SYRIAN REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE:

AN ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

BAHAR ALBAYRAK

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2019

SYRIAN REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE:

AN ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations: Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East

by

Bahar Albayrak

Boğaziçi University

2019

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Bahar Albayrak, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;

- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;

- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.

Date 29.07.2019

ABSTRACT

Syrian Refugees and the Politics of Migration in Europe:

An Ontological Security Perspective

This thesis examines the effects of the mass arrival of Syrian refugees to European politics by using the concept of ontological security. It focuses on the identity dimension of the issue by depicting the relationship between ontological security and the anti-refugee discourse and policies of states. The main argument of the thesis is as follows: the reason for the rise of anti-refugee discourse and the policies of exclusion of refugees is the sense of disruption in ontological security. Two states, Germany and Hungary, are used as case studies within the period between 2015 and 2017. The research collects data from sources through the literature based on the concept of ontological security to establish the theoretical framework of the thesis; media outlets to make a discourse analysis of declarations, interviews and party programs of political actors and; the examination of legal documents and political developments to determine the exclusion methods of states. In the discursive realm, the thesis identifies three main themes in the discourse producing process in case countries. In the exclusionary realm, the thesis examines two types of exclusion: physical and legal. The thesis intends to indicate that the ontological insecurity arising from the mass arrival of Syrian refugees brings the same conclusion even in two different countries, Hungary and Germany: anti-refugee discourse and policies.

ÖZET

Suriyeli Mülteciler ve Avrupa'da Göçün Siyaseti:

Varlıksal Güvenlik Perspektifi

Tez Suriyeli mültecilerin kitlesel göçünün Avrupa siyasetine etkisini varlıksal güvenlik konsepti çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Çalışma varlıksal güvenlik ve mülteci karşıtı söylem ile devletlerin politikaları arasındaki ilişkiyi açığa çıkararak konunun kimlik boyutuna odaklanmaktadır. Tezin temel argümanı şu şekildedir: Mülteci karşıtı söylem ve mültecileri dışlayıcı politikaların yükselişe geçmesinin sebebi varlıksal güvenliğin bozulmaya uğramasıdır. Almanya ve Macaristan örnek ülkeler olarak seçimiş ve 2015-2017 arasındaki periyotta inceleme yapılmıştır. Araştırmada tezin teorik çerçevesini oluşturmak için varlıksal güvenlik kavramı üzerine şekillenen literatür; söylem analizi için siyasi aktörlerin açıklama, röportaj ve parti programlarının yer aldığı medya organları ve devletlerin dışlama metotlarını belirlemek için yasal belge ve siyasi gelişmeler incelenmiştir. Söylem alanında örnek ülkelerde söylemi inşa sürecinde üç temel strateji belirlenmiştir. Politika üretimi alanında iki tip dışlayıcılık ele alınmıştır: fiziksel ve hukuki. Tez Suriyeli mültecilerin kitlesel göçünden ortaya çıkan varlıksal güvensizliğin birbirinden farklı iki ülkede, Macaristan ve Almanya, bile aynı sonuca götürdüğünü göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır: mülteci karşıtı söylem ve politikalar.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my family,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The context and argument of the study

The European Union (EU) has faced many challenges for almost a decade. The global financial crisis, Brexit and the mass arrival of people to the continent beginning from 2013 are among these major tests. After the Syrian Civil War starting in 2011, as a result of the social movements in the Middle East, also as known the Arab Spring, millions of people left the war-torn country and migrated to neighboring states. European countries have become one of the major destination points. The number of people arriving in Europe has sharply increased especially since 2013 (See Fig. 1). Nevertheless, the issue was not a "top priority" for European countries before 2015 (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016, p. 1). According to Eurostat data, over a million people applied for asylum in EU member states in 2015.

(thousands)

Fig. 1 Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 member states, 2008-2018

Source: (Eurostat, 2019)

1

The refugee movement to European states from conflict zones has been the greatest Europe has experienced since World War II and this situation has created discontent among European societies. All this process produces a sense of fear and anxiety in the everyday lives of many European citizens (Kinnvall, Manners, & Mitzen, 2018, p. 249). The atmosphere within the EU regarding the refugee issue has been more darkened, the anti-refugee discourse has been stricter, and the tension between parties has increased more and more since 2015. The rise of rightist movements and political parties within Europe is a reality without a doubt. Besides, the discourse revolving around the premises seeing refugees as risk factors for the receiving countries is on the agenda of mainstream parties.

Since the migration "crisis" in Europe related to the mass arrival of Syrian refugees is a relatively new phenomenon, academic literature on the issue is not thoroughly extensive. Though, as a growing discussion within the field, there are several studies examining the issue from different perspectives (Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Funk, 2016; Holmes & Castaneda, 2016; Thorleifsson, 2017; Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016; Rygiel, Baban, & Ilcan, 2016). There are various explanations as to why the mass arrival of people became a major issue and turned into a "crisis" for the EU. Cierca and da Silva (2016) argue that EU elites perceive the issue as a security problem based on the idea that European states should be protected from migrants due to the threat and instability that refugees brought with themselves. Together with this assumption, the authors argue that the EU holds the realist approach by closing borders, increasing control, and building fences (Cierco & Silva, 2016, p. 11). The basic argument is that the EU focuses on physical security with the perception of "danger" brought by migrants.

Apart from the analysis of the recent refugee "crisis" in Europe, the securitization of migration has already been a subject matter in various studies (Huysmans, 2000; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Guild & Selm, 2005; Bourbeau, 2011; Kaya, 2009; Bigo, 2002). This body of literature mainly focuses on how migration became a security issue for states. These studies are highly related to the ontological security theory in which a securitization debate is also on the agenda. However, the theory of ontological security presents a more extensive scope to deal with the issue by bringing the state concerns on identity into the equation. The difference between the securitization theory and the ontological security theory lies within the capacity of the latter in terms of involving the identity construction process. The ontological security theory allows seeing the connections between uncertainty and anxiety in critical situations. When identity and ontological insecurity of the self is disrupted by different factors, agents need to rebuild it through identity construction process.

Ontological security theory allows examining the issue with both the discourse of securitization and identity construction process. While studying the issue, to ignore the dimension of identity vis-à-vis the "other" would be a lacking analysis since political actors use concerns related to identity in the anti-refugee discourse. As mentioned below in detail, the theory of ontological security constructs a relationship between identity and security. This thesis examines the issue through the lens of the concept of ontological security. Apart from the securitization paradigm, ontological security also involves the identity and discourse production processes. In the case of the mass arrival of Syrian refugees to Europe and its political outcomes, the discourse revolving around the identity construction is on the agenda. This thesis contributes to the literature on the securitization theory with this aspect.

The literature of ontological security also presents some insights into migration. Different scholars study states' policies on migration and minorities with the framework of ontological security (Agius, 2016; Combes, 2017; Croft, 2012; Staniševski, 2011; Noble, 2005). Nevertheless, analysis available of the recent refugee "crisis" in Europe is only a handful (Alkopher, 2018; Gazit, 2018; Mitzen, 2018). The thesis contributes to this growing literature by examining the issue with dimensions of discourse and policy-making within the framework of ontological security theory.

The thesis focuses on the identity dimension of the issue by depicting the relationship between ontological security and the anti-refugee discourse and policies of states. The main argument of the thesis is as follows: the reason for the rise of anti-refugee discourse and the policies of exclusion of refugees is the sense of disruption in the ontological security of the states and societies examined in this study. The thesis focuses on how the search for ontological security affects the political debates on the mass arrival of Syrian refugees to Europe and how discourse shaped the policy-making process of states. The thesis intends to indicate that the discourse on the exclusion of refugees is not an independent process from the policy-making area. Rather, it paves the way for the exclusionary policies and changes in legal structure.

For this purpose, the research discusses the issue and contributes to the literature with the following questions:
- How do state actors build anti-refugee discourse and implement policies of exclusion?
- How does the theory of ontological security explain this issue?

- What are the connections between discourse production and the area of policy-making?

1.2 Theoretical framework

The term ontological security has been a part of growing literature within the discipline of International Relations (Kinnvall, 2004; Steele, 2005; Steele, 2008; Rumelili, 2015; Mitzen, 2006; Mitzen, 2016; Mitzen & Larson, 2017). The literature is mainly based on the premise that states seek not only physical security, as realist theories claim, but also one of their main drives is to search for ontological security, which is a term borrowed from British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991) who defines the concept as "a sense of continuity and order in events" (p. 243). Anxiety and ontological insecurity are likely to occur in "critical situations," which are factors that lead to the individual to be ontologically insecure because of the unpredictability and uncertainty of the situation. In the state-level analysis, these critical situations are also effective in creating circumstances that produce a sense of ontological insecurity. The study argues that the mass arrival of refugees leads to the emergence of a "critical situation," causing the disruption of the routine.

The thesis focuses on three main concepts within the theory of ontological security: routinization, reflexivity, and narrative. These concepts are necessary to build ontological security. For a stable identity and full sense of ontological security, an agent should have routines in their relationships with others, in their environment to act away from critical situations, risks, and threats. It is important to note that ontologically secure identity is sustained through reflexivity and interactions with others. A consistent narrative is also needed in the process of building the ontological security.

Routines, reflexivity, and narrative are important pillars of creating a stable self-identity. Everyday routine is the condition to sustain a stable environment for ontological security to come into being. In the case that narratives and routines are disturbed by a "critical situation," ontological insecurity is likely to emerge. In these situations, agents seek to preserve their ontological security through different strategies such as the securitization of the self and emphasizing the boundaries based on the identity between them and others.

Given this theoretical framework, the thesis classifies common discourses under three categorizations in term of securing the self and drawing the boundary between self and others. The first is related to seeing refugees as risk factors to the security of society. The second is based on the differences between two distinct civilizational paradigms. According to this idea, refugees are Muslims, from different parts of the world, so they are not compatible with western European values. Lastly, the discourse on nationalistic values and refugees as a threat to cultural values of the receiving countries is on the agenda of political debates.

The thesis also argues that the anti-refugee discourse is effective for the emergence of policies of exclusion and turns into a legitimizing instrument in the exclusion of refugees from the territory. There has been a mutual shaping between discourse and policy making area. To discuss how these two realms influence each other or which one determines the other extends the scope and purpose of the thesis. The aim of the research conducted is to indicate there has been a parallel between the discourse production process and policy implementations of the political actors vis-à-vis the refugee issue in the case countries, Hungary and Germany. The study identifies and examines two types of exclusion methods: physical and legal. The physical exclusion includes building border fences, implementing border controls,

the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU with the initiatives of Germany. The thesis examines the legal exclusion in terms of changes and amendments in asylum and refugee laws. The thesis intends to indicate the relationship between anti-refugee discourse and the implementation of policies to exclude refugees from the states.

Through this concept, the research examines the effect of endeavor to sustain a secure self-identity vis-à-vis the current challenges of migration towards to European lands and how the situation has influenced the politics of states by examining Germany and Hungary as case studies.

1.3 The selection of the cases

The thesis focuses on two states, Germany and Hungary, as case studies. The reason for the selection of these countries derives from their conflicting stance in the EU-wide initiatives about the issue. Both countries frequently blame each other's policies in terms of identifying characteristic of the issue and finding a solution to the problem.

Germany insists on solving the "problem" in an EU-wide perspective. German Chancellor Angela Merkel supports the idea of establishing a common EU policy and removing the burdens in border countries, namely Greece and Italy. In fact, she has been the only EU leader to support a common EU policy vis-à-vis the issue and has taken action for this purpose (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016, p. 2). As a result of this perspective, she announced the open-door policy for Syrian refugees. On the contrary, Hungary is the leading country opposing the arrival of people to Europe. From the beginning of the crisis, Viktor Orbán has objected to any initiatives to regulate the movement of people and defends the exclusion of refugees from European territory (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016, p. 2).

The European Agenda on Migration, to name an example, was declared on May 2015 with the aim of identifying an EU-wide and coherent approach to the "migration crisis" (European Commission, 2015a). The most debated aspect of the agenda has been the relocation and resettlement of migrants in border countries like Italy and Greece among the member states. According to the document, the distribution would be based on the quantitative criteria that indicates the capability of member states to integrate and handle refugees. The indicators would be as follows: the size of the population, total GDP, average number of asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees, and unemployment rate. According to these criteria, the rate of refugees in Germany and Hungary would be as follows: 18,42 percent and 1,79 percent. The agenda also brings into question 20,000 resettlement places that would be allocated to each member state based on the same criteria in the relocation process. According to the European resettlement scheme, Germany's share is 15,43 percent, and Hungary would allocate 1,53 percent of the total. Despite the small number of refugees that Hungary would take according to the quota system, Viktor Orbán strongly opposed the plan and criticized Merkel for her leading role in the "EU's misguided refugee policy" (Orbán, 2015c).

Between 2015 and 2017, one can observe that Hungary and Germany locate themselves in very opposing positions to each other within the EU. It can be said that there are two axes in the EU with regard to the position in the refugee issue. On one hand, there is the Visegrad group under the leadership of Orbán which opposes the arrival of people, and defend the idea that countries should build walls and fences to stop people from coming to Europe (Toygür & Benvenuti, 2016, p. 2). On the other, Merkel and some moderate voices directly reject the ideas of walls and fences and stand with an EU-wide solution and policies. For the study, to analyze these two

distinct countries is helpful as they are leading countries of their positions and other member states situate between these countries in terms of their stance in the issue. Besides, one of the main aims of the thesis is to indicate the emergence of the anti-refugee discourse due to ontological insecurity even in a leading country, namely Germany, among EU member states with a moderate position and backing up for a EU-wide solution. The thesis intends to indicate that two otherwise different countries produce similar outcomes in terms of theory.

1.4 Methodology of the thesis

The extent of the thesis is to depict how the emergence of ontological insecurity is effective in the anti-refugee discourse and implementing policies of exclusion. For this purpose, the study examines the discourse produced in the political landscape in Germany and Hungary with the aim of determining the similarities in two structurally different countries. The research collects data from diverse sources through the literature based on the concept of ontological security to establish the theoretical framework of the thesis: media outlets to make a discourse analysis of declarations, interviews and party programs of political actors and; the examination of legal documents and political developments to determine the exclusion methods of states.

The research is based on critical discourse analysis, which is a useful method to depict the relationship between discourse, and social structure and change. It also helps to reveal the relational nature of the discourse and how it is shaped through context. The critical discourse analysis allowed analyzing both clear and opaque connections of "domination, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language" (Wodak, 1995, p. 204). Power and discourse are interrelated; they "flow

into each other" (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4). The purpose of the critical discourse analysis is to depict the discursive structure embedded in power relations. The discourse is also socially constitutive which means that it contributes to the construction and formation of social relations, institutions and identities (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64).

One of the main principles of the critical discourse analysis is the premise that the discourse has dialectical relationships with the social. The critical discourse analysis involves the idea that discourse is not an independent process from social structure and processes. Social and language are connected to each other and have a dialectical relationship (Wodak, 1995, p. 206). According to Fairclough (2010), the critical discourse analysis has three main characteristics: "it is relational, it is dialectical, and it is transdisciplinary" (p. 3).

The critical discourse analysis also involves the processes of depicting the relationships between those who have power to shape the discourse and others. According to Wodak (1995), the purpose of critical discourse analysis is to explore social inequality, as it is constituted and legitimized in language (p. 204). Van Dijk (1993) argues, through discourse production process, "the justification of inequality involves two complementary strategies, namely the positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the Others" (p. 263). According to this idea, the other is portrayed through focusing on negative social or cultural differences and conveying negative aspects such as perceiving them as threats, while the own group is described through emphasizing positive characteristics such as sympathy, tolerance or cultural/social superiority over the other (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 263). Apart from the semantic strategy in the discourse, the statements should also be credible in order to be persuasive. Van Dijk (1993) describes these persuasive moves

as follows: (1) argumentation which uses the facts as a strategy to be more credible, (2) rhetorical figures that means exaggeration of negatives aspects of others and positive characteristics of the own group, (3) specific chosen lexical style involving the negative reflection of others, (4) story telling which includes personally experienced events about the other, (5) giving reference to witnesses, sources and experts (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 264). One of the ways of problematizing others is to give emphasis on their threat to the interests of dominant group such as "they are taking our jobs," "they will harm our economy, welfare system" (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 264). The critical discourse analysis is a useful analytical tool for the purpose of the study. First of all, it enables to depict the relationship between discourse and power and how discourse is interrelated to the context in which it emerged. Secondly, since ontological security theory involves identity construction process, critical discourse analysis helps to indicate how this process is done through discourse used by political actors.

The data collected for determining how political actors built anti-refugee discourse as a state policy is from news outlets. The sources consist of four media sources: *Der Spiegel*, *Deutsche Welle*, *New York Times*, and the *Guardian*. The period taken into account for the research is between the years 2015 and 2017. This specific time is important for the study. As mentioned above, the issue became the main concern for EU member states following the mass arrival of Syrian refugees in 2015. For the study, the term "refugee" is searched through on these media outlets, the results are categorized and irrelevant news are eliminated. Since media outlets mentioned above include news related to the refugee issue from different contexts and countries, the elimination is firstly made through the selection of news related to the case countries, Hungary and Germany. The second elimination criterion is to

exclude op-eds due to the fact that the thesis focuses on the discourses of political actors and their policy decisions. An analysis on the role of the media in the process of production of anti-refugee discourse would indeed be useful for its conveying role in the distribution of the discourse. However, the aim of the present thesis is to make a state-level analysis. So the thesis does not analyze the role of media on the issue but focuses on political actors instead.

Using media coverage for the study includes advantages and disadvantages. As Helbing and Tresch (2011) suggest, the method is beneficial for making research on the positions of the political parties on specific issues. Media coverage is useful in terms of collecting data for longer and shorter periods, which facilitates gathering information on changes in party politics, especially during election campaigns (Helbling & Tresch, 2011, p. 176). Since the content of the thesis involves the discourse and policy changes of political actors, the usage of media coverage is beneficial to depict these issues. Despite its advantages, it also brings some challenges to the researcher such as its framing characteristics. Media outlets have a process of selection in terms of choosing "the newsworthy events" about which news is put in the coverage (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 2012, p. 250). Thus, the researcher should be aware of the framing characteristic of media outlets while pursuing the research.

Another important limitation of the study is the language barrier. The languages spoken in the two countries used as case studies -Germany and Hungary- is not English. All the sources of the research are derived from the texts translated into English from Hungarian and German. This creates an indirect link between the data and the researcher. Besides, there is a possibility that the scope of the thesis might become narrower due to the availability of the translated texts. Due to the fact

that the mass arrival of Syrian refugees to Europe and the transformation of the issue into a "crisis" has become one of the top agenda items of the international public, the visibility of the political actors became widely apparent in news outlets. Nevertheless, the study has no pretension to depict the etymological sources of the expressions in the specific language, but it examines the ideological background of the discourse related to ontological insecurity. It can be claimed that the thesis succeeds to depict this orientation by drawing the general picture through examining translated texts. Both using media coverage for collecting data and language barrier bring a further limitation. Hungary, as a leading country in the refugee debate in Europe, has much more media coverage compared to Germany. However, this visibility is almost univocal due to the fact that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is a dominant political figure both in his country and also in the refugee debate in Europe. Another important limitation, which is worth mentioning, is that the source for the data is limited to texts translated into English. For instance, some political parties publish their English version of party manifestos; while of them only use native language in their policy papers. This is also an important limitation in the thesis.

The migration is an extensively wide concept including refugees, asylum seekers, illegal migrants and economic migrants and all of these concepts have different meanings and involve different legal processes for migrants and different obligations for states. For instance, according to the UN 1951 Convention a refugee is a person who;

> As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a

result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 1992)

The definition of the term refugee implies a "necessity" for those who migrate due to the threats in the own country, whereas economic migration has a different motivation based on voluntarily departure for economic considerations. To examine all of different concepts related to the migration in terms of their definitions, legal structures and motivations behind them extends the limits and purpose of the thesis. Since the aim of the thesis is to depict the ontological insecurity behind the anti-refugee discourse by using the critical discourse analysis, it is important to note that the discourse used by political actors in the case countries involve the usage of these terms interchangeably for the same reason: excluding subjects or others from the country. Throughout the thesis, I will also use these terms interchangeably to refer to same group of people, Syrian refugees, because the important thing for the thesis is to indicate the anti-migration discourse revolving around the mass arrival of Syrians to Europe.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

Chapter I establishes the theoretical framework of the thesis. Firstly, it concentrates on the origins of ontological security as a concept in the social sciences and then focuses on how the discipline of International Relations applies this theory to the state-level analysis. It investigates the possibility of using the theory of ontological security in the case of migration.

The thesis focuses on two cases, Germany and Hungary, in order to understand how ontological insecurity affects the discourse produced by political actors. The two countries have different political structures and contexts. In this

regard, Chapter II centers on the analysis of political background and actors of each country in addition to the significant political events related to the refugee issue. Depicting the differences of these two cases is essential for the argument of the thesis.

Chapter III includes the discourse analysis of the political actors regarding migration and Syrian refugees and indicates the relationship between ontological insecurity and the growing anxiety in the face of mass migration. The chapter identifies three main themes in the discourse producing process in case countries. First of all, refugees are seen as risk factors for the security and well-being of the country. Secondly, political actors use the discourse highlighting cultural, religious and civilizational differences between Christian western societies and Muslim eastern societies. The third theme is about the praise of the nationalistic values with the claim that refugees destroy the culture of the receiving country.

Chapter IV focuses on the methods of exclusion of Syrian refugees. The aim of the chapter is to depict how the discourse shapes the barriers to exclude refugees. The chapter analyzes two types of exclusion. Firstly, it focuses on "physical exclusion," including border controls, border fences, and other initiatives for stemming the mass arrival of people. Secondly, the chapter reveals legal exclusion, including changes in the legal structure of the country regarding asylum procedures. In these two types of exclusion, the intention is the same: to keep refugees out from Europe. In conclusion, Chapter V gives a summary of the main points of the research and describes the contributions of the thesis to this growing literature of ontological security.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

EXPLAINING ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY FOR STATES

The term ontological security has been a part of growing literature within
International Relations (Kinnvall, 2004; Steele, 2005; Steele, 2008; Rumelili, 2015;
Mitzen, 2006; Mitzen, 2016; Mitzen & Larson, 2017). The literature is mainly based
on the premise that states seek not only physical security, as realist theories claim,
but also that one of their main drives is to search for ontological security which is a
borrowed term from British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991). As Mitzen (2016)
puts it, "states not only seek to secure their territory and governance structure; they
also seek to secure their identity as a particular kind of actor" (p. 272). Such a
premise indicates that ontological security, or preserving identity is as important as
the protection of the material existence of the state. Steel (2008) further develops this
idea and suggests that "states pursue social actions to serve self-identity needs even
when these actions compromise their physical existence" (p. 2). The same logic can
also be seen in the works of Mitzen (2006) and Rumelili (2015). According to this
idea, states may adopt policies that can be a threat to their physical security at the
expense of holding their ontological security.

