“The Entel”

Representations of a Degenerated Intellectual Figure in Cartoon Strips

Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Critical and Cultural Studies

by

Nadir Öperli

Boğaziçi University

2006

ABSTRACT

The Entel

Representations of a Degenerated Intellectual Figure in Cartoon Strips

by

Nadir Öperli

This thesis tries to understand the emergence of *the entel* type, a caricature of intellectuals which became popular around the mid 80's in various Turkish cartoon magazines and newspapers. It is not an all encompassing research about cartoons that figured *the entel* type. Rather, it uses a collection of such cartoons to illustrate a trend that mocked and deprivileged intellectuals during this period, and tries to understand why and how *the entel* type has become so popular specifically during the mid 80's. Of course, such an endeavor necessitates contemplating on the changing mind sets and cultural climate of the era, as well as an overview of the parallel receptions of intellectuals in the Turkish historical context, which are the two essential issues dealt within this study.

It is possible to claim that *the entel* figure has emerged as an extension of the intellectual-people opposition, the origins of which go back to the Tanzimat era. However, *the entel* has its peculiar characteristics which make him/her a representative figure of the mood of the post-80's era. In this study, *the entel* is analyzed first in terms of iconography, gender, and life style. *The entel*'s adventures within the city venues, his/her encounters with other nascent urban figures are also discussed as well as his/her mood that is saturated with a feeling of melancholia and cynicism.

ÖZET

Entel

Dejenere bir entelektüel tiplemesinin karikatürlerdeki temsilleri

Nadir Öperli

Bu tez, 1980'lerin ortasında, çeşitli mizah dergilerinde ve gazetelerde yayınlanan karikatürler aracılığıyla popülerleşen ve entelektüelleri karikatürize eden bir tiplemenin, *entel*'in ortaya çıkış koşullarını anlamaya çalışıyor. Bu anlamda, *entel* tiplemesinin yer aldığı karikatürleri bütüncül bir bakışla analize eden bir araştırma olmaktan çok; bu karikatürleri, 80 darbesi sonrası, entelektüelleri alaya alan ve onları itibarsızlaştırmayı hedefleyen bir stratejiye işaret etmek için kullanıyor ve *entel* tiplemesinin neden özellikle 80'lerin ortasında popülerleştiği sorusuna yanıt arıyor. Tabii ki böyle bir çaba, dönemin değişen düşünce yapısı ve kültürel iklimi üzerine söz söylemeyi ve Türkiye'nin özgül tarihsel koşullarında entelektüellerin farklı algılanma biçimlerine yeniden göz atmayı gerektiriyor. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın önemli bir bölümü, *entel* tiplemesini ortaya çıktığı koşullarla ve tarihsel bağlarıyla ilişki içinde ele alıyor.

Bu haliyle, *entel* tiplemesini, kökleri Tanzimat dönemine kadar giden halk-aydın zıtlaşmasının bir devamı olarak görmek mümkün. Ancak, bu tarihsel bağlarının yanı sıra *entel*, onu 80 sonrası dönemin ruh halini temsil eden bir figür haline getiren, kendine has özelliklere de sahip. Bu çalışmada *entel* tiplemesi, ikonografisi, toplumsal cinsiyeti ve hayat tarzıyla inceleniyor. Bunun yanı sıra, yine aynı dönemde karikatürlerde popülerleşen diğer tiplemelerle karşılaşmaları ve melankoliyle sinizm arasında salınan ruh hali de, hem *entel*'i, hem de dönemin koşullarını anlamak adına masaya yatırılıyor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should start offering my gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Meltem Ahıska, for keeping her faith in me and in this thesis. Without her encouragement, support, and thought provoking comments, I would not be able to find the motivation to finish this thesis. I am also very indebted to Assoc. Prof Işıl Baş, the co-advisor of this thesis, and the coordinator of the Critical and Cultural Studies Program at Boğaziçi University, for her patience and supervision not only during this last phase, but also throughout the entire period of my MA studies. I am grateful to Assist. Prof. Zafer Yenal for giving me encouragement at the most depressing moments of writing. I am also thankful to Assist. Prof. Didar Akar and Prof. Sibel Irzık for their insightful criticisms, which will also contribute to my future studies. I would also like to thank Ali Şimşek for introducing me with alternative ways of thinking about the context of this thesis.

Both, the research and writing phases of this thesis were very joyful thanks to the support of lots of kindhearted friends. I am very indebted to Tuğçe Oktay and Maral Jeoufradi for their assistance in my research; to Cansu Sertlek and Senem Aytaç for their help in translating the cartoon strips figured throughout this thesis; to Şule Bakırcan for providing moral support; and to my classmates Zeynep Atalay, Engin Kaya, Beril Sönmez, and Serkan Delice for their friendship and for providing inspiration throughout my MA studies. I also owe a favor to my colleagues at Altyazi Monthly Cinema Magazine, for their understanding and help, which granted me more time to spend on my studies.

Last, but not least, I should send my gratitude to my family, for their endless, unfailing and uncalculating love and care. Without their gentleness, not only this thesis, but also my life would have been pale and hollow.

P.S.: I do not know how I can put into words Gözde Onaran's contribution to this thesis. Now when I try to imagine how this thesis would have been without her, I feel so much deserted that I cannot imagine anything. Besides her academic contribution which enabled me to find a language for my thesis, and her eagerness to share all the emotional, psychological and spiritual burden of writing, she taught me something which I had not believed before: Far is not that far.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION……....1

CHAPTER 1

Situating *the Entel*: Demythologization and Mockery OfIntellectuals…..……...11

The Ivory Tower and Dreams of Westernization:
An Account of the Intellectuals in the
Turkish Historical Context.....12

The Changing Functions of The Intellectuals
in the Postmodern Condition.....26

CHAPTER 2

An Overview Of The Post 80's Period In Turkey:
Neoliberal Transformation and Its Extensions.....36

Obscuring Borders of the
Public and Private Realms.....43

Neoliberal intellectuals as
the new opinion leaders.....49

Changing Discourse of the Mass Media
and Explosion of Stereotypes.....60

CHAPTER 3

Analysis of *the Entel* Type through Cartoon Strips.....65

Iconography of *the Entel*.....66

The Encounters of *the Entel*.....93

Melancholia and Cynicism of the Entel.....110

CONCLUSION……..……128

BIBLIOGRAPHY……...……...…135

LIST OF THE FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Teoman Turan. *Limon*, 31.05.1990…….…….70

Figure 3.2. Behiç Ak. "Entellektüel Ayı." *Cumhuriyet*, 20.07.1984…….…….70

Figure 3.3. *Süper Tan*. 12.12.1991…….…….73

Figure 3.4. Metin Üstündağ. *Limon*, 21.02.1991..…….…….73

Figure 3.5. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 13.02.1992…….…….78

Figure 3.6. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 15.02.1992…….…….…78

Figure 3.7. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 20.01.1992…….…….…82

Figure 3.8. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 16.01.1992…….…….…84

Figure 3.9. Haslet Soyöz. *Milliyet*, 09.08.1989…...…….…….…84

Figure 3.10. Haslet Soyöz. *Milliyet*, 05.08.1989.....…….…….…87

Figure 3.11. Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 04.05.1989…...…….…….....…….…87

Figure 3.12. Derya Sayın, *Limon*, 07.02.1991…...…...……..……..……90

Figure 3.13. Ahmet Yılmaz, *Limon*, 01.03.1991...…...…….……..……90

Figure 3.14. Mehmet Çağçağ, *Limon*, 26.10.1989....…...…….……90

Figure 3.15. Kemal Urgenç and Mahmut Tibet, *Limon*, 31.05.1990…….……92

Figure 3.16. Kaan Ertem, *Limon*, 14.12.1989……...…….……92

Figure 3.17. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 30.01.1992……...…….……94

Figure 3.18. Mahmut Tibet. *Limon*, 31.05.1990..…...……...…….……94

Figure 3.19. Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 21.07.1986…….…...…….……94

Figure 3.20. Kemal Gökhan Gürses. *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*, 1989…….……97

Figure 3.21. Güneri İçoğlu. *Limon*, 08.10.1991……..……...…….....100

Figure 3.22. Suat Özkan. *Limon*, 06.07.1989…...……..……...……...100

Figure 3.23. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 12.02.1992..…..……...……...104

Figure 3.24. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 22.02.1992..…..……...……...105

Figure 3.25. Kemal Gökhan Gürses.
"Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 26.02.1992..…..……...……...106

Figure 3.26. Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 18.08.1986….……...……..113

Figure 3.27. Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 31.05.1986.……...……..115

Figure 3.28. Kemal Urgenç. *Limon*,19.07.1990...…..……...……...120

Figure 3.29. Güneri İçoğlu. *Limon*, 09.07.1991...…..……...……...120

Figure 3.30. Sadık Üçok. *Limon*, 20.05.1990…...…..……...……...121

Figure 3.31. Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 04.12.1986....……...……...123

Figure 3.32. Metin Üstündağ. *Limon*, 23.07.1987.....……...……...123

Figure 3.33. Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 01.10.1991.....……...……...123

Figure 3.34. Gani Müjde and Alp Tamer. "Yusuf Yusuf", *Limon*, 25.01.1990…...126

Figure 3.35. Gani Müjde and Alp Tamer. "Yusuf Yusuf", *Limon*, 11.01.1990…...126

INTRODUCTION

> Evet, Türkiye'de aydınlar da var, "entel"ler de. "Aydın"ı oldukça ayrıntılı anlatmaya çalıştım; "entel" için fazla konuşmaya değmez: "Entel", günümüz gereği "tedbil-i kıyafet" gezen eski "kapıkulu"dur! (Naci 1995:187)[1]

Fethi Naci ends his short article, *"Münevver"den "Entel"e* --which evaluates the transformation of the intellectuals in the Turkish context-- with the above quotation. In this study, I would like to propose the contrary and claim that it is worth talking about *the entel*. Actually, I should accept that Naci's evaluation reflects the common belief about the reception of *the entel*, a belittling abbreviation in Turkish slang, which stands for the people who pretend to be an intellectual but lack the necessary substance for it. Since *the entel* points to a clown figure feigning intellectuality, what it illustrated is thought to be unworthy of discussion. The few accounts contemplating on *the entel* focus on it as a mere concept and try to figure out the dynamics in the creation of such a new term. They do not discuss the characteristics of what the term signifies in depth. This hesitation to talk about the characteristics of *the entel* as a figure (not the term, but the type that the term points at) is related to the risk of trivialization. Once one starts to talk about what the characteristics of *the entel* are, there is the danger of presuming his/her actual presence in society. Falling into the trap that Naci also falls in a single sentence: "There are both the intellectuals and *the entels*…" Are there really? If yes,

[1] "Yes, there are both 'intellectuals' and 'entels' in Turkey. I tried to discuss 'the intellectual' in detail, but 'the entel' is not worth talking much about. 'The entel', is the 'kapıkulu' (*a member of the Janissary Corps in the Ottoman Empire who was strictly tied to the authority. In Turkisk 'kapıkulu' means the one who is the servant waiting in front of one's door –N.Ö.*) who wanders around disguised as a common person due to contemporary conditions."

where are they? What do they look like? What do they do for a living, and what kind of a life style do they have? Are they female or male? What are their worries or desires? What do they think about the problems of the country and the world? All of these questions do and do not have answers. They do not have answers if we talk about *the entel* as people living among us feigning intellectuality effortlessly. They do have answers if we talk about *the entel* as certain representations, disseminated -if not created- through fictional narratives, *comic strips*, *novels*, *movies*, even *articles,* which, for the sake of irony, construct an imaginary figure for *the entel*.

Contextualizing the *Entel*

In this project, I choose to study the representations of *the entel* as created for the purpose of mocking and parodying fake intellectuals. Its being a representation does not mean that I am going to talk about him/her as a figure out of this world. On the contrary, I will ask why and how such a parodic representation of intellectuals -mostly of leftist intellectuals- has emerged in the post 80's period of Turkey. In Chapter 2, I hope to contextualize *the entel* type in relation to the political and cultural climate of the era. Evaluating the violent rupture initiated by the coup d'etat of September 12th, and the neoliberal transformation enforced by the policies of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), it is not difficult to grasp the path in which the *entel* type has emerged. The irony of dishonoring the intellectuals through *the entel* type, was doubly determined by the mood of the era. From one perspective, *the entel* seems to be an extension of the

anti-intellectualist discourse of the military dicta and the following governments which accused the leftist intellectuals as the responsible agents for the chaotic atmosphere and disorder of the pre-80's decade. For the state authority in the post 80's, the intellectuals were devilish figures working against the interests of society. The authorities' immense propaganda against intellectuals (conducted both through torturing them in prisons and/or constantly accusing them in their public speeches) has resulted in the dishonoring of the intellectuals. It is possible to understand the popularity of *the entel* figure in relation to this general, anti-intellectualist trend since in most of the illustrations, *the entel* is depicted as an impotent figure, who has trouble dealing with contemporary reality, and is trapped in a passivity created by a feeling of nostalgia. On the other hand, the *entel* type is also employed in many occasions to mock the neoliberal transformation and the depoliticization of intellectuals during the post-80's period. In these depictions, *the entel* parodied cynical and apolitical intellectuals, pursuing nothing but their self-interests. As such, *the entel*'s relation to the dynamics of the era, which deprivileged intellectuals, is contradictory: on the one hand, *the entel* owes its common usage to these dynamics; on the other hand, it also criticizes them for discrediting the intellectual vocation.

Damaging the reputation of the intellectuals is not a trend that emerged after the 80's. Throughout the late 19th and 20th century, the intellectuals were either accused of treason, not being loyal to the mission of searching for universal truths, or of being ineffectual dreamers remote from the people of their own country. The humiliation of intellectuals is especially accelerated in periods of social crisis, during which

intellectuals are expected to take the societies out of the crisis situation, but also are thought to be responsible agents for such a situation. For instance, intellectuals from the interwar years were characterized mostly by disenchantment and disillusionment. Theodor Adorno recalled that era as a period of "anti-intellectual intellectuals" seeking authenticity through religion (Adorno 1973: 3-4). The history of intellectuals as such is the struggle for a source of authenticity for the intellectual identity. The perception of intellectuals has changed drastically depending on where they found this source.

A general discussion of the roles and missions of intellectuals and the accompanying representations of them is outside the scope of this study. However, it is possible to observe that traces of earlier struggles/representations of the intellectuals in the Turkish context are visible in the figure of *the entel* as well. For instance, as Nurdan Gürbilek points out, it is possible to find parallels between *the entel* and *the züppe* (a Turkish term simultaneously referring to the "the dandy" and "the snob") who frequently appeared in the novels of the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), a reform period in the Ottoman Empire during which the western oriented modernization was accelerated through the initiatives of new intellectual groups (Gürbilek 2003). In the first chapter, I will present an account of the main discussions concerning intellectuals within the Ottoman/Turkish context and history. Here, my discussion will focus on the intellectuals' ideal of westernization and the reactions against this ideal. In this discussion, I will also refer to the contours of the intellectuals vs. masses dichotomy in the Turkish context since defenders of anti-westernization accused intellectuals of being detached from their own culture and people.

The entel is strictly bound to the socio-cultural mood of the era in which it emerged as well as to earlier perceptions of intellectuals in Turkish history. However, it is not far fetched to read him/her from a more general perspective that situates *the entel* within discussions of postmodernism in western theory. In chapter 1, I will also try to figure out how we might think of *the entel* type in terms of the changing roles/meanings of intellectuals in an age frequently referred to as the postindustrial or the postmodern. The axis of my discussion will be the "informationalization" of knowledge, the specialization of intellectuals, and the mediation of intellectuals' mental labour through the principles of free market economy.

Studying *the entel* through cartoon strips: The research, methodological concerns and limits of the study

The irony embedded in the figure of *the entel* seems to be simplistic: S/he parodies the people who pretend to look, act and live like an intellectual. As such, it is possible to assume that *the entel* functions on behalf of the so called "genuine intellectuals", differentiates their vocation and provides an ironic tool to prevent intruders from penetrating their territory. However, in practice, *the entel* does not function in such a straightforward fashion. In most cases, it is common to degrade the vocation of intellectuals regardless of their authenticity, and usually it becomes difficult to tell who *the entel* is and who *the intellectual* is. Besides, different groups might have different intentions in their usage of the term. For instance, neoliberal intellectuals might

use it in order to accuse the leftist intellectuals of uselessness, but leftist intellectuals might as well use it against the neoliberal ones to mock their conformism. Furthermore, university students might apply the term to refer to both groups. Sometimes, it might become a strategy for self-parody when an intellectual humiliates himself/herself by referring to himself/herself as an *entel*. On other occasions, intellectuals might use this term self-consciously to underline the banality of the never-ending accusations directed towards them (For instance, an intellectual who is criticized for not being involved in the reality of the people might respond by admitting "Yes, we're all *entels*, what can we do about it?"). Furthermore, the term might be used by people who are not intellectuals themselves in cases where their interests clash with the interests of intellectuals (For instance, in the news covering the gentrification of Ortaköy –a district which became popular among intellectuals during the late 80's-, local residents of Ortaköy were depicted as accusing intellectuals for being *entels* who were caught in hedonist practices and had no circumstantial worries.) (See Appendix 1).

In short, there are various different strategies in the usage of *the entel* term according to the interests of the party using it. However, regardless of these intentions, there is also a more or less agreed upon image of *the entel*. In this study, I will not deal with the intentions of various parties that frequently use *the entel* term, but with the image repertoire that emerged around *the entel* term, which further created an *entel* type with a set of predetermined characteristics. Put differently, I will work out the characteristics of *the entel* figure in relation to the cultural climate of the post 80's in Turkey. In doing this, I choose to analyze cartoon strips published in news magazines,

newspapers and caricature magazines. In choosing the cartoon strips, the works of Ayşe Öncü (1999), Levent Cantek (2002), and Ali Şimşek (2005) as well as a Turkish comic strip research magazine, *Serüven* have been very helpful. All these authors claim that cartoon strips, especially after the diversification of the publications, became a new field for social research. Moreover, especially as Şimşek points out, during the post-80's period cartoon strips not only represented the social reality of Turkey, but had a key role in naming, producing and reproducing this reality with their special language. Şimşek argues that this special language of the cartoon strips, especially of those that appeared in cartoon magazines, was overwhelmed by a strategy of creating new stereotypes in order to name certain tendencies, feelings or groups assumed to be flourishing within newly emerging lifestyles. The *entel* type also acquired its iconography and characteristics through its appearance in the cartoon strips of the period. Thus, for a study that aims to contextualize the *entel* type and to pinpoint its iconography and characteristics, these cartoon strips seemed to be the most proper field for data collection.

The data of this study consists of samples from three main sources: *Limon* caricature magazine, *Yeni Gündem* news magazine and *Hürriyet* daily newspaper; three publications that are highly popular in their respective fields. Besides the systematic review of these publications, I have tried to enrich my sample with certain cartoons and articles from a number of other publications, such as *Milliyet* and *Tan* newspapers, and cartoon strip books by Kemal Gökhan Gürses, which provided material directly related to the topic (*Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*, *Boşver... Nasılsa Halk Anlamaz*, and *12 Eylül*

Öncesine Dönmek İstiyorum.) I have collected most of the data for this study throughout the research phase for the exhibition project titled *The person you have called cannot be reached at the moment: Representations of Life Styles in Turkey, 1980-2005* (*Aradığınız Kişiye Şu An Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri, 1980-2005*)[2] In addition to the data that I have provided through this research, I have scanned through each issue of *Limon* magazine, and cartoon strip books available from the archives of 'The Centre for the Study of Cartoons and Caricature'. My research is focused on the late 80's and early 90's, which correspond to the lifetime of *Limon* magazine, which published its first issue on the 14th of March, 1986; and was closed down and transformed into another magazine called *Leman* on the 21th of November, 1991. Although it seems that *Limon* magazine is the main reference point marking the time span of my data, my choice of this particular time span was not limited to the publishing period of *Limon*. Apart from the cartoon strips included in this study, there are various indications showing that it is this period when *the entel* type started to appear in diverse media, and the noun 'the entel' has embedded itself in daily language. For instance, in May of 1989, an article series was published in Milliyet daily newspaper, which had a title directly referring to one of the popular arabesque songs of the time: "Allah Allah Allah Bu Nasıl *Entel* Takılmak?" ("Oh My God! How do we become *entel* like that?"). This series, which was written by Demirtaş Ceyhun, tried to discuss how and why the *entel* type emerged and suddenly gained so much popularity in the media and daily language, with an ironic

[2] This exhibiton was directed by Assoc. Prof. Meltem Ahiska and Asst. Prof. Zafer Yenal, from the Sociology Department of Boğaziçi University. I have worked with Tuğçe Oktay and Maral Jefroudi as the research assistants of the project. For this research, we went through the popular newspapers and magazines of the 1980-2005 period.

attitude. The five articles in this series were later collected in a book that was published in 1989. The popularity of the word "entel" is also observable in the headlines of various news and articles in the newspapers and magazines published throughout the late 80's: "Entel Olma Hevesi" ("Desire for being entel"), "Entel Bir Melodram" ("An Entel Melodrama"), "Memenin Enteli Olur Mu?" ("Does something like an entel breast exist?"), "Şimdi Moda Entellikte" ("Now being entel is in") (See Appendix 1). There is also a book titled *Entellere Dantel: Entel Dantel Öyküler* (*Lace for the Entels: Entel Dantel*[3] *Stories*) published in 1992, which collected short stories by Nurettin İğci depicting the gap between the intellectuals and the masses.

However, my discussion of the *entel* excludes a systematic analysis of all these news and articles, and focuses on the cartoon strips. As such, in this study, *the entel* is not just a word that refers to an abstract intellectual figure marked with hollowness, degeneration, dandiness and decadence. Rather, it is regarded, as I have pointed out, as a representation of intellectuals that creates a mental image, an icon on the mind of the one who reads or hears about it. As such, the *entel* comes with a concrete shape, even with an iconography. When one hears the word "entel" while referring to someone, either a male figure with long hair, earrings, beard, pipe, eyeglasses; or a female figure with short hair, smoking cigarettes comes to one's mind. However, *the entel* is not a crystal clear term applied only in order to signify such a type with a specific appearance. Rather, it brings about various connotations with itself, indicating a mood and a mind set

[3] "Dantel" is the Turkish word for "lace", and it is used as a rhyme with the word "entel" to point to the hollowness of the deeds of *the entels*. In the common usage of "entel dantel", "dantel"s feminine connotations are also very influential, since in the creation of *the entel* type, a strategy of feminization is visible as I will discuss in Chapter 3.

that need to be further elaborated. In Chapter 3, I will be dealing with the physical attributes, mood and mindset of *the entel*.

One last point. This is not a systematic study of the cartoons of the period using the *entel* as a point of reference. On the contrary, I use the cartoons descriptively, as a point of reference in order to understand the emergence of the *entel* type. Thus, I do not present an account of the different styles appearing in the cartoons, or different discourses and policies of the publications they appeared in. Since I have tried to work with cartoons published in diverse media, such an endeavor would be shifting the focus of this study. As such, I do not intend to present an account of the thematic and stylistic trends within the cartoons of the period. Rather I am using cartoons and cartoon series, in order to see beyond them, and to identify the discourses reflected in the figure of the *entel* typification.

CHAPTER 1

SITUATING *THE ENTEL*:

DEMYTHOLOGIZATION AND MOCKERY OF INTELLECTUALS

The ideological climate and cultural atmosphere of post-80's Turkey was very definitive in the emergence and dissemination of a term and type as *the entel*. In the second chapter, I will discuss the environment in which *the entel* type became popular. However, discussing *the entel* figure just in relation to the epochal conditions of Turkey would be incomplete. In his body, there are also traces of the old discussions about the positions and identity of the intellectuals in Turkey. In this chapter, I want to first present a historical-chronological account of the different meanings and roles given to the intellectuals in the Turkish context. Of course, this will be a very short and limited overview, in order to present a historical background for certain characteristics or themes visible in *the entel* type. I will construct this section around two themes: the intellectuals vs. masses dichotomy and the question of westernization. This discussion of the historical perceptions of the intellectuals does not provide sufficient background to help us understand the conditions of emergence for *the entel*. Some aspects of these conditions and of *the entel* type are related to the western trends of the post 80's (which are presented and accepted as the global trends of the age) that also affect the roles and identities of intellectuals in a wider scale. Thus in another section, I will try to discuss the shifts in the positions of the intellectuals in an age marked by the rise of the New Right, neoliberal trends and consumerism. To put it in a different way, I will present an

account of the diverse views trying to understand the positions of the intellectuals in an era frequently referred to as the era of postmodernity.

Before starting to write about these two topics, I should state that, in presenting a general discussion of intellectuals, I do not claim to position *the entel* type as a group among the intellectuals. In this study, I do not have the purpose to look for the place of *the entels* within society, or to give an account of whether they really exist or not. In presenting first a historical and than an epochal overview, I hope to prepare a ground to better conceive the conditions of emergence for *the entel* figure.

