

Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey under PASOK Rule of 1981 – 1989

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Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

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Abstract

Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey under PASOK Rule of 1981 – 1989

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Professor Aydın Babuna, Dissertation Advisor

This dissertation analyzes the impact of the Cyprus issue, Aegean disputes and minority conflicts on Greek foreign policy towards Turkey under PASOK rule between 1981 and 1989. The continuity of traditional Greek expansionist motivation and its reflections on the foreign policy strategies of PASOK governments during the 1980s; the populism created with the dramatization of Cyprus issue around Turkey's political and military presence on Cyprus island; PASOK's nationalist discourse on Cyprus and attempts to internationalize the Cyprus conflict as part of geopolitical strategies of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey; its post-modern approaches to Aegean disputes through continental shelf and territorial waters issues and instrumentalization of the Turkish Minority in Greece in the bilateral relations with Turkey constitute the main focal points of the study. These issues are evaluated with the developments in Greco-Turkish relations in a historical context of geopolitical conjuncture.

This dissertation is mainly based on documents from the Greek and Turkish archives, and, analysis of Greek scholars in order to construct a framework by understanding the mainstream approaches to Greco-Turkish conflicts in the Greek academic circle. The dissertation argues that traditional Greek extensionist policies, which arise from the well-known Megali Idea phenomenon, have a continuous character which has effected every generation of Greek ruling elite throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The work shows that the continuity of traditional Megali Idea in a post-modern character was one of the most dominant element in shaping PASOK's foreign policy strategies towards Turkey during its rul-

ing period between 1981 and 1989. In this respect, although PASOK appeared as a political movement challenging the established order in Greece, it has adopted Greek nationalism and the traditional features of Greek foreign policy and transformed itself to a mainstream political actor embracing the national issues instead of the socio-economic problems of the Greek society. In that sense, the study is trying to uncloak the reasons of the motivation behind PASOK's instrumentalization of Cyprus, Aegean and minority issues in the historical context of Greco-Turkish relations.

193,000 words

Özet

1981 – 1989 PASOK İktidarı Döneminde Türkiye’ye Yönelik Yunan Dış Politikası

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Profesör Aydın Babuna, Tez Danışmanı

Bu tez 1981 – 1989 arasındaki PASOK iktidarı döneminde, Kıbrıs sorunu, Ege anlaşmazlıkları ve azınlık meselelerinin Türkiye’ye yönelik Yunan dış politikası üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Geleneksel Yunan genişlemeci motivasyonu ve 1980’ler boyunca PASOK iktidarı dönemindeki dış politika stratejileri üzerindeki yansıması; Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs adasındaki siyasi ve askeri varlığı üzerinden Kıbrıs sorununun dramatize edilmesi ile yaratılan popülizm; PASOK’un Kıbrıs’la ilgili milliyetçi söylemi ve Kıbrıs sorununu Yunan dış politikasının Türkiye’ye yönelik jeopolitik stratejilerinin bir parçası olarak uluslararasılaştırma çabaları; kıta sahanlığı ve karasuları anlaşmazlıkları üzerinden Ege sorunlarına yönelik post-modern yaklaşımları ve Yunanistan’daki Türk Azınlığı Türkiye ile ikili ilişkilerde araçsallaştırması bu çalışmanın temel odak noktalarını oluşturmaktadır. Bu konular, jeopolitik konjonktüre göre Yunan-Türk ilişkilerinin tarihsel bağlamındaki gelişmelerle birlikte değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu tez temel olarak Yunan ve Türk arşiv belgeleri ile Yunan-Türk anlaşmazlıkları ile ilgili Yunan akademik çevrelerindeki ana akım yaklaşımları anlayarak bir çerçeve inşa edebilmek amacıyla çoğunlukla Yunan araştırmacıların çalışmalarına dayandırılmıştır. Tez, iyi bilinen Megali Idea fenomeninin yarattığı, 19. ve 20. yüzyıllar boyunca her nesilden Yunan yönetici elitlerini etkileyen geleneksel Yunan yayılmacılığının süregelen bir karakteri olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Çalışma, geleneksel Yunan yayılmacılığının bu devamlılık özelliğinin, 1981 – 1989 arası iktidarı bo-

yunca PASOK'un Türkiye'ye yönelik dış politika stratejilerinin oluşturulmasında en belirgin unsurlardan biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu noktada, her ne kadar PASOK Yunanistan'daki müesses nizama meydan okuyan bir siyasi aktör olarak ortaya çıkmışsa da, sonunda kendisini Yunan milliyetçiliğini benimseyen ve Yunan toplumunun sosyo-ekonomik sorunları yerine Yunan dış politika geleneğinin yayılmacı karakterine sarılan bir siyasi harekete dönüştürmüştür. Bu anlamda, bu çalışma Yunan-Türk ilişkilerinin tarihsel bağlamı içerisinde, PASOK'un Kıbrıs, Ege ve azınlık konularını araçsallaştırmasının ardındaki motivasyonun sebeplerini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.

193.000 kelime

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To Attila and Krisztina

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Glossary of Non-English Terms

Allagi	Change
Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou	Progressive Party of Working People
Arkhaiologia Elliniki	Greek Archeology
Autochthones	Natives
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	Republican People's Party
Ellinikos Synagermos	Greek Rally
Enosis	Union
Enosis Kentrou	Centre Union
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo	National Liberation Front
Filotimo	Sense of Honor
Heterochtones	Non-natives
Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous	History of the Greek Nation
Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion	Central Intelligence Service
Kommounistiko Komma Elladas	Communist Party of Greece
Laikon Komma	People's Party
Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos	Popular Orthodox Rally
Levendia	Generosity and Bravery
Megali Idea	Great Idea
Metapolitefsi	Regime Change
Milli Selamet Partisi	National Salvation Party
Paleotomanos	Ex-Ottoman
Paleoturkos	Ex-Turk
Palmerokratia	Period of Palmer Rule
Panellinio Apeleftherotiko Kinima	Panhellenic Liberation Movement
Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Turcophones	Turkish Speakers
Tourkokratia	Period of Ottoman Rule
Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı	Turkish Resistance Organization
Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı	Turkish Petroleum Corporation

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People
BAKEŞ	Culture and Education Foundation of Western Thrace Minority
CCT	Coordination Council of Thrace
CHP	Republican People's Party
EAM	National Liberation Front
EC	European Communities
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KKE	Communist Party of Greece
KYP	Central Intelligence Service
MSP	National Salvation Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	New Democracy
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally
PAK	Panhellenic Liberation Movement
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Corporation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
USA	United States of America

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Introduction

The relations between Greece and Turkey have been marked by alternating periods of mutual hostility and reconciliation ever since Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829. Since then, the two neighbouring countries have faced each other in three major wars, the Ottoman-Greek War in 1897, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and finally, the Turkish-Greek War between 1919 and 1922 after the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. The last one was followed by the Turkish-Greek population exchange and a period of friendly relations from the 1930s to the mid-1950s. Both countries joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Relations deteriorated again in the 1950s due to the Cyprus issue, and the countries were on the brink of war with Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Besides, subsequent military confrontations over the Aegean Sea and minority issues of the Turks of Western Thrace and Greeks of İstanbul resulted in many other conflicts challenging the status quo between them.

While I discuss Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the 1980s, three major discussion units generate the turning points for my dissertation: the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, in which I believe that Greek foreign policy's tension-oriented perspective towards Turkey was strongly motivated by the Turkish presence on the island of Cyprus from 1974 onwards; the Aegean disputes, mainly arising from territorial waters and

continental shelf conflicts which gave the Greek side a motivation for geographical and economic expansion; and the minority issues which constitute a kind of “weak spot” for both countries in their homogenized national unification.

A band of Greek Cypriot nationalists who formed EOKA-B (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-B), advocating Enosis¹ with Greece and backed by the Greek military junta in Athens, staged a coup against the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios on July 15, 1974. An ex-EOKA leader, Nikos Sampson, was appointed as the President of Cyprus. Just a couple of days after the coup, Turkey, using its guarantor status arising from the trilateral accords of the 1959-1960 Zurich and London Agreements, intervened in Cyprus, took control of 37% of the northern part of the island, and expelled the Greek population in the north to the south. Once again, war between Greece and Turkey seemed imminent, but actual war was averted when Sampson’s coup collapsed and Makarios returned to power. Also, the Greek military junta in Athens, which failed to confront the Turkish intervention, fell from the power on 24 July. However, the damage to Turkish-Greek relations was done, and the capture of Northern Cyprus by Turkey would be a sticking point in Turkish-Greek relations for decades to come.

After 1974, the political disputes between Turkey and Greece have mainly been categorized under three topics until today: the Cyprus issue, the Aegean disputes under the shadow of Cyprus, and the minority problems. What I am going to analyze in my dissertation are Greek foreign policy towards Cyprus from 1974 onwards, the Aegean disputes, and the minority problems which have been strongly affected by the narrative of defeat in Cyprus. This motivation was totally tension-oriented, especially on the disputes over the Aegean and the minority problems.

1 Enosis simply means ‘Union’. However, Enosis, in general, represents the movement of various Greek communities that live outside Greece, for incorporation of the regions where they inhabit into the Greek state. More specifically, since the second half of the 20th century, Enosis has represented the unification of Cyprus and Greece under the Hellenic Republic.

The Aegean conflict was motivated both by considerations of military tactical advantages and by questions of economic exploitation of the Aegean. The latter issue became particularly significant, as there have been expectations of finding oil in the Aegean from the 1970s onwards. This was highlighted during the crisis in the 1980s, when vessels from both sides entered into disputed waters to conduct any kind of survey. Such activities in the disputed waters had always had the possibility to turn into an armed conflict between the two neighbouring states. For example, when a Turkish vessel entered into the disputed waters to perform an oil survey in 1987, the Greek Prime Minister of the time, Andreas Papandreou, thought about ordering the Turkish vessel to be sunk if found within disputed waters claimed by Greece. Consultations about this issue were held in Davos between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, and the crisis ended in a short time, but these kinds of crisis usually constituted the significant characteristics of Turkish-Greek relations of the 1980s and reflected the tense nature of the relations throughout the 1980s.

The Greco-Turkish issues which have remained unresolved until today actually emerge from the motivation of both states for the mutual delimitation of several zones in the Aegean Sea. Delimitation of the continental shelf zone in international parts of the Aegean Sea, which would give the states exclusive rights to economic exploitation and geographical expansion; the sovereignty over the islands related with the continental shelf dispute, and the width of the territorial waters are the elements of that motivation. Both sides currently possess 6 nautical miles off their shores in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims the right to unilateral expansion to 12 nautical miles, based on the international law of the sea. Turkey does not accept the applicability of the 12-mile rule in the Aegean Sea and has threatened Greece with war in the event that it tries to apply the rule unilaterally.

Besides the Cyprus conflict and Aegean dispute, the minority issue is the oldest source of conflict in state-to-state affairs between the two countries, having its roots in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed after the end of the Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922. The Treaty of

Lausanne is the legal document which has regulated the rights of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in Greece and Turkey since 1923. It recognizes the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace, and non-Muslim Greeks, Armenians and Jews in Turkey as the official minority groups, and provides a legal framework to protect the religious, economic, social and cultural rights of these minority groups. Nevertheless, during the following decades, Turkey and Greece have both consistently violated these rights, not only marginalizing their minorities but also putting them under political suppression and forcing them to emigrate, especially in the case of the Turks in Western Thrace. The status of the Turkish Minority in Greece had always been reflected as a threat to Greek national sensibilities, and so the Minority itself is still considered as a “weak spot” in Greek foreign policymakers’ minds. Mainly because of this reason, serious violations have continued and reached their most disruptive point in the form of denial of self-identification, economic and educational marginalization, appointment of muftis by the state, limitations on political representation, restrictions on freedom of movement and closure of minority associations, all in contradiction with the obligations of the Lausanne Treaty.

Up to today, Greco-Turkish relations have mostly been dominated by lack of mutual trust, mainly arising from the Cyprus problem, the Aegean disputes and the minority issues. Therefore, in my dissertation, I try to focus on the reasons underlying the motivation of Greek foreign policy on Cyprus, the Aegean disputes and the minority issues, which have always created tensions in relations with Turkey. I argue that Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, especially after 1974, was very much tension-oriented. The sensitive character of the Cyprus issue and populist policies in the domestic arena arising from that sensitivity towards Cyprus, the complex characteristics of the Aegean disputes, and the “weak spot” minority issue determined the cornerstones of the foreign policy of PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima) towards Turkey during the 1980s. PASOK governments followed tension-increasing policies towards Turkey from 1981 onwards, and in my dissertation, I try to explain this tension-oriented foreign policy mainly by referring to the effect of populism on the Greek domestic environment during PASOK’s ruling period of 1981-1989.

PASOK is a political movement that has left its mark on 21 years of the post-civil war political history of Greece. PASOK has three periods of power. The first ruling period covers the years between 1981-1989, in which fundamental socio-political changes had been introduced in Greece. The second power period is the era of 1993-2004, which can be described as the mature power period of PASOK, where the socio-political changes of the 1980s were internalized by almost all the political actors of the country and Greek society. The last is the short two-year period of 2009-2011, when the unfortunate economic crisis hit Greece shockingly. From this point of view, each ruling period of PASOK is a separate dissertation subject with its own dynamics. However, there is no doubt that the most important one among these periods was the period of 1981-1989, which deeply shaken the political dynamics in Greece, reshaped the society and experienced the most breaking developments in Greece's international relations. In order to understand the density of PASOK in Greek political history, it is necessary to look at this extraordinary, highly dynamic history of the 1980s, written with the Andreas Papandreou phenomenon. More importantly, the hottest period of Greco-Turkish relations is this conflictual period of 1981-1989, which was produced by the extraordinary international dynamics of the 1980s. Greece and Turkey have returned from the brink of the armed conflict more than once during this period. The main reason why this period of Greco-Turkish relations is referred to an era of dangerous tensions is the foreign policy followed by PASOK towards Turkey. For these reasons, the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in this period of 1981-1989 is a noteworthy subject matter to examine in itself and constitutes the main subject of this dissertation.

§ 1.1 Sources and Methodology

In this dissertation, the research method known as “qualitative historical analysis” is used in order to understand the structural transformation of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the 1974-1981 New Democracy period and to explain the tension-oriented feature of that transformation

with the populist tendencies of the PASOK government between 1981 and 1989.

My dissertation is a diplomatic history study, so I need to look at historical events through the eyes of a historian, and at the same time, I need to evaluate the international political developments through the eyes of a political scientist. From that point of view, it is necessary to find a way to explain Greek foreign policy of the 1980s with a diplomatic history method.

The phrase “qualitative historical analysis” mainly refers to a methodological approach which focuses on qualitative measurement and use of primary and secondary historical sources. Additionally, the meaning of the phrase includes evaluations by diplomatic historians and political scientists of any case for the construction of a theoretical approach. In other words, a research with a qualitative historical analysis method requires examination of a certain quality or making reference to a phenomenon. In my dissertation, it is required to make that reference to the phenomena of Cyprus, the Aegean dispute and the minority issue in Greek foreign policy under the PASOK government of the 1980s.

Qualitative historical analysis in international relations focuses on a number of cases to summarize the analysis of a certain policy, or a political attitude. The case is often a country, a crisis, a war or any other event which can be considered as a component of a political process, and is defined by Odell as “*a single example for an event or a phenomenon*”.² From that point of view, in my study, I focus on evaluating those cases with observations, such as a distinctive policy of the PASOK government, or a significant event in PASOK’s ruling period in the 1980s with observations of the prominent analysts, or the witnesses of the time. Moreover, narrative analysis is often used to match these observations in my qualitative analysis for the final conclusion of my study.

However, I use history as a pathfinder in the essence of the study for a variety of reasons. I study an international phenomenon by turning to

2 John S. Odell, “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 2001): 168.

history to find out the facts which I use for description and explanation in my dissertation. The meaning of the facts is never objectively obvious, which is why all empirical observations must be filtered through a conceptual framework by analyzing political events with a qualitative historical method to increase the relevance of the cases for the construction of the concept and to transform descriptive historical accounts into analytic accounts.³

The qualitative historical research method in my dissertation is accomplished with the examination of some primary and secondary source materials. As Topolski emphasizes, the primary source materials label the basic information.⁴ Basic information, given by primary source materials, refers to statements which are relatively free of any kind of evaluation. Parliamentary questions and official proceedings of Turkish deputies in the Hellenic Parliament and the official documents of the Republic of Turkey, which have been examined in the archives, provide that basic information in my study.

Primary sources refer to the original source materials on the events which shaped Greek foreign policy under the PASOK government in the 1980s. The minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, Grand National Assembly of Turkey and UK Parliament, official records of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Aegean disputes, official records of the United Nations (UN), published archival materials from British and US archives, and policy documents and declarations of PASOK contribute to my study as secondary sources. From the archival sources I try to figure out the motivation behind the political behaviors of foreign policy makers of PASOK governments of the time in the dissertation. I found out the related primary materials in Greece from the archives of the Culture and

3 Jack S. Levy, "Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of International Relations" in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001): 76.

4 Jerzy Topolski, "The Role of Logic and Aesthetics in Constructing Narrative Wholes in Historiography", *History and Theory*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May 1999): 203-204.

Education Foundation of the Western Thrace Minority (BAKEŞ), established as a non-profit company due to the restrictions on social organization in Western Thrace, in which I could access the parliamentary proceedings of the Hellenic Parliament and the extensive collection of local newspapers in Western Thrace. Also, I reached to the Turkish archival sources in the Directorate of State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, PASOK's policy declarations and criticisms of political analysts on the party's policy papers have really broadened my horizon in order to describe my discussion on the transformation of PASOK from socialism to populism including nationalist discourses. Additionally, the memoirs of prominent PASOK politicians about the crisis with Turkey and both national and local Greek newspapers are examined in the dissertation.

Each primary document is evaluated with observations on the policy implementations of PASOK's foreign policy makers, their interactions with their Turkish counterparts and other international actors, and the framework of a particular foreign policy event. As Larson describes, national and local daily publications are used as useful aids in my research process to establish my context by understanding the atmosphere of the time and public reactions.⁵ They allowed me to construct the chronology of events, because a precise chronology is crucial in my dissertation, and thus, the type of events told me how PASOK foreign policy makers responded to their counterparts, to the public and to other international actors in the events, and they showed me how their policy-making process was affected by the pressure arising from the foreseen event or crisis in that sequence.

Much of the discussions between historians and political scientists about the source of materials have revolved around whether the primary

5 Deborah Welch Larson, "Sources and Methods in Cold War History: The Need for a New Theory-Based Archival Approach" in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001): 345.

sources should be taken into consideration alone, or whether the secondary sources could also provide a sufficient base for developing an approach or explaining the type of events because the historians do not produce unproblematic narrative from which the data can be elicited to construct the framework.⁶ While political science generally puts nomothetic evaluations forward, history underlines more idiographic, specific explanations about a certain event. In other words, historians base their conclusions mainly on primary sources, but political scientists are willing to use a wider source of materials, such as policy papers, academic publications, and think-tank reports.⁷

My study also focuses on the international political behaviors of the PASOK government of 1981-1989, and as I try to explain PASOK's policies towards Turkey, a historical analysis with primary sources would not be satisfactory alone. For this reason, I need to explain the historical events by looking from an international political perspective, and that is why I had to refer to many other secondary sources, such as the published archival materials from British and US archives, publications of the international institutions, published memoirs of the former diplomats, academic studies, policy papers of related institutions in Greece and research studies conducted by scholars in Greek academia. In brief, I tried to combine the historian's case, which is constructed by primary sources, and the political scientist's approach, which is developed by secondary sources to reveal an explanatory structure.⁸

Lastly, the element which adds a methodological originality to my dissertation is the official documents on the parliamentary activities of the Minority deputies and also the sources from the Western Thrace local

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- 6 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Introduction: Negotiating International History and Politics" in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001): 28.
- 7 Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy and Stephen D. Krasner, "Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations", *International Security*, Vol. 22, No.1 (Summer 1997): 37.
- 8 Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 129.

Turkish press, which I use especially in the sixth chapter, where I examine the developments regarding the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace. Local Turkish press sources are used for the first time in an academic study and official documents on the activities of the Minority deputies in the Hellenic Parliament are published for the first time, too. In addition, the Greek sources from Greek academia which I can use limitedly also constitute an originality in terms of Turkish academic literature.

§ 1.2 Contribution to the Literature

The post-1974 dramatization of the Cyprus conflict through the Greek public; the enhancing of national sensitiveness towards Turkey in the imagined Turkish expansionism in the Aegean maritime areas, and the complete rejection of ethnic diversification in Greece with aggressive policies towards the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace constitute the bases of PASOK's arrogance in the foreign policy narrative. This arrogance emerged from the populist discourse with nationalist elements which had its roots in the first half of the 20th century and preserved its strong legacy through every subsequent ruling elite.

Undoubtedly, the PASOK period of the 1980s represents a transformation in the Greek foreign policy making processes. The period of 1981-1989 signifies the continuous characteristic of the legacy of Greek populism spiced with Greek nationalism in the foreign policy traditions of Greece. It is mostly accurate that the increasing power of PASOK by combining the Greek nationalism and populist discourse in the country led to bureaucracy's decreasing of power over the foreign policy making process and resulted in a structural and behavioural change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the hands of PASOK politicians. On the other hand, the paradigm of the declining power of bureaucracy in the foreign policy making process does not mean ideological transformation. The increase of PASOK's nationalist discourse caused the bureaucratic elements, although they weakened in the power, to meet at the same point as PASOK in terms of ideology, which is nationalism. Thus, the situation

enables us to try to understand the legacy of the nationalist-leaning populism in Greek foreign policy by analyzing the unique collaboration between the bureaucratic elites and the populist leadership of PASOK.

In the most challenging times for international politics in the 1980s, just before the end of the Cold War, the PASOK government ultimately attempted to help to increase the Greek state's political role in the international arena by confronting the Turkish policies on Cyprus, Aegean Sea and minorities. By the end of the twentieth century, the state bureaucracy in Greece also intensely tried to utilize PASOK's mobilizing power to strengthen Greek policies in the international arena and bring the Greek public together against the so-called threat coming from the east, which was Turkey. However, when all these inferences are evaluated in a historical context, the behavioural objective of foreign policy makers of the PASOK period was a populist and aggressive one in a post-modern sense rather than being a defensive one against the imagined threat from the east. Some historians argue that the Megali Idea ended in 1922 after Greece's defeat in Anatolia. However, it can be said that the Megali Idea ended only if the expansionism is considered as a continental extension. But, the Greek motivation for irredentism remained through the Enosis conceptualization in Cyprus, the territorial waters and continental shelf extension in the Aegean maritime areas, and the disregarding of Turkish existence in the country.

I conclude from my research and the prominent works that I could examine that the predominant discussion that the Megali Idea had come to an end in 1922 is questionable, and this questioning constitutes the main starting point of this study. First of all, there must be persuasive reasons to believe that the Megali Idea has taken its place in the pages of history. Moreover, we must clarify whether or not the Greek policy makers abandoned their motivation for establishing geopolitical hegemony against Turkey through the disputed issues.

If we take a short look at the historical context while we try to clarify this point, it does not provide us with strong indications that there was a renunciation. How else can it be explained that the ideal of Enosis, which was built on the idea of the unification of Cyprus and Greece and was

strongly supported by the political elites in Athens and which also caused a bloody conflict, occupied the Greek-Turkish agenda for more than half a century? Or, when it comes to sharing the Aegean Sea, with what sentences can we explain the reasons behind the motivation that this sea is a “Greek Lake”, as the Greek policy makers openly admit, which I will explain in the following chapters? With what references in the literature can we explain the claims that the Aegean Sea is almost entirely legitimate Greek territory based on the combination of the rights granted to the states by international law on territorial waters and continental shelf with maximalist projections?

At least, as far as I can see, the political history and international relations literature on Greek-Turkish relations have difficulties explaining these questions. For this reason, I think that the essence of the Greco-Turkish conflicts that encompassed almost the whole 20th century and continued with strong inheritance by PASOK is a modern form of expansionist motivation constructed by the traditional Megali Idea. Therefore, I would argue that the Greek policy makers, including PASOK elites, intentionally and successfully instrumentalized the Cyprus and Aegean issues in their relations with Turkey in order to allow a deliberate political hegemony over the disputed regions. I define this situation as the post-modern Megali Idea, which can probably be considered a little pretentious. In return, those policy makers built the argument for Turkey’s expansionism against Greece by attributing a meaning to the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, namely Turkey’s political extension in Greece. That is, they themselves were actually defining the counter-challenge that naturally stood against the expansionist motivation.

This argument is of course open to debate and strong criticism. However, I think that despite the clear definitions and provisions in international law, keeping the 12-mile Greek territorial waters claims in the Aegean Sea over the head of Turkey like “the Sword of Damocles”, considering the disputed areas as legitimate Greek territories, claiming that the islands have a continental shelf, even though Greece is not an archipelago state, and striving for years to ensure the geographical and political integrity of the island of Cyprus with Greece in a dramatic and

painful history are the most important indicators that the Megali Idea was not buried in Asia Minor in 1922. This is, in my expression, a post-modern Megali Idea that emerged from the subtle and sometimes vulpine instrumentalization of international law and especially the legal norms that developed in the second half of the 20th century.

At this point, my dissertation mostly focuses on searching for the traces of the post-modern Megali Idea in PASOK's populist practices in the conflicts with Turkey, and the question that I try to answer emerges. Does that unique collaboration of the bureaucratic elite and discursively populist political leadership of PASOK on the foreign policy making process represent a radical transformation of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, or does it reveal the continuity of Greek populism and legacy of traditional Greek nationalism in a post-modern meaning?

I believe that the significance of my study emerges at three points. First of all, the general literature evaluates Greek populism, Greek expansionist motivation and Greek nationalism in separate contexts with different cases in different time periods according to the historical conjuncture. I argue that PASOK inherited these three phenomena and constructed its foreign policy towards Turkey in the 1980s on these three phenomena with a unique combination of them. The uniqueness of my main argument is that PASOK's populism was combined with Greek nationalism and with the legacy of Greek expansionist motivation in foreign policy practices and that this combination reached dangerous levels in Greece's relations with Turkey. I claim that this was the main reason lying behind the constant dangerous crises in Turkish-Greek relations in the 1980s and this reveals the original aspect of my dissertation.

In other words, the cases that I discuss in this dissertation are the populism created with the dramatization of the Cyprus issue around Turkey's political and military presence on the island of Cyprus; PASOK's nationalist discourse on Cyprus and attempts to internationalize the Cyprus conflict as part of geopolitical strategies of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey; PASOK's post-modern expansionist approaches to the Aegean disputes through the continental shelf and territorial waters issues, and

PASOK's instrumentalization of the Turkish Minority in Greece in bilateral relations with Turkey. In my opinion, these are actually the results of PASOK's Turkey policies at macro level. I will discuss these cases by explaining PASOK's macro foreign policy strategy which was constructed on the three pillars: populism, nationalism and the legacy of expansionist motivation.

The second point that reveals the originality of my dissertation is that I try to analyze Greco-Turkish relations in the 1980s with a holistic approach. In general, the literature examines and makes conclusions about Greco-Turkish relations in the 1980s through separate events and crises. For instance, the most studied events are the 1987 Aegean crisis, which is the most famous and well-known one in the history of the relations, the developments related with the Cyprus issue during the 1983-1989 period, and the developments regarding the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace in the period of 1988-1990. However, all of these in fact constitute the sub-components of PASOK's foreign policy towards Turkey on the macro scale. In that sense, I develop an original analysis by revealing that the significant characteristics of the foreign policy strategies of PASOK towards Turkey, as a populist power inherited Greek nationalism and Greek expansionist motivation, caused the developments in Cyprus, the crisis in the Aegean and the events in Western Thrace. In other words, by explaining PASOK's macro foreign policy strategy towards Turkey, I will discuss the developments related with Cyprus, the Aegean and Turkish Minority of Thrace in order to detail my holistic approach in the dissertation.

In this sense, my focal points in the study reveal my contribution to the literature. Firstly, I believe that I have verified the continuous character of Greek expansionist motivation and its influences on the ruling elite in Greece and the reflections of that continuous character on the foreign policy strategies of the PASOK government during the 1980s. I have argued the impact of populism on the Greek foreign policy making process, and I have tried to explain how PASOK inherited populism by revealing the historical development of Greek populism, and more importantly, I believe that I have been able to clearly explain with specific examples

how Greek populism turned into a dangerous instrument when it was combined with nationalist rhetoric in the PASOK period of the 1980s.

However, in this study, not only do I reveal the characteristics of this expansionist motivation, but I also find out how the populist tradition in Greece has shaped PASOK's approaches to foreign policy. I argue how PASOK was transformed from a leftist movement into a central political phenomenon in order to achieve power and how PASOK reconciled with the established order in Greece to consolidate its power, and I figure out how PASOK adopted Greek nationalism in doing so. I have constructed my argument on these three phenomena, Greek expansionist motivation, Greek populism and Greek nationalism which are given. I put forward that these three phenomena form the basic components of PASOK's foreign policy towards Turkey, and that the core element which makes PASOK's foreign policy unique is its ability to construct its foreign policy strategies towards Turkey successfully on these three pillars.

As far as I can conclude from my research, the literature on PASOK generally discusses these three phenomena separately from each other. Some discuss these phenomena at the very least level, and especially, there is almost nothing about the influences of Greek expansionist motivation and Greek nationalism on PASOK's foreign policy towards Turkey. For example, there is a general consensus in the literature that PASOK is a populist party. However, while discussing the effect of populism on Greek foreign policy, most of the scholars generally discuss PASOK's populist discourse as anti-Western, anti-American and anti-NATO. What I argue is that the developments in Greco-Turkish relations, especially the 1974 Cyprus intervention of Turkey, formed a negative political psychology towards Turkey in Greek society. PASOK saw it, and, as it needed the support of all factions in Greek society -the rightists, the leftists, the central voters- in order to consolidate its power, populism was indeed used as a basic instrument of foreign policy towards Turkey, rather than towards the West.

As far I can observe, the scholars studying Greek populism mainly argue that successive governments in Greece have always developed antagonistic discourses to legitimize state rationalization and modernization,

and this successiveness remained as a distinctive feature in the construction of the historical legacy of populism in Greece by putting emphasis on the right-wing tradition in Greek politics. However, I believe that such an argument is lacking on one point. Regardless of whether it was on the right or left of the political spectrum, all Greek governments inherited this successiveness. In this study, I describe how the leftist PASOK inherited populism by adapting it to its leftist discourses. Another common belief in the literature is that successive Greek governments adopted the populist narratives by accusing their predecessors of being politically corrupt. What I contribute to that argument is that whether they were military or civilian governments, rightist or leftist, it did not matter that all of the successive political actors were members of the ruling elite circles in the country, and that despite their accusatory discourses against each other, they met at a common point in policy implementation.

There is also a dominant opinion in the literature that Greek irredentism ended with the Asia Minor disaster of 1922. Almost everyone says this. However, my argument is that if the Megali Idea is described as a continental expansionist projection, then we can claim that the Megali Idea phenomenon disappeared in 1922. However, this would be a reductionist approach. The Megali Idea is much more than that and it was transformed after the mid-1920s. According to my opinion, it turned into a projection of establishing a political and geographical Greek hegemony, especially over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in the historical context. PASOK inherited this transformation and therefore, especially by using international law as an instrument, the PASOK government has placed the increase of the limit of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles and the application of the continental shelf to the islands at the center of its foreign policy strategies towards Turkey. In this way, it paved the way for the crises in the Aegean in the 1980s, and these cases point out that Greek expansionist motivation had a continuous character inherited by every generation of Greek ruling elites.

I have observed in the literature that many of the researchers try to promote PASOK's anti-Western character of foreign policy and unintention-

tionally diminish the importance of this legacy of expansionist motivation. The works on PASOK mainly argue that the transformation of Greek foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century was constructed on deep mistrust of the West, the reaction to the West's passive behaviour against Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, and the idea that the West was favoring Turkey in its relations with Greece. However, what I argue in this study is that PASOK instrumentalized this anti-Western rhetoric to replace its foreign policy priority with Turkey in order to legitimize its expansionist motivation towards Turkey. Furthermore, some other discussions focus on the idea that one of the distinctive characteristics of PASOK's foreign policy conceptualization was the emphasis on international cooperation underlining the widening effect of international law in regulating the conflictual issues between the nation states. What I contribute at this point is the idea that PASOK actually instrumentalized the international law and regulations for legitimizing its motivation to establish a geopolitical hegemony over the Aegean against Turkey, rather than promoting them for international peace and cooperation.

On the other hand, the mainstream approaches do not discuss the idea that PASOK adapted Greek nationalism in its transformation from a leftist movement to a central one. The general tendency in the literature is that PASOK turned into a populist movement with the concern of appealing to the rightist and central voters in order to consolidate its power and developed nationalist narratives in the context of populism. However, this is an inadequate perspective in my opinion. My argument is that PASOK had already adopted Greek nationalism before coming to power. In fact, a significant majority of PASOK's ruling elites were members of the predecessor central leftist factions who distanced themselves from the socialist left, the radical left and communism and defined the Cyprus problem through Hellenism, for instance. In this sense, before coming to power, PASOK had already transformed itself into a mainstream political actor embracing nationalist approaches instead of prioritizing the socio-economic problems of Greek society, and it appeared as a movement which had already adopted and internalized Greek nationalism while marching to power in the 1974-1981 period.

Particularly the scholars in Greek academic circles studying PASOK tend to soften PASOK's nationalism by establishing a relation between Papandreou and his predecessors. They mainly argue that Papandreou's radical and populist rhetoric on national issues, his collectivism and his strong leadership character to handle all the national political problems were mainly inspired by the right-wing rulers and military regime's implementations. It is true, but what I find lacking is the fact that the nationalist tradition in Greek politics was inherited from generation to generation, it was not something specific to PASOK's right-wing and military predecessors. PASOK had already been structured as a nationalist formation and inherited these features of nationalist tradition from the Greek political culture.

Moreover, I claim that even though it developed challenging discourses, PASOK is a political party which was reconciled with the established order in Greece. I explain that the majority of PASOK's political elites came from the ruling elite classes in the country and that therefore, they easily and quickly adapted traditional Greek nationalism to make PASOK a mainstream political movement. I argue that PASOK was a contender for power with its reconciling attitude towards mainstream politics in Greece, and that this formation made PASOK a strong political movement in its journey to power. At this point, I develop a discussion, with reference to some other Greek researchers, that the transformation of PASOK before coming to power was, in fact, not ideological, but was a change to open the path for reconciliation within the ruling elites in order to achieve power. This reconciliation was a kind formulation to disseminate PASOK's political proposal to as many social groups as possible within a nationalist rhetoric.

§ 1.3 A Glance at the Chapters

After the introduction as the first chapter, the second chapter draws attention to the conceptual framework of my dissertation, which is PASOK's populism. In the second chapter, I try to show structural changes in Greek

foreign policy over the PASOK period and how the functioning of foreign policy was affected by the populist narratives of PASOK. This section helps the reader to understand the role of Greek populism and the practices of the party leadership's reflections on the government's policies. Therefore, the theoretical framework of populism and the reflections of the historical development of Greek populism on PASOK's foreign policy through the political process of the 1980s is outlined in this chapter. This section emphasizes the significance of Greek populism on PASOK's policy makers, independent politicians, intellectuals and other scholars in Greece, and it focuses on how the country's political elite was mobilized around the populist movement with the contributions of Greek nationalism in the foreign policy making process. Also, PASOK's administrative control over the Greek bureaucracy, the effect of bureaucracy under PASOK's control on the foreign policy decision-making process, and the partnership with the public on foreign policy constitutes the content of this chapter, and it shows how a populist mobilization occurred throughout the country under a socialist party's rule. Through these examinations, the second chapter also indicates the role of Greek nationalism in representing the tension-oriented Greek foreign policy towards Turkey under the PASOK government in the 1980s. This part emphasizes Greek nationalism's effect on populism through the bureaucratic foreign policy decision-making process and in promoting Greek national interests during the 1980s.

Furthermore, the second chapter also gives an explanation of Greek populism by looking at the historical background. In order to understand the dynamics of the tension-oriented Greek foreign policy towards Turkey during the 1980s, it is vital to perceive the historical background of populism in Greece in the 20th century. In this chapter, as the core Greek-Turkish conflicts date back to the early 20th century, I explain the development of Greek populism over a long period of time from the 1920s onwards. However, I mainly focus on Greek populism as a modern phenomenon of the period from the 1950s onwards by trying to explain the class

structure in Greece in order to understand how populism has surrounded the social classes and political factions, including the effects of Greek nationalism.

The Greek-Turkish conflicts can be explained more precisely with the modern dynamics of international politics in the new world order, especially after the Second World War. I make a historical periodization and divide this period into three: The first period is the period of friendly relations with Turkey from the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 to the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict in the mid-1950s. This period reflects the construction era of Greek populism and includes the structuring of populist discourses for transforming the domestic dynamics of the Greek political arena. The second period reflects the reconciliation of the social classes with the establishment and integration of the industrialist class into the circle of the ruling classes in the post-World War II era. That period represents the age of tense relations from the beginning of the Cyprus crisis in 1955 until PASOK's coming to power in 1981, in which Greek populism began to surround the whole political spectrum in Greece. The third period is the start of the leftist party rule from 1981 until 1989 when PASOK fell from power. While I explain the framework of that period, I discuss how PASOK has transformed its narrative from a socialist one to a populist one including nationalist elements, and how the PASOK elite inherited Greek populism and practiced nationalist policies in the foreign policy making process by harmonizing them with the domestic dynamics mostly determined by populist practices.⁹ Significantly, I try to point out the continuous character of Greek populism with nationalist components among the ruling elites by making no distinction between the rightists and leftists.

After the theoretical section, the third chapter summarizes the historical background of the main conflict issues in Greco-Turkish relations.

9 Grigoriadis is also making a similar periodization. The only difference is that he is taking Greece's EEC membership in 1981 as a distinctive historical point in the relations with Turkey. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Greek-Turkish Relations" in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics*, eds. Kevin Featherstone, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020): 613-615.

The fourth chapter explores PASOK's new approach to the Cyprus issue in the 1980s with the new positioning of Greece in the challenging era of international developments. In contrast to the past that mostly outlines Greece's political weakness against Turkey regarding Cyprus, this part will focus on PASOK's most effective role in Greece's Cyprus policies, which introduced new challenging decisions related to the conflict. The continuous tense approach of the Greek state bureaucracy to the Cyprus issue, as well as the political aggression of Greek governments related to the Cyprus conflict in the international arena during the 1980s, can be explained by discussing PASOK's tension-oriented power in the policy making processes related to Cyprus. This significant characteristic throughout PASOK's rule in those years played a crucial role in the legitimization of the strained government decisions on Cyprus. The new tension-oriented policy of PASOK brought about a mutual bargain between the PASOK party and state bureaucracy in Greece, especially regarding the policies on Cyprus. Moreover, this process was more complex and multi-dimensional than the standard narration about Greek foreign policy. In this regard, examination of the newly introduced PASOK policies towards Cyprus and the state bureaucracy's response to the new policy provides an opportunity to understand the complexities of the relations between PASOK and Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. Explaining these complexities shows how the PASOK leadership succeeded in mobilizing the state bureaucracy and the public around the nationalist policy making process related to Cyprus.

In the fifth chapter, I discuss PASOK's policies on the Aegean disputes by mainly focusing on the territorial waters and continental shelf issues. This section reveals the main policy changes on the territorial waters and continental shelf issues from the Greek perspective during PASOK rule of the 1980s. In this section, diplomatic developments, such as the exchange of notes, provide information about the background and origins of PASOK policies on the continental shelf and territorial waters issues, their capacity to result in crisis, and the behaviors of the decision-makers during these crises by asking such questions as follows: What was the motivation of PASOK governments' decision makers to increase the diplomatic

crisis with Turkey, how did the popular nationalist narrative open doors for the crisis with Turkey arising from the territorial waters and continental shelf disputes on the Aegean Sea, and what were the results of these Aegean crises in the domestic political arena for PASOK's popularity? This section helps to explain three main issues about PASOK's tension-oriented policies on the Aegean dispute: Firstly, it draws a path towards understanding how the PASOK leadership developed its foreign policy by combining populism and nationalism with motivation towards territorial expansion in the Aegean Sea. Secondly, the explanations help to analyze Greek public opinion about the expansionist policies of PASOK on the Aegean Sea. Thirdly, I discuss whether PASOK's populist discourses and Greek public opinion intersect on PASOK's expansionist visions on the Aegean Sea through the territorial waters and continental shelf disputes.

In the sixth chapter, the developments related with the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace are analyzed with reference to the structural changes in the minority policies of Greece in that period and the political tendencies of the PASOK government related to the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace. However, in this section, my goal is not only to discuss the changing minority policies of Greece, but also to describe the radical structural policy change of the PASOK government on the Turkish Minority as a component of the tension-oriented policy towards Turkey. This presents a panorama of PASOK's foreign policy, a picture in which PASOK policy makers of that time represent the significant characteristic of a unique policy-making: Reflection of a minority problem within the country to the tense foreign policy towards Turkey. For instance, the closure of institutions belonging to the Turkish Minority, and obstacles to the election of the Turkish Minority's religious leaders (muftis) are used as examples of PASOK's minority policies to answer how the Turkish Minority became a component of PASOK's tension-oriented foreign policy towards Turkey. In this way, PASOK and its political tendencies towards the Turkish Minority are illuminated through the example of the Turkish Minority's social and political life by evaluating official proceedings of Turk-

ish deputies in the Hellenic Parliament and the Minority's local newspapers of that time. This section is enriched with major Minority political figures, such as Sadık Ahmet's political struggle for the rights of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace.

The concluding chapter, as the seventh and the last section of the dissertation, presents my conclusions on the continuity of Greek populism and summarizes its legacies in the PASOK government of 1981-1989. In that chapter, I conclude how the continuous feature of Greek nationalism with populist approaches was inherited by the PASOK elites and I try to show the significant results of the foreign policy practices towards Turkey in the 1980s. As the last point, I try to find the answer to the question of whether the Megali Idea¹⁰ ended in 1922, as some historians argue, or whether the Megali Idea and Greek populism in the nationalist structure remained in practice after the transformation of the Megali Idea. Moreover, did the construction of Greek populism in the first half of the 20th century reflect on PASOK's foreign policy making process with its legacy? The chapter includes my responses to these questions by evaluating the results of PASOK's populism with nationalist approaches towards Cyprus, the Aegean and minority policies in the relations with Turkey.

9 Great Idea. It is the concept that expresses the goal of reviving a Greek state, which would include the Greek populations and the regions that traditionally belonged to Greeks since the ancient times (parts of the Southern Balkans, Eastern Thrace and İstanbul, Western Anatolia, Aegean islands and Cyprus).

Conceptual Framework: Characteristics of PASOK's Foreign Policy towards Turkey

§ 2.1 Populism as a Phenomenon

Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, in their famous classical work on populism, begin with a critical question to understand the populism phenomenon of the mid-20th century: “*Does the anger of American Middle Western farmers against urban lawyers, the droolings of Tolstoy over muzhiks, the rationalization of East European resentments against alien traders, and the slogans in terms of which rulers of new nations legitimate themselves and subvert liberal institutions – do all these have a common intellectual source, and are they parts of one phenomenon? Is there one phenomenon corresponding to this one name?*”¹

The answer to that question was of course not an easy one, and the phenomenon of populism was not only related with the anger of the people, or reactions of the ruling leaders to legitimize the regimes which they

1 Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, “Introduction” in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 1.

established to mobilize society towards one significant enemy, or ideology. However, from the beginning of the 20th century onwards, populism evolved as a phenomenon which has successfully been used by many of the political leaders and persons as an instrument to mobilize the social classes in a society towards a sacred cause, a national aim or a security issue(s) which was attributed as crucial for the survival of the nation.

In that sense, it is important to clarify whether populism, as a phenomenon, evolved as a political theory, or just as a concept for the socio-political mobilization of the people. While Gellner and Ionescu are trying to answer the critical question above, they arrive at the necessity to understand if populism is a unitary concept or simply used in a completely heterogeneous context: *“One question is whether populism was primarily an ideology (or ideologies) or a movement (or movements) or both. Perhaps, and this is the second issue, populism was a sort of recurring mentality appearing in different historical and geographic contexts as the result of a special social situation faced by societies in which, as the French sociologist, Alain Touraine, described it, the middle social factors were either missing or too weak. Thirdly, populism can be defined in terms of political psychology. The element of political persecution mania was more acute in its political psychology. It was imbued with the feeling that identifiable or unidentifiable conspiracies were at work, deliberately or tenaciously, against the people. The basic attitude was one of apprehension towards unknown outside forces: colonial oppression, people living in towns with international roots or ramifications, bankers, international capitalists, etc. As such populism could be characterized by a peculiar negativism – it was anti: anti-capitalistic, anti-urban, as well as xenophobic and anti-Semitic. In contrast, and this was the fifth point, populism worshipped the people. ... Finally, until now this recurring mentality usually disappeared in history by absorption into stronger ideologies or movements. There were three ways in which this happened. One led to socialism. One led to nationalism. And, as for instance in Eastern Europe before and after the First World War, one led to peasantism”*.²

2 Ibid. 3-4.

At this point, it is necessary to explain how populism as a political phenomenon can unite political leaders and societies around a specific purpose. The critical question to be asked arises right here. For example, when Hitler tried to mobilize the German nation around the goals of national socialism, was the nation actually inclined to this mobilization? Or, was this mobilization achieved by using certain ideological means of repression, when the nation was already opposing Hitler's aims? Or, as in another example, when Juan Peron was building nationalism in Argentina, how could he obtain the support of the industrialist class together with the middle and lower classes, workers' unions and industrial workers in the cities that constitute the massive background of the left-wing movements? At this point, Gellner and Ionescu's conceptualization begins to make sense. A political scientist who seeks an answer to the question of whether populism is an ideology or a political movement rather than a phenomenon, actually comes across the fact that populism is a fact that includes different historical and geopolitical characteristics and can vary according to social and geographical dynamics.

Political movements or leaders who can instrumentalize a country's or a society's historical and geographical dynamics in line with their political goals, together with low-level education and economic development, can easily create mobilization around their populist discourses by directing the social psychology. While creating this mobilization, factors claimed to be against the public many times and the threats created by a number of unknown forces are built by the political leader or movement, and thus populism is revealed as a phenomenon. At this point, the main elements that make up the structure of populism appear as the existence of the masses of the people who unite around a political personality or a movement and the abstract existence of anti-people elements which are capable enough to motivate these masses around the leader or the movement. However, perhaps the most essential element in building populism in a country or within a social entity is the presence of a party or mainstream politics that can be challenged. While populism is being built, it needs the presence of a mainstream political environment which will be

accused of acting against the interests of the people in order to create a space of legitimacy for itself by confronting it.³

From this point of view, populism emerges as a form of discourse claiming that policies contrary to the interests of the people are applied by a certain group that dominates the governance over the society, and that this particular group establishes an anti-popular elitist mechanism by dominating the state organs. The next rhetoric of the populist discourse turns into a political narrative that emphasizes that the political interest groups operating this elitist mechanism which dominates the state organs should be removed from the government and that the state mechanism should be used for the benefit of the people and for the development of society. This basic rhetoric of populism actually makes enemies of political persons or groups in power, even if they have come to power through democratic methods, and constructs an opposition through the interests of ordinary individuals in society. At this point, the strongest argument used by populism is to glorify the economic and social interests of ordinary citizens in the streets. By emphasizing the economic and social interests of the ordinary citizen, populism uses the citizen's prejudices and emotional hurts against this constructed elitist group and seeks to achieve success by developing a social mobilization against that hostile image.⁴ For this reason, it is difficult to evaluate populism as an ideological approach. Populism is a phenomenon that creates mobilization with the discourse it develops over the benefit of the people against the ruling group, rather than an ideology. This phenomenon occurs historically in times of crisis, or during times of economic and political difficulties of societies, and loses its influence and power in times when economic and political challenges are overcome. In this sense, it is almost impossible to associate populism with any particular ideology. It

3 Margaret Canovan, "Populism for Political Theorists", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (2004): 242.

4 Faruk Loğoğlu, "Popülizm nedir? İyi midir, kötü müdür? Bizde nasıldır?", *Gazete Duvar*, Accessed on November 15, 2020, doi: <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/forum/2017/04/02/populizm-nedir-iyi-midir-kotu-mudur-bizde-nasildir>

is seen that both left-wing ideological approaches and right-wing movements often produce populism.⁵

The basic stage in the construction of populism can be seen as mobilization for the interests of the people against the ruling elites or person. However, the most important factor that puts populism in a challenging position for power holders and enables populist movements to rise to power is the institutionalization of its discourse after a successful social mobilization. Populism is institutionalized in three types: Utopian, plebiscitary authoritarian and protestatory plebeian. As Hermet argues, utopian populism is more of a weak institutional structure created by a limited and isolated intellectual environment devoting itself to the struggle for the interests of the people, and periods of success for it have historically been relatively rare. Plebiscitary authoritarian populism is a popular movement that is mostly initiated through a cult personality that can be called patriotic, and although it shows an institutional character that turns into an authoritarian structure through this cult political personality, its institutionalism is still not broad and organized. Protestatory plebeian populism, on the other hand, is the historically strong and often successful genre that begins with the dissatisfaction of a particular social group with the existing order or power holders and can be strongly institutionalized as a party organization from the local to national.⁶

In the cases where plebiscitary authoritarian and protestatory plebeian populism can form components together, it is seen that populism emerges in its strongest and most organized form. Especially, populism, which is shaped over authoritarian cult charismatic political personalities, creates a strong populist party organization from the local to the national, to the extent that the political organization around the leader can penetrate all layers of society. At this point, the relationship of the leader produced by the institutionalized populism with the mass of the people

5 Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe* (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1994): 2-4.

6 Guy Hermet, "Foundational Populism" in *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, eds. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu and Sorina Soare, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2013): 85.

becomes important. The populist leader is a cult-like charismatic personality who, like other politicians, does not look down on the people, and the image of coming from among the people is widely constructed. The leader has a certain distance from the public, yet he is a strong political personality from within the people, well educated, able to enter the “higher class” and establish relations with the “world above” to protect the interests of the people.⁷

Although there are natural boundaries between the charismatic leader and the mass of the people, the populist leader who has successfully established the political organization and the establishment around the leader can reach the strength to seize the power by symbolizing the personality of the leader, the sacredness of the purpose and the leader’s struggle for this sacred purpose for the benefit of the people. For this, the populist movement which is created by the leader and the establishment mostly use democratic methods. However, after seizing power, if it erodes the democratic methods it uses, it can turn into an authoritarian rule, or even a bloody dictatorship, as in the case of Nazi Germany. Or, while preserving the instruments of democracy, it can still constitute a challenge to democracy by establishing a strong authoritarian government within the liberal democracies.⁸ Although differentiating according to the socio-political dynamics and sociological structures of countries, populist governments formed within liberal democracies can emerge at any point on a wide-ranging ideological spectrum from the far right to the far left, including extremist versions. At this point, it is necessary to look at how populism uses the instruments of democracy in its relationship with politics.

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- 7 Sergiu Mişcoiu, “From Populism to Neo-populism? Empirical Guidelines for a Conceptual Delineation” in *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, eds. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu and Sorina Soare, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2013): 23.
 - 8 Tjitske Akkerman, “Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?”, *Acta Politica International Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (June 2003): 154.

§ 2.2 Populism and Politics

There are differences of opinion in the literature on whether populism is an ideological approach or not. Mainly, the arguments which state that populism is not a political ideology, but a phenomenon created by almost all political elements of the right and the left to gain power against the power holders are much more prominent. For instance, according to Tarchi, populism is a fictitious entity that emerges in the political discourses and rhetorical strategies of different political movements and regimes in a wide variety of ways and eliminates the dividing line between the right and the left by including the different contexts.⁹

In her famous work, *Populism*, Margaret Canovan says that populism is such a dangerous phenomenon that it can produce reactionary dictatorships within democracies using the opportunities provided by democracy. Canovan even states that, despite all the unpleasant appearance of populism, it can turn into an interesting one and in political practice it can even promise a liberal form of government with appealing rhetoric such as direct popular rule, where political elites will completely be eliminated with nice-sounding discourses such as “radical democracy”. This situation, expressed by Canovan, in essence, paves the way for a dictatorial movement that can destroy liberal democracies by using the methods of liberal democracies, and that is populism.¹⁰ These populist movements that emerge within liberal regimes are actually a kind of mechanism in which politicians who have no connection with any ideology claim to cover all political ideologies without any ideological formation and produce eclectic policies that appeal to all segments of society.¹¹ In this sense, populism appears as a political movement that is not

9 Marco Tarchi, “Populism and Political Science: How to Get Rid of the “Cinderella Complex”” in *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, eds. Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu and Sorina Soare, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2013): 115.

10 Margaret Canovan, *Populism* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981): 172-173.

11 Ibid. 260-261.

related to any ideological framework, rather than a political ideology. In short, it is a mass movement without ideology that emerges as a result of the mobilization created by the populist leader or group that claims to be free from any kind of political affiliation and represent all social classes in society.

On the other hand, although populism is a phenomenon independent of political ideologies, it oftenly emerges as a political mass movement. Workers' movements with socialist tendencies and far right movements that contain extremist nationalism can both be categorized as populist. This situation varies according to the approach of the populist politician or group aiming to gain power. For instance, the reaction of socialist labor movements against the ruling elites of the capitalist order in a country may be populist, as well as nationalist right-wing populist movements, sometimes including racism, against the same ruling elites of the same capitalist order. What they have in common is that they both claim to struggle for the interests of the people by challenging the market model with a reductionist approach in that all of the people accept their own populist discourse in order to construct a sovereignty of the people.¹²

In fact, the discourse put forward by this mechanism, which is political in essence, and which attracts the public most, is the discourse based on equality. The populist politician, or group, institutionalizes a society by redefining it, and it develops a discourse on the equality of the elites and the individuals in that society, which in fact can be considered as revolutionary, by establishing a relationship of equality between the ruling elite and the ordinary citizens of the society. Here, what makes the populist politician, or group, unique is that he creates an instrument to achieve the power by constructing an argument that only he can provide this equality between the ordinary individual and the elite. At this point, the politician, or group, who instrumentalizes a very liberal discourse such as equality, assigns himself the task of laying the stones on the road to the

12 Samir Gandesha, "Understanding Right and Left Populism" in *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism*, ed. Jeremiah Morelock, (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018): 50-51.

equality which he promises, and thus, the possibility of shifting to authoritarianism arises. In this sense, power is embodied in a group or in a single individual and a narrative on the singularity of the people, including all segments of society, is developed which is indeed a fantasy rather than a reality.¹³

Although it varies according to the socio-political dynamics of each country, the orientation of the politician or group, which paves the way to seizing political power by instrumentalizing the singularity of the people and the interests of the people on a discourse basis, mostly moves away from democracy after coming to power, especially in economically under-developed and developing countries.¹⁴ Perhaps the most considerable aspect of populism in its relation to politics is that it makes a significant contribution to the erosion of democratic values, wholly in some societies and partially in others, and opens the path for populist political personalities or groups to take advantage of this erosion. This situation, which reveals that populism is not a political ideology, is a distinctive feature that enables populism as a phenomenon to produce authoritarian-leaning political personalities and movements. In other words, while populism paves the way for the politician or group seeking to achieve political power by eliminating the ruling elite, that politician or group also uses populism to gain the support of the masses of the people, which is the most important element in seizing power through democratic tools.

In brief, populism and politicians construct each other mutually, and as a result, they generate a political power whose ideological discourse can be left or right. Whether these political powers are reconciled with democratic values is not very important, because, from that moment on, the priority is the consolidation of power for the ruler, the political person or group, which emerges as a power as the result of that mutual construction. For this consolidation of power, depending on the dynamics of

13 Andrew Arato, "Political Theology and Populism", *Social Research*, Vol. 80, No. 1, Political Theology? (Spring 2013): 157.

14 Angus Stewart, "The Social Roots" in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 194-195.

the society from which it emerges, it may turn into an absolute authoritarian regime, or it may also adopt a long-term government strategy by making the leader a cult figure in a democratic environment by preserving the existence of the instruments of democracy, such as elections and constitutional institutions. As Peter Wiles argues, in any case, the existence of the elements which provide sustainability for the populist power is indispensable. For this power consolidation, the stance against the “Establishment” in the country is embodied, the moral stance is glorified rather than the ideological program, and the organization and discipline of the movement behind the populist leader or group are ensured by bringing the dignity and authority of the leader or group to the fore. It is as a result of the effective public acceptance of these tools that populist power is achieved.¹⁵ This populist power maintains its existence as a dictatorship regime in some countries, or as a charismatic leadership government within democracy in others.

Historical experience reveals that especially in the second half of the 20th century, populist movements followed a different course between economically under-developed and developing countries in terms of transforming into dictatorship. For example, in the economically under-developed Third World countries, which started to gain their independence in the 1950s, populist movements turned into tyrannical authoritarian structures with nationalist tendencies, including a reaction against colonial powers.¹⁶ It is possible to see more interesting examples in developing countries such as in Eastern Europe. Populism, which emerged as peasant movements in the early 20th century, created authoritarian-leaning governments within the constitutional system in a highly inter-

15 Peter Wiles, “A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism” in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 166-167.

16 Kenneth Minogue, “Populism as a Political Movement” in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 208-209.

esting way in the course of history. Some of these are socialist governments and some are anti-communist governments. For instance, if we look at Greece, in the 1960s, many of the Greek political parties from the left to the right of the political spectrum carried out political activities as active populist organizations against the monarchy and military-backed elements in mainstream politics which had pro-fascist traces.¹⁷ In this respect, the existence of populism in Greece is worth to examine.

§ 2.3 Populism in Greece

In order to comprehend the formation of populism in Greece, it is necessary to understand the internal dynamics created by the political cultures that have been in conflict with each other since the establishment of the country. In Greece, it is possible to talk about two basic historical political cultures that have been formed and rooted since the independence in 1829, which are directly determinative of the social dynamics, and that are too comprehensive to fit into the identity of any political party. One is the political culture that ensured the construction of the modern Greek state by imitating the liberal institutionalization of the West, and the other is the political culture, which is positioned against the first one, which is based on the more fragile and antagonistic state-society relationship and which emerged as a result of the negative articulation between the liberal institutionalization of the modern state and the overwhelmingly pre-capitalist economy and society.¹⁸

It would not be an exaggeration to say that Greece's nearly two centuries-old political history is the story of the conflict between these two political cultures. As seen in almost all under-developed and developing countries, this kind of autochthonously emerging natural categorization is the main determinant of all political clashes, and social and political

17 Ghita Ionescu, "Eastern Europe" in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969): 113.

18 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation" in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1993): 2-3.

dynamics in Greece as well. The class consciousness that constructed the modern state represented by the former and the class consciousness, which was mostly excluded in the construction process of the modern state represented by the latter, have historically always produced each other and have been in conflict throughout the two centuries with collective experiences in a system of shared assumptions placed on quick adaptation to changing circumstances; spawning a cultural cosmopolitanism linked to an often exalted sense of Greece's international importance; engendering a manipulative approach to the international relations of Greece and bringing forth a strong nationalism.¹⁹

According to Diamandouros, the older of these two political cultures is a political stance positioned against the liberal enlightenment, revealed by the long-standing historical realities of Greek political life, in which the Greek Orthodox Church had a strong decisive role as a militant and anti-Western element: *"... this is a culture marked by a pronounced introvertedness; a powerful statist orientation coupled by profound ambivalence concerning capitalism and the market mechanism; a decided preference for paternalism and protection, and a lingering adherence to precapitalist practices; a universe of moral sentiments in which parochial and, quite often, primordial attachments and the intolerance of the alien which these imply predominate; a latent authoritarian temperament ... and a diffident attitude towards innovation"*.²⁰ These distinctive features belong to the political culture represented by the segments of Greek society that constitute the majority, but remain outside of the class divisions determined by the clear-cut bureaucratic elitism with that emerged in the foundation and development processes of the modern Greek state.

19 Ibid. 6-7. Also see Angelos Chrysosgelos, "The people in the 'here and now': Populism, modernization and the state in Greece", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2017): 478. Chrysosgelos argues that successive governments in Greece have always developed antagonistic discourses to legitimize state rationalization and modernization and this successiveness remained as a distinctive feature in the construction of the historical legacy of populism in Greece.

20 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation", 3.

This, in essence, is a political tradition that remained under the domination of the Church which was subjugated to the nation state, and was introduced to liberal democratic values very late and was distant from elitism because of the close-knit association between traditional religion and nation state which created a Greek banal nationalism in terms of national-religious identity and a mundane political religion.²¹ In particular, it symbolizes a socio-political existence against the ruling bureaucratic elite class.

Again, according to Diamandouros' definition, the relatively younger one of the Greek political cultures is the culture which is the result of the reflection of the limited intellectual accumulation created by the enlightenment on the political arena, based on political liberalism with a secular character, reconciled with the outer forces and trying to indoctrinate the ideas which were heavily influenced by the developed industrial societies of the West: "*The younger of the twin cultures of Greece ... Over time, it has been identified with a distinct preference for reform, whether in society, economy or polity, designed to promote rationalization along liberal, democratic and capitalist lines. Favorable to the market mechanism and supportive of the use of the state to foster competition and an internationally competitive economy, it has been more receptive to innovation and less apprehensive of the costs involved in the break with tradition. More outward-looking and less parochial than its rival, this is a culture which, on the whole, has tended to favor rather than to oppose the creation and proliferation of international linkages and to promote Greece's integration into the international system*".²² The conflict between the political culture represented by the old, or more precisely, traditional institutions and supported by the majority of the factions in society, and the enlightened and liberal political culture that embraced the tradition of bureaucratic elitism since the foundation of the modern Greek state and

21 Nicolas Demertzis and Hara Stratoudaki, "Greek Nationalism as a Case of Political Religion", *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Special Issue: Emotion, Authority, and National Character (2020): 117.

22 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation", 5.

found support from the smaller factions in society constitutes the story of Greek political life.

This duality in Greece's political culture also brought about a deep-seated socio-political divide. The historical development of the socio-cultural conflicts of the social strata that constituted the country's bureaucratic elite classes which were in a minority, and the social strata that were outside the bureaucratic elite classification and constituted the majority were also reflected on the political system.²³ Institutions, political parties and political figures representing both segments fed on this distinction and effectively used this socio-cultural separation as a facilitator for opening a power path for themselves. In fact, although almost all political actors were representatives of this separation in Greek society, which has very strong historical roots, they all needed this social separation to be solid and continuous in order to consolidate their political presence. In other words, these two political cultures were equally nourished by the existence of the social separation they created, as they produced each other, but eventually they met at a common point, especially in the national issues. The best historical example of this situation can be given from the National Schism²⁴ period that Greece experienced before, during and after the First World War. The two political cultures conflicted with each other with hostility in domestic politics and provoked their sociological ground, and they used these conflicts and provocations to consolidate their power by mobilizing their sociological ground, but when they achieved power they went head-to-head with each other in the direction of ensuring Greece's territorial expansion to the east (against Turkey).²⁵

23 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends" in *Greece in the 1980s*, ed. Richard Clogg, (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1983): 47-48.

24 The National Schism was the period of a series of disagreements and political conflicts between the monarchy and Prime Minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos regarding several foreign and domestic policy issues of Greece in the period of 1910-1922.

25 For a comprehensive analysis, see Basil C. Gounaris and Marianna D. Christopoulos, "Re-assessing the Greek National Schism of World War I: The Ideological Parameters", *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique*, Vol. 15 (2018): 257-268.

At this point, an interesting question arises. How can these two political cultures, competing with each other in Greek politics, constructing each other and meeting at the common point on national issues at the end, reveal populism? Indeed, as the literature has agreed to a great extent on the general definition of populism, the rhetoric produced by the movements coming from the social classes which are excluded by the bureaucratic elites, and are opposed to those elite classes who are in the position of hegemonic power in a country, behind the scenes, or on the political scene, includes much more populism. In this case, due to the nature of populism, the old political culture, which is represented outside the bureaucratic elitist tradition, must produce populism in Greece against the young political culture represented by the bureaucratic elites, as defined by Diamandouros. However, very interestingly in the case of Greece, both political cultures could produce populism against each other.²⁶

The first of the most important reasons for this situation is that Greece's national issues always preceded domestic issues. As a result, the two political cultures in Greece could often unite on national issues, or they could take each other's place according to their power status. In such a situation, both political cultures always had to promote national issues more than domestic issues in order to consolidate their power when they were in government. For this reason, it is not surprising that the older political culture produced populism, since it could cling to a conservative and nationalist narrative more easily. What is surprising, however, is that

26 For instance, the military regime of 1967-1974 employed populist rhetoric in its effort to justify its decision not to return to the barracks following the removal of the "inept civilian governments" of the 1950s and 1960s; Karamanlis and his center-right government in the post-authoritarian period of 1974-1981 developed populism with a national unity rhetoric to raise the country from the destruction caused by the military regime; and PASOK in the early 1980s raised a leftist populism by arguing that center-right governments did not represent the genuine interests of the Greek people, but only those of the "corrupt elites" and that democracy had not really been restored with the return of civilian rule. See, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "For the People, Against the Elites: Left versus Right-Wing Populism in Greece and Turkey", *Journal of the Middle East & Africa*, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (January-March 2020): 55-57.

the intellectual elite, who were historically bearers of modernization and liberal democratic values, appealed to populism, which is not surprising to anyone who is actually familiar with the political life of Greece. The reason for this was the national issue promotion, which became the prerequisite for ensuring the consolidation required to preserve power as a result of the conflicts of both political cultures and their construction of each other. Therefore, populism prevailed over liberalism and became hegemonic in society. Thus, that populism in the Greek case simply turned to democratic illiberalism and it was transformed into the polar opposite of political liberalism.²⁷ This is what distinguishes Greek populism from other examples of populism and makes it unique. Just as the intellectual elites identified with modernization and liberalism and the factions opposite them needed each other to survive, they also needed populism for the maintenance of the conflict between them, which was necessary to construct each other. This situation, which added a distinctive feature to Greek populism and caused power holders from both political cultures to resort to populism, created a continuous confrontation between the masses, the people, the underprivileged, and the poor which constituted the majority, and the elite, the establishment, the privileged, and the rich classes which constituted the minority in the Greek social structure.²⁸ Therefore, this confrontation carried Greek populism to a hegemonic role over all socio-political elements, and almost every politician or group, whether privileged or non-privileged, began to see populism as an essential component of coming to power and staying in power.

There is a very important unifying element that caused both political cultures in Greece to embrace populist rhetoric and lean towards populist practices when they came to power. Greek nationalism has historically been extremely successful in uniting politicians from both the elite and middle and lower classes around a common national aim. In addition, it is one of the most important factors in the maintenance of the hegemonic role of populism as a national phenomenon for every politician or

27 Takis S. Pappas, "Why Greece Failed?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 2013): 33.

28 Ibid. 41.

faction that shares the national aim, rather than the hegemony of a single politician, or a faction from a particular class.

Greek nationalism was born as an intellectual movement in Western Europe in the late period of the 18th century. It developed as a diaspora movement which had been deeply influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of Western Europe, particularly from republican ideas in the environment of the French Revolution. Greek nationalist ideas in their infancy period had mostly been appealed to by Europe's enlightened and liberal intellectual circles and they existed among a limited circle of Greek and European philosophers in Western Europe as an ideal and as a discussion topic to free the Greeks from Ottoman tyranny. In the early 19th century, Greek nationalist ideas spread around the territories where Greeks lived under Ottoman rule. Thus, the Greek independence movement emerged in such a modern nationalist environment embellished with the ideas of autonomy and freedom to Greeks who were identified as the individuals of the Hellenic civilization by Greek nationalist philosophy of the late 18th and the early 19th centuries, and the modern Greek nation state was idealized on this Hellenist structure of thought.²⁹

The bureaucratic elite classes that emerged from the foundation of the modern Greek state and formed the younger political culture as defined by Diamandouros, existed in the historical process as the inheritors of the modern Greek nationalism in Greek political life which was produced by the Greek enlightenment. Modern Greek nationalism inherited by the younger political culture was built up around the Hellenic characteristic with the ideas of individual freedom with reference to Western liberal values. However, it had a significant difference from the liberal Western definition of individual freedom. The Greek type of individual freedom has mostly been described as a kind of group individualism which refers to a particular group, the Greeks in this case, as a whole entity.³⁰ In other words, the idea of individual freedom has been dissolved

29 Victor Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001): 62-63.

30 John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece: the Modern Sequel From 1831 to the Present* (London: Hurst&Company, 2002): 3.

in the defined group of Greeks, and the Greek nation has categorically been identified as the individual to be given, or provided with, freedom. Thus, the modern type of individual freedom, which has its roots in the Enlightenment, did not develop among modern Greek nationalists and it left a strong legacy to the bureaucratic elite classes who historically considered the Greek nation as a homogenous whole.

At this point, the bureaucratic elite classes, who historically considered themselves as the bearers of Western-centric modernization and as the elements that enabled society to adopt it, defined 'the people' as a single homogeneous structure when national issues came into question. In this context, the meanings of 'the people' and 'the nation' become synonymous, and in fact, the nationalist approaches that the bureaucratic elites produced by legitimizing 'the interest of the nation' constructed an articulation between nationalism and populism. As a result of this, a national populist idiom was formed as the most common variety in politics, referring to the whole nation, and this situation, which can indeed be defined as national populism, constituted an instrument used by the elite classes for the deployment of the nationalist ideas that equated 'the people' with 'the nation'.³¹ The significant difference between the nationalism which actually developed with an arrogant discourse among the Greek bureaucratic elite classes, and the nationalist discourses developed by the middle and lower classes, is that equalization between 'the nation' and 'the people'. Ultimately, however, both concepts were dissolved into rough and sometimes aggressive nationalism in the same sense, and the nationalism of the elite classes, too, began to produce populism. This was particularly evident and noticeable, and sometimes ignored different ethnic and sociological structures in Greek society, when strong sensitivities increased on the national issues.

The extensive social classes excluded by bureaucratic elitism, who are the representatives of the old political culture in Diamandouros' definition, and the political institutions and organizations representing them

31 Emmanouil Tsatsanis, "Hellenism under siege: the national-populist logic of antiglobalization rhetoric in Greece", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (February 2011): 14-15.

on the political scene do not need such definition games. In other words, while the intellectual and bureaucratic elites of secular character, which represent the class reflection of modernization in Greece, built by the economic-political processes created by capitalist relations, presented their nationalism in the form of populism by melting the meanings of the concepts of 'the nation' and 'the people' in the same pot, somewhat subtly within the discourse of modernization, the elements of the old political culture, on the other hand, developed a more open, intimate and direct nationalist formation. The institutions representing the old and the traditional, especially the Greek Orthodox Church, conservative political organizations, and the majority of individuals from the middle and lower social classes perceived nationalism directly as the ideological definition of the political instruments protecting the interests of the Greek people, the people who constituted the individuals whom they considered ethnically Greek, rather than the nation.

The main reason why these groups did not need the synthesis of nation-people in order to build nationalism and present it in a populist form was the existence of a particular class, that is, the elite, who were believed to act socially against the public interest. For the bureaucratic and intellectual elites, the people were an instrument they needed to cover their nationalism while constructing populism. However, for those who were excluded by elitism, the presence of elites was a direct reason for populism. Populism turned into a political movement as a result of a discourse against the elite. At this point, middle and lower class nationalism demonized the national elites, who were believed to have grown up with outward ideas, by accusing them of cooperation with foreigners and developed the belief that this class deprived the people of prosperity. At the point where reductionist narratives began to emerge, as the intellectual and bureaucratic elite did not protect the interests of the people and even sold the nation to foreigners, the elites became a part of the group of enemies and this kind of discourse evolved into populism.³²

32 Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Iliana Giannouli and Ioannis Andreadis, "Greece: Populism Between Left and Right" in *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, eds. Toril

While the elite classes tried to mobilize the people around modernization by building nationalism by concealing them within the national identity formation, the most important actors in the populism construction process of the middle and lower classes were the Church of Greece together with conservative political organizations and parties. The Church of Greece, as the most important element that historically represented and kept alive the old political culture, was not only against modernization by the elites, but also played the leading role in the construction of a more ethnic and religious-based nationalism against nation-wrapped nationalism. In the case of Greece, the influence of the Church on the political field is quite remarkable, and the Greek Church had an important place in the nationalist consolidation of the middle and lower social classes which constituted the majority of society.³³

However, what makes Greece unique in terms of the study of populism is that the representatives of the two hostile political cultures agreed to make populist discourses hegemonic by building an identity in a nationalist formation. The church, as the dominant element of the old political culture, functioned as the most important promoter in the acceptance of the populist narrative by the middle and lower social classes in the national identity construction. Stefanidis explains how populist narrative was used as the element of the glorification of the Greek national character in the statements of the Greek Church during the reconstruction period of Greek nationalism in the mid-20th century: “*The superiority-inferiority complex was clearly reflected in another widespread generalization regarding Greek identity, ‘national character’. This was described as a composite of intrinsic ‘moral and intellectual’*

Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömback and Claes H. de Vreese, (New York: Routledge, 2017): 195-196.

- 33 The Church of Greece has actively and explicitly been involved in every aspect of social and political life in Greece, including historiography, education, folklore studies, literature, poetry and architecture, since its establishment. See Nikos Chrysoloras, “Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture”, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2004): 44.

qualities that remained almost immutable throughout the centuries. Pseudo-scientific arguments were employed to corroborate such beliefs. The list of essential attributes invariably included piety, patriotism, heroism, a commitment to the defense of liberty, a sense of honor (filotimo), a manly blend of generosity and bravery (levendia), a penchant for civilizing work but also a propensity to discord and factionalism".³⁴ Today, it is still possible to see the strong effectiveness of the Greek Church and the Orthodox religion on events symbolizing social mobilization such as official openings of school semesters, cultural festivals, religious oaths taken in the Hellenic Parliament, and celebration of national holidays. Also, the faith has an official characteristic in the national state structure with the strong emphasis on the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ as the prevailing religion in the Greek Constitution.³⁵

The strongest example of the bureaucratic elites' and the Church's nationalist consolidation by using populist discourse as an effective tool can be given in the field of education. The Greek modern education system, which has been structured with the common efforts of the bureaucratic elites and the Greek Church, has a decisive role in the process of raising patriotic Greek citizens. In Greece, the nationalistic approach to history has successfully been imposed on every new generation through the nationalist presentation of Greek history in school textbooks with a populist narrative. Greek elementary and high school history textbooks, many of which have been taught in the schools since the early years of independence with almost the same content, have played a vital role in mobilizing the Greek lower, middle and ruling classes around Greece's historical aims. Millas transmits interesting examples of Greek school books which propound the historical greatness of the Greek nation: "*According to the Greek sixth-grade textbook, the Greek nation is already around 4,000 years old: After the wars against the Persian Empire ... a new Greek civi-*

34 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967* (London: Routledge, 2016): 42.

35 Ali Hüseyinoğlu, "Questioning Islamophobia in the Context of Greece", *IRCICA Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2015): 69.

lization was created which the whole world still admires. ...This civilization was later conveyed and spread to deepest Asia by Alexander the Great. When the Greeks became Roman subjects, this civilization was carried to Europe and formed the basis of present-day civilization. [During the Byzantine era the Greeks] fought against the barbarian nations to save civilization and Christianity. When Sultan Mehmet II brought this long and glorious historic period to a close, Greek intellectuals escaped to the West and took with them the torch of Greek civilization, helping to kindle the Renaissance in Europe ... The Greeks were enslaved by the Turks for almost 400 years ... With its trust in God and its patriotic devotion, the eternal Greek race was reborn".³⁶

To give an example from the field of education may not be enough to explain the consensus of elite and popular sections in populist rhetoric for every society or country. However, it is very enlightening in terms of understanding the distinctive characteristic of Greek populism and helps a lot to show how elites and conservative-leaning middle and lower class social segments can manifest common populist political behavior whenever discussions of reform in education arise in Greece. In 2007, when the center-right New Democracy (ND), often reconciled with bureaucratic elitism and considered to be the representative of the capitalist business elite, came to power and when it wanted to replace the history textbooks in secondary education, which are full of misinformation and ultra-nationalist heroic rhetoric, the ND government was confronted with organized responses in a wide spectrum, from the elites to citizens of the lowest strata. The Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), a right-wing populist party, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the former PASOK minister's party Democratic Rebirth, members of parliament belonging to the conservative wing of the two major parties, New Democracy and PASOK, Greek diaspora groups, major and minor media outlets, prominent intellectuals from both the left and the right, from re-

36 Hercules Millas, "History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey", *History Workshop*, No. 31 (Spring 1991): 24-25.

nowned leftist composer Mikis Theodorakis to neo-Orthodox philosopher Christos Giannaras, a former President of the Hellenic Republic, Christos Sartzetakis and thousands of Greeks from all different social classes of Greek society actively sought to sign the petition to withdraw the new history textbook from the new curriculum of the secondary schools.³⁷

As it can be understood from this example, Greek populism occupies a special place in classical populism studies. Although populism in Greece is in essence a phenomenon created by the discourses developed by the excluded broad social classes and the institutions and political organizations representing them against the elites, Greece's unique dynamics carried Greek populism somewhere beyond the elite-lower class conflict. In Greece's unique domestic dynamics, populism became a political instrument used by both the elites and political organizations and institutions, representatives of the lower class, against each other, and ultimately Greek populism was in a hegemonic position over all social classes and political movements. As it can be seen in the textbook example, the populist approach could easily combine a citizen of the middle or low income group in the farthest corner of the country with a wealthy industrialist or a senior public official in Athens towards a common goal. The main reason for this is that populism in Greece is not a mass movement arising from the bottom and achieving power by producing populist discourse. On the contrary, it is establishing itself in that power. Therefore, Greek populism is a phenomenon which contaminates all major political forces, and thus transforms Greece into a populist democracy with specific characteristics.³⁸

37 Emmanouil Tsatsanis, "Hellenism under siege: the national-populist logic of antiglobalization rhetoric in Greece", 16.

38 Takis S. Pappas and Paris Aslanidis, "Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts" in *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, eds. Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015): 195.

§ 2.4 Historical Legacy of Greek Populism

In the political history of Greece, although it is seen that political organizations representing both the bureaucratic elite classes and middle and lower classes have developed populist discourses in several periods, it can be said that populism began to appear as a political formation in modern Greece in the first half of the 20th century. What makes Greek populist political parties and movements in the 20th century different from populist political movements in Europe at all times is that Greek populism was both a right-wing as well as a left-wing development, particularly in its radical forms. Moreover, the Greek case of populism was a strong phenomenon which comprised a sense of marginalization from its European contemporaries by providing a reassurance of the continuity of Greek civilization and Orthodoxy.³⁹ For this reason, when evaluating the historical legacy of Greek populism, it is almost impossible to make an ideological distinction between the left and the right, or a distinction of sociological base in terms of class representation. Throughout the historical process, although it varies according to the periodic conjuncture, Greek political parties and movements have often been more nationalist or more populist than each other, regardless of the right and left.