Through this concept, the research indicates the effect of endeavor to sustain
a secure self-identity vis-à-vis the current challenges of migration towards European
lands and how the situation has influenced the politics of states by examining
Germany and Hungary as case studies. Of course, the theory of ontological security
is not the only element for explaining the issue, but it offers an adequate alternative
explication. As Steele (2008) argues, ontological security does not falsify
"alternative accounts of state action but … it provides a more complete

16

understanding of what motivates states in their actions" (p. 8). Apart from that, analyzing the issue through ontological security presents a "far more well-rounded approach to crisis, anxieties, and insecurities … than existing approaches" (Kinnvall, Manners, & Mitzen, 2018, p. 255). According to Croft, (2012) "[ontological security theory] has great potential for focusing empirical investigations into intersubjectively constructed beliefs, practices, routines and discourses" (p. 233). In the case of how migrants coming from war-torn areas, which are mostly from Muslim geography, affect the European politics and help to construct the anti-migration discourse. Ontological security is a productive theory to understand the dynamics of the issue.

The theory of ontological security is a field still growing. Different contributions and several criticisms to the theory are within the part of the literature. Browning and Joenniemi (2016) suggests that identity is not just related to stability, but rather it has the capacity to adapt and the ability to deal with changes (p. 32). According to the ontological security theory, the agent builds her identity on the basis of a stable relationship with others in a predictable environment. Besides, the argument of ontological security theory based on the fact that securitization of the identity is a mean to overcome ontological insecurity, is criticized due to the fact that such a premise may lead to the normalization of the securitization process (Browning & Joenniemi, 2016, p. 45). Nevertheless, the theory presents a useful framework to understand the refugee "crisis" in Europe in which many states engage in anti-refugee discourse based on securitization and essentialism. The motives behind this situation can be diverse, but the lens of ontological security presents an effective instrument since a study without focusing on the dimension of the identity and the growing concerns about the disruption of it would be lacking.

Since the concept is originally developed on the individual level, it is important to understand how it is applied to international relations and how it became an important guide to interpret state behavior. The structure of the chapter includes firstly the examination of the meaning of the term through three subtitles – routinization, reflexivity, and narrative, secondly the literature review on how the term is applied to the discipline of International Relations by emphasizing the state role in pursuing ontological security in various cases and empirical studies.

2.1 Explaining the concept: Ontological security

The term "ontological security" gets on the stage of social sciences with the work of British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991) who defines ontological security as "a sense of continuity and order in events" (p. 243). According to Giddens (1991), "To be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, 'answers' to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses" (p. 48). In other words, ontological security refers to the security-of-being which is sustained by being aware of who we are, why we are acting in specific ways and giving a meaning to external reality. To put it in another way, "agents are normally able if asked, to provide discursive interpretations of the nature of, and the reasons for, the behavior in which they engage" (Giddens, 1991, p. 36). The self-awareness and having the knowledge of others and the environment surrounding the individual are very important cornerstones to build ontological security, which is a must in constructing a full identity. Being able to be aware of the meaning of self and others is not enough to sustain ontological security. The confidence in the continuity of self-identity and the feeling of the constancy of the

social and material environments of action are also important necessities (Giddens, 1991, p. 92).

Feeling of deep anxiety towards uncertainty emerges when facing an identity threat according to Giddens' theory (Giddens, 1991, p. 42). Uncertainty leads to the inability to act. Since being able to act is a necessity for an agent for developing ontological security, uncertainty creates a disruption in the process of sustaining a full sense of identity (Mitzen, 2016, p. 272). As mentioned above, ontological security is a necessity and inquiry for all individuals to pursue their day-to-day activities. Routines and conventions are important pillars of it. At this point, an important question arises: How can the individual get rid of uncertainty in order to achieve ontological security in this risky environment that she can confront in her everyday life? Giddens' answer to this question is the "emotional inoculation" that sustains a "protective cocoon" by developing a basic trust in relation to risks and dangers surrounding settings of action and interaction (Giddens, 1991, p. 45). Inability to sustain the basic trust in a chaotic or traumatic state, the existential anxiety emerges in relation to the overall security system that individual develops. In case of developing a healthy basic trust system, actors can tolerate a certain measure of uncertainty and do not respond to it by drawing self-boundaries or securitizing the subjectivity (Mitzen, 2016, p. 274). At this juncture, "anxiety has to be understood in relation to the overall security system the individual develops, rather than only as a situationally specific phenomenon connected to particular risks or dangers" (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Anxiety results from the incapability of having a full identity, which requires giving meaning to the self, self's actions, others, and the external world.

As Giddens (1991) warns the reader, anxiety is a different emotion from fear (p. 50). According to him, "Fear is a response to a specific threat and therefore has a definite object... Anxiety, in contrast to fear, 'disregards the object'... anxiety is a generalized state of the emotions of the individual" (Giddens, 1991, p. 50). The feeling that emerges out of the absence of ontological security is anxiety rather than fear. Anxiety is an "unconsciously organized state of fear," "It is free-floating...it can come to be pinned to items, traits or situations which an oblique reaction to whatever originally provoked it" (Giddens, 1991, p. 45). Identification and projection are two important ways of dealing with emerging existential anxieties (Giddens, 1991, p. 47). The reflexive nature of building an identity and ontological security helps both individuals to overcome the threat coming from existential anxieties and newly-emerged dangers that are not confronted before. Thus, one can depict that identity construction and sustaining ontological security does not end at some point, rather, this process is always a matter of becoming and continuation. Anxiety and ontological insecurity are likely to occur in "critical situations," which are factors that lead to the individual to be ontologically insecure because of the unpredictability and uncertainty of the situation.

The routinization, reflexivity, and narrative are important to build a whole identity and ontological security. Nevertheless, these three concepts are not completely separate from each other, on the contrary, they are related as Kinnvall and Mitzen (2017) puts it,

> The premise of ontological security, as discussed by Giddens, is that the formation of the subject is fraught with an underlying, ineradicable anxiety. Since all social actors need a stable sense of self in order to realize a sense of agency, managing that fundamental anxiety is an ongoing project. Actors are viewed as ontologically secure when they feel they have a sense of biographical continuity and wholeness that is supported and recognized in and through their relations with others. When the relationships and understandings that actors rely on become destabilized, on the other hand,

ontological security is threatened, and the result may be anxiety, paralysis or violence. (p. 4)

All three, routinization, narrative, and reflexivity, are necessities for developing a stable sense of identity and ontological security. To put in another way, a narrative and routinization are constructed through a reflexive process that needs to be compatible with the narrative and be sustained through routinized actions.

2.1.1 Routinization

As mentioned above, every-day-life includes uncertainty, chaos, and many risks. This chaos and uncertainty are not just about "disorganization" but are also related to the "loss of a sense of the reality of things and of other persons" (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). At this juncture, such questions arise: How do individuals surrounded by dangers, uncertainties, and chaos learn to deal with these issues? Or, what are the roots or motives that assure an individual to live in that environment? Giddens (1991) answers these questions with the concept of "faith" in the coherence of everyday life that is produced through the process of routinization (p. 38). An individual develops a basic trust system by forming routines from the very early period of her/his life. As Giddens (1991) suggests "all individuals develop a framework of ontological security of some sort, based on routines of various forms" (p. 50). This routinized relationship between agents is an important barricade against the threatening environment consisting of chaos and uncertainties. In situations of the disruption of routines, an existential crisis is likely to occur (Giddens, 1991, p. 173). The vitality of routines to construct a stable identity is put by Giddens (1991) as; "The discipline of routine helps to constitute a 'formed framework' for existence by cultivating a sense of 'being', and its separation from 'non-being', which is elemental to ontological security" (p. 45).

2.1.2 Reflexivity

Another important concept to understand ontological security is reflexivity. The

building process of ontological security contains a reflexive relationship with others.

Reality is not given, but a set of experiences resulting from a reflexive relationship

with other creates meaning to construct the identity of agents (Giddens, 1991, p. 39).

Thus, agents need reflexive relations with others to build ontological security. As

Giddens (1991) puts it, "self-identity … is not something that is just given, as a result

of the continuities of the individual's action-system, but something that has to be

routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual" (p. 58).

2.1.3 Narrative

Construction of the narrative is important to sustain the constancy and stability that

an individual needs in the process of building identity. Narrative of the self is defined

by Giddens (1991) as follows, "the story of the self, the story or stories by means of

which self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the individual concerned and

by others" (p. 243). These coherent biographies or stories about the agent are

necessities for an individual to sustain ontological security. According to Giddens

(1991), "A person's identity is not to be found in behavior, nor in the reactions of

others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going" (p. 60). This narrative

needs to be compatible with the actions of the individual. If a critical situation which

leads to the disruption of stable identity emerges and individual acts in a way

contradicting to this narrative, ontological insecurity is likely to occur. That is why

agents have to hold stable narrative.

2.1.4 A summary

Routines, reflexivity, and narrative are important pillars of creating a stable self-identity. Everyday routine is the condition to sustain a stable environment for ontological security to come into being. In the case that narratives and routines are disturbed by a "critical situation," ontological insecurity is likely to emerge. In turn, agents seek to preserve their ontological security through "reasserting routines of appealing to comfortable narratives" (Mitzen & Larson, 2017, pp. 3-4). A brief summary of what needs to be required for creating the ontological security and what ontological insecurity means is given below:

To build a full identity and ontological security requires;

- Routinized relationships with others in day-to-day experiences,

- Constructing a basic trust system from early childhood,

- Reflexivity which includes how to see others and an idea that how to be seen by others,

- Faith in the consistency of everyday life,

- Self-integrity which involves giving "meaningful" answers of who we are and about our actions

- Stability of self-other relations

- A consistent narrative which does not create disruption with the biographical story and current actions.

Ontologically insecure people may include;

- The disrupted feeling of biographical continuity which may refer to the inability to construct a relation between the past, present and the future

- Full awareness of dangers in which the individual is obsessively
  occupied with possible dangers and paralyzed in terms of actions
- Lack of developing trust in her/his own integrity,

This brief introduction to the concept of ontological security highlights the close relationship between anxiety, basic trust and everyday routines of social interaction while building up ontological security. After a very brief introduction to the concept regarding the state of the individual in the face of an ontological threat, it is better to lay the groundwork for the relationship between ontological security and the state.

2.2 Ontological security in international relations

States search for and maintain ontological security because, like individuals, they want to preserve their self-identity constructed through a stable narrative and routinized relations with other agents. In times of critical situations, ontological insecurity for states is likely to occur. These critical situations are effective on a state-level analysis, just as they are effective on an individual, in creating circumstances that produce a sense of ontological insecurity. Steele (2008) identifies three characteristics of critical situations, especially for states, as follows: (1) a considerable group of people are impacted, (2) they are unforeseeable and (3) the identity is endangered and people think that something can be done to terminate them (p. 12).

Different scholars approach the issue from different perspectives. Some scholars use the term to explain the foreign policy decisions of states (Mitzen & Larson, 2017), and some apply the concept to the field of conflict resolution (Rumelili, 2015). We can see this diversity in the definition of the term. The concept is identified by Kinnvall (2004) as follows, "security of being, a sense of confidence

and trust that the world is what it appears to be" (p. 746). The concept is also defined as follows: "Ontological security refers to the security not of the physical body out of the self or identity, the subjective sense of who one is that enables and motivates actions and choice" (Mitzen & Larson, 2017, p. 2). Before going through a literature review of the ontological security theory in state-level analysis, it is important to examine how routinization, reflexivity and narrative are applied to states.

2.2.1 Routinization in state-level analysis

Ontological security seeking is a "conservative need" provoking agents to choose the stability to change (Mitzen & Larson, 2017, p. 4). This does not always produce positive outcomes. This is because the need for seeking ontological security and holding on to the routines and constructed narratives may result in dangerous consequences. In other words, agents may feel the extreme urge to protect their routines in the face of changing conditions, which may result in the disruption of ontological security. Such orientation may trigger violent or undemocratic policy outcomes in the case of states, as we see in Hungary's policies in the recent migration crisis. The emotional effect of the disruption of the routine is anxiety, which appears in the face of critical situations in which routines are distorted and ontological insecurity emerges.

The character of reflexivity while constructing the identity is elaborated in the work of Mitzen (2016). According to this logic, actors build their identities through a routinized relationship with others. Since routinization is important for the creation of a self-identity, actors feel that they need to stick with their routines that are crucial for avoiding uncertainty. The term itself refers to everything from the mere lack of knowledge of absolute certainty to situations in which it is impossible to

know the outcomes or results. In these circumstances, agents may feel insecure about what they could do and this would be the case when ontological insecurity emerges. Uncertainty also may reveal in unexpected situations and big crisis. According to the conditions, they determine the position they hold through putting emphasis on narrative or reconstituting the self-identity.

Home is an important metaphor in the process of constructing and maintaining ontological security through building routines. As Kinnvall (2004) puts it,

> Ontological security is maintained when the home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material environment. Home, in this sense, constitutes a spatial context in which daily routines of human existence are performed. It is a domain where people feel most in control of their lives because they feel free from the social pressure that is part of the contemporary world (p. 747).

Following this logic, home is one of the necessities while constructing routines which are important aspects of pursuing the ontological insecurity. According to Mitzen (2018), the idea of home is managed through two levels: a micro level which is related to personal place of an individual and macro-political level of the political projects that order our lives (p. 1374). Home presents a quite familiar environment to follow day-to-day activities. As Mitzen (2018) puts, "Home is central to processes of self-stabilization" (p. 1376). Four important characteristics of home can be mentioned to understand its role in constructing the routine: first, it is the place for performing daily activities; second, it is also a place for constructing new habits out of public eye; third, home keeps people safe from the chaotic world out there and fourthly, "home has a particular temporality… to be at home is in a sense to bracket linear or biographical time" (Mitzen, 2018, p. 1376). Thus, home is important for sustaining the stability and routines to construct ontological security. This metaphor can be frequently seen in the anti-migration discourse used by certain European

political actors revolving around the premise that refugees are invaders of "their" homes.

For a stable identity and full sense of ontological security, an agent should have routines in their relationships with others, in their environment to act away from critical situations, risks and threats.

2.2.2 Reflexivity in state-level analysis

Through interactions with others, the individual learns what is socially acceptable and what is not (Staniševski, 2011, p. 64). This helps the agent determine its identity and place it within the community. Ontological security is directly related to self-identity. However, this identity is not strict and unchangeable, rather it is a "process of being" (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 748). Since it is an uncompleted task, a need for an "other" is always on the agenda. The identity is constructed through reflexivity. It is about the positioning of the self vis-à-vis the changing conditions. As Croft (2012) puts it "the self is not something fixed, but it is something in motion" (p. 226). As the identity of an individual is constructed through interaction and can be redefined in the face of changing conditions, the same is relevant for the state as well. This character of identity construction in terms of being open to be moderated also becomes possible when state interests alter. According to Steele (2008), "state interests can change all the time, and if this is the case, then identity changes are possible within similar institutional forms. Ontological security helps connect interests to these sudden engagements with identity" (p. 20).

The identity is the focal point of the process of seeking ontological security and identity construction needs a division between us vs. them. According to Combes (2017), language is an important element to "describe or delimit" self from

others (p. 128). Agents need an "other" to build an identity, after describing what is threat and danger, other is described as dangerous to the self (Rumelili, 2012, p. 14). The immigrant in a global world in which movement of people become more spread is the most disturbing other (Staniševski, 2011, p. 73). According to Combes (2017), there are two ways of which the stranger becomes the interest of politics: "The stranger reveals herself as such by doing something strange…and a particular group is assigned blame for pre-existing danger as means of dispelling some of the social anxiety associated with danger" (p. 130).

According to Huysmans (1998), the identification of the threat is a must for states in the process of building political identity (p. 239). Thus, defining a threat by the state can change through time corresponding to the context since "a loss of threat damages the political identity" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 239). Discursive formation becomes useful for identifying what is secure or not and which meaning being attributed to the content of the concept.

As already stated, the construction of the identity needs another subject being. As Rumelili (2012) puts it, agents build the identity mainly by "discourses and practices that differentiate ourselves from others" (p. 11). This process also involves the securitization of the subjectivity and the abjection of the other. As Kinnvall (2004) suggests, "construction of an abject-other becomes a means to securitize subjectivity as it reduces anxiety and increases the ontological security" (p. 753). This securitized subjectivity can be thought as a "reflex" shown by agents when they confront a situation that they struggle to deal with. This process involves the abjection of the other by conveying negative aspects to other such as "through stereotyping, relying on enemy images, resurrecting national myths" (Mitzen, 2016, p. 274).

The securitization process also paves the way for legitimizing policies adopted by states. As Rumelili (2012) suggests, "securitization is a multi-faceted process that empowers certain actors, legitimizes exceptional measures, and reproduces a discourse about the imminence of a threat to the survival of self" (p. 12). Drawing a boundary between those-one-can-trust and those-one-fears moderates the fear of uncertainty. It manages the ability to determine who to fear and whom to trust by establishing a sphere of trustworthy people (Huysmans, 1998, p. 235). Such a division between us and others may lead to acts of violence. According to Croft (2012), "these divisions have led to acts of real and brutal violence, inflicted by some who feel the need to assert the superiority of their identity over that of the insecuritized other" (p. 230). As understood, the reflexive character of ontological security, which requires other agents to interact, does not always create a positive outcome. The process of self-boundering from others may lead to the securitization of the subject and abjection of the others.

2.2.3 Narrative in state-level analysis

The need for maintaining a stable biographical narrative for individuals to preserve the ontological security is also relevant for states. As Steel (2008) suggests, "those specific telling which link by implication a policy with a description or understanding of a state self constitute a state's biographical narrative" (p. 10). In the state level analysis, the narrative is generally used for justifying current political actions. States need to construct a narrative with the ability of performing the discourse compatible with their actions. The process includes specific strategies.

According to Kinnvall (2004), chosen traumas and glories are important in order to produce a comfortable ground for constructing an identity vis-à-vis the other

in the times of ontological insecurity (p. 755). In other words, an appropriate set of

events is chosen from history and brought to the light in the process of building the

discourse by states in order to create a consistency with actions and policies. This is

because if the distance between the narrative and current events increases, states'

sense of ontological security may be disrupted. The reflexive character of building a

self-identity leaves space for reconstituting the identity through the discursive

formation when ontological insecurity occurs. As Steele (2005) puts it, the discourse

is really useful because "a biographical narrative is a device of comparison for

actors, and disconnects between it and the actions of a state produce anxiety" (p.

527). With the flexibility of reconstructing the narrative, agents have the ability to

manipulate history by using it in the process of forming the base for ontological

security. As Steele (2008) claims, "the struggle for ontological security is intertwined

with the ability of agents to fixate on collective memories" (p. 55). The currency of

the discourse is nothing to do with the external reality, rather it is internal to

discourse (Campbell, 1992, p. 6). The discourse can be constructed regardless of the

content of the reality and can become more valued than the facts. History does not

become an instrument in the construction of a basis for ontological security just

through supplying specific events but also through "enlivening history by using it to

create the basis for action" (Steele, 2008, p. 56).

To overcome uncertainty, the agent takes part in the process of imaginations

and fantasies in order to create a full sense of identity. As Kinnvall (2018) suggests,

these imaginaries are social products, constructed collectively and open to change

and modifications (p. 9). The discourse is constructed through the speeches of

political actors vis-à-vis the relevant interest or policies regarding the issue. As

Steele (2008) puts it, "A state's biographical narrative is a form of performative

language" (p. 72). The legitimization of states' policies even if it is controversial become possible with the ability to perform this discourse construction. Since the narrative is important for ontological security, states and agents may reconsider and reproduce it through discourse and manipulation of past events.

2.3 Literature review of the ontological security theory

The ontological security developed in International Relations literature presents a quite productive alternative to the conventional thinking on state's behavior because the theory introduces the identity of the state into the equation. It is also a crucial guideline to think about the relationship "between identity and security, and between identity and important outcomes in world politics" (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2017, p. 3). Since there is no single overall ontological theory of world politics, the scholarship presents pluralistic researches based on different cases.

Huysmans is the first scholar who brought the concept of ontological security into the agenda of International Relations. According to Huysmans (1998), the essence of security is also related to the "wider framework of meaning" within the cultural, symbolic or discursive area that is constructed (p. 228). The work of Huysmans is important in order to develop a further understanding of the connotation of security. First of all, he approaches the term as a "thick signifier" which means that the concept of security should be understood within its self-referential character (Huysmans, 1998, p. 232). The concept of security does not just refer to the "fact out there", concrete reality like an enemy outside the country, but is also constructed through specific arrangements and giving different attributions to its meaning. Through this logic, the securitization and/or creating a story within the securitization framework for states and/or societies becomes possible. Approaching security as a

thick signifier paves the way for extending the capacity of the term and elaborating more on the ontological security within the discipline of the International Relations. As Huysmans (1998) puts it, "by introducing new referent objects, that is, units receiving threats –adding indivuduals, ecological system, community, etc. to the traditional state-centric agenda" (p. 227). Following Huysmans' explanation of the term, it can be said that a securitized object can be something/someone like migrants, ecological problems or terrorism other than conventional security object like an enemy state.

