Kemalist ideology", in Atatürk and Modernization of Turkey, p. 33.

utterly ambivalent and abstract mass.<sup>49</sup> In fact the analysis of the concept 'people' is not necessary at all, since they are uneducated and 'ignorant of their true interest'. What is essential in this populist regime is to rule people with the rhetoric of an equal society (basic rights of all individuals are guaranteed irrespective of their socio-economic class).

According to Sabri Akural, one must distinguish between political rhetoric and practice and articulated Kemalist rhetoric. "Kemalist populism, in theory imbued with egalitarian values, did not in practice seek to reconstruct the economic order. Kemalist reform policies reflected the parochial concerns of the urbanised intellectuals, not the aspirations of the peasant community."<sup>50</sup> In the 1930s peasants constituted more than 80 per cent of Turkey's population. However, except for some exemptions (such as abolition of the 'aşar') generally high taxes were collected from basic food and

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49) As put forward in the studies of Şerif Mardin and Taha Parla, the idea of the Young Turk (reinforcing stereo-type slogans like justice, fraternity, freedom, equality etc.) is not based upon a concept of freedom, but on rhetoric. Moreover, what they mean by populism is the idealization of a guided and controlled mass action. As a matter of fact the actions, organizations and slogans of the ruling political elite do not have any faith in people at all, their populism was predominantly abstract. See, Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1983, passim; Taha Parla, op.cit., Ziya Gökalp..., pp. 31-33.

50) Sami N. Akural, op.cit., "Kemalist Views on Social Change", in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, p. 139.

materials, the great mass of the peasantry were almost neglected.<sup>51</sup>

However, as Ali Kazancıgil pointed out, Atatürk, used populism as a 'major ideological instrument in forging the alliance of the state elites and the civil elites'.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, a single party regime in order to gather members of the intelligentsia around its principles, managed to find ideological elements, that it substituted for some premises of intelligentsia; populism, etatism, peasantism, secularism and (which were seemingly radical) dominated the leftist members of the intelligentsia just as well as it dominated liberals. The Turkish left spoke

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51) Here Şerif Mardin's comment about the mentality of the ruling elite is worth considering: "The members of the bureaucratic class under the Republic had little notion of identifying themselves with the peasantry...I do not, recall any members of the ruling elite having constructed an operative theory of peasant mobilization, Russian, Chinese or even Balkan style. As for attempts by officials to identify themselves with the peasant, these are limited to a few radical teachers. Again, one has a feeling that the traditional Ottoman relation with the periphery is being perpetuated...(according to Republican programme) peasants were "backward" and would only be changed by transforming the laws of the land." Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*, (Winter-1973), p. 24.

52) Ali Kazancıgil, op.cit., "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism" in Atatürk founder a Modern State, p. 51.

from within this ideological consensus up until 1970.<sup>53</sup>

### Etatism in the 1930s:

As generally accepted, etatism (devletçilik) was firstly a response to the developments in the Turkish economy after 1929. A second reason and at least as important as the first one is that the Great Depression also damaged Turkey's economy. Despite some improvement in industry in the 1920s, the government was dissatisfied with the rate of growth achieved through private enterprise. Starting from 1930, therefore, the government attempted to implement etatism in other words, 'increased state supervision, control and direction of production'.<sup>54</sup> Thus, the government aimed at quickening the slow pace of industrial development in the first decade of the Turkish economy.

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53) According to Worsley, "In many underdeveloped societies, the populist celebration of the peasant, particularly celebration of the 'communitarian' aspect of village society, remains simply part of the ideological armoury of rhetoric, ...lodged in party programmes and national mythology, but unimportant in practice." Worsley op.cit., pp. 229-34. See also, Ahmet Oktay, Toplumcu Gerçekçiliğin Kaynakları, BFS Yayınları, 1986, pp. 335-6.

54) "The first step in the statist program came in 1929 as soon as the Lausanne Treaty was no longer in force, when a series of protective customs duties was set up to protect nascent Turkish industry. On June 11, 1930, the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic was set up..." Stanford&Ezel Kural Shaw, The History of Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, The Rise of Modern Turkey, 2nd. Vol., 1808-1975, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 390.

However, Faruk Birtek evaluated these developments differently. According to Birtek (he also accepts the effects of the Depression on the Turkish economy as primary reason), the period including the years 1923-30 can be described as a period of continuous development of the agricultural periphery. Those interests represented a gradual conflict with the 'organizational rationality' of the political center. That agricultural periphery was an obstacle for structural transformation.

"In this structural context, etatism may be viewed as the culmination of a search for structures to support a particular center...After 1932 a rapid expansion of an industrial sector allowed the political center to place itself in the middle of the economic resource flows." Birtek argues that, etatism instituted an autarkic economy of heavy state controls investment and distribution...this response to the crisis should be understood in terms of a historical pattern that is fundamentally political. Etatism is only a part of a more general process whereby a particular political mode extends itself to previously uncontrolled spheres of a society.<sup>55</sup>

Hence, it can be argued that etatist policies were

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55) Faruk Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semiperipheral Economy", 1985, p. 409.



involved in the 1930s, not implemented as a deliberate ideological choice<sup>56</sup>, but as a result of a gradual and pragmatic response to the effects of the Great Depression and as a means of industrialising the country in the absence of a sufficient accumulation of private capital.

Etatism was by no means aimed at changing the capitalist way of development of the economy. During the etatist period many state economic enterprises such as mining textiles, and banking were sources of materials and credit for the private sector. These kind of economic activities accelerated the development of industry and the working classes.<sup>57</sup>

Gülalp's view is worth considering on the Kadro's misperception about the periods of 1920s and 1930s also. He clarified that the 1930s was a period of early industrialisation in the Third World, necessarily in the form of import-substitution. And this was outcome of the

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56) For details of the etatism see, Taner Timur, op.cit., pp. 121-46.

57) Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw clarify the point:

"Turkey's industrial development in the 1930s created a growing working class that required the introduction and enforcement of various labour and social regulations. The republic's programs in this respect reflected the idea of populism that society was composed of functional groups, with the government's main task being that of merging the interests of all, thus achieving social unity and order and avoiding class distinctions and conflicts." See, Stanford&Ezel Kural Shaw, op.cit., pp. 390-394.

1929 World Depression. "Failure to see this, then, leads to overlooking the period of the 1920s when the new regime engaged in neither industrialisation nor statism. The same point can be made in two different ways: (i) there were other countries in the Third World that did not experience a war of liberation like Turkey but that nonetheless underwent a similar process of industrialisation during the 1930s; (ii) Turkey, that won a war of liberation in the early 1920, did not undertake industrialisation until the 1930s."<sup>58</sup>

### The Main Aspects of the Kadro Philosophy: The State and Class Views of Kadro

According to Kadroists, etatism was to be both a means of avoiding exploitation and social class strife for Turkey. However, Kadroists did not completely deny the existence of social classes in Turkey. Foreexample, ismail Hakkı Tökin claims that the classes in the West in the pre-capitalist period were similar to those of that existed in Turkey. He mentions the rentier class who emerged in France before the French revolution and represented a kind of land-tribe lordship. The representatives of this class could be seen working in cities as well as performing their traditional role in agriculture. At the

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58) Gülalp, op.cit., pp. 70-76.

same time, it was supposed that labourers, peasants, merchants, and other professionals did not have a class consciousness that would lead to class conflict. Therefore, they argued that the development of these classes had not created the deep conflicts that existed in the West, and this phenomenon was considered to be an advantage for Turkey.<sup>59</sup>

According to Kadroists, in this period (in 1930s), it was not possible to accept a class of entrepreneurs that had accumulated capital to invest in industry. Thus, it is maintained that the nonexistence of such a capitalist class with a large and financial capacity was an advantage. Financial capital and development requires the employment of a large proletariat. Such development has to be denied from the very beginning lest it should lead to class conflict between a modern bourgeoisie and a proletariat class as seen in the West.

Because of the nonexistence of an enterprise class that could realise economic development this task was than to be undertaken by the state. As a result, capital would be in the hands of the state and class conflict therefore would not emerge. However, the dilemma of the Kadroist

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59) İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin) says on this matter that, "As we have seen before through contacts with the western countries, that the class conflict destroys the unity of the nation and its character." Interview with Tökin, 1.5.1992.

approach to class conflict starts at this point. By the 1930s the Kadroist concept of a non-conflicting society was utopian in the belief that state intervention in economics is a guarantee against social strife and disharmony.