The People's Party (Laikon Komma), founded in 1920 by one of the famous politicians in Greek political history, Dimitrios Gounaris, can be shown as the party that started the organized populism tradition in Greece by transforming it into a political party. The populism of the People's Party is very evident. The party, which came to power in the 1920 elections with the promise to the war-weary Greek people to end the Greek military campaign in Anatolia, embraced Greek nationalism after coming to power and played a significant role in Greece's military defeat in 1922. The party, whose important leaders were executed in the 1920s,

39 Kostas Ifantis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "Introduction: A Note on Populism in Crisis-ridden Greece", *Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 58, Özel Sayı: Yunanistan Krizinin Şifrelerini Çözmek: Sorunlar, Başarısızlıklar ve Meydan Okumalar/Special Issue: Deciphering the Greek Crisis: Issues, Failures, Challenges (2018): 5.

came to power again in 1933, under the leadership of conservative politician Panagis Tsaldaris, with a harsh opposition to the liberal elites in the country, especially Eleftherios Venizelos, and a pro-monarchist attitude. Especially in the political atmosphere of the 1930s, the People's Party consolidated its power by cooperating with military and bureaucratic elements on the nationalist right. The populist legacy of the People's Party, which played an important role in the restoration of the monarchy in 1936, was to alternate between democratic values and monarchist affiliations according to the tendencies of the Greek people.⁴⁰ Another characteristic sign of that period was the complicity of the larger middle class parties, led by the populist People's Party, corrupted by fascist-leaning political ideas, in weakening the work of the Hellenic Parliament and thus in effect debilitating parliamentary democracy in Greece. As a result of the populist policies of the small middle class parties and the People's Party, it was possible for the fascist-oriented bureaucratic and military elements in the country to gain legitimacy in politics, and even the fascist and national socialist formations in Greece in the 1930s emerged within the People's Party.⁴¹

Another important legacy of the People's Party is that, although it was founded and developed as a populist movement against elitism in rhetoric, it created the populist phenomenon unique to Greece that brought together the military and civil bureaucratic elites and the elite political figures of the right in the political scene. The United Alignment of Nationalists, led by the People's Party, gained a significant political victory in the 1946 legislative elections under the leadership of Konstantinos Tsaldaris,

40 For further details about the role of the People's Party and its leaders, Panagis Tsaldaris and Konstantinos Tsaldaris, in Greek political life during the 1930s and 1940s, see Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 109-117.

41 Eleftheria Manta, "The 'National Socialist Party of Greece' and its Contacts with Italy: Contribution to the Study of Greek Fascism", *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis Series Historica*, Vol. 9 (2012): 89-90.

the leader of the People's Party. The People's Party remained as the dominant force in the Greek political scene until 1950, during the depressive period of the civil war.⁴² The People's Party, as an organizational force where populist and nationalist political elements gathered together, played a significant role in the exclusion of the leftist movement and the Communist Party of Greece from the constitutional political order in Greece during this period and the establishment of the nationalist-leaning populist right tradition that would dominate the Greek political arena for the next three decades.⁴³

In the polarization environment created by the Cold War, and with the positioning of Greece in the Western Bloc, the anti-communist wind blown by the nationalist-oriented populist governments played a major role in the alienation of the radical left and communist elements in the country. The distinctive role of the People's Party here is that it opened the door to nationalist populism by combining the representatives of elitism in the country with the political elements not coming from the elite classes in anti-communism. Firstly, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos), founded by populist politicians who left the People's Party under the leadership of the famous marshal Alexandros Papagos, which dominated the political arena in the first half of the 1950s, then the National Radical Union, led by the center-right politician Konstantinos Karamanlis who would mark Greek politics for nearly forty years until the mid-1980s, succeeding the Greek Rally again with populist elements, passed through this door.⁴⁴

Populism, including nationalist narratives, institutionalized by the People's Party, accompanied the process of radical socio-political change

42 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 135.

43 For a comprehensive analysis of the exclusion of the leftist factions and the communists from the legal political stage in Greece by the populist nationalist forces, see Thanasis D. Sfikas, "War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945-1949", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2001): 13-20.

44 Peter Siani-Davies and Stefanos Katsikas, "National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 2009): 563-564.

experienced during the long rule of the right-wing tradition, which consolidated its power in Greek political history from the early 1950s onwards. The period of anti-communist and anti-left populist powers in Greece, which glorified Greek nationalism, involved a very comprehensive reconstruction process from the development of the capitalist industrialist class to the redefinition of the nation until the mid-1960s, under a strained peaceful environment guarded by a formally democratic order held in place by repression, persecution of the left, and armed violence towards the opponent elements of the right-wing governments in society, as Mark Mazower identifies.⁴⁵

Papagos' Greek Rally is the symbol of the centralization of Greek populism. Marshal Papagos acted as the leader of the government of national consensus, with the support of almost all political factions of the right and liberals. The adoption of populism by the Greek center left, which will be discussed with further details in the next chapters, also coincides with this period. The populist Greek Rally government was reinforced by desertions from the center right, and by the outside cooperation of Georgios Papandreou, the leader of the Democratic Socialist Party.⁴⁶ Georgios Papandreou, with his Democratic Socialist Party, continued to support Papagos' populist government, and opened the path for the Greek left to interiorize the populist demands of society in order to achieve power.

However, the most original characteristic of this period, even the element that gives Greek populism its singularity, is the anti-Americanism that developed since the early 1950s, even though the country was positioned in the Western Bloc. Both Papagos' Greek Rally and the National Radical Union of Karamanlis took the capitalist development within the Western Bloc as a model, but interestingly, at the same time, they successfully created the anti-American populist discourse on the subject of national issues, which constituted the most sensitive point for all segments of Greek society, regardless of elite or lower class, and they bequeathed

45 Mark Mazower, "Introduction" in *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943 – 1960*, ed. Mark Mazower, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 7.

46 N. C., "Greece under Papagos", *The World Today*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (March 1953): 111.

it to the next generation of politicians. During this period, Papagos' Greek Rally laid the foundations of the anti-American populist discourse and made national affairs the most powerful instrument of the populist narrative. It was Papagos and the Greek Rally that took the biggest steps toward the reassertion of national independence. The Papagos government made it clear to the Americans that decisions involving the Greek economy would be "Greek decisions" and the success of the 1953 monetary reform, which placed the Greek economy on the path of development, contributed to this relative resurgence of Greece's political autonomy from their major ally, the United States. In 1954, the Papagos government even blackmailed the Americans with a reduction in the size of the army, and significantly, in 1954, it was Papagos who decided to appeal to the UN over Cyprus, ignoring the Americans' warnings that Washington would not support such a move.⁴⁷

In Greece, anti-Americanism, which is still strong today, has its roots in the post-World War II period. Anti-Americanism developed as a phenomenon in the early years of the Cold War and became a phenomenon that not only left politics but also right politics used against the left. During the Second World War, anti-Americanism was a discourse often voiced by leftist factions. However, when the devastating civil war between the communists and monarchists, which broke out in the power vacuum after the war, resulted in the victory of the monarchists supported by Britain and the USA, a process was experienced in which the USA succeeded in considerable efforts to prevent Greece from falling under Soviet influence. However, after the coercive efforts to establish American hegemony over Greek politics and society through political tools such as the Marshall Plan, and the influence of leftist thought, which did not lose its importance among Greek society despite being defeated in the civil war, anti-Americanism gained support from all social groups during this process. At this point, when the perception of the belief that

47 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents: The U.S. Experience of Greece, 1947–1961. Policies, Historicity, and the Cultural Dimension", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2014): 92.

“Greece belongs to the West” was a coercion and that it turned into a hegemonic relationship between the West, in particular the United States and Greece, became increasingly widespread, and the post-war American economic aid began to turn into American political control over Greece from the early 1950s, anti-Americanism emerged as an element of sensitivity for every political segment in Greece.⁴⁸

Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was the successor of Papagos, used anti-American populism, which was strengthened in Greek public opinion due to the Cyprus problem, especially since 1955, to gain power in domestic politics and to maintain his popularity during his rule between 1955 and 1963. During Karamanlis’ ruling period, in the eyes of Greek society, the USA was seen as the biggest obstacle to the union of Greek Cypriots with Greece. Although Karamanlis stood against the anti-colonial attitudes rising from the left regarding the Cyprus problem, he did so to maintain the economic support coming from the US and the West to the developing Greek economy, and he took the sensitivity of the anti-Americanism in the public opinion into consideration and ensured the independence of the Republic of Cyprus by negotiating with Turkey without the imposition of the USA as the foreign actor.⁴⁹

Karamanlis was the powerful center-right political figure who economically integrated Greece with the West. However, he did not hesitate to embrace populism in order to use the anti-Americanism that existed in Greek society in domestic politics. He openly supported Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and showed his support for Egypt’s anti-Western President Gamal Abdul Nasser as the first Western prime minister to visit Egypt in 1957. Moreover, the Greek disengagement became much more evident even in the issues involving defense policies during the Karamanlis period. Karamanlis’ government, taking the rise of anti-Americanism

48 Elisabeth Kirtsoglou and Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “The Poetics of Anti-Americanism in Greece: Rhetoric, Agency, and Local Meaning”, *Social Analysis*, Vol. 54, Issue 1 (Spring 2010): 113.

49 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents: The U.S. Experience of Greece, 1947–1961. Policies, Historicity, and the Cultural Dimension”, 93.

on its shoulders in the domestic arena, refused the U.S. request for the installation of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Greece by the late 1950s and turned its attention to the Western European powers, France and West Germany for achieving an association with the newborn European integration.⁵⁰

In the depressed 1960s of Greek political history, the populist narrative became more hegemonic among political actors than ever before, and this time, the central leftist party, the Centre Union (Enosis Kentrou) of Georgios Papandreou who was reconciled with the established order in the country in the early 1950s, took its place on the stage of history as the champion of populism. Although they were in government only for a short time between 1963 and 1965, the Center Union and its leader Georgios Papandreou were the most popular and dominant actors in Greek politics until the military coup in 1967.⁵¹

Georgios Papandreou, who introduced “Papandreou politics” in Greek political history and a left-wing populism that would dominate almost half of the next fifty-year period until 2004, was in every sense the beneficiary of the outbursts of popular feeling in Greek society. The Centre Union’s political stance in the 1960s was a populism that included enough radical rhetoric to express even the establishment of people’s courts against the monarchy-backed political forces in the country, and Georgios Papandreou, during his entire political adventure in the 1960s, adopted a Macchiavellian approach and maintained tactical retreats according to political conjuncture. Georgios Papandreou’s Centre Union too, like many other Greek political alliances, was an artificial unity, embracing, from its formation in 1961, the whole political spectrum ranging from right-of-center figures to socialists.⁵²

50 Ibid. 94.

51 Thanos Veremis, “The Union of the Democratic Center” in *Greece at the Polls The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Penniman, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981): 88-89.

52 Marcus Wheeler, “Greece: Grapes of Wrath”, *The World Today*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1967): 235.

In order to understand how the left populist tradition constructed by Georgios Papandreou was integrated with the established forces in Greece to achieve power consolidation, it is enough to look at the following statement in the interview he gave to the Guardian at that time: *“I am the only enemy of Communism because my methods are democratic ... I have disarmed the Communists through political freedom and social justice. All my life I have been a democratic enemy of Communism”*.⁵³ Such a statement very typically points to politicians who cooperate with the dominant elite forces in the periodic conjuncture, prioritize taking power by taking into account the tendencies of the majority of the people rather than the ideological formation, and displaying opportunistic political behavior as well as populist. At this point, what makes Greek left populism unique is that it was strongly reconciled with the hegemonic forces in Greece, such as the civil and military bureaucracy⁵⁴ and business world, rather than being opposed to elitism, and it was constructed by left-wing politicians who came from or belonged to the elite class. For these reasons, Greek left populism, whose flag Georgios Papandreou handed over to his son Andreas, included populism, anti-imperialism, socialism, criticism of capitalism, and perhaps the most dangerous element of all, Greek nationalism that produced very strong hostile political behaviours. In a sense, this is the summary of the political story of Georgios’ son Andreas Papandreou and his party, PASOK.

§ 2.5 Left Populism in Power: The Case of PASOK

PASOK was a socialist phenomenon when it came to power in October 1981 and Andreas Papandreou’s extraordinary rhetoric on ‘Allagi’, which

53 *The Guardian*, 20 July 1965.

54 For instance, one of the first priorities of Georgios Papandreou’s Centre Union was to ensure control over the military. For this reason, Georgios Papandreou struggled with the monarchy to gain full power over the military and the process resulted in a military coup in April 1967. See, Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece The Search for Legitimacy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987): 55.

means change, was perceived by most people as a signal for a radical overturning in the political arena of Greece. From social policies to economic policies, from security understanding to foreign policy, PASOK's narrative was quite unprecedented in modern Greek history and its leader was remembered as a maverick in popular imagination.⁵⁵

At the same time, PASOK's promise to change was conspicuously extraordinary and challenging to the mainstream politics in Greece, with special emphasis on unusual matters of fact by a unique populist narrative. As Stavrakakis and Katsambekis argue, the Greek political stage was dominated by PASOK's archetypal populism putting forward the demands of the so-called 'nonprivileged' Greek people for social justice, popular sovereignty and national independence against an establishment accused of monopolizing political access and economic privilege in various ways, often with the help of external powers, initially Britain and then the US.⁵⁶

The populist narrative of PASOK was constructed on an anti-imperialist character and recalled the third world's anti-imperialist rhetoric of the second half of the 20th century. PASOK's policy paper titled the Declaration on Governmental Policies (APPENDIX A), which was published in July 1981 as a propagandist booklet for the 1981 elections, starts with a strong emphasis on national independence. The first two chapters of the paper focus on Greece's historical destiny as a downtrodden country and establishes the perspective of 'Allagi' on the grounds of national character by putting special emphasis on national identity and national independence of the Greeks. The party's first message to the citizens is the reconquest of the national independence of the country which arises from the popular sovereignty provided by Greek citizens.⁵⁷ This is the core

55 Eirini Karamouzia and Dionysios Chourchoulis, "Troublemaker or peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, the Euromissile Crisis, and the policy of peace, 1981-86", *Cold War History*, Vol. 19, Issue 1 (2019): 39.

56 Yannis Stavrakakis & Giorgos Katsambekis, "Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014): 124.

57 Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, *Diakiriksi Kivernitikis Politikis Simvolaio me to Lao* (Athens: Grafeio Ekdoseon KE.ME.DIA PASOK, 1981): 13.

and starting point of PASOK's idealization of 'Allagi' for the socialist transformation of Greek society. In other words, party leaders and ideologists overlapped the national independence of the country and socialist transformation of the people by constructing a simple populist narrative.

In the second chapter of the policy paper, PASOK's ideologists are more explicit in explaining PASOK's conceptualization of the change by intensifying around the sensitiveness for national independence. The idea of 'Allagi' configures national independence as a prerequisite for radical change in the country in accordance with PASOK's description of socialism. The recreation of Greek society is illustrated with a socialist character which is defined as national rebirth. The national rebirth of the Greeks is based on the principle that national independence is a precondition for the realization of popular sovereignty, a democratic environment and social liberation.⁵⁸

The most interesting parts of the second chapter of the declaration are the ninth, tenth and eleventh articles which are directly related with Turkey. Those articles, in fact, reflect the linkage of PASOK's conceptualization of national independence and Turkey. Precisely, the ideologists of PASOK construct their 'national independence' identification on Greco-Turkish relations, which had a strong correspondence through the Greek public in the post-1974 period. That correspondence was a favorable tool to use to climb the steps to power, but on the other hand, it was also a supplementary element for PASOK's populist characteristic, which included nationalist elements, regarding the international problems with Turkey. As can be clearly understood from the declaration, PASOK's definition of Greece's national independence harbors the susceptibility about Turkey which was disposed to mobilize Greek society around PASOK's populism with an anti-imperialism narrative. PASOK conceptualizes national independence as a national mobilization against Turkey and projects an extensive transformation of Greek foreign and national security policies, as is clearly mentioned in the policy paper with phrases reflecting populist discourse:

58 Ibid. 15.

"9. Our country has no claims and requirements against any other country, and of course, any other people. However, it faces serious external risks which dictate the examination of our foreign and defense policy, as a must. The dangers are so obvious that, despite what have happened at other times in our history, the perspective of ignoring, or even misjudging the country's interests has been frazzled.

10. There is a specific and intended threat from Turkey against our national integrity and security.

Claims, challenges, acts of Turkey leave no room for doubt about its aims. The critical national deadlocks which were created by the right-wing policies require a radical policy change to deal with them.

11. National issues and strategic goals

Dealing with critical national issues – such as the threat of Turkey in the Aegean, which is covered by the Atlantic Alliance, the occupation of 40% of Cyprus by Attila's forces, the return to NATO with the simultaneous disengagement of sovereign rights in the Aegean, the presence of foreign bases in our country, which are not only exposing the country to the threat of extinction in the event of a global conflict but also undermining national security – linked to the following strategic objectives:

Configuration of a national security policy.

...

Configuration of an independent, realistic and multidimensional Greek foreign policy.

...

*Active contribution to the detente, disarmament and global peace."*⁵⁹

The priority given to national independence and security concerns about Turkey might be surprising for someone else who is studying socialist PASOK, which created a transformation in mainstream Greek politics during the 1980s. At this point, a very critical question comes to mind: While many of its contemporaries in European countries promoted the development of social rights, the fight against social injustices, the reduc-

59 Ibid. 16.

tion of unemployment and the alleviation of the economic burden of market capitalism on the oppressed classes during the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s, why did PASOK ideologists promote national security concerns and geo-strategic challenges to the country as a promise to Greek society? The answer is hidden in the question itself. PASOK itself was a populist political party which mobilized all socio-political actors in Greece, including state bureaucracy, around Greek national apprehensiveness in order to consolidate its power in the country, rather than being an ideologically socialist party giving precedence to the daily economic and social problems of the Greek people.⁶⁰ In other words, when PASOK achieved power with the promise of change, the majority of the party authorities and its charismatic leader Andreas Papandreou were in fact the inheritors of the old generations of Greek populism.

Even though PASOK developed a socialist rhetoric in the beginning since its foundation in 1974, it constituted a unique example that was transformed into a functionally conservative structure, especially in the years of power, by undergoing an important metamorphosis.⁶¹ The populist leader of the party, Andreas Papandreou, saw the two-party structure that emerged in the country especially after 1974, and after a radical socialist start-up, he successfully transformed it into a populist political structure that prioritized consolidation in order to gain the support of the central masses, most of whom had a strong nationalist and conservative sensitivity and were indeed the legacy of the multi-party political environment of the pre-1974 period.⁶² At this point, PASOK's rise to Greek

60 Dimitrios A. Sotiropoulos, "Bureaucrats and Politicians: A Case Study of the Determinants of Perceptions of Conflict and Patronage in the Greek Bureaucracy under PASOK Rule, 1981-1989", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (September 1994): 350-351.

61 Takis S. Pappas, "The Transformation of the Greek Party System since 1951", *West European Politics*, Vol. 26, Issue 2 (2003): 98.

62 Ibid. 99.

political life and especially the populist wind that it blew in the 1980s constitute the very unique and original example of populism in the power approach in Greek political history.

Although the mainstream populism literature argues that since populist movements do not come from the ruling elite, they usually do not have the ability to rule, and when they come to power, they often become corrupt and the power of populism descends into failure because of democratic accountability and dysfunctional bureaucracy,⁶³ populist governments are neither inevitably episodic nor necessarily destined to fail. It is empirically demonstrated that populist movements are mostly capable of constructing socio-economic policies and implementing the legislative practices which are in fact familiar to their core ideological formations. Populist movements can govern with populist discourse and practices, because the content of populism includes different contexts which constitute the institutional background of those populist movements. A populist movement can be structured on many different components such as region, referent actor, history, and political and economic circumstances, as well as the capabilities of the political leaders and ideologists. In that sense, a populist party or group can even be constructed as a political movement in an environment created by democracy and its institutions. Thus, populists can achieve the ability to govern and they can implement their power in the government by corrupting the liberal democratic institutions and disregarding the constitutional procedures.⁶⁴

It is generally seen that populist parties use a variety of means to keep themselves in power. In this sense, it is useful to consider the relation between populism and power as an objective one, since power is one of the significant components of politics rather than a phenomenon that populist movements can and cannot govern, and there are various means of preserving political power. Populist movements are also aware that when

63 Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016): 31.

64 Giorgos Venizelos, "Populism(s) in Power: A framework of analysis – insights from the case of Syriza (2013 – 2019)", Centre on Social Movement Studies (COSMOS), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence: 2-3.

they come to power, they must use the relevant instruments to preserve and consolidate the political power they gain, and they do this effectively. One of these instruments, perhaps the most effective tool used by populist movements, is to resort to constitutional changes within the democratic order. Thus, they deconstruct the existing institutional order, serve as an ideological critique to realize their promises in order to overcome the instabilities in the old order, and consolidate their power in the hands of the populist leadership.⁶⁵ In the use of instruments for the maintenance of power, it becomes the most important goal to eliminate alternative power centers that may challenge the populist leadership. Consolidation, provided by constitutional changes, as an element of the populist leader's ability to practice and sustain power over the political and social order is often used to centralize the power in the executive branch and lengthen the amount of time that the populist party and leader can stay in government.⁶⁶

When PASOK came to power in Greece, it did not hesitate to use the same instrument for power consolidation. When Papandreou became prime minister by dragging the masses after himself, the biggest threat to his power was the presence of Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was holding presidential power, and whom Papandreou regarded as the representative of that old order which he criticized a lot. Karamanlis represented a kind of counter-power of the established order against Papandreou's populist power, and Karamanlis' existence in the presidency considerably influenced the direction of both the domestic and international political issues of Greece during the first co-existence with the government of PASOK from 1981 to 1985. Moreover, the presidential responsibilities of Karamanlis became one of the most critical targets of PASOK's revisionary proceedings of 1985-1986. After long efforts and political maneuvers, Papandreou made constitutional amendments that would limit

65 David Landau, "Populist Constitutions", *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March 2018): 522.

66 Ibid. 532.

the political power of the president and make himself the dominant political actor as prime minister, by breaking the written rules and traditions.⁶⁷ Through the constitutional amendments in March 1986, the responsibilities and the important political powers of the President of the Hellenic Republic were abolished⁶⁸ and the prime minister, Andreas Papandreou at that time, became a constitutional hegemonic power over Greek politics.

One of the most important topics in the discussions about the relationship between populism and power is the changes in the rhetoric of populist movements after they come to power. However, there is an important point to be underlined here. Popular mobilization does not always need to be accompanied by a strong populist rhetoric. Populist rhetoric can merely infuse itself into the development of populist mobilization and include just an anti-elite character through social and economic problems by valorizing ordinary people,⁶⁹ because the main problems that concern ordinary people are economic in the domestic field. The issues related with international politics are not often among the focal points of ordinary citizens, and for this reason, most of the populist movements in the process leading to power appear to develop discourse over the socio-economic problems of the people, even if there are exceptions.

However, as noted above, this does not mean that they are not populists. A problem arises at this point: The narrative that the populist movement develops over socio-economic problems during the process of taking power does not appeal to all segments of society, since there are also other sections of society that are not affected by socio-economic problems or are less affected. It is here that populist movements, mostly

67 Vassilis Kapetanyannis, "The Left in the 1980s: Too Little, Too Late" in *Greece 1981-1989 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1993): 82.

68 See footnote 10 in Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, "New Trends in Greek Contemporary Constitutional Theory: A Comment on the Interplay Between Reason and Will", *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (Fall 1999): 226.

69 Robert S. Jansen, "Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 2011): 83.

through their leaders, construct a definition of 'people' which includes all social classes, including the elites, starting from their approach to power and more intensely when they gain power. The most powerful amalgam that works in this construction is nationalism. In so doing, they adopt nationalist ways of speaking and framing situations. In this way, by building a broad definition of 'people', they create a popular society by making class differences insignificant; they raise a national solidarity, albeit temporarily, by constructing a parasitic popular enemy to keep this popular society alive in a mobilized manner, and they use this national solidarity to eliminate opposing elements to sustain their power in government.⁷⁰

The emergence of PASOK as a phenomenon in Greece, its coming to power and its practices in the government period are a very good example of this. PASOK developed during the period 1974-1981 as a political movement representing anti-right forces in Greece and expressing the demands of the non-privileged majority in particular. One of the significant discourse of the party was the socialist transformation of Greek society and the promise to implement social reforms and welfare policies. Even though it criticized the government on national issues and developed some discourses on these issues, its political discourse also included socialist aims such as improving the living standards of the working class and socialization of the means of production.⁷¹ It even followed policies in line with these goals in the early period of its rule. PASOK's social and economic policies were designed to favor the middle and lower classes of Greek society, and this was achieved by introducing considerable increases in wages and salaries of the working classes, especially of public workers.⁷² However, later in its ruling period, as in the stories of many other populist movements, when the necessity of considering the demands and sensitivities of not only anti-right and working classes but

70 Ibid. 84.

71 Christos Lyrantzis, "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment" in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1993): 29.

72 Ibid. 26.

also other classes of society emerged for power consolidation, nationalism, whose main focus was Turkey, was adapted to PASOK's populism in order to build national solidarity. As a result of this, unique to Greece's socio-political dynamics, a nationalism with Greek populist sentiments,⁷³ which included a re-appropriation of national membership from the right-wing elites, was developed in order to maintain PASOK's hegemony.

At this point, it is possible to identify two important characteristics of PASOK's populism. First, during its rule, PASOK actively sustained institutional corruption in Greece and in this way was able to consolidate its power by substantially removing the potential threat from bureaucratic elitism against its power. Second, and what makes PASOK's populism distinctive, is that as a left-wing populist party, it was able to integrate the traditional policies of bureaucratic elitism into PASOK's governmental strategies with a series of rightward policy shifts.⁷⁴ These two factors enabled left populism to stay in power for a long time in Greece.

PASOK sets a very good example of establishing hegemony over democratic institutions by corrupting them. Indeed, as Lönnroth identifies, PASOK is a nominally socialist party that posed in Greece's political arena as the complete antithesis of democratic liberalism and its institutions. PASOK achieved this by weakening liberal democracy to political extremism characterized by populism under the challenging economic conditions of Greek society, which went from relative riches to very low standards of living in the post-1974 period.⁷⁵ As the most important element of the political tradition in Greece, in terms of historical reality, too, the situation that arises is that the motivation of the party, which has taken over the government, to seize the state bureaucracy is formed immediately. This situation is more evident in the power of populist parties such as

73 Carsten Holbraad, *Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003): 161.

74 Alexander Kitroeff, "Andreas G. Papandreou: A Brief Political Biography", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997): 24.

75 Axel Lönnroth, "Populism in Post-Crisis Greece", MaRBLe Research Papers, Maastricht University: 2.

PASOK. When PASOK came to power in 1981, the party soon began to attempt to acquire full control over the Greek bureaucracy, and these attempts remained unchallenged in filling the ministries with its own party personnel and in formulating and passing administrative legislation in the parliament.⁷⁶ Moreover, during the rule of PASOK, bureaucratic institutions, which are essential elements in the functioning of democracy, functioned not for the maintenance of democratic values, but for the implementation of the practices of the ruling party. In order for the bureaucracy to continue this function, PASOK made it an unwritten rule that bureaucrats must adhere to PASOK's practices in order to advance in their careers,⁷⁷ and this enforcement of bureaucracy by the ruling PASOK corrupted the democratic institutions in Greece for eight years, allowing PASOK to remain the sole power in the government of the country.

In this context, as Dobratz and Whitfield mention, Andreas Papandreou and PASOK disrupted the dominance of the old version of clientelism-oriented politicians in Greece by introducing a change from the decentralized personalism of the typical clientelistic party to the highly centralized personalism of the typical populist party. Thus, the Greek political system under PASOK rule became much more open to especially financial abuse and to political corruption of the institutions by the party leaders who struggled to maintain and enhance their political power over the bureaucracy and the people.⁷⁸

It is common for populist movements in Greece to resort to nationalist propaganda, recognizing the impact of the glamorousness of Greek nationalism on Greek society. However, it should be underlined here that

76 Dimitrios A. Sotiropoulos, "Bureaucrats and Politicians: A Case Study of the Determinants of Perceptions of Conflict and Patronage in the Greek Bureaucracy under PASOK Rule, 1981-1989", 352.

77 Ibid. 360. Sotiropoulos transmits his interviews with high level bureaucrats. Almost half of the key bureaucrats in his interviews admit that civil servants supporting PASOK would be promoted more in 1981-1989 under PASOK government.

78 Betty A. Dobratz and Stephanie Whitfield, "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era", *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (September 1992): 170.

Greek populism acquires an aggressive and irredentist character, especially when it inherits the historical legacy of Greek nationalism. In particular, the continuous identification of the historical legacy, which passed down through generations since the emergence of Greece as a modern nation-state, of Greece's survival through an aggressive opposition to Turkey makes Greek populism dangerous.

Andreas Papandreou, as the charismatic leader of PASOK, had a considerable influence in the construction of left-wing populism, including Greek nationalism. Papandreou built up an ideal of national independence on the narrative of Greece's suffering position under foreign control, and indeed, he pointed to US hegemony over Greek domestic politics and foreign relations, and he constructed a political goal to free Greece from American hegemony and to provide popular sovereignty for a national independent administration. In Papandreou's developing ideological formation, US hegemony was put in a demonized position as responsible for the corrupt regime of the established order in Greece during the post-World War II era. This was a reductive approach to explain the domestic and international situation of the country; however, it was simple enough to be favored among ordinary citizens who had been oppressed under the hegemony of the right-wing ruling elites. It was also a clear anti-Americanism, emerging from the negative historical experiences of the recent past. The unwillingness of the rightist factions of the ruling elite to cede power to the leftists in the early 1960s and the overthrow of Andreas Papandreou's father, Georgios Papandreou's government in 1965 with the cooperation of the conservatives, industrial elites, monarchy and military bureaucracy radicalized broad sections of Greek society. Thus, Papandreou modified a unique discourse with nationalist tendencies by placing the rightist parts of the ruling elite in the target, as the forces to be eliminated for the survival of the nation.⁷⁹

Andreas Papandreou successively organized a resistance organization, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Panellinio Apeleftherotiko

79 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece 1945-1967*, 156-157.

Kinima – PAK) in the late 1960s. The PAK, as a grass roots movement,⁸⁰ played a vital role in motivating and mobilizing the oppressed forces inside and outside of Greece around Papandreou's idealization of national independence by leading the anti-dictatorship struggle of political actors against the military dictatorship in Greece. The PAK's main ideological priority was anti-Americanism, which kept the political factions in the organization within a common political target aiming to free the country from US control by overthrowing the military regime.⁸¹ However, despite his considerable contribution to the struggle of democratic forces against the rightist ruling elites and his well-respected personal contest against the military dictatorship, Andreas Papandreou inherited significant characteristics of the previous governments, which he effectively used to construct the populist power of PASOK throughout the 1980s. Papandreou's radical and populist rhetoric on national issues, his massive party organization, his collectivism and his strong leadership character to handle all the national political, economic and social problems⁸² were mainly inspired by the right-wing ruling powers' and military regime's implementations.

Andreas Papandreou's personality had a dominant effect on the formation of the PASOK phenomenon and PASOK, as a new party in Greek politics from September 1974 onwards, was structured on Papandreou's populism based on anti-imperialist rhetoric. In many ways, Papandreou's ideas, experiences and some of his personal characteristics had decisive

80 Nick Papandreou, "Life in the First Person and the Art of Political Storytelling: The Rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou", GreeSE Paper No.85, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe (May 2014): 3.

81 For Papandreou's own evaluations on US support for the military regime in Greece and the PAK's ideological formation in Turkish, see Andreas G. Papandreu, *Namlunun Ucundaki Demokrasi*, transl. Semih Koray, Mehmet Emin Yıldırım, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988): 398-406.

82 Nikiphoros Diamandouros, "PASOK and State Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988)" in *Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986*, ed. Speros Vryonis Jr., (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Pub., 1991): 15.

effects on the party's policy determination mechanisms. Indeed, although it evidently promised to restore democratic values in Greece, PASOK itself became a leader-dominated political organization soon after its foundation. Papandreou's dynamic appearance on Greece's political scene after a brilliant academic career in the United States, and his active opposition and challenging role to the established forces in the country during the turbulent 1960s gradually shaped his worldview as PASOK's leader. Additionally, some of the tough characteristics of Papandreou's personality, such as his belligerent and ambitious nature, had significant effects on the development of PASOK as a political movement diverging from other existing political actors.⁸³ In that sense, Papandreou was able to establish a direct and personal relationship with the citizens through a populist, ambiguous and very highly effective political discourse. This direct relation between the party leader and his followers, after a time, resulted in bypassing the party organization at the implementation process of policies, and Papandreou's own political dominance over the party prevailed over the common mindset in PASOK's organizational structure.⁸⁴ The hegemonic role of Andreas Papandreou over PASOK remained unchanged even after the party had risen to power and his national independence rhetoric had begun to turn to a kind of rough nationalism, especially in the foreign policy-making process.

The ideological patterns of foreign policy are mentioned in the Founding Declaration (APPENDIX B) of the party which was declared by Papandreou himself on September 3, 1974. In the declaration, the conceptual principles and the political goals of PASOK are identified around the main principle of national independence, which is supported by another three sub-principles: popular sovereignty, social liberation and political democracy. The text starts with an aggressive reference to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and anti-Greek American policies in the region, and

83 Michalis Spourdalakis, "I Poreia pros tin Eksousia, 1974-1981" in *O Andreas Papandreou kai i Epochi tou (1 Tomos)*, ed. Vasilis Panagiotopoulos, (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2000s): 239.

84 Andreas Pantazopoulos, *Gia to Lao kai to Ethnos I Stigmi Andrea Papandreou 1965-1989* (Athens: Polis, 2001): 171.

highlights the principle of national independence as the distinctive and vital one, and as a pre-condition for realizing the national freedom of Greece with sovereignty which would be ensured by liberated citizens under a democratic administration. Thus, the declaration summarizes that popular sovereignty, social liberation and political democracy can only be achieved through the construction of a fully national independence.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the declaration also pointed to a very distinctive feature that distinguished PASOK from the other left movements in Greece and signaled its reconciliation with the established political order in the country: frustration and distance from the dogmatism and the entanglements of the traditional left and the existing socialist regimes.⁸⁶

The idealization of national independence was the core element of PASOK's foreign policy concept during the opposition period of the party until 1981. Papandreou constructed his opposition narrative on the principle of national independence by demanding the immediate dissolution of Greece's economically and politically dependent position in the Western system. Moreover, Papandreou developed a strong criticism of the rightist elements of the ruling elite by accusing them of heavy economic and political corruption in the country during their long period of governance from the post-war era onwards and by affiliating them with collaboration with outsider forces as traitors.⁸⁷ Thus, PASOK's ideological framework which was based on the principle of national independence and its strong promotion in the political arena during the second half of the 1970s were characterized by a populist approach to Greek foreign policy. This characterization was narrated through the adoption of a series of program declarations which included Greece's withdrawal from NATO, the suspension of the European integration process, the removal of American military bases in Greece and most significantly, the struggle

85 For further details about the four principles in the declaration and full text of the declaration in Greek, see *Makedonia*, 10 September 1974.

86 Michalis Spourdalakis, "I Poreia pros tin Eksousia 1974-1981", 236.

87 Takis S. Pappas and Paris Aslanidis, "Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts", 182.

against the Turkish threat by means of restoration of the territorial integrity of Cyprus and settlement of the Aegean dispute.⁸⁸

PASOK's strong ideological emphasis on national independence recalls the popular phenomenon of third world nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly, in the field of foreign policy, the proposals for overthrowing the dependent regime of the rightist ruling elite in Greece led to discussions of the question of whether Greece could be considered as a third world country or not. Papandreou adopted this political approach during the military dictatorship years, and he developed his ideological perspective around Greece's imagined position of a country economically and politically exploited by the imperialist powers of the capitalist system. He justified his ideological approach by referring to the political and economic relations between the rightist elements of the ruling elite, industrialist elites and conservative rightist political elites, who were the core elements of the political system in Greece, and the economic power holders in the imperialist countries of the Western capitalist world. According to Papandreou, the ruling elites in Greece were corrupted actors who governed Greek society in collaboration with the Western powers and they were the actors of the system to be eliminated for the liberation of Greek society in order to realize national independence.⁸⁹ That approach of Papandreou, which has many notional similarities with third world nationalism, distinguishes PASOK as a socialist movement from its contemporaries in Europe. PASOK, with its concern for Greece's national independence, was rather a populist movement aiming at liberalization of its people from exploiting powers than a party of class struggle. At the same time, although the party's principles aimed to achieve socialist transformation of Greek society, the precondition of national independence for achieving socialist transformation puts the party and its leader on the nationalist side of the political spectrum.

88 Christos Rozakis, *I Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki 1974-1985* (Thessaloniki: Malliaris-Paideia, 1986): 122.

89 Andreas Pantazopoulos, *Gia to Lao kai to Ethnos I Stigmi Andrea Papandreou 1965-1989*, 109-111.

Briefly, despite the American effect on the political and economic dynamics, Greece in the 70s and 80s was still not a third world country in terms of economic development, and Greek society could not be considered as the exploiting one in terms of economic and socio-cultural relations with the West. Therefore, PASOK's adoption of a maximalist position in the fields of domestic and foreign policy had no equivalent and it distinguished PASOK from the classical leftist, or socialist movements of class struggle. In addition, Papandreou's strong nationalist rhetoric through the principle of national independence, which targeted the external powers, uncovered his patriotic credentials which made the party's road to power easier.⁹⁰ His famous nationalist slogan, more reminiscent of a right wing slogan, of "Greece to the Greeks"⁹¹ during the electoral campaign of 1981 facilitated the transmission of his political message which attracted the crowds much more than the socialist terminology. When PASOK came to power in October 1981, neither Andreas Papandreou nor his party was socialist anymore. Furthermore, the party itself was transformed into a nationalist movement with strong populism, instead of transforming Greek society into a socialist one.

Papandreou was a more credible contender for power with his more reconciling attitude towards mainstream politics in Greece and this formation made him a more noticeable political leader before the 1981 elections.⁹² The transformation of PASOK was, in fact, not ideological, but it was a change to open the path for reconciliation within the ruling elites in order to achieve power. Besides, the transformation in the process of the 1981 legislative elections was a formulation to disseminate PASOK's political proposal to as many social groups as possible within a nationalist rhetoric. Andreas Papandreou realized that the description of national independence had to be explained to ordinary citizens in a nationalist

90 Nikiphoros Diamandouros, "PASOK and State Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988)", 22-23.

91 Andreas Pantazopoulos, *Gia to Lao kai to Ethnos I Stigmi Andrea Papandreou 1965-1989*, 180.

92 Van Coufoudakis, "The Democratic Transition to Socialism in Post-War Greece", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 4 (1988): 22.

narrative by pointing out concrete threats rather than emphasizing its philosophical notion. Therefore, PASOK's transformation in the process leading to the 1981 elections was definitely its leader's choice to maintain the party's rapid rise to power. Within that strategy, the narrative was apprehensibly softened in terms of economic and social policies, and Papandreou almost abandoned its radical position on socialist transformation of Greek society.⁹³

The transformation of policies in the process leading up to the 1981 elections had a dual effect in the post-1981 governing period. First, the strategy on policy transformation effectively contributed to the gradual shift in PASOK's ideological position to the center, covering both the leftist and rightist center of the political sphere. Second, the PASOK party organization and the leadership were constrained to increase their radical political rhetoric, including harsh aggressive nationalist tones, by taking the nationalist sensitiveness of the central rightist voters into consideration as a result of that new central political position.⁹⁴ Furthermore, increasing the nationalist rhetoric helped enormously to facilitate the transmission of the party's and Papandreou's message on alienating the outsider powers as threats to Greece by preventing the emergence of ideological and political differences between the social forces supporting PASOK.

In brief, PASOK's policies and narratives were successfully transformed into a nationalist character which melted conservative, rightist and leftist voters in the same pot as single political motivation around PASOK. This intentional shift in the party's position also provided a tool to the leadership to maintain the cohesion between PASOK's nationalism and different social groups in the country, because Papandreou's nationalist narrative and the party organization's achievement on the adoption

93 Christos Lyrantzis, "The Power of Populism: The Greek Case", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (September 1987): 668.

94 Kyriakos Mitsotakis, *Oi Simpligades tis Eksoterikis Politikis: Esoterikes kai Diethneis Pieseis stis Ellinoamerikanikes Diapragmatevseis gia tis Vaseis 1974-1985* (Athens: Patakis, 2006): 131.

of a nationalist character created an eclectic characteristic for the movement. In other words, PASOK moved from being a movement of ideological mobilization to being a national populist party. In that sense, the historic programmatic declarations of PASOK in the field of foreign policy were also transformed. However, apart from the criticism of the opposition position, the emphasis on national independence, which was the core element of the promise to change the foreign policy, with the nationalist transformation of the party in the ruling position became dangerous in the implementation during its term in office.⁹⁵ More precisely, populist nationalism could be rewarded with populist support at the domestic level, but it could cause troubles in the international arena which might make the government pay a price.

In fact, PASOK cannot be considered a class struggle movement. It was never a political movement that represented the oppressed classes of the country. Andreas Papandreou developed a “third road to socialism” which was a brilliant strategy that placed PASOK between the social democratic movement and the traditional communist ideology.⁹⁶ Thus, Papandreou stripped himself of being a social democrat leader threatening the interests of the elite classes, or a communist revolutionary character, both of which actually scared the ruling elite. Indeed, Papandreou developed a political struggle against the hegemonic powers among the ruling elite, mostly conservative and rightist, since the end of the civil war in the country, in order to reach to the government.

In other words, PASOK’s leadership was part of the ruling elite, too. Many of them came from the bureaucracy, academic circles and even from the business world, but they had not been in the government, except for Papandreou himself and his family in the mid-1960s.⁹⁷ Therefore, the process up to the 1981 elections actually represents the adaptation of the

95 Ibid. 142.

96 Theodore C. Kariotis, “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997): 50.

97 For a very comprehensive research in Greek on leading figures in PASOK’s party organization and Papandreou’s inner circle, see Dimos Markou Mpotsaris, *I Dynasteia Papandreou* (Athens: Isokratis, 1983): 169-188.

party organization to the nationalist characteristic of the hegemonic ruling class. From that point of view, PASOK's nationalism, especially in the rhetoric on the national issues, would be much more understandable.

Briefly, PASOK's leader and his inner circle had long before adopted the nationalist feature of the Greek ruling class, and they merely transformed the party's narrative from a socialist one to a nationalist one which would cover the Greek people's concerns more inclusively. The result of the transformation in PASOK and the efforts to become closer to the ruling elitism manifested themselves in the 1981 declaration, with the softening narrative in foreign policy issues and the strengthening nationalism with an anti-Turkish discourse. The declaration recognizes the crucial characteristics of foreign policy for the country's future and reaffirms many of PASOK's historical discourses, such as the need for national independence and removal of the dependent regime of their predecessors. It promises a genuinely independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy for Greece in order to achieve national independence. However, the most distinguishing feature of the declaration is the reflection of the softening about Greece's position in the Atlantic system and integration to the European Economic Community, and on the other hand the specific consolidation of nationalist rhetoric on Turkey.

The declaration, interestingly, constructs a correlation between NATO and Turkey's threat to Greece, as it becomes the essence of Papandreou's harsh criticisms of the Atlantic Alliance by accusing it of favoring Turkey during the 1980s. In the declaration, while giving capital importance to the handling of national issues, PASOK promises a more active response to the constructed Turkish threat and a stronger mobilization of the Greek people and bureaucracy for a solution to the Cyprus problem. In that sense, the necessary condition for the radical rearrangement of the country's foreign policy towards realizing PASOK's promises was the easing of ties with the Western camp. On that point, an analysis of common NATO-Turkey political interests against Greece was propounded in the declaration, and PASOK's anti-Western rhetoric was used to legitimize PASOK's nationalism which created a strong anti-Turkish narrative. Although the promise of a permanent withdrawal from NATO remains in the

declaration, the NATO issue was softened by transforming it to a “strategic goal” that could be realized under certain conditions in the future, and anti-Turkish policy prioritization is attributed with a greater importance compared with NATO. It is very obvious in the declaration:

“The Alliance is unable (because it does not want to) to secure our borders from the Turkish threat. The opposite is exactly true. The Turkish Armed Forces are being equipped and modernized, while both Turkey's claims to the Aegean and its violations are escalating dangerously.

Apart from this peculiar position of Greece in the Alliance, there are also recent bitter experiences which have accumulated in the People: the royal coup of 1965, the seven-year dictatorship and Attila⁹⁸ in Cyprus.

Regarding the defense of our country:

a. NATO does not guarantee our borders “to the east”.

b. At the same time, munitions and preparation of the Armed Forces of our country is part of the retaliation to the Warsaw Pact - and not to Turkey's existing threat to the Aegean.

c. Within NATO, there is the possibility of leaking information to Turkey.

d. Even in the completely hypothetical case of “danger from the North” - non-existent, as the Minister of National himself admitted ...

e. The New Democracy government has reached an agreement with NATO on returning to NATO's military wing (Rogers) - with Attila who is always in Cyprus - which entails concessions to Turkey, our unwritten national sovereign rights in the Aegean and the acceptance of NATO's substantial supremacy on our airspace.”⁹⁹

It was an instrumentalization of NATO in PASOK's nationalist narrative on Turkey by diminishing the aggressive anti-Western rhetoric and by increasing anti-Turkey conceptualization in foreign policy perception.

98 The word ‘Attila’ in PASOK's declaration refers to Operation Atilla. Operation Atilla is the code-name of Turkey's first military operation to Cyprus which was launched on 20 July 1974 following the Greek Cypriots' coup.

99 Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, *Diakiriksi Kivernitikis Politikis Simvolaio me to Lao*, 31-32.

In other words, when the nationalist narrative dominated PASOK's foreign policy concept more and more, PASOK began to replace the West with Turkey in the threat perception of national independence understanding. There is a very simple reason for this, related with populism: The main concern of the Greek public was Turkey, not the Americans, as more than 90 percent of Greeks believed in the 1980s that Turkey was a much bigger threat to Greece than the USA.¹⁰⁰

The declaration represents a turning point in PASOK's history since 1974 and it was the final step of the gradual change of the party and its leader. The transformation of the party from a protest and system-challenging political movement to a central ruling party also represents the change from a socialist movement, at least in narrative, to a central and highly motivated populist party. The PASOK party leadership successfully transformed the party, the party's political approaches and its policies by adopting and implementing a populist mode of political incorporation in accordance with the Greek people's high expectations from the ruling elites.¹⁰¹ Especially for the core foreign policy issues, which were central in PASOK's political proposal from the beginning onwards, the shift from an anti-imperialist tendency to populist pragmatism became much clearer when the party achieved the great electoral victory in October 1981.¹⁰² In reality, the Greek people's expectations related with foreign policy were to restore Greek honor after "the defeat" in 1974 and to challenge the "Turkish threat". Thus, PASOK's major reform strategy in Greek foreign policy turned into a battle with Turkey under strong nationalist mobilization of all actors in the country.

The main element that produced the pragmatist approaches in the process of coming to power was the motivation to impose the party on the hegemonic sections of society. However, after coming to power, prag-

100 Panayote E. Dimitras, "Greece: A New Danger", *Foreign Policy*, No. 58 (Spring 1985): 137.

101 Christos Lyrantzis, "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment", 30-31.

102 Theodore A. Coulombis, "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?" in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1993): 119.

matism also manifested itself in anti-Turkish behavior. There are two significant reasons for PASOK's increasing anti-Turkish nationalism as the ruling party; one is international, the other is national.

First of all, the international system was undergoing a structural change when PASOK came to power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the US' cessation of moderate policies towards the Soviet Union brought the detente period of the 1970s to an end. Until the mid-1980s, relations between the two camps of the Cold War were shaped by mutual suspicion and periodically increasing tensions. The tense relations between the superpowers of the international system created strong pressure on the PASOK government to make a selection between its anti-imperialist, in fact anti-American, narrative and the realities of international politics. Those developments in the international system conflicted with the declared goals of PASOK's foreign policy and complicated the implementation of its electoral promises towards removal of American military bases from Greece.¹⁰³ More precisely, PASOK, as the ruling party of a country in the European Community and a member of NATO, could not have challenged the hegemony of the Atlantic system, the United States, in the intense environment of the international system. For this reason, PASOK's anti-Americanism was removed from the agenda of foreign policy priorities.

The second reason why PASOK softened its harsh rhetoric towards the West is the Karamanlis effect. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the architect of the foreign policy of the previous period and the prominent leader of Greece who ensured Greece's integration to the European Community, was the president of the republic during the first four years of PASOK in power. Besides, Karamanlis was a powerbroker figure on the political and bureaucratic elite and on the people of Greece, as a long experienced and prestigious politician. Karamanlis, even though he was not involved in politics as the president, always maintained his interests in foreign policy

103 Christos Rozakis, "I Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki 1981-1990" in *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous (Tomos IST) Sigchronos Ellinismos apo to 1941 os to Telos tou Aiona*, eds. Gavriella Etmektoglou, Hagen Fleischer, Ksanthippi Kotzageorgi-Zimari, Evanthis Chatzivasileiou, Aleksandros I. Despotopoulos, (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 2000): 372-373.

issues to follow the results of the central policies of his previous governments, especially those ones about European integration. Although Karamanlis usually expressed his evaluations on foreign policy privately to the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, it was a well-known fact that he and the prime minister disagreed on many foreign policy issues, especially on Papandreou's distant approach to Greece's European integration. President Karamanlis many times expressed his opinions about the European future of Greece publicly. As a matter of fact, the Karamanlis effect indirectly contributed to the easing of Papandreou's criticism of the West, and his personal insistence on the maintenance of policy towards European integration of the country resulted in the moderation of PASOK's policies.¹⁰⁴

Thus, PASOK had to follow an extraordinary policy change from the socialist narrative of the pre-power period to a tough nationalism after the access to power in the early 1980s. Due to the challenges mentioned above, PASOK's rulers had to face quite strong difficulties in implementing pre-power commitments in foreign policy, and the transformation of foreign policy strategies caused PASOK's general political narrative to change from socialism to nationalism at domestic level, too. This distinctive change of political narrative was visibly reflected on long-term foreign policy objectives, and harsh criticisms of the United States, NATO and European integration gave way to Turkey and anti-Turkish narrative in a short span of time. So, "struggle with Turkish expansionism" and "liberalizing Cyprus from Turkish invasion" became the major foreign policy goals in PASOK's discourse about the national issues.¹⁰⁵ The natural result of this remarkable change from radical socialist narrative to nationalist-leaning populism in foreign policy was inevitably pragmatism. Andreas Papandreou and the party organization from the top executives to the local offices had to adopt a pragmatist approach, collaterally with previous populist right-wing governments of the post-war period, in order

104 Dimitris Konstas, "Oi Stochoi tis Ellinikis Eksoterikis Politikis: 1974-1986" in *Sigchroni Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki (Tomos A')*, eds. Dimitris Konstas and Charalampos Tsarandidis, (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1988): 41.

105 Ibid. 21-22.

to handle the difficult foreign policy problems of the country and mobilize the public around PASOK's nationalism. Therefore, the radical elements of the party's declarations, such as the removal of US bases from Greece, and withdrawal from NATO and EC membership could not be encountered in the policy implementations during the 1980s,¹⁰⁶ but on the other hand, the conflicted environment with Turkey became dominant in Greek foreign policy discussions in that period.

PASOK, throughout its ruling period in the 1980s, was governed by the unique adoption of Greek nationalism into its populism which was mostly constructed on an anti-Turkish discourse. The postponing and abandoning of the implementation of the party's most ambitious pre-government promises actually represent a disloyalty to the ideological principles in the founding process of PASOK. Consciously, knowingly and willfully, PASOK was transformed into a nationalist-leaning populist political phenomenon by the party leadership in the political environment of the country, in which critical foreign policy issues could not be managed without touching the nationalist sensitiveness of the ruling elites and Greek public. Thus, populism and nationalism remained largely steady as key features of PASOK's political formation from coming to power in 1981 until falling from power in 1989. It was the most effective way to keep the party organization and alignments adhesive to the party, to cover up the impossibility of keeping their promises on radical transformation of the state's foreign policy strategies, and to protect the party's political credibility among the ruling elite classes.¹⁰⁷

That dimension was particularly noticeable at international level mainly through the development of tension-oriented foreign policy towards Turkey, by promoting nationalist approaches in the foreign policy-making process of the Cyprus, Aegean and minority issues. In that sense, PASOK's political framework of foreign policy did not contain a radical

106 Ibid. 39-40.

107 Christos Lyrintzis, "The Power of Populism: The Greek Case", 672.

differentiation from the previous governments; quite the contrary, it contained a strong continuity of previous populist policies constructed by the country's ruling elite circle.¹⁰⁸

In the last instance, PASOK's nationalism was popularized by Andreas Papandreou's significant contribution with his charismatic political personality. Papandreou was the main shaper of PASOK governments' foreign policy strategies and he had a catalytic effect on the transformation of policies from a socialist character to a nationalist one by uniting all factions composing PASOK. His hegemonic role on all policy formulation processes, especially in the foreign policy, became much more dominant when the conflicts with Turkey escalated into crisis after 1983. Papandreou and his inner circle, like his predecessors, were the real center of the decision-making process in Greek foreign policy, and the most important foreign policy decisions were formulated by that inner circle of PASOK elites by limiting official institutions' legitimate roles.¹⁰⁹ PASOK, indeed, built up a decision-making structure similar to a presidium in which the leader was attributed a sanctity for the sake of the nation. In that sense, the greatness of the prime minister was justified by the inefficiency of the bureaucratic structure in Greece for the planning and implementation of foreign policy strategies.

In brief, Greek foreign policy throughout the 1980s was constituted on an absolute trust in Andreas Papandreou in accordance with his nationalist rhetoric about the national issues, which resulted in a strong quarrel with Turkey. However, in the end, the burden of enormous defense expenditures on the ailing Greek balance of payments and the heavy economic conditions which detracted from PASOK's populist image, made

108 In fact, there was a clear absence of substantial policy differentiation between PASOK and the right-wing forces represented by the New Democracy, in the political arena of Greece in the 1980s. For an interesting analysis about this issue, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997): 97-99.

109 Panagiotis Ioakeimidis, "To Montelo Schedias mou Eksoterikis Politikis stin Ellada: Prosopa Enanti Thesmon" in *Sigchroni Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki: Mia Sinoliki Proseggisi (Tomos A')*, ed. Panagiotis Tsakonas, (Athens: Sideris, 2003): 114.

Andreas Papandreou retreat from his raucous nationalist march against Turkey.¹¹⁰ This is the story of the 1980s in Greek political history.

110 Thanos Veremis, "Defence and Security Policies under PASOK" in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1993): 185.

The Historical Background of Greco-Turkish Conflicts

§ 3.1 The Historical Development of the Hellenic Nationalism

Hellenic nationalism is a modern definition which has mainly been used to describe the common interests of the Hellenic people who are imagined to live under a single Greek political entity. Hellenic nationalism is directly related to Hellenism, which is associated with Greek civilization and is modified by references to the glorified Hellenistic period of ancient times and by the combination of ancient and modern Greeks into a single national narrative.¹ In this context, the configuration of Hellenic nationalism, which is mainly based on Hellenism, arose as a modern phenomenon in the early 19th century as a result of the Enlightenment in Europe. Early Greek intellectuals were strongly affected by the world of ideas of the Enlightenment and they contributed a lot to the development of Greek national identity from the late 18th century onwards. The period from the late 18th century to the early 19th century is described as the

1 Nicolas Demertzis and Hara Stratoudaki, "Greek Nationalism as a Case of Political Religion", 107.

Greek Enlightenment by many scholars.² The awakening of the national identity of Greeks was characterized during this period by Greek intellectuals living in European cities deeply influenced by the liberal environment of thought in industrializing Europe.

From the mid-18th century onwards, Greeks in the Ottoman Empire conducted most of the trade activities and Greek tradesmen from the cities of the Black Sea shores to the northern edge of the Adriatic Sea established trade colonies. Especially, the cities of Trieste and Vienna became major centers of Greek economic and cultural activity in Europe, due to the support of the Habsburg Emperor. Most of the intellectual production of the Greek Enlightenment in terms of publication of books took place in the cities of Vienna, Trieste and Venice at the end of the 18th century. Later on, Greek commercial communities extended to other western cities of Europe, such as Marseilles, Amsterdam and Paris, where they developed a quite strong intellectual life with Greek schools and libraries.³

The significance of these Greek intellectuals of the late 18th and early 19th century was their philosophical inheritance adopted from the European Enlightenment. Their philosophical approach was mostly affected by the secular character of the Enlightenment and industrial development in Europe. Greek intellectuals of this strong network played an accelerating role in the development of the Greek Enlightenment in a secular character, with reference to the Ancient Greeks, in the early 19th century. Moreover, Greek intellectuals in Europe experienced the impact of ancient Greek philosophy on their European contemporaries, and thus,

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- 2 See, Victor Roudometof, "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (May 1998): 21-26; Richard Clogg, *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996): 5-6; Catherine Koumarianou, "The Contribution of the Intelligentsia towards the Greek Independence Movement, 1798-1821" in *The Struggle for Greek Independence Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg, (London: The Mac-Millan Press, 1973): 67-86.
 - 3 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution The Making of Modern Greece*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2013): 55-56.

their interpretation of Ancient Greek civilization was directly linked with Greek people of the 19th century by erasing the Byzantine and Ottoman periods. They reached the conclusion that pure Greek culture was contaminated during Byzantine and Ottoman times by the effect of Christian and Muslim religious culture. Thus, Ancient Greek civilization was promoted as the most significant characteristic of modern Greek identity with the purification of Greek culture.⁴

During the Ottoman rule, the poor Greek intellectual world knew very little about Ancient Greece, and it is not an exaggeration to argue that modern Greek philosophers discovered their ancestral culture and philosophy from the 18th-19th centuries in enlightening Europe. Almost all of them were introduced to Ancient Greece in the Enlightenment environment of Europe. Therefore, the flag bearers of that '*Ancient Greekism*' were the ones who studied in European institutions and lived in European cities. For example, in 1815, Grigorios Paliouritis in his *Arkhaiologia Elliniki* (Greek Archeology) invited the Greeks to take gigantic steps on the path to the acquisition of their ancestral virtue and religion. The most influential Greek philosopher of the early 19th century, Adamantios Korais, edited many works by the Ancient Greek philosophers for his followers and invited the Greek people to get rid of the illiteracy of the Byzantine and Ottoman dark ages. Moreover, he blamed the Greek Orthodox clergy and *Tourkokratia* (the period of Ottoman rule) for the backwardness of Greek people in the 19th century. Another prominent figure of the Greek Enlightenment, Rigas Velestinlis, also known as Rigas Feraios, called the Greeks for a revolution to build up a French type of secular republic in order to become free from Ottoman tyranny.⁵ The common

4 For a detailed analysis of the thoughts and influences of early 19th century Greek philosophers on modern Greek identity which was based on the promotion of pure ancient Greek culture, see Murat Önsoy, "Modern Greek Enlightenment and 19th Century Greek Nationalism", (Master of Arts Thesis, Bilkent University, 2005): 70-80.

5 For citations from the works of philosophers of the Greek Enlightenment, see Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 28-31.

thread to all this was the dignification of Ancient Greek culture by denigrating the Byzantine and Ottoman periods which had a substantial effect on the evaluation of Greek identity throughout the history.

A crucial question appears at this point. Did the evaluation of Greek identity have a continuous or discontinuous characteristic? The philosophers of the Greek Enlightenment mostly tended to construct Greek identity on the Ancient Greek inheritance, and they underestimated the strong effect of Christian Orthodoxy on ordinary Greek people, which was derived from the Byzantine legacy with the hegemony of the Orthodox Church on social relations among them.⁶ In other words, the Greek identity which they tried to narrate on the myths of Ancient Greece had a discontinuous character. That discontinuity comprised almost a two thousand-year period of history in which the Greeks evaluated their social characteristics under Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman rules.

The Greek identity could not be developed only on ancient inheritance, as the intervening period after Ancient Greece was long enough to attribute the historical references to the construction of collective identity. Besides, the Christian Orthodox character of the Greeks was much stronger than the Greek Enlightenment philosophers conceived, and their efforts, or philosophical attacks, on breaking the Christian Orthodox hegemony on Greekness came to naught. When the Greek intellectuals tried to define the continuous character of Greek identity, they were faced with the challenge of a long Byzantine inheritance of Christian Orthodoxy, and they were compelled to melt Ancient Greek and Christian Orthodox legacy in the same pot. At that point, Orthodoxy was included

6 As Triandafyllidou and Veikou argue, the Greek identity, on the one hand, looks to the East, to the Byzantine tradition and Christian Orthodox heritage. However, the East is also a source of worry for modern Greece as it represents Ottoman legacy. Anna Triandafyllidou and Mariangela Veikou, "The hierarchy of Greekness: Ethnic and national identity considerations in Greek immigration policy", *Ethnicities*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2002): 192.

within the ethnic definition of Hellenism in order to construct the Greek identity within a continuous historical context.⁷

Especially from the independence of Greece onwards, the discussions on Greek identity shifted from a secular character with a constitutional citizenship understanding containing republican thought to an ethnic and cultural definition of Greekness which included not only Ancient Greekness, but also Christian Orthodox Greekness.⁸ This was a *sui generis*⁹ form of the romantic movement of the 19th century peculiar to Greek philosophy. When the new Greek state was faced with the challenge of construction of national identity and the geographical extent of this national identification, the Greek Orthodox character became more ascendent in the collective national identity-building process. Because, although the Greek Enlightenment philosophers promoted the Ancient Greek character, the large mass of Greek people were not incorporated into that Ancient Greek connection.

Besides, the new Greek state inherited a poor, weakened territory which was very far from the glorious Ancient Greece. The people of that poor territory were mostly controlled by the Greek Orthodox Church, and their Orthodox sense of belonging was much stronger than it was towards those ancient ancestors. Thus, the political elites of the new Greek state in the 1830s opened the way for the synthesis of Ancient Greek and Greek Orthodoxy. They used the traditional connections of religion to construct the collective Greek identity with the splendid but notional legacy of the Ancient Greek world. Therefore, the Greek Church continued to be a historically important institution in Greek society and made a substantial contribution to the development of Greek national identity.¹⁰ As

7 Magdalini Bakali, "Perspectives on Greek National Identity in the Light of an İstanbul Greek Newspaper, 1908-1911", (Master of Arts Thesis, Sabancı University, 2018): 9.

8 Nikos Chrysoloras, "Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture", 42.

9 Not like anyone or anything else, unique to one case.

10 Vassiliki Georgiadou, "Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism", *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 1995): 303.

a result of this, with the more realistic Orthodox character of the 19th century, religion inevitably became the dominant component of Greek collective identity. Those intellectuals who supported the secular characteristic of Greekness and criticized the religious affiliation in the process of nation building were excluded, or even jailed and killed.¹¹ The liberal nationalism of the Greek Enlightenment was transformed into a Hellene-Orthodox synthesis which was defined to aim for the unification of all Hellenes, who were the grandsons and granddaughters of the Ancient Greeks but also the devoted members of the Greek Orthodox world at the same time.

This ethno-religious Hellene-Orthodox synthesis dominated the discussions on the nation-building process of Greece during the 1830s and 1840s. At this point, the romanticism of the 19th century played a consolidating role in the discussions on the continuity of Greek national identity. The Greek intelligentsia during the 1840s had made a great effort to establish a continuous character of Greek identity from the Ancient Greeks to the modern Greeks including the Orthodox period of Byzantine times, by using anthropology, linguistics and folklore, which were the core elements of the 19th century romanticism and were used to construct the cultural identities of the modern nations.¹²

The nation-building process was accompanied by a common history-building process during the 1840s, and this created a historical background, which is very difficult to interrogate and is almost unquestionable in Greek historiography, for the modern phenomenon of Hellenic nationalism. The Greek history-building process was conducted on the ground which had been underlaid by Ancient Greekness carrying the arrogance of ancient philosophy, Byzantine Greekness bearing the arrogant character of Greek Orthodoxy, and modern Greece tendering the Greek

11 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflicts", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Winter 1979): 10-11.

12 For a detailed discussion of the effects of romanticism on the Greek intelligentsia of the 19th century which created an impulse towards Greek national unity, see the well-known study of Greek romanticism by Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, *Ellinikos Romantismos* (Athens: Ermis, 1994): 419-427.

pride of the independence warriors against Ottoman tyranny. A continuous character was attributed to the history of the Greeks in order to define a Greek national identity, and Ancient Greece, the Byzantine Empire and modern Greece constituted the three pillars of modern Hellenic nationalism. This constructed continuous character of the Greek nation very strongly affected the domestic dynamics of politics in Greece and also the international relations of the country, for the next two centuries, through the incorporation of the lower social classes of Greek society into a single Greek nationality.¹³

Although the motivation of the Greek intelligentsia, politicians and independence heroes was quite strong towards the development of the Greek state, the common history had to be completed in order to keep this motivation alive on the columns of Hellenic nationalism. This missing part of the nation-building process was crowned with a historical contextual framework provided by the historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, who is widely accepted as the pioneer of modern Greek historiography. Paparrigopoulos, in his famous work, *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous* (History of the Greek Nation), whose first volume was published in 1853, constructed a unity of the Hellenic nation which has an unchanging continuous character from Ancient Greece via the Byzantine Empire, reaching modern Greece by referring to the splendid unity of the Hellenes throughout the history.¹⁴

The History of the Hellenic Nation was later published in a series of volumes between 1861 and 1874, and Paparrigopoulos incorporated all

13 John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History Since 1821* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 31.

14 Liz Potter, "‘Two Thousand years of suffering’: George Finlay and the History of Greece", *British School at Athens Studies*, Vol. 17, Scholars, Travels, Archives: Greek History and Culture through the British School at Athens (2009): 24. Paparrigopoulos' work also constructed a legitimization for the new political ideology of the Greek nation state, which encouraged national unity. For an extensive analysis, see Constantine Hatzidimitriou, "From Paparrigopoulos to Vacalopoulos: Modern Greek Historiography on the Ottoman Period" in *New Trends in Modern Greek Historiography*, eds. A. Lily Macrakakis, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, (Hanover: Modern Greek Studies Association, 1982): 13-24.

the missing periods of Hellenism and defined an uninterrupted continuity of 4000 years of history of Hellenism. The ancient, the Macedonian, the Christian, the medieval and the modern ages of Hellenism were separately introduced in his study with their own unique historical missions in the continuous history of the Hellenic nation. Paparrigopoulos' work has been very influential on Greek historiography and historical philosophy and is considered as the official history of the Greek nation. Although Paparrigopoulos' work received quite strong criticism within the academic environment and it portrayed an imagined character for the Hellenic nation in many aspects, it constituted a very strong base for the Hellenic-Orthodox synthesis which is the starting point of modern Hellenic nationalism of the last 200-year period of history. It provided a national identity formation for the modern Hellenic nationalism and combined the pureness of the Hellenism which is attached to Ancient Greek, and the Orthodoxy of Hellenism which is correlated with Byzantine history. In other words, Paparrigopoulos espoused Pericles and Theodora by matching Romantic Hellenism and Byzantism.¹⁵

However, this interpretation of Hellenic nationalism which dominated the political arena of the Greek world during the second half of the 19th century was confronted with a great challenge. The Hellenic State included only a small number of Hellenic people in its territories, and the majority of Hellenes remained outside the boundaries of the state, most of them living in Ottoman territories. At this point, a distinction between the two camps became clear. The indigenous elites of Athens, the *autochthones*, claimed that the Hellenic nation consisted of Hellenes who lived in the territories of the Greek state, while the outsiders, the *heterochthones*, defined the nation covering all Hellenes living inside and outside the

15 Niyazi Kızılyürek quotes from Cyril Mango's lecture given at King's College in 1964, see Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkıracında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011): 46.

Greek state.¹⁶ Philosophical debate between these two camps determined the future of Hellenic nationalism: The outsiders won the debate and the Greek political elite drew a new picture of nationalism including the idea of taking all Hellenes inside the boundaries of the Greek state with more territorial demands of Greece.¹⁷ This idea was conceptualized as the Megali Idea, which gave Hellenic nationalism an irredentist character.

§ 3.2 The Megali Idea

The Megali Idea directly dominated Greek politics for almost one century. It was first introduced by the Prime Minister of Greece, Ioannis Kolettis in 1844 during the constitutional debates in the Hellenic Parliament. It was a conceptualization of the natural territories of the Greek state from a Hellenic nationalist perspective. Kolettis narrated his ideal of unification of all Hellenic people living in the geographical area surrounding the Kingdom of Greece in the 1840s. However, in a historical context it was the expression of an idea which imagined that the Greek state would cover all historically ethnic Greek-inhabited areas. This definition inevitably referred to the Ottoman lands, where a large number of Greek populations were still living, and all other regions which historically belonged to the Greeks since ancient times, but where other ethnic groups such as Slavs and Turks were still existing. Although they were not clearly mentioned as the Ottoman lands in Kolettis' speech, he used the term 'East' while he was speaking about the rights of Greeks living outside the Kingdom of Greece. It was clear that his idea pointed out those areas where Hellenic people were living under Ottoman rule, such as the Southern Balkans, Western Anatolia, the Aegean Islands and the Eastern Mediterranean islands including Crete and Cyprus: "*The Megali Idea means*

16 Paraskevi Brousta, "Greece and the Great Powers (1833-1862): The Diplomacy of National Integration", (Master's Degree Thesis, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2006): 33.

17 Ibid. 34.

*that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East – that is the destiny of Hellenism – to Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be theirs, and which is chiefly inhabited by people claiming to be descended from Hellenic stock, professing the Orthodox or Greek faith, or speaking the language.”*¹⁸

Ioannis Kolettis’ definition of the rights and destinies of Greek people living outside the Greek state deeply changed the tentative direction of Hellenic nationalism from the second half of the 19th century onwards. Previously, the elites of the economically poor and politically weak Kingdom of Greece had shuttled between developing the newly founded Greek state and including the outsider Hellenes. However, Kolettis’ strong and passionate vision of the Megali Idea opened a path for Hellenic nationalism to walk through the ideal of unification of all the Hellenic population.¹⁹

The definition of the Megali Idea was an abstract one when Kolettis first narrated it in the Hellenic Parliament. However, the Megali Idea itself actually manifested a great contradiction in terms of the real politics of the mid-19th century. The political elite of the Kingdom of Greece imagined a Hellenic nation including all Greek-speaking people who adopted the Hellenic culture of the Ionian Islands, the Balkan Peninsula, the Western Anatolian part of the Ottoman lands, and the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean islands. However, the Greek state did not have any economic or military power to run a campaign to unify all Greeks in those imagined territories.²⁰ Despite the economic and political weakness of the Greek state, the Megali Idea still dominated the political mobilization

18 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism, A “Sacred Synthesis”* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013): 21-22.

19 Megali Idea projected a unitary Hellenic Republic which is totally Greek in name and language. Roumen Daskalov, “Bulgarian-Greek Dis/Entanglements” in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans Volume One: National Ideologies and Language Policies*, eds. Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013): 159.

20 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Redefining the Nation: Shifting Boundaries of the ‘Other’ in Greece and Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 2011): 169-170.

of the Greek elites as a myth for almost one century, because of its distinctive feature of completing the missing part of the historical continuity of the Hellenic nation.

When Paparrigopoulos defined the continuous character of the Hellenic nation throughout the history, the abstract geographical boundaries of this constructed nation were deficient. The Megali Idea created a geographical continuity for the construction of the Hellenic nation and it drew the boundaries of the nation to include all places where Greek-speaking people with Christian Orthodox faith lived. In brief, Paparrigopoulos' definition of the continuous unity of Hellenic people in history and Kolettis' narration on the continuous unity of Hellenic people in geographical terms brought the Megali Idea into being as an instrument which engendered Hellenic nationalism with a romantic character. In this context, the Megali Idea always prevailed in the real dynamics of the international political environment in the 19th century. It was adopted by the vast majority of Hellenic people not only living in Greece, but also those living outside of Greece, and it became an obsessive political conviction especially in the minds of the political elites and clergy.²¹

The last component of the Megali Idea was the Greek Orthodox institutions to be included in the official ideology. When the Megali Idea became a state doctrine in Greece which aimed to unify all Hellenic people with Christian Orthodox faith under a single political entity, i.e. the Greek state, from the mid-19th century onwards, the imagination of historical continuity of the Hellenic nation in a specific geographical area included the particularity of common religious belief too, which was Christian Orthodoxy. Especially after the recognition of the autocephalous Church of Greece by the İstanbul Patriarchate, the Church of Greece became much more active in terms of the political unity of Greek Orthodox people, as it

21 From the mid-19th century onwards, Greek domestic politics predominantly centred on the Megali Idea by taking especially British patronage. Richard C. Hall, *The Modern Balkans A History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011): 67.

was a national and independent church, whereas the İstanbul Patriarchate was an Ottoman institution which was subject to the sultan.²² After it achieved its autocephalous position in ecclesiastical terms, the Church of Greece was nationalized around the myth of the Megali Idea, and both the political elites of Greek society and the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church were easily mobilized through a single aim for the unification of all Greek-speaking people of the Mediterranean basin.²³

In this respect, it is much easier to understand the domination of the Megali Idea in Greek politics as an accelerator for Hellenic nationalism, because the Megali Idea had an affiliation with the Ancient Greeks, which provided a glorious character to Hellenic nationalism, it was closely attached to the Byzantine Empire, which provided a Christian Orthodox character to Hellenic nationalism with the inclusion of the clergy, and it completed the missing part of the nation-building process in Greece for the mobilization of political elites and different social classes of Greek society around Hellenic nationalism. This mobilization of the elites became a campaign to extend Hellenic nationalism to all Hellenic people outside Greece and the politization of all ethnic Hellenic people around the Megali Idea's fictive unification under the Greek state with a nationalism which gone wild to recapture the land and redeem the populations that had been historically Greek.²⁴

The nationalist mobilization which the Megali Idea created in the second half of the 19th century meant irredentism in that case. As Hellenic

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- 22 For further details about the historical process of the recognition of the Church of Greece as autocephalous entity by the İstanbul Patriarchate, see Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004): 43-47.
- 23 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism, A "Sacred Synthesis"*, 23-30. Grigoriadis discusses the historical process of the nationalization of the Orthodox Church in Greece in detail and he points out how the Church of Greece became more passionate and fanatical about Hellenic nationalism than the political elites.
- 24 Christine Philliou, "The Ottoman Empire between Successors: Thinking from 1821 to 1922" in *Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space*, ed. Jorgen Nielsen, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012): 34.

nationalism became an ideal for all Greek people in and outside Greece, the Greek state was inevitably dragged into following expansionist policies, although there was always a big gap between the imagination and the capability. Three times in the 19th century, the attempts were made to realize the unification of the Hellenes through the Megali Idea, yet the realistic environment of international politics did not allow it to be achieved. In other words, the Greek political elites, as the followers of the Megali Idea, always imagined unifying their cognates under the Kingdom of Greece, but they never had the capability of realizing it in terms of economic and political power.²⁵

These attempts mainly targeted the Ottoman lands, where a great number of Greek-speaking people lived, and Greece had always been involved in conflicts with the Ottoman State throughout the 19th century. Greece first attempted to annex the lands of Thessaly and Epirus from the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War of 1854-1856. However, as this was an international war between Russia and the British-French-Ottoman Alliance, Britain and France objected to the Greek demands. The Greek government was very much willing to expand its territories to the north, to Thessaly and Epirus, in order to take a significant step towards Hellenizing its northern neighboring regions. Soon after the outbreak of the war, the Greek government started to support the Ottoman Greek rebellions in Thessaly and Epirus. Besides, a number of Greek officers crossed the Greek-Ottoman border with troops to support the rebels. However, when the Greek intention of expansion came to light, soon afterwards, the British and French navies invaded the Greek port of Piraeus in May 1854 and forced Greece to stay neutral during the war. The blockade by the British and French navies of Greece continued until 1857, and soon Greece had to abandon following the policy of support for Greek rebellions in the Ottoman lands.²⁶

The second attempt by Greece towards the projection of the Megali Idea was during the Cretan Revolt of 1866-1869. When Britain transferred

25 Deniz Ş. Sert and Konstantinos Travlos, "Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry", *Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 59 (2018): 111-112.

26 Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010): 68.

the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864 in return for its forced neutral position during the Crimean War, the Greek political environment was full of excitement that the same would happen for Crete, too. The Greeks on the island of Crete revolted against Ottoman rule, and their intention was to remove Ottoman authority in Crete and replace it with Greek rule. The public in Greece, with the Greek national feeling which had always tended to dominate government decisions, pressed the Greek government for a more aggressive attitude in order to annex Crete. Although the Greek state was weakened in a corrupt and insolvent position of public affairs, they demanded a solution to the conflict in Crete which would open the way for the annexation of the island by Greece.²⁷ However, Britain continued to support Turkish rule in Crete, because the Suez Canal had just opened a few years before and the completion of the Suez Canal put the island of Crete in a strategically important position as a link to the British trade route to India, which had to be protected because of the necessity for the economic interests of rapidly industrializing Britain in the 19th century. Thus, British policy in supporting Ottoman territorial integrity preferred the ongoing Turkish rule on the island of Crete instead of the corrupt and inefficient administration of the Greek state.²⁸ The political elites and public in Greece, who were strongly mobilized around the Megali Idea, were disappointed once more, as it was understood that the realization of the Megali Idea was completely related with the dynamics of the international political environment. Greece itself was not eligible to extend its territories. More precisely, the Great Powers of the time were to decide if Greece could expand to the imagined Hellenic territories which were projected by the Megali Idea.

Another attempt at territorial expansion took place during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. When the Ottoman Empire suffered a huge territorial loss during the defeat of 1877-1878, public imagination on expanding the Greek territories in accordance with the Megali Idea was reawakened in the political discussions in Greece. The public accused the

27 Kenneth Bourne, "Great Britain and the Cretan Revolt, 1866-1869", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 35, No. 84 (December 1956): 76.

28 Ibid. 81-82.

government of displaying passive behavior towards supporting the demands of the Greeks in Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace to unite with the Greek state, and the Greek government was strongly criticized by making no progress while the Ottoman lands were invaded by Russian armies. Although the government sent some troops to Thessaly, the Ottoman armies resisted the Greek incursion in Thessaly, and the Greek army could not progress. At the Berlin Conference of 1878, Greece demanded the annexation of Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace. However, yet again it was decided by the Great Powers to allocate only some small parts of Thessaly and Epirus lands to Greece.²⁹ During the war, the Greek government felt excited about realizing territorial expansion as far as Thrace in line with the Megali Idea. However, the big gap between the imagination and the capability of the Greek state appeared in the real politics of inter-state relations once more, and Greece had to content herself with the territories approved by the Great Powers, who were indeed the real decision makers regarding the territorial changes in the international politics of the late 19th century.

However, even though Greece's requests for annexing Thessaly in Berlin Congress were not concluded, the Great Powers left an open door. The Great Powers called Ottoman State to reach an agreement with Greece for a new demarcation line on the borders of Thessaly and Epirus with the Thirteenth Protocol of the Treaty of Berlin in 5 July 1878. The negotiations on the borders of Thessaly and Epirus were left to the discretion of the Ottoman and Greek governments, and if two governments cannot resolute the situation then the frontier was to be determined with the Great Powers' mediation.³⁰ When the Ottoman Empire was hesitant about the determination of the Thessaly border with an agreement with Greece, the Great Powers put pressure on the Ottoman Empire in

29 For further details about the Greek-Ottoman frontier discussions and negotiations at the Berlin Conference of 1878, see Mustafa Malhut, "93 Harbi Sonrasında Ortaya Çıkan Osmanlı-Yunanistan Sınır Meselesi ve İngiltere'nin Tutumu", *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2020): 68-71.

30 Mehmet Uğur Ekinçi, "The Origins of the 1897 Ottoman-Greek War: A Diplomatic History", (A Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2006): 10.

line with the demands of Greece, and as a result, the Convention of İstanbul was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece in 1881, which determined the new frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus. At the end of this process, which is known as the expansion of 1881 in the Greek political history, Greece captured Arta region and most of Thessaly, except Elassona region, and took these places from the Ottoman Empire without war.³¹

Although the attempts by the young Greek state were mostly disappointed in such a short period of time, the public excitement towards the Megali Idea could never be diminished. During the revolts that took place in Crete in 1896 and early 1897, which broke out as a result of the never-ending aspiration among the Greek population for the unification of the island with Greece, the Greek public in the motherland Greece was again mobilized around sensitiveness towards the Cretan issue.³² This public mobilization was totally centered around the aim of the unification of the island with Greece, and the Greek government could not ignore that strong public will, which resulted in military intervention by Greece in Crete. Although the Greek government was quite timid towards supporting the revolt in Crete at the beginning and the Great Powers warned the government not to take any action to annex the island to Greece, the Greek government could not stand against the nationalist propaganda garnished by the ideals of the Megali Idea. They decided on military intervention in Crete aimed at unifying the island with the mainland by sending a military ship, but it resulted in all-out war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire.