1.1. The Ivory Tower and Dreams of Westernization: An Account of the Intellectuals in the Turkish Historical Context

In his short book called *Yeni Orta Sınıf* (*The New Middle Class*), Ali Şimşek discusses the cultural structure of Turkey in the late 80's and early 90's through the transformation of mass media channels. He analyzes the cartoon magazines, which are prominent publications in which popular trends of the era are crystallized. In his evaluation of the new figures emerging in such magazines, he also discusses *the entel* type, and proposes to evaluate this new type as a continuation of a very old dichotomy, which he calls the "Karagöz reflex" (Şimşek, 2005: 106). In the traditional Turkish shadow play, *Karagöz* stands as the figure that is identified with the sensibility of the common people, in contrast to *Hacivat*, his buddy who represents the intellectual elites of the era. The contrast between the two characters is created through their dialogues, body languages, appearances, interests, manners, etc. Although *Karagöz* is positioned as

belonging to “the low culture”, in all the plays he is able to reign over *Hacivat* with his sincerity, energy, and craftiness. He represents the common sense and mocks the superficiality of *Hacivat* who is depicted as living in his ivory tower, remote from the people. The tension between *Karagöz* and *Hacivat* is considered as the epitome of the long lasting clash between the intellectuals and the masses.

In the body of *the entel*, among other things, it is possible to find traces of this clash as well. The identity of *the entel* type is created in contrast to the common people. S/he stands for an imaginary intellectual figure who is self indulgent, and who does not care about the concerns of other people. Even in occasional cases where s/he is depicted as contemplating the matters of the country, s/he does this in a pessimistic mood, without believing that it is possible to change the inferior conditions of the people: In the agenda of *the entel*, the ideal to save the country is reduced to fruitless discussions which are doomed to be futile. This unproductive nature of *the entel* type is also connected to his/her worries about the people’s approach to him/her. As will be seen in the cartoon strips analyzed in Chapter 3 as well, *the entel* usually complains that people do not understand him/her. However, in his ironic depiction, this complaint is parodied since s/he is most of the time illustrated as speaking in an incomprehensible language full of intentionally obscured concepts, or concepts borrowed from the western culture. S/he always thinks about leaving the country, which also indicates that s/he does not live where s/he really belongs to. This is also marked by his/her modern appearance. However, the appearance of *the entel*, like his vocabulary is also an imitation of Western styles. As such s/he is assumed to be alienated from the “reality” of the country s/he

lives in. On the other hand, she also lacks the necessary qualities in order to be counted as a part of the West, since s/he is nothing but an imitator. Therefore, his/her desires to leave the country are never realized as are his/her ambitions to be understood by the people. *The entel* as such looks like a *züppe* (a term used in Turkish for both "the dandy" and "the snob") wandering around the city in search for his/her lost (and non-existent) place. S/he usually ends up in bars (the so-called "entel bars") where his/her despair is deepened further.

As Nurdan Gürbilek observed, the *züppe*-like depiction of *the entel* might even be traced back to the Tanzimat period of the Ottoman Empire (Gürbilek, 2003). This period is very important in terms of understanding the clash between the intellectual groups and the masses in relation to the westernization/modernization ideal that infused the mood of the era. Though in certain periods it lost its significance, this intellectuals/masses dichotomy was revived repeatedly especially during and after situations of social and/or political crises that result in structural reforms, coup d'etats, or similar forced interventions in the political sphere. Before turning to Gürbilek's analysis, I will present an account of the main struggles in the formation of modern intellectuals in Turkey.

Studies about the intellectuals in Turkey, usually take the *Tanzimat*[4] period (1839-1876) as a milestone. 'Tanzimat', (which means "reorganization" in Turkish) refers to a period of reforms in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of sultans Abdulmejid (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876). This period starts with the

[4] For a detailed discussion of the Tanzimat period in relation to the westernization, see Şerif Mardin's *Super Westernization in urban life in the Ottoman Empire in the last Quarter of the nineteenth century* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

Rescript of 1839 known as *Tanzimat Fermanı* or *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* (*The Tanzimat Edict* or *The Rescript of the Rose Chamber*). This Rescript proclaimed the principle of equality for persons of all religions before the law, and also guaranteed security of life, honor and property. The most radical reform introduced with the *Tanzimat Edict* is claimed to be the principle of equality for persons of all religions before the law (Lewis, 1968). However, Emre Kongar disagrees with this evaluation and claims that the most crucial legislation of the Edict was the recognition of the rights of the central bureaucracy, which had already become a political power in the Empire (1986, 22-23). In this period, the power of the *Ulema*[5], people functioning as theocrats, jurists and teachers, who evaluate social matters and state affairs according to the Islamic rules, started to diminish since their scholastic way of thinking was also held responsible for the decline of the Empire. They were accused of being obstacles in the modernization of the Empire in line with new scientific developments and modern administrative practices of the West. A new elite group who were educated in the western countries started to gain power and to take over the power of the *Ulema* in the administrative affairs of the state. This new group was later called *münevvers* (meaning 'enlightened' in Turkish) which positioned them in relation to the western intellectuals of the enlightenment period. *The münevvers* took their authority from their knowledge about world affairs rather than from religion. That is why, they are considered as the first 'modern' intellectuals of the Empire. This does not mean that people living through their

[5] "*Ulema* was applied as a common term for those scholars who completed their *madrasa* training and gained an *icazet* (graduation degree), and took responsibilities in law, education, primary religious services and occasionally in bureaucracy or devoted themselves personally to community services in Ottoman polity" (Ipsirli 2004: 1).

mental labor did not exist during the previous decades of the Empire. Besides the *Ulema*, there were also poets, miniaturists, and other artists, gathered under the name *Arif* who were involved in occupations that require mental labor. However, like the *Ulema*, the *Arif* also does not stand as a group *for themselves*; economically they were strictly tied to the imperial family and their taste. Murat Belge argues that it is the relative secularization of knowledge and its producers during this period that enables the consideration of the Tanzimat as a period in which intellectuals -in the modern sense of the term- have emerged (Belge 1983: 123-124). The new intellectuals' approach to the government of the country was opposed to the *Ulema* since their main ideal was reinstituting the structure of the Empire in line with the developments in the western countries. Here we should stress the fact that the conflict of interest between *the münevvers* and *the ulema* does not mean that *the münevvers'* thoughts also contradicted the mindset of the imperial family. On the contrary, they were the carriers of the imperial families' ideal of going back to the good old days by importing western practices. The intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire were enlightened by the initiative of the imperial authority, since it was this authority that sent them to western countries for their education. Based on this fact, Belge concludes that the Ottoman intellectuals never gained an institutional identity as their western counterparts who have emerged as a group in their own right on the scene of history through their power struggle with the authority of the Church. (ibid: 124) Şerif Mardin and Cemil Meriç also underline this nature of the Ottoman intellectuals during the Tanzimat period. In his account of İbrahim Şinasi, a prominent poet/journalist of the era, Mardin argues that the new

intellectuals of the Tanzimat period did not have autonomy in their "culture of critical discourse" ("kritik söylem kültürü") since most of them were educated through the state's initiative and functioned as the new bureaucrats of the state. Because of their bond with the state, they did not have chief power in their struggle with the conservative groups who continuously resisted modern reforms. When the counter strategies of the conservatives took the shape of violent demonstrations, for instance, the intellectuals could not ignore their oppositions to the reforms since they were also the representatives of the state apparatus, and responsible for keeping peace within the society. Mardin distinguishes these intellectuals by calling them "encyclopedists" to underline their dual position in the modernization process: They contributed to the modernization of the society as far as their bureaucratic occupations permitted (2005: 268). Cemil Meriç presents a similar account, however, he rather problematizes the Tanzimat intellectuals' orientation towards the West. He opposes the term *münevver* to refer to the new intellectuals and proposes another name for them: *Müstağrib* (one who admires the west, an occidental), and explains this term with allusion to the story of *Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves*: "*Müstağrib* is a young fellow who discovers the cave of the 40 Thieves, and wants to take the treasures of this foreign civilization and bring them to his country"[6] (1983: 133). Meriç argues that the first *müstağribs* gathered around one of the new institutions of the Tanzimat period, the *Translation Office*. For Meriç, the logic of the *müstağribs* is crystallized in a famous phrase by Şinasi who also worked in the Translation Office: "To marry the mature mind of Asia with the fresh mind of Europe"

[6] "Müstağrib, Kırk Haramiler'in mağarasını keşfeden ve yabancı bir medeniyetin hazinelerini ülkesine taşımak isteyen toy bir delikanlı."

(“Asya'nın akl-ı piranesi ile Avrupa'nın bikr-i fikrini izdivaç ettirmek”). However, according to Meriç, such a marriage has never occurred in the Ottoman Empire since “the new intellectuals forgot about ‘the mature mind’ of Asia and solely turned towards newly found Europe.” (ibid.)

As seen in the accounts of Belge, Mardin, and Meriç, the intellectuals’ relation with state authority, and their orientation towards western values and practices stand as two main themes shaping the discussions about the rise of the new intellectuals as public figures in the late Ottoman Empire. However, the telos of the modernization endeavor of the intellectuals (and the state as well) was partial westernization: Importing techniques and scientific practices in order to rehabilitate the existing institutions and structure of the Empire, while keeping the moral and cultural values of the Islamic way of life intact. However, since the implementation of those techniques and practices (i.e. the reform of the educational institutions) both required a shift in the mind set of society, and a transformation in the way of living, this fantasy of a partial westernization was said to be resisted by the masses. For instance, Şerif Mardin claims that there are two reasons of the clash that emerged between the masses and the intellectuals after the Tanzimat period: One is that the masses are never revolutionary; rather they are conservative due to the uncertainty caused by the poor conditions of their lives. Once they face a pressure trying to introduce further changes into their lives, this causes them to feel insecure to a greater extent. Moreover, Mardin states that such conservatism is more radical in the Islamic societies since the social and moral norms and values of these societies are not open to criticism: “Openness to criticism which is accepted as a virtue in the Western

culture is perceived as a defect in the Islamic culture." (2005: 277) This account of Mardin in terms of understanding the masses/intellectuals dichotomy presents a very normative evaluation since it over-generalizes the characteristics of the masses, and imagines an essential difference between the Islamic and Western cultures. Besides, Mardin discusses this dichotomy as a given fact, an objective phenomena regardless of the processes in which it is continuously negotiated and recreated. Thus, I will propose that the opposition between the masses and the intellectuals is a descriptive dichotomy, rather than an objective one, strictly tied to the western oriented modernization projects. It is not easy to pinpoint whether this dichotomy dwells on social realities or is just an outcome of the discursive strategies of different intellectual groups. (By social realities, I mean certain demonstrations, rebellious activities, etc. organized by the participation of the masses against the modernist reform practices of the Tanzimat bureaucrats. And by discursive strategies, I mean all the speeches, articles, poems, novels, etc. in which the masses/the intellectuals dichotomy was reproduced by the intellectuals opposing the implications of the western-oriented intellectuals.) For instance, the Young Ottomans were an intellectual group standing against the westernization ideals of the bureaucratic intellectuals of the Tanzimat period. They were also educated in the West, but differed from the western-oriented intellectuals by their emphasis on patriotism. Şerif Mardin, distinguishes their writings by a mood of "enthusiasm" which constructs an imagined bridge between them and the masses. (ibid: 269-273) They accused the reformist intellectuals of being imitators of the West, dandies who tried to impersonate Western values regardless of their roots, and defended a turn back to the authentic reality of the

people. In another article, “Excessive Westernization after Tanzimat” (“Tanzimattan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma”), Mardin points out the abundance of decadent dandy characters in the novels from the period, and interprets this as a reaction to the endeavor of intellectual elites in terms of the westernization of the institutions of the Empire (Mardin, 2000). It is possible to observe such snobbish characters who are estranged from their own culture in novels such as *Felatun Bey'le Rakım Efendi* (*Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi*, by Ahmet Mithat), *Şıpsevdi* (*Quick to Fall*, by Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar), *Efruz Bey* (*Mr. Efruz*, by Ömer Seyfettin), *Araba Sevdası* (*The Carriage Affair*, by Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem). Based on the name of the protagonist from *The Carriage Affair*, Bihruz Bey, Mardin calls this abundance of dandies the “Bihruz syndrome”. Bihruz Bey is depicted in the novel as a *züppe* character who is an admirer of the western culture and ignorant of his own culture. He is not happy with the insufficient Turkish language, and tries to use his inadequate French in any occasion that creates various scenes in which he was ridiculed. Mardin finds an intricate point in the ridicule of Bihruz since the writer, Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem was among the elites of the era, and also a defender of the modernization. He was also one of the most prominent figures of the Serveti Fünun movement in literature, defending the motto of “art for its own sake”. Mardin proposes that Ekrem’s satirical approach to the character of Bihruz Bey was caused by his closeness to the Young Ottoman movement. His mockery of the dandy functions to underline the Young Ottomans’ discontent with the reforms of the *Tanzimat* era, and it functions as “a social control” since it provokes lower classes against the modernist intellectuals of the day (ibid.)

As Nurdan Gürbilek pointed, Mardin's approach to the *Carriage Affair* just explains the sociological dimension of the novel, excluding possible literary interpretations which might account for the ambivalence of the author's, critics' and readers' positions (Gürbilek, 2003: 611). However, for the sake of my discussion of the intellectuals, it is better to stick to such a framework. Gürbilek, takes the discussion further, and claims that "Bihruz syndrome" as a social control mechanism has implications affecting oppositions to the intellectuals throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, and it is possible to find its traces even in the popping up of the *entel* figure in the 80's:

> Mockery of this rootless creature, this freak of nature, this pretentious extravagant called *züppe* also had a significant place in the political discourse of modern Turkey. (…)Mardin rightly states that the opposition to the *züppe* was influential in Turkey up to the 1960s as an opposition to socialism. It is a response that left its traces in Turkish nationalism and anti-Western chauvinism. As a matter of fact, traces of the "Bihruz syndrome" are seen in Turkey even today in the opposition to intellectuals that was an important component of the cultural climate following the military coup in 1980. The *entel* figure (*entel* being the belittling abbreviation of the Turkish word "entelektüel" meaning "intellectual") was the main target of Turkish humor and especially of Turkish caricature in the 1980s and 1990s, and the word *entel* has a popular usage today designating people torn away from life, and of course, from manly virtues, people occupied with insignificant details, excessively sophisticated and rather effeminate. Hence, *züppe* designates both the imitating snob and the effeminate dandy. (ibid: 609)

Here, Gürbilek's observation that the mockery of the *züppe* left its traces in Turkish nationalism is very important. As such, we can say that in the construction of the Turkish national identity -a process started in the late periods of the Ottoman Empire and accelerated during the War of Independence and after the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923- meanings attributed to the West had a key role. Despite its inability to

stop the recession of the Empire, the western style modernization was never forsaken as the model for civilizing the country. It even continued in the first decades of the 20th century when the Empire was invaded by the Allies of the West including England, France, Greece and Italy. That ideal of western oriented modernization was kept not only among the last bureaucrats of the dying Empire prisoned in İstanbul, but also among Turkish nationalists who tried to stand against the imperialist invasion. Meltem Ahıska, in "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern" (2003), also points to the irresolute situation of the nationalist intellectuals in their evaluation of the West. Ahıska quotes an anecdote that Halide Edip Adıvar, a woman writer who participated in the National Struggle, wrote in her memoirs. Halide Edip was assigned with the duty of visiting the villages in order to report the violence done by the Greeks to Turkish villagers. In such a visit, "an old peasant woman complained to Halide Edip that her writing reports was in vain. She said, 'Why do you write? What could writing mean for a people who are being slaughtered?' Then she continued: 'I have asked for pity from the Greeks. (. . .) They told us that they have been sent by Avrope [Europe; in Turkish, Avrupa]. So, my girl, please tell that man called Avrope to leave us alone, we didn't do anything bad to him, tell him not to disturb us'[7]" (2003: 364). Here, the West represents a source of fear, "a threatening force" in Ahıska's words for the people of Anatolia under the imperialist invasion. However, Ahıska points to another dimension hinted in this anecdote, the ambivalent situation of the West for Halide Edip and other intellectuals struggling for independence: "While actually fighting the Western forces,

[7] Ahıska quotes this anectode from Halide Edip Adıvar's *Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı* (İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1994, p. 201).

Halide Edip and other Turkish intellectuals discussed and wrote on the possibilities of Westernization as a synonym of modernization. There was a wide gap between how the intellectuals and the local communities interpreted the 'West.' (…)Westernization and modernization had been brought on the agenda of the Turkish national elite by means of a threat, 'by convincing Turks of past and present inadequacy.' The constitutive lack was there, right at the center of national identity." (ibid.)

This "lack" will be further deepened after the national liberation and with the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923. The nationalist elites gathered around Mustafa Kemal and decided to take over the modernization project initiated in the last century of the Ottoman Empire since they also pointed the Western civilization as the benchmark for the reconstruction of the state and its institutions. However, there is a sharp difference between bureaucratic intellectuals of the early Republic and those of the Tanzimat period since the former were not committed to a partial westernization ideal namely importing the technical and scientific developments of the West while keeping the Islamic way of living. In the Turkish Republican ideology, the West was perceived as a model to be imported with all of its social and cultural practices as well as its institutions and techno-scientific developments. Thus, the modernization project of the Republic marked a rupture from the past which was realized in the sequential reforms not only created a framework for the modern constitution of the state, but also abruptly changed the practices of everyday life. The intellectuals of the era also played a key role in this westernization project since they took over the mission of educating ignorant people of Anatolia. They were also implementers of the state policies like their

counterparts in the Tanzimat period. This was again an outcome of the lack of proper occupations other than the state institutions in which the intellectuals might exist. Belge discusses that, especially after the Democrat Party took over the government of the country in 1950, the relative broadening of the private sector made it possible for the intellectuals to exist in various occupations other than state institutions (1983: 126). Belge also claims that the occupational liberation of the intellectuals from the state authority also further changed their way of thinking. He sees the roots of the struggle between the leftist intellectuals and the state, which started in the late 60's and continued throughout the 70's, in this occupational liberation of the intellectuals. And it might be claimed that through the violent practices of the military intervention of the March 12,1971, the intellectuals realized that their coalition with the state in order to modernize the country had come to an end. Here, referring to Gramsci's differentiation between the "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals[8], it is possible to claim that until the 60's, the majority of the intellectuals (at least as represented in the public sphere) had characteristics of the traditional intellectuals, supporting the ideology of the state. After the 60's, the intellectuals found new occupations and liberated themselves from the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Since then, the number of the "organic intellectuals" who conduct their mental labor against the hegemony of the state increased continuously.

[8] Gramsci divides intellectuals into two categories: traditional and organic. The traditional intelletual functions as the protector and instructor of knowledge, and works as teachers, priests, administrators, etc. The organic intellectual, on the other hand, acts as the organizers of a new culture, and a new legal system. He is actively involved in society and constantly struggle to change minds and expand markets. (Gramsci: 1999)

I am aware of the fact that such an overview of the contours of the formation of the intellectuals have shortcomings and is simplistic. However, it is necessary to point out three dimensions that shaped perceptions of the intellectuals throughout the modernization process of Turkey: 1) The Turkish intellectuals gained power in their organic attachment to the state institutions. 2) They were the forerunners of the western oriented modernization project since the Tanzimat period. 3) Their orientation towards the West was turned against them by the opposing intellectuals or politicians as an accusation of being remote or alienated from their people.

Here, I should stress one last point. The intellectuals' involvement with the West, and the adversity shown them because of their westernist attitudes dwell on a further tension between the localness and the foreignness. In order to elaborate this point, I would go back to the Gürbilek's discussion of the Tanzimat literature once more.

Nurdan Gürbilek reminds us of Orhan Koçak's analysis of the late Ottoman modernist novelist Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil. In his article, "Missed Ideal" ("Kaybedilmiş İdeal"), Koçak pointed out that the *Tanzimat* had introduced a "rift" in the Ottoman world by presenting Western culture as an ideal to be embraced, thereby reducing the "local ego" to "a state of infant-like helplessness before the foreign ideal." Koçak proposes "this rift experienced as a double-bind, resulting in a futility that defined the contours of much of modernist Turkish literature up to this very day." [9] Gürbilek evaluates this situation as a double deformation:

> The local self will cause the foreign ideal to appear as a deformed one, while the foreign ideal has already deformed that local self. The localness ensures that the foreign ideal is

[9] Gürbilek quotes from Orhan Koçak's "Kaptırılmış İdeal: Mai ve Siyah Üzerine Psikanalitik Bir Deneme, " (in Toplum ve Bilim, v. 70, 1996, p. 118, 147.)

> artificial, incomplete, and snobbish, whereas the foreign ideal has already transformed that localness into an inert, clumsy, and worn-out provinciality. The ideal will always look like a caricature of itself, something *alafranga* in the local scene, but the local scene itself is already reduced to a caricature of itself, something *alaturka* before the foreign ideal[10] (Gürbilek, 2003: 602).

In the emergence of the *entel* figure, the traces of this in-between situation of Turkish intellectuals between localness and foreignness (or westernness) are visible as well. S/he is a figure depicted as a foreigner in terms of his appearance and life style. However, especially in his encounters with the caricaturized local figures like the *zonta*, there are hints that the *entel* also carries marks of locality, at least envies localness as well as westernness. I am going to elaborate more on this aspect of *the entel* in Chapter 3.

At this point, before discussing the conditions of the post 80's Turkey where *the entel* figure disseminated, I want to present a short account on the literature about the changing roles of the intellectuals in the contemporary world.

1.2. The Changing Functions of The Intellectuals in the Postmodern Condition

Within the enormous literature on intellectuals, Zygmunt Bauman's discussion of the transformation of the intellectual's role from *the legislator* to *the interpreter* offers inspirations to understand the occurrence of *the entel* in the Turkish context. In *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity, and Intellectuals* Bauman proposes a treatment of the category of the intellectual "as a 'spot', a 'territory' inhabitated by a shifting population, and open to invasions, (…)" and also "a structural element within the societal configuration, an element –defined not by its intrinsic qualities, but by the place it occupies within the system of dependencies which such a

[10] In Turkish, *alafranga* is the belittling term for "French style," "something or someone snobbish, imitating European ways" and *alaturka* is the belittling term for "Turkish style," "something or someone stuck in the narrow traditional world." (Gürbilek, 2003: 625)

figuration represents, and by the role it performs in the reproduction and development of the figuration" (Bauman, 1987: 19). Such an understanding excludes the excessively normative accounts that search for a true essence in terms of how the ideal intellectual, for any time and any place, should be. The intellectual occupation is contingent on socio-cultural conditions and power struggles which also determine it as an unfixed category. As such, perceptions of the intellectuals and meanings attributed to them fluctuate through different cultures and different epochs.

Bauman, in his analysis of the evolution of intellectuals starting from "les philosophes" of the 18th century tries to understand how and why such a category as the modern intellectual has come into existence. He foregrounds the rise of the administrative tasks of the absolutist monarchy that called for "a grand design for a better society; experts, specialists, advisers –those who 'know better'"[11] (ibid. 36). Bauman finds parallels between the modern intellectual, whose role he claims to be that of a legislator, and *les philosophes*. The legislator role of the modern intellectual requires "making authoritative statements, which arbitrate in controversies of opinions." (ibid: 5). Bauman points out how the role of the intellectual has been transformed in the postmodern condition from the legislator into the interpreter whose work consists of "translating statements, made within one communally based tradition so that they can be understood within the system of knowledge based on another tradition." (ibid: 6). Here, Bauman employs the ambivalent concepts "the modern" and "the postmodern" not as two different and sequential epochs, but as two different contexts and/or two different

[11] Bauman's proposition that the first modern intellectuals has emerged in order to take part in the administrative facilities of the state also coincides with the emergence of the münevvers in the Tanzimat period, which I have discussed in the previous section.

"cognitive models" which enable the reevaluation of the changing roles and strategies of intellectuals. In his terms, the modern/postmodern dichotomy "stands for differences in understanding the nature of the world, and the social world in particular, and in understanding the related nature, and purpose of the intellectual work" (ibid: 3). The shift in the role of the intellectuals cannot be thought of as specific to their fields only. As they are caused by certain transformations in social and cultural processes, they also affect the values and practices of that society. For Bauman, one of the most important outcomes of the change of mood from "the modern" into "the postmodern", and the accompanying shift in the role of the intellectual from "the legislator" to "the interpreter", is "the absence of grounds on which authoritative judgments of value can be made" (ibid: 156).