"The Authoritarian State": In Kadro and Şevket Süreyya.

In the eyes of Şevket Süreyya, etatism is a complete regime that not only intervenes in economic activities but regulates the whole activities of a nation. In terms of this aspect Kadro typically embodied the 'authoritarian' movements of the 1930s Europe. "Kadro's theory actually was an artificially created hypothesis resulting from the combination of certain Marxist ideas together the concept of a totalitarian state formulated in order to explain the statism of Turkey. This theory appeared to originate in the class conception of Marxism, but deviating to the right, adopted the Fascist corporate theory of merging all social classes into a strong, "impartial" state."<sup>60</sup>

Although, 'Fascism' was not accepted as a part of Kadroist theory, the authoritarian state was greatly admired. Şevket Süreyya tries to justify these ideas with the old tradition of state and army being identical. In

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60) Kemal Karpaz, op.cit., p. 70.

his following article Şevket Süreyya explains Turkey's "etatist regime": "The regime that closes up its doors, turns a blind eye and a deaf ear to the things happening outside (itself) is the Ottoman Empire. But the ability of the new Turkish intelligentsia to follow and comprehend ideological and social movements outside itself day by day from its point of view, is one of the great powers that differentiates it at the same time, from the elements (remnants) of the old regime.

In this respect, socialist ideas and fascist interventions are, a phenomena that the Turkish revolution and intelligentsia were well aware of, knew about and followed closely. Even if it is impossible not to feel a spiritual and intellectual temptation towards these phenomena which are not only more progressive and worth celebrating for our nation, but also for all mankind. For such an insensitivity is nothing but ignorance, and to be deprived of human contemplation... However, this is not composed of a subjectivist and idealist tendency. Were it so, it would be possible to consider the concept of "etatism" not as a basic principle but as a temporary, and changeable movement that is not based upon material necessity, but one that changes everyday into a different shape, being bound to the emotional and intellectual tendencies which would continually be changing!...As a matter of fact, statism, in the Turkish liberation movement, is something which

comes directly out of the material nature of this movement and its historical code."

Şevket Süreyya tries to justify these ideas with the old tradition of the "state and army identical nature": "Above all, statism, for us, is a form of the old militarized national regime (ordulaşmış millet rejimi) under the modern conditions and necessities...And the militarized national regime for the Turkish nation, has been a basic national way of life since the very beginning of our nation. We cannot even meet one of the individualistic boundaries or conditions that are fundamental to the historical formations of the nations of the Latin origin, the Anglo-saxon race and the new American nation. And therefore, the system of "etatism" is the militarized national system which is the national system of our nation, which is also specific and of its own, from the unknown ages of history!..."

"Etatism is such a national and social order within which all fields of national life and framework of the national body are regulated in an organized national harmony which considers the common and supreme interests of the nation paramount to individual interests and tendencies...(and in this respect) etatism also means the discipline of a complete and rigid life and contemplation, which

comprises all fields of national life."<sup>61</sup>

### On The Peasants:

Possibly Yakup Kadri's novel 'Yaban' best portrays Kadro's approach to the Turkish peasantry. Yakup Kadri regards the peasant, paradoxically, in a contemptuous way. Because of their lack of political consciousness and ignorance of revolutionary ideology of any kind they are blamed by Yakup Kadri.<sup>62</sup>

Yakup Kadri, does not only hate the rural poor of Anatolia, but also expresses his dislike towards all social categories through adjectives like anti-revolutionary, degenerate and faithless. The only exceptions are those accepted by Kadro revolutionary youth; civil servants and equivalent workers. A classless

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61) Şevket Süreyya, İnkılabın İdeolojisi: "Programlı Devletçilik", see: Kadro no: 34, 1934 pp. 5-11.

62) Yakup Kadri almost hates the peasants who are not in the way they should be: as Jesus said when he was crucified. 'Father forgive them; for they know not what they do.' Berna Moran refers to this parallelism in his critical analyses of Yaban: "Is Ahmet Cemal himself not a Kemalist as well? Weren't those who did not believe him like those did not believe in Jesus forgives those who crucified him, because they did not know what they were doing. Ahmet Celal, while the enemy was plundering the village on that very day of 'the last judgement' says he had forgiven the peasants because 'they did not know what they were doing'. See, Berna Moran, "Yabanda Teknik ve İdeoloji" in Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1983, p. 175.

(abstract) image of people, i.e. citizens, or youth or as Şevket Süreyya conceptualizes an army-like society, is seen as desirable and all the layers of society disregarding this fact should be considered 'enemies'.

Following their unsuccessful experience with the Kadro Yakup Kadri changed his opinion about the anti-revolutionary character of the people and then accused the Republican elite (as a scape goat) due to the fact that they had not contact with people.<sup>63</sup>

As Şerif Mardin pointed out, the Kemalist regime lacked the mobilising aspect of revolution which the above mentioned regimes were able to manage. "The only current within Kemalism which took note of the organizational-mobilizational side of modernization was the publication Kadro...Just as the Kemalists missed the mobilizational aspect of modernization, they also did not see too well the nature of the integrative network of modern society,

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63) Yakup Kadri stated that: "For many years even a letter of the word "revolution" has not mirrored here. Whose fault is this? Is it the peoples'? No, no, a thousand times. The fault is of those who cling to the dream that a revolution can be carried out without a schedule and in an organised fashion. A couple of amendments and a few orders to the governor, police and gendarme...We take it for granted that everything is over. We do not want to see that these amendments and orders have not been able to changed their way of thinking." Yakup Kadri(Karaosmanoğlu), Panaroma, 2nd.ed, Vol. I-II, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1971, pp. 88-101.



or were unable to legislate it into existence."<sup>64</sup> Hence, it can be argued that Kadro's philosophy is based on idealisation of the Turkish revolution and misreading of the 1930s etatist experience.

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64) Serif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", op.cit., p. 25.

### CHAPTER III. THE POLITICAL (Ideological) STANDPOINT OF THE KADRO MOVEMENT/PHILOSOPHY:

Kadro attempted to systematize the Kemalist ideology on the grounds that it was not a doctrine. Furthermore, it can be argued that Kadro wanted to be the single storyteller of the Revolution, setting out their own explanation within an theoretical system that would be the ideology of the revolution.<sup>65</sup> Kadro made an uncompromising stand in its way to be the only interpreter of revolution. While Kadro was considering Kemalism as a crude ideology of the National Revolution, it described the leading members of the RPP, excepting 'Gazi' (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), as mediocrats, those without methodology, naive intellectuals or soldier minded people like Peker.

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65) Taner Timur's comment clarified this matter very well. To claim that Atatürk (Kemalism) was not a doctriner would not be so much meaningful because not being a doctriner does not mean that having no ideology. However, claiming that Atatürk was not dogmatic will possibly be more meaningful. Atatürk was always emphasizing the importance of critical reason and positive science. For details of this matter see, Taner Timur's discussion in Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü semineri, op.cit., pp. 103-104.

### The Opening Declaration of Kadro:

Turkey was now experiencing a revolutionary process. This revolution had all the theoretical and ideological elements which would be a principle for itself and a conscience for those who wanted to keep it. However, these theoretical and ideological elements were not constituted and codified within an ideological system that could be an ideological base for the revolution. To explain this was the most urgent and honourable of all duties that befell the Turkish revolutionary intellectualism of that time. As these ideological and theoretical elements of our revolution were explained one by one, each of which were valuable and original, these main elements would be the criteria for the revolutionist generation and a new and standardized revolutionary would arise as such."<sup>66</sup>

These ideas which would be developed and treated in the later issues of Kadro could be summarized in this way: The Turkish revolution had not come to an end. On the contrary it was gaining deeper dimensions and which had to be so. Revolution was not a neutral order. It was represented by an *avant-garde Cadre* which was small in number but influential. The ideology of the revolution had not been put forward yet...

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66) Kadro., no: 1, 1932, p. 3.