Huysmans (1998) also makes a distinction between enemy and strangers (p. 241). While the enemy is subject to fear, the stranger is subject to anxiety. States do not aim at the elimination of enemies but at the destruction of strangers, or more generally strangehood (Huysmans, 1998, p. 242). This is due to the fact that strangehood is a direct threat to the ability of the ordering of the state. It creates uncertaintly simply because strangers are both within society, but they also do not belong to it. The stranger creates ontological insecurity because they are threats in the sense of disrupting the sense of being and fundamental trust in the world (Gazit, 2018, p. 8). As Gazit (2018) puts it, "The stranger desanctifies their world by undermining the mere boundary of this world as such: their basic turst in what holds their society together" (p. 8). Kinnvall (2004) further develops this idea and suggests that strangers need to be turned into an enemy (p. 457). Because the enemy with its ability to create fear is easier to handle rather than a stranger which produces the anxiety, an emotion directly related to ontological insecurity. The transition of a subject from a stranger into the enemy is done through the discourse.

The relationship between the discursive formation of security and politics is further elaborated in the work of Huysmans. Firstly, security practices determine the

position held by the political agents in the relevant country. They use security

policies to confirm their positions (Huysmans, 1998, p. 244). Identifying the agents

to be secured or a threat to be avoided is involved in the process of constructing the

discourse initiated by the political elites. As Huysmans (1998) suggests, the security

policy is political and these two cannot be thought of as seperable from each other (p.

245). In other words, the approach of security as a thick signifier provides a flexible

and wide area in which the discourse related to which groups of people are

marginalized or securitized. As Rumelili (2012) also depicts, "security, threat,

danger, and risk are not objective conditions, but social constructs that are shaped by

dominant discourse" (p. 2).

Different scholars deal with the relationship between security and identity by

using the concept of ontological security by means of various cases and theoretical

investigations. In her work, Kinnvall (2004) approaches the ontological insecurity as

a response to growing uncertainties originated from globalization, which promotes

people and groups to develop a high level of religious nationalism. Here, the

changing factor or "a moment of crisis" is the destabilizing character of

globalization. In such an environment, people feel insecure and find the answer in

nationalistic and religious ideologies to reconstruct their identity or self-being.

Following this logic, she argues that in a situation of such uncertainty, the response

of the state to the stranger is the reproduction of its meaning as a threat to the state's

security and turning it into an enemy.

An important body of the literature focuses on the state's role producing

discourse to maintain the sense of ontological security. Rumelili (2012) assumes that,

"Actors in international relations can maintain a sustainable state of ontological

security to the extent that they are able to (re)produce discourses that distinguish

themselves from significant others in a socially validated fashion" (p. 8). Rumelili's approach indicates the state's role to create discourse in the name of pursuing or preserving ontological security. Another important aspect of Rumelili's approach is the way she deals with the roots of ontological security for society. She argues that the ontological security of society is changeable under different conditions, it is not constituted through an "essence" or specific identifying threats (Rumelili, 2012, p. 16). Also inspired by Hansen (2006), she puts forward the dimensions of construction of identity as temporal, spatial and ethical. According to this idea, the self separates itself from the other by "representing the self as advanced and the other as backward along a historical path (temporal distinction), and/or by excluding the other from its territory (spatial distinctions), and or/by assuming a responsibility over the other (ethical dimension)" (Rumelili, 2012, p. 23). Apart from the examining states' behavior through the lens of ontological security, the institutions are studied through this theory as well. Steele's work on the CIA and the application of torture in the 2000s is explained through the narrative interplayed between public opinion and elite discourses and the routinized organizational process (Steele, 2017).

In the literature, ontological security is also studied in the migration research (Gazit, 2018; Mitzen, 2018; Alkopher, 2018). Gazit (2018) uses the concept of ontological security to better understand Germany's migration policies vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees through the model of rites of Arnold van Gennep, which is mainly based on three phases of migration. These phases are the initial stage (the pre-liminal phase), a transitional, unstable stage of "wavering between two worlds" (the liminal phase) and the incorporation of the individual or group into their new position in society (the post-liminal phase) (p. 3). This theory is used for explaining the changing social and symbolic meanings in the face of ontological insecurity.

According to this idea, after the emergence of the ontological insecurity in Germany regarding the migration crisis, this existential anxiety is overcome by reconstitution of the identity through power relations and constant discussions among different political, social and religious agents by following Gennep's three phases (Gazit, 2018, p. 3).

Alkopher (2018) uses the concept of ontological security while explaining the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe through three different socio-psychological analytical lenses. The first is the "reaffirmation of national identities" in the "Visegrad Four" countries after facing the uncertainty created by the great number of people coming to Europe. Here, the disruption of ontological security is sustained at the expense of efforts of supranational institutions of the EU. The second lens is "managing the securitization" done by the European Commission despite the challenge of skeptical members. The ontological security is challenged on an institutional level because of the role of these institutions, which act as the "gatekeeper" and "order provider" of the union. The third lens is the "empathy" and "desecuritisation" indicated in Germany's reaction to migration. According to this idea, Germany replies with "empathy" and "desecuritization" to the ontological insecurity because the country builds its identity based on "civilian culture" and "anti-militarism" after the Second World War. The thesis basically contronts this idea. Merkel's normative stance at the beginning of the crisis turned into a stricter position.

Mitzen (2018) handles the issue with the concept of "home" by assuming since the home is important for constructing ontological security, political actors use this metaphor to legitimize their policies like building fences and walls. Within this framework, migration is discussed within the framework of "home" and preserving it from strangers.

The literature on ontological security in International Relations also focuses on the role of political elites who are effective in the construction of identity through difference and distinctiveness (Agius, 2016; Combes, 2017). Different nation-states, even if they build their identity based on similar values, may develop different narratives in a situation which their ontological insecurity is in crisis as indicated by Agius (2016) while indicating the different discourses of Denmark and Sweden to the same event regarding migration and strangers.

Steele (2008) presents four components of ontological security process in the state-level. These are "material and reflexive capabilities", "crisis assessment", "the biographical narrative a state employs to justify and describe its actions" and "co-actor discourse strategies" (p. 50). According to this idea, material and reflexive capabilities form the identity. States with more capabilities -namely the powerful states- are the most possible actors to create an outcome in the international system and to affect other states with their actions. With this in mind, the case of Germany as having the leading role in the migration crisis can be explained through with its capabilities in the European Union. In the crisis assessment, Steele (2008) puts emphasis on the fact that these crises are not "objective facts" but "socially constructed" (p. 71). Nation-states are contingent upon three important abilities to define a situation as a crisis and to build a self-identity based on that. The first one is discursive abilities, linking the crisis to the national self and determining the policy that might end this crisis. The second ability is the biographical narrative as explained above in detail in terms of how states need it in the process of constructing self-identity. But here it is important to note that Steele presents a quite understandable chain of how narrative works in the process of constructing ontological security in a time of critical situations (See Fig. 2). Thirdly, co-actor

discourse strategies imply that states might implement strategies to affect other agents' sense of ontological security. States may use an event in a way that may pressures others to change their policies by manipulating their ontological security (Steele, 2008, p. 74). This indicates that contracting a discourse compatible with the situation is not only a process developing within the states, but also states may produce discourse to manipulate other agents.

Fig. 2 Steele's chain of constructing narrative in critical situations

Source: Steele, 2008, p. 73.

Steele's contribution to the literature is quite important since his work paves the way for better investigating states' actions in the face of ontological insecurity and anxiety. To identify what ontological security means for the state is important, but to examine how states react to these developments is also extremely crucial. Steele's work contributes to the literature by indicating how states' policies can be shaped vis-à-vis the existential crisis.

Ontological security is a useful theory to explain the current crisis Europe has faced since 2015 with the mass movement of people from war-torn areas. Because after a very short time European states identified the situation as "crisis" and the migration became a governmentality problem. Also, EU member states have been highly divided on how to solve the issue, which has created great tension between some states and upper institutions, and laws of the European Union. For instance,

Hungary did not accept the quota system implemented by the European Council. The general tendency within the continent is not accepting Syrian refugees into the land. For this purpose, borders have been protected, fences and walls have been heightened and anti-migrant discourse has been growing since the crisis began.

The mass movement toward the European lands in 2015 indicates a critical situation which leads to uncertainty and inability to act for states. It disrupts the everyday-live routines and this sense of disruption results in the redefinition of identities vis-à-vis the others, namely refugees. Narrative based on nationalism, religion and historical myths helps to construct the anti-migration discourse and paves the way for exclusionary policies.

CHAPTER 3

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF CASE COUNTRIES

The thesis focuses on two countries, Germany and Hungary, as case studies. At the

beginning of the crisis, two states hold different positions regarding the refugee issue

but their positions became less varied by 2017. The German government, under the

leadership of Merkel, applied an open-door policy for Syrian refugees in 2015, and

this decision led to the extensive discussions in both public and political debate.

Merkel is confronted by many criticisms against her policy accepting refugees to the

country from both her party and political actors in the opposition. During two years,

2015-2017, this debate was on the center of the agenda of the political landscape.

Given this context, the normative stance of Merkel regarding the open-door policy

for Syrian refugees has shaken, and the country turned into a regime of exclusion.

Merkel also supports a common European approach for handling the situation, but

this stance is also confronted by some EU member states. Hungary is the most severe

actor conducting an anti-Merkel campaign within the EU.

Hungary followed a different strategy from Germany, in terms of its position

vis-à-vis the situation in question. The Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, strongly

opposed to the arrival of people to the country and established a border regime from

the very beginning of the so-called crisis. Exclusionary policies to stem people to

arrive in the country expanded with the anti-refugee discourse. The hardline stance

on the refugee issue of Hungary made the country a leading figure of those defending

the exclusion of refugees in the EU.

The chapter examines these two countries in terms of their political landscape

and main actors engaging the refugee discussion. At this point, it is critical to note

the differences between case studies. Germany presents a more diverse political

environment in which actors take part in discussion with a more agonistic way. The government is not alone in conducting the discussions on refugees, but also different political actors engage in the debates. Whereas in Hungary, the government rules over the country under a system of the "illiberal democracy" in which the opposition is under great pressure by the government.

3.1 Germany: From "welcome culture" to exclusion

Germany has been the leading country in the discussions of the refugee issue all across the EU. The country has been the driving force in initiatives of implementing an EU-wide refugee policy. Nevertheless, the mass arrival of migrants after Merkel's declaration of an open-door policy in August 2015 has become a major issue in internal political and public debate. Migration has created a polarized society in 2015: on one hand, there were people and NGOs supporting Merkel's policy, on the other side, a significant number of politicians and German citizens criticized the arrival of refugees to the country. However, this division of the country regarding the refugee issue has shifted to a stricter atmosphere. As Dostal (2017) suggests, there has been a change in the mood from happiness to fear in terms of accepting refugees (p. 593). The "happiness" came from the idea of Germany's ability and the necessity of helping refugees, whereas this emotion turned into a fear including concerns that Germany might face the existential threat due to the arrival of refugees (Dostal, 2017, p. 593). In July 2015, the state of the nation was described as "state of anxiety" ("How many refugees", 2015). By 2017, the country was defined as a "paralyzed nation" (Thurau, 2017).

In 2015, when Hungary cut the main routes to refugees and people were stuck in the country, Merkel announced the *Willkommenspolitik* (welcome politics) and

implemented an open door policy with the famous motto "We can do it and we will do it" (Harding, 2015). After the declaration of Merkel on accepting refugees from Hungary, numerous individuals and NGOs welcomed refugees at Munich train station with placards carrying the messages "welcome" and "we can show you where to register" in five languages (Connolly, 2015). The number of people applying for asylum status in Germany dramatically increased in 2015 (See Fig. 3). It is important to note that according to the registration record of the EASY quota system, which is a program for resettlement of the refugees in German states, the number of refugees that arrived to the country was 890,000 in 2015, but only almost 450,000 of them were able to apply for asylum status. The rest registered in 2016 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2016).


Fig. 3 Asylum applicants in Germany, 2009-2017

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)

The welcoming attitude of the German government and public towards policy turned into a state of anxiety especially after some significant events like sexual assaults of women on New Year's Eve in Cologne and terrorist attacks in Germany. The fear

from refugees in terms of the potential disruption of Germany's culture and risks over its values (Pearlman, 2017, p. 314), and critics of Merkel from different segments of political representations have increased by 2017. This section of this chapter analyzes the main political actors involved in the refugee debate, and the effect of the mass arrival of refugees to internal politics, namely the 2017 federal election.

3.1.1 Actors in the German political system and their positions on the refugee debate

Examining all political actors in the German political system exceeds the limits and purpose of the concerned subject matter of the thesis. The first three parties in the result of 2017 German federal election are examined. It is crucial to highlight some important points to better understand the political landscape of the country in terms of the debates revolving around the refugee issue between 2015 and 2017. Without drawing a general picture of the positions of significant actors, the discourse based on the ontological security and its potential to create a system of exclusion would be lacking. This section analyzes main political actors involving the refugee debate, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU), its coalition partner The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and growing rightist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

The German political system is designed to avoid the emergence of the one-party-dominant ruling with the purpose of preventing the political instability in the Weimar Republic (Lees, 2013, pp. 65-66). Thus, coalitions in the government are so common in German politics. The CDU has been a dominant political actor in Germany. The party has held the chancellery for "48 of the 68 years of the Federal Republic of Germany's existence" (Chase, 2017b). The CDU was established in

1945 and it is a center-right party based on "cultural and national conservatism, Catholic social welfarism, and pro-business market liberalism" (Clemens, 2018, p. 56). People who vote for the CDU are traditionally from rural or suburban areas and define themselves as mostly patriotic and religious (Clemens, 2018, p. 60). In 2000, Angela Merkel became the first woman leader of the CDU replacing Helmut Kohl and was elected as the first female chancellor in German history in the 2005 federal elections. She has been the head of government in Germany with different coalitions since then. The CDU established the Grand Coalition with the SPD in 2005, formed a coalition with the liberal party FDP in 2009 and entered into a coalition with the SPD in 2013. Two parties agreed to build another coalition after long talks of negotiation following almost six months of "uncertainty" after the 2017 federal election (Oltermann, 2018).

The leadership of Merkel is important for the country for both her long-term administration and her governance at difficult times like the global financial crisis in 2008. According to Fulbrook, she became "one of the most powerful individuals in Europe and one of the most powerful women in the world" (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 289). As a strong leader, Merkel faced many criticisms due to her moderate stance about the refugee issue. The policy of Merkel on the refugee issue is based on three main concerns: the limit on asylum seekers is not allowed, fences do not help to solve the problem, and a European solution needs to be implemented (Hasselbach, 2016). There are various explanations on Merkel's normative stance on the issue. Some argue that "Merkel is trying to transform Germany into a moral superpower in Europe" ("Merkel's refugee policy," 2015). However, Merkel's normative approach of opening borders to refugees in September 2015 did not end well. As Hoffmann

(2016) wrote in February 2016 after five months of Merkel's decision, "Merkel's humanitarian approach in the refugee crisis has failed."

Within two years, one can easily see the transformation of Merkel's policy in the refugee issue from a moderate position to a stricter stance. The main reason for this change is the growing opposition and criticisms to Merkel's policy and leadership. Even in the CDU, the atmosphere was tense as declared by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2015 autumn; "the mood of the party on the refugee issue is 'quite bad'" ("Merkel faces growing," 2015). In early 2016, even the position of Merkel as a leader of the party was questioned. A senior CDU politician says: "Now, some are saying, we have to solve the problem [migration issue], without Merkel if necessary. That is still a minority, but it is a growing minority" ("Chancellor running," 2016).

Merkel tried to preserve her stance toward the issue by supporting the motto "We can do this" by saying: "If we now have to start apologizing for showing a friendly face in response to emergency situations, then that's not my country" (Nelles, 2015). But while the pressure over her policy increases, the position she held has shaken. After one year from the declaration of her open-door policy, Merkel announced that the motto "We can do this" turned into an empty slogan and would not prefer to use it again ("Merkel to drop," 2016). In the annual meeting of her party in December 2015, Merkel defended her policy about welcoming refugees but also talked about "noticeable reduce" of arrivals of asylum seekers and migrants ("Merkel's CDU," 2015). Even though Merkel faces criticisms from her party about her stance of refugee issue, she rejects the upper limit of the number of refugees. But then, she accepted the refugee quota during the coalition talks after the 2017 federal election (Connolly, 2017).

The CSU can be located to the right of the CDU with its Christian

conservative background (Falkenhagen, 2013, p. 397). The party is effective in

Bavaria, a German city in which the CDU does not run in the elections rather the

CSU has been dominant in politics in this region. The party strongly and openly

criticized Merkel's refugee policy and defends the idea of putting a limit of 200,000

refugees per year from the very beginning of the refugee debate ("Bavaria knocked

back," 2016). The leader of the party Horst Seehofer claimed that the chancellor's

welcoming policy for refugees radicalized the country (Hoffmann, 2016) and

suggested that Germany needs to stop the arrival of refugees by saying, "What we

now need is a system of rules, a kind of guarantee, for drastically limiting the influx

of refugees" ("'We want a solution," 2016).

The cleavage between parties was so tense. The political debates in Germany

even include the possible separation of the CSU which claims that CDU will lose

votes because of her position on the refugee issue. Bavarian Finance Minister

Marcus Söder said, "It is obvious that, with the shift to the left undertaken by the

CDU, room to the right has been created" (Amann, Neukirch, & Pfister, 2016). The

leader of the party Horst Seehofer further suggested that the CSU should race

independently in 2017 elections (Clemens, 2018, p. 64).

The SPD is the oldest political party in Germany. Its roots date back to the

labor movements in the late 19th century (Fuchs, 2017). The party represents the

center-left in German politics with its traditional voters composing of "industrial

workers and low-income owners" (Fuchs, 2017). Together with the CDU, the party

has dominated German politics for a long time. But, the refugee debate in the country

led to the decline of the influence of the party. Parallel to Merkel's policy, the SPD

also supports a European-wide solution to the problem and opposes to the upper limit to the number of refugees arriving to Germany (Conrad, 2015).

The AfD was officially established in April 2013 and gained its first success in the European elections in May 2014 with 7.1 percent of the vote (Decker, 2016, p. 2). The party can be classified as a right-wing populist party which also holds an economically liberal and conservative position (Decker, 2016, p. 5). In the German public, the party is frequently accused of its affiliations with the extreme right movement in the country. Even though the party holds a rightist ideology, it separates itself from the extreme right parties and movements of the country (Decker, 2016, p. 12). The relationship between the AfD and far right was on the agenda in March 2016 following the message of neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) to the voters. When the party declared that its supporters could give their votes to the AfD, which responded in returns as follows: "We have no overlaps with the NPD whatsoever" (Knight, 2016a).

The party opposes to the arrival of refugees to the country. As a response to Merkel's motto "we can do it", the party uses the expression "we do not want to do it" (Wagener, 2015). The party supports the closure of borders and increased deportations of rejected asylum seekers in addition to opposing family reunifications and the idea of instability and insecurity of Germany due to the mass migration of Muslims (Bierbach, 2017b). The refugee issue is also seen as a chance by party elites for reaching the large masses. Back in 2015, former deputy head of the AfD right-wing populist party, Alexander Gauland saw the refugee issue in Germany as an opportunity to increase the party's popularity among the nation: "The Germans won't accept 1.5 million refugees. The mood will change. When it does, you can only hope that people will vote for us instead of for the NPD" ("Which side," 2015).

The government also drew attention to this situation. German Justice Minister Heiko Maas said the AfD "takes advantage of radicalization online and elsewhere for its political purposes" ("German justice minister," 2016).

3.1.2 What does Bundestag election in 2017 tell about the refugee debate in Germany?

The last Bundestag election in 2017 is significant both for Germany and in terms of the subject matter of the thesis. The election was held in a period in which the refugee debate was at the center of politics and the issue determined the results of the election. The discussions over the arrival of refugees in Germany altered the political landscape of the country. People feel more and more "shut out" from conventional political parties like the CDU and SPD that both have been dominant in German politics for a long time. Thus, new parties –more nationalist, right-wing– find space in public debate, and especially AfD achieved a big success in the 2017 Bundestag election. According to Kurbjuweit (2016), a more varied party system will occur in Germany and this will lead to difficult consensus in future governments and pragmatism. This argument has proved itself in the process following the elections. The coalition negotiations lasted for almost six months until the establishment of the grand coalition between the CDU and SPD.

The CDU/CSU became the first among others with the rate of 37.2 percent but it was the worst election result for the party since 1949 (Blasina & Pronczuk, 2018). The clash between the CDU and the CSU over the issue of the migration led to the differentiation in electorate strategies. According to Clemens (2018), the CDU conducts two different election campaigns: one is the strategy of the center of the party aimed at gaining votes from the SPD, the other is executed by its Bavarian

sister party to obstruct the effects of the AfD (p. 64). The most significant

consequence of the 2017 Bundestag election is the success of the anti-migrant party,

AfD (See Fig. 4). The party was the first populist right party entering the Bundestag

in Germany's political history in 60 years (Henley, 2017). The result for the SPD is

also disappointing with 20.5 percent of the votes. Some describe this situation as a

disaster for the party due to its "worst result in a national election since 1945" (Wüst,

2018, p. 87).

Fig. 4 Federal election results in Germany, 2009-2017

Source: The Federal Returning Officer of Germany

The AfD succeeded to gain almost one million votes from the CDU and two-thirds of

these people said that the government paid no attention to the concerns of citizens in

terms of the refugee issue (Clemens, 2018, p. 72). According to Klikauer (2018),

voters and supporters of the AfD are former voters of the CDU who are frustrated

with the refugee policy of the party; supporters of the Nazi party, the NPD; and

people who do not vote in previous elections (p. 80). The AfD also managed to

attract politicians from the traditional conservative party, the CDU. The leader of the

party Alexander Gauland is a former CDU party member (Klikauer, 2018, p. 81).

The rise of the AfD in the 2017 elections is explained through two political decisions made by Merkel: her initiatives during the Eurozone crisis and open-door policy relating to the refugee issue (Art, 2018, p. 77).

According to Dostal (2017), the effects of the refugee issue to the results of the 2017 German elections can be explained through four dimensions: temporal, media discourse, ideological, and psychological (p. 593). The temporal dimension is related to the shift in the mood of the German public from "happiness to fear about the arrival of refugees" which is fueled by the media discourse. The ideological dimension refers to the divisions in political parties regarding the refugee issue. According to Dostal (2017), all parties from right to left face divisions concerning the migration and the "most dramatic split appeared among mainstream conservatives" (p. 593). The psychological aspect is related to the perception of Germans about the effect of globalization on the basis of losing control of globalism and concerns about being losers or winners of the process (Dostal, 2017, p. 595). According to this argument, Germans have already believed that they lost control of globalism and could not get enough benefit from the process. In addition to this, they think that they will face a "cultural fatalism" due to the low fertility rates (Dostal, 2017, p. 595).

