

THE NEW “INTEGRATION” TESTS AND MATERIALS IN THE NETHERLANDS,
GERMANY, BADEN-WURTTENBERG, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
THE MUSLIM OTHER AND THE CHANGE FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO
ASSIMILATION

LONI DIANE SNYDER

BOSPHORUS UNIVERSITY

2006

THE NEW “INTEGRATION” TESTS AND MATERIALS IN THE NETHERLANDS,
GERMANY, BADEN-WURTTENBERG, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
THE MUSLIM OTHER AND THE CHANGE FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO
ASSIMILATION

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts
In
Cultural and Critical Studies

by
Loni Diane Snyder

Bosphorus University
2006

Abstract of the thesis of Loni Diane Snyder

"The New 'Integration' Tests and Materials in the Netherlands, Germany, Baden-Wurttemberg, and the United Kingdom: The Muslim Other and the Change From Multiculturalism to Assimilation"

In the Netherlands, Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany, and the United Kingdom new “integration” tests and materials have recently been instituted. This thesis will examine these materials in an attempt to understand what their purpose is and why they have recently come into existence. In particular, it will be shown that the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests specifically target Muslim populations: these tests will be analyzed to display the identities that are constructed within the tests and an attempt will be made to explain why it is specifically Muslims, and specifically these identities that have been targeted. The “integration” materials in general display an overall change in ideology from multiculturalism to acculturative assimilation, wherein liberalism has been empowered to make demands on immigrants for adaptation of the “core” culture. This in turn has been caused by antagonisms inherent within liberalism itself which are brought to crisis through confrontation with a critical Other which is defined as outside the understanding of the liberal system: particularly Muslims. The “integration” tests and materials are an attempt on the part of western liberal democracy to resolve the conflicts and repair the liberal system by empowering liberalism to make demands which would make the Other more compatible with the “core” culture of liberalism.

Loni Diane Snyder Tez Özeti

“Hollanda, Almanya, Baden-Wurttemberg ve Birleşik Krallıkta yeni “Uyum” testleri ve materyalleri: Müslüman “Diğer” ve Çok Kültürlülükten Asimilasyona Değişim”

Hollanda, Almanya, ve Birleşik Krallıkta yeni uyum testleri ve materyalleri yakın zamanda uygulamaya konulmuştur. Bu tez, söz konusu materyalleri, amaçlarının ne olduğunu ve neden yakın zamanda ortaya çıktıklarını anlama çabasıyla inceleyecektir. Özellikle, Hollanda ve Baden-Wurttemberg testlerinin Müslüman nüfusu hedeflediği gösterilecektir: Bu testler, içerilerinde inşa edilen kimlikleri gözler önüne sermek için analiz edilecek ve neden özellikle Müslümanlar ve bu kimliklerin hedef alındığını açıklama çabasında bulunulacaktır. “Uyum” materyalleri, liberalizmin, göçmenlere “Çekirdek” kültürü benimsemeleri üzerine isteklerde bulunmalarıyla güçlendirildiği, genel olarak ideoloji bazında çok kültürlülükten, kültürel etkileşimli asimilasyona doğru bütünsel bir değişim göstermektedir. Akabinde, buna, kritik “Diğer” olarak liberal sistem anlayışının dışında tanımlanan, özellikle Müslümanlarla karşılaşmalardan doğan krizler tarafından ortaya konan liberalizmin doğasında olan düşmanlıklar sebep olmuştur. “Uyum” testleri ve materyalleri, Batı liberal demokrasisi tarafında uyumsuzlukları çözmeye ve “Diğer’ini” liberalizmin “Çekirdek” kültürü ile daha uyumlu hale getirecek isteklerde bulunmak üzere liberalizmi güçlendirerek tamir etme çabasıdır.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
PART I	
CHAPTER 2: THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, BADEN-WURTTENBERG, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NEW “INTEGRATION” TESTS.....	5
The Netherlands.....	7
Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany.....	24
Stereotypes and Simulacra.....	37
The United Kingdom.....	43
PART II	
CHAPTER 3: MULTICULTURALISM TO ACCULTURATIVE ASSIMILATION: AN IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE TO A NEW, DEMANDING LIBERALISM.....	51
CHAPTER 4: THE ANTAGONISMS FROM WITHIN: THE WEAKNESS OF THE WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.....	60
Internal Antagonism 1: Tolerance.....	60
Internal Antagonism 2: Invisible Doxa and Openness to Claims.....	64
Internal and External Antagonisms.....	67
CHAPTER 5: REBALANCING THE SYSTEM.....	71
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	76
APPENDICES	
A. Possible Questions for the Netherlands’ “Civic Integration Examination Abroad” English Translation.....	81
B. Possible Questions for Netherlands’ “Civic Integration Examination Abroad” Original Dutch.....	84
C. Baden-Wurttemberg’s “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities English Translation.....	87
D. Baden-Wurttemberg’s “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities Original German.....	91
E. Sample Questions for the “Life in the United Kingdom Test”.....	95
REFERENCES.....	99

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the Netherlands:

Immigrants seeking to relocate to the Netherlands now face an unusual challenge - they must view a government-sponsored film featuring gay men kissing and topless women sunbathing... The new film has one goal: to stop the flow of immigrants, especially of Muslims from countries like Morocco and Turkey (White 2006).

In Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany:

“Where do you stand on the statement that a wife should obey her husband and that he can hit her if she fails to do so?” “Imagine that your adult son comes to you and says he is homosexual and plans to live with another man. How do you react?” “What do you think if a man in Germany is married to two women at the same time?” ... These are questions from a new 'citizenship test' for those hoping to become German citizens, introduced in the southern German state of Baden-Württemberg on 1 January 2006 by interior minister Herbert Rech... But not everybody is allowed to air their opinions on these moral dilemmas: only citizenship applicants from the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Smith 2006).

On March 15, 2006 the Netherlands initiated the “Civic Integration Examination Abroad” and the accompanying orientation packet including the film *Naar Netherlands (Coming to the Netherlands)*. Critiques were quickly made about two controversial images shown in the film: first, a topless woman sunbathing, and second, two gay men kissing. It has been questioned whether this content is appropriate and necessary, and whether it targets Muslim groups in order to discourage them from immigrating.

In Germany, the federal state of Baden-Wurttemberg has taken an even more controversial course of action. On January 1, 2006 Baden-Wurttemberg initiated the

“Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities” as a way to test the “conviction” of immigrants from the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to uphold the German Basic Law.¹ Both the clear targeting of specifically Muslim immigrants and the offensive and personal nature of the questions came under immediate attack. These measures were taken in addition to the Germany-wide provision made on January 1, 2005 to institute integration courses incorporating both language and cultural orientation and testing.

In the United Kingdom, citizenship applicants from November 1, 2005 have been required to take the “Life in the United Kingdom Test.” The United Kingdom also instituted new citizenship ceremonies and updated the oath of allegiance to include a pledge to respect the rights and freedoms of the United Kingdom, to uphold its democratic values, observe its laws, and fulfill the duties and obligations of citizenship.

Within the space of four and a half months, three European countries instituted new tests for immigrants. What is more, two of those tests show clear bias towards Muslim immigrants. The goals of this thesis are to attempt to uncover the reasons for this near simultaneous emergence: what is the cause and what is the purpose of the new tests, and why do two of them target Muslims?

The first section of this thesis will cover the details of the new “integration” tests in the Netherlands, Baden-Wurttemberg, and the United Kingdom as well as other “integration” materials in Germany and the United Kingdom.² Relevant background and

¹The specific details of who is required to take the “Conviction Test” will be discussed below.

² The term “integration” will be used in quotes when referring to the materials used by the countries which refer to this idea. Quotes are used because later in this thesis integration will be defined and employed with a more specific meaning.

history of each country will be given in order to better conceptualize the placement of the tests in each society, and the tests and their implementations will be explained. Finally, an analysis of some of the test questions will be presented in order to better understand the goals of the test, and to demonstrate how the receiving country's perception of the applicant is reflected in the identity constructed in the tests.

In the second section, the "integration" materials will be used as evidence of a change of approach towards immigrants. Where the previously dominant multicultural approach championed the retention of the immigrant's culture in the new country, the advent of the "integration" materials which attempt to define, teach, and require adaptation to a "core" culture, demonstrates an ideological shift towards acculturative assimilation. The genesis of a liberalism more prepared to demand adherence to certain values will be found to be the result of a perception of powerlessness engendered by liberal and multicultural principles. Liberalism has consequently been empowered to demand acculturative assimilation in order to rectify the weaknesses which threaten the liberal system from within. The targeting of specifically Muslim populations in the Netherlands and Baden-Wurtemberg tests is a result of discomfort with the visibility of Muslims in the public sphere, the impression of Muslims as irreconcilably different from the "West," and the idea that Muslims have characteristics incompatible with liberal democracy which thus challenge the system by exciting to crisis point the antagonisms already inherent in the liberal system.

Given the sensitive nature of the topic and the potential broadness of the issue, it is necessary to briefly mention the limitations of this thesis. Because of my specific aim for this thesis, I will be unable to provide a critique of the justice, practicability, or

effectiveness of the tests, nor will I be able to suggest changes; my concern with the tests will be the identities they construct and the overarching ideology they demonstrate. A central theme of the thesis will be the way that “the West” perceives particularly Muslim immigrants (the West’s simulacra of Muslims); because my concern is the role and effect of this perception itself I will not try to prove how or whether this perception corresponds to reality. It should also be stated that this thesis is necessarily one-sided in discussing the West’s simulacra of Muslims while not providing discussion of Muslim’s perception of the west or of themselves. It is hoped that these limitations allow this thesis to retain focus while navigating a complicated issue.

One further matter needs to be clarified before embarking on the topic. For the purpose of this thesis I have adopted the terms “the West,” “the non-West,” “the westerner,” and “the non-westerner.” These terms are problematic first in that they presume to delineate concepts which cannot be delineated, and second because they contribute to and reproduce the same frames with which this thesis takes issue. I have hesitantly employed these words for lack of better terms, but remind the reader to be aware of the implications of them.

PART I
CHAPTER 2

THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, BADEN-WURTTENBERG, THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE NEW “INTEGRATION” TESTS

It is necessary at the outset to clarify why this thesis examines specifically the Netherlands, Baden-Wurttemberg (a federal state in Germany), and the United Kingdom. There are some similarities between these areas. First, they are all liberal democracies located in Europe. Second, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom all have a high number of immigrants of Muslim background. Third, the immigration patterns of all three countries are similar, and the Muslim immigrants of each largely arrived in parallel waves. Fourth, in both the Netherlands and Germany the largest immigrants group is Turkish.³ Despite these similarities, the primary reason for selecting these areas for this thesis is the advent of “integration” tests in these specific places: each of these locations has recently developed new “integration” tests for immigrants – granted in vastly different manifestations. In this chapter more focus will be given to the tests in the Netherlands and in Baden-Wurttemberg than to that in the United Kingdom because the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests, announced within months of each other, are more controversial and more innovative than the comparatively moderate United Kingdom test, and hence require more explanation and

³ In Britain the largest immigrant groups are from the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent.

analysis.⁴ One of the main causes for the controversy surrounding the Netherlands and the Baden-Wurttemberg tests is that they show bias towards Muslim applicants. As such, it is intriguing that tests with similar focus could be developed simultaneously in different countries. The United Kingdom's test, in contrast, is a more traditional citizenship test. It is therefore presented here as a conservative balance for the more radical tests, which nevertheless display the ideological shift that will be discussed in the second part of this thesis.

The goals of this chapter will be threefold: first to explain the facts of the tests in each region, and to understand some of the background of each country in order to understand the context in which each test has arisen. The second goal of this chapter is to analyze some of the test materials in each country to see how a “non-western” and Muslim identity is constructed based on stereotyped assumptions about all “non-westerners” and Muslims: particularly the views that they are oppressive to women, intolerant, and fundamentally incompatible with liberal democratic society. The third goal is to show that, as can be seen in the tests, the receiving societies are requiring more from their immigrants in terms of asking the immigrant to accept the ways of life and the values of the receiving country. This change represents a larger ideological shift towards a liberalism that is more empowered but less accepting: it is a shift from multiculturalism towards acculturative assimilation.

⁴ This will be discussed below. In short, while the UK test is a rather traditional citizenship test, the Netherlands test is used before applicants can migrate to the Netherlands – it is a test for temporary residence. The Baden-Wurttemberg test is innovative in that it is conducted as an interview, and has no set questions or procedure.

The Netherlands

Background

Employing Brubaker's conception of national citizenship, the Netherlands is *the* archetypical European multicultural pluralist society (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship is *jus soli*,⁵ naturalization is standard,⁶ and immigrants are seen as "ethnic minorities" with a right to access society: "Minority groups are not just in 'our' society, but this society is also their society, and ours includes members of the minority groups" (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (1983): 14). An important precedent for Netherlands multiculturalism was *pillarization* – "living apart together." Society was divided vertically into different pillars (the three largest were Protestant, Catholic, and Social-Democrat) that operated separately from each other. They had separate schools, hospitals, newspapers, sports clubs, etc., such that many people did not have any personal contact with people from a different pillar. The denominational nature of pillarization ended in the 1960s, but the institutional structure of pillarization has survived, becoming the roots of multiculturalism (Duyvene de Wit and Koopmans, 2005).

Starting in the 1990s, Netherlands multiculturalism began to be criticized. Frits Bokestein (VVD), who later became the leader of Europe's most successful liberal party, warned publicly against "giving in" too much to the cultural peculiarities of immigrants, and argued that they should be expected to integrate much more into the

⁵ Since 1953, Netherlands has had *jus soli* citizenship for third generation immigration. In 1984 the "Opteregelning" was introduced, whereby second generation foreigners between 18 and 25 years of age can get citizenship by a simple declaration (Duyvene de Wit and Koopmans 2005).

⁶ Naturalization requires five years legal residence or three if married to a national, rudimentary knowledge of Dutch and not being considered a threat to Dutch society. (Duyvene de Wit and Koopmans 2005)

Dutch way of life (Thranhardt, 2000: 172). Bokestein argued that immigrants should “integrate” and there should be less emphasis on cultural diversity. More famously, Pim Fortuyn, the popular ethno-nationalist, anti-immigrant politician who received 17% of vote in the May 2002 elections despite having been killed several days earlier, repetitively argued that the permanent inhabitants of the Netherlands should have Dutch culture and that for immigrants, assimilation to this culture is an absolute duty.⁷

Arguments against multiculturalism also came from less ethno-nationalist sources. The theory of *minorization* propounded that an *ethnic minorities industry* had been created that socially constructed ethnic minorities, stressing the difference between the minorities and the majority in every aspect of life: living proof of the existence of the underlying dividing lines and expressing the idea that ethnic minorities are not full members of the Dutch imagined community. Further, it was argued popularly that the Dutch state grants so many group rights that being acculturated in the Dutch political context did not mean substantively being integrated into the national community (Koopmans and Statham 2004), and that tolerance had been confused with indifference.⁸ Consequently the Dutch Nationality Law instituted in 2003 included a naturalization test and moved from policies for migrant groups to policies for individual migrants.

Citizenship courses (*inburgeringscursussen*) were also introduced in 1998.

⁷ Pim Fortuyn also commented specifically about Muslims in the Netherlands, even writing a book entitled, *Against the Islamization of Netherlands Culture*. He is also famous for arguing that the Netherlands is “full” and for the popularizing the slogan “Netherlands for the Netherlander!” (Treanor, 2006).

⁸ Quote of Rita Verdonk, Netherland’s Minister of Immigration and Integration in Synon (2006).

The New “Integration” Test in the Netherlands

The “Netherlands’s Civic Integration Examination Abroad” was instituted on March 15, 2006. Contrary to traditional “integration” tests, the Netherlands’ test is not a citizenship test, but rather a test for a three-month *authorization for temporary stay* in the Netherlands, particularly for the purpose of forming a family by marriage to someone in the Netherlands, or to join family members already living in the Netherlands. Further contrary to most “integration” tests, the test is not given after years of residence in the new state, but interestingly, *before* the applicant’s arrival in the Netherlands. The test is taken in the embassy or consulate of the Netherlands in the applicant’s home country. The test is therefore not a test taken at the end of the integration process, as a validation of successful integration, but instead it is a first step in the integration process, a symbol of good faith on the part of the applicant, an avowal that he or she will make an effort to understand the culture of the receiving country. Finally, the Netherlands’ test differs from traditional citizenship integration tests in that it is not necessary for all individuals, but only for people from a “non-western” country (this will be discussed in the next section).

The test consists of two parts: 1) Knowledge of Dutch language and 2) Knowledge of Dutch society. The introduction to the orientation pack recommends that the applicant spend about 375 hours total studying, 50-70 hours of which are recommended for the Knowledge of Dutch Society part.

In preparation for the test the prospective applicant buys an orientation pack (available in bookstores in the Netherlands or from an online retailer). Included in the pack is the film, *Naar Nederlands (Coming to the Netherlands)* in the applicant’s own

language as well as in Dutch. Also included is a booklet showing pictures from the film and a list of 100 possible questions that could be asked about them. There is also an audio CD on which the same questions are recorded. The answers are supplied and the applicant is expected to memorize them.

The applicant should study the film carefully, and prepare for the 100 possible questions to be asked and answered in the Dutch language by using the booklet, the written questions, and the recorded questions and answers. The film and accompanying questions cover the following aspects of life in the Netherlands: geography and living in the Netherlands; history; constitution, democracy and legislation; the Dutch language; parenting and education; health care; work and income.

During the test at the embassy, the applicant is given a booklet containing 30 of the images from the orientation photo book. The test is taken orally, and the applicant is connected via telephone to a remote computer that asks the test questions and records her/his answers. The questions appear as they have been given in the practice pack and are of three kinds: yes / no questions; open questions with a closed, unambiguous answer; closed questions with two answer options. The questions are geared towards repetition and memorization and there is no room for the applicant's own thoughts, but only for recitation of the previously supplied answers. The test checks whether the applicant has studied the film and understands enough Dutch to answer the questions (being able to communicate on a low level in well-rehearsed situations).

For applicants in countries in which the controversial nude or gay scenes are illegal, there is an edited version of the orientation film and booklet. The controversial scenes comprise approximately 20 seconds of the 105 minute film.

Target Population Group of the Netherlands' Test

Critically important in understanding and analyzing the Netherlands' test and orientation pack is for whom it is and is not intended; it is a question of to whom the information is communicated and at whom it is directed. As mentioned in the preceding section, the test (and hence the orientation material) is only required for "non-western"⁹ peoples. Citizens of western states are exempt: persons of Australian, Belgian, Canadian, Cypriot, German, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, French, Greek, British, Hungarian, Irish, Icelandic, Italian, Japanese, Latvian, Liechtenstein, Lithuanian, Luxemburg, Maltese, Monegasque, New Zealand, Norwegian, Austrian, Polish, Portuguese, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish, Czech, Vatican, American, Swedish or Swiss nationality do not have to take the test. For all others the test is necessary in order to receive a residence permit.

While the test is required for all "non-westerners," the addition of some fact and analysis shows that the test is oriented particularly (though not intended exclusively) towards applicants of Turkish and Moroccan origin. This claim is supported by the fact that the Netherlands' biggest non-western immigrant groups are from Turkey and Morocco.¹⁰ In 2005 Turkey and Morocco were also the countries with the largest number of applicants for the MVV, the authorization for temporary stay, for which the Netherlands' test is now a requirement.¹¹ Thus, of the people required to take the test,

⁹ This term is problematic, particularly as the list of exemptions includes Japan. This term is used here for convenience in describing those nationalities who are required to take the test, and for lack of a more appropriate term.