The absence of grounds for intellectuals as such also problematizes the function of intellectuals and raises the question whether or not they are of use for the well-being of the society. Such an instrumental understanding of the intellectuals further removes the prestige and privilege of the intellectuals in the public scene. Sibel Erol also argues that there is a general trend in the perception of the intellectuals in western cultures, which is oriented towards the demystification of the authority of intellectuals:

> From the 1920's to the present, the Western conception of the intellectual has moved towards a demystification and deprivileging of the intellectual's function and contribution to society. His image is reduced from an idealist and selfless leader who thinks in terms of the whole to a highly specialized expert in a limited field. (Erol 1994: 1)

It is not possible to conceive the transformation of the intellectuals, independent from the changing perceptions about knowledge, which were also further transformed by

the shifting roles of intellectuals. As Lyotard puts it, in "the postindustrial" and "the postmodern age", the status of knowledge is altered which also transforms the traditional roles of intellectuals:

> Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its 'use- value'. …Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major -perhaps the major- stake in the worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control of access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor. (Lyotard, 1984: 3, 4-5)

"Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity" will also impose a new role on the intellectual. Lyotard chooses to discuss this dimension of the issue in terms of the academia. However, I will try to hold onto a more general perspective. In the postmodern age, various writers/scholars underlined the fact that new intellectuals who are highly specialized in their fields came about. Foucault, for instance, in his evaluation of changing regimes of knowledge/truth in relation to power structures, proposes that the contemporary intellectual is a "specific intellectual". Foucault claims that the new intellectuals have different roles and functions compared to the traditional intellectual figure who "*par excellence* used to be the writer: as a universal consciousness, a free subject, he was counterposed to the service of the State or Capital –technicians, magistrates, teachers." (Foucault 1980: 206). The specific intellectuals do not deal with universal issues; rather they are specialists in their fields, psychiatrists, engineers, doctors, academicians, etc. In their body, the writing ceases to be the marking sign of the intellectuality since they are politicized not through what they write, but through what they do. Foucault conceives this new pattern of intellectuality very positively and

evaluates it as a “global process of politicization”. Of course in this evaluation, Foucault does not think of the specific intellectual as an ordinary technician who devotes himself to the constitution of the capitalist order. He gives his frequently cited example of Robert Oppenheimer as an illustration of the specific intellectual: An atom scientist who made the knowledge about the destructiveness of the atomic bomb public. As such, the specific intellectual is politicized through the unveiling of power relations behind the production and distiribution of knowledge. However, he does not stand on the periphery of these regimes as an observer. What he tries to demystify is also his interconnectedness with this power. In Foucault’s words: “The intellectual role is no longer to place himself ahead and to the side in order to express the stifled truth of collectivity, rather it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into his object and instrument in the sphere of knowledge, truth, consciousness and discourse.” (ibid: 207-208)

Foucault welcomes the emerging specific intellectuals since he finds a new possibility for politicization in them. In the body of the specific intellectual, the acclaimed gap between theory and practice is more or less trespassed. Since he gets political through his work in his specific field, in the action of the specific intellectual, theory and practice are merged. However, I would say that Foucault’s specific intellectual, though proposed against the idealized figure of the universal intellectual, also carries the traces of idealization. The specificity of the intellectual vocation does not necessarily and generally bring about a politics of unveiling as Foucault claimed. Rather, as discussed by Lyotard in his account of knowledge, most of the time, such specificity

renders both the knowledge and the intellectual valueless and hands them over into the service of the capital. Besides, Foucault proposes the specific intellectual as an alternative to the traditional intellectual figure, who, through his desire for reaching the ultimate knowledge and truth, positions himself in a mythical place outside the existing power relations. However, Foucault's account of the specific intellectual does not provide the necessary explanations to understand how this intellectual, occupied with the deeds of his own field, might situate himself in the mission of unveiling power-knowledge-truth relations. The specific intellectual seems to be capable of excluding himself from the homogenizing pressure of the hegemonic structures and institutions. Radhakrishnan also raises a similar criticism towards Foucault's specific intellectual, and asks: "What gives Foucault the right to chose freely and joyously to be a specific, deglobalized, local, and countermnemonic intellectual, given his historical proximity to the regimes and narratives of colonialism and imperialism" (Radhakrishnan 1990: 70). What Radhakrishnan's argument draws attention to is the fact that not only the right to speak for others (as Foucault opposed), but also the right to speak about knowledge produced within one's own field is confined to the predispositions of the hegemonic narratives and discourses. In the final analysis, Oppenheimers are exceptional figures in history. Today, among the people whom Foucault considers to be specific intellectuals, the majority of experts remain cloistered in their fields, which are integrated with free market principles, and are gaining power through selling their knowledge, as foreseen by Lyotard.

Informationalization, commodification, and massification of knowledge and intellectuals have been accelerated in the post 80's era through the global dispersion of the neoliberal policies and the expansion of the reign of the logic of the free market. These developments rendered the potential Foucault saw in the specific intellectual futile. Once the market has gained mythical power as to measure everything on a global scale, the logic of free floating capital has become the norm to evaluate everything on a monetary basis. Not only physical labour, but also mental labour has started to be evaluated in terms of the profits they provided. As such, the intellectuals have been exposed to the calculating eye of the market and they are also labeled with an appropriate price tag.

Thus, the specificity and expertise of intellectuals do not necessarily result in the democraticization of knowledge on a macro scale. On the contrary, knowledge mediated through the market lost its intrinsic value and became equivalent with money. In such a view, the intellectuals whose labor does not produce concrete results or commodities fitting the new reality framed by the logic of the market are assumed to be parasitical to society. Their distinctiveness is erased; they are invited to demonstrate what good they provide for the well-being of the society (read as the well being of the market). Here I do not want to present a totally pessimistic picture, saying that there is no room for intellectuals to act outside the reality of the market. What I try to underline is the fact that if we assumed the public realm to be the locale of intellectuals (Habermas, 1991), even if intellectuals cut their ties with capital since this realm is determined by capital, they would not be able to escape the equating functioning of the market. Actually, Jean

Paul Sartre, who evaluated intellectuals as "beings-in-contradiction," already pointed out this paradoxical nature of intellectuals in modern societies. For Sartre, the intellectuals can respond to the pressures by conformism, subserving themselves to the authorities, accepting the dominant ideology, and becoming apolitical. In this case, Sartre underlines, "his rulers typically say with satisfaction of a man, 'he is no intellectual'" (Sartre 1975: 244). The other way for intellectuals is to become aware of the fact that their mental labour, producing knowledge, and as such reconstituting hegemonic institutions contradict their humanism and their search for universal ends. However, in this second way, he cannot escape pressures of the hegemony, either. If the intellectual becomes aware of his bond with the system and tries to break this bond, then the intellectual is accused of being a monster, a vampire-like being for the society. He is referred to by other people as someone who "interferes in what does not concern him" (ibid). Today, I would argue that this second case ceased to be an exclusionary position for intellectuals. If an intellectual is perceived to be a danger and accused of being an ineffectual dreamer, his/her position is negotiated within the pragmatist logic of the capital and most of the time appropriated by the market in order to be included in the functioning of the culture industries. As such, like manual labour, mental labour is also subservied to the free market. In an article defending the reappropriation of mass communication technologies by intellectuals, Douglas Kellner presents an overview of the position of intellectuals in relation to the capital:

> Today, the culture industries require growing numbers of applied psychologists, copy-writers, statisticians, computer operators, managers, and so on. The increased specialization and technological imperatives of contemporary capitalism require increased numbers of technicians, scientists, and publicists, and less philosophers, historians, and

> workers in the humanities. The intellectuals, like everyone and everything else, are thus subject to the laws of capitalist accumulation, although they are often the last to see this, thinking that they operate in a realm above economics and material interests. Intellectuals are thus often the dupes and servants of capital, even though they are not actually serving it by choice. (Kellner, 5)

In an age, where the world is frequently being referred to as a global village, interconnected with high-tech mass communication networks, supranational capital, and other global flows, the meanings and functions of intellectuals are shifting as I tried to illustrate in this short section. As the homogenizing effect of the industry-based, mass media-dominated cultural practices equates different localities under the assimilating power of global capital, the intellectuals' capacity for imaginative thinking (thinking about the possibility of a better world) is withering away as well. Of course, there is also room for the marginality attributed to intellectuals, however, this is also a more or less legalized and systemized marginality; a decoration piercing the boredom of the commodified practices of the culture industry. However, it should be said that most of the time the intellectual vocation cannot escape appropriation and further commodification by the principles and mechanisms of the market.

In line with these evaluations about intellectuals in the postmodern condition, I would propose to read *the entel* as a figure of the flourishing culture industries of Turkey in the post 80's era. In the popularity of this figure, it is possible to see both the loss of belief in the intellectual vocation and an accompanying demythologization of mental labour. In the Turkish context, this demythologization and loss of belief was first initiated by the dicta of the Military Security Council, which governed the country for three years following the coup d'etat of September 12, 1980. It was further deepened by

the neoliberal policies of the Motherland Party, which introduced a new social reality into the agenda of the country. In this atmosphere where the loss of reputation of intellectuals became a common mood, it is not surprising that a figure like *the entel*, parodying the intellectuals' demoralization and "useless" activities has emerged. In the following section, I will try to pinpoint the dynamics of the post 80's era in Turkey, which provided a fertile ground for the emergence of *the entel*.

CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF THE POST 80's PERIOD IN TURKEY: NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS EXTENSIONS

In this chapter I will try to give a brief account of the social and cultural conditions within which *the entel* type has emerged as a major stereotype in caricatures, and in the discourse of media. I will also try to comment on the transformation of the image of the intellectuals after the 80's and to look at how *the entel* relates to the intellectuals of the period. By doing this, I hope to present a prelude to my analysis of the caricatures in which *the entel* type figures. In order to analyze the tensions and strategies formed around *the entel* type, we need to focus on the dynamics of social and cultural life emerging throughout the 80's. Needless to say, I neither have the intention of isolating the social and cultural realm from the political and economical spheres, nor have I the claim of giving an all comprehensive picture of the cultural climate. Mine is a modest and humble overview of certain characteristics of this period, which could provide a ground for understanding the emergence of *the entel* category and enrich my analysis of *the entel* typification through caricatures.

1980 has been a crucial turning point not only for Turkish history, but for the history (or historiography) of many western societies in general. There are various accounts that take 1980 as a milestone for their observations of a certain 'turn' (such as postmodern 'turn', neoliberal 'turn', an individualistic 'turn', a global 'turn') in western societies. However, different from the implications of the concept for the so-called "western culture", for the Turkish context, the 'turn' introduced by the year 1980 does

not only exist in an interpretative frame, but also has a sharp and brutal precision marked by *the coup d'etat* of September 12, 1980. Like other milestones of the Turkish Republic, the turn of 1980 was also initiated by a state apparatus, and as in most cases, this apparatus was the military force. Though its basic claim was "to rehabilitate" society by reconstituting the institutional order of the state[12], this military intervention - differing from the previous military interventions of 1960 and 1970- marked a more extensive political project to transform the existing social, political, cultural, and economic phenomena. As obviously observable in the constitution accepted in the referendum of November 7, 1982 (with a percentage of 91.4), 1980 marks a violent detachment from earlier decades[13]. The radical rupture showed itself as total oppression in the first three years during which the dicta of the National Security Council and its puppet government[14]was in power, and as an expansion of commodities, cultural practices, and mass communication technologies after the neoliberal politics of Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP)[15] were put into practice. However, for a

[12] The head of Turkish General Staff, Kenan Evren pointed the aim of the military intervention in his speech on the 12th of September as such: "to preserve the unity of the country, reconstitute the authority of the state and destroy factors preventing proper functioning of democratic order." (Evren, 1990: 546)
[13] Evren in a speech that he made in Afyon on the 29th of August, 1982, revealed the mind-set of the new constitution: "I never said that the new Constitution will bring more liberty than the Constitution of 1961. On the contrary I said: 'The Constitution of 1961 was loose and abundant for us. Since it did not fit us, it led us to the coup d'etat of September the 12th.' Now it is time to sacrifice individual rights and liberties for the peace of the society." ["Ben hiçbir yer ve hiçbir zamanda hazırlanacak yeni Anayasa, 1961 Anayasası'ndan daha ileri özgürlükler getirecek demedim. Tam tersine 'O anayasa bize bol geldi, içinde oynamaya başladık, oynaya oynaya 12 Eylül'e geldik" dedim. Toplumun güvenliği, toplumun huzuru için kişi hak ve menfaatlerinden fedakârlıkta bulunmak zorundayız."] (Evren, 1991: 237)
[14] One week after the coup d'etat, on 20th of September, 1980, former commander of the Turkish Naval Forces, Bülend Ulusu was assigned as the prime minister by Kenan Evren who was simultaneously the head of Turkish General Staff, Turkish National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu/MGK), and thus Turkish state. Bülend Ulusu and his government took vote of confidence from the five members of the MGK and governed the country till the elections of 1983 under the strict supervision and control of MGK.
[15] ANAP is the party founded by Turgut Özal that won the 1983 elections-first democratic election after 1980 and governed the country for 8 years.

various number of accounts, the neoliberal expansion introduced by ANAP's political projects did not bring relief for the society although it presented itself as a relief from "the polemical, violent, and futile"[16] struggles of the past. Rather, it took over the basic project of the military intervention to break people's relation with the politics. Whereas the National Security Council implemented this project by the pressure of military force; ANAP mediated it through its neoliberal discourse which demonized and humiliated the oppositional politics of the past, and introduced and supported the western life style as a role model for the society which promised richness, comfort, and peacefulness.[17] The ideal of being integrated to the world economy and culture was further redefined and transformed the realm of politics as well. The neoliberal discourse supported technicalization and informationalization of the politics and curtailed its radical and utopist aspects. As Ömer Laçiner pointed out: "The target of the 1982 Constitution and other political implications of September 12 whose basic framework continues till now, has been to repress the political sensibility and consciousness of society, and eventually to depoliticize people"[18] (Laçiner, 2002: 15). Thus, from a certain standpoint, one of the basic characteristics of the politics of the period when *the entel* type emerged was the

[16] In ANAP's political discourse, condemning the recent past (second half of the 70's where clashes between different political groups went violent) was a common rhetorical strategy. Turgut Özal, the head of the party, frequently accused opposing views and parties as being old fashioned and stuck in the ruins of the 70's.

[17] Actually the ideal of being integrated to the western culture has been an ongoing theme in Turkish history as I have discussed in Chapter 1. What makes the post 80's period different from the earlier decades is the opening of the market to the foreign investment and commodities. Moreover, the developments in the mass communication technologies informed people more easily and speedily about the developments in the western world. As such the ideal of being westernized found its most suitable material basis after the 80's.

[18] "1982 Anayasası ve 12 Eylül rejimi altında yapılıp, ana hatlarıyla günümüze kadar korunan siyasal düzenlemenin amacı defalarca vurguladığımız gibi toplumu politik duyarlılıktan, politikleşmekten uzaklaştırmak, caydırmak, bu vasfı köreltmekti."

removal of 'politics' from daily life while trying to create a culture of consensus dominated by the discourse of economics. In this period, individualistic economic interests replaced the forms of political organization. This is obvious in the following statements of Taha Akyol, one of the leading members of the ANAP. He redefines the Turkish New Right as follows: "Representation of the conservative values, which have always been rejected by the Jacobin and official ideology, with the economic rationality, which is the real rationality that avoids any utopian vision."[19] Hence within the neoliberal ideology of the ANAP, economics was declared to be more important than politics. During the reign of the ANAP governments, the political action lost its future prospects and has been reduced to the short term policies which first and foremost targeted material prosperity. In this decade, politics itself introduced and supported the apolitical, and widened the scope of the apolitical whereas the realm of economics was widened. On the other hand, there are opposing views rejecting evaluation of the post 80's as an era of depoliticization. For instance, Nilüfer Göle does not agree with the common interpretation that 80's was a period where people got more and more detached from the field of politics. Rather she claims that in this period a different political culture had continuously been developing, which was marked by 'consensus' in contrast to 'clash' and 'conflict' that dominated the politics of the previous decade (Göle, 2000: 37-40). For Göle, this tendency towards consensus is not something bad by definition, rather it's something to overcome the intolerance and impatience not only among the political parties but also among different social groups as well: "After the 80's, different

[19] Quoted in *7. Kuruluş Yıldönümünde Türk Siyasal Hayatında Siyasi Kültür ve Ekonomik Politika Bakımından Anavatan Partisi* (1989), p. 30.

political movements backed down from their constant opposition against the state and faced each other. There are various indicators that these different groups discovered and acknowledged each other's existence through banishing the ideological walls between them"[20] (ibid: 38). For Göle, the shift of emphasis in the political sphere (from ideological toughness, clash, and discussions around the system towards moderation, consensus and discussions around policies), eventually presented pluralism as a possibility of redefining societal relations after the 80's. Throughout this period, the civil society has improved itself to an extent where it has become the transporter of the modernization project. For Göle, the turn of the 80's was a period when the state initiated modernization project (which dominated the history of Turkish republic since its foundation) started to become outdated and was replaced by the society initiated modernization project. However, the change in the actors of modernization did not necessarily introduce a change in the understanding and implementation of modernization. Though the soul of modernization was marked by liberalism after the 80's, under the absence of a corresponding liberal ethical code, this liberalism was frequently confused with imitative westernism. Göle defines this situation as "liberal delusion" ("liberal yanılgı") and proposes that the late 80's and early 90's marked such a delusion following the reformist policies of the 80's. The reason behind this delusion and other discontents of the neoliberal turn was the absence of the liberal ethical code:

> Through the development of liberalism, it becomes more and more important to internalize its ethical code and to regulate social relations accordingly, especially in different fields of social life such as business ethics, professionalism, public

[20] "Farklı siyasi akımlar 80 sonrasında, yüzlerini devlete muhalefetten birbirlerine çevirmişler ve aralarındaki ideolojik duvarları yer yer yıkarak, birbirlerinin varlığını keşfettiklerine, kabul ettiklerine dair işaretler vermişlerdir."

> consciousness, civic manners. Liberalism is not the state of unlimited freedom; once it's developed, a stronger liberal ethical code is required.[21] (ibid: 57)

Actually, whether the absence or the presence of this liberal ethical code is responsible for the "liberal delusion" is a debatable issue. There are opposing opinions claiming that this delusive state marks the natural development of neoliberal policies since these policies enforce acceleration of commodification, support consumerism and subordinate social life to the principles of free market. Carl Boggs, in *The End of Politics* discusses a similar situation in the American context, the dynamo behind the global appraisal of neoliberal politics, but his interpretations of this appraisal is far more pessimistic:

> Today business elites are not only stronger and more aggressive than before, they face considerably less organized political opposition -owing in no small measure to their much enhanced international mobility and to the success of their propaganda, which trumpets the inevitability of "free market" economics as the only rational alternative. (…) Corporate domination is facilitated by a thoroughly depoliticized public that is consumed by spectacles and carnivals that take place of serious political debates, that substitute for genuine popular involvement that might conceivably pave the way toward greater self-governance. Hence the neoliberal order, geared far more toward values of democracy or the free market, has come to depend on an atomized society of disengaged individuals who feel alienated and powerless. (Boggs, 2000: 12)

Here, though one aspect of the rise of the neoliberal order, and culture of consensus it has created seem to be the pluralization of action groups, and acceleration of individual autonomy, from another perspective, these are just ornaments to mask the discontents of neoliberal policies. Rather than replacing the clashes of the previous decades through prompting reconciliation and consensus, neoliberal order, in Boggs'

---

[21] "Liberalizm geliştikçe esasında kamu alanına ilişkin yaşamsal alanlarda –örneğin iş ahlâkı, profesyonellik, kamu bilinci, kentsel görgü gibi– ahlâk kodunun içselleştirilmesi, insanlararası davranışların böylelikle düzenlenmesi önem kazanmaktadır. Liberalizm, her şeyin mübah olduğu sınırsız bir serbestlik değildir. Liberalizm geliştikçe etik değerlere ihtiyaç artmaktadır."

words, gave birth to a "culture of antipolitics" accompanied by the rise in consumerism, and the simultaneous decline of political consciousness.[22]

Whether it stems from the absence of an ethical code, or it is the natural outcome of neoliberal development, Göle's concept of "liberal delusion" remarks one of the key characteristics of the late 80's which will enrich our discussion of the figure of *the entel* in the following chapter: This liberal delusion is basically a kind of pathetic formalism. It showed itself as a deception where the form rendered the content unsubstantial and possessed its meanings. Through this deception, "putting on a pair of blue jeans, looking modern, even being young and beautiful is evaluated as being liberal." (Göle 2000: 59) As I will discuss in the following chapter, the soul of *the entel* type is also marked by such a delusion: S/he carries the premises and look of an intellectual, but what s/he lacks is the content that has been attributed to the 'true intellectual figure'. His/her name, which was constructed by dropping some letters from the word *entelektüel*, indicates this formalism: even in name s/he is a shortened version of the intellectual; a form without substance.

[22] For Boggs, culture of antipolitics have features as such: "an unmistakable retreat from the political realm; a decline in the trappings of citizenship and with it the values of democratic participation; a narrowing of public discourse and erosion of independent centers of thinking; a lessened capacity to achieve social change by means of statecraft or social governance; and the eventual absence of societal understanding of what is common and public, what constitutes a possible general interest amidst the fierce interplay of competing private and local claims." (Boggs, 2000: 22)

2.1.1 Obscuring Borders of the Public and Private Realms

Nurdan Gürbilek claims that one of the key characteristics of the 80's in Turkey is an impression that there occurred a deceptive expansion in the public realm which stemmed actually from the blurring of the line between private and public spheres (Gürbilek, 1992: 110-123). The multiple effect of shrinking space for political action, amplification of media channels, and a neoliberal shift of emphasis from the public to the private, transformed the structure and perception of public and private spheres.

Hannah Arendt's admirable observations about the public sphere in *The Human Condition* also provide insights in order to understand this blending of public and private realms in the Turkish context. In a section where she evaluates the recession of the public realm in a broad historical context, she applies the metaphor of "a table" in order to explain the function of the public realm:

> To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that, the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them. (Arendt 1958: 52)

The public sphere is vital for public life since it connects people and creates an idea of shared unity. There, people meet as peers, and are engaged in political action to attain their shared goals and ideals. Seyla Benhabib argues that, in Arendt's political thought, the public space has two main functions: *The holistic* function and *the epistemic* function (Benhabib 1996: 201-203). The holistic function points to the fact that Arendt's

view of the public space presupposes "a fair degree of homogeneity and convergence around a shared ethos" (ibid: 201). As such public space might appear as the political space where people might act with shared values for collective ideals. On the other hand, *the epistemic function* of the public space, Benhabib argues, is present in Arendt's attempt to distinguish boldly between the social and the political realms. In making such a sharp differentiation, Arendt underlines that not every collective activity involves a political attitude, or that not any action in the public sphere is political. "The authentic political attitude" for Arendt "is to transform the dictates of the self-interest into a common public goal"; and as such "anticipated communication with others transcends the boundaries of the face-to-face society" (ibid). For Arendt, the reason behind referring to modern society as mass society is the recession of the public sphere. Now, physically people again seem to be living together and getting involved in face-to-face communication, however this does not entail a political attitude. The deflation of public sphere annihilated the ground for common political action, and created a kind of turbulence in which the public realm occupied by politically conscious individuals is replaced by a kind of social sphere where individuals melted into the absorbing masses. In the social realm, as opposed to the political realm, the individuals get together because their personal needs are diverged in the same direction, not because they share common ideals "to transform the dictates of their self-interests." Social realm, in Arendtian sense, "is a kind of pseudo-public realm, a distortion of authentic public life characterized by a combination of conformity and egocentricity. In society, human beings are bound together, but the concerns that bind them are essentially private, to do

with production and consumption in a common economy and a common mass culture." (Canovan 1992: 117). The social sphere was thus marked by uniformity of individuals as opposed to the public sphere which was marked by plurality. Thus, what Arendt observes in the process where the public sphere was diminished is the historical rise of the social. For her, the rise of the social was initiated by the property owners' claim for protection against the public, which used to be a private manner. Hitherto through their organic ties with the state and its hegemonic institutions, the property owners (or the capital) managed to deceive the public that the protection of their private property rights is a public duty. By the effect of this delusion, in a relatively short time, Arendt argues, "the new social realm transformed all modern communities into societies of laborers and jobholders" (Arendt 1958: 46). Such a limited evaluation of public life excludes the premise of action from the lives of the people. "The emergence of society –the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices- (…) on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (ibid: 40). The rise of the social derives its strength from its power in claiming that it has the potential to preserve the private and at the same time present a possibility of existence with a public identity. However, for Arendt, the claim of the social to contain the public and the private is delusive, because the strategies of the social develop in favor of the fetishization of private space to an extent that the public sphere seems to be withering

away. It is not far fetched to claim that Arendt's remark about French people's fetishization of their private spaces turned to be the norm in today's modern societies:

> Since the decay of their once great and glorious public realm, the French have become masters in the art of being happy among 'small things,' within the space of their own four walls, between chest and bed, table and chair, dog and cat and flowerpot, extending to these things a care and tenderness which, in a world where rapid industrialization constantly kills off the things of yesterday to produce today's objects, may even appear to be the world's last, purely humane corner. This enlargement of the private, the enchantment, as it were, of a whole people, does not make it public, does not constitute a public realm, but, on the contrary, means only that the public realm has almost completely receded. (ibid: 52)

Eventually, according to Arendt's analysis, the boost of the social and the move away from a politics of engagement in the public sphere has decreased the potential for political action. At this point, if we turn back to the Turkish context of the post 80's period, what we observe is again a boost which presented itself as a relative widening of the public sphere. In this period, a new, hybrid language was disseminated through the publication of news magazines that not only included a mixture of news and articles about politics, economics and arts, but also combined different jargons and discourses of these diverse areas. This process was accelerated after private radio channels and televisions were founded since their domain of influence was wider and they had a more direct way of communicating with the masses. This development presented itself as the circulation of a new language, a new discourse different from the boring, repetitive discourses of the military people and politicians occupying the public sphere during 1980-1983, the aftermath of the coup d'etat. Though presented itself as a widening of the public sphere, I would propose that this expansion actually functioned as the expansion of "the social" -in Arendt's sense of the concept. As Nurdan Gürbilek

remarked, it is deceptive to regard these developments as a relief or a relative expansion in the public sphere since they were accompanied by an extreme individualization and intimation. Even the political parties, imitating the popular stars of the day, based their images on a claim of intimateness, sincerity, and familiarity. In Gürbilek's words:

> In public sphere everybody is acting as 'they are', and are accepted as authentic as long as they act with that premise. Here, the issue is not the transformation of politicians or popular stars into public figures (this transformation has already occurred), rather it is the premise that their identity stems not from their distance, but from their proximity to us in an environment which codifies non-personal, distant and formal behavior as moral evil.[23] (Gürbilek, 1992: 112)

This picture is parallel to Arendt's observation that through the expansion of the social, the private sphere has been invading the public sphere, which results in a kind of reciprocal mutilation. In this sense, Gürbilek's interpretation, although it focuses on the recession in the public realm, has a lot to say about the private realm as well since privacy and intimacy embedded in the private realm has become stale and perishes through its drifting into the public realm. This process indicates more than personalization and informalization of the public sphere. The private realm has also been deserted since all the private matters, emotions, secrets started to be disclosed before an imagined audience through various media channels, and lost their confidentiality. Thus, the blurring of the line between the public and private realms functioned in a reciprocal manner and resulted in a relative shrinkage in both spheres; both were recessed in favor of "the social".