3.2 Hungary: A country of border regime

As a relatively small country located in Central Europe, Hungary became one of the main actors throughout the process in which the EU discussed the migration crisis and how to find a way to reduce the burden. The country has indicated high resistance to EU initiatives aiming at solving the problem and turned into a symbol of anti-migration attitude among EU member states. Another essential feature of

Hungary within this context is that the country is at the border of the Schengen zone and one of the main transit routes used by newcomers who want to reach Germany. The number of people arriving as asylum seekers has dramatically increased in 2015 (See Fig. 5). The Hungarian response to mass migration has been severe and can be expressed by Prime Minister Orbán's own words as follows: "In 2015 the Hungarian response was loud and clear: controls, identification, interception and turning back, as required under the Schengen Agreement" (Orbán, 2016b). As we can see from Fig 3., this policy of "control," "identification" and "expulsion" seems to be successful. There is a sharp decrease in asylum applications between 2015 and 2017.

Fig. 5 Asylum applicants in Hungary, 2009-2017

Source: Hungarian Statistical Office, 2018

Hungary basically indicates a zero-sum game while approaching the issue. As Kékesi (2017) clearly identified that Hungary built "one of the toughest border regimes in Europe" (p. 2). The toughness of the border policy was also declared by the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (2016f):

> This is a slight exaggeration, of course, but in essence it is true that not even a bird can enter the territory of Hungary without being screened…the border cannot be protected with flowers and cuddly toys. The border can be protected with fences, police officers, soldiers and weapons.

50

In order to better analyze the stance of Hungary on the refugee issue, this section of the chapter focuses on the political background of the country.

3.2.1 Hungarian political structure: The actors, system, and context

The current ruling party of Hungary is Fidesz (the acronym for Alliance of Young Democrats) under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. The party was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party supporting the free market economy and European integration and won its first significant victory in the 1998 general elections by gaining 148 seats in the parliament. Between the period 2002 and 2010, the party could not achieve becoming the ruling party, but in 2010 Orbán and his party won 53 percent of the popular vote and gained 2/3 majority in the parliament (Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012, p. 138). The success of the party is derived from its ideological transformation.

Since 2010, Orbán's Fidesz party has been ruled over the country. The general election in 2010 became the major turning point in Hungarian political life. First and foremost, the ideology of Fidesz which was supporting the liberal market economy and European integration back then in the 1990s has changed to "illiberal democracy" (Rupnik, 2012, p. 132) and Eurosceptic vision (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013, p. 25). And second, the government started to hold nationalist, populist and rightist discourse over the issues like migration, opposition, media and the rule of law.

The shift in the Hungarian political system or ideology after 2010 has been defined with different concepts by various scholars. The most striking ones among them are "identitarian populism" (Nagy, 2016, p. 1042), "nationalist conservative revolution" (Müller, 2011, p. 5), and "rule of populist radical right party"

(Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 319), "a sharp u-turn" (Kornai, 2015, p. 3), and the "Putinization of the Hungary" ("The Putinization of Hungary?," 2010). Nevertheless, Viktor Orbán defined the new regime in the country as an "illiberal state" as indicated by himself in his speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp on 26 July 2014 (Orbán, 2014):

> … We must break with liberal principles and methods of social organisation, and in general with the liberal understanding of society… The Hungarian nation is not simply a group of individuals but a community that must be organised, reinforced and in fact constructed. And so in this sense, the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central element of the state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.

According to Rupnik (2012), Hungary has passed through a transformation in basically three areas since the 2010 general election: from democracy to an illiberal order, economy from a liberal market order to the state-centered, and from the vision of European integration to Euroscepticism (pp. 132-133). The most significant aspect of the transformation from democracy to the illiberal mode of administration is seen in the new constitution implemented by Orbán's Fidesz party. One of the enormous changes in the country after Fidesz had gained power was issuing a new constitution which was signed on 25 April 2011 by the president and went into effect on 1 January 2012.[1] The majority of the Fidesz in the parliament at that time was enough to implement a new constitution, but the party executed some amendments and regulations which facilitate to not face any massive challenge in the making process of a new constitution. These are reducing the power of the Constitutional Court which functions as checking mechanism to the government, taking control of the Election Commission which has the role of deciding proposals for referendums,

---

[1] For the translated version of the constitution, see. "The Fundamental Law of Hungary", http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf.

increasing the rein over the media and bringing a loyal Fidesz member to the presidency (Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012, p. 141). With these changes, the party did not face a massive challenge while making the new constitution.

What did the new constitution bring to the politics and society in Hungary? To analyze all changes in detail would exceed the purpose of the thesis, but some significant changes are important to understand the current political climate and some constitutional amendments on the issue of migration. The considerable difference between the old and new constitution is on the issue of check mechanisms. In the new constitution, check and balance system was weakened (Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012, p. 142). Among them as indicated by Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele (2012), in the old constitution, citizens could challenge the constitutionality of a law, but in the current order, only those who are affected by the law could complain about the constitutionality (p. 142). In addition to that, the "parliamentary commissioner for human rights" under the control of the government was established instead of the old ombudsman system which had the role of observing human rights and were an independent body (Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012, p. 144). These developments helped the government to rule over the country more easily without facing any severe confrontation in jurisdiction and amendments in the legal system related to the migration which is against international law did not encounter any huge challenges.

Another shift can be seen in the perspectives on Europe as well. Hungary became a full member of the EU in 2004 which is the first member among Eastern European countries. In the period 1998-2002 the Fidesz Party was "quite flexible with Brussels in order to make as rapid progress as possible with the EU accession negotiations," but after the 2010 general elections the stance of the party toward EU

was changed and became more rigid (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013, p. 25). They

began to see Europeans as "foreigners meddling in Hungary's affairs" (Taggart &

Szczerbiak, 2013, p. 25). This orientation also can be seen in the migration discourse

in recent years. While the EU criticizes the policies of the Hungarian government

about violations of EU and international law, Orbán condemns EU bureaucrats and

institutions as entities intervening in domestic affairs of the country and limiting the

national sovereignty:

> Europe is not being guided by the people; Europe is being guided by opinion makers who are linked to what is usually called "liberalism" by ties of ideology on the one hand – based on their intellectual beliefs – and of financial interests on the other hand. This is a team. They make decisions against the interests of their own countries by sidelining them, and at the same time, they will never openly admit that we are right. (Orbán, 2017d)

Apart from illiberalism and Euroscepticism, another ideological premises held by the

Fidesz need to be examined in order to understand current developments and policy-

making processes in Hungary regarding the migration issue. The ideology of Fidesz

party under the leadership of Viktor Orbán can be defined as the nationalist, morally

conservative, religious (Müller, 2011, p. 6), and "etatist" (Batory, 2015, p. 286).

After Orbán came to power in 2010, one of his first immediate action was the

declaration of Trianon Memorial Day on 4 June, the anniversary of Trianon treaty

that was signed in 1920 and officially ended the Kingdom of Hungary. The intention

behind it was to create a "day of national unity" (Walker, 2018). The boost in the

nationalist discourse and creating a historical narrative are crucial strategies used by

Orbán concerning dealing with the "foreigners" as we will see in the following

chapter of the thesis.

    Another strategy used by Fidesz within the scope of its ideology is the

distinction between "us vs. other." In Fidesz style of politics, the creation of enemies

to the public good is essential (Nagy, 2016, p. 1043). There are internal and external

enemies targeting national unity. Among these enemies EU, communists, some NGOs and -now- migrants can be counted. This dichotomy between the "evil vs. good," "us vs. other" is the backbone of the discourse of the Fidesz. In a speech by Orbán in 2014, the vitality of the "other" was indicated while he reflected his content about the results of the general election (Orbán, 2014):

> Thank you to everyone whom it concerns; to Providence, to the voters, to Hungary's legislators and at such times we must also thank those who turned against us and provided an opportunity for good to win the day regardless, because after all, without evil, how could the good be victorious?

The main competitor of the Fidesz, ruling party of Hungary and Viktor Orbán is the Jobbik, far-right party of the country. In this competition, Viktor Orbán tries to not leave any room for Jobbik with its rightist discourse and politics (Nagy, 2016, p. 1043). Jobbik which is extremely right-wing, anti-Roma and anti-Semitic became the third party after Socialists in the 2010 elections. Even if two parties seem to be rivals in the political arena, Fidesz with its nationalistic belief and ideological system opens space for Jobbik and legitimizes it (Müller, 2011, p. 7). The Hungarian political landscape seems to be getting stuck in rightist discourse and policy-making.

Hungary and Germany have different characteristics in terms of their political structure. Whereas Germany involves different actors and variations in the political arena; the ruling party, Fidesz, dominates the Hungarian politics. This situation can also be seen in the debates on the refugee issue. As seen in the following chapter, Germany involves more diverse political affiliations in terms of the mass arrival of people, but in Hungary, the prime minister and the government dominates the discussions and orients people according to their perspective.

CHAPTER 4

BUILDING ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-REFUGEE

DISCOURSE IN GERMANY AND HUNGARY

Discourse analysis on the migration issue is both essential and necessary for the study because the language used by politicians lays the foundation for bringing new policies and law amendments. In addition, the discussion on the issue indicates which strategy is being used for building ontological security in times of crisis. According to Steele (2008), states have different capabilities to define a situation as a crisis and to build a self-identity based on that (p. 74). One of these capabilities is the discursive ability including to construct a link between the national self and determining the policy which might stop this crisis (Steele, 2008, p. 74). The depiction of how an anti-refugee stance is created through discourse regarding strengthening the sense of ontological security in public and the political arena is important to understand the ideological background of the so-called refugee crisis.

As discussed earlier in detail, building ontological security basically requires three important processes: routines, reflexivity and narrative. The mass arrival of refugees to Europe created a disruption to the sense of stable environment and routinized relationship with others. This unstable situation requires the construction of a new relationship with those who are "strangers" to the established structures. The reflexive character of building ontological security entails establishing a relationship with those including the definition of them on whether they are "trustworthy" or a "threat to security." The narrative is also important in the sense that discourse is produced to develop ontological security. In the case of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe, one can observe the narrative production process with

giving reference to the history and identity construction regarding the description of the situation and refugees.

In this chapter, the strategies used by states are examined in terms of how the routinization, reflexivity and narrative became a key component in order to build the ontological security. Primary sources such as news outlets, articles, and statements by political actors are examined for this purpose. In the realm of discourse, three main themes come forward: the securitization of migrants by seeing them as risk factors, the distinction between "us" vs. "them" which is composed of a two-tiered strategy: civilizational nexus based on religious differences and the nexus of nationalization including the protection of national values from newcomers with different cultural affiliations. The thesis makes a separation between civilizational and nationalistic premises in the anti-refugee discourse production process. Nevertheless, these are not completely different processes and independent from each other. The research includes, for instance, dimension of the religion in the civilizational nexus of the anti-refugee discourse. However, political leaders emphasize religious differences of refugees while using a nationalist discourse. Brubaker (2017) also claims that there has been a shift from "nationalism" to "civilizationism" based on the "notion of a civilizational threat from Islam" in national populisms in Northern and Western Europe (p. 1193). In the thesis, I prefer to examine the anti-refugee discourse by focusing on the issue as separate nexus, nationalist and civilizational, due to the fact that the nationalist discourse involving the protection of the homogeneity of receiving country or *Leitkultur* debate in Germany is still a strong orientation in the discourse production process in the case of exclusion of Syrian refugees.

Two cases have different characteristics in terms of the themes being highlighted, the density of exclusionary orientations and the diversity of actors involving the discourse production process. Hungary holds a stricter position than Germany on this issue. The Hungarian government has been initiating anti-refugee discourse from the early days of 2015 whereas in Germany, the tone of anti-refugee discourse was more moderate. However, after several breaking points, it has dominated public discussion in the country.

Certain themes like refugees as disrupting factors of the economy are less observed in Germany than in Hungary. This is because Germany suffers from labor shortage and the possibility of migrants as a solution to this problem has also been discussed by various actors, including those in the business world and in government. This argument came forward more than the discourse seeing refugees as a risk factor to the economy.

The third difference between two cases is the diversity of actors participating in the anti-refugee discourse. The ruling party of Hungary, Fidesz, dominates the political discussions in the country. Actors in the opposition and pressure groups like the media, NGOs and different segments of society are much weaker when compared to Germany. The issue is also related to the visibility in the media, since primary sources like news outlets and articles constitute a major area of the investigation in terms of depicting the discourse and policies.

4.1 Refugees as a security problem

Within the process of re-defining ontological security in times of crisis, identifying the threat is essential. The discourse on refugees as if they are threat to the well-being of society and the state is one of the important strategies used by political

actors and elites in Europe. The securitization of refugees in the discursive realm is a constructed process through language. As Huysmans (1998) argues, apart from the reality or concrete facts about the issue, the securitization process is related to the "wider framework of meaning" within the cultural and symbolic area (p. 228). Political actors use this discourse based on the fact that refugees pose a threat to the security of society and state without using any factual references as indicated above. With parallel to this line of argumentation, Rumelili (2012) also puts that security concerns are not "objective conditions, but social constructs shaped by the dominant discourse" (p. 2). This discourse revolving around the premise that refugees are dangerous to the receiving country became the focal point of increased security measures in Germany and Hungary. The securitization of refugees through the language comprising the idea of that their existence creates threats to the order of society and the state is formed through four main assumptions: migrants (i) increase terrorism in Europe, (ii) disrupt the economy, (iii) lead to the rise of crime, and (iv) create risks for the European lifestyle.

The perception of refugees as a security problem is spread both in Hungary and Germany through the discourse production process including political actors, elites, and the media. As discussed in Chapter 2, the emotional outcome of ontological insecurity is the anxiety in the face of the uncertainty of critical situations (Giddens, 1991, p.42). Various research shows that European people are also anxious about the consequences of the arrival of migrants. The Pew Research Center survey in 2016 on ten EU countries indicates that many Europeans are concerned about the effects of migrants on security, terrorism, and crime (Pew Research Center, 2016). Hungary is the most anxious among other European nationalities: According to 76 percent of Hungarians, refugees will increase the possibility of terrorism in the

country, this rate among Germans is 61 percent. More, 82 percent of Hungarians think that refugees will create a burden on the economy by taking jobs and social benefits, whereas 31 percent of Germans, which is below the average rate 50 percent, fear that refugees will lead to an economic burden. Following Italy and Sweden, Hungarian people become the third group which consider refugees as more to blame for committing higher rates of crime than other groups of people. 43 percent of Hungarian people hold this view according to the survey, which is more than the average of 30 percent. For Germany, this rate is 35 percent which is again above the average (Pew Research Center, 2016). This research is important since it indicates the anxiety about refugees among the public.

The disruption of ontological security paves the way for redefining identity through determining the boundary between them and others. Agents are capable of redefining their identities vis-à-vis the changing conditions. This process requires another subject, namely being the other. This reflexive character of building the ontological security does not always produce positive outcomes. As Kinnvall (2004) argues, the construction of a boundary between self and other becomes a method "to securitize subjectivity as it reduces anxiety and increases the ontological security" (p. 753).

The discourse related to the securitization is produced to "provide safety, counter danger… impose order and certainty, ensure existence" (Stern, 2006, p. 192). The securitization process also includes a definition of the "other." According to Rumelili, "this other is assumed to be the dangerous other" (Rumelili, 2012, p. 14). In the context of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe, this distinction is basically rooted in the idea of making the contradiction of the lives of migrants versus the well-being of EU citizens. In two case countries, Hungary and Germany, one can

easily depict this orientation through the discourses of politicians and different actors regarding the issue. The idea is that refugees produce dangers by bringing crimes, by disrupting the economy, committing terrorist activities, and damaging the everyday lives of Europeans.

The first discursive strategy under the securitization discourse is that refugees bring terrorism to European soil. Political leaders use this discourse by strengthening the sense of anxiety among people. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán is one of the leaders in Europe who defend this argument most ardently. He establishes a direct link between migration and terrorism: "We witnessed the fact that mass migration represents an exponentially increasing terror threat – indeed today we are not even talking about the threat of terror, but the fact and reality of terror" (Orbán, 2015i). According to him, the rise in migration also means the increase in the probability of terrorist attacks and he equates migrants to the terrorists by saying, "There are various estimates as to how much the danger of terrorism in Europe has grown. My position is that even one terrorist is one too many" (Orbán, 2015g). The Hungarian leader approaches the issue like a zero-sum game. According to this idea, allowing migrants means putting European people's lives into danger:

> We Hungarians have been advocating the closure of our borders to stop the flood of people coming from the Middle East and Africa. We have been fiercely criticised for this, by those who claim that this is not a humane approach. But we are faced with a question. Which approach is more humane: to close the borders in order to stop illegal immigration, or to put at risk the lives of innocent European citizens? (Orbán, 2015i)

The choice of words of Orbán is strategic on the purpose of objectifying migrants. On the one side, he mentions the prevention of "illegal migration" without referencing the subject and avoids using words evoking that migrants are human. On the other side, he chooses the expression of "putting the lives

of innocent people at risk." This narrative constructs the perception that a "phenomenon" jeopardizes the lives of Europeans.

The metaphor of the home is also used in anti-refugee discourse. The ontological security theories give weight to the idea of home since it creates a secure environment and routines which are subsequent elements of avoiding ontological insecurity. As Mitzen (2018) puts, "Home is central to processes of self-stabilization" (p. 1376). This premise is rooted in the idea that the protection of the home is also a necessity for preserving the sense of ontological security. Orbán also uses this symbol and constructs an analogy between home and state. Refugees are strangers who try to enter the secure environment of Hungarians and they have capability to disrupt it. Leaders as the guardians of the state should protect the homeland from foreigners:

> No one wants to give the keys of their home to complete strangers, or to take their doors and the windows off their hinges. So the people need security, and they expect their elected leaders to guarantee safety and security in their lives. But accepting a flood of migrants makes a safe and secure life impossible. (Orbán, 2016d)

In Germany too, refugees are observed as factors that bring terrorism into the homeland. The anxiety among the population regarding the issue has risen especially after the attacks perpetrated by refugees and assumptions on the basis that the arrival of refugees in masses leads to an increase of terrorist attacks in the country has dominated political discussions. In July 2016, within six days, there were a number of attacks in different cities in Germany carried out by migrants: An asylum seeker attacked several people with an ax and a knife on a train; an Iranian-German immigrant who grew up in Munich killed nine people in Bavaria with a handgun (Wilson, 2016); a suicide bomber with Syrian origin who has ties with the ISIS

injured 15 people in Ansbach (Eddy, 2016). After this sequence of violence, the

debates on refugees as threat factors and increasing security measures have expanded

in public debate. Merkel also touches upon the situation by stating that refugees

"mock the country which took them in" (Early, 2016). Apart from Merkel's

declaration, the policymakers also initiate the debate on strengthtening security

measures in the whole country including "an increase in police personnel, a central

crime unit for pursuing crime on the internet, easier deportation for migrants who

have committed crimes, and depriving Germans who join foreign 'terror militias' of

their citizenship" (Knight, 2016b). Since Syrian refugees are coded as "dangerous

others," these events become a means to punish and construct sterotypes of certaing

groups of people.

Another important terrorist attack in the country that has major

influence on the spread of the securitization discourse came in the last days

of 2016. 12 people were killed and 49 people were injured in a terrorist attack

by a Tunisian with a lorry crashing a Christmas market in Berlin. After this

attack, prominent German politicians started to declare a modification in the

security structure of the country. Federal Interior Minister Thomas de

Maizière put forward the approach of "strong state" ("Germany balances,"

2017). Also, the head of the SPD, Sigmar Gabriel, called for a more strict

attitude for the potential of violent Salafism by saying that "I am in favor of

zero tolerance" ("Germany balances," 2017). He also published a paper with

the title "Time for more security in times of growing uncertainty" in which

he recommended to increase domestic security in addition to hasten the

deportation of those who are not eligible to get asylum status, to establish a

"uniform intelligence data system, which can be used at the local, regional

and national level" ("Gabriel backs," 2017). In the paper, he also suggested to fight against Islamist terrorism both culturally and with security measures ("Gabriel backs," 2017).

The anxiety fueled by the dominant political environment leads to policy change, such as augmenting security measures, police surveillance and an increase in the numbers of police. The area of policymaking is important in a lot of ways. First of all, there is a correlation between discourse production and policymaking. The debate on the issue in the public paves the way for initiatives for emergence of new policies. Secondly, new policies construct a much stronger anti-refugee discourse. The discourse and policymaking are two concepts feeding and strengthening each other. As Rumelili (2012) argues that the securitization process "legitimizes exceptional measures, and reproduces a discourse about the imminence of a threat to the survival of self" (p. 12).

At this point, it is important to mention the actions of the Hungarian government in terms of how the discourse making connections between refugees and terrorism has developed into a security matter to be fought back. In 2015, refugees and police forces came across in a Hungarian village, Röszke. The disturbance of refugees about the closed borders turned into a riot which Hungarian police and a team from its counter-terrorism center (TEK) took action, and the government implemented harsh measures that resulted in the injury of many people (Field, 2015). Police and the TEK used tear gas and water cannons in response to people throwing sticks and stones at them (MIGSZOL, 2015). The event was called "the Battle of Röszke" by the Hungarian government (Kékesi, 2017). Using the counter-terrorism force

to handle the issue and the word "battle" to describe the events are strong indicators of the government's strategy in terms of the securitization of migrants. Special units which are supposed to combat with terrorism/terrorists were ordered to control the issue on the border. The situation creates an image among the public along the lines that those who are at the border and who are trying to enter the country are terrorists. The strong image of the clash between the security forces and refugees evokes the perception of common citizens to the idea of such a contradiction: "invasion of the country by unknown elements" and defending forces of the mainland. 11 people among the crowd were arrested and underwent to the trial with the charge of illegally entering the country and being part of a mass riot (MIGSZOL, 2015). After the trial process, which is also criticized regarding mistrial and manipulations like false translation (MIGSZOL, 2015), one of them was sentenced to 10 years in jail with the charges of acts related to terrorism (McGuinness, 2015). Nevertheless, the Hungarian prime minister was also critical to those giving legal support to refugees: "These groups [NGOs] provide legal representation for terrorists detained by Hungary for launching an attack on the Hungarian border at Röszke" (Orbán, 2017d).

