A NEW WAVE OF MIGRATION FROM TURKEY:

AN EXPLORATION OF DRIVING FORCES

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Elif Akpınar, certify that

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ABSTRACT

A New Wave of Migration From Turkey: An Exploration of Driving Forces

Migration is a recurring topic throughout history, caused by different factors at different times, and has been spotlighted by different disciplines like sociology, economics, international relations, and psychology. The term "migration" includes a number of related aspects, from the decision to migrate through the integration (or non-integration) process and even further. There is a huge literature encompassing the theoretical framework and historical data of migration.

Migration has always been embedded in Turkey's history, though the reasons for moving, groups of people who move and destinations have changed over time. Starting with the establishment of the Turkish Republic, national and international movements have helped to shape the country. Almost every decade has had its own migration pattern, formed by various micro- and macro- level determinants.

For the last few years, international migration has again become a popular topic among Turkish society. Numbers and destinations are publicized via statistics, the reasons and motivations behind this phenomenon are intensely discussed. This thesis aims to contribute to this literature by suggesting a few factors that are related to willingness to migrate, making use of a survey completed in 2018.

ÖZET

Türkiye'den Yeni Bir Göç Dalgası: Tetikleyen Nedenler Üzerine Bir Araştırma

Göç, tarih boyunca farklı etkenlerin neden olduğu ve sürekli tekrarlanan bir konudur. Aynı zamanda sosyoloji, ekonomi, uluslararası ilişkiler ve psikoloji gibi farklı disiplinlerin de ilgi alanındadır. "Göç" terimi, aksiyona geçme kararı alınmasından, gidilen ülkeye entegre olunmasına (ya da olunamamasına) kadar olan süreçleri ve daha fazlasını kapsar. Göç konusunda, teorik çerçeve ve tarihsel datayı konu edinen çok geniş bir literatür bulunmaktadır.

Göç etme nedenleri, göç eden kişiler ve göç edilen coğrafyalar zaman ile değişse de, göç kavramı Türkiye'nin tarihine her zaman dahil olmuştur. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşundan beri, ulusal ve uluslararası göç hareketleri bugünkü ülkeyi şekillendirmiştir. Farklı makro ve mikro değişkenler, neredeyse her 10 yıla farklı bir yön vermişlerdir.

Son birkaç yılda uluslarası göç Türk kamuoyunda tekrar populer olmaya başladı. Giden kişilerin sayıları ve gidilen ülkeler, istatistikler sonucunda belirleniyor ve kamuoyu ile paylaşılıyor. Aynı zamanda bu fenomenin arkasındaki nedenler ve motivasyonlar yoğun bir şekilde tartışılıyor. Bu tez, 2018 senesinde tamamlanan bir anket veritabanını kullanarak, literatüre göç isteği ile ilişkili olabilecek bir kaç değişken sunmayı hedefliyor.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents and to my lifetime buddy: I am more than grateful for their endless support and love.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a recurring topic throughout history, caused by different factors at different times. Be it a forced or a voluntary act, migration is defined as "the temporary or permanent move of individuals or groups of people from one geographic location to another for various reasons ranging from better employment possibilities to persecution" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 4). Routes or reasons may change, but mankind stays in motion – today even more internationally than ever before.

International migration has always been embedded in Turkey's history, though the reasons for moving, groups of people who move and destinations have changed over time. Starting with the establishment of the Turkish Republic, national and international movements have helped to shape the country. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, international migration has been used as a policy to build a more homogeneous nation-state. The outflow of non-Muslim minorities from Turkish borders and the inflow of Muslim or Turkic groups re-defined the notion of homeland for many people. In another milestone, during the 1960s Turkey experienced a different type of international migration; it started with *Gastarbeiter* (foreign workers) who were meant to go abroad for a limited period of time and ended up with Turks being the largest minority community in Germany. The oil crisis and economic downsizing of Western Europe in the 1970s defined new destination paths for Turkish emigrants. The military coup in 1980 increased the number of asylum demands from Turkey to other countries, highlighting another type of international migration. The new millennium reshaped the classifications

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established by previous Turkish emigrants with large numbers of better educated and highly-skilled Turkish emigrants. After 2010, Turkey experienced several migration patterns wherein migration was indirectly caused by the political actions of government directed at certain groups. Most recently, there has been an intensive discussion about young and well-educated Turkish people (mostly academicians and white-collar employees) deciding to move to another country. Unquestionably all movements in history have contributed to elements of the community; in my opinion, however, the latest has the vast potential to change the texture of Turkish society. This recent phenomenon is further interesting for me, since I have had the first-hand experience of interacting with a considerable number of friends, family members and colleagues who have either already moved or are on the verge of taking the decision.

Migration itself is a major topic; it may be domestic or international and a response to a wide range of situations, including a desire to explore or upgrade, work-related factors or even the need for basic survival. Additionally, migration research is not only about the "movement" of people; there is a huge literature on settled migrants, their living conditions, identity and generation issues, xenophobia – and surely a totally different structure to discover. Keeping this broader framework in mind, I would like to note that this thesis will only focus on present day, international migration from Turkey and the potential reasons that create such willingness to migrate. This thesis aims to understand the driving forces that affect individual's and groups' willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day. To explore the driving forces, I aim to understand the current circumstances creating the intent to migrate from Turkey and relevant influencing factors. In pursuit of this endeavor, I will make use of the previous and current literature on international migration in order to understand the framework and as theoretical guidance, present

population and migration data from Turkey to control the local structure and analyze newly completed research data by Kadir Has University – Center for Turkish Studies (Research on Social and Political Trends in Turkey, 2018) to statistically test the factors affecting willingness to migrate from Turkey.

Chapter 2 discusses the definition of migration, narrowing the focus to international migration, and presents the relevant theoretical framework. For the mostly descriptive presentation of international migration, a grouping based on level-of-analysis is used for detailed explanation.

Chapter 3 introduces the history of international migration in Turkey. The broad time interval, from the establishment of the Republic to the current day, aims to sharpen the understanding and enhance the comments about the present time by elucidating past experiences.

Chapter 4 makes use of the 2018 database of an annual quantitative survey conducted by Kadir Has University – Center for Turkish Studies (Research on Social and Political Trends in Turkey, 2018) to suggest the factors that are affecting willingness to migrate from Turkey and answer the main question of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Understanding the term migration

Moving to alternative geographies has always been interesting for humankind.

Whether arising of necessity–seeking better land, weather, water, or security–or the

desire for adventure–exploring alternative routes, supplies, or sources–history is

filled with human groups headed for different destinations. Migration is a type of

movement, which in Latin originally means ". . . the movement or wandering of the

population within a country, or moving, settling from one country to another"

(Huzdik, 2014, p. 6). But it should not be mistakenly used as a synonym for

"mobility," Huzdik (2014) argues, which is free, physical movement. Migration, as a

concept, is defined by UNESCO (2017) as ". . . the crossing of the boundary of a

political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the

movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic

migrants." Although there are various definitions of migration, Lee (1966) makes the

following generalization: "[n]o matter how short or how long, how easy or how

difficult, every act of migration involves an origin, a destination, and an intervening

set of obstacles. Among the set of intervening obstacles, we include the distance of

the move as one that is always present" (p. 49).

I believe it is important to distinguish between different concepts that are

often discussed under migration studies. Migration is defined by the International

Organization for Migration (IOM) as: "the movement of a person or a group of

persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population

movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length,

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composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification." (www.iom.int). This definition includes both national and international migration. For the remaining part of this thesis, I will mostly focus on international migration, so I will use the word migration as a synonym for international migration processes. Emigration is defined as: "the act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settling in another" and immigration as "the process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement" (www.iom.int). Based on these definitions, it is possible to say that emigration is a concept defined from the perspective of the sending country, whereas immigration is defined from the perspective of the receiving country. Selvin (2016) also suggests that emigration has been accepted as a human right, while immigration is at the discretion of the country of destination. Political concerns may result in additional types of migrants, such as asylum seeker (a person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments) and refugee ("a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. . ." (www.iom.int).

    The UN Migration Agency defines a migrant as ". . . any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the

movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is" (www.un.org). As mentioned above, this definition includes different migration types (domestic or international), willingness condition, all circumstances and possible causes (migration due to work, marriage, asylum, etc.), and all possible durations.

Although there are clearly specified definitions for the above-mentioned concepts, in real life they are not sufficient to explain "migration" and/or "migrants;" the reality is much more intricate. In some cases, political reasons may indirectly cause people to become economic migrants; in other cases, family (re)unification may be the hidden reason for labor migration. Definitions categorize and make the phenomena easier to understand, but it is important to keep in mind that these definitions may fail to capture real life complexities.

With the aim of discovering the forces affecting willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day, this thesis will narrow its focus and exclusively dwell on theories of international migration that are mostly related to economic reasons and also the historical background on an economic perspective.

To be able to evaluate and understand the framework better, in the next part I present a summary of international migration theories. There is a substantial academic literature and a broad framework of international migration theories stemming from the nineteenth century. After presenting the existent framework, I aim to highlight specific theories or factors that are more relevant for today, i.e., the twenty-first century.

2.2 Theoretical framework: Theories on international migration

The very first literature on migration dates back to the late nineteenth century; Ravenstein (1885) shows a general picture of migration at the time in the United

Kingdom, pointing to factors that regulate migration based on empirical census data and suggesting that the main reason for movement is to achieve better economic conditions. After his work, a number of theories explaining the reasons for international migration contributed to literature. These various theories may be differentiated through their concepts, assumptions and level of analysis, each providing a different point-of-view of the immigration phenomenon. As Arango (2000) points out, "Migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory" (p. 283). Still these theories facilitate greater understanding of the phenomenon and help to make further estimations using previous knowledge. For categorization purposes, I find it easier to group the theories by level of analysis, as proposed by Faist (2000) and Hagen-Zanker (2008), as summarized in Table 1. Theories that focus on the individual level (person) are classified as micro-level theories, whereas theories that focus more on the big picture (like aggregate migration trends or the economic structure of a country) are classified as macro-level theories. Meso-level theories are in-between the former two and focus on medium-level structures (like family, community or social networks) (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Macro-level theories take macro-level opportunity structures (economic structure) as the main reason for international migration.