As shown in Tekeli-ilkin's article, it is in the typical manner of Cadrists to ignore 'other' elites. Three sub-groups of intellectuals which Kadro denied are respectively, "quasi intellectuals", "intellectuals of the pre-revolutionary period" or "intellectuals of the constitutionalist period" and the last group, old established university (Darülfunun) intellectuals. In terms of Kadro's approach, amongst those sub-groups it is the second group with which we are primarily concerned. The main intellectual group with which Kadro was in conflict was this second category too. They stood in the 'key places'. Kadro accused these people within this group of being 'unfaithful to the revolution' and not having a systematic method. These people in question constituted the leading elite of the RPP and the close circle of Atatürk.<sup>67</sup>

From the beginning of the journal's publication when one analyses Kadro it can be seen that all sections of society, ways of thinking and opponents of revolution

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67) İlhan Tekeli-Selîm İlkin, op.cit., 1984, pp. In the interview (dated 1.5.1992) a question was directed to İ.Hüsrev Tökin by Professor Reşat Kaynar about Atatürk's affiliation to economic matters. Tökin in his reply pointed out that 'Atatürk had a vision for socio-economic and political matters'. Tökin considered other leading Kemalists (except İnönü) as soldiers and naive intellectuals to be methodless people. However, Professor Kaynar (through his personal contacts) said that Kadroists were considered also as naive intellectuals by leading Kemalist.

and Kadro are criticized. Walter F. Weiker pointed out this aspect of Kadro as follows: "During its lifetime Kadro effectively held the initiative in debate over the content of Kemalism and the Turkish revolution, and stirred controversy with a variety of groups about Kadro's ideas, in addition to its clashes with the RPP organization over both ideas and limelight. Representing a very left-wing position, Şevket Süreyya discussed a major doctrinal topic in each issue of the journal. His chief theses were the delineation of the National Liberation Revolution and the need for an avantgarde "guiding cadre" the source of the journal's name. Şevket Süreyya was also one of the outspoken proponents of overall economic planning and mobilization of resources in a total development drive. He envisioned such a drive not only in the economic sphere, but in the social and political as well..."<sup>68</sup> As Weiker pointed out, Kadro was representing quite, radical position. However, during the publication Kadro never proclaimed itself as a left wing movement. Kadro carried on with this intention which it explained from its first issue, through to its demise.<sup>69</sup>

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68) Weiker, op.cit., pp. 224-25.

69) Another Kadro member Yakup Kadri's surprising words are worth considering here, "Once I told to my friends that this journal (Kadro) will bring us to the 'power' very soon", Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri, op.cit., p. 83.

### Cadrism and The Kemalist Elite:

Tekeli-ilkin pointed out that, in the developing countries to become a political elite -in the vanguard of the rulers- without working for power seems attractive to intellectuals.<sup>70</sup> Due to the fact that Şevket Süreyya, Burhan Asaf, Vedat Nedim, İsmail Hüsrev who were the founders of Kadro and who also came to the forefront of leftist political movement, this group of people were considered Kadroists from left.<sup>71</sup>

Kadro, maintaining this tradition, continued its mission of serving the ones who were in power by functioning as a "think tank". In the view of Sabahattin Selek who represents clearly the manner of *Kadrist thinking*, in countries like Turkey where class conflicts are not clear, regimes must be

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70) Possibly it will not be wrong to consider 'Cedid Grubu' as one the last Cadrist group: a group of intellectuals who are called the "Second Republicanists or Neo-Ottomanist" have emerged in the late 1980s. Members of this group whom are lightly tied to each other served President Turgut Özal as a think-tank defending such political ideas as the system of presidentship, open society, decentralisation of the state etc. (U. Dalak)

71) See, İlhan Tekeli- Selim İlkin, op.cit., p. 36.

controlled by the cadres.<sup>72</sup>

According to Selek, Atatürk, considered the non-existence of class consciousness as a sign of 'health and strength', and put forth the slogan of "we are a mass with no classes and privileges". Therefore, the new regime would be consolidated and governed by the single party regime which was the representative of the whole nation.<sup>73</sup> However, Selek notes that Atatürk delivered the regime into 'the hands of the youth' instead of the Party (RPP) in his Speech (Nutuk) delivered in October 1927, and did not rely much on the party or cadre type of

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72) Selek's opinions must be considered as that of a late Kadroist or as a kind of nostalgia for the Kadrists ideas. Selek's book is important in terms of its straitforward approach to the events that happened during the National Struggle and afterwards. Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu İhtilali, Kastaş A.Ş., 8th ed., İstanbul, 1987, pp. 741-755.

73) This is summarized by Atatürk's words such as: "The cadre of the RPP are all individuals of the nation, and it will be a school in order to give people a political education." Ibid., p. 751.

leadership.<sup>74</sup>

As mentioned above Kadro attempted to systemize the Kemalism as an strict ideology. However, there is no doubt that Kemalist leaders were aware of the important place of ideology in the formation process of a new regime.<sup>75</sup> In this respect, Atatürk was different when compared with the Unionist leaders. It can be claimed that the leaders of the Republic did not want anyone or any groups to produce any ideology other than that of their own.

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74) According to Selek, it is obvious that any party setting out with this mentality cannot succeed in carrying out the regime. Besides, the leading cadre of this party, İnönü being the first, was mischosen. The determination of Mustafa Kemal Paşa which he showed in the elimination of the second group (The Progressive Republican Party and Unionists), was not shown by the other leading members of the RPP. For instance, Selek does not accept that İnönü interprets the PRP experience differently from Atatürk. İnönü's statement, which he made in Ulus dated September 9, 1963, includes this: "The PRP has never said that it represents a conservative movement... Most of the leading members of the Party were progressive and reformist in terms of their backgrounds and mentalities." Ibid., pp. 746-47; 753.

75) However, it is unlikely to think that ruling elite of the RPP had been unfamiliar with the conception of ideology until Kadro appeared. Like Atatürk, they had also attained their maturity within the variety of the ideological movements of the Second Constitutional period. They were involved in the ideological activities of the Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki). See, Celal Bayar, Atatürk' ten Hatıralar, Sel Yayınları, İstanbul, 1955, pp. 11-20,



As İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan pointed out, Ziya Gökalp is possibly the only example in our recent history who openly accepted the role of ideology and who was effective in this role. Gökalp managed the integration of theory and ideology spontaneously. The integrating point here is that the leaders of the Unionists (İttihat ve Terakki), had left the role of ideologist to Gökalp. As opposed to this, in the Republican era there were some who wanted to play this role, but the political leaders of the Republic did not cast this role to anybody other than themselves.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, it really is not possible to think that Kadro might have influenced Atatürk.

#### The Method and the Ideological Standpoint of Kadro

The founders and ideological theorists of the Kadro journal (except Yakup Kadri) were formerly Marxists. Kadroists, accepted the concept of dialectics but historical materialism.<sup>77</sup> Although such Leninist thesis as 'dependency' and anti-imperialism constituted an important place in Kadro's Third Worldist revolution theory Kadroists admitted that they had abandoned "communism", both at a theoretical and personal level.

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76) İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, op.cit., p. 61.

77) Hilmi Ziya Ülken classified Kadroist theory among the 'historical materialist' thought currents of the Republican period. See, Hilmi Z. Ülken, Çağdaş Türk Düşünce Tarihi, Ülken Yayınları, 2nd ed, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 383-85.

According to the Kadroist theory, "Marxism (in Şevket Süreyya's term 'scientific socialism' was the outcome of applying historical materialism to the analysis of 19th century Western European reality. But in the 20th century there is a 'world system' and the class struggles of the previous period are being replaced by national liberation struggles. Therefore, the historical materialist method should be applied to the analysis of this new reality for which Marxism is inadequate"<sup>78</sup>

In the Kadroists view the bourgeois-proletariat contradiction (unique to 19th century capitalist countries) was also no longer relevant. On the world-scale the dominant contradiction of the 20th century was between the capitalist world system and underdeveloped countries (between metropolis and colonies/semi-colonies).<sup>79</sup> İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin) argues that Kadro's theory was not essentially aimed at 'etatism', but at the 'colonisation conflict'. In this sense Kadro's principle thesis had been based on a revolutionary ideology which it embodied in the Turkish national revolution. The

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78) Haldun Gülalp, op.cit., p. 72. See, İ.H.Tökin, "Milli Kurtuluş Devletçiliği", Kadro, No: 19, p. 28.

79) Ibid., p. 29. In this context, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin points out an anecdote related to Karl Radek who stated that "If the people of China had shortened their skirts 1 cm. the textile industry in Manchester would have gone bankrupt" From interview with Tökin (dated 1.5.1992).

