

TURKISH INDEFINITES: SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY

ECEM BAYKUŐ

BOĐAZIĐI UNIVERSITY

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TURKISH INDEFINITES: SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY

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Ecem Baykuş

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Turkish Indefinites: Scope and Specificity

Turkish indefinites in object position are expressed in two ways: one is marked with the accusative case, and the other one is non-marked. Interestingly, there is a sharp contrast between these two indefinites. Accusative marked indefinites in the object position show ambiguity between specific and non-specific interpretations whereas non-marked indefinites have only a non-specific interpretation. This thesis aims to develop a critical perspective on the semantic and syntactic differences between these two types of indefinites in Turkish. Although Enç (1991), Keleş (2001), Öztürk (2005) and Özge (2010) present their proposals on the behavior of accusative marked and non-marked indefinites, these proposals are insufficient to fully account for the indefinites behavior. This thesis aims to give a unified and semantic oriented investigation on Turkish indefinites by delving into the missing points in earlier works. Firstly, this thesis will look at the behavior of indefinites in extensional contexts and clarify the contrast between accusative marked and non-marked indefinites in these contexts. Secondly, the thesis will analyze the interaction of indefinites with intensional operators. Fodor (1970) claims that a specific and a non-specific reading that indefinites receive are derived separately from a *de re* and a *de dicto* reading. Therefore, an indefinite receives four different readings when it scopes below an intentional operator in the surface structure. In conclusion, this thesis will go over the proposals on indefinites and provide a critical perspective on them by looking at Turkish examples.

ÖZET

Türkçe Belgisiz İsimler: Açık ve Belirli

Türkçe’de nesne olarak kullanılan belirsiz isimler iki şekilde ifade edilir; bunlardan birincisinde belirsiz isim belirtme durumu alır, ikincisinde ise belirtme durumu belirtici yoktur. Bu belirsiz isimlerle ilgili ilginç olan kısım belirtme durumu alan ve belirtme durumu belirtici olmayan arasında keskin bir fark vardır. Belirtme durumu alan nesne konumundaki belirsiz isim, belirli ve belirsiz anlamlar taşıyabilirken belirtme durumu belirteci olmayan belirsiz ismin sadece belirsiz anlamı vardır. Bu tezin amacı, iki farklı kullanımı olan nesne konumundaki belirsiz isimlerin dilbilimsel ve anlambilimsel farklarını derinlemesine incelemektir. Enç (1991), Keleş (2001) ve Öztürk (2005) belirsiz isimlerin dilbilimsel davranışları üzerine çalışmış ve bu davranışlar üzerine farklı analizler sunmuş olmasına rağmen bu tez anlambilim odaklı birleşik bir analiz sunmayı hedefler. Öncelikle, bu tez nesne konumundaki belirsiz isimlerin davranışlarını ve iki belirsiz isim ifadeleri arasındaki farklılıkları kapsamlı bağlamlarda incelemektedir. Kapsamlı bağlamda belirtme durumu alan ve almayan belirsiz isimlerin arasındaki farkı açıklamak hedeflenmektedir. Daha sonra ise bu belirsiz isimlerin davranışları içerimsel bağlamlarda incelenecek ve aralarındaki fark açıklanacaktır. Ayrıca bu tez, belirtme durumu alan ve almayan belirsiz isimlerin içerimsel işleyicilerin olduğu yapılarda nasıl davrandığı üzerine de yoğunlaşacaktır. Anlambilimsel odağında literatürde oluşmuş bazı karışıklıkları da çözmeyi hedeflemektedir. Sonuç olarak, bu tez belirsiz isimler üzerine yapılmış analizleri eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla inceleyip iki farklı ifade edilen belirsiz isimlerin davranışlarını bu analizler ışığında değerlendirecektir.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Indefinites.....	4
1.2 Scope rigidity.....	7
1.3 Turkish indefinites	10
1.4 Outline of the thesis.....	12
CHAPTER 2: INDEFINITES AND SPECIFICITY.....	14
2.1 Fodor and Sag’s proposal	14
2.2 Intermediate readings	16
2.3 Referential interpretations of Turkish indefinites.....	23
2.4 Intermediate readings in Turkish.....	25
2.5 Existential closure	32
2.6 Abusch’s proposal: U-Set mechanism.....	37
2.7 Choice function analysis	39
2.8 Keleşir and Enç’s proposals on Turkish indefinites.....	47
2.9 Singleton indefinites	56
2.10 Pseudo-incorporation	60
2.11 Generalized Skolem terms.....	67
2.12 Conclusion	75
CHAPTER 3: INDEFINITES IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXT.....	77
3.1 De re- de dicto	77
3.2 The scope paradox	81
3.3 Turkish indefinites	84
3.4 Split intensionality	89
3.5 The fourth reading	91

3.6 Conclusion	95
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION	97
REFERENCES.....	100

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Scope rigidity in Turkish	8
Figure 2. Reverse order	9
Figure 3. Indefinites inside relative clauses.....	26
Figure 4. The narrow scope reading	27
Figure 5. The wide scope reading	28
Figure 6. The intermediate reading	28
Figure 7. Quantifier in a relative clause	31
Figure 8. Heim's (1982) proposal	34
Figure 9. Heim's (1982) modified proposal	35
Figure 10. Abusch's (1994) proposal	38
Figure 11. Choice-function analysis	40
Figure 12. Reinhart's (1998) proposal.....	41
Figure 13. Reinhart's (1998) proposal for intermediate readings.....	42
Figure 14. Kratzer's (1998) proposal	43
Figure 15. Kelepir's (2001) adoption of a choice function analysis	53
Figure 16. Incorporation	61
Figure 17. Pseudo-incorporation	63
Figure 18. A de dicto reading	78
Figure 19. A de re reading	79
Figure 20. Choice-function analysis	87
Figure 21. Split intensionality	90

ABBREVIATIONS

1	First person
2	Second person
3	Third person
ABL	Ablative
ACC	Accusative
AGR	Agreement
AOR	Aorist
COND	Conditional
COP	Copula
DAT	Dative
DP	Determiner Phrase
FUTURE	Future Tense
GEN	Genitive
IMPF	Imperfect
iff	if and only if
LF	Logical Form
LOC	Locative
N	Noun
NOM	Nominative
NOT	Negation
NP	Noun phrase
OPT	Optative
PAST	Past Tense

PL	Plural
POSS	Possessive
PPL	Participle
PROG	Progressive aspect
QP	Quantifier Phrase
REL	Relative clause
SG	Singular
st	such that
TP	Tense Phrase
V	Verb
VN	Verbal Noun
VP	Verb phrase
w	World
\forall	Universal
\exists	Existential
\wedge	and
\rightarrow	if

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Turkish, there are two ways to express indefinites in the object position: one way is to mark indefinites with the accusative case and the other way is to leave the indefinites caseless. There is a clear contrast between these two types of indefinites regarding their semantic interpretation and syntactic behavior. This thesis is mainly concerned with the contrast between these two types of Turkish indefinites which appear in the object position. An accusative marked indefinite in the object position is ambiguous between specific and non-specific readings, which is very similar to the behavior of indefinites in English, whereas non-marked indefinites have only a non-specific reading (Enç, 1991; Erguvanlí & Taylan, 1984; Nilsson, 1985; Zidani-Eroglu, 1997; among others). Although scholars (Diesing, 1992; Enç, 1991; Fodor & Sag, 1982; among others) interpret the notion of “specificity” differently, it is clear that the existence of accusative marking on indefinites in the object position clearly affects their interpretation (Aygen-Tosun, 1999; Enç, 1991; Erguvanlí & Taylan, 1984; Nilsson, 1985; Zidani-Eroglu, 1997; among others). This thesis aims to ascertain whether those interpretations of the notion of “specificity” can fully explain all semantic interpretations of accusative marked indefinites in the object position. With respect to the interpretation of accusative marked indefinites, this thesis will discuss three separate phenomena that fall under the umbrella of specificity: scope driven specificity, epistemic specificity, and partitivity (Ionin et al., 2009). The scope driven specificity phenomenon is based on that specific interpretations of an indefinite result from the indefinites’ behavior of taking a wide scope over an operator at LF. Fodor and Sag (1982) and Abusch (1994) observe that indefinites

seem to take exceptional wide scope by violating scope islands such as if-clauses. The choice-function analysis of indefinites (Kratzer, 1998; Matthewson, 1999; Reinhart, 1997) aims to explain the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites by analyzing indefinites in situ. The second phenomenon is epistemic specificity, which is closely related to identifiability and referentiality. In this phenomenon, a specific indefinite refers to an individual the speaker has in mind (Fodor & Sag, 1982; Schwarzschild, 2002). Some of the scope driven specificity analyses are closely related to epistemic specificity, but some are not. One of them is Reinhart's (1997) choice function analysis. Lastly, a theory on specificity is about the third phenomenon in which specificity entails partitivity or presuppositionality (Diesing, 1992; Enç, 1991). Enç argues that specific indefinites include overt partitives while an alternative view assumes that specificity entails presuppositionality. The presuppositional analysis claims that the restrictor of an indefinite denotes a non-empty set (Diesing, 1992; Kelepir, 2001). This thesis will first address previous proposals' predictions on how accusative marked indefinites yield specific readings considering the interpretations of the notion of "specificity". It also aims to show that none of these proposals is sufficient to fully account for the behavior of accusative marked indefinites.

A proposal on the behavior of Turkish indefinites must account for the behavior of non-marked indefinites together with accusative marked ones. It is important to look at what blocks non-marked indefinites from receiving specific interpretations. Öztürk (2005) adopts a pseudo-incorporation analysis to explain why non-marked indefinites are always interpreted as non-specific in relation to universal quantifiers, other operators or negation. However, this analysis fails to account for the difference between accusative marked indefinites and non-marked

indefinites in object position. Therefore, one additional goal of this thesis will be to show that the pseudo-incorporation analysis is insufficient to account for the behavior of non-marked indefinites in object position.

This thesis will also discuss the interpretations of indefinites with respect to intentional operators like propositional attitude verbs. Proposals on Turkish indefinites (Enç, 1991; Kelepir, 2001; Öztürk, 2005) make false predictions on the interaction of accusative marked indefinites with intentional operators. Earlier accounts (Dede, 1986; Kelepir, 2001; Von Stechow & Kornfilt, 2005) claim that accusative marked indefinites always yield a *de re* interpretation with respect to intentional operators; however, Özge (2010) shows that accusative marked indefinites are ambiguous between a *de re* and a *de dicto* reading. Another goal of this thesis will be to show that earlier proposals on accusative marked indefinites are inadequate to explain how they yield ambiguous readings with respect to attitude verbs. Furthermore, it aims to show that the specific interpretation of an indefinite does not entail its *de re* interpretation. A paradox reading, non-specific *de re*, is available for accusative marked indefinites in the object position and previous accounts fail to show its existence. This thesis is also concerned with whether Turkish support further supporting examples to Fodor's (1970) observations on indefinites receiving a specific *de dicto* reading. This reading is highly controversial in the literature (Keshet, 2008, 2010; Keshet & Schwarz, 2014; Szabó, 2010; Von Stechow & Heim, 2011).

In the coming sections of this chapter, I will first provide some background knowledge on indefinites in English, and then give a background on Turkish indefinites and scope rigidity. Before concluding, I will present the outline of this thesis.

1.1 Indefinites

Naively indefinites can be viewed as existential quantifiers:

(1a) Mary saw a cat.

(1b) Reading: There is an x such that x is a cat and Mary saw x .

(1c) $\llbracket a \text{ cat} \rrbracket = \lambda g. \text{there is an } x \text{ such that. } x \text{ is cat and } g(x) = 1$

(1a) has the reading of (1b), under this view, in order to obtain that meaning, the indefinite *a cat* has to denote an existential quantifier as in (1c). If *a cat* denotes an existential quantifier, then the sentence (1a) is true if there is at least one individual who is a cat and Mary saw it; if not, it will be false.

In some cases, it is seen that indefinites are ambiguous between specific and non-specific readings when there are other operators like modals and attitude verbs in the sentence structure.

(2) Mary is looking for a cat.

Reading 1: There is a (particular) cat that Mary is looking for. (inverse scope)

Reading 2: Mary is looking for any cat. (surface scope)

Consider the following scenario, Mary goes to Maçka Park every day and she feeds and takes care of all the cats living in that park. Today, she goes to the park again, but she can't see Mira, whose leg is broken. She feeds the cats as usual, but Mira is not there. Mary is still looking for her. Under this scenario, the inverse scope reading, *Reading 1*, is true such that Mary is looking for a particular cat, namely Mira, in the park, and the surface scope reading, *Reading 2*, is false because she sees the other cats in the park. On the other hand, in the evening, a vet takes all the cats in the park to give them medicine before Mary comes to the park. When Mary goes to the park to feed the cats again, there is no cat in the park. In this case, *Reading 2* is

true while *Reading 1* is false because she is looking for any cat, including Mira, Puffy, Kara, etc. There is no particular cat that she is looking for in this scenario. Considering the scenarios, (2) is ambiguous between two readings: one is specific in that Mary is looking for a particular cat; the other one is non-specific in that she is looking for some cat. The view that indefinites have an existential interpretation predicts that a specific reading obtained in (2) results from indefinites taking wide scope in the sentence structure as in (3). When the indefinite scopes below an intentional operator as in (4), it has a non-specific meaning.

(2) Mary is looking for a cat.

(3) LF1: [[a cat]₁ [NOT Mary is looking for t₁]]

(4) LF2: [NOT Mary is looking for [a cat]]

The view predicts that first Quantifier Raising (QR) applies to the structure. Secondly, the indefinite which is analyzed as an existential quantifier covertly moves above the other operators (intentional operator in our case) and it yields a specific reading.

Surprisingly, indefinites appearing inside island constructions are also ambiguous between specific and non-specific readings. Consider the following sentence:

(5) If a relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune. (Heim, 1982)

Reading 1: There a relative of mine such that if he dies, I will inherit a fortune.

[[a relative of mine]₁ if t₁ dies, I will inherit a fortune]

Reading 2: If any relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune.

[if [a relative of mine] dies, I will inherit a fortune]

The controversial situation for indefinites appearing in island constructions is that the specific reading is still available for indefinites inside the islands as in (2); however, there is no consensus on where this reading originates. The QR view predicts that QR applies to the indefinite and moves it outside of the if-clause island in order to have specific reading; however, this is a syntactic violation. This means that the source of *Reading 1* in which *a relative of mine* has a specific reading cannot result from QR. This is so because the QR view supposes that indefinites are existential quantifiers; therefore, it predicts that they act similarly to quantifiers when they both appear inside the islands. Consider the following sentence:

(6) If each relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune.

**Reading 1*: For every relative of mine, if he dies, I will inherit a fortune.

* [[every relative of mine]₁ [if t₁ dies, I will inherit a fortune]]

Reading 2: If every relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune.

[if [every relative of mine] dies, I will inherit a fortune]

Quantifiers appearing inside islands have only non-specific readings as the specific reading is not available, which is different from the indefinites' behavior. Under the QR view, indefinites, which are interpreted as existential quantifiers, take wide scope over another operator to have a specific meaning. However, indefinites can still have specific readings even if they appear inside an island, but other quantifiers cannot receive specific readings under the same conditions. This indicates that QR is not exceptional with respect to island constraints.

The sharp contrast between (5) and (6) shows that indefinites act differently compared to other quantifiers when they both appear inside the islands. Under the QR view, the indefinite in (3) shows exceptional behavior by violating syntactic constraints because the specific reading should be impossible.

Scholars (Abusch, 1994; Fodor & Sag, 1982; Reinhart, 1997; Schwarzschild, 2002) present different proposals to explain this exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites and their difference from other quantifiers. In Chapter 2, this thesis will discuss these proposals in detail.

1.2 Scope rigidity

To have a better grasp of the syntactic behavior of accusative marked indefinites under QR, we need to understand that Turkish is a scope rigid language, which is different from English, and quantifiers are subjected to scope rigidity. This section aims to provide background knowledge on scope rigidity in Turkish.

I am going to show how Kelepir (2001) illustrate scope rigidity in Turkish. In a scope rigid language, quantifier phrases follow the surface structure order (Aygen-Tosun, 1999; Göksel, 1998; Kelepir, 2001; Zidani-Eroglu, 1997). For example, when there are two quantifiers in a sentence structure, the one in subject position c-commands the one in object position, and in contrast to English, the LF movement, Quantifier Raising, is not applicable to that structure (Kelepir, 2001).