Another strategy used by states while confronting ontological insecurity is to transform anxiety into fear through the process of creating enemies (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 457). This is because the enemy is easier to handle than a stranger who creates uncertainty and anxiety (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 457). The Hungarian government, for instance, took some efforts to construct a refugee image as if they are enemies and impose this idea to the public. Two important strategies are worth to mention at this point vis-à-vis the issue: the questionnaire sent by the government to the citizens

through e-mails in 2015 and billboard campaigns during the referendum process about the EU's quota plan in 2016.

On April 2015, the government held a questionnaire composed of 12 questions including the relationship between migration, terrorism, and the economy which are sent to Hungarian citizens who are above 18 years old. The questionnaire, including a letter from Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was sent through an e-mail to approximately 8 million citizens to get their opinions on issues such as migration, terrorism and the effects that migrants have on the economy (European Commission, 2015b). At the beginning of the questionnaire, Orbán addresses Hungarian citizens. The text includes some leading statements by the Prime Minister:

> I am sure you will remember that at the beginning of the year Europe was shaken by an unprecedented act of terror. In Paris the lives of innocent people were extinguished, in cold blood and with terrifying brutality. We were all shocked by what happened. At the same time, this incomprehensible act of horror also demonstrated that Brussels and the European Union are unable to adequately deal with the issue of immigration… This represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its tracks. (National consultation on immigration to begin, 2015)

The Hungarian prime minister creates an image of refugees as if they are enemies coming for the purpose of disrupting the security and well-being of European people. The choice of words such as "brutality," "in cold blood" is strategic in order to create fear among people. The important thing here is his attempt to construct a direct link between this brutal terrorist attack and migration. He also suggests that this "threat" must be stopped.

The questionnaire includes leading questions like "We hear different views on increasing levels of terrorism. How relevant do you think the spread of terrorism (the bloodshed in France, the shocking acts of ISIS) is to your own life?", There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may

have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?", "Did you know that economic migrants cross the Hungarian border illegally, and that recently the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?", "We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?", "Would you support the Hungarian Government in the introduction of more stringent immigration regulations, in contrast to Brussels' lenient policy?", "Do you agree with the view that migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border should be returned to their own countries within the shortest possible time?", "Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?" ("National consultation," 2015)

In these questions, one can easily see how the Hungarian government prefers to use the term "economic migrant" and "illegal migrant" instead of refugees. According to the government, both terms "economic migrants" and "illegal migrants" have the same meaning and can be used in an appropriate context to instrumentalize it for different purposes. While mentioning jeopardizing people's jobs, they prefer to use the terms "economic migrant." On the other hand, the concept "irregular migrants" become a tool for emphasizing border crossings. The term of refugee is not used in the questionnaire. The reason for it is derived from the fact that the concept of refugee requires legal obligations regarding offering protection and shelter for those who come for seeking refuge. This option is something that the Hungarian government avoids.

As we can see from the questionnaire, another important strategy is the creation of the perception of refugees as "bad for the economy." The argument that

migrants are a burden to the economy is used for creating a negative image in the public opinion. At this point, it is important to say that the Hungarian government makes a distinction between "refugees" and "economic migrants." As Orbán indicated in his speech in the Parliament in 2015 (Orbán, 2015f):

> I would like to make it clear that the rules relating to refugees do not come into play at all if we are talking about economic migrants; no one, no country in the world is obliged to accept them, unless they want to. There is no international law which compels anyone to receive economic migrants. As regards genuine refugees who are indeed fleeing degradation or a threat to their lives, the world does provide safe shelter for them. But a refugee cannot say that they want to be a refugee in Germany, or in Macedonia – or in Hungary, for that matter. They have no choice!

The Hungarian Prime Minister also focuses on this subject in his several statements by emphasizing the economic incapability of Europe to cope with many people and the preference should be to protect economic interests because Europe must stay "at the center of the world economy" (Orbán, 2015i). Here, he builds a direct link between migrants and a possible failure of the European economy if the "crisis" remains unsolved. His perspective on the issue is not just related to national interests. He further develops his argument to make it more "realistic" by focusing on the micro level economic effects: "This is happening in an economic environment in which millions of Western European citizens feel that they have to work ever more for less money, just to keep their jobs" (Orbán, 2015a). Also the Minister Overseeing the Prime Minister's Office János Lázár said that those coming to Hungary are not refugees but economic migrants who migrate for better life conditions and exploit the system (Novak, 2015). State actors pay attention to the possible outcomes rather than the realities in the production process of discourse. While using this discourse, they create a sense of uncertainty to strengthen the validity of their anti-refugee stance. As

Campbell (1992) suggests, the currency of the discourse is nothing to do with the external reality, rather it is internal to discourse (p. 6). The facts are insignificant as long as the discourse is produced in a compatible manner with the perception of the public.

The separation of refugees in terms of "bad" and "acceptable" ones on the basis of economic concerns is observed in the discourse construction process. According to this idea, people fleeing from distorted areas whose lives are at risk can come to the country, but some refugees move simply because of economic reasons, reaching better life standards that they could not find in their home country. People coming with this motivation are simply unacceptable. This discourse can be seen in the German political landscape. Following this logic, Horst Seehofer, the head of the conservative CSU, the Bavarian sister party of the CDU, defined the situation as the "mass abuse of the asylum system" ("Flames of hate," 2015). Nevertheless, it is important to say that politicians put forward this discourse based on a clear distinction between "economic migrants" or "refugees" but they use these concepts interchangeably and create a generalization: the purpose of those coming to the country is to exploit the system, not escape from persecution. As mentioned above, the German case is different from Hungary in terms of debates on refugees leading to economic disruption. The anti-refugee argument on economic concerns does not have the dominance within the political discourse.

The second strategy of the Hungarian government to impose the anti-refugee stance to the public comes with the campaign for the referendum on the EU quota system. The ruling party initiated a billboard campaign all over the country for the rejection of the plan. The messages on billboards were controversial in terms of highlighting the possible devastating effects of migrants to the country such as "Did

you know that since the start of the migration crisis there has been a sharp increase in the number of harassments against women in Europe?", "Did you know that Brussels wants to deport the equivalent of a town of migrants to Hungary?", and "Did you know that since that start of the migration crisis 300 people have died in terrorist attacks in Europe?". Another campaign within the scope of the quota referendum came by the publication of a leaflet by the government which suggests that there are 900 "no-go zones" in Europe including London, Stockholm, Berlin because the outgrowth of the number of refugees in these cities may lead to the increase in terrorist risks (Payton, 2016).

Another major theme which is used through securitization discourse is that migration increases the risk of crime. Besides the threat of terrorism, it is suggested that crimes such as the theft, robbery, physical assault, rape, and murder increase because of migrants. Refugees are perceived as people who are more inclined to commit crime than native people and the arrival of migrants is thought as a factor to increase crime rates. A poll conducted in 2016 with 1,203 random people in Germany by public broadcaster ZDF verifies this orientation. According to the survey, 70 percent of respondents "expect crime to rise due to a large increase in refugees" and 73 percent of them think "laws and procedures for deporting asylum seekers who commit crimes should be strengthened" ("Poll: Germans," 2016). In fact, these premises arise from the discourse produced through anxiety and fear. In reality, there was not such a direct link between refugees and increasing in crime rates. Several official reports indicate this reality. The German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation revealed a report in 2015 showing that crimes perpertrated by refugees are at the same level with those committed by German citizens ("Report: refugees," 2015). Another report released in 2018 by National Crime Statistics shows

that the number of crimes dropped 10 percent according to the recent year and this was the biggest decline in 25 years (Luyken, 2018). Despite the results of these reports and statistics, people feel insecure because of the arrival of refugees.

In the early days of 2016, the assaults to women on New Year's Eve created a breaking point in German public debate and an increase in existing anxiety among the society. Ninety complaints had been filed and perpetrators were described as young men between the ages 15 and 35 with the appearance of migrant backgrounds ("Dozens of women," 2016). In an internal report of Germany's national police, events were described as "chaotic and shameful" ("Police report," 2016). The event created a heated debate in Germany, especially on social media. Lobo (2016), in his commentary in German tabloid Spiegel, categorized the elements of the "digital mob" after the events: "radical, misanthropic generalizations," "an accelerated lowering of inhibitions created by mutual reinforcement," "the dissemination of a quasi-apocalyptic sensibility as justification for radical thoughts and action," and "calls for concrete plans for acts of revenge and violence combined with threats of violence against those who would stand up to the mob mechanism." The discourse on the social media fuels the action. Right-wing radicals arranged a "meeting in order to hunt down foreigners" due to "protecting the women" (Lobo, 2016).

As mentioned above, the construction process of building an identity through drawing boundaries between self and others does not always produce positive outcomes. It may lead to the acts of violence. As Croft (2012) suggests, "these divisions have led to acts of real and brutal violence, inflicted by some who feel the need to assert the superiority of their identity over that of the insecuritized other" (p. 230). The use of armed force against refugees was on the agenda of German political debate after the Cologne event. The head of AfD, Frauke Petry declared this idea

even though she stated that she is not in favor, but employing security forces to the border would not be a problem according to the constitution:

> In response to numerous questions, and after listing off various options for securing the border, I mentioned that the use of armed force in the case of an emergency is consistent with German law, a step which I personally, explicitly do not want. ("The immigration of Muslims", 2016)

Frauke Petry also opened Germany's policing and stringent gun ownership law up for discussion by saying "Every law-abiding person should be in the position to protect himself, his family and his friends" ("Call-to-arms," 2016).

Recommendations for increasing security measures was also on the agenda of the government. Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere suggested that authorities would focus on "prevention, more video surveillance in public places where many people gather, police presence on the streets and tougher penalties" and add asylum seekers who carried out serious crimes should be deported from the country ("Germany mulls," 2016). Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, the head of the SPD, the CDU's coalition partner, supported this idea and recommended to "strengthen deportation procedures for criminals" since German taxpayers do not have to pay foreign criminals in German prisons ("Germany mulls," 2016). Angela Merkel also joined this heated debate around what to do with these people who bring crimes to the country. Chancellor Angela Merkel backs the deportation idea and said, "The most important thing is that the facts about what happened [in Cologne] are spoken about openly and bluntly. Terrible things happened, and we must respond to them" ("Merkel backs," 2016). This discourse built by politicians in terms of refugees are dangerous and need to take measures to stop them led to the policy making decisions as discussed in more detailed in the following chapter.

In the Hungarian context, the relationship between migration and crime rates is also put forward especially by the government. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is so sure that there is a significant correlation between increasing number of migrants and rates of crime and highlights that people should be aware of this fact when refugees are allowed to get in (Orbán, 2015j). But yet he does not give any statistical information indicating the so-called relationship:

> ...Mass migration increases the risk of crime. It is not PC, not politically correct, to talk about this –indeed in the Western world this fact is publicly denied – but it is a fact for all that. In those places in Europe with high numbers of immigrants, crime has increased significantly and public security has deteriorated. There is more theft, robbery, physical assault, grievous bodily harm, rape and murder. Whether we talk about them or not, these facts are still facts. (Orbán, 2015i)

This line of logic brings the issue to the argument that migrants are also threatening the everyday lives of Europeans who are vulnerable and mostly victims due to the arrival of refugees who carry all "evil" to the continent. The threat to everyday lives basically means that they create a risk for the micro level of individual lives like their jobs, social security and freedom.

The discourse involving the idea of refugees as threat to the freedom of German people is one of the subject matters within the whole picture. Opinions about the issue comes forward to both criticize Merkel's open door policy and highlight the incompatibility of refugees to German society: "We are endangering our freedom when we take in too many people who don't want this freedom" ("Inside the revolt," 2016).

Orbán also believes that migration will destroy the livelihood of Hungarian people if the arrival of people to the country would not be stopped

by saying the migration "will jeopardise our very livelihoods, our jobs, and everything which we have built over the last few years" (Orbán, 2015b). According to this logic, Hungarian people are vulnerable regarding the effects of mass migration. Thus, the state must take prominent role in order to protect the public. He declares the mass migration is a main public security issue:

> What we now see to be at stake are not only our culture, finances and social services, but the security of our everyday lives…public security is deteriorating... But the situation is that the European people are at risk – in particular, the vulnerable ones, women, and those who are unable to protect themselves. This is unacceptable. This is why I think that from now on mass migration is fundamentally a public security issue. (Orbán, 2016a)

The securitization discourse used by politicians in Germany and Hungary paved the way for legitimazing anti-migrant policies and practices like building border-fences, amendments on laws as discuseed in more detail in the following chapter.

4.2 Civilizational nexus: Refugees as a threat to western values

The second theme is the anti-refugee discourse based on civilizational and religious differences. This idea is related to the perception of dissimilarity between European and Islamic civilizations and Christianity and Islam. The mentality behind this discourse did not come out from nothing with the mass arrival of people from the Middle East to Europe. It has a historical background. The discourse and/or perception of Western superiority over Eastern backwardness can be traced back to the late 18th century. As Edward Said put forward: "the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures" became a hegemonic ideology (Said, 2003/1978, p. 7). As ontological security theory

argues, the reflexive character of building an idedntity requires an "other" constrasting the self. European identity is built on its "superiority over the Eastern others." According to Hansen (2006), the temporal dimension is important to build an identity and to differ the self from others (p. 43). Wihin this logic, the self is percepted as temporally progressive than the other which is backward. The other is seen as having certain characteristics like being "backward," "tribal," "savage," "barbarian," or "primitive" (Hansen, 2006, p. 43). The discourse revolving around the idea of Western superiority over Eastern cultures comes to the forefront in the European public discourse with the mass arrival of people from Muslim territories. There are several assumptions used in the political arena in two cases in question, Hungary and Germany. The premises mostly used within this framework can be summarized as follows: Muslims are not compatible with European values because they hold different religious beliefs and belong to another civilization. This discourse is one of the backbones of anti-refugee statements in Germany and Hungary.

In 2016, the Infratest dimap representative survey carried out on May 2 and 3, with around 1,000 participants for German public broadcaster WDR indicates the public opinion regarding Islam (Brady, 2016). According to the survey, 60 percent of Germans believe Islam "does not belong in Germany." The survey also represents the differences in accordance with party affiliations. The rate of AfD supporters who thinks that Islam does not belong to Germany is 94 percent. 58 percent of the people believe that the country's settled political parties (the CDU, the CSU, the SPD, the Greens, the Left, and the FDP) are unsuccesful in terms of taking considerations about radical Islam. Another important finding of the survey is that 50 percent of Germans are concerned about the influence of Islam in Germany because of the number of refugees arriving to the country (Brady, 2016). The surveys indicates the

anxiety among the public about the influence of Islam and refugees to the country and political actors dispose these concerns into their discourse.

The incompatibility of Islam to European culture is a crucial subject matter for political actors in the process of discourse construction in both Germany and Hungary. The German political party, the AfD published a party manifesto in 2017 including discriminative elements against refugees based on their religious affiliations and cultural values. The party declares its opposition to Islamic practices on the basis of their characteristics against the "liberal-democratic constitutional order, laws, and the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations" of German culture (AfD, 2017). This idea is in the party manifesto as follows:

> Islam does not belong to Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed by the AfD as a danger to our state, our society, and our values. An Islam which neither respects nor refrains from being in conflict with our legal system, or that even lays claim to power as the only true religion, is incompatible with our legal system and our culture. (AfD, 2017)

The AfD also declares its critical position to certain Islamic symbols like "minarets" or "muezzins" by making a comparison between Muslim mosques and Christian churches:

> The AfD rejects the minaret as a symbol of Islamic supremacy, as well as the muezzin call that proclaims that no god exists beside the Islamic Allah. Minaret and muezzin calls contradict a tolerant coexistence of religions, which the Christian churches of modernity do practice (AfD, 2017).

The hostile attitude of the AfD is not a marginal orientation. As already stated, the party showed significant success in the German federal elections in 2017. The results of the election and the dominance of this discourse in the German political arena indicate that these ideas are accepted by a large number of people in the country.

This exclusionary discourse is also used by different politcal actors from various party affiliations and prominent figures in Germany.

One of the most debated issues regarding Islamic practices in Germany is the burqa, a veil covering the whole body and face with a grille in front of eyes to make it possible to see. Among the German political arena and in the public domain, Muslim women wearing the burqa become problematic since this form of appearance in the public space is not compatible with European values. In September 2016, CDU's Bavarian sister party CSU announced a policy paper about refugees in the country. The paper focuses on the views on Islamic practices like banning the burqa in public: "Whoever doesn't want to do without a burqa or niqab can find another country to live in" ("Bavarian CSU," 2016). The paper also includes the criteria for future migrants: "In the future, priority must be given to migrants who come from our Christian western cultural area" ("Bavarian CSU," 2016). The discourse indicates the exclusionary character of the statement about Muslim refugees by prioritizing Christian migrants. The party asks strongly for the ban of burqa, which is seen as "a uniform of Islamism", in public and also believe that "headscarves should be banned in public services and judiciary" ("CSU comes," 2016). While the discourse in the political debate mostly focuses on the burqa, actors like the CSU also demands giving some limitations to the wearing of headscarf in some sectors. The CSU is not the only one which is against the headscarf. In their party manifesto, the AfD also stated the position on the subject by suggesting the full prohibition of headscarves:

> The burqa or the niqab create barriers between the wearers of these garments and their surroundings, and thus impede cultural integration and social coexistence. A prohibition is necessary and, according to a judgement of the European Court of Justice, is lawful. Public servants should not wear a headscarf. At schools neither teachers nor students should be allowed to wear headscarves, thereby following the French model. The headscarf as a

> political-religious symbol of Muslim women's submission to men negates integration efforts, equal rights for women and girls, and the unimpeded development of the individual. (AfD, 2017)

The debate on banning the burqa is spread to different segments of the political landscape. There were similar statements from members of the ruling party. A CDU member, Jens Spahn stated that he does not consider "particularly enriching to drive through streets where I don't see any women on the streets, and if I do, they are wearing headscarves" by also highlighting that the situation is "a disruption of our state" (Neukirch, 2016). In another statement made by him, he explains his opinion on the burqa and said "full veil is wrong to be in Europe" by underlining the cultural differences between migrants and European values:

> For me what is decisive is that those who come here, understand, above all, that the values of the western world, this freedom, these basic principles . . . are different from those in Afghanistan, Syria, China or Bangladesh and that our society is therefore different (Wagstyl, 2016).

Federal Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere from the ruling party, the CDU, also made parallel statements to the growing anxiety on women wearing the burqa by highlighting the necessity of banning "full-face veils in certain areas of public life" including "driving a car, visiting public authorities, in schools and universities, working in public service and appearing in court" (Knight, 2016c). After the meeting with state interior ministers of Germany affiliated with the CDU, he declared that they "unanimously reject the burqa" on the grounds that it does not belong to the German culture (Knight, 2016c). He made further comments and said that the state has the authority to lay the legal groundwork to force people to show their faces if necessary. According to the Interior Minister, showing the face is an "act of communication and he wishes the "country to be recognizable" (Bölinger, 2016).

The debate on wearing the burqa in the public space has dominated the German political landscape not only at the minister or member level from the government, but Chancellor Angela Merkel also joined the discussion by saying that "a fully covered woman has little chance of integrating in Germany" (Knight, 2016c). After almost a month from this statement, at the International Parliamentarians' Conference in Berlin on September 2016, she also higlighted that a complete ban of the burqa would violate fundamental rights like religious freedom, neutrality of the state to all religious beliefs and suggested "precise plans of action for places where a full-face veil is not warranted" by saying that "Although some religiously motivated behavior may seem strange, we must always keep the high value of religious freedom in mind" (Kinkartz, 2016). Towards the end of the year, this "moderate" position has shifted to more direct and strict discourse: "Full veiling is not appropriate here…The full veil must be banned wherever that is legally possible" ("Support, sarcasm," 2016). Merkel tried to hold a balanced position between two polarised segments of the German society. At some point, she could not succeed because of the increasing criticisims against her policy.

In reality, the burqa debate initiated in the public is a political manoeuvre to comfort the anxious German public over the issue. According to legal experts, the German constitiuon "prohibits a total ban on the burqa or the niqab, given its guarantees of religious freedom" (Knight, 2016c). The German Parliament accepted a partial ban on the burqa in 2017 and niqab for civil servants, judges and soldiers, but this is also considered as a symbolic movement since there are only a few people wearing the burqa or niqab in Germany (Lowe, 2017). Nevertheless, the debate on the burqa indicates several things. One of them is that the discourse on the burqa as being problematic for culture and society paves the way for making a legal

foundation for the issue. Secondly, the burqa became a symbol in the anti-refugee debate and exclusion of migrants based on their religious affiliations.

The burqa as an Islamic practice is not the only issue reigning over the German public debate. Some religious groups and sects are also under attack from different segments of the political wing. In an interview with German weekly *Der Spiegel*, the leader of the SPD and German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel declared that he has "zero tolerance" in fighting against Islamism and further comments that "Salafist mosques must be banned, communities dissolved, and the preachers should be expelled as soon as possible." According to him, the combat against Islamism and terrorism "must be also a cultural fight" in addition to security measures ("German Vice Chancellor," 2017). Islam as a religion is also called into question in terms of its mentality in creating a threat to the state. This thought came from Alexander Gauland, the leader of the AfD in Brandenburg: "Islam is not a religion like Catholic or Protestant Christianity, but rather intellectually always associated with the takeover of the state… That is why the Islamization of Germany is a danger" (Carrel, 2016). The ideology of Islam is seen as a potential threat to the existence of the German state, like an invader to be confronted.

It is important to note that the exclusionary discourses on immigrants did not start with an immediate reaction unlike Hungary. In the early days of Merkel's open-door policy, there was a positive mood about welcoming refugees. Even though the policy faced severe criticisms, Germans were generally content with their leading role in the issue compared to other European countries. After several breakpoints, there has been a mood shift regarding refugees. The events in New Year's Eve at the end of 2015 led to the debates over whether Muslims are compatible with living or integrating in Europe.