Turkish national revolution (in the view of İsmail Hüsrev Atatürk revolution) was regarded by Kadro as the first anti-imperialist revolution in the Third World. Kadro was published as a tool of this struggle. According to Tökin, in terms of this aspect it could also be argued that Atatürk had liked Kadro! (because) Kadroists had given their energy to build up Kemalist ideology.<sup>80</sup>

İsmail Hüsrev claims that while Kadro attempted to develop a political-economic perspective for the Turkish liberation movement they used Marxism partially as a dialectical method not as a whole ideology (including values et.). İsmail Hüsrev, who to a great extent represents Kadro's political economic approaches, mainly based on Werner Sombart. Theoretical explanation of such ideas as charismatic leadership and the metropol-colony strife (in contemporary political literature center-periphery model) mostly come from 'Weber-Sombart school'.<sup>81</sup>

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80) From interview with İsmail Hakkı Tökin.

81) On this matter see for Şevket Süreyya's comment, "Bir İlk Eser: Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı", Kadro, No:34, pp. 34-39. Also, for a detailed analyse on the Political and economic ideas of İsmail Hüsrev see, İbrahim Cılga, "Tökin'in Bir Model Oluşturma Girişimi: Türk Ulusal Kurtuluş Hareketi ve Bir 'Milli İktisat Düzeni Önerisi'", in Türk Toplum Bilimcileri, Emre Kongar, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1988, pp. 179-211.

### On the Eclectic Nature of the Kadroist Philosophy:

This eclectic (paradoxical) stand of Kadro was pointed out by Taha Parla as such: "Kadroists attempted to apply their strange hybrid to Kemalism in 1930s which contained elements from Leninism and Fascism. However, these are uncompromised elements. When we consider the categories used and the approach realized, we will notice this alongside a critique of imperialism: "in today's world, and especially in the less developed countries (compared to capitalist countries) the basic controversy is not amongst social classes but between dominant nations and poor nations" this is a theme adopted from the 'fascist' ideologies of Europe."<sup>82</sup>

On the other hand Mete Tunçay holds an opposite view point on the matter of the Kadroists' ideological stand which is worth considering. According to Tunçay, Şevket Süreyya had not diverged from his former political line; in fact, the story of "returning" regarding the Kadroists was not true. "What actually changed was what happened in the Party (TKP). During the early days of the Republic the TKP consisted of the most nationalist section of the Comintern. The responsibility belonged to Şevket Süreyya

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82) See, Taha Parla, in Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, Interviewers: Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p. 44.

to a great extent."<sup>83</sup>

In his novel Suyu Arayan Adam Şevket Süreyya clarifies the matter: "The Comintern was and has always been unable to grasp the essence of national liberation movements. For this reason the view which was put forward in both my work "İnkılap ve Kadro" and "Kadro" publication defending the independent character of national struggle movements is based on these important principles. This view was a novel and pure one which led us to give up communist considerations and to oppose them. Those who attacked Kadro have never been able to understand this side of the Kadroist movement."<sup>84</sup>

In fact, in the mid-1920s the Comintern had replaced its former policy of the World Revolution. Because of these anti-imperialistic tactics of the Comintern, which aimed to protect the socialist 'motherland', namely the Soviet Union, national independence movements were considered as a buffer zone or reserve force after that time. While this transition was taking place the Turkish Communist Party (or Aydınlik circle) was criticized by the

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83) Mete Tunçay, Bilineceği Bilmek, Alan Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1983, p. 206.

84) Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, Remzi Kitabevi, 8th ed., İstanbul, 1987, p. 448.

Comintern because of its nationalist leanings.<sup>85</sup>

According to İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, in practice, the aforementioned tactics of the Comintern would have just paved the way for the satellisation of the national independence movements under the rule of Stalin's Soviet Union.<sup>86</sup> Finally, it would not be wrong to claim that, both in practice and to a great extent in theory Kadroists left their former ideological stand in favour of their eclectic theory.<sup>87</sup>

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85) "In fact the attitude of Aydınlik was simply support for a national bourgeoisie to bring about the technological infrastructure of capitalism. However, due to the fact that at that time there were no other ways, this was inevitable. The Aydınlik circle wanted to the Government of Ankara period (without suffering the pains which would be caused by private sector capitalism) and to approach socialism at one attempt." See, Mete Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar-1 (1908-1925), BDS Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p. 226.

86) From the interview with İ.H.Tökin. And on this matter Cem Alpar referred to Vedat Nedim (Tör): "Vedat Nedim also stressed the difference between the anti-imperialist World view of Atatürk and the anti-imperialist tactics of the Communist International. Stalin wanted to take advantage of national independence movements on behalf of the World working class. In other words, national independence movements were thought to be not brand-new and unique historic events, but movements attached to the Communist International". See, Cem Alpar, "The Turkish Revolution and Kemalism in the Kadro Movement", in International Symposium on Atatürk, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 1984, p. 741

87) Haldun Gülalp, op.cit., p. 70.

## The Eclectic Nature of the Kadroist Philosophy: a Comparison With the Japanese Showa Group.

It is accepted that in the broadest sense a cadrist type of thought emerges in the transition periods in societies. A comparative approach is helpful to show these common aspects. According to Hayashi, for latecomers to the modernization process unbalanced development is inevitable. He draws a parallel between unbalanced development and an eclectic structure of ideas in these kind of groups. Takeshi Hayashi, points out a similarity between Kadro and Japan's Showa Kenkyukai group. "A case similar to that of the Kadro is Japan's Showa Kenkyukai (Showa study group), founded in 1933 as a 'think tank' to Prince Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945),...The study group lacked a real identity, and its members had only one thing in common; all of them recognised Japan's resignation from the League of Nations as a national crisis;... However, it is surprising that an important member of the Showa group, who played a significant role in the course of Post Second World War 'democratisation', stated that the group 'did not conceive of fascism as being bad at that time'; it was rather impressed by the criticisms of the European democratic powers made by pro-Nazi intellectuals. This indicates that it was difficult for this group to identify fascism as such because it was often disguised as an aggressive nationalism. This reminds us of the fact

that fascism itself emerged as an outcome of the critical environment, both domestic and international, that prevailed in post-First World War society."<sup>88</sup>

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88) "This leads us to conclude that, for the late starters suffering from an unbalanced development, unless 'modernisation' as a value and as an ideal is integrated with nationalism, it does not translate into an actual nation -building programme. This in no sense means, however, that modernization when coupled with nationalism can, per se, be justified. As was seen in Japan and elsewhere, unconditional nationalism always runs the risk of transforming itself into xenophobic chauvinism or self-centred ultra-nationalism." Takeshi Hayashi notes that, "two years after the founding of the Showa Study Group, however, its members took an anti-fascist stand."

See, footnote no: 4. Takeshi Hayashi, "The Modernisation of Japan and Turkey" in A. Kazancıgil & E. Özbudun, op.cit., Atatürk..., pp. 222-3.



"In his quest for truth the historian is bound by as strict rules as the scientist. He has to utilise all the methods of empirical investigation. He has to collect all the available evidence to compare and criticize all his sources. He is not permitted to forget or neglect any important fact. Nevertheless, the last and decisive act is always an act of the productive imagination." 89

Ernst Cassirer,

## PART TWO

### CHAPTER IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF ATATÜRK'S MESSAGE

According to some scholars, Kadro had been supported during its publication mainly by Atatürk and other members of the ruling political elite.<sup>90</sup> The claim about this so called support has continued up to now without making exhaustive researches into the related data including the Kadroist's memoirs and other documents. "During the three years of Kadro's existence, from the beginning of 1932 to the end of 1934, the monthly journal of political, economic social and literary commentary was

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89) Ernst Cassirer, op.cit., An Essay on Man, p. 204.

90) "...Some officials also objected to the position of Kadro in its interpretation of the Turkish revolution. Kadro was supported and protected by some senior officials, above all Atatürk and İnönü. Nevertheless, complaints were made to Atatürk and İnönü about Kadro and attempts were made to have its publication stopped." Cem Alpar, op.cit., p. 761.

on precarious ground. That the enterprise could survive headed by an avowed former communist who had only recently abandoned that ideology was due largely to the fact that Kadro had the obvious and firm support of both Atatürk and İnönü."91 Defenders of the aforementioned claim specifically referred to a message that had been given by Atatürk to the Kadro journal on the 10th anniversary of the Republic.92

First of all Atatürk's message must be considered. It is described as concise but skillfully written by İsmail Hüsrev Tökin. Tökin evaluates the message to day as such "Actually Atatürk meant to tell us in his message ' Do not make a great blunder'!"93 When the message was published by Kadro it was presented in these words: "The compliments of our Great Chief, delivered to us on the occasion of the 10th. anniversary of the Republic and which give us enthusiasm and courage."94

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91) Weiker, op. cit., p. 224.