(7)

Öğrenciler-in çoğ-u her kitab-ı okudu.

students-GEN most-POSS every book-ACC read

“Most of the students read every book.”

(Kelepir, 2001 p. 55)




Figure 1. Scope rigidity in Turkish

In (7), the quantifier *öğrencilerin çoğu* c-commands the quantifier *her kitabı* 2, meaning that QP1 scopes over QP2 (see Figure 1). There is only one reading possible for (7) which is in line with the surface structure scope relation. (7) has the following reading :

(8a) The students who read every book are more (by a contextually set amount) than those who didn't. (surface scope reading)

(8b) For every book x, most of the students read x. (inverse scope reading)

(Kelepir, 2001)

Kelepir observes that the reading (8b) is true under the following scenario while (8a) is false in this scenario:

The book h is read by the students A, B, and C.

The book g is read by the students A, C, and D.

The book k is read by the students A, B, and D.

The book m is read by the students A, C, and D.

According to her observations, the sentence (7) cannot be true under this scenario because there are four students and only one student read all the books, not most of them. The fact that (7) is false under this scenario shows that (7) does not

have the inverse scope reading (8b). (7) has only the surface scope reading (8a) and nothing else. She argues that the reason why the inverse scope reading is not available is due to the scope rigidity; therefore, in order to get this reading (8b), the structural positions of the quantifiers have to change, meaning that the quantifier *her kitab-ı* has to c-command the quantifier *öğrenciler-in çoğu*, see Figure 2, which is the reverse c-commanding relation of quantifiers in (7).

(9)

Her kitab-ı öğrenciler-in çoğ-u okudu
 every book-ACC students-GEN most-POSS read
 “Every book, most of the students read.”

(Kelepir, 2001 p. 55)




Figure 2. Reverse order

Based on her observations, sentences (7) and (9) have different readings, respectively (8a) and (8b), and these readings are distinct from each other. She provides empirical evidence that Turkish is a scope rigid language.

1.3 Turkish indefinites

In Turkish, there are two ways to express indefinites in object position: one is marked with an accusative case marker, and the other is non-marked.

(10)

Melisa bir kedi gördü.

Melisa a cat see-PAST

“Melisa saw a cat.”

(11)

Melisa bir kedi-yi gördü.

Melisa a cat-ACC see-PAST

“Melisa saw a cat.”

Interestingly, accusative marked indefinites in object position show an ambiguity when there is another operator in the structure, contrary to non-marked ones (Keleşir 2001; Öztürk, 2005; Enç 1991). This can be seen in the following examples:

(12)

Üçten az öğrenci bir kitap oku-du.

Three less than students a book read-PAST

“Less than three students read a book.”

(13)

Üçten az öğrenci bir kitab-ı oku-du.

Three less than students a book-ACC read-PAST

“Less than three students read a book.”

(14a) There are less than three y such that y is a student for which there is a book x and y read x . (surface scope reading)

(14b) There is a book x such that less than three students read x . (inverse scope reading)

In both sentences (12) and (13), the quantifier *less than three students* is in the subject position while the indefinites *bir kitap* and *bir kitab-ı* are in the object position regardless of whether they are marked with a case or not. However, sentences (12) and (13) differ in the available readings. Sentence (13) has the readings (14a) and (14b) while (12) has only the reading (14a).

Assume that four students (A, B, C, D) are studying in the same school. The school gives them a set of books (X, Y, Z) and assigns them to read one book from that set during spring break. Consider the following scenario:

Students A and B read the book X and students A, B, C, and D read the books Y and Z.

Under this scenario, only the inverse scope reading (14b) is true for (13) while the surface scope reading (14a) is false. There exists one book, X in our scenario, and only two students read that book, X. However, four students read the books Y and Z; therefore, the surface scope reading that less than 3 students read a book will be false because there are four students who read at least one book. Interestingly, sentence (12) cannot be uttered under this scenario because speakers find it awkward to assume that the non-marked indefinite *bir kitap* in (12) is interpreted as one particular book.

Evidently, the inverse scope reading of an indefinite in the object position is only allowed when it is marked with the accusative case in Turkish, as in (13). (13) is ambiguous between the specific and non-specific readings, (14a) and (14b), which are distinct from each other. On the other hand, (12) has only one reading, the non-specific surface scope one.

The inverse scope reading in (13) results from the accusative marked indefinite; consequently, the semantic contribution of this case marker to the readings in (14) needs further investigation. The QR view predicts that the indefinites in (12) and (13) take narrow scope at LF and the quantifier scopes above the indefinite, in line with the surface structure, so that the non-specific reading (14a) is available. On the other hand, the same view predicts that the indefinite in (13) should take wide scope at LF, contrasting with the surface structure, so that (13) receives the specific reading (14b). In short, when QP c-commands indefinites in the surface structure, the accusative marked indefinites in object position either move above other operators or appear under the scope of them at LF, and this behavior leads to semantic ambiguity according to the QR view.

When an accusative marked indefinite in the object position scope above a quantifier at LF, this is exceptional for Turkish considering that Turkish is a scope rigid language. Moreover, similarly to English indefinites in islands, Turkish accusative marked indefinites in direct object position also display exceptional behavior by violating scope rigidity. This situation needs a close examination.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

This thesis aims to analyze the behavior of indefinites in Turkish in two contexts: extensional and intensional. Chapter 2 will discuss proposals on the behavior of indefinites in receiving specific meaning. Chapter 2 will introduce earlier proposals (Fodor and Sag, Abusch, Schwarzschild, Reinhart, and Kratzer, Enç, Keleşir, Öztürk) and check whether they can account for the behavior of indefinites in the object position. Chapter 3 will discuss accusative marked indefinites in the

intensional contexts and show that the paradox reading is available in certain situations. Chapter 4 will summarize the main points in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

INDEFINITES AND SPECIFICITY

In this chapter, I will summarize proposals on the exceptional behavior of indefinites appearing inside islands and discuss whether these proposals can be extended to Turkish. Besides, I will present proposals on Turkish indefinites and discuss whether they can provide a comprehensive account for their behavior. In addition to the exceptional behavior of accusative marked indefinites in Turkish, there is a contrast between a non-marked and an accusative marked indefinite. This thesis also discusses whether proposals on Turkish can explain this contrast. It appears that non-marked indefinites do not receive a specific reading; following, an account which provides a specific reading for an accusative marked one also must block this reading for non-marked ones.

2.1 Fodor and Sag's (1984) proposal

Indefinites show an exceptional behavior in that they yield a specific reading when they appear in islands. Fodor and Sag (1982) argue that the apparent scope ambiguity of indefinites can be characterized as a lexical ambiguity between a referential and a quantificational interpretation. Specifically, if indefinites appear inside islands and the specific meaning is available, then these indefinites are referential expressions, referring to a particular entity the speaker has in his mind. On the other hand, when an indefinite does not appear inside an island, it has a quantificational interpretation, whether or not it is interpreted specifically. Fodor and Sag (F&S) argue that indefinites are ambiguous between existential quantifiers and definites. They do not argue that existential QR analysis is

completely wrong, but they say it is only applicable when QR does not violate any syntactic constraints. Fodor and Sag observe the difference between the quantifying determiner ‘each’ and the indefinite article ‘a’ in island constructions (see examples (5) and (6)). According to the QR view, the contrast between (5) and (6) can only result from moving the indefinite *a relative of mine* out of the *if-clause* island boundaries, thus violating the island constraint, unlike *each relative of mine*. Unlike this view, Fodor & Sag’s proposal doesn’t need to assume structural movement in the case of specific readings of an indefinite inside the islands because, according to them, the indefinites inside islands, which are interpreted specifically, are actually interpreted as definite descriptions. This is illustrated in (15).

(15a) If a relative of mine dies, I will inherit a fortune.

(15b) LF: [[if [a relative of mine] dies] I’ll inherit a fortune]

(15c) *F&S’s Reading 1*: If a relative of mine that I have in mind dies, I will inherit a fortune.

(15d) (15c) => There is a specific relative of mine that if he dies, I’ll inherit a fortune

(15e) [[a relative of mine₁]]^[1 → the speaker] = [[the relative of mine₁ that I₁ have in mind]]^[1 → the speaker]

defined iff there is exactly one relative of the speaker’s that the speaker has in mind. If defined: [[a relative of mine₁]]^[1 → the speaker] = The x such that x is the relative of the speaker that the speaker has in mind.

(15f) *F&S’s Reading 2*: If the relative of mine that dies, I will inherit a fortune.

(15g) [[a relative of mine₁]]^[1 → the speaker] = λg. there is an x such that x is a relative of the speaker and g(x) = 1

According to Fodor & Sag, indefinites structurally stay inside of the *if-clause* island, but they can refer to a specific entity the speaker has in mind. In regard to their proposal, sentence (15a) has only the one LF in (15b), in which the indefinite appears inside the *if-clause* island. The referential interpretation of the indefinite in (15f) entails the specific reading under the QR view. Under the Fodor & Sag view, the denotation of the indefinite, which is interpreted as a referential expression, has the denotation as in (15e). Moreover, the same LF (15b) also allows the quantificational interpretation of indefinites as seen in (15f), in which the indefinite *a relative of mine* is not referential but quantificational. The denotation of the indefinite, which is interpreted quantificationally, is represented in (15g). In short, F&S prevent the island violation by assuming a referential interpretation of specific indefinites inside islands.

2.2 Intermediate readings

F&S observe that since specific readings of indefinites inside islands are referential interpretations of those indefinites, therefore of scopeless expressions, one does not expect specific readings of indefinites inside islands relative to an operator that scopes under another operator (that is intermediate readings). To clarify this, if an indefinite is inside an island and the quantifier phrase contains it, the intermediate reading should be impossible, because the indefinite is not quantificational. In relation to this, they argue for the absence of the intermediate reading (16c) of the sentence (16a).

(16a) Each teacher overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called before the dean. (from Fodor and Sag, 1982)

- (16b) For every x such that x is a teacher such that x overheard the rumor that there is a y such that y is a student of mine and y had been called before the dean. (every teacher > rumor > there is a student) (narrow scope)
- (16c) For every x such that x is a teacher there is a y such that y is a student of mine, x overheard the rumor that y had been called before the dean. (every teacher > there is a student > rumor) (intermediate scope)
- (16d) There is a y such that y is a student of mine and for every x such that x is a teacher, x overheard the rumor that y had been called before the dean. (there is a student > every teacher > rumor) (wide scope)

Assuming that indefinites are island- insensitive, the QR view would predict that (16a) has the three readings in (16b), (16c) and (16d). In (16b), the indefinite scopes inside the relative clause island; in (16c), the quantificational indefinite escapes from the island, but it is interpreted in the scope of the highest quantifier; In (16d), the indefinite takes widest scope. These two views, the QR view and F&S' proposal, both derive (16b) and (16d), although they would explain the latter in a different way.

For the sentence (16a), suppose the following context: teachers A, B, and C are working in the school where I work and this school has 6 students who are Ozan, Okan, Serkan, Mina, Ali, and Ahmet. Only Serkan and Mina are actually my students in that school. Besides, there are many rumors about the students in the school:

Rumor 1: 'Mina is called before the dean'

Rumor 2: 'Serkan is called before the dean'

Rumor 3: 'One of Ecem's students is called before the dean.'

Scenario 1: Teachers A, B, and C heard rumor 3. The rumor only says one of my students is called before the dean, but the teachers do not know which student.

Consider that Ozan is called before the dean, but according to the rumor, one of my students is called; consequently, the teachers will think Ozan is Ecem's student because they don't know that Ozan is actually not my student.

Scenario 2: Teachers A and B heard the rumor 2 and teacher C heard the rumor 1.

Teachers A and B know a particular rumor that Mina is called before the dean, which happens to be my student. Teacher C knows the particular rumor that Serkan is called before the dean, who is actually one of my students. The teachers only know who the rumor is about, but they are not told that these students are mine.

Under *Scenario 1*, the narrow scope reading (16b) is true for both QR and Fodor & Sag because it doesn't matter who the students are. What matters is that they heard a rumor a student was called before the dean. Any student who is called before the dean satisfies the narrow scope reading. On the other hand, the intermediate reading (16c) will be false because the rumor says Ozan, a student of Ecem, is called before the dean while he is actually not my student.

Under *Scenario 2*, the narrow scope reading (16b) will be false for the QR view because the rumor doesn't say that they are students, and the teachers won't know that. What the teachers heard is that a particular person is called before the dean; but, they do not know that he is my student. This reading does not hold under this scenario. However, the intermediate reading (16c) is true for QR view because each teacher knows a rumor about a particular person, who happens to be my student.

Readings like (16c) are called intermediate readings because indefinites scope under an operator while scoping above another operator in the structure. This reading

can be derived only if the indefinite is interpreted quantificationally. Fodor and Sag argue that (16a), like (17), can only receive two interpretations of the indefinite *a student of mine*: a lower scope quantificational and a referential one.

(17) John overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called before the dean. (from Fodor and Sag, 1982)

F&S Reading 1: John overheard the rumor that a student of mine that I have in mind had been called before the dean. (referential)

F&S Reading 2: John overheard the rumor that there is a student of mine that had been called before the dean. (quantificational)

According to F&S, the indefinite in (16a) is either interpreted quantificationally and inside the island or referentially, in which case the effect is that of widest scope (no scope relationship between the indefinite and other operators in the sentence). Therefore, they argue that the intermediate reading (16c) under the QR view is absent because the sentence (16a) is actually false in *Scenario 2*¹. They claim that intermediate readings are not available when the indefinite appears inside an island.

Abusch (1994) strongly criticizes Fodor & Sag's analysis by arguing that there are cases where indefinites receive a genuine intermediate reading. Abusch agrees with Fodor & Sag's observation that indefinites act differently from quantifier phrases in islands, and this behavior needs an explanation. However, she objects to the referential/quantificational ambiguity of indefinites that Fodor & Sag argue for by asserting that indefinites in islands can receive intermediate readings like (16c),

¹ F&S acknowledge that some speakers actually judge (6a) true in *Scenario 2*. However, they argue that those speakers, who get this intermediate reading, do not consider relative clauses as islands; therefore, for those speakers, intermediate readings of indefinites look like escaping from relative clause islands and the reading (6c) is not problematic for them. Indeed, for Fodor and Sag, there is still no instance of island-escaping behavior of indefinites. Indefinites are still interpreted quantificationally.

and therefore their wide scope behaviors outside islands cannot be due to a referential interpretation.

Abusch proposes that there is no entailment relationship between a specific and a non-specific reading. Consider the following example:

(18a) Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read *a book* he had recommended. (from Abusch, 1994)

(18b) For every student x there is a book y such that Himmel recommend y and x read y , Himmel rewarded x . (every student $>$ a book) (non-specific)

(18c) There is a book y such that Himmel recommended y and for every student x , such that x read y , Himmel rewarded x . (a book $>$ every student) (specific)

(from Abusch, 1994)

She provides the following scenario for (18a):

Professor Himmel recommends to his class these two books: *Buddenbrooks* and *Beowulf* but his favorite book is *Buddenbrooks*. He rewarded every student of him who read *Buddenbrooks* while students who only read *Beowulf* are not rewarded. Under this scenario, reading (18b) is true because there is a particular book, *Buddenbrooks* in this scenario, and Himmel recommended that book, and for every student who read *Buddenbrooks*, Himmel rewarded those students. However, reading (18a) is false under this scenario since there are students who read a book that Himmel recommended which happens to be *Beowulf*, but they are not rewarded. This scenario for (18a) proves that there is at least one case in which the wide scope reading of indefinite is true and the narrow scope reading is false, which implies that wide scope readings do not result from narrow scope readings. Also, this is evidence that specific readings are independent of non-specific readings. Conversely, a narrow

scope reading does not entail a wide scope reading. Abusch states that if Himmel does not recommend any book, the reading (18b) will be vacuously true whereas the reading (18c) is false. This provides the evidence that non-specific readings do not entail specific readings.

Having proven that wide scope and narrow scope readings are distinct, Abusch argues that intermediate readings are also independent from both of them. Consider the example in (19a) below in which Professor Himmel is replaced by a quantifier. According to Abusch, three readings (wide, narrow, and intermediate scope) are available for (19a).

(19a) Every professor rewarded every student who read a book he had recommended.