To start with, the most well-known theory in migration literature–the neoclassical macro-migration theory–explains migration through economic reasons and differentials in wage and employment conditions between countries. According to this theory, the main aim of international migration is income maximization. In this perspective, ". . . migration occurs until wage equalization has occurred" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 6). In other words, this theory assumes income

maximization as the main aim of immigration and that when wages are equal among

countries, immigration will stop. Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana (2016) challenge

this theory, discussing cases of developing countries where decisions against

migration might be taken due to family, hierarchy or power relations. Even though

the potential income is higher in the destination country, "[f]emales may stay at

home because gender norms prescribe that leaving the family behind is

inappropriate, while males may be forced to stay behind to fulfill a perceived

security function in the household" (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016, p. 22).

It is also possible to challenge this theory by taking non-economic concepts into

account, like freedom or democracy, which may also be critical points in the

migration decision even though income is not maximized.

Table 1. Migration Theories by Level of Analysis

Micro-level	Meso-level	Macro-level
Migration cause: Individual values, desires, expectancies e.g., improving survival, wealth, etc.	Migration cause / perpetuation: Collectives, social networks e.g., social ties	Migration cause / perpetuation: Macro level opportunity structures e.g., economic structure (income and employment opportunities differentials)
Main theories: Push and Pull Factors Neoclassical Micro-Migration Theory Behavioral Models Theory of Social Systems	Main theories: Social Capital and Network Theory Institutional Theory Cumulative Causation Theory New Economics of Labor Migration	Main theories: Neoclassical Macro-Migration Theory Migration System Dual Labor Market Theory World Systems Theory Mobility Transition

Source: Faist (2000), Hagen-Zanker (2008), and Wickramasinghe &Wimalaratana
(2016)

Another macro-level theory is migration system theory, where Mabogunje (1970) adds to the literature by considering the mandatory movements from rural to urban areas, especially in underdeveloped countries. Mabogunje defines rural-urban migration ". . . a basic transformation of the nodal structure of a society in which people move from generally smaller, mainly agricultural communities to larger, mainly non-agricultural communities" (Mabogunje, 1970, p. 2). Mabogunje suggests that rural-urban migration is a dynamic, interdependent system, where there is an almost circular schema: a potential migrant's outflow is controlled by the rural control sub-system (family, community norms, etc.), goes through migration channels with controlled by the urban sub-system (government policies, employment market, etc.) and, finally, the urban adjustment mechanism takes place. Both positive and negative feedback channels the pool of potential migrants, encouraging or discouraging migration. This theory mainly assumes that migration adds to the economic, social, cultural and institutional status in both the receiving and sending areas (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016, p. 24). Hagen-Zanker challenges this model since it is ambiguous and does predict migration trends.

As the name reflects, dual labor market theory is based on economic dualism in the labor market. The theory assumes a primary sector, which consists of well-paid, high-skilled jobs and a secondary sector of unskilled jobs (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). In this set-up, wages in the primary sector increase parallel to inflation, so there is enough demand to fill the jobs with national workers. This inflation-related raise is too costly for the secondary sector, however. As Piore (1979) argues, since there is no demand from the national workers for the secondary sector, developed industrial countries end up pulling migrant workers (from developing countries with low wages, high unemployment or both), mostly temporary, for unskilled jobs; this,

he argues, is the main cause of immigration. From a macro point-of-view, this theory leaves out individual or community factors from the migration decision and ties migration activity to the demand of developed countries for low-skilled labor (Massey et al., 1993). As long as the income in the receiving country is higher (which would be the case, since the sending country is assumed to have low wages and/or high unemployment), this theory does not conflict with neoclassical macro-migration theory.

Another theory at the macro-level, the world systems theory, argues that immigration is a consequence of economic globalization and goes in parallel with market creation, which was achieved by colonial regimes in the past and by neocolonial governments and multinational firms today (Massey et al., 1993; Hagen-Zanker, 2008). This view, which builds on Wallerstein's work *The Modern World-System*, argues that ". . . the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist societies created a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 444). In other words, as a result of economic globalization, the international labor force moves in the opposite direction from international capital (Huzdik, 2014). Massey et al. (1993) argue that ". . . migration is a natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist development" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 445) and is very much connected with key elements of the world market economy, such as land, raw materials, labor, material and ideological links, as well as global cities, which serve as centers for the banking, finance and high-tech parts of the structure.

The last, but not least, macro-level migration theory I would like to introduce is the mobility transition theory, derived from Zelinsky's (1971) hypothesis defined as: "[t]here are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility

through space-time during recent history, and these comprise an essential component of the modernization process" (p. 222). Zelinsky (1971) indicates that industrialization, demographic factors and modernization are associated with patterns of migration and highlights personal freedom as an important part of the modernization process. As I have stated before, concepts like freedom or democracy add another dimension to that part of the migration literature which take economic motivations as the main reason to migrate, challenging them in that sense. Those concepts have become more and more intertwined with the modernization process, and they pave the way from meeting one's basic needs to a more advanced discussion on life satisfaction. Nevertheless, Hagen-Zanker (2008) challenges this hypothesis due to its lack of differentiation among migration types, agreeing it is a good indicator of previous migration patterns in industrial societies (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

At the individual level, the push and pull framework was initially presented by Lee (1966), categorizing the factors affecting the decision process into four groups: (1) factors associated with the area of origin; (2) factors associated with the area of destination, (3) intervening obstacles; and (4) personal factors.

Neoclassical macro-migration theory is also mirrored at the micro level of analysis by the micro-economic model of individual choice. Also referred to as the human capital approach, this theory is ". . . an individual investment decision to increase the productivity of human capital, thus again focusing on the labor market, but at the same time explaining the selectivity of heterogeneous migrants" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 10). According to this approach, the migration decision depends on calculations of positive monetary as well as non-monetary returns (for example, an investment in human capital may result in better wages – a monetary return–or a

would-be migrant may be able to act on the inclination toward the destination location–a non-monetary return). Age is also considered to be an important element in this theory. This theory assumes that ". . . the young and the educated migrate in the first phase" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 10). This theory is useful in explaining the individual selections of the migrants, but, as a shortcoming, it is very hard to make generalizations for groups of people, such as those, for example, from the same origin country.

Hagen-Zanker (2008) discusses a few behavioral models under micro-level theories. In Wolpert's stress-threshold model (1965), it is assumed that people compare the utility of origin and destination places to a certain threshold level and then take the migration decision. On the other hand, in Crawford's value-expectancy model, it is assumed that people take migration decisions based on certain values; these are not necessarily economic but may also be individual and societal.

Theory of social systems is Hoffmann-Nowotny's explanation of migration, which ". . . is a result of resolving structural tensions (power questions) and anominal tensions (prestige questions)" (as cited in Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 11). It argues that people may want to migrate to achieve a higher status, but achieving it depends on different global status arrangements. Hagen-Zanker argues that after the migration decision, those tensions are more often transformed into other tensions, rather than decreasing.

In the meso-level, decision making is done neither at the macro-level nor by individuals. Instead, networks like social ties, the household, family or community are the decision-making units. Arango (2000) suggests that networks form an intermediate level of decision-making between individual decisions (micro-level) and structural determinants (macro-level).

Social capital and networks are considered significant factors in increasing the likelihood and perpetuation of migration since they both ". . . lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected returns to migration" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 448). Theory suggests that social relations and social capital in households, neighborhoods, and communities give information prior to migration that helps in the decision making process. After the movement, they also help with the adaptation process (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). Massey et al. (1993) also suggest that the probability of making a decision in favor of migration increases if the person is related to someone who has had an international migration experience before and ". . . the likelihood of movement should increase with the closeness of the relationship (i.e., having a brother in Germany is more likely to induce a Turk to migrate there than having a cousin, a neighbor, or a friend); [*sic*] and it should also rise with the quality of the social capital embodied in the relationship (having a brother who has lived in Germany for ten years is more valuable . . . than having one who has just arrived, and having one who is a legal resident is better than having one who lacks residence documents)" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 460). Arango (2000) summarizes it as follows: "[m]igration networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal relations that link migrants or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home. They convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms" (p. 291).

There are also institutional components of a migrant network, which include the rules and norms that regulate this structure. In this case, those rules and norms act as social capital, making the migration process easier by decreasing the transaction and migration costs (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). In addition to these institutionalized rules and norms, there are external migrant institutions that aim to create a balance

between the high number of potential migrants and the limited number of visas in destination countries (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). These institutionalized patterns range from non-profit NGOs, which focus on humanitarian concerns and facilitate the process by giving information and legal advice, to people smugglers and recruiting agents that provide help in exchange for fees (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). All type of organizations aim to sustain and, in a sense, re-create migration. Massey et al. (1993) suggests that, with those institutions ". . . the international flow of migrants becomes more and more institutionalized and independent of the factors that originally caused it" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451).

Cumulative causation theory suggests that migration sustains and reproduces itself, becoming increasingly common (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). I find this theory similar to the social capital and network theories since as migration becomes more and more embedded in social ties, expanding networks and local culture; this enables more people to be familiar with the notion and affects the migration decisions of future migrants. Arango (2000) also argues that "networks are the main mechanism that makes migration a self-perpetuating phenomenon – since networks are cumulative in nature. They tend to grow ever larger . . . as every move constitutes a resource for those who stay back, and facilitate further moves, which in turn widen the networks and the probability of their further expansion" (p. 292). According to Massey et al. (1993), social scientists have discussed six factors that have the potential to cumulatively affect migration: (1) income distribution – as the income of migrated families/family members increases, other families will have more motivation to migrate; (2) land distribution – as migrants (especially those coming from rural areas) buy farmland, more land is withdrawn from production, causing

outmigration in the area; (3) the organization of agrarian production – as migrants (especially that are coming from rural areas) farm the land on their own, it decreases the demand for labor, causing outmigration in the area; (4) culture – as the percentage of the migrants in a community increases, it also changes the values and the culture ("[a]t the community level, migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people's behaviors, and values associated with migration become part of the community's values" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 453)); (5) the regional distribution of human capital – as migration "selects" relatively skilled, productive people, sending countries may decrease in human capital after a while; and (6) the social meaning of work/social labelling – as more migrants work in certain sectors/jobs, these are labelled "immigrant jobs," making native workers more reluctant to work in those areas and leading to increased migration. As a result, cumulative causation theory suggests that migration leads to more migration in the future. But surely migration does not continue forever, "At one-point, migration networks become saturated, labor scarcity in the source country increases and migration potential is very low with only old people or children left to migrate" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 18). At such a point migration is expected to start to decline.