Weiker allocates a special part for Kadro's ideology under the title of "The Development of Republican Ideology" (in the Chapter Forteen, pp. 222-27).

92) Kadro, No: 22 (October, 1933), p. 2.

93) From interview with İsmail Hüsrev Tökin dated 1.5.1992.

94) Gazi's compliment to Kadro (in issue, no: 22, October 1933).

The message given by Atatürk to the Kadro journal appears at first reading to support Kadro, but on further reading this is found not to be so. However, Kadroists considered the message to be both supportive and encouraging.

Let us read the message: "I remember that, when Kadro began to publish it mentioned that its aim was to provide a way of thinking and method unique to the Turkish nation and to establish and spread this thinking and method through the nation and the country. I wish Kadro much success in this aim."<sup>95</sup> Gazi Mustafa Kemal

The message was naturally taken as a compliment in accordance with the principle of Kadro 'A directive should be considered but not interpreted.'<sup>96</sup> In fact many researchers studying Kadro, without trying to evaluate the message within the general political

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95) Atatürk's message: "Hatırlıyorum ki, Kadro intişar ederken maksadının Türk milletine has meslek ve metodun, millet ve memlekette teessüs ve inkişafına hizmet olduğunu yazmıştı. Kadro'ya bu maksadında geniş muvaffakiyet temenni ederim." Gazi M. Kemal

"Gazi Hazretlerinin Kadro'ya iltifatları", Kadro, no: 22, 1933, p. 3.

96) see, Ömer Sakıp, "Kadroların Analizi", Forum, Cilt X, No: 111, 1958, p. 11.

context, have since repeated it.<sup>97</sup> The message, however, when read through the method of hermeneutics,<sup>98</sup> can be seen as a reference to Kadro's life which it seemed would not last long. For example, Weiker claims that the above mentioned 'favorable response' by Atatürk (given before the Kadro's publication) is an 'obvious and firm support' that goes through the entire life of Kadro. However, Weiker lacks the empirical data in order to show the pseudo support that was given to Kadro by Atatürk and İnönü. He thinks it is sufficient to refer to the fact

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97) To give certain examples which interpret the message as supportive: "Even, in the 10th year Mustafa Kemal Paşa praised them (the Kadroists) and, Prime Minister İsmet Paşa was to contribute to the journal. However, when the class aspect of the Anatolian Revolution overtook the leaders of RPP, they did not tolerate this, and the journal had to close down." Merdan Yanardağ, op.cit., p. 9. According to Cem Alpar, "Atatürk submitted an encouraging paper(?) which was the lead article in Kadro on the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic" Cem Alpar, op.cit., p. 761.

Another researcher says this: "Mustafa Kemal's words related to Kadro, issued in the head page of its 22th issue show that the journal had a significant support in the political circle for a certain period." Naci Bostancı, Kadrocular ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Görüşleri, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1990, p. 10.

98) In an interpretation process we can imagine a series of interpretants, in this chain the first interpretants serve as tradition for the final interpretants, which are the interpretation in the true sense of the term. According to Paul Ricour, "reading is the concrete act in which the destiny of the text is fulfilled. It is at the very heart of reading that explanation and interpretation are indefinitely opposed and reconciled." See for further explanation of hermeneutical interpretation on text, Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, (esp. to the parts: What is a text ?, Explanation and understanding.) Ed. by John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 145-152.

that Yakup Kadri (owner of Kadro) and Falih Rıfkı who wrote articles for Kadro were Atatürk's closest friends.<sup>99</sup> Although Weiker points out that Kadro was very critical of the Kemalist RPP and its ideology, he ignores the fact that Atatürk was the leader and the head ideologue of that party. This idea possibly prejudiced and misguided Weiker in his research on the Kadro.

Despite the Kadroists' declaration that they had abandoned their ex-ideology, namely Communism, during the publication of the journal, nationalist type of socialism (to a some extend Leninism) and radical bourgeoisie ideas constituted the bulk of their eclectic theory.<sup>100</sup> In order to evaluate the text correctly intensive study needs to be undertaken. Hence, this text must be understood in the politics of that period, which were overwhelmed by the Kemalist ideology of the RPP under the patronage of Atatürk.<sup>101</sup>

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99) see, Walter F. Weiker, op.cit., pp. 224-26. See also footnote no: 118.

100) See, Korkut Boratav, Türkiye'de Devletçilik, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974, pp. 217-18.

101) İlkay Sunar approaches to the matter with a more attentive manner: "...although in principle the movement was not officially sanctioned, the ideologues of the movement were, nonetheless, men in official contact with Kemalist circles." İlkay Sunar, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development, Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, Ankara, 1974, pp. 74-5.

Atatürk's message was given to Kadro in the October of 1933. The message emphasizes that the aim of Kadro could not be out of 'the way of thinking and method unique to the Turkish nation'. The beginning of the publication of Kadro could only have been possible with the special permission that Yakub Kadri got from Atatürk.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, as it became clearer from Yakup Kadri's and other Kadroists' writings, Kadro was under the tight government control during the time when its publication continued.<sup>103</sup>

### "Reluctant Diplomat"

In order to analyse the message it is necessary to interpret the first chapter of Yakup Kadri's book "Zoraki Diplomat", and his other comments relating to the subject. The implications of this work provides us with essential information in respect to Atatürk's approach to Kadro. These writings also clarifies the phenomenon of co-optation. Yakup Kadri relates the subject Kadro expressed at Atatürk's dinner table through Falih Rıfkı's words: "Yesterday evening a very serious meeting, resembling the meeting of a party session, at Çankaya was held. The Secretary General together with some members of

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102) Yakup Kadri, op.cit., Atatürk Semineri, p. 82.

103) Murat Belge, op.cit., Toplum ve Bilim, p. 9

the "Central Committee" discussed an article issued in Kadro for long hours, and demanded an immediate disciplinary decision about you. I suppose today towards the evening you are going to receive an ultimatum dictated by Gazi himself: it says "either make your situation clear or resign from the Party."<sup>104</sup> On receiving this warning Yakup Kadri hastened to Çankaya, leaving a message to Gazi's aide-de-camp then went to Ruşen Eşref's house to wait for a response to this message.<sup>105</sup>

In order to understand the nature of Gazi's asserted support for Kadro, it is essential to continue with quotations from a dialogue between Yakup Kadri and Atatürk. "Yakup Kadri said "As you know I have been publishing a journal with the name Kadro for a few months. The aim of this journal was to found the ideological aspect and to interpret and codify the principles of the RPP. from this direction. However, I see that my aim has been misunderstood and therefore there have been some undesirable discussions that may hurt your excellency unnecessarily. Hence, I would like

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104) Yakup Kadri, Zoraki Diplomat, 3rd ed, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 23.

105) According to, Sabahattin Selek's account, who examined Atatürk's 'Visitor Books' in which records (about his daily life in Çankaya) were kept: Atatürk paid 21 visits during the second six months of the 1932. One of this visits was paid to Ruşen Eşref's house that shows how seriously Atatürk approached this event. See, Sabahattin Selek, op.cit., pp. 754-55.

to submit with your high permission that we have decided to close down Kadro"..."No"! says Atatürk 'you are not going to close down your journal. However, if I see any controversial article like the one I saw yesterday evening, I will ask you and your friends to come and explain to me what you mean. Are we agreed ?'..."<sup>106</sup> Then Gazi's aide-de-camp took out a copy of Kadro out of his pocket and showed some lines underlined with a red pen. According to Yakup Kadri's interpretation these lines -written by Burhan Belge- meant that "as long as the revolution remains in the hands of a sole person or class it cannot be considered the nation's own work." <sup>107</sup> Yakup Kadri showed his astonishment with these words "Why have our comrades from the party misjudged this? I could not understand...In your various speeches haven't you expressed that our revolution arose from the national will and thus this controversial matter should be closed."<sup>108</sup>

Here it must be remembered once again that the message Kadro regarded as a compliment was given in 1933 nearly one year after this serious warning mentioned above. The words 'the way of thinking and method unique to Turkish

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106) Yakup Kadri, op.cit., Zoraki Diplomat, p. 25.

107) However, it must be pointed out that Burhan Belge's this comment contradicts with Kadro's general approach to the authoritarian leadership.