(19b) For every professor x and for every student y such that there is a book z such that x recommended z and y read z, x rewarded y. (every professor > every student > a book) (narrow scope reading)(non-specific)

(19c) For every professor x, there is a book z that x recommended and for every student y, y read z, x rewarded y. (every professor > a book > every student) (intermediate scope reading)

(19d) There is a book z such that for every professor x and for every student y such that x recommended z and y read z, x rewarded y. (a book > every professor > every student) (wide scope reading) (specific)

Now consider the following scenario in which there are two professors, Professor Himmel and Professor John, but these two professors recommended different sets of books to their students. Professor Himmel recommended *Beowulf* and *Buddenbrooks* while Professor John recommended *War and Peace*, *Madam Bovary*, and *Beowulf*. The students Ali and Ozan are students of both Himmel and

John and these books are recommended to them by the professors. Ali read *War and Peace* and *Buddenbrooks*; Ozan read *Beowulf* and *Madam Bovary*.

Professor John rewards both Ali and Ozan because they read one book that he recommended. On the other hand, Professor Himmel only rewarded Ozan for reading *Beowulf*.

In this scenario, both specific and non-specific readings of (19a) are false. The specific reading is false because there is no one particular book that the professors recommended, such that all of the students read that book and rewarded. The non-specific reading is false because not every student is rewarded by every professor for reading one recommended book. In our scenario, Ali was not rewarded by Himmel although he had read one recommended book. On the other hand, the intermediate reading (16c) is true under this scenario because for every professor, there is at least one book for which he rewarded every student who read that book. For Professor John, there are two books, *War and Peace* and *Beowulf*, such that he rewarded every student who read one of them. John rewarded Ali because he read *War and Peace*; he also rewarded Ozan because he read *Beowulf*. For Professor Himmel, there is only one book, *Beowulf*, and he rewarded a student who read it. Ozan is the only student who read *Beowulf* and he was rewarded by Himmel; however, Ali didn't read that book and he wasn't rewarded by Himmel. Abusch proves that there is an intermediate reading independent of the other readings and she argues that this is a problem for the analysis of Fodor & Sag. According to Abusch, this independent intermediate reading is not explained through Fodor & Sag's analysis².

² If one tries to say that relative clauses are not islands for some speakers (see Fodor and Sag's analysis), Abusch points out that we would predict other quantifiers to scope outside of them as in the following example:
(100) Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read every book he had recommended.

To conclude, based on these observations, the intermediate reading is independent from the narrow scope and wide scope readings. The existence of intermediate readings is problematic for Fodor & Sag's analysis because they do not predict it. Considering these facts, Abusch's observations display that Fodor & Sag's attempt to solve the puzzle of why indefinites move outside islands is not adequate to explain their behavior because they miss the available intermediate reading.

2.3 Referential interpretations of Turkish indefinites

That accusative marked indefinites in the object position scope above a quantifier at LF is exceptional for Turkish. Similarly to English indefinites appearing in islands, Turkish accusative marked indefinites in direct object position violate scope rigidity in order to yield a specific reading (Kelepir, 2001). This section aims to apply Fodor & Sag's analysis which suggests that there is no structural movement that causes a syntactic violation, but the source of the specific reading is the lexicon, in the case of Turkish. For sentence (20), in which the indefinite is not marked, Fodor & Sag predict the following reading:

(20)

Üçten az öğrenci bir kitap oku-du.

Three less than students a book read-PAST

“Less than three students read a book.”

The sentence (100) lacks the specific reading “For every book *x* and Himmel recommended *x* such that every student *y* and *y* read *x*, Himmel rewarded *y*.”, which shows that the genuine quantifier *every book* in (100) does not act similarly to indefinites inside the relative clause islands. Evidently, it is not the case that relative clauses are not islands for some speakers.

F&S's Reading 1: Less than three students read a book. (Possibly different books for different students)

This can be explained by quantificational interpretation of the indefinite at LF.

On the other hand, sentence (21) shows an ambiguity.

(21)

Üçten az öğrenci bir kitab-ı oku-du.

Three less than students a book-ACC read-PAST

“Less than three students read a book.”

F&S predicts the following readings for (21):

F&S's Reading 1: Less than three students read a book. (Possibly different ones) (quantificational)

F&S's Reading 2: Less than three students read the book that I have in my mind. (referential)

The accusative marked indefinite in (21) is ambiguous between quantificational and referential interpretations under the extension of F&S's view to our Turkish data. If the accusative marked indefinite appears in the object position and the specific meaning is available, then this indefinite is a referential expression, referring to a particular entity that the speaker has in mind. Following, Fodor & Sag, we can assume that *Reading 2* does not lead to a violation of scope rigidity because the indefinite is lexically interpreted as a definite description when it receives a specific meaning.

Given this, an analysis inspired by Fodor & Sag solves the apparent violation of scope rigidity observed in the existential interpretation of Turkish indefinites in

object position. However, Fodor and Sag’s analysis is not sufficient to explain all the behavior of Turkish indefinites. In the following section, considering Abusch’s criticisms of Fodor and Sag, we will look into data in which Turkish indefinites receive intermediate readings.

2.4 Intermediate readings in Turkish

Considering the existence of intermediate readings, this section focuses on whether genuine intermediate readings are also available in Turkish. If these readings are available, it means that F&S’s analysis does not apply to the Turkish case either. Kelepir (2001) also provides evidence against F&S’s analysis, in which referential interpretation of accusative marked indefinites is blocked. Furthermore, she adopts a choice-function analysis to interpret intermediate readings.

Let’s examine the following example in (22a)³ in which an indefinite appears inside a relative clause, and one quantifier is in the highest position while the other quantifier contains the indefinite.

(22)

Her	profesör	sınavda	bir	soruyu	cevaplayan	her	öğrenciyi	ödülledi
								dirdi
every	professor	exam-	a	question	answer-REL	every	student-	reward-
		LOC		-ACC		ACC		PAST

“Every professor rewarded every student who answered a question in the exam.”

(22) has the representation in Figure 3 in which the quantifier *her profesör* c-commands another quantifier *sınavda bir soruyu cevaplayan her öğrenci* and the indefinite *bir soruyu*, and it is structurally in the highest position. The indefinite *bir*

³ (16a) is the Turkish counterpart of Abusch’s example without a pronoun:

(17) Every professor rewarded every student who read a book he had recommended.

soruyu, which is structurally in the lowest position, appears in a relative clause island (see Figure 3)⁴




Figure 3. Indefinites inside relative clauses

Fodor and Sag predict two readings for (22a): a quantificational and a referential interpretation of the indefinites.

(23a) Every professor rewarded every student who answered any question in the exam. (quantificational interpretation)

(23b) Every professor rewarded every student who answered the question that I have in mind in the exam. (referential interpretation)

These two readings (23a) and (23b) have the same LF, which is in line with the surface structure in Figure 3. Although these two readings have the same LF, the indefinite *bir soruyu* can be interpreted quantificationally leading to reading (23a) or as a definite description, resulting in reading (23b). For the non-specific reading (23a), there are possibly different questions for students such that if every student answers at least one of them, every professor will reward them. For the specific

⁴ It is not entirely true syntactic representation of the sentence (22a), but I use this tree for simplicity.

reading (23b), the speaker has a particular question in her mind such that every student who answers that particular question will be rewarded by every professor.

If indefinites were allowed to escape islands, then they could scope above a quantifier (*every student who answered a question in the exam*, in our case). Under this assumption, the QR view could predict three readings for (22):

(24a) For every professor x and for every student y such that there is a question z and y answers z in the exam, x rewarded y . (narrow scope reading)

(24b) There is a question z such that for every professor x and for every student y such that y answers z in the exam, x rewarded y . (the widest scope reading)

(24c) For every professor x , there is a question z such that for every student y such that y answers z in the exam, x rewarded y . (intermediate reading)

These reading have the following LF's represented in Figure 4, 5 and 6.

Besides, Figure 4 shows the LF that Fodor and Sag adopt in explaining both referential and quantificational interpretations.

(25a) every professor > every student > a question (narrow scope)




Figure 4. The narrow scope reading

(25b) a question > every professor > every student (wide scope)




Figure 5. The wide scope reading

(25c) every professor > a question > every student (intermediate scope)




Figure 6. The intermediate reading

The reading in (24a) is also predicted by Fodor and Sag and (24b) follows from the reading where the indefinite is interpreted referentially; however, (24c) is the problematic reading for their analysis.

Abusch proves that there exists an intermediate reading like (24c), which is independent of the other readings, (24a) and (24b). As we will see below, the same intuitions for (26) also hold for its Turkish counterpart (24a).

(26) Every professor rewarded every student who read a book he had recommended.

Consider the following scenario:

Two professors, namely John and Alex, give the same course LING101, and prepare a final exam of this course together. The exam has six questions. John decided to give rewards to students who answered Question 1, Question 2, and Question 3. Alex decided to give rewards to students who answered Question 3 and Question 4. Their students' names are Ahmet and Rana. Ahmet solved Question 1, Question 3 and Question 4, and John rewarded Ahmet. Rana solved Question 3 and Question 2, and both John and Alex rewarded Rana.

Turkish native speakers find the sentence (22a) true under the given scenario. Furthermore, under this scenario, only the intermediate reading (24c) is true because surface scope (24a) and inverse scope readings (24b) are false. The reading (24a) is false because not every student who answered a question is rewarded by every professor; Ahmet solved a question, but he only got a reward from John, not Alex. The reading (24b) is also false because there is no particular question that every student solved, and got a reward from the professors. Both Ahmet and Rana solved Question 3, but only Rana got a reward.

Based on these observations, there exists a genuine intermediate reading for Turkish accusative marked indefinites which appear inside a relative clause and the universal quantifier *every professor* is in the highest position in the surface structure.

The existence of the reading (24c) appears to cause a problem for the application of Fodor and Sag’s theory to Turkish examples because they cannot predict it.

Fodor and Sag are aware of this problem but try to overcome it by arguing that relative clauses are weak islands for those speakers who get the intermediate reading (24c) for sentences like (26) and (22a).

Given our goal, we will look at the following data (27) to check whether relative clauses are weak islands for Turkish speakers. If they are, then the intermediate reading available for (27) will not be problematic for their analysis; however, if the speakers find relative clauses as strong islands, then Fodor and Sag’s analysis cannot account for the available intermediate reading. For this purpose, the sentence (27) in which a quantifier phrase is inside a relative clause island is formed.

(27)

Ecem	her	kitabı	okuyan	en az üç	öğrenciyi	ödüllendirdi.
Ecem	every	book	read-REL	at least three	students	reward-PAST

“ Ecem rewarded at least three students who read every book.”

The quantifier *her kitabı* appears inside a relative clause which sits in the restrictor of the quantifier *en az üç öğrenciyi* (see Figure 7). Differently from (22), an indefinite is replaced with a quantifier.




Figure 7. Quantifier in a relative clause

If relative clauses are weak islands for some speakers, the sentence (27) is expected to be true under the following scenario:

Ecem has 6 students who are Arda, Emir, Mina, Serkan, Zehra, and Rana and she suggested three books for them to read, which are *On the Road*, *Martin Eden*, and *War and Peace*.

For the book *On the Road*, Arda, Serkan, and Zehra read it and Ecem rewarded them.

For the book *Martin Eden*, Arda, Emir, Serkan, and Zehra read it and Ecem rewarded them.

For the book *War and Peace*, Arda Emir, Serkan, and Rana read it and Ecem rewarded them.

There is one student, Mina, who read all of the books and Ecem didn't reward her. In short, Arda, Mina and Serkan read every book, but only Arda and Serkan are rewarded.

The native speakers of Turkish that I consulted found (27) false in the given scenario because they report that there are only two students who read every book

and got a reward from Ecem. These speakers only get the surface scope reading for the sentence (27), which means that for Turkish speakers, relative clauses are strong islands.

Fodor and Sag explain that intermediate readings are available for some speakers by asserting that the indefinite inside an island is interpreted quantificationally but is moved outside an island to yield an intermediate reading because, for those speakers, relative clause islands are not strong. Under this assumption, another quantifier can also scope outside of the relative clause island because the speakers are insensitive to those islands. However, it is shown that Turkish speakers are sensitive to relative clause islands, and they don't allow the island escaping behavior of the quantifier. This proves to us that how they accept intermediate readings cannot be reduced to not being sensitive to islands.

To conclude, Fodor and Sag's analysis fails to account for the behavior of indefinites in Turkish because the indefinite violates both the island constraint and scope rigidity, which is evidently different from the behavior of quantifiers. The quantificational interpretation of indefinites is inadequate to explain all the exceptional behavior of them. Plus, the quantificational indefinites still act differently from quantifiers under the same conditions. This thesis supports Abush's criticism against Fodor and Sag's analysis of indefinites; and provides further supporting evidence for her criticisms from Turkish.

2.5 Existential closure

As mentioned above, under the view that indefinites are existential quantifiers, there is a clear contrast between an indefinite and a quantifier when they appear inside an island. While the former has a wide scope interpretation, the latter does not, even

though they both appear in the same environment. The view that sees indefinites as existential quantifiers expects indefinites to be local and respect the syntactic constraints like other quantifiers; however, indefinites seem to violate island constraints under QR analysis- also called as exceptional scope taking behavior of indefinites- which shows that they do not show the same behavior as the other quantifiers. Heim (1982) argues that indefinites do not have their own quantificational force. Instead, they are restricted variables that can be bound by an existential operator. An existential closure provides the quantificational force that indefinites do not have by being coindexed with them. Heim's proposal offers a solution for the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites because an existential operator may appear outside of an island containing an indefinite and still can bind an indefinite's variable. The following example shows how Heim's proposal account for the wide scope reading of indefinites without violating syntactic constraints.

(28) If a friend of mine likes a cat, I give it to him. (Abusch, 1994)

(29) *Reading 1*: If any friend of mine likes a cat, I give it to him. (narrow scope reading)

(30) *Reading 2*: There is a friend of mine such that if he likes a cat, I give it to him. (wide scope reading)

In order to yield the reading in (30), the QR view predicts that the indefinite takes scope above the conditional. On the other hand, an alternative view, Heim's proposal, predicts the following representation in Figure 8 for (30):




Figure 8. Heim's (1982) proposal (adopted from Abusch, 1994 p.101)

As seen in this representation, Heim's proposal seems to solve the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites. The indefinite stays inside the if-clause but gets its existential wide scope interpretation from the existential operator which occurs at the highest position in the structure, as seen in Figure 8.

Abusch criticizes Heim's proposal by claiming that there is an interfering operator "always" between the indefinite and the existential closure; therefore, how the indefinite gains its existential reading creates a problem. It is because the variable introduced by the indefinite can only be bound by the closest operator in the structure (Abusch, 1994; Heim, 1982).

Heim observes that there is no restriction in binding an indefinite's variable; following, this leads to an unselective binding. The major problem with unselective binding is that it causes weak truth conditions because any entity can verify the sentence (Abusch, 1994). The logical expressions of (28) are the following:

$$(31a) \exists x_2 \forall x_1 [\text{cat}(x_1) \wedge \text{friend of mine}(x_2) \wedge \text{like}(x_1, x_2) \rightarrow \text{give}(I, x_1, x_2)]$$

(31b) $\sim \exists x_2 \forall x_1 [\text{cat}(x_1) \wedge \text{friend of mine}(x_2) \wedge \text{like}(x_1, x_2) \vee \text{give}(I, x_1, x_2)]$

(from Abusch, 1994 p.101)

These two logical expressions in (31) are equivalent; based on that, consider (28) in the following scenario: Ecem is not a friend of mine, and a cat doesn't like her, but I give a cat to Ecem. In this scenario, the mere existence of an individual is enough to verify (31a).

The sentence (28) will be still true in this scenario due to the logical nature of *if* and the unselective binding in Heim's proposal. Unfortunately, the weak truth conditions for indefinites resulting from existential interpretation do not solve the puzzle of how indefinites get wide scope by violating the island constraints.

To avoid this result, Heim (1982) modifies her analysis in which the indefinite which is bound to the existential operator will move leftward to the topmost next level (see Figure 9).




Figure 9. Heim's (1982) modified proposal (adopted from Abusch, 1994)

Abusch criticizes this analysis on the base that the indefinite has to move out of the if-clause island. Another criticism comes from Schwarzschild. He claims that

the domain of *a friend of mine* is so inclusive that it includes all the friends. This is a problem for a wide-scope reading because it fails to derive the intended meaning that there is a special friend of the speaker who gets a cat from him.