---

[23] "Kamusal alanda herkes 'olduğu gibi' davranıyor, öyle davrandığı sürece sahici görünüyor. Burada yeni olan, politikacıların ya da sahne sanatçılarının kamusal kişiliklere dönüşmesi değil (bu değişim çok önce yaşandı), kişisel davranmamayı bir ahlâki kötülükmüş gibi gösteren bu ortamda onların kimliğinin bize olan mesafelerinden değil, bize olan yakınlıklarından kaynaklanıyormuş gibi durması"

I am aware of the fact that this discussion of the obliteration of the line between the public and the private sphere is not novel. One may even claim that today it turned into an academic presumption for social sciences, and there are various accounts (especially feminist critics) questioning the critical validity of such a concrete dichotomy, claiming that it is fabricated to bifurcate the individual and to keep matters of the private realm out of the reach of political action. Historically, the rise of these critical accounts also coincided with the observation that the line between the public and private realms got blurred, and when it became impossible to talk about 'public' and 'private' as pure categories. However, there is an eventual point on which accounts that made a historical distinction between the public and private realms. Those opposing accounts defending that such a distinction is fabricated intersect each other: Through the acceleration of developments in mass communication technologies (which also caused media channels to gradually occupy a larger area and gain more power in social life), the issues which were regarded as public matters and those regarded as private matters have been merging; public has been moving into the scope (if not sphere) of privacy, and privacy has been moving into the scope (if not sphere) of the public. Thus, whether one follows the observations similar to Arendt's claiming that the public sphere as a binding but separating "table" has been withering away, and the distinction between public and private realms has been vanishing; or one favors the criticisms that the public/private dichotomy is fabricated and politically charged, one ends up with a social realm in which publicity and privacy has been getting increasingly blended.

Such an understanding provides a powerful tool for us to evaluate the popping up of *the entel* since *s/he* appeared as a chameleon semi-intellectual figure who wandered in this emerging private/public sphere. There, devoid of the characteristics attributed to the image of the true intellectual, and thus devoid of the power to affect the public opinion, s/he also chooses to look social and fashionable by manifesting his/her privacy and getting clear off his/her political engagements that had formerly caused his/her behavior to look distant and non-personal. In contrast to the political and public discourse within which the intellectual has been positioned in the earlier decades, in the discourse of *the entel*, the politics is almost absent, or reduced to the politics of melancholia. Instead, a new language of intimacy appears and is circulated through the media. I will elaborate more on this "social" but apolitical appearance of *the entel* type in the following chapter.

2.2. Neoliberal intellectuals as the new opinion leaders

This reshaping of the borders between public and private realms is also related to the transformation of the political discourse and how intellectuals were associated with this transformation. As I've shortly discussed in the previous chapter, until the 80's, the state was both a crucial subject, and a crucial object in shaping the position of the intellectuals. The intellectuals were either bureaucrats, or supporters of certain political movements, and/or parties. There were many lawyers, doctors, professors, engineers, writers, artists among them, but they did not foreground their professional identity as much as their political identity in shaping their public personas. Apart from the

bureaucratic intellectuals who had an organic tie with the state, there were those opinion leaders whose main agenda was political as well. Their endeavor to affect public opinion was through political action, whether this was in the form of organizing demonstrations, meetings, forums, or publishing journals, bulletins, manifestos, etc. However, as I have discussed before, the intellectuals in Turkish history had an ambivalent position. While on the one hand, some intellectuals were criticized (especially by 'popular' press and populist politicians) as being aloof from the experiences of "real people"; on the other hand they were also regarded as the vanguards of modern/westernized values in Turkey. The power of intellectuals, whether they occupied bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic positions, stemmed from how they positioned themselves through their specific political discourse and rhetorical strategies. Their image as intellectuals was formed within this discourse, the core of which was framed by a certain agenda oriented towards the future, either in the form of Kemalist westernization ideals, or in the form of revolutionary and fundamentalist movements' idealization of a systemic reform. However, with the expansion of neoliberal ideologies and related policies, and accelerated impact of the emerging implications of the free market, the emphasis now has shifted from the future to the present which also had an impact on the discourse of the politicians. This transformation was first marked by the rise of populism in the political discourse (since the main concern now was to have control over people's current worries), and then the rise of the language of economics full of statistical figures. The latter development was interrelated with the structural transformation in the composition of the bureaucratic staff of popular political parties.

The organization of the major political party of the period, ANAP was dominated by liberal engineers. As Göle's extensive study, *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere* (*Engineers and Ideology: From Avant-Garde Revolutionaries to Modernizing Elites*) underlined through the categories of Karl Popper, in this period, the "utopian social engineering" of the previous decades which emphasized futuristic projects was replaced by "piecemeal social engineering" which focused on 'here and now'. Göle claims that the 80's in Turkey was dominated by the ideology of engineers participating in the bureaucratic staff of ANAP. These engineers – different from the politicians of the previous decades who emphasized the importance of moral values, ethical principles and legislative procedures were foregrounding numbers, statistics with a premise that their scientific background created a space for consensus that was liberated from the restrictive burden of ideologies. In an interview Göle cites the words of an engineer from ANAP illustrate the nascent technical discourse within politics: "As engineers, we have such a characteristic: Since we talk through numbers, it is easier for us to convince people. We are not interpreters, we form a specific group who talk through numbers. We do not resemble lawyers, economists, or bureaucrats. We do constant analysis until the phase of implementation. Once the implementation has started, that is the only solution there. There is only one way, practice is singular"[24] (Göle, 2004: 15). Here the use of the term "economist" corresponds to a certain type of economist, the economist of the pre-80's period whose main concern was political

[24] "Bizim mühendis olarak şöyle bir özelliğimiz var. Biz rakamlarla konuştuğumuz için karşıya kendimizi kabul ettirmemiz kolay olur. Yorumcu değiliz, rakamlarla konuşan bir kesimiz. Bir avukata, bir iktisatçıya, bir bürokrata benzemeyiz. Tatbikata gelinceye kadar kâğıt üzerinde etüdünü yaparız ama uygulamaya gelince artık çözümü bitmiştir, tek yolu vardır, uygulama tektir."

economy, and was able to talk about economics constantly relating it to the politics. The field of politics and economics were not separated. One of Göle's observations is that during the 80's, economics declared its autonomy from the field of politics. The jargon of economics, as liberated from the reach of the state, and going under the control of new entrepreneurs, special economists, experts, market traders, corporations became dominated by complex mathematical figurations and confusing details. This technical shift, which had been remodeling the political establishment, also introduced a new language of politics. The new politics of the 80's was put under the reign of the economics which assumed to have its own laws conducted by the "invisible hand" of the market, and "led the society into the right direction". Özal, frequently defended such an understanding in his speeches: "We should not get out of economic laws. It is not possible to change the stream of the river. You will try to change it but it will continue to flow from its previous stream" (quoted in Akdoğan 2001: 180). The technicalization of politics also had implications further affecting other areas of public life. For instance, the structure of media channels was radically changed by the accelerating effect of this technical shift since in this period, for the first time in the history of Turkish newspapers, special pages were dedicated to economics, which also further elevated the dominance of the jargon of economics. Of course, the macro effect of all these developments was the remodeling and the redefinition of the social and the political reality. This new reality was tyrannized by the knowledge and discourse of economics. If one was not "talking through numbers", if one was not talking about worries of here and now, one

was doomed to be evaluated as a utopian, an unrealistic ideologue whose words and practices were futile and irrelevant.

This neoliberal redefinition of what is real and what is not, and the increasing importance of economics and engineering as the dominant and vital fields of praxis, has a lot to say about *the entel* since one of the motivations in the creation of *the entel* type was to caricaturize the "old style" intellectuals who did not conform to the new reality of the neoliberal world, and who were stuck in the discourse of the pre-'80s period. One dimension of *the entel* points at and accuses the old style intellectuals who have been trying to hold on to their previous utopian ideals and resented the idea of change disseminated through the changing discourse of politics and economics.

The redefinition of social and political reality naturally necessitated a corresponding change in the previously idealized image of the intellectuals. So, new opinion leaders arose, to whom we might refer as the neoliberal intellectuals. The peculiarity of the neoliberal intellectuals is that forerunners of this image of the intellectuals were mostly leftist intellectuals of the 70's, their power was sustained by their positions in various media channels, and their discourse was overwhelmed by an endevour to propagate a certain life-style corresponding to the circulating values of neoliberalism. These new opinion leaders were the utopians of the past, but they had now transformed themselves by adapting to the current trends of the period, and most of them established organic connections with the newspapers, the popular magazines, and later with the private television channels. They were the new celebrities, and were also part of the new elite group of emerging private-public sphere in the 80's as well as the

prime agents in the formation of this new sphere (Bali, 2002: 202-213). The neoliberal intellectuals could exist without the universalistic claims of the former intellectuals directed towards the future and their politically engaged attitudes/discourses. The new power source for neoliberal intellectuals was the capital on which their institutional identity was built (the capital of media giants), however, they assured a continuous relation with that capital through their claim of an imagined tie with the public, and its particularistic, present-oriented demands. As stated before, most of these neoliberal intellectuals working for newspapers and magazines were former leftists and anarchists who had challenged the state and the Republican ideology throughout the late 60's and 70's. Now, having lost their ideal of a 'better world', they tried to fit themselves into the ideal of progress and integration with the West. They were integrated into the neoliberal ideologies to create a new role model for the people: educated, material oriented, secular, and westernized. They saw both Islamist and Kurdish movements, and a few other, leftist intellectuals as potential dangers to their ideal of creating a modern country fully integrated to the West. They were especially in a continual distress with the "old syle" leftist intellectuals since they used to share the same ideals in the pre-80's period. In the new situation, "old style" leftist intellectuals were the spectres from the past for the emerging liberal intellectuals whose ambition was to blend into the present. Nilüfer Göle also emphasizes these intellectuals' foregrounding of the present throughout the 80's underlining that they have started to live in their own time, and that a shift from "the engaged intellectual" towards "an individualistic intellectual" has occurred. Göle evaluates that this individualization of the intellectuals has been a key effect in the

creation of *the entel type*, since *the entel* was pictured as the intellectual who has been disengaged with his collective, political missions, and instead occupied with issues related to arts and daily life (Göle, 2000: 9). Avoidance of the past, and emphasis on the present were characteristic features of the neoliberal intellectuals as well since they were the opinion leaders, rhetoricians of emerging neoliberal life styles.[25] They were the experts, gustoes, both producing and consuming the practices within the new life styles. As such they imagined a bond with the reality of "the people" who were also overwhelmed by these practices (Even if they did not have enough income to engage in these practices, they became a part of them as spectators, informed through the mass communication media). The neoliberal intellectuals as such also positioned themselves as the leaders of the society, who knew better the problems and the reality of "the people". Whatever they did, it was for the public's good; the motto of "for the people against the people" was completely transformed into the motto of "for the people". As Bali's extensive study of newspapers and magazines of the period shows, the main agenda of the neoliberal intellectuals was to create a life-style around the neoliberal policies of government to replace the political space emptied by the withering political activism of the past decades (2002: 202-213). In line with ANAP's strategy of accusing the past decade as a decade of "stupid political divisions and clashes", the life-style

[25] This emphasis of the present, of course, was not specific to the neo-intellectuals, rather it marked the mood of the time, as Ahmet Oktay pointed out: "People living in the periphery of the city and people of the dominant classes are in a simultaneous individualization process, all are filled with the ambition of wealth and success. Nothing other than the motto of 'now and here' means something to anyone. Actually, the name for this kind of life style is very explanatory: 'köşeyi dönmek' (having turned the corner) Once having turned the corner, everyone is throwing one side of his/her past into the garbage, and trying to find a meaning in life by appropriating the utilitarian, hedonist, and ephemeral techniques of the present." (Oktay, 1991: 24)

prompted by neoliberal intellectuals conditioned the past as a period where individual matters, emotions, private concerns, etc. were delayed or frozen for the sake of futile utopias. Now the repressed feelings, desires, longings could be exhibited and "satisfied" publicly. Gürbilek offers such a perspective to evaluate the mood of the 80's in Turkey through the theme of "the return of the repressed". She claims that one dimension of the 80's is the bursting out of the "low culture" through which not only the culture of the excluded segments of society, those located within the periphery, in the countryside, or among the low income groups returned; but also those codified as "high culture" discovered the periphery, the repressed inside them. (1992: 106) Though this (the return of the repressed) presented itself as a *cultural diversification and multiplication*, one should note that the repressed did not return with the characteristics that once caused its repression. Thus throughout the 80's, accompanied by the development policies of the neoliberal governments supporting a fast consuming society, the repressed returned mostly in the form of vulgarness and covetousness. That is why, one is stricken by a burst of unsatiable desires in this period as well as the diversification of cultural claims. Eventually, "the desires, which were the promises of freedom at the time they were repressed consumed themselves through an exterminating greed since on the way back, they abandoned all these promises."[26] (ibid). *The entel* frequently depicted in the cartoon strips as encountering other stereotypical types that were created to represent the vulgar figures flourishing in the civic life (like *maganda*, *zonta*, etc.). Out of these encounters, even a hybrid figure, *zontellektüel* has emerged. These themes of "covetousness" and

[26] "bastırıldığında bir kurtuluş vaadi olarak görünebilen arzu, geri dönerken taşıdığı bütün vaatleri terk ettiğinden, kendisini bir arsızlık olarak tüketiyor."

"discovering the periphery/repressed inside" were at stake in this hybrid form, as I will discuss in my analysis of the *Zontellektüel Abdullah* comic strip series.

Another dynamic in the emergence of the *entel* type is his/her relation to the discussions of the '68 generation. The debates around generational differences, and gaps turned to be a very popular subject in the post-80's. As I have pointed above, the transformation of the leftist intellectuals most of whom were members of the acclaimed '68 generation was very influential in the popularity of these debates. Popular news magazines of the 80's, like *Nokta*, *Tempo* and *Yeni Gündem* frequently published articles, surveys, etc. on the issue of 'generation' (see Appendix 2). Rıza Tura draws our attention to an important point indicating that in Turkey '68 was discovered towards the mid 80's, and functioned as a barrier to block efforts to discuss and understand the '70s (Tura, 1999: 35-46). This late discovery caused '68 to be evaluated not with the revolutionist mood attached to it, rather it was fetishized as a success of the members of this generation who have been integrated to the political system after the 80's. Tuna Erdem reminds us of another aspect of this debate. Apart from those integrated to the system, the discourse of other members of the '68 generation passed their melancholy which excluded mourning but glorified pain and agony to the following generations. Since the '68 generation told stories of what they were exposed to (not stories of how they acted politically) in such a melancholic mood, it was no surprise that cynicism and apolitical attitude was disseminated among the following generations (Erdem 1999: 71-82). Actually this melancholy, also an integral part of certain typifications of the *entel*, is in line with the notion of "left melancholia" introduced by Walter Benjamin. As Wendy

Brown points out, left melancholia is "a condition produced by attachment to a notion of progress in which opportunities missed or political formations lost are experienced as permanent and unrecoverable" (Brown, 2001: 169). Thus a very crucial characteristic of left melancholia is a disability in grasping the particular mood of the present. Rather than evaluating history to understand and evaluate the moment, the history for the left melancholic is frozen in the past. As Benjamin very poetically puts it, "sentiments themselves become things for the left melancholic (...) who takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods" (Benjamin, 1994: 305).

It is observable that, in its certain depictions, *the entel* is also such a fetishist of the past, a "left melancholic" who "comes to love his left passions and reasons, his left analyses and convictions more than he loves the existing world that he presumably seeks to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them" (Brown, 1999: 21). In such illustrations of *the entel* type as a melancholic, "the old-style leftist intellectuals" who were stuck in the past days were mocked. *The entel* as a parody of the old-style intellectuals is a specter-like figure who lost his/her relation to the present time and daydreamed about the good old days. However, it is not only the leftist intellectuals who were parodied by the *entel* type. It is possible to encounter another ironic strategy in the figurations of *the entel* that ridiculed the transformation of the neoliberal intellectuals. The neoliberal intellectuals as members of the '68 generation, had an anarchist, leftist past; but since they were integrated to the neoliberal trends, now they

were accused of being conformists and opportunists[27]. One dimension of the *entel* type also pointed to that pragmatism in the emergence of the neoliberal intellectuals who were preoccupied with their individualistic concerns and getting away from the worries of the public. In such depictions, *the entel* is overwhelmed by conformism and a cynical attitude, especially towards political matters.

Thus, *the entel* is interrelated with the '68 debates in two aspects: *The entel* type has the potential to ridicule both the pragmatism of the '68 members who turned to be the ideologues of neoliberal policies and the melancholia of others who were stuck in discussions about an already lost battle. However, the latter usage became more popular since it was embraced by the neoliberal intellectuals (actually by the neoliberal policies in general) as a discursive strategy. In their articles they used the *entel* term or illustrated the *entel* type in order to demonize the old-style intellectuals and their melancholia with degrading humor. Using the power of the mass media, they could enclose the meanings and usages of the *entel* term as pointing to the intellectuals outside the nascent reality of the neoliberal life styles. As such, we can arguably claim that *the entel* turned out to be a shield for the neoliberal intellectuals with which they prevented the possibility of being caricaturized as *the entel*. Pointing others as *the entels*, they passed over the burden of the past to the shoulders of other members of their generation who resisted change and

[27] Actually in the Turkish context, the neoliberal intellectuals' conformism was designated with the verb "dönmek" which had connotations that refer to the change of gender. This is understandable on the basis that one of the popular discussions of the public scene during the '80s was the sex-change operation of the famous singer Bülent Ersoy. In order to humiliate them, the neoliberal intellectuals' change of position was ridiculed through this comparison with transexuality. This connection is striking in order to understand the gendered mindset of this period during which an appearance of freedom was promoted continuously. This gendered mindset is also very crucial to an understanding of gender strategies around *the entel* type.

were “lost in melancholia”. In this sense, *the entel* was a kind of scapegoat hiding sins and misdemeanors of the neoliberal intellectuals, especially in their evaluation of the past.

2.3. Changing Discourse of the Mass Media and Explosion of Stereotypes

Discussing the cultural atmosphere of the post-80’s period, as Nurdan Gürbilek underlined, we need to focus on two trends, which were hand in hand throughout the 80’s. First, there were techniques of coercion initiated by the military council’s oppressive practices and taken over by the following governments. Secondly, there was an enormous “burst” in the realm of cultural practices introduced and enabled by the neoliberal policies and crystallized as the relief of ‘repressed’, ‘delayed’ desires and longings. Gürbilek outlines various intersecting dynamics behind the “burst” of the 80’s as follows: “Culture was subordinated to the market in a manner not seen in previous periods, advertising put an infinite amount of images into circulation and through publications of top selling news magazines, a new public sphere was formed accompanied by the emerging news discourse”[28] (Gürbilek, 1992: 21). She builds her evaluation of the cultural climate of the 80’s around the concept of ‘language’. Of course, periodizing a certain age as such is not novel, every period might be evaluated by its certain and distinguished language. However, it seems that interpreting this period through language is a must since in this period the force exercised on people changed

[28] “Kültür, daha önce görülmedik boyutlarda piyasaya tabi oldu, reklamcılık kısa sürede sınırsız sayıda imgeyi dolaşıma soktu, çok satan haber dergilerinin yayın hayatına girmesiyle yeni bir kamuoyu, yeni bir haber dili oluştu.”

both their conception and their use of the language. According to Gürbilek, the distinctive feature of the language in this period was a rupture between language and reality, and the circulation of an imaginary language that excluded sincerity and genuine experiences. (ibid: 25)

The major force producing, reproducing and disseminating this language was the mass media. Ali Şimşek evaluates the mass media of the period as "the showcase of the new middle class." He tries to distinguish the late 80's and early 90's by the rise of the new middle class,[29] and further claims that the mass media transformed itself in order to preserve the interests of this new middle class. The new actors of the emerging mass media were popular erotic magazines targeting men (such as *Erkekçe*, *Playboy*, *Playmen*), and news magazines which positioned themselves as the spokesperson of the neoliberal values and pioneered the transformation of the discourse of the mass media (such as *Sabah*, *Hürriyet*, *Nokta*, *Aktüel*, *Tempo*). The discourse of this new mass media was marked by a tendency for "confession" and a claim for "sincerity" (Şimşek, 2005: 58-77).

One of the dominant strategies in the changing language of the mass media accompanying this tendency for confession and sincerity was "naming". Nurdan Gürbilek argues that "naming" everything repressed in the pre-80's period functioned as if these repressed issues which had been assumed to be unspeakable for years were acknowledged. However, Gürbilek claims that such an evaluation of the "naming"

[29] Şimşek borrowed this term from Can Kozanoğlu who ironically describes the new middle class as "open to changes but the guarantee of the fixed". For Kozanoğlu, members of this new middle class is "the everyone" of such cliché sentences as "today, everyone…": "New products are produced for them, stock exchange and free market are for them, the best seller books are for them…" (Kozanoğlu, 2001: 57-58.)

would be misleading, since the perceptions of those named were not enriched, on the contrary, they were fixed into the images which was forced upon them in this naming process. In order to present an account of how these naming strategies functioned, Gürbilek draws our attention to the change of discourse in the headlines of the newspapers and news magazines. In this period, headlines started to be imaginative rather than informative, and thus "verbs" disappeared from the headlines[30]. She claims that besides attracting readers' attention to the news, these headlines without verbs had various functions: "A noun evokes facts and fixes them. Rather than drawing our attention to a happening or reporting from a world that is changing or has the potential to change, a headline without verbs turns a quote from life into an image and reconstructs the world of language for us each and every day. The replacement of verbs with nouns in sentences in language coincides with a condition where verbs are banished from life, a stabilization where one is condemned to facts"[31] (Gürbilek, 1992: 47). This kind of a naming strategy, not only fixes the current facts, but also redefines and appropriates everything related to the past according to the needs of the present day.

One of the effects of this naming trend during this period is a multiplication of stereotypes. Of course, stereotyping has been a common and dominant strategy of representation in different periods. However, in the 80's, by the effect of diversifying mass media, the strategies of stereotyping were accelerated and expanded their scope to

---

[30] Here, Gürbilek refers to Ahmet Oktay's analysis in *Toplumsal Değişme ve Basın* (1987: 108-109), and gives some examples to these headlines without verbs: "Adalet Sancılı", "Memura Bir Parmak Bal", "Üç Vakte Kadar Komünist Parti", "Beyoğlu Kan Revan", etc.

[31] "Ad, veri olanı çağırır, sabitler. Fiilsiz başlık değişmekte olan, ya da değişme ihtimali olan bir dünyadan haber vermek, bir oluşa dikkat çekmek yerine, hayattan yapılan bir alıntıyı bir imaja dönüştürüp her gün sözün dünyasını yeniden kurar bize. Cümlede adın filin yerini alması, fiilin hayattan kovulduğu, verilere mahkûm kalınan bir stabilizasyon ortamının dildeki karşılığıdır."

include first the marginalized figures which were assumed to be unspeakable in previous periods, and then anything that had the potential to be circulated as materials enriching the logic of advertisement and the discourse of the mass media[32]. First, there were the repressed groups of the past, like homosexuals, transvestites, etc, who were named and disseminated within the pages of newspapers and magazines; then anything pertaining to the private sphere which was exiled from the language for decades was exposed incrementally to those naming strategies. Though a more colorful language seemed to emerge through which different groups found a possibility for visibility in the public scene, in most of the cases these groups did not have a chance to represent themselves. Rather, circulated in the discourse of the mass media, they were wrapped in a straight jacket that fixed their images and condemned them to become "cheeky", entertaining stereotypes. This way, they were introduced into the public scene as ahistorical subjects, everything appertaining to their existence was assumed to be deciphered in the few pages of the coverage reserved for them in the media, and their image was immediately consumed as such. This mechanism of stereotyping had a role in reproducing existing power relations. Michael Pickering also underlines this dimension of stereotyping: "The comfort of inflexibility which stereotypes provide reinforces the conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed." (Pickering, 2001: 3) All the stereotypes produced also had a dimension that naturalizes and normalizes certain characteristics

[32] Soner Yağlı connects the diversification of the mass media to the rise of free market economy, which necessitated an accompanying advertising sector to expand consumerist culture. In order to create new consumers, the domain of advertisements had to be widened which further triggered diversification and multiplication of newspapers, magazines, and than television channels. Yağlı claims that during this period, one witnessed the sudden disappearance of the word "the press" in favor of "mass media". (Yağlı, 2003: 137-138)

that are attributed to the mentioned stereotypes, which were actually outcomes of related power relations.