108) Yakup Kadri, op.cit., Zoraki Diplomat, p. 26.



nation' which constitute the key part of the message function with an implicit meaning rather than what it overtly says. In another sense, when the message is read with a particular stress, which gives an impression of a sophisticated celebration text it will be seen that it is loaded with a strong warning. Thus, the aim of this interpretation is to reveal its covert meaning with its implications referring to Kadro's life.

### "Ankara, Moscow, Rome"

It has been made clear in certain preceeding chapters that Atatürk's message is covert, making it necessary to analyse all data and available facts scrupulously. From this aspect the publication of Kadro preceeding October 1933 needs to be examined. Was Kadro publishing something that conflicted with "a way of thinking and method unique to the Turkish nation?" In this publication, Yakup Kadri's ten-part serial called "Ankara, Moskova, Roma" is possibly one of the most critical.<sup>109</sup> Yakup Kadri's serial begins with a critic of the French Revolution in

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109) Weiker also stressed on the controversial aspect of these articals: "A particular controversial aspect of Kadro was a series of articles on literary and cultural subjects by Yakup Kadri. He had recently been on an extensive tour of the Soviet Union, and in a ten part series called "Ankara, Moscow, Rome" he made no attempt to hide his admiration for Soviet achievements in transforming Russian society. He also made occasional favorable comments on aspects of the organization of society in fascist Italy, though his general opinion of fascist performance was very critical..." Walter F. Weiker op.cit., p. 224.

the sixth issue of Kadro. We know that Kadro regards the French Revolution as an old fashioned phenomenon.<sup>110</sup>

According to Yakup Kadri, the French Revolution arrived 50 years too late. In terms of real influences it never reached the people. The organizations which were shaped by the principles of the French Revolution had begun to decay and were out of date by the 30s.<sup>111</sup> "Since the First World War the time gap separating us from the French Revolution has immensely widened. The nations which were bathed in pain and blood in the years 1914-18 no more believe in the words brotherhood, liberty and justice. Today they consider these words to be metaphysical and abstract concepts. Each society wants to establish an organization according to new principles. Fascist Italy was not a state that was set up according to the 1793's principles any more than German democracy was. Russia, a land covering one sixth of the world, started a political and social experiment that had never before been experienced."<sup>112</sup>

As mentioned before, in terms of civilisation and ideology Kadro's ideas were not reconcilable with the Kemalist elite. The Kemalist cadre was definitely

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110) Yakup Kadri, "Ankara, Moscow, Rome", Kadro no: 6, June 1932, pp. 37-40.

111) Ibid., p. 38.

112) Ibid., pp. 39-40.

following the western cultural path that was determined by previous modernizers. As Mete Tunçay pointed out, even in the years 1925-29 when Turkey was furthest away from the Western World, western oriented reforms were promoted.<sup>113</sup> With those anti-western stance it is difficult to imagine that Kadro could have been tolerated by Atatürk.

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113) Mete Tunçay, op.cit., T.C'de Tek parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, p. 331.

## CHAPTER V. THE END OF KADRO

The reason why Kadro's publication ceased, or in other words, the question 'why did the Kadroists' action fail?' is still preoccupying scholars' minds. This problematic matter has not yet been dealt with comprehensively.

The reasons for Kadro's closure have been discussed in several different approaches. Firstly, these approaches are going to be considered: ilkey Sunar, both stresses the importance of the matter and formulates the question as such: "Perhaps the best way to begin to understand the political background of 1950, and hence post revolutionary politics, is to begin with a comparative question: namely, why did the Kadro movement fail?"<sup>114</sup>

According to ilkey Sunar, Kadro had not influenced Kemalist ideology so much. However, its crucial impact was seen in the non-bureaucratic strata of the

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114) "It was the only ideological alternative offered to a nationalist state disappointed with an era of capitalist development. The 1929 Depression had become the springboard for significant changes as the central bureaucracy, frustrated by the sluggish pace of private initiative, had begun to push for a larger domain of state enterprise. The Kadro movement was but an intellectual response to these developments; why was it then so quickly dismissed? The Kadro ideology was in fact, rather congenial to the bureaucratic outlook; why then was it not implemented?" ilkey Sunar, op.cit., p. 74.

financial and local constituency of the Party. "The advocacy of a polity guided and ruled by the expertise of a skilled few found immediate opposition in the local and financial constituency of the Party...Ultimately the Kadroists failed because the Party leadership did not wish a head-on clash with the social notables. But rather it chose to renew the tacit elite partnership which had been forged in the early days of the republic."<sup>115</sup>

In the view of Metin Heper, the Kadroists wanted to provide a socio-political philosophy for the Kemalist regimes's new etatist economic policy. Kadro's attempt which was 'bureaucratic-based economic nationalism' was stopped by Atatürk. However, Heper argues that Kadro's attempt -although it was a brief episode in Turkish political development- must be evaluated within the general action of a bureaucratic intelligentsia 'that would pass muster as the new Turkish political philosophy'. For Heper these attempts, which can be summed up as 'attaching substantive connotation to the principles of Atatürkist thought' on the part of

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115) Ibid., pp. 74-5. On this issue Burhan Oğuz asserts that, "The national alliance of the bureaucratic elite rulers with the bourgeois classes was started by the Young Turks and was continued by the Kemalists as well. As was known a monolithic mass was necessary to be formed on a national scale in order to accomplish the National Struggle, beginning in 1920. To achieve this aim 'a pact' was formed with a group of usurpers, landlords, and chieftains." See, Burhan Oğuz, "Fransız Devrimi ve Kadro", (1991), presented in Konya Selçuk Üniversitesi in 1989, p. 217.

bureaucraticization show a degenerate and anti-liberal tendency.<sup>116</sup>

According to Metin Heper, Kadro's cessation can be explained by Atatürk's decisiveness as an intervention to stop the aforementioned trend. "It is possible that before Atatürk died efforts on the part of the bureaucratic intelligentsia to promote transcendentalism in a bureaucratic direction ...could be carried out only up to a certain point. Moreover as the Kadro episode showed, there was always a possibility that Atatürk would effectively restrain moves in that direction. Once Atatürk passed away, however, no such obstacle remained."<sup>117</sup>

Some scholars accept that they did not understand the reasons why Kadro's publication was stopped. For example, Walter Weiker considered Kadro's place within the general modernization process as compatible with the Kemalist outlook. Weiker, however, could not explain convincingly

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116) Heper asserts that the above mentioned doctrinaire attempts were not compatible with Atatürk's outlook. "In this way, secularism, for instance, acquired in time excessive anti-clerical, positivistic characteristics-so much so that it was labelled 'an official dogma of irreligion'. Nationalism, too, gained so chauvinistic a colouring that it became irreconcilable with democracy. And, rather doctrinaire views were developed about the value of state economic enterprises-altogether different from the early pragmatic attitudes towards etatism" Metin Heper, op.cit., p. 73.

117) Ibid., p. 74.

the reasons made Kadro closed down: "The precise reasons why Kadro ceased publication at the end of 1934 are not clear. As late as the end of 1933 Kadro still was in apparent favor with Atatürk, as members of his inner circle such as Falih Rifki contributed to the journal's columns... Atatürk himself had contributed a statement of good wishes, which he did not usually do lightly."<sup>118</sup> As shown in the previous chapters according to some others Kadro had become a victim of the hostile bourgeoisie classes.

Another group of scholar emphasized one specific reason eg.: Kadro's left or bureaucratic leanings. "Kadro, as a monthly journal, did not survive very long...Its self-assigned aim was to develop a theoretical framework to interpret the Turkish revolution and thereby become the ideological spokesman of the Kemalist regime. But after its initial ambivalent reception of the journal, the regime ordered the discontinuation of its publication. The specific details of this episode still remain undisclosed

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118) "The public reason for the closing was that the owner Yakup Kadri had been appointed ambassador to Italy and would no longer be able to run the journal, though in view of the fact that other Kadro mainstays had held government jobs while Kadro was appearing and were available in Ankara and in those jobs after publication ceased, this explanation was hardly plausible. It is much more likely that Atatürk finally agreed with the long-standing demands of men like Peker that the party be the chief source of ideological development as well as of its dissemination." Walter F. Weiker, op.cit., p. 226. Note: Yakup Kadri, had been appointed ambassador to Albania not to Italy as Weiker claimed!

but it is clear that the regime's dislike of Kadro originated from what were perceived to be the latter's left-wing leanings."<sup>119</sup>

### The End of Kadro in the Kadroist's Memoirs

As will be seen from the memoirs of the Kadroists (despite Atatürk's early approval) the antagonism in question would have surfaced immediately after Kadro's publication started.