Turkish indefinites also violate scope rigidity when they receive a specific interpretation under the QR view.

(32)

Üçten az öğrenci bir kitab-ı oku-du.
 Three less than students a book-ACC read-PAST
 “Less than three students read a book.”

If we adopt Heim’s proposal to explain the accusative marked indefinites, the indefinite *bir kitabı* in (32) introduces a variable into the representation and an existential closure has to appear in the nuclear scope of the quantifier *üçten az öğrenci*. When the indefinite *bir kitabı* receives a specific interpretation, the existential closure appears at the topmost level at LF. This analysis allows indefinites to be interpreted in situ. However, Heim’s proposal also predicts weak truth conditions due to the existential closure’s unselective binding nature; therefore, any entity can verify the sentence (33).

(33)

Eğer her öğrenci bir kitab-ı okursa, Ali sevinecek.
 If every student a book-ACC read Ali be happy-Future
 “If every student read a book, Ali will be happy.”

The wide scope reading of (33) would be trivially true under Heim’s first proposal. Under a scenario that either not everyone reads a book, or everyone read a newspaper rather than a book, (33) would be still true. Considering Abusch’s criticisms against Heim’s analysis, this thesis argues that Heim’s proposal cannot explain how the behavior of Turkish indefinites. Even though Heim (1982) modifies

his proposal, it still does not allow accusative marked indefinites to yield a specific reading without violating syntactic constraints.

2.6 Abusch's proposal: U-Set mechanism

Given how an existential closure operates in Heim's proposal, Abusch (1994) presents another proposal concerning the problem of the weak truth conditions and the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites. According to Abusch's analysis: the indefinite is interpreted as non-local; therefore, it receives its meaning from a lexical storage mechanism. This lexical storage mechanism enables indefinites to be interpreted semantically so that they do not need to move syntactically. However, the weak truth condition problem is still available because the indefinites still have an unrestricted meaning. Abusch proposes a U-set mechanism in order to add a restrictive property for the non-local interpretation of indefinites. This mechanism will produce the desired truth conditions.

ϕ : U' functions as a set of indices of unquantified in situ indefinites. I will call these sets U-sets.... each element of U is a pair consisting of a variable and a restriction. (Abusch, 1994, p. 109).

Abusch preserves the notion of indefinites introducing variables to the semantic representation, but these variables are restricted. Differently from Heim, the indefinites receive their meaning from the U-set mechanism non-locally even though their variables are bound by an existential operator. For sentence (34), the readings in (35) are available.

(34) If a friend of mine likes a cat, I give it to him.

(35a) If any friend of mine likes a cat, I give it to him. (existential reading)

(35b) There is a friend of mine such that if he likes a cat, I will give it to him. (specific reading).

For the specific reading (35b), Abusch’s proposal predicts the representation in Figure 10 in which the indefinite’s variable is bound by the existential closure appearing at the topmost level. However, the indefinite receives its meaning from the storage mechanism. Therefore, the indefinite is interpreted in situ but still yields the specific reading.




Figure 10. Abusch’s (1994) proposal

In conclusion, Abusch’s proposal seems to solve the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites with this storage mechanism. She agrees that indefinites act differently than the other quantifiers as observed by Fodor & Sag(1982), and Heim (1982). Secondly, she criticizes both analyses in terms of being insufficient to explain all the behaviors of indefinites. Fodor & Sag’s analysis fails to explain the intermediate reading which is available for indefinites while Heim’s proposal fails to give an account for the wide scope reading of indefinites inside the islands. Abusch solves the puzzle of indefinites with the lexical storage mechanism which allows wide scope and intermediate scope readings and interprets indefinites in situ without leading to a violation. Abusch's analysis still contains the existential closure operator as well as the notion that indefinites introduce variables to the representation; but

differently from Heim, Abusch restricts the variable by a lexical storage mechanism so that it gives the desired truth conditions. The variable is interpreted lexically and non-locally so that indefinites do not need to move syntactically, which solves the problem of island escaping behavior.

If we extend Abusch's analysis to Turkish, the accusative marked indefinite *bir kitabı* in (33) receives its specific interpretation without violating scope rigidity and the island constraint. The reason is that an existential closure appears at the highest position at LF. Secondly, the indefinite receives its meaning from the lexical storage mechanism in situ; therefore, no other entity than books or students can assert the sentence (33) due to the restrictive binding nature of U-sets.

Abusch's analysis seems to account for how indefinites receive a specific and an intermediate reading; however, this analysis is still inadequate to explain all of the behavior of indefinites. In addition to a specific and a non-specific interpretation of an indefinite, they also show an ambiguity relative to an intentional operator.

Abusch's U-set mechanism allows indefinites to be interpreted in situ; therefore, it cannot predict three readings that the indefinite receives when there is an intentional operator in the structure (see Chapter 3). Given that, Abusch's proposal fails to account for ambiguities in the intentional contexts.

2.7 Choice function analysis

Up to this point, this thesis has discussed that indefinites appearing inside an island behave differently than genuine quantifiers such that they yield specific meaning when there is another quantifier in the subject position or an operator like negation which c-commands the indefinite. Under the QR view, this behavior is exceptional because if they move outside of islands, they violate island constraints. Regarding

the exceptional scope taking behavior of indefinites, scholars put forward different proposals (Fodor & Sag, 1982; Abusch, 1994). However, these proposals are insufficient to give an account for all the behavior of indefinites.

Another proposal, concerning this exceptional behavior of indefinites, is to interpret indefinites under choice function semantics. This choice-function interpretation accounts for the indefinites' behavior in situ which is a strong alternative view against QR (Kelepir, 2001).

A function f is a choice function ($CH(f)$) if it applies to any non-empty set and yields a member of that set. (Reinhart, 1997, p. 372)

Under this analysis, an indefinite's restrictor denotes a predicate type $\langle e, t \rangle$. Indefinite determiners introduce a function variable f with the type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, e \rangle$ into the system such that it takes this $\langle e, t \rangle$ argument and returns an individual as represented in Figure 11.

(36) A man walked in.




Figure 11. Choice-function analysis

The choice function semantics predicts for (36) that there is a way of picking an individual in the set of men.

Scholars use choice-function interpretation to explain the exceptional scope-taking behavior of indefinites; however, they have different proposals on where the

function variable gets its value. Kratzer (1998) argues that existential closure appears at the topmost level in the structure and binds the function variable there. Under Kratzer's analysis, indefinites are ambiguous between quantificational and specific interpretations. Besides, a specific interpretation has arrived through the choice function picking up a particular individual from the set denoted by the indefinite's restrictor. The wide-scope analysis of indefinites turns into a pseudo-scope example under this analysis.

On the other hand, Reinhart (1997) argues that this function variable that is introduced into the system has to be bound to existential closure which can appear "any admissible scope cite". She gives the following structure for (36) where the indefinite *a man* is interpreted in situ (see Figure 12).




Figure 12. Reinhart's (1998) proposal

These two approaches derive intermediate readings with different interpretations of choice functions. Reinhart argues that the intermediate readings depend on where the existential closure appears.

(37) Every linguist studied every conceivable solution that a problem might have.

(37) has the following intermediate reading:

(38) For every linguist x , there is a particular problem y (a possibly different one for each linguist) such that x studied every possible solution to y .

This reading is represented in Figure 13 under her proposal. Under Reinhart's proposal, existential closure appears below the quantifier *every linguist*, but it is above the quantifier *every solution* while the indefinite *a problem* stays in situ. However, Kratzer (1998) argues that the given structure in Figure 13 is impossible. In her analysis, intermediate readings are only available when the choice function has an overt bound variable.




Figure 13. Reinhart's (1998) proposal for intermediate readings

Kratzer uses parametrized choice functions (that is a skolemized choice function) to get the intermediate reading.

Under this analysis, (37) has the following representation in Figure 14:




Figure 14. Kratzer's (1998) proposal

According to Kratzer, the intermediate reading in which different linguists studied different problems is only possible when the speaker chooses one particular problem from the set of problems for every linguist. For instance, there is one set of problems for every linguist study and this set includes problems A, B, and C. There are also two linguists, X and Y, in the discourse and the speaker chooses problem A for the linguist X and problem B for the linguist Y. In a context like this, there is a genuine intermediate reading, and it is derived through contextual clues. When the choice function is skolemized, it picks an individual from the set denoted by the restrictor, but the value of the function depends on the universal quantifier. In our example, the function chooses the problem from the set of problems for every linguist depending on who the linguist is.

Mathewson (1999) also adopts skolemized choice functions for the intermediate readings but differently from Kratzer, she argues that the function variable is bound by the existential closure which appears at the topmost level.

These proposals seem to solve the problems discussed so far because they interpret indefinites in-situ position. Besides, they explain how the intermediate readings are derived; the system does not give vacuously true sentences as in the Heim proposal. However, they still fail to explain all the behavior of indefinites. First of all, Mathewson (1999), Kratzer (1998), and Reinhart (1997) always predict a de dicto interpretation of indefinites in intentional context (see Chapter 3). Although the indefinite receives either a non-specific or a specific interpretation, it is always interpreted below the intensional operator, yielding a de dicto reading. This problem is further discussed in Chapter 3.

These proposals also fail to explain the behavior of Turkish indefinites. First of all, Kelepir (2001) argues that when the subject of a sentence is a negative polarity item, accusative marked indefinites in object position does not receive a specific interpretation. She gives evidence for cases where a specific interpretation is blocked for accusative marked indefinites. However, as the existential closure may appear freely in the structure, Reinhart proposal fails account for that a specific interpretation of indefinites is blocked in certain cases (Kelepir, 2001).

On the other hand, Kratzer's proposal seems to explain why non-marked indefinites in the object position are always interpreted as non-specific because they are interpreted as quantificational, so their scope is always local. However, Kelepir argues that this proposal is inadequate to explain why accusative marked indefinites are ambiguous when there is an intentional operator. (see Chapter 3).

Kelepir (2001) illustrates how Lidz (1999) adopts choice function analysis for accusative marked indefinites in direct object position in Kannada. Kannada has also two types of indefinites: one is marked with accusative case and the other is non-marked. Similarly to Turkish, accusative marked indefinites can take wide scope or

narrow scope at LF with respect to a quantifier in the subject position and an intentional operator which c-commands the indefinite in the surface structure. On the other hand, non-case marked indefinites in a direct object position receive their interpretation relative to their surface scope position. They do not take scope over a quantifier in the subject position at LF because, in the surface structure, they appear below the subject quantifier. Based on his observations on Kannada indefinites in direct object position, he argues against Reinhart's choice-function analysis which includes free existential closure insertion. According to him, if an existential closure can appear in any scope site, then this proposal cannot explain why non-marked indefinites in Kannada receive only a surface scope interpretation while accusative marked ones can receive both a surface scope and an inverse scope interpretation. Similarly to the Turkish case, Reinhart's analysis also fails to explain the difference between accusative marked indefinites and non-marked indefinites in the object position (Lidz, 1999). Lidz proposes that Kannada indefinites are interpreted as either existentially or as a choice function (Kelepir, 2001). If the indefinite is marked with an accusative case, then it is interpreted as a choice function, if not, then it is interpreted existentially. According to Lidz's proposal, the existential closure has to appear at the topmost level, which is against Reinhart's argument, therefore, the indefinite will receive a specific reading. In addition, he also argues that choice functions are skolemized when the accusative marked indefinite receives an intermediate reading or narrow scope reading.

(39)

prayiyobba	vidyarthi	pustakav-annu	huduk-utt-idd-aane.
every	student	book-ACC	look for-PPL-PROG-3SG

“Every student is looking for a book.”

(Lidz, 1999 p. 328)

Sentence (39) has two interpretations:

(40) For each student, there is a particular book that the student is looking for.

(Intermediate)

(41) There is a particular book that all of the students are looking for.

(specific)

Under Lidz analysis, the reading in (40) has the representation in which the existential closure appears at the topmost level and binds the function variable. When the choice function skolemized and the universal quantifier determines its value, the indefinite receives an intermediate reading in situ. Given that, the choice function will give different books for different students.

(42a) $\exists f \forall x$ [student (x) \rightarrow look for (x, f(book))]

(Kelepir, 2001 p.98)

Under his analysis, (41b) has the following representation:

(42b) $\exists f \forall x$ [student (x) \rightarrow look for (f(book))]

(Kelepir, 2001 p.98)

Although Lidz's proposal regards the difference between accusative marked indefinites and non-marked indefinites, it is still inadequate to explain all their behavior. Chapter 3 discusses that Turkish accusative case marked indefinites can receive de dicto readings. Lidz's proposal fails to provide an account of how accusative marked indefinites receive de dicto readings.

2.8 Kelepir and Enç's proposals on Turkish indefinites

As discussed in Section 2.1, Fodor & Sag (1982) argue that indefinites are ambiguous between referential and quantificational interpretations such that if the indefinite is inside an island and receives specific meaning, then it is interpreted

referentially. Enç (1991) criticizes Fodor and Sag's analysis based on the source of specificity mostly depending on the scope relation of the indefinite with the other operators. Instead, Enç argues that the source of specificity is independent of scope relations. She provides the following examples (43a) and (43b) to show that even though both indefinites show the same scope behavior in the structure, they differ in meaning.

(43a) John talked to **a logician** about this problem.

(43b) John talked to **a certain logician** about this problem.

(Enç, 1991)

Enç argues that these two sentences (43a) and (43b) make the same assertion but they have different meanings. There are cases where one of the sentences is acceptable and the other is not in the same context. In (43a), *a logician* can quantify over a set of logicians in the domain of discourse but in (43b) *a certain logician* requires that a set of logicians which are salient in the conversation of context. Consider the following scenario: the speaker is from Turkey, and he is only familiar with Turkish logicians. However, He heard that John talked to a logician who happened to be Dennis from Denmark. The first sentence (43a) is true and felicitous in this context, whereas the second sentence (43b) is not because the Danish logicians are not salient to the speaker.

If the source of specificity for indefinites is just based on scope relations, then (43a) is equivalent to (43b). However, this is not the case. Enç shows that these two sentences might make the same assertion, but they have different presuppositions.

She observes that the Turkish accusative case marker also presents a similar contrast as seen in (43). Turkish indefinites in object position may or may not carry an accusative marker, but only the accusative marked indefinites show ambiguity.

Enç notices that a similar case as seen in (43b), in which the indefinite quantifies over a salient set, requires accusative case marking in Turkish. According to Enç's observations, accusative marked indefinites in object position can yield a specific meaning without scoping over other quantifiers in the structure. Enç's observations are in contrast with Fodor and Sag's analysis, which supposes that indefinites interpreted quantificationally take wide scope in the structure to have a specific meaning. Enç gives the following examples to show that the source of specificity is not based on scope relations.

(44)

Odam-a birkaç çocuk girdi.
my room-DAT several children entered

“Several children entered my room.”

(Enç, 1991)

Sentence (44) is followed by (45) and (46):

(45)

İki kız-ı tanıyordum.
two girl-ACC I-knew

“I knew two girls.” (among them)

(46)

İki kız tanıyordum.
two girl I-knew

“I knew two girls.” (not necessarily among them)

(Enç, 1991)

Enç argues that sentences (45) and (46) differ in meaning because the indefinites *iki kız* and *iki kız* quantify over the different sets. According to her observations, there is a connection between the sets denoted by *birkaç çocuk* in (44) and *iki kız* in (45); however, this is not the case for (46). (45) sets up a discourse for (45), in which there is a set of children who entered the room. (45) has the interpretation that these two girls are members of the set of children in the context provided in (44). On the other hand, differently from (45), (46) may be interpreted as these two girls are not members of the set salient to the discourse in (44). In addition, (45) can be equivalent to (47), while (46) cannot. (47) is an example of an overt partitive sentence; following, the accusative case marking in an indefinite enables the covert partitive meaning as seen in (45). Enç argues that the accusative marked indefinite in object position quantifies over a salient set previously introduced in the discourse.

(47)

Kız-lar-dan iki-sin-i tanıyordum.

girl-PL-ABL two-AGR-ACC I-knew

“I knew two of the girls.”

(Enç, 1991)

Given these observations, Enç presents the following analysis: accusative marked indefinites may link to the antecedents in the previous discourse and if so, they receive specific meaning. The nature of this link is weak; therefore, those indefinites may also be interpreted as non-specific (when there is no link to the prior discourse). The source of specificity in Enç’s analysis is the partitive meaning of indefinites which requires a link to the prior discourse.