The new economics of migration theory consider migration to be a family or community decision. It is often mentioned that this theory has appeared to challenge the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory (Massey et al., 1993; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Here, the aim is not to maximize income but, instead, minimize risks for the smaller community (Massey et al., 1993) and ensure the total wellbeing of the complete family. The focus shifts from the macro- or individual level; however, the new economics of migration theory does not totally

ignore individual behavior but suggests studying it in the context of a group (Stark, 1991; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). The new economics of migration theory indicates that ". . . migration is possible even if there is no difference in wages or employment rates because migration cannot be linked to the labor market conditions only" (Huzdik, 2014, p. 7). In terms of risks, family level can be considered as in more control, compared to an isolated individual level, since there is a possibility of diversifying total income: ". . . if income and [/] or status are low and [/] or risks are high and there are market and government failures [. . .] the household then makes the decision that one or more members of the household migrates to a labor market that is negatively or non-correlated with the local labour market" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 15). In this way, the family/household co-insures their income. If the conditions in the original or destination country deteriorate, the family/household has another option for support.

Whatever the level of analysis, the migration decision is always based on a cost-benefit examination. At the individual level, migration aims at maximizing income level, taking into account personal characteristics such as education level, marital status, etc. At the meso-level, the migration decision depends on the alignment of family/community and aims to minimize the risks, utilizing available network resources to facilitate the process. At the macro-level, the migration decision is very much dependent on the demand for labor and migration laws. These levels of analysis are not isolated from each other; on the contrary, all levels are interdependent. Hagen-Zanker (2008) summarizes this interdependency as follows: "[s]tructural macro factors affect the decisions made on the micro-level. Political institutions (e.g. migration laws), pull factors (like labour demand in the Dual-Labour Market theory), economic development (like in the World Systems theory,

NELM [new economics of labor migration] or mobility of transition) all constrain the migrant's decision making process" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008, p. 21).

Real-life reflections of the above-mentioned most important migration theories are not as clear as on paper, of course. Although these theories are not necessarily in conflict, they can be blended in different combinations to explain various situations. Also, time is a significant factor in defining the migration process. Based on the time period in question, the reasons for migration and selection of destination countries have always changed and will continue to do so over the coming years.

Today, in the twenty-first century, naturally some of the above-mentioned theories ". . . have changed or broken up due to globalization or technology shifts" (Huzdik, 2014, p. 9). For instance, neoclassical macro-migration theory indicates that migration cannot occur unless there is a wage gap between the origin and destination countries (to maximize income, wages should be higher in the destination country). But today, we see people moving to other countries, even for lower wages, because they favor other values (e.g., they may be looking for enhanced democracy, or may prefer the place of destination). World-systems theory may be further discussed and enlarged, taking into account multi-national firms or educational institutions that make migration less complicated, without significantly changing the circumstances of one's current employment. It is also relevant to say that social capital/network theories have also transformed along with technological advances, e.g., new forms of networks established via online channels that are more suited for disseminating or receiving perfect information. The social labelling effect described by cumulative causation theory may also decline (if not completely disappear) as "immigrant jobs" are gradually increase in quality and display requested skills.

Naturally, all theories have their strengths and weaknesses; in the broader literature it is possible to find critiques for each theory–and surely some points need to be adapted for the current environment. Additionally, I consider it impossible to strictly define one single level-of-analysis or single reason for the migration decision. In other words, I think individual, family or community decisions or structural constraints alone do not suffice to explain the migration process. I believe the path leading to the migration decision is multifaceted and defined by various parameters, constraints and/or opportunities. Nevertheless, the above literature review is designed to study the evolution of the discussion and understand the main concepts in order to make better use of the up-to-date data. However, I consider cumulative causation theory to be the most relevant for the scope of this thesis. Cumulative causation theory suggests that migration sustains and reproduces itself, becoming increasingly common (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). As will be seen in the following sections, migration is strongly embedded in Turkish history with regard to social ties, expanding networks and local culture; this enables more people to be familiar with the notion and affects the migration decision of future migrants.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH HISTORY ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Migration has been part of Turkish history, starting from the establishment of the Turkish Republic. From 1923 until today, millions of people from different origins have either come to or moved from this country. There have been various reasons for these movements in specific periods, which will be discussed separately in the following sections.

The estimated total number of Turkish citizens living in other countries reached 5.5 million in 2016, including second- and third-generation migrants of Turkish descent outside of Turkey (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016)–which is 7% of Turkey's population in the same year (Turkish population 2016: 79.8 million people; http://www.tuik.gov.tr). Migration from Turkey has taken a few particular forms, the first of which was obligatory relocation due to the founding of the nation state. In the most recent decades, outward migration can be categorized under five types: (1) family related emigration; (2) asylum seeking; (3) irregular (undocumented or clandestine) labor emigration; (4) contract-related (low-skilled) labor emigration; and (5) emigration of professionals and high-skilled people." (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013). The influence and significance of each form of migration have changed over time, and the emigration of professionals and high-skilled people is increasingly being discussed; this parallels the global phenomenon that, according to several international migration statistics, migrants are increasingly likely to have higher education levels (Acar, 2017, p. 2). Turkey is certainly an important player in global migration studies, and for the aim of this thesis it is worth examining historical data to be able to better understand the current willingness of people to

migrate from Turkey. In the following sections, I will categorize the historical

background and give a brief overview of the historical data.

3.1 Early years of the Turkish Republic

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, migration was used as a policy

to build a more homogeneous nation state–as was the case in many state and nation-

building efforts during the first half of the twentieth century. World War I had

damaged the economies of the countries, as well as drastically decreasing their

populations; Turkey's 1914 population of 15.9 million had decreased to 13.6 million

by 1927 (see Table 2). As part of establishing a nation state, the population was

considered a source of defense and national security, as well as a necessity for

economic development (Kirişçi, 2000). In that sense, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's

policy defined the structure for the inflow of groups to Turkey: "those people (anasır)

who were outside Turkey but of similar ethnic origin (ırk) and culture (hars) as Turks

should be brought to Turkey" (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 15).

The mass departure of the non-Muslim minority groups living in Turkey

(Greek Orthodox Christians, for instance) and the inflow of Muslim or Turkic groups

that had previously been part of the Ottoman Empire, shaped the nation-building

process (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009). Two remarkable outflow

waves from Turkey were the Albanians (1914-1915) and the population exchange

between Turkey and Greece (1922-1923) (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey,

2009). The Muslim population that migrated to Turkey was around 1.6 million–

consisting mostly of Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking

Muslims), and Turks from Eastern Europe (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016).

Table 2 shows a summary of census data from 1914 to 2005 about the population of Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups. It is seen that the decrease in non-Muslim populations is not exclusive to the first years of the Turkish Republic, but the percentage of non-Muslim groups continued to decline until the 2000s. Kirişçi (2000) argues that states prefer persons that are likely to strengthen a country's national identity and sense of cohesion. As a natural consequence of the state preference, ". . . exclusive priority was given to encouraging and accepting immigrants who were either Muslim Turkish speakers, or who were officially regarded as belonging to ethnic groups that would assimilate into a Turkish identity without difficulty, i.e., Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars from the Balkans" (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009, p. 2). Table 3 shows the number of people who migrated to Turkey by region.

Although the population movements in the first years of the Turkish Republic were not voluntary or based on the rational decisions of individuals, they were important in shaping the characteristics of the nation-state.

3.2 Post-World War II period

The second large-scale movement from Turkey dates back to the post-World War II period of the 1950s. The rising demand for manual labor, especially in Western European countries that lacked manpower due to their population losses, created a new migration wave from Turkey; this movement had long-term effects on shaping the Turkish population living outside of Turkey and ended with Turkish migrants as the largest migrant group (with Moroccans) in Europe (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016).

Table 2. Muslim and Non-Muslim Populations in Turkey 1914-2005 (in thousands)

Year	1914	1927	1945	1965	1990	2005
Muslims	12.941	13.290	18.511	31.139	56.860	71.997
Greek Orthodox	1.549	110	104	76	8	3
Armenians	1.204	77	60	64	67	50
Jews	128	82	77	38	29	27
Others	176	71	38	74	50	45
Total	15.997	13.630	18.790	31.391	57.005	72.120
% of non-Muslims	19.1%	2.5%	1.5%	0.8%	0.3%	0.2%

Source: Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009

This era signifies a shift in Turkish migration history. During the Ottoman and early Republic period, mass migration was more a result of enlarged (or changed) county territory, not the search for a new job or aspirations for a new life in an unknown country (Abadan-Unat, 2011). The lack of manpower in Western European countries created a demand for unskilled labor; this demand was well-received by the Turkish economy, which at the time was going through a major change since ". . . masses of unskilled rural labor . . . became idle during the course of urbanization, modernization of agriculture and capital-intensive industrialization over the 1950s and 1960s . . ." (Acar, 2017, p. 3). Abadan-Unat (2011) notes that both migrant-exporting and migrant-receiving countries considered this transfer of surplus labor a form of "goods exchange." At that time, the main motivations for the Turkish government to adopt an emigration policy, sending manual, low-skilled labor were: (1) decreasing the unemployment rate in Turkey, which reached 2.5 million by the

mid-1960s; (2) to develop Turkish economy through emigrant remittances; and (3) gaining the know-how and new skills of migrants when they returned to Turkey, which would also improve the Turkish economy (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009; İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). This emigration policy was also included in the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967) with the following targets:

> Another aspect of [the] employment policy is the export of surplus labor to those countries of Western Europe which suffer from a dearth of labor. However, Turkey, while having surplus unskilled labor, is lacking in sufficient numbers of skilled labor. Therefore, it is essential that measures be taken to ensure that Turkey's deficiency in skilled labor not be exacerbated by Turkey's labor export policy. (State Planning Organization, Turkish Five-Year Development Plan:456)

The first major bilateral agreement, between Turkey and West Germany, was signed in 1961 and *Gastarbeiter* officially migrated to Germany with a license offering a two-year maximum stay there (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). The number of *Gastarbeiter* was 7,000 – from the start of the process until the treaty was signed. In the following years this number increased to 18,558 in 1962 and 27,500 in 1963 (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). This first bilateral agreement is, in a way, an indicator of how state intervention can define the international migration pattern.