The conditions in the war were against the Greek Army, which caused another military and social disappointment in the end. They have a grand

31 Nicole Immig, "The "New" Muslim Minorities in Greece: Between Emigration and Political Participation, 1881-1886", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 2009): 513-514.

32 Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984): 30.

vision like the Megali Idea aiming to take all Greek-speaking Orthodox people inside the national boundaries of Greece, but the political and military capability of the Greek state was inadequate for achieving such a goal. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, the Greek Army circumstances were very far from realizing the ideals of the Hellenes. The army also had a shortage of horses, weapons and munitions and furthermore, the system of military transportation in Greece was in a primitive state.³³

The result was inevitably a total loss for Greece after a short 30-day battle. The Ottoman armies defeated the Greek armies on all fronts and the Greek government and society were worried about losing the lands which they had, while they were planning to extend Greek territories as far as Macedonia and Thrace. At the end of the century, it was a great loss for the Megali Idea glorified since the 1840s and confirmed that Greece definitely did not have any political, economic or military power to realize the territorial aims envisaged by the Megali Idea. However, the Great Powers in the changing security environment of Europe by the end of the 19th century helped the Greek idea for a limited expansion against the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1897. Thessaly was wholly incorporated into the Kingdom of Greece and Crete was given autonomy under the administration of a Christian governor.³⁴ But, this land allocation was nothing more than a conciliation, and it was far from satisfying the Greek political elites and Greek public through the Megali Idea. Thus, the Greek public fell into a silence about the Megali Idea, and focused on domestic political revenge until Balkan Wars.

The result of the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 for Greece can be considered as a territorial triumph by some. Greece succeeded in expanding its territories as far as Thrace and the historically important trading city and port of Thessaloniki was included in the boundaries of the King-

33 Ibid. 112.

34 For the details of the peace treaty after the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 signed in İstanbul in September 1897, see "Text of the Graeco-Turkish Peace Treaty", *The Advocate of Peace* (1894-1920), Vol. 59, No. 10 (November 1897): 242-244.

dom of Greece. Moreover, all Aegean islands, except the Dodecanese, Imbros and Tenedos, were annexed by the Greek state.³⁵ Greece reached almost half of the territories perceived in the Megali Idea, except Western Anatolia and Cyprus. The territorial achievements in the Balkan Wars motivated Greek policy makers to believe in more land reclamation from the Ottoman Empire, where a large number of Greek-speaking people lived, and this caused a period of political hope for the realization of the Megali Idea.

The short one-year period between the Balkan Wars and the First World War was a period that represented the final powerful awakening of the Megali Idea in terms of continental expansion. It was a period of brevity for many Greeks as they remembered it as a children's myth. This myth period of Greece symbolized a magical era full of socio-political happiness and hope for the final achievement of the Megali Idea under a unified and calm political environment. However, this period full of hope again caused a final break from reality in the turbulent climate of international dynamics of the 1910s. History once more functioned as an idyllic exercise for all the Greeks around the Aegean, and the great prime minister of that period, Eleftherios Venizelos, who was carrying the flag of the Megali Idea, blindfolded the Greek public to conceive fundamental social, economic, and political challenges as well as a foreign policy which led to catastrophe in 1922.³⁶ Venizelos' foreign policy for the upcoming global conflict was simply identified by the irredentist characteristic of the Megali Idea. He supposed that if Turkey joined the war effort and was on the victorious side, it would lead to the destruction of Hellenism in Asia Minor. Even if Turkey stood on the defeated side, it would still generate a risk for the destruction of Hellenism in Asia Minor because of a possible alien domination in the region. Therefore, according to Venizelos, in both cases, Greece would be the losing party, even if it participated in the war

35 Nikos Svoronos, *Çağdaş Hellen Tarihine Bakış*, transl. Panayot Abacı, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1988): 85.

36 George Kaloudis, "Greece and the Road to World War I: To What End?", *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 2014): 9.

and contributed to the political and military victory of the Western Allies. From such a viewpoint, Venizelos believed that the oncoming great war in Europe offered an unmissable opportunity for Greece to finalize the territorial aims of the Megali Idea.³⁷

Throughout the one-hundred year story of Hellenic nationalism, the period of Venizelos' government represents the highest level of the political ambitions of the Greek political elite, because Venizelos had the facilities that his predecessors never had. The Greek army had been modernized during the last couple of decades, and it was victorious in the Balkan Wars with the technical support of the Great Powers. In addition, the Greek economy was relatively in a better situation, as the rich Greek merchants comprised a national bourgeois. As the armaments race between the Great Powers had been increasing since the 1880s and industrialism in Europe had developed very high business standards, the Greek merchants of the 19th century were transformed into the trade bourgeois of modern Greece. For instance, Vasileios Zacharias, famous as Basil Zaharoff in Western literature, the arms dealer, and Georgios Averoff, the chief financier of the first modern Olympic Games in 1896, were the two Greek businessmen with international fame.³⁸ The modern army and the presence of the national bourgeois as the developer of economic activity made Greece one of the most prominent local actors among other Balkan states for legalizing the vision of the Great Powers of sharing of ex-Ottoman lands. For instance, as Paparrigopoulos also mentioned in his study on the history of the Hellenic Nation, the Greek political elites had always considered the Greeks as the most proper nation in the East to rule İstanbul.³⁹ Such a description turned into a kind of sacred mission for Greece,

37 Nikos Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Conference (1919)* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978): 33-34.

38 For further analysis on Greece's economic development in the late 19th and early 20th century, see Harry J. Psomiades, "The Economic and Social Transformation of Modern Greece", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Mediterranean Europe: Proving Ground for Development (1965): 195-197.

39 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, "Political Romanticism in Modern Greece", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May 1999): 50.

a member of the Western world, to bring civilization to the underdeveloped and backward East. While Hellenic nationalism shaped a political passion such as the Megali Idea, at the same time it constructed the modern Hellenic nation as the mother of Western civilization. Moreover, those lands where Greek-speaking Orthodox people lived under Ottoman rule were considered as those ones waiting to be rescued by their Western kinsfolk. In other words, the Megali Idea of Venizelos' time was accompanied with an ambitious assertion for solving the famous "Eastern Question" in terms of geopolitics and culture. The Greek armies which invaded Western Anatolia were assigned with a mission civilisatrice.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the political over ambitiousness of Venizelos, the Greek public and British Government headed by David Lloyd George led to further war and miscalculation of the disagreement between the Great Powers on sharing ex-Ottoman lands and the moral power of the Turkish civil and armed resistance against Greek expansion in Western Anatolia. When the Greek armies landed in Western Anatolia in İzmir in May 1919, the Greek political and military leaders predicted the annexation of the historical lands of the Greeks which was narrated with the irredentist feature of the Megali Idea with the support of the Allies. However, their prediction confirmed that it was an illusion rather than a concrete objective target. Turkish resistance under Mustafa Kemal's command stopped the Greek advance in Anatolia, and Turkish nationalist mobilization among the Turkish population throughout Anatolia extended the battle. The more the battle was extended, the more the Greek army failed to maintain such a war, which consumed the resources of Greece. In addition to this, the Allies' duplicitous policies also had an important effect on the miscalculation by the Greek political leaders. For instance, France had agreed with the Greek government on granting the lands of Thrace and Asia Minor to Greece, but then they became very concerned about British influence, and the French began to search for opportunities to agree with the Turkish Nationalist Movement in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal's

40 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 60-61.

leadership.⁴¹ The Allies' policies on ex-Ottoman territories were differentiated from each other when Turkish resistance in Anatolia became successful, and as a result, the French and Italian governments made an agreement with the Ankara Government and Britain was left alone to support the Greek campaign in Anatolia. Under these circumstances, the Greek government could not obtain more financial and military support from Britain and the great offensive of the Turkish armies in August 1922 resulted in the absolute defeat of the Greek army, which is known as the "Asia Minor Catastrophe" in Greek historiography. It was not only the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia, but also, it was the strongest erosion of the hundred-year ideal of continental irredentism based on the Megali Idea, which had depicted a vision of unification of all Hellenes living in the surrounding lands of the Aegean. Although this vision was almost impossible to realize in terms of military in the hard-core realistic environment of nation states, it took almost one century for the Greek political elites to comprehend it after a dramatic political, economic and humanitarian loss through the disaster in Asia Minor.

§ 3.3 A Concise History of the Cyprus Issue

The island of Cyprus has always been placed in a core position in the political geography of the Mediterranean throughout the history. It was an island of conflict between the Egyptians and Roman Empire in ancient times and it was considered as a geopolitical base when the Ottoman-Venetian clash appeared from the Middle Ages onwards. The island remained under Ottoman hegemony for almost 300 years and the dynamics of the industrializing world of empires in the 19th century brought the island to another critical position for securing the trade routes between

41 David Roessel, "The "Repeat in History": Canto XXVI and Greece's Asia Minor Disaster", *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1988): 184-185.

India and Europe. As the engine power of the 19th century industrialization, the British Empire was the one most interested in providing security of the economic routes for its huge industrial and commercial sectors.⁴²

British interests in Cyprus had already been clarified before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and the absolute Ottoman defeat in this war resulted in a hegemony change on the island. The island of Cyprus was temporarily transferred to Britain in June 1878 in exchange for British support to the Ottoman Empire against Russian expansion. Britain took over the administration of the island in the name of the Ottoman Sultan and was committed to giving military support to the Ottoman Empire in case of any Russian attack on the Ottoman territories. Thus, de facto British rule started in 1878 and the colonial period brought modernization in both a social and political sense, capitalism and nationalization to the island. From 1878 onwards, history witnessed how a small island turned into an ethnic conflict between its residents. Before the issue turned into a multi-party international conflict in the sui generis environment of the Cold War from the 1970s onwards, the history of Cyprus in the 20th century was mostly characterized by increasing Greek nationalism not only towards British colonialism but also towards the Turkish presence, and a bloody conflict between Greeks and Turks on the island.⁴³

3.3.1 *Cyprus under British Rule*

De facto British rule in Cyprus began in 1878 and the Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914 when the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War. However, the social and political impact of the British on the Greek and Turkish populations of Cyprus started from 1878 onwards and engendered extensive changes in the socio-political life of the islanders by constitut-

42 Marc Aymes, *A Provincial History of the Ottoman Empire Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in the nineteenth century*, transl. Adrian Morfee, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014): 34-37.

43 A. Suat Bilge, *Ankara Atina Lefkoşe Üçgeni* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1996): 69-71.

ing identities without ever blending into a common Cypriot consciousness.⁴⁴ In other words, while the reasons for the conflict in Cyprus are discussed as a Greek-Turkish issue, it cannot be evaluated without understanding the strong effect of the British colonial period which gave rise to the modern phenomenon of nationalization in Cyprus.

Cyprus did not have a significant importance in the diplomatic environment of the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, it was not considered as a topic for discussion during the negotiations of the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Britain intentionally did not open the Cyprus issue for discussion, as it was a strategic key point for British policy makers for securing British economic and trade interests against expansionist Russia towards the Mediterranean and the agreement on Cyprus between Britain and the Ottoman Empire remained in the shadow of other political developments in Europe.⁴⁵

Although the other Great Powers of Europe did not attach importance to the island of Cyprus because they had been busy with the partition of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, British politics was definitely aware of the strategic importance of the island for the economic security of industrialized Britain. For this reason, Cyprus appeared as a bilateral conflict between the British and Ottoman Empires in international politics. Especially in the 1870s, the statesmen and policy makers in Britain strongly argued for the security of trade routes from India to Britain and in many governmental and parliamentary meetings, an alternative trade route to India was discussed passionately, and thus, Cyprus emerged as a strategic location in these discussions on trade security.⁴⁶

44 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 176-178, 187.

45 Naomi Rosenbaum, "Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960", *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1970): 621.

46 Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934): 66.

During the negotiations of the Treaty of Berlin, British diplomacy exerted extra efforts to diminish the strategic importance of Cyprus and it was skillfully dropped from the agenda, even though the island was sometimes weakly stated as a part of the Eastern Question. The British government regarded Cyprus as an element of a bilateral geographical conflict between Britain and the Ottoman State and the negotiations on Cyprus were conducted secretly. As part of this secret diplomacy, Cyprus was excluded from the busy environment of international politics of the 1870s and British diplomacy succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Government to assign some administrative authority to the Britain on the island of Cyprus.⁴⁷

The Convention on Cyprus between the Ottoman and British Governments was signed on June 4th, 1878 in İstanbul. In general, it was a defense alliance convention against Russian invasion of the Kars and Ardahan provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the Convention provided British support for Ottoman territorial integrity after the huge territorial loss in the Treaty of Berlin. However, one concession made by the Ottoman government was a kind of price to pay for British support. Article 4 of the Cyprus Convention gave Britain the right to use and administer the island of Cyprus. An additional agreement to the Convention was signed on July 1st, 1878 in İstanbul again, and how the British would administer the island was detailed, but Britain pledged to hand the administration back to the Ottoman State if Russia ended the invasion of Ottoman lands. The distinctive feature of this Convention was that Britain had a de facto political authority in Cyprus and had the right to participate in the tax

47 Dwight Lee quotes a very interesting memorandum of Colonel Robert Home, a British military intelligence officer in Turkey, to the British government. During the preparations for the Berlin Conference, Home, in the memorandum, recommends to the British Government to occupy Cyprus to defend the route to India from Russian aggression and therewith, the British government decided to negotiate with the Ottoman State in secret to take the control of Cyprus. Thus, the Britain took over the rule in Cyprus with the secret Cyprus Convention of 4 June 1878. See Dwight E. Lee, "A Memorandum Concerning Cyprus, 1878", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1931): 235-241.

collection process, and thus had an indirect authority to control the financial income of the island.⁴⁸ Although the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan over the island was accepted with the Convention, this remained on paper and the Convention opened a wide path for Britain to take full control over the island for possible annexation in the future.

The first British administrator, appointed as high commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, arrived in Cyprus on July 12th, 1878 and took the authority from the Ottoman governor. The administration handover in Cyprus created confusion, but at the same time, it resulted in the first division in the minds of local Turks and Greeks of the island. The Turks of Cyprus interpreted the British administration as the result of a temporary agreement and they continued to consider themselves as the subjects of the Ottoman Sultan. This situation caused an interesting modest relation between the British administration and Turkish population of Cyprus, as the Turks evaluated the British rule as a provisional administration until Russian invasion ended in the Ottoman provinces, and they believed that British would withdraw from the island and Cyprus would be returned to the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹

On the other hand, the Greek population had an opposite evaluation and expectations about the new situation. The Cyprus Convention signified the end of the Turkish rule in Cyprus and they handled the new political dynamics in Cyprus with British rule as the beginning of a transition period for future unification with Greece. When the British High Commissioner arrived on the island, the Greek community clearly expressed their hopes and expectations about the unification of Cyprus and Greece in the near future, and they took the new political situation cre-

48 For details of all articles and appendices of the Cyprus Convention of 1878, see George Hill, *A History of Cyprus, Volume IV, The Ottoman Province The British Colony 1571-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952): 300-304.

49 Anastasia Yiangou, "Cyprus under the British, 1878-1945" in *Introduction to the History of Cyprus*, eds. G. Kazamias, A. K. Petrides & E. Koumas, (Nicosia: Open University of Cyprus, 2013): 168.

ated by the Cyprus Convention as an opportunity to ensure Greek hegemony over the island. Although it can be argued that British rule provided such an opportunity for possible unification with Greece, the idea of unification with Greece was still not common among Greek Cypriots, at least not until the early 1900s. Besides, Britain's strategic aims did not include the unification of Greeks in the Mediterranean, rather, it was a strategy to preserve British political and economic interests by following "divide and conquer" tactics.⁵⁰

British rule in Cyprus brought Turkish hegemony to an end and for the first time in the political history of the island, the Greek population gained a majority in the administrative bodies founded by the British authorities; in other words, the Turks lost their monopoly on official authority.⁵¹ The British secularized the administration system on the island with a radical reformation period from 1878 until the late 1890s, and this period put the Turks in a disadvantageous position. The Turks, who were accustomed to the classical Ottoman bureaucratic and judicial systems, found themselves in a kind of alienated position when the British founded modern institutions to rule the island. For example, an assembly was established to provide limited representation for islanders and Christians gained a majority in the assembly. A constitution was made, secular courts were established everywhere on the island and local municipalities were restructured according to the modern needs of the people. However, such political and bureaucratic innovations were totally unfamiliar and not easy to adopt for the Turks of the island, as the ex-hegemons of the Ottoman system which was mostly designed according to Muslim and non-Muslim division. The newly introduced political system made the Turkish Cypriots intellectually inactive and politically apathetic during the first thirty years of British rule.⁵²

50 Dan Lindley, "Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 2007): 229.

51 Charles Fraser Beckingham, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus", *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 5, No. 1/2 (1957): 68.

52 Ibid. 69.

On the other hand, the Greek people of Cyprus were much more eager for modern change on the island and they were familiar with the constitutional developments of the modern age as they were more closely connected to Europe through trade activities. The Greeks of Cyprus used this new environment provided by British rule to transfer the hegemony from the ex-rulers, the Turks, to the newly-developing middle class, mostly comprised of Greeks. More interestingly, that Greek middle class of Cyprus was transformed into an ethno-communal elite class by gaining the majority in legislative, bureaucratic and judicial bodies on the island during this reformation period.⁵³ During the first two decades of British rule, most of the middle and low positions in the island administration were occupied by Greek Cypriots. As a result, the end of the Ottoman system also brought the Turkish hegemony in bureaucracy to an end with the help of the British rulers who gave more opportunities to the Greeks to participate in the island's bureaucracy. Just two years after British rule began, the percentage of Greeks in public bodies increased to 34%. By the end of the century, the legislative, bureaucratic and judicial bodies were mostly occupied by Greeks. For example, out of 472 official posts, 237 of them (50%) were occupied by Greek Cypriots and Turks took 198 (40%) posts in governmental bodies. Besides, Greek Cypriots were more dominant in the police forces of the island.⁵⁴

Although political rule in Cyprus was transferred to Britain in 1878, the period of British rule until the First World War can be defined as the age of hegemony change from Turks to Greeks in bureaucracy and the age of bourgeoisification of Greeks in the more dynamic economic environment. This radical change in Cyprus at the end of the 19th century resulted in a social and economic division between Greeks and Turks, and

53 Nicos Trimikliniotis, "Nationality and Citizenship in Cyprus since 1945: Communal Citizenship, Gendered Nationality and the Adventures of a Post-colonial Subject in a Divided Country" in *Citizenship Policies in the New Europe*, eds. Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig & Wiebke Sievers, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009): 391.

54 Rolandos Katsiaounis, "Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", (PhD Dissertation, University of London, 1996): 142-143.

in the long run, underlined the political distance between the two communities. The Greeks participated more in bureaucratic and economic activity under British rule, and they had more economic enrichment and more political power. This power shift in advantage to the Greeks created a correlation between economic enrichment and education, and most of the Greek people of Cyprus had the opportunity to access greater education facilities when compared with Turks. They went to Greece, they went to Europe to receive higher education and they returned to Cyprus as teachers, doctors, lawyers and politicians. More precisely, the period of British rule created not only a dynamic economic and bureaucratic activity on the island, but also created a highly mobilized capitalist-oriented Greek population with increasing education levels as a result of this developing economic activity.⁵⁵

When the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War in October 1914 on the side of Germany, the Britain abolished the Cyprus Convention of 1878 with a unilateral act and announced with an order in council that Cyprus was annexed by the British Empire in November 1914. However, Britain's annexation was not recognized by the Ottoman Empire, but the de facto situation continued during the Great War of 1914-1918 and remained uncertain until Turkey established its position as the successor of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. In the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey recognized the British annexation of Cyprus and the de facto position of Cyprus under British rule was internationally legalized.⁵⁶

With the Treaty of Lausanne, the island became a de jure colony of the large British Empire and from the 1920s onwards, the political developments in Cyprus were mostly characterized by colonial relations between the islanders, especially the Greeks and British administration. Political mobilization of the Greek community in Cyprus accelerated the nationalist awakening among the Greek people and the situation turned from reconciliation between Greeks and British rulers into a challenge to British

55 Kyriacos C. Markides, "Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1974): 316.

56 Anastasia Yiangou, "Cyprus under the British, 1878-1945", 174, 178.

authority for the separation of the Greek Cypriots from the British Empire.⁵⁷

Moreover, British rulers lost the balance in every area between the two different ethnic communities of Cyprus. While the level of higher education among the Greeks was increasing enormously, British administration did not follow any policy to motivate the Turks for higher education. Furthermore, while the Greeks were experiencing a significant enrichment from developing trade, British policies confined the Turks to the land. The process was unrecoverable by the 1920s: A gap appeared between the quite illiterate and land-confined Turks and the well-educated and rich bourgeois Greeks. In addition to all this, a large number of the island's most talented officials were replaced with new ones, and this caused corruption in the British administration itself. Most of the newcomers did not have any previous colonial experience and they could not understand the complex social and political situation which existed in Cyprus. This created a tripartite social tension between poor peasant Turks, rich bourgeois Greeks and arrogant British rulers. This tension inevitably resulted in an authoritarian style of British administration, when the high commissioners and ruling elite of limited abilities, lacking in intellectual and social attainments, and without any dignity came to colonial positions in Cyprus in the 1920s. As a result, far less social contact took place between members of the colonial administration and the local elites, mostly Greeks.⁵⁸

The social tension affiliated with increasing nationalism among Greek Cypriots in the late 1920s turned into an uprising in the beginning of the 1930s. The uprising occurred in October-November 1931 in an environment of socio-economic turmoil on the island. The uprising of 1931 has two characteristics: First, it was a result of heavy tax policies of the British administration over Cyprus people and social tension between the

57 Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Past Hurts and Relational Problems in the Cyprus Conflict", *International Journal on the World Peace*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 2010): 42.

58 For further details, see Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island, A History of the British in Cyprus* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010): 101.

ruling British elite and Greek community of the island. The British administration imposed more and more heavy taxes on the island in order to finance the remaining debts from the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹ In addition to the heavy tax burden, the authoritarian governance of the British over both the Greek and Turkish population created dissatisfaction, especially among Cypriot Greeks.⁶⁰

Socio-economic dissatisfaction was the main reason for the second characteristic of the uprising: It definitely had a nationalist character and the main motivation of the Greeks during the 1931 uprising was separation from British rule and unification with Greece. Furthermore, Greek diplomatic envoys in Cyprus also provoked ultra-Greek nationalist movements on the island and organized meetings against the British administration to fire up the uprising for the unification of Cyprus and Greece.⁶¹ The social unrest, economic difficulties arising from heavy tax burdens and nationalist motivation for the idea of possible unity of Greeks in mainland Greece and the island of Cyprus triggered the bloody events in the autumn of 1931. Only Greeks joined in the uprising, because it started with the call of the Bishop of Kitium and Greek rebels set fire to governmental buildings in Nicosia and in other cities, attacked British officials, and created chaos on the island.⁶²

59 In the Treaty of Lausanne, Ottoman debts were distributed among all successor states. Cyprus was also included as a successor entity as a former Ottoman territory, and some amount of the tax collected from the people of Cyprus was allocated by the British administration to pay Ottoman debts.

60 George Kaloudis, "Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict", *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1999): 10.

61 The Greek Consul in Cyprus, Alexandros Kyrou, who was absolutely dedicated to the ideal of Enosis, played a major role in the 1931 revolt towards raising the Greek Cypriots' demands for Enosis with the consent of the Greek Foreign Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos. Antonis Klapsis, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 24/25 (2008/2009): 133-134.

62 For further details about the 1931 events in Cyprus, see Andreas Karios, "The Events in Colonial Cyprus in October 1931: The Suppression of a Revolt in the Interwar Years" in *Unsettled Problems after the 1919 Peace Conference, Military Conflicts and Diplomatic*

Although there are socio-economic pressures under the factors that sparked the revolt of the Greek Cypriots in 1931, it is clear that the idea of Enosis triggered by the nationalist awakening was much more effective in the main motivation. There are also strong clues that the events of 1931 were reminiscent of an Enosis-focused Hellenic awakening involving Greek Cypriots, nationalist circles in Greece and even the Greek Patriarchate in İstanbul. In this regard, the letter of Turkey's General Directorate of Security written to the Turkish Prime Ministry which was based on intelligence information received from Greece is interesting. It is mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1931 that it is stated in some publications in Athens that the movements towards the unification of Cyprus with Greece would begin in November 1931 and the relations between the members of the Holy Synod of the Greek Patriarchate in İstanbul and the leaders of the Greek uprising in Cyprus and the Greek Consul in Cyprus are transmitted from the issue of Patris newspaper dated 5 November 1931.⁶³

However, the uprising was unsuccessful because of several reasons. Firstly, the Greek Cypriots' demands for unification with Greece were rejected by Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, because Greece, at the beginning of the 1930s, was suffering socially and economically from integration problems, as more than one million Greeks had moved from Anatolia after the Turkish-Greek War of 1922. In addition to this, Greece, which was in poor economic condition and experiencing political unrest, was looking for an international alliance with Britain and trying to solve the conflicts with Turkey inherited from the population exchange of the 1920s by that time.⁶⁴ Therefore, unification with Cyprus was very

Negotiations, 45th International Congress of Military History 18-23 August 2019 Sofia, Bulgaria (Sofia: International Commission of Military History, Bulgarian Commission of Military History, 2020): 406-412.

63 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-10-0-0/Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü/109-727-4, 29 November 1931.

64 For the Venizelos government's approach to the Cyprus revolt of 1931, see Antonis Klapsis, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt", 135-137. Also see Reed Coughlan

far from the realities of international politics. Mainly because of that, the nationalist character of the 1931 uprising was destined to fail and it happened so. Secondly, the economy of Cyprus was very much dependent on Britain. An uprising against British rule did not bring any solution to the economic problems of Cyprus, and instead, it provided a path to more authoritarian rule during the 1930s with the suspension of the existing colonial constitution,⁶⁵ and more importantly, the Turkish community of Cyprus became a domestic ally for the British after the bloody rebellion of the Greeks. In the end, British troops suppressed the uprising in November 1931 and the situation returned to normal, but the uprising created an implicit alliance between the British rulers and Turks against the separation threat by the Greek Cypriots.

British rule during the 1930s was more oppressive towards the Greek community of Cyprus. It should be underlined that all ethnic groups on the island, including the Turks, suffered from British authoritarianism, but especially the Turks, as the passive participants in the political life of the island and mostly comprising the peasant population of the island, did not suffer as much as the rebellious Greeks did. More precisely, the Turks were in a defensive position behind the doors of their homes and preferred to watch the developments from outside, as they did not have any political or economic power to become involved in the conflicts. Rather, the British administration sometimes directly targeted the Greek community, as a threat to British colonial power in Cyprus. For example, the British administration prohibited Greek flag on the island and gatherings of more than five people and even ringing the church bells was prohibited except on very important religious occasions, such as Easter and Christmas.⁶⁶

and William Mallinson, "Enosis, Socio-Cultural Imperialism and Strategy: Difficult Bedfellows", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 2005): 584.

65 Antonis Klapsis, "The Strategic Importance of Cyprus and the Prospect of Union with Greece, 1919-1931: The Greek Perspective", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2013): 776.

66 Doros Alastos, *Cyprus in History, A Survey of 5000 Years* (London: Zeno, 1955): 356-357.

After this period of conflict, the new Governor of Cyprus, Richmond Palmer, was appointed in 1933 and during his governance period, strict measures continued to be taken against any kind of possible nationalist movement which aimed to unify Cyprus with Greece. The Palmer period is known as “Palmerokratia”, which means “the Palmer rule” and refers to the administration period of Richmond Palmer.⁶⁷ The era of Palmer symbolizes the most oppressive period in the political history of Cyprus. Even the British themselves defined the Palmer period as “benevolent autocracy”. Legislative council and municipal elections were suspended, all representative bodies in Cyprus were closed and Palmer governed the island through the executive council, whose members were appointed by the British administration. Such a strict administration period, especially the prohibitions on the symbols of Greek nationalism and Greek Orthodoxy and the strict provisions on legislation, executive representation and election of archbishop, shows the anxiety of British rulers towards increasing Greek nationalism in Cyprus with a strong will of unifying the island with motherland Greece.⁶⁸

Authoritarian rule of the British during the 1930s could not erase the Greek Cypriots’ nationalism towards unification with Greece. Instead, the Greek Cypriots’ political mobilization strengthened underground, but was divided into two camps. The Church of Cyprus and communist unions appeared in the political arena as the most prominent actors of the Greek community. Although both shared the common goal of unification with Greece, the Church remained with a more orthodox interpretation of Greek nationalism, while the leftist unions followed a kind of secular Marxist interpretation of modern nationalism with a strong reference to Greekness. The Communist Party of Cyprus was established in 1926, but just five years later, it was closed in 1931 after the uprising. During the

67 Alexis Rappas, “The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (October 2008): 365.

68 Anastasia Yiangou, *Cyprus in World War II Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010): 17-18.

Palmer period, the leftist factions and worker movements were put under strong pressure, and as a result, they could not find a free sphere to run their political activities in. In Cyprus, due to political pressures, only five labour unions officially registered between 1932 and 1938.⁶⁹ The leftist factions mostly carried out underground activity and they began to be legal again by the end of the 1930s when Britain entered the Second World War.

British focus on the Second World War caused a relatively free political environment in Cyprus politics, and leftist factions and the labor unions formed AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou – the Progressive Party of Working People) in 1941. On the other hand, the rightist, conservative groups mostly represented the bourgeois classes in the Greek community formed the Cypriot National Party with the support of the Church of Cyprus in 1943. The political division among Greek Cypriots was ideological rather than a schism at national level. Both the leftist and rightist groups and parties shared the common goal of unification with Greece and this phenomenon became stronger when British rule allowed a limited democracy during the war years. In 1943, municipal elections were held and the leftist parties and groups participated in the elections under the United Front of Workers and Working People coalition. The results traditionalized political confrontation among Greek Cypriot people as the communist left and anti-communist conservative right. The right won a victory in the 1943 elections; however, the leftist coalition gained a majority in two big cities, Limassol and Famagusta.⁷⁰

The distinctive feature of the 1943 municipal elections was the strong re-birth of Greek nationalism in Cyprus after the long oppressive years of British colonial administration. The left became a strong challenge to the hegemonic conservative-right among Greek Cypriots, and yet, it was understood in these elections that none of the political parties could obtain

69 Gregoris Ioannou, "Labour Relations in Cyprus: Employment, Trade Unionism and Class Composition", (PhD Dissertation, The University of Warwick, 2011): 32.

70 Anastasia Yiangou, *II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Kıbrıs Doğu Akdeniz'de Siyaset ve Çatışma*, transl. Kıyal Eresen, (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2016): 174-175.

public support without reference to unification with Greece. For this reason, it was a turning point in Cyprus history, as both communists and rightist groups supported by the Church of Cyprus competed to be champions of nationalism on the island.⁷¹

Despite the limited democratic environment of the 1940s, the Greek Cypriot community did not evaluate this environment in terms of developing a national mobilization with other ethnic groups on the island. On the contrary, both the leftist and rightist political actors of the Greek Cypriots hid their heads in the sand with the dream of Greek unification and they were almost unable to understand or to see the radical change in the international order after World War II. Besides, they underestimated the increasing political mobilization of the Turkish Cypriots with Dr. Fazıl Küçük's valuable efforts. Fazıl Küçük was elected to the local Assembly of Nicosia in the 1943 elections and formed the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party in 1944. While the Turkish Cypriots entered into political organization in the mid-1940s, they began to obtain Turkey's support in the changing international environment of the post-war period. As a counter-reaction, the Greek political actors on the island, despite their ideological differentiation, turned their political struggle from an intra-community clash into an inter-community conflict between Greeks and Turks. This was the deterministic feature of Cyprus politics with the interference of Greece, Turkey and Britain in the 1950s,⁷² under the shadow of Enosis myth.

71 The Church of Cyprus remained neutral in the elections. However, during the election process, the common target of both right-wing and left-wing parties was Enosis. Ibid. 170-173.

72 As Adamantia Pollis argues, British rule in Cyprus strengthened identification within each community, sharpened the cleavages between them and redefined the social order into two antagonistic nationality groups, Greeks and Turks. Adamantia Pollis, "Inter-group Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July 1973): 591.

3.3.2 *Hellenic Nationalism in Cyprus and the Myth of Enosis*

While the Megali Idea was wounded after the defeat of Greek armies in Anatolia in 1922, its spirit lived on in Cyprus as the carrying power of Hellenic nationalism. There were two main reasons for this: Firstly, although the island of Cyprus was included in the vision of the Megali Idea as a Hellenic land, the island itself was geographically not the primary target for Greek irredentism. İstanbul and the Western Anatolian lands had always been in the first place for the geopolitical imagination in the Greek policymaking process towards the realization of the Megali Idea. Because of that, when the Megali Idea declined in the Asia Minor catastrophe, although Cyprus remained at the bottom of the Greek irredentist agenda,⁷³ the island of Cyprus remained as a leftover of the Megali Idea.⁷⁴

Secondly, British rule in Cyprus constituted a delicate balance between Greece and Britain. Britain was the enabler of the Greek military process conducted in Anatolia towards the Megali Idea. Moreover, Greece placed itself among the Allied Forces mainly led by Britain during the global conflict of 1914-1918 for gaining political and military British support for its expansionist aims towards Western Anatolian lands. Thus, Greek ambitions on the Megali Idea did not include Cyprus as it was under the legal rule of Britain, Greece's ally and patron. Mainly for these two reasons, the most essential ideal of the Megali Idea, which was unification of the Hellenes under a single Greek state, stayed alive among the Greek Cypriot community with a strong basis provided by Hellenic nationalism.

73 Diana Weston Markides, "Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty" in *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, eds. Vassilis K. Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003): 14.

74 Markides and Georghallides point out that Greece's aspiration to unify with Cyprus continued in Lausanne, despite the complete defeat in Anatolia: "In the aftermath of the First World War, during which Britain had offered Cyprus to Greece, Greek Cypriots hoped that a provision for the union of the island with Greece would be incorporated into the Treaty of Sevres (1920). In the event, Cyprus was not included in that treaty. Hopes were raised once again at Lausanne in 1923 that Greece might be compensated for its Asia Minor losses by the acquisition of Cyprus", see Diana Markides and G.S. Georghallides, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol.13, No.1 (1995): 64.

Despite the fact that the Greek political elite in the motherland clearly understood the impossibility of the realization of the objectives towards continental expansion identified by the Megali Idea, the Greek Cypriots exempted themselves by transforming the idea of unification of the Hellenes to the unification of Cyprus and motherland Greece. More precisely, the original meaning of Enosis, which was introduced by the Megali Idea, was to unify all Hellenes living outside of the Greek state. However, the distinguishing characteristic of Hellenic nationalism in Cyprus was the achievement of transforming the mythical content of Enosis from the unification of all Hellenes to another myth, the unification of Hellenic Cyprus with motherland Greece. Therefore, while the Megali Idea sustained a great injury in Anatolia in 1922, ironically, Enosis was turning into an enthusiastic mass movement with the basis of Hellenic nationalism in Cyprus in the same timeframe of political history.⁷⁵

Although the historical background of the Enosis idea in Cyprus can be dated back to the independence period of Greece from the Ottoman Empire,⁷⁶ it became a more substantial political factor in Cyprus during the second half of the 19th century with the increasing Hellenic nationalism, especially after the beginning of British rule in 1878. Soon after British rule started with the arrival of the first British High Commissioner, a Greek Cypriot delegation headed by the Archbishop of Cyprus uttered their desire to unify with Greece.⁷⁷

Development of Hellenic nationalism in Cyprus took place in a short period of time when compared with the development of nationalism in modern nation-states of the West. More significantly than the political effect, British rule brought economic and technological development to the

75 Ibid. 65. Markides and Georghallides argue that enosist radicalism, as a greater opposition towards the government in Cyprus through mass movements, was directly encouraged by the Greek Consul in Cyprus, Alexandros Kyrou.

76 The Archbishop of Cyprus, Panaretos sent a letter to the Governor of independent Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias in 1828 and mentioned his wish for inclusion of Cyprus in the territories of the newly established independent Greek state. See, Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs*, 76.

77 Hüner Tuncer, *Kıbrıs Sarmalı Nasıl Bir Çözüm?..* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012): 30.

island, which accelerated the nationalist dynamics within the Greek community in the upcoming decades. The technological introduction of British rule in Cyprus had immediately increased the transportation facilities on the island, and as one of the most important parts of the development chain, increasing transportation facilities resulted in a boom in economic activity in Cyprus. Increasing economic activity resulted in enrichment mostly among the Greek Cypriots and created a middle class from the Greek Cypriot community. This economic development within the prospering Greek middle class on the island triggered an increase in educational activity. More schools opened on the island and young members of the middle class went to Greece to receive higher education. It is not difficult to presume that the education system in Cyprus was built on a program promoting Hellenism and the heroic history of the Hellenes to mobilize the young generations around nationalist formation. This increasing educational activity which imposed Hellenic nationalism, in the end, resulted in the creation of a politicized generation who enhanced the level of mobilization in the political struggle for the unification of Cyprus and Greece.⁷⁸

The change in the economic activity in Cyprus in the 40-year period between 1880 and 1920 was remarkable. According the first available figures in 1888, the total trade volume in Cyprus was 617,852 British pounds. This amount increased by 20% at the end of the century and from 1901 to 1921 the change in the trade volume was recorded as 189%. While the total trade volume was 746,034 British pounds in 1901, this amount increased to 2,161,795 British pounds in 1921.⁷⁹ This enormous positive change in the

78 Panayiotis Persianis, "The British Colonial Education 'Lending' Policy in Cyprus (1878-1960): An Intriguing Example of an Elusive 'Adapted Education' Policy", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1996): 50-52.

79 For a comparison of the change in the economic activity in Cyprus, see the Cyprus Blue Books of the British Colonial Office. Great Britain Colonial Office, *The Cyprus Blue Book 1887-1888* (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1889): 461; Great Britain Colonial Office, *The Cyprus Blue Book 1900-1901* (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1902): 303; Great Britain Colonial Office, *The Cyprus Blue Book 1921* (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1922): 164-165.

trade activities on the island of Cyprus by the beginning of the 20th century created an active middle class bourgeois in the Greek community. Especially the urban population in the ports of Larnaca and Limassol utilized this enrichment emerging from the external trade. Moreover, this significant increase in the expansion of trade volume accelerated the political activity of this newly-emerging middle class, and their active role in the socio-political life of the Cypriot Greek people preserved the classical position of the merchant classes.

The more the Greek community took advantage of economic enrichment in Cyprus, the more education facilities improved. Many of the graduates from the high schools of Cyprus were the children of that middle class and many of them moved to motherland Greece to receive higher education in Greek universities, where they experienced the power of Hellenism over the Greek people. The interesting point is that those Greek Cypriot students in Greek universities did not stay in Greece, returned to their homeland, Cyprus, and played the role of conveyor of Hellenic nationalism to the lower classes on the island, such as the peasants.⁸⁰ This was the distinctive feature of the evolution of this new middle class. The number of university graduates from Greek universities who arrived on the island increased year by year. Moreover, the majority of these university graduates were composed of lawyers, who were the driving force of Hellenic nationalism in Cyprus. It is possible to understand their influence on Cypriot society, especially on the Greek Cypriots, from the note of the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, William Haynes-Smith, which was written under the effect of anxiousness about the developing nationalism in Cyprus: "*The village communities are composed of a fine peasantry who are at present contented and industrious. The town communities, however, contain many political agitators, including several Greek advocates, who have little business and who have much to gain from agitation.*"⁸¹

80 Rolandos Katsiaounis, "Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", 306-307.

81 Ibid. 308. Katsiaounis is citing from British National Archives.

The impetuous and strong interaction between increasing economic activity and developing education in Cyprus in fact had a *sui generis* character in the case of Cyprus and it can only be understood if the social dynamics of Greek society are evaluated with the effect of Hellenic nationalism. Hellenic nationalism spread around the middle class of the Greek community of Cyprus through education. There were only 121 schools in Cyprus in 1881, whereas the number of modern schools on the island dramatically increased to 741 by 1921.⁸² From the beginning of the 20th century, in these modern schools which were mostly funded by the middle class Greek bourgeois, the Hellenic character of Cyprus was imposed on the new generations of Greeks.

The general framework and basic principles of the modern education system created by the Greek middle class on the island adopted the dominant model of the history of Greece. The new Greek Cypriot generations were mainly educated by the imagined history of Greece, which includes the periods of Ancient Greece, the glorious Christian Orthodox Byzantine Empire of medieval times, and modern Greece, which gained a victorious independence from the Ottoman Empire that had destroyed the pure Greek culture for centuries. In other words, the Cypriot history started in Ancient Greece, too, continued with Greek Orthodox Byzantine history and was finalized with the liberation of the Greeks from "Tourkokratia" with the heroic struggle of the Greeks in the 19th century. The education in Cyprus was designed in accordance with Paparrigopoulos' conceptualization of the Hellenic nation and Hellenic nationalism was the metaphysical and transhistorical component of this history teaching. The Greek Cypriot generations were also taught, in the same way as their kinsfolk, the same clichéd discontinuous character of Hellenism throughout history and such an educational doctrine created generations who did not feel any belonging to Cypriot social identity. "Cyprus is and has been Greek and nothing but Greek" was the main message conveyed by the Greek Cypriot primary and secondary education programs, which

82 Reed Coughlan and William Mallinson, "Enosis, Socio-Cultural Imperialism and Strategy: Difficult Bedfellows", 580.

also strongly imposed the Christian Orthodox character of the Greek Cypriot people. The Hellenic nationalism which successfully proliferated through the vessels of the Greek Cypriot community mainly from the middle classes in the towns and cities constituted the basis for the Hellenization of Cyprus. As a reflection of Hellenic nationalism, Cyprus was reconstructed as Hellenic Cyprus and the identity of the Cypriot was equated with that of the Greek from the beginning of the 20th century onwards.⁸³ In brief, the Greek Cypriot community conceived a Hellenic history of Cyprus which began with the Hellenization of Cyprus in the 14th century BC by placing the Greekness character of the island at the moral center, inevitably considered the others, the Turks, as a non-Hellenic population, and the British as rulers, in this case, as the enemy, and contemplated a political struggle against these others for the survival of Cypriot Hellenism.⁸⁴ This picture of harmony of the constructed discontinuous Hellenic character of Cyprus and the presence of the other as the enemy, which was drawn by Hellenic nationalism, explains the violent history of Cyprus throughout two-thirds of the 20th century.

Greek Cypriot generations raised by such a nationalist-programmed education system, as a result, they became the major socio-political actors of the political sphere of Cyprus and built up a Hellenist substructure in this regard. When the first active political movements started in the 1930s, the main theme of the political discussion on the subject was to remove the British rulers from the island and to achieve the unification of the Greeks in Cyprus and mainland Greece, that is to say Enosis. Greek Cypriot political mobilization was achieved by those educated middle class members during the first quarter of the 20th century around the

83 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of education in Cyprus towards the imposing of Hellenic nationalism on the social classes in the Greek Cypriot community, see Yiannis Papadakis, "Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus' ", *History and Memory*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue: Remembering and Forgetting on Europe's Southern Periphery (Fall/Winter 2008): 131-134.

84 Ibid. 137.

ideal of Enosis. For example, the political movements that initiated the uprising in 1931 was wholly organized by the Greek Cypriot community and the 1931 uprising in Cyprus had a completely Greek character. Additionally, it was a kind of agitation to measure the possible British reaction against the demands of the Greek Cypriot community for Enosis, rather than to achieve independence for all Cypriot people.⁸⁵

The political life of the Greek Cypriots has been shaped almost completely by Hellenic nationalism, and even the ideological conflicts between political factions were wholly defined by the nationalist character of the political sphere. However, the distinctive feature of this nationalist political sphere is defined by its historical complexity. Historically, there are three main actors in Cyprus politics which are separated from each other only ideologically, but they are close to each other in their political implementation, because the political elites of these actors come from the same nationalist educational background mentioned above. The right, mostly represented by the radical factions who ran the armed struggle against British rule and the Turks for Enosis; the left, mostly represented by the communists who were not in the armed struggle traditionally but who favored Enosis; and the Church, which can be defined as being on the right-wing side of the political sphere but which at the same time was supported by the left when Enosis came onto the stage.⁸⁶

In order to understand this nationalist character of Greek Cypriot politics, the commonality of the policies of the left, the right and the Church towards Enosis should be examined. Otherwise, one can fall into the error of assuming that the ideological development of politics in Cyprus was generated by a class struggle and that the Church was an impartial supra-party institution. On the contrary, all of the right, the left and the Church

85 George Hill, *A History of Cyprus, Volume IV, The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571-1948*, 547-548.

86 Nicos Peristianis, "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics" in *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*, eds. Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006): 102-103.

in Cyprus followed the same political target, Enosis, with the ideal of unification of all Hellenes in Cyprus and Greece.⁸⁷

Before the armed violence started in Cyprus in the mid-1950s, internal political life of the Greek Cypriot community was mainly dominated by conflicts between the leftist factions, mostly composed of communists, and the rightist groups, composed of conservatives and radicals aiming at armed struggle. Moreover, the Church mostly rallied the rightist groups, as communism was considered as the most important threat during the inter-war period. The Greek Cypriot Communist Party, AKEL, which was still a significant political actor in Cyprus in the mid-1950s, was not against armed struggle, either. The only difference between AKEL and the other Greek Cypriot factions was the timing and formation of the armed struggle against the British colonizers in Cyprus. Besides, AKEL was never opposed to Enosis, either. The point on which they objected was the starting time of the struggle to unify with motherland Greece. However, due to its ambivalent policies at the beginning of the Enosis struggle, AKEL was excluded from the efforts for starting the armed struggle, AKEL members were accused of being traitors, threatened and sometimes attacked by EOKA until the mid-1950s. On the other hand, most of the right-wing factions were pro-Enosis and were incorporated into small armed groups which later formed EOKA, and they were united to take immediate action against British rule and the Turkish presence on the island in order to realize Enosis. Until the 1960s, the Church was mostly in the favor of the right-wing factions and EOKA's political wing was led by Archbishop Makarios, while its military organization was headed by Georgios Grivas.⁸⁸ The rightist tradition in the Greek Cypriot

87 In Cyprus, variants of the nationalism have always been espoused both by the rightist and leftist parties, and the Church of Cyprus. Nathalie Tocci, "Greece, Turkey and Cyprus" in *European Politics*, eds. Colin Hay, Anand Menon, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 125.

88 For further details, Yiannis Papadakis, "Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May 1998): 151.

community historically had a strong sense of the national unity of Hellenism and the conceptualization of Hellenism was transformed into Cypriot Hellenism to sustain the Greek Cypriots under a collective political formation. Thus, the sacred cause of the Megali Idea was reflected as the unity of people of the Hellenic nation, the unity of the Greek historical narrative from ancient to modern Greeks and the unity of the core values of Greek national identity as Helleno-Christian in Cypriot Hellenic nationalism, and consequently, the rightist political tradition of the Greek Cypriot community positioned itself as the Cypriot part of this great political vision of Hellenism.⁸⁹

Interestingly, the leftist factions in Cyprus, mainly represented by AKEL, were incorporated into that nationalist narrative from the 1950s onwards. Although AKEL and communist politics were excluded from mainstream politics in Cyprus, especially after Makarios' coming to power in the early 1950s, the notion of the left in Cyprus was transformed from the global ideal of socialism's class struggle to the struggle of the Greeks of Cyprus against British imperialism. Furthermore, that struggle against British imperialism simply meant the independence of Greek-dominated Cyprus and then unification with Greece, that is, Enosis. On the one hand, while the mainstream leftist political party, AKEL, and other small leftist groups in Cyprus were justifying their struggle as being anti-imperialist against British rule, on the other hand, they opened a path for Greek imperialism towards Cyprus by upholding the very troubled ideal of Enosis.⁹⁰

At this point, communist AKEL and the Church of Cyprus under the political and ecclesiastical leadership of Makarios formed an unnamed coalition towards Enosis. Makarios and the Church tolerated and sometimes allied with AKEL in many cases for Enosis. Nationalism, which was the common ground for Enosis for both the Church and AKEL, brought

89 Ibid. 154-155.

90 For an explanatory analysis, see Stavros Tombazos, "AKEL: Between Nationalism and 'Anti-Imperialism'" in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, eds. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek and Umut Özkırımlı, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010): 218-235.

these two uncompromising parties together in the same political line for the desire of the Greek Cypriot community to unify with motherland Greece. In other words, Greek nationalism constituted a legitimate base for both the Church and AKEL to be leading parties in the Cyprus conflict in accordance with the political projection of the Greek Cypriot leadership towards Enosis.⁹¹

During the 1960s, both AKEL and the Church promoted Enosis, and Makarios united the rightist and leftist factions in the Greek community in the manipulative ways of the complex character of Cyprus politics. While the right-wing EOKA was running an armed campaign against the Turks on the island, communist AKEL evidently favored Enosis and gave support to Archbishop Makarios for Enosis in the political arena. AKEL's political slogan was pure Enosis in the mid-1960s and when Andreas Fontis declared the official view of AKEL in 1964, he was pointing out Enosis as the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, he announced that if a plebiscite was held in Cyprus, AKEL would definitely vote for Enosis. In addition to this, Ezekias Papaioannou, the Secretary General of AKEL said in 1966 that they would liberate Cyprus and annex it to the national structure. AKEL's position for Enosis was formalized by its leader Andreas Zeartides in 1965 in an interview with the scholar Thomas Adams: "*What we want is national liberation, and in Cyprus this means Enosis—but we want genuine Enosis, not the kind proposed by the imperialists...*", and Adams says that "*apparently, AKEL feels safe in straddling the fence on this issue, optimistically sensing that the possibility of union with Greece is becoming more and more remote*".⁹² The liberation and annexation with the national structure which are mentioned in these statements and

91 Ahmet Tolgay transmits from the memoirs of Dimitris Christofias, the former Secretary General of AKEL between 1988-2009, that Christofias states that there has always been a complete national unity among the Greek Cypriots and institutions regarding the Enosis. Ahmet Tolgay, "Hristofias'ın kaleminden: AKEL ve ENOSİS...", *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 15 September 2017, Accessed on December 18, 2020, doi: <https://www.kibris-gazetesi.com/hristofiasin-kaleminden-akel-ve-enosis-makale,3275.html>

92 T.W. Adams, *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971): 126. Also, for different remarks made by AKEL authorities about the purpose of Enosis, see Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 120-121.

interviews by AKEL authorities refer to the desire of AKEL for certain unification of Hellenes living in Cyprus and those living in motherland Greece.

Meanwhile, Makarios, with AKEL's support, adopted the policies of AKEL towards Enosis and Makarios' and AKEL's perspective on Cyprus issue became almost the same. While Makarios was discussing Enosis with the Greek government in Athens, he was arguing for AKEL's slogan of pure Enosis in front of the Greek public and he was frequently mentioning that the Greek Cypriot community would only accept unification with Greece without any compromise from the interests of Greek Cypriots.⁹³ The process, which was experienced during the 1960s in Cyprus, was specific to the dynamics among the Greek Cypriots. Both the right and the left had the same nationalist background of the early 20th century, which introduced Enosis to the elites of the Greek Cypriot community with the notion of Hellenism. The leftist movement did not develop from the class struggle, and instead, it appeared in the struggle for independence from British rule. The rightist politics of Cyprus were fed by the same notion of struggle for getting rid of the British administration. When the Church shared the same political goal towards Enosis with both, a unique triangle of informal alliance of parties which might never have come together emerged in the case of Cyprus. Thus, both AKEL and EOKA followed the same political campaign for Enosis, the former in the legitimate arena, the latter in the underground with violence, under the consolidating role of the Church and under Makarios' leadership in the conflicting atmosphere of Cyprus politics throughout the whole 1960s.⁹⁴

93 Caesar V. Mavratsas, "The Cyprus Conflict: National Mythologies and Real Tragedies" in *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts Perspectives from the Front Lines*, eds. Judy Carter, George Irani, Vamik D. Volkan, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016): 63.

94 For a comprehensive analysis on the roles and involvement of political factions in Cyprus in the struggle for Enosis in the 1960s, see Paul Sant Cassa, "Patterns of covert politics in post-independence Cyprus", *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1983): 115-123.

Hellenic nationalism in Cyprus in fact has a dual characteristic: While it can be situated in the general conceptualization of Hellenic nationalism, it can also be argued that it turned into a Greek Cypriot nationalism according to the changing political conjuncture. However, it is almost impossible to categorize Hellenic nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism as separate phenomena, as Enosis was the single political target of both. In that sense, some argue that Makarios' turned to Greek Cypriot nationalism and segregated from Hellenic nationalism, especially after he began to have conflicts with the Junta administration in Greece from 1967 onwards. However, this was not a significant disintegration within the notion of Hellenic nationalism, it was rather a divergence on the way to Enosis. Both targeted Enosis, but while the Junta in Greece aimed for an Enosis with compromise to Turkey, Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership maintained their strong position on pure Enosis until 1974. But, the Junta in Athens always intended to open the channels with Turkey to negotiate the Cyprus issue for Enosis and they were ready to start Greek-Turkish dialogue for a solution of the conflict towards a conditional Enosis.⁹⁵

Nationalism in Cyprus was mostly manipulated by the Church and EOKA until the 1960s and after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as a non-aligned state in international politics the communist AKEL also became involved as the third actor in the Enosis struggle. This triangular structure of nationalism in Cyprus was the political reflex of all social classes in the Greek Cypriot community through Hellenic nationalism. Although they differentiated from each other ideologically, the commonality and singularity of Enosis brought all the parties of the Greek Cypriot community together in the mobilization enforced by Hellenic nationalism. More briefly, Hellenic nationalism amongst the Greek Cypriots was carried out by the actors of the political scene, but it spread

95 Constantine P. Danopoulos, "The Greek Military Regime (1967-1974) and the Cyprus Question – Origins and Goals", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 10 (Fall 1982): 261.

through the capillaries of the Greek community, which historically considered itself as a member of the great Hellenic nation with its center in mainland Greece. In that sense, nationalism in Cyprus was a homeland nationalism⁹⁶ with a Pan-Hellenic character, because its purpose was clearly to unify the Greeks of Cyprus with their cognates in mainland Greece under a single Greek state. Moreover, it was an ethnic nationalism, because the Greek Cypriots had always affiliated themselves in a kinship relation with the Hellenes in motherland Greece and they had handled the Cyprus question in the Hellenic ethnic sense.⁹⁷

To sum up, an almost hundred-year political struggle of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis, since de facto British rule started in 1878, reflected the most orthodox ethnic character of Hellenic nationalism. The ethnic Greeks of Cyprus always had the aim of unification with the Greek nation state and constructed an imagined social unification with their kinsfolk living in the territories of the Greek nation state. Desperately, that process of construction of an imagined political and social unification included the assimilation, or annihilation, of the Turks in Cyprus by EOKA's terror campaign until 1974. It was doomed to fail because of several reasons, such as the international political balance, Turkey's involvement in the conflict, Greece's political weakness for Enosis, and Enosis came to an end in 1974 with Turkey's military intervention.⁹⁸ However, most importantly, although the time for the Enosis vision was already over, Hellenic nationalism did not become extinct in Cyprus. Hellenic nationalism

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- 96 Jan Penrose argues that when the nation is considered as an ethnic entity, the definition of homeland refers to a single cultural entity of the same ethnic people, which means the geographical extension of people of the same origin. See Jan Penrose, "Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8, Issue 3 (July 2002): 291. In that case, Greek nationalism in Cyprus is in accordance with Penrose's explanation of geographical extension of people of the same ethnic origin.
- 97 Niyazi Kızılyürek, "Modernity, Nationalism and the Perspectives of a Cypriot Union", *Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien*, No. 34 (Juillet-Decembre 2002): 220.
- 98 Nadav Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 10, Issue 4 (2004): 619-621.

in Cyprus left a legacy of the Cyprus issue by transforming it from an ethnic conflict into an international legal one and the successful dramatization of Turkey's intervention by the successor governments in Greece after 1974 as a foreign policy tool against Turkey significantly contributed to this.

3.3.3 *Geopolitical Conflict between Greece, Turkey and Britain in the 1950s*

The world order went through a drastic change in the post-war period of the 1950s and the system evolved into a bipolar character led by the two great powers, the United States and Soviet Union. The polarization of the world order divided the system of nation-states into two camps and Greece, Turkey and Britain, which had different threat perceptions from communism and the Soviet Union, placed themselves in the Western Alliance.

Cyprus, as a small geographical area with an extensive geopolitical location, was considerably affected by international developments in the transforming globe of the 1950s. Most importantly, political developments in Cyprus had a character of going beyond the shores of the island from the beginning of the 1950s. As the conflict on the island turned into an inter-community situation, Greece and Turkey, as the kin-states of the two communities, and Britain, as the colonial ruler of the island, found themselves involved in a complex socio-political problem which had the potential to influence the geopolitical dynamics in both the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Western Alliance itself.⁹⁹

The increasing mobilization of Turks in Cyprus motivated the Greek community more to achieve a solution which might open the path towards the unification of Cyprus and Greece. However, the Turkish population of the island was still considered as an unimportant minority among the majority Greek population. Although Turkey did not attach a geopolitical interest to Cyprus, the presence of the Turkish population on

99 Ibip. 618.

the island constituted a tool for Turkey to strengthen its relations with Britain in international politics through the Cyprus conflict. The implicit alliance of the Turks with the British colonial administration created a positive approach from the British side to keeping the status quo on the island and this situation implicitly made Britain and Turkey closer to each other on the Cyprus conflict at international level. At this point, it should be underlined that the Turks of Cyprus had a vital interest in reconciliation with the British rulers, because the survival of the Turkish population in Cyprus was directly related with Greek hegemony on the island. If Greek hegemony was constituted in Cyprus, the Turkish population would be faced with the danger of disappearing. More precisely, the motivation for survival pushed the Turks of Cyprus to establish moderate relations with the British rulers.¹⁰⁰ This moderation resulted in an unofficial mutual support between Britain and Turkey against secessionist Greek Cypriot endeavors during the 1950s, because, Greece's possible control over the island of Cyprus would have challenged the geopolitical balance between Turkey and Greece.¹⁰¹

The dispute over Cyprus ended the temporary Greek-Turkish friendship which had been formed during the 1930s and reached its peak with simultaneous NATO membership in 1952, because the perceptions of the countries and two peoples on the island were very different from each other. For Greece and the Greeks of Cyprus, the essence of the Cyprus problem was related with the strong belief in Cyprus' position of culturally and ethnically being a part of Greek world. Mainly because of this reason, the Greek Cypriots developed a strong demand for self-determination in the short term in the conjuncture of the 1950s and for unification with Greece in the long term when the international political environment became appropriate. As the majority population of the island,

100 Rodrigo Bueno-Lacy & Henk van Houtum, "The Glocal Green Line: The Imperial Cartopolitical Puppeteering of Cyprus", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2019): 605.

101 M. Fatih Tayfur, "Akdeniz'de Bir Adanın Kalın Uçlu Bir Kalemle Yazılmış Hikayesi: Kıbrıs" in *Akdeniz'de Bir Ada KKTC'nin Varoluş Öyküsü*, ed. Oktar Türel, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002): 33.

the Greeks believed that a possible Greece-Cyprus unification in the future should not be obstructed by a Turkish minority of some 18 percent. In the 1950s, the Turkish population constituted approximately 18% of the whole island, though the exact percentage of the Turkish population was debated in those years.¹⁰²

On the other hand, Turkey's and the Turkish Cypriots' approach to the problem was totally different. First and foremost, the Turkish Cypriots did not wish to be ruled by the Greeks as they had a strong apprehension arising from bad historical experiences of conflicts between Greeks and Turks. Secondly, this apprehension of the Turkish Cypriots was shared and supported by Turkey for numerous reasons. Turkey's arguments when intervening in the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s can be discussed from historical, geographical, strategic, political and humanitarian perspectives. Turkish foreign policy, after a restrained balancing position until the 1950s, began to be affected by changing regional dynamics which were based on historical affiliation with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey's motivation while intervening in Cyprus in the 1950s was historical, as the island had for 300 years been a territory of the Ottoman Empire, whose successor was Turkey. Secondly, Cyprus is geographically very close to Turkey and its proximity to Turkey and its distance from Greece made the island a security gate for Turkey. Thirdly, the strategic need to avoid the encirclement of Turkey by Greek islands motivated Turkey to prevent Greek irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Fourthly, Turkey had to preserve the political balance established with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, so from the Turkish point of view, Greece should not have been allowed to disrupt the balance between the two neighboring countries with a possible expansion to the southern shores of Turkey. Fifthly and

102 According to the population census of 1960 in Cyprus, Turks constituted 18.06% of the total population of the island. See Republic of Cyprus, *Census of Population and Agriculture 1960, Volume 1, Population by Location, Race and Sex* (Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960): 1.

lastly, Turkey's motivation to intervene in the conflict was humanitarian and concerned the welfare of Turkish Cypriots on the island.¹⁰³

Besides Greece and Turkey, Britain's policies related to Cyprus in the 1950s were generally based on preserving the ongoing status quo on the island in order to preserve British geopolitical interests. For that purpose, British diplomacy followed a bipartite policy on Cyprus whose components were alternative to each other. The British first rejected the presence of any conflict in Cyprus and built their strategy on the island's existing status quo of being a British colony. By the end of the Second World War, A. J. Dawe, British Deputy Secretary of the Colonial Office, was saying that Greece did not have any historical rights to the land of Cyprus and that there did not exist any conflict in Cyprus.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the new British Foreign Secretary in 1953, Anthony Eden, said that neither now nor in the future would there be a Cyprus issue for Britain. One year later, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies confirmed Eden and added that some territories in the Commonwealth would never gain independence because of their positions.¹⁰⁵

Although Britain obstinately implemented its policies to keep Cyprus within the Commonwealth, that policy was not sustainable and British policy makers realized this unsustainability at an early stage. Britain came out of the Second World War with economic and military weariness and the United States became the hegemonic power in the Western Alliance. At this point, the British also realized their own diminishing political power on a global level and understood that Cyprus would not be kept as a British colony anymore. Then, British policy evolved into an alternative component to internationalize the issue by protecting British interests in the Mediterranean. Britain presented the case to the international

103 Andrew Mango, "Greece and Turkey: Unfriendly Allies", *The World Today*, Vol. 43, No. 8-9 (August-September 1987): 145.

104 Hüner Tuncer, *Kıbrıs Sarmalı Nasıl Bir Çözüm?..*, 45.

105 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 102.

public as a tripartite issue to be solved between Greece, Turkey and Britain.¹⁰⁶

The aim of British strategy was to avoid the total loss of British interests on the island by preventing Cyprus from unifying with Greece and to involve the USA, as the hegemonic power of the Western Bloc, in the situation in order to reduce the possibility of any armed conflict between the two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece. In 1955, the new British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, declared that policy change by Britain and invited both Greece and Turkey to discuss the Cyprus issue in a trilateral international conference.¹⁰⁷ From the mid-1950s onwards, although Greece and the Greek Cypriots continued to insist on the 'Greek' character of the issue to be discussed between Greece, the Greek Cypriots and Britain, the unification of Cyprus and Greece constituted a challenge to the joint interests of the Western Alliance. Thus, joint interests thwarted the Greeks' nationalistic vision and the issue was highly internationalized by British and Turkish diplomacy with the support of the United States with an unnamed collectiveness of strategic interests in the Cold War environment.¹⁰⁸

The internationalizing character of the Cyprus issue with the involvement of Britain and Turkey was a challenge for the Greek Cypriots, who strongly dedicated their self-determination understanding to unification with Greece. In other words, the Greek Cypriots evaluated the self-determination principle, which was a popular phenomenon in the independence movements of third world countries in the 1950s and 1960s, as an opportunity to unify with Greece. As a result, they built their strategy on two steps: First, gaining independence from Britain, and second, unifying with Greece after independence and realizing the decades-old dream of

106 Celal Şar, "British Policy towards Cyprus and the Cyprus Question 1878-2005", (A Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2005): 14-15.

107 Hüner Tuncer, *Kıbrıs Sarmalı Nasıl Bir Çözüm?..*, 50.

108 William Mallinson, "Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism?", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2009): 739.

unification of Greeks in the motherland and Cyprus.¹⁰⁹ However, Britain's decisive policy of taking the issue out of the hands of the Greeks and involving Turkey in the conflict changed the direction of Cyprus diplomacy in the second half of the 1950s. Consequently, the Greek Cypriots started an armed struggle when they realized the British intention to prevent them from unifying with Greece and observed Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus conflict by mobilizing the Turks of Cyprus.¹¹⁰

In fact, the Greek Cypriots had been making preparations for an armed struggle since 1952. Makarios III¹¹¹ visited Greece to discuss unification in 1951. However, the Greek government refused the demands for unification once more and the Greek Cypriot leaders realized the contradiction between the dreams of unification and the poor position of Greece in the international arena.¹¹² The truth was clear: Greece did not have any political or military power to unify Cyprus and Greece. At that point, Makarios tried to bring the self-determination demands of the Greek Cypriots to the UN agenda. The government in Greece changed and when the conservative Field Marshall Alexandros Papagos became prime minister, he started to follow affirmative policies for the Greek Cypriots' demands on unification. When Papagos first tried to discuss the issue with Britain, he seemed to have the intention to handle the Cyprus case between the Greek Cypriots, Greece and Britain. When he met with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 1953, Eden categorically refused to discuss Cyprus, as it was not regarded as an issue to be solved from the British perspective. After Britain's clear objection to the Cyprus issue, the

109 Nicel Masarogullari, "Nationalism in Cyprus: The Effects of Institutionalization on Nationalist Mobilizations and Political Conflicts as Reflected in Turkish Cypriot Nationalism and Greek Cypriot Nationalism", (Master of Arts Thesis, Marshall University, 2011): 76.

110 Ibid. 77.

111 Makarios III was elected as Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus in October 1950. Soon after, he became the popular leader of the Greek community in Cyprus and he remained as political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots until his death in August 1977.

112 Christos P. Ioannides, *Cyprus under British Colonial Rule Culture, Politics and the Movement toward Union with Greece, 1878-1954* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019): 256.

Papagos government decided to take the Cyprus problem to the UN General Assembly. However, the Greek motion on the Cyprus issue was not accepted by the UN to be brought to the agenda with New Zealand's resolution and the United States' negative approach towards discussing Cyprus in the General Assembly.¹¹³

When Greece and the Greek Cypriots were faced with a lack of any support for self-determination of the Cypriots at international level, this created great disappointment for both. Then Makarios began to believe more strongly in the necessity of armed struggle to separate Cyprus from British rule. Soon after the political defeat at the UN General Assembly, Makarios started preparations for armed rebellion, and Greek Cypriot guerillas from different far-right underground groups gathered together under the commandship of former Greek general Georgios Grivas.¹¹⁴ Before Grivas arrived in Cyprus to bring the underground groups together, there were already some organizations for an armed rebellion in both the villages and cities of Cyprus. Therefore, he did not have any difficulty in finding human resources for the fight, and he was immediately able to bring three underground organizations, the Cyprus Farmers' Union in the villages, and youth movements, the Church-controlled Christian Youth Movement, and the far-right nationalist Pancyprian Youth Movement in the towns together. Grivas succeeded in mobilizing young Greek Cypriots and they composed the skeleton fighting force of the newly established EOKA as a conventional guerilla force living in camps

113 Hubert Faustmann, "The Historical Background to the UN's Involvement with Cyprus" in *The Work of the UN in Cyprus, Promoting Peace and Development*, eds. Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001): 11-12.

114 Georgios Grivas was originally from Cyprus. He was born in Nicosia, then he moved to Greece to study at the military school. He served in the Greek Army in different ranks until his retirement in 1946. After he retired, he focused on organizing paramilitary groups in Cyprus for annexation by Greece and he formed the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA).

in the forests and mountains of Cyprus.¹¹⁵ Besides, he formed town groups from the youth who continued in their office jobs and schools but who were fighters after the office and school. In addition to this young fighting force, Grivas integrated the National Front of Cyprus, composed of experienced former Greek soldiers and Greek Cypriot fighters, which supplied EOKA with intelligence, weapons, medicines and safe houses and confronted the British on the streets of towns and cities with demonstrations and riots.¹¹⁶

From 1955 onwards it became clear that Makarios had taken over the political leadership of the Greek Cypriots' confrontation with Britain, and that EOKA under the paramilitary leadership of Georgios Grivas was the driving armed force of the Greek Cypriots for the removal of British colonial rule and annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots. In accordance with this purpose, EOKA started its armed attack on April 1st, 1955, just five days before the new British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, invited the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers to London for a trilateral international conference to discuss the Cyprus issue.¹¹⁷

EOKA attacks on the British and Turks in Cyprus increased rapidly, the terror took a turn for the worse and armed violence had spread all over the island by the summer of 1955. In such an environment, the London Conference was held on August 29th, 1955 with the participation of the British Foreign Secretary, Harold MacMillan, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos. MacMillan offered to keep British sovereignty on island, but at the same time Britain agreed to give local autonomy to Cyprus. More interestingly, Britain offered to allow both Turkey and Greece to undertake the

115 EOKA was formed in Cyprus with the implicit approval of the Greek government of the time, presided over by Marshall Alexandros Papagos. Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010): 20.

116 For further details about the formation of EOKA, see John Newsinger, *British Counter-insurgency, From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): 84-91.

117 Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960): 395-396.

military defense of the island jointly with Britain. The Greek position at the conference was clear: Stephanopoulos did not discuss any other issue except self-determination. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, objected to both local autonomy and implementation of the self-determination principle and asked to preserve the status quo on the island. Turkey also claimed the return of Cyprus to Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which was the sovereign power on the island until the beginning of the First World War, if Britain could not preserve the status quo.¹¹⁸

The London Conference resulted in no agreement and the parties could not even achieve any positive step to becoming a bit closer to each other's perspectives. However, the conference particularly symbolized the increasing international character of the Cyprus conflict. British diplomacy successfully changed the Cyprus issue from an internal matter, or a bilateral matter between the Greek Cypriots and British, to an international issue by involving the two motherlands, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, although the Greek Cypriots and Greek government could not imagine discussing the partition of the island in any sense, British decision makers saw the partition of the island after the London Conference as a possibility. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, apprehensively wrote this possibility in his memoirs, which were published before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Eden in his memoirs evaluates the situation in Cyprus from the perspectives of Britain, Turkey and Greece, and concludes with the possibility of partition of the island if British strategic concerns were not addressed. Eden says that Turkey's claims on Cyprus were stronger from the perspective of geography and tactical considerations. From the perspective of race and language, Eden justifies the claims of the Greek Cypriots and Greece. However, from his point of view, these were secondary issues and he evaluated British claims from a strategic perspective. According to Eden, as British industrial life had for so long depended on energy supplies from the Persian Gulf via the Middle East and Cyprus, the demands of the Greek Cypriots

118 Melih Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1) Ayağa Kalkan Adam 1954-1959* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993): 27, 36.

and Greece for self-determination could not be realized unless they were reconciled with British claims. Eden also states that if Greek and Turkish claims could not be associated with those of the British for the control of the island, the partition of the island might be inevitable.¹¹⁹

EOKA's continuous attacks on British colonial offices and Turkish settlements in Cyprus caused the British to impose sanctions on Greek Cypriot leaders. When Makarios' connection with EOKA and gun-running to the island was confirmed, the British colonial administration exiled Makarios to the Seychelles in March 1956. Makarios stayed in exile in the Seychelles and then in Athens until December 1957.¹²⁰ During this period of Makarios' exile, the political leadership of the Greek community shifted underground. EOKA and Grivas replaced Makarios and violence against the British administration increased, and as the only active power on the island EOKA strongly influenced the Greek Cypriot politicians in refusing every attempt at a political solution, except the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Under these conditions, the British government made a new proposal, known as the Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus by Lord Radcliffe.¹²¹

The Radcliffe proposal reflected Eden's calculation of possible partition of the island between the two communities. The Radcliffe proposal recommended an assembly with 6 seats allocated for members who would be elected by the Turkish Cypriots, with 24 seats for members who would be elected by the rest of the population, meaning the Greek Cypriots, and another 6 seats for members who would be nominated by the Governor of Cyprus. The constitutional proposal of Lord Radcliffe is considered as an arrangement to give autonomy to the island. However, as

119 Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle*, 415.

120 Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III, 1950-1977: Creating the Ethnarchic State" in *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: the Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, Their Identities and Politics*, eds. Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013): 262-263.

121 For further details about EOKA's campaign during the power gap when Makarios was in exile and the process leading to the Radcliffe Proposals, see David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 194-236.

the absolute authority to decide on the defense, external affairs and public security policies of Cyprus was given to the Governor of Cyprus. The Radcliffe Proposal was actually a paper to grant semi-autonomy to Cyprus, because, as the Turkish members of the assembly would be separately elected by Turkish voters on the island, this meant that the Turkish presence in Cyprus was accepted as a separate political entity with this paper. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lennox Boyd, progressed further and he added to the Radcliffe Proposal the right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination, as well as the Greek Cypriots having the same right.¹²²

When Eden's words in his memoirs are evaluated with Lord Radcliffe's proposals, it appears that the Britain had started to follow a policy on ruling the island by establishing a balance between Greeks and Turks by referring to two separate political entities. As Hatzivassiliou argues, the Constitutional Proposals of Lord Radcliffe in 1956 had some favorable, modern and democratic characteristics under the conditions in Cyprus in the late 1950s, and it was one of the most liberal constitutional attempts made by the British until that time. However, it was impossible for the Radcliffe Proposal to be accepted, especially by Greek Cypriots, for two reasons. First, the British government did not discuss any details of the Proposal during the preparation period with either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots, and it had a force majeure character by completely creating discredit, especially from the Greek Cypriot point of view. Secondly, in furtherance of the Greek Cypriots' discredit, the Proposal included the recognition of a separate Turkish Cypriot entity by giving Turks the right to elect assembly members in a separate vote and recognizing their right to self-determination. Giving the right of self-determination to the Turkish Cypriots was quite risky from the viewpoint of the Greek Cypriot leadership, because, they knew that if the Turks were granted such a right,

122 For discussions on the Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus by Lord Radcliffe, see UK Parliament Archives, "Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe's Proposals)", HC Deb, 19 December 1956, Vol. 562, Accessed on September 10, 2019, doi: cc1267-79, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals>

they would tend to develop wider constitutional demands and the situation would become a total partition of the island, which they could never accept, and indeed, the Greek Cypriot leadership was afraid of that possibility. This was the significant feature of the 1956 Radcliffe Proposal, in which the British threatened the Greek Cypriots by giving the same self-determination right to the Turkish Cypriots, and thus, they aimed to secure the continuation of British colonial rule on the island.¹²³ However, in fact, British policy makers' move was towards the transformation of the status of the Turkish Cypriots from a minor community to a politically equal entity with the Greek Cypriots.

British policy on internationalizing the Cyprus issue had a very important blind side: British diplomacy pretty much focused on only British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The island of Cyprus was merely a point touching upon the strategic route of British interests. In this sense, it was very much about a lack of understanding and realizing the increasing social distance between the Greeks and Turks, which had an ethnic character. In that process, British policy became more estranged from fulfilling the political expectations of both communities. The ongoing situation in Cyprus, with decreasing hopes as a result of the attempts at a solution, raised doubts about the British perspective and both sides started to place more focus on their own arguments.¹²⁴ At that point, the Greek argument for self-determination by eliminating the Turkish population and British rulers on the island gained more and more strength.

123 Radcliffe's proposal was to propose the basic features of constitutional development in Cyprus on the basis of continuing British colonial regime. Although Radcliffe rejected the claims of Turks for political equality with Greeks, the proposals provided extensive power and status to Turkish Cypriots which constituted a separate Turkish sphere cut out from the Greek pattern. Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 162. The aim of the British high level foreign bureaucracy was to threaten Greece and Greek Cypriots by forcing them to reconsider the merits of the status quo in Cyprus. Ibid. 163.

124 Robert Holland, "Playing the Turkish card: British policy and Cyprus in the 1950s", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 56, Issue 5, Britain, Turkey and NATO (2020): 759-768.

On the other hand, the Turkish argument was much simpler and clearer: partition of the island between the Turks and Greeks. Soon after the Radcliffe Proposal, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey started to demand partition. At this point, it should be underlined that the Proposal constituted a basis for the struggle of the Turkish Cypriots for political equality with the Greek Cypriots, or further on for their self-determination, with the increasingly stronger position of Turkey in the Cyprus conflict. The Turkish government declared its official policy as “partition” when the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly on December 28th, 1956 and said: *“The problem of partition should never be ignored. The Turkish government is evaluating the problem of partition as a considerable proposal. We cannot leave our 120,000 population to other states in the partition problem of the island. We see as a must our outpost to be in Cyprus for the security of Turkey. Demanding the disposal of the whole island to us would not accord with international realities. For this reason, we are in favor of partition of the island. No one even can think of compelling Turkey towards another solution except partition of the island”*.¹²⁵

The Democrat Party government’s partition policy was supported by the main opposition Republican People’s Party, too, and the idea of partition, which was introduced by the British actually, mobilized the society in Turkey. In 1957 and 1958, many meetings were organized with the support of the Turkish media and the Turkish Cypriots’ associations in Turkey, under the slogan of “either partition, or death” to support the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı – Turkish

125 Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, Türk Hükümeti’nin ve Kamuoyunun Davranışları (Karşılaştırmalı İnceleme)* (Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F. Yayınları, 1963): 287. Armaoğlu quoted the speech by Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey between 1950-1960 from the Democrat Party, at the Turkish Assembly from the official proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Resistance Organization) was founded by Rauf Denktaş to provide security for Turkish Cypriots on 27 November 1957.¹²⁶ TMT, differently from EOKA, was a defensive underground organization, rather than a reactionary one, against Greeks and British rule. However, they could not stay outside the ongoing spiral of violence on the island. TMT organized meetings in big cities such as Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol and Paphos, on 27-28 January 1958, against the Greek offensive and British imprudence, to protect the survival of the Turks on the island. The protesters met with the armed response of the British security forces and seven Turkish students were killed.¹²⁷ The year 1958 symbolized the highest point of the nationalist character of the Cyprus conflict.¹²⁸ While Greeks were attacking both British officials and the Turkish community, the Turkish community was organized underground to protect themselves. However, although the British government cooperated with both Turkey and Greece for a solution in Cyprus, the British colonial administration on the island did not hesitate to use force either against the Greeks or the Turks, and the Cyprus issue turned into an inextricable situation with this violence.

British efforts to reach a solution in Cyprus by involving Turkey in the Cyprus issue and internationalizing the conflict was a part of strategy of divide et impera.¹²⁹ This policy was structured on British interests and it was the result of the will to keep the island of Cyprus under the British

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- 126 The exact date of establishment of the TMT varies across several sources. 1 August is widely accepted as the establishment date, but there are also other given dates, such as 15 and 23 November 1957. However, Rauf Denktaş claimed that the organization was established on 27 November 1957 and that this took place in the house of the military attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. See, Erdinç Gündüz, "1 Ağustos ve TMT", *Kıbrıs Postası*, 4 August 2011.
- 127 Saime Yüceer, "Kıbrıs Türklerinin Kendi Kaderini Tayin Etme Mücadelesinde İlk Büyük Olay: 27-28 Ocak Halk Hareketi" in *Uluslararası Boyutlarıyla Kıbrıs Meselesi ve Geleceği Uluslararası Sempozyumu 11-13 Aralık 2014/Gazimağusa Bildiriler*, ed. Duygu Türker Çelik, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016): 145.
- 128 Stavros Tombazos, "Kıbrıs Milliyetçilikleri" in *Kıbrıs Dün ve Bugün*, ed. Masis Kürkcügil, (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2003): 51.
- 129 Divide and rule policy.

colonial regime. However, it opened the way for the ethnic communities to develop their national existences on the island by transforming these existences into single political entities separated from each other. That transformation was supported by the motherlands in different ways: While Greece gave support to the Greek Cypriots for annexation of the island by removing the Turkish population, Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriots in order to preserve their existence under a separate entity.