Enç's analysis proposes that partitivity and specificity go hand in hand. Moreover, she states that partitives are necessarily specific because the salient set has been already introduced into the context. Strong criticism of Enç's analysis comes from Keleşir (2001), who argues that specificity and partitivity are distinct from each other; therefore, specificity does not entail partitivity in all cases. Keleşir (2001) explains the interpretation difference between (45) and (46) as the presupposition accommodation of accusative marked indefinites. The restrictor of *birkaç* denotes a set of children in (44) and the restrictor of the indefinite in (45) is a set of girls. Enç supposes that the set of girls in (45) is in fact a subset of children in (44). Although Enç argues that there is a subset relation between the set of children in (44) and the set of girls in (45), Keleşir states this subset relation is not necessary. The meaning difference results from the fact that the speaker presupposes a set of girls for (45) but there is no presupposition of this set in (46). Keleşir gives the following example (48) to show that accusative marked indefinites do not always have a covert partitive meaning.

(48) Ahmet bugünlerde ne yapıyor?

What is Ahmet doing these days?

(48a)

Bir çevirmen arıyor.

an interpreter looking for

“(He) is looking for an interpreter.”

(48b)

Bir çevirmen-i arıyor.

an interpreter-ACC looking for

“(He) is looking for an interpreter.”

(Kelepir, 2001)

Kelepir argues that (48b) is a felicitous answer to the question “What is Ahmet doing these days?” even though there is no set of translators mentioned in the prior discourse. In addition, Kelepir states that (48b) is not equivalent to (49) which includes an overt partitive structure.

(49)

Ahmet çevirmen-ler-den bir-i-ni arıyor.

Ahmet interpreter-PL-ABL one-3.POSS-ACC looking for

“Ahmet is looking for one of the interpreters.”

(Kelepir, 2001)

When (49) is given as an answer to the question (48), the speaker who asks (48) will ask for clarification on which translators Ahmet is looking for. The difference between (48b) and (49) provides evidence that indefinites can receive specific meaning even without a prior discourse. Based on these observations, Kelepir argues that indefinites do not need prior discourse for specificity, while partitivity always requires prior discourse.

Kelepir also argues against Enç’s analysis, which supposes that presuppositionality and partitivity are identical. According to Kelepir, the presuppositionality of an NP is the presupposition of the non-emptiness of the set denoted by this NP. The non-emptiness of the denoted set is also a part of world knowledge; therefore, the presupposition failure examples provide evidence of the close relationship between world knowledge and presupposition (Kelepir, 2001). On the other hand, partitivity requires saliency of the set in the context; therefore, it also contains definiteness. The prior discourse that the partitivity requires does not depend on world knowledge; consequently, this discourse may not be in the actual

world. In short, presuppositionality may not include saliency contrary to partitivity, which always requires it.

According to Kelepir, accusative marked indefinites are presuppositional and she gives the following examples (50) in which the accusative marked indefinite appears in the antecedent of a conditional. Von Stechow (1998) suggests a conditional environment for testing presuppositionality, and she uses this environment test to check whether Turkish accusative marked indefinites are presuppositional.

(50a)

Bir hata-yı bul-ur-san gitmene izin vereceğim
a mistake-ACC find-AOR-COND-2SG you-go I will let
'If you find a mistake, I will let you go.'

(50b)

Bir hata bul-ur-san gitmene izin vereceğim
a mistake find-AOR-COND-2SG you-go I will let
'If you find a mistake, I will let you go.'

(Kelepir, 2001)

The difference between (50a) and (50b) is that the speaker presupposes a mistake in (50a) while it is not the case for (50b). Consider a context in which the speaker assumes there may not be any mistake. If the speaker utters (51) before the sentences in (50) in this context, the sentence (50a) will be infelicitous but not (50b).

(51) Bu yazı kontrol edildi mi bilmiyorum.

I don't know whether this text has been edited.

There are some problems with Kelepir’s presuppositional analysis of accusative marked indefinites. First of all, if accusative marked indefinites presuppose the non-emptiness of their restrictor, then they are strong quantifiers according to Heim and Kratzer (1998). If they are strong quantifiers, then there should be no case in which they are non-presuppositional. Özge (2010) gives the following example (53) to show that accusative marked indefinites are not necessarily presuppositional.

(53)

Konferans-a	Türkçe	bil-en	İzlandalı-yı	çağır-alım.
conference-DAT	Turkish	know-REL	a Icelander-ACC	invite-OPT.2PL

“Let us invite a Turkish-speaking Icelander to the conference.”

(Özge, 2010 p.46)

(54)

...eğer	böyle	biri	var-sa	ve	biz	o-na	ulaş-abil-ir-sek.
...if	such	someone	exist-COND	and	we	it-DAT	reach-can-AOR-COND

“... if there is such a person and we can reach him/her.”

(Özge, 2010 p.46)

Özge argues that if the speaker does not assume that there is a Turkish-speaking Icelander in the actual world otherwise it would be odd to state (54). However, (54) is completely natural as a follow-up statement to (53).

Özge aims to show that accusative marked indefinites can also be non-presuppositional; however, his test is insufficient to show this. The sentence “ Circle the correct answer, if there is one” is perfectly grammatical even if the definite description before the if clause presupposes the existence of a correct answer.

I propose a better test to check whether accusative marked indefinites are presuppositional or not. The following sentence in (55) is a natural follow-up for (55):

(55) Ama öyle biri yok.

But such person absent

“But, there is no such a person.”

Secondly, Kelepir argues that accusative marked indefinites only receives a de re interpretation in their interaction with an intensional operator. She assumes that as the existential closure appears above the intensional operator, the indefinite is evaluated in the actual world. However, there is a confusion about how indefinites get ambiguous in the intensional context in her analysis. The fact that an existential closure binds the choice-function variable above an intensional operator only gives the specific reading whereas intentionality of an indefinite depends on whether the intensional operator binds the restrictor’s world variable or not. This analysis can only generate a de dicto reading in which the indefinite is evaluated in a world that the intensional operator introduces. Although Kelepir argues that accusative marked indefinites only receive a de re interpretation with respect to an intensional operator, the choice function system cannot generate this de re interpretation. (see Chapter 3).

In conclusion, Kelepir’s analysis is also insufficient to explain the behavior of indefinites in Turkish. There is empirical evidence against presuppositional and partitivity analyses.; Additionally, these analyses fail to explain how ambiguity arises at the interaction of accusative marked indefinites with intensional operators.

2.9 Singleton indefinites

Under the view that indefinites are existential quantifiers, indefinites appearing inside an island seems to scope out of that island construction while other quantifiers stay inside it (see the example 48). How indefinites can scope outside of an island to yield a specific interpretation is a puzzle; following, there are main approaches to this puzzle: one of them views indefinites as variables that are bound by existential quantifiers at LF (Heim, 1982; Kratzer, 1998; Reinhart, 1997) (see Sections 2.5, 2.7); another one views indefinites as acting like referential expressions referring to a particular entity the speaker has in mind (Fodor and Sag) (see section 2.1).

Schwarzschild (2002) comes up with a new analysis which proposes that indefinites are still existential quantifiers, but their restrictors may denote singletons in the right context. Given that, he supposes that they do not have an exceptional scope taking behavior but instead when their restrictor denotes a singleton, the scope of indefinite is neutralized relative to another quantifier or an operator like negation by nature.

Schwarzschild's (2002) analysis holds the view that indefinites are existential quantifiers; therefore, indefinites quantify over sets in their domain. However, similarly to Abush's observations on Heim's proposal, if the restrictor of the indefinite is not contextually restricted, it leads to undesired truth conditions. Based on these observations, Schwarzschild (2002) suggests an analysis that both restricts indefinites domains – consequently it gives the right truth conditions - and explains how they receive a specific reading.

Under Schwarzschild's analysis, indefinites are still existential quantifications over individuals, but the restrictors of the indefinites may be reduced to singleton sets in the right context. According to Schwarzschild, the set denoted by the restrictor of an indefinite does not have to be familiar to all discourse

participants. On the other hand, the definite descriptions require it. Given that, the context is restricted in such a way that only the speaker, not the hearer, is familiar to the referent of the restrictor. He also calls this one-way familiarity of discourse participants hearer/ speaker asymmetry. In other words, there is an asymmetrical relation between the speaker and the hearer such that the hearer may not identify the referent of the singleton indefinite. Therefore, a singleton indefinite is implicitly restricted in such a way that it just holds of one individual. For instance, the restrictor of an indefinite *book* can denote a singleton if there is exactly one book in the consideration of the speaker at the time of utterance in the world of evaluation.

Schwarzschild argues that singleton indefinites' scope behavior is similar to singular definites. The singleton indefinites' scope is neutralized in nature because the restrictor has a singular extension, and the speaker is familiar to that individual.

According to him, an indefinite which shows exceptional scope properties to yield a specific reading is just a singleton indefinite, which is "an existential whose domain has a singleton extension" (p. 291). Consider the following example (56):

(56) If a friend of mine from Texas had died in the fire, I would have inherited a fortune.

(Schwarzschild, 2002)

Schwarzschild argues that those indefinites which are interpreted as referential in Fodor and Sag's analysis are just examples of singleton indefinites, but differently from Fodor and Sag, he argues that those referential indefinites in Fodor and Sag's analysis are also existential quantifiers.

According to Schwarzschild, the indefinite *a friend of mine from Texas* has the following existential interpretation: *a friend of mine from Texas* quantifies over a set of friends of the speaker from Texas. Although the speaker may have more than

one friend, at the time of utterance in the world of evaluation, there is exactly one friend from Texas who is familiar to the speaker; therefore, this set of friends reduced to a singleton set. This implicit restriction in the quantifier domain provides that the restrictor of the indefinite has only one element. When the restrictor of the indefinite has a singleton extension, it acts like a singular definite; consequently, its scope is neutralized. In example (55), the singleton indefinite appears either inside the conditional or above it at LF, and the restrictor of it has only one referent, namely John, and if John, who is a Texan relative of the speakers, dies, the speaker will inherit a fortune. There is a false conception of indefinites taking wide scope to receive specific interpretations, but they are just singleton indefinites; therefore, their scope is irrelevant. The pragmatic side of the singleton indefinite analysis is that it puts contextual restrictions in the domain that the indefinite quantifies over in such a way that the set denoted by the restrictor has only one member, and that member is identifiable to the speaker but not the hearer.

The observed different behavior of indefinites from other quantifiers results from the fact that non-singletonness implicature is triggered by other quantifiers but not by indefinites. Schwarzschild argues that the restrictors of other quantifiers are not singletons in most situations due this implicature.

Schwarzschild's analysis differs from Fodor and Sag's referential indefinites in that indefinites are always existential quantifiers. In addition, Abush's criticisms against Fodor and Sag based on available intermediate readings are also addressed by Schwarzschild. Secondly, Schwarzschild argues that the restrictor of the indefinite may contain a bound variable; therefore, if there is no bound variables, the singleton indefinite appears to take the widest scope but if there are bound variables, the singleton may take intermediate scope as well. Consider the following example:

(57a) Every boy₂ smiled at every adult who voted for a movie that his₂ mother₁ said her₁ favorite.

(Schwarzschild, 2002 p.295)

Schwarzschild presents that sentence (57a) has the following specific reading: there is one particular movie such that every boy smiled at every adult who voted for that movie and that movie is his mother's favorite one. This reading results from that the restrictor of the indefinite *a movie that his mother said her favorite* has singleton extension such that there is exactly one movie at that time of utterance. On the other hand, the restrictor of the indefinite also has a bound variable; therefore, for each value of the bound pronoun *his*, the restrictor has a singleton extension relative to who the boy is. Consider the following intermediate reading as well:

For every boy, there is one particular movie that his mother said was his favorite, and he smiled at every adult who voted for it.

In this intermediate reading, the movie that that boy's mother said is his favorite depends on who the mother is, so for every boy, there is one particular movie, and that movie changes from one boy to another. The domain is implicitly restricted in such a way that the restrictor of the indefinite may denote a different singleton depending on the bound variable in its domain. He states that (57a) is equivalent to (57b):

(57b) Every boy is such that there was a movie that his mother said is her favorite and, he smiled at every adult who voted for it.

The truth conditional equivalence of (57a) to (57b) also proves that the scope of the singleton indefinite is neutralized relative to the quantifier *every adult* in (57a). For the existence of the intermediate reading. Schwarzschild argues that the indefinite does not take intermediate scope in the structure in which it has to scope

outside of the relative clause island, it is just a singleton indefinite with a bound variable. The fact that there are different movies relative to the different boys is a result of the bound pronoun that the indefinite contains. In addition, Schwarzschild also proposes that in some examples of intermediate readings, the bound pronoun is not as apparent as (57a), but the indefinite still contains a bound variable which is covert.

Öztürk (2005) adopts Schwarzschild’s analysis to explain why accusative marking is compatible with the specific reading that accusative marked indefinites receive. Öztürk discusses the reason why an accusative case can both mark for definiteness and specificity in Turkish.

2.10 Pseudo-incorporation analysis

Below is the distribution of Turkish NPs in the direct object position (58). It is well established among scholars that definiteness is marked with an accusative case as in (58a) and marked NPs are referential. Turkish bare NPs are incorporated, as in (58d), and they are non-referential. However, the main discussion on NPs revolves around the indefinites in the object position. In this section, I aim to look at two prominent analyses of Turkish indefinites’ syntactic and semantic categories.

(58)

a. Ali- \emptyset	kitab-1	okuyor.	b. Ali- \emptyset	bir kitab-1	okuyor.
A-NOM	book-ACC	read-IMPF-3SG	A-NOM	one book-ACC	read- IMPF- 3SG
“ Ali is reading the book.”			“ Ali is reading a specific book.”		
(definite, referential)			(indefinite, referential)		

c. Ali- \emptyset	bir kitap- \emptyset	okuyor.	d. Ali- \emptyset	kitap- \emptyset	okuyor.
A-NOM	one book- \emptyset	read-IMPF-3SG	A-NOM	book	read- IMPF- 3SG
“Ali is reading a book.”			“Ali is book-reading.”		
(indefinite, ?)			(incorporated, non-referential)		

Turkish does not have an overt determiner for definiteness. instead, case morphology, specifically the accusative case marker, enables definiteness in the sentence structure. Öztürk (2005) explores the question of how case morphology can mark for definiteness or what is the direct link between the case marking and referentiality. She proposes that case marking and referentiality are closely correlated. One of the clear examples of this correlation is accusative case marking for referentiality (see examples (58a) and (58d)). There is a clear contrast between acc-marked and non-marked bare nouns in object position; the former is referential, but the latter is non-referential.

Assuming head incorporation, bare NP *kitap* can stay unmarked although case has to be assigned for visibility (Aydemir, 2004; Kornfilt, 1995; Sezer, 1991).

The typical examples of incorporation involve a bare noun in a preverbal position which incorporates into the verb head in the syntax as shown in Figure 16. This operation results in new verb head formation.




Figure 16. Incorporation

Incorporation is only allowed for objects of transitive structures. This explains the contrast between marked and unmarked nouns because the incorporated noun has no syntactic status on its own, so it is not marked with a case, but rather, it is a part of the newly formed verb head. This operation enables NPs to stay caseless in transitive structures as in (58d).

However, Öztürk (2005) argues against the head-incorporation analysis for Turkish by presenting her observations on bare nouns which are not in the pre-verbal position for different reasons but still stay caseless. Consider the following example (59):

(59) Ali kitap da okudu.

Ali book also read.

“Ali also did book reading (in addition to magazine reading).”

If the noun head *kitap* is incorporated into the verb head *okudu* and forms a new morphologically complex head, then one would expect nothing to intervene between these two heads. However, in the example (59), the focus participle *da* intervenes between two heads *kitap* and *okudu* implying that these two cannot be parts of one structural head. The only reason a focus particle can intervene between two syntactic constraints is because they are independent.

Based on this observation, Öztürk proposes that head incorporation is incompatible with Turkish; on the other hand, she posits a new account, pseudo-incorporation. Different from the head incorporation analysis, she argues that when bare nouns in Turkish appear in direct object position, they incorporate as a nominal phrase while forming a new unit with the verb head as shown in Figure 17:




Figure 17. Pseudo-incorporation

In this pseudo-incorporation configuration, the NP is the complement of the verb head. Massam (2001) argues that the pseudo-incorporated nouns are base generated as the verb head complement, but they do not move outside of VP because they fail to check case marking.