Table 4 shows the subsequent labor agreements signed with other countries in the following years. As seen in the table, the 1960s marked a wave of migration that mostly targeted European countries via the bilateral agreements. However, this trend changed in the 1970s with North Africa, Russia and the Middle East new destination areas (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). Different from the migration to Europe in the 1960s, which was handled formally by the state, this migration stream was organized by entrepreneurs and middlemen (Abadan-Unat, 2011).

Table 3. Number of People Who Migrated to Turkey by Region (1923-1995)

Year	1923-1939	1940-1945	1946-1995
Bulgaria	198,688	15,744	603,585 [a]
Greece	384,000	-	25,889
Romania	117,095	4,201	1,264
Yugoslavia	115,210	1,671	188,040
Turkistan [c]	-	-	2,878
Others	10,029[b]	-	17,869
Total	825,022	21,616	839,525

Source: Kirişçi, 2000
Notes:
   (a) Subsequent to the influx of the 310,000 refugees that sought asylum from
       Turkey in 1989, 124,678 had returned to Bulgaria as of March 1994.
   (b) This figure covers the period 1923-1949.
   (c) Turkistan refers to the geographical area corresponding roughly to the present
       Central Asian countries and the Sinkiang province of China, known as East
       Turkistan.

Parallel to the Turkish government's aim with its emigration policy, the

bilateral agreements with Germany and other European countries were based on a

"rotation" principle. According to this principle, Turkish workers were sent abroad to

return to Turkey after a year, with know-how and new skills to add to Turkish

economic development (Abadan-Unat, 2011). However, this emigration policy did

not turn out as the Turkish state expected, since it was later understood that a transfer

of know-how and skills would not be possible in the projected time interval (Abadan-

Unat, 2011). According to Abadan-Unat (2011), it solely worked in the other

direction and benefited migrant-accepting states and their financial capital; through

immigration, receiving states were able to increase their productivity, and it also gave their native labor a chance for upward mobility.

Most of the first wave of *Gastarbeiter* were hired through anonymous recruiting via employment agencies. In this case, the basic idea was to fill a vacant position with a random person who fit the job requirements. Another method was called nominal recruiting, in which a potential employee was nominated (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). Other than these two official methods, an alternative migration model was travel via tourist visa, arriving in Germany and looking for suitable employment opportunities there. Although there is no available data on the number of illegal migrations, it is estimated to be around 20% of current migrants (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). This era represents the contact-related (low-skilled) labor emigration category.

Abadan-Unat (2011) examines this era with the view that it was governed by "economic fluctuations and national wishes of the accepting countries," referring to Franklin D. Scott's 1968 work. Although the final choice to work abroad belonged to the individual, it was very much influenced by demand from industrialized countries and the willingness of the Turkish state to answer it.

Table 4. Bilateral Work Force Treaties of Turkey and Receiving Countries

Country Name	Agreement Year
West Germany	1961
United Kingdom	1961
Austria	1964
Belgium	1964
Netherlands	1964
France	1965
Sweden	1967
Australia	1967
Switzerland	1971
Denmark	1973
Libya	1975
Norway	1981
Jordan	1982
Qatar	1986

Source: İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014; Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009

After the oil crisis in 1973, which affected the economies of Western European countries and decreased the demand for migrant labor, Arab countries became attractive for Turkish labor (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009). The three-staged migration to Arab countries can be categorized as: (1) to Libya and Saudi Arabia between 1967 and 1980; (2) to Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen and Jordan between 1981 and 1992; and (3) the decline of Turkish migration to the area after 1993 (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009). Global developments–the Gulf Crisis in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union–created a destination for Turkish migrants: the Commonwealth of Independent States (Focus Migration,

Country Profile: Turkey, 2009). Table 5 shows emigration from Turkey based on the country of destination. Political and economic changes in the world arena are directly reflected in changes in the destination countries. Between 1961 and 1974, 97.5% of Turkish migrants went to European countries. This percentage shrank below 1% in 1990s, then seems to stabilize around 9% between 1996 and 2005.

The oil crisis of 1973 slowed labor immigration to Germany but migration continued in a new form: family reunification. The first wave of *Gastarbeiter* who migrated to Germany had left their families behind in the initial phase; they were mostly planning to return to Turkey after a certain period. But reality differentiated from the plan, and in the 1970s it was clear that Turkish labor in European countries was not a temporary phenomenon but workers intended to stay (Abadan-Unat, 2011). Social security agreements between governments for foreign workers followed as a result, which provided workers access to health care, social insurance, unemployment and pension rights, and state assistance in childbirth and child care (Abadan-Unat, 2011). In particular, the introduction of child subsidy payments in West Germany encouraged Turkish workers (who were ". . . among the least likely to bring their families to Germany") to reunite their families and also to increase their number of children (Abadan-Unat, 2011). Table 6 shows the number and distribution of Turkish workers throughout European countries, including the worker-adult-child distribution for 1980. It clearly shows the increasing population once the families are brought together in the "foreign" country. The increasing number of Turkish migrants created Turkish minority groups in many European countries. As a result, family-related migration continued ". . . due to active networks between the sizeable migrant Turkish community in migrant-receiving countries and their families in Turkey" (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013). It is estimated that nearly half

of the 100,000 migrants leaving Turkey have done so due to family relations (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013).

Remittances are also an important aspect of this era that helped the Turkish economy in the short-term. In 1964, remittances only made up 2% of export income. Gradually, this amount rose to 50% of exports in 1970-1971 and 90% in 1973, helping to balance the foreign trade deficit in 1973 (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014). At the time it contributed to Turkish economy, but was not a sustainable input and definitely not comparable to the added-value that was expected from migrant-workers to bring to the Turkish economy via know-how and new skills. According to Abadan-Unat (2011), the remittances ". . . resulted only in a dependent industrialization and prevented the cycle of underdevelopment from being broken" (p. 7).

Labor migration is not the only element that shaped Turkish history. Starting with the early 1980s, Turkish military intervention, political instability, long-term conflicts with the PKK, and escalating violence have caused many Turkish citizens to seek asylum, especially in Western European countries (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013; Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009). Between 1981 and 2005, more than 664,000 Turkish citizens applied for asylum, but refugee recognition rates have generally been low (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009).

Table 5. Emigration from Turkey Based on Country of Destination (1961-2005)

	1961-1974		1975-1980		1981-1990		1991-1995		1996-2000		2001-2005		Total 1961-2005	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
European Countries	790,017	97.5%	13,426	12.8%	2,612	0.6%	9,647	2.8%	10,465	9.3%	16,561	9.1%	842,728	42.4%
Arab Countries	2,441	0.3%	74,181	70.6%	423,208	97.7%	208,274	60.4%	32,195	28.5%	57,974	31.9%	798,273	40.2%
Australia	5.806	0.7%	2,647	2.5%	2,478	0.6%	1,324	0.4%	515	0.5%	176	0.1%	12,946	0.7%
CIS Countries	-		-		-		115	0.0%	65,521	58.0%	89,623	49.3%	155,259	7.8%
Others	12,235	1.5%	14,792	14.1%	4,875	1.1%	125,238	36.3%	4,256	3.8%	17,533	9.6%	178,929	9.0%
Total	810,499		105,046		433,173		344,598		112,952		181,867		1,988,135	

Source: İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014

Table 6. Number and Distribution of Turkish Workers in European Countries (1968-1980)

				Worker	Adult	Child	
Country	1968/69	1970/71	1973/74	1980	1980	1980	Total
Germany	171,016	373,000	605,000	590,623	287,377	584,400	1,462,400
Holland	13,243	16,512	46,018	47,326	38,137	36,249	121,712
France	4,000	10,000	29,600	38,000	20,695	34,077	92,772
Belgium	4,217	8,500	10,000	23,000	13,305	30,258	66,563
Austria	5,259	12,316	29,764	30,130	17,331	17,539	65,000
Switzerland	5,227	6,502	23,158	20,119	2,143	13,604	35,857
Denmark	-	2,377	7,000	9,321	250	6,264	15,841
England	-	1,387	2,170	3,000	1,000	2,000	6,000
Norway	-	200	449	1,370	163	719	2,252
Total (Europe)	204,633	435,581	769,734	770,290	385,455	733,366	1,885,102

Source: Abadan-Unat (2011)

Abadan-Unat (2011) suggests that this labor-exporting era had three major effects on the structure of Turkish society. First was the loss of skilled labor. Although it was noted in the Turkish Five-Year Development Plan by the State Planning Organization that the labor migration policy should not decrease the population of skilled labor (which was already lacking); migration was nevertheless supported by the high inflow of remittances. It is estimated that 17% of skilled labor migrated from Turkey between 1961 and 1973. The second effect Abadan-Unat (2011) notes is a change in social mobility. On the one hand, upward mobility was seen in Turkey, essentially from agricultural to industrial-based work. On the other hand, Turkish migrants experienced downward mobility, in which white-collar workers engaged in blue-collar jobs (in order to be able to work abroad, they disguised their professions). The third effect was a new definition, a new element in Turkish society, called *Almanyalı* (the one from Germany)–as most Turks abroad live in Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2011). The element was largely adopted by the Turkish society and used to describe migrants who still have relationships with Turkey and dream of returning to their homeland to set up a small business or for retirement (Abadan-Unat, 2011).

3.3 The millennium: A new migration wave

Starting in the 1990s, in parallel to economic globalization, international flows of capital, trade and labor increased significantly. The number and variety of destination countries for Turkish migrants also increased during this time (Acar, 2017). The distinguishing characteristics of this era were the absence of an official state emigration policy and the skill level of Turkish migrants. Through the late 2000s, the emigration of university graduates and skilled labor from Turkey reached 4,000-

5,000 people a year, predominantly migrating to Australia, Canada, the U.S. and certain European countries (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013).

Figure 1 shows an overview of Turkish migrant stock in the receiving countries in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-2000s. This is also a good way to see that Germany, by far, still holds the largest Turkish minority, despite the changes in migration trends and additional destination countries for Turkish migrants.

From 1960 through the 1970s, Europe was almost the only migration destination for employment and Germany was the leading European country; a huge number of people, especially low-skilled manual workers, emigrated from Turkey. In the 2000s, although Germany still holds the highest proportion of Turkish migrant stock, other geographies are also attracting Turkish migrants for employment. The Turkish Employment Office shows that between 2000 and 2011, there was a decline in terms of employment, not only to Germany but to all European countries. Table 7 shows that geographies other than Europe, especially Middle Eastern and CIS countries, are increasingly importing Turkish labor (EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013; Turkish Employment Office).