¹⁰ In 2002, People from Turkey represented 6.2% of the inflow into the Netherlands, the largest single-country group. People from Morocco made up 5.2% of the inflow. Figures available from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2006)

¹¹ From Turkey there were 5700 applicants, from Morocco 4500 applicants in 2005 (Immigration and Naturalization Department of the Netherlands, 2006).

the countries from whom the largest amount of applicants come are Turkey and Morocco, and so it is logical for the makers of the orientation pack and test to prepare the information with a Turkish or Moroccan user in mind. This hypothesis is further supported by the film, which uses people of primarily Turkish and Moroccan origin as commenters who speak about their experience as immigrants, as well as by interviewing immigrant families identified as being of Turkish and Moroccan origin. Additionally, in explaining the geographic size of the Netherlands, map representations of the Netherlands are compared to those of Turkey and Morocco.

It is significant that the user conceptualized in the making of the orientation pack and film is Turkish or Moroccan because both of these countries are overwhelmingly Muslim,¹² and thus the conceptualized user would also necessarily be Muslim. This is only a conception however; by examining the primary religion of the applicant's country of origin, we are able to estimate that about half of the people required to take the Netherlands' test are Muslim.¹³ While the test is required of all "non-western" people, it speaks particularly to a Muslim viewer from Turkey or Morocco.

The knowledge of for whom the test is required ("non-westerners") and to whom it is orientated (Muslims, particularly those from Turkey and Morocco) is necessary for further analysis of the test questions. The Netherlands test consists of one hundred possible questions, many of which are factual, such as "Where does the Queen live?" or "Where do most specialists work?" For the discussion presented here, these questions

¹² Turkey is officially 99% Muslim. Morocco is officially 99.9% Muslim.

¹³ As no official information available, this is the best approximation. The approximation that half of the people taking the test are Muslim was reached thus: Accessing information on the percentage of total of inflow by country of origin, we first subtracted the nationalities who are exempt from the test: 38.2% of the total immigrant inflow to the Netherlands. Of the remaining countries, we added together the percentages of those which are primarily Muslim countries. By this method we were able to find that approximately 28% out of 61.7% of immigrants who would have to take the test, or about half, are likely to be Muslim.

are considered non-problematic, so they will not be commented on in this analysis section. However, approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the questions on the Netherlands' test construct an identity of the applicant. The constructed identity is based on the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands'¹⁴ conception of the applicant as “non-western.” Moreover, as Turks and Moroccans make up the largest and most visible immigrant group, the applicant is associated automatically with these Muslim groups, even if this is not the case, so that the test is oriented conceptually towards Muslim applicants. Thus the identity constructed in the test is first of all that of a “non-western” person, second that of a Muslim person. This identity does not necessarily correspond to the realities of “non-western” or Muslim people or to the applicant himself. Rather, the constructed identity is a creation by the makers of the test that reflects concerns within the population of the Netherlands about what it considers to be characteristics of “non-western” and Muslim people – stereotypes. Hence the constructed identity says more about the viewpoint of the Netherlands' society than it does about the actual practices or beliefs of either the applicant himself or “non-western” or Muslim people in general.

What is the identity of the “non-western” person in general and the Muslim in particular that the makers of the Netherlands' test have constructed? First, the identity of the “non-westerner” and the Muslim is constructed as fundamentally different from the Netherlands' society. This is true in terms of culture, norms, expectations, beliefs, and practices. Moreover, the characteristics of the “non-westerner” and Muslim are often constructed as incongruous with the Netherlands' identity, such that there is the construction of a binary opposition between the created identity of the “non-westerner” and the Netherlands identity. Between the two identities is an unbridgeable gap, and no

¹⁴ The orientation pack is published by the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands.

overlap of the cultures is presented as existing. With this in mind, the applicant is presented with an “either-or” choice between the identities. To be accepted in Netherlands’ society he must choose to distance himself from the society and the stereotyped characteristics associated with the “non-westerner” and Muslim.

Analysis of the Netherlands Test

I would like to examine just a few ways in which identity is constructed in the test. See appendices A and B for the full list of questions. Several test questions concern gender equality and the role of women. Question 50 concerns the self-determination of women regarding marriage, and assumes that it is necessary to inform the applicant that women have the right to choose their partners:

50. Is it possible for women in the Netherlands to choose for themselves whom they wish to marry? Yes

The question assumes either that the applicant comes from a society in which arranged marriages are the norm, or that women are not allowed to make decisions, even ones of such primary importance in their lives as whom they marry. In the question, women choose for “themselves” as opposed to having someone else choose for them. The question also assumes that the applicant may be expecting to continue this practice in the Netherlands, and that s/he may disapprove or be surprised by the ability of women in Netherlands to choose their spouses for themselves. It follows that the question is expecting some difficulty on the part of the applicant in accepting this basic ideal of the Netherlands society.

Question 91 concerns women in the workplace. It assumes that the applicant believes that only men should work:

91. Who works in the Netherlands, only men, or men and women? Men and women

Significantly, the question does not ask: “Who works in the Netherlands: men, women, or both?” In not including the word “women” in the initial choice, the question assumes that the applicant is accustomed to only men working. This amounts to assuming that the applicant is not used to including women in the public sphere, but rather believes that women stay at home, while men work.

Question 77 is about the separation of men and women. The subject is the school, and the assumption is that the applicant is unaccustomed to mixed gender classrooms:

77. Do boys and girls sit separately in class or together in the same class? Together in the same class

The question assumes that for the applicant the separation of the sexes is the norm, as is evidenced by using the word “separately” as the first option, and “together” as the second. Moreover this occurs at an early age, as the question uses the word “boys and girls” and “class.” This question constructs the applicant as a parent of a child in a school in the Netherlands, and assumes that on learning that her/his child is together in the same class with members of the opposite sex, that s/he will be shocked and offended, and therefore needs to be warned that this is the norm in the Netherlands.

Question 59 concerns the abuse of women and assumes that the applicant does not see a problem with it.

59. Is it permitted or illegal to beat women? Illegal

The question uses the word “beat,” as opposed to hit, to confer the idea of repetition, and also to associate the practice with punishment. Interestingly, the question chooses to use “women” as opposed to “wife” or “daughter,” which implies that the applicant comes from a society where abuse is not limited to spousal or familial abuse, but that the abuse of women in general is permitted. In asking whether abuse of women is “permitted” the question first assumes that it is permitted in the society from which the applicant is originating, but it also carries an idea that in the applicant’s mind, the authorities do not have the right to intervene in what may be considered to be family matters. This question, while initially quite straightforward, casts the society of the applicant as condoning and permissive of the abuse of women, such that the authorities would not intervene.

The Netherlands’ test also constructs the applicant as belonging to a society in which a single religion prevails, and therefore assumes that the applicant is unaware of the principle of tolerance of other religions:

53. Does the Netherlands have a state religion or are there many religions? Many religions

60. Do all people in the Netherlands have the same belief? No

Both of these questions refer to the Netherlands’ as having many different religions. Question 53 creates a binary opposition with “state religion” or “many religions.” Because we know that it is the Netherlands which is represented by

“many religions,” then the applicant is cast as belonging to a society that has a state religion which is singular in contrast to the Netherlands “many.” The same idea is repeated in question 60 which makes the point that the Netherlanders do not all have “the same belief,” which assumes that the applicant comes from a society in which this situation is strange: from a society with one religion. These questions cast the applicants as unprepared for the diversity of religion in the Netherlands, and unaccustomed to being tolerant of different religions.

Question 56 concerns the question of tolerance, this time of homosexuality:

56. Is homosexuality permitted or illegal? Permitted

Again, in constructing a binary opposition, where “permitted” represents the Netherlands, the applicant is cast as coming from a society where homosexuality is “illegal.” The applicant is therefore constructed as unaccustomed to homosexuality, and is unprepared to be tolerant of it.

Question 54 relates to freedom of expression and opinion, and of the freedom of the press. It assumes that the applicant is unaccustomed to these liberties:

54. Are the radio, newspapers, and television free to express their opinion? Yes

The purpose of this question is to inform the applicant of the fact that expression is free. The assumption is that the applicant is not used to free expression in media. It moreover

assumes that the applicant may be offended by some comments in the media, and needs to be reminded that such comments are permitted.

The Netherlands' test casts the "non-westerner" and Muslim as culturally different from Netherlands' society. The applicant's society is cast as backwards or rude, lazy or uneducated:

68. When you visit someone, do you usually make an appointment or just show up? I make an appointment

92. When will you look for work, as soon as possible or later? As soon as possible

75. Do children learn if they play? Yes

In question 68 the applicant is depicted as "just show(ing) up," oblivious to the custom of making an appointment in advance. Because "non-westerners" are either unaware of this custom or ignore it, they are backwards or rude, in contrast to a Netherlander who would never "just show up." Question 92 also asks a question with a choice of two answers where one is obviously wrong. "As soon as possible" is obviously the correct answer, though this question assumes that the applicant may well be thinking of looking for work later. The applicant is thus cast as lazy in not doing what s/he obviously should do. Question 75 assumes that the applicant is unaware of modern teaching methods. It assumes that the applicant, cast as a parent, would be concerned about children playing in school, and would believe that this is uneducational. This constructs the applicant as belonging to a strictly pedagogical school system, which is unenlightened about modern learning techniques.

Again, it is significant that the test does not apply to "westerners." Examining some of the factual questions, it is necessary to question whether a western immigrant would necessarily know that *Nederlands* means low country (question 6) or whether s/he

would know Rembrandt van Rijn's most famous painting (question 29). Like most non-Dutch people, s/he probably would not know the answers to these questions. Nevertheless, as a "westerner," s/he does not need to take the integration test. Logically this means that s/he does not really *need* this information in order to immigrate to the Netherlands. Most of the factual questions of the test are in this way apparently not necessary in order to immigrate to and live in the Netherlands; what *is* apparently needed is the knowledge provided about the basics of the culture. This is why "non-westerners" need to take the test while "westerners" do not: it is assumed that a "westerner" would know that the press is free, that boys and girls sit next to each other in school, and that beating women is prohibited. While the test contains 100 questions, what it is really asking is the information which "westerners" are assumed to automatically know while "non-westerners" might not: information about the culture that "westerners" supposedly have in common. In this way the "non-westerner" is again cast as different and outside the system, in need of training in order to function to expectations.

The Film *Naar Nederland*

A major component of the text of the Netherlands' test is the orientation film *Naar Nederland*. The film is 105 minutes long. The entire film will not be explained or analyzed here. Rather, I would like to highlight some of the more interesting aspects of the film that relate to the topics of this thesis.

In the film, the Netherlands is portrayed as overwhelmingly cold and gray. In the outdoor scenes the sky is bleak and gray and the people are wearing warm coats.

This portrait of the Netherlands is supported by testimonials from immigrants: the first minute of the film shows immigrants describing how they found the Netherlands to be cold, unfriendly, untouchable, and bleak.

It also is stressed near the beginning of the film that the Netherlands is a small country. To emphasize this, images are shown of the Netherlands fitting into Morocco and Turkey multiple times. The film then states that many people come to the Netherlands to live, as a computer screen map of Europe shows graphic planes flying into the Netherlands in a manner recalling a military invasion plan or a terrorist attack. The narrator then states, in a somewhat annoyed or disappointed sounding voice, that a lot of people have to live in the Netherlands. The imagery of this sequence invokes the idea of invasion, both by showing how the Netherlands is dwarfed by the countries from which the majority of its immigrants come, and by the war-like plane images, and is a standard racist motif (van Dijk, 1992).

In a later section on housing, pretty Dutch houses are shown before switching to scenes from what is described as a low-income housing development where many immigrants live. The images of the low-income housing show bleak apartment blocks which look dirty and ill-kept. Gangs linger outside menacingly. The presenter walks to one of the flats and introduces a family from Turkey, who point out for the camera crew the problems and cramped conditions of the flat. The father is interviewed, and states that if he were younger, he would think very hard before he left his country to come the Netherlands, and that he probably would not come.

In the section on employment, possibilities are similarly bleak. It is stressed that an immigrant who does not speak Dutch is likely to find work in the service industry,

particularly in cleaning and sanitation, and that the immigrant may have to take work for which he is overqualified.

In the section regarding family, the host is shown playing a board game in a home with a Dutch family. The mother is interviewed and tells us that they spend a lot of time as a family. Regarding rules, she says: “Of course we would never hit the children, but they do have to stick to the rules of the house.” The children are shown continuing to play the board game.

The final thing that I would like to mention about the film is the use of an actor to portray an immigrant who makes comic mistakes. Interestingly, the actor “looks Dutch.” In one sequence the actor is shown walking past un-curtained windows as a narrative voice says that part of Netherlands’ culture is to leave the curtains open to prove that you have nothing to hide. At this point the actor passes outside of a window in which we can see a woman standing on a chair and having her skirt hemmed. The actor doubles back and stares in the window. The women inside are shocked at this behavior and hurry to shut the curtains, as the narrator tells us that the practice of leaving the curtains open is not meant for everyone to “shamelessly look in.”

In another sequence the actor is used to explain what is expected at a job interview. He arrives late and sits down immediately without shaking hands with the interviewer. To the interviewer’s annoyance he does not make eye contact with her, and eventually is thrown out of the interview for answering his mobile phone.

Another scene shows the actor going to a Dutch friend’s birthday party. As he approaches the apartment, the narrator informs us that you do not usually go to birthday parties unless you are invited. Inside the flat, after shaking hands with everyone, the voice over tells us not to be surprised if you see a man standing at the cooker in an

apron, because in many families the men and women perform the same roles. Later, the host tells the actor that they are going to look at holiday photos. He is shown a picture of a woman in a bikini on the beach as the voice over tells us that people do not usually make a fuss about nudity. The actor looks ruffled and disturbed.

What is significant about the information in the film and the questions on the test is that these are the things that have been chosen by the makers of the orientation course as necessary for the specifically non-western and Muslim immigrant to know. Cultural questions are buried amongst factual questions, but it is apparently only the cultural questions that count. It is these cultural questions that create an identity for the “non-western” immigrant as overwhelmingly different such that s/he can be assumed to be ignorant to the rules and norms of the Netherlands’ society. The “non-western” immigrant is constructed as alternatively unaware of or opposed to gender equality, oppressive to women, intolerant of other religions, intolerant of homosexuality, intolerant to the free expression of views in the press, backwards, lazy, or uneducated. The identity created in the test is basically a stereotype of the “non-western” immigrant, which may be based on stereotypes of the “non-westerner” which exist outside the test.¹⁵ In requiring all “non-western” immigrants to take the test, the Netherlands is according the stereotypes to all “non-westerners.” And in asking the individual applicant the questions, the Netherlands is stereotyping him/her as a “non-westerner” who has these characteristics.

In the Netherlands’ test, “Non-western” people are constructed in opposition to “western” people: *they* juxtaposed against *us*. This point is emphasized by the fact that the test is taken before the “non-western” immigrant’s arrival in the Netherlands: the

¹⁵ This will be discussed in detail in a later section.

dissonant nature of the two cultures must be rectified before the immigrant can even be allowed to step foot on Netherlands' soil. "This film is meant for people not yet in Holland to take note that this is normal here and not be shocked once they arrive," according to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a member of the Dutch Parliament and onetime Somalian immigrant (White, 2006). The film prepares the immigrants for a life that will be different, because the two societies are assumed to be different.

The creation of the "non-western" identity relates to the purpose of the test, which is to teach the "non-western" immigrant about the norms of the Netherlands. According to the Dutch minister for integration and immigration Rita Verdonk, an important goal of the test is "to set up a code of conduct about what we as Dutch people feel is important if you live here." While the test assumes that there are differences between *them* and *us*, it also assumes that the immigrant can understand more easily and join the *us* by learning the information provided in the film. In short, the orientation pack and film are meant to encourage acculturative assimilation. The immigrant is presented with the ways of life in his new country and told that life will be much easier and better for him if he learns to live not in the past, in his old country, but in the present, in his new country. To do this he is told explicitly that he needs to learn the Dutch language, but through the images of the film the message is also clear that if he wants to live in the Netherlands he needs to adopt, or at least accept, Dutch ways.

Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany

Background

In Germany, citizenship laws are a federal responsibility, but executing them is a state responsibility. Citizenship is granted in the state in which the immigrant lives. It is for this reason that the federal state of Baden-Wurttemberg's "integration" test will be discussed, and not a test for Germany itself. But before discussing Baden-Wurttemberg specifically, it is necessary to provide some background information on the nature of citizenship within Germany as a whole.

Until recently, Germany's ethno-cultural exclusionist citizenship regime allowed people of German ethnicity, but who had been citizens of other countries, even for generations, easy access to German citizenship, while people of non-German origin were required to achieve 15 years of residence before being allowed access to citizenship.¹⁶ Non-Germans were seen as temporary residents and "foreigners" and no effort was made to integrate them into the German system, even when all evidence showed that they planned to remain in Germany. In 2000 a new citizenship law came into effect that rectified some of the discrepancies between German citizenship law and the reality of the immigrant situation in Germany. Part of the citizenship bill was the requirement of the naturalization applicant to sign a country wide universal form: an oath to follow the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) and to abide by the liberal democratic constitutional structure.

¹⁶ Non-Germans seeking naturalization also were required to give up their other nationality, not be a threat, not depend on social welfare, and identify with German culture (*bekanntnisse zum Deutsche kulturkreis*) (this requirement would be broken if the potential citizen were involved with an ethnic association for example), and even if the applicant complied with all of these, he did not have the right to be naturalized (Duyvene de Wit and Koopmans, 2005).

On January 1, 2005 the *Zuwanderungsgesetz* went into effect, making provisions for “integration” courses for new arrivals to Germany. The “integration” courses consist of 600 hours of language training with the goal of achieving sufficient *sprachkenntnisse* (language ability) plus 30 hours of cultural orientation covering legal issues, history, and the culture of Germany. Topics included in the cultural orientation are: the new citizen’s rights and obligations as members of German society; regional customs and their cultural and historical background; and the values of the German democratic system, for example freedom of religion, tolerance and equal rights. The final test consists of a language examination and a test about the cultural orientation course. In instituting the integration courses, Germany recognized that while it needs more immigrants, the immigrants who are already in Germany should be better integrated before more immigrants are allowed. With the introduction of the *Zuwanderungsgesetz*, Germany as a whole strongly identified with the ideological shift that we have already seen in the Netherlands: an institutional focus on identifying and teaching a “core” culture to immigrants, requiring immigrants to be aware of and understand the “core” culture, and encouraging immigrants to acculturate to the receiving society.

A Handbuch für Deutschland (Manual for Germany) was released at the time of the *Zuwanderungsgesetz* (January 2005). The manual was written for the use of European Union citizens, late repatriates, and students. Its goal is: “to make it easier for you to get to terms with your new environment...to help you integrate in Germany as quickly as possible (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, 2005: 2). The manual was available online as well as in print and could be accessed in German, English, Turkish, French, Spanish, and Russian. Topics included: economy, history, employment, discrimination, household, and health.

The New “Integration” Test in Baden-Wurttemberg

The “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities” was instituted in the federal state of Baden-Wurttemberg on January 1, 2006. Otherwise known as the “Conviction Test,” and nicknamed in the media the “Intolerant Tolerance Test,” the test consists of 30 sample questions covering topics as diverse as democracy, freedom of religion and religious feelings, homosexuality, the role of men and women, and the terror attacks in New York and Washington 2001 and Madrid 2004 (see Appendices C and D for the full list). The “test” actually is conducted in the form of a discussion between naturalization authorities and the citizenship applicant. The questions which make up the “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities” are considered to be a guideline for the discussion, but the interviewer is given full authority to choose how many questions to ask, which questions to ask, how to phrase them, how to follow them up, and even to devise new questions as s/he finds appropriate. The applicant is encouraged to explain his/her opinions and points of view. At the end of the discussion, a copy of the questions and the applicant’s answers is given to the applicant, which s/he then signs. If at any point after the test it is found that the applicant lied during the discussion, citizenship may be revoked, even if it means the person will be rendered stateless. The Baden-Wurttemberg conviction test is taken in addition to the standard test for foreigners wishing to become German citizens, which includes language proficiency skills and general knowledge.