Given this, the fact that the focus particle intervenes between the noun and the verb can be explained with pseudo-incorporation. Pseudo-incorporation takes *kitap* in (58d) as an independent phrase structure, a complement of the verb head, which is not case marked and has a non-referential/non-specific meaning. The pseudo-incorporated noun is also interpreted as non-referential, which is why (58d) differs from (58a) in terms of referentiality.

Given how bare nouns in Turkish behave when they are not marked with the accusative case, the question is whether non-marked indefinites can also be examples of pseudo-incorporation similarly to bare nouns. As discussed before, Turkish indefinites can be marked or non-marked with the accusative case but only the marked ones behave similarly to English indefinites. Only these case-marked indefinites are ambiguous between specific and non-specific interpretations while the non-marked indefinites are always interpreted as non-specific and take narrow scope with respect to other operators, such as negation, in the structure. Considering non-marked indefinites' scope behavior, Öztürk argues that they behave very similarly to bare NPs in Turkish. According to Öztürk, indefinites in object position without any

accusative marking are pseudo-incorporated nouns; therefore, they act differently from the accusative marked indefinites in object position, which are not incorporated. In the previous sections, it is shown that non-marked indefinites always have a non-specific interpretation when they appear with a universal quantifier in the subject position or other operators like negation. According to Öztürk, the reason why non-marked indefinites are not interpreted as specific is that they are pseudo-incorporated. As a consequence, they always appear under VP. Öztürk (2005) assumes the structure given in Figure 17 for the unmarked indefinites in the object position as well.

The difference between a bare noun and a non-marked indefinite is that indefinites are formed with a numeral *bir* (Öztürk, 2005). Traditional accounts argue that *bir* is an indefinite article (Kornfilt, 1997; G. L. Lewis, 1967); however, if it were a true indefinite article, then this would be an exceptional situation cross-linguistically. If a language does not have a definiteness article, then it does not have an indefinite article as well (Crisma, 1999; Longobardi, 2001 cited in Öztürk, 2005). Later on, Aygen-Tosun (1999) argues that *bir* is ambiguous between a numeral meaning and existential quantifier; therefore, she explains the presence of *bir* with indefinites with its existential quantifier nature. On the other hand, Öztürk argues that *bir* is a modifier of NPs such that it modifies the bare NP in a complex predicate constructed through pseudo-incorporation. Taking *bir* as a modifier of NPs also explains how it appears with a pseudo-incorporated noun structure. According to Öztürk, the reason why *bir* appears with indefinites is to imply that that NP is singular; otherwise, it would be number-neutral due to the nature of pseudo-incorporation.

As discussed above, previous accounts (Abusch, 1994; Enç, 1991; Fodor & Sag, 1982; Keleşir, 2001) fail to explain the behavior of accusative marked indefinites in the object position which receive a specific reading. Öztürk (2005) also claims that these accounts fail to explain the specific interpretation of marked indefinites because these accounts cannot explain why indefinites are marked with an accusative case, which is only compatible with referential readings., Enç and Keleşir do not consider accusative marked indefinites as fully referential; following, they fail to explain why specific indefinites are marked with the accusative case (Öztürk,2005). Although Fodor and Sag consider specific indefinites as referential in certain situations, they fail to explain all of their behavior. Regarding her proposal that case is only compatible with referentiality, Öztürk (2005) adopts Schwarzschild's (2002) analysis of singleton indefinites to explain why specific indefinites are marked with accusative case. Schwarzschild argues that a specific interpretation of indefinites is due to their restrictors denoting singleton sets. In his analysis, both definites and specific indefinites have singleton extensions, but the difference between them is that for the specific indefinites, not all discourse participants are familiar with the members of the set denoted by the restrictors. However, for definiteness, all of the discourse members are subjected to the familiarity condition. Öztürk argues that Schwarzschild's analysis gives an account for why the accusative case which is a definiteness marker in Turkish is compatible with specific indefinites. The reason is that both definites and specific indefinites have a singleton as their restrictors.

An argument against Öztürk's assumption that referentiality comes with an accusative case comes from Arslan-Kechriotis (2009), who shows that the indefinite form *bir* NP in the object position has referential interpretation even though it is not

marked with a case. She demonstrates that the indefinite form *bir* NP behaves differently than bare NPs while patterning with DPs. One example compares ellipsis of bare NPs, indefinites, and definites.

(60)

*Bütün gün	kitap	oku-dum,	san-a	da	oku-ma-n-1	tavsiye ed-er-im.
all-day	book	read-PAST-1SG	you-DAT	too	read-VN-POSS.2SG-ACC	recommend-AOR.1SG

“*I did book-reading all day. I recommend you to read (it), too.”

(61)

b. Dün	bir kitap	oku-dum,	san-a	da	oku-ma-n-1	tavsiye ed-er-im.
yesterday	one book	read-PAST-1SG	you-DAT	too	read-VN-POSS.2SG-ACC	recommend-AOR.1SG

“I read a book yesterday. I recommend you to read (it), too.”

(62)

c. Dün	kitabı	oku-dum,	san-a	da	oku-ma-n-1	tavsiye ed-er-im.
yesterday	the book	read-PAST-1SG	you-DAT	too	read-VN-POSS.2SG-ACC	recommend-AOR.1SG

“I read the book yesterday. I recommend you to read it, too.”

(Arslan-Kechriotis, 2009)

In (60), the bare NP, incorporated one, *kitap* cannot be elided in the follow-up sentence but it is possible to elide the indefinite *bir kitap* in (61) and the definite *kitabı* in (62). According to Arslan-Kechriotis (2009), the fact that the indefinite behaves similarly to the definite but not the bare NP in ellipses examples is evidence for indefinites *bir* NP patterning with DPs. She proposes that the indefinite

form *bir* NP has a referential interpretation. therefore, they are not pseudo-incorporation examples. Arslan-Kechriotis (2009) differentiates indefinites from definites as indefinites introducing novel referents to the discourse while definites only referring to familiar referents.

Considering Arslan-Kechriotis's (2009) observations and argument that *bir* NP is DP, the pseudo-incorporation analysis then fails to account for the given examples above. It follows that if non-marked indefinites are not examples of pseudo-incorporation and do not behave similarly to bare NPs, then there is a need for a new account, which explains why specificity and de re readings are blocked for non-marked indefinites whereas they are possible for marked ones.

2.11 Generalized Skolem terms

There is a clear contrast between two types of Turkish indefinites: accusative marked and non-marked ones. Non-marked indefinites in the object position are always interpreted as non-specific in relation to an intentional operator. Özge (2010) also addresses this contrast in his dissertation in which he first discusses the previous analysis of Turkish indefinites; then, he offers his own proposal which aims to explain the behavior of Turkish indefinites.

Enç analyses Turkish accusative marked indefinites in the object position as covert partitives; however, Keleşir (2001) and Özge argue that there is empirical evidence that shows that Turkish accusative marked indefinites do not entail covert partitive meaning. Secondly, Keleşir analyses Turkish accusative marked indefinites as choice functions whose restrictor denotes a non-empty set. Özge argues that there are cases in which the existential presupposition for an accusative marked indefinite is absent. Özge's other argument against Keleşir is her prediction that accusative

marked indefinites always receive a de re interpretation in intentional contexts. However, Özge provides examples that show that it is also possible for accusative marked indefinites to be interpreted as de dicto. (see Chapter 3)

Besides his arguments on accusative marked indefinites, he also argues against Öztürk's pseudo-incorporation analysis of non-marked indefinites in the object position. Özge (2010) claims that pseudo-incorporation is insufficient to give the contrast between accusative marking and zero marking on indefinites.

He proposes that the distinction between kinds and properties can account for the contrast between non-marked and accusative marked indefinites., non-marked indefinites in the object position are existential quantifiers whose restrictor denotes instances of kinds. The asymmetry between non-marked and accusative marked indefinite is due to the nature of the accusative case which only applies to the non-kind-oriented NPs. Accusative marked indefinites express a property of individuals while non-marked indefinites' restrictors can only have kind denotation.

According to Özge's proposal, non-marked indefinites behave very similarly to bare NPs, which is in line with Öztürk's arguments. Bare NPs also denote kinds but in the case of non-marked indefinites *bir* applies to an NP; therefore, *bir* NP has the cardinality one while bare NPs are number neutral. The indefinite form *bir* NP expresses the predicate (63); however, when it appears in the object position, it becomes an existential quantifier by type-shifting.

(63) $[[bir\ NP]] = \lambda x. x$ is a set of individuals that instances the kind denoted by NP and that has the cardinality 1. (p.131)

Considering Aygen-Tosun (1999)'s discussion of the interpretations of *bir*, Özge argues that *bir* has numeral reading in the indefinite form *bir* NP. On the other hand, the interpretation of *bir* with the accusative marked indefinites is different

from the numeral interpretation. Under the indefinite form “*bir NP+ Acc*”, *bir* applies to properties and yields referential terms (p.130). Before we move on to the proposal on accusative marked indefinites, let's first examine the following observations in relation to Özge's proposal on non-marked indefinites

(64)

Bu kardeşim Hasan.

this sibling-POSS.1SG Hasan.

“This is my brother Hasan.”

(Özge, 2010 p.132)

(65a)

Kendisi Sabancı Üniversitesi-nde akademisyen-dir.

he S. University-LOC academician-COP.3SG

“He is an academician at Sabancı University.”

(65b)

*# Kendisi Sabancı Üniversitesi-nde bir akademisyen-dir.

he S. University-LOC an academician-COP.3SG

“He is an academician at Sabancı University.”

(Özge, 2010 p.132)

(65) are alternative continuations of (64); however, (65b) is unacceptable for the native speakers while (65a) is acceptable. According to Özge, this contrast results from the non-marked indefinite *bir akademisyen* because being an academician at Sabancı University is not general enough to be a kind description (p.132). Özge argues that a locative case introduces an anchor to a specific situation so that's why it is not compatible with the general kind referring indefinite in (65b).

Similarly to Öztürk's (2005) observations, Özge also proposes that accusative marking is required for the referential interpretation. This also means that if an indefinites' restrictor does not have a kind denotation, indefinites are marked with an accusative case. Özge (2010) proposes "Any sort of "anchoring" to a discourse referent blocks the possibility of kind denotation." (p.134). Followingly, non-marked indefinites do not receive a referential interpretation.

(66)

Ahmet-i *(bir) denetçi seçtiler.

A.-ACC (a) auditor elect-PAST-PL

"They elected Ahmet auditor."

(Özge, 2010 p.133)

Özge argues that the non-marked indefinite *bir denetçi* as an argument of the verb *seç* is ungrammatical because the verb *seç* is not compatible with kind denotations. In (66), electing requires contextually specified business but the non-marked indefinite *bir denetçi* does not satisfy this condition. However, in the following example (67), the indefinite *bir denetçi* is acceptable because the verb *yap* is compatible with kind denotations. In this example, the indefinite's restrictor denotes an instance of a kind, as a result, it receives occupational attribution.

(67)

Ahmet-i (bir) denetçi yaptılar.

A.-ACC (a) auditor make-PAST-PL

"They made Ahmet auditor."

(Özge, 2010 p.133)

Under Özge's proposal, the contrast between (66) and (67) provides evidence for the fact that non-marked indefinite's restrictors can only have kind denotation. If

the verb is not compatible with kind denotations, then the existence of a non-marked indefinite in the object position leads to ungrammaticality.

Considering his observations on non-marked indefinites and his proposal that non-marked indefinites in object position are existential quantification over instances of kinds, his proposal disregards the fact that non-marked indefinites in the object position can receive referential interpretations. Arslan-Kechriotis (2009) provides empirical evidence that non-marked indefinites may receive a referential interpretation. (See the examples in (58)). If non-marked indefinites' restrictors are predicates over instances of kinds and any kind of discourse referent blocks kind denotation, then Özge's proposal cannot explain how the non-marked indefinite receives a referential interpretation (See the examples in (68)). If the indefinite *bir resim* in the object position is referential⁵, then it cannot be existential quantification over instances of kinds. Furthermore, Özge expects accusative marking on NP if it is referential; however, the indefinite in (68) is not marked with the accusative case but still has a referential interpretation. Özge's proposal disregards the fact that non-marked indefinites can receive a referential interpretation.

(68)

Ali	bir resim _i	yapıyordu,	nihayet	on-u _i	bitirdi
Ali	one picture	make-IMPF-PAST- 3SG	finally	it-ACC	finish-PAST

“Ali was painting a picture for days. He finally finished it.”

(Erguvanlı, 1984, p. 23)

Özge also argues that the ungrammaticality of (65b) results from the kind denoting indefinite *bir akdemisyen*; however, when the third singular copular is not attached to the indefinite, the sentence becomes grammatical.

⁵ The indefinite is referential in the sense that it introduces a new referent to the discourse.

(69)

Bu kardeşim Hasan.

this sibling-POSS.1SG Hasan.

“This is my brother Hasan.”

(70)

Kendisi Sabancı Üniversitesi-nde bir akademisyen.

he S. University-LOC an academician.

“He is an academician at Sabancı University.”

The 3rd singular copular is optional in Turkish and its existence makes a difference in sentences (65b) and (70). Considering Özge’s proposal on non-marked indefinites and his arguments on the ungrammaticality of (65b), his proposal cannot give us the reason why (70) is grammatical even though the non-marked indefinite appears with a locative which blocks a kind denotation under his proposal.

Apart from his observations on non-marked indefinites, he also proposes that accusative marked indefinites are generalized Skolem terms which can have a particular individual in their extension. First of all, an accusative marked indefinite’s restrictor denotes contextually limited properties, which distinguish it from non-marked indefinites. Secondly, *bir* is not interpreted as a numeral when it is used with the accusative marked indefinites, which also differentiates marked ones from non-marked indefinites. Özge argues that *bir* applies to properties such that it picks an item from the extension of that property (p.130). These two assumptions which are accusative marked indefinites are skolemized terms and the restrictor of accusative indefinites are sets of properties, are the main arguments of Özge’s proposal.

Steedman (2010) introduced a semantic device, a generalized Skolem term based on the idea of Skolem functions. However, it is different from the choice function analysis. Skolem terms refer to individuals and they are not variables over choice functions which need to be bound by the existential operator. When the choice function is skolemized, it picks an individual from the set denoted by the restrictor. However, for generalized Skolem terms, there is no arbitrary function that is first introduced into the mechanism and then skolemized to give a particular individual from the set. When indefinites are analyzed as generalized Skolem terms, they are introduced into the system just as a Skolem term without any Skolemization process. After the term is introduced into the system, “the evaluation procedure”⁶ first checks whether there is any bound variable in this term. If there is a bound variable, then the evaluation procedure inserts an assignment function which maps an individual for the term. If the Skolem term does not contain any bound variable, then the evaluation system assigns an individual to the term, which gives the referential interpretation of accusative marked indefinites. Under this system, a generalized Skolem term is a semantic mechanism that provides a discourse referent. Let’s look at the following example and see how a generalized Skolem term (abbreviated as GST in the following description) analysis works.

A GST is a structured object of the form $sk^A_i:p$, where p is the (possibly complex) restrictor predicate, i is the index that is unique to the NP that is interpreted as a generalized Skolem term, and A is the possibly empty set of arguments of the Skolem function that the GST designates. (Özge, 2010 p. 91)

(71) Every man loves some women.

(72) a. $\forall x$. man' x à loves' $sk^{(x)}_{41:woman}$ ' x

⁶ Özge (2010) calls it in that way.

- b. Every man loves the woman individual that the Skolem term $sk_{41:woman' x}^{(x)}$ maps him to (non-specific reading)
- (73) a. $\forall x. \text{man}' x \text{ à loves}' sk_{17:woman' x}$
- b. Every man loves the woman individual denoted by the Skolem term $sk_{17:woman' x}$ (specific reading)

In the representation (72a), the Skolem term has a bound variable (x) which is bound by a universal quantifier; therefore, the evaluation procedure inserts an assignment function and it assigns women individuals for every man, possibly different ones. On the other hand, (73a) has an independent Skolem term, which has no bound variable; therefore, the procedure supplies an individual to this term. For instance, this Skolem term's extension is Mary (at the speech of utterance) such that every man loves Mary. Furthermore, the restrictors of the Skolem terms can be subject to implicit domain restrictions, similarly to Schwarzschild's singleton indefinites. The restrictors can contain free variables and these variables can be bound by other operators in the structure.