The entel also appeared as such a stereotype which was named by the mass media. Especially in the late 80's and early '90s, it functioned to homogenize the image of intellectuals through maintaining and reproducing certain manners and patterns of behavior attributed to the negative conceptions of them. As I have indicated before, *the entel* as signified in its name was born as an abbreviation, however, it was not a belittling abbreviation from any random image of the intellectuals, it was an abbreviation from the image of a specific group of intellectuals in a specific context: the leftist intellectuals who were the major disreputed community after the 80's. *The entel* was born as the parody of the leftist intellectuals, but this parody concealed more complex strategies, which further dilated the scope of that stereotype. I will try to analyze these strategies in the following chapter through the caricatures in which *the entel* figure appeared.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF *THE ENTEL* TYPE THROUGH CARTOON STRIPS

In this chapter, I would like to discuss the characteristics of *the entel* type as it appears in various cartoon strips published in popular newspapers, news magazines, and caricature magazines. In the *Introduction* section, I have discussed why I chose the cartoon strips as data for my analysis, and specified the sources and the time interval in which they were published. Here I will analyze my sample of cartoons and will also refer to some articles from newspapers and news magazines to enrich my discussion about *the entel*. I will start by figuring out the iconography of *the entel*. Here my focus of analysis will be the physical appearance, the gender, and the life style of *the entel*. Commenting on the dynamics contributing to the creation of a specific image for *the entel*, I would like to show that the figure of *the entel* is not randomly stereotyped as having particular physical characteristics and donning specific accessories; rather it has been constructed as such in constant dialogue and tension with the popular debates of the era. Then, in another section I will elaborate on the encounters of *the entel* with other stereotypes of the cartoons, like *maganda/zonta* and *the ordinary man*. Related to this discussion of encounters, I will also analyze the hybrid form of *the entel*, *zontellektüel* which appears in the cartoons as pointing to the ambivalent nature of the type. After figuring out how the identity of *the entel* is constructed through his/her iconography and encounters with other types, I am going to discuss melancholia and cynicism, which further shapes the mood of *the entel*, and his/her relation to the past, and political matters of the day.

Throughout all these discussions, one should keep in mind the conditions in which *the entel* was born. As I tried to discuss in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the entel type emerged in an atmosphere where mental labor was renegotiated and revalued within the market. As such, the distinctiveness of intellectuals was wiped out and their occupation was demystified, since then their labor was also subordinated into the capital. Besides, in an atmosphere where all identities were commodified and massified by the expanding culture industries, cultural and intellectual practices and the identity of intellectuals were also commodified, they were also absorbed into the masses. In all the tensions determining the appearance and the mood of the *entel*, it is possible to find traces of this demythologization and deprivileging of the intellectual occupation.

3.1.Iconography of *The Entel*

As I have indicated in the *Introduction* section, one of the main concerns of this study is not to point to a specific group of people as *the entels*. Rather, *the entel* type is taken as a distorted but nevertheless representative figure for the intellectuals, which was constructed by the language of the era marked by irony and a tendency for 'naming'. My choice of the cartoon strips as the data for analysis is also related to this fact. In the post-80's period, the cartoon strips in newspapers and magazines distinguished as a field which was driven by an ironic attitude for naming the prominent figures of the city life in an exaggerated fashion. As Ali Şimşek draws our attention to the fact that most of the popular stereotypes of the period, like 'maganda', 'zonta', 'kıllanan adam', 'yurdum

insanı', and 'the entel' were all named and disseminated through the cartoon strips (Şimşek, 2005: 86-91).

Since I am proposing to discuss the dynamics of the depiction of *the entel* in the cartoon strips, first I should overview the iconography of him/her. In this part, I will try to sketch this iconography in three sub-sections. First, I will comment on the physical appearance of *the entel* in terms of the gendered attributes of the male and female figurations. Then, I will try to discuss the characteristics of *the entel* and their meaning in a certain gender regime. In the last section, I am going to claim that *the entel* types evoke a certain life style, and I will try to illustrate the contours of this life style.

3.1.1. The Physical appearance of *the entel*

In trying to conceive the figure of *the entel*, one of the things that strikes the observer is his/her physical appearance. First of all, the appearance of *the entel* is built on the deformation, and/or exaggeration of the conventional characteristics attributed to accepted gender categories. If *the entel* is a man, he's pictured as a character which lacks the physical characteristics of a stereotypical Turkish man. He neither wears a moustache, nor has a short hair cut; furthermore, he does not even comb his hair properly. Rather he has long and messy hair, wears casual clothes such as a vest on top of a pair of jeans combined with heavy shoes, sports shirts or t-shirts, a scarf, eyeglasses, earrings, etc. His appearance partly attributes to him a "feminine" look with certain characteristics that have been constructed in Turkish culture as peculiar to women, like long hair, earrings, scarf, etc. This "feminine" look characterizes the average nature of

the male entel: He is not sharp, precise, tough or decisive as "a man should be", rather he looks rounded and squishy. This appearance fits one of the major *raison d'etres* of *the entel*, the supposed liberal transformation that the intellectuals had gone through. Since now the intellectual is believed to be lacking the sharpness which he possessed in the previous decade when he was politically active, he is represented in the figure of *the entel* as lacking toughness and persuasiveness. His rounded appearance is in line with his political cynicism and his tendency towards consensus in terms of social and political matters. Another aspect of *the male entel* that differentiates him from *the female entel* is his pipe. As opposed to the leftist intellectuals of the previous decades, who smoked cheap, local brands of cigarettes like 'Samsun', 'Bafra', 'Maltepe' to identify mostly with workers and students, *the male entel* smokes pipes. Since the ideal of having a western identity returned and replaced the ideal of constructing a local identity of the past decade, his smoking habits also changed from local cigarettes to the pipe -which is a stereotypical accessory for depicting western intellectuals. Besides, the pipe of *the entel* is also a means (like his glasses) to signify his intellectual occupation. He would like to indicate that he is extremely occupied with thoughts, and thus he needs the assistance of a pipe to contemplate restlessly. *The male entel* is so frequently depicted with his pipe that it becomes an inseparable part of him underlining his desire to look pensive and sophisticated. However, the wide use of the pipe in *the entel*'s depiction functions to caricaturize his desire to reach the level of sophistication he envies. Through the smoke of the pipe, not his thoughts but his unattainable desires for intellectuality are seen. *The entel* is intuitively so aware of his quasi-intellectuality that

he anxiously tries to close the gap between his desire and his capacity for being an authentic intellectual by a prop, namely a pipe. This is obvious in Figure 3.1 where *the entel* is depicted as someone who remembers the discussions/panels he joined through exhibiting his different pipes. Attributing such a special meaning to the pipes also ridicules the afore-mentioned discussions since the pipes are positioned as the most valuable things reminiscent of these discussions. A similar distorted relation between *the entel* and his pipe might be seen in Figure 3.2, which is an episode from 'Entelektüel Ayı' ('The Intellectual Bear'), a cartoon strip series by İsmail Gülgeç published in *Cumhuriyet* daily newspaper. In this series, the intellectual is not referred to as *the entel*, but as *the bear*. However, this *bear* figure might be evaluated as an exaggeration of *the entel* figure since it also caricaturizes the formalism and superficiality of the intellectuals with a more vulgar epithet. In this example, *the intellectual bear*'s relation with his pipe is depicted with an ironic tautology: "He smokes pipe because he is an intellectual, and he is an intellectual because he smokes pipe." This tautology summarizes *the entel*'s relation to his/her appearance, as I will further discuss.

If *the entel* is a woman, two major tactics determine her physical appearance. First of all, she is usually depicted as carrying characteristics that have been typically attributed to men, such as smoking publicly, wearing trousers, having a short hair cut. However, such masculine connotations attributed to *the female entel* type do not function in the same way as the feminized figurations of the *male entel* type. They also point to an idea of transformation that changed the appearance of the intellectual women from the previous decade, however, in this appearance, traces of a feminist struggle

Figure 3.1

Wall sign: Pipe exhibition by Tonguç İlker
Tonguç İlker: And this is the one I used to smoke when discussing the topic of "rural community becoming conscious"

(Teoman Turan. *Limon*, 31.05.1990)

Figure 3.2

Voice over: Mr. Intellectual Bear, why do you smoke a pipe?
Intellectual Bear: Because I'm an intellectual.
Voiceover: Ok… Why are you an intellectual?
Intellectual Bear: Guess why! Because I smoke a pipe, of course!

(Behiç Ak. *Cumhuriyet*, 20.07.1984)

rather than political cynicism might be found. *The entel* woman, as depicted in news and caricatures, has a claim for liberty and freedom, and this claim is also apparent in her outfit. She wants to break away from the traditional female roles which impose a certain form onto her and sentence her to the position of the 'significant other'. Her appearance is liberated from the traditional images of women in terms of both the dominant secular ideology of the Turkish republic and the ideology of Islam. Instead, she has a bohemian image marked by a challenge against male dominance through a claim for the things reserved as men's territory. However, in most cases, this appearance of the female *entel* does not function to typify her as a feminist activist. On the contrary, since the dominant mood of the news and cartoon strips that depicts her as such is bold sarcasm, the image of *the female entel* reverses the message attached to it. Rather than underlining her claim for more liberty, in such media, this appearance is functionalized to ridicule her feminist claims by reducing them to simple formalist demands. So, her endeavor to have a liberal appearance is reduced to a desire to look like the idealized image of the western feminist intellectuals. This is obvious in Figure 3.3, where Hale Soygazi was mentioned as having "devoted herself to being an *entel*." The language of this article is astonishing since it works against the relaxed and cheerful mood in which Soygazi and her *entel* friend are depicted in the accompanying photograph where we see the two women self confidently holding cigarettes. An account of Soygazi's *entel* behaviors is presented as such: Getting dressed plainly, not caring for her boyfriend, even excluding him, and enjoying the freedom with her female friends. The article written from a misogynistic perspective condemns the look of Soygazi in the photograph stressing that "she is trying

to attract attention by smoking cigarettes and wearing casual dresses" (Figure 3.3). However, the article reaches its most humiliating level in the caption: "Even if it is not welcome by *the entels*, every now and then Hale Soygazi gets undressed; of course in line with the demands of those screenplays which she can comprehend" (ibid). What this short article targets is not specifically the persona of Hale Soygazi, but the rise of the feminist trends among women, which is symbolized by Soygazi. While abasing Soygazi's appearance and way of living as a free woman divorced from her husband, the article also reduces the feminist upheaval into a futile, ephemeral fashion among *the female entels*. In the cartoon strips also, the depiction of *the female entels* functions to caricaturize their appearance since they are illustrated constantly with humiliating irony. Through this irony, the core of the feminist struggle that aims to abolish discrimination towards and oppression of women is reduced to a struggle to reach the desired western and modern outlook. In the short news article about Hale Soygazi, though it is said that "Soygazi goes free", it is also implied that it is not possible for her to reach such a free state since she is represented just as imitating a modern look. As such, through the formalism attached to the appearance of *the female entels*, the feminist promises of liberation and freedom are subtly ridiculed in the strip cartoons. I am going to elaborate the relation of the feminist movement of the post-80's and the emergence of *the entel type* later in this chapter.

Besides such cross-sex characteristics attached to them, the appearance of *the male* and *the female entel* typifications share some common points in their depiction: First, because their major occupation is arts, they are pictured as eager to fake a

Figure 3.3

Hale, entel takılıyor

Arada bir de soyunuyor...

Entellere ters gelse de Hale Soygazi arada bir soyunuyor. Tabii aklının yettiği filmlerdeki senaryo icabı...

Eski kocası Ahmet Özhan'dan ayrıldıktan sonra evlenmeye tövbe eden Hale Soygazi, artık hanım arkadaşları ile takılıyor.. Şu sıralar özgür kadını oynayan Soygazi kendini entelliğe verdi ...

Sade giyinmek, beraber olduğu erkeği takmamak entellik sayılmaya başladı günümüz Türkiyesi'nde.. Bu ilkeden yola çıkanların başında da Hale Soygazi geliyor. Sanatçı eski kocası Ahmet Özhan'dan ayrıldıktan sonra free takılıp beraber olduğu erkeği dışlayıp kadın arkadaşları ile özgürlüğün tadını çıkarmaya çalışıyor. Elinde sigara ve spor giyimiyle de ilgi çekmek için uğraş veriyor.

(*Süper Tan*. 12.12.1991)

Hale behaves like an "entel" nowadays

She sometimes strips: Though not approved by entels, Hale Soygazi sometimes strips. Of course, her roles in films force her to do that.

- After divorcing from Ahmet Özhan, Hale Soygazi has promised herself not to marry again. Nowadays, she is hanging out with her female friends. She is acting like an entel and performing a "free woman" image.
- Dressing plainly, not caring much about the boyfriends-these are the characteristics of being an entel in today's Turkey. Hale Soygazi is one of the pioneers of this trend. After divorcing from her ex-husband, she has been enjoying her freedom with her female friends that do not care about their men. She's trying to get attention with her cigarette and sportive clothing style.

Figure 3.4

The man: Özgecan, look what I have bought for you… A Kurdish… For our oriental corner…
The woman: Great!

(Metin Üstündağ. *Limon*, 21.02.1991)

bohemian artist's messiness which also signifies their liberal stance. They try to look as if they are not bound by the social norms. On the contrary, they have an image as if they push the limits of what is determined as a 'proper' look. Besides, their casual appearance also carries the promise of having a "young" soul, they follow the fads and fashion of their time. However, their modern appearance is turned against them in the cartoon strips since the cartoonists depict their fashionable look with sarcastic humor. *The entels*, via their obsession with appearance reduce their understanding of the intellectual occupation to a simple appearance. This appearance functions as the symbol of *the entels*' formalist being and signifies that they cannot exist beyond their form. In other words, they are nothing but shape, which cancels the possibility of gaining a "true" and "authentic" intellectuality for them.

This prototypical appearance of *the entel* also signals the proposed transformation s/he had gone through from *the intellectual* to *the entel*. Before the 80's, when his/her life was determined presumably by political action, s/he had a mediocre look, which did not differentiate him/her from "lower class" people[33]. Now, s/he is no more entitled to this limiting mode of appearance, and his/her desires to have an attractive appearance might be set free as everything that s/he had repressed. Transformation of his/her outlook is the primal surface in which his/her change of

[33] Though it is possible to find traces of the neoliberal ideology in the appearance of *the entel*, s/he is not ideologically alert about his/her appearance like the leftist intellectual of the previous decade. In the articles of the columnists, interviews, and memoirs about the 60's and the 70's, there is always a remark about the typical appearance of the idealized leftist intellectual. S/he tries to avoid wearing jeans, rather s/he wears a green coat, soldier boots, etc. which enables uniformity and avoid differentiation through appearance. In an interview I conducted with Kemal Gökhan Gürses, the creator of the *Zontellektüel Abdullah* series, he also pointed out that "before the 80's, the intellectuals were resistant to wearing even jeans since such clothes were identified with western imperialism. However, after the 80's, as happened in various fields of life, people lost their political sensibility about clothing as well." (Gürses, 2006)

character and mind-set is crystallized. Since his/her political conceptualization of life and his/her beliefs about "the possibility of another world" was replaced by political cynicism and worries about "catching the time", his/her mediocre appearance was replaced by a fashionable messiness. This messiness is not pictured as something internalized by *the entel*, rather it is something that s/he puts on to give certain messages –that s/he is liberal and not constructed by conventions.

As I will show in the following sections (especially in the section where I will discuss the life style of *the entel*), *the entel*'s relation to the trends of the day is not limited to the scope of fashion wear, rather his/her life style is under the effect of an all encompassing commodification. S/he is not just an ordinary follower of fashion; s/he follows anything appertaining to 'here and now'. However, his/her interest in the happenings of the present time is always depicted as trapped in formalist concerns. Even if s/he is involved in a current political debate, for instance, the identity struggle of Kurdish people, s/he is depicted as trying to be **s**howing interest in this problem in order to acquire the image of a sensible intellectual. Like his/her appearance, his/her mindset and attitudes also turned to be commodifiable entities (see Figure 3.4).

3.1.2. The Gender of *the entel*

In the above section, my comments about the appearance of *the entel* were based on the gendered nature of that typification. However, the gender of *the entel* is crucial beyond affecting the appearance of him/her. Therefore, it requires further attention.

The entel was created in an environment of relative pluralism in the cultural sphere. This pluralism was created by a change in the conceptualization of what was included in the scope of politics. Göle emphasizes that in this period matters which were degraded in the previous decades like environmental protection, women's liberation, individual rights and liberties, politics of gender and sexuality, identity politics etc. started to be included in the political agenda (Göle, 2000: 39-40). Among all new groups raising their voices publicly, the feminist movement was especially important in terms of understanding the characteristics of *the entel*'s gender. In the previous decades, the representations of the intellectuals (both in popular and alternative mediums) were dominated by masculine images. In those representations, women were either missing or were present as 'significant others' of men. However, after the 80's by the impact of the rising feminism, the representation of women was both more visible and varied. The image of *the entel* was also influenced by the feminist movement. In *the entel* cartoons, *the female entel* types are represented almost as much as *the male entel* types and they are generally depicted as "feminists". One of the rasions d'etre of *the female entel* types seems to be caricaturizing feminists. Through this caricaturization, feminist intellectuals are sketched in two ways: First, as I have discussed in the above section, they are depicted as being obsessed with formalist details; and secondly, they are depicted as being not true to themselves. In this latter aspect, *the female entels'* feminist tendency is mocked as insincere and hypocritical. They are feminists, not because they have claims about the women's inferior positions in the society, but because being feminist is the current trend in the western intellectuals' agenda. Though they seem to be organizing

activities, demonstrations, etc., their endeavor is for show only. They are depicted as in need of the masculine power, and toughness; the true nature of them is this adherence to the masculine world. Şepnem in the *Zontellektüel Abdullah* series is positioned as such a feminist *entel*. She has financial means, she acts as she likes, and she also has the mission of educating her lover Abdullah and turning him from a *zonta* into an intellectual (This tension between *the zonta* and *the entel*, and the hybrid form born out of this tension, *the zontellektüel* will be elaborated more in the following section of this chapter.) In the various stages of this education, she has a kind of *reaction formation* dilemma to the *zonta* characteristics of Abdullah. Though she tries to erase his *zonta* characteristics, in certain occasions she likes his male toughness and authentic sensibility. For example, when Abdullah gets jealous of her in a bar and punches a guy who is close to her, Şepnem acts as if she is uncomfortable with his behavior. However, later, when they are alone in her flat, she shows him tenderness saying that he is the first man getting jealous of her and expresses that this makes her happy. (see the Figure 3.5 and 3.6) Throughout the series, Şepnem's attitude towards Abdullah presents such conflicts. Though she reacts as if she detests Abdullah's *zonta* behaviors, her inner voice takes her into other directions, and she is also charmed by the very same behaviors. Most of her friends exhibit the same dilemma. All are impressed by the masculine characteristics of Abdullah, which they seemed to disapprove in the public sphere. Actually this picturing of *the female entels* as feminists who had an ambivalent position in relation to the traditional patterns of masculinity points to the mainstream branch within the Turkish feminist movement in the 80's represented in the new

Figure 3.5

The man with long hair (Abdullah-Apo): Dou you want me to repeat, ha? Shall I repeat once more?!!
The woman (Şepnem): Please Apo! You don't know anything about sharing! You ruin everything!
The man sitting on the chair: Don't hit on my head! Don't hit on my head!
Abdullah: Even the poet says "Keep away from my beloved", man!
Şepnem: But we don't have a relationship like this with you!
The man sitting on the chair: Don't hit on my head!
The other man sitting next 1: Let's attack him! This is not fair!
The other man sitting next 2: Violence is not the solution!
The other man sitting next 3(to the man with long hair): You're a zonta! A zonta!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 13.02.1992)

Figure 3.6

Şepnem: You're crazy! Nothing to forgive! You're the first man to be jealous of me and fight for me!
Abdullah: Whoa!!! Look at the difference between what she did in the bar and what she says now. She blamed me for being primitive and wild. Now look at this position!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 15.02.1992)

women's magazines like 'Kadınca'. Candan Yenigün, in a study where she compares the feminist discourses of two women's magazines, 'Kadınca' and 'Feminist', concludes that 'Kadınca' stands for a more egalitarian feminism –which takes men and the masculine world as the main reference point- as opposed to the radical feminist stance of 'Feminist', which announced men and the patriarchy as the enemy, and tried to liberate women from the criteria of the patriarchal society. In her evaluation of the 'Kadınca' magazine, Yenigün underlines that, "'Kadınca', by proposing man as the model for liberation advises women to go public, to take on new roles, to become role breakers and thus to become integrated into the standards of the 'masculine' public world" (Yenigün 1989: 203). However, while taking masculine attributes as the ideal, 'Kadınca' also affirms the characteristics of women which might be employed as powerful tactics in the struggle for women's liberation: "Woman in the world of man is tried to be rendered as powerful and successful as a man but also conscious of the additional power of her sexuality; her feminine power. This creates an image that is 'seductive in appearance' but 'masculine in character' which will provide the woman with the strength necessary for the struggle of power" (ibid: 208). In *the female entel* typification, it is possible to find the traces of this dual discourse of the 'Kadınca' magazine, which arguably points to the common feminist understanding of the period. *The female entel* in her struggle to gain more liberty within society also faces the dilemma of putting on masculine characteristics and simultaneously employing her seductive femininity. *Şepnem,* for instance, not only has a more masculine appearance but also employs attitudes traditionally attributed to men such as paying the bill at a restaurant. However, she does

not disregard her feminine sexuality, on the contrary, she tries to keep her feminine sensuality as opposed to the vulgar masculinity of *Abdullah*.

Such depictions of *the female entels* not only give clues about their representations in the cartoon strips, but also condition how *male entel* types are depicted[34]. In the previous part, I have already pointed out that *the male entels* as opposed to the masculine images of the intellectuals of previous decades were pictured with feminine physical attributes. However, this femininity is not separated from their behavior patterns or moods. *The male entels* as opposed to the extreme masculine characteristics of *the zonta* and *the maganda* types are usually depicted with characteristics which have been traditionally identified with women. They are obsessed with how they look, they cannot take initiative, and they cannot exercise power on others to make them do something. In the *Zontellektüel Abdullah* series, Şepnem's approach to the masculine characteristics of Abdullah is formed through a comparison of him with other "entel" men around her. Abdullah attracts Şepnem for the first time when he orders something in the bar where they were discussing the struggle between *the zontas* and *the entels*. There, Abdullah enchants everyone with his sincerity and truthfulness. In a scene, where he enters *the entels'* circle for the first time in an *entel* bar, Abdullah orders something from the waiter with a decisive and pressing manner and

[34] While discussing the radio plays produced in the first decades of the Turkish Republic, Meltem Ahıska underlines that the representations of women in those plays speaks about men more than women, as is the case when the representations of the masses gives us information not about the masses, but about the elites producing such representations (Ahiska 2005: 260). Though Ahıska's comments are about a totally different medium from a totally different period, they have applicability beyond both the period and the medium since they point to an established mindset. The creation of the image of *the entel* also follows similar patterns: First, the representations of *the female entels* speak for *the male entels* as I am going to discuss in this section. On the other hand, *the entels* as the parodic representations of the intellectual elites, also speak about the masses against which they were positioned. I will discuss this dimension of *the entel* in the last section of this chapter.

the waiter immediately brings his order. Here, Şepnem, fascinated by Abdullah's precision in placing an order, compares him to Berk -one of her *male entel* friends, probably her ex-boyfriend- where we see Berk trying to order something in the same frame. As opposed to Abdullah, Berk is shy and timid, trying to talk to the waiter with an indistinct voice (Figure 3.7). Then, we should ask why such characteristics which have traditionally been attributed to women –such as being passive, and keeping one's voice down in public- are all gathered in the image of *the male entels*. One of the reasons for this depiction is the general tendency in the creation of *the entel* which I've been referring to throughout this study: To bring intellectuals into disrepute. However, this is not enough to understand why *the male entels* depicted in an effeminated manner. Here, we should turn our attention to Yenigün's discussion about the discourse of the 'Kadınca' magazine once more. In her extensive study, one of the striking observations is that while stressing an egalitarian feminist understanding, 'Kadınca' magazine also has many inferences about men since in this struggle for equality, the image of men is frequently stressed as a role model. In Yenigün's words,

> *Kadınca* attributes a passive, irresolute, and childlike character to men. It is as if certain personality traits typical of females, such as dependency, helplessness, lack of initiation, were projected onto the male. This childlike character and weakness attributed to men seems to help 'Kadınca' both to avoid the presentation of males as enemies and be able to impose on women the identity of a mother who would possess and protect these 'children'. Men are somewhat feminized with a passive, perplexed and childlike character, women are endowed with determination (ibid, p. 206).

It is not too far fetched to claim that *the male entels* stand for this image of man supported by the 'Kadınca' magazine. In most of the cartoon strips, *the male entels* are depicted as oriented towards consensus. In *the entels'* power struggle with other groups,

Figure 3.7

And Zontellüktüel Abdullah is at Ortaköy now... he has finally found a place to fulfil his title.

The thin man: Look at this my brother Apo! (hiccup)..This is between you and me... (hiccup) we've always been excluded … (hiccup)…like you…

The woman with glasses: Please Orhan... Do not be a dead drunk again, ok?
The man with freckle: Don't worry chick…we'll solve this problem..he'll be ok..

The thin man: Shock over shock again! (hiccup) This makes one rebellious!

Abdullah: Hey man! Come here! Cut some parsley... squeeze a lemon, spill it on parsley and bring here...come on honey…
The waiter: Sure man...
The woman with glasses: Will you stop please!
The thin man: Look, let me explain…

Şepnem: He's so dominant at the table! His communication with waiters is so impressive...His demands are immediately fulfilled. But if Berk ordered the same thing...