Fig. 1 Turkish migrant stock abroad in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-2000s
Source: (Focus Migration, Country Profile: Turkey, 2009)

Starting from the 1960s until the late 2010s, the reasons for migration and settlement diversified. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of reasons for residence permits in the EU for Turkish citizens in 2017 (Eurostat News release, 2018). In 2017, family reasons remain the biggest reason (41.5%) since there is a sizable Turkish community already settled in different EU countries.

Table 7. Number of Workers Sent Abroad by the Turkish Employment Office

Receiving country	2000	2006	2009	2010	2011
EU Countries	2,264	1,330	1,637	1,323	1,619
ME Countries	2,507	39,823	32,546	33,993	28,331
CIS	7,145	36,898	17,264	14,307	18,235
Australia, Canada, U.S.	51	59	97	27	21
Israel	1,322	602	541	401	50
Other	273	2,635	5,628	4,718	5,526
Total	13,645	81,379	59,479	54,847	53,828

Source: EU Neighbourhood Migration Report, 2013; Turkish Employment Office

Fig. 2 First residence permits in the EU by reason (%), 2017
Source: Eurostat News release (2018)

The minority groups shaped in each geography differs in age and education level as well. OECD (2011) data shows that Turkish migrants have a balanced average sex ratio among OECD countries, with 52% males and 48% females. Also, in almost all OECD countries, active age groups (25-44 years) make up about half of the migrant population (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). However, in Canada, the U.S. and Australia, there are slightly more migrants aged 65 and older; this is estimated to be due to the older migrant relationships with Turkey and the lower return rates linked to geographical distance (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). Germany, as the country with the biggest Turkish minority population, also has a 12% share of migrants who are aged 65 or more; this differs slightly from the OECD country average of 10% (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). On the other hand, the OECD-DIOC database shows that Turkish migrants in Great Britain, Canada and the U.S. are more highly educated compared the OECD average at 43%, 55% and 76% respectively, which are quite different than the OECD average of 16% (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). Figure 3 shows the percentage of highly-educated Turkish migrants in age group 25-34 in various destination countries (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016; OECD DIOC database, 2011).

Figure 3 suggests that there should be a difference in employment opportunities in, for instance, Austria and Canada. Data indicates that Turkish migrants in Canada (49%) and Great Britain (35%) are generally engaged in highly-skilled professions; however, in countries where blue collar occupations are dominant, like France (18%) and the Netherlands (27%), those percentages are comparatively lower (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016). In Austria and Germany, three-quarters of Turkish migrants are in the lowest-skilled professions (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016; OECD-DIOC database, 2011). This may be connected to the

fact that the first migrants who went to Germany in the 1960s were mostly from rural areas and not well-educated. Family reunification, which still constitutes the biggest proportion of residence permits, and networks, which are significant factors increasing the likelihood and perpetuation of migration, may have had an effect on the educational level in those countries. On the other hand, it is also suggested that the low educational level of the migrants in other countries might be due to the immigration policies of these host countries (Germany and Austria are mentioned in this case), which did not create policies to integrate young migrants until very recently (Migration Profile Turkey, 2016).


Fig. 3 Percent of highly-educated Turkish migrants in various destination countries
Source: Migration Profile Turkey, 2016; OECD-DIOC database, 2011

As stated in the very beginning of this chapter, the 2000s can be differentiated from previous decades by the increasing education and skill level of Turkish migrants. Table 8 shows a summary of Turkish migrant stock in OECD

countries, which clearly shows the increasing percentage of medium- and high-

skilled labor for both female and male workers.

Table 8. Turkish Stock of Emigrants in OECD Countries by Gender and Education Level (%)

		1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Low		80	55.36	75.39	70.82	74.20	68.61	64.61
	Male	77.62	68.44	69.56	64.84	68.80	62.11	59.07
	Female	83.62	39.26	83.02	78.35	80.75	76.08	70.87
Med		15.53	36.42	17.79	21.24	18.36	20.86	22.97
	Male	16.76	23.07	22.46	26.09	22.43	25.63	27.11
	Female	13.65	52.86	11.69	15.14	13.43	15.37	18.29
High		4.47	8.22	6.81	7.94	7.44	10.53	12.42
	Male	5.62	8.49	7.98	9.07	8.76	12.26	13.82
	Female	2.73	7.88	5.29	6.51	5.83	8.54	10.84

Source: Acar, 2017; IAB Brain Drain Database

In the 2010s, Turkey experienced significant political conflicts that caused a

high number of people to emigrate from Turkey. One of the biggest incidents

showing public unrest was Gezi Park, where people protested against the

government's plan to develop Taksim Square, Istanbul in 2013. The angry and

violent response of the government, followed by arrests and lawsuits, was perceived

as alarming by attendees, who were mostly highly-educated and represented the

academic and artistic segments of the Turkish public, causing them to leave the

country. The second serious incident was the failed military coup attempt in 2016.

Although there are no official statistics of those who emigrated specifically as a

result, it is believed that tens of thousands of teachers and academics were removed

from their jobs after the coup, including hundreds who had signed a peace petition calling on the government to restart the Kurdish peace process. Applications for asylum in Europe by Turks also multiplied after 2016, according to İbrahim Sirkeci, director of transnational studies at Regent's University in London, who has studied the migration of Turks to Britain for 25 years: "[h]e estimates that 10,000 Turks have made use of a business visa plan to move to Britain in the last few years, with a sharp jump in applications since the beginning of 2016. That is double the number from 2004 to 2015" (Gall, 2019). According to the official statistics of receiving countries, which were collected by Lowen (2017), 17,000 Turkish citizens had already migrated to the UK, 7,000 to Germany and 5,000 to France by the end of 2017.

This considerable increase in the medium and, especially, the high-educated migrant stock of Turkey has been heavily discussed for the last couple of years. Emigration of the high-skilled group, called "brain-drain," may be interpreted as a loss of wealth for the sending country. A number of discussions, one being the seminal work of Bhagwati and Hamada, suggest that emigration can be seen ". . . as an erosion of human capital, which is a fundamental input for economic and social development" (Acar, 2017). Acar (2017), on the other hand, introduces relatively newer economic models which suggest that international migration may actually be advantageous for the sending country through four channels: (1) human capital channel–if migration comes with better education, this might motivate people (potential migrants) in the sending country to become more educated; (2) productivity channel–if highly-educated migrants transfer funds, investments, technology, or know-how, this might increase the productivity levels of the sending country; (3) transfer channel–remittances that make up an important part of the GDP; and (4) institutional channel–via the positive externalities of highly-skilled migrants

in the political, economic and social institutions in the sending country. For the case of Turkey, I think it will take at least a decade to be able to see and interpret the complete picture of high-skilled migration. Be it the traditional or newer position on migration, it is interesting to see what is more likely to create the intent to migrate from Turkey.

In the next chapter, I will use quantitative data from a very recent survey, completed in 2018 by Kadir Has University, Center for Turkish Studies, and try to come up with some hints about factors that may be likely to affect Turkish people's willingness to migrate.

CHAPTER 4

2018 DATA FROM TURKEY

After studying the broader theoretical framework on international migration, I have

narrowed my geographical focus specifically to Turkey, discussing important

migration-related milestones in Turkish history from the establishment of the

Republic until the current day. In this part of my thesis, I will now narrow my

discussion timeline and focus on the year 2018. I will be analyzing quantitative

survey data from Turkey to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons that are likely

to motivate Turkish citizens to move and live outside of Turkey.

4.1 Introduction of the database used for analysis

For my analysis, I use the database from the Social and Political Trends in Turkey

2018, conducted by Kadir Has University, Center for Turkish Studies. This trend

analysis report has been published annually by CTRS since 2011 in Turkish (English

versions are available only for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018). Based on the most

discussed points and problems in Turkish public opinion, questions included in

yearly surveys evolve with time and differ from each other – so a direct comparison

between years may not be a perfect fit.

There are a few reasons that I specifically chose to work with this database.

The first, and one of the most critical criteria, was the time period of the survey.

Fieldwork was done between 12 December 2018 and 04 January 2019, and the report

was published by the CTRS on 30 January 2019. The fact that the data is notably up

to date is essential for me, since this thesis aims to contribute to the literature with

time-relevant input about the factors affecting the willingness or decision to migrate

from Turkey. So, for the sake of focusing on the most recent information coming out of the survey, I chose not to include a comparison of results between previous trend reports.

The second reason why I was eager to work with this data is its extensive framework. The Social and Political Trends in Turkey survey does not only focus on willingness to migrate from Turkey. On the contrary, it was conducted to ". . . identify public opinion and attitudes in Turkey towards present and potential problems and current events," covering areas like politics, the economy, foreign policy, the Kurdish issue, terror, elections and socio-cultural indicators. This wide-ranging information about opinions on different aspects of life in Turkey allows me to evaluate the reasons from a broader angle and gives a wider perspective to my analysis.

The Social and Political Trends in Turkey, 2018 uses data representative of Turkey. Surveys were conducted with adult citizens (18 years and older) who are residents of city centers in 26 provinces (İstanbul, Ankara, Konya, Bursa, Kocaeli, İzmir, Aydın, Manisa, Tekirdağ, Balıkesir, Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Zonguldak, Samsun, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Malatya, Bitlis, Erzurum, and Ağrı). These provinces are defined as representative of Turkey by the Turkish Statistical Institute. The number of interviewees in each city and neighborhood is based on population distribution; the sample is randomly selected. In each neighborhood, a starting point is determined and dwellings/workplaces are included in the sample based on a predetermined rule. In case of absence or no-reply, that interviewee is replaced with the next person on the route. In total 1,000 interviews were carried out face to face, using prepared survey

question forms. Each interview took almost 20 minutes. Table 9 and 10 show the

basic demographic characteristic of the respondents.

Table 9. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (1)

	Gender		
Age groups	Female	Male	Total
18-24	49	82	131
25-34	123	126	249
35-44	104	107	211
45-54	73	97	170
55-64	71	49	120
65+	80	39	119
Total	500	500	1,000

	Gender		
Education level	Female	Male	Total
Primary school (1-5 years)	121	89	210
Secondary school (6-8 years)	95	133	228
High school (9-11 years)	158	147	305
University[a] (12-15 years)	124	128	252
Graduate school[b] (15+ years)	2	3	5
Total	500	500	1,000

Notes:
(a and b) The number of respondents that went to graduate school is very low. In future analyses, this group will be combined with university graduates and evaluated as one category.