Realization of the arguments for self-determination and partition, and the strategic goals of both motherland countries and Britain in Cyprus appear to be difficult when the geopolitical realities of the time are taken into consideration. The Greek argument for the annexation of Cyprus, which would be followed by self-determination, was not realistic for the Greek Cypriots, because the motherland, Greece, did not have the political, military and economic power to realize it. Greece was economically in a developing process in the late 1950s and this development process was strongly dependent on the economic support of the Western powers. Annexation of Cyprus could result in the irreparable breakup with the Western powers, as this would create an intra-alliance conflict with Turkey. To preserve stabilization in the Alliance, the Western powers would take any strict measures to prevent Greece from getting into a conflict with an ally, Turkey, and the developing economy would be negatively affected by it. Turkey's argument for partition was also not based on a concrete strategy. Turkish policy makers uttered the partition policy by the end of the 1950s, but the partition strategy did not have any future vision. Questions such as "What would happen after partition? Would the Turkish community aim to have independence or to integrate with Turkey?" were left unanswered. It is understood that the partition strategy of the Democrat leaders in Turkey was promoted to save the day, rather than being part of a long-term geopolitical target.¹³⁰

130 Both Turkey and Greece did not have any chance to realize what they projected in Cyprus. Because the USA and Britain were determined not to allow any conflict within the Western Alliance, and neither Turkey nor Greece had political power to resist this US-British decisiveness. Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics* (Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003): 138-149.

Apart from Greece and Turkey, Britain's position in international politics was not hegemonic anymore. The Cold War conjuncture in the 1950s created a bipolar international system and while the Soviet Union led the communist world, the United States became the hegemonic power in the Western Alliance that Britain was a member of. In such a structure of international relations, bloc interests were sometimes ahead of national interests of the allied countries. In the bipolar character of the Cold War, the United States' substantial policies on preserving the interests of the Western Alliance included solving, or at least postponing, any conflict within the Alliance which threatened the bloc interests. Britain's old type of divide et impera policy on Cyprus did not work, and even worse, Britain's Cyprus policies brought two NATO allies, who were located at the borders of the communist bloc, into conflict because of their kinship with the communities in Cyprus. Moreover, colonialism could no longer survive in a bipolar world system and by the late 1950s its days were numbered. Colonies were gaining their independence and it was the age of the birth of the Third World with the non-alignment phenomenon. In this sense, Britain could not follow policies towards establishing a balance by dividing the island into different political entities in order to sustain its colonial rule in Cyprus. Thus, British decision makers realized that Britain could not play a political role in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean alone without the consent of the hegemonic power, the United States. British diplomacy understood that it was coming to an end in Cyprus and the new British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, who came to office after the resignation of Anthony Eden because of the humiliating defeat in the Suez operation, proposed a new plan to the Cypriot communities in May 1958.¹³¹

The violence and armed clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities had the risk of turning into a civil war in Cyprus. The Turkish newspapers in Cyprus drew attention to the serious situation and they

131 Andrekos Varnava, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960", *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2010): 92.

mentioned the possibility of civil war. Many of them were asking the British to bring the Greek aggression towards the Turks under control, or else they were demanding that the British partition the island between Greeks and Turks.¹³² Besides, some of the Turkish newspapers were even mentioning Turkey's military intervention in the island in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots' safety of life and property.¹³³ Armed attacks by EOKA mainly aimed to homogenize the Cyprus population by removing the Turkish presence by forcing them to migrate from the island, because the Turks were already becoming a political entity due to the British policies and Turkey's involvement in the situation. Previously, the Greek Cypriots had considered the Turkish population of Cyprus as a minority group which could not constitute any threat to the homogenous Greek character of Cyprus. However, conditions had considerably changed by the end of the 1950s, and the Turkish Cypriots became a threat to the Greek Cypriots' political leadership, which aimed to unify the island with Greece, and for EOKA, which was faced with an organized Turkish resistance under TMT.¹³⁴

The MacMillan plan was submitted to the Cypriot communities in such an environment of violence in 1958. Britain started to change its Cyprus policies with the MacMillan government. While previous Prime Minister Anthony Eden tended not to accept any Cyprus problem and to try to define the conflict by focusing only on British interests, MacMillan recognized the possibility of the total loss of Cyprus for Britain, if they did not prevent the armed conflict before it turned into a civil war. British policy on Cyprus with MacMillan government turned from keeping full

132 Turkish newspaper Bozkurt published Fazıl Küçük's statement demanding the partition of the island. *Bozkurt*, 4 June 1958. Cited in Nikolaos Stelya, *İstenmeyen Bebek Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Kıbrıs Sorununu Yeniden Okumak: Kıbrıslı Türk Basını, EOKA ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu (1955-1959)* (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2013): 81.

133 Turkish newspaper Halkın Sesi gave the news about Turkey's possible military intervention. *Halkın Sesi*, 11 June 1958. Cited in Nikolaos Stelya, *İstenmeyen Bebek Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Kıbrıs Sorununu Yeniden Okumak: Kıbrıslı Türk Basını, EOKA ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu (1955-1959)*, 81.

134 Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963* (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Pub., 1986): 227, 244-245.

British sovereignty on the island to abandoning full sovereignty in return for British military bases and giving the island a large degree of autonomy, or sharing sovereignty with NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The main reason behind this significant policy change was economic rather than political. Cyprus in fact became an economic burden for Britain in the 1950s after the huge economic and military decay resulting from World War II. During the 1950s, the British government had invested a huge amount of money in the island in order to keep its control over Cyprus. After the war, the amount which was spent by the British government from colonial funds to modernize infrastructure on the island and to increase life standards accounted for around 30 million dollars. That amount was spent on services, such as an island-wide electricity grid, highways, better piped drinking water to villages and public health. Moreover, when the British withdrew from Egypt in 1954, Cyprus became the home of the British Military Joint Headquarters in the Middle East and the British government spent almost the same amount of money on infrastructure for the British military bases on the island, which were established between 1954 and 1957. Researchers have estimated that around 28 million pounds was spent on capital expenditure and on civilians' and servicemen's salaries in the British military bases in Cyprus by the end of the 1950s.¹³⁵ As a result, when the geopolitical realities were combined with the economic reasons which forced the British to end their rule in Cyprus, British policy makers could not pursue Eden's policies on the ongoing conflict which neglected its inter-communal and ethnic characteristics. Consequently, the policy shift was embodied with the plan prepared by Harold MacMillan.

The MacMillan plan, in reality, included an abstract partition of the island between the Greeks and Turks. MacMillan, in his plan, offered separate Houses of Representatives for both communities and each commu-

135 Diana Markides, *The Cyprus Tribute and Geopolitics in the Levant, 1875-1960* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019): 214.

nity would run their own legislative activities through these separate organs.¹³⁶ For foreign and security policies of the island, the plan offered a joint council which would be headed by the Governor and would be composed of four Greek Cypriot members, two Turkish Cypriot members and representatives of the governments of Greece and Turkey. According to the MacMillan Plan, the international legal status of Cyprus would not be changed for the next 7 years. At the end of the 7-year period, Britain would share the sovereignty of the island with its NATO allies Greece and Turkey, in return for leaving the British military bases on the island.¹³⁷

The plan submitted by the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was the last attempt by the British government and it aimed to reduce British status by transforming full sovereignty into a kind of protection of interests through military bases. Furthermore, the plan was an offer for the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey through their kin communities in Cyprus without any territorial engagement. The principle of sharing of sovereignty in the long term, which was clearly included in the plan, was in fact an offer to Greece and Turkey for partition of the island, but the plan did not determine how the frontiers of this possible partition would be drawn.¹³⁸ The MacMillan plan can be considered as a relatively realistic proposal when the history of Cyprus is examined today. It was the result of the British perception of the strong separation of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from each other in both social and political aspects which had already arisen from Greek ambitions for unification with Greece and turned into armed violence by the end of the 1950s.

136 Frank Hoffmeister, *Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006): 3-4.

137 Andreas Karyos, "To Schedio Makmilan", *I Kathimerini*, 28 December 2014.

138 John Reddaway, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1958, is citing his own observations on the violence on the island and MacMillan's proposal to the parties of the Cyprus conflict. For further details about the MacMillan plan, see John Reddaway, *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection* (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1986): 107-111.

Despite the fact that the MacMillan plan was prepared in accordance with the substantial realities in the field, it remained far from satisfying either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots and kin states. Therefore, all the parties in the Cyprus conflict rejected the plan with contradictory reasons. The Greek Cypriots and Greece rejected MacMillan's plan because it did not contain any principle referring to the unification of Cyprus and Greece and Turkey had become a decisive actor in the Cyprus issue. Although the MacMillan plan offered the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, the Greek Cypriots envisaged a pure unification with Greece without any Turkish involvement in the island of Cyprus.¹³⁹ On the other side, although the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey did not reject the plan, they did not accept immediately, because it did not put concrete territorial partition of the island forward. The plan predicted the existing disintegration of the ethnic communities which would become a total disengagement in the near future, but the distinctive characteristic and the weakest point of the plan was its obscurity.¹⁴⁰ In other words, although Britain's intention on the partition of the island was quite clear in MacMillan's plan, the details of the partition were still not discussed concretely. Interestingly, the Turkish Cypriots were worried about the plan in the sense that it could open the path for unification of Cyprus and Greece, but the process evolved in another direction. Between 1959 and 1960, the unification occurred, but not between Cyprus and Greece, and instead, it took place between the Greek and Turkish communities. At the same time partition happened, too, but it did not draw any concrete boundary between the Greeks and Turks.

139 Alan James, "The Making of the Cyprus Settlement, 1958-60", *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1998): 15.

140 Chares Demetriou, "Divide and rule Cyprus? Decolonisation as process", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 57, Issue 4 (2019): 410-411, 418.

3.3.4 *Republic of Cyprus as a Reluctant Unity*

Nikolaos Stelya defines the Republic of Cyprus as an unwanted baby. The Greek and Turkish communities on the island started to negotiate the conditions for establishing a republic when it was clearly understood that international political dynamics did not make either unification with Greece or partition possible in 1959. Greece and Turkey, and the Great powers in the Western Alliance forced the old enemies in Cyprus to cooperate with each other in order to end the armed fight and to procure unity under a republic. However, it was a force majeure cooperation of the Greek Cypriots, who had defended the annexation of Cyprus to Greece for decades, and the Turkish Cypriots, who had defended the partition of the island for years. For this reason, the cooperation between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to form an independent republic was a kind of forced marriage and the baby produced by this marriage, the Republic of Cyprus, was unwanted.¹⁴¹

The Republic of Cyprus was established in a political environment which was directly affected by the international dynamics. The ongoing conflict in Cyprus put three NATO allies, Britain, Turkey and Greece in a disagreement and this situation caused tension in NATO, where the United States was trying to create solidarity among member states against the communist threat from the Soviet Union. Because of that, the United States became much more involved in the disagreement and pushed the three states towards a solution. The USA put pressure on both the Turkish and Greek governments to change their uncompromising policies that deepened the conflict. So, the American policy on Cyprus was viewed within the context of Greek-Turkish antagonism,¹⁴² which was to be solved.

141 Nikolaos Stelya, *İstenmeyen Bebek Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, Kıbrıs Sorununu Yeniden Okumak: Kıbrıslı Türk Basını, EOKA ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu (1955-1959)*, 98-103.

142 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "The Value to CENTO of UK Bases on Cyprus", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 2009): 611.

Neither Turkey nor Greece could confront the US pressure for several reasons, but mainly for economic reasons. Turkey slid into an economic crisis in the second half of the 1950s mainly because of a liberalization program based on capital imports from abroad. Since Turkey took a huge amount of foreign debt to finance infrastructure investments and modernization in agriculture, it appeared almost impossible to decrease the fiscal deficit. Foreign debt increased rapidly and when the government could not pay the foreign debts in 1958, it signed a credit program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under such difficult economic conditions, Turkey needed US support to ease the economic crisis and could not stand against US constraints about Cyprus. The Adnan Menderes government abandoned the partition policy and started to follow much more moderate policies for the solution of the conflict.¹⁴³ Furthermore, Greece was also economically bound to the Western Alliance, but for its developing economy. The Greek economy underwent a significant transformation during the 1950s and recorded a rapid industrialization under right-wing governments. Firstly, Alexandros Papagos (1952-1955), and secondly, Konstantinos Karamanlis (1955-1963) followed industrialization policies reconciled with the increasing Greek industrial bourgeois. However, this industrialization was very much dependent on American aid.¹⁴⁴ Under these circumstances, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis could not stand against US coercion, either, for a solution in Cyprus, because if he did so, foreign capital coming from the Western Allies could be cut and the industrialization process of the Greek economy would reach a deadlock. Therefore, the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, which were heavily dependent on the West in terms of the economy and military, could not resist US pressure and reached an agreement for a formula to provide a status of independence to Cyprus.

143 D.H., "Strains and Stresses in Turkish Policy: Summer 1958", *The World Today*, Vol. 14, No. 9 (September 1958): 401-404.

144 Richard Clogg, *Yunanistan'ın Kısa Tarihi*, transl. Dilek Şendil, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2013): 147.

The Zurich and London Agreements were basically negotiated between Turkey and Greece by excluding the Turkish and Greek communities on the island. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff met in Zurich on February 6th, 1959 and agreed on the formation of an independent republic in Cyprus with a federative model.¹⁴⁵ The Turkish and Greek prime ministers signed four documents in Zurich: 1) A Gentleman's Agreement explaining the content and meaning of the documents signed in Zurich, in order to ease the implementation of the agreements, 2) The document on the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, 3) The Treaty of Guarantee, and 4) The Treaty of Alliance Between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The documents which were accepted in Zurich Agreements had to be signed by Britain and the local parties of the agreement, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, after the agreement was concluded between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in Zurich, representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities came together in London on February 19th, 1959. In London, Britain, the Greek Cypriots' representatives and the Turkish Cypriots' representatives accepted the three documents of the Zurich Agreement, namely the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. Also, it was agreed that Britain would cede its right of sovereignty over the island to the Republic of Cyprus and take the military bases of Akrotiri and Dikelia with sovereign rights.¹⁴⁶

The topics which the Zurich and London Agreements focused on can be categorized under three balancing headings: Division of political power in Cyprus, prevention of possible Turkish or Greek intervention in the island and prevention of the Enosis and partition. First of all, Turkey and Greece balanced the political power in the structure of the Republic of Cyprus to end the armed conflict. The president of the republic would

145 Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1980): 15-16.

146 Nikos Skoutaris, *The Cyprus Issue The Four Freedoms in a Member State under Siege* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011): 17-18.

be a Greek Cypriot who would be elected by Greek votes on the island, the vice-president of the republic would be a Turkish Cypriot who would be elected by Turkish votes and both Greek and Turkish would be the official languages of the new state. A sensitive balance was established by giving the right of veto to both the president and vice-president. The president and the vice-president had, separately and conjointly, the right to veto all laws and decisions made by the House of Representatives, except the basic articles of the constitution.¹⁴⁷ A House of Representatives was formed, which was responsible for legislation. 70% of the members of the House would be composed of Greeks, while the remaining 30% of the members would be composed of Turks. Both the Greek and Turkish representatives would be elected separately by their communities' votes. Moreover, two separate Communal Chambers were established which would be responsible for the communities' local issues. Central bureaucracy was shared between the two communities: 70% of public official positions would be distributed to Greeks and 30% would be allocated to Turks. A 3000-strong army was founded, and 60% of the army force would be selected from Greeks and 40% from Turks. The local administration was also divided. The Greek and Turkish communities would have separate municipalities in the five big cities of Cyprus, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos.¹⁴⁸

Secondly, Turkey and Greece established a balance for protecting the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus with the Treaty of Alliance. The Treaty created a sui generis alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, and gave the right to Turkey and Greece to settle military troops on the island. Cyprus did not have any military threat from neighboring regions, so this treaty was to prevent both Turkey and Greece from any aggression which could be of an irredentist nature. In other words, it was a mutual promise by Turkey and Greece to refrain from any military intervention to the island. Thirdly, Turkey, Greece and Britain created a unique balance with the Treaty of

147 Ibid. 15-16.

148 Hüner Tuncer, *Kıbrıs Sarmalı Nasıl Bir Çözüm?..*, 64-65.

Guarantee in order to avoid possible unification of Cyprus with Greece, and the territorial partition of the island according to Turkey's will. Britain, Turkey and Greece assumed themselves as guarantor states on Cyprus and they assumed responsibility for preventing Cyprus from any attempt for unification with any other state, which indeed meant the end of EOKA's struggle for Enosis on paper.¹⁴⁹

However, although a strong balance was established on paper with the three treaties mentioned above, the Treaty of Guarantee concealed a weak point in itself which harbored the possibility of destroying the balance. The Treaty of Guarantee left an open door for Britain, Turkey and Greece, the guarantor states, to conduct military intervention on the island, if a threat appeared to demolish the independence, territorial integrity or security of the Republic of Cyprus and the basic provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. This principle was the result of the lack of confidence between the three guarantor states and mistrust towards the Cypriot communities, especially the Greek Cypriots, because all these agreements were made on a sensitive and weak balance which was established between the communities, who were historically mistrustful of each other. In addition to this, these agreements emerged from the pressure created by the international dynamics of the time, rather than from the will of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, Turkey and Greece. In this sense, even any simple disagreement between the two communities had a strong potential to escalate into a conflict, as the historical developments on the island confirmed, and it could be considered as a threat by the guarantor states to intervene in the island. Therefore, the balance which was established by the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959 was very much on a knife edge.¹⁵⁰

149 Andreas Karyos, "60 Chronia Meta: Oi Kiniseis ton Protagoniston kai oi Symfonies Zyrichis – Londinou: Etsi grafike to telos tis EOKA", *I Simerini*, 31 March 2019.

150 It should be underlined that the 1959 Agreements and the 1960 constitution of Cyprus created a complex judiciary ground to establish a political administration and created a power-sharing system which allowed the Turkish Cypriot population a larger share of seats in the legislature (30%), civil service (30%), army (40%) and police (30%) than

Under these circumstances, a Joint Constitutional Commission was established after the Zurich and London Agreements, which was composed of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments were also included in the Constitutional Commission. This Commission worked on preparing a constitution for the Republic of Cyprus and approximately one year later, a draft constitution was submitted to the parties in April 1960.¹⁵¹ Then, Britain declared the independence of Cyprus by an official declaration by the Queen and the Republic of Cyprus officially appeared as an independent state on August 6th, 1960.

The most significant characteristic of the Cyprus constitution was that it had a strong bi-communal framework. All the parts and articles of the constitution referred to the bi-communal structure on the island and it distributed legislative, executive and judicial power between the two communities. Especially, distribution of the executive power was the weakest point of the constitution. The provisions of the Cyprus constitution which define the allocation of executive authority between the Greek and Turkish communities clarify that weak point. The Executive was divided into two between the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President by veto rights and by the right of forming the government. The Council of Ministers would be composed of ten ministers, seven of them from the Greek community and three of them from the Turkish community. More interestingly, the President and the Vice-President each had the right to select and appoint the ministers from their own communities. Besides, both the President and the Vice-President had the right of veto for their decisions and the decisions of the House of Representatives. Those provisions on distribution of executive power point out the strong bi-communal nature of the Cyprus Constitution.¹⁵²

their share of the population at that time. Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., "The Cyprus Crisis 1974-75: Political Juridical Aspects", *SMU Law Review*, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (1975): 515.

151 T. W. Adams. "The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 1966): 476.

152 Ibid. 479-480.

While the Constitutional Commission was working on drafting the constitution, the elections were held in Cyprus in December 1959 in accordance with the provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements. Archbishop Makarios was elected as the President of the new Republic from the Greek community and Dr. Fazıl Küçük from the Turkish community was elected as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. When independence was officially declared in August 1960, the government began to work, but the problems arising from the divided character of the constitution appeared immediately. The problems related to sharing of power in the central bureaucracy, army and local bureaucracy of the new state resulted in a kind of unarmed conflict between 1960-1963. For instance, for sharing of the public service offices, a Joint Consultative Committee was established to study how the 70:30 ratio could be implemented in distribution of the offices in central bureaucratic institutions. However, after a while it was understood from the affirmation of the Supreme Constitutional Court that neither of the communities were following the provisions of the Constitution on appointments to the public services. Soon, both communities started to blame each other for trying to take the full control of the central bureaucracy of the new state and frictions arose over the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the staffing of the state mechanism.¹⁵³

The army became another topic of conflict. Vice-President Dr. Fazıl Küçük was in favor of forming the units in the army as small as possible and separating Greek and Turkish units, because he most probably predicted that the Greeks, from their experience of EOKA's armed struggle, and as the major population on the island, could easily mobilize the armed forces by taking control of the army, if the army was not structured on small units which were easier to control for the Turkish side. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots wished to ensure mixed military units

153 Vassilis K. Fouskas and Alex Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution* (London: Pluto Press, 2009): 18-19.

which would allow them to control the power in the Cyprus army. As a result, the efforts to establish a national army in Cyprus failed.¹⁵⁴

The deepest disagreement was about the municipalities. The constitution established dual municipalities in Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. The constitutional provision on dual municipalities annoyed the Greek community and their claim was mostly based on the unjust character of distribution of local administrative power in the cities, where they comprised the majority of the population. However, Greek Cypriot harassment was rather related with the loss of full political power at regional level. By having separate municipalities in the big cities, the Turks gained a kind of local independence and had the opportunity to strengthen their position against possible Greek aggression, as they had badly experienced it before 1960. More precisely, where once the Greek Cypriots had been fighting against the British and Turkish presence in Cyprus as the powerful actor on the island, now they did not even have any authority over the Turkish local administration in the cities. The Greek Cypriot community and political leaders convinced Makarios to get rid of this provision and President Makarios, without waiting a long time, attempted to by-pass the separate-municipalities provision of the constitution and he reawakened the old 1950 British colonial law which allowed the central government to determine certain areas in villages and towns for improvement. This law also gave the right to the government to appoint boards to carry out health, sanitation and other local services for the citizens. These were known as Improvement Boards, and they acted as local municipal institutions. Makarios enacted the law on Improvement Boards, and soon afterwards Greek municipal offices gave up their duties and were positioned in these Improvement Boards. It was a clear attempt to nullify the separate-municipalities provision of the Cyprus Constitution and to take control over the cities back into the hands of the Greek Cypriot community. Of course, the Turkish Cypriots did not accept this fait accompli situation, although their efforts to circumvent the Greek

154 James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 31.

Cypriot attempts to take political control over the cities remained inconclusive.¹⁵⁵

The developments and deep differences of opinion about the implementation of the constitution demonstrated the failing points of the arrangement in Cyprus within this three-year period of 1960-1963. Most importantly, the Zurich and London Agreements and the Constitution enforced the solution of the conflict from outside without considering the socio-political dynamics in Cyprus, by prioritizing the international dynamics and geopolitical interests of the Western Bloc. While the outside powers tried to balance the sensitive connection between Greeks and Turks, they attributed too little power to the Greeks in proportion to their majority population on the island, which they could never accept. This situation prevented them from integrating into the new state and quite the contrary, it created a feeling of victimization for the Greek community and motivated them to refuse belongingness to the Republic of Cyprus and to unify with Greece. In other respects, the Agreements and the Constitution assigned too much power to the Turks despite their lesser population on the island, which they very much welcomed, but which they could not preserve against Greek aggression.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the weakness of the constitution took precedence over the will of the NATO allies US, Britain, Turkey and Greece.

However, there are scholars who consider the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 workable despite its difficulties of implementation and its complexities in addressing the solution of the conflict between two communities. This interpretation of the Constitution tends to evaluate it as a lost opportunity rather than a construction destined to collapse. For instance, Hatzivassiliou argues that the political environment of Cyprus, which was

155 For a very comprehensive analysis of 1960 Cyprus Constitution, see Norma Salem, "The Constitution of 1960 and its Failure" in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, ed. Norma Salem, (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1992): 117-125.

156 Hubert Faustmann, "Independence Postponed: Cyprus 1959-1960", *Cyprus Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2002): 114.

dominated by extremists on both sides, was the main reason for the failure of the Constitution and he says: “*The constitution was indeed immensely complex, but not unworkable. In the end, the way a system is implemented is perhaps more important than its actual legal character. Implementation also involves aspects such as mutual trust and the desire to compromise*”.¹⁵⁷

Although Hatzivassiliou has a positive approach for the workability of the Constitution, he accepts that it did not solve the conflict and merely postponed the disagreements between the two communities. Moreover, he involuntarily confuses the intention of the Greek Cypriot community by establishing a relation between the weak effect of moderate forces in the Greek community and the hope that they would prevail over the extremists. He implies: “*The fundamental unspoken assumption of the Greek side was that tension would work in favor of the extremists and of those advocating partition, while smooth political development would work in favor of moderate forces and of the Greek Cypriot majority*”.¹⁵⁸ However, those who reduce the reasons for the failure of the Constitution merely to extremism are missing one important side of the issue: The Constitution failed to create a nation, since the citizens of Cyprus defined themselves with their affinities rather than as Cypriot nationals. Moreover, the Constitution itself provided for a communal division rather than a national integration.¹⁵⁹

The arrangement in Cyprus created a kind of boomerang effect: The Greek Cypriots did not welcome the Republic of Cyprus, as they supposed that it strongly weakened their authority, which they believed that it was

157 Faustmann is quoting from Evanthis Hatzivassiliou. Hubert Faustmann, “The Cyprus Question, 1878-1960 The Constitutional Aspect”, Book Review, *Cyprus Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2005): 129.

158 Ibid. 129.

159 Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Lenos Trigeorgis, “Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993): 343.

an absolute authority arising from their majority on the island,¹⁶⁰ and impeded their vision of unification of Cyprus and Greece. They did not discount the possibility of a new armed conflagration and EOKA continued to preserve its underground organization. The Turkish Cypriots, in general, welcomed the Republic of Cyprus with diffidence, as they realized that the surplus power attributed to them exceeded their ability to keep it and that it would incite Greek aggression.¹⁶¹ Therefore, they also did not discount the possibility of an armed conflict and TMT continued to organize Turkish Cypriots against any aggressive attacks that would come from EOKA. That mutual belief and expectation of a new future armed clash constituted a single blow to the abdominal cavity of the Republic of Cyprus in a short period of time.

3.3.5 *Terror on the Island and the Process Leading up to 1974*

Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, once referred to the lack of feeling of Cypriot nationality among the Greek Cypriots and he said it was because of the constitutional arrangements which did not reflect the will of the Greek Cypriots. Makarios pointed out that the Cypriots, in fact he meant the Greek Cypriots, would continue their national struggle in order to shape their future through Enosis.¹⁶² This approach by Makarios actually reflects the lack of correlation between the state and the nation in Cyprus. Indeed, it is a narrative which underlines the constitutional invalidity of the Republic of Cyprus in the eyes of Greek Cypriot political leaders. Makarios himself described the Turkish Cypriots as

160 Georgia Dimari and Marilena Varnava, "1960 Cyprus Constitution: Conflicting Interpretations and their Repercussions on Future Negotiations", Conference Paper, 5th Biennial Hellenic Observatory of PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece and Cyprus (June 2011): 2.

161 Ibid. 3.

162 Michael Stephen, *The Cyprus Question: A Concise guide to the history, politics and law of the Cyprus Question* (London: Northgate Publications, 2001): 21.

neighbors residing in the same place as the Greek Cypriots and he displayed a culture-based allegiance by underlining the ethnic characters of Cypriot nationals with an ethnocentric approach. Makarios' approach, in fact, was not confusing because the constitution's structure was also built on the presence of two different sociological entities on the island. This discriminative character of the constitution resulted in a quick disengagement of the ethnic communities from the state and especially the Greek Cypriots continued to consider themselves as part of the great Hellenic nation rather than as nationals of the new state.¹⁶³ Consequently, the vision of both political and sociologic integration of the Greek and Turkish communities to preserve the existence of the Republic of Cyprus failed in a very short period of time. In brief, the Cyprus Constitution did not give any identity to the nationals of the new Cypriot state and the ethnic identity of the communities remained as strong as it had been before 1960. If the sociological attachment to ethnic denomination exceeded the constitutional relation with nationality, then the total disintegration of different ethnicities under the same constitutional unit would be inevitable. That is what happened in Cyprus during the silent period of 1960-1963.

Soon after Makarios was elected as the president of the Republic of Cyprus, he actually decided to annihilate the Cyprus state. He once expressed this intention of his to a Greek Cypriot journalist, stating that he was going to raze the Zurich and London Agreements to the ground without waiting longer than five years.¹⁶⁴ The Greek Cypriot ministers of the first cabinet of Cyprus gave clues about the destruction of the Republic.

163 Makarios himself strongly embraced Hellenism's fanatic form containing hostility against Turks and Turkey. During his political life, although masterpieces and political rationality have often been observed, fanatic approaches towards Turkey and Turks of Cyprus caused by the irrationality of the passion of Hellenism have always reflected on his political strategies. Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik 1967-1970* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993): 173-174.

164 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 108.

Makarios' colleagues, Spyros Kyprianou, Glafkos Clerides and Tassos Papadopoulos, all three of whom became presidents of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus in later years, were politicians who had connections with EOKA and they were all in favor of following Greek nationalist policies for unification with Greece.¹⁶⁵

However, there was one Greek Cypriot member of the Cyprus cabinet who was directly involved with the underground paramilitary forces, Polycarpos Georkatzis, the Minister of the Interior in the Makarios Government. Georkatzis used the nickname Akritas for his underground activities and the preparations for a new armed conflict which aimed to remove the Turkish population of Cyprus was named after his nickname as the Akritas Plan. Georkatzis was personally involved in drawing up the plan and he himself monitored the armed preparations of EOKA underground. The plan was constructed on a two-pillar strategy: Firstly, the Greek Cypriots' political leadership would gain support from the international public for the self-determination of the Greek Cypriots under the Republic of Cyprus. They would use the necessary tools to convince international society of the socio-political disorder in Cyprus which they claimed that it arose from the 1960 Constitution. According to the Greek Cypriot point of view, the Constitution did not provide any legal basis for the solution of the Cyprus conflict, and for this reason, the issue was to be handled again at international level. Secondly, the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance were targeted to be dissolved in order to prevent any possible intervention by Turkey to save the Turks on the island. In parallel with that, EOKA was to start an armed campaign against the Turkish population on the island which aimed to remove them from Cyprus, or more clearly, to exterminate them.¹⁶⁶

165 Yitzhak Oron, *Middle East Record Volume One 1960* (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1960): 227.

166 For further details about the Akritas Plan, see Sabahattin İsmail, *150 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu* (İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, 1998): 72-86. The Akritas Plan was never mentioned in Greek Cypriot literature and it is almost impossible to see any comprehensive discus-

On November 30th, 1963, the Akritas Plan was put into practice with a move by President Makarios, who was also in coordination with EOKA to enforce the plan, on a constitutional amendment. Makarios submitted a package for the amendment of 13 articles of the Cyprus Constitution related with core issues such as the veto right of the vice-president, the status of separate municipalities, the distribution of public services and the numbers in the army and the removal of the Community Chambers. This was not an ordinary constitutional amendment proposal, but rather, it was an attempt to eradicate the autonomous status of the Turkish Cypriots as a separate entity from the Greek Cypriots under the federal structure of the Republic of Cyprus. These demands by Makarios for constitutional amendment aimed to destroy the political balance between the Turks and Greeks. More importantly, that demand for constitutional amendment was in reality the reflection of the Greek Cypriot leadership's intention to destroy the federative structure of the Republic of Cyprus, under which the Turkish and Greek communities were separate political entities. The demands for constitutional change mostly aimed to transform the state of Cyprus from a federal structure to a unitary one, in which the Greeks would have the dominant power and Turks would have a minority status. Makarios' proposal for constitutional amendment was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots on December 6th, 1963 and EOKA started its armed attacks at Christmas. Starting with the Christmas attacks, according to the official records, 364 Turkish Cypriot civilians were killed, many more were injured and 25,000 of them fled from their homes as a result of EOKA attacks during the 1963-1964 crisis.¹⁶⁷

sion about it in international academic literature either, except by some Turkish scholars. However, the details of the plan were published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper, *Patris*, in the Greek language and an English translation of the Akritas Plan was submitted to the UN General Assembly and Security Council as an official UN document, No. A/33/115; S/12722, on May 30th, 1978. See Hilmi Akil, "Federal Republic of Cyprus: Notes on Reunification and Conflict Regulation", *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (September 1985): 4, 13.

167 Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (New York: Boulder, 1982): 120.

The main reason behind the start of the armed attacks by EOKA was to take control of political and bureaucratic power under Greek Cypriot rule in the Republic of Cyprus. Attacks continued during December 1963 and turned into an attempt to massacre the Turkish Cypriots. Under these circumstances, Turkey intended military intervention on the island to protect the Turkish community from EOKA attacks. However, the international community objected to Turkey's unilateral military action. Only the Turkish Air Force made warning flights over the island, and thus, EOKA attacks on the Turks were stopped.¹⁶⁸ Later on, a joint military unit composed of soldiers of the guarantor states, Turkey, Greece and Britain, landed on the island as a peacekeeping force and on December 30th, a ceasefire agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was signed as the Green Line Agreement which separated the Greek and Turkish zones of the capital city of Nicosia. Soon after, Makarios unilaterally declared that the Greek Cypriots had annulled the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, and in fact, a de facto situation appeared which meant the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus.¹⁶⁹

The attacks by EOKA continued in 1964, and the UN Security Council assigned a peacekeeping force to ensure peace in Cyprus with the unanimously adopted Resolution 186, on March 4th, 1964. Resolution 186 of the UN Security Council created the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the consent of the Government of Cyprus and authorized the Secretary General of the UN to determine the size of the UNFICYP in consultation with the British, Turkish and Greek governments.¹⁷⁰ However, this resolution created another conflict which has not been solved since then. The Republic of Cyprus was de facto ended by the one-sided declarations of the Greek Cypriots and there was no longer a legitimate

168 Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking 1964-1986* (New York: Routledge, 1998): 20-21.

169 Hasan Ünal, "The Cyprus Question: History, Mutual Perceptions and Latest Trends", *Medzinárodné Otázky*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1999): 50.

170 Van Coufoudakis, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (September 1976): 463.

government in Cyprus from December 1963 onwards. With this resolution, the Greek Cypriots assumed themselves to be the only legitimate political representative on the island and they totally excluded the Turkish Cypriots from international legal activities related with the Cyprus issue. In brief, the UN Security Council stayed on the side of the collapsed Cypriot Government dominated by the Greeks and this deepened the division instead of providing a solution for the ongoing conflict.

It is possible to say that the decision of UN Security Council deepened the separation both between the two communities on the island and between Greece and Turkey. The decision has caused particular concerns in Turkey and created the exacerbation of the debates about the option of military intervention. Turkish Foreign Minister of the time, Feridun Cemal Erkin stated in his parliamentary speech that the decision to deploy the peacekeeping force on the island was positive, but he then commented that the Greeks in Cyprus evaluated that the decision had served for their own political purposes and therefore, they intensified the attacks on Turkish settlements in the island.¹⁷¹ It is also seen that Turkish opposition parties developed serious criticism to the Turkish government. For example, the critical attitude of the main opposition, the Justice Party towards the Turkish government about Security Council's decision is considerable. The deputy Faruk Sükan, who spoke on behalf of the Justice Party group in the National Assembly said that the Cyprus problem remained unsolved, Cyprus issue entered into a new era that will be against Turkish Cypriots with the resolution, the decision prevented Turkey from intervening to the island and he criticized the Turkish government's attitude by saying that this decision will prevent Turkey from ensuring security for the Turks in Cyprus.¹⁷²

It is possible to encounter uncertainty and anxiety caused by the decision in the Turkish press as well. While the talks about the Cyprus issue continuing in the Security Council, Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou's statements that threatening to fight with Turkey in Cyprus are

171 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 1, Cilt: 28, Toplantı Yılı: 3, 10 March 1964: 482.

172 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 1, Cilt: 28, Toplantı Yılı: 3, 11 March 1964: 538.

having wide coverage in the Turkish press,¹⁷³ on the other hand some Turkish newspapers were responding to his statements in a similar style by reminding the military victory of Turks against Greeks in the September 9, 1922.¹⁷⁴ After the decision, Makarios' foreign minister, Kyprianou's comments evaluating the decision as a victory for the Greek Cypriots were included in the Turkish press.¹⁷⁵

As provoking the concerns of Turkey, Greece and Greek Cypriots have also considered the resolution as a decision that removes the founding treaties of the Republic of Cyprus rack in the practice. In this regard, Papandreou told in his statement in the Greek media that a new era had begun in Cyprus, the peacekeeping force would ensure peace in the island and Turkey's possible military intervention had been prevented by pointing out that the decision had hindered the intentions of the outsider forces for any military intervention.¹⁷⁶ Papandreou was not so wrong in his evaluation in March 1964. Because, until that point, international involvement in the Cyprus conflict had been almost wholly limited to Turkey, Greece and Britain as guarantor states, but with the resolution Cyprus issue became subject to a wider international involvement,¹⁷⁷ which satisfied Greek Cypriots and Greece for a short-term.

The criticism of the opposition parties, the distant approach of the Turkish press to the decision and the satisfaction of the Greek side have led the Turkish public to the opinion that the Security Council resolution does not bring a solution to the Cyprus problem, but instead encourages the aggressive attitudes of the Greek Cypriots. Thereupon, Turkey, by hardening her stance, sent a note to Makarios stating that the attacks to the Turks had to be ceased soon, if not, then Turkey would do the neces-

173 *Hürriyet*, 1 March 1964.

174 *Tercüman*, 3 March 1964.

175 *Hürriyet*, 5 March 1964.

176 *Makedonia*, 5 March 1964.

177 James Ker-Lindsay, *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-64* (Mannheim and Möhnese: Bibliopolis, 2004): 120.

sary and that note have also been delivered to the other guarantor powers and the United States.¹⁷⁸ The US State Department, by taking this warning in serious, gave instructions to US embassies in Athens and Nicosia to warn Papandreou and Makarios about the seriousness of Turkey's warning, with the telegram sent in the same day.¹⁷⁹ With the spread of the news in the Turkish press that military preparations were made for an intervention to Cyprus,¹⁸⁰ expectations towards a military operation to the island have risen in Turkey. In this process, Turkey softened her attitude towards the intervention when the peacekeeping forces landed to the island of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has received authorization from the parliament to send troops to Cyprus in order to show its decisiveness.¹⁸¹ However, this authority has mostly been used as a threat element especially against the Greek Cypriots and Greece regarding the Cyprus conflict.

The UNFICYP forces arrived on the island at the end of March 1964. However, the UNFICYP did not take any concrete initiative to stop the attacks by EOKA, and instead, the peacekeeping force put itself in the passive position of merely reporting the casualties of the conflict. This passive position of the UNFICYP encouraged EOKA and direct attacks on Turks continued to increase. And, developments had begun to gain a provocative dimension for Turkey since April 1964. First, Makarios, with a unilateral move, he notified the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia that he terminated the Guarantee Agreement.¹⁸² Then, he went to Athens and he agreed with Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandrou on finding a solution to the Cyprus issue with the UN mediation, preserving the Enosis as

178 *Milliyet*, 12 March 1964.

179 Document 25, Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts, 12 March 1964, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, eds. James E. Miller Jr., David S. Patterson, (Washington DC: Department of State, 2002): 51-53.

180 *Milliyet*, 13 March 1964.

181 *Cumhuriyet*, 17 March 1964.

182 *Tercüman*, 5 April 1964.

the ultimate goal and receiving Greece's military support to Greek Cypriots in the case of Turkey's military intervention.¹⁸³

All these happened caused a re-evaluation to take the option of military intervention into consideration in Turkey and has launched the process that results in the famous Johnson Letter sent to Ankara. From this point on, Turkey began to feel a disappointment against Western allies, mainly against the USA.¹⁸⁴ The Turkish government changed its attitude and raised its criticism against the USA, especially when no action were taken against the attacks on Turks in Cyprus and, according to Turkish press, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in an interview given to the American press during his visit to the USA said: "*If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up. ... a new kind of world will then come into being on a new pattern, and in this new world Turkey will find herself a place*".¹⁸⁵

The fact that the Greek attacks on the island against the Turks were not stopped, the peacekeeping force remained passive, the great powers, especially the USA, remained silent against the Greek attacks and especially the harsh criticism of the opposition created a perception in the domestic public that the Turkish government's policies on Cyprus are not sufficient to stop Turkish losses. This situation led the Turkish government to decide to carry out military action in Cyprus. Prime Minister İnönü conveyed to the US Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare on 4 June 1964 that Turkey will conduct military intervention to Cyprus and the ambassador asked to postpone the intervention for 24 hours.¹⁸⁶

183 Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971): 100.

184 *Cumhuriyet*, 18 April 1964.

185 *The New York Times*, 17 April 1964. İnönü writes in his memoirs that he gave interview to Newsweek and New York Times but he does not write anything about this statement. İsmet İnönü, *Defterler (1919-1973)* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2017): 665. Although no news containing these statements was published in Time magazine, it appeared in the Turkish press. *Milliyet*, 16 April 1964.

186 *Hürriyet*, 5 June 1964.

A unilateral military action was quite risky under the Cold War conditions of the 1960s and the Western Alliance was worried about a possible armed conflict between Turkey and Greece. The United States had reservations about Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, as it could cause weakness on the frontline of NATO with the Soviet Union, if a conflict occurred between Turkey and Greece. When the American Ambassador visited Turkish Prime Minister in the next day, it was declared to the public that USA, in the negotiations held between Ankara and Washington, demanded moderation from Turkey and expressed her concerns that Turkey's intervention would cause a total war in Cyprus.¹⁸⁷ In fact, on June 5th, the letter of US President Johnson was delivered to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü.¹⁸⁸

The letter from US President Lyndon Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in June 1964 stopped Turkey's plans for military intervention in Cyprus. Johnson wrote the letter in an almost patronizing style and mentioned that peaceful means had not been exhausted and he clearly underlined that Turkey's right to take any unilateral action could not as yet be considered appropriate. He said: "*I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.*"¹⁸⁹ It was a clear threat from the US to Turkey, and Turkey's economic, political and military power was not strong enough to challenge this US threat. These restricting reasons revealed that Turkey was not able to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 and the Turkish government could not take any unilateral military action on the island.

187 *Hürriyet*, 6 June 1964.

188 The details of the letter were hidden from the Turkish public at first and the full text of the letter appeared in the press approximately two and a half years after the letter's arrival. *Hürriyet*, 13 January 1966.

189 Süha Bölükbaşı cited the letter from official proceedings. See Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1993): 517.

Johnson's letter has widely been discussed in Ankara. Despite the letter, in order to give the message that Turkey is determined to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus, Greek Cypriot positions in Kokkina and Morphou Bay, holding the Turkish Cypriot villages under siege, were bombed by Turkish jetfighters in August 1964.¹⁹⁰ It should be noted that this campaign was conducted as a result of Turkey's inconclusive attempts and it was nothing more than a show of force to deliver a military message to Greek side and to the world public.¹⁹¹ In those days, Turkey in the long term did not have the power to stand against the US request to not to intervene in Cyprus. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü admitted in his meeting with Turkish political leaders that the USA was threatening Turkey by using both her military and diplomatic power to show her decisive stance against Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus.¹⁹² In fact, Turkey refrained from the US intimidation. As a matter of fact, the Turkish government, which has been raising the thesis of partition again for a while upon the Greek attacks intensified in the island, started to give messages that it might agree to a federative solution, too, right after the letter.¹⁹³

One of the most significant results of Johnson's letter is Turkey's starting to question the US alliance, and despite being a NATO member in particular Turkey was confronted with reality that her security can not be provided against the Soviets. As a result, anti-Western and anti-American approaches began to gain more support within Turkey's political dynamics.¹⁹⁴ More importantly, apart from the Johnson letter, Turkey in 1964 did not have military power for landing to Cyprus and political power for imposing it to the USA. Turkey thoroughly realized that she is alone on her

190 Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Spring, 1980): 50.

191 The Turkish government announced that it carried out this air operation because the attempts to stop the armed attacks of the Greeks failed. *Hürriyet*, 9 August 1964.

192 *Hürriyet*, 13 June 1964.

193 *Hürriyet*, 21 June 1964.

194 Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001): 689.

theses about Cyprus and brought her political and military relations with the USA, both bilaterally and within NATO, to a new level by diversifying her foreign policy after 1964. In particular, she realized that she was completely dependent on the USA militarily and did not have the means and equipment to carry out a military operation against Cyprus. As a result of this, the countries where Turkey purchased weapons were diversified, more importance was attached to the development of the domestic defence industry, and economic and technical efforts were accelerated to develop Turkish navy for carrying out a landing operation in Cyprus.¹⁹⁵ When considered in the long term, the most important result of the Johnson Letter is that it caused Turkey to access the capacity for conducting military action in Cyprus within next ten years, while she did not have that capacity in 1964.

In July 1964, the United States became directly involved in the dispute as a conciliator to settle it with a plan for solution submitted by Dean Acheson, former US Foreign Secretary, who was appointed as mediator in the Cyprus issue. The Acheson Plan was prepared with an American type of trade mentality and it was quite simple: Turkey was offered a small area of land on the edge of the Karpas Peninsula in Cyprus, whose sovereignty would totally belong to Turkey, and Greece would cede the small Kastellorizo Island, which is just a few kilometers away from the Anatolian Peninsula facing Kaş, to Turkey. In return, the island of Cyprus would be unified with Greece.¹⁹⁶ Turkey's approach towards the plan was positive with some minor revisions, and Greece was also positive about the plan, but they had reservations about ceding the Greek island of Kastellorizo to Turkey, which could be negotiated. However, American foreign policy makers did not count on the great desire of the Greek Cypriots to unify with Greece. Makarios wanted a pure, undiluted unification with Greece and he was against any kind of compromise with Turkey. Thus,

195 Ibid. 690.

196 For further details about the Acheson Plan, see Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms, Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (New York: Praeger, 1966): 200-204.

the Greek Cypriots rejected the Acheson Plan and the US projection to solve the dispute through the Acheson Plan failed.¹⁹⁷

The UN Security Council's decision, which favored the Greek-dominated Cyprus Government as the legitimate representative of the island at international level, the USA's direct involvement in the conflict by indisposing Turkey towards an intervention, the US failure on the solution of the conflict with the Acheson Plan and international unresponsiveness towards the Greek Cypriots' rejection of every proposal for a solution made the Greek Cypriots feel that the way had been paved for Greek hegemony over the island by unification with motherland Greece through self-determination.¹⁹⁸ EOKA pressure on the Turkish Cypriots increased, armed attacks and mass killings started again. Between 1965-1968, hundreds of Turks left their homes because of the EOKA threat and they became refugees. The Commander of the UNFICYP, General Thimayya, reported that more than 600 Turkish refugees were living in caves under very difficult circumstances.¹⁹⁹

In the following process, Turkish and Greek prime ministers met in Alexandroupoli and Keşan in September 1967 and tried to discuss the solution proposals for the Cyprus problem. However, the insistence of the Greek side on Enosis caused these negotiations to be inconclusive, too,²⁰⁰

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- 197 Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou even considered Acheson's offers as an opportunity to unify Cyprus and Greece, and he told his associates, 'Listen, we are being offered an apartment building and subletting only one penthouse to our neighbours, the Turks', but the plan met with disapproval by the Greek Cypriots. See, H. W. Brands, "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 1987): 357.
- 198 Former Greek Foreign Minister Ioannis Toumbas was mentioning in his speech in the Hellenic Parliament in January 1967 that Enosis is the constant policy of Greek governments. Rauf R. Denktaş, *Rauf Denktaş'ın Hatıraları (1964-74) IV. Cilt (1967) Arşiv Belgeleri ve Notlarla O Günler* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1997): 14.
- 199 Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*, 130.
- 200 Asaf İnhan, former Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia, transmits that Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel reacted harshly to the Greek Prime Minister's proposal for En-

and then the Greek attacks on the Turks in Cyprus increased again. On October 30, 1967, when the Greek Cypriots' Defense Council took a decision to attack the villages of Boğaziçi (Agios Theodoros) and Geçitkale (Kophinou), where the Turks lived intensely, a crisis broke out on the island once again.²⁰¹ As the Greek attacks on these two villages intensified, the Turkish government decided to hold an urgent meeting on the evening of 15 November and gave an ultimatum to Makarios for the withdrawal of Greek forces from Boğaziçi and Geçitkale.²⁰² The Greeks, on Turkey's ultimatum, withdrew from these two villages. However, the crisis was not over. Many Turks disappeared during the EOKA campaign in 1967. Increasing EOKA attacks on Turks, especially in 1967, once more stirred Turkey up to conduct a coercive diplomacy, including military threat, in Cyprus. The Turkish government was diplomatically determined to backtrap the Greek Cypriots and Greece. Turkish government took authorization from the Turkish Parliament for a military operation to the Cyprus,²⁰³ and this was effectively used as a coercive instrument against Greece.

Furthermore, Turkey also believed Greece's role in these attacks and urged Greece to do her part to decrease the tension on the island by issuing a diplomatic note to Greek government. Moreover, Turkey informed UN Security Council, which convened on November 25 and demanded the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the island who had been secretly sent to Cyprus.²⁰⁴ During all these processes in November 1967, Turkish jetfighters operated constant warning flights over the island of Cyprus

osis and because of Greek side's insistence on Enosis the Alexandroupolis-Keşan process failed in September 1967. Gül İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991)* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007): 14.

201 Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition Volume 2* (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989): 198.

202 Süha Bölükbaşı, *Barışçı Çözumsuzlük* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2001): 179-180.

203 *Milliyet*, 18 November 1967.

204 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Sayı 38 (November 1967): 24, 90-91.

and thus Turkey gave the message to the Greek Cypriots and Greece that military power could be used if necessary.²⁰⁵

Indeed, Turkey, for the case, prepared to make a military landing with an army corps, but US President Lyndon Johnson once more became involved and sent a message with his envoy Cyrus Vance, to Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, that if Turkey made a landing, the US would not let the Turkish Army use NATO weapons in Cyprus.²⁰⁶ Turkey stopped the preparations for landing and for the second time, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was obstructed by the US President's interference in the Turkish government's initiative for a military operation. In the end, Turkey and Greece agreed on the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Cyprus, General Grivas was recalled to Athens and the crisis was over in the early December 1967.²⁰⁷

Despite the US President's interference, which hindered a Turkish operation on the island, both the international community and the Greek Cypriots realized the strong intention of Turkey to rescue the Turkish population in Cyprus. For the first time after all the massacres and forced migration of the Turks, inter-communal talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides started in June 1968 with the UN Secretary General's efforts. Grivas left the island and Rauf Denktaş returned to the island as the new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community after a four-year exile in Turkey. Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş led their communities during the inter-communal talks between 1968-1974, which was also supported and supervised by the Turkish and Greek governments.²⁰⁸

205 Fuat Aksu, Yunus Çolak, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Krizlerinde Ahdi Hukuk: Kıbrıs ve Nahçıvan Krizleri", *Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Sayı 88 (Kış 2019): 37.

206 Erol Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2010): 124.

207 Cihat Göktepe, "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2005): 440-441.

208 For a detailed assessment of the 1968-1974 inter-communal talks in Greek, see Miltiadis Christodoulou, *I Poreia Mias Epochis I Ellada I Kypriaki Igesia To Kypriako* (Athens: Ioannis Floros, 1987): 618-623. Christodoulou argues that although there were challenges to the inter-communal talks from both sides, progress had been realized in the talks, and indeed, constitutional experts, Orhan Aldıkaçtı from Turkey and Michael Dekleris

The inter-communal talks of 1968-1974 were negotiated under four phases until 1971. The Greek Cypriot side mostly focused on the amendment of the 1960 Constitution based on Makarios' thirteen points. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side pressed for an early agreement and seemed to be ready to accept most of the Makarios points in return for stronger autonomy at local level, which would separate the settlements on the island according to communal grouping. The talks between Clerides and Denktaş until 1971 was the period when a peaceful settlement was the closest on both sides. However, the talks were undermined and broke down in the tense political environment of the early 1970s. Grivas secretly returned to Cyprus on 31 August 1971 and re-organized the extremist elements of EOKA under EOKA-B, who were absolutely against any kind of negotiation, except for unification with Greece.²⁰⁹ EOKA-B's extremist attitude against inter-communal talks and re-starting of violence against the Turks put the Greek Cypriot side in a difficult and fearful position, because EOKA-B targeted not only Turks, but also Greek Cypriot political leaders who had a positive approach towards granting some compromises for a settlement on the island. For this reason, Greek Cypriot side became more reluctant towards the settlement of the dispute. This Greek reluctance towards the solution of the Cyprus problem was perceived by Turkish side as the duplicity of the Greek Cypriots and as a result of this, the Turkish Cypriots became more and more hopeless about achieving a solution to the Cyprus issue.²¹⁰ In the end, the inter-communal talks completely failed in 1974 and EOKA-B's violence aimed at the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots dominated the land of Cyprus.

from Greece, were able to finalize a draft for an extensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

209 "Survivor", *Time Magazine*, Vol. 99, Issue 9 (28 February 1972): 30-31.

210 Michalis Stavrou Michael, *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009): 29-30.

3.3.6 *Turkey's Intervention in 1974 and Its Consequences*

Grivas' return to Cyprus changed the political balance within the Greek Cypriot community. In fact, EOKA was re-organized under EOKA-B not only against the Turkish Cypriots, but also against Makarios and his supporter factions, because Makarios and the Greek Cypriot political leadership had conflicts with the Junta government in Athens about the solution of the Cyprus issue and the joint policies against Turkey on the common political interests of the Greek Cypriots and Greece. Thus, Makarios himself and the political parties on the Greek side who supported Makarios fell into a challenging position for the Junta's foreign policy goals on the relations with Turkey.²¹¹

Although they avoided a direct conflict with Turkey, the Junta leaders in Athens were actually dreaming about the unification of Cyprus and Greece by giving some compromises to Turkey. On the other hand, Makarios had once been adherent to pure unification with Greece without any compromise with Turkey, but that policy of his had not been favored by the Junta leaders in Greece.²¹² Tension between the Greek Junta and Makarios had occurred since the end of the 1960s and Makarios changed

211 In addition to his pro-Enosis political affiliation, in the early 1970s, Makarios, with his non-alignment attitudes, had also been conceived as a threat to US interests in the Mediterranean. Therefore, Makarios' threatening position for the USA's close relations with Greece and Turkey and its concern for stability in the region in favor of its interests made him the target of the USA. At this point, the Greek Junta in Athens, which was in close relations with the American administration, followed the policy of avoiding a direct conflict with Turkey because of the Cyprus issue. Thus, in the early 1970s, US policy towards Cyprus became increasingly focused on removing Makarios from power in Nicosia and this American approach coincided to a great extent with the Cyprus policy of the Greek junta, so that the relations between Makarios and the Greek junta reached a breaking point. See Aylin Güney, "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 2004): 33.

212 William Hale argues that if Turkey had not intervened in Cyprus in 1974, the Greek Junta leaders were planning to unify Cyprus with Greece and to consolidate the Greek military regime with the completed Enosis. See, William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 123.

his strategy from unification with Greece to a solution under the independent Republic of Cyprus at the beginning of the 1970s. That strategy change by Makarios was the most significant impetus of the inter-communal talks between 1968-1974 which kept the Greek Cypriot side on the table for a possible solution for the Greek-Turkish common Republic of Cyprus.²¹³ In other words, although Makarios understood the impossibility of unification with Greece because of geo-political reasons in the Cold War environment of global politics, it was already too late to turn away from the motivation of unification of Cypriot and mainland Hellenes under a single territorial integrity. In the early 1970s, the presence of Enosis was at its peak after the long struggle with Makarios' passionate policies since the early 1950s. However, now, the political dynamics in Greece and on the Greek Cypriot side were not ready for this radical shift by Makarios from Enosis to the Republic of Cyprus, in which he compromised with the Turks. Therefore, the Junta in Athens decided to change the course of the events by removing Makarios from power.²¹⁴

In addition to this, domestic political dynamics in Turkey had changed since the 1960s and Turkey's position was different from the time of the Acheson Plan, when Turkey accepted the idea of unification of Cyprus and Greece in return for a small piece of land on the island. Since inter-communal talks started in 1968, Turkey supported a federative solution

213 For instance, in the inter-communal negotiations in 1972, the Greek Cypriot side agreed to give a broader autonomy to the Turks under the Republic of Cyprus and Makarios, contrary to his proposal about the thirteen points for revision of the Cypriot Constitution in 1963, accepted the idea of separate local Turkish authorities whose responsibilities were regulated by the parliament. See, Nicos Panayiotides, "1960-1974: The Destabilising Foreign Interventions in the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus" in *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions*, eds. Michalis Kontos, Nikos Panayiotides, Haralambos Alexandrou, Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014): 81.

214 Rauf Denktaş writes in his memoirs on 1 July 1974 that the conflict between the Junta in Athens and Makarios is growing, the government in Athens is breathing fire at Makarios and he is expecting a move from the Greek Junta. Rauf R. Denktaş, *Rauf Denktaş'ın Hatıraları (1964-74) IX. Cilt (1973-1974) Arşiv Belgeleri ve Notlarla O Günler* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1999): 350.

based on the presence of two equal sovereign communities. Besides, Bülent Ecevit and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) came to power under a coalition with the conservative National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP) in January 1974 and Turkey's position on a federative solution for the Cyprus issue was much more strengthened. Bülent Ecevit declared his policy of a bi-communal federative solution which protected the equal sovereignty of the Turkish and Greek communities in the protocol of the CHP-MSP coalition.²¹⁵

However, the Junta government in Athens miscalculated Turkey's changing position on the Cyprus conflict and they still believed that unification of Cyprus and Greece could be achieved in return for a small compromise with Turkey. They took an irreversible step in Cyprus and on July 15th, 1974, EOKA-B, together with the National Guard of Cyprus, with the support of Greek army officers on the island,²¹⁶ staged a coup d'état and they overthrew the Makarios government. Makarios escaped to London and the leader of the coup, Nikos Sampson, proclaimed the establishment of the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus and declared himself as the president of that republic.²¹⁷

215 İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, *Koalisyon Hükümetleri, Koalisyon Protokolleri, Hükümet Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri Cilt 1* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2015): 591.

216 Turkey's representative in NATO at that time, Turgut Tülümen states that the Canadian ambassador in NATO has confirmed from the Canadian battalion in Cyprus working under UNFICYP that the Greek regiment on the island organized the coup. Turgut Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1998): 138.

217 The mainstream Greek press welcomed the coup with moderation and confessed the contribution of the National Guard. *Ta Nea* wrote that the government was overthrown in Cyprus with the intervention of the National Guard and the new president Sampson announced the aims of the new government. *Ta Nea*, 16 July 1974. Similarly, *To Vima* provided the details of Sampson's commitments. *To Vima*, 16 July 1974.

This miscalculated step resulted in dramatic changes to the future of the Cypriot communities. Turkey would not allow any attempt for unification of Cyprus and Greece²¹⁸ because it meant a geographical containment of Turkey by Greece and would cut off Turkey's marine connection to the rest of the world. The USA would not allow such an attempt, because the conflict would escalate into an armed conflict on the southern wing of NATO and put the Alliance in a weakened position against the Soviet Union.²¹⁹ As a result, Turkey intervened in Cyprus on July 20th,

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- 218 Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia of the time, Asaf İnhan evaluated that the coup is an attempt towards Enosis, he reported this evaluation with a crypto report to Ankara and the Turkish Government concluded the developments in Cyprus as Greece's move for the realization of Enosis. Gül İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991)*, 28.
- 219 For a very interesting research study about the USA's indirect role in Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, see Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001): 161-168. O'Malley and Craig argue, with reports and witnesses, that American foreign affairs bureaucracy knew about the plans for the coup and they estimated that the coup would lead to Turkey's intervention, and for this reason, they did nothing to prevent Turkey from any military action on the island of Cyprus. Furthermore, they argue that Turkey also knew about the preparations for the coup and had started to mobilize its forces long before the coup. Moreover, the US administration was concerned that any possible Turkish-Greek conflict would harm the USA's strategic Cold War interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. A full Enosis would lead to Turkish aggression, while on the other hand, a separated Cyprus from Greece would disappoint Greece. Therefore, the US favoured the partition of the island to prevent both Turkey and Greece from disappointment and conflict, which Vassilis Fouskas defined as Double Enosis. According to Vassilis Fouskas, the Greek Junta in Athens and Turkish political elites in fact agreed on the partition of the island between Turkey and Greece. At that point, the coup against Makarios was used as an instrument for the removal of Makarios from power, as the USA wished, and as a reason for Turkey's intervention on the island for the partition. For example, when Turkey's intervention began on 20 July 1974 and the Greek administration in Cyprus begged for help from Athens, Gregorios Bonanos, Chief of the Greek General Staff, clarified Greece's position by saying his famous phrase: "Turkey attacks Cyprus. But we are Greece". For this very interesting analysis based on documental archives and testimo-

1974 by using their right arising from Article 4 of the Guarantee Agreement.²²⁰ Turkish Armed Forces took control of a narrow path between Kyrenia and Nicosia, 3% of the territory of Cyprus, Nicos Sampson renounced the presidency and Glafkos Clerides took over the presidency temporarily. The Junta government in Athens fell and a democratic regime was restored in Greece.

The foreign ministers of the guarantor powers, Britain, Turkey and Greece, came together for peace talks in Geneva and signed the First Geneva Protocol on July 30th, 1974. The protocol accepted the right of Turkey to intervene on the island after the coup and mentioned the de facto presence of two autonomous entities on the island, namely Greek and Turkish. The second round of peace talks was held in Geneva with the participation of political leaders of the two communities to discuss the constitutional issues. Turkey's position was to establish a federative status in accordance with the sovereign equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. However, the Greek Cypriots and Greece followed a strategy of prolonging the talks and their position seemed to be a return to the status quo of the 1960 Constitution by removing Turkish Armed Forces from the island rather than reaching a federative conclusion.²²¹ When the talks came to a deadlock, Turkey, on August 14th, launched the

nies of the political figures of the time, see Vassilis K. Fouskas, "Uncomfortable Questions: Cyprus, October 1973-August 1974", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2005): 49-58.

220 Article 4 of Guarantee Agreement says: "In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty". However it was clearly not mentioned as military action, when the state of affairs is broken the right to re-establish it to the guarantor powers was entitled with a general statement of 'taking action'. It was interpreted by Turkish foreign affairs bureaucracy as military action being included, too, in the interpretation of the article and Turkey's military intervention was based on this.

221 Füsün Türkmen, "Cyprus 1974 Revisited: Was It Humanitarian Intervention?", *Perceptions*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2005): 82-83.

second phase of the operation, which eventually resulted in the control of 37% of northern Cyprus lands. The line, named the Attila Line, was drawn between Famagusta and Lefka, which comprises the current geographical status in Cyprus.

The results of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus have long been discussed since it happened in 1974. Although there were crucial consequences of the intervention within the dynamics of the international political environment of the time, the outcomes of the Turkish intervention, which allocated the Cyprus territories between the Turks and Greeks, were much more devastating for the Greek Cypriots. First of all, the most important result of Turkey's intervention was the creation of the historical trauma whose effects felt in Greece even today in a profound way. It is possible to see the first signs of this trauma in the Greek press at that time. In the first instant, the news has been made on Greek Cypriots' heroic resistance against "Turkish invasion" and that they shot many Turkish jetfighters.²²² There are even reports of the stopping of "invader" Turkish troops, accompanied by cartoons containing humiliating expressions.²²³ There are frequent reports that the Greek Cypriot troops dominated the situation and that the "invader Turks" got stuck.²²⁴ There is an impression that the change on the island is not accepted by the Greek side and even it is possible to see the news that Greece will respond to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and the Junta government would attack Turkey from Thrace.²²⁵

However, after the overthrow of the junta in Athens, when the dimensions of the Turkish intervention were understood and especially when the northern part of the island was taken under Turkish control after the second Turkish operation, the short-term heroic stories turned into an accusing discourse. At this point, it is seen that foreign powers such as

222 *To Vima*, 21 July 1974.

223 *Apogevmatini*, 22 July 1974.

224 *Makedonia*, 22 July 1974.

225 *Thessaloniki*, 22 July 1974.

the USA are blamed for the disaster and division in Cyprus.²²⁶ When it is understood that the Greek Cypriots cannot stand against the Turkish intervention and the northern parts of Cyprus have been lost, NATO is blamed, the news that NATO remains inactive against “Turkish aggression”²²⁷ and that Greece withdraws from NATO’s military wing prevails.²²⁸ In brief, after a while, confrontation of Greek politics and society with the new reality in Cyprus turned into a continuous traumatic political psychology on a massive scale in which the events of 1974 is described as “all hell breaking loose”.²²⁹

Secondly, the Turkish intervention confirmed the de facto partition of the island since 1963.²³⁰ The constitutional crisis of 1963 resulted in the political separation of the two communities and EOKA’s attacks on the Turks since Christmas 1963 isolated the Turkish community from social and political life on the island. Although the talks had been held between 1968-1974, they did not open a path for a possible agreement on ending the conflict on the island. Definitely, both the Greek and Turkish communities were isolated from each other, and worse, the isolation of the Turkish community turned into a struggle for survival against EOKA violence. Turkey’s intervention made this de facto partition a reality of life in the island in a territorial sense.²³¹

Thirdly, Turkey’s intervention brought the vision of Cyprus-Greece unification, which is historically called Enosis, to an absolute end. Despite

226 *Athinaiki*, 15 August 1974.

227 *To Vima*, 15 August 1974.

228 *Ta Nea*, 14 August 1974.

229 Vamık Volkan, “Trauma, Identity and Search for a Solution in Cyprus”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Turkey and the EU: Still Committed? A New Cold War in the Caucasus Cyprus: Solution or Separation (Fall 2008): 96.

230 Makarios himself accepted de facto partition of the Cyprus island. In his speech to Greek people in the Syntagma Square in Athens on 29 November 1974, he stated that the solution of the Cyprus problem can provide self-government to the Turkish Cypriots. Tasos Chatzianastasiou, *Kypros kai Metapolitefsi* (Athens: Enallaktikes Ekdoseis, 2004): 56.

231 Vamık D. Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, *Türkler ve Yunanlılar Çatışan Komşular*, transl. Banu Büyükkal, (Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 2002): 182.

the wide gap between the vision and the possibility, the Greek Cypriot political leadership and to some extent, the Greek political elites in Athens always continued to believe that the unification of Cyprus and Greece, Enosis, under a single political entity would be realized one day. British efforts to internationalize the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s by involving Turkey in the Cyprus issue and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 was a blow to Enosis, but Turkey's intervention in 1974 was the final knockout punch for Enosis.²³²

Lastly, and most importantly, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus changed the essence of Turkish-Greek relations. Despite many problematic issues in the relations, Turkey and Greece had somehow maintained their coherent positions in the Western Alliance since the end of the Second World War. However, in fact Turkey's action in Cyprus was a concrete reaction not only against the Greek Cypriot hegemony on the island, but also against Greece's irredentist visions in the Mediterranean basin. Greek policy makers, most probably, did not imagine Turkey's military reaction against Greek political designs on the Mediterranean through the Cyprus conflict. The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus meant a total political and military loss for Greece and that feeling of loss created an interminable sensitiveness in Greek foreign policy makers against Turkey through Cyprus. From 1974 onwards, Greek foreign policy towards Turkey was characterized by this sensitiveness of the loss in Cyprus, which was mainly enclosed by a nationalist narrative.²³³

232 Walker is meaningfully identifying the end of Enosis by taking a Greek village and its people's struggle with other Greek forces in Cyprus as a case study. Anita M. Walker, "Enosis in Cyprus: Dhali, a Case Study", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1984): 486-487, 489.

233 After Turkey's intervention to Cyprus, beginning with the Karamanlis government, the discourse on "Turkish aggression" has considerably increased in Greece, and the discussions that Greek army needs to be strengthened against Turkey has become one of the most hotly debated topics. Kamuran Gürün, *Bükreş-Paris-Atina Büyükelçilik Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994): 362-363.

§ 3.4 History of the Aegean Dispute as a Greco-Turkish Conflict

The basin of the Aegean Islands has always been of strategic importance historically as a geopolitical maritime landscape in terms of economic activities and political rivalry since the ancient times. Despite this ancient strategic importance in the struggle between different hegemonic powers throughout the history, the dispute over the Aegean Islands from the perspective of international politics and law is a modern phenomenon which appeared at the beginning of the 20th century.

The last decades of the Ottoman Empire signified territorial disputes with geographically expanding Balkan nations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which resulted in endless territorial loss for the Ottoman State, accompanied by the everlasting expansion of her successors, the Balkan states. Greece is considered to be the leading expanding Ottoman successor in the European lands of the decadent empire in the contentious environment of international politics of the 19th century. After Greek independence in 1829, the new Greek nation state categorically followed a territorial expansionist policy against the Ottoman Empire, as the Greek nation, identified and promoted by the Megali Idea, was constructed on a notionally defined geographic area based on where the Hellenic people lived. That notional geographic area comprised an extensive region from the Peloponnese and Ionian Islands to the southern shores of Western Anatolia and included the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean.²³⁴

However, the dream of unifying all the lands where the Hellenic people live under the Greek nation state has always collided with the realistic dynamics of international relations. The territorial expansionism in accordance with the Greek nation state's imagined territory in the Megali

234 Procopis Papastratis explains the geographical framework of the Megali idea as an extensive territory from the Ionian Sea to Cyprus including Epirus, Albania, Macedonia, Constantinople, Western Anatolia, Cilicia and Cyprus. See Procopis Papastratis, "Megali Idea and Mare Nostrum Aspects of Greek and Italian Nationalism" in *L'Europe méditerranéenne Mediterranean Europe*, ed. Marta Petricoli, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008): 77.

Idea could have only been realized with the political support and consent of the hegemonic powers of international politics. In other words, Greek expansionism is the story of a successful combination of Greece's territorial imagination and the hegemonic powers' geopolitical interests, which has been politically and militarily practiced throughout a period of more than a century from 1829 to 1947. After the establishment of the modern Greek nation state as the Kingdom of Greece in 1832, the first territorial expansion occurred in 1864, when Britain ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. The second territorial expansion took place after the huge territorial losses by the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Although Greece did not take part in the war, Britain supported Greek claims on Thessaly and Epirus for the agenda of the Berlin Conference in 1878 and opened a path for a debate on the Ottoman-Greek border in these regions. The long negotiations and pressures of Britain, which continued even after the Berlin Conference, resulted in the finalization of a new Greco-Ottoman border in Thessaly with the Convention of İstanbul signed in May 1881. With this Convention, most of Thessaly and the areas around Arta were incorporated into Greece.²³⁵

The expansion of 1881 into Thessaly played a stimulating role in Greece's motivation for annexation of the Ottoman areas where Hellenic people lived as a majority and during the Crete crisis in 1896, the Greek government envisaged expanding the annexation policy to the islands of the Mediterranean. Although the Crete crisis ended in disappointment for Greek policy makers and resulted in a military loss in the following war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897, it was a turning point in terms of increasing the motivation of the Greek political elite for the realization of territorial expansion towards the Mediterranean islands. Crete could not

235 For a discussion of diplomatic attempts towards Greek claims at the Berlin Conference of 1878 from the Greek point of view and Greece's territorial expansion after the Berlin Conference until 1881, see Evaggelos Kofos, "To Ellinovoulgariko Zitima" *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous Neoteros Ellinismos apo to 1833 os to 1881 Tomos II*, ed. Andreas Mpagias, (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1977): 343-365.

be incorporated into the Greek nation state in 1897, but the strong sentiment of the Greek public regarding Crete left a legacy of belief in the possibility of annexing it to the Greek governments of the early 20th century, especially when the Prince of Greece was appointed as high commissioner to Crete, with responsibilities including establishing an autonomous government, creating a military force, administering justice issues and granting the right to conclude conventions related with the island.²³⁶

Another result of the 1897 defeat for Greece was the increasing awareness about the navy's role for possible expansion to Crete and the Aegean Islands. During the uprising in Crete in 1896, despite the strong appeals of the Cretan insurgents, the Greek government could not provide enough military power to Crete because of the poor and disorganized state of the navy.²³⁷ Following the war of 1897, Greek policy makers attached much greater importance to the development and modernization of the Greek navy, as they understood the necessity of having a stronger navy in order to achieve territorial expansion to the islands in the Aegean Sea.

Although there were disagreements related to developing the naval forces in the domestic political arena, those policy makers who argued that the Greek navy was to be designed and developed as an armed force which could provide a Greek dominance on the Aegean Sea, emerged victorious from these discussions. In addition to this, as Fotakis points out, Greece's geographical situation forced decision makers to concentrate on establishing a new and modernized navy in the Aegean Sea to both defend Greek territories from a possible Turkish attack and to maintain the historical Greek expansionism towards Ottoman Turkey.²³⁸

The mountainous geography of Greece, including its islands and peninsulas and the very poor road and railway network on the mainland,

236 Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012): 222-223.

237 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics" in *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006): 87.

238 Zisis Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919* (London: Routledge, 2005): 3.

made policy makers understand that the seaborne mobilization of the Greek army was the more effective form of military mobilization for possible warfare in the near future. More importantly, in accordance with the Megali Idea's aims, the islands of the Aegean Sea, most of which were under Ottoman rule at that time and the Western coast of the Anatolian Peninsula had always been a principal Greek war objective. The occupation of those islands and the Anatolian coast could not be achieved without the strong support of a naval fleet which had modern maritime warfare capabilities.²³⁹

Consequently, a navy revolution was realized in Greece from 1897 until the First Balkan War in 1912. The Greek government bought a new 10 thousand-ton warship and 8 new destroyers in the upcoming years. Besides, a new dreadnought, which was named as *Averof* after the famous Greek businessman of the time, Georgios Averoff, was bought from Italy with his financial support. Before the outbreak of the First Balkan War in October 1912, the Greek navy reached a superior position against Ottoman sea power in the Aegean Sea. As the navy provided military superiority to Greece, the Greek government was almost ready to invade some of the Aegean Islands when the Balkan Wars commenced.²⁴⁰

3.4.1 *The Balkan Wars*

The Aegean Islands are traditionally subdivided into four main groups, from north to south: the North Aegean islands, the Northern Sporades, the Cyclades, and the Southern Sporades or Dodecanese, as they are commonly known. There was a relatively structured balance between the Ottoman Empire and Greece in the Aegean Sea before the conflict years of the early 20th century began and the territorial distribution of the islands of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Ottoman Turkey provided a kind

239 Ibid. 16-17.

240 Demetrius John Cassavetti, *Hellas and the Balkan Wars* (London: Adelphi Terrace, 1914): 29-32.

of balance of power. While the Eastern Aegean islands remained under Ottoman rule, the other islands were incorporated into territories of the Greek nation state.²⁴¹

Before the Balkan Wars, the islands of the South Sporades or Dodecanese islands were invaded by Italy during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. Italy invaded the Dodecanese islands, which are composed of 15 larger islands on the south-western shores of the Anatolian peninsula, to force the Ottoman Empire into a settlement during the ongoing war in Libya. Although the Ottoman State objected to the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese islands, when the Balkan War started in October 1912, it had to accept the Italian invasion as a temporary act with the Treaty of Ouchy.²⁴² The Italian invasion of the Dodecanese was regarded as an opportunity for possible autonomy of these islands by Greece and the Greek government asked the Great Powers if the Italian invasion was permanent. When Britain and the other Great Powers gave a guarantee of preventing the islands from falling under permanent Italian rule, the uncertain political situation was regarded as part of a strategy for possible future Greek expansion to the Dodecanese. In other words, Greece accepted the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese, as it was better to leave them under Italian rule with autonomy instead of returning them to Ottoman rule.²⁴³

241 John Papadimas, "The Dodecanese and the Aegean Issue: Historical Background" in *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, eds. Aldo Chircop, Andre Gerolymatos and John O. Iatrides, (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000): 8.

242 The Treaty of Ouchy was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Italy on October 18, 1912, just ten days after the First Balkan War started, in the Ouchy District of Lausanne, Switzerland. The Ottoman Empire and Italy agreed on ceding the Dodecanese islands back to Ottoman rule in return for the withdrawal of all Ottoman military units in Libya. Although all Ottoman troops and officers were withdrawn from Libya, Italy did not retreat from the Dodecanese islands.

243 For a comprehensive evaluation of Greek strategy on the Dodecanese islands in the summer of 1912, see Athena Macris De Fabo, "The Aegean Island Question and Greece: A Diplomatic History 1911-1914", (PhD Dissertation, The George Washington University, 1981): 29-37.

The Italian invasion of the Dodecanese islands actually revealed the desperate situation of the Ottoman Navy, which encouraged Greece to plan for a military move to the other islands in the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman Navy could not protect the islands against Italian invasion and could not even show any counter-resistance to keep those strategic pieces of land in the South Aegean which were located in a critical position for the military protection of the Anatolian mainland.²⁴⁴ Thus, soon after the outbreak of the First Balkan War on October 8, 1912, Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 18, 1912, and the Greek Navy did not wait to begin the invasion of the North Aegean islands.

There were three major components of the political motivation of the Greek government in 1912 to annex the Aegean Islands into the Greek nation state; one was notional, while the other two were tangible. First of all, the idealization of the Megali Idea included the pieces of land in the Aegean Sea which were populated by Greek-speaking Hellenic people as a majority. The Megali Idea, which gave a rise to the increase of Hellenic nationalism among the Greek-speaking people of the Ottoman Empire, envisaged the Aegean Sea as an inner sea between mainland Greece and the historically notional Hellenic lands of Western Anatolia.²⁴⁵ Thus, the annexation of those lands where the Greek-speaking population lived in larger numbers became a policy tool for Greek policy makers in the early 20th century towards irredentism. More briefly and explicitly, the Greek governmental authorities considered the territorial expansion through Ottoman lands where Hellenes lived as a natural consequence, as the conceptualization of the Megali Idea provided a kind of legitimate ground for nation state-building in Greece after the 1840s.²⁴⁶

244 Hazal Papuççular, *Türkiye ve Oniki Ada 1912-1947* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019): 12-13.

245 Aristotle A. Kallis, "To Expand or Not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and the Quest for an 'Ideal Fatherland'", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 2003): 256.

246 Erik Goldstein, "Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1989): 345-346.

Secondly, when the militarily poor situation of the Ottoman Navy became clear after the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese islands was completed in a short period of time with a quick military success, Greece's anxiety about going to war with the Ottoman Empire after the loss in the 1897 war almost disappeared.²⁴⁷

Thirdly, the race between Greece and the Ottoman Empire to develop and modernize the navy was evidently won by Greece during the first decade of the 20th century. The Ottoman Navy was comprised of old battleships and destroyers, while the Greek Navy was equipped with new battleships and the dreadnought *Averof*. Besides, almost all the sea vessels in the Ottoman Navy needed maintenance and repair. Because of this, the Ottoman Navy could not move from its operation bases while the Italian Navy was invading the Dodecanese islands in May 1912. Greek military experts correctly observed that weak position of the Ottoman Navy in relation to the Greek Navy in the Aegean Sea and they decided to move towards the North Aegean islands soon after the First Balkan War started in October 1912.²⁴⁸

The Greek Navy invaded the island of Lemnos first on 21-22 October 1912. The operations of the Greek Navy in the North Aegean campaign at the beginning of the First Balkan War were centered on Lemnos because the island provided an important base for Greek naval vessels against the Ottoman Navy. Moreover, Lemnos was in a strategic position to control the Dardanelles Strait, where the Ottoman Navy could move against the Greek campaign in the North Aegean islands. The port of Moudros on the island became an operation base for the naval campaign.²⁴⁹

Soon after the invasion of Lemnos, on 31st October, the islands of Imbros, Thasos and Agios Efstratios were invaded without any resistance

247 A Greek diplomat of the time, Demetrius Caclamanos, narrates his own memoirs about the discussions among high-level Greek naval officers before going to war. See, Demetrius Caclamanos, "Reminiscences of the Balkan Wars", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 16, No. 46 (July 1937): 116-117.