"Immediately following the publication of the first issue, Peker warned Atatürk about the journal. There were certain definitions, which Peker did not like, for example, a semi-colonial and planned economy. He was making complaints about Kadro saying that there is no country other than Russia which has a planned economy."  
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Yakup Kadri comes to a conclusion about Kadro's cessation which is to a great extent similar to that which other Kadro members reached. Here, the most important point is that Yakup Kadri, like the other Kadroists cannot explain the crucial problems which stemmed from Kadro's understanding of the 'contemporary civilisation', revolution etatism differing to Atatürk's.

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119) Haldun Gülalp, op.cit., p. 71.

120) Yakup Kadri, op.cit., Atatürk Semineri, pp. 83-84.



Yakup Kadri summarizes the point as follows, "However, what can Atatürk possibly do as a national leader? They (the RPP leaders) do not like us because they do not understand us, they will realize what we mean 30 years later, when it is too late."<sup>121</sup>

If Atatürk and İnönü had supported Kadro's ideas they would have supported its aim of transforming Turkish society into one as experienced by Russia and fascist regimes, in other words, the opposite of Atatürk's outlook or idealized Western civilisation. Atatürk chiefly insisted on the cultural aspect of society while trying to divorce it from a traditional and religious past in order to establish a national state on a secular basis. As mentioned in the previous chapters in this context Atatürk's inspiration mostly came from French origins. It may be definitely argued that Şevket Süreyya's doctrinal writings as well as Yakup Kadri's admiration for those experiences were something that were unacceptable to Atatürk.

According to the Kadroists, the inner circle of Gazi was full of people who were the remnants of the Constitutional period. Having adapted themselves to every possible political change that had emerged they were in favour of the status quo. Kadro dealt with Gazi and his

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121) Ibid., p. 83.

clique very intensively. However, Atatürk's relationship with his inner circle had been shaped by the fact that they underwent many of the aforementioned events and political struggles together, dating back to the beginning of the National Struggle. Thus it is convenient to say that Atatürk established a kind of tie with his inner circle. İnönü, Celal Bayar and Recep Peker were among these leading personalities.<sup>122</sup>

Furthermore, with respect to a total break from the heritage of Ottoman reformism Kadro represented a very radical stand point, rejecting all the Western heritage. Such as in terms of understanding the concept of 'contemporary civilisation' Kadro was differed from Kemalism. Nonetheless, the old ideal of Western civilization had not lost its value for Atatürk at any time. Therefore, the answer to the question "Why did Kadro fail?" lies not in the rivalry of hostile groups. Although, these reason stand out clearly, Kadro's different approach to the 'contemporary civilization' and its different sense of revolution, are more significant.

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122) İnönü (1883-1973) served as the Prime Minister between 1925-37. Celal Bayar (1883-1985) also, though underestimated by Kadroists, took his place amongst these sub-chiefs, being responsible for İş Bankası, industrial undertakings and the economy when Prime Minister in 1937. Recep Peker (1888-1950) was a member of the General Presidency between 1923-38, and until 1936 the General Secretary, Prime Minister in 1946-47.

### The Editorials in the Issues Nos: 29-34

Another reason that caused Kadro to close down is perhaps its harsh style of approach to the other elites. It would not be wrong to say that Yakup Kadri was not so 'innocent' as he claimed when he defended his ideas in question. In order to understand how bitterly, harshly and contemptuously Kadro criticized and satirized the rulers of the regime some examples should be cited.

#### The Editorial in Issue No. 29:

"A lousy man what a tragic thing! He is as if under the weight of an evil omen. He is a miserable man shrunk with fear and shame, just like a leper or a man infested with pox, who feels himself defective and wretched...Is the louse a kind of disease? No, it knows how to turn to the colossal body of a gallant gradually into that of a shabby *Dervish*. In a revolutionary regime, the opportunist is just like this louse. At first, one or two, afterwards tens and twenties, and later hundreds of them... A peculiar, unusual deviation has shown the revolutionist, this most dangerous enemy of revolution, to be a harmless even often useful element...Some conservatives, some contra-revolutionaries, some tyrants ...have all been considered enemies by most revolutionists. In fact, it was neither Pope nor Bonaparte who stopped the French Revolution, but the

mild, gentle and deceitful grip of Talleyrand.

However, Talleyrand did not even betray anything or anyone. He was an honest statesman, who carried out the task given to him with loyalty and sincerity, in three different periods dissimilar to each other, under the rule of three masters and each enemies of one another, and this is the weakest and strongest side of the opportunist type... Character and heroism are the things that the opportunist would never like. It is for this reason that the opportunist, when he achieves political influence, changes the character of the revolutionary regime to an indistinct, inactive, and vulgar situation. To them all extraordinary personalities like a freak of nature."<sup>123</sup>

#### Analysis of the Editorial in Issue No. 29:

An analysis of the allegory in the editorial (which was published in 1934 no:29) does not need much clarification. This 'allegoric satire' reaches almost to a degree of insult with its strong language. In other words, Kadro meant to say 'close me down' with this article. The main theme of the article can be summarized as such. The article suggest that, the Chief (Gazi) is surrounded by lice, namely opportunists and shrewd

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123) Kadro, editorial (başyazı) no: 29, 1934.

(political) operators. This causes the regime to fall into lassitude and opportunism and mediocrity causing the revolution to stop. In fact this is possibly due to the carelessness of the Chief. It is known that, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir later would not arbitrarily choose the title "Single Man" for his work single (=tek) means not only unique but also alone in Turkish.

As shown, Kadro not only criticizes the ruling political elites but also satirizes them in all respects. Thus, it is not difficult to anticipate how such a criticism would utterly vex the administration, especially the Secretary Generals of the RPP and other leading staff. Hence, this article is quite beyond the limits of an innocent warning.

#### The Editorial in Issue No: 34.

The editorial of issue 34, in which it was obvious that Kadro was going to close down, is interesting in that it shows the nature of the platonic relationship between Gazi and Kadro.<sup>124</sup> This article reflects a disillusionment from the challenging style of the former issues. It more closely resembles the tragic style of oriental literature.

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124) Kadro, no: 34, 1934, pp. 3-4.

Here are some excerpts from the article: "Every eternal hero has a story-teller. No one knows the heroics that are not recorded in legends. Who knows what great events on earth have been forgotten? In the ancient times "chroniclers" and poets went around with the commanders. The men of action, almost all of whom have a deep and subtle 'intuition' know this quite well, and they want their works and deeds to be appreciated and confirmed especially by these people, because the memory of people is weak, and their hearts slippery. Nothing could be entrusted to them without being written and sealed...There is no more tragic thing than to fall into the hands of a bad, clumsy and insensitive story-teller for a hero... Caesar, afraid of this, registered his deeds with his own hands while the famous book of Machiavelli, is the account of what Caesar Borgia (Caesar II) did. Nevertheless, it has been considered the expression of an original doctrine, sprung out of the writer's genius. As a matter of fact, Machiavellianism is nothing but the ideology of Caesar Borgia's regime... Therefore, it can be said that every event which has not been put into an idea is an exclamation in the middle of a desert. To whom does it address? Who hears it?..."<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, according to the opportunistic mentality, the first task of a man is to appease these kinds of events, and to avoid the influences of these

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125) Ibid., pp. 3-4.

personalities. Unfortunately, there are those who name this consideration and manner of act as precaution and rule, even those who want to include the concepts of government and state in it." 126

Consequently an important question emerges, if there was any 'obvious and firm support' by the political leaders of the day, why then was Yakup Kadri exiled to Albania as ambassador,<sup>127</sup> and why did no further publications of Kadro occur? Hence, it is correct to say that the story circulated by the above mentioned scholars is the same as the one previously put forward by the Kadroists. In other words, Kadro was closed just because Atatürk had been convinced by the Kadro's opponents.

For clarifying the matter another question can be ask: although Kadro's publication was prevented, why were the Kadroists not removed from their government posts? This fact (to a certain extent) can be understood when the conditions of the 1930s are considered in terms of a lack of an educated elite to work in government. That is to say, as mentioned in previous chapters, possibly Atatürk's aim at unifying the intellectuals played an

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126) Ibid., p. 4.