Target Population Group of the Baden-Wurttemberg Test

The Baden-Wurttemberg “Conviction Test” is unusual in the extent to which it singles out a single population group: Muslims. According to a press release by the Ministry of Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg dated December 14, 2005, the “Conviction Test” is intended for all citizenship applicants from the 57 states of the Islamic conference as well as Muslims applicants from other states, or if there is otherwise doubts about the honesty of an applicant’s oath to the Basic Law. The same press release attempts to justify the creation of the “Conviction Test.” Citing a controversial study by the Central Institute of Islam, which had reported that 21 percent of Muslims in Germany thought the German Basic Law and the Koran were incompatible, the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg expressed doubts about the honesty of Muslim applicants when swearing the oath to the Basic Law which is required under the citizenship law of 2000. The Ministry questioned “whether the declaration of belief in the German constitution by Muslims corresponds in general to their personal attitudes and values...whether it can be generally assumed that the Muslims signing of the oath corresponds to their actual internal attitude” (Press Release of Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg, 2005).

Following the study, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported that an internal memo from the Baden-Württemberg Interior Ministry to the 44 branches of the immigration authority throughout the state instructed them to have “general suspicion” about the loyalty of Muslims to Germany. The memo mentioned that "the inner devotion" to Germany should be doubted in the case of every Muslim who applies for German citizenship (Hawley, 2006). The test is thus a reflection of the Baden-Wurttemberg

Ministry of the Interior's disbelief in the honesty and ability of Muslim applicants to uphold the Basic Law, and is an attempt by the Ministry and naturalization authorities to ascertain the inner feelings and beliefs of the applicant through discussing the questions: "Until now, we have always asked what the immigrants know about our constitution. But there is a big difference between what one knows and what one believes or identifies with."¹⁷ The test is a demand to demonstrate what Baden-Wurttemberg considers to be "democratic" convictions.

The announcement of the "Conviction Test" was met with concerns over whether or not the test is constitutional. As the conviction test is specifically for Muslim applicants it violates Article 3 of the German constitution that "No one may be prejudiced against or favored because of their sex, their parentage, their race, their language, their homeland and origin, their faith or their religious or political opinions" (Smith, 2006). SPD national boss Ute Vogt criticized the tests because it "places people under suspicion due to their religion alone."¹⁸ On January 5, 2006 another press release from the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg emphasized that the conviction test was to be used not only for Muslims, but would be used for all naturalization applicants whose oath to uphold the liberal democratic constitutional structure is doubted. However, it is clear from both the initial citing of the report by the Central Institute of Islam and in the requirement that it be taken by all Muslims that the test was constructed and is intended primarily for the Muslim applicant. By singling out Muslims, the identities that are created in the test are assumed to be both unique to Muslims, and universal to all Muslims. The wording used to show that the test is not

¹⁷ Conservative Christian Democratic Union member Heribert Rech, cited in Hawley (2006).

¹⁸ Vogt cited in Karakasoglu (2006) (author's translation).

just for Muslims, but that the test will be used whenever there is suspicion about the applicant's ability to uphold her/his oath to the basic law, rather than legitimizing the test, shows the mindset of automatic suspicion towards Muslims by the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, this wording means that the test is given as an arbitrary decision made on the part of the naturalization authorities regarding the assumed loyalty of the applicant, particularly the Muslim applicant. The word "doubt" as used in conjunction with the takers of the test, is invariably linked to the word "suspicion" used on the internal memo that explained the test. These words express the idea of guilt, and the impression that the applicant is lying or cannot be trusted; subsequently they make the "Conviction Test" into a trial. The test is administered only when there is "doubt" or "suspicion" about the applicant: this means that in even having to take the test the applicant is being accused. From the beginning of the "Conviction Test" the applicant must take a defensive stance, as in reality he is not just taking a test: he is being accused and tried.

Prime Minister Guenther H. Oettinger and Minister of the Interior Heribert Rech affirmed that they supported the use of the discussion manual:

A person who wants to become a German citizen and live with us, must accept our Basic Law and its value order. The naturalization authorities will lead a discussion about our constitutional system whenever they have doubts about the sincerity of the oath to respect and uphold the liberal democratic constitutional structure. This is not discrimination. It is a matter of course as well as a signal to naturalization applicants that we are serious when we say that if they want to become German, they should be resolved to say sincerely and convincingly that they will follow our system. (Oettinger und Rech halten an Gesprächsleitfaden für Einbürgerungsbehörden fest, 2006)

Analysis of the Baden-Wurttemberg “Integration Test”

In attempting to analyze the questions used in the Baden-Wurttemberg “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities,” the reader should be reminded that the questions are considered as a guideline, but are not necessarily the verbatim questions actually asked during the discussion. However, the sample questions provide a frame for the interviewer, and so influence the interview and the questions asked. The guideline questions available from the “Manual” are pandemic in their construction of an overwhelmingly negative identity of the Muslim applicant. Here I will analyze just a few of the constructed identities. Please see Appendixes 3 and 4 for the full list of the “Manual” guideline questions.

One of the themes very strongly presented in the questions is the maltreatment of women. The questions confront the applicant with the topics of honor killings and of wife beating, and ask the applicant to comment. However, because of the aforementioned situation which leads to the interview, the questions are not really “just questions,” but are actually accusations:

24. In the newspaper one sometimes reads about a case where a daughter or a wife is murdered because of "immoral lifestyle" in order to restore the family honor. How do you feel about such an act?
6. What do you think of the statement: That a wife must obey her husband and he can hit her if she does not obey him?
8. In Germany the police can intervene in a violent argument between a married couple, and in order to prevent further threats can send the aggressor out of the house for several days. What do you think about this?

Here the immediacy of the questions reflects the accusatory nature of the *situation* of the “Conviction Test,” which is based on the preexistent “doubt” about the applicant on the part of the naturalization authorities. The questions are direct and personal. A controversial topic is introduced, and the applicant is asked to give his/her judgment on

it; but it is conveyed that this question is being leveled more as an accusation than a question precisely because this question represents something that the naturalization authority “doubts” in the applicant. In these cases, an extremely personal link is drawn between the questions asked and what the naturalization authority believes about the applicant. It is therefore clear that the naturalization authority is not asking the applicant, “What do you think about honor killings?” in an abstract way, but rather the applicant’s own experiences with honor killing, even whether the applicant would engage in it under certain circumstances. This point is made clearer in comparing the treatment of domestic violence in the *Manual for Germany*, which is targeted to Europeans, with the “Conviction Test.” In the *Manual for Germany*, the reader is told that s/he need not be afraid of deportation if s/he is abused by his/her spouse, that s/he should apply for a restraining order, and that shelters are available. The reader is constructed, if anything, as the victim of domestic abuse rather than the perpetrator. Moreover, s/he is never asked to describe or defend her/his attitudes towards domestic abuse. However, in the “Conviction Test” the applicant must be defensive as her/his personal identity is constructed as the perpetrator of violence: that s/he would engage in domestic violence even to the point of murder.

Question 15 also *accuses* the applicant of belief in arranged marriage. It associates the applicant with violence and categorizes a cultural practice as wrong:

15. What is your opinion of parents who push their children into forced marriages? Do you believe that such marriages are compatible with human rights?

This question does not talk about parents arranging marriages, but about children being “forced” into marriages. This again frames the issue in violence. The follow-up

question links arranged marriage to human rights and suggests the “correct” answer: that arranged marriages are wrong because they are in violation of human rights. In this question, a practice that has been used for centuries is reduced to “wrong” by framing it with violence and the violation of human rights. The question is not theoretical: the naturalization authority is not asking the applicant to defend the practice in terms of theory, but rather accusing her/him of participating in a practice that is categorized overtly as “wrong.” The follow-up question leads the applicant to the “correct” answer by using the words “human rights:” of course “forced marriage” is not compatible with “human rights.” This question also sets up an interesting dichotomy between the parent in the question, who is the applicant and who is constructed as following a “wrong” practice, and the children who are “forced” into the marriage by the parent. As the children are “forced,” there is a sense of resistance on the part of the children: the children want to adopt the “right” German way of marriage, but are the parents use violence to make the children continue in the “wrong” way. The opposition is the bad, unacculturated parent vs. the good, Germanized children.

Several of the questions on the test concern gender equality and the oppression of women. The following questions cast the applicant as “backwards” and imply that the country needs to punish them:

9. Do you think it is progress that a (sic) men and women in Germany are equal under the law? In your opinion what should the country do when men do not accept this?
7. Do you think it is permissible that a man shuts his wife and daughter into the house in order to prevent them from dishonoring him in public?

In question 9, gender equality is framed as “progress;” the accusation to the applicant is that s/he believes in male dominance, which is framed as the opposite, “backwardness.” The question also raises the idea of punishment or at least of control. Here, the country, which is framed as progress, has to do something about “backwards” men who do not accept this. The words “should” is used to describe a moral obligation. This is a thinly veiled threat made directly to the applicant on the part of the naturalization authority: Baden-Wurttemberg does not accept men who do not believe in gender equality, and the country is willing to punish. Interestingly, the question asks what the country should do about “men” who do not accept this. The question here frames the woman as unimportant: it apparently inconsequential whether a woman accepts gender equality or not. In so doing, the test question supports the same structure of male dominance that it attacks.

The following questions concern self-determination of women, the acceptance of German dress, and male dominance. These questions construct the applicant as believing that only Islamic dress is appropriate, casts the applicant as violent, and also construct a difference of authority in men and women:

17. Your adult daughter/your wife would like to dress like other German girls and women. Would you attempt to prevent her from doing this? If so, with what methods?

18. For female citizenship candidates: Your adult daughter would very much like to dress like other girls and women too, but your husband is against it - What would you do?

In question 17 the male applicant is framed as being against the German way of life by being opposed to the German style dress for his wife or daughter, which he is assumed to think is wrong. The male applicant is constructed as “preventing” his daughter from exercising her own will, and asked what “methods” he might use. Again, he is asked not

only what he thinks about the possibility of his daughter wearing German-style dress, but what methods he might employ to stop her. Here, violence or maltreatment are suggested about the identity of the male applicant. Question 18 for the female applicant, constructed here as a mother, erases the applicant as an important actor. First it does not ask whether she herself would consider wearing western clothes: it is assumed that she would not. She is constructed as submissive to her husband: it is her husband who is against the daughter's choice of clothes, and the question does not ask the applicant her own opinion about her daughter's choice of clothes, but how she feels about male dominance in the family. Would the applicant confront her husband and support her daughter, or would she remain quiet?

As questions 17 and 18 are differentiated according to the gender of the applicant, are other questions similarly chosen according to gender? For example, would a female applicant be asked question 24 about honor killings or number 8 about domestic abuse? Indeed, referring to the entire question list in Appendixes 3 and 4, it appears that the target applicant is male in the majority of the questions. This exhibits an interesting turn: that the Baden-Wurttemberg naturalization authorities, while accusing the Muslim applicant of male dominance, engage the same perspective when conducting the interview. They assume that it is the man whose opinions are important.

The applicants also are asked to explain their feelings towards religiously motivated violence and terrorism. In the following questions, the interviewer accuses the applicant of associating with terrorists and of agreeing with their motivations:

22. You learn that people in your neighborhood or from your friend or acquaintances is has (sic) perpetrated or is planning a terrorist attack. How do you react and what do? (sic)

23. You have heard about the attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and on March 11th 2004 in Madrid. In your eyes were the perpetrators terrorists or freedom fighters? Explain your viewpoint.

Interestingly, rather than asking what the applicant thinks of terrorism in general, question 22 constructs the applicant as personally knowing terrorists: that s/he lives near and associates with them. The naturalization authority places the applicant in a horrific situation, and asks for his/her reaction. The applicant basically is being asked whether s/he would hide the terrorist, thus supporting the cause, or whether s/he would turn to the state for help. The question asks the applicant where her/his loyalties lie. The second question asks for a viewpoint, but again there is only one “correct” answer. This is not a theoretical discussion where the applicant could defend, to some extent, the position of “freedom fighter.” Rather, the applicant is accused of believing that the terrorists were freedom fighters (and thus approving of terrorism), and must prove that s/he “understands” that they were terrorists. We could also argue that as Al-quaeda, which was behind the events mentioned in the question, does not label its fighters “freedom fighters” that this term is not appropriate here and hence there is again only one correct answer to the question.

The test constructs the Muslim applicant as intolerant to criticism of his/her religion:

3. In films, plays, and books, the religious feelings are sometimes insulted of those who have different religious beliefs. According to you which methods are acceptable for individuals to use to fight against such religious insults and which not. (sic)
4. How do you feel about criticism about your religion? Do you find this permissible? Could you discuss this?

In question 3 the use of the words “fight against” and “insults” are telling. It is assumed that the applicant will see criticisms of her/his religion as “insults,” and will want to “fight” against them. Assuming this, the question goes on to ask what methods are acceptable. But the use of the words “fight against” instead of the more neutral “oppose” presumes that the applicant would choose a violent method of retaliation. The applicant is constructed as preferring violent means of retaliation and must prove first that s/he would not be overly angered by criticism, and second, if s/he were angered, that s/he would choose non-violent methods of opposition. The second question similarly asks if criticism is “permissible,” making the assumption that for the applicant, criticism is not permissible.

These are merely a sample of the identities constructed in the “Conviction Test” and the frames that are used. Throughout the test, the identity of the applicant, who is specifically Muslim, is constructed as oppressive to women, violent, in association with terrorists, and intolerant to religious criticism. The applicant is accused of being “wrong” and “backwards” and s/he must prove that s/he is willing to accept the “correct” German way of thinking.

Unlike the Netherlands’ test, the orientation courses in Germany, or the *Manual for Germany*, the Baden-Wurttemberg test does not attempt to instruct the applicant about the receiving society. There is no preparation manual for the test; indeed, the questions were meant to be kept secret from the applicant prior to the test. Rather, the immigrant is tested on her/his presumed (in)ability to integrate into the society. The message to the applicant is that her/his identity is suspicious, and that s/he must accept the German way of life in order to be accepted. Like the Netherlands, the Baden-Wurttemberg test is geared towards assuring that the immigrants who are admitted will

accept and adopt the culture of the receiving society; but in the case of the “Conviction Test” this is done by filtering out those applicants whose integration is viewed as impossible, rather than by teaching the culture. Any teaching is done prior to the test, in the cultural orientation section of the Germany-wide “integration” course.

Stereotypes and Simulacra

Before continuing further, it is necessary to address an issue that applies to the tests in both the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg. In both tests, the identity of the specifically Muslim applicant is constructed as oppressive to women, intolerant of religious criticism, violent, backwards, and overall, incompatible with the receiving society. As the identities constructed in both tests are remarkably similar, it is necessary to question why it is these specific identities that have been constructed.

The timing of the tests is significant, and the fact that they were instituted within three and a half months of each other attests to the fact that they are responses to largely similar stimulants. The events of September 11, 2001 mark a divide in time, and were the prime catalysts of a major change of focus regarding the relationship between “the West” and the “Muslim world,” where tensions between the two were seen to be in the process of erupting. The Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004, the murder of controversial filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on November 2, 2004, the London transport bombings in July 2005, and the Mohammed cartoon controversy starting from September 30, 2005 all associated Islam with violent events. These events were mentioned continually in the media, in an endless repetition. A 2005 study by the

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights found that in all three of our countries of study, ill-feelings against Islam grew post 9-11 (Report on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU 2005). A 2006 study by the Pew Global Attitude Project showing how westerners and Muslims view each other showed that in Germany, only 40% of the non-Muslim population viewed Islam favorably, while 83% viewed Christianity favorably. In the Netherlands, the numbers were 45% and 83%, respectively (The Great Divide, 2006). The Helsinki study also mentions that in all three countries negative reporting by the press was at least partially to blame by reinforcing negative views of Islam through repetition. For both the Netherlands and Germany, the murder of Van Gogh was mentioned in particular for raising negative feelings, and in a separate article, it was reported that immigration experts in the Netherlands expressed concern that the Van Gogh murder re-enforces public prejudices of Islam as a “dangerous” religion (Week of Violence, 2004).

In these events themselves, and in the repetition and endless comments on these events, the association began to be drawn between Islam and extremism, and from there to violence, intolerance, and terrorism, such that “terrorism” automatically means “Islamic terrorism.” A report in Germany stated that 83% of Germans associated Islam with terrorism (German have negative views of Islam, 2004). The Pew Global study reported that in Germany 78% of the non-Muslims population saw Muslims as fanatical and 52% thought Muslims were violent. 35% of the population was very concerned about Islamic extremism within Germany, and an additional 43% of the population reported being somewhat concerned. In the Netherlands, these numbers were 32% and 44%, respectively (The Great Divide, 2006). That is not to say that the public are pawns to the media, but the media, as well as the events themselves, certainly influence the

public, fairly or unfairly, by showing the events powerfully, and by associating or framing them in certain ways (Media Has Anti-Muslim Bias, Claims Report, 2005).

These negative opinions, perceptions, prejudices and stereotypes are unquestionably the impetus for the construction of the Muslim identity in the Netherlands' and Baden-Wurttemberg tests as violent and intolerant of religious criticism. The test questions are a result of pre-existing stereotypes about Muslims as violent and intolerant; they construct Muslim identities in this way because the makers of the test already believe that these are innate characteristics of Muslims. For example, Netherlands test question 54 regarding freedom of the media to express opinion may be seen as directly related to incidents such as the Van Gogh murder in which free expression caused insult and eventually violence. Questions 53 and 60 regarding religious tolerance assume that the applicant is not religiously tolerant based on stereotypes of Muslims as being unaccustomed and violent to other religions.

Similarly, the construction of Muslim identity as oppressive to women is based on pre-existing stereotypes. In the Baden-Wurttemberg test in particular, over half of the thirty questions deal in some way with the role of women. This seems to be directly related to the public discussion about honor killings and forced marriage among Muslim immigrants that was taking place in Germany leading up to the creation of the test.¹⁹ Largely as a result of the attention by the press to such stories, Muslims came to be associated with oppression of women in the minds of Germany's non-Muslim population. A 2004 report in Germany claimed that 93% of non-Muslim Germans questioned associated "Islam" with oppression of women (German have negative views

¹⁹ See, for example: Elbaum (2006); Germany: The Problem of Forced Marriages (2004); Paterson (2005); James (2006). One of the most publicly discussed "honor killings" was that of Hatan Surucu, who allegedly was shot by her brother in Berlin in February 2005.

of Islam 2004), and the 2006 Pew Global study reported that 80% of non-Muslims in Germany thought that Muslims were “not respectful to women”(The Great Divide, 2006). The public concern about honor killings and forced marriage, for example, is reflected in questions 15 and 24 regarding those subjects. But stereotypes about Muslim treatment of women also are seen in questions which ask about the ability of women to work in different jobs (10 through 14), about the kinds of dress that are appropriate (17 and 18), about allowing daughters to participate in swimming lessons (16), and about keeping women indoors to avoid dishonor (7). In all of these questions, stereotypes about Muslims which have been reinforced by the media become institutionalized as the identity of Muslims in the Baden-Wurttemberg test.²⁰ To a somewhat lesser extent, the Netherlands test similarly utilizes stereotypes about the roles of Muslim in questions which ask whether women have the right to decide whom to marry (51), about whether it is permissible to beat women (59), and about whether women also work (91).