248 Ibid. 118.

249 T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Balkan Harbi VII nci Cilt Osmanlı Deniz Harekatı 1912-1913* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993): 77-78.

from the Ottoman garrisons with few military staff. Then, Samothrace on 1st November, Tenedos on 3rd November and Icaria on 17th November were invaded by the Greek Navy. After these fast occupations without any resistance from the Ottoman military units, the Greek fleet targeted the big islands of the North Aegean. Greek troops landed on the island of Lesbos on 21st November, although Ottoman troops on the island resisted until 20th December, when the island came under the control of the Greek troops. On 24th November, Greek soldiers landed on the island of Chios and came up with resistance there, too. However, Ottoman resistance in Chios was not strong enough to restrain the invaders and without any military support from the Ottoman Navy, the garrison in Chios could only resist until 3rd January 1913, when it surrendered.²⁵⁰

The last phase of the Greek campaign in the Aegean was the annexation of the island of Samos, which had had an autonomous status since 1821, although the island was not a part of the North Aegean island group.²⁵¹ An uprising began in Samos in September 1912 with demands for unification with Greece. However, the Greek government could not become involved in the situation on Samos because of the political balance with the Great Powers after the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese. Nevertheless, the uprising in Samos continued and the Ottoman authorities could not quell the riot and the assembly in Samos, which was composed of local Greek islanders, adopted the decision to unify with Greece on 24th November. Greece did not recognize that decision until March

250 Şerafettin Turan, "Geçmişten Günümüze Ege Adaları Sorunu, Boyutlar, Taraflar" in *Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler, Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (20 Temmuz 1974'e Kadar)*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1986): 48.

251 Samos was given autonomy during the Greek uprising for independence against the Ottoman Empire that started in 1821. The people of Samos joined in the uprising and a government with a constitution was set up to administer the island in May 1821. However, Samos' political and administrative situation remained uncertain. None of the North Aegean and Dodecanese islands were incorporated into the Greek nation state after the Greek War of Independence due to pressure by the Great Powers and Samos was declared an autonomous and semi-independent tributary state of the Ottoman Empire in 1834.

1913 due to the ongoing war with the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. The Greek government accepted the decision of the Samos Assembly on 15th March, 1913 and Greek troops landed on the island of Samos on the same day.²⁵² Thus, the invasion of the North Aegean islands was completed in March 1913 and all the islands in the northern basin of the Aegean Sea, except some very small uninhabited islets on the Anatolian shore, were taken under Greek rule. In fact, the Greek military campaign on the North Aegean islands lasted only two months, from mid-October to mid-December 1912 and the Ottoman Navy could not make any counter move against the Greek invasion of the North Aegean Islands. The invasion of those islands by Greece was a total loss for the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War, while it was the first concrete military achievement for Greece against the Ottoman State since her independence.

The Greek expansion into the North Aegean islands can be evaluated from two perspectives: One can argue that the invasion of those islands was a strategic decision under the ongoing war conditions of late 1912 in order to gain a military advantage against the Ottoman Empire. This can only be true if the historical dynamics of the Greco-Turkish conflict are considered in a military sense. However, Greek conceptualization of territoriality of the nation state was strongly based on ethnic deployment of Hellenic people who were in the majority outside Greek national territories in 1912, especially in the Ottoman territories which also included the Aegean Islands.²⁵³ For this reason, the Greek invasion of the North Aegean islands in October-December 1912 was both an expansion with an

252 Athena Macris De Fabo, "The Aegean Island Question and Greece: A Diplomatic History 1911-1914", 48.

253 Cassavetti is explaining the main reason of the Greek expansion towards the Aegean very clearly in his classical book on Greece's strategies in the Balkan Wars: "There are two great causes which have brought about this persistent struggle for freedom on the part of the Greeks; one is their own strong spirit and desire for liberty which has never been crushed, and the second is the incapacity of the Turks to govern them. The second cause has helped very greatly to keep the first always at work. ... It is possible that the spirit of the Greeks living in European Turkey and on the Asiatic shores of the Aegean

ethnic motivation for gathering Greek-speaking people under the rule of the Greek nation state, as envisaged in the Megali Idea, and a military strategy to gain superiority against the enemy.

When the St. James Conference began on 16 December 1912 in London with the initiative of British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, the Greek invasion of the North Aegean islands was one of the most difficult topics for discussion between the Greek and Turkish delegations and the British Foreign Minister. Greece's claim at the conference definitely conformed with the definition of nation state based on the Megali Idea's nationalist and irredentist conceptualization of including all Greek-speaking people inside the borders of modern Greece. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos confirmed that approach of the Greek government at the conference and established Greece's claims to the annexation of the North Aegean islands with an ethnic assertion. Venizelos demanded that the Ottoman State leave the North Aegean islands occupied by Greece, as well as the island of Crete and the Thrace region, to the sovereignty of the Greek state, because the majority of the population of those islands were ethnic Hellenes.²⁵⁴

During that conference in London, the Balkan states negotiated the peace conditions with the Ottoman Empire under the auspices of the Great Powers. The significance of the conference in London, which was related with the Aegean Islands, was the Greek delegation's persistent diplomatic attempts to make the Great Powers accept the sovereignty of Greece over the North Aegean islands. The Ottoman delegation at the conference had not accepted Greek claims to the North Aegean islands before and this caused Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to enter into more active diplomatic attempts to guarantee Greece's presence

might have been curbed for many years to come, because their enterprising nature enabled them to obtain such advantages through their association with foreign countries that from the material point of view it was to their interest to restrain their patriotic desire to become subjects of the Kingdom of Greece". Demetrius John Cassavetti, *Hellas and the Balkan Wars*, 4.

254 William Peter Kaldis, "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (June 1979): D1122.

on those occupied islands. It is understood from the confidential letter from Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, to Fairfax Leighton Cartwright, British Ambassador in Vienna, that Greek attempts towards the Russian Ambassador in London were more than enough to convince the Russians to accept Greek sovereignty over the islands. At the meeting of the Great Powers' ambassadors, the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, offered to make the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Lemnos neutral, in return leaving all other occupied North Aegean islands to the rule of Greece.²⁵⁵ The conference ended with no agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Balkan states, and the war continued until the spring of 1913. However, the Greek occupation of the North Aegean islands continued and a de facto Greek rule was created on those islands as the first step for their incorporation into the Greek nation state in the near future.

The main reason lying behind the disagreement on the situation of the Aegean Islands was divergence of opinions between the Great Powers. While Britain, France and Russia favored the Greek claims to the islands, on the other hand, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy feared Greek expansion in the Aegean Sea which was subordinated by Britain, France and Russia, to the detriment of Italian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans. Thus, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy supported the Turkish claims to the islands. The Great Powers did not wish to clash because of that issue, and the problem of the Aegean Islands remained unsolved at the St. James Conference which was held between December 1912-January 1913. However, the diplomatic attempts of Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and the discussions on Greek occupation of the North Aegean islands among the Great Powers brought the Aegean dispute to the top of the international agenda in the pre-First World War period. This situation gave positive hope to Greece for future diplomatic efforts to annex those islands and all the succeeding Greek

255 For the original text of the letter, see, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. IX The Balkan Wars, Part II The League and Turkey* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1934): 334-335.

governments in the 1910s made strong and sometimes successful efforts to keep the issue as a hot topic in the international agenda.²⁵⁶

More importantly, Greece's territorial extension to the islands which are located before the entrance to the Dardanelles Strait gave rise to an endless geopolitical conflict between Greece and Turkey. While Greece was expanding to the north-eastern parts of the Aegean Sea with the claims of ethnic unification under the Greek nation state, this expansion had at the same time been oriented to the sovereign Turkish lands of Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia and its integral parts on the Aegean Sea. In other words, Greek expansion to those pieces of land on the Aegean Sea where Hellenic people lived meant a containment of Turkey by Greece, as well as Turkish geographical regression for the benefit of Greece which resulted in establishment of Greek zones of influence over that geography.²⁵⁷ This was something unacceptable for the Ottoman political authorities of the time and for Turkey, the successor of the Ottoman State after the dissolution. More precisely, when Greece invaded the North Aegean islands in 1912, Greek decision makers did not know that while they were celebrating taking the islands of the Aegean Sea into Greek territories as their Megali Idea promised, they had lit the fuse of a conflict which would last even until today.

Greek expansion with irredentist motivation under the effect of Hellenic nationalism emerged as a core element of the Megali Idea vision and directly targeted Turkish geographical presence on the Aegean Sea and Western Anatolia. The First Balkan War and upcoming warfare years until the late 1910s provided a golden opportunity for the Greek governments to include Hellenes of the Aegean Islands into the Greek nation state. More precisely, the war environment of the 1910s, which resulted in the political dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, opened up a very large

256 Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement" in *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006): 146.

257 Erol Kalkan, "The Longstanding Dispute between Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Issue", *International Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies*, No. 28 (2020): 168.

path for Greek policy makers to extend the borders of the Greek nation state towards those islands where Greek-speaking people were in the majority.²⁵⁸

For the purpose of taking the North Aegean islands under the control of the Greek armed forces and keeping them under Greek authority for future annexation, Greek diplomacy during the First Balkan War tried to gain international support among the Great Powers, who were all involved in the issue. Relevantly, the close interest of the Great Powers in the Aegean Islands issue during the London Conference of December 1912-January 1913 also encouraged Greek politicians, especially Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, to look for international support for Greek irredentist policies towards the Aegean instead of direct discussion with Turkey. In other words, Greek diplomats knew that Greece could annex the North Aegean islands if they could obtain the political consent of the maritime powers, Britain and France.²⁵⁹

The Greek government's total strategy consisted of two sub-strategies to obtain political support, especially from the Allied Powers, Britain, France and Russia: Firstly, an effective propaganda network had to be set up in order to draw the attention of the public in these countries. Secondly, the diplomacy which would accompany this mass propaganda would be pursued by the diplomatic authorities with the increasing popularity of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos among the European public. The propaganda machine was run by an international press office in Athens headed by famous Greek economist Andreas Andreadis, who was also a well-known propagandist. The international press office in Athens created a significant awareness in Western Europe about Greece's alleged

258 For instance, as Hall argues, Greek desire to keep the islands under the authority of the Greek nation state made a post-war arrangement impossible and Greece's enjoyment of stunning victories in the Balkan Wars renewed Greek efforts to achieve national goals in Anatolia. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000): 140.

259 Stephen P. Duggan, "Balkan Diplomacy II", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1917): 234.

rights to the territories of the Ottoman Empire where Greek-speaking people lived, including the Aegean Islands. That first international press office of Greece also formed a strong public opinion in Paris and London in favor of Greece's expansionist moves towards Ottoman territories.²⁶⁰ Moreover, Eleftherios Venizelos himself was a part of that propaganda strategy. He published a letter in the national newspapers in France and Britain claiming the rights of Greece to the Aegean Islands. Venizelos' letter targeted the public in those countries by promoting the principle of nationality for Greece's occupation of the North Aegean islands and he claimed that those islands should have been under the rule of Greece, as the majority of the population was made up of ethnic Hellenes.²⁶¹ Thus, with the awareness raised through the French and British public, the Greek diplomatic delegation could attract the attention of the Allied Powers to the North Aegean islands and could obtain open support for the occupation of those islands during the First and Second Balkan Wars.

Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and Greek diplomats followed a simple but stubborn diplomacy in the capitals of Britain, France and Russia and they were able to obtain at least implicit support from those three Great Powers for continuity of de facto Greek control of the North Aegean islands. For instance, despite the uncertain position of Russia during the London Conference at St. James Palace, by the end of negotiations in January 1913, the Greek government had already received the support of Russia regarding the occupation of the North Aegean islands. The Tsar's government clearly declared their position of favoring Greek presence on the islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles Strait, instead of any other foreign navy which could threaten Russian political interests in the Turkish Straits. Furthermore, the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, declared his government's support for Greek authority over the North Aegean islands to John Gennadios, Greek Ambassador in London, in early April 1913. At the same time, the French Foreign Minister,

260 For a discussion on Greek propaganda during the Balkan Wars, see Dimitri Kitsikis, *Yunan Propagandası*, transl. Hakkı Devrim, (İstanbul: Meydan Neşriyat, 1963): 84-85.

261 For the response of the Ottoman authorities to Venizelos' letter, see Necdet Hayta, *Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze* (Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi, 2006): 150-151.

Stephan Pichon, gave a similar guarantee in words for Greece's control over those islands to Athos Romanos, Greek Ambassador in Paris. In addition, Britain also became a silent supporter of Greece for the expansion to the islands of the Aegean Sea. Although he did not mention it in front of the international public, the British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, privately assured the Greek government with regard to maintaining its presence on the North Aegean islands.²⁶²

The Greek Ambassador in London, John Gennadios, was very much influential on British foreign policy makers during the First Balkan War, by attracting their attention to the alleged rights of Greece to the Aegean Islands emerging from the existence of Greek people living there. As John Kittmer argues: "*Gennadius' career in London coincided with a time when Greece's hopes as an expanding nation depended on British imperial policy and British good will. Educated in a protestant grammar-school in Malta, well trained in the English language and British history, Gennadius had sure instincts for the alignment of British and Greek interests. He once said, perhaps with a touch of exaggeration, that 'one glance at the map and at history suffices to convince everyone that England is Hellenism's only natural ally'. ... The London Peace Conference of 1912 to 1913 was a particular stimulus for pro-Hellenic sentiment in London. In 1913, the Anglo-Hellenic League was set up to defend the 'just claims and honor of Greece', to 'remove misunderstandings between the British and Hellenic races' and to 'improve the social, educational, commercial and political relations of Greece and Britain'.*"²⁶³

By the end of the First Balkan War in the spring of 1913, Greek diplomacy in London had already gained strong British support for Greece's

262 For further details about Greek diplomatic attempts towards the ambassadors of the Great Powers at the London Conference, see William Peter Kaldis, "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914", D1124-D1127.

263 John Kittmer, "Gennadius, the Koraes Chair and the state of Modern Greek in Britain", Accessed on December 26, 2019, doi: <https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/johnkittmer/2016/02/03/gennadius-the-koraes-chair-and-the-state-of-modern-greek-in-britain/>

political and military presence on the North Aegean islands. More interestingly, even Germany had followed a change of strategy towards Greek occupation of the North Aegean islands. During the ambassadors' meetings on the Balkan disputes in London in May 1913, Germany's position evolved from the support of the status quo on the islands under Ottoman rule to the acceptance of Greece's authority over those islands. As Germany's involvement and interest on the Aegean Islands were much less significant than those of the other Central Powers, German diplomacy most probably did not wish to enter into an armed conflict with the Allied Powers because of Greek claims to the Aegean Islands. As British Foreign Minister Edward Grey mentioned in another confidential letter to the British Ambassador in Vienna, Fairfax Leighton Cartwright, the German Ambassador in London had reflected his government's opinions about the disputes over the Aegean Islands and declared that sovereignty of all the islands, except Imbros and Tenedos on the North Aegean Sea, which were already occupied by Greek naval forces, might be transferred to Greece.²⁶⁴ Despite some objections of Austria-Hungary and Italy, it should be underlined that Greek diplomacy from the beginning of the negotiations in London in December 1912 until the end of the First Balkan War in May 1913 succeeded in constructing a legitimacy among the Great Powers of Britain, France, Russia and Germany for the occupation of the North Aegean islands by Greece.

However, Venizelos sensibly did not insist on recognition of these occupied islands as Greek territory because of the sensitive and fragile balance between the Great Powers. As all the Great Powers had different interests in the Aegean Sea, despite Greek diplomacy's achievement in obtaining support for the ongoing de facto Greek rule on these islands of North Aegean, that achievement could at any time be broken by any disagreement among the Great Powers. Mainly because of this, Venizelos stopped at the moment when he had to and left the final decision about the legal status of the Aegean Islands to the Great Powers, by following a

264 G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. IX The Balkan Wars, Part II The League and Turkey*, 825.

moderate and friendly attitude of neutrality towards Britain and France in the environment of the impending great war among the Great Powers.²⁶⁵ This was because, once diplomatic support for Greece's claims to the islands had been gained from Britain, France, Russia and Germany, from that moment on it made much more sense to wait for a consensus among those powers for official recognition of the islands as Greek territory. Briefly, Greek diplomacy preferred to wait for the Great Powers to agree on official international recognition of the islands' status in favor of Greece, instead of threatening the balance among them with a precipitous diplomatic attack. Thus, the final decision on the status of all Aegean Islands, except Crete, was left to the Great Powers to make with Article 5 of the Treaty of London, which was signed by the Balkan states and Ottoman Empire on 30 May 1913.²⁶⁶

When the Balkan Wars ended in August 1913, the main islands and many of the small islets of the North Aegean Sea were no longer under Turkish rule. For the first time since the independence of Greece, the Megali Idea achieved a concrete military success in terms of territorial extension in the Aegean Sea, from Thassos in the north to Samos and the group of small islands in the south.²⁶⁷ However, neither the Treaty of London signed after the First Balkan War, nor the Treaty of Bucharest that concluded the Second Balkan War on 10 August 1913 provided a certain *de jure* solution for the status of the Aegean Islands. Greek occupation on the islands continued after the Balkan Wars as a result of the implied consent of the Great Powers.

Besides, the Ottoman Empire did not develop any counter move to take the Aegean Islands back from Greece and that apparent weakness of the Ottoman State to make any claim on the Aegean Islands inclined the

265 William James Battle, "Greece at the Peace Table", *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (October 1920): 8.

266 For further details about the articles of the Treaty of London in May 1913, see R.B. Mowat, *Select Treaties and Documents to Illustrate the Development of the Modern European States System 1815-1916* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916): 120-121.

267 W.L.G. Joerg, "The New Boundaries of the Balkan States and Their Significance", *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, Vol. 45, No. 11 (1913): 821-822.

Greek government to develop a territorial appropriation strategy which would lead to official annexation in the long term. Except for some of the rumors about possible Ottoman preparations for an operation to the islands in autumn 1913, Greece did not face any harsh response from the Ottoman State against the Greek expansion into the North Aegean. Although those speculations suggested that an Ottoman naval force had been gathered at İzmir for an attack on the Aegean Islands, in fact, there were no such preparations on the Ottoman side.²⁶⁸

Greece's military occupation of the islands was still on a knife edge because of the susceptible relations in between the Great Powers and between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Greece's diplomatic attempts towards Britain were increased to enforce the Great Powers into taking a decision about the status of those occupied islands in favor of Greece. As it was understood from the official writings, the Greek government, in December 1913, put strong pressure on British Foreign Minister Edward Grey to conclude their decision on the Aegean Islands, as Turkey would take advantage of the delay in the Great Powers' decision to engage in intrigue concerning those islands. Moreover, the Greek Prime Minister asked the British Prime Minister to declare their official decision on the islands to the international public as soon as possible in order to designate the de jure status of the islands as Greek territorial integrity.²⁶⁹

Consequently, the Great Powers notified Greece and Turkey about their decision on the future of the North Aegean islands with a common note in February 1914 and declared the annexation of the North Aegean islands by Greece, except Imbros and Tenedos. In the note, it was stated

268 Hüsni Özlü, "Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Balkan Savaşları'nda Ege Adaları'nın İşgali Süreci", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi/Journal Of Modern Turkish History Studies*, XII/25 (2012-Güz/Autumn): 12-13.

269 See the telegram from Francis Bertie, British Ambassador to France in February 1914, to the British Foreign Minister Edward Grey, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. X Part I The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1936): 226-227.

that the Greek government authorized the representatives of the governments of the Great Powers to make the decision about the legal status of the North Aegean islands in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of London signed on 30 May 1913 and Article 15 of the Treaty of Athens signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire on 14 November 1913.²⁷⁰

The Great Powers' decision on the situation of the Aegean Islands was made out clearly in favor of Greece and all North Aegean islands which were occupied by Greek naval forces during the Balkan Wars, except Imbros and Tenedos, as well as the tiny island of Kastellorizo in the Dodecanese, were ceded to Greece. However, some conditions were placed on Greece's legitimacy regarding the islands. Greece was not allowed to fortify the islands, nor could it use them for naval and military forces. Smuggling traffic between Anatolian lands and the islands was to be assessed by the Greek government, and Greek authorities on those islands were charged with the protection of basic rights of Turks living there. Besides, as it is understood from the letter of Sir Louis du Pan Mallet, British Ambassador in İstanbul to Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, the Great Powers allayed the Ottoman government's security concerns, assuring them that they would use their influence on Greece to make sure those conditions were fulfilled by Greece. The North Aegean islands were to be left to Greece after the Greek armed forces withdrew from Albanian lands.²⁷¹ Greece fulfilled most of the conditions, except demilitarization of some islands. The Greek government refused to withdraw troops from Chios, Lesbos, Psara, Lemnos and Samothrace by claiming that those islands were necessary for defense against a possible Turkish attack, which

270 In the Treaty of Athens, the status of the North Aegean islands remained unsolved. Both Greece and the Ottoman Empire agreed on leaving the issue to the arbitration of the Great Powers with Article 15 of the agreement. Article 15 confirmed Article 5 of the Treaty of London, which stipulated that both states assumed to endorse the provisions of the Treaty of London related with the Aegean Islands. For further details see, Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece The Aegean Disputes A Unique Case in International Law*, (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004): 834-835.

271 G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. X Part I The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War*, 281-282.

would target Greece from Anatolia, and asked for more guarantees from the Great Powers to prevent any possible military aggression by Turkey.²⁷²

The Ottoman State had objected to the decision and argued against the mediation of the Great Powers, as it favored Greece with an unlawful act. However, this political decision was due to two main reasons: First, effective Greek diplomacy through British, French and Russian governments resulted in the loss of the Aegean Islands for the Ottoman State, which produced a new balance of power in the Aegean Sea in favor of Greece. Secondly, it was the result of the disposition among the Great Powers to keep the balance of power among themselves. The Ottoman Empire was to break up and both the Allied and Central states preferred not to go into a conflict after the Balkan Wars. Their considerations about a wider conflict temporarily forced them to reach a peaceful outcome to the Balkan crisis in general and they decided not to use the Balkans to force a European conflict.²⁷³ Thus, they agreed on leaving those pieces of land to Greece in order to keep political tension at an international level under control.

The Greek government, as expected, welcomed that decision of the Great Powers to cede the North Aegean islands to Greece with pleasure, and immediately withdrew their troops from Albania. However, Greece was still on tenterhooks about the Aegean Islands issue, because the continuity of Greek territoriality on the islands was very much subjected to the diplomatic consensus between the Great Powers. Especially Britain's position in supporting Greek expansion towards the Ottoman State was to be strongly maintained, because it provided a comfortable sphere to Greek policy makers to construct Greek hegemony over the Aegean.²⁷⁴

272 Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of Balkan Wars 1912-1913* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938): 436.

273 David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914", *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997): 144.

274 For a short analysis of the unofficial British-Greek alliance through private diplomatic relations between Eleftherios Venizelos and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, see

To sum up, the developments of the period between October 1912 and February 1914 represented an enormous Greek territorial expansion as a counter to Ottoman Turkey. The naval and military reformation in Greece during the first decade of the 20th century brought a military achievement, accompanied by diplomacy and the Great Powers' support, which represented a further Greek expansion in terms of geography and ethnicity.²⁷⁵ The First Balkan War further enlarged the boundaries of the Greek nation state including Eastern Macedonia, Crete and the North Aegean islands. The agreements and arrangements after the Balkan Wars were designed to consolidate the territories where larger Greek populations existed, and the withdrawal of Ottoman Turkey from the Greek mainland up to Western Thrace gave rise to expansionist motivation for Greek decision makers and the strengthening of the Megali Idea's irredentist perspective.

Although the fundamental feature of the Great Powers' act was judicially controversial, the North Aegean islands became de facto territories of Greece by the beginning of 1914. More precisely, the Greek nation state had already taken the North Aegean islands inside the Greek national boundaries before the First World War.²⁷⁶ When the continent entered a global conflict in the summer of 1914, the reality was that neither the Ottoman State nor her successor the Republic of Turkey could find any political or military power to claim the opposite anymore.

3.4.2 *Greek Attempts to Control the Aegean Sea during and after the First World War*

The geographical dispute between Greece and Turkey after the Balkan Wars was a reflection of the British-German geopolitical conflict on the

Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement", 148-149.

275 Michael N. Schmitt, "Aegean Angst: The Greek-Turkish Dispute", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 45.

276 Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War*, 67.

path to the First World War. Britain's strategy was to block German geopolitical expansion in the maritime areas and after the blockade of the German Navy into the North Sea, British diplomacy actually extended a second maritime blockade to Germany, who wished to reach the Eastern Mediterranean through the alliance with the Ottoman State. The strategy behind the support for giving the Aegean Islands to Greece was in fact to take a further step in the British-German geopolitical conflict.²⁷⁷ When Greece's national aspiration for expansion to the Aegean Islands became harmonized with British global interests against Germany, it was not a surprising act by the British to procure the political authority of Greece over the Aegean islands, as Greece became militarily and economically dependent on Britain before the Great War.

As Fotakis argues, there was a strong interrelationship between the core issues of Greek national interests and Greek naval policy at the outbreak of the First World War. Greece did not have any other formidable question about its western frontiers after the territorial arrangements of the Balkan Wars. However, the dream of expansion to Asia Minor, which was under Turkish rule, was the age-old interest of the Greek nation state and policy makers. The achievements on territorial extension in the Balkan Wars added a significant characteristic to Greek irredentism: As it was conceptualized in the Megali Idea, the vision of the territorial expansion of the Greek nation state up to those areas where any Greek people existed, including İstanbul, became a central characteristic of the modern

277 Harold Ray Stevens quotes interesting observations from the letters of Joseph Conrad, a British correspondent who lived in İstanbul during the Balkan Wars, to British Imperial and Foreign Intelligence Units. Conrad comments that the Central Powers' demands for returning to the old status quo in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean constitute a challenge to British interests in the Mediterranean, so the changing status quo in the region should be maintained by Britain. See, Harold Ray Stevens, "Conrad, Geopolitics, and 'The Future of Constantinople' ", *The Conradian*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Autumn 2006): 21-22.

Greek national interest through irredentism.²⁷⁸ From 1914 onwards, irredentism had been normalized as the inclusive element in the national interest understanding of Greek policy makers. Thus, preservation of Greek national interests in Asia Minor became the first priority of Greek foreign policy in the historical context, and territorial expansion in the Aegean Sea and control of the Aegean Islands with naval power became a kind of insurance tool for securing that foreign policy priority. In other words, as long as the Turkish presence continued in Asia Minor, which threatened Greek political and armed existence on the Aegean Islands, the islands had to be kept in Greek territory with a strong naval power which had the capability to respond to Turkey.²⁷⁹ Briefly, Greece's geographical expansion to the Aegean Islands was part of a much bigger geopolitical strategy of taking the territories where any Hellenic populations existed, as it was envisaged in the Megali Idea.

The period before the First World War can be considered as one of the turning points in the history of the Greco-Turkish dispute on the Aegean Islands. The Greek and Turkish approaches to the issue on the eve of the Great War were substantially differentiated from each other. While the Ottoman Empire evaluated the conflict from a strategic argumentative perspective as a security problem for the Anatolian lands, Greece's approach was mainly based on the ethnic composition of the islands. The Ottoman Empire claimed the return of the islands because of security concerns towards the Anatolian mainland, while Greece claimed to keep the political authority over the islands because of the majority of Greek population in these islands. In fact, these patterns constituted the background of the historical context of the Aegean dispute. It was a security

278 Michael M. Finefrock, "Ataturk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea: Cause and Consequence of the Greek Plan to Seize Constantinople from the Allies, June-August 1922", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1980): D1049-D1050.

279 For a comprehensive analysis of the correlation between Greek national interests and maritime irredentism in the Aegean Sea, see Zisis Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919*, 79-80. Fotakis quotes the arguments of Nikolaos Stratos, the Minister of Marine Affairs in Venizelos' government between 1911-1913, on the dependency between Greek expansion to the Aegean Islands and Greek national interests.

issue for the Turks, whereas it was an issue of irredentism with notional socio-ethnic characteristic for Greece to include her kinsfolk inside the boundaries of the Greek nation state.²⁸⁰

Besides, the involvement of the Great Powers in the Aegean dispute from their national and global interest perspectives brought the conflict to the level of a more complex international issue at the beginning of the First World War in the summer of 1914. In the tense environment of the international relations in 1914, the Aegean dispute did not turn into a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. However, when a global-scale battle started among the Great Powers of the international system, the importance of the Aegean dispute was pushed into the background. In fact, Greece preferred the silence about the status of the North Aegean islands. As the Ottoman Empire and other powers plunged into a dreadful armed conflict, this situation provided the Greek government, with an environment for keeping the status quo in the islands, an opportunity to increase the Greek administrative and military presence in the Aegean Sea for a possible attack on the Asia Minor in the near future.²⁸¹

Despite the unchanging situation in the North Aegean islands in the early months of the First World War, both Greece and the Ottoman State maintained their position of asserting their arguments for the possession of those islands. When they decided to participate in the war on the side of the Central Powers, most probably, the Ottoman governmental authorities counted on the return of the Aegean Islands to Ottoman rule, as well

280 Incorporation of the Aegean Islands, together with other territories in Macedonia, into Greece created the feeling that Greece was on the roll to realize Megali Idea after Greeks waited impatiently for almost a century. Aristides N. Hatzis, "A Political History of Modern Greece, 1821-2018" in *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, eds. Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2019): 7.

281 The Greek approach evaluated the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia as a whole geographically and economically. For this reason, the Greek government of the time considered the Aegean Islands as a springboard to Western Anatolia and Venizelos mentioned this Greek intention clearly in the Paris Peace Conferences after World War I. Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyutları İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri 1821-1993* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2018): 55.

as other lost territories in the Balkans.²⁸² On the other hand, Greece's strategic objectives were to obtain full control of the Aegean Sea for the national targets arising from the vision of the Megali Idea. Simply, Greek strategy on territorial expansionism through the ancient Hellenic lands under Turkish rule was settled in three successive phases according to existing international conditions: The first leg was to take control of the Aegean Islands that remained unoccupied by the Italians, the second leg was to achieve full control of the Aegean Sea with a deal with Italy and the last phase would be the final attempt in Asia Minor.²⁸³ The history of Greco-Turkish relations witnessed all these three phases in sequence.

During the First World War, Greece always waited for an opportunity to participate in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, especially by maintaining particular interests in the islands of the Aegean. After taking control of the North Aegean islands, Greece began to attach more focus on the Southern Sporades, or Dodecanese islands. However, the Italians also planned to use these Southern Aegean islands as military base for possible military operations in the partition of the lands of Ottoman Turkey. At this point, there appeared a clash between Greek expansionist views on the Aegean and Italian plans to hold the islands as military base for maintaining the Italian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁸⁴

Although Greek policy makers had imagined continuing the territorial expansion to the South Aegean, the real power dynamics between Greece and Italy deterred Greece from entering into a direct conflict with Italy. In short, Greece did not have the power to enter into any armed conflict with the Italians. Instead of forcing the conditions which would lead

282 William Peter Kaldis, "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914", D1140.

283 George Kaloudis quotes Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos' speech before the Hellenic Parliament on 17 November 1914 and summarizes Greek governments' final target as securing the future of Hellenism in Asia Minor as part of a long-term strategy. See, George Kaloudis, "Greece and the Road to World War I: To What End?", p. 11. In that case, Greece's expansion towards the Aegean Islands appeared as the first step towards the final target, which was to annex Asia Minor (Turkey's Western Anatolia region).

284 Richard Bosworth, "Britain and Italy's Acquisition of the Dodecanese, 1912-1915", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1970): 691-692.

to a battle with Italy in the Aegean Sea, the Greek governmental authority followed the same tradition of the pre-First World War period: Diplomacy once more was put on the stage. This time it was towards Italy to open a path for discussion on the Dodecanese islands in order to change their status. Greek diplomacy embarked on the same terms and conditions of the 1912 Italo-Turkish Treaty of Ouchy in order to convince Italy to hand the Dodecanese over to Greece, which in fact meant the end of temporary Italian occupation of these islands. However, Italy's efforts to take part in the partition process of Anatolian lands signaled that, despite Greece's expectations, Italian existence in the Dodecanese would be a permanent occupation rather than a temporary one.²⁸⁵

When a clash between Greece and Italy appeared just at the beginning of the First World War, British diplomacy took the situation into its own hands in order to keep both states on the side of the Allied Powers. Especially after the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, keeping the status quo in the Aegean Sea became much more important in order to prevent the Central Powers from taking an advantageous position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Thus, Britain followed a policy in dichotomy in order to protect the geographical balance between Italy and Greece in the Aegean Sea.²⁸⁶ Both Italy and Greece were favored by the British and both were promised an advancement in the Aegean Sea and Anatolian lands of the Ottoman State. For example, at the very early stage of the war, on 8 August 1914, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, was writing to the Foreign Minister Edward Grey about the maritime importance of Greece: "*Greece is an important factor in the Medn. and we greatly desire that if possible she shd be brought into the alliance against Germany. When M Venizelos was last here he made earnest request for an alliance which it was not then possible to accede to. But it is hoped by the Admiralty that this may now be reconsidered. The*

285 William Peter Kaldis, "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914", D1144.

286 Richard Bosworth, "Britain and Italy's Acquisition of the Dodecanese, 1912-1915", 693-695.

*Greek fleet comprises 3 ships & an excellent flotilla all under British officers. They have the best harbour & the key to the Adriatic. If Greece will join England & France (& we could surely make her a good offer) the Medn situation will be absolutely satisfactory.”*²⁸⁷

On the other hand, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey tried to satisfy the Italians’ sensibility on the status of the Dodecanese islands against Greece’s attempts to prevent Britain from favoring Italy. Grey seemed to allay Italy’s concerns about the islands and give an informal guarantee for the continuation of Italian existence in the South Aegean islands. Moreover, Grey made an unofficial promise to his Italian counterparts for taking part in possible partition of the Ottoman Empire after the Allied victory in the war in return for joining the war on the side of the Allied Powers. British diplomacy’s main concern was to keep the Greco-Italian conflict away from the Allies’ interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to prevent it from posing an obstacle to Britain’s operations in the Aegean basin. It was especially true for the possible British operation in the Dardanelles Strait, which had already begun to be planned in 1914. Foreign Minister Edward Grey, in his letter to the British Ambassador in Athens on 25 January 1915, explained that Britain would prefer to allocate some other lands in Anatolia to Greece instead of the Dodecanese islands, which were under Italian occupation. Grey also asked the British Ambassador to appease the Greek government over their claims to the South Aegean islands and keep them on Britain’s side in the war;²⁸⁸ as Britain needed the North Aegean islands, which were under Greek occupation, for the Allied campaign in the Dardanelles. It was a British attempt to satisfy Italian claims to the islands in order to keep both Italy and Greece on Britain’s side, or at least to keep them neutral for protecting British interests in Turkey’s lands.²⁸⁹

287 Geoffrey Miller, *Superior Force The conspiracy behind the escape of Goeben and Breslau* (Hull: The University of Hull Press, 1996): 192. Miller cites Winston Churchill’s note to Edward Grey from official proceedings.

288 Necdet Hayta, *Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911’den Günümüze*, 228.

289 Richard Bosworth, “Britain and Italy’s Acquisition of the Dodecanese, 1912-1915”, 701-703.

The diplomatic attempts of the British Foreign Minister can be considered as successful, as Italy formally delivered a memorandum to Edward Grey on 4 March 1915 which explained Italian intention to join the Allied Powers after Grey's warnings to the Greek government about their claims to the South Aegean islands. The Italian government in the memorandum claimed the recognition of Italian annexation of the Dodecanese islands and the allocation of some territories in Western and Southern Anatolia to Italy.²⁹⁰ Italy's claims and participation in the war within the Allied Powers was discussed until the spring and at the end Britain, France and Russia accepted the Italian demands on the South Aegean islands and Southern Anatolia. In the agreement signed between France and Russia on 26 April 1915 in London, it was agreed to recognize Italian annexation of the Dodecanese islands.²⁹¹ Besides, the Allied Powers agreed on leaving Antalya and Turkish territories in Southern Anatolia to Italy in the partition process of the Ottoman lands if the Great War was concluded with an Allied victory, in return for Italy's participation in the war on the Allied side.²⁹² These developments in the first half of 1915 allayed the Italians' concerns about Greece's opportunist policies arising from the political conditions of the war on expanding to the South Aegean islands. Italy, for a while, could prevent Greek intentions on capturing those islands by joining the war on the side of Britain. However, Italian governments could never erase Greece's hundred-year ambitions for expansion in the Aegean Sea.

Britain's favor towards Italian interests in the Dodecanese islands did not prevent Greek diplomacy from maintaining her visions of establish-

290 Paul du Quenoy, "With Allies Like These, Who Needs Enemies?: Russia and the Problem of Italian Entry into World War I", *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 45, No. 3/4 (September-December 2003): 426-427.

291 For further details about the Treaty of London of 1915, see Rene Albrecht-Carrie, "The Present Significance of the Treaty of London of 1915", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (September 1939): 364-371.

292 David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties Volume II* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938): 1211.

ing Greek hegemony over the Aegean Sea. On the contrary, the Greek government, especially Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, attributed a particular importance to the British-Greek alliance for Greece's territorial expansionism towards the Aegean Islands. Venizelos even conflicted with Constantine, the King of Greece, on Greece's role in the World War. In fact, Venizelos himself had foreseen that Greece's irredentist plans for the Aegean Islands could only be achieved with the consent of the Great Powers, especially of Britain. Moreover, Venizelos knew that Greece by herself could not remove the Italian presence in the Dodecanese islands and that this could only be achieved by political and military support from Britain. Additionally, Venizelos' ambitions for extending Greek territories were not limited to the Aegean Islands. He predicted an Allied victory in the war and Ottoman dissolution after that probable Allied victory, so he honestly believed in the opportunity to expand Greece's territories to Western Anatolia and realize the Greek dream projected in the Megali Idea. In other words, Venizelos and Greek diplomacy following Venizelos, considered the outbreak of the Great War as a historic opportunity to achieve the historical territorial aims of the Greek nation state to unify Hellenic people living in the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor. The strong belief in the realization of those opportunist plans among Greek policy makers and diplomats dragged them into a fevered British partiality at the outbreak of the First World War.²⁹³

Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia and the First World War started in July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia posed a question for the domestic political agenda in Greece, because Greece and Serbia were allies in the Balkan Wars and there was an alliance agreement between Greece and Serbia which was still in effect. Greco-Serbian agreement in the alliance of 1913 was activated when Bulgaria attacked both in August 1913 and caused the Second Balkan War. The alliance agreement had guaranteed the support of the two countries for each other in the event of an outsider attack and it became the main topic of domestic political con-

293 George Kaloudis, "Greece and the Road to World War I: To What End?", 16-19.

versation in Greece when Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Although no particular state was referred to as an aggressor in the Greco-Serbian Alliance Agreement of 1913, Venizelos and his followers claimed that Greece should go into the war on the side of the Allied Powers against Austria-Hungary and Germany, as the Greco-Serbian agreement obliged Greece to help her ally when an attack from an outsider took place. On the other hand, King Constantine pointed out the Balkan context of this alliance agreement and claimed that the Greco-Serbian Alliance Agreement could not be valid in the case of Austria-Hungary's aggression against Serbia. In brief, while Venizelos and his government strongly desired to join the war on Britain's side, King Constantine was against involvement in the conflict of the Allied forces. However, both Venizelos and the King shared the territorial ambitions of Greece and they merely drew different paths to achieve Greek territorial expansion to the east.²⁹⁴

The Allies attempted to help the Serbians when the war began and they offered to allocate to Bulgaria the Bitola-Ohrid area, which was under Serbian rule, and the Kavala and Drama areas, which Greece occupied in the Balkan Wars, if Bulgaria joined the war with the Allied Powers. In that case, Venizelos was asked to cease Greek intentions in Kavala and Drama, and in return, Greece was promised with assurances about the expansion into Western Anatolia. Interestingly, Venizelos accepted this offer and agreed to cede the Kavala-Drama area to Bulgaria. That diplomatic behavior actually shows how the ambitions on expanding to the east, to the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia, surpassed the will to expand to Macedonia and Thrace.²⁹⁵ There can be one reason for that: The majority of the population in the Macedonian and Thracian territories were Turks and Muslims, whereas the population in the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia mainly consisted of Greek-speaking Hellenic people. In that sense, there is a harmony between Venizelos' diplomatic behaviour and Megali Idea's vision of unification of the Hellenes under

294 Ibid. 12-13.

295 Ibid. 14-15.

the Greek nation state. Thus, Venizelos preferred to give priority to expansion to the east rather than to the north. John Stavridi, the Greek Consul General in London, who was a close friend of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, narrates in his diary about Venizelos' ambitions on expanding Hellenism towards to the east, to Turkey: "*But now the circumstances have clearly changed. At this moment when the prospects of realizing our national views on Asia Minor are opening before us, certain sacrifices in the Balkans can be made in order to secure the success of so magnificent a national policy.*

Above all we should withdraw our objections to concessions being made by Serbia to Bulgaria, even if these extend to the right bank of the Vardar.

*But if these concessions are not sufficient to draw Bulgaria into co-operation with her former allies, or at least to the maintenance of a benevolent neutrality towards them, I should not hesitate, however painful the operation might be, to recommend the sacrifice of Kavalla, so as to save Hellenism in Turkey and to secure the creation of a truly great Greece, including almost all the territories in which Hellenism has been active during its long history."*²⁹⁶

It is obvious that Venizelos' priority was to open a path for Greece's territorial expansion towards Turkey by obtaining guarantees from Britain and the Allied Powers in order to achieve it. Obtaining guarantees, on the other hand meant making concessions. Thus, the Greek government in 1914 did not consider ceding the Kavala-Drama area to Bulgaria risky, because the historical targets of Greek foreign policy on the Aegean-Anatolian basin, since the Megali Idea was declared in the 1840s, had always made Greek governments feel obliged to focus on including the Greek

296 Smith quotes Stavridi's memories from his diary and explains the behavioural change of Venizelos in his diplomacy to cede the Kavala-Drama region to Bulgaria in return for Western Anatolia. See Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek–Turkish Settlement", 153–154.

population of the east, instead of expanding to the Balkan peninsula.²⁹⁷ Secondly, the strategic and economic importance of the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia had already surpassed the ancient significance of the mountainous Macedonian basin in the early 20th century. Economic activities in the Aegean Sea and port cities of Western Anatolia had increased significantly since the early 19th century. Thus, considering the geo-economic importance of the Aegean-Western Anatolian basin combined with the Greek population density, the diplomatic behaviours of Venizelos and Greek diplomacy, as followers of the Megali Idea's mission of unifying Greeks, towards expanding Greece against Turkey was not something extraordinary.

However, Constantine's anti-Bulgarianism and obstinacy made Venizelos' projections on going into the war within the Allied Powers almost impossible to realize. King Constantine definitely rejected participation in the conflict with Britain and the Venizelos government could not fulfill the plans constructed on British offers in 1914.²⁹⁸ As a result, the Allied Powers could not intervene in the situation in the Balkans, while Bulgaria could not find any area to realize British offers to herself concerning the Macedonian lands. Thus, Bulgaria went into the war on the side of the Central Powers and soon started to invade Serbia from the south. Bulgaria's invasion resulted in Serbia's collapse and Greece had to declare neutrality under these conditions at the outbreak of the war in 1914.

Despite the disagreement with King Constantine, Venizelos clamorously maintained his position of entering an alliance with Britain and France. It was not because he believed in the probable victory of the Allied Powers, but because he believed that the Lloyd George government's insistence on seeking a British-Greek alliance for the campaign of the Al-

297 For a more comprehensive analysis of Venizelos' political vision of expansion to Anatolia, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998): 46-53. Also, see George Kaloudis, "Greece and the Road to World War I: To What End?", 19-20.

298 Ibid. 21.

lied forces in Turkey provided the opportunity for his government to realize historical Greek claims to the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor. In addition to this, the strong English and French effect on the Greek naval forces also caused the high-level Greek naval officers to urge the Venizelos government to go into the war alongside the British-French alliance. More importantly, the geographical distribution of the Greek population in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, from mainland Greece to the southwestern corner of the Anatolian peninsula including the Aegean Islands, motivated him to achieve unification of this population under a single Greek state. Venizelos always mentioned the specific weight of the geography in the national interests of Greece and he consistently underlined the necessity of alliance with Britain and France, who were the dominant powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, for guaranteeing the future political destiny of the Greek peoples distributed in this geography.²⁹⁹ Most probably, he did not want to miss this opportunity to be the historical hero of Greece who unified the Hellenic world. The Venizelos government continued to discuss Greece's possible involvement in the British-French Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean and especially Britain's positive approach towards satisfying Greece with some territorial rewards in Western Anatolia caused Venizelos to deepen the conflict with the King, who objected to Greek-British cooperation against the Central Powers.

On the other hand, the Greek palace court and high-level advisors of King Constantine, especially some of the high-level naval officers, were rather pro-German. Constantine himself believed in Germany's superiority in terms of military and naval development against the Allied Powers and that was why he was willing Greece to remain neutral in the conflict between the Allied and Central Powers.³⁰⁰ For this reason, he developed a policy of strong neutrality of Greece, which pleased Germany and Austria-Hungary but caused him to fall into disagreement with Prime Minister Venizelos. The political struggle between King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos constituted the grounds for the 'National Schism' in

299 Vincent J. Seligman, *The Victory of Venizelos A Study of Greek Politics, 1910-1918* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920): 31.

300 See Zizis Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919*, 119-122.

Greek political history, but more importantly, this severe separation between the elected government and monarchy in the country caused political turmoil in Greece. Under these conditions, Britain made a move to strengthen the pro-British Prime Minister's hand in mid-1915 and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill asked Greece to take part in the British campaign in the Dardanelles by giving support to the Allied Powers.³⁰¹ However, Churchill referred to logistic support for British troops and did not ask for Greek army corps' direct involvement in the battle. The British offer provided an opportunity for the Greek government's claims to the Aegean Islands. Greece had been unable to gain any support for the removal of the Italians from the Dodecanese at the beginning of the war, and now, if Greece became involved in the Dardanelles campaign and could play a crucial role in a possible British win, then the British might change their policy of supporting the Italian presence in the Dodecanese islands. Furthermore, effective Greek support for the Dardanelles campaign would also provide an advantageous position to Greece for the partition of the Ottoman Anatolian lands.³⁰²

Venizelos' government intended to take action to embroil the Greek army in the Allied Dardanelles campaign against Turkey. Indeed, Venizelos himself offered Greek army corps' active participation in the Dardanelles campaign to the British government. Despite this clear offer, British government members were surprised about it, because they did not expect such eagerness from the Greek government as Venizelos was in a deep crisis with King Constantine. Venizelos offered to send three divisions of Greek troops to Gallipoli without even asking the Hellenic Army General Staff. The British evaluated Venizelos' offer as surprising and Churchill's circle said it was by far the most interesting moment up to

301 Ibid. 106-107.

302 A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture-and After: A Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor (1915-1922)* (London: Methuen & Co, 1937): 8. In January 1915, Britain proposed that Greece join in the Dardanelles campaign and Venizelos agreed to participate in the British attack on the Dardanelles with Greek naval elements.

then in the war.³⁰³ Soon afterwards, Venizelos, without any previous consultation with the Hellenic General Staff, asked General Ioannis Metaxas to start the preparations of one army corps for joining the Dardanelles campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula. Metaxas strongly objected to that instruction by the Prime Minister and submitted his resignation from his duties. In fact, Metaxas actually was not sure about the success of the Dardanelles campaign, as he explained to the British Military Attache in Athens: “*The scheme [the Gallipoli campaign] in his opinion was impossible if it did not succeed as a coup de main; the impossibility of maneuver would hold it up, and it would then become a drain upon Greece which would eventually result in important detachments being required, which they could not afford. He was strong in his opinion that once the Turks had mobilized the project offered every danger and little prospect of success.*”³⁰⁴

Although the Greek Navy, which was strongly under British and French influence by that time, favored Venizelos’ plans to participate in the Dardanelles campaign, high-level generals of the land forces of the Greek Army opposed Venizelos for this decision. In fact, Metaxas envisaged the flow of the events and he was a reasonable general regarding the capabilities of the Greek army in such a battle in the Dardanelles. History proved Metaxas right when the Allied armies were defeated by Turkish resistance in the Dardanelles. Venizelos also met with strong resistance from King Constantine. Constantine strongly argued against Venizelos’ attempts through Britain to send Greek army corps to the Dardanelles campaign. The Constantine-Venizelos crisis turned into an angry political dispute in front of the public and Eleftherios Venizelos resigned from his office in March 1915.³⁰⁵

Despite the deep conflict with King Constantine, Venizelos did not give up his diplomatic efforts towards Greece’s interests in the Aegean

303 Zisis Fotakis, *Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919*, 112.

304 Ibid. 113.

305 Thanos Veremis and Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Protagonist in Politics, 1912-20” in *Eleftherios Venizelos The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006): 117.

Islands. After Venizelos' resignation in February 1915, Greece went to the polls and Venizelos was re-elected. He regained the prime minister's office in August 1915 and continued his diplomatic attempts towards the Allied Powers. The political conflict between Venizelos and Constantine was further complicated when Constantine amended the Greek constitution in autumn 1915. The constitutional amendments were unacceptable for the Hellenic Parliament, where Venizelos' Liberal Party had the majority, because King Constantine gave the monarch the right to dismiss the government unilaterally with these constitutional provisions. However, this was an opportunity for the Allied Powers and Venizelos, who was backed by the Allied Powers, to start a military struggle against the King and in October 1915 Britain and France landed army troops at Thessaloniki after Venizelos invited them.³⁰⁶ It was a clear message to the King, but at the same time strongly amplified the political fight between the elected Prime Minister and the King of Greece. Although clear pressure came from the Allied Powers, King Constantine did not take any step backward and dissolved the parliament which was under dominance of Venizelos' followers, in December 1915, and called for new legislative elections. Venizelos once again resigned from the prime minister's office, left Athens, went to Crete and did not take part in the elections, as he regarded the dismissal of the parliament by the King Constantine as unconstitutional.³⁰⁷

On 30 August 1916, the army officers who supported Venizelos staged a military coup in Thessaloniki against the monarchy in Greece and they formed a government. That government established in Thessaloniki was proclaimed as the Provisional Government of National Defense. Soon afterwards, in October 1916, Eleftherios Venizelos, together with the famous Admiral of the Greek Navy, Pavlos Kountouriotis, who was the chief admiral of the Greek Navy during the occupation of the North Aegean islands in 1912-1913, and General Panagiotis Danglis from the Greek Land Forces, came to Thessaloniki. Venizelos was assumed as the head of that

306 Ibid. 120-121.

307 Ibid. 122.

National Defense Government in Thessaloniki and he was given the duty of administering Greece's participation in the war with the Allied Forces. Soon afterwards, a provisional state was proclaimed in Thessaloniki which included Greek Macedonia, the Aegean Islands and Crete, with the support of Britain and France. Thus, the conflict between the monarch and the prime minister reached the point of a political separation of the country and Greece was politically divided into two camps as Royalists and Venizelists.³⁰⁸

At this point, it is important to underline Venizelos' political stance. He was a liberal republican and although he did not make any attempt to abolish the monarchy in Greece, he contributed a lot towards the development of democratic institutions in Greece, which constituted a background for the country's tradition of anti-monarchism and anti-militarism. However, the international political conditions of the time and strong traditionality among Greek people forced him to remain reconciled with the monarchy. His conflict with King Constantine cannot be associated with anti-monarchism. It was rather a personal conflict in order to favor Allied interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, as Venizelos was at the same time a Hellenist who believed in Greece's historical targets of territorial expansion to the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor. The conflict between Venizelos and Constantine arose from the parting of the ways towards the realization of the sacred targets of the Greek nation state, rather than from a monarchist-anti-monarchist separation.³⁰⁹

308 Augusta Dimou, *Entangled Paths Toward Modernity: Contextualizing Socialism and Nationalism in the Balkans* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2009): 360-362.

309 Both Venizelos and King Constantine shared Greece's territorial ambitions in the Balkans and Asia Minor. The only difference between them was related to the prediction of a victorious alliance. While Venizelos calculated that Britain and France would win the war, King Constantine predicted that the Central Powers would prevail. For an interesting historical research study on Britain's relations with both King Constantine and Venizelos through arms trader Basil Zaharoff, which shows that both men had similar ambitions towards Greek irredentism, see Joseph Maiolo and Tony Insall, "Sir Basil

Venizelos' provisional government was recognized by Britain and France in December 1916 as the legitimate government of Greece. The Allied act in recognizing Venizelos' government as the legitimate rulers of Greece split the country into two separate political bodies at international level and created pressure on King Constantine in Athens. Soon after the British and French recognition, Venizelos' government declared war on Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and thus, one part of Greece joined in the war on the side of the Allied Powers, while the other part under Constantine's rule still remained neutral.³¹⁰

Taking encouragement from Allied support for the government in Thessaloniki when he was the head of the provisional government, Venizelos continued his diplomatic activity to gain an advantageous position for Greece on the Dodecanese islands, even though the country was in political chaos. This shows Venizelos' passionate commitment to Greece's irredentist aims towards the Dodecanese islands in order to establish Greek hegemony over the Aegean Sea. In January 1917, Venizelos sent a representative to Italy and proposed that the Italian government cede the Dodecanese islands to Greece and added that Greece would negotiate to keep only two islands from the Dodecanese group under Italian rule.³¹¹

The position of the Allied Powers was critical for Greece's involvement in the war during the first half of 1917, because the Allied support for Venizelos actually meant a kind of consent for Greece's vision of future expansion towards the Aegean and Anatolia after the war. Britain and France did not leave their work to chance and established a naval

Zaharoff and Sir Vincent Caillard as Instruments of British Policy towards Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the Asquith and Lloyd George Administrations, 1915-8", *The International History Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 2012): 820-827.

310 For further details, see Stefan Papaioannou, "Greece from national expansion to schism and catastrophe, 1912-1922" in *The Routledge Handbook of Balkan and Southeast European History*, eds. John R. Lampe, Ulf Brunnbauer, (London: Routledge, 2020): 172-180.

311 Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı", *Belleten*, Cilt XXIX, No. 113, (Ocak 1965): 104.

blockade around Southern Greece, including the port of Piraeus, to enforce King Constantine to abdicate the throne in order to open the path for Venizelos to unify Greece under a single government which would go into the war on the Allied side. At the beginning of June 1917, Britain and France gave a memorandum to the King which reminded him of their obligation as protective powers of the Kingdom of Greece, which promised to protect the constitutional authority in Greece when the country gained independence in 1829 and they asked for Constantine's resignation of the crown.³¹² It was a clear message to Constantine to abdicate the throne, the King could not bear the pressure and socio-economic consequences of the blockade of Athens and Southern Greece, and he agreed to go to exile on 15 June 1917. More interestingly, he left the throne to his younger son Alexander, who was regarded as a pro-Allied prince, instead of his elder son and crown prince George.³¹³ Many other royalist politicians and high-level army officers, including the famous General Ioannis Metaxas, who objected to Venizelos' intentions to join the war on the Allied side, went into exile with the King. The Allied pressure caused a power gap in Athens and the Venizelists immediately took power in the political sphere of Greece by the summer of 1917.³¹⁴

Eleftherios Venizelos returned to Athens and Greece was unified under the single government of Venizelos with the support of Britain and France. Venizelos' first decision was to enter the war on the side of the Allied forces, and the Greek Army began to participate in the battles against the Central Powers, especially against Bulgaria on the Macedonian front, with the Allied armies. The Greek Army's participation in the battles on the Macedonian front was a starting point for Venizelos in his

312 Herbert Adams Gibbons, *Venizelos* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920): 299.

313 For further details about the developments leading to King Constantine's abdication of the throne and Venizelos' retaking of power from first-hand witnesses, see S. B. Chester, *Life of Venizelos* (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921): 295-304.

314 S. Victor Papacosma, "Ioannis Metaxas and the "Fourth of August" Dictatorship in Greece" in *Balkan Strongmen Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast Europe*, ed. Bernd J. Fischer, (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2007): 169.

hopes and plans to shift Greek forces to the east, to the Aegean and especially to Asia Minor. In fact, Venizelos did not attach any importance to the war against Bulgaria on the Macedonian front. On the contrary, he was planning to use the Greek Army's participation in the battles as a tool for strengthening his diplomatic attempts towards the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia to finalize the Megali Idea.³¹⁵

For this reason, Venizelos' Liberal Party mobilized the Hellenic Parliament towards Greek interests in the Dodecanese islands and the government obtained the parliamentary support for the expansionist plans towards the Southern Aegean. Nikolaos Stratos, Member of the Hellenic Parliament from the pro-royalist National Conservative Party, explained Greece's legitimate rights to the Aegean Islands and said Greece would claim her national rights, which were Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands and Cyprus, from the Central Powers. Furthermore, Venizelos himself told the Italian Ambassador in Athens that Greece would ask for Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands to be ceded to Greece in the peace conference after the war and he said that if Italy objected to this, then it would be a violation of the Allied principle of the self-determination of the people.³¹⁶ Venizelos and Greece's self-confidence about the possible expansion in the Aegean was increased after Greek armies participated in the war. It seems that the British-French support for Venizelos against the King and their promises to Greece regarding the territories of Ottoman Turkey encouraged him to threaten Italy on the issue of the Dodecanese islands. In other words, Venizelos found the political courage to threaten Italy about the Dodecanese because of the Allies' political maneuvers to keep Greece and Italy in reconciliation during the war in the Dardanelles. However, Britain and France would continue favoring Italy regarding the Dodecanese after the war.

Venizelos was aware of the significance of obtaining the full support of the Allied Powers to realize his government's intentions to establish

315 Christopher Kinley, "Reclaiming the Unredeemed: Irredentism and the National Schism in Greece's First World War", (Master of Arts Thesis, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2016): 51, 57.

316 Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı", 104.

full hegemony over the Aegean Sea. He followed a multi-dimensional diplomacy for Greece's territorial interests over the islands of the Aegean. Not only Britain and France but also President Wilson's United States was a part of Greek diplomacy's strategy for obtaining wider international support for Greek legitimacy over the Aegean Islands. The diplomatic team of the Greek Embassy in Washington played a particular role in the increasing propaganda in American newspapers about Greece's rightfulness for annexing the Dodecanese islands. For example, at the outbreak of the First World War, many American newspapers published analyses which harshly criticized Turkey and promoted Greece's rights to the Aegean Islands.³¹⁷

Greece's diplomatic attempts to obtain American support for Greek claims to the Aegean brought more concrete results in the last months of the First World War. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, who was in charge of preparations for the principles of peace after the First World War, stated in the memorandum dated 21 September 1918 that Greece should annex some important islands in the Aegean Sea, especially those ones which are located close to the shores of the Anatolian continent where ethnic Greeks were in the majority.³¹⁸ In addition to this, the United States Foreign Ministry drew the attention of the government to the conflict between Greece and Italy over the Dodecanese islands, and recommended to the American policy makers to find a solution for the Dodecanese conflict in favor of Greece in the peace negotiations.³¹⁹

As it is seen, in addition to British and French endorsement for Greece's irredentist vision towards the Aegean Sea and Turkish territories of the Anatolian continent, Venizelos' government was also able to obtain American endorsement for the same purposes before the Paris Conference that started in January 1919. Venizelos was very satisfied with

317 For further details about Greek propaganda related to the Aegean Islands in American newspapers, see Mine Erol, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Arifesinde Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye Karşı Tutumu* (Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1976): 26-30.

318 Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations A Personal Narrative* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921): 195.

319 Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı", 105.

the Allied victory in the war, because the success of his persistent pro-Allied policies against the royalists at domestic level was confirmed with that victory. At the same time, he was also pleased to see the Allied triumph in the Great War for a possible territorial expansionist success for Greece towards the Aegean Sea. At the negotiation table at the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos stood for confirming Greece's annexation of the Dodecanese islands, as he believed the Allied Powers would transfer those islands from Italy to Greece after the 'successful' efforts of the Greek army troops in the battles on the Macedonian front.³²⁰

Before the Paris Peace Conference started, Venizelos sent a notice, titled Greece at the Peace Conference, to all delegations represented at the conference and declared Greece's claims to territorial extension. According to the notice, the Greek government demanded the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands.³²¹ However, Italy strongly objected to Venizelos' notice regarding the demands for the Dodecanese islands and reminded delegates of the secret wartime arrangements which allocated the Southern Anatolian lands to Italy and confirmed the Italian presence in the Dodecanese islands.³²²

Despite Italy's strong objection, Greece's intimate diplomatic relations with Britain, France and Wilson's United States provided a considerable political advantage for Venizelos at the Conference. At the beginning of the Conference, the American delegation submitted an offer, which was the ceding of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands to Greece. Encouraged by this American offer, Venizelos demanded the full annexation of all Aegean Islands to Greece in February. In March, the Commission working on the Aegean Islands decided to leave the islands in the Aegean Sea, except the ones occupied by Italy, to Greece. However, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was not satisfied with this arrangement and he intensified his personal diplomatic efforts through Allied delegations in order to guarantee the annexation of the Dodecanese islands, and

320 William James Battle, "Greece at the Peace Table", 9-10.

321 Ibid. 13-14.

322 Andrew Dalby, *Makers of the Modern World. The peace conferences of 1919-23 and their aftermath. Eleftherios Venizelos' Greece* (London: Haus Publishing, 2010): 98-100.

indeed, he succeeded in this. By the end of April, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who was in fact an inconsequently pro-Greek, proposed to cede all the Aegean Islands, including Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands, to Greece and US President Woodrow Wilson shared Lloyd George's opinion and he favored uniting the İzmir district and the Dodecanese islands with Greece.³²³ In the end, Britain and France initiated the establishment of Greek rule over the Aegean Islands by pushing Italian interests in the Aegean into the background and agreed on giving Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands, including the island of Kastellorizo, to Greece.³²⁴

The progress of the negotiations on the territorial arrangements at the Paris Peace Conference turned against Italy and especially Britain's efforts in strongly supporting Greece in these arrangements caused deep disappointment for the Italian government. When Tomaso Tittoni was appointed to the foreign ministry, the Italian government started to seek conditions for a bilateral agreement with Greece on the Dodecanese issue. As the Italian government understood that it was almost impossible to break British support for Greece, their intention in a bilateral deal with Greece was at least to keep a couple of Dodecanese islands under Italian rule. The new Italian Foreign Minister Tittoni succeeded in convincing the delegates for a deal on the Dodecanese conflict and signed an agreement on 29 July 1919 in Paris during the Peace Conference, which was called the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement. The agreement was a secret one and it did not have a judicially binding perspective. Rather, it was a written gentlemen's agreement in order to push the Greek and Italian governments to make efforts regarding the conflicting territorial claims of these two countries, especially over the Dodecanese islands. With this agreement, Italy supported the territorial claims of Greece over Northern Epirus and agreed to cede the Dodecanese islands to Greece, except

323 For Wilson's support for Greece on the Aegean issue at the Paris Peace Conference, see Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974): 63-64.

324 Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı", 105-106.

Rhodes. It was agreed that the island of Rhodes would remain under Italian rule until the time when Britain decided to transfer Cyprus to Greece and if that happened, Italy would accept a plebiscite on the island for the unification of Rhodes with Greece. In return, Greece agreed to support the establishment of an Italian protectorate over Albania. Greece started to invade Western Anatolia in May 1919 and in this agreement, Italian claims over the territories of Western Anatolia which were not yet captured by Greek armies were also accepted and a free zone at the port of İzmir was allocated to the Italian government.³²⁵

However, this agreement was never implemented because of two reasons: Firstly, it was merely a tactical arrangement for Venizelos to ease and postpone Italian reactions towards Greece at the outbreak of the Asia Minor invasion, because the Greek government was almost sure about the full annexation of the Dodecanese islands to Greece after the clear support of the Allied Powers at the Paris Peace Conference. Venizelos did not need any bilateral agreement with Italy for those islands, but he still did not want any possible armed reaction from the Italians in the Dodecanese while the Greek army began the Asia Minor campaign. Therefore, he had to pacify the Italians and he made it with this arrangement with Tittoni which was almost impossible to implement. Secondly, Greece's territorial ambitions were much bigger than the Italians estimated, as Venizelos did not have any intention to leave even a small piece of land in Western Anatolia to Italy. Furthermore, the agreement provided an exemption to both states. If both were not satisfied with the territorial gains, then they had the right to terminate the agreement.³²⁶ Lastly, this agreement was a concession for Italy and for this reason the succeeding

325 For further details about the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement, see H. James Burgwyn, *Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918-1940* (Westport: Praeger, 1997): 15-16.

326 Italy refused to abide by the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement. See the Telegram of Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan, No. 341, Telegraphic [E 9155/56/44], Foreign Office, July 30, 1920, 11 p.m. In Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XIII, Turkey February-December 1920, Arabia, Syria, and Palestine February 1920-January 1921, Persia January 1920-March 1921* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1963): 110-112.

Italian Foreign Minister, Carlo Sforza, canceled the agreement in July 1920, soon after he learned about it.³²⁷

Italy's termination of the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement disturbed Greece and her protector Lloyd George's government during the Paris Peace Conference. On the other hand, it was a challenge to the Greek-British innominate agreement to leave the Dodecanese islands to Greek rule. As Italy was not satisfied with the post-war territorial arrangements in Anatolia, the Italian government tried to object to the Allied projections which caused Greek geopolitical hegemony on the Aegean basin. However, Greece's endless claims on expanding to the Southern Aegean and Western Anatolia with seemingly limitless diplomatic support of British during the Conference had exceeded Italy's capabilities to resist the Allied Powers' decisions, which favored Greece in terms of politics, diplomacy and the military.³²⁸ In other words, Italy did not have the political power to change the plans of the British and French for leaving the Aegean Sea to Greece.

Although Greece could not annex the Dodecanese islands, Venizelos' diplomatic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference were crowned with the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920. Greece had gained an enormous diplomatic victory through Venizelos' dreams of extending Greek territories to the east including the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor. In the Treaty of Sevres, in addition to the territories around İzmir in Western Anatolia, all the North Aegean islands including Imbros and Tenedos, which are critically located at the mouth of the Turkish straits, were handed over to Greece with Article 84. Moreover, Article 122 of the Treaty of Sevres confirmed the Italian rule over all the Dodecanese islands. Although the Treaty of Sevres was never valid because of the success of Turkish resistance in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal's command, the provisions of the Sevres Treaty regarding the Dodecanese islands are worth quoting because they did not change in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. In the Treaty

327 Joseph S. Roucek, "The Legal Aspects of Sovereignty Over the Dodecanese", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (October 1944): 702.

328 Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974): 319-320.

of Sevres, Turkey renounced in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands of the Southern Aegean Sea, known as the Dodecanese islands, which were under Italian occupation by the time the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the parties: Astropalia, Rhodes, Chalki, Karpathos, Kasos, Tilos, Nisyros, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, Kos and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Kastellorizo.³²⁹

However, Greece did not give up her claims to the Dodecanese islands and convinced Italy once more to make a bilateral agreement between Greece and Italy which regulated Italy's renunciation of many of the Dodecanese islands in favor Venizelos' Greece. The agreement was signed by Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and Italian Ambassador in Paris, Lelio Bonin Longare, on the same date as the Treaty of Sevres in Paris. Therefore, the second bilateral Greek-Italian agreement on the status of the South Aegean islands was called the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement. This agreement basically represented Italy's withdrawal from the Dodecanese islands, except Rhodes. Despite some strong objections for any compromise to Greece on the Aegean Islands in the Italian government, this agreement also represented Italy's loss of political hegemony over the Dodecanese islands, which had been under Italian occupation for eight years since the summer of 1912. According to that 10-article agreement, Italy agreed to transfer all the Dodecanese islands, except Rhodes and Kastellorizo, to Greece. Besides, it was agreed to establish an autonomous administration including the islands of Rhodes and Kastellorizo by the Italian authorities in Rhodes.³³⁰

Venizelos and Greek diplomacy's strategy at the Paris Peace Conference was based on the target of unification of Greek people living within and outside of the Greek national territories. All the Greek claims related with the Aegean Islands, which were under Ottoman rule until the First

329 Hazal Papuççular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", (PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2015): 64-65.

330 J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective, Part III State Territory* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970): 396. For details of the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement, see also Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı", 107-108.

World War and the Dodecanese islands, which were under Italian occupation, actually originated from this geographical distribution of Hellenic people around the Aegean basin.³³¹

The mentality lying behind Greece's claims on extending its territories to those areas where Greek-speaking Hellenic people were living was totally ethnographic.³³² In other words, Greece's intentions on extending the nation state's geographical sovereignty were adopted from the ethnic and sociological existence of Hellenic people on the islands of the Aegean and Western Anatolia. Greek policy makers and diplomats of the 1910s considered that those lands historically and legitimately belonged to the Greek nation, as the population in these areas was mainly composed of ethnic Greeks. In the case of Greek expansionism towards the Aegean Islands in the 1910s, irredentism motivated by ethnography was the dominant characteristic. That was also adapted from the modern American principle of self-determination which was introduced by the US President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. The principle of self-determination was used as a tool by Venizelos to construct a legitimacy for the Greek claims on unifying Hellenic people living outside Greece, or more precisely, although Woodrow Wilson developed the idea of self-determination mostly for stateless people, Venizelos adapted it to the Greek case as the right of people who lived under different entities to be unified under a single state. Thus, Greek government officials and diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference could legitimize their expansionist

331 Greece in the conference followed a strategy for the re-establishment of a single Greek state including the territories of the Dardanelles, Eastern Thrace and İstanbul, Western Anatolia, Aegean Islands and Cyprus. See, N. Calogeropoulos, N. Stratos, *Notes on the Greek Question addressed to the President Woodrow Wilson* (Geneva: A. Kundig, 1920): 5-7.

332 Konstantinos Svolopoulos, *Eleftherios Venizelos 12 Meletimata* (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1999): 46-47. Svolopoulos builds his argument on the ethnocentric characteristics of Venizelos' claims on expanding Greece's territories by giving the example of Venizelos' offer to separate Greeks and Albanians in Northern Epirus in different zones according to their ethnic identities.

territorial claims by presenting the argument of the quantitative majority of Hellenic people on the Aegean Islands and in Asia Minor.³³³

Greek diplomacy during the Paris Peace Conference can be considered as successful especially for Venizelos' wishes to procure Greek territorial hegemony over the Aegean Islands. During all the negotiations and meetings, Greece insistently prioritized the Greek identity of the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor to ensure the expansion of Greece's boundaries which had constituted the grounds of Greek irredentism since the mid-19th century.³³⁴ In that sense, the Paris Peace Conference represented the highest point for the successes achieved by Venizelos' diplomacy. On paper, Eleftherios Venizelos created a Great Greece with an area of 171,163 square kilometers and a population of 6.5 million.³³⁵

At the conference, Venizelos and Greek diplomats used all kinds of diplomatic tools effectively. Persuasion, lobbying, negotiation and public propaganda were used to convince Western publics to believe in Greece's territorial rights to the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor on a legitimate basis arising from the ethnic Hellenic character of these areas. In other words, Venizelos used all these diplomatic tools to persuade Western delegations to favor Greece's expansion towards the Aegean and Western Anatolia to free Greek people of those lands under the Greek nation state.

333 Greek delegation in Paris promoted Greece's territorial claims with ethnographical maps and as Dalby argues, by raising the Greek demands with a carefully timing, they persuaded America to decide whether two million Christians shall be condemned to perpetual bondage in Anatolia. Andrew Dalby, *Makers of the Modern World. The peace conferences of 1919-23 and their aftermath. Eleftherios Venizelos' Greece*, 106.

334 Thanos Veremis, "1922: Political Continuities and Realignments in the Greek State" in *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, ed. Renee Hirschon, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003): 53-62. Veremis argues that the construction of cultural identity for Greek people scattered over a wide geographical area from the Peloponnese to Western Anatolia had constituted the basis for the irredentist aims of the modern Greek nation state since the mid-19th century.

335 William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936): 542.

In addition to his title of prime minister, as a talented diplomat he successfully used his qualities of charm, will, power and personal force on the representatives of the Allied Forces and he skillfully promoted his necessary arguments for Greece's claims to take the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia. Particularly, his personal influence over British Prime Minister Lloyd George provided him with an enormous advantage to persuade other participant delegations to accept Greece's claims. Venizelos, by destroying traditional mechanisms of diplomacy together with his British counterpart Lloyd George, reached the most glorious diplomatic victory in the history of modern Greece by persuading the participant states at the Paris Peace Conference to confirm Greece's extension of her boundaries to the Aegean Islands, including Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Samothrace, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Icaria,³³⁶ and the Western Anatolian lands of Turkey.³³⁷

The significance of Venizelos' diplomacy is that it created a modern tradition of enforcing irredentist Greek claims by using diplomatic tools through the Western Powers, with whom Greece had a wide range of political credit.³³⁸ From the Venizelos period onwards, Greek diplomacy, apart from the domestic political developments, always succeeded in using the diplomatic legacy of Venizelos to realize territorial expansion throughout the first half of the 20th century. It was a diplomacy accompanied by stubbornness emerging from that political credit provided by

336 Those North Aegean islands were ceded to Greece with Article 84 of the Treaty of Sevres. See the Turkish translation of the text of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920, *Müttefik ve Ortak Devletlerle Türkiye Arasında 10 Ağustos 1920'de Sevres'de İmzalanan Barış Andlaşması*, 26, Accessed on August 21, 2020, doi: http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Sevr_TR.pdf

337 Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek–Turkish Settlement", 161.

338 According to Llewellyn-Smith, the Western Powers were the main motivators and supporters behind Greece's expansion to the Aegean and Western Anatolia. Cited in Konstantinos Travlos, "The Correlates of Obsession: Selectorate Dynamics and the Decision of Venizelos for Military Intervention in Asia Minor" in *Salvation and Catastrophe The Greek-Turkish War, 1919-1922*, ed. Konstantinos Travlos, (London: Lexington Books, 2020): 73.

the Western Powers. Even though some obstacles emerged, sometimes in a specific time period, to realizing these irredentist goals, Greek diplomacy's significant feature of using that political credit with an insistent character resulted in the achievement of the dreams of taking the Aegean Islands inside the Greek boundaries. The interwar period and post-World War II developments and arrangements proved this.

3.4.3 *Treaty of Lausanne and Status Quo in the Aegean until the Post-Second World War Period*

Eleftherios Venizelos and Greek diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference made history for Greece in 1920. However, the creators of this diplomatic victory were overwhelmed by their territorial ambitions and they did not take the developing dynamics in Turkey, which had the capability to resist to occupation of Anatolia, into consideration. As the flow of historical developments confirmed, the Greek diplomatic victory in Paris was the result of Venizelos' personal efforts to put Allied support on the table. But, the Greek diplomatic environment failed to understand and to see the developing armed Turkish resistance in Anatolia because of the victorious frame of the diplomacy in Paris. More briefly, the dynamics on the diplomacy table in Paris and developments on the field in Anatolia were far removed from each other. Greek diplomacy and the political elite, including Venizelos himself, completely failed to conceive the power and extent of the Turkish nationalist resistance in Anatolia led by Mustafa Kemal.³³⁹

The Ottoman Empire was defeated and dissolved by the end of the Great War in 1918. The Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Sevres confirmed that historic dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Greek geographical expansion against Turkey. However, Italy's disappointment at

339 Dionysios Tsirigotis, "The Asia Minor Debacle: The Causes of Greece's Defeat" in *Salvation and Catastrophe The Greek-Turkish War, 1919-1922*, ed. Konstantinos Travlos, (London: Lexington Books, 2020): 119.

the distribution of the Ottoman lands, based on the fact that they had expected to be given the city of İzmir and the territories around İzmir but were awarded only Antalya and the mountainous Southern Anatolian lands, also weakened Allied projections for the occupation of the Ottoman territories.³⁴⁰ Moreover, France's disinclination for a continuous invasion in Southeastern Anatolia and giving more focus to Syria and Lebanon dealt a major blow to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres related with the sharing of Anatolian lands. In addition to all this, when it was understood that the British intended to give only diplomatic support to Greece,³⁴¹ the Greek Army in Western Anatolia was totally left alone on the battlefield to realize Greece's territorial ambitions in Asia Minor.

The ongoing war between Greek intruders and re-organized Turkish armies under Mustafa Kemal's solid military and political leadership turned into an inconclusive struggle for the Allied plans for distribution of Turkish territories. Despite the diplomatic success at the Paris Peace Conference, Greece's failure to achieve a quick military victory over Turkish resistance forces in Western Anatolia led to two results related with the Dodecanese islands. First, the victory of the Turkish Army over Greek occupation forces made the provisions of the Treaty Sevres and the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement related with the Sevres Treaty, impossible to implement. Thus, a new situation emerged after the Turkish military success against British-backed Greek forces in Anatolia and the direction of the political designs on the Aegean Islands considerably changed. Moreover, the new dynamics that appeared with the Kemalist victory in Anatolia brought forward the necessity for a new arrangement on the Dodecanese issue. Secondly, Greece's military and political failure in the struggle for the enforcement of the provisions of the Sevres Treaty with the Kemalist government in Ankara caused a deterioration in obtaining

340 Michael M. Finefrock, "Ataturk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea: Cause and Consequence of the Greek Plan to Seize Constantinople from the Allies, June-August 1922", D1051.

341 Dionysios Tsirigotis, "The Asia Minor Debacle: The Causes of Greece's Defeat" in *Salvation and Catastrophe The Greek-Turkish War, 1919-1922*, 120-121.

the Dodecanese islands from Italy. In other words, the success of the Kemalist resistance against Greek occupation in Anatolia strengthened Italy's hands against Greece to preserve the continuity of Italian rule in the Dodecanese islands. Then, the new fascist government of Italy under Benito Mussolini's prime ministry began to put pressure on the Allied Powers for the revision of the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement which resolved the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece.³⁴²

Italy had already foreseen the course of events in the Turkish-Greek battle in Western Anatolia and understood the impossibility of implementing the Treaty of Sevres in November 1921. The Italian government changed the official definition of the Italian authority in Rhodes to "the Authority of Rhodes, Kastellorizo and Other Occupied Dodecanese Islands" to give the message to Greece about Italian intentions on keeping the Dodecanese islands under Italian rule.³⁴³ Moreover, Italy's fascist Prime Minister, Benito Mussolini, considered the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement as a humiliation for Italy. The new nationalist perspective of Italian politics was far removed from agreeing to leave these islands to Greece and Mussolini made attempts to keep the Dodecanese under Italian control. In November 1922, soon after Greece's defeat in Anatolia, Mussolini met with British Foreign Minister George Curzon and French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré in Switzerland. Mussolini simply demanded from the Allies to leave the Dodecanese islands under Italian authority as it had been settled in the Treaty of Sevres and in the London Agreement between Britain, France and Italy in April 1915.³⁴⁴

It is crucial to state that the international environment of the 1910s and 1920s was still very realistic and dependent on military power. When

342 Hazal Papuççular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", 67-68.

343 Necdet Hayta, *Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze*, 236.

344 For further details about the talks between Britain, France and Italy cited from the official writings before the Lausanne negotiations started, see Mim Kemal Öke, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı (1922-1923) Cilt 1* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1983): 308-317.

Greece's diplomatic victory at the Paris Peace Conference was not consolidated with military success in Western Anatolia, the decisions on transferring the Dodecanese islands to Greece stayed on paper, too. Or, more precisely, when Italy started to observe Greece's possible defeat against Turkish forces in Anatolia, she renounced her compromises about the Dodecanese in the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement.³⁴⁵ Greece once more encountered the cold face of realistic international relations: If you did not have your own military capability to realize your territorial ambitions, the endless support of the Great Powers was not guaranteed. That was what happened from 1920 to 1922.

At this point, it is important to see how Italy's approach to the Dodecanese issue changed rapidly in a short period of time from July to November 1922. In July, just two months before the Turkish victory over Greece in Western Anatolia, Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Schanzer visited London with the purpose of discussing all outstanding questions, particularly the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the conflict over the Dodecanese islands with Greece. Schanzer proposed a draft agreement to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George and that draft included the return of the Dodecanese islands to Greece, except Rhodes and Stampalia. In return, Italy demanded neutralization of the Corfu Channel for Italy's close security in the Ionian Sea. However, Lloyd George and the British Government did not accept this Italian proposal.³⁴⁶ Italy's position was almost the same as it was in August 1920, because it was still hoped that Greece's military action in Anatolia would be successful in order to suppress Turkish nationalist resistance and Britain was expectant about Greek success over the Turks so as to force the implementation of the Sevres Treaty. However, conditions changed in two months, and thus, so did Italian behaviour. When the Turkish Army achieved a certain victory over Greek forces in Anatolia and the Greek armies were dispersed in a 10-day time period in September 1922, the Italian government remembered the inter-Allied London Agreement of wartime in 1915 and the

345 Hazal Papuççular, *Türkiye ve Oniki Ada 1912-1947*, 28.

346 C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940* (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1975): 188.