127) Kadro's message for the closure "To our readers: KADRO, following its next issue will not be published for some time because of our colleague and owner of journal Yakup Kadri Bey's appointment to a foreign country to represent our government." Kadro, No: 34., October (Teşrini Evvel) 1934.

important part in this matter. However, Kadro's proclamation about the closure of journal has completely fitted in co-optation pattern which it had obviously seen in with the case of Free Party.<sup>128</sup>

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128) Fethi Bey, submitted a vote of non-confidence against Şükrü Kaya the Minister of Internal Affairs regarding the forgery and conspiracy that was happened in the municipality elections; by 15 November of 1930, following ardent discussions (with the exception of 10 vote) the majority of the Assembly issued a vote of confidence to the minister. Upon these negative developments Fethi Bey sent a petition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs explaining that he had closed the Free Party (SCF).

According to Serbest Fırka members' memoirs, (declared) abolition letter's text had been written by involvement Gazi and İsmet Paşa. The original letter is that the below quoted one. "Efendim: Büyük Gazimiz Mustafa Kemal Hazretlerinin teşvik ve tasvibiyle Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkasını teşkil etmişim. Kanaatimizce bu teşvik ve tasvip, teşkil edeceğim fırkanın Gazi Hazretlerine karşı siyasi mücadeleye girmesi ihtimalini hadd-ı zatında bertaraf ediyordu. Esasen bu kanaat haricinde siyasi bir teşekküle vücut vermek mesuliyetini almayı hatırıma getirmemişim. Halbuki tahakkuk eden şekle (nazaran) fırkamız atıyen Gazi Hazretleriyle siyasi sahada karşı karşıya gelmek vaziyetinde kalabileceği anlaşılmıştır. Bu vaziyette kalacak siyasi bir teşekkülün mevcudiyetini fırka müessisi sıfatıyla muhafaza ve idameyi muhal buluyorum. Bu sebeple SCF'nın feshine karar verdim. Bu karar fırka teşkilatına tebliğ edilmiştir. Keyfiyeti arz ederim efendim." A. Fethi. See, Mete Tunçay, op.cit., TC'nde Tek-Parti... p. 273. See, for details of this matter also to: Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, Baha Matbaası, İstanbul, 1969, pp. 90-97.



## CONCLUSION:

Kadro was first published in 1932 by special permission from Atatürk, and not on orders from Atatürk or İnönü as is claimed by some authors. Hence, the permission for publishing must be questioned within the concept of co-optation. In terms of the state's authoritarian power and class view Kadro's theses seemed to be compatible with the populist policies of the single party regime. However, except a marginal sympathy from some of the bureaucrats Kadro was not appreciated by RPP leaders.

Populism was used for the unification of the intelligentsia. We argue that Kadroists' action was allowed to exist within this context (via populism). Sami N. Akural pointed out this fact as follows: "...Atatürk (also) used populism to counter the exhortations of domestic communists, who were echoing the rhetoric of the Soviet Revolution with fictitious claims that the class struggle existed in Turkey."<sup>129</sup>

Kadro expounded its theses within the 1930's authoritarian single party regime with a populist rhetoric of a classless and unified society while etatism (state capitalism) was maintained in the economy. Kadro tried to combine the rhetoric of the post-revolutionary

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129) S. N. Akural, op.cit., p. 138.

(anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist) populism of the 1920s with the 1930s populism which was predominantly etatist.

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To what extent (could) the ideological basis in question, which Kadro defended, have been injected into Kemalism? The claim of Kadro in 1932 is to contribute to the reproduction of the Kemalist ideology put it into a mature (doctrinaire) form. According to some scholars, this contribution was 'a peculiar hybrid' of Kemalism, in other words a kind of endeavour to give a strict "authoritarian/ totalitarian" and a mixture of a socialist-fascist form to it. As shown in the previous chapters the pragmatic feature of Kemalist ideology was an important obstacle for Kadro's attempt in this respect.

The single party regime maintained the Western oriented cultural reforms which were backed by the paradigm of seizing the contemporary civilization in the 1930s. Revolution(ism) thus, had been accepted for protecting and developing reforms from these aspects. Regardless of Fascism and the partial effects of the Soviet Revolution (as an alternative civilisation model) on Atatürk's worldview, Western civilization has always remained a unique example. Kadro's understanding of revolution(ism) which stresses stronger 'totalitarianism'/authoritarianism (than the Kemalists) in the single party regime and very strong anti-West/liberal leanings in both cultural and

economic aspect were not compatible with the Kemalist prospects.

Hence, Kadro's relationship with the ruling political elite developed mainly within a conflicting framework. It can be said that Kadro clashed (in an argumentative way) with almost all the other political elites by defending its own opinions about the Turkish Revolution and ideology. In this regard, Kadro's produced ideas which were not compatible with Atatürk's principles is very important.

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Kadro wasted most of its energy in systematization etatism in order to create a new social system for Turkey. However, in terms of this aspect Kadro could not affect government policies. Yahya Tezel pointed out both these questions as to whether Kadro effect government etatist policy or not, and surfacing conflict between Kadro and the Kemalist leaders is as follow: "It must be stated that in terms of government policies Kadro did not affect etatism. Kadro started publication following the decision of the Government to move towards state capitalism and accelerating the growth of industrialisation on January, 1932. Subsequently a serious conflict surfaced between Kadroist and Kemalist leaders. Atatürk's increasing discontent led to the closing of the journal and the exiling of one of the leading members of the Kadro to Albania, as an

ambassador. These two facts cannot be neglected in the relationship between Kadro and the government."<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, the claim is that the Kadro's publication was stopped just because the implementation of the etatist policy had been consolidated by government (means Kadro's mission had finished) in the 1934 is not plausible.

The memoirs of Yakup Kadri and Şevket Süreyya assert that Kadro underwent a strict control from its early days of publication onwards. The fact that the owner of Kadro, Yakup Kadri and Falih Rifkî (one of Kadro's contributors) were both very close to Atatürk made it possible for the publication of the journal to carry on longer than anticipated. This, however, did not prevent the closure of the journal. These facts were discussed (in the first and last chapters) within the conceptual framework of co-optation.

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Some radical representatives of the Turkish left have criticized Kadro from the beginning (1932). Kadro's approach to the class and state were the matters that essentially were considered by these critics. The following critical views will help one to be able to complete the ideological aspect of Kadro. Possibly one of

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130) Yahya S. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-50), 2nd ed., Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, p. 213.

the earliest and the most fervent critics of Kadro is Hikmet Kıvılcımlı.

For Kıvılcımlı, the Kadroists could not see that Turkey was developing towards a capitalist structure with different social classes...To him, what the Kadroists expounded was not a true and original ideology of any kind but just servitude to the existing system.<sup>131</sup> Unlike Kıvılcımlı, Yalçın Küçük (although in a pejorative way claims that the greatest ideologist of the Kemalist period is Şevket Süreyya) says that the Kadroists played a very important part in terms of influencing the political character of the period.<sup>132</sup>

However, in terms of Turkish political and social thinking Kadro must be evaluated from a broader perspective. For an appreciative conclusion it would be appropriate to quote Kemal Karpat's words defining Kadro's

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131) Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişimi, Bibliotek Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 139-48.

132) "Şevket Süreyya Bey, who once was a member of the administrative committee of the Turkish Communist Party, scraped the concepts of class and conflict from the intellectual life of Turkey, in his masterpiece, 'İnkılap ve Kadro' and the journal Kadro which he published in the early 1930s, all by himself. The belief of Kemalism for "the classless and unified" masses comes from this fact. Kadro was very influential in the removal of the class conflict from the frame of mind of the Turkish intelligentsia, and, furthermore for a long time the TKP, too was satisfied with the Kemalist ideology." See, Yalçın Küçük, Bilim ve Edebiyat, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1985, p. 213.

privileged place as such: "The Kadro was the first comprehensive attempt to discuss economic and social problems from a political point of view, and produced a number of social studies. Incomplete and eclectic though its views were they had the advantage of being the first in the relatively unplowed field of social studies."<sup>133</sup> Kadro's legacy in this regard (as an important part of the Turkish dependency, and 'center-periphery' theories) survived into the mid-1970s in different fields of Turkish political thinking.<sup>134</sup>

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133) Kemal Karpat, op.cit., p. 72.

134) For the critical analysis of 'the stories of the semi-colonisation process of the Ottoman Empire 19th century 'see Zafer Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi", in Türkiye Tarihi, Vol. III, op.cit., pp. 196-99.

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