Table 10. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (2)

Marital Status	Gender		
	Female	Male	Total
Married[a]	296	257	553
Not married, living together[b]	2	5	7
Single	156	226	382
Widower / Separated	46	12	58
Total	500	500	1.000

Notes:
(a and b) The number of respondents that are not married but living together is very low. In future analysis, this group will be combined with married respondents and evaluated as one category.

4.2 Methodology

4.2.1 Hypothesis

After discussing the theoretical and historical background of migration and various reasons causing it, I would like to further narrow the discussion and focus on the economic arguments. As I previously stated, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by suggesting a few factors that are affecting willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day. For that reason, I aim to find a supporting relationship between willingness to live abroad and answers to questions related to the individual's or Turkey's economic situation. I expect to see that people who are more likely to prefer to live abroad are those: (1) who indicate that they are most concerned about Turkey's economic problems; (2) who think that there is currently an economic crisis in Turkey; and (3) who express that they are economically worse off compared to last year. Table 11 summarizes the above relationships.

Table 11. Relationships between Variables Expected to be found to Support Main Hypothesis

1	People who say economic problems are the major problem in Turkey are more likely to prefer to live abroad
2	People who think that there is an economic crisis in Turkey are more likely to prefer to live abroad
3	People who have been economically worse off in the last one year are more likely to prefer to live abroad

4.2.2 Variables

The data I will use for my analysis consists of categorical answers to related questions.

As stated in the hypothesis, the main aim of this study is to find a relationship between specific driving forces and willingness to migrate from Turkey. Furthermore, it is significant and interesting to see the demographics of people who would prefer to live abroad if they had the chance.

Interviewees were asked a single question about their willingness to live abroad. The question wording and the list of answers are shown in Table 12.

I should highlight that the "no opinion" answer does not indicate that the respondent has not given an answer, or the data is missing; it means that the respondent has elected to give this answer. For this reason, I preferred to keep these respondents in the data set.

Table 12. Question Wording for Preference to Live Abroad

Question Wording	List of Answers
Would you prefer to live abroad if it is possible?	Yes
	No
	No Opinion

Out of 1,000 interviewees, 60% answered that they would not prefer to live abroad even if they had the possibility. A response of "no opinion" was given by 216 respondents and 180 respondents indicated that they would prefer to live abroad if they had the opportunity. A breakdown of the answers is given in Figure 4.

Fig. 4 Breakdown of answers for preference to live abroad

For the first set of questions, I aim to find a supporting relationship between the willingness to live abroad and answers to questions related to the individual's or Turkey's economic situation. For this statistical test, I have chosen three questions that specifically investigate the (either real or perceived) economic situation of the respondent and Turkey in general. The question wording and the list of answers are shown in Table 13 and Table 14.

Table 13. Question Wording for Questions Related to Economic Situation (1)

Question Wording	List of Answers	Group Name
1.The Most Important Current Problem in Turkey: Please indicate from the selection provided on the card what is the most important current problem in Turkey?	Rise in the cost of living	Economy
	Devaluation of Turkish lira/Weakening of exchange rate	
	Unemployment	
	Economic crisis	
	Price increase	
	Judicial system	Democracy- Justice- (Human/Women) Rights
	Restriction of personal freedoms and rights	
	Democratization	
	Justice	
	Violence against women	
	Intolerance	
	Disrespect	
	Struggle against FETO	Domestic Politics
	Refugees[*]	
	Current government	
	Corruption	
	Political governance system	
	Kurdish issue	
	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	
	Education system	

Notes:
*Refugees are categorized under domestic politics. The refugee issue is international, but it is domestic politics that defines how to deal with this problem within national territories.

Table 14. Question Wording for Questions Related to Economic Situation (2)

Question Wording	List of Answers	Group Name
2.The Most Important Current Problem in Turkey: Please indicate from the selection provided on the card what is the most important current problem in Turkey?	Developments in Syria	Foreign Policy
	USA Relations	
	EU Relations	
	Developments in Iraq	
	Terrorism	Terrorism
	No answer[a]	-
3. Do you think Turkish economy is currently in an economic crisis?	Yes	-
	No	-
4. Effects of Economic Developments of the Past Year How did the economic developments of the past year affect you?	I am economically better off	Better off
	I was not affected	Not Affected
	I am economically worse off	Worse off
	I was unemployed (I lost my job)	Worse off
	I was unable to provide adequately for myself / my family	Worse off
	No answer[b]	-

Notes:
   (a) Five respondents did not answer Question 1 in the table above. They are not included in the statistical analysis (total sample = 995).
   (b) 72 respondents did not answer Question 3 in the table above. They are not included in the statistical analysis (total sample = 928).

     The first question about the biggest issue in Turkey has 26 possible answers (one

being "no answer"). I preferred to categorize these answers into five groups

according to the main problem they are related to. There were five respondents who

did not answer this question, so I chose not to include that data in the further

statistical analysis, giving a sample for this question of 995. Figure 5 shows a breakdown of the individual answers, along with the totals of the five groups: (1) Economy; (2) Democracy-Justice-(Human/Women) Rights; (3) Domestic Politics; (4) Foreign Policy; and (5) Terrorism plus an extra category for "no answer."

The second question asks the respondents if they think there is a current economic crisis in Turkey. All 1,000 respondents replied to this question with either Yes or No. It is worth highlighting that 77% of the respondents indicated that there is a current economic crisis in Turkey. The breakdown of Yes and No answers are given in Figure 6.

The third question investigates how the respondent's individual economic situation was affected by economic developments within the last year. A total of five different answers were given, which I grouped into three main categories: better off, no change and worse off. A total of 72 respondents did not answer this question, so I chose not to include that data in the further statistical analysis. Excluding the missing answers, 74% of respondents perceive their individual economic situation to be worse off compared to last year. Figure 7 shows a detailed breakdown of the answers.

In addition to questions related to the economic situation, I further look at the relationship between willingness to live abroad and general evaluation of living in Turkey in order to have a broader idea about factors that may be affecting the preference. I chose further three questions from the survey: one about respondent's general happiness level living in Turkey and the other two about whether there has been a change in Turkey and its direction. Table 15 shows the question wording and list of answers.

Fig. 5 Breakdown of answers for the most important current problem in Turkey

Fig. 6 Breakdown of answers for current economic crisis in Turkey

Fig. 7 Breakdown of answers for the individual economic situation within the last one year

Table 15. Question Wording for General Evaluation Questions

Question Wording	List of Answers
4. Being Happy to Live in Turkey: Are you happy living in Turkey?	Very happy
	Happy
	Neither happy nor unhappy
	Unhappy
	Very unhappy
5. When assessing in general, do you think that Turkey is a changing country?	Yes
	No
6. Please indicate the direction of the change in Turkey - for better or worse? [*]	Getting better
	Getting worse

Notes:
*This question is only relevant for respondents who answered Question 5 as "Yes, Turkey is a changing country." (Total sample = 449).

The question about happiness investigates the average happiness level of people living in Turkey. I thought this might be a direct indicator; if people are unhappy, they would be more likely to prefer to live abroad. I find it interesting that almost half of the respondents (42%) defined themselves as neither happy nor unhappy; since happiness is a relatively subjective matter, I expected to see more absolute answers. Figure 8 shows the breakdown of answers for the happiness level.

Fig. 8 Breakdown of answers for happiness level

I think the vaguest question in this survey was the question about "change." Respondents were asked if they think that Turkey is a changing country. I believe the responses depend very much on the presumption of what one thinks about change. I was curious about the answer, because seeing the relationship between the answer to this question and willingness to leave would also give an idea about how change in general is perceived. The last question mentioned above is an addition to the previous one. Only respondents who think that Turkey is a changing country answered this question; they were asked if this change they have perceived is in a positive or negative direction. Figures 9 and 10 show the breakdown of the answers to the first question. Answers are almost split into half, with No answers slightly higher (55%). Similarly, in the next question the answers are split as 56% to 44%, where "Yes" is the higher percentage.

Fig. 9 Breakdown of answers if Turkey is changing

Fig. 10 Breakdown of answers if Turkey is changing for better or worse

Notes:
*Only respondents who answered that Turkey is changing were asked this question (total sample = 449).

Also, I will make use of the demographic characteristics of gender, education level, age group and marital status as variables in my analysis and see if there is a relationship between them and willingness to migrate abroad. I have previously introduced these demographic characteristics.

All answers from the survey questions and demographic data (including age and education level, since I prefer to present them as groups) are categorical variables. I will use Pearson's Chi-square (χ^2) test for independence to test how likely it is that an observed distribution is due to chance. The Chi-square test

basically determines whether the observed dispersal of cases departs significantly

from what is expected to be found if the null hypothesis (H_0) were correct (Pollock,

2015). In other words, the Chi-square test analyzes if the null hypothesis (H_0), which

assumes variable 1 and variable 2 are independent, is true or not. The Chi-square test

for independence does not provide the direction (or any details) of the relationship; it

basically determines whether variable 1 is dependent on variable 2. Since my

hypothesis suggests that economic reasons are the definitive motivation affecting

willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day, I will use willingness to live

abroad as the dependent variable and apply Chi-square tests to all other categorical

variables I included above.

4.3 Chi-square tests and comments

To find the factors that are likely to affect willingness to live abroad, I will run χ^2

tests for independence of "liveabroad" (the variable indicating the willingness to live

abroad if one has the opportunity) and the other independent variables. I will use

STATA for tests and I present the tests one by one with null (H_0) and alternative (H_1)

hypotheses, and then give my comments on the analysis. I will use $\alpha = .05$ as

criterion for significance for all tests.

χ^2 Test 1: Willingness to Live Abroad and the Most Important Problem in Turkey

In this first test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on the response to what constitutes Turkey's major problem. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and the idea on Turkey's major problem are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and the idea on Turkey's major problem are dependent

Among people who indicate that problems related to the economy are Turkey's most important problems, answers that they would prefer to live abroad (f_0 = 93) are less than expected (fe = 94.8). But, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is not statistically significant since $\chi^2_{critical, 8, .05}$ = 15.507. We fail to reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that there is no association between preference to live abroad and the idea on Turkey's major problem. Table 16 shows the χ^2 test for independence.