Treaty of Sevres which confirmed Italian authority over the Dodecanese islands. Then, Italian diplomatic attempts began for canceling the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement in which Italy had agreed to cede the Dodecanese to Greece.³⁴⁷

Italy's reminder to the Allies about the London Agreement of 1915 and the related provisions of the Sevres Treaty was actually based on her accomplishments for the Allied Forces in the Great War. The Italian government started to pressurize the British and French much more after Greece's defeat in Anatolia, as they did not follow the official engagements of these two treaties. The Italian government constructed its argument on the cancellation of the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement, in which Italy compromised to give all of the Dodecanese islands, except Rhodes, to Greece in the terms and conditions of the post-war period. According to Mussolini's fascist government, Italy had accepted the provisions in the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement in order to contribute to a lasting peace in the Eastern Mediterranean provided by the Treaty of Sevres and this agreement was created as a conciliatory element between Italy and Greece with the common effort of Britain and France for ensuring a peaceful environment in the region, and that was why Italy signed it. The Italians claimed that the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement could be implemented under the previous conditions when the Treaty of Sevres was signed. But now, conditions had changed in the Eastern Mediterranean and the clear victory of the Kemalist forces in Turkey and the evacuation of Asia Minor and İzmir by the Greeks decreased the possibility of a sustainable peaceful environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. So, as the Italians argued, a wide revision of the situation and settlements related with the Dodecanese islands were necessary. Italy, in the post-war conditions in which Greece could not protect her diplomatic gains on the battlefield, now began to promote the necessity of change in the context of the Dodecanese issue. The Italian government started to evaluate the

347 Alan Cassels, *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970): 22-23.

Italo-Greek conflict over the Dodecanese islands as part of a general settlement in the Eastern Mediterranean and did not accept the obligatory nature of the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement. Moreover, Italian assumption on that agreement was based on a simpler affirmation: the Treaty of Sevres could not be implemented because of its unjust provisions, so the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement could not be implemented because of its unjust framework for Italian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.³⁴⁸

Mussolini's government thus demanded the re-examination of the Venizelos-Bonin agreement with the Allied Powers on the whole and Mussolini declared Italy's intention to construct a new settlement regarding the status of the Dodecanese islands. Before that, the Italian Foreign Minister, Carlo Schanzer had already informed Ioannis Metaxas, Greek Ambassador in Rome, on 8 October 1922 that Italy had been intending to discuss the new situation that had emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean and the status of the Dodecanese islands. Furthermore, Schanzer declared to Metaxas that Italy had considered the Venizelos-Bonin Agreement annulled as the conditions had excessively changed in the Dodecanese dispute, and thus, a new arrangement had to be issued. The Italian government instructed the Italian embassies in Paris and London to inform the French and British governments about Italy's re-evaluation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. From that date on, the Italian government began to point out the further difficulties that Italy would encounter with the new Ankara government in Turkey. Thus, Mussolini's ultra-nationalist government began to emphasize vociferously that Italy would reject any proposal which included the transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Greece at the Lausanne Peace Conference.³⁴⁹ Italy made a u-turn on her position on the Dodecanese issue with Greece after the military disaster in Asia Minor. In other words, Greece's military loss in Asia Minor against the Kemalist forces of Turkey very much weakened her

348 Ibid. 39-42.

349 For Italy's diplomatic attempts and rapid policy change with the Mussolini government in Autumn 1922, see Maria Antonia di Casola, "Italy and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. 23 (1993): 69-70.

hand for protecting the gains of the Treaty of Sevres at the Lausanne Conference of 1923.

When the Lausanne Peace Conference opened on 20 November 1922, the actual state of the Aegean Islands was occupation by Greece and Italy. While the Dodecanese islands had been occupied by Italy since 1912, all other Aegean Islands in the eastern and northern parts of the Aegean Sea had been under Greece's de facto authority since the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913. Despite this actual state, the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference had made a great effort to take these islands of the Aegean back under Turkish rule again, because of their geographical location providing great importance for the security of the Anatolian continent and Turkish straits. It is possible to observe Turkey's security concerns about the Aegean Islands from the Turkish delegation's claims to the islands at the meeting on 25 November 1922 related with the status of the Aegean Islands. İsmet Paşa, the head of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference, said: "*The islands of the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea belong to Asia Minor due to their geographical situation. They have a great importance for the peace and security of Anatolia. These islands consist of both small and big ones and especially those small islands in the territorial waters can threaten the peace in Asia Minor. As they are the complementary parts of that region, it is a must to put these islands under Turkey's sovereignty. In addition to that, as they are located in Turkish territorial waters, it is necessary for them to be under Turkey's sovereignty.*"

The rights of Turkey on Tenedos and Imbros, whose destiny are to be determined by the Great Powers according to the agreement dated on 30 May 1913, were confirmed by the note of the same states dated on 14 February 1914. Accordingly, these two islands were put under Turkish sovereignty.

Furthermore, it is necessary that the island of Samothrace which is located close to the Turkish shore and Dardanelles Strait remains in Turkey, and this is proper for looking after one's rights.

Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Icaria islands were left to Greece by the Great Powers. These islands are of vital importance in terms of

Turkey's security. Furthermore, procurement of the economic needs of these islands necessitates their unification with Asia Minor. For this reason, Turkey does not accept the decision taken related with these islands by the Great Powers.

Greece's imperialist aims in Anatolia, which have been learnt by the entire world in recent years, have proved how these islands could create a danger for Turkey's security. Therefore, these islands have to be totally disarmed for the sake of general peace, and only the gendarmerie should be kept in enough numbers to maintain order and safety.”³⁵⁰

At the Lausanne Peace Conference, Turkey's attitude was mostly related with the security concerns, as was clearly understood from İsmet Paşa's words in the session related with the Aegean Islands. There were two main reasons for this attitude: First, Turkey was aware of Greece's irredentist aims towards the Anatolian lands and the founding elite in Ankara had a deep mistrust of the Great Powers. Thus, their stress mostly emerged from worries about the possible usage of these islands for another invasion operation to Turkey in the future. Indeed, there was an example proving that Turkish concern about another possible invasion. The island of Lemnos was actively used by British forces during the Dardanelles Campaign to invade Turkey. Therefore, İsmet Paşa and the Turkish delegates in Lausanne decided to struggle to prevent these islands from being left to Greece's control and rule.³⁵¹ The second reason was rather geopolitical. For the last one hundred years, there had been a geographical balance between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The islands were distributed almost equally. However, Greece had broken this balance in the Balkan Wars by invading the North Aegean islands. Now, there appeared a geopolitical risk for Turkey. If those islands were left under Greek sovereignty, Turkey would consider it as a containment from

350 Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler, Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap I* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969): 97.

351 Nuri Karakaş, "Aegean Islands in the Negotiations at the Lausanne Peace Conference" in *The Forgotten Turkish Identity of the Aegean Islands: Turkish Identity in Rhodes and Kos*, eds. Mustafa Kaymakçı, Cihan Özgün, (Konya: Eğitim Yayınevi, 2018): 222-224.

its western shores, and the Aegean Sea, as the only water passage for Turkey in terms of economic and security concerns, would fall under Greece's control.³⁵²

While the Turkish delegation brought the security concerns forward in the session, Eleftherios Venizelos, head of the Greek delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference, approached the situation completely ethnocentrically. Venizelos claimed that in these islands, over which Turkey purported to keep hegemony, Greeks composed the majority of the population. For that matter, Venizelos pointed out the figures related with the ethnic distribution of Greeks and Turks in the Aegean Islands. According to the demographic figures explained by Venizelos in the same session, there were 9,207 Greeks in Imbros, but no Turks; in Tenedos there were 5,420 Greeks and 1,200 Turks; in Kos there were 14,550 Greeks, while there were 2,020 Turks; and in Rhodes, the central island of the Dodecanese, while there were 37,777 Greeks, there were only 4,854 Turks living. Because of this demographic structure of the Aegean Islands where Greeks were in the majority, the Greek delegation at the conference objected to Turkey's demands on the islands and claimed the continuity of Greek rule on the Aegean Islands and the transfer of the Dodecanese islands. Moreover, in the other islands, only Greeks were living, and there was no Turkish population.³⁵³

Greek diplomacy's approach to the political situation of the Aegean Islands was as constant as it was at the Paris Peace Conference, because the irredentist characteristic of Greek strategies on the Aegean Islands was still very effective on the policy-making process in Greece and the Greek representatives in Lausanne did not regard it as necessary to adapt the new conditions of the international system and framework of Greco-Turkish relations to their strategies on the Aegean Islands issue. Their belief in the unification of ethnic Hellenes living in the former and current

352 The debates in the Turkish Parliament shows the anxiety of Turkish ruling elites for possible security threats to Turkey that could come from the Aegean Islands in the future. *Ibip*. 226.

353 Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler, Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap I*, 98.

Turkish sovereign territories under the Greek nation state was still very strong. Despite the agonizing military defeat in Western Anatolia in 1922, they did not change their conception of inter-state relations with an ethnocentric perspective.³⁵⁴

The significance of the Lausanne Peace Conference for the Aegean conflict is that the negotiations during the conference confirmed the relative affiliation of the conflict with both the geoethnic and geopolitical character of Greek-Turkish contest over the region. Greece's expansionist strategies towards Turkey's possible hegemony areas and Turkey's security conceptions regarding the Aegean clashed with each other and this became more apparent during the Conference. The conflict itself was geopolitical, yet only Greece's and Turkey's conceptualizations of their geopolitical aims were different from each other. While Greece mostly focused on her kinsfolk on the Aegean Islands to ensure a strategic advantage for herself, Turkey put her legitimacy regarding the possible security threats forward in order to procure a geopolitical advantage for herself.³⁵⁵ The negotiations for the Aegean Islands at the Lausanne Peace Conference actually wrote the story of that Greco-Turkish geopolitical rivalry.

The Lausanne Conference also confirmed the possibility of the Greco-Turkish conflict over the Aegean Sea of turning into a deadlock in the upcoming decades because of these clashing strategies. Turkey would not bear any further Greek expansionism closer to her Anatolian shores, while on the other hand, Greece could not give up her historical aspiration of the Megali Idea on expansion to the ancient Greek territories.

354 For instance, despite the certain military loss by Greece, Venizelos, when the Lausanne Conference started, was still trying to save 'imagined Greek territories', such as Eastern Thrace and he did not open any discussion about the the Aegean Islands' belonging to Greece. Kaloudis quotes from the correspondences between Venizelos and the government in Athens. See George Kaloudis, "Ethnic Cleansing in Asia Minor and the Treaty of Lausanne", *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 2014): 79-80.

355 Brian W. Beeley, "The Greek-Turkish Boundary: Conflict at the Interface", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978): 356.

Briefly, Turkey had to keep Greece away from her shores to guarantee the security of the Aegean water passage for Turkey's military and economic security, whereas Greece had to achieve the historical ambitions of unifying the Hellenes around the mainland, including the Aegean Islands. The Lausanne Conference could not have concluded a long-lasting resolution of that conflict, and it happened so. The Greco-Turkish fight over the Aegean basin was frozen for a while under the new conjuncture created by the unprecedented dynamics of the inter-war period and a balance was established between the two neighbours.³⁵⁶

On the other hand, although the Aegean dispute was mainly limited to its Greco-Turkish character, Italy was still involved in the conflict due to her ongoing occupation of the Dodecanese islands. Greece, humiliated by the military defeat in Asia Minor, implicitly postponed her claims to the Dodecanese during the Lausanne Conference and did not intend to enter a negotiation with Italy over these islands. The issue related with the Dodecanese was mostly handled as a bilateral Italo-Greek and Italo-Turkish matter to be solved together by Greece, the Great Powers and Turkey. Furthermore, the Italian government also preferred to avoid discussing the Dodecanese within a multilateral environment because of the Great Powers', particularly Britain's, support for the expansionist ambitions of Greek policy makers. The Italians most probably believed that they could keep the Dodecanese islands under Italian rule by negotiating the issue bilaterally with Greece and Turkey and they were not mistaken in predicting Turkey's unwillingness for a new diplomatic battle with Mussolini's Italy over the Dodecanese islands.³⁵⁷

There appeared an indirect diplomatic cooperation between Italy and Turkey at the Lausanne Conference due to the coercive conditions of the

356 Hüseyin Pazarcı, "Lozan Antlaşması'ndan 1974'e Kadar Ege'ye İlişkin Gelişmeler ve Yunanistan'ın Ege Politikası" in *Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler, Tarih Boyunca Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (20 Temmuz 1974'e Kadar)*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1986): 19.

357 Dilek Barlas, "Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-36", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 2004): 233.

international environment for both states.³⁵⁸ Socially, economically and militarily, Turkey had suffered from the battles since the last decade of 1911-1922 and needed an alliance for urging the Great Powers to accept Turkish claims to territorial and economic independence. On the other hand, Mussolini's Italy had to keep the Dodecanese islands under Italian rule and preserve his own popularity which was spiced with Italian nationalism in the highly jingoistic domestic political environment of Italy under the National Fascist Party government.

Thus, Italy and Turkey backed each other up during the negotiations at the Lausanne Conference. While Turkey expressed her security concerns emerging from the Greek expansionism in the Aegean Islands, on the contrary, she did not touch upon any possibility of a security threat which would arise from fascist Italy's continuous occupation of the Dodecanese islands on the southwestern shores of the Anatolian peninsula. On the other hand, despite the Great Powers', especially Britain's diplomatic pressure on the Turkish delegation aimed at inhibiting Turkey's claims, Italy did not accompany that overwhelming diplomatic strategy of the Great Powers. Quite the contrary, the Italian government promoted Turkish claims, especially those concerning the North Aegean islands, because the Turkish-Greek conflict in the North Aegean resulted in the extension of Italy's room for diplomatic maneuver for her claims on keeping the Dodecanese under her rule. In other words, the more Turkey and Greece were busy with the North Aegean islands, the more Italy was diplomatically unconstrained about the Dodecanese. The Lausanne Conference was in fact a multi-party negotiation mechanism; however, most of the negotiations at the Conference were processed in a tripartite structure between the Allies, Turkey and Greece. From the beginning of the Conference, Turkey and Italy seemed to support each other, as their interests in the Aegean conflict had become closer to each other after the Turkish victory in Asia Minor. İsmet Paşa, in Paris before he arrived in Lausanne, had already declared Turkey's position against Italy as being

358 Chester P. Higby, "Aspiring Italy", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 175, The Shadow of War (September 1934): 46-47.

in goodwill with Italy's special interests on the conflicted issues, and in return he expressed his hope to obtain Italy's favorable attitude towards Turkey's claims in Lausanne. At this point, İsmet Paşa actually referred to Italy's expectations of a definitive assignment of the Dodecanese at the Conference. Italy was seeking a simple arrangement about de jure transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Italy and for this reason the Italian delegation in Lausanne was trying to avoid elevating the issue to the international level of the Conference. In this respect, cooperation between the Turkish and Italian delegations appeared to be in each other's interests regarding the North Aegean and Dodecanese islands.³⁵⁹

İsmet Paşa wrote to Ankara about his strategy of not bringing the Dodecanese issue to the agenda of the Conference and he seemed to favor the Italian efforts to give the issue a bilateral perspective: "*The Dodecanese conflict has already been solved. It is not necessary to make it an issue of concern at the Conference now.*"³⁶⁰

In his next telegram to Ankara, İsmet Paşa stated much more clearly his intention for a solution to the Dodecanese issue bilaterally with Italy: "*... I transmitted to the Italians that we can easily reach an agreement with them about the Dodecanese issue. ... The Dodecanese islands, in effect, have not been of concern.*"³⁶¹

Turkey's position on the Dodecanese issue at the Conference was clear after these short evaluations by İsmet Paşa to the government in Ankara: Turkey was seeking Italian support in her diplomatic struggle with Greece over the North Aegean islands and in return the Ankara Gov-

359 For further details about the Turkish and Italian strategies at the Lausanne Conference which backed each other up, and İsmet Paşa's writings related to obtaining Italian support, see Maria Antonia di Casola, "Italy and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923", 71-74.

360 İsmet Paşa's Telegram to the Turkish Government on 29 November 1922, No. 57, Hey'et-i Vekile Riyasetine, No. 38, 39, 40, 29 Teşrin-i sani 38 (29 Kasım 1922), in Bilal N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları I (1922-1923)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990): 149-150.

361 İsmet Paşa's Telegram to the Turkish Government on 24 December 1922, No. 205, Hey'et-i Vekile Riyasetine, No. 139, 140, 24 Kanun-i evvel 338 (24 Aralık 1922), in Bilal N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları I (1922-1923)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990): 274-276.

ernment was not intending to disrupt Italy's interests in the Dodecanese.³⁶² This strategy determined the framework of the discussions on the Aegean Islands and Italian-Turkish association on the Aegean actually became the determining factor in the arrangements related with the Aegean Islands at the Lausanne Peace Conference.

Despite this collaboration between Italy and Turkey at the Conference, İsmet Paşa placed a reservation on the island of Kastellorizo. Turkey insisted on the transfer of Kastellorizo to Turkish sovereignty, but Italy strongly objected to it. In the end, İsmet Paşa was thankful for the help Turkey received from Italy for the arrangements on the conflictual issues with Greece and for Italy's effort to convince the Great Powers to consider Turkey's concerns over territorial and economic independence. İsmet Paşa withdrew his reservation on Kastellorizo island and an exchange of letters followed between the two heads of the delegations which definitely showed a solution had been reached for the issue of Kastellorizo with a bilateral agreement, totally separate from the Treaty of Lausanne. The Italian first delegate informed his government with an urgent telegram: "*With the acknowledgement of our sovereignty on Kastellorizo we have by now favorably defined in the best possible way all the questions of predominant Italian interest before the Conference.*"³⁶³

When this last kink was ironed out between Turkey and Italy in the Conference, there was nothing left to negotiate regarding the Dodecanese issue. Both Turkey and Italy achieved their objectives. Turkey gained Italian support in the negotiations related with the North Aegean islands. However, she could not retake all of the North Aegean islands as she had demanded at the beginning of the Conference. The islands located at the entrance of the Dardanelles Strait, Imbros and Tenedos were left to Turkey's sovereignty to reassure the security concerns. All other North Aegean islands which were under Greek occupation remained in Greece's territory. In other respects, Italy achieved her goal to avoid the internalization of the Dodecanese issue at the Conference. The resolution on the

362 Maria Antonia di Casola, "Italy and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923", 75.

363 Ibid. 76.

Dodecanese islands at the Lausanne Conference favored Italy and those islands remained under Italian rule. It was a win-win situation for both Turkey and Italy. Although Turkey could not fulfill all of her aims related to the North Aegean islands, she was able to ensure the geographical security of the Straits by taking Imbros and Tenedos, which are located at the mouth of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, Italy was able to maintain her existence in the Dodecanese by transforming de facto status over the Dodecanese islands to a legal one with the Lausanne arrangement.³⁶⁴

As a result, Greece, despite her defeat in Asia Minor, protected her sovereignty over the islands of the Eastern and Northern Aegean, as she claimed the ethnic Hellenic coherence of those islands which had been uninterrupted since the ancient times. The Great Powers confirmed those ethno-centric claims of Greece over the Aegean Islands and with the Treaty of Lausanne the North Aegean islands were placed under Greek sovereignty. In addition to Imbros and Tenedos, the small Rabbit Islands were given to Turkey and Italian rule over the Dodecanese islands was officially recognized by the Treaty. Despite many decisive settlements, the Treaty of Lausanne actually introduced a new specific conflict zone between Greece and Turkey which would constitute a background for the future Aegean problems of the 20th century with the new definitions of international law. The texts of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty actually aimed to prevent the possibility of future disputes over the Aegean because of the existence of many small islets which were almost impossible to be listed by name. Based on that point, Greece developed a new claim in the upcoming decades. As the Treaty of Lausanne specified Turkey's renouncement of her rights over islands lying further than three nautical miles from her continental coastline,³⁶⁵ Greece's evaluation of that resolution was to hinder Turkey regarding any claim even over small islets and rocks within that three-mile limit.

364 Fabio L. Grassi, *İtalya ve Türk Sorunu 1919-1923 Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, transl. Nevin Özkan, Durdu Kundakçı, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003): 193-195.

365 Constantinos Stephanopoulos, "An Aegean Peace: International Law and the Greek-Turkish Conflict", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1998/1999): 18.

The Treaty of Lausanne resolved the territorial and military disputes over the Aegean Islands and established a status quo between Greece and Turkey on the Aegean Sea comprehensively in the articles 12-16 as follows: *“Article 12: The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-14th November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Icaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15. Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.*

Article 13: With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Icaria:

(1) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.

(2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.

(3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.

Article 14: The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of persons and property. The maintenance of order will be

assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders.

The agreements which have been, or may be, concluded between Greece and Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.

Article 15: Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Kastellorizzo.

Article 16: Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.

The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from unneighborly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.”³⁶⁶

These articles of the Treaty of Lausanne not only established a regime on the territorial status of the Aegean Islands, but also created a political balance between Greece and Turkey by putting restrictions on the armament of the islands. Those provisions were aimed to prevent any other possible armed conflict in the Aegean Sea in order to keep the status in favor of Greece, as Greece could build an internationally recognized sovereign status on the islands whose characteristics were claimed as Hellenic. However, the territorial ambitions of Greek politics on expansionism towards the historical lands of Hellenism were something that could not be halted. As the Western support interestingly continued after the

366 Lawrance Martin, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 Vol. II* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924): 964-966.

Treaty of Lausanne, despite a decade of tranquility and global war, Greek ambitions were reignited.³⁶⁷

Although the Treaty of Lausanne could not establish a regime for the maritime borders between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea and left the status of small islets unclear, the Treaty constituted a strong geopolitical balance between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean basin. There were strategic losses and achievements for both states. Turkey was recognized as a legitimate and equal member of the international system as an independent nation state, but in return she had to renounce some of her territorial claims, such as the North Aegean islands, Western Thrace, and Mosul and Kirkuk.³⁶⁸ On the other hand, Greece was able to realize some of her aims for territorial expansion, as the legitimacy of Greek rule over the North Aegean islands was confirmed by an international legal agreement. However, the Dodecanese islands were left to Italy and her dreams of continental expansion into Western Anatolia had been totally annulled politically by the Turkish victory in Asia Minor and juristically with the Treaty of Lausanne.³⁶⁹ Within this political balance, an equal area of continental shelf and air space were recognized for both states,

367 For instance, despite the reconciliation between Turkey and Greece in many other problematic areas in the early 1930s, Greek rulers had never lost their motivation to expand towards the Aegean. Greece defined the limit of her territorial waters as 10 nautical miles with the Royal Decree on 18 September 1931. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece The Aegean Disputes A Unique Case in International Law*, 126-127.

368 Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002): 63-64.

369 Sfetas transmits the feelings of Greek public about the Treaty of Lausanne by citing from the Greek press as follows: "In July 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne was perceived in Greece as "the lesser evil", ... The Treaty of Lausanne was a Treaty of defeat; there was no reason for triumph, but for contemplation. The road from Sevres to Lausanne proved to be painful because of the national split of the Greeks and the inconsistency of Greece's former Allies. The revolution of the Greek Army in September 1922 and Venizelos, who opted for peace, saved Greece's dignity in Lausanne. The Asia Minor debacle should be the beginning of Greece's reconstruction and peaceful work. Greece's only requirement was the implementation of the Treaty by Turkey", Spyridon Sfetas, "The Legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Light of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Twentieth Century: Greek Perceptions of the Treaty of Lausanne", *Balkanica*, No. XLVI (2015): 196.

Turkey's security concerns were accepted by all parties who signed the agreement and all of those Aegean Islands which remained with Greece and Italy were disarmed and demilitarized by the explicit provisions stated in Articles 12-16 of the Treaty.

More significantly, the most disappointing characteristic of the post-war process and that balance created by the Treaty of Lausanne for Greece was the decease of Greek continental irredentism. However, only continental projections of the Megali Idea died out as an historical context but its visions continued to survive for Greek policy makers with a self-renewing framework. Despite the clear articles of the Treaty of Lausanne which identified the territorial ownership of the islands in the Aegean Sea, Greece continued her attempts to change the legal status of the Aegean Islands throughout the post-Treaty period. During this period, especially until the end of 1924, Britain played a significant role in preventing Greece's claims on the islands from becoming a new international crisis in the Aegean and Turkey, and as a party of the balance in the Aegean, followed the developments by paying close attention to Greece's claims, even if she was no longer a party of the discussion on the territorial status of the Aegean Islands any more.³⁷⁰ Despite the military loss in 1922 and diplomatic retraction at Lausanne, ongoing claims on the Aegean actually showed the endless character of Greek irredentism. Although, there was the possibility of abuse regarding the small islets and rocks in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Treaty had drawn a clear picture about the legal status of the islands in the Aegean Sea. However, especially Greece continued to insist on discussing and claiming her territorial concerns over the islands of the Aegean.

At this point, it should be stated that the status quo of the Aegean Islands was destined by the Great Powers during the first half of the 20th century. Greece's militarily successful naval campaign in the North Aegean during the Balkan Wars was legalized by the support of the Great

370 Hazal Papuççular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", 78.

Powers, especially by Britain. In the upcoming years, the Treaty of Lausanne legalized Greek expansion over these islands in a geopolitical power gap by confirming the 1914 Decision of the Great Powers.³⁷¹ In a period of dissolution of empires in the international system, in which a relatively weakened Turkey emerged in military and economic terms, Greece's irredentism had actually achieved a limited access to the territorial expansion which had been envisaged with the Megali Idea.

In this sense, the acquisition of some islands in the Northern Aegean and some territories in Western Thrace was not adequate for the historical ambitions of the Greek nation state which had been constructed since the independence. For this reason, despite the realistic features of the international dynamics among the Great Powers and the balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea which was founded by Lausanne, the impractical perspective of Greek foreign policy structure strongly remained in the revisionist environment of the interwar period. A document in the Turkish archives is considerable in that it reveals that Greek political elites were making efforts to consolidate Greek supremacy in the Aegean Sea, even at a time when Greece was struggling with social and economic problems at domestic arena in 1927. In response to Turkey's efforts to show up in the seas by repairing some of the navy elements, it is understood that a commission consisting of political and military representatives has been formed in Greece to work to take the necessary measures for the Greek Navy to sustain its supremacy against Turkey in the Aegean Sea.³⁷² This shows that although there was a peace environment after the Lausanne, the motivation for the belief that the Aegean belongs to Greece was still alive in the minds of Greek political and military decision-makers. But of course, due to challenging conditions in domestic and international politics, Greece did not take any other move towards the Aegean in the 1920s.

371 Yannis A. Stivachtis, "The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands The Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. XXIX (1999): 104.

372 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-10-0-0/Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü/63-422-7, 30 November 1927.

Greece obtained the North Aegean islands with the Treaty of Lausanne and now the Dodecanese question remained as an unattained aim for Greek governments of the time. Despite the strong will to continue the irredentist policy implementations of the Greek policy-making elites, during the 13-year period between 1923 and 1936, Greek governments could not make any progress in entering into a negotiation process with Italy over the Dodecanese question. Two important reasons lay behind this immotility. The first was the chaotic and unstable environment of Greek domestic politics.³⁷³ Greece had experienced a troubled transition from monarchy to a constitutional parliamentary regime and until 1927 that parliamentary regime could not be instituted. The country was ruled by Theodoros Pangalos' military dictatorship until August 1926. Then, Pangalos was removed after another coup organized by Georgios Kondylis and a democratic regime was restored and relative stability was created when Venizelos returned to the political stage again in 1928.³⁷⁴ However, together with the unsettling economic effects of the 1929 Great Depression and the sociological deterioration created by the huge number of refugees from Asia Minor (around 1.5 million), who came from Anatolia after the Greco-Turkish population exchange, Greece's political and military position at international level was significantly weakened for continuing her claims over the Dodecanese islands. Secondly, the increasing Italian threat in the Mediterranean region enforced a weakened Greece to reconcile with Italy in foreign policy.³⁷⁵ Greece was not in an enough powerful position to stand up to Italy's military threat in the region and it seemed a better alternative for Greek foreign policy makers to appease Italy's chauvinist irredentism. Greece's and Turkey's situation

373 Despite the motivation on Greek supremacy in the Aegean remains, Greek governments' priority was to provide peace within the frontiers in that period. See Arnold J. Toynbee, "The East after Lausanne", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 15, 1923): 89.

374 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 108.

375 For an interesting observation which professes Greece's desperation over the Dodecanese islands against imperialist Italy in this period, see N. G. Mavris, "Certain Misconceptions in Relation to the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece", *Social Science*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1946): 26-28.

provided Italy with an opportunity regarding France's increasing political influence in the Balkans and interestingly, Mussolini's Italy encouraged Greece and Turkey to form an alliance for preventing French influence in the Aegean basin from the Balkans.³⁷⁶

France had historically been considered as a rival state for Italy's imperialist aims in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Since the end of the First World War, France began to attempt to form alliances in the Balkans under her own auspices. Especially, the treaty signed between France and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1927 disturbed the Italian government, as the treaty, which had been considered as an anti-revisionist alliance near to Italian territories, might have provided a supremacy in favor of France over the Adriatic basin where Italy had territorial ambitions.³⁷⁷ France's diplomatic steps against Italy disposed the Mussolini government to see both Turkey and Greece as possible allies to balance French influence in the Balkans, or more specifically, to blockade a French-backed alliance system in the Balkan Peninsula.³⁷⁸

In accordance with this purpose, Mussolini started to follow a foreign policy strategy to bring Greece and Turkey together around a revisionist block in the Aegean for balancing the diplomatic alliance created by France in the Balkans. Mussolini encouraged both Turkey and Greece for a rapprochement through diplomatic negotiations in order to discuss and solve problems between the two countries for establishing a Greco-Turkish alliance which would be backed by Italy. Mussolini's strategy created an Italian-Turkish rapprochement in the late 1920s and with Turkey's modest approach to the big powers in the establishment period of the Turkish Republic, this brought about a reconciliation process between Italy and Turkey, and Greece, as well. In April 1928, the Turkish, Greek and Italian foreign ministers met in Milan and negotiated a treaty between

376 Mustafa Türkes, "The Balkan Pact and Its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States, 1930-34", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1994): 130.

377 Ibid. 127-128.

378 Dilek Barlas, "Friends of Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936", 238. Also see Hazal Papuçcular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", 143.

the three actors in the Mediterranean. During the Milan meeting, the three parties agreed to conclude the reconciliation among themselves with a treaty and as a result of this, Italy and Turkey signed the Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation on 30th May 1928. The Italo-Turkish Treaty of 1928 assured reciprocal neutrality in case of an armed conflict with a third party and forbade Italy and Turkey to join any military alliances which were directed against either of them.³⁷⁹ This treaty revealed the change in Italian strategy over Turkey which marked the elevation of Turkey's position to a sovereign state in the international system which had to be considered by Italy through economic, political and military cooperation.³⁸⁰

In addition to the Turkish-Italian agreement, the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and agreements in 1930 created a peaceful atmosphere in the first half of the 1930s.³⁸¹ However, this peaceful period was mostly the result of fear arising from Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean, and both Greece and Turkey themselves had to follow an alliance policy to restrain Mussolini's aims in the region. These three factors, namely, Italy's need for a counter-alliance against France in the Balkans, Turkey's need for reconciliation with Italy for any possible aggression towards Anatolia from the Dodecanese and Greece's need to reconcile with Italy under the heavy domestic socio-economic and political conditions of the country interestingly became correlated with each other and resulted in a temporary detente over the Aegean disputes. More briefly, diplomatic rivalry between Italy and France in the Balkans caused a Greco-Turkish

379 Nicola Degli Esposti, "An impossible friendship: differences and similarities between fascist Italy's and Kemalist Turkey's foreign policies", *Diacronie Studi di Storia Contemporanea*, No. 22 (2015): 6.

380 Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, "To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-32", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (October 2002): 149.

381 Hazal Papuççular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", 144.

detente over the Aegean Sea until the negotiations for the new regime for the Turkish Straits began.³⁸²

The first attempt to break the Greco-Turkish balance in the Aegean was undertaken by the Greek government during the negotiations of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits in 1936. During the discussions on the military situation of the Turkish Straits, when Turkey claimed to militarize the Straits because of the security concerns, Greece had drawn a conclusion from the Turkish claim that she also had the right to militarize the North Aegean islands because of similar security concerns, as the content of the Montreux agreement lifted the demilitarized status of the islands adjacent to the Dardanelles.³⁸³ The Greek Ambassador in Paris, Nicolas Politis, who was the representative of Greece in the Montreux negotiations, claimed that if Turkey was to be allowed to militarize the Straits, in return the Greek government also had the legal right to militarize the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, which are located at the mouth of Dardanelles Strait, for the possible security threat which would arise from the militarized Turkish Straits under the full sovereignty of Turkey without any international surveillance.³⁸⁴

It should be noted that Greece came under the rule of the corporate politician, the former army general Ioannis Metaxas in April 1936 and Metaxas declared his corporate regime, which is known as the 4th of August Regime,³⁸⁵ or Metaxas Dictatorship in August 1936 when the Mon-

382 France was the patron and defender of the status quo in the Balkans in the early 1930s and Italy was the threat for breaking French patronage in the region. See, Roumiana Preshlenova, "Uniting the Balkans: Common Desires and First Initiatives in the Interwar Period" in *Disintegration and Integration in East-Central Europe 1919-post-1989*, eds. Wilfried Loth and Nicolae Paun, (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2014): 102-103.

383 R. Craig Nation, "Greek-Turkish Rivalry and the Mediterranean Security Dilemma" in *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, ed. Stephen J. Blank, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999): 286.

384 Necdet Hayta, *Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze*, 262.

385 4th of August Regime: Greece fell into political instability by the mid-1930s. After the legislative elections of October 1935, the monarchy was restored, and after the legislative

treux negotiations were in progress. The Metaxas rule created a new nationalist awakening in all aspects of society in Greece after long-lasting political instability and domestic rivalry among the Greek political elite especially from the Asia Minor disaster in 1922 onwards.³⁸⁶

The Metaxas government's second attempt to break the Greco-Turkish balance in the Aegean Sea aimed to extend Greece's territorial waters. Soon after he established his corporate administration, Metaxas took a step to extend Greek territorial waters on the Aegean on 8th October 1936. The Metaxas government enacted a law (numbered 230/1936) concerning the extension of the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Greece. In article 1 of this law, it is set forth that the extent of the territorial sea is fixed at six nautical miles from the coast, without prejudice to provisions in force concerning special matters, with respect to which the territorial zone should be delimited at a distance either greater or less than six miles. The king approved the law and Greek territorial waters were extended from 3 nautical miles, which was fixed in the Treaty of Lausanne, to 6 nautical miles, which constituted the first blow to the geopolitical balance in the Aegean and constituted the first step of the new type of

elections of January 1936, none of the political parties could gain a majority in the Hellenic Parliament. Besides, the communists won 15 seats and became a balance of power between the Monarchists and Liberals (Venizelist Republicans). General Ioannis Metaxas was appointed as Minister of Defence and then Prime Minister in the spring of 1936. The appointment of Ioannis Metaxas as prime minister resulted in widespread strikes and protests all over the country and the country was dragged into a socio-political deadlock in the summer of 1936. Metaxas declared a state of emergency on the 4th of August with the excuse of social unrest and communist danger, with the support of the King. He adjourned the parliament and amended the articles of the constitution related with civil rights and freedoms. Metaxas ruled the country with totalitarianism until his death on 29th January 1941. This period was known as the "4th of August Regime" or "Metaxas Dictatorship" in Greek political history.

386 For an interesting and comprehensive evaluation of nationalist awakening through press propaganda during the Metaxas dictatorship, see Marina Petrakis, *The Metaxas Myth Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005): 175-190.

Greek irredentism towards the east.³⁸⁷ With this decision, maritime areas on the Aegean Sea which fell under Greece's sovereignty increased to 35%.³⁸⁸ This extension represents a change in the Greek strategies for irredentism towards the Aegean which would be put into practice after the Second World War. In other words, when continental irredentism came to an end after the Second World War, Greek diplomacy was already prepared to transform Greek irredentism into a judicial phenomenon with this act before the Second World War.

In addition to this, when Metaxas became prime minister in April 1936, the Greek government had already begun diplomatic attempts to be freed of the obligations that emerged from the Balkan Entente of 1934.³⁸⁹ Soon after he became Prime Minister of Greece, Metaxas immediately notified the Council of the Balkan Entente that the agreement did not enforce any obligation for Greece to join in cooperation with any power out of the Balkans. This notification was actually a violation of Article 3 of the Balkan Entente of 1934 and it was against the terms of Article 4 of the agreement, which prevented signatory parties from making any political or military alliance with non-Balkan powers against the signatory

387 Britain objected to Greece's decision on extending the territorial waters to 6 nautical miles, as it had broken the territorial balance in the Aegean, but Turkey did not show any counter reaction due to the friendly relations with Greece and strategic priorities in the 1930s. See the explanations in the endnote 152 of Jon M. Van Dyke, "An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law", *Ocean Development & International Law*, Vol. 36, Issue 1 (January-March 2005): 108.

388 Hüseyin Pazarcı, "Lozan Antlaşması'ndan 1974'e Kadar Ege'ye İlişkin Gelişmeler ve Yunanistan'ın Ege Politikası", 24.

389 Balkan Entente (1934): This was a treaty signed by Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia on 9 February 1934, in Athens. The Balkan Entente was signed to maintain the geopolitical status quo in the Balkan region following World War I. The Entente was in fact intended to form a united front against Bulgarian irredentist ambitions on the territories of the Balkan states. The Entente obliged the signatory parties to suspend all disputed territorial claims against each other and not to participate in any cooperation with a non-Balkan power against the signatory states.

states.³⁹⁰ In July 1936, before Metaxas declared his corporate regime, he started the process of nullifying the Balkan Entente. Metaxas' policy change towards the Balkan Entente resulted in British-Greek rapprochement for an alliance against possible German aggression towards the Balkans after Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland, which caused a fracture in the balance of power in Europe in favor of Germany.³⁹¹ These changes in Greece also caused the remembrance of the irredentist motivations in the foreign policy-making process among the political elites of the country. When Europe was preparing for a new conflict with the increase of revisionist German power on the continent, Greece, although she did enter any official alliance, started to show a tendency towards possible cooperation with the old ally, Britain in order to be protected from German aggression.³⁹² At the same time, the international situation provided an opportunity for Greece to observe international conjuncture for maximizing her territorial interests in the Mediterranean including the Dodecanese islands.

However, neither the Greek mainland nor the islands of the South Aegean could be prevented from German occupation. German forces started to attack Greece in April 1941 and almost the whole country was occupied by the Wehrmacht (the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany) after a one-month resistance. In addition, when the Allies were defeated at the Battle of Crete in May 1941, the Dodecanese islands and many other Greek islands in the Aegean Sea were also occupied by the Axis Powers. The Dodecanese islands remained under Axis occupation for more than two years and when Mussolini's Italy surrendered to the Allies in September 1943, an extensive Allied military operation in the Dodecanese soon began. The main reason for the Allied campaign in the Dodecanese islands was to capture these Italian-held islands in the Aegean Sea and to use

390 Harry Cliadakis, "The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Metaxas Dictatorship, 1935-36", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1979): 130-131.

391 Ibid. 132-133.

392 Sotiris Rizas, "Geopolitics and Domestic Politics: Greece's Policy Towards the Great Powers During the Unravelling of the Inter-War Order, 1934-1936", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 2011): 155-156.

them as military bases against German occupation in the Balkan territories. However, the Allied operation was planned without any air support and it resulted in a military failure. During the two months until the end of November 1943, the Dodecanese islands fell into German hands again and the Allied forces suffered heavy casualties in men and naval vessels. The campaign resulted in a German victory and the Dodecanese islands remained under German occupation until the end of the war. When Germany surrendered in May 1945, the German forces in the Dodecanese islands were transferred and British forces were brought in. Soon afterwards, Britain founded a military administration of the Dodecanese islands to rule during the transition period until their final legal status was determined in 1947 in the Paris Peace Treaties.³⁹³

Greece's occupation by the Axis Powers between 1941-1944 resulted in enormous economic and physical damage to the country. However, the international public were always kept focused on the Hellenic identity of the Dodecanese and even during the most intense period of the war, Greece's claims to the Dodecanese were promoted by scholars in the Allied countries. For example, in 1941, J. L. Myres complained about the Axis occupation of the islands whose ethnological connection with Greece was broken and he mentioned the pure Hellenic character of the population living in the Dodecanese islands by establishing a connection with the Ancient Greeks.³⁹⁴ However, the conflict with Italy over the Dodecanese still remained strongly alive and when the course of events began to develop in favor of the Allied forces, the ambitions towards reclamation of the Dodecanese islands were reanimated, especially from 1944 onwards. Particularly in the United States, Greek diplomacy had already begun to mobilize the international public for the post-war arrangements of the status of the Dodecanese in favor of Greece. Already in 1944, the Greek Ambassador in Washington DC, Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, wrote the fol-

393 Hazal Papuççular, "War or Peace? The Dodecanese islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)", 401.

394 J. L. Myres, "The Islands of the Aegean", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (March 1941): 144.

lowing in an American journal: “*The Greek claims on the Dodecanese islands rest mainly on the principle of nationality. The Dodecanese-which means twelve islands-include Rhodes, Cos, Patmos, Kalymnos, Leros, Nisyros, Tilos, Khalki, Symi, Astropalia, Karpathos, and Kasos, as well as the tiny island of Kastellorizo. According to the census taken in 1936, they have a population of 140,000, of which 80 percent are Greek, 10 percent Turkish, and 10 per cent Italian settlers. No comment is therefore needed on the justice of Greece's expectations for these islands. It is pertinent only to note that even Italian leaders such as Count Sforza and other members of the Mazzini Society in the United States have openly admitted recently that a democratic peace must give the Dodecanese to Greece*”.³⁹⁵

Despite the effective diplomatic attempts towards American foreign authorities, by the end of the Second World War in April 1945, the American Foreign Ministry was still undemonstrative about transferring the Dodecanese islands to Greece. On the other hand, British governmental authorities had already chosen their side regarding the Dodecanese issue in favor of Greece. It is possible to observe from the memorandum sent by US Department of State to the British Embassy in Washington DC on 27 April 1945 that the British Government made a proposal for the transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Greece, but American decision makers refused it: “*The Department has read the paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador; copy of which has been received from the British Embassy, concerning plans for British military administration in the Dodecanese islands and a proposal that the British Government make a statement indicating that it will support Greek claims to the Islands. The Foreign Office has expressed the hope that the*

395 Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, “Greece’s National Aims. Their Historical and Ethnological Background”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 232, A Challenge to Peacemakers (March 1944): 113.

proposal will meet with the approval of the United States Government".³⁹⁶

By the end of the war, there was a strong mobilization among the Greek public and policy makers for the destiny of the Dodecanese. On the same day when Germany laid down its arms on 7 May 1945, the Greek government applied to Britain and demanded the transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Greece. Moreover, on the same day, the Regent and the Archbishop of the Church of Greece, Damaskinos, departed for Rhodes to give the message on the unification of the Dodecanese islands and mainland Greece.³⁹⁷

Greek diplomacy at the end of the war was aware of the opportunity for the territorial integration of the Dodecanese islands with the Greek nation state, and, despite the major domestic political problems in the country, diplomatic efforts could be made in accordance with associations and foundations of diaspora Greeks and Greeks of the Dodecanese islands in different parts of the world. In other words, a total mobilization was instigated together with Greek diplomatic officials and non-governmental organizations towards the American and English authorities. In the end, both the American and British governments were convinced for the transfer of the Dodecanese from Italy to Greece and Britain played a crucial role in enabling a consensus among the victorious Allied Powers.³⁹⁸ Thus, once more the old alliance between Britain and Greece emerged in the post-Second World War era and Britain succeeded in constituting a common understanding among the Allies on the Dodecanese question in favor of Greece. At the beginning of 1946, the United States and Britain came to a final agreement to transfer the Dodecanese islands

396 The Department of State to the British Embassy, Memorandum, 868.014/4-1745, Washington, April 27, 1945, in Herbert A. Fine, Ralph R. Goodwin, John P. Glennon, Rogers P. Churchill, Laurance Evans (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945): 308.

397 Hazal Papuççular, *Türkiye ve Oniki Ada 1912-1947*, 204.

398 Ibid, p. 203.

to Greece. However, the Soviet Union had the last word on the destiny of the islands. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov declared at the Big Four Conference held in Paris in June 1946 that the Dodecanese islands should be ceded by Italy to Greece.³⁹⁹ As a result, the Dodecanese question was resolved with the consensus of the Allies, as British diplomats had worked for.

The Treaty of Peace with Italy within the Paris Peace Treaties legally confirmed the handover of the Dodecanese islands by Italy to Greece. Italy, as one of the defeated parties of the Second World War, actually did not have any diplomatic power to object to the consensus of the Allies on transferring the Dodecanese to Greek sovereignty. In the negotiations of the Paris Peace Treaties, the Dodecanese question did not occupy a long part of the process and the Italian government agreed to cede all the islands which were under Italian rule to Greece with Article 14 of the Treaty. As the Greek population of the islands wished and more significantly, as the Greek policy makers had dreamed of for decades, the Dodecanese islands including the small island of Kastellorizo were integrated into Greek national territories with the condition of demilitarization.⁴⁰⁰ In this sense, the Paris Peace Treaties represented the final phase of Greek national integration since independence almost 120 years before. Except for Eastern Thrace, Western Anatolia and Cyprus, the Megali Idea's territorial conceptualization was almost realized by the post-Second World War era with the endless diplomatic support of Britain for Greece throughout almost one century.

399 Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The Four Ministers Conference in Paris", *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, Vol. 2, No. 13 (June 24-July 7, 1946): 392.

400 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, "Peace with Italy – An Appraisal", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (December 1947): 493.

3.4.4 *Shift from Continental to Maritime Expansion in the Cold War Environment*

Greek irredentism underwent a radical change during the post-Second World War era in response to the radical transformation in the international system. After 1945, the destructive results of the Second World War enforced the new great powers of the system, the United States and Soviet Union, to develop international cooperation to safeguard their global strategic interests. International cooperation was built up through international organizations with an institutionalist approach in the post-Second World War era. Eventually, the institutionalist development of this international cooperation revealed the necessity for adopting new regulations to shape the global order and to prevent a global conflict among the states.⁴⁰¹

Furthermore, the perspective of the conflict also changed enormously during the first decades of the Cold War era. The most significant change in the characteristic of the conflicts was the transformation from armed battles on the continents to global competition for economic and technological superiority.⁴⁰² Thus, the Greek type of expansionism which aimed to unify the people of same ethnic and cultural identity under the territorial integrity of a single nation state fell behind the modern developments in the international system. The new and challenging developments in the international system enforced the nation states to re-evaluate their power elements at regional and global level by adopting the regulatory characteristics of international law.⁴⁰³ To be more precise, the superiority

401 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War" *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 461-462.

402 A. W. Purdue, "The Transformative Impact of World War II", *European History Online (EGO)*, published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz (2016-04-18), Accessed on January 2, 2021, doi: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/purdukea-2016-en>

403 Heinhard Steiger, "From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World Citizen – Reflections on the Formation of the Epochs of the History of International Law", *Journal of the History of International Law*, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (2001): 190-191.

of the nation states over a rival state became strongly related to their economic and technological power as long as they could adopt the democratic values and principles of international law among their national interests.

The significant result of this international institutionalism was the rapid development of international law through multilateral international treaties and conventions. In addition to international regulations adopted through international institutions, when the increasing importance of maritime areas became the new conflictual phenomenon among the states, protection of the peace on the seas became necessary, too. Thus, clashes of geopolitical and economic interests on the seas were transformed from close combat with war vessels to judicial conflicts with new definitions, such as 'territorial waters' and 'continental shelf'. The territorial water conception had been defined in the first half of the 20th century, but when economic resources under the seabed began to be discovered as a result of the technological developments, utilization of the seabed also became an element for conflicts between the states. The definition of continental shelf was developed out of these new conflicts and a comprehensive regulation on the continental shelf issue became necessary in the 1950s.⁴⁰⁴

Under these changing circumstances of the international system, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, in accordance with the soul of the period in which global peace was promoted as a phenomenon, was signed in Geneva on 29 April 1958 in order to place the ongoing and possible maritime conflicts between the states under regulation. The Convention basically constituted the rights of the sovereign states over the continental shelf in the surrounding seas. In general, the Convention focused on establishing a regulatory judicial regime for governing the su-

404 For further details and discussions about the historical development of the continental shelf issue in the 1950s with international aspects, see Ann L. Hollick, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981): 117-126.

perjacent waters, maintaining the submarine cables and pipelines, governing the navigation, fishing, scientific research and the coastal states' competition in the maritime areas, delimitation of the usage of the seabed among coastal states and tunneling on the seabed.⁴⁰⁵ The Convention made a definition of the continental shelf in terms of exploitability of the natural resources under the seabed rather than making a geographical definition which might cause a new type of motivation towards a territorial expansion for the coastal states. Article 1 of the Convention clearly defined the continental shelf by referring to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas which are adjacent to the coast and outside the territorial waters to where the depth of the superjacent waters allows for the exploitation of natural resources.⁴⁰⁶

Despite the peaceful framework of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the adoption of international law and regulations in the national strategies of the nation states had the problem of misperception. The new definitions in the international maritime law were not something extraordinary for those nation states who had frontier problems with the neighboring countries arising from historical conflicts, such as Greece. Those nation states immediately began to claim the use of new legal definitions in the international maritime law for their expansionist aims. This was certainly true for Greece and Greek diplomacy, as they did not wait long to transform the legal definition of continental shelf to good account for the Greek nation state.⁴⁰⁷

The continental shelf issue between Turkey and Greece, as a political factor affecting the relations of two coastal states of the Aegean Sea, appeared on the political agenda with Greece's efforts in seismographic research and petroleum exploration in the 1960s. Turkey did not react to

405 Rene Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, *A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea* (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991): 328.

406 Malcolm Nathan Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 523.

407 After the Geneva Convention, Greece began to conduct first research works with geophysical survey in 1961. Cihat Yaycı, *Yunanistan Talepleri (Ege Sorunları) Soru ve Cevaplarla* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2020): 139.

those attempts in the 1960s, as most probably the Cyprus problem was considered as a more crucial foreign policy issue, and all Turkish governments were busy enough with domestic political developments in Turkey's unstable inner political environment throughout the 1960s. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, Turkey started to give more attention to the newly emerging continental shelf issue in the Aegean Sea and in November 1973, the Turkish government authorized the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türk Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı – TPAO) for petroleum exploration in 27 areas of the Aegean Sea.⁴⁰⁸

The continental shelf issue between Turkey and Greece turned into a political crisis with Greece's diplomatic responses in 1974. Greece sent a note to Turkey on 7 February 1974. The note stated that the territories in which the TPAO had been permitted for exploration, including the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Aya Evstratios, Chios, Psara and Antipsara, and the seabed under these islands belonged to Greece and the Greek government had absolute sovereignty over these territories. The Greek government claimed these sovereignty rights with reference to Article 1, Paragraph b, Clause 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Besides, it had been indicated in the note that Greece had already been permitted to undertake petroleum exploration since 1961 in the territories where Turkey gave exploration permission to the TPAO. For the limitation of the continental shelf, the Greek government referred to Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention and claimed that the midline rule is the one which can provide an equal sharing for the limitation of the continental shelf between two coastal states whose coasts face each other. Furthermore, the Greek government declared that Greece did not recognize Turkey's permits for petroleum exploration in the region, had sovereign rights for conducting exploration of the natural resources of these islands

408 Greece began to grant exploration licenses beyond its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from mid-1960s onwards. Greek government enacted a decree law on exploration and operation of submarine resources in 1969 and a law on the oil researches towards the determination of the continental shelf in 1972. Ibid. 139. For Turkish government's authorization of TPAO in November 1973, see *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, 1 November 1973.

and for benefiting from these resources and reserves as sovereign rights.⁴⁰⁹

Turkey developed an objection to Greece related with the continental shelf issue with a counter note. The Turkish note dated 27 February 1974 stated that international law and legal conditions had been carefully examined before permitting the TPAO and the permission to the TPAO had been given with reference to the 1958 Geneva Convention and decision on the North Sea Continental Shelf issue made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In this note, Turkey basically explained its own legal and political approach to the continental shelf issue and declared its own arguments. According to Turkey's argument, the seabed under these territories is the natural extension of the Anatolian continent, and thus, Turkey has the right to conduct exploration of the seabed under these islands according to the conventions and ICJ decisions. Turkey also clearly declared that the Greek islands, which are close to the Turkish coast, are located on the natural extension of the Anatolian continent and because of that, these islands cannot be considered as having continental shelf separated from the Greek mainland. In addition to this, Turkey declared in this note that it would not accept the principle of equidistance as a rule of law to determine the limits of the continental shelf. On the contrary, Turkey's position was a kind of mutual agreement on the limitation of the continental shelf of coastal states, whose coasts are facing each other, rather than the equidistance principle. The equidistance principle was considered as a third option at the Geneva Convention and decisions of the ICJ, if the parties cannot reach an agreement or if there is no other limitation under special circumstances. Additionally, there had never been any attempt from either the Turkish and Greek sides to determine the limits of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Although there had never been any intention for an agreement, the Greek government continued to give permission for petroleum exploration in the Aegean Sea.

409 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note Verbale to the Embassy of Turkey in Athens on 7 February 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)* (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1980): 21-22.

According to Turkey's opinion, decisions made by the ICJ and articles of the Geneva Convention state that islands have a secondary importance for limitation of the continental shelf. Turkey claimed that the Aegean Sea was a typical "special case" and thus, Turkey and Greece should start negotiations to reach an agreement on an equal basis in line with international maritime law.⁴¹⁰

The continental shelf issue was not clear for either side during the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. Both states brought the issue onto the political agenda within the perspectives of their national interests. When the issue turned into a serious inter-state dispute in the Aegean Sea, both parties could then understand their perceptions on the principle of the continental shelf after these exchanges of notes in the first half of 1974. The Greek government declared with another note on 24 May 1974 that it was not against a limitation of the continental shelf between Turkey and Greece in accordance with the positive rules of law determined by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf.⁴¹¹ The Turkish government responded positively with a note on 5 June 1974 and declared that it was ready to start meetings in order to find an urgent solution to the issue and agreed that the place and the date of the meetings could also be determined by Greece.⁴¹²

Although there were some positive attempts from both sides, when Turkey sent the military research ship TCG Çandarlı to the Aegean Sea for a magnetometric survey, it caused tension between the two states. The Greek government immediately protested Turkey on 14 June 1974 and

410 Note Verbale of the Embassy of Turkey in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 February 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 23-24.

411 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note Verbale to the Embassy of Turkey in Athens on 24 May 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 25.

412 The Response of the Embassy of Turkey in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 June 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 25-26.

claimed Greece's exclusive sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea with reference to the first and second articles of the 1958 Geneva Convention. The Greek government stated that these attempts by Turkey were threatening the sovereign rights of Greece in the region and that in such an environment, it was not possible to start the negotiations for a permanent solution to the dispute.⁴¹³

Despite the reaction against TCG Çandarlı in Greece, the Turkish Government did not back down and gave TPAO oil exploration licenses in four more fields in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea with a prime ministry decree dated July 2, 1974⁴¹⁴ and rejected Greece's notice of protest with a counter note on 4 July 1974. The Turkish note stated that the TCG Çandarlı was doing research in the Turkish continental shelf area in accordance with international law and that the ship would continue with this research work within the perspective of the petroleum exploration privilege program.⁴¹⁵

The continental shelf issue between Turkey and Greece remained as a diplomatic dispute until July 1974 and both states preferred to keep the peace and not to increase the tension, and they discussed the issue with the exchange of diplomatic notes. However, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 changed the direction of the relations between the two countries, as well as the continental shelf issue. Greek government gave a severe note to Turkey stating Greece's sovereign rights on the continental shelf and the islands' position of having continental shelf on 22 August

413 The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note Verbale to the Embassy of Turkey in Athens on 14 June 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 26-27.

414 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-18-1-2/Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı (1928-)/317-46-9, 2 July 1974.

415 The Response of the Embassy of Turkey in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 July 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 27.

1974, after Turkey's intervention in Cyprus.⁴¹⁶ But, Turkey had already opened four new areas in the Aegean Sea for petroleum exploration and gave permission to the TPAO to carry out explorations in these four new areas with a decree of the council of ministers on 18 July 1974,⁴¹⁷ just two days before the Cyprus intervention began.

Turkey's position on the Aegean continental shelf dispute changed to more rigid diplomatic behavior, especially after the Cyprus intervention in 1974. The Turkish government firmly rejected the last Greek note with a counter note on 16 September 1974. In that Turkish note, the areas where the TPAO had been permitted for exploration in the Aegean Sea were defined as Turkish continental shelf. However, Turkey left the door open for possible negotiations in the future and stated that the dispute over the determination of the limits of the continental shelf under the Aegean Sea, where the two countries shared opposing shores, could be resolved with an acceptable and common-sense solution by first-hand negotiations.⁴¹⁸

The Exchange of notes on the continental shelf issue continued in 1975. Greece issued a note to Turkey on 27 January 1975 and it is stated in that note that Greece was willing to reach a limitation on the continental shelf on the Aegean Sea within the perspective of international law. However, it was understood from that latest Greek note that as both countries had different approaches to the Geneva regulation on the continental shelf, the Greek government offered to ask the ICJ to determine how the regulation would be implemented and what the disagreements would be on the content of the issue. Moreover, the Greek government offered to

416 The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note Verbale to the Embassy of Turkey in Athens on 22 August 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 28.

417 *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, 18 July 1974.

418 The Reply of the Embassy of Turkey in Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 September 1974, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, p. 29.

make an agreement between the two countries with the condition of reserving the right to go to the ICJ unilaterally.⁴¹⁹ This approach from the Greek side was quite new. Turkey responded with a positive approach with a note on 6 February 1975, but repeated her opinion on the presence of deep problems related with the Aegean Sea and her constant position on finding a solution to the dispute through first-hand peaceful negotiations. Furthermore, it was stated in that latest Turkish note that Turkey believed the method for the solution of the disputes should be first-hand negotiations. However, Turkey was not against bringing the Aegean continental shelf issue to the ICJ jointly and recommended to start high-level meetings between two states.⁴²⁰

After this exchange of notes in the first half of 1975, both states agreed to start high-level meetings related to the Aegean dispute and the first ministerial meeting was held between 17-19 May 1975 in Rome. At this meeting, the Greek government submitted a draft bond of arbitration which included a joint application of the two states to the ICJ. However, the Turkish government at that Rome meeting implied that the Turkish side was not ready to discuss this draft and the Turkish diplomatic representatives at the meeting argued that searching for a solution to the dispute would be the first step and that this process should be completed before discussing the draft. In the joint statement after the meeting, the parties declared that the issues related to the Aegean continental shelf had been discussed and the initial study of the text of the special agreement to submit the case to the ICJ had been undertaken.⁴²¹

Not the foreign ministers, but the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece met in Brussels on 31 May 1975. Both prime ministers declared

419 Note Verbale of the Embassy of Greece in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 27 January 1975, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 29-30.

420 The Reply of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to the Embassy of Greece in Ankara on 6 February 1975, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 30-31.

421 Nevin Aslı Toppare, "A Legal Approach to the Greek Turkish Continental Shelf Dispute at the Aegean Sea", (A Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2006): 38.

with a joint statement that the problems between Turkey and Greece should be solved in bilateral meetings by using peaceful methods. The prime ministers with this joint declaration decided that the continental shelf issue should be solved by the ICJ and they decided to hold the expert-level meeting for the continental shelf issue soon after the preparations were completed.⁴²²

The two countries interpreted the Joint Declaration of Brussels differently in the upcoming years. While Greece claimed that both countries had come to an agreement to bring the continental shelf case to the ICJ, Turkey insisted on taking the necessary steps to solve the problem through bilateral negotiations. Moreover, the Greek side considered that Turkey's obstinacy about holding bilateral negotiations instead of directly taking the issue to the Court was an attempt to gain time for preparing her arguments for the ICJ.⁴²³

After all these exchanges of notes, disagreements between Turkey and Greece gradually intensified. On the one hand, the parties transmitted their opinions to each other with these notes, while on the other hand, no result was obtained from any of the expert-level meetings. The Bern Meetings in January 1976 comprised an important turning point during this process. However, there was no concrete result at the end of the Bern process, either. It was an expert-level process of meetings and the experts of the two states could not reach any mutual understanding for the solution of the continental shelf dispute.⁴²⁴

422 Sevin Toluner, *Milletlerarası Hukuk Dersleri Devletin Yetkisi (Yer ve Kişiler Bakımından Çevresi ve Niteliği)* (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1984): 207.

423 Fuat Aksu, "Ege Denizi'ne İlişkin Sorunlar Kıta Sahanlığı'nın Saptanması Sorunu", Accessed on August 28, 2020, doi: <http://www.turkishgreek.org/iki-uelke-arasindaki-temel-sorunlar-ve-taraflarin-yaklasimlari/ege-denizi-ne-iliskin-sorunlar/k-ta-sahanlig-n-n-saptanmas-sorunu>

424 In the first Bern Meetings, Greece's position on the continental shelf issue was consolidated on three main aspects: Greece's territorial and political integrity, the Greek islands' own continental shelf and implementation of the median line principle for the seabed between the Greek islands and Turkey's Anatolian coast. Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003): 34-35.

As a result of both parties insisting on their own points of view, Greece sent a diplomatic note to Turkey on 22 May 1976 and in this note it was stated that the disagreements between the two countries continued. The three main aspects of the Greek position in the Aegean dispute were clearly stated in the note: Territorial and political integrity of the Greek continent and the islands, the Greek islands' own continental shelf, and the midline principle to be accepted as the limitation to the continental shelf under the seabed between the Greek islands and Turkey's shores.⁴²⁵ The Greek claims during the Bern Meetings were of course not accepted by the Turkish government. The Turkish delegation placed particular emphasis on the geographical location of some of the Aegean islands. Turkey claimed that the islands of Lemnos, Chios, Samos, Lesbos, Aya Evstratios, Achikeria and Kos were located in the Turkish continental shelf area and so these islands could not have their own continental shelf.⁴²⁶

The second round of Bern Meetings was held in June 1976 and again the parties could not reach any concrete solution. The significant result of the Bern Meetings was the secession of the approaches of the two parties from each other. From the Turkish point of view, Greece's intention was evaluated as a new type of Greek expansionism by using the flexibility of international judicial principles. When the Bern Meetings resulted in a dead end, the negotiations on the continental shelf dispute were ended. There were several reasons for the inconclusiveness of the discussions. First of all, Greece insisted on implementing the midline principle as an international rule to determine the limit of the continental shelf under the Aegean. However, while counting the limits of the continental shelf under the Aegean Sea, Greece's main concern was to delimit the continental seabed by taking account of Greek islands whose shores were

425 Note Verbale of the Embassy of Greece in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 22 May 1976, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 44-46.

426 Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece The Aegean Disputes A Unique Case in International Law*, 252.

facing Turkey's Anatolian continent. Thus, the Greek approach was to count the midline principle from the nearest Greek island to Turkish shores, which was unacceptable to Turkey.⁴²⁷ Secondly, the Greek government declared itself as not disposed to discuss any issue which may lead to renunciation of Greece's rights legally arising from that international rule of law. This approach closed the doors to compromises for the success of the process and negotiations naturally went into a deadlock. Thirdly, Greece's persistent references to those general principles of the UN Charter, which do not require negotiation in the case of any right of a member which is contested by another member, constituted another reason for the failure of the process, and this provided an opportunity for the Greek government to refrain from bilateral negotiations with Turkey. Finally, the Greek government considered the case as a negotiation process on the borders and constructed an inter-relation between the border and the continental shelf.⁴²⁸ Thus, the Greek government simply concluded from the situation that the principles of international law did not allow the states to negotiate the limits of the continental shelf without the midline principle. Moreover, when the midline principle was closed to discussion in the case of the Greco-Turkish Aegean continental shelf, a breakdown in the negotiation process was inevitable.⁴²⁹

Turkey, of course, did not accept any of these Greek claims and continued to maintain her constant position and views on the continental

427 Turkey's approach to the median line principle was quite contrary to Greece's. The Turkish argument claimed that the median line principle should be applied to the mainlands of Greece and Turkey, not to the Greek islands. Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, "The Aegean Dispute in the Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation", *Laws*, Vol. 3 (2014): 15, 17.

428 Alexis Heraclides, "The Unresolved Aegean Dispute: Problems and Prospects" in *Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation From Europeanization to De-europeanization*, eds. Alexis Heraclides and Gizem Alioğlu Çakmak, (London: Routledge, 2019): 91-93.

429 International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 47-49. See Annex VI, The Statement of the Greek Delegation at the Meeting of Experts of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Bern on 19 and 20 June 1976.

shelf issue. The Bern Meetings had ended without any positive result and right after the Bern process, the developments increased the tension over the Aegean Sea. In July 1976, Turkey started to prepare the research ship Hora (MTA Sismik I) to send to the Aegean for petroleum exploration and a short-term crisis, generally known as the Hora Crisis, took place.⁴³⁰

When the Hora Crisis intensified, the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, Dimitris Kosmadopoulos and the Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil had a meeting, but both parties maintained their position. The Greek Ambassador stated his country's position to the Turkish Foreign Minister and he declared that any research attempt without the Greek government's permission on the Aegean Sea meant the violation of Greece's legal rights and would lead to increasing of the political tension between two countries. The Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil seemed intent on not escalating the tension and he responded to the Greek Ambassador that Turkey's attempt was just for scientific research and that this would not mean any change on either country's political and legal positions on the Aegean Sea.⁴³¹ Moreover, Turkey underlined the scientific objective of the attempt and warned Greece not to turn the situation into a military crisis with a National Security Council declaration. The National Security Council of the Republic of Turkey also declared that the Hora would not be accompanied by warships, but in order to guarantee that the vessel would be able to carry out its research normally, its movements would be followed by special devices.⁴³²

Despite the positive meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister and Greek Ambassador, Turkey sent the ship Hora to the Aegean Sea for seismic research in August 1976 and began petroleum exploration. This caused strong anxiety in Greece. The Greek government insisted that any research attempt in the Aegean Sea was subject to the permission of the

430 Athanasios Antonopoulos, *Redefining Greek-US Relations, 1974-1980, National Security and Domestic Politics* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020): 116.

431 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet: Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar 1974-1979* (İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınları, 1979): 253-254.

432 *Milliyet*, 14 July 1976.

Greek government, any research ship's route had to be notified to the Greek authorities, Greece had the right to follow any kind of research ship with military vessels and even they planned to complain Turkey to European allies, NATO and the Security Council.⁴³³

According to Greek governmental reports, the Hora conducted seismic research from 20:45 hours on 7 August 1976 to 00:30 hours on 8 August 1976 without any permission from the Greek authorities and the reports said that the areas where the seismic research was conducted were Greek territories according to international law, its sovereign rights had been violated by Turkey, and the Turkish government had been asked to avoid such attempts.⁴³⁴

Turkey responded to the Greek anger with a note on 8 August. The Turkish government in the responsive note stated that Greece's definition of areas beyond Greek territorial waters as Greek continental shelf was a violation of international law, because the negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf had failed and there had not been any clear determination for the limits of the continental shelf for either country. Therefore, the Turkish government emphasized that Greek claims on the violation of sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean were invalid. Besides, in this note, Turkey added that the Hora was doing research beyond the borders of Greek territorial waters, and, as there was no agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf in these areas, the research work of the Hora was totally legal. Furthermore, Turkey claimed that a solution which was acceptable for both states should be concluded through bilateral negotiations and that the Hora would continue exploration.⁴³⁵

433 Athanasios Antonopoulos, *Redefining Greek-US Relations, 1974-1980, National Security and Domestic Politics*, 123.

434 Note Verbale of the Embassy of Greece in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 7 August 1976, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 54.

435 The Reply of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to the Embassy of Greece in Ankara on 8 August 1976, in International Court of Justice, *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey)*, 54-55.

As Turkey continued the research work in the Aegean Sea, the situation turned into a low-level struggle including only diplomatic tools. After a while, the Greek government began to focus on alternative instruments to strengthen and pursue the political battle against Turkey's unbreakable constant position on the continental shelf.⁴³⁶ One alternative way was the promotion of the issue before the international institutions. After the Hora Crisis of 1976, the Greek government applied to the UN Security Council and ICJ to take action against Turkey in order to internationalize the Aegean dispute, which would constitute a strong legacy for the PASOK government of the 1980s to increase the tone of the Greco-Turkish conflict in the Aegean Sea with a nationalist narrative.

§ 3.5 Historical Background of the Turkish Minority in Greece

Minority issues in Greece are still a strong taboo for the Greek public to discuss. There has always been a great deal of ignorance about the situation of the minorities in the country and the Greek public is always reluctant to accept the existence of different social identities in Greece. Indeed, the great majority of Greek citizens tend to believe that there are no different ethnic groups living in their country.⁴³⁷ The Greek state, as it had been built up on a strong Greek-Orthodox identification, historically pictured a territory fully populated by ethnic Greeks and this inevitably resulted in a reactionary denial of any other social identity other than 'Greek' since the establishment of the Greek state in the early 19th century.

There are historically different religious and ethnic groups living in today's Greece. Muslims in Thrace, small Jewish communities in some of

436 Turkey's evaluation of the regulations in the international law and decisions made by international courts have been based on the primary position of the continental mainlands and the secondary importance of the islands for the limitation of the continental shelf. Alexis Phylactopoulos, "Mediterranean Discord: Conflicting Greek-Turkish Claims on the Aegean Seabed", *The International Lawyer*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1974): 433.

437 Richard Clogg, "Introduction" in *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, ed. Richard Clogg, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2002): x.

the big cities and small groups of Catholic and Protestant Christians in the Aegean Islands can be given as examples of the religious diversity nationwide. Religious diversity does not seem to cause a political problem, as Article 3 of the 1975 Greek Constitution accepts the Greek Orthodoxy as the dominant religion, not the official religion of the state, and Article 13 of the Constitution puts the freedom of religious belief and practice with respect to all known religions under guarantee. But the political problem emerges when the debates on different ethnicities in Greece appear in public discussions and those are strongly accompanied by the state's official non-recognition of the existence of any other ethnic identity apart from 'Greek'. Mainly because modern Greece has been constructed on the legacy of ancient Greek civilization and the modern Greek nation has been considered as the successor of that ancient Greek civilization as a cultural object, naturally, 'Greekness' has become an integrating instrument for the singularity of the identity of the Greek nation.⁴³⁸ Thus, any other ethnic identity has constituted a challenge for that singularity and they have never been accepted either by the state or the considerable majority of the public.

Although there are ethnic groups such as Slavic Macedonians, Vlachs and Albanians in Greece, their number is not significant. Also, it is difficult to access reliable statistical data about their population and hence, they all are accepted as ethnically 'Greek'. However, the minority in the Thrace region is an exception. Statistical data about the Muslim population in Thrace vary and there is a polemic about the number of the "Muslim Minority in Thrace", as officially recognized by the state. While local minority institutions in Thrace claim that the Minority has a population of around 120,000-150,000, official Greek sources say that around 90,000

438 Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafyllidou, *Cultural Diversity in Greek Public and Political Discourses*, EMILIE, D3 Country Reports on Migration and Multiculturalism Discourses, (Athens: ELIAMEP, April 2007): 4.

Muslims live in the provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace.⁴³⁹ However, the debate on the numbers regarding the population of the Minority does not make this particular issue insignificant in the political sphere. On the contrary, the socio-political existence of “Muslim Minority in Thrace”, as Greek officials define it, has created an extensive political dispute, not only in Greece, but also at international level as a foreign policy dynamic, particularly between Greece and Turkey, and from a broader perspective between Greece and international society.

Besides the polemics on the population of the Minority, the major disagreement about the Minority’s social and political presence is related with identification of the Minority as a social entity, that is, with whether the Minority in Thrace is to be identified as a religious minority or as an ethnic minority. More precisely, the question is whether the Minority in Thrace is a Muslim minority or a Turkish minority. The Minority itself strongly claims its Turkish identity, whereas the official Greek approach is defining the Minority as a Muslim minority by referring to the Treaty of Lausanne, as it is described as “Muslim” in the related articles of the Treaty, and so the conflict reaches a kind of dead end. There are two significant reasons underlying the official Greek discourse about the Minority’s identity which debilitate it. First, the Turkish identity, as an ethnic definition, poses a challenge to the singularity of the identification of the Greek nation, as it is explained above. Secondly, closely connected with the first reason, if there occurs a challenge to singular Greek identification of the nation, it naturally results in a political threat to the national integrity.⁴⁴⁰ So, the official Greek stance is to be hysterically sensitive about defining the members of the Minority as ‘Turks’ because of the challenges which have strong potential to damage ‘Greek’ identification of the nation.

439 For a detailed discussion about polemics on the population of the Minority in Thrace, see Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace”, (PhD Dissertation, University of Bergen, 2000): 27-40.

440 Thalia Dragonas & Anna Frangoudaki, “Educating the Muslim Minority in Western Thrace”, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 2006): 22-23.

Furthermore, the Minority's sentiment about its Turkish identity is not based on reasonable explanations, either. There are minority members whose native language is different from Turkish, such as the Muslim Pomaks and there is a Muslim Roma population within the Minority, socially isolated in their own neighborhoods in the cities of Komotini and Xanthi, where the Minority population is concentrated. The Minority's discourse is reactive to this diversity within the Minority and it mostly tends to try to prove the Turkish ethnic origins of the Pomaks and Roma with a nationalist narrative.⁴⁴¹

Even though there is social and ethnic diversity within the Minority, it should be underlined that Turkish identity is widely accepted by both the Muslim Pomaks and Roma, too. The Minority's claim to Turkish identity touches upon Turkish nationalism from the perspective of discursivity, but those claims to identity mostly originate from historical political tension between Greeks and Turks. The *modus vivendi* of the Minority in Thrace has been profoundly affected by the unstable dynamics of Greek-Turkish political relations and the Minority has adopted Turkish identity as a result of long-lasting hegemonic practices on the part of both the Greek and Turkish states.⁴⁴²

This adoptive Turkish identity generates a common supra-identity definition for the members of the Minority. Despite the fact that the Minority members use definitions such as Turk, Pomak and Roma, every one of them is referring to a different ethnic sense of belonging, among

441 For a detailed research study of the Pomaks in the Balkans, see Halim Çavuşoğlu, *Balkanlar'da Pomak Türkleri: Tarih ve Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı* (Ankara: KÖKSAV-Kök Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı, 1993): 106-124. Çavuşoğlu is an academic who has conducted valuable sociological research about different ethnic groups in the Balkans. Although his research is a worthwhile work for discussions on the origins of the Pomaks in the Balkans, he himself comes from the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace and his explanations are rather an attempt to establish a connection between the Pomaks' ethnic origins and Turkish ethnic identity.

442 Fotini Tsibiridou, "Writing about Turks and Powerful Others: Journalistic Heteroglossia in Western Thrace" in *When Greeks Think About Turks: The view from Anthropology*, ed. Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, (London: Routledge, 2006): 133.

themselves, it is clearly observed in their relations with other social elements outside the Minority that they do prefer to express their sense of belonging to the stronger elements of the Minority who are Turcophones.⁴⁴³

Additionally, even though Greek official discourse is disposed to divide the Minority's ethnic identity into three, namely, Turk, Pomak and Roma, in practice, discriminatory policies which are derived from the so-called problem of "the Turks" are imposed on both Pomak and Roma members of the Minority.⁴⁴⁴ Greek official discourse, unwittingly or not, regards the Minority as a possible threat of being "Turks" to the Greek national identification and the Pomaks and Roma are included in this non-recognized Turkish identity of the Minority, too. From this point of view, despite the fact that the Minority has ethnic diversification in itself, the Muslim society in Western Thrace can be described by the definition of "Turkish", as a common supra-identity for the Minority members, although the description of the identity of minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne is mainly based on religion.

3.5.1 *Treaty of Lausanne and Regime for Minorities*

The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) was not only an armed conflict between Turkish nationalists and the Greek Army who invaded Anatolia, it was also a struggle of the Turkish military and political elites for building a Turkish nation from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after

443 Christos L. Rozakis, "The International Protection of Minorities in Greece" in *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996): 113.

444 Aarbakke quotes an article from the mainstream Greek press stating that no matter what descent they are of, the minority members faced with the same discriminatory implementations, such as prohibition of constructing and repairing houses, non-issuing of driving licences; non-recognition of the diplomas obtained from Turkish universities. Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace", 350-351.

the absolute defeat in the First World War. However, the mixed population structure of both Anatolia and the Greek mainland was a strong challenge for the building of new Turkish and Greek nation states by the early 1920s. The homogeneity of the population in the territories of the newly founded Republic of Turkey and in post-1922 Greece had been considered as a necessity by the political elites of both nations. Thus, with a compulsory mass displacement perspective, it was decided to exchange the non-Muslim population of Anatolia and Muslim population of Greece with the Convention on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed in Lausanne on 30 January 1923.⁴⁴⁵ Around 1,200,000 non-Muslims moved to Greece from Turkey and around 400,000 Muslims moved to Turkey from Greece from 1923 onwards.⁴⁴⁶

Besides Turkish motivation to homogenize the population of modern Turkey, there was the same goal on the Greek side, too. Exchange of populations was mostly considered as a powerful complimentary socio-political tool to create a successful modern Greek state with a mono-ethnic Greek identity in terms of culture and linguistics.⁴⁴⁷ However, although the creation of homogeneous societies under modern Turkish and Greek nation states was the aim for representatives of both states, it was a failure for both sides during the negotiations in Lausanne. Their position in the negotiations changed from population homogenization to preserving

445 For a detailed evaluation of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey from a judicial perspective, see Michael Barutciski, "Lausanne Revisited: Population Exchanges in International Law and Policy" in *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, ed. Renee Hirschon, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003): 23-37.

446 The exact numbers and statistical figures of the exchanged populations vary in different studies. It is possible to see different figures in the research on the Turkish-Greek population exchange, but numbers of around 1,200,000 and 400,000 are more likely to represent the numbers of people who were displaced. For example, Onur Yıldırım gives the number of Greek refugees as 1,221,849 and Muslim refugees as 388,146. Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934* (New York: Routledge, 2006): 91.

447 Evtichia Voutira, "I "epitichis" apokatastasi ton Mikrasiaton prosfigon" in *I Ellinotourkiki Antallagi Plithismon: Ptiches mias Ethnikis Sygkrousis*, ed. Konstantinos Tsitselikis, (Athens: KEMO, 2006): 240.

geo-strategic interests and instead of fully homogenized territories, they agreed to leave some of their kinsfolk behind as extended hands into each other's strategic locations, İstanbul and Western Thrace.

The Greeks of İstanbul and Muslims living in the Western Thrace region of Greece (the Western Thrace region is comprised of three prefectures: Xanthi, Rhodope and Evros) were excluded from the population exchange and around 100,000 Muslims, a significant majority of them ethnic Turks, remained settled in Western Thrace, while around the same number of Greeks remained in İstanbul as national minorities. The idea for keeping those groups within previously belligerent states was a strategic decision, rather than a humanistic approach. İstanbul, with its non-Muslim population, had always been a strategic city in the political conflict between Turkey and Greece, and also the Western Powers. Britain, in particular, had made an effort to keep the Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul with its Greek community during the Lausanne negotiations.⁴⁴⁸ When it was decided to maintain the Greek community in İstanbul, in return, Turkey negotiated to keep some Turks in Greece and the Turks of Western Thrace, in a strategic settlement between Turkey and Greece, were kept in their homes. To be more precise, the Greeks of İstanbul and Turks of Western Thrace were considered as strategic policy tools to balance and to ease the conflicts in the strategic issues between Turkey and Greece in the Lausanne negotiations.