A question that must be asked in conjunction with these issues is why is it the role of *women* that has been so emphasized in these tests, instead of other things that may differentiate Muslims from the West, for example, economic matters concerning the use of interest, or the difference of holy days and holidays, or the prohibition of pork. All of these things also could be said to differentiate Muslims from the West, and all of them could cause a conflict with western practices. What is clearly visible in the tests’ emphasis on the roles of women in Muslim culture is the West’s belief and concern that “Islamic practices and conceptions of women’s role in society are incompatible with the

²⁰ Concern about the treatment of women in Islam also is reflected in the fact that Necla Kelek, author of the 2005 semi-autobiographical book *Yabancı Gelen* in which she claims she was treated as a slave by her family, was asked to perform the role of Integration Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg. It is claimed that she had a “major role” in the concept of Baden-Wurttemberg’s test (Polat 2006).

liberal democratic commitment to equal citizenship” (Carens 2000:14), for example, that Islam requires women to dress in restrictive ways that limit their capacity to act in the public sphere, that it legitimates patriarchal authority or permits wife-beating (Carens 2000:144). It is for this reason that the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg attempts to justify the questioning of what are essentially cultural practices in the “Conviction Test:” because certain practices regarding women that are considered characteristic of Muslim culture are claimed by the Baden-Wurttemberg authorities to be incompatible, not with German culture, but with the concept of equal citizenship that is the basis of the liberal democratic constitutional structure itself. In other words, according to the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg, these practices are disallowable because they violate the Basic Law. It is for this reason that the naturalization authorities are “justified” in having “doubts” about the Muslim applicant: the way Muslims are characterized to treat women is opposed to the Basic Law, so that in swearing an oath to the Basic Law, the Muslim applicant would assumed to be lying, unless s/he can show that s/he does not hold these negative characteristics. In the Netherlands a similar focus on the roles of women and gender equality can be seen, which also relates to the belief that regarding women, Islamic practices are incompatible with liberal democratic equal citizenship. This presumed incompatibility has become more visible as more Muslims immigrate to Western countries while retaining their culture, and as the press publicizes practices that defy equal citizenship, such that the “problem” can no longer be ignored. Necla Kelek performed the role of calling Germans to action in this matter by charging that, by not making criticisms because of fear of being considered racist, the Germans were condoning untenable situations in the Turkish communities (Polat 2006). The focus on the role and treatment of women in the

tests is a response to increasing fear in the receiving country that allowing Muslims to retain certain cultural characteristics will result in the country condoning unequal citizenship.

Vitally important to understanding the identities constructed about Muslims in the tests and the stereotypes which bred them is the fact that at no point are we talking about “actual” Muslims,²¹ but rather about *how the West views Muslims*, and about what the West associates with Muslims. As such we are dealing not with real people, society or religion, but rather with a *simulacra* (Baudrillard ,2002) – a creation by the West; a “copy that is its own reality.” Because of events and media coverage, the west has developed stereotypes about Muslims that have taken on a life of their own, to the point that it is the simulacra that is identified as the applicant in the “integration” materials. In this new manifestation of classic Orientalism (Said, 1979) the “actual” applicant and the “actual” Muslims are displaced by the simulacra of Muslims. In the “integration” materials, it is not the Muslim that is represented, but rather the perceptions of the west.

The simulacra of Muslims is perceived as being basically different and incompatible with the west. The Pew Global report showed that in Germany 70% of non-Muslims feel that there is a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in modern society (The Great Divide, 2006). There is the belief that it is therefore important to “identity the conflicts between Islamic beliefs and those that undergird the liberal democratic institutions of the west” (Carens, 2000:140-141). These feelings of an ethical and moral divide are illustrated in the tests. In both the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg the applicant is presented with a choice between “western”

²¹ “Actual” has been put in quotes here to attempt to avoid the discussion of what an “actual” Muslim should/would/might be. Here I mean it to be anything/anyone that is not simply the West’s simulacra.

characteristics and “Muslim” characteristics. In Baden-Wurttemberg in particular, the applicant is presented with a catalogue of negative characteristics and stereotypes the Germans associate with Muslims: particularly those characteristics the Germans feel are most incompatible with German society. The applicant is assumed to identify with these negative characteristics, and he must prove that he is not incompatible with German society by distancing himself from these characteristics and stereotypes. “There is a sense that if Muslims are to be part of a new national German culture then it must be demonstrated that their values do not jar with the ethos of the German state, that there is no ethical tension between being a good Muslim and a good German” (Modood, 1997: 9). The choice is exclusive: if the applicant is the stereotypical Muslim, s/he cannot also become a German.

The United Kingdom

Background

Like the Netherlands, the UK has a multicultural pluralist citizenship regime. Most resident minorities have full equal social and political rights, but retain much of their cultural difference from the majority society. There is *jus soli* citizenship and naturalization after only five years.

The United Kingdom’s multiculturalist regime has been structured heavily by its state sponsored *race relations industry*, wherein immigrants mobilize on the basis of their racial and cultural difference from the majority society in order to access racially-defined institutionalized channels to the political process. In the United Kingdom’s

version of multiculturalism, race is the main defining category, and the main channel of access to the political process. Subsequently, if a group emphasizes a characteristic that is not racial, for example, the characteristic of being Muslim, the group is less well served by the race relations industry (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham see the exclusion of religiously defined groups as purposeful, and that not accommodating for Islam as an “ethno-religion” in the race relations industry is a way of suppressing Islam within the liberal system. In the United Kingdom the state relegates religion to the private individual conscience. As the UK considers Islam to be a particularly community centered and political religion, the potential difficulty in accommodating for these characteristics may explain why the UK is reluctant to grant access to Muslims as an “ethno-religion” (Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 18): because the UK is afraid the associational activities of the Muslim community cannot be included easily within its secular integrationist formula.²²

The New “Integration” Test in the United Kingdom

In order to be naturalized in the United Kingdom, the applicant is required to prove sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic and also sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom,²³ either by passing the “Life in the United Kingdom Test” (instituted on November 1, 2005) or by attending and passing combined English language and citizenship classes. The “Life in the United Kingdom Test”

²² As a result, many claims made by Muslims in Britain are for the extension of Multiculturalism to recognize cultural and religious groups and also to change the fact that Britain’s discrimination legislation contains clauses on racial equality by not religious equality (except in Northern Ireland). This, in turn was a large part of the controversy during the Rushdie Affair in Britain. See Koopmans and Statham (2004: 218).

²³ The Act of 2002. The English requirement is ESOL entry 3: workable, but not perfect English.

consists of 24 computer-based questions. The test takes 45 minutes, and a 75% is required to pass. The test is based on information found in chapters 2 to 4 of the book *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* and includes the following topics: migration to Britain, the changing role of women, children, family and young people, population, religion and tolerance, regions of Britain, customs and traditions, the working system of government, the formal institutions, devolved administration, Britain in Europe and the world, and the ordinary citizen. While no official questions are given in advance, study of the relevant chapters should result in a passing grade (see appendix 5 for a list of sample questions). The test is considered to be part of the process of integration emphasizing “integration and cultural adaptation” and aiming to make everyone familiar with basic “British values.” Like the Netherlands test, the orientation courses in Germany, and the *Manual for Germany*, the British test is geared towards supplying important knowledge about the receiving society in order to prepare the immigrant for normal life there. Immigration Minister Tony McNulty explained: “It is a test of their preparedness to become citizens, in keeping with the language requirement as well”(New UK Citizenship Testing Starts, 2005). Unlike the Netherlands test, the British integration test takes place at the end of the naturalization process, after at least five years of residency in the country, and as a final step to citizenship.

The UK also has recently instituted the requirement that all persons being naturalized must attend a citizenship ceremony and take an oath of allegiance and a pledge to observe the rules and customs of democratic citizenship.²⁴ To the existing oath of allegiance is added a pledge which states that the person will respect the rights

²⁴(Home Office of the United Kingdom 2004). The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill of April 12 2002 renamed the “oath of allegiance” as the “citizenship oath and pledge.”

and freedoms of the UK, will uphold its democratic values, observe its laws, and fulfill the duties and obligations of citizenship.

Target Population Group of the United Kingdom Test

The United Kingdom test is useful as a contrast to the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests. All three countries arguably experienced the same events and media repetition delineated in the previous section. But whereas the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests were influenced by these events to target a specific population for the test, exempting others, the UK test is for all people who want to become citizens of the UK, and as such no groups are singled out for the test nor exempt.

Analysis of the United Kingdom Test²⁵

In contrast to the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests, the United Kingdom test, partly because it is not intended for a single group, does not create an identity of the applicant. While the former institutionalized their society's negative stereotypes of "non-westerners" and Muslims, in the UK test the applicant is noticeably absent: instead the subject of the test, if anything, is the UK itself. The style of the UK test is factual and pedagogical (See appendix E for list of sample questions):

1. How many people live in the countries of the UK?
12. What is the census and how is census data collected and used?
25. How do elections for the House of Commons work? How are candidates selected? What do the Speaker and Whips do?
26. What is the House of Lords and who are its members?

²⁵ The reader is again reminded that there are no "official" questions available in advance for the UK test, so the analysis concerns the sample questions provided by the "Life in the UK" website. See appendix 5 for a full list of the sample questions.

But while the test succeeds in not creating a negative identity of the applicant, it has been criticized as being pedantic. It has been argued that most adult citizens of the UK could not pass the new citizenship test.²⁶ The test has also been criticized as not being helpful in immigrant's daily life as it asks the applicant about the members of the House of Lords but does not enquire, for example, where medical services are given or the major methods of transport. The reason for this, simply, is that the UK test is a citizenship test. It therefore is concerned with the things that a citizen is assumed to need to know in order to operate as a citizen within the society: "The test itself will concentrate on life in the UK today...in the test we concentrate on knowledge which will enable people to play a full role as citizens in today's Britain" (Home Office of the United Kingdom 2005). The UK test differs from the Netherlands' test and Baden-Wurttemberg's test in the fact that it is a civics test, not a culture test. Immigration Minister Tony McNulty explained in November 2005: "This is not a test of someone's ability to be British or a test of their Britishness...It is a test of their preparedness to become citizens..."²⁷ The test does not ask cultural questions because its aim is not to require the immigrant to adopt British culture, but to learn British civics so s/he can fulfill her/his duties as a citizen.

Interestingly, the questions for the "Life in the United Kingdom Test" are based on Chapters 2 to 4 of the eight-chapter book *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*: five chapters have not been included in the test, though the information they contain must have been considered relevant enough to merit inclusion in the manual applicants must study in order to pass the test. The chapters of the manual which have

²⁶ See, for example *Could you pass the citizenship test?* (2005).

²⁷ Cited in *New UK citizenship testing starts* (2005)

been excluded from the test are “The Making of the United Kingdom,” covering history; “Everyday Needs,” including housing,²⁸ money and credit, health, education, leisure, and transport; “Employment,” including looking for work, equal rights and discrimination, and working for yourself; “Sources of Help and Information,” including libraries and police; and “Knowing the Law,” including the rights and duties of a citizen, human rights, marriage and divorce, children, consumer protection, criminal courts, civil courts, legal advice and aid.

The manual on which the test is based includes the more “practical” information that the test was criticized for not including. In including this information in a manual of which the applicant is required to study three chapters, the United Kingdom is thereby putting this more “practical” or cultural information in the applicant’s hands. While s/he is never tested on the extra information, because the UK test is a civics test, s/he is thus encouraged to consult the manual for information on the more cultural topics. For the UK test, unlike the Netherlands test, it is not *required* that s/he learn this information, it is suggested. In the missing chapters of *Life in the United Kingdom*, similar to the test, the reader is barely present. Unlike the Netherlands and Baden-Wurtemberg tests, the United Kingdom test and the manual on which it is based do not create an opposition between the way of life in the receiving society and the way of life in the applicant’s society of emigration. At no time are the two depicted as mutually incompatible: rather, the subject is the United Kingdom itself.

²⁸ This excluded section includes a short paragraph on Islamic mortgages, saying that currently a small number of lenders give loans which do not break Islamic law, but the number is increasing.

Summary of Part I

In Part I we have examined the “integration” tests and practices in the Netherlands, Germany, Baden-Wurttemberg and the UK. In both the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg specific populations have been targeted for the tests and negative identities of the applicants have been constructed based on pre-existing stereotypes, which have been cast as incompatibly different from the West. In contrast, the test in the United Kingdom does not target a specific population nor create an identity of the applicant, but rather focuses on civic knowledge while including cultural information in the study manual.

While the three tests vary in content and application, a general similarity can be seen between all three countries: that of requiring more from immigrants in terms of asking the immigrant to accept the ways of life and the values of the receiving country. The Netherlands’ test, taken before the immigrant moves to the country, requires the immigrant to learn about the culture and the daily ways of life in the Netherlands, as well as some history and information about the political structure. In Germany, the integration courses provide immigrants with information about citizenship rights, the values of the German democratic system such as tolerance and equal rights, and cultural and historic background. *The Manual for Germany*, geared towards Europeans, includes much the same information, but does not include a test. In Baden-Wurttemberg, the “Conviction Test” functions to filter out those applicants for citizenship who are assumed to be unable to uphold the liberal democratic constitutional structure. In the “Life in the United Kingdom Test,” the applicant is required to learn the duties of the

citizen, but the manual from which he studies this information also includes information on culture and daily life.

In all of these ways, the receiving countries are requiring more of their immigrants. Where the receiving societies perceive incompatible differences between their society and the values and practices of the immigrants, they are requiring that the immigrants distance themselves from those values and practices. In the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests, where the Muslim identity is constructed as intolerant or oppressive to women, the tests forcefully inform the applicants that such characteristics will not be condoned in the new country. In doing so the receiving countries are moving away from cultural relativism and multiculturalism that had encouraged them to accept differences between the receiving society and the immigrant. What can be seen emerging in these tests and materials are western countries that are more empowered to make demands of their immigrants, and more empowered to not accept what they do not believe is compatible with their own societies: what is emerging is an ideological shift from multiculturalism toward acculturative assimilation.

PART II

CHAPTER 3

MULTICULTURALISM TO ACCULTURATIVE ASSIMILATION: AN IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE TO A NEW, DEMANDING LIBERALISM

As evidenced by the new integration tests and materials in the Netherlands, Germany, Baden-Wurttemberg, and the United Kingdom, an ideological shift is taking place which is empowering countries to demand more of their immigrants: a shift from multiculturalism to acculturative assimilation. Moving away from cultural relativism, there is now a demand for a cohesive national identity and for assimilation to a unitary culture. In this chapter we will attempt to understand what exactly this ideological shift means and entails.

We need to begin with a basic understanding of what multiculturalism is, where it came from, and how it has been applied and manifested in western liberal democracies.

Liberalism

Integral to our understanding of multiculturalism is the fact that it is founded in liberal principles: most important are the ideas of *equality* (equal respect) and *individualism*. Charles Taylor states that necessary for liberal society is the belief in “the equal dignity of all citizens and the equalization of rights and entitlements” (Taylor, 1994). There can be no second-class citizens in a truly liberal society because as human beings, all people have equal dignity. Individualism is therefore important because the

basic component of society is the individual, who is equal to other individuals.²⁹

Furthermore, in liberalism, the individual is considered to be the main actor, the level at which decisions are made. Also of primary importance in understanding liberalism is that it is often co-existent with democracy and with secularism.³⁰

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism³¹ also is based on the principal of equal respect and often is co-existent with democracy and secularism. Multiculturalism is an extension of liberalism, but in multiculturalism the concept of equal respect is understood somewhat differently. The primary difference between liberalism and multiculturalism is that in multiculturalism individuals with certain characteristics form groups, and it is the *groups* that are recognized as important actors, whereas liberalism sees individuals as the primary actors. The reasoning behind this is Kymlicka's conception of *societal culture* (Kymlicka 1995) wherein the identity and freedom of the individual are dependant on the availability of a group suitable to him. Habermas summarizes the concept thus:

The integrity of the individual legal person cannot be guaranteed without protecting the intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialized and has formed his or her identity. The identity of the individual is

²⁹ Individualism, it can be argued, is in turn based on Protestant principles.

³⁰ Secularism is the separation of religion and politics. It should be noted that this is not always the case, and that a lot of liberal democracies acknowledge a state religion or privilege a certain religion within their boundaries. The principal of secularism usually stands to some extent, however.

³¹ Michael Waltzer breaks Liberalism into liberalism 1 and 2. Liberalism1 corresponds with what I am referring to as "liberalism" here. Liberalism 2 corresponds with what I am calling multiculturalism. Amy Gutmann describes liberalism 1 and 2: "Liberalism 1: the respect for the unique identities of each individual, regardless of gender, race or ethnicity. Liberalism 2: respect for those activities, practices, and ways of viewing the world that are particularly valued by, or associated with, members of disadvantaged groups...including women, Asian-Americans, African-Americans, Native Americans..." (Habermas, 1994: 109).

interwoven with collective identities and can be stabilized only in a cultural network. (Habermas, 1994:129)

The group or societal culture is therefore necessary for the individual in order for him/her to truly have the freedom to make decisions. By extension, not having access to one's societal culture restricts the individual and hence having to transform to another societal culture puts one at a disadvantage and limits his/her freedoms (Carens, 2000b, p. 55).

It is with this understanding of equality that under multiculturalism we are urged to protect all the distinct societal cultures within a given state. Such a policy "Promotes equality because it gives people access to their own societal cultures instead of placing them at a disadvantage by requiring them to adapt to another culture" (Carens, 1994). Allowing and preserving distinct societal cultures preserves equal respect of each individual because the individual is dependant on the support of his societal culture. This logic is especially true for migrants, whose lives already have been disrupted by migration. Immigrants in particular need to have access to their own societal cultural in order to have the necessary emotional and moral support (Rex, 2000), and in order to minimize the amount the disadvantage of moving to a new society. Multiculturalism promotes individual equality by encouraging society to provide each individual with access to the societal culture s/he needs.

Multiculturalism protects and recognizes different groups within the society in order to protect the freedom of the individual. This means that the society is made of many culturally and ethnically different groups. If these groups are to survive as a single state, what can unite them?

National Political Creed

During the multicultural era, the answer was the national political creed,³² which is embodied in the principles of the constitution. Groups can have differences, belong to separate societal cultures, speak different home languages, and have different religions as long as they adhere to the same political creed. Belief in, dedication to and respect for these principles is enough to make a nation in spite of other differences. Furthermore, the liberal democratic constitutional state can ask of immigrants only that they assimilate to the ideals of the political creed: “All that needs to be expected of immigrants is the willingness to enter the political culture of their new homeland, without having to give up the cultural form of life of their origins by doing so” (Habermas, 1994: 139). According to this logic, immigrants should be able to retain as much of their own culture as they want, as long as they adhere to the principles of the constitution, for by adhering to these ideals the identity of the political community can be preserved. This is the ideal of liberalism, that all things can be accommodated within one system.

Core Culture

Recently, however, there has been a growing recognition that the political creed is vitally based on a “core” culture. Samuel Huntington (2000) is one of the more vocal supporters of the idea that the “core” culture that produced the national political creed is vital to the survival of the creed. According to Huntington, the political creed, along

³² The term “American Creed” was coined by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944 in *The American Dilemma*. Myrdal defined the Creed as loyalty to democracy, liberty, equality, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and private property.

with the liberal principles of a state, are based on certain underlying ideas and principles that largely remain unstated and un-codified.³³ This is the same as the definition of a culture, but Huntington extends this logic to assume that the *particular culture* that created the creed is the necessary element to its survival. Pierre Bourdieu employs another term relevant to our understanding of a “core” culture of a political creed. *Doxa* are the unspoken rules of culture, which he defines as: “adherence to relations of order which because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought world are accepted as self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1984: 171) and elsewhere as the “socially accepted subtext about how the world works” (Bourdieu, 1977: 170).³⁴ If culture is the general way that the world is conceived to be, the doxa of a culture are the unspecified but closely followed rules that allow that particular conception and way of life to be. Doxa do not need to be expressed because they are seen, within a culture, as self-evident. They are the necessary but taken-for-granted elements that allows the culture to govern itself quietly. Each culture has its own particular doxa, in the same way that each political creed is conceived as having its own particular “core” culture. The “core culture,” policed by its doxa, enables the particular political creed to emerge and to survive.