Şepnem: …the waiter would hem and haw and make Berk forget about his order...
Berk: Ehh….mmm….sorry…One minute please! Could you please help me?
The woman with glasses: If you don't know how to drink, then don't! Come on man!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 20.01.1992)

like *the magandas*, *the zontas*, etc. it is usually the women who occupy the front lines since they have taken over the masculine characteristics that the male *entels* lack. In contrast to the sharpness of *the female entels*, *the male entels* are round, fragile and passive. Most of the time they are the victims of the masculine violence of *the zontas* and *the magandas*. They are depicted as the masters of rhetoric, however, most of the time the ground for their rhetorical discussions is not well built and their arguments might be refuted even by *a zonta* (See Figure 3.8).

3.1.3. The life style of *the entel*

The entel emerged as a formalist and gendered type and brought about a specific notion of life style with him/her. Though this life style is the outcome of the image of *the entel*, it is also an essential part of him/her. It is possible to claim that *the entel* cannot be thought of without this specific life-style.

The core of *the entel*'s life style is marked by an overflowing desire (sexual or material oriented) and its satisfaction. However, this desire is masked behind an endless but pointless endeavor for intellectual activities, including chatting about grand intellectual matters in bars, joining panels, art exhibitions, etc.

The entel is usually depicted as not being dependent on jobs as other people are. Occasionally, s/he appears as an academician, a journalist, a writer, but more frequently s/he is an artist. However, in most of the cases his/her occupation is not specified. Whether s/he has a job or not, in actuality *the entel* is a bohemian who does not need (and who cannot manage) a proper job. His/her inoccupation renders him/her futile for

Figure 3.8

The man with curly hair*:* Of course you can't hear; you're communicatively-retarded!! You've ruined this beautiful city! You made our virgin Istanbul smell like lahmacun!
The woman: Calm down Berktan!

Abdullah: Sorry my man but you made it smell like alcohol. You mean that you've enlightened the city by the signs of those tiny bars? You've made "vesikalı yarim Istanbul" smell like pizza and hamburger!

The thin man with moustache: Is it God that makes you say all these words Apo? Gimme high-five!!
Abdullah: Not at all man, no problem! High-five!!
The man with curly hair: What? To us! How can he ever say this to us!!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 16.01.1992)

Figure 3.9.

(Haslet Soyöz. *Milliyet*, 09.08.1989)

-- How am I going to become an entel? I'm rushing from one movie to another in Istanbul Film Festival, from one concert to another in Istanbul Music Festival , from one bar to another at night... I have beard and glasses; my wife has a boyfriend; I've gay friends...

the society, and creates a gap between him/her and the "working people". *The entel* puts all his/her time and effort into pragmatic deeds towards satisfying his/her desires, and to criticize others' work. S/he takes great pleasure in criticism and evaluation, however, his/her critical discourse is fake, his/her analyses are always far-fetched and incomprehensible full of unjustified arguments and copy-paste sentences. *The entel*'s reliance on such a fake critical discourse is a tool for masking his/her groundless intellectuality. What matters for him/her is just to "appear intellectual". Mentioning the necessary characteristics to be a good *entel* in a cynical article, Çetin Altan underlines this nature of *the entel*: For Altan, in order to be a good *entel* "(…) One has to denounce everything produced and disdainfully criticize their producers. (…) One should not know anything deeply, but must look as if one knows everything whereas one doesn't think that it is worthy explaining those things in detail (…) One always has to hold on to the (self appointed) privilege of judging others (…)" (Altan 1992).

In terms of his/her occupation, *the entel*'s time is spent in leisure. However, this leisure is not out of laziness or indolence. On the contrary, one of the conditions d'etre for *the entel* is being on the run. S/he always pursues an activity, a festival, a cocktail for an exhibition, a panel, etc. Here, especially activities like film festivals, music festivals, concerts of western bands and singers are emphasized frequently since they point to the new trends emerging in the cultural surface of İstanbul after 1980 (See Figure 3.9). *The entel* participates in these activities with an unsatiable eagerness: S/he should always be ready for a new happening; she should know every cultural activity worth mentioning and should run from one film to a concert, from a panel to an exhibition. Here, being

there rather than active involvement is stressed. The nature of interaction during the event and how s/he is affected by it is considered irrelevant. The life style of *the entel* accentuates the precedence of quantity over quality. Thus what matters for *the entel* is speed: the speed of the activity, and his/her speed of participating in one activity after another. S/he is one of the prestigious customers of the diversifying and accelerating culture industry of İstanbul.

Apart from the spaces for artistic recreation, the main gathering venues for *the entels* are pubs and bars. *The entels* are depicted in bars so frequently that they are identified with those bars to an extent that it seems they cannot exist outside of them. Besides, a concept of 'entel bars' is embedded in daily language together with the word "entel". In March 1989, a local daily newspaper, *Yeni Asır* published a series, with the title "Şu Entel Bar Dedikleri…" ("What they call entel bars…"), in an attempt to promote the *entel bars*, like *L'aventure*, *Mavi*, *Phoenix Bar*, *Charlie's Bar*, and *Piccadilly Bar* in the city of İzmir. In this series, *the entel bars* are distinguished by their modernist styles and their customer profiles. People going there are expected to be aware of what's going on in the artistic agenda of the society, and this functions as an automatic exclusion mechanism to determine the ideal customer profile for these bars. The barman of *Mavi Bar*, one of the bars labeled as *the entel bar* in *Yeni Asır*, Sinan Görsel, describes this situation as follows: "Of course there is no rule saying that an ordinary man cannot come in here. He can come and have his/her drink, but he cannot get a taste of the atmosphere of the bar. Here, the topics people chat about are fixed, and in order to join these chats, s/he should be capable of talking about artistic and cultural

Figure 3.10

(Haslet Soyöz. *Milliyet*, 05.08.1989)

The man with beard: I badly want a double of rakı and a shot of w... sorry, chick! (He means woman)
The woman standing next to him: So you're bored of me?

The woman behind: I'm lonely!
The man behind: The best version of loneliness is the one that is felt on bed lying with a stranger.

The woman at the other corner: Sweetie, whenever we make sex he prefers to read books.
The man at the other corner: He never understands from what he reads anyway.

Figure 3.11



-- Beurk! Why the hell did I talk this much?!!!!

(Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 04.05.1989)

matters. Otherwise, s/he would get bored here."[35] The choice of bars as the iconographic venue for *the entels* is strictly related to the characteristics attributed to him/her. First of all, *the entel bars* are the places for alcoholic beverages. Consumption of the alcoholic beverages paves the way for and accelerates futile chats and discussions of *the entels*. Besides, alcoholic beverages also enable *the entels* to forget their restlessness about the present time. When they get drunk, they shift to a melancholic mood mourning for the lost things, sentiments and values of the past. Related to that, the alcoholic drinks together with the effect of the noisy atmosphere, prevent a reciprocal conversation among *the entels.* Rather in *the entel bars*, most of the conversations are monologues. There, talking is no more a means of communication, it is a masturbative activity (like most of the activities of *the entels*) which is motivated towards achieving a feeling of relief from anxiety. As such, *the entel bars* are positioned as the venues of pointless sociability. This nature of the *entel* bars might be seen in Figure 3.10, where each person is following his flow of thoughts regardless of what the others are speaking about. Figure 3.11 in which an *entel* is depicted as vomiting out his tongue also farcically points to this nature of *the entel bars*. Since not the content, but the length of his words are important there, he is devastated after an ordinary night in *the entel bar*.

If we turn our attention from the public image of *the entel* and go inside his/her house, we see that s/he is rarely depicted as a family wo/man. In the few examples when s/he is depicted in a marital relationship, s/he is again stuck in between the intellectual identity s/he has been trying to construct and the husband/wife or father/mother roles

[35] From an interview by Figen Özbey published in Yeni Asır daily newspaper, 15.03.1989.

s/he is supposed to play. In Figure 3.12, *the male entel* is complaining about the equal role distribution in the domestic sphere. He wants to ask his wife to make Turkish coffee for him, but he cannot ask her since he believes that this traditional demand contradicts his intellectual image. In Figures 3.13 and 3.14, sexuality appears as the area of conflict. In Figure 3.13, the grandfather of the woman complains about the passivity of her husband in terms of initiating sexual intercourse. Rather he chooses to play chess with his wife. Playing chess and making love are contrasted here as the two interchangable activities for spending the night. In the words of the grandfather, who symbolizes the weight of traditional expectations on the couple's shoulders, the premise of making love was constructed as a lost opportunity. The grandfather cannot understand why his 'beautiful granddaughter's husband plays chess with her instead of making love to her. *The entel* couple is subtly depicted as resisting the traditional expectations forcing them to have sex and to reproduce. However, from another perspective, one might claim that *the entel* couple in this cartoon is positioned to reproduce the traditional husband and wife roles. The wife is attributed the role of a mediator: She tries to calm down her husband in order to prevent a possible quarrel between him and her grandfather. We know what the grandfather wants, we know what the husband wants (since the grandfather puts the burden of their playing chess on his shoulders), but we do not know what the woman wants for herself. She just tries to keep the consensus passively. In Figure 3.14, sexuality becomes a problematic issue for the couple in another dimension. There the *entel* woman catches her *entel* boyfriend (or husband) while he was masturbating in the bathroom. He defends himself in a pretentious way, saying that

Figure 3.12

(Derya Sayın, *Limon*, 07.02.1991)

-- Look at this situation! I so badly want a cup of Turkish coffee from my wife. But how can I tell this to her! What the hell is this kind of equality!

Figure 3.13

(Ahmet Yılmaz, *Limon*, 01.03.1991)

The old man: Oh my god...We let him to marry with our beloved and sexy girl... Look what he's doing at three o'clock in the morning! Then, we still expect him to give us a grandchild.
The girl: İlber, please do not get nervous. He's our guest and older than us. Besides he's returning to his village tomorrow.

Figure 3.14

(Mehmet Çağçağ, *Limon*, 26.10.1989)

The woman: This cannot be real Olcay, you can't do this to me. You could have told me if there were problems in our relationship. Huuu!!

The man: This is not related to our relationship. It's different! This thing and you are both special for me...

masturbation and making love to her are separate things for him. Here again, the irony of the cartoon is constructed on various presuppositions which also reproduce traditional male and female roles. First of all, it is implied that *the entel* man prefers masturbation to making love to his *entel* girlfriend (or wife), her girlfriend also interprets his masturbation as a sign of something missing in their relationship. She assumes that she is incapable of satisfying her boyfriend's sexual desires. Such an understanding which implies that *the entels* are incapable of satisfying their sexual desires with *entel* partners is a frequent theme in the cartoons, especially in some occasions where *the entels* encounter *the zontas*. I am going to elaborate on this theme in the following section where I will discuss such encounters.

In the strip cartoons, the decoration of *the entel*'s house is another dimension pointing to the characteristics of his/her life style. In any occasion, the library is the center of gravity for *the entel*'s house. The major emphasis about his library is on its fullness (See Figure 3.15 and 3.16). In Figure 3.17, a capture from *Zontellektüel Abdullah* series, Abdullah asks Şepnem whether she read all the books in her library. Her answer summarizes *the entels*' relation with the books: "Are you mad! When will I live if I read all of them?" and she continues: "My sweetheart, some people go to hairdresser's everyday. Some buy a new dress everyday... the latest fashion! These make them feel good and comfortable. Buying books is the latest trend in our community. We relax this way. One day, they will certainly be read. No need to hurry!" Since "reading books" is one of the major characteristics attributed to the image of the idealized intellectuals, in the figure of *the entel,* "books" also turn out to be a target of parody.

Figure 3.15

(Kemal Urgenç & Mahmut Tibet, *Limon*, 31.05.1990)

-- It's unbelievable. This is what I call a chance! Such a huge volume costs only three thousand liras. I wish I had bought more...

Figure 3.16

-- Shall I put scatter some classics here and there İlknur?

(Kaan Ertem, *Limon*, 14.12.1989)

What is important for him/her is just possession of these books; they lost their meaning in the hands of *the entels* since they are reduced into accessories contributing to the emergence of their intellectual image. In this sense, it is noteworthy that in two different cartoons, *the entel* types are depicted while buying their books after they tried them in a dressing cabin (See Figure 3.18 and 3.19). In these cartoons, books are turned into mere objects of fashion, devoid of meaning.

3.2. The Encounters of *the Entel*

The life style of *the entel* presents him/her as an urban figure. It is not possible to find a representation of *the entel* living in the provinces. S/he is born in the city, and destined to live there. This is understandable if we consider that it is the urban intellectuals of the post 80's period that are parodied through the *entel* figure. In this period, the provincial intellectuals continued to assume their genuineness, authenticity and truthfulness in the public opinion.[36] In the civic becoming of *the entel*, associating the city with transformation, change and decay has a key role as well as the view of the country as the landscape of continuity, stability and purity. The positioning of *the entel* as an urban figure presents various possibilities for encounters with other new figures meandering through the transforming, liberalizing and globalizing cityscapes. In this section, first I am going to discuss the dynamics of these encounters that frequently results in tension between *the entels* and the above-mentioned types. I will try to

[36] For a discussion of the provincial intellectuals, see Necati Mert's "Taşra ve Aydınları" ("The Province and Its Intellectuals", 2005: 137-155).

Figure 3.17

-- Did you really read all of these? Şepnemm!!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 30.01.1992)

Figure 3.18

-- Ok, I'm buying this.

(Mahmut Tibet. *Limon*, 31.05.1990)

Figure 3.19



The salesman: Here you are; you can try this.
The customer: I liked it...Please wrap it.

(Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 21.07.1986)

evaluate how the identity of *the entel* is constructed as opposed to those types. Though *the entel* frequently has conflicts with them, there is also another tendency in the sample cartoons to foreground the similarities of *the entel* with those other types. I will also discuss this tendency that results in the hybridization of *the entel* with those types s/he encountered.

3.2.1.*The Entel* vs…

In his adventures in the cityscapes, *the entel* frequently encounters *magandas*, *zontas*, *kıros* and types that are positioned within the problematic category of "the ordinary people" or "the simple men". What is interesting here is the very fact that throughout the research conducted for this study, not a single cartoon was encountered as positioning *the entel* against the idealized image of the intellectual. The figure that has been accepted traditionally as the true intellectual is rendered invisible; there is no space for him/her in the rotting cityscapes. In the world of cartoons, there are no intellectuals other than *the entels*, and *the entels* as parodic representations of the true intellectual figurations were never depicted together with what they parodied.

It is possible to discuss the encounters of *the entel* in relation to the emotional impact and the atmosphere of these encounters: First, there are those encounters with the migrant figures, stereotyped in the cartoons with names like *maganda*, *zonta*, *kıro*, etc. All those names signify similar stereotypes depicted as migrant figures that cannot adapt to the moral codes and practices of city life, and try to continue their provincial life styles in the cities. They are sketched as hybrid figures, who try to enjoy the freedom

and diversity presented by the consumerist culture of the city but who also try to keep their rural sensibilities. Ayşe Öncü, through a similar analysis of cartoons, describes *the maganda* as a figure of "brute strength, hairy body, and unbridled sexual appetites, who infects and pollutes the cultural atmosphere of the social settings he appears in (…) He is invariably depicted as a male, and more often than not, in a state of sexual arousal (…) He is 'the animal within us,' the absolute other, whose physical repulsiveness is the embodiment of vulgar sexual urges" (Öncü, 1999: 111-112).

The entels' encounters with *zontas* are marked by violent tension. The two are in constant struggle to gain territory in the newly emerging city. Kemal Gökhan Gürses' two cartoon strip series, *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı* (*The War Between The Intellectuals and Zontas*, AZS) and *Zontellektüel Abdullah* (*The Hick-intellectual Abdullah*) starts with episodes depicting such struggles between *the entels* and *the zontas*. In both of the series, the first encounter takes place on a bus when one of *the zontas* disturbs *an entel*. In AZS a *male entel* warns a *zonta* who is leaning over him. In reply, *the zonta* forces him to get out of the bus and starts to beat him. In *Zontellektüel Abdullah*, on the other hand, the first tension arises between a *female entel* and a *zonta*. This time, *the female entel*, reacts to *the zonta*'s sexually harassing behavior in an exaggerated manner. The scene, in a surreal manner, turns into a musical where *the female entel* and two of her friends start to sing and dance to their ironic Turkish version of the song 'Can't Touch This'. This time it is *the zontas* who leave the bus. It is significant that in their encounters only *the female entels* had a presence against *the zontas*. One of the reasons for this is the tendency to depict *the female entel*s as

Figure 3.20

(A scene from *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*)

The man with glasses: I've trapped the "zonta"!
The woman: Until the day comes at which women will be treated as human beings, death for "zontas" and machos!
The man with moustache: Take this!
The man with glasses: My friend, I'm from Anatolia too. I'm from the Aegean Region . But the city life…
The fat man: That's enough! Shut up man!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*, 1989)

feminists, which I have discussed previously. Besides, such a depiction is also related to the characteristics of *the zonta* figure: Since he is portrayed as a migrant who is unable to control his sexual desires, and has no familiarity with, and therefore no understanding of the behavior of modern urban women, he is shocked by the bold and opinionated attitude of *the female entels*. On the other hand, he is comfortable in his encounters with *the male entels* since he can impose his brutal violence on a man without hesitation. In their encounters, *the male entels* are frequently beaten by *the zontas*, the only instances where they are able to confront the aggressiveness of *the zontas* is when they act together with their other *entel* friends. However, this solidarity between *the entels* is also ironic, since it lacks the political esprit among the intellectuals from the previous decades. Now they only get together when they are distracted by *the zontas'* penetration into their own spaces in the city. In *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı* when *the male entel* is beaten by *the zonta*, the other *entels* rush to help him, and one of *the female entels* sticks her finger into the eye of *the zonta*. The other *zontas*, hearing their friend's painful cries get together to help him and a clash resembling a civil war starts between the two groups to gain reign over the city (see Figure 3.20). The striking point here is the fact that *the entels'* only political involvement is those cases when they try to protect their life styles against *the zontas*. Their political consciousness is limited with this life style.

The other figures that *the entel*s frequently encounter belong to the general and problematic category of 'the ordinary people'. Such encounters do not have a precise structure as *the entel*s' encounters with *the zontas*. However, it is possible to claim that *the entels'* relation to the ordinary people is dominated by a feeling of uneasiness. This

uneasiness is the result of a kind of astonishment that stems from the minimalism and sincerity embedded in the life styles of simple men. Usually, *the entels* encounter the simple men while they are working as porters, carriers, construction workers, etc. Here, the physical burden on the shoulders of the simple men underlines their authenticity and truthfulness to traditional values. Besides, the reality of their physical endeavor also emphasizes *the entel*s' meaningless lives. However, *the entel* is not eager to engage in self-criticism during his/her encounters with the simple men. Rather s/he observes them with a romanticizing gaze. In Figure 3.21, *the entel* comes accross a porter carrying a big package of Atlas Company. On the package, the picture of the mythological figure of Atlas carrying the world on his shoulders enlightens *the entel*: He then realizes that the real burden bearers carrying the world on their shoulders are those "poor-fellows". Such a romanticizing tendency might be seen also in Figure 3.22. This time *the entel* praises the labor of the porter. However, the porter's response to this is "to fart". As such, *the entel*'s tendency to romanticize the figure of the ordinary man is insulted. However, the ridicule of *the entels* in their encounters with simple men is not limited to such direct and vulgar behaviors. Even the plain existence of them is enough to ridicule *the entels'* situation. The porters in both cartoons are the passive centers of gravity; their truthfulness and genuineness are simply mocking the existences of *the entels*.

Figure 3.21

-- Oh my entel mind! I've misunderstood mythology up to now. It seems that these poor guys are the ones who carry the world on their back. They are Atlas, they're Sisyphos...

(Güneri İçoğlu. *Limon*, 08.10.1991)

Figure 3.22

--Don't worry my beautiful proletarian. Beautiful days, as clean as your sweat on your forehead, are very soon for you. Expect the sunset...

(Suat Özkan. *Limon*, 06.07.1989)

3.2.2. The Hybrid form of *the entel* and *the zonta: Zontellektüel*

In most cases where *the entel* encounters *the zontas*, there is tension which leads to a differentiation between the two based on their distinct conceptions about city life. On the other hand, there is also a sub-theme in the cartoons, which subtly points to certain similarities between the two. First of all, *the entels* occasionally reproduce the vulgarity and the brutality of *the zontas*, whose characteristics they complain most about. As I have illustrated above, *the female entels* might injure *the zontas* with their fingers, or *the male entels* might easily shift to the use of brutal force in circumstances where they have the opportunity to act collectively. However, it is possible to trace the similarities of *the entels* with *the zontas* beyond such obvious acts. First of all, both of these figures exist in the cartoons by means of their exaggerated physical attributes. As opposed to the beardy, pipe smoking *entel* figure, which is frequently pictured as wearing eyeglasses, *the zontas* are illustrated with their heavily built and hairy bodies, moustaches, short hair, and the prayer beads they carry. The two types' appearances are totally different, but this does not point to a substantial difference in their characters: Both are obsessed with how they look and tend to evaluate things and people around them according to their appearances as well. Their concerns are similar, gathered around the life styles they stand for. Figure 3.8 exemplifies this similarity: *The entel* accuses *the zontas* for their local eating habits and indicates the previously pristine Istanbul smells which became infested now with those of lahmacun -a local food with a heavy smell- because of them. *The zonta* replies with similar accusations, criticizing *the entel*'s westernized, assimilated eating and drinking habits, the pubs and bars s/he regularly

goes to. This cartoon erases the differences of *the entels* and *the zontas* and equates them on the same ground: They are like two sides of a coin, one is portrayed with his/her westernized habits and practices, and the other is depicted with his eastern way of living. They stand for the extreme poles of the discussions around the transformation in big cities with the triggering effects of neoliberal policies and pressures of globalization. The similarity of these opposed figures is crystallized in *Zontellektüel Abdullah*, a character created by Kemal Gökhan Gürses for a series published in *Hürriyet* daily newspaper. The series tells the success story of Abdullah, a character born in one of the underdeveloped cities of the eastern regions of Turkey and who migrated with his family to one of the shantytowns of İstanbul. Once he is grown up, Abdullah starts to work on construction sites, but although he looks, speaks and acts like his friends, he is not one of them. When they go to a brothel, for instance, he feels pity for the prostitutes working there. He is not as insensitive as the other *zontas*. In his first encounter with *the entels*, there occurs a clash between them about entering Ortaköy, a neighborhood segregated by *the entel* groups. *The entels* try to prevent the entrance of *the zontas* to Ortaköy saying that their vulgarity does not fit the elegance of the place. There, *Zontellektüel Abdullah* manages to come up with reasonable arguments to counter their claims (See Figure 3.8). *The entels*, unable to refute Abdullah's arguments, invite him to an *entel* bar to further discuss the dilemma between *the entels* and *the zontas*. This invitation marks a new period in Abdullah's life. During the discussion at the bar, he gets the attention of *an entel* woman, Şepnem with his decisiveness and sincerity. He spends the night at Şepnem's flat and becomes her boyfriend. From that instance on, we witness how

Şepnem determinedly transforms Abdullah *the zonta* into an *entel*. Overnight, he shifts to the ponytail and earring, starts to read Şepnem's books, cuts his moustache, imitates the beard style of an *entel* and of course starts to smoke the acclaimed pipe. He simply mimics the life style of *an entel* since he socializes with Şepnem at panels, art exhibitons, *entel bars*, discos, etc. During this transformation, Abdullah's inner voice expresses his observations about the world of *the entels*. Most of the time, he is astonished by the superficiality of the activities of *the entels*. Moreover, he also finds a mood of futility in his new, *entel* life which makes it resemble his former life as a *zonta*. For example, in Figure 3.23, Abdullah is depicted for the first time after his transformation in an *entel* bar. There, he observes his surroundings with a calculative doubt. He asks himself what the difference between that bar and the *ocakbaşı* (a local place where usually *sish kebab* and *rakı* are consumed and local music is played) might be. As an answer to his own question, Abdullah sees the presence of *the women* as a marking difference between the two places. However, he thinks since these women are addressed with titles such as "hocam" (a noun which had masculine connotations and applied for addressing someone), since they act like men, their presence does not count as a major difference between the two places. In Figure 3.24, when one of Şepnem's artist friends asks Abdullah where he is from, he reminds him of a *zonta* friend who once asked the same question. "We did not move any further" he thinks, "Both the intellectual people and *the zontas* ask the same question."

Figure 3.23

Abdullah (the man with moustache): Of man…how is this different from our *ocakbaşı (a special Turkish restaurant in traditional style-N.Ö.)*
The woman behind (with blonde hair): Man… I feel so sorry about this republic issue…
Abdullah: Of course there is one difference… women! But if they are being addressed as man or bro…
Şepnem (the woman with a hat): Wow your hair is so shiny! Its as if they are joyfully dancing in harmony…
Abdullah: If there were only men I would loosen these tough guys' tongues in no time… then it would turn to road trip right away…
The man in shadow: The Turkish people should unite man…we've been oppressed all the time! We deserve to desire to be strong…
The woman (with blonde hair): (referring to a popular shampoo advertisement…) I wash and I go out
Abdullah: Yoooo! Look at that rocker! He's shamelessly hitting on Şepnem! Damn, I'll eat him alive!
Abdullah: You! You are an idiot! Do you know!
Şepnem: But Apo please! What is this supposed to mean now?
Abdullah: Do some self criticism man! Give brief and clear answers to my questions! Don't just nod your had! Tell me what does third world mean? What does polygamy mean? What does pluralism mean, what is it good for? Why don't the walls talk, explain!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 12.02.1992)

Figure 3.24

Thin man with beard: What do I do, I go and look for the pure man! Where do I find him?..hahhhaa..