χ^2 Test 2: Willingness to Live Abroad and Turkey is in an Economic Crisis

In this second test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on the idea that Turkey is in an economic crisis. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and the idea that Turkey is in an economic crisis are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and the idea that Turkey is in an economic crisis are dependent

Table 16. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and the Most Important Problem in Turkey

Live abroad		Economy	Democracy-Justice-(Human/Women) Rights	Domestic Politics	Foreign Policy	Terrorism	Total
Yes	f_o	93	13	49	7	17	179
	f_e	94.8	8.3	47.3	3.8	24.8	179.0
No	f_o	318	27	153	8	96	602
	f_e	318.8	27.8	159.1	12.7	83.5	602.0
No opinion	f_o	116	6	61	6	25	214
	f_e	113.3	9.9	56.6	4.5	29.7	214.0
Total	f_o	527	46	263	21	138	995
	f_e	527.0	46.0	263.0	21.0	138.0	995.0

Pearson χ^2 (8) = 15.0533   P = 0.058

Notes: Five respondents did not answer this question (total sample size = 995).

Respondents who indicate that there is currently an economic crisis in Turkey answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 161) more than expected (f_e = 139.1). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical, 2, .05 = 5.991. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and the idea that Turkey is in an economic crisis are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to have the view that Turkey is in an economic crisis.

Similarly, respondents who indicate that there is no current economic crisis in Turkey answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 19) less than expected (f_e = 49.9). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to have the view that Turkey is not in an economic crisis. Table 17 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that people who think that there is an economic crisis in Turkey are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

χ^2 Test 3: Willingness to Live Abroad and Respondent's Economic Situation in the Past One Year

In this third test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on changes in respondent's self-economic situation in the past one year. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's self-economic situation in the past one year are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's self-economic situation in the past one year are dependent

Table 17. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Turkey Is in an Economic Crisis

Live abroad		Economic Crisis in Turkey		
		Yes	No	Total
Yes	f_o	161	19	180
	f_e	139.1	40.9	180.0
	%	20.83%	8.37%	18.00%
No	f_o	449	155	604
	f_e	466.9	137.1	604.0
	%	58.09%	68.28%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	163	53	216
	f_e	167.0	49.0	216.0
	%	21.08%	23.35%	21.60%
Total	f_o	773	227	1,000
	f_e	773.0	227.0	1,000.0
	%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (2) = 18.5653   P = 0.0001

Respondents who indicate that their economic situation is worse off compared to last year answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 145) more than expected (f_e = 130.5). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical, 4, .05 = 9.488. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's self-economic situation in the past one year are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to be economically worse off in the past one year. Table 18 shows the χ^2 test for independence.

Similarly, respondents who indicate that their self-economic situation is either better off or did not change compared to last year answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 2 and f_o = 29 respectively) less than expected (f_e = 4.0 and f_e = 41.5 respectively). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to indicate that their economic situation is either better or did not change

compared to last year. According to the percentage levels of each dependent, we see that people who think that they are economically worse off are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

Table 18. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Respondent's Economic Situation in the Last One Year

Live abroad		Economic Development in 1 Year			
		Better Off	No Change	Worse Off	Total
Yes	f_o	2	29	145	176
	f_e	4.0	41.5	130.5	176.0
	%	9.52%	13.24%	21.08%	18.97%
No	f_o	17	142	391	550
	f_e	12.4	129.8	407.8	550.0
	%	80.96%	64.84%	56.83%	59.27%
No opinion	f_o	2	48	152	202
	f_e	4.6	47.7	149.8	202.0
	%	9.52%	21.92%	22.09%	21.76%
Total	f_o	21	219	688	928
	f_e	21.0	219.0	688.0	928.0
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (4) = 11.3696   P = 0.023

Notes: 72 respondents did not answer this question (total sample = 928)

χ^2 Test 4: Willingness to Live Abroad and Respondent's Happiness Level

In this fourth test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on the respondent's happiness level. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's happiness level are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's happiness level are dependent

Respondents who indicate that they are either unhappy or very unhappy, answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 69$ and $f_o = 25$ respectively) more than expected ($f_e = 27$ and $f_e = 8.6$). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since $\chi^2_{critical, 8, .05} = 15.507$. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's

happiness level are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to be unhappy or very unhappy living in Turkey. Table 19 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that people who are either unhappy or very unhappy are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

Similarly, respondents who perceive themselves as happy, very happy, or neither happy nor unhappy, answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 3$ and $f_o = 23$ and $f_o = 60$ respectively) less than expected ($f_e = 11.0$ and $f_e = 58.9$ and $f_e = 74.5$ respectively). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to indicate themselves as happy, very happy, or neither happy nor unhappy.

χ^2 Test 5: Willingness to Live Abroad and the View that Turkey is Changing

In this fifth test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's view that Turkey is a changing country. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's view that Turkey is a changing country are independent

H1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's view that Turkey is a changing country are dependent

Table 19. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Respondent's Happiness Level

Live abroad		Happiness Level					
		Very Happy	Happy	Neither happy nor unhappy	Unhappy	Very Unhappy	Total
Yes	f_o	3	23	60	69	25	180
	f_e	11.0	58.9	74.5	27.0	8.6	180.0
	%	4.92%	7.03%	14.49%	46.00%	52.08%	18.00%
No	f_o	44	269	224	58	9	604
	f_e	36.8	197.5	250.1	90.6	29.0	604.0
	%	72.13%	82.26%	54.11%	38.67%	18.75%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	14	35	130	23	14	216
	f_e	13.2	70.6	89.4	32.4	10.4	216.0
	%	22.95%	10.71%	31.40%	15.33%	29.17%	24.60%
Total	f_o	61	327	414	150	48	1,000
	f_e	61.0	327.0	414.0	150.0	48.0	1,000.0
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (8) = 222.7243   P = 0.000

Respondents who indicate that Turkey is a changing country answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 104$) more than expected ($f_e = 80.8$). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical, 2, .05= 5.991. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's view that Turkey is a changing country are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to think that Turkey is a changing country. Table 20 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that people who think Turkey is a changing country are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

Table 20. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and the View that Turkey is Changing

Live abroad		Turkey is a changing country		
		Yes	No	Total
Yes	f_o	104	76	180
	f_e	80.8	99.2	180.0
	%	23.16%	13.79%	18.00%
No	f_o	268	336	604
	f_e	271.2	332.8	604.0
	%	59.69%	60.98%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	77	139	216
	f_e	97.0	119.0	216.0
	%	17.15%	25.23%	21.60%
Total	f_o	449	551	1.000
	f_e	449.0	551.0	1.000,0
	%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (2) = 19.6075   P = 0.000

χ^2 Test 6: Willingness to Live Abroad and the View that Turkey is Getting Better or Worse

In this sixth test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's view that Turkey is getting better or worse. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's view that Turkey is getting better or worse are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's view that that Turkey is getting better or worse are dependent

This question was only asked to respondents who indicated that Turkey is a changing country in the previous question. Respondents who indicate that the direction of the change in Turkey is for the worse answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 78$) more than expected ($f_e = 46.1$). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical, 2, .05 $= 5.991$. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's view that Turkey is changing for better or worse are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to think that Turkey is changing in a worse manner. Table 21 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that people who think that Turkey is changing for the worse are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

Table 21. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and the View that Turkey is Getting Better or Worse

Live abroad		Turkey change direction		
		Better	Worse	Total
Yes	f_o	26	78	104
	f_e	57.9	46.1	104.0
	%	10.40%	39.20%	23.16%
No	f_o	188	80	268
	f_e	149.2	118.8	268.0
	%	75.20%	40.20%	59.69%
No opinion	f_o	36	41	77
	f_e	42.9	34.1	77.0
	%	14.40%	20.60%	17.15%
Total	f_o	250	199	449
	f_e	250.0	199.0	449.0
	%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (2) = 64.8914   P = 0.000

Notes: Only respondents who answered that Turkey is changing were asked this question (total sample = 449).

Similarly, respondents who indicate that the direction of the change in Turkey is for the better answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 26$) less than expected ($f_e = 57.9$). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to indicate that Turkey is changing for the better.

χ^2 Test 7: Willingness to Live Abroad and Gender

In this seventh test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's gender. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H$_0$: Preference to live abroad and respondent's gender are independent

H$_1$: Preference to live abroad and respondent's gender are dependent

According to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical, 2, .05 = 5.991. We fail to reject the null hypothesis. It is likely

that there is no association between preference to live abroad and gender. Table 22 shows the χ^2 test for independence.

Table 22. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Gender

Live abroad		Female	Male	Total
Yes	f_o	94	86	180
	f_e	90.0	90.0	180.0
No	f_o	293	311	604
	f_e	302.0	302.0	604.0
No opinion	f_o	113	103	216
	f_e	108.0	108.0	216.0
Total	f_o	500	500	1.000
	f_e	500.0	500.0	1,000.0

Pearson χ^2 (2) = 1.3549   P = 0.508

χ^2 Test 8: Willingness to Live Abroad and Education Level

In this eighth test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's education level. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's education level are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's education level are dependent

In the original data, education level is indicated by ten different categories, based on the number of years attending school and school level. I decreased the number of categories to four, based on the school levels in the Turkish education system. Due to the low number of respondents with a graduate degree (15+ years of education), I choose to combine it with university graduates.

Respondents who has a university or graduate school degree answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 62$) more than expected ($f_e = 46.3$). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 critical,

$_{6, .05}$= 12.592. We may reject the null hypothesis. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's education level are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to hold a university or graduate school degree. Table 23 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent, we see that people who either hold a university or a graduate school degree are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

χ^2 Test 9: Willingness to Live Abroad and Age Group

In this ninth test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's age group. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's age are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's age are dependent

In the original data, age is indicated as a continuous variable from 18 to 65 (people who are over 65 are defined as 65+). I created the categorical variable of age group, consisting of six groups, to be able to analyze the age data with the same methods as other categorical variables.

Respondents who belong to the youngest age groups in the data, namely 18-24 and 25-34, answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 31 and f_o =60 respectively) more than expected (f_e = 23.6 and f_e = 44.8). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since χ^2 $_{critical, 10, .05}$= 18.307. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's age group are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to belong to the youngest age groups in the data, 18-24 and 25-34.