The events on New Year's Eve in Cologne were significant for the perception of refugees in German society. The attitude toward foreigners became stricter in a sense that refugees are not compatible with the values of Western civilization. In an interview with one of the leading feminists in Germany, Alice Schwarzer, in Spiegel about the Cologne events, the stereotype towards migrants can openly be seen. According to her, the reason why sexual assaults occur against women is due to people coming from different cultural environments (Hoffmann & Pfister, 2016). Her comments on the subject are as follows:

> In recent decades, millions of people have come to us from cultural groups within which women have absolutely no rights…The men who are now coming to us from Islamic cultural circles are, of course, shaped by conditions there, which are still much more antiquated than here…We need to finally be proactive in enlightening people from Islamic cultural groups…We already have enough problems here and we don't need to import anymore. (Hoffmann & Pfister, 2016)

In an article in *Spiegel* written after the events in Cologne, the state is criticized for failing to protect its citizens, enforce the law against migrants, sustain security and public order ("Has the German state," 2016). The article also defines the situation as "the clash of two cultures" in Germany:

> A constitutional state that emphasizes de-escalation, integration and the empathetic re-socialization of young offenders; and immigrants from authoritarian societies who misunderstand the approach and take advantage of the fact that they, even if they break the law, are neither deported nor toughly punished. (Has the German state," 2016)

In an article written in German tabloid Deutsche Welle, Shamil Shams underlines the different characters of Islamic and European cultures: "I was sure that the migrants' influx would ultimately disturb the harmony and balance of German society. I feel that Islamic culture and European norms are not compatible" (Shams, 2016). He also claims that German society will change through arrivals from Islamic countries:

> German society is changing, with right-wing Christian as well as Islamic groups getting stronger by the day. It is an alarming situation for the majority of secular people in Germany and Europe…If the German government wants to protect the country's secular foundations, it must increase checks on the people it intends to integrate into its society. Integration is not only about learning the German language. (Shams, 2016)

The discourse on the distinctive character of Islam as a religion from Christianity has dominated the political debate in Germany. Hungary has instrumentalized this discourse from the early days of 2015 and the government has created a strong anti-Muslim stance centered around the arrival of refugees. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is much more direct on the issue than his German counterparts. He builds a complete seperation between Islam and Christianity and maintains a strict stance by expressing that those coming to Europe are "radically different" from Europeans:

> Let us not forget, however, that those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? If we lose sight of this, the idea of Europe could become a minority interest in its own continent. (Orbán, 2015g)

The Hungarian Prime Minister highlights that European identity is based on Christianity. Orbán also emphasizes that he is not against the religion of Islam itself, but it is better for Christians to keep it away from the European lands. According to this idea, the increase in the visibility of Muslims in Christian countries will lead to a war between religions and Christianity will lose at the end. This responsibility is on the European leaders and Orbán describes it as a "historic challenge" (2017e). To keep Europe as a Christian continent and to not lose this war, Muslims should not be allowed to enter European countries:

I personally have great respect for Islam. Without Islamic philosophy, part of the world would have fallen prey to barbarism centuries ago. But once again, we mustn't fool ourselves: immigration would lead to a majority Muslim population in Europe within the foreseeable future. If Europe allows cultures to compete, then the Christians will find themselves on the losing side. These are facts. The only way out for those who want to preserve Europe as a Christian culture is not to allow more and more Muslims into Europe. But this is something that Europe's leading politicians are unwilling to talk about. (Orbán, 2015d).

For Orbán, it is not enough to predict the future, in the sense that Europe is going to lose this religious war. He also uses "scientific" terminology for the picture he depicts is not just a loose prediction but a something that is going to be real:

…They will become countries with mixed populations, with a Christian element and a non-Christian element which has a strong religious identity. And if I judge the laws of biology and mathematics correctly, the ratio between these two elements will continuously shift away from Christianity and towards the non-Christian religious communities. The end of this process is unforeseeable – or only foreseeable mathematically; but in that sense it is rather easily foreseeable, and this answers our question. It is true that it only answers it mathematically, and luckily human history and politics are more complex than mathematics: this is the only ray of hope for us. But how this will end is mathematically foreseeable. (Orbán, 2017e)

Civilizational discourse is also on the agenda in the sense that migrants may change European values forever. It is called as "civilizational disaster" by Orbán, and if it happens, this disaster cannot be reversible:

Everyone can see that Europe is reeling from an unprecedented wave of mass migration. The policy which Brussels is now pursuing will lead to civilisational disaster. The nature of civilisational disaster is that it does not happen overnight. Instead it proceeds slowly, but inexorably, as differences in fertility rates and repeated flows of mass migration change the composition and culture of the European population… We may lose our European values – our very identity – by degrees, like the live frog allowing itself to be slowly cooked to death in a pan of water. Quite simply there will be more and more Muslims, and Europe will be transformed beyond recognition (Orbán, 2016g)

"Invasion" is another strong word used by Orbán within this context. According to him, European values, civilization, and Christianity is invaded by migrants who are not looking for a shelter, but try to kill European values and identity:

> This is an uncontrolled and unregulated process…the most precise definition of this is "invasion". Yes, Europe is under invasion, and this feeling is not alleviated by knowing that the countries neighbouring the war zones are even worse off than we are. Our continent is yet to appreciate the gravity of the problem: there is a challenge to its very culture, way of life and pattern of existence up to now. (Orbán, 2015h)

Other figures in the government circle, such as Antal Rogán, the leader of the parliamentary group of Fidesz, also used this discourse. He warns the public about the possible outcomes that the mass migration of Muslims will bring and the future of Europe. According to him, mass migration will change the continent into a "United European Caliphate" (Sereghy, 2016, p. 231). Another official from the ruling party, Fidesz, Lászlo Simon recommends that Hungarians should make more babies to combat the effect of mass migration on their culture and to stop Islam from destroying "the remainder of European culture" (Sereghy, 2016, p. 231). Viktor Orbán's advisor, Miklós Maróth, believes that all Muslims reject the European legal system and want to stick with Islamic law, *Sharia* and also proposes that Muslims living in Europe already should be banned from citizenship and "migrants and refugees 'should be wrapped in pork skin' if they do not accept European norms" (Sereghy, 2017, p. 232).

The Hungarian case is much more radical than Germany in terms of discourse constructed through an anti-refugee stance. We see the clear distinction of self and other in discourses produced by political actors as ontological security theory argues. The self constructs its identity through drawing boundaries with other agents. In the

case of the mass arrival of refugees to Europe, this distinction has come into being with the civilizational paradigm and religious affiliations.

4.3 The nexus of nationalism: Refugees as a threat to national values

The arrival of refugees also increases the tone on the nationalistic discourse. In Hungary and Germany, the debate over multiculturalism or possible disruption of the national characteristic of the country by foreigners dominates public and political discussions. One of the outcomes of the ontological insecurity is the rise in nationalistic discourse. According to Kinnvall (2004), nationalism and religion offer answers to agents in the process of building ontological security (p. 742). In her research, Kinnvall (2004) depicts that the uncertainty resulting from the effects of the globalization leads to the rise of religious nationalism. Following this argument, it can be depicted that the nationalistic values can be a reference point to deal with the sense of ontological insecurity in times of crisis.

Nationalism is one of the backbones of the anti-migrant discourse used by Viktor Orbán. Protection of external borders, national unity, Hungarian people, community, cultural traits and national uniqueness are included in this discourse. According to him, the protection of the country is not a duty just for the government, but also all political parties are responsible for this. He puts effort to consolidate the stance against refugees: "I ask you, regardless of your party affiliation, to support the Government in the fight against mass immigration. Because we only have one country, and it is the duty of us all to protect it." (Orbán, 2015e)

The cultural homogeneity and risks carried by migrants who have the power to change it is a crucial issue. According to this logic, Hungarians should remain as Hungarians. Alkopher (2008) defines this situation as the "reaffirmation of national

identities" after encountering uncertainty with the mass arrival of people. According to this idea, the newcomers are a threat to the national unity of the state and different cultures or affiliations that might harm this unity should not be allowed:

> And if we allow this, in ten or twenty years we will not recognise Budapest, and we will not recognise our cities. And parents should imagine their children asking them fifteen years from now why this was allowed to happen to our country. Therefore I believe we must be firm in preserving the country's culture, we must preserve its security, and we must also preserve its cultural homogeneity. (Orbán, 2016d)

In Germany, as well, discussions over nationalism and leading culture of Germany are on the agenda of the public and political space. In April 2017, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maziere wrote an article on Leitkultur "leading culture" or "guiding culture" for the daily *Bild*. He put forward ten theses defining "who Germans are" and "who belongs to Germany" (Maizière, 2017). Before explaining these ten theses, he gives a brief background about the meaning and the scope of the term. According to Maiziere, the answer to the question of "who does belong to Germany?" is the citizens of the country (Maizière, 2017). Those who live in the country for a long time are a part of the country but not within the cluster of "cultural unity" as he puts forward: "when I talk about 'us' or 'we', I refer first and foremost to the citizens of our country." (Maizière, 2017). The Interior Minister prefers an exclusive concept of national belonging in his conceptualization of German *Leitkultur*.

The first of these ten theses is about banning the burqa. The debate on the burqa in Germany is discussed through the civilizational-religious nexus of the issue. But here, we can see the same debate in the nationalism nexus. It is important that this religious form of wearing is one of the top priorities while defining the building

blocks of German *Leitkultur*. Maiziere put his arguments on the issue as follows: "In our daily lives it is important that we are able to see whether the person we talk to shows a friendly or a sad face. We are an open society. We show our face. We don't do burkas" (Maizière, 2017). He also focuses on the religious characteristic of Germany. Even though he states that Germany is neutral in terms of different beliefs, religions and lifestyles, he also declares that the country is based on Christian tradition (Maizière, 2017). He highlights that the *Leitkultur* is not binding but also adds that those who are not familiar with it or reject this leading culture, will hardly integrate into the society: "they will hardly be able to integrate successfully, because they will not develop a sense of belonging if they are neither familiar with our Leitkultur nor at least willing to respect it." (Maizière, 2017).

The debate on the leading culture is not new in the German political landscape, but the tone of the discussion has became more severe with the so-called refugee crisis. The term was firstly used by the Syrian-German academic, Bassam Tibi, in terms of refering to a European *Leitkultur* based on fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, secularism, pluralism and society (Rindisbacher, 2013, p. 50). However, the term became part of a political debate in Germany and turned into a question related to "German" identity in contrast to the European root of the concept. In 2000, the CDU politician Friedrich Merz reintroduced the term in terms of limitations on migration by giving reference to the "liberal German leading culture" (Bierbach, 2017a). According to him, migrants should respect the German *Leitkultur* based on the constitution, the German language and essential principles like equality (Scholz, 2017). With the ten theses of the Interior Minister, the term is currently on the public agenda in the context of the so-called refugee crisis.

The head of the rightist party in Germany, the AfD, Frauke Petry is one of the politicians defending this idea by saying that "the immigrant of so many will change our culture" ("The immigration of Muslims," 2016). The manifesto of the AfD also adressess this issue. The party states that they are in favor of the "German predominant culture instead of multiculturalism" by arguing that the latter is indifferent to the national history and will devalue national culture (AfD, 2017, p. 46). According to the party manifesto, the government and civil society should secure "German cultural identity as the predominant culture" (AfD, 2017, p. 46).

The CSU in Germany also repeat this idea by pointing out the "dominant culture" in the Bavarian Constitution which is the opposite of multiculturalism and declares that "Germany must remain Germany" ("CSU comes," 2016). The party indicates its position by highligthing the necessity of control on migration and opposes to any further change in the country: "We are against the fact that our cosmopolitan country is changed by immigration or refugee influxes" ("CSU comes," 2016). The party declares, "We are against the notion that our weltoffen [world-open] country is changed by migration and refugees. We shouldn't be the ones who adjust to migrants, the opposite should be true" ("Bavarian CSU," 2016).

The historical narrative is essential to make people believe in the national unity and historical continuity vis-à-vis the emerging crisis. Giving reference to a historical period and reminding the success of the nation at that period would become a useful medium to consolidate the public opinion on the specific issue on the agenda. According to Kinnvall (2004), chosen traumas and glories are important in order to produce a comfortable ground for constructing an identity vis-à-vis the "other" in times of ontological insecurity (p. 755). Political actors use historical events to make a connection between narrative and current crisis in order to sustain

the biographical unity and consistency. Viktor Orbán used this strategy to both praise the Hungarian nation and fundamental unity and to give reference to historical events which might be parallel to the current crisis.

During a speech made on the national holiday on March 15 celebrating the Hungarian revolt against Habsburg rule in 1848, the Hungarian prime minister gives reference to history based on the Hungarian character of hospitality toward newcomers while making comparisons to the current situation. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that Hungary is not an immigrant country in another speech by saying "we are not a nation of immigrants, and we are not going to be either" (Orbán, 2016h):

> It is claimed that we are xenophobic and hostile, but the truth is that the history of our nation is also one of inclusion and the intertwining of cultures. Those who have sought to come here as new family members, as allies or as displaced persons fearing for their lives have been let in to make a new home for themselves. But those who have come here with the intention of changing our country and shaping our nation in their own image, those who have come with violence and against our will, have always been met with resistance. (Orbán, 2016c)

While defending the idea of the construction of border fences Viktor Orbán gives reference to the Berlin Wall and declares how Hungary as a country historically opposed to the wall and contributed to its collapse. Again he highlights the distinctive character of the current situation. According to him, Hungary is a country opposed to any kind of borders, but the mass arrival of refugees is unprecedented in history and the state should act according to the current conditions:

> After all, it was Hungary that cut through the Iron Curtain which divided Europe – and the German people – in the decades after the Second World War... In 1989 we dismantled a fence which divided the peoples of Europe. In the early autumn of 2015 we erected a fence on the external green border of the Schengen Area, to protect the European Union's greatest achievement: free movement within the

common area of the internal market. As a result, we have been protecting the European people's way of life and economic model – at least on the section of Europe's external border for which we are responsible. (Orbán, 2016e)

Another reference to history dates back to 11th century of the Hungarian imperial era. By following the King Saint Ladislaus' legacy, Viktor Orbán finds a way to legitimize the policy on the current problems of "Brusselism" and migrants:

Saint Ladislaus strengthened the Hungarian state, thus protecting us against all external attacks and internal intrigues, and his practice of Realpolitik among the great powers guaranteed our country's independence: "Stop Brussels". His actions protected the Hungarian people against destruction by nomadic peoples: "Stop migrants." (Orbán, 2017c)

The discursive realm dominated by the political actors in Hungary and Germany indicates different strategies. The construction of an identity is essential for agents and in times of ontological insecurity, agents need to rebuild it through drawing boundaries between the self and others. The securitization of migration, highlighting differences between refugees and the national self, based on religious and cultural affiliations, are among these strategies as mentioned above in detail. It is also important to note that ontological security theory involves the idea of requirement for identity construction process to deal with the uncertainty and anxiety arising from the disruption of identity. The discourse produced by the political actors does not just involve the securitization of the subject and the separation of the self from others, but also includes the identity construction process for the self. Because state agents describe the self while characterizing the "other." As discussed earlier, the debate on the *Leitkultur* in Germany and statements by the Hungarian Prime Minister about the identity of the nation indicate the identity construction process. The following chapter examines how this

discourse seeing refugees as incompatible with the receiving cultures paves

the way for policy choices of states in terms of keeping them away from the

self.

CHAPTER 5

METHODS OF EXCLUSION IN GERMANY AND HUNGARY

This chapter focuses on the methods of exclusion implemented by Hungary and

Germany. The main aim of this chapter is to indicate that the anti-refugee discourse

is not independent of the policy-making area and paves the way for conducting

exclusionary policies. The discourse producing process and the implementation of

policies reinforce each other.

Following this line of thinking, the chapter focuses on two types of methods:

the physical and legal exclusion of refugees. The study examines border fences,

border controls, and the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU as physical

exclusion methods. In regards to legal exclusion, the chapter focuses on changes and

amendments in the refugee law system in case countries between the years 2015 and

2017.

5.1 Physical exclusion

Initiatives to exclude refugees from the territory and the anti-refugee discourse in

politics support each other. The discourse became a concrete reality with border

fences and controls. In the refugee "crisis" in Europe, this dimension of the issue is

highly discussed by the member states from different positions. Hungary is one of

the biggest supporters of building fences to keep refugees away from the country. In

contrary, at least in the discursive realm, the government in Germany opposes to any

kind of fence or the building of walls along the border. However, the country uses

another strategy by the implementation of border controls and putting efforts to

initiate the refugee deal with Turkey "to protect the external border of Europe."

As already discussed in previous chapters, the identity construction process requires a separation between the self and others. This boundary also includes the spatial dimension. According to this idea, the self separates itself from the other by also excluding the other from the territory (Rumelili, 2012, p. 23). In the case of the disruption of ontological security, the self may protect its own identity by keeping away the "dangerous other" from the territory. Between the years 2015 and 2017, Germany and Hungary used this method by backing it up with the discourse of protecting "Europe" from the mass arrival of people.

One of the immediate reactions of Hungary to the growing number of refugees coming to the country in 2015 is to build fences along the border. In the summer of 2015, Hungary announced that they would build a border fence along its border with Serbia and Croatia. This plan raised many criticisms against the Hungarian government (Bilefsky, 2015). The government was also strict vis-à-vis the critiques of its policies. Opposition politician and journalist György Kakuk was arrested by the Hungarian police for protesting against building a border fence through taking bolt cutters to a wire (Nolan & Connolly, 2015). But the Hungarian government did not take a step back from the border strategy. In an interview in a German newspaper, *Bild Zeitung*, Orbán (2015d) defends his policy on border fence as follows: "Today, it is illegal immigrants who are breaking across our borders. The fence of communism was directed against us. The fence we are currently constructing is meant to serve us." Hungarian Prime Minister also advocates the border fence because of its functionality to stop the migrants:

> Why does the Hungarian government support the fence? It supports the fence because it works. It works!...This double line of defence, with police behind it – and military operations and a strict penal code behind that – has been, combined with the police, enough to prevent illegal entry into the territory of Hungary along a section of 175 kilometers. (Orbán, 2015f)

When tension arose between refugees and the Hungarian police force, while people were trying the cross the border, Hungary put all efforts to stop them as Orbán declared "as long as the migrant threat exists, there must be a fence" (Orbán, 2017b). Despite the effort put by the Hungarian government to stop the people from coming, migrants found a way to cross the razor wire by using several methods like cutting the fence and opening a gap or using blankets to cover and jumping through the other side of the border (Nolan, 2015).

Hungary built another border fence with high technology in 2017. This second fence was well equipped with the capability of delivering electronic shocks, heat sensors and cameras regarding not allowing people to cross the border (Dunai, 2017). These strategies became successful in terms of stopping people entering the country: the number of arrivals sharply decreased between 2015 and 2017.

The closure of the border through fences is not the only strategy used by the government in the name of constructing physical barriers. On September 2015, the government declared that Budapest's central station, Keleti was closed to refugees and all trains going to the West were stopped (Nolan & Connolly, 2015). Many refugees and activists demonstrated outside the train station by demanding that they were allowed to travel to Germany. Some groups of refugees endeavored to make their journey by walking after the government's action of stopping people from moving to Austria and Germany by train (Graham-Harrison & Henley, 2015). After the declaration of Austria and Germany allowing migrants to go to these countries, buses carrying them moved toward the Hungarian-Austrian border (Smale, Lyman, & Hartocollis, 2015). This situation indicates that Hungary does not only want refugees out of the country but out of Europe as a whole.

Germany did not build physical fences to stem the arrival of refugees but tried to stop them with different strategies. On one hand, the German Chancellor suspended the Dublin Regulation and implemented an open-door policy for Syrian refugees in August 2015. On the other, Germany established temporary border controls and closed all train traffics with Austria in September 2015 (Harding, 2015). Then Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere explained the purpose of this measure as limiting "the current inflows to Germany and returning to orderly procedures when people enter the country" ("Migrant crisis," 2015). Despite criticisms of the European Commission, the "temporary" border controls are continuing. On April 2019, the German government extended the policy for six months longer (Meier, 2019). The border control seems to be successful in terms of accepting lower amount of people to enter the country. According to the data provided, Germany sent back 50 percent more people in the first half of 2016 when compared to 2015 (Knight, 2016d).

Another important physical exclusion method is the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU. The major actor of the implementation of the deal was Germany with the negotiations made with Turkey. As mentioned before, Merkel's perspective on the refugee issue was to find an EU-wide solution. For this purpose, Germany pushed for the realization of the deal. The other important motive for Germany is about protecting the external border of the EU. On this subject, Merkel said, "Everybody said we need to protect our external border, everybody said we need to fight illegal migration, everybody spoke in favor of the NATO-mission in the Aegean Sea, and everybody welcomed the new proposal" ("Merkel pushes," 2016). According to Merkel, the most significant part of the deal is its contribution to securing the EU's external border (Rönsberg, 2016).

Negotiations started on November 2015, and the deal between Turkey and the EU was signed on 18 March, 2016. According to the deal, all irregular migrants traveling across Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, and for each Syrian to be sent back to Turkey, "another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria", and Turkey will be responsible for preventing illegal passings to Europe (European Council, 2016). In return, Turkey will take 3+3 billion euros from the EU for funding projects related to the protection of refugees and the visa liberalization for Turkish citizens after fulfilling specified criterias (European Council, 2016). The deal has been a success in terms of stemming people passing to Europe. According to the European Commission factsheet, after the implementation of the deal, the arrival of irregular migrants to Greek islands dropped by 97 percent (European Commission, 2018). While the average of daily arrivals on Greek islands was 6,360 on October 2015, it decreased to 80 arrivals on average by March 2016 (European Commission, 2018). The deal was criticized by many experts on the grounds that "fortress Europe is secured" (Riegert, 2016). Nevertheless, then German Interior Minister from the CDU suggested the increase of border controls in order to keep the EU safe from future arrivals from other transit routes after closing the Balkan routes with the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey, and added that member states should implement border controls if necessary (Martin, 2016).

Apart from building a border fence to stop refugees, Hungary also located the police force on its border with Serbia to keep refugees away from entering the country (Feher, 2015). This several-thousand police force was called as "border hunters" with helicopters and dogs, but authority was not given to use fire arms. This force aims to reduce "security risks and manage situations where there are massive

inflows" as police commissioner Karoly Papp said (Feher, 2015). Along with this decision, submitting the bill that allows the army to take control of the border was also discussed by the far-right Jobbik party (Feher, 2015). Under certain conditions, such as declaring a state of emergency because of mass immigration, the proposed legislation would place army personnel at the borders and that personnel would have the authorization to fire on migrants crossing illegally. The proposal was met with strong opposition from some lawmakers (Feher, 2015).