Another way to think of this is the ideal vs. the reality of liberalism. The idea of unity under a creed is the ideal: everything, every variation can be accommodated under

³³ Huntington (2000) speaks about the culture which underlies the Creed within the confines of his American example: his argument is that the American Creed is the specific consequence of the culture of the Anglo-Protestants who speak English.

³⁴ Doxa is a term originally coined by the Greek Sophists and used to mean a common belief or popular opinion. Plato used doxa to mean error, or the opposite of truth. I here employ the term doxa to mean specifically the unspoken rules of the society, in particular the rules that govern customs. The use of doxa here should not be confused with its other uses. Moreover, doxa as it is employed here, is not equivalent to ideology. While ideology is also invisible and held to be common sense, ideology refers to assumptions and opinions whereas here doxa refers to rules.

this ideal liberalism. The belief in a “core” culture corresponds to what is perhaps the reality of liberalism as we know it today. Liberalism is not completely liberal: it is only liberal within a certain field of limitations. Liberalism is meant to be accommodating, but it can only accommodate for variations within certain limits: those variations which can be expected because they still fit within its limited field. “Core” culture may be defined narrowly or widely, but variations that are not within a certain limit of that “core” culture cannot be accommodated by the reality of liberalism as it is today. Real liberalism is only a limited version of the ideal.

The Shift Away from Multiculturalism towards Acculturative Assimilation

During the period when multiculturalism was strongest, the state was made up of many diverse groups that were united by a common political creed. The liberal democratic state could ask immigrants to accept the creed, but could not ask them to give up their culture. Under multiculturalism, the political creed is considered sufficient to unify the nation. It was thus a move closer towards the ideal of liberalism, the ability to accommodate everyone and everything. Multiculturalism is imperfect, but it was a step in the right direction.

The new “integration” tests and materials signify the end of the belief in the sufficiency of the political creed. A demand for a more cohesive nation is emerging, and, as can be seen in the tests, the state is responding by making increasing demands on its immigrants for acculturative assimilation. It is a movement to return to the “core” culture of the nation, and an end to toleration of divisive difference. The empowered state is no longer limited to just asking for adherence to the creed, it is now asking for

adherence to the “core” culture that founded it. This is tantamount to a step backwards, away from the ideal of liberalism, and instead embracing the reality of liberalism as it exists today. Recognizing the limitations of the system, the tests show a movement towards further defining those limits, giving up the ideal and institutionalizing the limitations of reality by asking for adherence to a “core” culture.

Asking for adherence to a “core” culture is problematic, however, because it requires defining and delineating a “core” culture in a dynamic and multi-faceted society. Deciding which beliefs, values, ideas, and practices comprise the “core” culture assumes that of the many choices in the society, there is one culture which defines them all. The tests and materials, in demanding more of their immigrants, are charged with the problematic task of defining and delineating a “core” culture, while, it could be argued, a true “core” culture does not exist.

The UK test, as we have discussed, is a civics test. However, the information the applicant must study comes from the manual *Life in the United Kingdom*, which is published on behalf of the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group. The advisory group’s purpose, in making its report to the Home Office was “...providing practical support for new arrivals to integrate...helping all migrants to a better knowledge of our language and *our way of life*...” The Home Secretary described the group’s report as “...a well judged analysis of what those *core British values* are...” (emphasis added) (Blunkett, 2004) The problem is that an “advisory group” is here attempting to define, for the whole of a widely differentiated society, what the most important or relevant “core British values” are. This assumes that there is just one “way of life” that is British, and there is a clear way to decide what is suitable as a “core British value.” In the case of the United Kingdom, the test itself does not incorporate a requirement to know the

“core” culture, but rather only the civics surrounding the political creed. There is nevertheless an inclusion of a “core” culture in the very manual from which the citizenship applicant learns his responsibility as citizen.

In Germany, an attempt to define the “core” culture has been necessary when deciding what elements of German society the immigrant will learn about in the cultural orientation part of the orientation course, as well as the decision of what to include in the *Manual for Germany*. In the Baden-Wurtemberg test, specific differences that are assumed to exist between the applicant and the society are highlighted in the questions. In choosing stereotypes about the applicant, the makers of the test cast these stereotypes as in opposition to the “core” values of Germany that cannot be forsaken. It is for this reason that the applicant and the society are cast as fundamentally incompatible.

In the Netherlands, the defining of a “core” culture is even more pronounced. The orientation pack and film are presented as an overview of the “culture” of the Netherlands: what the immigrant needs to know to live in the Netherlands. A large amount of information about the Netherlands is presented, from history, to politics, to daily interaction, but what is stressed most is the way of life. Referring back to the description of the “actor” in the *Naar Netherlands* video presented in the Netherlands section of the previous chapter, the actor is always used to highlight the cultural aspects about the Dutch. “We” leave our curtains open, “we” do not stare in the windows. The problem with including any of this information is who decides that these aspects comprise the “core” culture and that it is necessary for the immigrant to know and understand these aspects over others.

Though the delineation of a “core” culture is deeply problematic, it is this concept to which the states are attempting to return. But making acculturative demands

on immigrants calls into question the definition of liberalism. If, as has been believed in the past, the liberal democratic state can only require assimilation to the political creed, and if countries are now making demands for acculturative assimilation to a problematically defined “core” culture, then if this is still liberalism, it is a re-worked and re-invented form of liberalism. Through the demands made on immigrants in the tests and materials, liberalism emerges in a new form: a new, more demanding liberalism.

CHAPTER 4

THE ANTAGONISMS FROM WITHIN: THE WEAKNESS OF THE WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

As we have seen illustrated in the tests, an ideological shift has occurred from multiculturalism to acculturative assimilation. Accordingly, liberalism has been redefined and is now more demanding. Why have these changes occurred? In this chapter it will be argued that liberalism has become more demanding in response to antagonisms which have arisen from within liberalism itself. Liberalism has become more demanding in order to rid the system of weakness that threatened to destroy the liberal system.

Internal Antagonism 1: Tolerance

In Chapter two we discussed the importance of the principle of equality in liberalism. Another important aspect of liberalism is *freedom*. Specific definitions of “freedom” vary. Article 9 of the European convention of Human Rights grants the freedom of thought, conviction, and religion. Some societies further qualify free speech as a basic freedom. In the United States Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson depicted freedom as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” But in order for everyone to have freedom, *tolerance* is required. Tolerance is the ability to endure or adapt; or to have sympathy or indulgence for beliefs different from one’s own.³⁵

³⁵ Tolerance has sometimes been criticized in recent years. It has been pointed out that tolerance can be seen as enduring something, but not accepting it. This has been used to argue that some people are not accepted into society as equals, and that their presence is merely “tolerated.”

Tolerance is crucial to freedom, because for everyone to have freedoms, people must be tolerant of other people's ideas, especially where they differ from their own.

But the principle of tolerance becomes problematic when the West comes up against its simulacra of Muslims because the West perceives and constructs Muslims as fundamentally intolerant. In Chapter Two I attempted to show the relationship between terrorist events and the perception of Muslims as violent and intolerant. At this stage I would like to advance this argument by showing the relationship between intolerance, the threat of violence, and censorship.

As discussed regarding 9-11 and other events, the media, through publicizing events, framing them, commenting on them, and repeating them, plays an important role in influencing public opinion. Just as the aforementioned events served to associate Islam with violence, other events have served to associate Islam, in the conception of the West, with censorship. The following are very public "examples" of the intolerance of Muslims to criticisms of their religion: the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie assumed to be because of blasphemy to Islam found in *The Satanic Verses*; the threats against, and eventually the violent murder in 2004 of film-maker Theo Van Gogh after making a short film entitled "Submission" which was critical of the treatment of women in Islamic societies; the cancellation of an opera in Berlin which would have shown the severed head of Mohammed along with those of Jesus Christ, Buddha, and Poseidon, for fear of reprisals from the Islamic community; and finally the controversy of late September 2005 around the publishing of twelve editorial cartoons regarding Islam in the Danish Newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. The "Muhammad Cartoon Controversy" in particular engendered a storm of discussion over whether freedom of speech would be forfeited if cartoons such as these could not be published (similar cartoons on other

religions are also published in the *Jyllands-Posten*).³⁶ The culture editor, on release of the cartoons, said that the cartoons were meant to encourage dialogue and awareness of freedom of speech:

The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feeling. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule. It is certainly not always attractive and nice to look at and it does not mean that religious feelings should be made fun of at any price, but that is of minor importance in the present context... we are on our way to a slippery slope where no-one can tell how the self-censorship will end (Rose, 2005, September 30).

In all of these examples, what has been elucidated in the media is the threat or expression of violence on the part of Muslims who have been offended by criticism or “insults” of their religion made by others. Muslims are cast as intolerant of these criticisms; they are not merely disturbed by them, but are deeply “offended” and “angered.” The response by “intolerant” Muslims to freedom of expression used in this way, as has been emphasized in the media, is violent reprisals against those who “insult” Islam. As Tasnim Aslam, spokeswoman of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan famously stated, “Anyone who describes Islam as a religion as intolerant encourages violence.”³⁷ In this way Muslims are cast as not responding in the appropriate and expected way to criticisms, which would be to debate the truth or fairness of such criticisms, but instead to respond with violence. This again is the stereotype exhibited in Baden-Wurttemberg

³⁶ Rose, culture editor of the *Jyllands-Posten* explained her motivation for publishing the cartoons, and their fairness, thus: “The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.” See Rose (2005a).

³⁷ Aslam was commenting on “derogatory” comments made by the Pope (Pakistan’s Parliament Condemns Pope, 2006).

test questions numbers 3 and 4 which ask the applicant about possible responses to religious criticism.

But perhaps even more important than the unfair casting of Muslims as intolerant and violent to religious criticism, is the affect this depiction of Muslims has on the ideology of freedom of speech. As can be seen in the examples, the criticism of Islam is associated with the responsive threats of violence. This results in a censorship of anything that can be seen as critical of Islam. The Berlin opera was cancelled, before it opened, because of *fear of violent reprisals* from the Islamic community. The reaction to the Muhammad cartoons was to questions whether such inflammatory criticisms should be allowed as they tend to engender violent reactions, or whether the threat of violence restricts freedom of speech and as such is a form of censorship. The threat of violence is felt to be real and leads individuals to censor themselves out of fear. Following the Danish Cartoon Controversy, Danish Comedian Frank Hvam declared he would (hypothetically) urinate on the Bible on television, but would not dare to do so to the Qur-an for fear of reprisal from Islamists (Debat: Bangebuks versus kulturminister, 2005). This self-censorship of anything critical of Islam because of fear of violence due to intolerance of that criticism has even received a name: “The Rushdie Rules.”

Intolerance, threats of violence, and censorship are a problem for any society, but for liberalism they lead to the emergence of a problem that is more consequential because this problem is based in the foundation of liberal society. In liberal society everyone is entitled to freedom, and in order to have freedom, there must be toleration of views that differ from one’s own. At the societal level this holds true as well. Liberal society must also be tolerant of views other than its own. This is especially true in the West, which is obligated to be “tolerant” because it has cast itself as the binary opposite

of what it has constructed as the “intolerant” Muslim. But being tolerant of views other than its own means that liberalism, and the western democracies that are based on it, are obligated to tolerate views that it labels as “intolerant,” because if it does not tolerate everything equally, freedom and equality will be destroyed by privileging some views over others. However, tolerating, and hence allowing, intolerant views, appears to lead, as has been demonstrated above, to censorship and the limitation of freedom of expression. In this way, abiding by the principle of tolerance, which is necessary for freedom, leads, paradoxically, to the destruction of that freedom. This paradox, based on liberalism’s core principle of tolerance, leaves liberalism helpless. Its principles make it weak, threaten its system with destruction, and leaves it with no way to defend itself.

Internal Antagonism 2: Invisible Doxa and Openness to Claims

In the political realm, liberal equality means political access. Especially under multiculturalism, groups and communities in liberal democracies have the right make claims for “special group rights (exemption from duties)...emphasizing their cultural difference from the rest of society”(Koopmans, 1999: 3). The availability of access to the public arena helps to ensure equality by allowing groups and communities a chance to legitimately share their views with the state as a whole.

Migrant groups in western liberal democracies are thus given access to the political system and the accompanying access to make claims on the system. Like any other group, these claims can be used to change and improve the equality of the system. These may include claims for exemptions or special treatments that the immigrant

groups may require because of their differences from the dominant society. Regarding claim-making for group identity, Koopmans and Statham found that in the Netherlands 60% of claims were made using religious identities, and in Britain 65.9%. Interestingly, Muslims are much more likely to make claims on the basis of their religious identity than are other groups: In the Netherlands 77.8% of claims made on the basis of religious identity were made by Muslims, and in Britain the percentage was 93.1% (Koopmans and Statham, 2004: 9). Muslim identity is the most unitary identity used by migrants when making claims on the state in these two countries, and is therefore the group most visible in relation to claims.

At this point it is necessary to return to the concepts of “core” culture and doxa. In Chapter Three we discussed the theory that the political creed, and hence the political system of a state, is founded on its ‘core’ culture. This culture is in turn regulated by its specific doxa, which are unspoken social rules that people of the society are expected to follow without being legally compelled to do so. These doxa control not only relations within the community, but also relations between the community and the political system: doxa implicitly regulate what enters the political system. Thus some potential political claims are automatically censored before they are even expressed. Moreover, because the political system is theoretically founded on the “core” culture and thus also its doxa, it is assumed automatically that censorship by this set of doxa will take place: the political system is based on the regulatory power of the doxa to control the kinds of claims made on the state. In this way the political system is prepared for claims that fall within the limits allowed by the “core” culture’s doxa, but unprepared for claims made outside the limits of what the doxa would usually allow. Thus, claims made which bypass the regulation of the doxa are not able to be accommodated by the state.

Naturally, immigrants, because they come from a different society and culture, may not share the same doxa as the receiving society. This is especially true of groups that are considered “more different” from western society; in particular “non-westerners” and, perhaps even more visibly and conceptually different, “Muslims.” The political system is based on a reliance on automatic censorship of some claims because of the commonality of the doxa that support the political system. However, immigrant groups, in not sharing the foundational doxa, may make claims, ambivalent to the prevailing doxa which may have otherwise censored them. This appears as especially true for Muslims, who both appear as “different” to the west and comprise the largest singular group identity when making claims. Because immigrants and most visibly Muslims may be able to bypass the unspoken doxa, claims may reach the political system for which the system is entirely unprepared. The political system is unable to accommodate them precisely because it was built not to accommodate them.

The antagonism here lies within the structure of liberalism itself: namely that it relies upon unspoken and uncodified doxa to censor what is and is not allowed within the political realm. Because the doxa are not law, but merely expectations, they cannot be invoked to censor claims made outside the limitations of the doxa that under normal circumstances should have been censored by the doxa. Such claims should never have existed and so the state is unable to accommodate them. If the doxa are not implicit in the individual and groups, their role of social control cannot be fulfilled. If the doxa are bypassed, the fundamental structure of the political system may be challenged by the presence of claims that it is not prepared to accommodate. The liberal system thereby relies on an internal system of control that, because of the presence of immigrants of different doxa, is no longer legitimate as a protection of liberal society.

But the liberal system is powerless to resist this challenge to its existence. The liberal system is obliged, because of its central principle of equal citizenship, to grant political access. Political access may result in claims, which when made by certain groups which do not share the same culture and doxa as the “core” culture, may bypass the doxa, and thus challenge the system by presenting possibilities the system was not made to handle and for which it is not prepared. Here again, a paradox renders the liberal system powerless to defend itself against its own potential destruction.

Both of these internal antagonisms are obligations that the liberal democratic system has to obey, but which make it weak and powerless. The liberal democratic system is obligated to be tolerant even if that tolerance leads to the destruction of the system, and it is obligated to grant political access even if that leads to the destruction of the system. The liberal democratic system has bound its own hands in these paradoxes, and by adherence to its own logic, rendered itself helpless. The liberal system has been rendered unable to protect itself.

Internal and External Antagonisms

These antagonisms, which threaten to destroy the system from within by making it logically helpless, have become dangerous, or indeed, even visible only recently. The antagonisms inherent in the liberal system are made visible only when confronted with an external antagonism, which, through its presence, causes the internal antagonisms to

come to crisis. The principle of tolerance does not become problematic until it is confronted with the possibility of its direct opposite, intolerance, and is required by its own logic to also tolerate it. As we have seen, this leads to the restriction of freedom which negates liberalism. Similarly, the reliance on unspoken doxa to regulate what enters the political system is only problematic when people who do not have the same doxa are able to bypass the doxic regulations and challenge the political system by making claims the system is unprepared to accommodate. For both of these internal antagonisms, the external antagonism which brings them to crises is the presence of a fundamentally different “Other.” This Other must be outside of the conceptualization of the liberal democracies as well as outside of the (“core”) culture and hence doxa of the receiving country. This Other must be outside the limitations of what is able to be accommodated in the reality of limited liberalism.

Theorists of the “clash of civilizations” cast Islam as the “critical Other” (Modood, 1997) of the West, immutable and impossible to reconcile with an equally fixed “western” culture (Glazer, 1983; Schlesinger, 1993; Huntington, 1996). In this perception, Islam, because it is so totally different from the west, is in fact beyond what the west can conceptualize: the west cannot understand Islam. It is the basic fear of what it cannot understand that has engendered *Islamophobia*³⁸ in the West. Islamophobia is a form of neo-racism, in which biologism (race) is replaced with culture as a legitimization for differentiation, to the same effect: “We now see the ‘sociological’ signifier definitively replace the ‘biological’ one as the key representation of hatred and fear of the other” (Balibar, 1991: 21). The outcomes are the same. We “continue to

³⁸ Balibar (1991) notes that this kind of racism is not truly new – it is similar to anti-Semitism. But now cultural-racism has become the prevalent form of racism since race is no longer an acceptable reason for differentiation.

retain the same structure (that of the denial of rights) while moving from the language of religion into that of science, or from the language of biology into the discourses of culture or history...in practice these justifications simply lead to the same old acts” (Balibar, 1991: 18). Targeting a specific group, Muslims, for the “integration” tests in the Netherlands and Baden-Wurtemberg amounts to racism; it is not based on biology, but on an assumed cultural difference that is seen as insurmountable.

Muslims are the Other for the West that acts as the external antagonism, exciting the internal antagonisms and bringing them to crises. They have become this crucial external antagonism at the current time because of increased Muslim immigration to western countries, because of the effect of 9-11 on the popular imagination, and because presumed differences between Muslims immigrants and autochthonous groups are highlighted in the media. The supposed differences of Muslims define them as outside the limits of variations that are accomodatable within the reality of western liberalism, yet Muslims are present and increasingly visible as immigrants in liberal democracies. The antagonisms or weaknesses already inherent at the heart of the liberal system are set in motion by the pressure of the presence of the external antagonism, the Muslims; without this external antagonism, the internal antagonisms may never arise as a problem. In this way it is easy to blame the external antagonism, because the arrival of the crisis occurs at the same time as the arrival of the external antagonism and the two are thus easily linked: “The threat from within is symbolized by the supposed threat from without” (Zizek, 1993: 211). Islamophobia is a reaction to the association of the external antagonism (Muslims) with the advent of problems, and the “integration” tests that target Muslims are the result of Islamophobia because there is a feeling that, “If you could just get rid of the outsider, everyone would once again fit into their own stable,

balanced place” (Zizek, 1993: 210). But the external antagonism is not the cause of the problems, it is merely that which set the already existent problems into motion towards a crisis. The crisis would not occur if the antagonisms did not already exist within the liberal system itself. It is hatred of the weaknesses within its own system that the west projects outward when it blames and targets its Other, Muslims. Zizek (1993) notes that when looking at others, a group or society will “never hate things that are not reflected in their own self hate,” but rather “hatred of other is based on an outward projection of what we hate in ourselves” (213). Islamophobia and the “integration” tests which target Muslims are the result of the west’s hatred of its own internal weaknesses, of the fact that it has made itself defenseless against provocations by an external Other.