Thin man with beard: In the East! And I notice immediately! Look, you are eastern too! I can sense it…

Thin man with beard: Where are you from?

(Flashback…)
The man with curly hair: Where are you from buddy?
Abdullah: I'm from Cylon!
The man with curly hair: From the center?
Abdullah: *(thinking…)* Damn we haven't been able to progress a tiny bit…the entel wonders about exactly the same thing that the zonta keeps asking!..
Abdullah: I'm from Cylon!

Thin man with beard: Hahha! Very good criticism!..thats right, now we all approach the issue universally! Hahha!

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 22.02.1992)

Figure 3.25

Abdullah: Damn I'll just shit on such civilization!

Abdullah: …he did his MA in the US while women were toiling in the mud…

Abdullah: …the industrialist so and so's son, daughter, or such and such company's executive manager…

Abdullah: they are really watching…am I zonta, or these people? Tell me…

Şepnem: Honey, of course you are right… these aren't our places, places that reflect us… I mean, you're not trying to say something to us right?

Abdullah: Well, since you, the enlightened brothers don't leave this place either?!..

Şepnem: Look, we are enlightened people who don't have songs, who don't have folk songs, who don't have places that would reflect our common thoughts!

Abdullah: Well in that case I offer all my respect to my *zonta*…he takes his culture to wherever he goes, and for all due respect he leaves it there when he comes back…

(Kemal Gökhan Gürses. "Zontellektüel Abdullah", *Hürriyet*, 26.02.1992)

In all these examples, an undertone that values *the zontas'* way of living more than the life style of *the entels* is prevalent. In Figure 3.25, after watching a mud-wrestling show at a nightclub, Abdullah articulates this mind-set. Observing the intellectuals and the richest people of İstanbul while they watch the women wrestling in the mud, he bursts out: "Fuck such modernism!..", and after criticizing Şepnem and other *entels* he continues: "…then hail to my dear *zonta*. He would take his manners into the place he goes, and transform the place." *The zonta*, as opposed to *the entel*, is depicted as having common and binding cultural codes and values that characterize him as a more concrete, stable, local and sincere figure.

Abdullah's transformation gains further momentum when an advertising agency, which is managed by one of Şepnem's friends, employs him. Then, he becomes able to exist in this new world without Şepnem's support. However, his transformation is not yet complete. During a promotion campaign for a political party, he catches the attention of some party members and is encouraged by them to go into politics. Once he decides to go into politics, he faces the dilemma of necessity to get married in order to have an attractive public image for the elections. While he has doubts about getting married to Şepnem because of her untraditional, Bohemian life style; he runs into Ayşe, his ex-girlfriend from his village, who now works at McDonald's. He makes a spontaneous marriage proposal to Ayşe. However, he could not make a choice between Ayşe and Şepnem. Learning this, Şepnem –in order to get her revenge from him- informs the authorities that Abdullah has been evading his military duties. Abdullah, taken on by the army for his military service, can be no longer enlisted for the coming elections. He

loses both his girlfriends and his career opportunities. Finally, the story goes back to its beginning, showing Abdullah while he is telling his original story to the cartooinst Kemal Gökhan Gürses. We do not know whether he regresses to his *zonta* life, or continues to seek opportunities to become *an entel*. In his own words, he ends up "neither an *intellectual*, nor a *zonta*…"

The main theme going through this series is Abdullah's inexhaustible potential to adapt to new conditions. He is a chameleon, a Zelig-like figure, who has a gift for catching the wind of change. Once he constructs his identity as a *zontellektüel*, a hybrid figure between *the zonta* and *the entel*, we witness the absurdity of the lifestyle of *the entels*. Each step that Abdullah takes unveils *the zonta* potential within *the entels* since their life style is also devoid of authenticity. By *the zonta* potential, I mean the lack of certain attributes such as sensibility, intellectuality and elegance that the *zonta*s are accused of. *The entels* also go to kebab houses as long as it is "in", they go to watch "vulgar" shows like mud-wrestling, they mostly read encyclopedia type of books in order to have plain information (a deeper and critical knowledge is not a necessity for them. Having familiarity with certain concepts that are being discussed in their social circle is sufficient.) Their condition is depicted as worse than *the zontas*, since *the zontas* are in peace with what and who they are and can form a coherent identity based on their traditional, cultural and moral values. As such the hybrid figure of *zontellektüel* does not show that *the zontas* have the potential to become intellectuals. Rather, it points to the looseness of the ground on which *the entels* stand. As pseudo-intellectuals, their way of living exhibits the characteristics of the life style of *a zonta*, which paradoxically they

constantly criticize. This hybridization points to and criticizes *the entel*'s in-between situation. S/he is stuck in-between the traditional eastern aspects s/he inherited and his/her occidental ambitions, aspirations to become an intellectual and the desire to enjoy the glamour of the city life.

All these encounters that *the entels* have with *the zontas*, *the simple men*, *etc.* and the hybrid figure of *zontellektüel* contribute to the ironic touch in the construction of *the entel* type. These encounters seem to be signifying that *the entel* type (and the fake intellectuals for which s/he stands for) is marginalized in relation to those other types who are depicted as having more authentic, genuine and sincere characteristics. However, I would rather propose to evaluate the implications of these encounters from a different perspective: Although they seem to be functioning to exclude the intellectuals from the "lower" segments of society by ridiculing them, the subtext of these encounters reveals another strategy: A strategy of inclusion that unmasks an imaginary resemblance between *the entel* and *the zonta*. One side of these encounters points to *the entel* and reveals his difference, even his alienation from the "real" ordinary people. From another perspective, these encounters offer a possible universe in which *the entel* might exist together with those people whom s/he regards as her/his inferior. In the case of the *zontellektüel* figure, this universe is further exaggerated to resemble a melting pot in which *the entel* and *the zonta* merge. Thus, through the parodic figure of *the entel*, the intellectuals are also leveled with the zontas, they are exposed to a kind of massification strategy. As such, the elegance and elitism embedded in the image of the intellectuals are taken away from them. This disrepute also renders them visible and down-to-earth,

almost ordinary, which makes it possible to discuss them in relation to and together with the stereotypical figures of the mass.

We might conceive of this strategy embedded in the body of *the entel* -which refers to an imaginary bridge between him/her and *the zonta* (or the simple people)- as an extension of the trend for deprivileging and demythologization of the intellectuals. As I have tried to discuss in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, this trend is accelerated after the dissemination of the market and its mechanisms in the post 80's era, since then the intellectuals have had to prove their utility on the scales of the market. Those who were involved in metaphysical speculation, who were not in pursuit of practical aims, or of non-material interests were accused as ineffectual dreamers. As such, the former prestige of the mental labor gravitated against the practicality of the physical labor. In such an environment, it is not surprising that *the entel* as a deformed figure representing the mental labor has so frequently encountered *the zonta*, who exists through his physical labor. In their encounters, and through the hybridization born out of these encounters, the target of dishonoring and humiliation is always *the entel*.

3.3. Melancholia and Cynicism of *the Entel*

As I have referred in the previous chapters, in a short passage of his book *Yeni Orta Sınıf* (*The New Middle Class*), Ali Şimşek evaluates the emergence of *the entel* type. He argues that the military dicta's victimization of the leftist intellectuals as the responsible agents of the bloody clashes during the late 70's was very effective in the

humiliation of the intellectuals as *the entel* (Şimşek, 2005: 103). This victimization, accompanied by the disappointment created by the "chameleon intellectuals" who became the neoliberal opinion leaders contributed to the parody of the intellectuals as *the entel*. Furthermore, Şimşek points out that "in the codifications of the intellectuals by the young people of the post 80's period, the failure of the well-intended, utopian and politically organized generations of the past decades (the '68 and '78 generations), a feeling of impotency accompanied by post-marxism and postmodernism; and a mood of kynicism were highly determining"[37] (ibid: 104). In most of the cartoons referred to in this study, *the entel* type is depicted as an impotent and cynical figure especially in terms of political issues as Şimşek underlined. Besides, as I have discussed in the preceding sections, *the entel*'s appearance, gender, and life style are ambivalent as is his/her relation to other types s/he encounters in the city. It is difficult to constitute a single coherent image and way of being for *the entel* since s/he keeps changing along with the latest trends, and thus each investigation reveals a new or added aspect of the figure. S/he is a chameleon, as I have already underlined, which makes him/her a type that fits into the cultural mood of the era**.**

In this section, I will try to illustrate the dynamics of *the entel*'s relation to the past and the politics. First, I will try to comment on the feelings of melancholia and impotency attached to the *entel* figure. In this discussion, *the entel*'s relation to the past as a period of the "lost battle" will hopefully be crystallized as well. Then, I will

[37] "Geçmiş dönemin (68 ve 78 kuşağı) iyi niyetli, ütopyacı, politik kuşağının başarısızlığı; postmarksizm ve postmodernizmle pekişen bir iktidarsızlık duygusu, kinizm (kayıtsızlık), genç kuşağın bir önceki kuşağı kodlamasını belirlemiştir."

evaluate the cynicism (not kynicism) that is depicted almost as a shadow of *the entel* type.

3.3.1. *The entel* and melancholia

In Chapter 2, I had proposed the notion of left-wing melancholia as a key concept in understanding the intellectual mood of the post-80's period in Turkey. In this section, I will try to exhibit how such melancholia is embedded in *the entel* type in order to problematize the intellectuals' account of the past, namely the pre-80's period. Before examining the cartoon samples, I would like to briefly go over Wendy Brown's evaluation of left melancholia, which was inspired by the reflections of Walter Benjamin. For Brown, left melancholia is "a condition produced by attachment to a notion of progress in which opportunities missed or political formations lost are experienced as *permanent* and *unrecoverable* (my italics)" (Brown, 2001: 169). The two words in italic (permanent and unrecoverable) are very crucial for my discussion of *the entel*. Other than his concerns about constructing a life style, the discourse of *the entel* is overwhelmed by the syndrome of "the good old days". Especially in *the entel* bars, s/he is frequently depicted as nostalgic about the old days during which s/he was meant to be an activist. In Figure 3.26, *the entel* reciting a gloomy poem in a bar is applauded by his friends. Their praises remind him of the days when he actively took part in demonstrations. He says that, even in those days, he did not receive such praise. Actually, since the major theme in his poem is sadness and melancholia, this sentiment could be generalized to include the whole group. All of them are deeply touched by the

Figure 3.26



The man with scarf: *(reading a poem)* Windows open… candles go out… sadness fills the chests…
The man with beard: Beautiful
The man with glasses: Man I am so impressed..
The woman: Something happened to me…

The man reading a poem: Thank you…even the reactions of people to the agitations I had to endure in the good old days haven't been this strong…thank you, thank you…

(Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 18.08.1986)

past. Like all feelings of melancholia, a feeling of something lost is attached to the mood of *the entels* in this cartoon. Their facial expressions, their looks, and even their postures reveal traces of their acceptance of the impossibility of returning to those good old days. Their loss is "permanent and unrecoverable". Feelings of grief and mourning which are caused by the loss and the transformation initiated by this loss are also evident in the cartoons depicting *the entels* in a melancholic mood. However, *the entel* never acknowledges this loss; he never speaks directly and openly about it. Rather he chooses indirect ways such as referring to the lost values and enthusiasm of the old days in order to glorify (and simultaneously mourn for) his past.

Besides his inability to acknowledge his loss, *the entel* hesitates to cope with the force responsible for his loss, namely the violent coup d'etat. The inability of *the entel* to face the process and outcomes of the military intervention, sentences his/her grief into a vicious circle s/he cannot break. Since s/he hesitates to face the real cause of his loss, the mourning of *the entel* has only symbolic value. It has lost its object, and turned into a never ending activity that fetishizes the lost things of the past. Like his appearance, his feelings of pain and grief are also fake and deceptive. They are functionalized to mask *the entel*'s involvement with his self-interests, to pretend that he is not as individualistic as his/her life style may make him appear to be. Through his/her melancholia, s/he gives the message that once upon a time he was politically conscious and acting in a collective manner for a better world, the "flow of life" pushed him/her to the conformism s/he is now caught in. In Figure 3.27, *the entel* summarizes the individualistic transformation he has gone through: In an attitude resembling melancholia, he starts to give an account of

Figure 3.27

-- We have read books man, we have read…
-- We shouted at the streets
-- At times we were existantialists, at times we were nihilists...

-- We attempted suicide and turned away…
-- Then, I got married ..I had a child..It didn't work out, so we got divorced.. And then, alcohol therapy… Now I'm a copywriter, I make good money.
-- No man, I do not regret it. If I had another life , I would exactly do the same..

(Tuncay Akgün. *Yeni Gündem*, 31.05.1986)

the things he has done in the past: He read a lot, joined demonstrations, became existentialist once in a while and then became nihilistic, he even tried to commit suicide. After those activist days, he got married, had a child, got divorced. Now he is working in the advertising business. But the central statement is in the last frame of the cartoon strip, in which *the entel* confesses: "I do not regret it. If I had another life, I would exactly do the same." This last frame sheds light of insincerity on the yearning from the preceding frames, since all the things he lived in his past are put in service of a predetermined end conflicting with the idealism of this past. In this cartoon, what is striking is not the transformation that *the entel* has gone through. Rather, it is his impudent attitude towards this transformation. In this cartoon, under the veil of his melancholy, a new strategy is crystallized that further demystifies and ridicules the melancholy of *the entel* as well. He seems to be aware of the emptiness, and futility of his stance; however, he capitulates on this stance anyhow, indifferent to his uselessness and impassivity. I would claim that this apathy is a kind of cyncisim (not kyncisim), which is very crucial in determining the mood of *the entel*.

3.3.2. *The Entel* and cynicism

As I have quoted above, Ali Şimşek regards kynicism as a crucial mood determining the existence of *the entel*. By kynicism, he means the indifference of *the entel*, especially towards the political matters of his era. Here, I would propose that it is more convenient to approach the indifference of *the entel* with the concept of cynicism rather than kynicism. The source for this proposition is Peter Sloterdijk's differentiation

between the two concepts in his extensive study, *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Sloterdijk attributes to kynicism a more positive meaning associating it with the Cynics of the Ancient Greeks, the most prominent figure of whom is Diogenes of Sinop. Kynicism, for Sloterdijk, dwells on a destructive irony with which "respectable thinking does not know how to deal" (Sloterdijk 1987: 103). He evaluates the ancient kyncisim as "cheeky" and indicates that this cheekiness comes from its opposition: "The kynic farts, shits, pisses, masturbates, (…) shows contempt for fame, ridicules the architecture, refuses respect, parodies the stories of gods and heroes (…) and says to Alexander the Great that he should get out of his sun (…)" (ibid: 104) As such, kynicism is "a first reply to Athenian hegemonic idealism that goes beyond theoretical repudiation. It does not speak against idealism, it lives against it (…) But this is not enough: Kynicism gives a new twist to the question of how to say the truth." (ibid.) On the other hand, Sloterdijk evaluates cynicism as a phenomenon related to the modernist conception of ideology, and he conceptualizes it through a revision of Marx's famous evaluation of ideology:

> Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness, (…) consciousness demoralized by the compulsion to survive and desire to assert itself. It is afflicted with the compulsion to put up with preestablished relations that it finds dubious, to accommodate itself to them, and finally even carry out their business. (ibid: 5-6)

As Andreas Huyssen pointed out in his Foreword to the *Critique of Cynical Reason*, Sloterdijk does not propose the two concepts as binary oppositions; however, he evaluates cynicism with negative connotations whereas he regards kyncisim as a strategy that appropriates irony or sarcasm to expose the functioning of ideology. Kynicism, for Sloterdijk, is the lost satirical stance that should be rejuvenated against the modern cynicism, which becomes an ideology in itself.

Slavoj Žižek, following Sloterdijk, also takes part in the discussion about cynicism. For Žižek, the cynical subject, as opposed to the kynical subject, is quite aware of the divergence between the constructions of ideology and social reality, but he nonetheless insists on the mask that ideology provides. In his discussion, Žižek appropriates the term kynicism parallel to Sloterdijk and indicates that "kynicism represents the popular, plebeian rejection of the official culture by means of irony and sarcasm(…) it subverts the official proposition by confronting it with the situation of its enunciation; it proceeds ad hominem (for example, when a politician preaches the duty of patriotic sacrifice, kynicism exposes the personal gain he makes from the sacrifice of others)" (Žižek 1989: 29). Žižek evaluates cynicism in relation to this subversive power of kynicism:

> Cynicism is the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical subversion: it recognizes, it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological universality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to retain the mask. This cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like morality itself put in the service of immorality —the model of cynical wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a supreme form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is therefore a kind of perverted 'negation of the negation' of the official ideology. (ibid)

The entel, is also overwhelmed with such a cynicism, he is also in a state resembling that of "enlightened false consciousness". He knows that the transformation he is living through is caused by the military intervention, and it stands as the utmost political matter to deal with. However, due to the fear created by the repressive practices and legislative procedures of the coup d'etat, s/he refrains from facing the violent reality of the military intervention. As a figure having a claim for an intellectual occupation,

s/he wants to get involved in political discussions, however his/her discussions about politics are simply either cynical arguments offering abstract tactics to save the country, or accounts of past politics, which end in the introverted melancholia that I have discussed in the previous section. In Figure 3.28, *the entels'* eagerness to save the country is ridiculed: It is just a decoration, like wallpaper or a painting for them. They just need to talk about the matters of the country to feel better.

Another dimension of the cynicism embedded in *the entel* figure is related to my discussion about *the entel's* encounters with other figures, for the sake of my discussion, *the zonta*. This cynicism functions to obliterate the distinguishing characteristics of the intellectual figure and to equate him/her with other people who presumably form the masses. For instance, in Figure 3.30, two *entel* men, supporters of different football teams, argue fanatically about the situation of their teams. Realizing the futility of their discussion, they agree that they should discuss the problems of the country, and try to find out what the most vital issue for the country is. They end where they started: The most important issue of the country is football. In another cartoon (Figure 3.29), another *entel* man arrives at Zile, a district of Tokat, bends on his knees, and confesses enthusiastically that he is from Tokat. The reason for his keeping this fact a secret for years is the negative image of this region as a place of low culture and uncivilized people. Here, in revealing this secret, he is not being sincere since the motivation for his confession lies in the fact that Tokat is the place where Ceasar the Great uttered his famous phrase: "Veni, Vidi, Vici". In this cartoon, the eagerness of the cynical *entel* to come to terms with his roots is again his calculating, cynical mind. However, whatever

Figure 3.28

The man with beard: Guys, this is the most important matter.. Revolutions and counter-revolutions!

The man with pipe: Hey man, two doubles of rakı and a saving the country board.

(Kemal Urgenç. *Limon*, 19.07.1990)

Figure 3.29

The man with long hair: I've been concealing that my hometown is Tokat for so many years now. And now I learn that this is the place where Caeser said "veni,vidi, vici." I'm from Tokat, Caeser the Great from Tokat!

The man on the bus: Kieeeep goin'!

(Güneri İçoğlu. *Limon*, 09.07.1991)

Figure 3.30

The man with glasses: Did you see how we scored those three goals…Now do you know who the champion is?
The man with pipe: You are just lucky, man.
The man with glasses: Three,three,three!
The man with pipe: Last year you were so silent when we became the champion!
The man with glasses: Let bygones be bygones., what matter is the present!
The man with pipe: Anyway, Fener is the greatest!
The man with glasses: We're glorious, we are the Beşiktaş partizans!
The man with pipe: Fener is the greatest!
The man with glasses: Look at us, There are so many problems within the country and what are we doing?
The man with glasses: Ok man, let's discuss about country problems.
The man with pipe: You're right, it is a shame. There is nothing more important than discussing about country problems and solving them.
The man with glasses: Before solutions, let's determine the problems first. What's our biggest problem in this country?
The man with pipe: What? You name it, I couldn't find any…
The man with glasses: Beşiktaş is the greatest!!
The man with pipe: Fener the lion!

(Sadık Üçok. *Limon*, 20.05.1990)

his motivation, he shows interest in the issues that he used to discount, even disrespect for being trivial assuming them to be things that ordinary people would dwell on. Therefore, now, he is no longer self-marginalized, no longer constructing his identity by excluding issues and practices that he regarded as low culture. As such, there is a way opened for him in order to stand close to the masses, not remote from them.

Sloterdijk also argues that modern cynics do not stand as public characters that they are no longer "outsiders". "Modern mass cynics lose their individual sting and refrain from letting themselves be put on the display(…) The person with the clear, "evil gaze" has disappeared into the crowd; anonymity now becomes the domain for cynical deviation. Modern cynics are integrated, asocial characters who, on the score of subliminal illusionlessness, are a match for any hippie." (ibid: 4)

This cynical nature of *the entel* that makes him both apolitical, detached, but also an integrated and anonymous figure was raised on the individualism which was the common value of the neoliberal era. *The entel,* invited to be included in the newly constructed reality, determined by the mediation of the market principles, has forsaken his responsibilities as an intellectual and started to pursue his own interests. He is no more a figure humiliated by others for being a chameleon figure, on the contrary, s/he humiliates himself/herself. *The entel*, born as a parodic figure mocking the deformation of the intellectuals, has turned to be the cynic involved in self-parody. He is content with his indifference and disinterestedness and he accepts that a better world is no more possible. However, he is not responsible for that, on the contrary, he assumes himself as capable of changing things, but it is just because of the order of things that the world

Figure 3.31

The man on the left: These are hard times, my friend. The situation is apparent. Think about Zola's Dreyfus case. What good we intellectuals have done for our country.
The man with pipe: A candle does not illuminate its stub my friend.
The man on the left: Bravo! You answered my question very well.

(Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 04.12.1986)

Figure 3.32

--This country cannot improve via reading and writing. I will marry with a housegirl like her and educate her…

(Metin Üstündağ. *Limon*, 23.07.1987)

Figure 3.33

(Mehmet Çağçağ. *Limon*, 01.10.1991)

The barman: Hey Celal, bro! You used to talk about Marx and Lenin, but you do not anymore…Expolitation of the working class , etc…I've been thinking about those things and you were right, man. I work for 12 hours a day and my boss does not increase my salary. I am going to be a socialist as well…You're right…
Celal: Fill it up or fuck off! It's too late…

will not go better. Figure 3.31, 3.32, and 3.33 points to this conformism in *the entel*, crystallized as the lack of belief for a better world.

Nilgün Toker proposes the concept of decadence to evaluate this indifference that the intellectuals show towards the problems surrounding them:

> I believe, if we accept the concept of decadence not with all the connotations attached to it since it was born from within the modernist tensions, but as an attitude that corresponds to the will for releasing one's self from any kind of determining force, we could conceive the reasons for the current tendency to evaluate the recession of the intellectuals after September 12 as a relief. The intellectuals seem to have a tendency to establish their private space of freedom instead of the ideal of collective freedom. September 12 is, for the intellectual, the turning point for the rise of individualism and subjectivity"[38] (Toker, 2005: 53)

September 12th… Behind all the fabricated discussions to save the country, and the never-ending melancholia, grief and mourning of *the entel*, his/her emptiness, futility, and cynicism, the coup d'etat of September 12th stands as the unspeakable origin or milestone. S/he is doubly determined by the practices of the military intervention: *The entel* might be regarded as a product of the anti-intellectualist discourse of the Military Security Council and following governments, which targets especially leftist intellectuals. Besides, the mood of *the entel* is also marked by the fear created by this discourse, which demonizes the politically active intellectuals as the responsible entities behind the violent conflicts of the pre 80's period. Under the influence of this demonization, *the entel* tries to avoid getting involved in serious political issues.

---

[38] "Dekadans terimini, modernizmin gerilimleri içinde doğduğu andan itibaren taşıdığı tüm içerikleriyle değil de, bu gerilim içinde bireyin kendisini her türlü belirlenimden özgürleştirme isteğine tekabül eden bir tavra işaret etmesi anlamında ele alırsak, 12 Eylül sonrası entellektüelin yaşadığı geri çekilmenin bugün bir özgürleşme olarak okunmaya başlanılmasının nedenlerini kavrayabiliriz diye düşünüyorum. Entellektüeller, toplumsal özgürlük yerine kendi öznel özgürlük alanlarını kurmaya, açınlamaya yönelmiş görünüyorlar. 12 Eylül, entellektüel açısından, bireyselliğin, öznelliğin yükselmesinin miladıdır."

A cartoon strip series, Yusuf Yusuf[39], published in *Leman* magazine, was based on this fear among intellectuals. There, an *entel* man, Yusuf tries to avoid politics, but finds himself constantly in situations which have political connotations. Throughout the series, there are references to Yusuf's politically active days as he is frequently depicted encountering his old friends. For instance, in Figure 3.34, while wandering around in fear and anxiety, Yusuf runs into an old friend who tells him that they got together again with the friends from the old days. He asks for Yusuf's phone number so that they can invite him to their meetings. Yusuf cannot refuse this request, but soon after this encounter he applies to the office of telecommunication services to change his phone number. After him, the man working at the office says that it is the fifth time this month that Yusuf has changed his phone number. Although Yusuf is frightened by politics, he cannot prevent his past from intruding in his life like a shadow. Occasionally, he becomes curious about what is being discussed among the leftists. In Figure 3.35, in such a scene, Yusuf decides to buy some leftist magazines from a news counter. He asks for them timidly, in an indistinct voice. However, his cynicism is revealed by the man working at the counter: Since he does not have the journals that Yusuf is looking for, he asks the neighboring counter by shouting out the titles of these journals. Yusuf, gets once more lost in panic about revealing that he used to be related to left-wing politics.