There were also some conflicts between refugees trying to cross the border and the police force on the Hungarian border. One of the most significant events concerning the clash between refugees and the police force was in Röszke, a region in the Southern border of Hungary, in September 2015. The disturbance on the closing borders turned into a riot which Hungarian police and a team from its counter-terrorism center (TEK) took action, and harsh measures were implemented which resulted in numbers of people being injured (Field, 2015). Police used tear gas and water cannons in response to people throwing sticks and stones at them (MIGSZOL, 2015). The event was called as "Battle of Röszke" by the government (Kékesi, 2017). Special units which are supposed to combat with terrorism/terrorists were ordered to control the issue on the border. 11 people among the crowd were arrested and underwent to the trial with the charge of illegally entering the country and being part of the mass riot (MIGSZOL, 2015). After the trial process which is also criticized regarding mistrial and manipulations like false translation (MIGSZOL, 2015), one of them was sentenced to 10 years in jail with the charges of acts related to terrorism (McGuinness, 2015).

Another strategy to exclude refugees from the territory in Hungary was to establish transit zones in which the asylum application process is handled. In

97

September 2015, the government passed an amendment including the construction of transit zones in which the asylum process in Hungary has been held. Only 10 people per day -holidays and weekends are excluded- are allowed to apply (Kékesi, 2017). This creates a burden and accumulation of people on the border day-by-day. Transit zones were actually built for preventing people from entering the country as also declared by Viktor Orbán, "Such free movement is not possible today: we've prevented it, and this is what the "container camp" and the transit zone are all about" (Orbán, 2017a).

The issue was also on the agenda of political debates in Germany. Political actors suggested the establishment of transit zones along the German border to keep refugees there and deport them more easily. CSU head Horst Seehofer and Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière from the CDU supported the idea and proposed the issue to Merkel in 2015 ("Germany shows," 2015). Hovever, the Justice Minister rejected the idea by saying "detainment centers on the border are not acceptable" ("Germany shows," 2015). Nevertheless, with the implementation of Asylum Package II in 2016, the government established "special reception centers" in which refugees are supposed to live during their application process.

The most discussed issue in German politics was to put a quota for refugees to be accepted in the country. In September 2016, one year after Merkel's decision of open door policy for Syrian refugees, CDU's Bavarian sister party CSU released a policy paper regarding refugees in the country. The paper includes a quota system for accepting 200,000 refugees each year ("Bavarian CSU," 2016). Merkel strongly rejected the idea and suggested that a quota for accepting refugees should be an EU-wide initiative, but it is not acceptable for Germany (Chase, 2016). Nevertheless, Merkel's CDU and the CSU submitted a policy suggestion in 2017, including the

limit for accepting people to 200,000 per year. The quota is for refugees, asylum seekers, and family reunifications, but not for highly-skilled employees (Bleiker, 2017).

5.2 Legal exclusion

After Merkel's declaration of an open-door policy, the government implemented several changes and amendments in the refugee law. One of the early decisions of the government about the refugee issue was the suspension of the Dublin Regulation, which is a determining document for the asylum process within the EU. The law describes the responsibility of EU members for the evaluation of asylum applications (European Commission, 2019). The law is in effect since 1995 and, the Dublin III Regulation which came into force in 2013 is currently applied (Maiani, 2016). Its aim is to regulate the criteria and mechanisms for determining which member state is responsible for examining the asylum application. This legal text resolves the situation by involving the state where the asylum seeker first entered is responsible for the procedure requiring the application of the seeker (Maiani, 2016, p. 12). The Dublin system is criticized on the grounds that it is unfair, inefficient and contains the risks for threatening the refugees' rights (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2015). Analyzing the vulnerabilities of the system in detail extends the limit of the subject matter. However, it is important to note that the structure of the Dublin system based on the fact that the first entry country is responsible for asylum applications, has become a burden for border countries like Greece, Italy, and Hungary especially after the 2015 mass arrival of refugees. In response to the growing pressure on the Hungarian border, Merkel decided the abolition of the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees ("Germany suspends," 2015). With this decision, no matter the first country that

Syrian refugees enter, they can apply for refugee status in Germany. In October 2015, only after two months of its suspension, the country brought back the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees ("Germany reinstates," 2015). This means that Germany would send Syrian refugees back to the country that they first entered.

Hungary also made changes regarding the Dublin Regulation. On 24 June 2015, the government suspended the applications of asylum-seekers who were sent back to Hungary where people were firstly registered (Feher, 2015). According to the Dublin Regulation, the asylum process should be done in the first entry country. But the government annulled EU rules with this decision. The Hungarian government claim that they have no responsibility in accepting refugees that arrived to Greece and did not register there before arriving to Hungary.

Another strategy used by Germany and Hungary is the extension of safe third countries. In 2014, the list of safe countries was extended to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia in Germany. The suggestion regarding the extension of safe countries of origin firstly came from Bavarian CSU leader Horst Seehofer. He demanded that all Western Balkan states should be declared as "safe countries of origin" so people from these countries would not be acceptable for the status of refugee (Hille, 2015). The proposal coming from the CSU in 2015 includes more extensions: Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro (Knight, 2015). The proposal was accepted, and the safe third country list was extended to Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro in 2015 (Walker & Jones, 2019). The government also prepared a draft for declaring Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria as third safe countries but the upper chamber of the parliament, Bundesrat rejected the proposal (Chase, 2017a) . The proposal was highly criticized on the grounds that these countries are not safe for the

deportation of people fleeing from these regions. Some argued that "the government is using the new law to bend reality for its own convenience" (Bölinger, 2016).

On 21 July 2015, Hungary passed a bill which requires the list of safe third countries including EU member states, EU candidate countries (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), member states of the European economic area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in addition to EU member states), US states that do not have the death penalty, Switzerland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Canada, Australia and New Zeland (Hungarian Government, 2015). The safe third country concept was initiated to the Hungarian asylum law in November 2010 by the assumption that it should be implemented case by case rather than preparing a national list of safe third countries (UNHCR, 2016).

Declaration of the list of safe third countries has faced criticism because the amendment regarding the determination of safe third countries is against the international law of asylum. Also, the list has included Serbia despite the recommendation of the UNHCR in 2012 that Serbia should not be considered as a third safe country. According to the UNHCR report in 2012, the asylum system in Serbia is unable to come to grips with the increasing number of asylum applicants and does not have a fair and efficient asylum system consistent with the international standards over the issue. Thus, the "UNHCR recommends that Serbia not is considered a safe third country of asylum, and that countries therefore refrain from sending asylum-seekers back to Serbia on this basis" (UNHCR, 2012). With the declaration of a safe-third country list, all neighbor states of Hungary, except Ukraine, became the third safe country for refugees, which basically means that

Hungary closed down all routes reaching the state along the Balkan passage routes by merely surrounding the country with a "legal fence."

Countries also implemented regulations modifying their asylum legal system. German government passed Asylum Package II in 2016 that is criticized for restricting the right of asylum seekers. The law brings an "accelerated asylum procedure" which means that the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Offices) will on decide the applications within a week and people are supposed to live in "special reception centers" during this process (Refugee Council Mecklenburg-Vorpommern eV, 2016). The aim of the accelerated procedure is to shorten decision-making process especially for refugees from third safe countries (Kalkmann, 2016). Other asylum seekers, who are influenced from the acceleration process, are those giving false identity, harming identity documents, refusing to provide fingerprints to the authorities, and being ejected due to public safety (Refugee Council Mecklenburg-Vorpommern eV, 2016). These criteria are applied for reducing the number of applications. The law also includes regulations for reducing the financial aid for refugees from 145 to 135 euros per month, and abolition of family reunification for people acquiring "subsidiary protection" for two years (Refugee Council Mecklenburg-Vorpommern eV, 2016). The process of deciding the applications in an accelerated amount of time by German authorities has been criticized due to the "quality" of the procedure (Kalkmann, 2016). In 2017, a German soldier managed to take the status of "subsidiary protection" and intended to carry out an attack against refugees with this false identity required during the asylum application process ("German soldier," 2017).

Parallel with the policy implemented in Germany, Hungary also made changes in the asylum application process. On 1 August 2015, an amendment came

into force on the procedures of accepting asylum applications. With this amendment, the duration of the asylum application was determined. According to this, the process has to be completed within fifteen days (it was thirty before) and the request should be made within three days, and courts should decide within eight days on who is eligible to be accepted as a refugee (Nagy, 2016, p. 1046). The state reserves the right to deny any suspicious application, which means that people could be refused without any legal and judicial process. Detention places have also been increased with this amendment (Nagy, 2016, p. 1046). Making it more difficult to apply for refugee status is one of the strategies that has been used by the Hungarian government since it has been declared by the officials several times.

On 15 September 2015, the same day of the completion of the building of a border fence between Serbia, amendments on the asylum law that makes it difficult to get into the EU lands and access refugee status came into force. This act simply criminalized migration. According to the amendments, whoever crosses the fence and enters Hungarian soil faces three years maximum imprisonment (Nagy, 2016). "The vandalization of the border fence and obstruction of the construction works related to the border fence" also become an element of the crime (UNHCR, 2016). The regulation in the amendment is as follows (UNHCR, 2016):

> (1) Any person who without due authorisation enters the territory of Hungary through a facility set up to protect the State border is guilty of a felony punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three years. (2) The penalty shall be imprisonment of one to five years if the criminal offence defined in Subsection (1) is committed by a) displaying a deadly weapon, b) carrying a deadly weapon, c) as a participant in a mass riot. (3) Any person who commits the criminal offence defined in Paragraph (1) while displaying or carrying a deadly weapon as a participant in a mass riot shall be punished with imprisonment of two to eight years. (4) The penalty shall be imprisonment of five to ten years if the criminal offence defined in Paragraphs (2) or (3) causes death.

The criminalization of migrants is seen in other states in Europe, but the Hungarian case is unique. This is due to the fact that just entering the country became the element of the crime, meaning that migrants who seek for refuge and enter the country turn into criminals who face penalties such as time in prison or expulsion from the country (Feher, 2015). Making it illegal to enter the country is against international law and the Geneva Convention and also an act to criminalize those who seek protection and asylum.

These measures are not limited to the legal basis; the government took the immediate action to enforce the law. According to the UNHCR report, 2,353 individuals were found guilty from "unauthorized crossing of the border fence between 15 September 2015 and 31 March 2016" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 22). They took several punishments from deportation to the actual imprisonment. Within the same periods, significant amounts of people were also sentenced because of destroying the border fence (UNHCR, 2016, p. 22).

Germany also put some efforts to criminalize migration. Terror attacks in Germany paved the way for increasing security measures and change in the legal system vis-à-vis the refugee issue. The government accepts certain measures to speed up the deportation of asylum-seekers who are rejected and to give more authority to the security forces for controlling the cellphone data of those who applied for refugee protection (Knight, 2017). This procedure will help authorities to follow people under suspicion (Knight, Merkel's cabinet approves faster migrant deportations, 2017).

Germany also started to implement policies for encouraging "voluntary returns." In 2017, the country with the collaboration of the IOM (International Organization for Migration) implemented a program called "StartHilfe Plus" with the

purpose of providing financial assistance for those who voluntarily return to their

countries ("Program paying," 2017). The program sustains support for over 40

countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia and others, but excludes Syria

(Returning from Germany, n.d.). The program provides a two-level assistance

scheme: 1,200 euros is given per person if they apply to the program by withdrawing

the asylum application before taking any results and 800 euros is given to refugees

who leave voluntarily after the unsuccesful result of the application (Federal

Ministry of the Interior, Building and the Community, 2017). Even though Syria is

not included in the scope of the program, the aim is to decrease the number of

refugees in the country.

In Hungary, on 1 June 2016, a new amendment entered into force targeting

primarily the integration process of refugees who "manage" to enter the country and

become recognized refugees. With this amendment, the government cut the support

for integration and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection for refugees without

implementing any alternative (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016). Every three

years, refugees have to be reviewed by Hungarian authorities to be evaluated

whether the refugee status and subsidiary assistances would continue or not. The

justification of the government to abolish the necessary assistance to accepted

refugees is related to its perspective of stopping economic migrants from applying

for refugee status:

> The purpose of the restrictions is to decrease the social services to . . . Those
> granted international protection as by this measure it can be avoided that the
> so-called economic migrants submit asylum applications in Hungary,
> exclusively in hope of a better life. (Nagy, 2016, p. 1050)

The duration of having a Hungarian ID for accepted refugees is reduced from 10

years to 3 years. After acceptance to obtain refugee status, the length of staying in

the reception center is cut from sixty to thirty days (Nagy, 2016, p. 1050). This

amendment definitely indicates the anti-refugee attitude of the government. Increasing the frequency of reviewing process for those who are accepted as refugees means basically that the government is willing to augment control over migrants. The justification to these amendments made by the governments as indicated above is derived from discourse that refugees are manipulators who exploit the system.

Further amendment on the regulation of the migration issue was entered into force on 6 July 2016. According to the bill, irregular migrants who are arrested within 8 km of the border are escorted by the police outside without any procedure for a registration (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016). People outside the border have to wait to be accepted in the transit zones where their registrations are implemented, or they go back to Serbia. These measures prevent people from getting the rights of asylum-seekers and international protection (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016). It is also suggested that the process is not transparent, which means that controlling over the push-backs is nearly impossible. The police force could push people outside the country even if they did not cross the 8 km limit (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016). This amendment is clearly a violation of the right to asylum according to international standards.

On 2 October 2016, the government held a national referendum on the EU plan, which initiates the relocation program suggesting a quota system that includes to distribute refugees across EU member states to decrease the burden over the transit countries used by refugees, such as Greece and Italy. According to the program, Hungary would have to take 1,294 refugees. In the referendum, citizens were asked, "Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?" (National Election Office, 2016). The majority of the votes

was "no" with 98.36%, and 1.64% of the people voted for "yes." Despite the absolute majority of those who oppose the EU quota program, the referendum was invalid because of the low turnout of 41.32% (National Election Office, 2016). The necessary turnout for a referendum to be valid is 50%, which was increased by the government in 2011 from 25% to the current value (Lyman, 2016).

After the referendum against accepting refugees, the Hungarian ruling party, Fidesz, proposed a constitutional amendment regarding the relocation plan of the EU including the resettlement of refugees from the Middle East and Africa who are in Italy and Greece to share the burden in transit zones. However, the amendment was rejected by Hungarian lawmakers, and could not reach the minimum votes to be accepted in Parliament (It needed to reach two-thirds of 199 Parliament members, but it received 131 votes) (Bardi & Karasz, 2016).

The discourse production process in line with the disruption of ontological security paves the way for certain policy choices of states. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the construction of the narrative in critical situations involves different strategies: the definition of the leading factors of the critical situation, the meaning of this critical situation for self-identity, defining the state's security interests, policy choices and the construction of the narrative about the actions of the state (Steele, 2008, p. 74). This thesis argues that the mass arrival of Syrian refugees to Europe, especially after 2014, creates a critical situation for states and societies and this leads to the construction of discourse and the determination of what should be done about it in terms of the state's policy choices. Within this regard, the thesis identifies two types of exclusion methods implemented by Hungary and Germany: physical and legal. These policy outcomes resulting from the disruption of ontological insecurity are compatible with the anti-refugee discourse used by political actors.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined anti-refugee discourse in two case studies, Germany and Hungary, between the years 2015 and 2017. The theoretical approach to this examination is ontological security, which is a framework that is growing in the discipline of International Relations. Analyzing the issue on the basis of a theory making possible to construct connections between identity construction processes and security concerns helped to understand the expansion of anti-refugee discourse and policies. At this point, the thesis demonstrated that growing discontent due to the mass arrival of people is related to the concerns about the identity of the receiving country. To prove this, the thesis focused on the discourse of political actors and methods of exclusion with research using primary sources.

The thesis contributes to the growing literature of ontological security theory in state-level analysis. As a relatively new area of research, the literature consists of a limited amount of case studies. In a way, the thesis puts one more brick to this new literature. The refugee issue in Europe turned into a crisis especially after the mass arrival of people in 2015. The topic also needs further explanations and research. The thesis aims to fill the gap in this area as well. Various researches that have been conducted examine the issue from different perspectives through economical explanations, realist theories or securitization literature. However, analyzing the issue without the dimension of identity construction process would be lacking, since political actors use anti-refugee discourse as an instrument for building a counter-identity. It is also crucial to note that the previous researches in the literature examining the issue from the perspective of ontological security theory generally focus on the one aspect of the issue, namely the discursive area. The thesis presents a

multi-layered analysis on the ground that the discourse production process is not independent from the policy-making area. Rather, anti-refugee discourse and the methods of exclusion in the policy-making area mutually shape each other.

The thesis analyzed the discourse of political actors through media coverage and found mainly three types of discursive themes. In the two countries of concern, Hungary and Germany, despite the differences in political structures and perceptions at the beginning of the crisis, the first mostly used discourse involves the securitization of the migration. According to this logic, refugees are threats to the safety of the well-being of the receiving countries. Under this securitization discourse, the thesis identifies three types of discursive strategies: "refugees bring terrorism to the country," "the rates of crime will increase due to the rising numbers of refugees," "refugees are threats to the European way of life."

The second theme under anti-refugee discourse is to draw boundaries on the identity on the basis of civilizational differences. This idea is mostly based on the assumption that refugees are incompatible with Western Christian civilization due to the fact that they are Muslims and belong to a different civilizational paradigm.

Another finding related to the anti-refugee discourse is its effects on the rise of national tendencies. According to this idea, refugees are threats to the cultural values of receiving countries. The thesis indicates that premises such as "Germany must remain Germany," and "Hungary must remain Hungary" were common in the political debates of the countries in question.

The thesis also analyzed the realization of the discourse in the policy-making area. Discursive barriers and exclusionary policies mutually shape each other. The thesis identified two types of exclusion methods: physical and legal. It examined border fences, border controls, and the refugee deal between Turkey and the EU

under the theme of physical exclusion. Germany and Hungary also implemented changes and amendments in their refugee laws to exclude refugees from their territory by simply making it more difficult to apply for refugee status and to stay in the country. The thesis focused on these regulations under the theme of legal exclusionary methods.

Despite the significant findings of the thesis and the contributions of the research to the growing literature of ontological security theory in state-level analysis, the study involves certain limitations. The thesis used media coverage for collecting data. Despite its functionality in terms of seeing political changes and debates in a short time, it also brings some limitations in terms of the selection criteria of media reports. The media may not cover all events and statements in specific context; some issues might be intentionally or unintentionally disregarded. Besides, the visibility of certain political actors might be more extensive than the others. This would make the research univocal, rather than the inclusion of different political actors to the debate. This research tries to avoid these limitations by using four different media outlets to decrease the effects of the selection criteria of the media.

The thesis examined the anti-refugee discourse and policy choices produced by political actors and used media coverage for collecting the data. The media is an important instrument for conveying and distributing anti-migration and rightist discourse and plays a crucial role in spreading these ideas. The media language involves and highlights particular ways of representing the world, constructing social identities and social relations (Fairclough, 1995, p. 12). The transformation of the media language and its role to spread certain kinds of discourse could be a matter of

topic for further analysis especially in the increase of anti-refugee/migration discourse in society.

The research focused on the issue for a two-year period and did not make a historical analysis in terms of the historical background of the countries vis-à-vis migration or minority groups. Further research might analyze the differences on the historical narratives on these issues to indicate the variations or similarities between different cases in history and the current refugee problem. The ideology and historical narrative of states is an important factor in terms of the perception of the other.

The thesis merely focused on the state-level analysis by examining the discourses of political actors and policy changes in the issue. However, the refugee crisis also needs to be examined through a sociological point of view, since the rise of the rightist movements in Europe, especially in Germany is on the agenda. Violence against refugees is on the rise in Europe. A further analysis would analyze how the anti-refugee discourse produced in the political realm influence the rise of rightist movements among the public. Another important aspect of the issue is Syrian refugees who are subject to the anti-refugee discourse and exclusionary policies. Further analysis focusing on their perspectives and experiences is also needed to understand their struggle and how they affect from this anti-refugee discourse and policy implementations.

The thesis examined the anti-refugee discourse and policy choices in the context of Europe by focusing on two case countries, Hungary and Germany. Nevertheless, a possible future research might add a third case to strengthen the comparative aspect of the study. In this context, Turkey offers a promising third case and it can be used to test the ontological security hypothesis. Given its dominantly

Muslim population and its ruling party's Islamic orientation, it would be interesting to see whether the Turkish state also perceives Syrian migration as a threat to its ontological security. This would be useful particularly in understanding the different components of ontological security, i.e. religion and nationalism. It would also be a good comparative case given the massive size of Syrian refugee/migrant population in Turkey compared to the countries studied in this thesis. Turkey has its own conditions vis-à-vis the perception of Syrian refugees by both political actors and public. The general attitude was moderate in terms of accepting and welcoming refugees. However, the anti-refugee discourse among public and political actors has increased especially after 2017. Therefore a further analysis would examine the reason of this transformation by regarding the Turkey's political context and structure.

REFERENCES

AfD. (2017). Manifesto for Germany.

Agius, C. (2016). Drawing the discourses of ontological security: Immigration and identity in the Danish and Swedish cartoon crises. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 109-125.

Alkopher, T. D. (2018). Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration: from regaining ontological security to desecuritisation. *European Security, 27*(3), 314-335.

Amann, M., Neukirch, R., & Pfister, R. (2016, May 10). *Bavarian conservatives weigh split from Merkel's CDU*. Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/

Art, D. (2018). The AfD and the end of containment in Germany. *German Politics and Society, 36*(2), 76-86.

Bánkuti, M., Halmai, G., & Scheppele, K. L. (2012). Disabling the constitution. *Journal of Democracy, 23*(3), 138-146.

Bardi, B., & Karasz, P. (2016, November 8). *Hungary's lawmakers reject plan to block resettlement of refugees*. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com

Batory, A. (2015). Populists in government? Hungary's "system of national cooperation". *Democratization, 23*(2), 282-303.