As for the interaction of indefinites with intentional operators, Özge claims that there is a situation operator in the structure and Skolem terms have a situation variable; and this variable gets bound by this operator. Moreover, the restrictors of indefinites may also contain a situation index which gets bound by the operator.

The analysis of indefinites as generalized Skolem terms is different from the choice-function analysis. First of all, it does not contain an explicit variable that is bound to an existential operator in the structure. These terms may exist independently in the structure without getting bound by any operator. Secondly, the intermediate readings are derived through bound variables that the term contains. The most important aspect of these generalized Skolem terms is that accusative

marked indefinites can receive a de re and a de dicto reading. On the other hand, choice function analysis can only generate a de dicto reading for indefinites. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 3.

To sum up, Özge tries to come up with a solution to all discussed issues related to accusative marked indefinites in object position. His proposal derives a specific interpretation of indefinites in situ so that indefinites do not violate scope rigidity to yield a specific meaning. Generalized Skolem terms contain bound variables which generates a non-specific and an intermediate reading while independent skolem terms, which do not contain any bound variable, receive a specific interpretation. The independent skolem term may also receive a referential interpretation. Although Özge's proposal can explain the behavior of accusative marked indefinites, there are problems in his analysis of non-marked indefinites. Differently from the accusative marked ones, non-marked indefinites do not receive referential interpretation because their restrictors only denote instances of kinds under his proposal. However, Arslan-Kechriotis (2009) provides empirical evidence that non-marked indefinites in the object position receive a referential interpretation. Özge's proposal cannot predict this because a referential interpretation blocks a kind denotation. In short, Özge's proposal is insufficient to explain the behavior of non-marked indefinites

2.12 Conclusion

In conclusion, accusative marked indefinites show exceptional scope taking behavior when they interact with a universal quantifier and an intentional operator. Differently from quantifiers, they receive a specific interpretation by violating scope-rigidity and island constraints under the QR view. If we assume that accusative marked

indefinites are fully referential expressions, then this assumption cannot derive an intermediate scope interpretation of these indefinites. Secondly, Enç (1991) interprets accusative marked indefinites as covert partitives and argues this partitive reading of indefinites entails specificity. However, Kelepir (2001) and Özge (2010) provide examples to prove that while accusative marked indefinites receive a specific reading without a partitive reading. On the other hand, Kelepir (2001) propose that accusative marked indefinites are presuppositional and adopts a choice-function analysis to explain their exceptional scope-taking behavior. There is a evidence

As for the non-marked indefinites, Öztürk (2005) proposes that they are pseudo-incorporated; therefore, they always take narrow scope with respect to an operator. The pseudo-incorporation analysis does not allow non-marked indefinites to be interpreted as a referential. However, Arslan-Kechriotis (2009) provides empirical evidence that non-marked indefinites may receive a referential interpretation. Besides, Özge (2010) also argues that non-marked indefinites' restrictor predicates over instances of kinds, and any kind reference blocks a referential interpretation. Both Öztürk and Özge fail to account for why non-marked indefinites always take narrow scope with respect to an operator because their analyses disregard a referential interpretation of a non-marked indefinite.

CHAPTER 3

INDEFINITES IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXT

In this chapter, I will present a basic notion of intensional semantics and introduce how different theories implement the notion of possible worlds into the compositional system. Besides, I will discuss the ambiguity that arises in the intensional context when the indefinites interact with an intentional operator. One of the goals of this thesis is to analyze Turkish indefinites behavior in intentional contexts. I adopt the theoretical framework of von Stechow and Heim's (2011) intensional semantics for the discussions in this chapter.

3.1 De re- de dicto

Indefinites show ambiguity when they interact with an intentional operator. The traditional scope theory of intentionality (Ladusaw, 1977; Montague, 1973; Ogihara, 1989; Russell, 1905; Stowell, 1978) predicts that this ambiguity in the intentional context results from the syntactic position of an indefinite at LF. Specifically, if an indefinite appears under the intentional operator, its restrictor is evaluated relative to a world that the operator binds. An indefinite restrictor, which is a predicate, is world dependent; therefore, if it is evaluated relative to a bound world, it receives a de dicto interpretation. On the other hand, if the indefinite appears above the intentional operator, then its restrictor will be evaluated relative to the actual world, receiving a de re interpretation. Consider the following example:

(74) Mary wants to marry a doctor.

Sentence (74) has two LFs:

(75)⁷ a. [Mary wants to [[a doctor]1 [PRO2 marry t1]]] ^[2→Mary]

b. [a doctor]1 [Mary wants to [PRO2 marry t1]] ^[2→Mary]

(75a) is represented in Figure 18 :




Figure 18. A de dicto reading

= 1 iff $\forall w'$ s.t. in w' where Mary gets what wants in @, Mary marries in w' an individual who is a doctor in w' .

(76) For any world w ,

$\llbracket \text{want} \rrbracket^w = \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle} . \lambda x . \forall w' \text{ s.t. in } w' \text{ } x \text{ gets what } x \text{ wants in } w: p(w') = 1$

$\llbracket \text{want} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda w . \llbracket \text{a doctor} 1 \text{ PRO2 marry } t1 \rrbracket^{w, [2 \rightarrow \text{Mary}]}) (Mary) =$

$\llbracket \text{want} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda w . \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^w (\lambda y . \text{PRO2 marry } t1 \rrbracket^{w, [2 \rightarrow \text{Mary}]}) (Mary) =$

$\llbracket \text{want} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda w . \llbracket \text{a} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{doctor} \rrbracket^w) (\lambda y . \text{Mary marries } y \text{ in } w) (Mary) =$

$\llbracket \text{want} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda w . \exists x \text{ s.t. } \llbracket \text{doctor} \rrbracket^w (x) = 1 \text{ and } [\lambda y . \text{Mary marries } y \text{ in } w] (x) = 1)$

$(Mary) =$

⁷ I made a simplification; therefore, Mary and PRO are co-referential.

$[\lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle} . \lambda x. \forall w' \text{ s.t. in } w' \text{ } x \text{ gets what } x \text{ wants in } @: p(w') = 1] ((\lambda w \exists x \text{ s.t. } [\text{doctor}]^w(x) = 1 \text{ and } [\lambda y. \text{Mary marries } y \text{ in } w](x) = 1) (\text{Mary}) =$

$[\lambda x. \forall w' \text{ s.t. in } w' \text{ } x \text{ gets what } x \text{ wants in } @, \text{ there is a } y \text{ s.t. } y \text{ is a doctor in } w' \text{ and } M \text{ marries } y \text{ in } w'] (M) = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \text{ s.t. in } w' \text{ Mary gets what she wants in } @, \text{ there is a } y \text{ s.t. } y \text{ is a doctor in } w' \text{ and } M \text{ marries } y \text{ in } w.$

The LF structure in Figure 18 shows that the intentional operator *want* c-commands the indefinite's restrictor *doctor*; consequently, its world variable is bound by the intentional operator. Under this representation, the indefinite receives a de dicto reading.

Consider the following representation of (75b) in Figure 19:




Figure 19. A de re reading

(77) $[[\text{a doctor}]^@ \lambda 1 [[\text{Mary wants to PRO}_2 \text{ marry } t_1]]^w.[2 \rightarrow \text{Mary}] = 1 \text{ iff there is an } x \text{ such that } x \text{ is a doctor in } @ \text{ and for every world } w \text{ such that in that world } w \text{ Mary gets what she wants in } @, \text{ she marries } x \text{ in } w.$

$[[\text{a doctor}]^@ ([[1 \text{ Mary wants } \text{PRO}_2 \text{ marries } t_1]]^@.[2 \rightarrow M]$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. \llbracket \text{Mary wants PRO}_2 \text{ marries } t_1 \rrbracket^@, [2 \rightarrow M]^{[x/1]}) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. \llbracket \text{wants PRO}_2 \text{ marries } t_1 \rrbracket^@, [2 \rightarrow M]^{[x/1]} (\text{Mary})) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. \llbracket \text{wants} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda w. \llbracket \text{PRO}_2 \text{ marries } t_1 \rrbracket^w, [2 \rightarrow M]^{[x/1]}) (\text{Mary})) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. \llbracket \text{wants} \rrbracket^@ ([\lambda w. M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w]) (\text{Mary})) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. [\lambda p. \lambda y. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } y \text{ gets what } y \text{ wants in } @, p(w')=1]([\lambda w. \\
&M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w]) (\text{Mary})) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ (\lambda x. [\lambda y. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } y \text{ gets what } y \text{ wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w'] \\
&(\text{Mary})) \\
&= \llbracket \text{a doctor} \rrbracket^@ ([\lambda x. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } M \text{ gets what } M \text{ wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w']) \\
&= \llbracket a \rrbracket (\llbracket \text{doctor} \rrbracket^@) ([\lambda x. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } M \text{ gets what } M \text{ wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } \\
&w']) \\
&= [\lambda g. \exists x \text{ st. } \llbracket \text{doctor} \rrbracket^@ (x)=1 \text{ and } g(x)=1] ([\lambda x. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } M \text{ gets what } M \\
&\text{wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w']) \\
&= [\lambda g. \exists x \text{ st. } x \text{ is a doctor in } @ \text{ and } g(x)=1] ([\lambda x. \forall w' \text{ st. in } w' \text{ } M \text{ gets what } M \\
&\text{wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w'] = 1 \text{ iff there is an } x \text{ st. } x \text{ is a doctor in } @ \text{ and } \forall w' \\
&\text{st. in } w' \text{ } M \text{ gets what } M \text{ wants in } @, M \text{ marries } x \text{ in } w'
\end{aligned}$$

The indefinite appears outside the scope of the intentional operator *want*; consequently, its restrictor is evaluated in the actual world. Under this representation, the indefinite receives a de re reading.

Under the scope theory of intensionality, a de re interpretation of an indefinite also implies specificity in the extensional context, whereas a de dicto interpretation implies non-specificity. The reason is that this theory predicts that the quantifier phrase entirely moves outside of the intentional operator; therefore, the restrictor also moves outside and yields a de re reading.

The specific de re reading of (74) is true and the non-specific de dicto is not in the following scenario:

Scenario 1: Mary sees John at a concert, and she falls in love with him. She doesn't know that John is actually a doctor. In fact, she thinks that it is early for her to marry before she sees John. However, she changes her mind, and she wants to marry John now.

The non-specific and de dicto reading of (74) is true but the specific de re is not in the following scenario:

Scenario 2: According to recent research, doctors receive the highest salary in the world. When Mary learns it, she wants to marry a doctor because they make a good amount of money. She doesn't know any actual doctor, but she wants to find one and marry him. It doesn't matter who he is as long as he is a doctor.

3.2 The scope paradox

Fodor (1970) observes that an indefinite receives three readings in a sentence like (78):

(78) Mary wants to buy an inexpensive coat.

(Keshet, 2008 p. 29)

(79) a. *Non-specific-De Dicto:* Mary wants to buy a coat, any coat would do as long as it is inexpensive. This reading is true in the following scenario: Mary wants to buy some coat, but she has no particular coat choice in her mind. She just wants it to be inexpensive.

b. *Specific-De Re:* There is a particular inexpensive coat and Mary wants to buy it. This reading is true in a scenario like this: Mary saw a coat in the

movie *The Matrix* and she wants to buy that leather *Matrix* coat. She may not know its price, but this coat is actually inexpensive.

c. *Non-specific-De Re*: Mary wants to buy some coat but this coat has the property of being inexpensive and Mary may not know this. This reading is true in the following scenario: Mary wants to buy an *LC Waikiki* coat, but she doesn't pick a particular one in the store. *LC Waikiki* coats are inexpensive compared to other brands, but Mary doesn't know this. She heard that this brand's coats are good, and she wants to buy one of them. This brand's coats happen to be inexpensive.

The view which sees a de re / de dicto ambiguity results from the syntactic position of an indefinite relative to the intentional operator at LF can account for the readings (79a) and (79b). However, this view cannot derive the third reading because the restrictor of an indefinite cannot scope outside of the intensional operator on its own. Under the scope theory, the indefinite has to scope under the operator to have a non-specific reading, while, at the same time, the restrictor has to move outside of the intentional operator to have a de re reading. However, this is impossible. This reading is also called a scope paradox because we can't derive both readings with the scope theory.

Although the intuitions hold for the existence of third reading for (78), the semantic system we introduced in Section 3.1 cannot derive this reading. The major problem with this system is that in which world an indefinite is evaluated depends on its syntactic position at LF; therefore, the notion of "specificity" also follows from its syntactic position. The existence of the third reading provides evidence that a de re reading does not imply specificity. Considering this, the ambiguity that arises in intentional contexts must be separated from the ambiguity in the extensional context.

An alternative semantic system to the scope theory of intentionality is assuming there are overt world variables in the structure (von Stechow and Heim, 2011). Under this system, the lexical entries and predicates have an unpronounced world variable in the syntactic structure and there is an explicit λ -operator that binds these variables. In the composition, there is no need for the rule Intensional Function Application anymore, the old rules, Function Application, λ -abstraction, and Predicate Modification are enough to derive the truth conditions. Given this, (80) has the following representations:

(80) Mary wants to buy an inexpensive coat.

(81) a. . *Non-specific-De Dicto*:

λ_{w_0} [Mary wants to_{w₀} [λ_{w_1} [an inexpensive coat_{w₁}]]] [PRO buy_{w₁} t₁]]

b. *Specific-De Re*:

λ_{w_0} [an inexpensive coat_{w₀}]] [Mary wants to_{w₀} [λ_{w_1} PRO buy_{w₁} t₁]]]

c. *Non-specific-De Re*:

λ_{w_0} [Mary wants to_{w₀} [λ_{w_1} [an inexpensive coat_{w₀}]]] [PRO buy_{w₁} t₁]]

For the third reading, the indefinite in (81c) is inside the scope of an intentional operator; followingly, it yields non-specific reading. On the other hand, the world variable of the indefinite is bound to the topmost λ -operator which makes the indefinite evaluated in the actual world. So far, this new overt world variable binding in the system can account for the third reading.

While this new system solves the problem in the scope theory of intentionality, Keshet (2008) argues that this system overgenerates undesired readings. He proposes that there are cases in which a de re reading is blocked for an indefinite. As this theory does not put restrictions on world binding, it predicts these undesired readings.

In this section, we discussed the existence of the third reading and show that the scope theory of intentionality cannot account for it. Although the overt world binding system seems to generate the third reading, it doesn't have any restrictions on world binding; therefore, it leads to undesired readings.

3.3 Turkish indefinites

In Chapters 1 and 2, we discuss that there is a contrast between non-marked indefinites and accusative marked indefinites. The latter in the object position shows an ambiguity when there is a universal quantifier in the subject position while the former does not ((Szabó, 2010, p. 35). This contrast between these two types of indefinites in Turkish holds when they appear with an intentional operator.

According to scholar's (Kelepir, Dede, Özge) observations, non-marked indefinites in object position always take narrow scope with respect to the intentional operator while the marked ones take wide scope. Following the scope theory of intentionality, Kelepir (2001) argues that accusative marked indefinites always receive a de re reading whereas non-marked ones receive a de dicto reading. Consider the following examples:

(82)

Bir çevirmen arıyor.
an interpreter looking for
“(He) is looking for an interpreter.”

(Kelepir, 2001 p.81)

(83)

Bir çevirmen-i arıyor.
an interpreter-ACC looking for

“(He) is looking for an interpreter.

(Kelepir, 2001 p.81)

Kelepir (2001) argues that (82) is only felicitous in a context like (84a) while (83) is felicitous in (84b):

- (84) a. The speaker has a document that needs to be translated and he is looking for someone who can translate it. (de dicto)
- b. There is a person who happens to be a translator and the speaker is looking for him.

Özge (2010) proposes that accusative marked indefinites do not always receive a de re interpretation in their interaction with intentional operators. Following Özge’s proposal, this thesis aims to show that accusative marked indefinites are ambiguous between a de re and a de dicto reading in intentional contexts. Regarding this, a scenario where a de dicto reading of an accusative marked indefinite is true and a de re reading is false is constructed for the sentence (85).

(85)

Melis partiye bir müzisyen-i çağırdığına inanıyor.

Melis party a musician-ACC invite believe

“ Melis believes that she invited a musician to the party.”

Scenario 1: Melis is going to give a big party at her house. She calls a group of entertainers for her party thinking that they are musicians, and she is going to invite one of them. Actually, they are entertainers, but she believes that they are musicians and she invited musicians to her party.

Non-specific de dicto reading (86b) is true in this scenario while de re reading (86a) is false.