[39] "Yusuf Yusuf" is an exclamation in Turkish slang, that signals the fear and anxiety.

Figure 3.34

The man with short hair: Oh wow Yusuf!
The man with short hair: How are you? It's been ten years since we saw each other!..we friends got together again..give me your phone, we'll call you..
Yusuf: My phone?..well..I mean..one four one…five two…
The man with short hair: We need you brother…
The man in the phone re-assignment office: Very strange man..this is the fifth phone he sold this month…

(Gani Müjde & Alp Tamer. "Yusuf Yusuf", *Limon*, 25.01.1990)

Figure 3.35

The man with long hair: I have to find the courage to buy these magazines this time. I wonder so much what's written in them…
The man with long hair: I'd like a "Yeni Çözüm" (New Solution), a "Toplumsal Kurtuluş" (Societal Survival) and a "Sosyalist Birlik" (Socialist Union), please.
The salesman: Hey, Brother Ercan.. This guy wants "Sosyalist Birlik" and "Toplumsal Kurtuluş". Do you have any? I've run out of them.

(Gani Müjde & Alp Tamer. "Yusuf Yusuf", *Limon*, 11.01.1990)

In this series, there are various scenes mocking the cynical attitude of Yusuf and his fear of getting involved in political issues. However, different from the other cartoons, *Yusuf Yusuf* is overwhelmed by a 'weird' mood of impotency. Yusuf, as an intellectual full of fear of politics, is illustrated ironically starting from the first frame of the series. However, his apolitical, conformist stance does not provide comfort for his life. His impotency, illustrated in an excessive fashion, transformed him into a figure who is unable to embody even a proper apolitical attitude.

This mood of cynicism blended with fear is arguably the most tragic, but also the most stunning dimension of *the entel*: Lost in fear, he is wholeheartedly trying to be a conformist, but all his efforts raise the ghost of the political in his life.

CONCLUSION

"*Entel* mikrop mu ki?"
"Why? They think *the entel* is a germ?" [40]

In this study, I tried to show that the answer for Müslüm Gürses' question is "No", "No, *entel* is not a germ." Gürses' question is striking with its reactionary tone, subtly casting doubt on the reasons for considering *the entel* as an outsider and for using the term "entel" as an insult so frequently. I tried to present an account breaking this common reception of *the entel* as a parody of intellectuals that mocks their arrogance and criticizes them for being ineffectual and futile**.** While it is an insult on intellectuals that casts them out of the reality of common people, in the figure of *the entel*, it is also possible to find strategies of inclusion that equate intellectuals with common people. These inclusive strategies make it possible to think of *the entel* as a down-to-earth figure, having similar problems to "ours", and not very different from "us" in his/her banality. I regard these strategies as an integral part of the cultural climate and ideological atmosphere of the post 80's period in Turkey. Actually, throughout this study, the first and foremost endeavor is to contextualize *the entel* type within this period to show that it is not a random figure that might have emerged at any time in any place.

In order to illustrate these strategies, I analyzed a sample of cartoon strips from the late 80's and early 90's, collected from various magazines, newspapers, and comic

[40] The famous arabesque singer, Müslüm Gürses, is answering the journalists who reminded him that his fans are criticizing him for becoming *entel*. The reason of his fans' reactions is Gürses's new album, "Söz Vermiş Şarkılar" (2006: Ada Müzik). This album was the project of famous poet/writer Murathan Mungan, and consists of Turkish covers of acclaimed English songs.

books. Since "entel" is an ambivalent term applied by different groups to point out different characteristics (of different people), I started by figuring out the peculiarities of the iconography of *the entel* as s/he appeared in cartoon strips. I differentiated between male and female figurations, and found out that the iconography of *the entel* is mostly determined by the deformation of traditional and accepted characteristics attributed to gender categories. If *the entel* is a man, he is illustrated with a timid appearance, devoid of the toughness and decisiveness of the traditional male figure. If *the entel* is a woman, she is depicted as having masculine characteristics. In both cases, *the entel* is meant to be occupied with his/her appearance, as s/he feigns to be an intellectual. The traces of his imitative intellectuality are also visible in his/her life style: S/he is depicted as an urban figure always chasing fashionable cultural activities since joining such activities is an inseparable part of having an intellectual look. S/he frequently hangs out in bars, which are then called *entel bars*. There, *the entels* meet and engage in fruitless and endless chats, mostly about how to solve the problems of the country, or about memories of good old days. In both his appearance and his life style, *the entel* is depicted as a figure occupied with superficial concerns about his/her look, s/he just imitates the appearance and style of an intellectual.

After outlining the appearance and life style of *the entel*, I focused on his/her encounters with *zontas*, *magandas* and *ordinary people*, stereotypes that are also commonly depicted in the cartoon strips. I argued that *the entel*'s identity is constructed through such encounters which position him/her as an outcast, a "germ" to society, an ineffectual figure remote from the reality of the people s/he lives with. As such,

completed by the imitative appearance and life style of *the entel*, these encounters function to exclude intellectuals from public life by accusing them of being fake and inauthentic. However, I argued that this common interpretation only partly grasps the nature of these encounters. The total effect of these encounters is "inclusive" rather than "exclusive" since they open a ground on which the intellectuals living in "ivory towers" were gravitated into the whereabouts of the "simple men". They are still seeking out panels, festivals, and they hang out in *entel* bars, however, they frequently wander around venues where they encounter *the zontas*. Furthermore, these are not mere encounters, they point to power struggles between *the entels* and *the zontas* in terms of sharing the districts of the city. Even wars break out among them as satirically depicted in the cartoon strip book *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*. Through such struggles, *the entels* are illustrated as sharing similar concerns with those other stereotypical figures they have been contrasted with. As such, although they point at and mock the artificiality of intellectuals, and seem to question their legitimacy, they also include them "in the picture", attribute them visibility and give them shape. As a result, intellectuals who used to have only imaginary images constructed through their "thoughts" (existent via what they write[41], or what they say), are given a concrete image. I do not say that this inclusive dimension of the cartoon strips functions in a positive way, that is to say, through these encounters *the entel* is not celebrated as a down-to-earth representation of intellectuals. Rather, it functions to cover genuineness of the intellectuals with earth: At the time s/he is reduced to a simplistic caricature, his/her thoughts are taken away from

[41] Let's remember Foucault here: "probably more than one, like me writes so as no longer to have a face" (1974: 28).

his/her image, and sentenced to an existence where form excludes substance. As such s/he is nothing but a clown; not a clown of the "palace", a clown among "us".

After giving an account of his image and his/her adventures within the city, I focused on the mood of *the entel*. The argument about *the entel*'s mood is probably the most important aspect of my discussion since it completes the picture by contextualizing my argument within the atmosphere of the post-80's era. In my research, I found two feelings that were embedded in *the entel* type: S/he is melancholic and cynical. *The entel's* melancholia, I claimed, resembles left-wing melancholia, a concept introduced by Benjamin. The left melancholic is someone for whom "sentiments themselves become things" and who "takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods" (Benjamin, 1994: 305). *The entel* is also someone who is depicted as being attached to "the good old days" and thus cannot leave the past behind. The reason for all the encompassing melancholia of *the entel* is the *coup d'etat* of 1980, which created a gap between "the past" and "today" and determined what is "outdated" and what is "current". The vicious nature of *the entel*'s melancholia is that, in his/her fetishism of the past, s/he never acknowledges the agent (the military intervention) responsible for his/her loss. Since s/he is hesitant to confront the violent reality of the military intervention, s/he cannot break the viscous cycle of melancholia. I further argued that his/her inability (or fear) to face the rupture caused by the *coup d'etat* forces *the entel* to speak more about useless and pointless matters of the country. This gives the impression that s/he is involved in politics, however it is just a tactic to veil his/her impotency in terms of dealing with real issues. As such, I proposed to study *the*

entel's relation to politics through the concept of cynicism, a concept defined by Peter Sloterdijk as "enlightened false consciousness". In his/her cynicism, *the entel* is actually aware of the real and significant political issues that s/he should intervene; however, s/he does not engage in such an intervention because of his/her impotency and fear. The cynicism of *the entel*, I further claimed, also functions to evade the genuineness of intellectuals since it reduces them to conformist figures who act like the three monkeys: they see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. In a final analysis, I suggested that the melancholic and cynical mood of *the entel* pointed at intellectuals as the group responsible for the inability to question the rupture introduced by *the coup d'etat*. As such, they are assumed to be betraying themselves and people by keeping silent, and not leading the way for the opposition against the hegemonic institutions of the state.

Suggestions for further research and prospective studies

In this study, I tried to present a sociological account of the emergence of a specific caricature of intellectuals, *the entel*. Since my aim was to discuss *the entel* type in relation to the conditions of the period it became popular, I approached my data, cartoon strips, from a descriptive point of view and presented them as examples that draw the contours of the post 80's period. Such an approach can develop an understanding about only a small piece of this complex and multidimensional subject. Since there are no other academic studies available that focus on *the entel* type, it would be valuable to present an account for future studies.

First of all, my study excludes comic art and the dimension of humor in the emergence of *the entel* type. Although it is a relatively new field, there are various studies about comic art, which propose a specialized perspective for the analysis of cartoons and other forms of comic art. However, there is no specific methodology for conducting research about comics; rather these studies employ the methodological approaches of literary theory. In terms of the subject matter of this study, a *semiotic analysis* might be conducted in order to explore the complex signification processes that shaped the emergence of *the entel* type and to reveal the manifest and latent meanings of cartoons in which s/he has appeared. Besides, a *content analysis* would further support such a semiotic analysis by providing a coding scheme for the recurrent patterns within the cartoons.

On the other hand, *the entel* is not a figure whose existence is limited to the world of cartoon strips. It is possible to encounter him/her in films, stories and novels as well. Besides researching the way *the entel* type is depicted by such different media, a comparative study that aims to account for overlaps and contradictions in the adoptions of *the entel* would provide a more comprehensive picture of this figure.

Moreover, this study's ambivalent methodology, as to relate *the entel* to the discourses of the period, lacks an account about the intentions of the people who used the term frequently. At the initial stages of my research, I conducted two interviews with Kemal Gökhan Gürses (the creator of *Zontellektüel Abdullah* and *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı*), and one interview with Gani Müjde (the creator of *Yusuf Yusuf* series), however, I realized that it is not possible to include the dimension of the caricaturists within the limits of this study since it would require a more comprehensive analysis. In addition, this study does not provide an all-encompassing account of the different receptions of

the entel, either. Since "the entel" term has lost the novelty and distinction it had during the post 80s, and became embedded in daily language, a more comprehensive research examining different patterns, meanings and perceptions of *the entel* term would provide thought-provoking insights.

At this point, in order to underline the necessity and importance of further research about different dynamics embedded in the creation and reception of *the entel*, I want to go back to Nurdan Gürbilek's discussion of Bihruz Bey once again. Gürbilek thinks that evaluating *The Carriage Affair* as just a satire of detached intellectuals falls short of understanding its writer's, critics' and readers' relations to the novel. She proposes to ask new questions in order to account for these dimensions, and states the following one:

> Could it be that reading *The Carriage Affair* merely as a satire of the foppish Bihruz—as we were taught by our teachers at school—involves the attempt to hide the inevitable snobbism at the origin of our own identities, the self we call the original Turkish spirit? Can it be that we haven't noticed that this national self established its very "originality" by hiding its own Westernized aspirations, constantly projecting snobbism to the excessive other, the dandyish Tanzimat self?" (Gürbilek, 2003: 612)

For prospective researchers that would try to outline different perceptions/receptions of *the entel*, it would be beneficial to restate Gürbilek's questions: Could it be that the popularity of the *entel* also involved an attempt to hide the inevitable snobbism at the origin of our own identities? Moreover, through the anti-intellectualism embedded in *the entel* type, can it be that our desires for being intellectuals are hindered? What if, rather than being a parody of intellectuals, *the entel* is a self-parody, reflecting our self-indulgence and hypocrisy on its mirror?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

7. kuruluş yıldönümünde Türk siyasi hayatında siyasi kültür ve ekonomik politika bakımından: Anavatan partisi. Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Propaganda ve Sosyal Faaliyetler Başkanlığı, 1989.

Adıvar, Halide E. *Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı*. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1994.

Ahıska, Meltem and Zafer Yenal. *The Person You Have Called Cannot Be Reached At The Moment Representations of Life Styles in Turkey 1980-2005* Trans. Ceyda Eldem, Leyla Tonguç, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006.

Ahıska Meltem and Ayşe Düzkan. "80'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Feminizm" *Defter 21* (1994): 145-167.

Ahıska, Meltem. *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2005.
---. "Yoksa Kadınlar Var Mı?" *Defter 21* (1994): 31-41.
---. "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2/3 (2003): 351-379.

Ahmad, Feroz. "The Military, the Parties, and Globalization, 1980-2003." *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003. 149-184.

Akay, Ali. "Aydınlar Üzerine Bir Bakış." *Türk aydını ve kimlik sorunu*. Ed. Sabahattin Şen. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995. 423-438.

Akdoğan, Argun A. *Mapping Özal's New Right Hegemonic Project*. PhD Dissertation. Middle East Technical University (METU), 2001.

Altan, Çetin. "İyi Bir Entel Olmak İçin." *Milliyet*. 15 February 1992.

Arat, Yeşim. "1980'ler Türkiyesi'nde Kadın Hareketi: Liberal Kemalizm'in Radikal Uzantısı." *Her yönüyle Türkiye'de kadın olgusu : kadın gerçeğine yeni yaklaşımlar*. Ed. Necla Arat. İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 1995. 75-95.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Arslan, Abdurrahman. "Değişim, Haz, Özgürlüğü Tüketimin Dünyasında Aramak." *Birikim* 152-153 (2001): 108-124.

Bali, Rıfat N. *Tarz-ı hayat'tan life style'a: yeni seçkinler, yeni mekanlar, yeni yaşamlar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002.
---. "80'li ve 90'lı Yılların Mirası." *Birikim* 152-153 (2001): 215-219.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Legislators and interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity, and intellectuals*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987.
---. "Legislators and Interpreters: Culture as the Ideology of Intellectuals." *Intimations of postmodernity*. London, New York: Routledge, 1997. 1-25.

Belge, Murat. "Tarihi Gelişme Süreci İçinde Aydınlar" *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. vol.1. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983. 122-129.
---. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Batılılaşma." *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. vol.2. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983. 260-264.

Benhabib, Seyla. "From the Problem of Judgment to the Public Sphere: Rethinking Hannah Arendt's Political Theory." *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996. 170-220.

Benjamin, Walter. "Left-Wing Melancholy." *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*. Eds. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994.

Bewes, Timothy. *Cynicism and Postmodernity*. London, New York: Verso, 1997.

Bilgin, Nuri. "'Toplumdan Sosyal Sisteme Entelektüeller." *Türk aydını ve kimlik sorunu*. Ed. Sabahattin Şen. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995. 189-204.

Binbay, Tolga. "Kalanlar: Türkiye Solunun 12 Eylül Yası." *Birikim* 198 (2005): 79-84.

Birkan, Tuncay. "Entellektüel: Toplum ile Yalnızlık Arasında." *Birikim* 177 (2004): 56-62

Boggs, Carl. *The end of politics: corporate power and the decline of the public Sphere*. New York : Gulford Press, 2000.

Bora, Tanıl. "12 Eylül Bozgununun Sürekliliği: Sol ve Sinizm." *Birikim* 198 (2001): 43-50.

Brown, Wendy. "Resisting Left Melancholy", *Boundary 2* 26.3 (1999): 19-27.
---. "FUTURES: Specters and Angels: Benjamin and Derrida." *Politics out of History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 138-173.

Canovan, Margaret. *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*.

Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Cantek, Levent. "Tükenişin On Beş Yılı (1980-1995)." *Türkiye'de Çizgi Roman*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002. 241-307.

Ceyhun, Demirtaş. "Allah Allah Bu Nasıl Entel Takılmak?" *Milliyet*, 5-9 August 1989.
---. *Entellektüel'den Entel'e*. İstanbul: e Yayınları, 1989.

Coşar, Simten. "Türkiye'de Aydın/Entellektüel Ayrışması Üzerine" *Birikim* 144 (2001): 37-49.

Dağtaş, Erdal. "Anlatılan Senin Hikâyendir!" *Serüven 2* (2004): 54-58.

Ekrem, Recazide M. *Araba Sevdası*, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1997.

Erdem, Tuna. "Alacakaranlık Kuşağı." *Defter* 37 (1999): 71-82.

Erol, Sibel. "Discourses on the Intellectual: The Universal, the Particular and Their Mediation in the Works of Nazlı Eray." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11, 1994.

Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları I*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990.

Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları III*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991.

Eyerman, Ron. *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

Foucault, Michel. "Truth and Power." *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

Giroux, Henry A. *Public Spaces, Private Lives: Beyond the Culture of Cynicism.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

Gouldner, Alvin W. *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, New York: Seabury Press, 1979.

Göle, Nilüfer. *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004.
---. *Melez Desenler: İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000.

Gramsci, Antonio. "The Intellectuals." *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers, 1999 (1971). 1-23.

Gürbilek, Nurdan. *Vitrinde Yaşamak: 1980'lerin Kültürel İklimi*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1992.
---. "Dandies and Originals: Authenticity, Belatedness, and the Turkish Novel." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2/3 (2003): 599-628.
---. "Kadınsılaşma Endişesi: Efemine Erkekler, Hadım Oğullar, Kadın Adamlar." *Kör Ayna Kayıp Şark*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004. 51-74.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991.

Hall, Stuart. "The Work of Representation." *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 1997. 15-64.

Hodge, Robert and Gunther Kress. *Social Semiotics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Hutcheon, Linda. *Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995.

Huyssen, Andreas. "Foreword: The Return of Diogenes as Postmodern Intellectual", *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Peter Sloterdijk. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. ix-xxv.

İğci, Nurettin. *Entellere Dantel: Entel Dantel Öyküler*. İstanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1992.

İpsirli, Mehmet. "The Ottoman Ulema (Scholars)." 2004. Foundation for Science Technology and Civilisation, Manchester: UK. 24 March 2006 <http://www.muslimheritage.com/uploads/OttomanUlema.pdf>

Jennings, Jeremy. "Of Treason, Blindness and Silence: Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modern France." *Intellectuals in politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Rushdie Affair*. Eds. Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch. London, New York: Routledge, 1997. 65-85.

Kellner, Douglas. "Intellectuals and New Technologies." 20 March 2006 <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/INT.htm>

Koçak, Orhan. "Kaptırılmış İdeal: Mai ve Siyah Üzerine Psikanalitik Bir Deneme," *Toplum ve Bilim* 70 (1996): 94–152.

Kongar, Emre. "Turkey's Cultural Transformation," *The Transformation of Turkish*

Culture, the Ataturk Legacy. Eds. Günsel Renda and C. Max Kortepeter. Princeton, New Jersey: The Kingston Press, 1986. 19-68.

Kozanoğlu, Can. *Yeni Şehir Notları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001
---. *Cilalı İmaj Devri : 1980'lerden 90'lara Türkiye starları*. İletişim Yayınları, 1992.

Laçiner, Ömer. "1980'ler: Kapan(may)an bir parantez mi?" *Birikim* 152-153 (2001): 10-17.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London, New York (etc.): Oxford U.P., 1968

Lipset, Seymour M. "The End of Ideology and the Ideology of the Intellectuals." *Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils*. Eds. Joseph Ben David and Terry Nichols Clark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 15-42.

Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. Geoff Bennington, and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Mardin, Şerif. *Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 1974.
---. "'Aydınlar' Konusunda Ülgener ve Bir İzah Denemesi." *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset – Makaleler 3 (Bütün Eserleri 8).* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005 [1991]. 251-260.
---. "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar." *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset – Makaleler 3 (Bütün Eserleri 8).* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005 [1991]. 261-283.

---. "Tanzimattan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma." *Türk Modernleşmesi (Bütün Eserleri 9).* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000. 21-79.

Meriç, Cemil. "Batıda ve Bizde Aydının Serüveni" *Cumhuriyet Dönemi türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. vol.1. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983. 130-137.
---. *Mağaradakiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005 [1978].

Mert, Necati. "Taşra ve Aydınları." *Taşraya Bakmak*. Ed. Tanıl Bora. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005. 137-155.

Mutman, Mahmut. "Yeni Kültür ve Aydınlar." *Doğu Batı* 36 (2006): 9-34.

Naci, Fethi. "'Münevver'den 'Entel'e." *Türk aydını ve kimlik sorunu*. Ed. Sabahattin Şen. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995. 181-187.

Oktay, Ahmet. "Şimdi Üzerine Düşünceler." *Zamanı Sorgulamak*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1991. 11-35.
---. "Türk Edebiyatında Aydın." Entellektüel Tereddüt, 1993 [2002].194-224.

Rose, Gillian. "Discourse Analysis: Text, Intertextuality and Context." *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials*. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2001. 135-163.

Öncü, Ayşe. "Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism." *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*. Ed. Çağlar Keyder. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 95-119.

Parla, Jale. "Car Narratives: A Subgenre in Turkish Novel Writing." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102.2/3 (2003): 535-550.

Pickering, Michael. *Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation*, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Radhakrishnan, Rajagopalan. "Toward an Effective Intellectual: Foucault or Gramsci." *Intellectuals, Aesthetics, Politics, Academics*. Ed. Bruce Robbins. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. 56-99.

Said, Edward. *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. "A Plea for Intellectuals." *Between Existentialism and Marxism*. New York: Basic Books, 1975. 228-298.

Sloterdijk, Peter. *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Trans. Michael Eldred. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

Stokes, Martin. "Sounding Out: The Culture Industries and the Globalization of İstanbul." *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*. Ed. Çağlar Keyder. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 121-139.

Shills, Edward. *The Intellectuals and the Powers, and Other Essays*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

Şan, Mustafa K. "Türk Aydınının Soykütüğü Üzerine Değerlendirmeler." *Entellektüel ve İktidar*. Ed. Kenan Çağan. Ankara: Hece, 2005. 271-307.

Şimşek, Ali. *Yeni Orta Sınıf*. İstanbul: L&M Yayınları, 2005.

Şinas, Kadir. *Her Türk Entellektüel Doğar*. İstanbul: Babil, 2005.

Taşkın, Yüksel. "Yeniden Siyasallaşma Kavşağında Kamusal Entellektüelin Güncelliği." *Birikim* 177 (2001): 63-71.

Tekeli, Şirin. "Women in Turkey in the 1980s." *Women in Modern Turkish Society : A Reader* Ed. Şirin Tekeli. London; Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Zed Books, 1995. 1-21.

Toker, Nilgün. "12 Eylül'den Bugüne Entellektüel Seyir." *Birikim* 198 (2005): 51-55.

---. "'Köşe'lerde Biçimlenen Yeni Entellektüellik." *Birikim* 152-153 (2001): 10-17.

Tura, Rıza. "'68' ile '71' Arasına Sıkışan Zaman: 70'li Yıllar" *Defter* 37 (1999): 35-46.

Türkeş, Ömer A. "12 Eylül ve Edebiyat: Değersizleşen Yazar mı, Roman mı?" *Birikim* 198 (2005): 89-95.

Uğur, Aydın. *Keşfedilmemiş Kıta: Günlük Yaşam ve Zihniyet Kalıplarımız*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.

Ülgener, Sabri F. *Zihniyet, Aydınlar ve İzm'ler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.

Yağlı, Soner. *1980 Sonrası Türk Yazılı Basınındaki Yapısal Değişimin Haber Söylemine Yansıması*. Unpublished PhD dissertation. İzmir: Ege Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Genel Gazetecilik Ana Bilim Dalı, 2003.

Yanar, Işık. "Enetellektüeller, İktidarlar ve Postmodernlik." *Entellektüel ve İktidar*. Ed. Kenan Çağan. Ankara: Hece, 2005. 201-209.

Yenigün, Candan. *Feminist Themes After 1980 in Turkey: A Study of Two Magazines*. Unpublished M.A. Thesis. Boğaziçi University, Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 1989.

Žižek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London, New York: Verso, 1989.

Zürcher, Erik J. "The Third Republic: Turkey since 1980". *Turkey: A Modern History*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 278-337.

Magazines, Newspapers and Comic Books

Below is the list of the primary sources which were searched for collecting the data:

Magazines

Limon (1986-1991)
Gırgır (1987-1991)
Yeni Gündem (1986-1992)
Nokta (1986-1992)
Tempo (1986-1992)

Comic Books

Gürses, Kemal Gökhan. *Aydınlarla Zontaların Savaşı* (*The War Between Intellectuals and Zontas*.). İstanbul: Cep Kitapları 74, 1989.
---. *Booşver... Nasılsa Halk Anlamaz!..* (*Never mind... People do not understand anyway*.) Ağaç Yaşken Eğilir: 3, İstanbul: Joker 17,1992.
---. *Aslında Bunların Hepsi Hikâye* (*In reality all these are tales*. Ağaç Yaşken Eğilir: 2, İstanbul: Joker 9. 1991.)
---. *12 Eylül Öncesine Dönmek İstiyorum* (*I want to return to the times before 12th September*.) İstanbul: Yılmaz Yayınları, 1990.
Demirci Latif. *Nostalcisi Kandilli* (*With a candled nostalgie*.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990.

Newspapers

Hürriyet (1990-1992)
Milliyet (1986-1988)
Cumhuriyet (1984-1986)
Süper Tan (1990-1992)