The ideological shift from multiculturalism to acculturative assimilation, the new focus on defining, delineating, and prescribing a “core” culture, and the arrival of a new more demanding liberalism enacted through a more empowered state are also responses to the crises caused by the internal antagonisms. The empowering of liberalism is a response to the weaknesses within the liberal system that had left it powerless to defend itself. These changes are efforts to amend the internal antagonisms.

CHAPTER 5

REBALANCING THE SYSTEM

The liberal system finds itself threatened with destruction because of internal weaknesses that bind its hands and prevent it from defending itself. It is necessary, in the face of an external antagonism that pressures the fault lines of the system, for the liberal system to amend these weaknesses. We have seen that there has been an ideological shift towards acculturative assimilation. We now explore how these two ideas are linked.

To begin this section it is necessary to clarify two commonly used terms: *assimilation* and *integration*. In recent years the term “assimilation” has largely been replaced with the term “integration,” and the term “assimilation” is often seen as politically incorrect. For this reason, up to this point in this thesis regarding the materials I have used the word “integration” in quotes to reflect that the materials are generally referred to in this politically correct way, but that definitionally, the way the materials are used is more akin to “assimilation.” In this chapter these words will not be used interchangeably, but rather to describe very different concepts.

Assimilation

For this chapter, *assimilation* will be used to mean “acculturative assimilation,” the adaptation of the immigrant to his adopted country. Assimilation means that gradually (sometimes over a few generations) the immigrant begins to lose the culture, language, etc., of her/his country of origin and in turn adopts the prevailing ideas,

lifestyle and culture of the receiving country. Assimilation refers to the immigrant specifically, not the receiving society: “assimilation is something immigrants or minorities must do or have done to them” (Modood, 1997).

Integration

In this chapter *integration* is used to define a change which takes place over the entire society. Integration differs from assimilation in that while assimilation assumes that only the immigrant will change in order to adapt to his/her new country, integration acknowledges that change is a two-way process, and that as immigrants from various countries make a receiving nation their home, they subsequently change the country itself. “Integration is interactive, a two-way process; both parties are an active ingredient and so something new is created” (Modood, 1997).³⁹

The Third Term: *Something Else*

Both assimilation and integration are used regularly when discussing immigrants and immigration. But when the meanings of the terms are examined more closely it becomes apparent that they are two parts of what logically should be a triad: the third term is missing. Assimilation assumes that the receiving country will make demands on the immigrant until he adapts to his new country, while integration assumes change and adaptation are mutual on the part of both the receiving country and the immigrant. What is missing is the opposite extreme from assimilation; “something else” a term which

³⁹The “integration” tests and materials do not represent a two-way process, but rather an assimilatory process of the immigrant being required to adapt to the receiving society.

would mean that the immigrant makes demands on the receiving country until the receiving country adapts to the immigrant. A term is needed wherein it would not be the immigrant who adapts to the state, but rather the state which adapts to the immigrant.

Assimilation-----Integration-----Something Else

This is a purely theoretical argument. But it does seem to be significant that there is no word to describe the third part of what must necessarily be a terminological triad, especially when the avoidance of the *something else* for which we have no name is the driving force behind the ideological shift from multiculturalism towards acculturative assimilation which prompted the creation of the “integration” manuals, courses, and tests.

Something else represents an imaginary, apocalyptic time in the future when liberal democracies will be utterly helpless, rendered so by their own exacting principles that obligate them to accept and tolerate everything. It would be a time when the liberal democratic state has lost control of itself through adherence to its values and has completely changed to conform to the demands of its immigrants. What “core” culture there was would be lost, replaced by the culture of newcomers: cultural annihilation. In short, *something else* is the West’s fantasy of its own destruction.

The vision of *something else* springs from the powerlessness that the liberal system is currently feeling. Because the internal antagonisms are paradox’s that render the liberal system defenseless, *something else* is already seen as a real potentiality. *Something else* is traumatic because it continuously threatens to happen, and must perpetually be expected; it is a “Trauma from the future” (Derrida, 2003).

Recentring Integration and Rebalancing the Triad

Due to the feeling of powerlessness caused by the arrival of the crises of the internal antagonisms, western liberal democracies perceive that they have inched past the middle line marked by integration and now are teetering dangerously close to the *something else* side of the spectrum. There is only one logical step possible in order to rebalance the system and re-center integration: counter-act the step towards *something else* by leaning back towards assimilation.

In order to avoid the inevitability of *something else* as the future, the system must be rebalanced by allowing liberalism to make claims back on immigrants; by empowering liberalism to require some amount of assimilation. Further, enabling liberalism in this way allows it to amend its weaknesses. The state is empowered to require tolerance and no longer is obligated to tolerate intolerance: “There is a European culture. It’s subscribing to a broader culture of tolerance. It’s not unreasonable for European Culture to say, ‘You have to accept that.’⁴⁰ The state is also empowered to require adherence to what it defines as its “core” culture and doxa, and no longer is obligated to allow political access to those who would bypass the doxa. The change is a reappraisal of the relationship between immigrant and state where liberalism asks not only what the receiving state owes immigrants, but what immigrants owe the receiving state. The movement towards acculturative assimilation is a defensive step taken in the face of a fear of self-destruction and annihilation and an effort to reaffirm and rebalance the system.

⁴⁰ F. Fukuyama, cited in Vanocur (2004).

It is this empowerment that is embodied in the tests and “integration” materials. In the tests the ability to require certain things from immigrants is demonstrated: there is a requirement for immigrants, particularly Muslims, to abandon characteristics that the state finds incompatible with its liberal democratic structure, and a requirement to learn about what it defines as the “core” culture and its doxa. Moreover, the tests represent a change where unspoken “core” culture and doxa become an orthodoxy: “A system of classification is only institutionalized when it has ceased to function as a sense of limits so the guardians of order must constitute the doxa as an orthodoxy” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 180). Because immigrants, especially under multiculturalism, were not required to adopt the “core” culture, and because this led to them possibly being able to bypass the doxa, these underlying regulations became invalid. Institutionalizing them by defining them on the tests makes them into an orthodoxy which enables them to serve as a now delineated requirement: the implicit rules have become explicit.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis we have seen that both the “Netherlands’s Civic Integration Examination Abroad” and the Baden Wurttemberg “Discussion Manual for Naturalization Authorities” specifically target Muslims and construct certain identities about them. We have also seen in all of the “integration” materials a general ideological shift from multiculturalism to assimilation. In this chapter I will attempt to summarize the main themes of this thesis in order to clarify why certain identities have been constructed in the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests and the reason that these tests specifically target Muslims, why there has been a change from multiculturalism to assimilation, and what are the goals and purposes of the new “integration” tests and materials.

The Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests target Muslims while the third new test in the United Kingdom does not. This is primarily because the UK test is a test for citizenship and is thus necessary for all citizenship applicants, whereas neither the Netherlands nor the Baden-Wurttemberg test are tests for citizenship but rather tests taken for authorization for temporary residence (Netherlands) or in addition to the standard citizenship requirements (Baden-Wurttemberg). These tests are not required for every applicant, but rather for all “non-westerners” (excluding Japan) for the Netherlands test, or for applicant’s whose oath to observe the German Basic Law is in doubt (Baden-Wurttemberg). However, within these two tests it is specifically the Muslim identity that is constructed as violent, intolerant, backwards, male dominant, and

oppressive or abusive towards women. These identities are based on preconceived stereotypes within the society of the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg which have been re-enforced by press coverage and repetition surrounding such events as 9-11, the bombings in Madrid and London, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh, as well public discussion surrounding “Islamic” practices toward women such as honor killing, subjugation, beating and “forced” marriage. These assumed “characteristics” of Muslims are seen as incompatible with liberal democracy.

Muslims in particular are targeted in these tests precisely because they are assumed to have these characteristics that are incompatible because such characteristics are beyond the limitations of current liberalism “in reality.” But these characteristics, especially those regarding the roles and treatment of women, are primarily symbols used to demonstrate that Muslims are irreconcilably different from “the West.” In the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg tests the Muslim applicant is forced to distance her/himself from these characteristics if s/he wishes to be accepted by the authorities. These tests also represent an effort by the receiving country to choose to accept only the “good” Muslim who will be able to function within the state’s liberal democratic system, and to filter out Muslims whose characteristics render them “incompatible” with the receiving society. In Baden-Wurttemberg this filtering is done by the naturalization authorities themselves; the authorities choose the applicants who is suitable or unsuitable for citizenship. In the “Netherlands’s Civic Integration Examination Abroad” the orientation film warns the applicant about life in the Netherlands, such that much of the filtering is done by the prospective applicant her/himself.

The stereotypes which paint negative characteristics of Muslims are not the only reasons that the tests have targeted Muslims. Another, and perhaps even more important

reason is because the weaknesses inherent in liberalism only come to crises when confronted by an Other that is so fundamentally different that it is outside the limitations and the conceptual system of liberalism and the West. Liberalism has an obligation to the principle of tolerance in order to guarantee freedom and equality.⁴¹ The principle of tolerance ideally obliges liberalism to tolerate all things, even intolerance which may limit freedom and destroy the system. Liberal democracy also relies on unspoken, uncoded doxa to regulate both society and the relationship between society and the political system. But liberal democracy is obligated to grant political access in order to protect equality, even to those who bypass the doxa when making claims and thus challenge the basis of the political system. For both of these internal antagonisms, the weakness of the system, that of potentially destructive obligation, does not become a problem until an external antagonism is present which forces the issue of tolerance or of doxa. Muslims are seen as this catalytic external antagonism because they are characterized as intolerant and censoring of freedom, and because, as a unified and visible group making claims on the system, they are seen as fundamentally different: Muslims are outside the normal limits of what can be accommodated in liberalism as it exists today.

The crises engendered by the combination of the internal and external antagonisms are the main cause of the ideological shift from multiculturalism to acculturative assimilation. In order to avoid the destruction of liberal democracy these inherent weaknesses needed to be amended, and the liberal system needed to be empowered to make certain demands on immigrants in order to do so. Thus liberalism has been empowered to require tolerance, and to require immigrants to learn what the

⁴¹ At least in theory

makers of the “integration” materials define as the “core” culture and to abide by its doxa. As has been exemplified regarding its perception of the role of women in Islamic society, liberal democracy also has been empowered to define what “characteristics” it finds incompatible with its system, and empowered to refuse to accept these characteristics. With the internal antagonisms repaired, the difficulty of the external antagonism is neutralized. The empowering of the system to make demands also has the benefit of re-centering integration such that the *something else* appears as less inevitable and indeed perhaps avoidable. The ideological change and the change in practices that have accompanied it are nothing less than an effort by liberal democracy to rectify problems and weaknesses within its own ideology and in so doing to attempt to save the system from what it had perceived as impending destruction.

To summarize, the roles of the neo-racist tests which target Muslims in the Netherlands and Baden-Wurttemberg have been: to identify characteristics of immigrants, namely Muslims, that are “incompatible” with the receiving society and to filter out those immigrants who are unwilling to abandon those characteristics. The roles of the “integration” materials in general (including the UK manual and the manual and courses in Germany) have been to define the “core” culture of the country and to require adherence to this culture, to institutionalize the “core” culture and its doxa as an orthodoxy in order to be able to require adherence; and to serve as the executor of the empowered state in making these requirements such that the state is able to prevent *something else* and the destruction of the system.

The tests thereby represent an important change in liberalism. While the ideal of liberalism would be to accommodate everyone under one system, liberalism as it exists

today is in reality only liberal within a certain field of limitations or variations acceptable to its “core” culture and doxa: it is only really prepared to accommodate a limited set of differences. Muslims are specified in the text because they are particularly represented as being outside of the limitations of accommodation: western liberalism as it currently exists has difficulty accommodating Muslims because it is not entirely liberal.

There are two ways that liberalism could respond to this. The first is what we can see represented in the “integration” materials: a change to acculturative assimilation. This option accepts the limitations of existing liberalism and attempts to amend the difficulties in accommodating for Muslims by making Muslims less “problematic” for the existing liberalism: by requiring them to adapt to “core” cultural values and doxa. This option recognizes that existing liberalism is not entirely liberal, but rather only liberal within a certain field, and hence deals with Muslims and other immigrants outside that field by attempting to change them into something accommodatable within that field.

The “integration” materials represent a turning away from the second, and better option: changing existing liberalism to make it more like the ideal. This unused option would recognize the limitations of existing liberalism and attempt to fix them, not by changing those who do not fit within the limits, but by finding a way to expand the limits themselves in order to accommodate a greater range of difference. This second option would be admittedly difficult, but it would result in a more open, more ideal liberalism, instead of what we see in the “integration” materials: a liberalism that has given up on its ideal, and is instead attempting to save itself by demanding assimilative change in the Other.

APPENDIX A

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS' "CIVIC INTEGRATION EXAMINATION ABROAD" ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Some of the questions refer to photos at which the applicant will be looking.

1. In which part of the world is the Netherlands?
2. Which country lies to the south of the Netherlands? Belgium
3. Which country lies to the east of the Netherlands? Germany
4. Which country is bigger: the Netherlands or Morocco? Morocco
5. Which country is smaller: the Netherlands or Turkey? Netherlands
6. What does Nederland mean? Low country
7. Look at the photo: what is it? A dike
8. What would happen if there were no dikes? The Netherlands would be under water
9. Name a big city on the coast. Utrecht
10. Do a lot of people live in the Netherlands or a few people? A lot of people
11. What is the capital city of the Netherlands? Amsterdam
12. In which city is the government? In the Haag
13. Where does the queen live? In the Haag
14. Where is the largest seaport? In Rotterdam
15. What is the name of the national airport? Schiphol
16. Where is Schiphol? In Amsterdam
17. Who helps you to come to the Netherlands? My partner
18. Is the Netherlands frequently damp or dry? Damp
19. When you come to the Netherlands, do you have to get your drivers license again? Yes
20. In the Netherlands, are the roads quiet or busy? Busy
21. In the Netherlands, are there few bicycles or a lot of bicycles? A lot
22. What is the typical Dutch mode of transportation? Bicycle
23. Do the Dutch live mainly in their house or outside? Inside
24. Who do you see in this picture? William of Orange
25. Was the king of Spain protestant or catholic? Catholic
26. How long was the war with Spain? Eighty years
27. How long has the Dutch state existed: 50 years or 400 years? 400 years
28. Were the VOC ships for (?) or for trade? Trade
29. Who painted this picture? Rembrandt van Rijn
30. Is the Netherlands an independent state? Yes
31. Which country occupied the Netherlands during WWII? Germany
32. Which big city was bombed in 1940? Rotterdam
33. Why is Anne Frank famous? She wrote a diary
34. Which of the Netherland's colonies became independent just after the Second World War? Indonesia

35. Which country did a lot of guestworkers come from: Turkey or England?
Turkey
36. Which of the Netherland's colonies became independent in 1975? Suriname
37. Who are these people? Princess Maxima and Prince William-Alexander
38. Where is Princess Maxima from? Argentina
39. Who is the crown prince? William-Alexander
40. Is the Netherlands a democracy? Yes
41. In which city is the parliament? The Haag
42. What is the most important law in the Netherlands? The constitution
43. Who is the president of the Council of Ministers: the Minister President or the Queen? The minister president
44. Who meets in this room? The House of Commons
45. How frequently are there elections: every four years or every 6 years? Every 4 years
46. How old do you need to be to be able to vote? 18
47. Does the Netherlands have one or more political parties? More than 1 political party
48. What is this man's position? mayor
49. Is discrimination illegal or permitted? Illegal
50. Do women have more rights than men or the same rights? The same rights
51. Is it possible for women in the Netherlands to choose for themselves who they wish to marry? Yes
52. Is discrimination due to homosexuality illegal or permitted? Illegal
53. Does the Netherlands have a state religion or are there many religions? Many religions
54. Are the radio, newspapers, and television free to express their opinion? Yes
55. Does the Netherlands have a lot of television channels, or is there state television? A lot of television channels
56. Is homosexuality permitted or illegal? Permitted
57. Is weapon possession without a license permitted or illegal? Illegal
58. Is female circumcision permitted or illegal? Illegal
59. Is it permitted or illegal to beat women? Illegal
60. Do all people in the Netherlands have the same belief? No
61. What language is spoken in the Netherlands? Dutch
62. Is it important to learn Dutch quickly? Yes
63. What do you learn in the Dutch language? Dutch *
64. Do you have to pay for a language course or is it free? You have to pay
65. Who pays for the language course: the school or yourself? Myself
66. In the Netherlands, do only children go to school, or do adults go too? Adults too
67. Are anniversaries celebrated in the Netherlands? Yes
68. When you visit someone, do you usually make an appointment or just show up? I make an appointment
69. Do grandparents usually live with their children or separately? Separately
70. Why is it good for children to watch Dutch television? To learn Dutch

71. Who is responsible for what children do: the school or the parents? The parents
72. How old are most children when they start school? 4 years old
73. From which age is education for children obligatory? 5 years old
74. Until what age is education obligatory? Until the age of 18
75. Do children learn if they play? Yes
76. Who chooses the school for the children: the parents or the municipality? The parents
77. Do boys and girls sit separately in class or together in the same class? Together in the same class
78. Do children wear uniforms to school? No
79. What do children do on the computers, learn or play? Learn
80. Is continued education for children of 12 years of age or for children of 4 years of age? From 12 years of age
81. After the age of 12, do all children go to the same type of education or are their two education paths? Two education paths
82. Children must go to school until they are how old? 18
83. From what age can youth make their own decisions? From 18
84. Is medical insurance obligatory or optional? Obligatory
85. Who pays for your medical insurance, the municipality or your partner? My partner
86. If you are sick where should you go, to the family doctor or to the hospital? To the family doctor
87. Where does one get prescribed medicine? At the shop or at the pharmacy? At the pharmacy
88. In case of emergency, where do you go, to the drug store or to the hospital? To the hospital
89. Where do most specialists work? In the hospital
90. Is the (consultations bureau) for big children or little children? For little children
91. Who works in the Netherlands, only men, or men and women? Men and women
92. When will you look for work, as soon as possible or later? As soon as possible
93. Where is there less and less work: in industry or in the service sector? In industry
94. Where can you find more work: in agriculture or in the service sector? In the service sector
95. Where can you find more work: in (?) or in agriculture? In (?)
96. How can you find work easier, through family or through the newspaper? Through your family
97. When you seek work do you register yourself at a school or at an employment agency? At an employment agency
98. At a job interview, does one shake hands and introduce oneself first, or sit down directly? Shake hands and introduce oneself

99. Will you get social benefits in the Netherlands, or must your partner look after you? My partner must look after me
100. Is life in the Netherlands expensive or cheap? Expensive

Translated from the list of questions at the back of the *Naar Nederland* photobook, from the orientation packet of *The Civic Integration Examination Abroad*, Institute of Immigration and Naturalization, Netherlands

Note: The translations are mine as there are no English translations available. I am not a Dutch-English translator, so these questions are to the best of my abilities. (?) represents terms for which I could not find a translation.