The fundamental rights and freedoms of those two minorities were guaranteed with the Treaty of Lausanne and the Treaty created a unique regime for those groups under nation states which were substantially constructed on Greek and Turkish nationalistic ideas with relatively homogenized societies. More literally, the motivation to guarantee the rights of the minority groups with a judicial definition in the Treaty of

448 Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, 104-106.

Lausanne was their potential to challenge the national unity which provides the basis for national identity.⁴⁴⁹ After the long-lasting conflict period, the negotiators of the Greek and Turkish states in Lausanne, most probably, aimed at a total dispatch of the Greek and Turkish populations within their territories. However, this aim could not be realized in Lausanne and the minority regimes in the Treaty of Lausanne, by keeping their fears for possible future challenges, were accepted by referring to the fundamental rights and freedoms of those minority groups.

The articles 37-45 of the Treaty which draw the framework for the status and fundamental rights and freedoms of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey appear under Section III, titled "Protection of Minorities" and the second part of the Treaty, titled "Special Provisions". The provisions on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Minority in Western Thrace were agreed in the last article of that section (Article 45): "*The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.*"⁴⁵⁰

While this Turkish minority group was retained in Greece's new territories after Lausanne, the historical connection of the Turks of Western Thrace to their kin-state stayed strong. In other words, their constitutional identity, which represented a commitment to Greece was still imaginary for almost all of the Muslims living in Western Thrace by the time the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. For this reason, articles 37-45 symbolize the establishment of a constructive regime of protection by the kin-state, the Republic of Turkey, for the security of existence of the Turkish

449 Yeşim Bayar, "In pursuit of homogeneity: the Lausanne Conference, minorities and the Turkish nation", *Nationalities Papers The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2014): 114-115.

450 The original text of the Treaty of Lausanne is in French. For an English transcription of the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne, see "Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923" in Martin Lawrance, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Volume II*, 959-1022.

Minority in Western Thrace. The same relation, vice-versa, prevails between Greece and the Greeks of İstanbul and it reveals the uniqueness of the regime of minorities which the Treaty of Lausanne founded.⁴⁵¹

In the Treaty of Lausanne, while the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Turkish minority were put under the protection of the signatories, it is still difficult to define this as an international protection globally. However, as it is a multi-party and comprehensive treaty, it can be considered more international when compared to other treaties which include minority rights. Thus, the Treaty itself, as it puts the signatory parties under international responsibility with special conditions for minorities, can be identified as both a minority and human rights document among contemporary international agreements, such as the UN documents of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), European Documents of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995).⁴⁵²

The framework drawn up with articles 37-45 in the related section of the Treaty of Lausanne provides for an international, and also sui generis inter-state between Greece and Turkey, and judicial protection for the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace. According to those articles in the Treaty, Greece undertakes to protect the freedom and right to live of the Turkish Minority without any discrimination of race, religion and language, freedom of worship, freedom of movement and migration and equality before the laws. Furthermore, the Greek government guarantees

451 The principle of reciprocity which was adopted in the Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty creates this unique regime of protection by the kinstates. Chousein defines it one of the four important features of the minority regime in the Treaty. Şule Chousein, "Evolution of Minority Rights in Europe: The Case of Western Thrace Muslim Turkish Minority", (Master of Arts Thesis, İstanbul Kültür University, 2006): 91.

452 Evelin Verhas, *Batı Trakya'daki Türk Azınlık: Uzun Yıllardır Süren Hak ve Tanınma Mücadelesi* (Budapest: Minority Rights Group Europe, 2019): 3-4.

to provide a proper environment for the Turkish Minority to take advantage of any political and social rights equally with the majority. Additionally, the Greek government made a commitment to the Minority that the Turkish language would be freely used in private life, in trade, in religious life, in the media, in the relations with public institutions and in the courts. More importantly, Greece guaranteed the right of the Minority to establish and to manage institutions for social, religious and beneficial purposes, to found schools with bilingual education and to provide full protection for religious institutions and waqfs.⁴⁵³

3.5.2 *Situation of the Minority after Lausanne until 1967 Military Coup*

The region of Western Thrace fell under the rule of Greece in 1920 after the Treaty of Sevres, signed as a peace agreement for the post-First World War period between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire and Greece. Thus, the Turkish population in Western Thrace had already experienced Greek rule before the Treaty of Lausanne, but the new regime established with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 provided a strong protection by Turkey over the Turkish Minority. Hence, the short period of 1920-1923 before Lausanne was already enough to create a political mobilization among Turks against Greek rule and the Turkish population in the region had already become a social structure conflicting with Greek authority before the Lausanne regime had been constituted.⁴⁵⁴ That political mobilization created continuing political tension between Greek governments and the Minority in the upcoming years, which introduced two

453 Şule Chousein, "Evolution of Minority Rights in Europe: The Case of Western Thrace Muslim Turkish Minority", 92.

454 There are two reasons for that: Greece's policy towards gradual Hellenization of Western Thrace and the negative effects of the worsening economic situation of the late 1920s on the Minority. Ali Chousein, "Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: The Case of Western Thrace", (Master of Science Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005): 55-56.

political motivations within the Minority: developing political representation at the national level and keeping the Minority's social integrity through a mobilization under institutional organizations at the local level.

In that sense, political representation of the Turkish Minority in the Hellenic Parliament and local bureaucratic organization by Turks in the prefectures of Western Thrace constituted the significant characteristics of the political presence of Turks in Greece, which led to political tension between the Minority and the state in the upcoming decades.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, these features of political representation at the national level and socio-ethnic organization at the local level also became the focal points in Greco-Turkish relations and they sometimes created suspicious attitudes from Greek governments towards the Minority, which was in practice under the protection of Turkey with the regime established by the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Minority developed a strong tradition of democratic representation in the Hellenic Parliament through legislative elections after 1923. At least two deputies from the Turkish Minority were elected in every legislative election between 1923-1967.⁴⁵⁶ The tradition of political represen-

455 The Minority has developed a strong political participation since 1923 and minority politicians, who are the main actors of this political participation, tended to define the relations between the national government and the Minority according to the interests and sensitivities of the Minority. For example, in the 1936 elections, although there was a Venizelist-Anti-Venizelist divide within the Minority, minority politicians united in the province of Xanthi and won the election to the anti-Venizelists, who they thought were in the interests of the Minority. Ibid. 60.

456 For detailed listings of Turkish deputies in the Hellenic Parliament, see Hikmet Öksüz, *Batı Trakya Türkleri* (Çorum: KaraM Araştırma ve Yayıncılık, 2006): 230-231. Those deputies who represented the Minority in the Hellenic Parliament in the early years also established a family tradition in the local political life of the Minority. Hafız Galip, a prominent figure in minority politics during the 1920s and 1930s, and who from the Galip family, a notable local family in Komotini, is an example of this. Other members of the Galip family became local minority politicians and deputies in the Hellenic Parliament

tation was accompanied by local organization in Thrace. The Turkish Union of Xanthi was founded in 1927 in the city of Xanthi, an industrialized and agriculturally developed city of the time in Western Thrace. The Turkish Union of Xanthi represents the beginning of local political organization of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and it shows the strong mobility of Turkish society in terms of politics and intellectuality. The Union was founded by two local journalists and it played a role in developing a political attraction mechanism for the local Turks of Xanthi with a Turkish nationalist narrative.⁴⁵⁷ After the Turkish Youth Union of Komotini was established in 1928, the teachers of the Minority became organized under the Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace in 1936. All these local political formations of the Minority were closely affiliated with the Kemalist development of the contemporary Turkish nation state in Turkey. However, that affiliation transformed the Minority in Western Thrace from a domestic affair into an international case which was considered as a challenge to Greek national unity from the 1930s onwards.

This was is a kind of social and political transformation period for the Minority, which was deeply affected by the Kemalist reformation in Turkey. The Minority transformed into a politically active society during this period. Modernization attempts in Turkey were directly reflected in Western Thrace and the Kemalist revolution being realized in Turkey generated excitement in the local Turkish media of Western Thrace. In the Turkish local newspapers published in Xanthi and Komotini, such as *Yeni Adım* and *İnkılap*, Atatürk's revolution was strongly promoted. The journalists in these newspapers, such as Mehmet Hilmi, who was at the same time the owner of *Yeni Adım* newspaper, strongly recommended the adoption of Kemalist modernization reforms of Turkish society in

until the 2000s. From this aspect, minority politics has some similarities with family traditions of Greek national political life, such as the Papandreou and Karamanlis families.

457 Aikaterini Damianidou, "The Muslim/Turkish Minority of Western Thrace: The Case of the Turkish Union of Xanthi", (MA Thesis, İstanbul Bilgi University, 2009): 30-31.

Western Thrace.⁴⁵⁸ The name of another newspaper, *İnkılap*, was directly influenced by the *inkılap* (revolution) period in Turkey and its editor Osman Nuri published articles showing admiration for Atatürk's revolution in Turkey, such as the alphabet reform and the right of women to vote and be elected. In addition, the newspaper itself followed a publishing policy of campaigning against Mustafa Sabri, ex-Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire, who moved to Western Thrace and stayed there in the 1930s, and his supporters.⁴⁵⁹

Political mobilization of the Minority in the 1930s took place around the associations established during the rapprochement period between Turkey and Greece and local newspapers in the region. Seventeen Turkish newspapers were published between 1924-1941 in Western Thrace and the majority of these were in line with the Kemalist form of Turkish nationalism. Although this was a period of freedom of the press and organization for the Minority, as it was guaranteed in the Treaty of Lausanne, political mobilization of the Minority among local elites, most of whom were members of local notable Turkish families and local journalists, came to existence in parallel with the Kemalist reformation period in Turkey. Besides, the framework of the political mobilization of the Turkish Minority in Greece was modelled on Turkish nationalization in Turkey and the emphasis on Turkish identification of the Minority in Western Thrace by those local elites had already given a start to instrumentalization of the Minority in Greco-Turkish relations.⁴⁶⁰

In this period, the conflict between the Islamists and nationalists appeared more distinctly both in the Minority and in Greco-Turkish rela-

458 Nilüfer Erdem, "Mehmet Hilmi'ye Göre Batı Trakya Türkleri'nin 1930 Türk-Yunan Dostluğundan Beklentileri", *T.C. İstanbul Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi, Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, Yıl 8, Sayı 15-16 (2009): 5.

459 Hikmet Öksüz, "Batı Trakya Türk Basınında Atatürkçü Bir Gazete *İnkılap* (1930-1931)", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt XVII, Sayı 50 (Temmuz 2001): 478-483.

460 When the reconciliation between Greece and Kemalist Turkey increased in the early 1930, the conservatist figures considerably lost their political effect in the Minority circles and the nationalists started to develop Turkish identity. Ali Chousein, "Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: The Case of Western Thrace", 57.

tions. Particularly, when those Islamist and pro-Ottoman religious officials and figures opposed to the Kemalist regime who were exiled from Turkey settled in Greece, and who were known as ‘the 150 Undesirables’ in Turkish historiography, they began to promote anti-Kemalist and anti-Turkish propaganda through their newspapers published in Western Thrace. Thirteen of those ‘150 Undesirables’ settled in Western Thrace and many of them worked in minority schools as teachers and in the mosques as preachers. Moreover, some were significantly active in propagating an Islamist opposition movement against Turkey and in organizing a society with an Islamic character in Western Thrace. Especially, Mustafa Sabri voiced a harsh criticism towards the secular regime in Turkey in his newspaper *Yarın*, which had been published from 1927 to 1930, and had conducted activities within the Minority to develop an anti-secular and anti-nationalist formation among the Minority members. However, the activities of the ‘150 Undesirables’ in Western Thrace constituted a threat to the essence of Greco-Turkish rapprochement in the early 1930s and Turkey’s precision and Greece’s contemplation of a regional alliance with Turkey in the challenging environment of the interwar period resulted in their removal from Western Thrace in 1931.⁴⁶¹

It is interesting to mention the debate on the introduction of the new Turkish alphabet to the Minority between the modernist journalist Mehmet Hilmi and Mustafa Sabri here in order to perceive the distinction between the nationalist minority elites and Islamists. Mehmet Hilmi had appeared as a prominent political figure and journalist in Western Thrace as an enlightened personality and one of the partisans of Kemalist ideas within the Minority. Moreover, he had been promoting the Kemalist reforms among the members of the Minority from 1926 onwards in his newspaper *Yeni Adım* by putting forward similar modernization projects to those of Kemalism for the Minority with direct political implications. Mehmet Hilmi in his newspaper defended the Turkish alphabet reform for the Minority as a pre-condition for social development and being a member of the civilized world. Furthermore, he articulated his positivist

461 Evren Dede, “Batı Trakya’da 150’likler -I-”, *Azınlıkça*, Sayı 44 (Şubat 2009): 2-3.

ideas with criticisms of the religious leaders of the Minority, landowners and '150 Undesirables' in Western Thrace, as the owners of the old mentality. After a while, Mustafa Sabri answered Mehmet Hilmi in his newspaper *Yarın* by declaring the supporters of the new Turkish alphabet as the new Turks who were hostile to the Arabs. Mustafa Sabri argued that the promotion of the new Turkish alphabet was a sacrilege and he declared by issuing a fatwa that the new Turkish alphabet was harming the Islamic religion.⁴⁶² Despite these kinds of polemics and backstage support by Greek governments for the Islamists in order to restrain the development of a Turkish nationalist consciousness among the Minority members, the efforts of 'the 150 Undesirables' were not effective enough on the Minority to realize a social transformation of the Minority members towards political Islam. However, they succeeded in constructing conservatism within the Minority and they left the legacy of a rift within the Minority, as conservatives and modernists.

Even though there was a deep conflict between the Turkish nationalists and Islamists within the Minority, Turkish identity among minority members was constructed during this period. The construction of Turkish identity emerged from the cleavages within Turkish society in Western Thrace which became well known during those years, in parallel with the developments in Turkey. The success of the Kemalist nationalization in Turkey was directly reflected in the political conflicts between the elites of the Turkish Minority, who were mostly pro-modernist elements in the Minority and were enthusiastic about the Kemalist reformation in Turkey, attracted notable figures of the Minority and gained political hegemony on a local level.⁴⁶³ Together with the moderate traditionalists,

462 For further details about the polemic between the modernist Mehmet Hilmi and Islamist Mustafa Sabri, see Yannis Bonos, "The Turkish Spelling Mistakes Episode in Greek Thrace, June 1929: beyond the opposition of Modernists versus Conservatives" in *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, eds. Nathalie Clayer, Eric Germain, (London: Hurst&Company, 2008): 369-372.

463 Ilias Nikolakopoulos, "Politikes Dynameis kai Eklogiki Symperifora tis Mousoulmanikis Meionotitas sti Dytiki Thraki: 1922–1955", *Deltio Kendrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon*, Vol. 8 (1990): 176-177. Nikolakopoulos in his argument mentions the political schism within the

the pro-modernist camp within the Minority became a dominant political actor, led by Hatip Yusuf.⁴⁶⁴ After this power shift within the Minority, the notables and political elites became more pro-Turkish nationalist and their integration into national politics and national political parties was rather uncertain and weak. They mostly focused on the Minority's basic problems of maintaining its existence under Greek rule, such as education and property rights of the Minority members.⁴⁶⁵

Turkey's political effect on the political elite of the Minority put the Minority in a position of making Greek national political actors feel doubtful about national unification of the country during these years of inner conflict and external threats before the Second World War. Despite the peaceful relations with Turkey, Ioannis Metaxas reacted strongly against the Turkish Minority and put restrictions on political and educational activities during his dictatorship period until 1941. For example, teaching of the Greek language became compulsory in minority schools⁴⁶⁶ and it was comprehended by the Minority as an attack by the state on the most important component of the Turkish identity of the Minority: freedom of language.

Minority as modernists affected by Turkey, moderate traditionalists, and Islamic traditionalists hostile to Kemalist nationalization in Turkey.

- 464 Hatip Yusuf is another example of family-politician traditionality in the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace. He himself was a deputy and a prominent political figure within the Minority during the 1930s; his son Hasan Hatipoğlu was a well-known minority politician and deputy during the 1950s and 1960s. Members of the Hatipoğlu family have been active in minority politics and the media until today.
- 465 For further details about parliamentary representation of the Minority in the 1930s, see Konstantinos Al. Tsioumis, "I Mousoulmaniki Meionotita tis Dytikis Thrakis kai oi Ellinotourkikes Scheseis (1923–1940) (Istoria-Politiki-Paideia)", (PhD Dissertation, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis, 1994): 181–195. Tsioumis argues that politicians representing the Minority were also lacking in Greek knowledge and they did not participate in parliamentary discussions as they were more affiliated with the interests of the Minority rather than debates at national level.
- 466 Ali Chousein, "Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: The Case of Western Thrace", 61.

Soon after the Metaxas Dictatorship ended, Greece was occupied by the Axis Powers in the Second World War and Bulgaria took control over Western Thrace from April 1941 until September 1944. The Bulgarians left the region to the resistance groups and from 1944 onwards the region fell under the control of the communist forces of EAM (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo – National Liberation Front) during the Civil War. The Minority's behavior during these years of occupation and armed conflict was generally directed towards keeping the population of Turks in the region. This orientation towards survival forced the Minority elites to follow balancing policies between the Bulgarian forces and Greeks during the Bulgarian occupation, and between communists and royalists during the Civil War.⁴⁶⁷

The conflict years of the 1940s did not affect the population of Turks in Western Thrace significantly and the Turkish population of the region remained almost the same after the war period, but, despite this, it is understood that even so, a considerable number of Turks migrated from Western Thrace to Turkey.⁴⁶⁸ Although it is not possible to find concrete statistical data for the numbers of Western Thracian Turks who migrated to Turkey during war years of 1941-1949 in Greece, there are some estimates of the migration numbers during the period of conflict between the communists and royalists. Hikmet Öksüz quotes from the reminiscences of Ahmet Kayıhan, in the book titled "Lozan ve Batı Trakya: 1913'te İlk Türk Cumhuriyeti (Lausanne and Western Thrace: The First Turkish Republic in 1913)", published in İstanbul in 1967, and he gives the number of both legal and illegal Turkish migrants from Western Thrace region to

467 For further details, see Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis and Georgios Niarchos, *The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940-49* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): 131-152, 245-259.

468 See Bülent Demirbaş about the estimated numbers of Turks who migrated to Turkey between 1946-1949. Bülent Demirbaş, *Batı Trakya Sorunu* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1996): 126-127. Demirbaş gives the number of Turkish migrants from Western Thrace during those years as around 25,000.

Turkey during the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 as 17,793.⁴⁶⁹ Despite suffering heavily from the poor economic conditions of the war years, the Turkish population in the region were considerably spared from the conflicts. Although the neutrality policies of the Minority resulted in lives being saved in the wars, they constituted a reason for the winners in Greek politics in the post-war period, i.e., the royalists, and the civil and armed bureaucracy, to marginalize the Turkish society of "Greek Thrace".⁴⁷⁰

The development of Turkish identity for the Minority with reference to the Kemalist type of Turkish nationalism during the 1930s and the displaying of neutral political behaviors for the survival of minority members while the country was struggling against the Axis occupation and communist threat, created an image of minority collaboration with their kin-state, Turkey, instead of considering the national interests of Greece, in the minds of the Greek political elite. The Turks of Western Thrace became unreliable citizens in the eyes of the victorious royalist politicians of the Civil War with their efforts to stay neutral between the conflicting parties. The telegram sent by Konstantinos Rendis, the Minister of Public Order, to the Aliens' Center-General of Macedonia-Thrace right at the end of the Civil War in March 1949, clearly shows the motivation of senior members of the Greek Government regarding the situation of ethnic Turks in the Thrace region of Greece: "*Through a series of orders, we have communicated that the national interest dictates the partial evacuation of the population of foreign ethnic origin [αλλογενών] from the border areas, as the presence of such a compact [ethnic] group presents a constant and serious danger for our national borders.*

[...]

We therefore urge you to issue the relevant orders to all competent authorities so that the largest possible number of those of foreign ethnic

469 Hikmet Öksüz, "Western Thracian Turks in Greek Civil War (1946-1949)", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Annual 2000/01, Vol. 5 (2001): 62.

470 Greek official narratives usually use the term "Greek Thrace" to describe the region consisting of prefectures of Xanthi, Rhodope and Evros. This is a political statement to emphasize the Greekness of Thrace rather than a geographical description.

origin is evacuated from our northern provinces. For this reason you should refrain from any action that could reduce the [legal] emigration flow of those of foreign ethnic origin. When illegal, their departure should be silently assisted'.⁴⁷¹

The beginning of the 1950s represents a temporary period of sincere and intimate political relations between Greece and Turkey under the newly emerging Cold War conjuncture. Both became military allies under NATO with their membership in 1952, they shared the same security concerns about the Soviet Union and both needed assistance and aid from the United States for economic development after the devastating effects of the Second World War and Civil War in Greece. Those conditions of the post-War era resulted in a rapprochement and the security risks which originated from the communist Soviet Union became a more important subject than the minority issues for policy makers in both countries. In 1951, Culture Agreements were signed to improve educational standards of the minorities and to extend academic cooperation between Turkish and Greek academia. For the first time in their history, a Turkish President, Celal Bayar, paid a state visit to Greece in 1952. President Celal Bayar visited Western Thrace, too, and a minority high school, named after him, was opened in Komotini. One year later, the King of Greece, Paulos I paid a state visit to Turkey with the Prime Minister, Marshall Alexandros Papagos and they formed the Balkan Pact in 1953-1954⁴⁷² with Tito's Yugoslavia, as a result of Britain's special efforts to create a regional alliance in the Balkans against the threat arising from Stalin's Soviet Union.⁴⁷³

471 Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis and Georgios Niarchos, *The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940-49*, 266.

472 The Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was comprised of two separate agreements: the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation signed on February 1953 in Ankara, Turkey, and the Military Cooperation Agreement signed on August 1954 in Bled, in today's Slovenia.

473 Peter Vukman, "The Balkan Pact 1953-58. An analysis of Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish Relations based on British Archival Sources", *Mediterranean Tanulmányok, Etudes sur la region mediterranneenne, Szeged*, No. 22, (2013): 26-27.

Turkish-Greek rapprochement in the first half of the 1950s was more a force majeure convergence under a military alliance as a consequence of common security risk perceptions, rather than a political alliance. Thus, minority issues were subordinated, or frozen, for a while, although increasing tension between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus broke the temporary rapprochement by the second half of the 1950s.⁴⁷⁴ When the Cyprus issue came to the forefront of the political agenda of the two NATO member states, their perceptions of a bilateral threat from each other were reawakened and any trouble related with their national minorities was directly associated with the developments in Cyprus from 1955 onwards.

The Cyprus issue was an accelerator for the transformation of the minority problems from the national to the international level in both countries. Turkish-Greek tension in the island of Cyprus was reflected as political pressure not only on the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace, but also on the Greeks of İstanbul. The events of 6-7 September 1955 were the tragic result of this core relation between the Cyprus developments and the minority issue. When EOKA started to attack the British and Turkish representations in Cyprus and Turks in Cyprus became a target to be evacuated for Greek domination on the island, it created an awareness in Turkey and the Democratic Party government utilized this awareness to

474 For instance, Turkish identity of the Minority did not constitute any challenge in those years. To give an example, it was envisaged to use “Turkish School” instead of “Muslim School” as an expression of schools in Western Thrace within the scope of the minority policy formed by the Papagos governments in the early 1950s. Therefore, all minority schools located in Western Thrace were identified as “Turkish Schools” without any bureaucratic challenge. For further details, see İlknur Halil, “Batı Trakya Türk Okullarında 1923’ten Günümüze Eğitim ve Öğretim” in *IV. Uluslararası Batı Trakya Türkleri Kurultayı 16-18 Haziran 2000, Londra*, ed. Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu, (Bursa: AKMAT Akınoğlu Matbaacılık, 2000): 94-102. More interestingly, the Turkish identification of the Minority schools was even institutionalized by a governmental decree in 1954 known as the “Papagos Law” and the “Muslim School” signs were replaced with “Turkish School” ones. Cem Şentürk, *Yunanistan’da Azınlık Eğitimi’nin Sorunları Bilimsel Araştırmalar Serisi No. 1* (Witten: Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu, 2005): 10.

stir up Turkish nationalist feelings in order to deflect criticism of the worsening economic situation and the increasing reaction from its opponents. The government's failure to take any precautions against the increasing tension and any possible reaction to the Greeks in İstanbul, together with provocations by the media and some non-governmental organizations, resulted in mass attacks on the Greek community of İstanbul and looting of their assets on 6-7 September 1955.⁴⁷⁵

There was no serious revenge attack on the Turks in Western Thrace after the events of 6-7 September in İstanbul. However, the Cyprus issue was reflected in the Greek government's minority policies as systematic socio-economic exclusion. The distinctive characteristic of official state policies towards the Turks of Western Thrace of that period was the transformation of the pressure from political to systematic one. Especially from 1956 onwards, the systematization of political pressure on the Turkish Minority was realized through expropriation of properties belonging to Minority members, intervention in the community waqfs and forced migration. During this period until the 1967 military coup, Greek governments carried out the first mass expropriation of lands owned by Turks. Furthermore, the government's direct intervention in the elections of administrative bodies of the Muslim community waqfs increased and migration to Turkey accelerated because of socio-economic pressure

475 There is controversy between Turkish and Greek historiography on the events of 6-7 September 1955. While Turkish historiography tends to describe the events as a mass attack on the shops and properties of the Greek Community in İstanbul, Greek historiography is mostly disposed to express the events directly targeting the Greek Minority's existence in İstanbul, and some even describes the events as a pogrom. For different a historical evaluation of the events of 6-7 September 1955 from a Turkish point of view, see Ulvi Keser, "Kıbrıs Sorunu Bağlamında Türkiye'de 6/7 Eylül Olaylarına Kesitsel Bir Bakış", *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies*, XII/25 (Autumn 2012): 181-226; for a chronological evaluation of the events from a Greek point of view, see the well-known study by Christophoros Christidis, *Ta Septemvriana (Konstantinoupoli kai Smyrni 1955): Symvoli stin Prosfati Istoria ton Ellinikon Koinotiton* (Athens: Kentro Mikrasiatikou Spoudon, 2000): 75-155.

coming from public bodies. Indeed, although it was not a significant number, some Turks were murdered by ultra-nationalist Greeks in Turkish villages in the prefectures of Rhodope and Xanthi.⁴⁷⁶ More interestingly, by the time the colonels took power in Greece with the Military Coup on 21 April 1967, it appeared that systematization of political pressure on the Minority by the state was not temporary, rather, it had a continuous character.

3.5.3 *The Turkish Minority under the Junta Regime*

Greece experienced political stability and economic growth between the years 1949-1963 under right-wing governments. The governments of that period mostly stayed on ground which was legitimized by the political and military victory over the communist threat in the late 1940s. Social, economic and political stabilization of the 1950s was achieved under the unnamed coalition of the bureaucratic and military elites and the industrial bourgeoisie of the time.⁴⁷⁷

Although the leftist factions, except the Communist Party of Greece, were mostly reconciled with the post-Second World War political order in the country, the ghost of the great schism between rightists and leftists was haunting the political arena. The ghost appeared in the elections of 1961: Georgios Papandreou's Center Union, including liberals and leftist factions, took 34% of the votes and won 100 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. The election of 1961 and its aftermath was the beginning of the political and parliamentary instability which culminated in the 1967 military

476 For a detailed explanation of the results of the systematic political pressure on the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace between 1955-1960, see İbrahim Mert Öztürk, "Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Batı Trakya Türk Azınlığı", *Journal of History School*, Issue XIX (September 2014): 484-501.

477 For a further analysis, see James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009): 66-72.

coup with Papandreou's increasing rhetoric about dark conspiracies of the political right, monarchy and military.⁴⁷⁸

The country went to the polls twice in this short period of time. None of the political parties could obtain a majority in the elections of 1963. However, Papandreou's popularity was increasing and he took a gamble by taking the country to the polls once again in 1964. Papandreou's increasing popularity was crowned with a victory in the 1964 elections. The Center Union won 52.7% of the votes and gained the majority in the Hellenic Parliament.⁴⁷⁹ Although Georgios Papandreou was able to stay in the prime minister's office for only 18 months, his political practices during this short period of rule were already enough to cause a political and governmental crisis and to increase the fears of far-right elements in the army. Some of the communist prisoners who had been in jail since the end of the civil war were released and frozen relations with the countries of the Communist Bloc were moderated. Furthermore, Papandreou introduced new reforms in the education system and tried to make the Greek people's daily spoken language the official language of the state. These were considered as leftist populist tendencies and his modest economic policies on inflation made the rightist economic oligarchy in the country more skeptical about the Center Union government.⁴⁸⁰

Georgios Papandreou appointed his son, Andreas Papandreou, as minister in the cabinet. The son, Andreas Papandreou was famous for his leftist ideas against the monarchy and far-right groups in the army. Andreas Papandreou's position in the government was not a simple case. Andreas was once accused of being the secret political leader of the left-wing officer groups in the army and he was a political figure who had

478 Neovi M. Karakatsanis, Jonathan Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels' Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d'Etat* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018): 12.

479 Roderick Beaton, *Greece Biography of a Modern Nation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019): 327.

480 Seraphim Seferiades, "Polarization and Nonproportionality: The Greek Party System in the Postwar Era", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (October 1986): 78-79.

challenged the role of the monarchy, Greece's adherence to the NATO alliance and the political isolation of the communists in the country.⁴⁸¹ When Andreas Papandreou's appointment to the cabinet was combined with another crisis concerning the minister of defense and between the prime minister and the new king, 24-year old Konstantinos II, Georgios Papandreou resigned from his duty in July 1965 and Greece entered a period of political turmoil and social unrest.

Weak and short-term governments followed each other. By the end of 1966, Papandreou's Center Union and other political parties agreed to go to the polls in May 1967. However, the colonels in the Hellenic Army acted more quickly than the politicians and they staged a military coup in April 1967. The military dictatorship, which was mainly led and controlled by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos and Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos, was not challenged either by any political group or the economic oligarchy in the country, or by the international allies of Greece. The colonels established a military regime with an ideological framework of Greek nationalism embellished with Greek Orthodoxy to mobilize the citizens with Greek-Christian values by controlling the mass media, terrorizing society through the police force and controlling economic activity in collaboration with the conservative business oligarchy.⁴⁸²

Greek-Christian values, which were promoted and imposed on individuals' social life during the Junta period, were not something extraor-

481 Andreas Papandreou had been accused of being the leader of a secret organization in the Greek army which was opposed to right-wing domination in the Hellenic Armed Forces. This accusation led to a political crisis known as Apostasia of 1965 which resulted in prime minister Georgios Papandreou's resignation. For further details about Andreas Papandreou's involvement in the 1965 political crisis and its consequences based on testimonies and archival sources, see Stan Draenos, *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012): 129-174.

482 For a more detailed explanation of the ideological background of the Greek Junta, see Theodore A. Couloubis, "The Greek Junta Phenomenon", *Polity*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 1974): 350-354.

dinary for ethnic Greeks in the country. However, the Junta's ideology created an oppressive political and social environment for the Minority in Western Thrace. The Junta were faced with the same problem as the previous policy makers on the Minority had. The legacy of homogenization of populations in Greece and Turkey created an illusion in policy makers' minds about the ethnic identity of their national minorities. The Junta leaders considered an ethnic homogeneous Greek society in their country, yet they came across a different ethnic and religious community when they arrived in Western Thrace. They saw school signs written in Turkish which mentioned the Turkish identity of the minority in the region.⁴⁸³ The majority of the population living in the prefectures of Western Thrace were native Turkish speakers and many of them could not speak even one word of Greek. Furthermore, they recognized an economically underdeveloped region and a rejected minority people.

The homogeneous Greek society which the Junta leaders had imagined was challenged by the social realities in Western Thrace. The strong Turkish presence in the region motivated the Junta to ignore the ethnic diversity of the country, and the Junta's reaction was to destroy all the signs symbolizing the Turkish identity of the Minority. However, they fell into a deep confusion about the identity of minority people. The clash between the cold fact of non-Greek identity of the Minority and the Junta's unbending nationalism of a homogeneous Greek society resulted in tragicomic definitions related to the ethnic identity of the Minority in Western Thrace. The Junta governments between 1967-1974 used different denominations to address the ethnicity of minority members in the region, such as "Muslim", "Ottoman", "Turk", "Greek Muslim", "Turcophones Greek", "Muslim with Greek Nationality", "Greeks of Turkic Descent", "Turks with Greek Nationality", "Ex-Ottoman (Paleotomanos)" and "Ex-Turk (Paleoturkos)".⁴⁸⁴

The confusion about the identification of minority members inevitably created a challenge to Junta ideology, which was strongly based on a

483 Ali Chousein, "Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: The Case of Western Thrace", 74.

484 Herkül Millas, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Bir Önsöz* (İstanbul: Kavram Yayınları, 1995): 159.

unique mixture of ‘Ancient Greek’ and ‘Christian-Orthodox’ narrative. As a common reaction of almost all nationalisms built on sand, the Greek nationalism of the Junta period also resorted to strict prohibitions to erase all kinds of symbols evoking the non-Greek identity of the minority population. The basis of those prohibitions on the minority was denial of any kind of different ethnicity in Greece. Thus, socio-political pressure on the Minority continued as systematic pressure which included judicial arrangements combined with security implementations in the Western Thrace region.⁴⁸⁵

First, the Junta government had forbidden the use of “Turkish School” signs at minority schools. With the statutory decree numbered 1109 and dated 21 January 1972, the term “Turkish School” was changed to “Minority School”.⁴⁸⁶ Soon after that statutory decree, using any kind of Turkish terms in the school was totally prohibited by a military government circular. Restrictions on the schools were followed by prohibition of the term “Turkish” on the names of minority institutions, such as the Komotini Turkish Youth Union. Besides, the activities of minority institutions such as the Komotini Turkish Youth Union, Turkish Union of Xanthi, and Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace, which had a strong effect on the minority’s social mobilization, were strongly restricted by the security forces in the early 1970s. In addition to all these, with the law numbered 1260 at the end of 1972, the use of Turkish place names in Western Thrace in any kind of communication, correspondence, visual and written media and on the radio was forbidden. Lastly, broadcasting by any Turkish radio stations and television channels and broadcasting of Turk-

485 Organized attacks and systematic pressure on the Minority, such as attacks to the mosques, Turkish cemeteries and historical places, reallocation of the lands from Turks to Greeks, began in the Junta rule. Ümit Kurtuluş, *Batı Trakyanın Dünü Bugünü* (Ankara: Sincan Matbaası, 1979): 54-57.

486 Ali Hüseyinoğlu, “The Development of Minority Education at the South-easternmost Corner of the EU: The Case of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace, Greece”, (PhD Dissertation, University of Sussex, 2012): 199.

ish music and Turkish movies on radio and television stations and in cinema halls throughout Greece were forbidden by law at the beginning of 1973.⁴⁸⁷

It is clearly possible to understand from those Junta government prohibitions that the Turkish definition of the minority's identity was targeted because of its potential threat for the undermining of Greek nationalism of the Junta period. The Junta itself did not contribute any philosophical approach to Greek nationalism. It was a crude military nationalism accompanied by a propagandist narrative of Greek Orthodox Christianity.⁴⁸⁸ The fact that there was a strong challenge coming from the presence of the Turks in Western Thrace and that the nationalist rhetoric of the Junta lacked any philosophical infrastructure was not adopted by the public, motivated the military policy makers to ignore the ethnic diversity of Greece. The pressure on the Turks in Western Thrace during the Junta period was a direct result of the combination of these components, and as a result, the minority was treated as a foreign entity, an "other" and this caused the minority population of Western Thrace to be subjected to an exclusion.⁴⁸⁹ Although it did not work, it remained a legacy for the post-authoritarian era after the collapse of the Junta regime in 1974.

3.5.4 *The Legacy of the Junta*

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 brought the Greek Junta in Athens to an end. The military regime could not withstand in-

487 Baskın Oran gives interesting details about the construction of political pressure on the Turkish Minority from the Junta period onwards through limitation of freedom of expression, communication and the media. For further details, see Baskın Oran, *Türk - Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1991): 210-212.

488 Theodore A. Coulombis, "The Greek Junta Phenomenon", 356.

489 Hristos İliadis, *"Trakya Tehdit Altında" Gizli Yazışmalar Türkiye Stratejisi – Gizli Politikalar – Azınlık Grupları*, transl. Lale Alatlı, (Komotini: BAKES Yayınları, 2021): 244.

creasing domestic political opposition, social unrest and economic collapse. Together with the humiliating loss in Cyprus for Greek national pride, the Junta leaders left the political stage to civilians and the charismatic leader of the right, Konstantinos Karamanlis, returned from exile in Paris to restore democracy in a turbulent political environment.⁴⁹⁰

The Junta regime had ruled Greece for almost seven years by absolute control over political factions, the media and civil society. However, the bureaucratic elite was the less damaged socio-political actor during these dark years and they played a crucial role while Karamanlis was restoring the democratic institutions in the post-authoritarian era. The bureaucratic elite played another distinctive role in that fragile period by continuing nationalism in state policies while Karamanlis was seeking for a balance between the different political factions who were eager to avenge the Junta period.⁴⁹¹

The Junta government had generally failed to impose supreme control over the state bureaucracy during their rule, and besides, the state bureaucracy did not enter any conflict with the military regime. Greek nationalism and corporatism were the common ground for that kind of implicit agreement between the soldiers and civil bureaucrats of the Greek state. The national character of the Greek state had been strongly structured on nationalist values since independence and it was just a matter of differences in implementation between the bureaucrats and soldiers during the Junta regime. The soldiers were the noisy standard-bearers of Greek corporatism, whereas bureaucracy was the actor behind the curtain to reflect the corporatist character of the state over society. The corporatism which shaped relations between the Greek state and elements

490 George Kaloudis, "The Influence of the Greek Diaspora on Greece and the United States", *International Journal of World Peace*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 2008): 29.

491 As Kassimeris argues: "... the 1974 transition to multi-party democracy, were marked by a curious amalgam of continuity and change. The symbols, the rhetoric and even the constitution changed, but without any systematic purge of the bureaucracy and the police apparatus; key sections of the state remained in the hands of the old order". George Kassimeris, "Junta by Another Name? The 1974 *Metapolitefsi* and the Greek Extra-parliamentary Left", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 2005): 745.

of society stayed strongly alive and proceeded in a favorable context. In addition, authoritarian practices continued and the authoritarian character of relations between central governments and society survived even after the fall of the Junta regime in 1974.⁴⁹²

In Greece, corporatist practices were realized by the combination of political power and bureaucratic tradition. From 1974 onwards, the single party governments of New Democracy and PASOK effectively succeeded in using their popular power in order to capture the bureaucracy and then they could use the bureaucratic mechanisms to establish control over social organizations. In this sense, the corporatist arrangement of state-civil relations in Greece has remained in the post-authoritarian era and interestingly, it has been characterized by de facto control by civil governments over civil society associations by manipulating them with state power. As Sotiropoulos argues, corporatist practices have been achieved through clientelist corporatism, which is unique to Greece, which entails a corporatist relation between the governmental authorities and social actors.⁴⁹³ The democratic regime in the post-authoritarian era has been restructured by enhancing the government's power over traditional bureaucracy, which enables domination by the ruling political parties in implementing their policies through all vessels of the society. As Sotiropoulos mentions: "*Government changes are directly linked to ensuing administrative changes. An extensive ebb and flow of administrative personnel and structures accompanies each succession of parties in power, making the Greek bureaucracy a prime example of a modern party politicized state institution*".⁴⁹⁴ In this way, the governments were always able to re-arrange bureaucratic power with loyal government officials in accordance with their ideologies and from the local to the central, the bureaucratic mechanisms became governments' ideological tools instead of providing services to the citizens on an equal basis.

492 Dimitris A. Sotiropoulos, "The remains of authoritarianism: bureaucracy and civil society in post-authoritarian Greece", *CEMOTI, Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien*, No. 20 (1995): 239-240.

493 Ibid. 241.

494 Ibid. 250.

Democracy was restored in Greece to a considerable extent under New Democracy rule from 1974 to 1981. However, this restoration period faced significant challenges from different aspects of society, especially from the minority in Western Thrace, because Karamanlis' restoration policies did not include state bureaucracy which was the representative of corporatism. Karamanlis mostly focused on incorporating political actors into the parliamentary democratic regime, however, he left policy implementations about sensitive issues, such as domestic ethnic problems and some foreign policy issues, to the hands of corporatist state bureaucracy. For this reason, as some scholars correctly observe, democracy came to Greece after 1974, but it did not visit Western Thrace!⁴⁹⁵

Socio-political pressures on the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace were inherited by the new democratic government after the Junta regime in terms of total disregard for the Turkish identity of the minority and their political representation. Practices such as prohibition of the term "Turkish" in the names of minority institutions and on school signs continued by gaining strength. Denial of Turkish identity has a three-phase background. Governments before the Junta regime mostly did not consider the Turkish identity of the minority as a strong political threat and the minority institutions could be defined with ethnic denominations. The Junta governments seemed to be in confusion regarding defining the ethnic identity of the minority. Although they ignored the Turkish presence in Western Thrace, they often preferred to name the minority with different identifications, including the term Turkish. However, democratic governments of the post-Junta period went into total denial of Turkish identity in Western Thrace. The legacy of the Junta's hostile nationalism against the Turkish presence in the region passed to the democratic government of post-1974 by transformation from confusion to absolute denial.⁴⁹⁶ The second dimension of the socio-political pressures of

495 Şule Chousein, "Evolution of Minority Rights in Europe: The Case of Western Thrace Muslim Turkish Minority", 109.

496 Denial of the Minority's ethnic identity and strict limits on the use of the word 'Turkish' for self-identification are the most significant characteristics of the minority policies of

post-1974 period was about the fear of political representation of the minority.⁴⁹⁷ In fact, the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace had a long historical tradition of democratic representation in the Hellenic Parliament since the free elections were held in Greece from 1920 onwards. Turkish deputies from the prefectures of Western Thrace were elected to the Hellenic Parliament in every legislative election from 1920 onwards and did not experience any kind of systematic prevention of political representation in the parliament.

At this point, it is interesting to quote an issue related with the fear from the Minority's political representation as a case. Andreas Papandreou's socialist-leaning PASOK party gained two deputies from the prefecture of Xanthi in the legislative elections of 1977. One of these two deputies was the Turkish deputy Orhan Hacııbram. According to the results, the Turkish candidate Orhan Hacııbram was the candidate receiving the highest number of votes among all candidates in the prefecture of Xanthi. Other candidates in the prefecture objected to the results six months after the elections. Hacııbram received 150 votes more than the candidate in second place, Charalambos Atmatzidis, who was of Greek origin. However, when the votes were recounted, it was announced that the Greek-origin candidate Charalambos Atmatzidis had received one more vote than the Turkish-origin candidate Orhan Hacııbram and Hacııbram was relegated into the second place, Atmatzidis was promoted to first place on the election list. After a while, the Greek Supreme Election Council made the decision to rearrange the distribution of the seats in the prefectures in the Hellenic Parliament and canceled one seat of PASOK from the prefecture of Xanthi. Instead, the Supreme Election Council decided that PASOK would have one more seat from the prefecture of Evros where all

the post-Junta governments in the second half of the 1970s. Thalia Dragonas & Anna Frangoudaki, "Educating the Muslim Minority in Western Thrace", 24.

497 The increase of the pressure on the political representation of the Minority started in the late 1970s. Fatma Tunç Yaşar, *Batı Trakya Meriç'in Öbür Yakası* (İstanbul: İlke Yayıncılık, 2005): 71.

deputy candidates were of Greek origin. Interestingly, the Supreme Council did not offer any reasonable justification for these unusual decisions in the election history of the country. Thereby, as Orhan Hacıbram was demoted to the second place on the election list, he lost his seat in the Hellenic Parliament.⁴⁹⁸ The minority members in Xanthi were considerably disappointed about this case and for the first time in the legislative elections, one of their basic democratic rights was violated by legal decisions. More interestingly, neither the ruling New Democracy party, nor Andreas Papandreou's socialist PASOK reacted to this anti-democratic act.

The case of Orhan Hacıbram in the 1977 elections can be considered as a unique example of the Junta's legacy of nationalism sustained by the judicial bureaucracy in the post-authoritarian era. The motivation behind this strange sequence of decisions was most probably to restrain the minority's political representation in the Hellenic Parliament. Or, according to a more provocative opinion, the Supreme Election Council made these decisions in the case of Hacıbram, because he represented the Turkish Minority rather than the citizens residing in the prefecture of Xanthi. It is impossible to know the thoughts of the judges who made this decision, but the latter motivation seems to be more sensible than the former. PASOK did not lose a seat in the parliament, the Greek-origin candidate had been elected and the Turkish-origin candidate lost in the end!⁴⁹⁹

498 *İleri*, 2 June 1978. *İleri* also published a series of articles from January to February 1981 about Orhan Hacıbram, whose deputyship was dropped by the court after the 1977 elections. *İleri* criticizes with harsh words the fact that Hacıbram, as a member of PASOK and as a member of the Turkish Minority, did not object to PASOK's nationalist approach to the minority and he accuses Hacıbram of hiding the truth about the loss of his deputyship in the 1977 elections. See, *İleri* 9 January 1981, 16 January 1981, 23 January 1981, 30 January 1981, 6 February 1981, 13 February 1981.

499 Orhan Hacıbram was an active deputy to raise the minority issues in the Hellenic Parliament. Most probably for this reason he had been targeted. Aarbakke explains the highly suspicious situation in the removal of Orhan Hacıbram's parliamentary membership as follows: "I was told by a Greek scholar who knows the background of the

All of these practices of the post-authoritarian era with a nationalist framework have been expressed in a famous saying in Greece, which is still repeated in the minds: “There are no Turks in Western Thrace, but there are Muslims!”. Such a deduction is the result of the absolute denial of the Turkish presence in the region and it became quite popular in official narrative during the post-1974 era.⁵⁰⁰ This narrative, interestingly, found a wide scope of implementation under PASOK governments during the 1980s. PASOK’s radical anti-Western and anti-imperialist character at the beginning of the road to power led the political elite to follow aggressive policies against any kind of social or ethnic presence which was considered as non-Greek in the country. This approach led to a socio-ethnic explosion at the end of the decade in the case of Western Thrace and opened a long-lasting depressive period in Greek-Turkish relations.

§ 3.6 Socio-economic and Political Situation in Greece before PASOK Government (1949 – 1981)

After the short and oppressive governance period of the Center Union, led by Georgios Papandreou, between 1963-1965, PASOK, which had been formed as a coalition of liberal opponents of the military dictatorship, the radical and center left in 1974, came to power under the charismatic and politically passionate leadership of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. The date when PASOK won the elections in October 1981 was a turning point for

case, that certain quarters had been strongly against Orhan Hacıbram. He was subsequently the victim of manipulations in the second count of the votes, and then when the final distribution of seats was decided. In reality there was nothing Orhan could have done about it”. Vemund Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace”, 235-236.

500 Public officials who were appointed by the Junta regime remained in charge in Western Thrace. So, the state mechanism continued to implement discriminatory and oppressive minority policy in the post-1974 era. Şule Chousein, “Unwelcome Citizens: Muslim Turks of Greece and Orthodox Greeks of Turkey”, *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences*, No. 2, Special Issue on Balkans (2009): 81.

the political destiny of Greece, since a leftist movement, for the first time in the country's history, took 48% of the votes and won a majority in the Hellenic Parliament with 172 seats.⁵⁰¹

The 32-year period between 1949 and 1981 was a period of socio-economic change in Greece. Industrialization in the country had changed the structure of the population and domestic migration increased throughout those years. The population in cities such as Athens and Thessaloniki had already doubled and a significant increase in the number of working class in the big cities had been observed.⁵⁰² Furthermore, the state also benefited from the economic development and appeared as an actor in the Greek economy, while the number of public servants increased and they were incorporated into the working class as a social actor. Workers in the industrial sector and servants in the public sector made up a strong social class which was to be an important actor in the political arena.

Greek politics had long been divided into camps since the struggle for independence in 1829. Political tension between the republicans and the royalists had always been inherited by the next generation politicians and soldiers throughout a century, and it reached its peak when Eleftherios Venizelos formed an alternative government in Thessaloniki against the monarchy in the country in 1916, which is defined as the 'National Schism' in the political history of Greece.⁵⁰³ The National Schism created a strongly divided society and socio-economic unrest during the inter-war period which shaped the political atmosphere of the country through military coups and political conspiracies in the 1920s and 30s. However, the short period of the '4th of August Regime' brought a relatively calm phase, which was a period of suppression of all political factions. Especially for republicans and communists, it was a period of reticence under the strong right-wing oppressiveness of Ioannis Metaxas until the outbreak of World War II.

501 Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: the Search for Legitimacy* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1987): 92.

502 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 148-149.

503 Thanos Veremis and Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Protagonist in Politics: 1912-1920", 118-120.

World War II brought a disaster to Greek society and turmoil to its politics, as it paved the way for the rise of communist armed factions. Traditional disunity in the political sphere of the country was strongly reflected in the political and social dynamics during the post-World War II period when the communists appeared as a prominent actor on the political stage. Greece suffered from a civil war between communist armed groups and pro-government actors who were supported militarily by Britain and the United States from March 1946 until October 1949. The civil war was a decisive achievement for pro-government actors. However, it left the fear of communism as a legacy.⁵⁰⁴

Communists and the royalist right-wing groups were the parties of the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949. But interestingly, while some elements of the pre-war republicans were dissolved into the radical left, who were considered as a threat to the established order, some others tried to open a space for themselves within the central movements, who had been reconciled with the anti-communist political elite. The transforming political dynamics in the post-civil war Greece have basically symbolized a clear division of these political elite into three camps: the right, which had generally been reconciled with monarchism until the 1970s; the center including the liberal right and left which have been reconciled with the established order, even until today; and the left including radical elements of socialists and communists who have always been considered as a threat to the political order.⁵⁰⁵ The strong fear of communism, exclusion

504 For an analysis on active American and British involvement in the Greek Civil War and its consequences in international dimension, see John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "The International Dimension of the Greek Civil War", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 99-101.

505 George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Rise of the Green Sun: The Greek Election of 1981* (London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College, 1983): 5. Mavrogordatos uses this triple division to explain the political atmosphere in Greece after the Civil War of 1946-1949. However, the later developments signify that the right-wing and central political elite had always been reconciled with the monarchy and royalism, but the radical left

of the radical left elements from legal politics as the communist 'criminals' responsible for the disaster of the civil conflict and Greece's articulation to the Western Alliance with NATO membership left the political power in the hands of populist right-wing elites who mobilized the Greek public with a nationalist narrative during the next 30-year period.

Under these circumstances, Field Marshall Alexandros Papagos, a war hero as the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army during the Greco-Italian War of 1940 and the military leader who defeated the communists in the civil war, came to power with his populist party of Greek Rally in 1952 and opened the way for a right-wing power tradition until 1981.⁵⁰⁶

From the end of World War II until the coup in 1967, the political arena of the country was mostly dominated by the conservative right-wing political class, as the victors over the communist threat in the civil war, and the state was used as a tool to keep the leftist parties and politicians out of the power.⁵⁰⁷ However, it should be stated that not all of the leftist factions stayed out of the political power. Although many of them had been labeled as dangerous communists who were enemies of the state, some of them, such as one of the prominent figures of the left, Georgios Papandreou, collaborated with the liberals, mainly ex-Venizelists, led by Sofoklis Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios Venizelos, and the leftist movements in Greece were divided into two: the communists, who mainly went underground and the center left, mainly reconciled with the new political circumstances of Greece in the Cold War era. In other words, although they conflicted with the monarchy, the center leftists of Greece shifted away from a common global communist idealization to a socialism mostly paying attention to the unique social dynamics of Greek society. For example, leftist parties such as the United Democratic Left and the

and communists had been in conflict with the monarchy and they had usually been excluded from legal political activity until the monarchy was abolished and the republic was restored in the 1970s.

506 Takis S. Pappas, "The Transformation of the Greek Party System since 1951", 92-93.

507 Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, "State and Party: The Greek State Bureaucracy and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 1981-1989", (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 1991): 37.

Peasants and Workers' Party entered the legislative elections in 1956 under the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Union led by Sofoklis Venizelos' Liberal Party. Later on, the liberal movement dissolved into Georgios Papandreou's Center Union with other leftist factions in 1961 and Georgios Papandreou succeeded in organizing the center left under his leadership. The most significant characteristic of the Greek center left in the 1960s was the development of a unique political rhetoric which conflicted with the monarchy, but at the same time was sensitive to Greece's national interests in the capitalist Western camp and economic interests of different classes of Greek society.⁵⁰⁸

While the socialist left was shifting to the center, Greece experienced a remarkable social and economic development during these years under the governance of the right-wing conservative political classes. A significant economic, social and demographic transformation had been realized during the 1950s and early 1960s. Bellou defines this period as a virtual metamorphosis of Greece from the position of a quasi-underdeveloped country with a traditional population to the threshold of modernity with fast industrialization and averaging economic growth rates of around 6.6%.⁵⁰⁹

The centralization of the Greek left and consolidation with the liberals put Georgios Papandreou's Central Union in a position which was a political alternative for social classes such as workers, farmers and public officers in a developing and industrializing country during the 1960s. The

508 The Greek left in the 1960s was anti-monarchist and anti-Western in the narrative, but indeed the political essence of the leftist tradition of the post-war era was constructed on Western values. As Botsiou argues, aspiring politicians of the left in the 1960s, prominent among them was Andreas Papandreou, were accomplished role models of American liberalism and bourgeois local urban activism. Konstantina E. Botsiou, "Anti-Americanism in Greece" in *Anti-Americanism History, Causes, Themes Volume: 3: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Brendon O'Connor, (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007): 221-222.

509 Fotini Bellou, "The Political Scene: Consolidating Democracy" in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou, (London and New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003): 157.

centralized left in Greece had already been reconciled with capitalist development in the country and it was not categorized together with the communist threat, but its strong conflict with the monarchy remained and Papandreou's struggle with the monarchy during his short period of governance between 1963 and 1965 resulted in a political crisis. Although Papandreou's narrative could never be considered as a sign for a communist revolution, the Central Union's challenging position for the conservative industrialist classes created a fear of destroying the economic interests of those classes and resulted in a military coup in April 1967 led by some colonels in the army.⁵¹⁰

The period of the Greek Military Junta (1967-1974) was a dark despotism for all social classes of the country. Mostly leftist politicians and intellectuals were exiled, but rightist political figures, such as Konstantinos Karamanlis, and center-right political groups also suffered from the oppressive socio-political situation in Greece created by the Junta. However, despite the strong oppressive political environment of the Junta period, the weaknesses of the regime were explicit in some respects. First of all, even though the US seemed to be neutral to the colonels' dictatorship, Greece's European allies objected to the Junta and it provided an environment for the opponents of the Junta to organize in Europe. While the prominent figure of the right, Konstantinos Karamanlis, was challenging the colonels from Paris, the future socialist leader, Andreas Papandreou, was re-organizing Greek socialists and liberals abroad under the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), as the predecessor of the future Panhellenic Socialist Movement, in Sweden and France.⁵¹¹ Secondly, the Junta could not destroy the political force of the center left in the country, and, by combining with the underground communist movements, the leftist factions in the country were embodied among the young population of Greece, especially in the biggest universities of the country in Athens and

510 Christos Kassimeris, "Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup", *Democracy and Security*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (July 2006): 62, 71.

511 Theodora Kotsaka-Kalaitzidaki, "The Human Geography of PASOK: 1974-1981", (Paper presented to the 2nd LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece, London, June 2005): 4.

Thessaloniki. In other words, while the intellectual challenge to the military dictatorship came from abroad, the physical challenge originated from the Greek universities. The Athens Polytechnic Uprising⁵¹² in November 1973 opened the path for the collapse of the military regime and Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 symbolized the Junta's end. Soon after Turkey's action in Cyprus, the Junta fell and parliamentary democracy was restored in Greece with the legislative elections in November 1974.

The worn-out country needed a popular figure for the difficult transition period after the military dictatorship and Konstantinos Karamanlis, the rightist popular politician of the past, returned to the political scene as a moderator to re-establish the democratic institutions.⁵¹³ Karamanlis' New Democracy Party won the majority in the Hellenic Parliament and Karamanlis himself played a balancing role between the right-wing factions and the industrialist classes, who had nationalist and anti-communist sensitiveness, and leftist groups and communists who were still considered as the enemies of the Greek state. Greece during the second half of the 1970s faced up to its Junta past and the Junta's crimes were mostly investigated and punished. Economic activity and politics were

512 Athens Polytechnic Uprising: Students of the National Technical University of Athens began protests against the Junta in the early morning of 14 November 1973. Student demonstrations turned into a civilian uprising against Junta rule and the protests escalated into an anti-Junta revolt in the following days. The Junta suppressed the uprising with tanks in the morning of 17 November 1973 and 40 people were killed by Junta troops after a series of gunfights during these four days. For an interesting analysis, see Marianthi Kotea, "The Athens Polytechnic Uprising: Myth and Reality", *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, Vol. 3, No. 8 (August 2013): 18-24. Kotea argues that the Junta had the support of USA and NATO during its rule and the Athens Polytechnic Uprising was a reaction not only against the Junta itself, but also against its backstage allies, USA and NATO. Furthermore, Kotea mentions that PASOK used the commemoration of the uprising in its leftist narrative while marching to power in the following years.

513 J. C. Loulis, "New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism" in *Greece at the Polls The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Penniman, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981): 59.

liberalized. Even the demons of the past, the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas – KKE) became legal. In addition, most significantly, Karamanlis had a vision of the Europeanization of Greece which led to full membership of the European Economic Community in 1981.⁵¹⁴

The restoration period of the post-1974 under Karamanlis' governance can be described as a liberalization process in terms of economic integration with the West and political intimacy with European Communities. This could only be achieved by a popular-rightist political movement and Karamanlis' New Democracy government did so. Because, ideologically, the left in Greece were still suspicious about European integration and they had been almost excluded from the power by the established order since the end of the Civil War, and they did not have a new and unique future vision for Greece under fast-changing international dynamics. During this balancing period of the rightist New Democracy, the leftover political legacy of the right-wing governments of the last 25 years and the Junta were observed clearly: national identity was accompanied by a Greek nationalist perspective. Even the leftist parties absorbed this unique nationalism for constructing a political identity for themselves to strengthen their reconciling positions with the Greek nation-state and the national values of Greek political culture. The post-1974 period witnessed the shifting of leftist discourse to the center together with the rightist actors who left their discriminative and aggressive political discourse against the left behind. In other words, despite their distinguishing political rhetoric, the extension of the right of free political association to all actors in the post-1974 era caused the rightist and leftist forces to situate themselves in the center around the common national values.⁵¹⁵

Although economic and political liberalization was mostly achieved during the post-Junta period, this nationalist legacy was mostly reflected as oppressiveness towards social classes of Greek society, such as unions,

514 Ibid. 68.

515 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends", 53-54.

intellectual opponents and minorities. Particularly, those ones who challenged the Greek national identity were affected negatively by ongoing pressure policies from the state regardless of rapid restoration of democratic values in the country. For example, state pressure on Turks in the province of Thrace still continued after the fall of the Junta and many times, physical attacks on Turks occurred under chaotic conditions and the Turks of Western Thrace were faced with terror situations.⁵¹⁶ Attacks on Turkish minority members, on the mosques in Komotini and Xanthi, on the Muslim cemeteries and on the fields belonging to Turks were quite common in the second half of the 1970s.⁵¹⁷

To sum up, social and ethnic groups, worker and peasant unions around the country, were very much overwhelmed by the right-wing governments and military dictatorship during the last 32 years of Greek politics before PASOK came to power and they were waiting for a reassuring environment in the political sphere of the country. Thus, the transforming socio-political situation in the post-1974 period resulted in the development of high expectations of different social classes from the new leftist government. The overwhelmed classes of the country, for example working classes, public officials many of whom were fired from their jobs, minorities and other social groups considered the leftist government of PASOK as an opportunity to relieve the political environment of Greece.⁵¹⁸

516 İbrahim Onsunoğlu, “Ölen Diktatör İoannidis ve Azınlık”, *Azınlıkça*, Sayı 59 (Ağustos 2010): 10.

517 For further details about organized attacks on the Minority which can be considered as terror conditions, see Baskın Oran, *Türk - Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*. 183-188. Oran quotes first-hand witnesses about the terror attacks on minority members and Turkish possessions in Komotini and Xanthi.

518 PASOK addressed the specific problems of the Greek society affecting ordinary people, such as small craftspeople, pensioners and farmers, and at the same time promised to glorify those ordinary citizens through national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation and democratic processes. Nick Papandreou, “Life in the First Person and the Art of Political Storytelling: The Rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou”, 21.

Cyprus Problem and PASOK's Approaches towards Turkey

§ 4.1 Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Instrument

When PASOK came to power in October 1981, its populist leader Andreas Papandreou was already ready for an outspoken propaganda on the Cyprus issue. PASOK's main arguments on foreign policy issues were based on an anti-Western discourse,¹ mostly narrated to the United States and Western Alliance, which were charged with being in collaboration with the military dictatorship and responsible for socio-economic collapse in the country.²

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- 1 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "Greek Foreign Policy in Defence of the National Interest", *Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 58, Özel Sayı: Yunanistan Krizinin Şifrelerini Çözmek: Sorunlar, Başarısızlıklar ve Meydan Okumalar/Special Issue: Deciphering the Greek Crisis: Issues, Failures, Challenges (2018): 115.
 - 2 Alexandros Nafpliotis, "From radicalism to pragmatism via Europe: PASOK's stance vis-à-vis the EEC, 1977-1981", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2018): 511.

In addition to this, PASOK's coming to power in the post-détente³ era of international relations was also a turning point for Greece's foreign policy dynamics, which included revenge against the legacy of right-wing politics and the Junta period. PASOK's interesting and challenging propaganda slogan of change, referred not only to a radical change in social and economic policies at the domestic level, but also to an evolution in the Greek foreign policy perspective. The evolution in the Greek foreign policy, which started soon after PASOK's electoral victory in 1981, progressed in two ways parallel to each other. First of all, PASOK had a strong belief in the damaging character of the legacy left by right-wing political dominance and military dictatorship which had shaped Greece's foreign policy in the last 30 years after the civil war. PASOK's main argument on Greek foreign policy under right-wing power from 1949 to 1981 was mostly founded on strong criticism of the country's unconditional devotion to the Western Powers, especially to the United States. Papandreou followed a strong and loud rhetoric of foreign policy criticism from 1981 onwards and his main argument was to awaken a national consciousness on Greek interests which had been sacrificed to the bloc interests of the Western Alliance, as he believed. The criticism was constructed with an anti-Western, especially anti-American character which was in fact inevitable because of the vengeful character of PASOK's foreign policy narrative. According to PASOK, the decision makers of the past, especially military dictators, right-wing political leaders and state bureaucracy had put Greek foreign policy interests on the back seat, while they conformed to Western and American demands for following the bloc policies. In such a perception, Greek interests were sacrificed to Western hegemony and

3 Détente was the era of easing relations between the United States and Soviet Union. It was the era of decreasing geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance between 1969 – 1974. During this period, the opposite sides in the Cold War agreed on decreasing the number of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles, and also, European security was given an institutional form with the Helsinki Records in 1974 which constituted a common security perspective for the whole European continent.

PASOK's promise of change was to destroy this hegemonic relation which usually ended up as a compromise of Greek interests.⁴

Secondly, PASOK's concern for Greek interests with an anti-Western rhetoric brought a debate on nationalist sensitiveness about transforming the foreign policy of Greece during the beginning of the 1980s. Although PASOK as a political organization had a socialist formation in many political aspects, the foreign policy understanding of the party represented a nationalist approach with special emphasis on the national interests of Greece, which became a full member of the supranational organization, the European Communities, in January 1981. From the beginning of the PASOK government, a nationalism of Greek pride had been the distinctive characteristic of its foreign policy. The Metapolitefsi⁵ period, which was characterized by a kind of anger nationalism derived from the social disappointment of the Greek people created by right-wing and military oppression of the past, was successfully transformed into a populist era with an upsurge in nationalism of pride. Papandreou definitely aimed to instigate the Greek people to accompany his foreign policy revolution which was targeted to stir the Greek state up as autonomous and capable of defending its independent character in matters of national interest.⁶

Despite the radical change in Greek foreign policy with PASOK, which was characterized by anti-Western narrative and strong attribution to independence in international relations by prioritizing national interest,

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- 4 Papandreou, in his book on imperialism and economic growth which was published in Greek, criticizes Greece's traditional position in the Western camp and its integration with the European Communities, and he explains European integration as an instrument providing a sphere for American dominance in Europe. See Andrea G. Papandreou, *Imperialismos kai Oikonomiki Anaptiksi* (Athens: Nea Synora A. A. Livani, 1975): 76-79.
- 5 Metapolitefsi refers to the period of post-1974, mostly until Greece's accession to the European Communities in 1981. It was a social, political and economic period of transition from military dictatorship to multi-party democracy in the country.
- 6 George Kassimeris, "The Greek Everyman: Andreas Papandreou at 100", E-Kathimerini, Accessed on October 11, 2019, doi: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/237418/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/the-greek-everyman-andreas-papandreou-at-100>

the answer to the question about the correlation between national interest and national threat was still unclear. For many of the bureaucratic elite and PASOK's statesmen in the early 1980s, it was still a debate about what they understood from the national interest perception of Greece. In the environment of the Cold War, Greece, as a member of Western Alliance, was still expected to perceive bloc interests to be over national interests. However, what Papandreou and the PASOK elites realized was the increasing importance of the national interest in the changing environment of international relations in which the Soviet Union had been losing power. It meant that the communism which had been presented as the main challenge in the national threat perceptions of the states of the Western Alliance, was not a security concern for Greece anymore. As a matter of fact, the traditional descriptions of the national interests of Greece and security threats to the country's national and territorial integration, which had been defined in accordance with the geopolitical environment of the Cold War, were challenged in that period of history when PASOK seized power.⁷

The history of international relations was in an era of change in the early 1980s when PASOK was consolidating its power in Greece. The security threats were being transformed from the international character of the Cold War into a more nationalized feature with which the states were describing these threats according to their own national interest definitions, rather than bloc interests. More precisely in the case of

7 Particularly related with the Cyprus issue, the historical Greek and Greek Cypriot doubts about the Western factor in Cyprus generally refer to the assumption of British and US interference in the Cyprus issue in favour of Turkey. Michalis Kontos, "Foreign Interventions and Greek Cypriot Perceptions" in *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem*, eds. Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell and Michalis Kontos, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016): 47-48. PASOK inherited that assumption.

Greece, the troubles which were of particular concern to the PASOK government, such as the problematic essence of Greco-Turkish relations, was given much greater importance than the ghost of communism.⁸

In brief, PASOK's revenge on the historical foreign policy of the right-wing dominance in Greece was accompanied by a populist nationalist narrative with anti-Western, more specifically, anti-American rhetoric. This anti-Westernism in PASOK's new foreign policy perception put the national interests of Greece forward in the international environment of changing state concerns and brought greater attention to the inter-state problems. In that case, Turkey and the security threats arising from the character of Greek-Turkish relations became more challenging for the evolving foreign policy of Greece under the PASOK government. Thus, the issues between Greece and Turkey were put in the first place on the foreign policy agenda of Andreas Papandreu. Consequently, it was not surprising that the Cyprus issue, which was the most fragile one for the Greek public and represented a political and military loss in recent Greek history, was positioned as the starting point of PASOK's transformation of Greek foreign policy.⁹

§ 4.2 PASOK's Efforts on Internationalizing the Cyprus Issue

Andreas Papandreu's different threat perception was not something new after his populist socialist party PASOK came to power. He had already started to mention his ideas on the shift of security concerns from

8 Van Coufoudakis, "Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and Pragmatism", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 1983): 378-379.

9 The internationalization of the Cyprus issue by Greek foreign policy began with PASOK rule by using victimization as an instrument for intimidating Turkey in the international system. Brian Mandell, "The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution" in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, ed. Norma Salem, (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press., 1992): 221-222.

communism, or the Soviet threat, to a Turkish threat in his election campaign during 1981. When the Greek government in 1980 negotiated Greece's re-entry into NATO's military branch under the Rogers Plan, Papandreou used this situation as a criticism of Karamanlis' government in his campaign and loudly attacked the attempts of Karamanlis' government to turn back to NATO's military branch. His argument was constructed on security concerns arising from Turkey and he claimed that NATO prevented Greece from defending Greek interests.¹⁰ Moreover, Papandreou claimed that NATO membership of Greece did not provide any security measure to protect Greece from Turkey, whereby he defined the eastern neighbor as a more dangerous power for Greece within NATO than the potential Soviet hostility outside NATO.¹¹ Papandreou's foreign policy understanding mostly arose from the longstanding historical mistrust of Turkey because of the unresolved conflict over Cyprus, which resulted in a feeling of military defeat among the Greek public. This mistrust was considerably reflected in his personal thoughts, which affected the decision-making process about the Cyprus-related policies of his government at the beginning of the PASOK governance period between 1981-1983.

Papandreou had never forgiven the policies led to the Turkish intervention of 1974¹² and he was aware of the Greek public's disappointment

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- 10 At the first NATO summit in December 1981 Papandreou attended as prime minister, he strongly criticized NATO allies, especially the United States for favouring Turkey against Greece; he vehemently attacked Turkey, while at the same time handing out to the NATO delegates a ten-page memorandum with the accusations of Greece against Turkey. This constituted the first breaking point and created mistrust in PASOK's relations with Turkey and the USA. Parmenion N. Tzifras, *I Athootiki mou Psifos gia ton Andrea G. Papandreou Proin Prothipourgo kai Proedro tou PASOK* (Athens: Nea Synora, 2001): 311.
 - 11 Maggie Jacobs, "Papandreou's High Drama", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (November 1983): 30.
 - 12 İnal Batu, former Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia is making that evaluation and he mentions that unforgivable characteristics of previous Greek mainstream policies towards Cyprus constituted the base for PASOK's uncompromising attitude towards Turkey about Cyprus issue. Gül İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991)*, 107.

about the Cyprus conflict and he first attempted to mobilize the public to avoid the feeling of loss in Cyprus. Moreover, he realized the strong resentment among Greek Cypriots against Greece which had emerged during the clash between the Junta and Greek Cypriot government before 1974. Papandreou, as the Prime Minister of Greece, paid an official visit to Cyprus in February 1982, just five months after he came to power and this was the first official visit from Greece to Cyprus at prime ministerial level.¹³ It was more than a visit and was rather a first step towards establishing a communication mechanism between the Greek Cypriot government and the PASOK government in Greece. As soon as he arrived in Cyprus, Papandreou claimed that it was not possible to tackle the problem through inter-communal talks anymore, and more interestingly, he stated that the efforts of Hellenes all over the world were needed to bring the Cyprus problem to the international arena and he initiated this.¹⁴

The meetings between Papandreou and the Greek Cypriot president became regular from February 1982 onwards to pursue the goal of integrating the approaches of the Greek Cypriots and Greece. That mechanism was a part of PASOK's strategy to resolve the historical duality between Greece and the Greek Cypriots which has existed since the first concrete demands of the Greek Cypriots on Enosis started in the early 1930s. Motherland Greece had never had the political power to achieve Enosis and this created a historical disappointment for the Greek Cypriots. Thus, political, economic and cultural connections between Greece and the Greek Cypriots were almost at breaking point when Papandreou

13 Papandreou's new approach to the Cyprus issue included the full support of the Greek government to the Greek Cypriot side by integrating Greek and Greek Cypriot policies towards internationalization of the issue. He gave a clear message to the world public about Greece's new policy towards the Cyprus issue when he arrived in Cyprus in February 1982: "I have come to assure you that both the Greek Government and the Greek people are giving and will continue to give their undivided support for the Cyprus people's struggle for freedom and independence". Marvin Hoowe, "Cypriots Greet Papandreou Warmly", *The New York Times*, 28 February 1982.

14 *Milliyet*, 28 February 1982.

came to power. The main objective of that strategy by Papandreou to establish this mechanism was to resolve the ongoing frustration of the Greek Cypriot community and political leadership.¹⁵ The PASOK government, in the early stage of their governance era, followed a patient policy to establish the mechanism on a reliable ground through two important targets: Firstly, through cultural programs and economic aid to the Greek Cypriot side, Papandreou restored Hellenism, which had been heavily wounded after the Turkish intervention in 1974.¹⁶ Secondly, Papandreou developed a respectful approach towards the political will of the Greek Cypriots and, contrary to his predecessors who had considered the Greek Cypriots as the sub-element of the greater Hellenic nation, Papandreou accepted the Greek Cypriot leadership as a counterpart in order to achieve their re-integration into Hellenism.¹⁷ That multicomponent strategy by the inexperienced PASOK in power was wiser and more reasonable than that of the previous governments, who were politically exhausted by the passion of Enosis, and simpler for constructing a base for a stronger collaboration between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Papandreou's efforts on construction of a mechanism for consultation was a success. He, himself and Greek government authorities met regularly with their Greek Cypriot counterparts and this counterpart relation

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- 15 During his visit to Nicosia, Papandreou oftenly emphasized that Cyprus is a Greek territory in order to indicate the union between Greek Cypriots and Greece. Tuncer Topur, *Yunan'la Sirtaki* (İstanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2014): 334.
 - 16 Greek economic aid to the Greek Cypriots increased from 1.25 to 2 billion Drachma (approximately 34.5 million Dollars) after Papandreou came to power. See, Jennifer Noyon, "Greeks Bearing Rifts: Papandreou in Power", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 97.
 - 17 Papandreou, during his visit to Cyprus in February 1982, often emphasized the independence of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and he mentioned that his campaign was to support the independence of Cyprus. Marvine Hoowe, "Papandreou, Due in Cyprus Today, Starts Drive for Turkish Pullout", *The New York Times*, 27 February 1982. At the same time, Papandreou, like his predecessors, considered Cyprus Hellenism as an extension of Hellenism, whose metropolis was Athens, see John L. Haines, "Party Politics and Greek Security Policy from 1974 to 1984: Change and Continuity", (Master of Arts Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1984): 192.

between Greece and the Greek Cypriots restored the trust between them in a short period of time. More significantly, the mechanism that Papandreou established with his personal efforts opened the way to integrating Greek and Greek Cypriot approaches for the commonness of interests towards the Cyprus conflict. It was a strategy by Papandreou of confidence building and was necessary to take the conflict away from its bilateral characteristic and put it on the agenda of the international community. In other words, the Greek Cypriot side, who always demanded Enosis and the Greek side who always refused those demands because of political, economic and military incapability, had created a Greek duality. Papandreou's worthy achievement was to be aware of the negative effects of this duality, which had caused dramatic failures for Greek foreign policy strategies at international level and to overcome this duality by making radical change towards constructing counterpart relations between equal entities.¹⁸

Papandreou, after he built up his strategy with relative success, took the next step for internationalization of the Cyprus issue. He persistently started to promote the international character of the Cyprus conflict through talks with the big powers in the Western Alliance and the PASOK government and Greek foreign policy bureaucracy began to make a noticeable effort to convince the international community for a solution to the Cyprus conflict through negotiations at the UN. Papandreou simply believed that Greece had a friendlier environment at the UN and he predicted that the Greek strategy for a possible settlement of the ongoing Cyprus conflict could obtain more significant support from the UN than from its allies in NATO such as the United States and Britain, against Turkey.¹⁹ The idea that lay behind the strategy of internationalization of the

18 Papandreou evaluated his strategy on Cyprus as "Hellenic Solidarity" by referring to two separate entities, Greece and Cyprus, and called for an international conference on the Cyprus issue. Marvine Hoowe, "Papandreou Seeks International Cyprus Talks", *The New York Times*, 2 March 1982.

19 A CIA document in January 1982 implies that Papandreou was seeking support for the internationalization of the Cyprus issue from the UN and non-aligned countries and his

Cyprus issue by Greek foreign policy was to gain international support to enforce a Greek-favored solution in the conflict with Turkey. Soon after Greek diplomacy began to discuss the Cyprus issue clamorously in front of the international community, Papandreou spilled the beans and pointed out the target of his strategy on internationalization of the Cyprus issue in his interview with the American media in December 1982: *“There can be no doubt that a fair settlement of the Cyprus problem would signify a decisive turning point in the climate of relations between Greece and Turkey.”*²⁰

It was a challenge from Greece to both Turkey and the other involved parties of the Cyprus issue, especially the United States and to a lesser extent, Britain, created by Papandreou himself. There is an important reason for Papandreou’s strategy which aimed to extend international support for the Greek strategy on Cyprus.²¹ Papandreou himself was an experienced politician in the Cyprus conflict, and especially during the 1964 crisis on the island, as a minister in the Greek cabinet of his father

diplomatic offensive about Cyprus was aiming to put pressure on the West. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Papandreou’s Cyprus Policy”, An Intelligence Memorandum, EUR 82-10015, January 1982: 8-10.

20 Maggie Jacobs, “Papandreou’s High Drama”, 31.

21 Papandreou’s strategy of internationalizing the Cyprus issue is not a newly established strategy in the early 1980s. On the contrary, it is a long-standing strategy rooted in the post-1974 era. Georgios Mavros, ex-foreign minister and one of Papandreou’s prominent foreign policy advisor, expressed Papandreou’s strategy of removing Cyprus from being a Greco-Turkish problem already in 1977 as follows: “I am completely opposed to any diplomatic manipulation that degrades the Cyprus issue from a large international issue to a simple Greek-Turkish one. From this point of view, the Greek-Turkish dialogue on the Cyprus issue not only did not benefit, but also damaged the Cyprus issue. Not only because after every Greek-Turkish dialogue the Turks were gaining more and more, but also for another more important reason: Cyprus is an independent and non-aligned state, a member of the UN. ... Any attempt to degrade the Cyprus issue into various Greek-Turkish ones and any search for its solution in an Athens-Ankara agreement are acts of ending the independence of Cyprus”. Sofias Maltezou, *Poios Pisteuei ton Antrea; Ta Yper kai ta Kata tou PA.SO.K. kai ton Allon Politikon Paratakseon* (Athens: Ermeias, 1977): 165.

Georgios Papandreou, he saw the ambivalent behaviors of the United States and Britain which never satisfied Greek ambitions on the unification of Cyprus and Greece. In 1964, while Greece and the Greek Cypriots were struggling for a pure Enosis and EOKA was attacking the Turkish community in Cyprus, Georgios Papandreou's government unbendingly negotiated with US president Johnson and US officials on achieving Enosis without a considerable compromise to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.²² Andreas Papandreou was both a minister in the Greek cabinet and his father's translator during the Cyprus negotiations between the US officials and Greek delegation headed by Georgios Papandreou in June 1964. After the negotiations in Washington and New York, during the summer of 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson, US government officials and diplomatic authorities mainly focused on convincing the Papandreou government for a solution with a concrete compromise to Turkey, such as a piece of land with sovereign rights.²³

The worsening situation on the island also brought Turkey's warnings of a military intervention to the agenda and US officials used this Turkish intention of military action for saving the Turkish population from possible annihilation as a threat by speaking softly but carrying a big stick. This US conception of the Cyprus conflict without any understanding of the dynamics in the field created a boomerang effect and Georgios Papandreou completely rejected the US proposals for a solution to the Cyprus conflict and challenged the US President by taking the risk of any possibility of armed conflict with Turkey.²⁴ Andreas Papandreou praised his father's stable position before the United States and he also encouraged his father not to negotiate for any compromise to Turkey on

22 Georgios Papandreou had oftenly emphasized his political aim towards Enosis since 1963. Rauf R. Denktaş, *Hatıralar Toplayış 10. Cilt Kıbrıs: Elli Yılın Hikayesi* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2000): 236.

23 Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front*, 104.