Scenario 2: Melis is going to give a big party and she invites Mert to that party. Melis hates musicians and she never invites them to her party. However, Mert doesn't tell Melis that he is a musician. Unfortunately, she invites Mert to her party without knowing he is a musician.

Only the specific de re reading (86a) is true in this scenario.

Showing that there exists a genuine de dicto reading for an accusative marked indefinite, the sentence (85) is ambiguous between the following readings:

- (86) a. There is a musician in the actual world and Melis invites him in every world w compatible with Melis' beliefs. (specific- de re reading)
- b. For every world w compatible with Melis' beliefs, there is an x in w such that x is a musician in w and Melis invites x in w . (nonspecific- de dicto reading)

The contrast between non-marked indefinites and accusative marked indefinites is still available in their interaction with intentional operators. While accusative marked indefinites exhibit an ambiguity, non-marked indefinites always receive a de dicto reading.

(87)

Melis partiye bir müzisyen çağırdığına inanıyor

Melis party a musician invite believe

“Melis believes that she invited a musician to the party.”

Sentence (87) has only the reading (86b) and it is not felicitous under *Scenario 2*.

Kelepir (2001) adopts a choice-function semantics to explain the behavior of accusative marked indefinites in general. Under this analysis, the existential closure operator appears in the highest position and binds the choice function variable. If we

employ this analysis, accusative marked indefinites receive a specific interpretation in situ. Given that, (85) has the following representation in Figure 20:




Figure 20. Choice-function analysis

This representation can generate a specific interpretation of an indefinite without violating any syntactic constraints because the indefinite variable is bound by the existential closure in the highest position. On the other hand, the restrictor *musicians* inside the scope of intentional operator *believe*. If we adopt the scope theory of intentionality, then this structure of (85) always generates the de dicto reading. Given that, it fails to account for the available de re interpretations for accusative marked indefinites. On the other hand, if we adopt an overt world-binding account, then it will account for both readings. However, this account will also generate de re readings for non-marked indefinites, which is an undesirable outcome. The system we need should account for both readings for accusative marked indefinites while blocking a de re reading for non-marked indefinites.

Öztürk (2005) adopts Schwarzschild's (2002) singleton indefinites analysis to explain the behavior of accusative marked indefinites. However, singleton indefinites analysis also interprets indefinites in situ which means that it cannot account for the de re readings that accusative marked indefinites receive.

Kelepir (2001) adopts a choice-function analysis of indefinites for the Turkish case and she argues that accusative marked indefinites always receive a de re interpretation in an intentional context. There are two problems with her proposals. First of all, she argues that accusative marked indefinites do not receive a de dicto reading but the choice-function analysis that she adopts only generates this reading. Figure 20 shows that it is not possible to derive de re readings with choice functions. Secondly, The only way her proposal generates a de re reading for accusative marked indefinites is her assumption that they are always presuppositional. However, depending on how the presupposition projects, both readings can be derived. Consequently, Kelepir’s analysis either cannot generate a de re reading or block a de dicto reading for accusative marked indefinites.

Another problem with Kelepir’s analysis is that this system cannot account for the third reading: non-specific and de re. Following Fodor (1970)’s observations, accusative marked indefinites in object position also yield a non-specific de re reading. The sentence in (88) has the reading (89):

(88)

Melis bir çevirmen-i göreceğine inanıyor.

Melis a translator- see believe
ACC

“Melis believes that she will see a translator.”

(89) In every world *w* compatible with Melis’ beliefs, there is an *x* st. *x* is a translator in the actual world and Melis sees him in *w*.

The reading (89) is true under the following scenario:

Melis is a journalist and wants to make news on bad working conditions in İstanbul. She hears that the company Transcom pays really a low wage to their workers, and she is going to interview one of them about their working conditions. It

doesn't matter whom she interviews. She just cares about seeing one person from that company. And she doesn't know that all the workers in that company are actually translators. Melis believes that she will see a translator or other, but she doesn't know they are translators.

In this scenario, a specific de re interpretation is false because there is no particular translator that she is going to see. She can interview any person who is working in that company. A non-specific de dicto reading is also false because she doesn't know that all the workers in that company are translators. However, a non-specific de re reading is true. Melis believes that she will see a person from Transcom, and it doesn't matter who is that person, but it happens to be a translator.

The existence of a non-specific de re reading for accusative marked indefinites is crucial for an account that tries to explain the behavior of Turkish indefinites in object position.

On the other hand, the semantic device, generalized Skolem terms, that Özge (2010) has proposed for accusative marked indefinites can generate this reading. According to this system, a generalized Skolem term can have a bound variable in its form in the representation; therefore, if an operator binds this variable, the Skolem term receives non-specific reading. This Skolem term also includes its restrictor in its form. If the term has a bound variable (s_0), a situation operator can bind this variable. The situation operator interprets it in the utterance world so that indefinites can receive a non-specific de re reading.

3.4 Split intentionality

Keshet (2008) identifies the problems occurring with the scope theory of intentionality and the world binding proposal; and, he presents a new theory called

split intentionality which fixes the appearing problems discussed above. In this new theory, intentionality is divided between the intentional operator and the up (^) operator which is inserted into the representation freely. This operator creates intensions out of extensions (p. 135). Keshet proposes that a DP which is below the up operator receives a de dicto reading whereas if it is above, it receives a de re reading. Consider the following configuration in Figure 21:

(80) Mary wants to buy an inexpensive coat.




Figure 21. Split Intensionality

The configuration in Figure 21 represents the non-specific de re interpretation of sentence (80). First of all, the indefinite *an inexpensive coat* is above the up operator (^); therefore, it is interpreted in the actual world which is the index of higher clause. On the other hand, it is below the intentional operator *want*; therefore, it receives a non-specific interpretation. In this structure, the quantificational force of the indefinite is below the intentional operator, but it is interpreted in the actual world. Keshet's (2008) theory of split intentionality correctly generates the third reading, non-specific de re, in the presented structure.

Keshet's proposal of split intentionality can also generate the third reading of accusative marked indefinites in the object position. Therefore, it can be an alternative approach to Özge's proposal as well.

3.5 The fourth reading

Fodor (1970) observes that sentences like (80) may receive four readings. Three of them are widely accepted and they are discussed above; however, the fourth reading is still highly controversial. Fodor argues that the quantificational force of an indefinite is separate from its intentionality; therefore, specificity and de re-de dicto readings are derived by different mechanisms. Following the QR view, when the indefinite takes wide scope over the attitude verb, it receives a specific reading. On the other hand, de re/ de dicto readings are based on the world variable of the indefinite. Given that, having quantificationally wide scope over an attitude verb does not imply de re interpretations according to Fodor's observations.

(80) Mary wants to buy an inexpensive coat.

(Keshet, 2008 p. 29)

(90) a. *Non-specific-De Dicto* is true in the following scenario: Mary wants to buy some coat, but she has no particular coat choice in her mind. She just wants it to be inexpensive.

b. *Specific-De Re* is true in the following scenario: There is a particular coat that Mary wants to buy. Mary saw that coat in the movie *The Matrix* and she wants to buy this leather *Matrix* coat. She may not know its price, but this coat is inexpensive now.

c. *Non-specific-De Re* is true in the following scenario: Mary wants to buy an *LC Waikiki* coat, but she doesn't pick a particular one in the store. *LC Waikiki*

coats are inexpensive compared to other brands, but Mary doesn't know this. She heard that this brand's coats are good, and she wants to buy one of them. This brand's coats happen to be inexpensive.

d. *Specific De Dicto* is true in the following scenario: There is a particular coat that Mary wants to buy, say that it is the leather Matrix coat. She wants to buy it under the description of "an inexpensive coat"; however, Mary may not know the leather Matrix coat, or the coat may not be inexpensive.

Keshet and Schwarz (2014) argue that if (80) has the meaning that the particular coat that Mary wants to buy does not have to be actually inexpensive, then (91) also expresses the same meaning. However, when the specific reading of the indefinite is forced by using an anaphoric pronoun "it" in the follow-up sentence, it is odd to say that the coat is inexpensive. When the specific reading is forced for the sentence (80), the *de dicto* reading of the inexpensive coat is not available according to their observations. The contrast between (91) and (92) provides evidence for their claim.

(91) There is a coat that Mary wants to buy. She thinks it is inexpensive. But really, it is quite expensive.

(92) Mary wants to buy an inexpensive coat. # But really, it is quite expensive. (p.33)

Szabo (2010) argues that it is a mistake to deny the existence of the fourth reading because these readings are real and not an illusion. He claims that (80) and (91) cannot have the same truth conditions due to the presence of the verb *think*; therefore, the contrast between (91) and (92) is a result of the presence of *think*, rather than the lack of a *de dicto* reading. He provides the following example in

which a specific reading of an indefinite in (80) is forced but still yields the de dicto reading.

(93) Mary thinks she bought an inexpensive coat. It is actually quite expensive. (p.34)

Following Fodor's observations, (93) has the same meaning as (80). Mary bought a particular coat under the description of the "inexpensive coat".

Szabo provides the following example in which a specific de dicto reading is available.

(94) Alex believes that eleven terrorists live across the street from him. (p.35)

According to his observations, a specific de dicto reading of (94) is felicitous in the following scenario:

Alex is a somewhat paranoid – he thinks that his neighborhood is full of terrorists. He spends much of his time observing comings and goings, following people around, and making inquiries. One day he goes to the police. The police officer who interviews Alex hands him a pile of photographs of people who live in his neighborhood. When Alex looks at a photograph he is asked first whether the person is a terrorist and if he answers affirmatively he is then asked where the person lives. When he is done looking through the photographs he is asked whether there are terrorists in the neighborhood who are not on any of the photographs he has seen. He says that there are not. He is also asked whether he knows how many terrorists he has identified. He says that there were quite a few but he does not know precisely how many. Fortunately, the police officer took tally. It turns out that Alex has identified 17 photographs as showing terrorists, and of those 11 as showing ones that live in the apartment building across the street from him. (Szabó, 2010, p. 35)

In this scenario, there are 11 people that Alex has identified but these people may not be actually terrorists. They may be terrorists in Alex's belief worlds.

Given the discussions on the existence of the fourth reading, I claim that accusative marked indefinites in object position receive the fourth reading and it is true in certain scenarios. Section 3.3. has discussed that the third reading, non-specific de re, is available for the sentence in (88).

(88)

Melis bir çevirmen-i göreceğine inanıyor.

Melis a translator- see believe
ACC

“Melis believes that she will see a translator.”

This sentence has the following reading as well:

(95) There is a particular individual, calling Ahmet, that Melis believes that she will see him. She believes that she will see Ahmet under the description of ‘a translator’. However, Ahmet may not be actually a translator.

This reading (95) is true in the following scenario:

Melis reads a translated article in an online journal and decides to read its original script. She couldn’t find the original script anywhere, so she thinks that the translator might have it. She searches on google to find out who translated the article, but she only finds out this name, Ahmet Yıldız. She mistakenly believes that he is the translator of the article. However, Ahmet happens to be an editor of this article. She wants to see Ahmet Yıldız to ask for the original script, but she sees him under the description of a translator.

The specific interpretation of the indefinite is true because there is a particular person, namely Ahmet Yıldız, that Melis believes that she will see him under this scenario. A de dicto interpretation is also true because Ahmet is a translator according to Melis’ beliefs but actually he is an editor.

Under the same scenario, a de re interpretation is false because Ahmet is not actually a translator; furthermore, a non-specific interpretation is also false because she is not looking for any translator.

A proposal that aims to give an account of the behavior of Turkish indefinites must also consider the interaction of accusative marked indefinites with an

intentional operator. In this regard, the proposals on Turkish indefinites assume that accusative marked indefinites only receives a de re reading. Özge's proposal seems to account for the third reading; however, it cannot generate the fourth reading, non-specific de re. The reason is that the restrictor of an independent Skolem term cannot be bound by the situation operator in the system. For (88), his system interprets the indefinite as a generalized Skolem term, and this term can be bound by the situation operator in the system. If the Skolem term does not have any bound variable, it is specified, and the evaluation procedure assigns one individual to that term. So far, we receive a specific reading of an accusative marked indefinite. The Skolem terms also include the restrictor predicate in their form. This semantic mechanism does not allow the restrictor of an independent Skolem term to be bound by a situation operator other than the same speech situation. In other words, although the indefinite receives a specific reading, it cannot receive a de dicto reading at the same time. For our sentence (88), the semantic mechanism assigns Ahmet Yıldız to the independent Skolem term, but it doesn't allow the interpretation of Ahmet as a translator in a possible situation. On the other hand, if we adopt a choice-function analysis for accusative marked indefinites, it straightforwardly predicts a specific de dicto reading.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter examines the interaction of Turkish indefinites with an intentional operator. I observe that accusative marked indefinites may receive a non-specific de dicto reading, which supports Özge's (2010) observations. Furthermore, I also claim that accusative marked indefinites receive a non-specific de re reading; followingly, proposals on Turkish indefinites cannot account for both readings: non-specific de

dicto and non-specific de re. Özge (2010) introduces a semantic device, generalized Skolem terms, to interpret accusative marked indefinites. Generalized Skolem terms can account for these three readings, a non-specific de dicto, a specific de re, and a non-specific de dicto; however, it does not allow a specific de dicto reading, which seems to be available for accusative marked indefinites. This thesis also makes contributions to the discussion of the fourth reading. It provides further supporting observations to Szabo's (2010) arguments on the fourth reading from Turkish.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The contrast between accusative marked indefinites and non-marked indefinites is the main subject of interest in this thesis. Accusative marking on indefinites affects its interpretation; however, there is still no consensus on the categorization of its effect. If we assume that accusative marked indefinites are entirely referential and accusative marking provides the referential interpretation, then this assumption cannot predict how accusative marked indefinites receive an intermediate reading which is true in a certain scenario. Following Abusch's (1994) observations on the existence of intermediate reading, I tested whether accusative marked indefinites have this reading by showing that they are true in a scenario where specific and non-specific readings are false. Another proposal comes from Enç (1991), and she argues that accusative marked indefinites are covert partitives. However, she assumes that a specific interpretation of an indefinite always entails partitive meaning. Kelepir (2001) provides empirical evidence that specificity does not entail partitivity but partitivity always entails specificity. Concerning this, she gives an example in which an accusative marked indefinite yields a specific interpretation but it doesn't have partitive meaning. As an alternative to partitivity analysis, Kelepir argues that accusative marked indefinites accommodates presuppositionality. She uses a conditional environment test to check whether Turkish accusative marked indefinites are presuppositional. According to her observations, they can appear in a conditional antecedent. On the other hand, Özge (2010) shows that accusative marked indefinites do not guarantee the non-emptiness of its restrictor. The semantic contribution of accusative marking on indefinite cannot be just reduced to one interpretation. The

empirical evidence shows that they can be interpreted as referential, partitive, and presuppositional, but it is also possible that they may not receive any of these readings. Özge proposes that these readings are the result of contextually driven domain restrictions. This proposal seems to account for different interpretations of accusative marking on indefinites.

As for the behavior of indefinites in their interaction with other operators in the structure, the same contrast between these two types still holds. An accusative marked indefinite can scope outside of an island by violating syntactic constraints, whereas a non-marked indefinite always follows the syntactic rules. Öztürk (2005) argues that non-marked indefinites are pseudo-incorporated nouns on the basis that they behave very similarly to bare NPs. Although pseudo-incorporation analysis can account for most of the behavior of non-marked ones, it fails to predict that these indefinites can also receive a referential interpretation, which differentiates them from bare NPs. Özge (2010) proposes that non-marked indefinites in object position are existential quantifiers over instances of kinds. However, this account also fails to predict how they receive a referential interpretation because referentiality blocks kind denotation.

Accusative marked indefinites show ambiguity in their interaction with intentional operators. Following Fodor (1970), I argue that accusative marked indefinites in object position receive four readings: a non-specific *de dicto*, a specific *de re*, a non-specific *de re*, and a specific *de dicto*. As an argument against always *de re* interpretation of accusative marked indefinites, I test whether they receive a *de dicto* reading by showing a scenario in which a *de re* reading is false and a *de dicto* is true.

Lastly, this thesis also discusses earlier analyses of indefinites' exceptional scope-taking behavior when they receive a specific reading. The crucial point in this discussion is that an analysis that aims to explain their scope behavior must consider their interaction with intensional operators. None of the analyses that we have discussed in this thesis generate these four readings, which are available for accusative marked indefinites.

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