APPENDIX B

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS FOR NETHERLANDS' "CIVIC INTEGRATION EXAMINATION ABROAD" ORIGINAL DUTCH

100 examenvragen bij het fotoboek en de film Naar Nederland

1. In welk deel van de wereld ligt Nederland?
2. Welk land ligt ten zuiden van Nederland? België
3. Welk land ligt ten oosten van Nederland? Duitsland
4. Welk land is groter, Nederland of Marokko? Marokko
5. Welk land is kleiner, Nederland of Turkiye? Turkiye
6. Wat betekent Nederland? Laag land
7. Kijk naar de foto, wat is dit? Een dijk
8. Wat gebeurt er als er geen dijken zijn? Staat Nederland onder water
9. Noem een grote stad in de Randstad? Utrecht
10. In Nederland wonen daar veel mensen of weinig mensen? Veel mensen
11. Wat is de hoofdstad van Nederland? Amsterdam
12. In welke stad zit de regering? In Den Haag
13. Waar woont de koningin? In Den Haag
14. Waar ligt de grootste zeehaven? Bij Rotterdam
15. Hoe heet de nationale luchthaven? Schiphol
16. Waar ligt Schiphol? Bij Amsterdam
17. Wie hipt u als u in Nederland aankomt? Mijn partner
18. Is Nederland vaak nat of droog? Nat
19. Als u naar Nederland komt, moet u dan opnieuw uw rijbewijs halen? Ja
20. In Nederland, zijn de wegen daar rustig of druk? Druk
21. In Nederland, zijn er veel fietsen of weinig fietsen? veel
22. Wat is typisch Nederlands in het verkeer? Fietsen
23. Leven Nederlanders veel binnen of buiten? Binnen
24. We zien u op het plaatje? Willem van Oranje
25. Was de koning van Spanje protestant of Katholiek? Katholiek
26. Hoe lang duurde de oorlog met Spanje? Tachtig jaar
27. Hoe lang bestaat de Nederlandse staat ongeveer, vijftig jaar of vierhonderd jaar? Vierhonderd jaar
27. Waren de VOC schepen voor de visvangst of voor de handel? Handel
28. Wie schilderde dit schilderij? Rembrandt van Rijn
29. Is er in Nederland scheiding van kerk en staat? Ja
30. Door welk land is Nederland bezet tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog?
Duitsland
30. Welke grote stad is in 1940 gebombardeerd? Rotterdam
31. Waarom is Anne Frank beroemd? Ze schreef een dagboek
32. Welke kolonie van Nederland wordt onafhankelijk vlak na de Tweede Wereldoorlog? Indonesië

33. Uit welk land kwamen veel gastarbeiders, uit Turkije of uit Engeland?
Turkije
34. Welke kolonie van Nederland wordt in 1975 onafhankelijk? Suriname
35. Wie zijn dit? Prinses Maxima en prins Willem-Alexander
36. Uit welk land komt prinses Maxima? Argentinië
37. Hoe heet de kroonprins? Willem-Alexander
38. Is Nederland een democratie? Ja
39. In welke stad zit het parlement? Den Haag
40. Wat is de belangrijkste wet in Nederland? Grondwet
41. Wie is de voorzitter van de raad van ministers, de minister president of de koningin? Minister president
42. Wie vergaderen in deze zaal? De Tweede Kamer
43. Hoe vaak zijn er verkiezingen, elke vier jaar of elke zes jaar? Vier jaar
44. Hoe oud moet u zijn om te mogen stemmen? Achttien jaar
45. Heeft Nederland een politieke partij of meer politieke partijen? Meer politieke partijen
46. Wat is de functie van deze man? Burgemeester
47. Is discriminatie strafbaar of toegestaan? Strafbaar
48. Hebben vrouwen meer rechten dan mannen of dezelfde rechten? Dezelfde rechten
49. Mogen vrouwen in Nederland zelf kiezen met wie ze willen trouwen? Ja
50. Is het discrimineren van homoseksuelen strafbaar of toegestaan? Strafbaar
51. Heeft Nederland een staatsgodsdienst of zijn er veel godsdiensten? Veel godsdiensten
52. Zijn de dranten, radio en televisie vrij in hun mening? Ja
53. Heeft Nederland veel televisiekanalen of is er een staatstelevisie? Veel kanalen
54. Is homoseksualiteit toegestaan of strafbaar? Toegestaan
55. Is wapenbezit zonder vergunning toegestaan of strafbaar? Strafbaar
56. Is vrouwenbenijden toegestaan of strafbaar? Strafbaar
57. Is slaan van vrouwen toegestaan of strafbaar? Strafbaar
58. Hebben alle mensen in Nederland hetzelfde geloof? Nee
59. Welke taal spreken de mensen in Nederland? Nederlands
60. Is het belangrijk om snel Nederlands te leren? Ja
61. Is het belangrijk om snel Nederlands te leren? Ja
62. Moet u voor een taal cursus betalen of is het gratis? Betalen
63. Wie betaalt de taal cursus, de school of uzelf? Ikzelf
64. Gaan in Nederland alleen kinderen naar school of ook volwassenen?
65. Worden verjaardagen in Nederland gevierd? Ja
66. Als u bij iemand op bezoek gaat, maakt u dan meestal een afspraak of loopt u zomaar naar binnen? Ik maak een afspraak
67. Ops's en oma's wonen die bij hun kinderen of wonen ze apart? Apart
68. Waarom is het goed om met kinderen naar de Nederlandse televisie te kijken?
Om Nederlands te leren
69. Wie is verantwoordelijk voor wat kinderen doen: de school of de ouders? De ouders
70. Hoe oud zijn de meeste kinderen als ze naar school gaan? Vier jaar

71. Vanaf welke leeftijd is onderwijs verplicht? Vanaf vijf jaar
72. Tot welke leeftijd is onderwijs verplicht? Tot achttien jaar
73. Leren kinderen als ze spleen? Ja
74. Wie kiest de school voor het kind: de ouders of de gemeente? De ouders
75. Zijn er op school aparte klassen voor jongens en voor meisjes of zitten ze samen in een klas? Samen in een klas
76. Dragen kinderen op school een uniform? Nee
77. Wat doet de jongen achter de computer, leren of spleen? Leren
78. Voortgezet onderwijs is dat voor kinderen vanaf vier jaar of vanaf twaalf jaar? Vanaf twaalf jaar
79. Gaan alle kinderen vanaf twaalf jaar naar hetzelfde sort onderwijs, of zijn er twee richtingen? Twee richtingen
80. Tot welke leeftijd moeten kinderen naar school? Tot achttien jaar
81. Vanaf welke leeftijd mogen jongeren hun eigen deuzes maken? Vanaf achttien jaar
82. Uzeif verzekeren tegen ziektekosten, is dat verplicht of vrij? Verplicht
83. Wie betaalt uw verzekering tegen ziektekosten, is dat verplicht of vrij? Verplicht
84. Als u ziek word, waar gaat u dan naar toe? Naar de hulsarts
85. Waar halt men medicijnen op recept? Bij de drogist of bij de apotheek? Bij de apotheek
86. In noodgevallen, waar gaat u dan naar toe, naar het ziekenhuis of naar de drogist? Naar het ziekenhuis in het ziekenhuis
87. Waar werken de meeste specialisten? In het ziekenhuis
88. Voor wie is het consultatiebureau, voor grote kinderen of voor kleine kinderen? Voor kleine kinderen
89. Wie werken er in Nederland, alleen mannen of mannen en vrouwen? Mannen en vrouwen
90. Wanneer moet u werk gaan zoeken, zo snel mogelijk of later? Zo snel mogelijk
91. Waar is steeds minder werk te vinden: in de industrie of in de zorg? In de industrie
92. Waar is veel werk te vinden: in de landbouw of in de zorg? In de zorg
93. Wat is makkelijker te vinden: werk in de beveiliging of in de landbouw? In de beveiliging
94. Hoe vindt u gemakkelijker werk, via familie of via de drant? Via familie
95. Waar kunt u zich inschrijven als u werk zoekt, bij een school of bij een uitzendbureau? Bij een uitzendbureau
96. Geeft men elkaar bij dit gesprek eerst een hand of gaat men direct zitten? Eerst een hand geven
97. Krijgt u in Nederland een uikering of moet uw partner voor u zorgen? Mijn partner
100. Is het leven in Nederland duur of goedkoop? duur

APPENDIX C

BADEN-WURTTEMBERG'S "DISCUSSION MANUAL FOR NATURALIZATION AUTHORITIES" ENGLISH TRANSLATION

1) The recognition of the free democratic laws of the Constitution of the Bundesrepublik of Deutschland encompasses the values which are set forth in the Constitution, which are the same in content as those in all of the States of the European Union.

The protection of human rights is one of the areas in which the State has exclusive jurisdiction over the use of aggression, which means that no person can use aggression against another, and that only in emergency situations. The State itself can only use violence in the context of legally mandated enforcement of the law such as the equality of men and women.

Are these concepts compatible with your personal views?

2) What is your opinion of the following statements?

Democracy is the worst form of government which we have, but the best which exists.' Humanity had never experienced such a dark phase as during democracy, but for man to free himself from democracy, he has to understand that democracy cannot give anything good to man."

3) In films, plays, and books, the religious feelings are sometimes insulted of those who have different religious beliefs. According to you which methods are acceptable for individuals to use to fight against such religious insults and which not.

4) How do you feel about criticism about your religion? Do you find this permissible? Could you discuss this?

5) In Germany political parties and organizations can be banned due to their stated opposition to the constitution and rule of law. Would you, in spite of such a ban, still support such a party and such an organization? Under what circumstances?

6) What do you think of the statement: That a wife must obey her husband and he can hit her if she does not obey him?

7) Do you think it is permissible that a man shuts his wife and daughter into the house in order to prevent them from dishonoring him in public?

8) In Germany the police can intervene in a violent argument between a married couple, and in order to prevent further threats can send the aggressor out of the house for several days. What do you think about this?

9) Do you think It is progress that a men and women in Germany are equal under the law? In your opinion what should the country do when men do not accept this?

10) In Germany everyone can work in any profession according to their education. What do you think about this? Are you of the opinion that certain professions should only be reserved for men or women? If so, which and why?

11) According to your opinion which profession should not be engaged in by a woman under any circumstances and why ? Do you have difficulty with accepting a woman in a position of authority in certain jobs?

12) In Germany everyone can decide for themselves if they want to be treated by a female or a male doctor. In certain situations this choice is not available: Emergency, change of shift in the hospital. In such a case would you let yourself be treated or operated on by a female doctor (male citizenship candidate) or a male doctor (female citizenship candidate)?

13) People often hear that parents forbid their adult daughter to work in certain jobs or to marry a man of their choice, What are your personal views regarding this standpoint?

14) What would you do, when your daughter marries a man who has a different religion or wants to pursue a course of study in something you disapprove of ?

15) What is your opinion of parents who push their children into forced marriages? Do you believe that such marriages are compatible with human rights?

16) In Germany, sports and swimming lessons are part of the normal school curriculum. Would you allow your daughter to participate? If not, why not?) What is your stance on allowing school children to take part in school trips and overnight school vacations?

17) Your adult daughter/your wife would like to dress like other German girls and women . Would you attempt to prevent her from doing this? If so, with what methods?

18) For female citizenship candidates: Your adult daughter would very much like to dress like other girls and women too, but your husband is against it - What would you do?

19) Your daughter /sister comes home and says that she was sexually molested. What would you do as a father/mother/brother/ sister ?

20) Your son/brother comes home and says that he was insulted. What would you do as father/mother/brother/sister?

21) According to you does the Constitution permit one to change their religion, or to leave their present religious community, and to live without a religion or to take on another religion. What is your opinion, when a person is punished due to such a change of religions (for example with the loss of succession)?

22) You learn that people in your neighborhood or from your friend or acquaintances is has perpetrated or is planning a terrorist attack. How do you react and what do?

Suggestions for the EEB (Individual Naturalization Official) :The chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, Dr.Nadeem Elyas, had declared in the ZDF (broadcast) on 15/07/2005 after the attacks in London- that " cooperation between the security services is for Muslims an Islamic obligation and not betrayal"!

23) You have heard about the attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and on March 11th 2004 in Madrid. In your eyes were the perpetrators terrorists or freedom fighters? Explain your viewpoint.

24) In the newspaper one sometimes reads about a case where a daughter or a wife is murdered because of "immoral lifestyle" in order to restore the family honor. How do you feel about such an act?

25) What do you think when a man in Germany is married to two women at the same time?

26) How do you judge, when a married man in Germany goes to his former hometown and marries a second time?

27) Some people say that Jews are responsible for all the evil in the world and even claim that they were behind the attacks of 2001 in New York? What is your view of such claims?

28) Your daughter applies for a position in Germany. She receives a letter that she was not accepted. You later learn that a black African from Somalia has gotten the position. How would you react?

29) Imagine this: Your adult son comes to you and declares that he is a homosexual. He says that he would like to live together with another man. How would you react?

30) In Germany several politicians have openly proclaimed that they are homosexual. What do you think about homosexuals in Germany holding public office?

Declaration of the Naturalization Candidate,

My answers and explanations in regard to the questions which were asked correctly reflect and correspond to my own inner convictions. I had no difficulty understanding the questions. In the case where I did not understand, they were explained to me so that I could understand them all. I was made completely aware, that any false declarations would be considered as fraud against the citizenship officials, and could lead, even after several years, to the revocation of my citizenship even in the case where that would render me stateless.

Place, Date, Signature ,

Note on source:

The press releases available on the website of the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wittenberg include references to the Conviction Test; however, there is at no point an official list of questions provided there. The only official information available on that site is that the test consists of 30 questions about the applicant's personal attitude about the Basic Law and the liberal constitutional structure, particularly regarding tolerance and the equality of the sexes, and is held as a discussion between naturalization authorities and the applicant. The questions may be selected, combined, and supplemented according to need. The questions included above are claimed to have been sent from the Minister of the Interior directly to the 44 regional offices of Baden-Wittenberg in September 2005 for implementation beginning in January 2006, the *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (30 January 2006) claims that the same internal memo asked the recipient not to publish the questions because this would hinder the achievement of the goal of the tests. Subsequently the questions were published in at least a dozen sites, newspapers, and magazines in both German and English. None of these sources in turn cite *their* source, which is assumed to have been an unofficial "leak."

Source:

Original German

Die gesinnungsprüfung (2006, January 4). *Tageszeitung*. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from the Tageszeitung Website: <http://www.taz.de/pt/2006/01/04/a0154.1/text>

English translation from

Geburtsname des einbürgerungsbewerbers (2005, January 6). Retrieved May 5, 2006, from the Islam.de Website: <http://islam.de/4401.php>

APPENDIX D

BADEN-WURTTEMBERG'S "DISCUSSION MANUAL FOR NATURALIZATION AUTHORITIES" ORIGINAL GERMAN

Baden-Württemberg: Gesprächsleitfaden für die Einbürgerungsbehörden

- 1.** Das Bekenntnis zur freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland umfasst die Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes, die inhaltsgleich für alle Staaten der Europäischen Union gilt. Dazu gehören unter anderem
 - der Schutz der Menschenwürde
 - das Gewaltmonopol des Staates, das heißt, außer dem Staat darf in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland niemand Gewalt gegen einen anderen anwenden, es sei denn in Notwehr. Der Staat selbst darf Gewalt nur auf Grund einer gesetzlichen Ermächtigung anwenden
 - sowie die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau. Entsprechen diese Grundsätze Ihren persönlichen Vorstellungen?

- 2.** Was halten Sie von folgenden Aussagen?
 - "Demokratie ist die schlechteste Regierungsform, die wir haben, aber die beste, die es gibt."
 - "Die Menschheit hat noch nie eine so dunkle Phase wie unter der Demokratie erlebt. Damit der Mensch sich von der Demokratie befreien kann, muss er zuerst begreifen, dass die Demokratie den Menschen nichts Gutes geben kann [...]."

- 3.** In Filmen, Theaterstücken und Büchern werden manchmal die religiösen Gefühle von Menschen der unterschiedlichen Glaubensrichtungen verletzt. Welche Mittel darf der Einzelne Ihrer Meinung nach anwenden, um sich gegen solche Verletzungen seines Glaubens zu wehren, und welche nicht?

- 4.** Wie stehen Sie zu Kritik an einer Religion? Halten Sie diese für zulässig? Setzen Sie sich damit auseinander?

- 5.** In Deutschland können politische Parteien und Vereine wegen verfassungsfeindlicher Betätigung verboten werden. Würden Sie trotz eines solchen Verbots die Partei oder den Verein doch unterstützen? Unter welchen Umständen?

- 6.** Wie stehen Sie zu der Aussage, dass die Frau ihrem Ehemann gehorchen soll und dass dieser sie schlagen darf, wenn sie ihm nicht gehorsam ist?

7. Halten Sie es für zulässig, dass ein Mann seine Frau oder seine Tochter zu Hause einschließt, um zu verhindern, dass sie ihm in der Öffentlichkeit "Schande macht"?

8. In Deutschland kann die Polizei bei gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Eheleuten einschreiten und zur Abwehr von weiteren Gefahren den Täter für einige Tage aus der Wohnung verweisen? Was halten Sie davon?

9. Halten Sie es für einen Fortschritt, dass Männer und Frauen in Deutschland kraft Gesetzes gleichberechtigt sind? Was sollte der Staat ihrer Meinung nach tun, wenn Männer dies nicht akzeptieren?

10. In Deutschland kann jeder bei entsprechender Ausbildung nahezu jeden Beruf ergreifen. Was halten Sie davon? Sind Sie der Meinung, dass bestimmte Berufe nur Männern oder nur Frauen vorbehalten sein sollten? Wenn ja, welche und warum?

11. Welche Berufe sollte Ihrer Meinung nach eine Frau auf keinen Fall ausüben? Hätten Sie bei bestimmten Berufen Schwierigkeiten, eine Frau als Autoritätsperson anzuerkennen?

12. In Deutschland kann jeder selbst entscheiden, ob er sich lieber von einem Arzt oder einer Ärztin behandeln lässt. In bestimmten Situationen besteht diese Wahlmöglichkeit jedoch nicht: Notfall, Schichtwechsel im Krankenhaus. Würden Sie sich in einem solchen Fall auch von einer Ärztin (männlicher Einbürgerungsbewerber) oder einem Arzt (Einbürgerungsbewerberin) untersuchen oder operieren lassen?

13. Man hört immer wieder, dass Eltern ihren volljährigen Töchtern verbieten, einen bestimmten Beruf zu ergreifen oder einen Mann ihrer Wahl zu heiraten. Wie stehen Sie persönlich zu diesem Verhalten? Was würden Sie tun, wenn Ihre Tochter einen Mann anderen Glaubens heiraten oder eine Ausbildung machen möchte, die Ihnen nicht gefällt?

14. Was halten Sie davon, dass Eltern ihre Kinder zwangsweise verheiraten? Glauben Sie, dass solche Ehen mit der Menschenwürde vereinbar sind?

15. In Deutschland gehört der Sport- und Schwimmunterricht zum normalen Schulunterricht. Würden Sie Ihre Tochter daran teilnehmen lassen? Wenn nein: Warum nicht?

16. Wie stehen Sie dazu, dass Schulkinder an Klassenausflügen und Schullandheimaufenthalten teilnehmen?

17. Ihre volljährige Tochter/Ihre Frau möchte sich gerne so kleiden wie andere deutsche Mädchen und Frauen auch. Würden Sie versuchen, das zu verhindern? Wenn ja: Mit welchen Mitteln?

18. Bei Einbürgerungsbewerberinnen: Ihre Tochter möchte sich gerne so kleiden wie andere deutsche Mädchen und Frauen auch, aber Ihr Mann ist dagegen? Was tun Sie?