Table 23. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Education Level

Live abroad		Education Level				
		Primary school	Secondary school	High school	University and grad school	Total
Yes	f_o	38	24	56	62	180
	f_e	37.8	41.0	54.9	46.3	180.0
	%	18.10%	10.53%	18.36%	24.12%	18.00%
No	f_o	125	168	177	134	604
	f_e	126.8	137.7	184.2	155.2	604.0
	%	59.52%	73.68%	58.03%	52.14%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	47	36	72	61	216
	f_e	45.4	49.2	65.9	55.5	216.0
	%	22.38%	15.79%	23.61%	23.74%	21.60%
Total	f_o	210	228	305	257	1.000
	f_e	210.0	228.0	305.0	257.0	1.000,0
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (6) = 27.0620   P = 0.000

Similarly, respondents who belong to the two oldest age groups, namely 55-64 and 65+, answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 11$ and $f_o = 11$ respectively) less than expected ($f_e = 21.6$ and $f_e = 21.4$ respectively). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to belong to the two oldest age groups, namely 55-64 and 65+. Table 24 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

χ^2 Test 10: Willingness to Live Abroad and Marital Status

In this tenth and final test, I will analyze if the preference to live abroad is dependent on respondent's marital status. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:

H_0: Preference to live abroad and respondent's marital status are independent

H_1: Preference to live abroad and respondent's marital status are dependent

In the original data, marital status is given in four different categories, as I introduced in the demographic characteristics of the respondents. Due to the low number of respondents under the "not married, living together" category, I grouped it under the "married" categorical variable.

Respondents who are single answer that they would prefer to live abroad ($f_o = 87$) more than expected ($f_e = 68.8$). Also, according to the χ^2 test of independence, this difference is statistically significant since $\chi^2_{critical, 4, .05} = 9.488$. It is likely that the preference to live abroad and respondent's marital status are dependent. We may also say more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to be single. Table 25 shows the χ^2 test for independence. According to the percentage levels of each dependent variable, we see that single people are more likely to live abroad if they had the chance.

Table 24. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Age Group

Live abroad		18 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 +	Total
					Age group			
		18 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 +	Total
Yes	f_o	31	60	36	31	11	11	180
	f_e	23.6	44.8	38.0	30.6	21.6	21.4	180.0
	%	23.66%	24.10%	17.06%	18.24%	9.17%	9.24%	18.00%
No	f_o	75	138	128	108	79	76	604
	f_e	79.1	150.4	127.4	102.7	72.5	71.9	604.0
	%	57.25%	55.42%	60.66%	63.52%	65.83%	63.87%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	25	51	47	31	30	32	216
	f_e	28.3	53.8	45.6	36.7	25.9	25.7	216.0
	%	19.09%	20.48%	22.28%	18.24%	25.00%	26.89%	21.60%
Total	f_o	131	249	211	170	120	119	1.000
	f_e	131.0	249.0	211.0	170.0	120.0	119.0	1.000,0
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (10) = 23.8412   P = 0.008

Table 25. χ^2 Test for Independence: Willingness to Live Abroad and Marital Status

Live abroad		Married and Living together	Single	Widower/ Separated	Total
		Marital Status			
Yes	f_o	83	87	10	180
	f_e	100.8	68.8	10.4	180.0
	%	14.82%	22.77%	17.24%	18.00%
No	f_o	358	214	32	604
	f_e	338.2	230.7	35.0	604.0
	%	63.93%	56.02%	55.17%	60.40%
No opinion	f_o	119	81	16	216
	f_e	121.0	82.5	12.5	216.0
	%	21.25%	21.21%	27.59%	21.60%
Total	f_o	560	382	58	1.000
	f_e	560.0	382.0	58.0	1,000.0
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Pearson χ^2 (4) = 11.6516   P = 0.020

Similarly, respondents who are married or living together answer that they would prefer to live abroad (f_o = 83) less than expected (f_e = 100.8). So, we may say more people who do not prefer to live abroad are likely to be married or living with someone. Table 14.10 shows the χ^2 test for independence.

All χ^2 tests for independence indicate that the two variables of this test have some relationship. To repeat, those tests do not provide any information about the direction or strength of those relationships.

χ^2 tests for independence were used to gain more information about people who would prefer to live abroad if given the opportunity. In the last section of this chapter, let us have a look at the characteristics of those potential migrants.

4.4 A closer look at the "potential migrants"

The previous part tested if there is a likely relationship between the selected variables and the willingness to live abroad. This section will have a more descriptive perspective to understand the demographics of "potential migrants" and take a closer look at the 180 respondents who would like to live abroad if they had the opportunity.

The gender distribution of the "potential migrants" is balanced. The sample of 180 "yes, I would prefer to live abroad" answers consist of 94 female and 86 male respondents. Gender distribution is almost even (52% female and 48% male). The χ^2 test for independence in the previous section also suggested that gender and willingness to live abroad are likely not to have a relationship; this balanced demographic distribution of "potential migrants" does not conflicting with that outcome. Also, when compared with the total sample (1,000 respondents–50% female and 50% male), the distribution does not differ very much.

Of the "potential migrant," 35% hold either a university or a graduate degree. This percentage is higher when compared with the education level of the total sample. Figures 11 and 12 show the education level distribution of "potential migrants" and the total sample, respectively.


Fig. 11 Education level of "potential migrants" (N=180)

Fig. 12 Education level of Turkey representative total sample (N=1000)

Although the percentages of graduates from primary school (1-5 years) and high
school (9-11 years) are nearly the same, those with secondary school (6-8 years) and
university and graduate school (12+ years) education are different among the two
samples.

The age distribution of those 180 "potential migrants" also differs from the
total sample. In the first sample, the youngest two age groups, 18-24 and 25-34,
make up 51% of total respondents who indicate they would prefer to live abroad. On
the other hand, this percentage decreases to 38% in the total sample. Figures 13 and
14 show the age group distribution of both samples.

Fig. 13 Age group distribution of "potential migrants" (N=180)

Fig. 14 Age group distribution of Turkey representative total sample (N=1000)

In other words, we may say that the younger age groups, 18-24 and 25-34, have a higher percentage of "yes" answers compared to the rest. Figure 15 shows the percentage of "yes," "no" and "no opinion" answers for the question about willingness to live abroad. The percentage of "yes" responses is lower in older age groups compared to two mentioned above.


Fig. 15 Percentage of answers among different age groups (%)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Migration has been a major topic in different disciplines like sociology, economics, international relations, and psychology. It includes many aspects, from the decision to migrate through the integration (or non-integration) process and even further. In this thesis, I was able to focus on a very limited time interval and a single geography. Even in this limited time and geography, it is still possible to see numerous reasons to take the decision to migrate abroad under very different economic and political macro-conditions.

One main point I would like to highlight is that the figures presented in this thesis are not constant or permanent – they are findings exclusive to their age, dependent on the macro- and micro-conditions. Each era may have other motivations, paths and consequences. In the 1960s, going abroad was a near synonym for "exile" for many Turkish workers, and their ultimate goal/dream was to return to their homeland (Abadan-Unat, 2011). Today, we see that second- and third-generation migrants born outside of Turkey visualize their future differently; they believe that they have plenty of options to choose from (Abadan-Unat, 2011). At the same time, there are plenty of people, having been born and raised in Turkey, who visualize a future abroad. It is highly probable that 30 years from now, we will still be discussing the topic of migration but the characteristics or the perspectives we use may be completely different, depending on the economic, political or cultural macro-conditions. So, it is important to point out that the conclusions in this thesis, which are derived from statistical analysis using the database of the Social and Political Trends in Turkey 2018 survey, should always be taken with regard to this specific

point in time. It is almost impossible to define a sole path for this expansive phenomenon; we can only try to come up with some hints that may group explanations and, in this way, facilitate understanding of the patterns. As Castles, de Haas and Miller (2013) point out: "[t]hroughout the world, long standing migratory patterns are persisting in new forms, while new flows are developing in response to economic, political and cultural change, and violent conflicts. Yet, despite the diversity, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies" (p. 9).

I started with the hypothesis that economic reasons are the primary definitive motivation affecting willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day. Starting with neoclassical macro-migration theory, economic factors have always been considered influential for international migration decisions at all levels of analysis–be it an individual decision, family alignment or macro-structure like dual-market or bilateral state labor agreements that produce and reproduce international migration. The literature review of the theoretical framework offers the advantage of understanding previous sets of ideas and being able to categorize and analyze past and current phenomenon. On the other hand, being aware of critiques of these theories and following the evolution of the literature itself has brought me to the idea that a single category of reasons or a single theory is not sufficient in itself or better than the rest at explaining international migration. As Arango (2000) pointed out, "[m]igration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory."

Still, in line with my hypothesis, I had a brief look at the Turkish history of economic-based international migration–especially the phenomenon of Turkish workers who, via state policies, moved to other countries in search of jobs but dreamed of returning to their homeland and ended up creating one of the biggest minority groups in certain (especially European) countries. By analyzing the

available statistics on Turkish emigrants, I observed certain developments throughout the timeline: changes in destination countries (starting predominantly from European countries and expanding to different geographies like MEA and CIS), different patterns of decision (state policy, economic necessity, high-skilled work) and changes in the education level of migrants (basic or high level). After providing the historical background, I started to analyze the survey database.

According to the χ^2 test for independence, this thesis finds evidence that there is likely a relationship between the willingness to go abroad and economic reasons. We may say that more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to have the view that Turkey is in an economic crisis. Also, the test showed that more people who prefer to live abroad are likely to be economically worse off in the past one year.

Besides the likely relationship with the economic situation, data shows evidence that willingness to live abroad is likely to be dependent on respondent's happiness level and respondent's idea that Turkey is changing (and changing for the worse). I also checked four demographic variables to see if there is a relationship. The χ^2 test for independence shows that willingness to live abroad and gender are likely to be independent. However, willingness to live abroad is likely to have a relationship with the rest of the demographic variables, namely age-group, education level and marital status.

Based on the literature review, historical background and 2018 survey database, it is not possible to prove that economic reasons are the definitive motivation affecting willingness to emigrate from Turkey in the present day. All likely relationships with willingness to live abroad suggest once again that the decision for migration is a multifaceted process and affected by a lot of variables.

The magnitude of effects of different variables on the migration decision is vague and likely to be subjective, varying among different time periods.

This thesis evaluates the willingness to live abroad–not the actual migration decision or act. However, empirical data suggests a strong link between willingness and actual migration (Otrachshenko & Popova, 2014). So, it is also important to measure the willingness of people; if migration trends continue to increase, managing the potential outflows of migrants could be related to reducing their desire to migrate. Further research that has a similar large sample size and uses qualitative data is needed to better understand the primary motivations behind migration intentions.

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