Bavaria knocked back on 200,000 refugee cap. (2016, January 04). Retrieved from The Local: www.thelocal.de/

Bavarian CSU call for drastic tightening of immigration laws. (2016, September 08). Retrieved from The Local: https://www.thelocal.de/

Bierbach, M. (2017a, May 17). *German issues in a nutshell: 'Leitkultur' - acceptance vs. assimilation*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Bierbach, M. (2017b, September 24). *AfD, CDU, SPD: Where do German parties stand on refugees, asylum and immigration?* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. *Alternatives, 27*, 63-92.

Bilefsky, D. (2015, June 18). *Hungary's plan to build fence to deter migrants is citicized*. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/

Blasina, N., & Pronczuk, M. (2018, October 30). *The Angela Merkel era: 18 years at the helm of Germany's CDU*. Retrieved from Financial Times: www.ft.com

Bleiker, C. (2017, December 09). *Germany refugee limit 'legally sound, ethically questionable'*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Bosworth, M., & Guild, M. (2008). Governing though migration control. *British Journal of Criminology, 48*, 703-719.

Bourbeau, P. (2011). *The securitization of migration: A study of movement and order.* New York: Routledge.

Bölinger, M. (2016, August 21). *Fewer burqas, more police.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Brady, K. (2016, May 12). *Almost two thirds of Germans believe Islam 'does not belong in Germany,' poll finds.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Browning, C. S., & Joenniemi, P. (2016). Ontological security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 31-47.

Brubaker, R. (2017). Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40*(8), 1191-1226.

Call-to-arms by German populist right AfD. (2016, August 20). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Campbell, D. (1992). *Writing security.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Carrel, P. (2016, April 17). *Islam not compatible with German constitution, says AfD party.* Retrieved from Reuters: www.reuters.com/

Chancellor running out of time on refugee issue. (2016, January 19). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Chase, J. (2016, September 20). *CSU and CDU move toward agreement on migrants.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Chase, J. (2017a, March 10). *German Bundesrat says Maghreb states not safe for refugees.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

Chase, J. (2017b, September 24). *What you need to know about Angela Merkel's CDU.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com

Cierco, T., & Silva, J. T. (2016). The European Union and the member states: Two different perceptions of border. *Revista Brasileira Politica Internacional, 59*(1), 1-18.

Clemens, C. (2018). The CDU/CSU's ambivalent 2017 campaign. *German Politics and Society, 36*(2), 55-75.

Combes, M. d. (2017). Encountering the stranger: Ontological security and the Boston Marathon bombing. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 126-143.

Connolly, K. (2015, September 03). *Germany greets refugees with help and kindness at Munich central station.* Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/

Connolly, K. (2017, October 9). *Germany: Merkel agrees to 200,000 refugees cap in bid to build coalition.* Retrieved from The Guardian: www.theguardian.com

Conrad, N. (2015, December 12). *Refugees and Syria dominate SPD party conference*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com

Croft, S. (2012). Constructing ontological insecurity: The insecuritization of Britain's Muslim. *Contemporary Security Policy, 33*(2), 219-35.

CSU comes under fire for 'catalogue of inhumanity' over refugee policy. (2016, September 09). Retrieved from Deutsce Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Czymara, C. S., & Schmidt-Catran, A. W. (2017). Refugees unwelcome? Changes in the public acceptance of immigrants and refugees in Germany in the course of Europe's 'immigration crisis'. *European Sociological Review, 33*(6), 735-751.

Decker, F. (2016). The "Alternative for Germany" factors behind its emergence and profile of a new right-wing populist party. *German Politics and Society, 34*(2), 1-16.

Dostal, J. M. (2017). The German Federal Election of 2017: How the wedge issue of refugees and migration took the shine off Chancellor Merkel and transformed the party system. *The Political Quarterly, 88*(4), 589-602.

Dozens of women sexually assaulted in Cologne. (2016, January 05). Retrieved March 17, 2019, from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Dunai, M. (2017, March 2). *Hungary builds new high-tech border fence - with few migrants in sight*. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/

Early, S. (2016, July 28). *Merkel: attacks by asylum seekers 'mock' Germany*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Eddy, M. (2016, July 25). *Suicide bomber in Ansbach, Germany, pledged loyalty to ISIS, officials say*. Retrieved from New York Times: www.nytimes.com

European Commission. (2015a, May 13). *A European agenda on migration.* Retrieved from European Commission: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/

European Commission. (2015b, May 31). *Hungary: Government's national consultation on immigration and terrorism creates widespread debate.* Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/

European Commission. (2018, April). *EU-Turkey statement: Two years on.* Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu

European Commission. (2019, May 26). *Country responsible for asylum application (Dublin)*. Retrieved from European Commission: ec.europa.eu/

European Council. (2016, March 18). *EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016*. Retrieved from European Council: www.consilium.europa.eu/

Eurostat. (2019, March 12). *Asylum statistics*. Retrieved from Eurostat: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fairclough, N. (1995). Media discourse. London: Arnold.

Fairclough, N. (2010). *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*. London: Routledge.

Falkenhagen, F. (2013). The CSU as an ethno-regional party. *German Politics, 22*(4), 396-420.

Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and the Community. (2017, January 31). *More support for voluntary returns*. Retrieved from Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and the Community: www.bmi.bund.de

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2016, December 14). *The 2015 migration report*. Retrieved from Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: http://www.bamf.de/

Feher, M. (2015, August 18). *Hungary deploys 'burder hunters' to keep illegal migrants out*. Retrieved from Wall Street Journal: www.wsj.com/

Field, R. (2015, September 22). *What really happened at Röszke?* Retrieved from The Budapest Beacon: https://budapestbeacon.com/

Flames of hate haunt a nation. (2015, July 24). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international

Fuchs, R. A. (2017, September 15). *The SPD: Germany's oldest political party*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

Fulbrook, M. (2014). *A history of Germany 1918-2014: A divided nation.* Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.

Funk, N. (2016). A spectre in Germany: refugees, a 'welcome culture' and an 'integration politics'. *Journal of Global Ethics, 13*(3), 289-299.

Gabriel backs more video surveillance after Berlin attack. (2017, January 03). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2015). *Why Dublin "doesn't work".* Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

Gazit, O. (2018). Van Gennep meets ontological (in)security: A processual approach to ontological security in migration. *International Studies Review*, 1-26.

German justice minister: AfD uses hate speech online. (2016, December 05). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

German soldier charged with plotting to kill politicians while posing as refugee. (2017, December 12). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel calls for ban on Islamist mosques. (2017, January 06). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Germany balances liberty and security in face of terror. (2017, January 06). Retrieved from Spiegel: www.spiegel.de/international/

Germany mulls deporting asylum seekers following Cologne attacks. (2016, January 08). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Germany reinstates Dublin rules for Syrian refugees. (2015, November 10). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

Germany shows signs of strain from mass of refugees. (2015, October 17). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Germany suspends 'Dublin rules' for Syrians. (2015, August 25). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Graham-Harrison, E., & Henley, J. (2015, September 4). *Hungary to take thousands of refugees to Austrian border by bus.* Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com

Guild, E., & Selm, J. v. (2005). *International migration and security: Opportunities and challenges.* New York: Rouledge.

Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war.* London and New York: Routledge.

Harding, L. (2015, September 15). *Angela Merkel defends Germany's handling of refugee influx.* Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/

Has the German state lost control? (2016, January 21). Retrieved March 23, 2019, from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Hasselbach, C. (2016, March 07). *Opinion: Merkel's secret U-turn.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Helbling, M., & Tresch, A. (2011). Measuring party positions and issue salience from media coverage: Discussing and cross-validating new indicators. *Electoral Studies, 30,* pp. 174-183.

Henley, J. (2017, September 24). *German elections 2017: Angela Merkel wins fourth term but AfD makes gains – as it happened.* Retrieved from The Guardian: www.theguardian.com

Hille, P. (2015, July 28). *The big questions: Germany and refugees.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/

Hoffmann, C. (2016, February 26). *Merkel's humane refugee policies have failed.* Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Hoffmann, C., & Pfister, R. (2016, January 21). *'The current outrage is very hypocritical'.* Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Holmes, S. M., & Castaneda, H. (2016). Representing the "European refugee crisis" in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life and death. *American Ethnologist, 43*(1), 12-24.

How many refugees can Germany handle? (2015, July 30). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Hungarian Government. (2015, July 21). *Government Decree 191/2015 (VII.21) on national designation of safe countries of origin and safe third countries.* Retrieved from Ref World: http://www.refworld.org/

Hungarian Helsinki Committee. (2016, June 15). *Hungary: Recent legal amendments further destroy access to protection, April-June 2016.* Retrieved from Hungarian Helsinki Committee: https://www.helsinki.hu

Huysmans, J. (1998). Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier. *European Journal of International Relations, 4*(2), 226-55.

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 38*(5), 751-777.

Inside the revolt against Angela Merkel. (2016, March 21). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Kalkmann, M. (2016). *Country report: Germany.* European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Brussels: European Conuncil on Refugees and Exiles.

Kaya, A. (2009). *Islam, migration and integration: The age of securitization.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kékesi, M. Z. (2017). *Hungary: Migration and the policy of closed borders.* Prag: Association for International Affairs (AMO).

Kinkartz, S. (2016, September 14). *Merkel, God and the burqa.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological security. *Political Psychology, 25*(5), 741-767.

Kinnvall, C. (2018). Ontological insecurities and postcolonial imaginaries: The emotional appeal of populism. *Humanity and Society*, 1-21.

Kinnvall, C., & Mitzen, J. (2017). An introduction to the special issue: Ontological securities in world politics. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 3-11.

Kinnvall, C., Manners, I., & Mitzen, J. (2018). Introduction to 2008 special issue of European security: "ontological (in)security in the European Union". *European Security, 27*(3), 249-65.

Klikauer, T. (2018). Germany's new populist party: The AfD. *German Politics and Society, 36*(4), 78-97.

Knight, B. (2015, July 28). *Germany shuts out refugees with 'safe' states list.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/

Knight, B. (2016a, March 07). *What does the AfD stand for?* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Knight, B. (2016b, August 11). *Germany to ease deportations for migrant criminals.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Knight, B. (2016c, August 19). *German interior ministers call for partial burqa ban.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Knight, B. (2016d, August 29). *Germany turning away and deporting more migrants.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Knight, B. (2017, February 22). *Merkel's cabinet approves faster migrant deportations.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Kornai, J. (2015). Hungary's u-turn. *Capitalism and Society, 10*(2), 1-26.

Kurbjuweit, D. (2016, March 08). *Germany enters a dangerous new political era*. Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/

Lazaridis, G., & Skleparis, D. (2016). Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek security professionals. *International Migration, 54*(2), 176-192.

Lees, C. (2013). Christian democracy is dead; long live the union parties: Explaining CDU/CSU dominance within the German party system. *German Politics, 22*(1-2), 64-81.

Lobo, S. (2016, January 08). *Pitfalls, prejudice and the Cologne sexual assaults*. Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/

Lowe, J. (2017, April 28). *German parliament passes partial burqa ban*. Retrieved from Newsweek: www.newsweek.com

Luyken, J. (2018, May 09). *What we learned from this year's crime statistics… and what we didn't*. Retrieved from The Local: www.thelocal.de/

Lyman, R. (2016, October 2). *Hungary to vote on accepting more migrants as*. Retrieved from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/

Maiani, F. (2016). *The reform of the Dublin III Regulation.* Brussels: Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs.

Maizière, T. d. (2017, May 01). *A Leitkultur for Germany - What exactly does it mean?* Retrieved from Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community: www.bmi.bund.de/

Martin, N. (2016, April 30). *Germany wants EU border controls extended*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (2012). "Mediatization" of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication, 16*(3), pp. 247-261.

McGuinness, R. (2015, December 1). *Syrian migrant jailed for 10 years in Hungary after border riot deemed an 'act of terror'*. Retrieved from Express: https://www.express.co.uk

Meier, A. (2019, April 15). *Border controls: state of emergency becoming state of normality*. Retrieved from Euractiv: www.euractiv.com

Merkel backs faster deportation for migrants who commit crimes in Germany. (2016, January 08). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Merkel faces growing party pressure on refugee crisis. (2015, October 24). Retrieved from Deutcshe Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Merkel pushes for legal migrant routes to EU. (2016, March 08). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Merkel to drop 'We can do this' from her speeches. (2016, September 17). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Merkel's CDU annual meeting to consider 'effective measures' for migrant arrivals. (2015, December 13). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/

Merkel's Refugee Policy Divides Europe. (2015, September 21). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Migrant crisis: Germany starts temporary border controls. (2015, September 14). Retrieved from BBC: www.bbc.com/

MIGSZOL. (2015, June 28). *Show trial in Hungary: Solidarity with the accused in Röszke*. Retrieved from Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary (MIGSZOL): http://www.migszol.com/

Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations, 12*(3), 341-70.

Mitzen, J. (2016). Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: Habits, capabilities and ontological security. *Journal of European Public Policy, 13*(2), 270-285.

Mitzen, J. (2018). Feeling at home in Europe: Migration, ontological security, and the political psychology of EU bordering. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1373-87.

Mitzen, J., & Larson, K. (2017, August 1). *Ontological security and foreign policy*. Retrieved from Oxford Research Encyclopedia: politics.oxfordre.com

Müller, J.-W. (2011). The Hungarian tragedy. *Dissent, 58*(2), 5-10.

Nagy, B. (2016). Hungarian asylum law and policy in 2015–2016: Securitization instead of loyal cooperation. *German Law Journal, 17*(06), 1033-1082.

National consultation on immigration to begin. (2015, April 24). Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: www.kormany.hu/en/

National Election Office. (2016, October 2). *Data relating to the result of the national referendum*. Retrieved from National Election Office: http://www.valasztas.hu/

Nelles, R. (2015, September 16). *The real Merkel finally stands up*. Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international

Neukirch, R. (2016, December 01). *Merkel adversary Jens Spahn on the rise*. Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Noble, G. (2005). The discomfort of strangers: Racism, incivility and ontological security in a relaxed and comfortable nation. *Journal of Intercultural Studies, 26*(1-2), 107-120.

Nolan, D. (2015, August 26). *Desperate migrants find holes in Hungary's razor-wire fence strategy*. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/

Nolan, D., & Connolly, K. (2015, September 1). *Hungary closes main Budapest station to refugees*. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/

Novak, B. (2015, June 19). *János Lázár: All refugees illegally entering Hungary are economic migrants*. Retrieved from The Budapest Beacon: budapestbeacon.com

Oltermann, P. (2018, March 04). *Merkel secures fourth term in power after SPD backs coalition deal*. Retrieved from The Guardian: www.theguardian.com

Orbán, V. (2014, July 24). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and student camp*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en

Orbán, V. (2015a, February 27). *The next years will be about hardworking people*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015b, May 8). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme "180 minutes"*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en

Orbán, V. (2015c, September 3). *Those who are overwhelmed cannot offer shelter to anyone*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015d, September 12). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's interview with BILD Zeitung*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015e, September 22). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address to Parliament before the start of daily business*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015f, September 23). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's reply in Parliament*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015g, October 30). *Interview with Viktor Orbán on the "180 minutes" programme on Kossuth Radio*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015g, September 3). *Those who are overwhelmed cannot offer shelter to anyone*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/those-who-are-overwhelmed-cannot-offer-shelter-to-anyone

Orbán, V. (2015h, November 7). *Viktor Orbán's speech at the opening of the World Science Forum*. Retrieved from Website of Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015i, November 16). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address in Parliament before the start of daily business*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2015j, November 16). *Televised interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the M1 "Tonight" programme*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en

Orbán, V. (2016a, January 29). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's press statement after his talks with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016b, February 22). *Viktor Orbán's preliminary address to Parliament*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016c, March 15). *Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March*. Retrieved from Miniszterelnok: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/

Orbán, V. (2016d, May 20). *Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme "180 Minutes"*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016e, July 13). *"Are you opposed to peace?"*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016f, August 26). *Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme "180 Minutes"*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016g, September 12). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address in Parliament before the start of daily business*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2016h, October 20). *Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the newspaper Passauer Neuer Presse*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2017a, April 28). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Kossuth Radio's "180 Minutes" programme*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2017b, June 12). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's reply to opposition comments on his address in Parliament before the start of daily business*. Retrieved October 29, 2018, from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2017c, June 27). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the closing event for the National Consultation*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2017d, July 7). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Kossuth Radio's "180 Minutes" programme*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Orbán, V. (2017e, September 16). *Viktor Orbán's address at the Congress of the Federation of Christian Intellectuals*. Retrieved from Website of the Hungarian Government: http://www.kormany.hu/en/

Payton, M. (2016, April 02). *Hungary's government claims there are 900 'no-go areas' in Europe overrun with migrants*. Retrieved from Independent: www.independent.co.uk/

Pearlman, W. (2017). Culture or bureaucracy? Challenges in Syrian refugees' initial settlement in Germany. *Middle East Law and Governance*(9), 313-327.

Pew Research Center. (2016, July). *Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs.* Retrieved from Pew Research Center.

Police report outlines 'chaotic and shameful' new year's eve. (2016, January 07). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Poll: Germans increasingly skeptical of refugees. (2016, January 15). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Program paying asylum applicants to leave Germany voluntarily begins. (2017, February 01). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Refugee Council Mecklenburg-Vorpommern eV. (2016, April). *Asylum Package II - what does it mean for refugees and their supporters?* Retrieved from Refugee Council Mecklenburg-Vorpommern eV: www.fluechtlingsrat-mv.de/

Report: refugees have not increased crime rate in Germany. (2015, November 13). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/

Returning from Germany. (n.d.). *Supplementary reintegration support/StarthilfePlus.* Retrieved from Returning from Germany: www.returningfromgermany.de/en

Riegert, B. (2016, March 19). *Opinion: Raise the drawbridge! EU refugee policy.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Rindisbacher, H. J. (2013). "Leitkultur" and canons: Two aspects of contemporary public debate. *Pacific Coast Philology, 48*(1), 48-68.

Rönsberg, A. (2016, March 18). *EU-Turkey migrant deal done.* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en

Rumelili, B. (2012, May 22). *Identity and desecuritization: Possibilities and limits.* Retrieved from NUPI's Research Seminar Series: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/

Rumelili, B. (2012, May 22). *Identity and Desecuritization: Possibilities and Limits.* Retrieved from NUPI's Research Seminar Series: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/

Rumelili, B. (2015). *Conflict resolution and ontological security.* London: Routledge.

Rupnik, J. (2012). How things went wrong. *Journal of Democracy, 23*(3), 132-137.

Rygiel, K., Baban, F., & Ilcan, S. (2016). The Syrian refugee crisis: The EU-Turkey 'deal' and temporary protection. *Global Social Policy, 16*(3), 315-320.

Scholz, K.-A. (2017, May 03). *What is German 'Leitkultur'?* Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Sereghy, Z. (2016). Islamophobia in Hungary: National report 2015. In B. Enes, & H. Farid, *European Islamophobia Report 2015* (pp. 223-237). Istanbul: SETA.

Sereghy, Z. (2017). Islamophobia in Hungary: National report 2016. In B. Enes, & H. Farid, *European Islamophobia Report 2016* (pp. 255-272). Istanbul: SETA.

Shams, S. (2016, January 11). *Opinion: Cologne attacks on Muslims show incompatibility of cultures*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Smale, A., Lyman, R., & Hartocollis, A. (2015, September 4). *Migrants cross Austria border from Hungary*. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/

Staniševski, D. (2011). Fear thy neighbor: ontological security and the illusion of national purity. *33*(1), 62-79.

Staniševski, D. (2011). Fear thy neighbor: Ontological security and the illusion of national purity. *Administrative Theory & Praxis, 33*(1), 62-79.

Steele, B. (2008). *Ontological security in international relations: Self-identity and the IR state.* New York: Routledge.

Steele, B. (2017). Organizational processes and ontological (in)security: Torture, the CIA and the United States. *Cooperation and Conflict, 52*(1), 69-89.

Steele, B. J. (2005). Ontological security and the power of self-identity: British neutrality and the American civil war. *Review of International Studies, 31*(3), 519-540.

Stern, M. (2006). 'We' the subject: The power and failure of (in)security. *Security Dialogue, 37*(2), 187-205.

Support, sarcasm after Merkel calls for banning burqas. (2016, December 06). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2013). Coming in from the cold? Euroscepticism, government participation and party positions on Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 51*(1), 17-37.

'The immigration of Muslims will change our culture' [interview with Frauke Petry]. (2016, March 30). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

The Putinization of Hungary? (2010, December 27). Retrieved from Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/

Thorleifsson, C. (2017). Disposable strangers: far-right securitisation of forced migration in Hungary. *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale, 25*(3), 318-334.

Thorleifsson, C. (2017). Disposable strangers: Far-right securitisation of forced migration in Hungary. *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale, 25*(3), 318-334.

Thurau, J. (2017, December 03). *Opinion: Germany, a paralyzed nation*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Toygür, İ., & Benvenuti, B. (2016). *The European response to the refugee crisis: Angela Merkel on the move.* Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center.

UNHCR. (1992). *Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees*. Retrieved from UNHCR: www.unhcr.org

UNHCR. (2012). *Serbia as a country of asylum*. Geneva: UNHCR.

UNHCR. (2016). *Hungary: As a country of asylum*. Geneva: UNHCR.

Van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 4 (2), 249-283.

Wagener, V. (2015, October 14). *Refugee policy: The mainstream rears its head*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com/en/

Wagstyl, S. (2016, September 29). *Rising German political star Jens Spahn says migrants must adapt*. Retrieved from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/

Walker, K., & Jones, T. (2019, February 15). *Germany's list of 'safe countries of origin' and what it means*. Retrieved from Deutsche Welle: www.dw.com

Walker, S. (2018, June 22). *Hungarian nationalist rock opera to retell 1920s grievances*. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/

'We want a solution to the immigration problem'. (2016, September 16). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Which side will prevail under strain of refugees? (2015, August 31). Retrieved from Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/

Wilson, C. A. (2016, July 25). *Week of violence rattles Germany*. Retrieved from New York Times: www.nytimes.com

Wodak, R. (1995). Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. In J. Verschueren, J.-O. Östman, & J. Blommaert, *Handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 204-210). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Wüst, A. M. (2018). Yet another grand coalition: The social democrats at the crossroads. *German Politics and Society, 36*(2), 87-99.