19. Ihre Tochter/Schwester kommt nach Hause und erzählt, sie sei sexuell belästigt worden. Was tun Sie als Vater/Mutter/Bruder/Schwester?

20. Ihr Sohn/Bruder kommt nach Hause und erzählt, er sei beleidigt worden. Was tun Sie als Vater/Mutter/Bruder/Schwester?

21. Erlaubt das Grundgesetz Ihrer Meinung nach, seine Religion zu wechseln, also seine bisherige Glaubensgemeinschaft zu verlassen und ohne Religion zu leben oder sich einer anderen Religion zuzuwenden? Was halten Sie davon, wenn man wegen eines solchen Religionswechsels bestraft würde (z. B. mit dem Verlust des Erbrechts)?

22. Sie erfahren, dass Leute aus Ihrer Nachbarschaft oder aus Ihrem Freundes- oder Bekanntenkreis einen terroristischen Anschlag begangen haben oder planen. Wie verhalten Sie sich? Was tun Sie?

23. Sie haben von den Anschlägen am 11. September 2001 in New York und am 11. März 2004 in Madrid gehört. Waren die Täter in Ihren Augen Terroristen oder Freiheitskämpfer? Erläutern Sie Ihre Aussage.

24. In der Zeitung wird manchmal über Fälle berichtet, in denen Töchter oder Ehefrauen von männlichen Familienangehörigen wegen "unsittlichen Lebenswandels" getötet wurden, um die Familienehre wieder herzustellen. Wie stehen Sie zu einer solchen Tat?

25. Was halten Sie davon, wenn ein Mann in Deutschland mit zwei Frauen gleichzeitig verheiratet ist?

26. Wie beurteilen Sie es, wenn ein verheirateter Mann aus Deutschland in seinen früheren Heimatstaat fährt und dort ein zweites Mal heiratet?

27. Manche Leute machen die Juden für alles Böse in der Welt verantwortlich und behaupten sogar, sie steckten hinter den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 in New York? Was halten Sie von solchen Behauptungen?

28. Ihre Tochter bewirbt sich um eine Stelle in Deutschland. Sie bekommt jedoch ein ablehnendes Schreiben. Später erfahren Sie, dass eine Schwarzafrikanerin aus Somalia die Stelle bekommen hat. Wie verhalten Sie sich?

29. Stellen Sie sich vor, Ihr volljähriger Sohn kommt zu Ihnen und erklärt, er sei homosexuell und möchte gerne mit einem anderen Mann zusammenleben. Wie reagieren Sie?

30. In Deutschland haben sich verschiedene Politiker öffentlich als Homosexuelle bekannt. Was halten Sie davon, dass in Deutschland Homosexuelle öffentliche Ämter bekleiden?

“Die Gesinnungsprüfung” *Tageszeitung*, (4 January 2006), online at <http://www.taz.de/pt/2006/01/04/a0154.1/text>

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR THE “LIFE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TEST”

Note: No official questions for this test are available. The questions here given are provided by the “Life in the United Kingdom” official website, and are given to provide the applicant with “an idea of the topics covered in the test.” As such they are meant to serve as a self-check of the applicant’s preparedness for the test. The questions are based on the reading material required for the test (Life in the United Kingdom: a Journey to Citizenship, Chapters 2,3, and 4).

Headings are also the headings given in the manual.

Migration to Britain

1. Where have migrants come from in the past and why? What sort of work have they done?

The changing role of women

2. Do women have equal rights and has this always been the case?
3. Are there as many women in education or work as men?
4. Do women get the same pay as men? Do women with children work?

Children, family and young people

5. How many young people are there in the UK?
6. Do many children live in single parent families or step-families? When do children leave home?
7. What sort of work do children do?
8. When do children take tests at school? How many go on to higher education?

9. What are the minimum ages for buying alcohol and tobacco? What drugs are illegal?
10. How interested are young people in politics? What do they see as the main issues today?

Population

11. How many people live in the countries of the UK?
12. What is the census and how is census data collected and used?
13. How many people belong to an ethnic minority and which are the largest minority groups? Where are there large ethnic communities?

Religion and tolerance

14. How many people say they have a religion and how many attend religious services? What are the largest religious groups?
15. What is the Church of England and who is its head? What are the main Christian groups?

Regions of Britain

16. Where are Geordie, Cockney and Scouse dialects spoken?

Customs and traditions

17. Do people tend to live in the cities or in the country?
18. What and when are the national days of the four countries of the UK? What are bank holidays?

19. What and when are the main Christian festivals? What other traditional days are celebrated?

The working system of government

20. What are MPs? How often are elections held and who forms the government?
21. What is the role of the Prime Minister? Who advises them and what are the main roles in the Cabinet?
22. What type of constitution does the UK have? What is Her Majesty's Opposition and what is the role of the Leader of the Opposition?
23. How is political debate reported? Are newspapers free to publish opinions or do they have to remain impartial?

The formal institutions – 1

24. What is the Queen's official role and what ceremonial duties does she have?
25. How do elections for the House of Commons work? How are candidates selected? What do the Speaker and Whips do?
26. What is the House of Lords and who are its members?
27. How can you visit Parliament?

The formal institutions – 2

28. How are judges appointed and how do they apply the law?
29. How are the police organized and who controls their administration?

30. What is the civil service and how do civil servants work with government?

31. How are local services managed, governed and paid for?

Devolved administration

32. What is proportional representation and where is it used?

33. What are the powers of the devolved administrations? Which areas of policy remain under the control of the UK government?

34. What are quangos and non-departmental public bodies?

Britain in Europe and the world

35. What are the roles and powers of the main institutions of Europe? How is European law organised?

36. What rights do citizens of European Union states have to travel and work?

37. What is the Commonwealth? What is the United Nations and what is Britain's role within it?

The ordinary citizen

38. What rights and duties do UK citizens have?

39. Who has the right to vote and at what age? How and when do you register to vote?

40. Who can stand for public office? How do you contact an elected representative?

Source:

<http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk/htmlsite/index.html>

References

- Abbas, A. (1996). Cultural studies in a postculture. In C. Nelson and D. P. Gaonkar (Eds.), *Cultural studies and the politics of disciplinarity* (p. 289-312). New York: Routledge.
- Agamben, G. (1996). Beyond human rights. In Virno, Paolo and Michael Hardt (Eds.), *Radical thought in Italy: A potential politics* (p. 158-164). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Almond, I. (2004, Nov./Dec.) The madness of Islam: Foucault's Occident and the revolution in Iran. *Radical Philosophy*, 128, 12-22.
- Appiah, A. A. (1994). Comments. In Amy Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition* (p. 149-163). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Arendt, H. (1968). The decline of the nation-state and the end of the rights of man. In *Imperialism* (p. 267-302). New York: Harcourt.
- Austen, I., Mason, C. and Staba, D. (2006, June 5). Six arrested in Canada raid attended the same mosque. *New York Times*. Retrieved June 8, 2006, from New York Times Website: <http://www.nytimes.com>
- Balibar, E. (1991). Is there a neo-racism? In E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (Eds.), *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities* (p. 17-28). London: Verso.
- Barker, M. (1981). *The new racism: Conservatives and the ideology of the tribe*. London: Junction Books.
- Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Plastic surgery for the Other*. Translated by Francois Debrix. Retrieved November 31, 2006, from the European Graduate School Website: <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/ baudrillard/ baudrillard-plastic-surgery-for-the-other.html>
- (1995). *The Gulf War did not take place*. Sydney: Power Publications.
- (2002, November). *The despair of having everything*. Translated by Luke Sandford. Retrieved November 31, 2006, from the European Graduate School Website: <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/ baudrillard/ baudrillard-the-despair-of-having-everything.html>
- Bayoumi, M. and A. Rubin (Eds.) (2000). *The Edward Said reader*. New York: Vintage.

- Bjorg, T. (1997). 'The invaders', 'the traitors' and 'the resistance movement:' The extreme Right's conceptualisation of opponents and self in Scandinavia. In T. Modood and P. Werbner, *The politics of multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, identity and community* (54-72). London: Zed Books, Ltd.
- Blunkett, D. (2004). Preface. Life in the United Kingdom: A journey to citizenship. home office of the United Kingdom on behalf of the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group. London: Crown Copyright.
- Borradori, G. (2003). *Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.)
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Translated by Richard Nice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).
- Brubaker, W.R. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
- Carens, J. H. (2000a). Muslim minorities in contemporary democracies: The limitations of liberal tolerance *Culture, citizenship and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness* (p. 140-160). Oxford: University Press.
- Carens, J. H. (2000b). Liberalism and culture. *Culture, citizenship and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness* (p. 52-87). Oxford: University Press.
- Casagrande, S. (2006, September 27). Political and cultural leaders condemn opera cancellation. *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved October 1, 2006, from Deutsche Welle Website: <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2187241,00.html>
- Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Statistics Netherlands) (2006). *Statline Databank*. Retrieved November 30, 2006, from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Website <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/>
- Connolly, K. (2005, December 31). Germans to put Muslims through loyalty test. *Telegraph.co.uk*. Retrieved May 25, 2006 from Telegraph.co.uk Website: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/>
- Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Controversial debate on interview guide for naturalisation applicants. *European Forum for Migration Studies*. Retrieved November 31, 2006 from European Forum for Migration Studies Website: http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dokz06_e.htm
- Could you pass the citizenship test? (2005, June 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved May 25, 2006 from BBC News Website: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4099770.stm>
- Debat: Bangebuks versus kulturminister (2005 October 7). *Boger*. Retrieved November 10, 2006 from Wikipedia Website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Danish_Muhammed_cartoons
- Die gesinnungsprüfung (2006, January 4). *Tageszeitung*. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from the Tageszeitung Website: <http://www.taz.de/pt/2006/01/04/a0154.1/text>
- Dutch Institute of Immigration and Naturalization (2005). *The civic integration examination abroad* (Including video and photo book). Amsterdam: Institute of Immigration and Naturalization.
- Duyvene de Wit, T. and Koopmans, R. (2005). The integration of ethnic minorities into political culture: The Netherlands, Germany, and Great Britain compared. *Acta Politica*, 40, 50-73.
- Elbaum, R. (2006, May 25). Abuse plagues Muslim women in Germany. *MSNBC*. Retrieved September 4, 2006 from the MSNBC Website: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12812607/.
- Fleishman, J. (2006, April 9). In Germany, citizenship tests stir up Muslims, and cultural debate. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved May 5, 2006, from the Los Angeles Times Website: <http://www.latimes.com>
- Foucault, M. (1994). *The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences: a translation of les mots et les choses*. New York: Vintage.
- Geburtsname des einbürgerungsbewerbers (2005, January 6). Retrieved May 5, 2006, from the Islam.de Website: <http://islam.de/4401.php>
- Germans have negative views of Islam (2004, September 16). *DPA*. Retrieved November 25, 2006, from Expatica News Website: <http://www.expatica.com>
- Germany: The problem of forced marriages in the Muslim community (2004, July 28). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved September 4, 2006 from Deutsche Welle Website: www.dw-world.de

- Glazer, N. (1983). *Ethnic Dilemmas, 1964-1982*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other. (2006, March). *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Retrieved December 1, 2006, from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253>
- Habermas, J. (1994) Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State. In Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (p.107-148). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Hawley, C. (2006, January 31). A German state quizzes Muslim immigrants on Jews, gays and swim lessons. *Spiegel in English*. Retrieved April 19, 2006 from the Der Spiegel Website: <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/>
- Home Office of the United Kingdom (2004). *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*. London: Crown.
- (2005). *Changes with effect from 1 November 2005 - The need to demonstrate knowledge of life in the United Kingdom as well as language ability*. Retrieved May 25, 2006, from Home Office of the United Kingdom Website: http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/applying/british_nationality/changes_with_effect.html
- (n.d.). *Life in the UK test*. Retrieved May 25, 2006 from British Home Office's Life in the UK Website: <http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk/htmlsite/index.html>
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- (2000). *Who are We? America's Great Debate*. New York: Free Press.
- Immigration and Naturalization Department of the Netherlands (2006). *Introducing the NID*. Retrieved November 20, 2006, from the IND Website: <http://www.ind.nl/EN/index.asp>
- Innenminister Rech antwortet SPD – Fraktionsvorsitzendem (2006, March 17). Retrieved June 5, 2006 from Innenminister Baden Wuerttemberg (Ministry of the Interior of Baden Wurttemberg) Website: <http://www.innenministerium.baden-wuerttemberg.de/>
- James, K. (2005, March 29). 'Honor killings' plague Germany's Turkish community. National Public Radio. Retrieved September 30, 2006 from NPR Website: <http://www.npr.org>

- Joppke, C. (2000). Mobilization of culture and the reform of citizenship law: Germany and the United States. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives* (p.145-161).Oxford: University Press.
- Joppke, C. (1996, August). Multiculturalism and immigration: A comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. *Theory and Society*, 25(4), 449-500.
- Karakasoglu, Y. (2006, January 19). Tremolo der Betroffenheit, *Die Tageszeitung*. Retrieved November 5, 2006, from the Die Tageszeitung Website: <http://www.taz.de/>
- Karapin, R. (2000). Major anti-minority riots and national legislative campaigns against immigrants in Britain and Germany. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: comparative European perspectives* (p. 312-347). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koopmans, R. and P. Statham (1999). Challenging the liberal nation-state? Postnationalism, multiculturalism, and the collective claims-making of migrants and ethnic minorities in Britain and Germany. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(3), 652-96.
- (2004, July). Problems of cohesion? Multiculturalism and migrants' claims-making for group demands in Britain and the Netherlands. *Centre for European Political Communications*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/europol.com>
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (2005, January). *A Manual for Germany*. Retrieved November 25, 2006 from A Handbook for Germany Website: <http://www.handbuch-deutschland.de/>
- Media has anti-Muslim bias, claims report (2005, November 14). *Guardian Unlimited*. Retrieved April 22, 2006 from Guardian Website: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>
- Modood, T. (1997). Introduction: The politics of multiculturalism in the New Europe. In T. Modood and P. Werbner (Eds.), *The politics of multiculturalism in the new Europe: racism, identity and community* (p. 1-25). London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Muslims in Baden-Wuerttemberg (n.d.). Retrieved June 5, 2006 from Innenminister Baden Wuerttemberg (Ministry of the Interior of Baden Wuerttemberg) Website: <http://www.innenministerium.baden-wuerttemberg.de/>

- Muslim Groups Angry over “Racist” Citizenship Test (2006, January 6). *Expatica*. Retrieved May 5, 2006 from Expatica Website: <http://www.expatica.com/source/>
- Naar Nederland* (2005). Ministrie van Justitie. Den Haag.
- Treanor, P. (n.d.). The nationalism of Pim Fortuyn. Retrieved September 10, 2006, from Paul Treanor Website: <http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/pim-fortuyn.html>
- “Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill” (Bill 119), United Kingdom House of Commons, Ref 093/2002 (12 April 2002). Retrieved July 10, 2006 from www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/119/2002119.pdf
- The New Nativism (2006, August 28). *The Nation*. Retrieved September 6, 2006 from The Nation Website: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060828/editors3>
- New UK Citizenship Testing Starts (2005, November 1). *BBC News*. Retrieved June 8, 2006 from BBC News Website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4391710.stm
- Oettinger und rech halten an gesprächsleitfaden für Einbürgerungsbehörden fest (2006, January 10).. Retrieved June 5, 2006 from Innenminister Baden Wuerttemberg (Ministry of the Interior of Baden Wurttemberg) Website: <http://www.innenministerium.baden-wuerttemberg.de/>
- Pakistan’s parliament condemns pope (15 September 2006). *ABC International News*. Retrieved September 20, 2006, from ABC News Website: www.abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=2447600
- Paterson, T. (2005, February 27). How many more women have to die before this society wakes up?. *Telegraph*. Retrieved September 4, 2006 from Telegraph Website: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/>
- Polat, U. (2006). Baden-Wurttemberg’s Conscience Test. Retrieved November 10, 2006 from Quantra.de Website: <http://www.Quantara.de>
- Press release of Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Wurttemberg (2005, December 14). Retrieved June 5, 2006, from Innenminister Baden Wuerttemberg Website: <http://www.im.bwl.de/sixcms/media.php/1227/regerklneu.pdf>
- Report on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU (2005, March 7). *International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights*. Retrieved June 10, 2006 from International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Website: <http://www.ihf-hr.org/>

- Rex, J. (2000). Multiculturalism and political integration in Europe. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: Comparative European perspectives* (p. 57-73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rose, F. (2005a, February 19). Why I published those cartoons. *Washington Post*. Retrieved May 25, 2006 from Washington Post Website: <http://www.washingtonpost.com>
- (2005b, September 30). Muhammeds ansigt. *Jyllands-Posten*. English translation retrieved November 30, 2006, from Wikipedia Website http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Danish_Muhammed_cartoons
- Said, E. (1979). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.
- Schäuble, T. (2002, March 7). Integrationschwerpunkt. Retrieved June 5, 2006, from Innenminister Baden Wuerttemberg Website: <http://www.im.bwl.de/sixcms/media.php/1227/regerklneu.pdf>
- Schlesinger, A., Jr. (1991). *The disuniting of America: Reflections on a multicultural society*. Knoxville: WhittleDirect Books.
- Silberstein, S. (2004). *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, D. G. (2006a, January 11). Failing the tolerance test. *Expatica*. Retrieved May 1, 2006 from Expatica Website <http://www.expatica.com/source/>
- (2006b, March 23). The great German citizenship trivia challenge. *Expatica*. Retrieved May 1, 2006 from Expatica Website <http://www.expatica.com/source/>
- Solomos, J. and L. K. Schuster (2000). Citizenship, multiculturalism, and the politics of identity: Contemporary dilemmas and policy agendas. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: Comparative European perspectives* (p. 74-94) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Statham, P. (2003). New conflicts about integration and cultural diversity in Britain: The Muslim challenge to race relations. In R. Cuperus, K.A. Duffek, and J. Kandel (Eds.), *The challenge of diversity: European social democracy facing migration, integration, and multiculturalism* (pp.125-49) . Innsbruck: Studienverlag.
- Synon, M. E. (2006, February 22). Burkas banned, language tests and compulsory history lessons: controversial new policies in Holland. *Daily Mail*, p.14.

- Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition* (p. 25-73). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Thranhardt, D. (2000). Conflict, consensus, and policy outcomes: Immigration and integration in Germany and the Netherlands. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: Comparative European perspectives* (p. 162-186). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (1983) Minderhedennota, zitting 1982-1983, 16 102, (No. 20–21). 's-Gravenhage.
- Vanocur, J. (2004, September 24). Trying to put Islam on Europe's agenda. *International Herald Tribune*. Retrieved August 31, 2006 from the International Herald Tribune Website: <http://www.ihf.com>.
- van Dijk, T. A. (1992). Discourse and the denial of racism. *Discourse and Society* 3(1), 87-118.
- Week of violence leaves people questioning tradition of tolerance (2004, November 10). *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Retrieved May 4, 2006 from Radio Free Europe Website: <http://www.rferl.org>
- White, J. (2006, March 27). Dutch film warns immigrants of risk. *Daily Campus*. Retrieved July 2, 2006, from Daily Campus Website: <http://www.dailycampus.com/media/storage/paper340/news/2006/03/27/Commentary/>
- Zizek, S. (1993). *Tarrying with the Negative*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- (1999a). The spectre of ideology. In E. Wright and Ed. Wright (Eds), *The Zizek reader* (p. 53-86). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- (1999b). Undergrowth of enjoyment: How popular culture can serve as an introduction to Lacan. In E. Wright and Ed. Wright (Eds), *The Zizek reader*. (p. 11-36). Malden, MA: Blackwell.