24 James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece History and Power, 1950-1974*, 102. For further details about Georgios Papandreou's negotiations on Cyprus with the US administration in Washington DC in June 1964, see also Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001): 251-256.

Cyprus. When the delegation returned to Greece, Andreas Papandreou was accused of failure in the negotiations with the United States and especially the rightist newspapers attacked him as responsible for preventing a peaceful solution in Cyprus. The process led to his resignation from the government and just one year later after the 1964 Cyprus crisis, Georgios Papandreou's leftist government fell. The Cyprus crisis and Georgios Papandreou's obstinacy in not negotiating with Turkey for a conditional Enosis in 1964 was one of the significant reasons for development of a strong opposition from the rightist media, politicians, royalist powers and army in Greece.²⁵

The details of what happened and what Andreas Papandreou experienced during the 1964 Cyprus crisis actually give some clues about his anti-Western, particularly anti-American conceptualization of the conflict. Papandreou strongly believed that Greece's allies in NATO, especially the United States and Britain, favored Turkey more than Greece in the Cyprus conflict and this created a weakness for Greek strategies on Cyprus.²⁶ Mainly for this reason, when he came to power in late 1981, he projected his challenging strategy on Cyprus and made a fundamental change to Greece's Cyprus policy by shifting Greece's attention from inter-Western Alliance solution efforts to a wider international struggle with the involvement of other international actors, especially the UN.

The inter-Western Alliance character of the Cyprus negotiations was rather closed to the attention of the international community and the dynamics of the negotiations were mostly determined and directed by the

25 Papandreou, in his memoirs, criticizes the US approach to the Cyprus conflict and he praises his father's stance against US President Lyndon Johnson as an honourable act. He appears to believe that the US favoured Turkey in the Cyprus conflict and he argues that if his father gave any compromise to Turkey it would be a strategic loss for Greece and would create a weakness for Hellenism to realize Enosis. His anti-American rhetoric is quite clear while he narrates his experiences during the June 1964 negotiations in the United States. For more details in Turkish, see Andreas G. Papandreou, *Namlunun Ucundaki Demokrasi*, 165-174.

26 Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front*, 105-106.

US dominance in the Cold War environment. After 1974, the Cyprus conflict was to be discussed between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders through inter-communal talks and these inter-communal talks were mostly interfered with by Greece and Turkey at the lower level, and sometimes by the United States, as the patron of the West, at the upper level in accordance with the motivation to protect the geopolitical interests of the Western Alliance.²⁷

In addition to this characteristic of the negotiations, the unavoidable feeling of loss in 1974 on the Greek Cypriot side was the dominant element which determined the essence of the inter-communal talks until 1981 and this resulted in refractory political behavior of the Greek Cypriot leadership through Hellenism. For example, in August 1981, Spyros Kyprianou, the president of the Greek Cypriot Administration, was still talking about realizing the dreams of Makarios through Enosis and he was mentioning a kind of new crusade at international level, and of course this approach, which evoked the spirit of Hellenic nationalism, drew reactions from the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey.²⁸ Such kind of unreasonable political behaviors by the Greek Cypriot leadership arose from the inconclusive and rock-ribbed environment of the inter-communal talks, which were mostly extinguished by the guarantor states and United States by constantly being replaced by another inconclusive negotiation effort. Papandreou started to press Kyprianou to end the inter-communal talks. He even strove to convince Kyprianou that the Turkish Cypriots' leader, Rauf Denktaş, was reflecting Turkey's will in the inter-communal talks and accused Denktaş of being Ankara's puppet. Papandreou's attempts towards the Greek Cypriot leadership achieved success after a while and Papandreou and Kyprianou agreed on ending the inter-communal talks in Cyprus. Papandreou's aim was to create international pressure on the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey through UN mechanisms in order to enforce

27 George A. Kourvetaris, "Greek and Turkish Interethnic Conflict and Polarization in Cyprus", *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Special Issue on Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea: A Region in Turmoil (Fall 1988): 192.

28 *Hürriyet*, 25 August 1981.

the Greek demands and legitimize Greece's new position on the Cyprus issue at international level.²⁹

Papandreou, from his own perspective, decided to overcome this vicious circle in the Cyprus issue for the benefit of Greece by extending its essence to international level, taking it from the hands of the United States and US-favored Turkey. Both in the inter-communal talks and in the Greek-Turkish discussions on Cyprus, Greek diplomacy felt itself to be the weak side against Turkey, who had been involved in the conflict by Britain in the 1950s and favored by the US since the 1960s. Although the USA prevented Turkey from taking military action in the 1960s and put an embargo on Turkey after the 1974 intervention, still the Greek public was keen on making a connection between the loss of the Greeks in 1974 and the US' backstage support for Turkey. Papandreou and PASOK shared this public opinion, too, and by going further they accused the US administration of being in collaboration with the Greek Junta and doing nothing to prevent Turkey from carrying out the 1974 intervention. In that case, the Greek public's claims on the recent past were much more inspired by Papandreou's populist nationalism in order to constitute a base for his newly introduced Cyprus policy with its anti-Western characteristic. He ingeniously used the sensitiveness of the Greek public in his radical foreign policymaking process towards Cyprus and especially in the early 1980s, he often condemned American foreign policy towards Cyprus by accusing it of encouraging and tolerating Turkish policy in Cyprus.³⁰

The propaganda on the public's beliefs, such as that the United States had accepted the coup of 1967 at once and then followed supportive policies for legitimizing Greek military dictators, that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July and August 1974 was realized with the unnamed

29 Sühra Bölükbaşı, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful NonSettlement between 1954 and 1996", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1998): 422.

30 John O. Iatrides, "Beneath the Sound and the Fury: US Relations with the PASOK Government" in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (Basingstoke: The Mac-Millan Press, 1993): 155-156.

permission of the Atlantic allies, and that Turkey was not forced to withdraw its forces from nearly 40 percent of Cyprus, was popularized across the nation and relocated to the international relations of the country by Greek diplomacy.³¹ In brief, according to Papandreou, the USA was the actor mainly responsible for Turkey's action in Cyprus and thus Greece's Cyprus strategies should be handled from the beginning by excluding the US' role in the conflict by obtaining political endorsement from the international community at the UN.

From this aspect, the main concern of Papandreou while he was internationalizing the Cyprus issue was to strengthen Greece's position against Turkey by obtaining wider support from the international community. His strategy was not complex and was based on a simple calculation: If Turkey was favored by the United States, Greece could obtain the support of the rest of the world by explaining the so-called Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus.³²

That approach by PASOK was entirely an attempt to keep Greek-Turkish relations in a careful balance by requiring more international legitimacy for Greek strategies. It would be a pragmatic policy if the requirements were provided at international level. For this reason, from the beginning of 1982 onwards, the PASOK government began an active presentation of the Cyprus problem, by placing strong emphasis on the

31 Constantine Melakopides, "The Logic of Papandreou's Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1987): 560-561.

32 Papandreou did not hesitate to use his populist rhetoric, including nationalism, as a weapon while implementing his strategy of internationalizing the Cyprus problem. The basis of PASOK's strategy was to promote the Greek-controlled "Republic of Cyprus" as an independent UN member state and to use Hellenism in populist rhetoric in doing so. In his speech in the Hellenic Parliament on February 21, 1986, Papandreou said: "... the PASOK Government takes the position that Cyprus is an independent member state of the United Nations that we are fighting with the Cypriot people for the recovery of land, which was violently occupied by invasion. And we have stressed that no solution to the Cyprus problem will be accepted by the Diocese of Hellenism, as long as it does not include the complete withdrawal of the occupying forces. This is the big, international, global, but also Greek issue". "Synedriasis Σ', 21 Fevrouariou 1986" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Dieftinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 71.

descriptions of “occupation” or “invasion” in the meetings of international organizations, such as the European Community, NATO and the UN. Especially, the UN platforms were actively used by Greek diplomacy to seek for the implementation of the UN resolutions on Cyprus. The PASOK government’s active diplomacy towards the UN included new approaches, too. For example, they called for demilitarization of Cyprus by expanding the UN peacekeeping force with some additional costs and the Greek government offered to cover these additional expenses for keeping a larger UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. It was a clear and interestingly unsuccessful attempt to de-legitimize Turkey’s military presence in the northern part of Cyprus. Moreover, Papandreou started to refuse to be involved in any trilateral negotiation with the guarantor states, Turkey and Britain, for the discussion of the Cyprus issue, in order to display his preferential policy alongside multilateral negotiations under the UN.³³

In the early period of the PASOK government, the UN’s position on the Cyprus conflict was stable, favoring both sides’ concerns on the political and social balance on the island after Turkey’s intervention in 1974. It is possible to observe the evolving political position of the UN from the Security Council’s and General Assembly’s resolutions and that evolutionary character of the UN on Cyprus would give a clue about the effectiveness of Greek diplomacy through the international community. At this point, it is important to state that Greek diplomacy’s efforts to mobilize the international community on Cyprus in favor of Greek strategies were to change the international balance against Turkey, because Papandreou’s perception of the Cyprus conflict diversified from that of his predecessors in terms of the political position of the Greek Cypriots in the eyes of Greek policy makers, and with regard to Enosis. Papandreou simply understood the breaking ties between the Greek Cypriots and Greece because of the patronizing relations constructed by Athens and

33 Van Coufoudakis, “Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens”, *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985): 213.

he changed by accepting the Greek Cypriot leadership as the representatives of an independent political entity.³⁴ Thus, he built up his strategy towards the international community on creating international legitimacy for the Greek Cypriots as the only legitimate political representative on the island. It was a unique strategy by PASOK to make both the Greek Cypriots and Greek public remember the legacy of the Republic of Cyprus by putting the Greek Cypriot side in the position of legal representatives of the Republic of Cyprus in the international arena.³⁵ The other, and most significant, part of that strategy was to isolate, or alienate Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots at international level for achieving a solution to the Cyprus conflict in accordance with Greek national interests, by promoting the constructed apprehension of “invasion”.

Apart from those efforts to isolate Turkey in the international arena because of the Cyprus conflict, Papandreou was very much aware of the fanciful characteristic and impossibility of Enosis in the age of global fractures in international politics of the 1980s. Enosis had created a huge political disappointment for Greek and Greek Cypriot political decision makers for almost a century and a psychological disappointment especially for the Greek Cypriot community who had considered themselves as a part of the great Hellenic nation since British rule started on the island. However, Greece’s weakness towards achieving Enosis, Turkey’s intervention in 1974 through the partition of the island and the dynamics of international politics, which never allowed a rupture in the balance of

34 As Melakopides argues Papandreou was aware of Greece’s indignity towards Greek Cypriots and Greece had to contemplate Greek Cypriots grievances through new political-legal means. Constantine Melakopides, “The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy” in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, ed. Norma Salem, (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1992): 85.

35 The Greek Cypriots, with the support of the Greek government in the early 1980s, managed to turn the UN into a powerful and effective political weapon against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Besides, they succeeded in gaining international political and diplomatic support to alienate Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. See Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 1997): p. 113.

power between Greece and Turkey, brought the Enosis dreams of the Greek Cypriots and nationalist Greeks in the motherland to an infinite end. The end of Enosis was also confirmed by the Greek Cypriot leadership in the Ten-Point Agreement signed with the Turkish Cypriot side. One of the points in the Ten-Point Agreement was to place the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus against any possibility of partial or complete unification of the island with another country, which actually referred to the Greek Cypriots' possible attempt for Enosis again.³⁶ Under these circumstances, Papandreou, as a populist politician but quick at comprehension, adapted Greek foreign policy to the new conditions of the era of non-Enosis. However, this was a unique policy adoption of replacing the old-fashioned idea of territorial unification of Cyprus and Greece with the new popular idea of political unification of the Greek Cypriots, which meant stronger cultural, economic and political integration of the Greek Cypriots and Greece under the international legitimacy of the Greek Cypriots as the only legitimate representative of the Republic of Cyprus.

Once the Greek Cypriots and Greece were reconciled again and integrated into a common strategy under the challenging global conditions of the early 1980s, Papandreou built his new foreign policy doctrine up by placing the hostility to Turkey in the center. This new doctrine in fact, although it was never narrated, instrumentalized the Cyprus issue, and

36 The Ten-Point Agreement was signed by Greek Cypriot leader Spiros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş under the auspices of the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, on May 1979. The Ten-Point Agreement pledged to negotiate the Cyprus conflict through inter-communal talks, to take UN Resolutions as the basis in the negotiations, to respect basic rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, to achieve an agreement under the auspices of the UN for the re-unification of the island, to take measures for preserving good faith and mutual understanding in the negotiations, to discuss de-militarization of the island, to guarantee continuity of the negotiations by avoiding any delay, and to hold the inter-communal talks in Nicosia. For further details about the Ten-Point Agreement of May 1979, see Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*, 141-142.

the Greek Cypriots willingly, or unconsciously embraced this instrumentalization in return for Greek diplomacy's efforts on international legitimacy, which could provide them with the opportunity to indulge the idea of being the only legitimate successor of the destroyed Republic of Cyprus. In other words, they principally left the decision-making process of the Cyprus strategies of the Greek side in the hands of Papandreou's PASOK government, who dramatized the Cyprus issue in the Greco-Turkish bilateral relations.³⁷

Papandreou's distinctive feature among the leaders of Greece was his national interest-oriented approach to political integration of Greek Cypriots and Greece with a populist narrative. The Greek Cypriots themselves were in a kind of political emptiness, especially after 1974, since the idea of Enosis was buried once and for all, and even the objective of a unitary state in Cyprus with the components of communal self-determination of both sides on the issues of low-level politics, which constituted the basis of the inter-communal talks in the post-1974 era, was not an option for constructing a new state anymore. For both the Greek Cypriots and Greece, the situation seemed to be desperate and they were aware of the beginning of an entirely new era in which they had to make concessions, if they aimed to re-establish a united and territorially integrated Cyprus under a unitary republic. However, the inter-communal talks of the post-1974 period did not result in any extensional agreement and this was evaluated, by both the Greek Cypriot side and Greece, as the fact that Turkey's objectives on Cyprus were not only related with maintaining the existence of the Turkish Cypriot population and suppressing Enosis, but also with geopolitical strategies like keeping half of the island of Cyprus

37 When PASOK came to power, the Greek Cypriots were actually ready to leave the initiative of the Greek side's Cyprus strategy to PASOK. In the message sent to the parliamentary meeting after the PASOK's election victory, which was unusual in fact, the Greek Cypriot Parliament invited the newly elected Hellenic Parliament, in which PASOK had an overwhelming majority, to provide a full support in the fight for the solution to the Cyprus problem. "Synedriasis Z', 2 Dekemvriou 1981" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Diefthinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 48.

under their control for gaining control of the balance against Greece in the Mediterranean.³⁸

This evaluation was most applicable for PASOK policy makers when they came to power in Greece and Andreas Papandreu mostly transcribed his foreign policy view on that simple reality: The picture of geopolitics had already drawn Turkey and Greece as the main figures of history. Cyprus was merely an instrumental conflict in that configuration by PASOK, and thus PASOK, who promised change in Greece, also adopted a radical change in the Cyprus policy of Greece. After all this, the remarkable foreign policy adoption process of PASOK in the early 1980s can be divided into three important steps: First, the Cyprus issue was delicately instrumentalized in the Greek foreign policymaking process. Turkey was attached with an antagonistic perspective to PASOK's narrative on this instrumentalization as the constructed "invader" power on the island. Second, the Greek Cypriots were fused into that strategy with the international legitimacy provided by internationalization of the issue against Turkey's constructed "illegitimate" military existence on the island. And third, Turkey was constructed as the common hostile power in the region for both Greece and the Greek Cypriots simultaneously to "liberate" the Republic of Cyprus and to "eliminate" the security threat to Greece.³⁹

38 Andreas Theophanous and Odysseas Christou, "The Cyprus Question and the Role of the UN: An Overall Assessment", *The Journal of Modern Hellenism*, Vol. 30 (2014): 79.

39 From the late 1970s, and especially from the early 1980s onwards, the Greek Cypriots abandoned the traditional dream of Enosis in return for international support for the legitimacy of their representation of the Republic of Cyprus. As Neophytos Loizides argues, there was no political party that talked about Enosis or related goals, but revived forms of motherland identification reappeared in various instances. One of the major successes of the Greek Cypriot leadership in this period, together with the government in Greece, was to bury the Enosis discourse to re-integrate the Republic of Cyprus through establishing a new set of beliefs for international cooperation and to receive international legitimacy for themselves by alienating Turkey as the invader. See Neophytos G. Loizides, "Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 2007): 177.

After PASOK came to power in October 1981, the UN Security Council's resolution numbered 495 on Cyprus on 14 December 1981 revealed a constant behavior of supporting inter-communal talks. The UN Security Council reiterated its support for the Ten-Point Agreement for the continuation of inter-communal talks and declared its contentment with the parties' intention of restarting the inter-communal talks within the framework of the Ten-Point Agreement. Besides, the resolution encouraged the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides to perform the inter-communal talks from a continuing, sustained and result-oriented perspective by avoiding any kind of possible delay.⁴⁰ The UN Security Council maintained its constant position on the Cyprus conflict by refraining from meddling in the inter-communal discordances on the island and supported the ongoing situation by referring to the continuous character of the inter-communal talks in accordance with the Ten-Point Agreement. Even the following Security Council Resolutions were a copy of each other and full of repeated sentences for supporting the inter-communal talks, the Ten-Point Agreement and the Secretary General's mission of good offices.⁴¹

The Security Council's stable position on the conflict did not dissuade the PASOK government from mobilizing the international community around the Cyprus conflict. The changing Greek diplomacy under the PASOK government realized the strong possibility of remaining inconclusive in the attempts towards the Security Council. Because of the global changes in international politics, the conflict in Cyprus remained frozen by the Great Powers of the Security Council. The NATO bloc in the Security Council, France, Britain and the United States, maintained their

40 UN Security Council, *Official Records Thirtysixth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1981* (New York: United Nations, 1982): 9.

41 See Security Council's resolutions on Cyprus in 1982 numbered 510 and 526, UN Security Council, *Official Records Thirtyseventh Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1982*, (New York: United Nations, 1983): 18; See Security Council's resolution on Cyprus in June 1983 numbered 534, UN Security Council, *Official Records Thirtyeighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1983* (New York: United Nations, 1984): 14-15.

smooth position by supporting inter-communal talks under the auspices of the UN, as their main assumption was to control the conflict without the risk of extension to a challenging problem within NATO. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was in a transition period after Brezhnev and struggling with economic weakening against the Western Bloc in the early 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Union foundered in the war in Afghanistan and any confrontation because of the Cyprus issue between the Western and Eastern sides in the Cold War under these circumstances was not in the interests of the Soviets. For this reason, the Soviet Union followed a “keep all sides happy” policy in the mid-1980s and Soviet diplomacy refrained from intervening in any other international conflict, including Cyprus, which might cause a new crisis with the Western Powers and which the Soviet Union could not afford to pursue in terms of military and economic reasons.⁴² In brief, there was an implicit agreement between the Great Powers of the Security Council about the ongoing situation in Cyprus, which Greek diplomacy was not strong enough to change.

However, the tranquility among the Great Powers of the international system created an unexpected advantage for Greek diplomacy in the General Assembly of the UN. Furthermore, satisfactory behaviors of the members of the Security Council about the ongoing unsolved situation in Cyprus affirmed Papandreou’s anti-Western claims on the reasoning of the Cyprus conflict. When PASOK came to power, Papandreou strongly criticized the Great Powers, especially the United States, for not involving themselves in the Cyprus crisis in order to prevent Turkey’s intervention

42 Andreas Stergiou, “The Communist Party of Cyprus and Soviet Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean”, *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 30/31 (2014/2015): 213. Also, “The New Thinking” in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev allowed for new geopolitical strategies, placing more emphasis on the Soviets’ concerns for economic resources, see Geoffrey Howe, “Soviet Foreign Policy under Gorbachev”, *The World Today*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (March 1989): 41-42.

in 1974 and for favoring Turkey when the island was partitioned in the post-1974 era.⁴³

In fact, Greek foreign policy had undergone a transformation since the restoration of democracy after 1974 and successive Greek governments tried to follow this transformed foreign policy which prioritized the vital national interests of Greece, despite the country's weak socio-economic situation when compared with the other allies in the Western camp. However, PASOK was more successful in the comprehension and practice of this transformation than its predecessor in the post-1974 period. What PASOK rulers believed was that decades of dependence on the Western Allies, and especially the external manipulation of the Greek domestic political arena that mostly came from the US, were evidence of the Allies' toleration and support of the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Moreover, when PASOK came to power, and during the early period of PASOK rule, the belief in the favoring of Turkey's revisionist objectives, especially in Cyprus, by the United States and NATO, which remained as a legacy from the Junta and post-Junta period, was still strong enough to open the way to adoption of an anti-American foreign policy by PASOK. This decade of transformation from 1974 onwards, in which PASOK played the crucial and leading role in the first half of the 1980s, represents a foreign policy consensus in Greece that affected almost all parties, political actors and bureaucracy on four basic principles: First, Greece's aidless international position, which enforced the Greek state to adopt an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy without dependence on the Great Powers in the Western Alliance; second, the changing security perception from the Western Bloc's common communist threat to the challenge coming from Turkey's increasing power, which was turning against Greece; third, the Western Allies' disregard for Greece in the disputes with Turkey; and fourth, the disappointment re-

43 Despite his anti-American rhetoric, Papandreou was indeed expecting more American involvement in the Cyprus conflict in favour of Greece. See Theodora Kalaitzaki, "Perceptions of the US Involvement by Athens and Ankara in the Greek-Turkish Dispute (1954-1999)", (PhD Dissertation, Bilkent University, 2004): 149.

sulting from the Western Allies' passive action against Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and partition of the island, which caused the appearance of a fundamental divergence between the interests of Greece and those of her allies, such as claims on removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, reintegration of the island, and the aims for economic and geopolitical integration with the Greek Cypriots, which substantially threatened crucial Greek interests.⁴⁴

The re-construction of the Cyprus strategies of Greece by Papandreou's PASOK was essentially based on this transformation around the four principles which aroused the mistrust towards the Western Allies, especially the US. Greek diplomacy predicted that they would not obtain any favorable change for Greek interests in Cyprus from the abortive position of the Security Council and the first affirmation to the Security Council was to slow down inter-communal talks during the election process in the beginning of 1983 on the Greek Cypriot side. Soon after Spyros Kyprianou was re-elected as the president of the Greek Cypriot Administration, Papandreou urged Kyprianou to cease collaboration with other strong political parties in Cyprus, especially with AKEL, and Greek diplomats in New York began to do their utmost to create a consensus in the UN General Assembly in favor of Greek claims on Turkey's "invader" position in Cyprus and to engender international consent for the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from the island, as a result of the Papandreou-Kyprianou cooperation.⁴⁵ In this context, Papandreou took a further step by proposing a new constitution for Cyprus under the auspices of the UN, but it was rejected by Turkish Cypriots and at the same time, together with Kyprianou, he began to take more stronger initiatives

44 Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-89" in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991): 42.

45 For further details about Papandreou's involvement in Cyprus politics and his efforts for the internalization of the conflict together with Kyprianou, see Kaysar V. Mavratsas, *Elen Milliyetçiliğinin Kıbrıs'taki Yönleri*, transl. Öztürk Yıldırımboza, (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 2000): 60-84.

towards the member states of the EC in order to involve them in Cyprus issue in favor of Greece and Greek Cypriots.⁴⁶

PASOK's radically changing strategy on Cyprus to internationalize the situation produced a result on May 13, 1983 with the UN General Assembly's resolution on the question of Cyprus by a vote of 103 in favor and 5 against with 20 abstentions. It was an overwhelmingly powerful resolution, mainly targeting the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island of Cyprus. Despite the US' and Britain's strong warnings and protests for avoiding partisan language, the resolution evidently took the side of the Greek Cypriots and accepted Greece's discourse against Turkey by constructing it as an illegitimate occupying power in Cyprus lands. For instance, just one day before the adoption of the resolution, the US representative at the UN stated the US government's sensitivity for preserving the balance between Turkey and Greece before the UN General Assembly, emphasized the role of the UN Secretary General's good offices and avoided any harsh statement about Turkey's presence on the island: "*We also are disturbed by the fact that the unresolved differences in Cyprus strain relations between two friends and allies in the region, Greece and Turkey. We will continue to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to help the parties to this unfortunate conflict reach a fair and lasting settlement. ... The United States believes it is this process—the direct discussions between the communities complemented by the good offices role of the Secretary-General—which has the best chance of producing the lasting settlement to the Cyprus dispute which we all seek*".⁴⁷ However, US and British efforts to moderate the context of the resolution served for nothing except PASOK's campaign of putting the Western Powers, espe-

46 Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations* (Abingdon, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998): 162.

47 Document 176, Statement by the Representative at the U.N. General Assembly (Sherman), May 12, 1983, "Support for the Good Offices Role of the U.N. Secretary-General" in *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1983*, (Washington: Department of State Publication, 1985): 466-468.

cially US and Turkey into the same picture decorated by an anti-imperialist narrative for Cyprus, and pushed the majority of UN member states to the side of Greece's new foreign policy strategy against Turkey.⁴⁸ Despite the US' and Britain's abstention votes, the resolution was accepted as it had been drafted.⁴⁹

The UN General Assembly's resolution in May 1983 represented both a victory of PASOK's effect on the change of Greek foreign policy on Cyprus and a turning point for the course of events in the Cyprus negotiations. Apart from that, this resolution meant the beginning of a new era in Greco-Turkish relations full of challenges and political struggles which sometimes led to the risk of armed conflict throughout the 1980s. The Greek strategy in the May 1983 UN General Assembly Resolution can only be understood from the geopolitical perspective. Greek motivation for submitting the Cyprus clause in front of the international community through UN structure was rather a part of the strategy to acquire a wider sphere against Turkey, than enforcing a solution in Cyprus. That move was structured on two pillars: The first one was to break the relation between Turkey and the US which provided a status quo for Turkey's military existence in Cyprus through ongoing inter-communal talks. The second one was to push Turkey into a bilateral struggle with Greece, who

48 After this resolution, in the 1980s, UN generally approached the Turkish Cypriots as a numerically smaller community to be represented sufficiently. Nathalie Tocci, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?* (Hampshire: Aldershot, 2004): 39. Hugo Gobbi, UN Special Representative to Cyprus in that period, made considerable mediation attempts in Cyprus between 1980-1983, but despite his efforts for mediation and the US' moderate policy to preserve the balance between Turkey and Greece, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution in favour of Greece and the Greek Cypriots and the old aspirations of union by one community and separation by the other continued. See, Hugo J. Gobbi, *Rethinking Cyprus* (Tel Aviv: Aurora, 1993): 27-28.

49 *Milliyet*, 14 May 1983.

could already be sure of the support of the international community with this resolution.⁵⁰

At this point, it is necessary to quote the related paragraphs of the resolution in order to analyze how a bilateral Greco-Turkish conflict was created by Greek diplomacy by instrumentalizing the Cyprus issue with the consent of the international community on the UN platform. The introduction of the resolution actually determines the direction of the next 17 paragraphs, which have targeted Turkey's military presence in Cyprus and Turkey's actions towards Cyprus. In the introduction part of the resolution, the UN General Assembly recalls the principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and acquisition of territories by force. Moreover, for the first time since 1974 in a UN resolution, Turkish troops in Cyprus were defined as foreign forces who occupied the territories of the Republic of Cyprus. By saying this, the General Assembly clearly underestimated Turkey's argument for legitimization of the 1974 intervention based on the guarantor rights arising from the Zurich and London Agreements. Additionally, the General Assembly mentioned its concerns about the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, defined it as a threat to international peace and security and gave support to the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus in accordance with PASOK's discourse on the international character of the Cyprus conflict. The introduction part was completed by criticisms of Turkey's unilateral actions with regard to encouraging Turkish citizens to settle in the areas under Turkish control by referring to the change in the demographic structure of Cyprus against the Greek majority.⁵¹

50 For example, when Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots decided to use Turkish Lira as a shared currency after the UN resolution, the Greek government made attempts towards the permanent members of the UN Security Council to ask them to prevent Turkey from this act. This reveals the Papandreou government's approach to the Cyprus issue as a bilateral Greco-Turkish conflict. *Cumhuriyet*, 20 May 1983.

51 UN General Assembly Official Records, *Thirty-seventh Session Supplement No. 51 (A/37/51), Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Thirty-seventh Session, 21 September-21 December 1982 and 10-13 May 1983*, (New York: United Nations, 1983): 48-49.

Paragraph 1 confirmed full support of the UN General Assembly for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and once again made a call for the cessation of all foreign interference. Although it was evident that the Republic of Cyprus was unilaterally under control of the Greek Cypriots, it was intentionally underlined in Paragraph 2 of the resolution that the Republic of Cyprus and its people had full and effective sovereignty and had the legitimate right of control over the entire territory of Cyprus. Moreover, the paragraph called the member states to support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights. In Paragraph 4, the proposal for total demilitarization of Cyprus was accepted, which meant the withdrawal of Turkish military forces and in Paragraphs 7 and 8, the expectation for the withdrawal of occupying forces was confirmed and the withdrawal of the troops was considered as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus conflict. Paragraph 11 implied human rights violations by Turkey and called for respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots. Freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right to own property and the implementation of urgent measures for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes in safety were included in this paragraph. Briefly, Turkey was put in a responsible position for all displacements on the island, which were in fact the result of a deeper and historically longer violent conflict between the two communities on the island. Paragraph 12 referred to the Turkish formation of the federative body established by the Turkish Cypriots in 1975 as a de facto entity and it was defined as a structure formed under the force of arms, which was not to be allowed to influence the solution process of the Cyprus problem. This paragraph was a clear disregard of the Turkish Cypriots' will as one of the communities in Cyprus. And finally, the UN General Assembly took the initiative with Paragraph 15 to provoke the Security Council into a stronger involvement in the Cyprus issue. In Paragraph 15, it was recommended to the Security Council to examine the question of the implementation of its resolutions related with Cyprus. It was also suggested to the Security Council to adopt the necessary

measures for the implementation of its resolutions in Cyprus. This paragraph was a challenge and an implicit message to the Great Powers in the Security Council, particularly to the United States, by Greece to give up favoring Turkey in the Cyprus issue.⁵²

Although it was a resolution related with the Cyprus issue, the context and the content of the resolution reflected Turkey's Cyprus policies and Turkish existence as a threat to international security, rather than making recommendations about the essence of the Cyprus conflict. The UN General Assembly determined its position by an overwhelming vote on the side of Greek diplomacy, which had been attempting to alienate Turkey at international level by using the Cyprus conflict as a tool. Many of the paragraphs in the resolution referred, openly or implicitly, to the "invader" role of Turkey, which had been constructed by PASOK-patronaged Greek diplomacy. In this context, the resolution was regarded as a political victory against Turkey among the Greek public, while the Turkish public was full of anger towards the international community by accusing it of taking the side of Greece and the Greek Cypriots. The well-known national newspaper, *Milliyet*'s front page headline summarized the angry reactions of the Turkish public: "*Turkish Army will stay in Cyprus*". *Milliyet* criticized the unfair perspective of the resolution and commented on the actions of the international community as explicitly taking the side of the Greeks by forcing Turkish Cypriots to bow the economic embargo.⁵³ *Cumhuriyet* placed a milder headline by just referring to the UN General Assembly's decision on Cyprus. However, in the text the resolution was criticized as unfair and invalid.⁵⁴ A harsher response came from *Tercüman*, in which the resolution was regarded as a feast for Greek Cypriots and Greece and the newspaper made headlines by Denktaş's statements saying that inter-communal talks could not be continued in this case.⁵⁵ And, *Hürriyet* was announcing that Turkey would not recognize

52 Ibid. 49.

53 *Milliyet*, 14 May 1983.

54 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1983.

55 *Tercüman*, 15 May 1983.

this decision.⁵⁶ In general, Turkish press was inclined to consider the UN General Assembly's resolution as a diplomatic failure by the international community which would lead to a bilateral crisis between Greece and Turkey instead of motivating the negotiations for a solution in Cyprus.

The attention of the Greek press to the UN resolution was merely differentiated in words from that of the Turkish media. Although it was a significant step for the Greek government in terms of the diplomatic conflict, the Greek media's approach still reflected a belligerent attitude. However, the Greek press showed the humor of a notional victory, while the Turkish mass media revealed an intangible disappointment. For instance, *Eleftheria* newspaper promoted Greek diplomacy's victory over Turkey. *Eleftheria*'s assessment was more related with Greco-Turkish relations than the conflict in Cyprus and the newspaper constructed a relation between Papandreou's radicalizing foreign policy and Greece's national interests regarding Cyprus. Turkey was regarded as a threat to Greece's national security through Cyprus and according to *Eleftheria*, Greek diplomacy had replied to the increasing Turkish threat with successful international diplomacy by convincing the majority of the UN member states to demand the Turks leave Cyprus. The comments in *Eleftheria* on the resolution merely touched upon the Greek Cypriots with a few words and the Greek-Turkish conflict was prioritized instead of discussing the essence of the Cyprus conflict.⁵⁷ Indeed, the Greek government considered the UN resolution as a Greek victory not only over Turkey, but also over the United States and Britain, who, according to PASOK's view, had always favored Turkey against Greece's interests in Cy-

56 *Hürriyet*, 14 May 1983.

57 *Eleftheria* said: "The UN demands that the Turks leave Cyprus. ... Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou expressed his full satisfaction for this development. ... The Greek Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of Cyprus had a meeting with the aim of informing each other about the developments in the Cyprus issue. The two men expressed their optimism for the outcome of the vote at the UN General Assembly and described the resolution submitted as one of the best and strongest ever ...", *Eleftheria*, 14 May 1983.

prus. The government evaluated the issue as a diplomatic success of Papandreou as he obtained the support of the Third World and non-aligned countries for the benefit of Greece, despite the British and American attempts to soften the content of the resolution. In fact, more than two-third of the countries which voted in favour of the resolution were the members of either Soviet bloc or non-aligned movement. The preparations for the resolution were finalized in non-aligned summit held in New Delhi in March 1983 and the draft resolution was sponsored in the UN by Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Moreover, Greece's diplomatic achievement through the resolution particularly disturbed the Turkish side as it was aimed, because the resolution made clear references on the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire island, as well as the promotion of the concept of one people in Cyprus.⁵⁹

The reaction of the Greek public and mass media was more inclined to handle the situation as a bilateral Turkish-Greek political struggle over national interests, and Cyprus was a geographical tool where those national interests of the two states intersected. From that point of view, the Greek media's general approach was in parallel with PASOK's strategy of carrying the Cyprus issue to another field where the bilateral character of Greco-Turkish relations prevailed in the essence of the conflict. That is to say, Papandreou seemed to receive major support from the public and media in his battle with Turkey in terms of defending the national interests of his country after that resolution by the UN.⁶⁰

58 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy", *The World Today*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 1984): 74-75.

59 Nikos Moudouros, "The "TRNC" in the Turkish Cypriot context: A moment of multiple and contradictory interpretations", *East Mediterranean Geopolitical Review*, Vol. 3 (Spring 2018): 45.

60 Papandreou, just one day after the UN Resolution, gave a tough message to Turkey in the meeting with an intense participation by the people, which was organized in Komotini, the city close to the border with Turkey: "We know that there are problems in relations with neighboring Turkey. I would like to emphasize that the two peoples can and must in the future proceed peacefully, in the context of a peaceful coexistence in the

Turkey's response to the UN General Assembly's resolution was of course as tough as could be expected. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey declared Turkey's official response that the resolution was immoderate and one-sided. As it was stated in the official declaration, the decision was considered to have no effectiveness in terms of international law and politics, and Turkey did not recognize that decision by the UN.⁶¹ The Turkish response was not unexpected. However, the historical developments of the Cyprus issue evolved into a Turkish-Greek bilateral conflict. Especially from May 1983 onwards, that considerable international support for Papandreou's policies triggered Greek nationalist sensitiveness towards Cyprus and it surrounded the political strategies of the Greek government which led to a more serious crisis in the upcoming years of PASOK rule. Soon after the resolution was passed, during the visit of the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegation to France and the Vatican, their approach to the Cyprus resolution from the perspective of a Greek-Turkish conflict became much more apparent, as Kyprianou stated that they would ask for the support from the Pope for the crusade which they had started against the Turks.⁶²

The disappointment and anger on the Turkish side, and the feeling of victory, which sometimes achieved a kind of crusade characterization, on the Greek side were actually the targets of Papandreou's strategy to turn

Aegean, in peaceful projects. Unfortunately, this message has not yet been accepted by the political leadership of neighboring Turkey. We would like to send a simple and direct message from Komotini to the Turkish people. We are not claiming anything. Greece wants to live peacefully, to cooperate with all the Balkan countries. But as we claim nothing, we make it absolutely clear that the people with their armed forces will never concede a single piece of land, sea or airspace. ... in the face of national independence, in defending the sovereign rights of the nation and the people, we are ready to make all the sacrifices. Strong Armed Forces means peace and security". *Foni tis Rodopis*, "14 Maiou 1983: Otan o Andreas Papandreou vouliaze tin Komotini", Accessed on December 30, 2020, doi: <https://fonirodopis.gr/press/97367/14-maiou-1983-otan-o-andreas-papandreou-vouliaze-tin-komotini/>

61 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *1983 Tarihçesi* (Ankara: İcra Sekreterliği, 1984): 14.

62 *Tercüman*, 28 May 1983.

the Cyprus conflict into a bilateral Greek-Turkish struggle in order to legitimize his foreign policy perspective based on the new definition of the security threat coming from the east, i.e., Turkey. Interestingly, very few of the scholars in Turkey could estimate the substantial characteristic of that new foreign policy strategy by Greece which was adopted by PASOK after 1981. Fahir Armaoğlu was among those few and he predicted the aim of Papandreou's move at the UN to transform the Cyprus issue into a Turkish-Greek conflict by victimizing it at the international level in order to produce a kind of amiability towards Greece in her struggle against Turkey. Armaoğlu argued in his column in the newspaper *Tercüman* that this decision by the UN would kill the inter-communal talks in Cyprus and that these efforts by the Greek government to internationalize the Cyprus issue would transform the balanced situation between Turkey and Greece into a more serious conflict between them, with unpredictable results which would cause disorder in the region and create greater mistrust between the two neighboring countries.⁶³ Inter-communal talks were suspended after the resolution and the flow of history in Greek-Turkish relations was irreversibly changed at the end of 1983. The response of the Turkish side to the UN resolution was the de jure declaration of the de facto disunity in Cyprus, which carried Andreas Papandreou himself and foreign policy decision makers in Greece towards a more aggressive policymaking process towards the issues related with Turkey.

§ 4.3 Proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and PASOK's Policy towards Turkey

After the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, the Turkish Federated Assembly of Cyprus held a session on June 3, 1983 under a special agenda to discuss the UN decision and its consequences for inter-communal negotiations. However, the UN resolution favoring the Greek

63 Fahir Armaoğlu, "Karar ve Sonrası", *Tercüman*, 15 May 1983.

side and accusing Turkey of being responsible for the divided situation in Cyprus caused the disengagement of the Turkish side from the idea of reunification of the island under a new federal structure and created mistrust regarding the objectivity of the international community. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş's interview before the session signaled the direction of the absolute division of the island. Denktaş simply declared the Greek side to be responsible for the partition of the island because of their passion for Enosis and pointed out the Turkish Cypriots' right for self-determination.⁶⁴

In the summer of 1983, the process evolved into the creation of an independent Turkish state in Cyprus and it was conducted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in close cooperation with Turkey and with its consent. Despite the strong will of the Turkish Cypriots for independence, the period in which the Turkish state of Cyprus was structured should be considered as a part of the foreign policy strategy of Turkey in reply to the victory of Greek diplomacy at the UN, since the support of the UN General Assembly for Greek claims on Cyprus in fact represented an advantageous position for Greek strategy to take the island back under Greek dominance by the withdrawal of the Turkish military presence. It was a challenge for Turkish foreign policy, and the only way to make a counter maneuver to the Greek move was to strengthen Turkish existence on the island by achieving an independent Turkish entity with Turkey's support. Despite the doubts of the National Security Council,⁶⁵ the Turkish Minis-

64 *Hürriyet*, 4 June 1983.

65 Turkey was ruled by a military government, which was named as the National Security Council, between September 1980-November 1983, headed by Kenan Evren, the leader of the military coup staged on September 12, 1980. In the autumn of 1983, the National Security Council seemed to be timid about the Turkish Cypriots' intentions for independence due to possible international reactions against Turkey. For instance, when Rauf Denktaş said in October 1983 that the name of the new state would be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish Minister of Defence, Ümit Haluk Bayülken responded to Denktaş that although the Turkish Cypriots had the right to self-determination, it was not appropriate to make sensational and passionate statements, and that

try of Foreign Affairs supported the independence of the Turkish Cypriots. At that point, it is unclear whether the Turkish Cypriots had the full support of Turkey or not. For instance, Asaf İnan and Candemir Önhon, ambassadors and high level diplomats in the Turkish foreign bureaucracy, claimed that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was not sure that the Turkish Cypriots were going to declare independence. Moreover, İnal Batu, the Turkish Ambassador in Cyprus in 1983, stated that although he was aware of extraordinary activities in the Parliament of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus towards the declaration of independence in November 1983, he was not informed about the further details of the Turkish Cypriot leadership's plans for independence.⁶⁶

However, İlter Türkmen, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1983, stated that Turkish foreign bureaucracy believed that an advantageous position for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots could only be ensured against Greece and the Greek Cypriots, if the Turkish Cypriots were to declare independence in the territories which were under the control of Turkey.⁶⁷ Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry assisted Rauf Denktaş towards independence, it took some time to convince the National Security Council and its military leader Kenan Evren about the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).⁶⁸ In the end, Turkey was able to singularize its strategy on Turkish Cypriot independence by procuring a consensus between the foreign bureaucracy and military government. Kenan Evren declared the National Security Council's support for Rauf Denktaş and the Turkish Cypriots' desire for independence by saying that it was impossible to turn back from independence at this point and that Turkey was ready to explain the fundamental right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots to her Western Allies, including

having a right and the time for using this right were different things. *Cumhuriyet*, 20 October 1983.

66 Gül İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991)*, 100-101.

67 Ali Satan and Erdoğan Şentürk, *Tanıkların Diliyle Kıbrıs Olayları 1955-1983* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2012): 450.

68 Ibid. 451.

Britain and the United States.⁶⁹ When the Turkish strategy on the Turkish Cypriots' independence became clearer by the end of summer 1983, the TRNC was proclaimed on November 15, 1983. It was both a Turkish counter move to Greece's acquisition at the UN in May 1983 and a common challenge from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to Greek strategies, but at the same time, it was the reflection of the aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots for an independent state in Cyprus.

After the intervention of 1974, the perception of Turkish foreign policy makers was mostly characterized by geopolitical concerns. Although the conflict in Cyprus had an ethnic character, this was true only when the domestic socio-political dynamics were taken into consideration. From the international aspect, the Cyprus conflict meant more than the inter-communal conflict of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus and the conflict itself was much more related with the national and geopolitical interests of Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, both Turkey's and Greece's involvement in the Cyprus issue was in fact the result of their sensitiveness towards the political position of their kinsfolk on the island, which was uttered more raucously before the international public, and of the regional dynamics of inter-state relations. A delicate international balance between Greece and Turkey had been established in the Eastern Mediterranean with the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and the ethnic conflict in Cyprus had a dimension which went beyond the territories of the island. For this reason, the possible conciliation and political union between the two communities of Cyprus had always been closely connected with the balance in Greco-Turkish relations.⁷⁰

69 Erdem Karaca, "Türk Basınında Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluş Süreci ve Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1975-1983)", (PhD Dissertation, Gazi University, 2010): 325.

70 For instance, Papandreou was aware of possible results of Turkish independence in Cyprus for Greek-Turkish geopolitical balance in Cyprus. On May 20, 1983, the Greek government expressed its concern to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council for the establishment of an independent state in the Northern Cyprus, and even after the proclamation of TRNC, when diplomatic contacts led to the start of UN sponsored

As the Greek Cypriots and Greece had never given up the idealization of a political union, Turkish foreign policy had never pushed the idea of partition into the background, either. This situation created a feeling of mistrust and a long-lasting tension not only between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also between the motherlands of Greece and Turkey. Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 can be considered as the outbreak of that inter-state tension which caused the geographical partition of the island of Cyprus. After 1974, Turkey's official position was determined as the achievement of a federation in Cyprus. The main strategy for this positioning by Turkey was actually based on the consideration of Greece's possible emplacement in the southern part of Cyprus, if the island was divided by partition or annexation.⁷¹

The chronological developments in Cyprus constituted the links in the chain of the Turkish-Greek balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, which had always been enforced by the international political dynamics, and now it was Turkey's turn to tip this balance in favor of herself with the proclamation of the TRNC.⁷² When EOKA started its armed campaign to achieve Enosis in the mid-1950s, Turkey was involved in the conflict with manipulation by Britain and Enosis was prevented by both Britain's

talks between Turkish and Greek sides in New York in January 1985, Greek government was worried that the US stance against the latest situation in Cyprus would be to upset the balance of power for the benefit of Turkey. Evaggelos Chekimoglou, "Enas Sosialistikis Prothipourgos I Proti Thiteia (Oktovrios 1981-Iounios 1985)" in *O Andreas Papan-drou kai i Epochi tou zos Tomos*, ed. Vasilis Panagiotopoulos, (Athens: Ellinika Gram-mata, 2000s): 85.

71 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, 309.

72 In Greece, proclamation of TRNC was clearly perceived as a move of Turkey. Georgios Mavros, former Foreign Minister and one of the most prominent politician in Papan-dreou's foreign policy decision making circle, said in the Hellenic Parliament on 17 November 1983: "The proclamation was not made by Denktas. Denktas expresses absolutely nothing, it has no political, moral or legal implications. ... this uprising was carried out by Ankara, which was the first to recognize the new state. ... they (Turkey) are trying to overthrow the state (Republic of Cyprus) with a decision taken by the Council of Ministers in Ankara". "Synedriasis A', 17 Noemvriou 1983" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Dieftinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 55.

and Turkey's efforts in the Zurich and London Agreements. The Agreements created a Turkish-Greek balance, but when the Enosis struggle started again with the constitutional crisis of 1963, the risk of disturbing the balance in favor of Greece appeared and the process reached the level of the coup in 1974 with the inconclusive inter-communal talks and EOKA violence. After the Turkish intervention in 1974, a relative balance had been achieved and inter-communal talks on the basis of federation were pursued until the early 1980s.

PASOK's radical foreign policy change on the Greek side after coming power at the end of 1981 constituted a new and post-modern challenge to this relative balance by constructing an international framework for the Cyprus issue. The resolution of the UN General Assembly had two significant outcomes which sabotaged Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Firstly, the resolution undermined the inter-communal talks for federation, which was the appropriate strategy for Turkey after 1974. Secondly, and more importantly, the UN General Assembly's resolution, which was actually an achievement of Greek diplomacy that followed the change introduced by PASOK, favored Greek interests and granted an international sovereignty to the Greek Cypriots as the legitimate rulers of the island at international level, even though they had never represented the Turkish community of Cyprus. As Turkey conceived this as a Greek victory at international level which constituted a threat to Turkish geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the proclamation of the TRNC was the inevitable consequence of Turkish foreign policy makers' efforts to show political defiance against Greece in Cyprus.⁷³

If there is an installed international balance between two conflicting and neighboring states in a certain geographical area, which is enforced

73 Greek side has also considered the proclamation of TRNC as a move in the geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Greece. Soon after the proclamation of TRNC, Greek press was mentioning that the West disapprove of the new Turkish self-assertion, there is a global condemnation which aided Greece to cancel the division in Cyprus, and the Hellenic President Konstantinos Karamanlis was underlining that united Hellenism will face the Turkish challenge in Cyprus with composure and determination. *I Kathimerini*, 16 November 1983.

and commanded by the outsider powers, there is also a risk of breaking that balance when tectonic changes occur in the international system which affect the enforcing and commanding position of the outsider powers on the balance. The bi-polar environment of the mid-1980s represented such an era of tectonic change in the international system, in which the US and Britain mostly focused on decreasing the power of the Soviet Union, in other words the Western victory over communism. The Cyprus conflict did not create a challenge any more for the Western Alliance in 1983, and neither the Greek diplomatic victory at the UN, nor the Turkish proclamation of an independent entity on the island constituted a significant interest for US and Britain, the hegemonic powers of the Western Bloc. For instance, as Leigh H. Bruce argues, the British military and intelligence facilities in Cyprus were playing key roles in supporting the US' Middle East policy and in monitoring Soviet military activity in the region. When Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou said that he would not renew the US bases accord when it expired in 1988, the Greek Cypriot leadership also tried to threaten the USA and Britain by saying that they intended to question the status of the British bases in Cyprus and that they would not hesitate to do so if this became necessary. Yet the US administration had never taken these threats into consideration. As Bruce incisively specified, the Cyprus problem had never been primarily an intercommunal one. Rather, it stemmed from more than thirty years of shortsighted policy and manipulation by outside powers, the United States, Great Britain, Turkey and Greece. In the first half of the 1980s, the USA recognized this reality more clearly and US policies shifted from the Greece-favoring position after 1974 Turkish intervention to a flexibility-providing position for Turkey in the changing environment of the 1980s.⁷⁴

At the same time, both the Greek Cypriots and Greece expected especially Britain, as the guarantor state, to play a more active role in preventing the Turkish Cypriots from gaining independence. The Greek side strongly believed that Britain failed to intervene to protect the integrity

74 Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance", *Foreign Policy*, No. 58 (Spring 1985): 117-118.

of the island by keeping the Turkish side away from any attempt at certain partition of Cyprus.⁷⁵ However, Britain could not do anything better for the Greek side than joining the non-aligned members of the international community in censuring the proclamation of the TRNC at the UN.

As a result of this sense of balance between Turkey and Greece, while the US and Britain showed flexibility for Turkey in the field, they did not neglect to satisfy Greek claims, either. The international community, this time with the full support of the great powers in the Security Council, especially with the efforts of Greek diplomacy through the non-aligned members of the UN, once more reacted to the proclamation of the TRNC with the well-known UN Security Council Resolution numbered 541. This Resolution, by referring to the conflicting feature of the proclamation of the TRNC with the Treaty of Guarantee, declared the declaration of the TRNC to be legally invalid, called for the withdrawal of the unilateral declaration of independence and called upon all member states of the UN not to recognize any authority in Cyprus other than the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, the Security Council Resolution no. 541 underlined that the TRNC was established with the illegal use of force by Turkey.⁷⁶ However, Papandreou and Greek foreign bureaucracy expected a stricter decision and possible sanctions against Turkey because of this unilateral act in Cyprus. Once more they were disappointed and despite Greece's expectations, the Resolution of the Security Council did not create any political pressure on Turkey because of the more important international issues, such as the Soviets' ongoing war in Afghanistan, concerning the hegemonic powers of the system. Moreover, there were signs that pointed out the passive diplomacy of Britain and the USA in preventing the Turkish Cypriots' unilateral declaration of independence, as Papandreou had expected.⁷⁷

75 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy", 77.

76 UN Security Council, *Official Records Thirtyeighth Year; Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1983*, 15-16.

77 Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Aylin Güney argue that Britain did not become involved in the Cyprus conflict directly after 1974, because the Constitution that Britain had guaranteed

Although Britain seemed concerned about the intentions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership on independence, British diplomatic efforts towards the Turkish government produced no result. Although transition to democracy had occurred in Turkey, Britain still believed that even the democratic change in Turkey would not affect Turkey's consistent position on Cyprus. Nevertheless, British foreign bureaucracy estimated in the autumn of 1983 that the Turkish Cypriots were preparing the ground for the declaration of independence and that the declaration would be announced in a short period of time. All the diplomatic interventions by Britain remained ineffective. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the diplomatic attempts was Turkey's perceptive diplomatic capability to defeat British and European pressure because of the Council of Europe's decision to exclude Turkish representatives from the acts of Parliamentary Assembly, as the Republic of Cyprus was represented there.⁷⁸ Simply, Turkey was excluded from the legal and democratic bodies of Europe and thus diplomatic intervention for the prevention of Turkish Cypriot independence towards Turkey did not mean anything for the Turkish foreign bureaucracy and government. Britain was also uncompanionable with the socialist PASOK government in Greece, led by Andreas Papandreu, and the British diplomatic authorities regarded PASOK as an extreme government and potential challenge for the Western Alliance because of Papandreu's angry rhetoric against Western imperialism and NATO. The British ambassador in Athens warned his government that Britain should

in 1960 was violated by the Greek Cypriots and so the division of the island became a desired option for Britain during the Cold War. See Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Aylin Güney, "The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (March 2005): 284-285. Also, rumours emerged in 1983 that the Turkish Cypriot side was preparing for a unilateral declaration of independence and any suggestion that Britain could join Greece and the Greek Cypriots in imposing sanctions was viewed unfavourably, because it would harm the Turkish Cypriots more. See James Ker-Lindsay, "Great Powers, Counter Secession, and Non-Recognition: Britain and the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2017): 434.

78 Ibid. 435.

take action against the Turkish Cypriots' unilateral independence as it would be both a violation of international law and the 1960 Agreements, as well as a threat to British interests in the region. However, the British government did not take any severe action against the Turkish Cypriots' move for independence, and most probably they believed that the Greek Cypriots would take a calm approach, too, since by November 1983, Britain already seemed to accept the Turkish Cypriots' action for independence and British diplomacy considered that the geographical partition of the island was inevitable as of that moment and the Greek side had to face the reality of a divided Cyprus.⁷⁹

Alongside Britain, the United States seemed to appear completely unmoved to prevent the independence of Turkish Cypriots. Although a warning from the US Government transmitted to Ankara to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots' unilateral declaration of independence could mobilize the US Congress to limit or to cut US military assistance to Turkey, the message was not taken into consideration by Turkey as an austerity measure by the USA. Ker-Lindsay's quote from a mid-level Turkish diplomat in New York shows Turkey's self-confidence against the US about the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriot leadership: *"If Denktash failed to obtain this satisfaction [of equality between the communities in the UN talks] he would almost certainly proceed to unilateral declaration of independence as there would be nothing to lose by so doing; ... and after the unilateral declaration of independence, a new Turkish state of Cyprus, even if largely unrecognized by world opinion, could only be brought to negotiate on a basis of "equality" with the Greek Cypriot government. ... Crucially, the diplomat believed that the Turkish Cypriots would declare independence and that, although a unilateral declaration of independence would cause problems for Ankara, Turkey would "have to go along" with it. Domestic opinion in the country was increasingly isolationist and people were still angry about the General Assembly resolution on Cyprus in May."*⁸⁰

79 Ibid. 437.

80 Ibid. 436.

Under these circumstances, Papandreou had reasons to be disappointed with Britain and the US and to believe that they still favored Turkey's instead of Greece's sensitivities in the region, despite the UN General Assembly's resolution. PASOK's efforts to internationalize the Cyprus issue was a success on one level, in that the majority of UN members were affiliated with the Greek narrative on Cyprus. On the other hand, it was a failure because Greek diplomacy could not mobilize the great powers of the Security Council, US and Britain to prevent the permanent partition of the island with the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. From that moment on, the Cyprus conflict turned into a billiard game between Turkish and Greek foreign policy makers which resulted in high-tension political relations during the rest of the 1980s and provided the opportunity for PASOK to follow aggressive policies against Turkey, her ally in NATO. Soon after the TRNC was proclaimed in November 1983, PASOK's policy towards Turkey turned from a cunningness based on strategy to an aggressiveness arising from hysterical sensitivity. More precisely, despite the international support for the Greek side as the legitimate government of Cyprus, in reality the proclamation of the TRNC was the confirmation of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus which constituted a concrete threat to Greek interests. Yet Papandreou himself became more obsessed with the idea of Turkey as a potential threat against Greece with her military expansion in the region through Cyprus and his strong belief in the lack of concrete support for Greece from the Western Allies incited this obsession.⁸¹

PASOK started to follow a policy of aggression towards Turkey in this international environment, in which the US and Britain were not involved in the Cyprus issue as they had been two decades before. In such an international environment, from late 1983 onwards, Papandreou's policies towards Turkey represented a significant regression, or sometimes freeze, in Greco-Turkish relations under the shadow of the agonizing sensitiveness of the Cyprus conflict. Indeed, bilateral relations reached a

81 Robert McDonald, "Greece after Pasok's Victory", *The World Today*, Vol. 41, No. 7 (July 1985): 135.

breaking point with dangerous tension escalated by PASOK government officials and authorities in the Greek foreign policy making process. The center-piece of Papandreou's foreign policy, the threat coming from the east (Turkey) became an *idée fixe*.⁸²

The foreign policy change towards a characteristic of obsession was mainly based on the perception that Turkey pursued expansionism and that as a result of the weak objections of the global powers she had achieved expansionist objectives in Cyprus. This perception of Turkish expansionism in Papandreou's policymaking process put Turkey in the position of a neighboring country posing a vital threat to Greece.⁸³ Moreover, it reflected the belief that Turkey sought to change the status quo between Greece and Turkey, which had been established by international treaties, such as Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936) and Paris (1947). The partition of Cyprus and Turkey's challenge with the proclamation of the TRNC was reflected as a fear of occupation in the PASOK government and foreign policy bureaucracy. Their evaluation of Turkey's move in November 1983 brought them to the conclusion that Turkey might have had long-term objectives and policy planning for revisionism towards the major Greek islands in the Aegean, which constituted the most important economic, demographic and security borderline of mainland Greece.⁸⁴ This particularly fictionalized policy of the PASOK elite, which had an immoderate suspicious character and included a strong fear of Turkey's intentions, was not based on any aggressive official explanation or any concrete intimidation from Turkey. Instead, it mostly originated from the deep disappointment with Greece's Western allies because of their passive attitude in supporting Greece's "aggrieved" position against Turkey. It legitimized Papandreou's assertion to follow independent foreign

82 A belief in which someone refuses to change their mind about something, even though it may be wrong.

83 Ozay Mehmet, "Crisis Management in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Since 1974" in *Turkish-Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, eds. Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis, (London: Routledge, 2004): 169.

84 Constantine Melakopides, "The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy", 83.

policy in all areas, but especially towards Turkey, without any expectation from the Western Alliance. This conceptualization of the “aggrieved” position of Greece in their relations with Turkey caused a sensitiveness in the foreign policy making process in the mid-1980s and as Rizopoulos argues, after a while it became almost impossible to have a reasoned, let alone nuanced discussion about Turkey, Cyprus and Greco-Turkish relations in general with the average Greek politician, journalist, or government member during PASOK’s rule.⁸⁵

The unilateral action of the Turkish Cypriots in November 1983 caused an immediate aggressive reaction from Greece. In fact, PASOK’s populism on prioritization and internationalization of the Cyprus issue represented the beginning of a risky period, from the end of 1983 until 1987, in Greco-Turkish relations. It was characterized by several crises escalated by the PASOK government and sometimes by Papandreou himself, with a populist and nationalist political behaviour both at domestic and international levels.⁸⁶

In this sense, the crisis that occurred in March 1984 was directly related with the anger arising from the Turkish independence in Cyprus and the PASOK government, most probably with a dangerous feeling of revenge, escalated the tension. Turkey planned a naval exercise in the international waters of the Aegean Sea and informed the Greek authorities

85 For a comprehensive political and psychological analysis of the foreign policymaking process on Turkey during the PASOK government of the 1980s, see Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “Pride, Prejudice, and Myopia: Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Warp”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 3, (Fall 1993): 21-24.

86 Some newly revealed documents in the British archives show that Andreas Papandreou was prepared to send troops to Cyprus after the Turkish Cypriots declared independence. Papandreou made a serious offer of military support to the Greek Cypriot leader, Spyros Kyprianou, at the emergency meeting in Athens just hours after the TRNC was proclaimed on November 15, 1983. Michael Daventry, “Secret papers show Greek plans for 1983 Cyprus invasion”, *Anadolu Agency*, 7 July 2015, Accessed on December 31, 2020, doi: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/secret-papers-show-greek-plans-for-1983-cyprus-invasion/28636>

about the exercise 15 days before it started. Somehow, Papandreou's government intentionally ignored the information, or the bureaucratic authorities did not inform the government, and a Greek warship and a civilian sea vessel carrying the Greek flag entered the exercise area while Turkish destroyers were doing artillery maneuvers. More interestingly, the Greek Intelligence Service reported to Papandreou on 8 March 1984 that the Greek warship was intentionally fired on by five Turkish destroyers in the Northern Aegean and then dangerous moments ensued. Papandreou called an emergency meeting for his cabinet and made a statement to the press that it was the worst military provocation by Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus, which confirmed the Turkish plans for invading Greek islands in the Aegean.⁸⁷

Papandreou, most probably, used this incident to exaggerate the situation in order to mobilize the Greek public around his hostile policies against Turkey, while the temperature derived from the proclamation of the TRNC was still high among the Greek public. Papandreou placed the Greek Armed Forces on alert and recalled the Greek ambassador back from Ankara. The two neighboring countries were almost on the brink of war on those two days between 8-10 March. Papandreou and the Greek foreign bureaucracy were appeased by the US authorities when the Turkish Embassy in Washington informed the US Foreign Ministry that the Greek ships had entered the firing zone while the artillery maneuvers continued. The NATO ambassadors were called for an emergency session on 10 March 1984 to discuss the Turkish-Greek crisis in the Aegean and when Turkey's explanations about the case were accepted by the NATO representatives in the session, the next day Papandreou had to confess to the unintentional firing by Turkish warships in the maneuver zone.⁸⁸

87 *Cumhuriyet*, 9 March 1984, 10 March 1984. The Greek government provoked the public by saying that Turkey was planning to invade the Greek islands and that the Turkish navy fired on Greek warships.

88 For further details about March 1984 crisis in the Aegean Sea, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000): 372.

After the March 1984 crisis in the Aegean Sea, Greco-Turkish relations reached a deadlock. The relations were frozen by the PASOK government with Papandreou's hostile narrative against Turkey by provoking the Greek public. From early 1984 until early 1987, almost three years, there was no contact between Greece and Turkey, except some diplomatic contacts at international meetings. The Greek government did not hesitate to agitate the crisis environment of the relations. Furthermore, Papandreou continued to mention the so-called Turkish intentions on invading Greece oftenly in front of the Greek public and did not hesitate to promote his government as the defenders of Greece against the aggressor, Turkey, by using the constructed Turkish threat of expansionism with a populist nationalism through the Cyprus issue in the domestic political sphere to refresh his decreasing popularity because of the worsening economic situation.⁸⁹ However, this did not mean anything in terms of international relations and the populist nationalism of PASOK could not force Turkey to step back. Instead, increasing Turkish-Greek tensions cost the PASOK government much more than expected, especially because of very high military expenditures.⁹⁰ Papandreou could not sustain the outcomes of his nationalist policies through Cyprus sensitiveness and had to change his position to a more pragmatic one at the end of his rule.

89 Papandreou said in December 1984 that even if the Cyprus problem has been solved, Turkey's threats in the Aegean would continue. *Eleftherotipia*, 20 December 1984. Papandreou was defending the government's policies towards Turkey by saying the following in his parliamentary speech on 23 April 1986: "After Denktas's declaration of pseudo-state, we cut off all kinds of contact with the Turks. There can not be a dialogue when the Cyprus issue is pending and doubts are expressed about the legal status regarding the Aegean. ... The truth is that Turkey is interpreting the Treaty of Lausanne, which accepted the islands in the Aegean as the Greek islands, with doubts". "Synedriasis PKΘ', 23 Apriliou 1986" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton El-linon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Diefthinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 110-111.

90 Eftychia Nikolaidou, "The Role of Military Expenditure and Arms Imports in the Greek Debt Crisis", *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (April 2016): 20-21.

§ 4.4 PASOK's Pragmatism on the Cyprus Issue by the End of the Governance Period

Papandreou's aggressive behaviors against Turkey after the proclamation of the TRNC, which caused a three-year freeze in Greco-Turkish relations, were actually the result of a wrongly calculated strategy which included formidable contradictions. When Papandreou came to power in 1981, he prioritized the Cyprus issue in his foreign policy and promoted it as an international problem by wresting it from the bilateral environment of Greco-Turkish relations where the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict had been determined. While doing this, his main argument was to accuse the hegemonic powers of the Western Alliance, especially the US, of allowing Turkey to "invade" the lands of Cyprus with an anti-imperialist narrative. He successfully expanded the Greek approaches on Cyprus to the international community and gained a diplomatic success with the UN General Assembly resolution in May 1983. However, the resolution provided the PASOK government and its leader with an abstract feeling of diplomatic victory and nothing more. The later developments in the field went too far to satisfy PASOK's expectations from the international community to enforce Turkey towards a pacification in the Cyprus issue in favor of Greece.⁹¹

91 For instance, despite all the efforts of Greece, in the Cyprus draft submitted by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on March 29, 1986, the vice presidency was given to the Turks. Cuellar's draft provided Turkish Cypriots 30% representation in the lower house of the legislature and 50% in the upper chamber. Greek Cypriots and Greece rejected this plan and Papandreou expressed his disappointment in the Hellenic Parliament with the following aggressive words: "... the presence of foreign troops is not only a matter of Cyprus but also of Greece. Because, when the invasion is justified and legalized, then we endanger other Aegean islands. ... Unfortunately, the Coellar initiative did not meet the expectations of the martyred Cypriot Hellenism. ... The structure of the plan is such that we must speak of an unconditional surrender of the Hellenism of Cyprus. ... I would like to state categorically that in case the security of the Cypriot Hellenism is threatened, the Greek Government will respond by exhausting all its capabilities to any request of the legitimate Cypriot Government in the context of the national, legal and historical obligations that connect us with Cyprus. The security of the Cypriot Hellenism is a major

Despite the Security Council resolution, which merely censured Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, but did not threaten them, and the reactions of the majority of UN member states against Turkey, the proclamation of the TRNC did not create a strong political pressure on Turkey by the hegemonic powers of the international system, as Papandreou expected. PASOK, while internationalizing the issue, did not account for the fact that the Cyprus conflict did not constitute a significant political priority for the majority of UN member states to mobilize the Security Council against Turkey after the Turks declared independence in Cyprus. More precisely, Greek propaganda was successful in preventing international support for the aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots through independence and recognition of the TRNC.⁹² However, although PASOK successfully internationalized the Cyprus issue, this internationalization was achieved through non-aligned states of the UN, not through the USA and Britain, who in fact had the ability to change the political dynamics in international conflicts. Especially after independence, Britain pursued a policy of trying to break the Turkish Cypriots' isolation and reinstate them at professional and social levels.⁹³ Thus, the efforts to internationalize the Cyprus issue counted for almost nothing when the USA and Britain did not make any concrete move to prevent Turkish independence in Cyprus. At this point, when PASOK could not find any exit door from the deadlock, Papandreou preferred to freeze the relations with Turkey with an increasing hysterical fear of the Turkish threat, or the possible Turkish invasion of Greek territories.⁹⁴

issue of the nation and it would be dangerous for peace in the region, if this truth was underestimated by anyone." "Synedriasis PKΘ', 23 Aprilou 1986" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, 112.

92 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence", *The World Today*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (April 1994): 72.

93 Ibid. 71.

94 Papandreou clearly indicated his hysteria about the Turkish threat at the PASOK congress in 1984. He said that the completion of the cycle of invasion, to territorially dispute an island of the Aegean and part of Western Thrace, were long-term targets of Turkey.

Papandreou started to collaborate with domestic actors in Greece more and more during the period of tense relations with Turkey after the proclamation of the TRNC in Cyprus. Especially, the nationalist-minded Greek military bureaucracy, who strongly exaggerated the Turkish threat, became a more influential actor in Papandreou's national security and foreign policymaking process. The increasing influence of the nationalist army bureaucracy in the policymaking process concerning the national interests of Greece against Turkey was accompanied by an increase in military expenditures and the need for high level technical support.⁹⁵ In other words, the freezing of political relations with Turkey with the perception of a threat to invade Greece incurred an economic cost to the Greek government as a result of highly increased military expenditures during the second half of the 1980s. What Papandreou did not calculate, before he froze the Greco-Turkish relations, was that the Greek economy was not strong enough to compensate these expenditures without debt. The economic condition of Greece very much relied on the financial resources coming from the European Community and the United States. These resources were predominantly allocated to high level military expenses which included high-technology military weapons bought from the United States, instead of financing domestic investments and deficits.⁹⁶

The result of the quarrel with Turkey through the Cyprus issue was an economic slump for Greece in an international environment where Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots still remained as strongly existing actors in the Cyprus conflict. However, PASOK had envisaged a Turkish defeat while internationalizing the issue. Although PASOK's, more particularly

Huliaras cites from PASOK's congressional documents, see Asteris C. Huliaras, "The Foreign Policy of the Greek Socialists (1981-1986): Forces of Continuity and Change", 88.

95 Military expenditures in Greece were 6.2% of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country in 1987. This was the second highest rate of military expenditures among NATO allies after the United States. See United States Department of Defence, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defence* (Washington DC: USGPO, 1989): 96.

96 Van Coufoudakis, "PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations" in *Greece 1981-1989 The Populist Decade*, ed. Richard Clogg, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993): 168.

Papandreou's, political passion spiced with populist nationalism⁹⁷ created a temporary mobilization around the governmental circles in Greece, this did not work at international level. It returned to PASOK as an economic burden that threatened this mobilization around the government, which was on a knife edge.⁹⁸

The worsening economic situation, mostly because of very high military expenditures, forced the Papandreou government to develop more pragmatist approaches to the Cyprus conflict by establishing diplomatic contact with their Turkish counterparts instead of following the meaningless freezing policy. Papandreou conducted the communication process secretly in 1987.⁹⁹ This was because the pressure from the nationalist military and foreign policy bureaucracy placed him in a difficult political position both at international and domestic level. The freezing policy with Turkey because of the Cyprus issue did not bring any benefit to his government, as the dynamics of Cyprus enforced the parties to proceed with the negotiations from an inter-communal perspective, despite the strong efforts by Papandreou to promote the conflict with an international aspect in order to bypass Turkey's effect. Despite the declaration

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- 97 Papandreou in 1987 was still threatening Turkey in order to keep the mobilization around himself alive and he was saying the following in the Hellenic Parliament: "In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be known to friends and enemies alike that in case of an attack and invasion against the Greek Cypriot positions, Greece will not stay out. I have warned that this is a casus belli. We hope that our partners in the EEC and our allies in NATO will understand the sincerity of our decision to defend Cyprus because if Cyprus is lost, Greece eventually will be lost". Cited in Athanasios G. Platias, "Greek Deterrence Strategy" in *The Aegean Sea after the Cold War Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, eds. Aldo Chircop, Andre Gerolymatos and John O. Iatrides, (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 2000): 76.
- 98 Papandreou himself accepted the economic burden brought about by the tension between Turkey and Greece and he declared that armament expenditure corresponded to 7% of the GDP. "Synedriasis ΣΓ", 11 Martiou 1988" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon, Tomos Δ' 1974-1989*, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Diefthinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 180.
- 99 William M. Hale, "Turkey" in *Middle East Contemporary Survey Volume XII: 1988*, eds. Ami Ayalon, Haim Shaked, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990): 765.

of independence by the Turkish Cypriots, the great powers of the international community retained their position of supporting the continuity of the inter-communal feature of the conflict under the auspices of the UN. Thus, when PASOK was faced with the coercive dynamics of Cyprus by 1987, Papandreou realized the significance of communication with Turkey in order to discuss the conflict. He entered into high-level and direct but secret contact with the Turkish government by trying to put the Greek foreign bureaucracy under more strict executive control imposed by himself. The secrecy shows the lack of trust by Papandreou himself and the PASOK government towards the diplomatic authorities in Greece, and even high level diplomats and undersecretaries were not informed of the ongoing secret contact between Papandreou and the Turkish government.¹⁰⁰

Although the prioritization of the Cyprus issue in Greek foreign policy brought Papandreou and PASOK a popularity in the domestic political arena in the first half of the 1980s, the long-term effects of the Cyprus issue were painful in terms of economic costs in the second half of the 1980s. Therefore, PASOK changed its policy of prioritization of the Cyprus issue in its relations with Turkey and the Cyprus conflict was given secondary importance in order to ease the tense relations with Turkey in the era of economic stagnation by the end of PASOK's rule. For this reason, when Papandreou had recognized Greece's disadvantageous position at the point reached, he realized that he had to negotiate the Cyprus problem directly with Turkey in order to reduce the negative effects of the Greek-Turkish tension on Greece, especially after the Davos Summit of 1988.¹⁰¹

Papandreou could not pursue the relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots at the same level as those he had established with Kyprianou, and in fact, he could not conceive the sui generis dynamics of the Cyprus issue which contained the elements of multilateral geopolitical

100 Giannis P. Kapsis, *Oi 3 Meres tou Marti* (Athens: Ekdoseis Nea Synora, 1990): 128.

101 Bilge Ustaoglu, "Yunanistan'da Panhellenik Sosyalist Hareketin (PASOK) Kuruluşu, Gelişimi ve Dış Politikası (Andreas Papandreou Dönemi)", (PhD Dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2020): 355.

rivalry in the region. When Georgios Vassiliou, whom Papandreou had never wished to be elected, as he supported the continuation of inter-communal talks in Cyprus, was elected as the new President of the Greek Cypriot side, the negotiations took on an inter-communal character again and Greek diplomacy did not have the political power to promote the issue as an international phenomenon anymore. In other words, Papandreou's populist nationalist narrative about the Cyprus issue was not enough to change the momentum of real socio-political dynamics in Cyprus and he later realized that his country had paid a price for the freezing of Greco-Turkish relations with very high and redundant military expenses. Soon after the Davos Summit between himself and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal in January 1988, he even had to express his radical policy change concerning the Cyprus issue from hostility to amiability, by saying that there was a light at the end of the tunnel.¹⁰²

However, when PASOK came to the end of its rule in a situation of economic turmoil with corruption scandals, once more Papandreou tried to cling to the international community as a last hope. This time, PASOK expected the European Community (EC) to become involved in the Cyprus issue in favor of Greek interests, after Turkey's Özal government applied for EC membership in April 1987. However, the EC remained withdrawn from direct involvement in the Cyprus conflict and postponed Turkey's application. Furthermore, the *détente* period emerging between the superpowers of the international system began to necessitate the easing of regional conflicts, such as the Cyprus issue. As a result, inter-communal negotiations in Cyprus were speeded up by the UN's efforts and Papandreou's strategy of internationalizing the Cyprus issue in accordance with the interests of Hellenism totally collapsed when he lost the elections in 1989.¹⁰³

102 Van Coufoudakis, "PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations", 174-175.

103 Papandreou's strategy on internationalization of Cyprus issue was insufficient and missing, as he, in every sense, refused to speak with Turkey about Cyprus conflict. Because of that, Papandreou was criticized by opponent politicians for not speaking out

To sum up, PASOK left a legacy of uncertainty and disorder in the Greek strategies on Cyprus. It opened a path for a common perception in Greece as Turkey's military and political presence in Cyprus is the first step in the Aegean towards Greece.¹⁰⁴ Despite the strong nationalist narrative on defending Greek interests in Cyprus, the reality that the next generation of Greek foreign policy makers inherited was the hardly believable characteristics of Greek concerns. The eight-year behaviors of the PASOK government actually revealed how Papandreou and his colleagues were in fact unprepared against Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue while they were propagandizing Cyprus sensitiveness in domestic politics. The most clear evidence for that argument is that although PASOK was successful about the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict and the international community showed a reaction in favor of Greece and the Greek Cypriots by providing international legitimate representation to the Greek Cypriots after the declaration of the TRNC, still Greece and the Greek Cypriots had to return to the traditional line of the conflict in which Turkey's and the Turkish Cypriots' positions remained constant in the pursuit of inter-communal negotiations. This caused PASOK to shift its position from internationalization of the conflict during the beginning period of its rule to pragmatism while falling from power in the spring of 1989.¹⁰⁵

the Cyprus issue in the bilateral processes with Turkey. Vamık D. Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, *Türkler ve Yunanlılar Çatışan Komşular*, 198-199.

104 Sergios Zambouras, "Current Greek Attitudes and Policy" in *Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives*, ed. Clement H. Dodd, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999): 114.

105 At the last point, Papandreou implicitly accepted that the Cyprus policies were at deadlock. When the opposition in the parliament accused Papandreou of conducting secret diplomacy on the Cyprus issue and compromising the interests of Greece, Papandreou stated that there was no change in strategy on Cyprus, but a new phase was entered: "It (new Cyprus policy) differs from the 7 years of 1974-1981 which is a period of clear retreat of our country, ... and of course it is different from the policy of 1981-1988. ... then the climate was political confrontation. We are in a new phase. Avoiding war, if possible without granting sovereignty to national rights, is a great contribution to our people, to the children, to the future, to a faster construction of the new economy of our country". "Synedriasis ΕΓ", 11 Martiou 1988" in *Vouli ton Ellinon, To Kypriako sti Vouli ton Ellinon*,

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY UNDER PASOK RULE OF
1981 – 1989

Tomos 4' 1974-1989, ed. Gerozisi Triantafyllou, (Athens: Diefthinsi Epistimonikon Meleton, 1997): 181.

Transformation of the Aegean Dispute from a Judicial Problem to Political Trouble in PASOK's Narrative

§ 5.1 The Aegean Dispute in PASOK's Policy towards Turkey

PASOK's approach to Greece's foreign policy issues before coming to power was accompanied by a strong populist, anti-Western and socialist-leaning narrative, as it is mentioned in the previous chapters. Papandreou's political behavior has usually been regarded as contradictory by those who evaluate politics and political developments by taking only the public narratives of the political leaders into consideration. In this sense, Papandreou, before coming to power and during his first government years, was mostly considered as being anti-American, being against European integration and having a tough stance towards Turkey. At the same time, Papandreou developed a criticism of the post-1974 government of New Democracy by narrating a rapprochement with the Communist Bloc and third world countries. In short, Papandreou's rhetoric was mainly based on a socialist and anti-imperialist change in Greece's political system.¹

1 Angelos Elefantis, "PASOK and the Elections of 1977: The Rise of the Populist Movement" in *Greece at the Polls The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Pennington, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981): 112-114.

The reflection of that change in the Greek political system, which Papandreou promoted, on the foreign policy was the formulation of the idea of independence in the foreign relations of the country. Moreover, that formulation of independence in foreign policy mainly referred to the relations with Turkey, particularly regarding the Aegean disputes. Before 1981, one of the distinctive characteristics of PASOK's foreign policy conceptualization was the emphasis on international cooperation underlining the widening effect of international law in regulating the conflictual issues between the nation states.²

For instance, Papandreou advocated nuclear-free zones in the Balkans in cooperation with communist states in the region.³ He consistently questioned the existing foreign policy strategies of Greece in the late 1970s and he raised the issue of Greece's national rights in the problems with Turkey by referring to international law. Moreover, Papandreou called for intransigence vis-a-vis Turkey and PASOK emerged as an extraordinary movement seeking to challenge all of the existing widespread beliefs and meanings that sustained the legitimacy of Greece's national political behaviors in the issues related with the country's special interests.⁴

As the leader of the opposition before 1981, Andreas Papandreou began to develop a strong criticism of the ruling New Democracy by attaching a particular focus on a more fundamental change in Greece's foreign policy. However, many of his foreign policies were actually initiated by Papandreou's predecessor Konstantinos Karamanlis, and in fact, Papandreou merely added a populist narrative to the foreign policy-making process which had been constructed by New Democracy in the post-1974

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- 2 Theodore A. Couloubis, "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives" in *Greece at the Polls The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Penniman, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981): 177-179.
 - 3 Barbara Slavin and Milt Freudenheim, "The World; A Nuclear-Free Balkan Zone", *The New York Times*, 15 November 1981.
 - 4 Takis S. Pappas, *Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014): 22.

period.⁵ So, a careful analysis of pre-PASOK developments in Greek foreign policy becomes necessary in order to understand PASOK's change regarding Greek foreign policy in the early 1980s. In other words, the PASOK of the 1980s, especially in the Aegean disputes with Turkey, was affected from a post-modern expansionist motivation and it promoted the continental shelf and territorial waters disagreements by searching for an international legitimacy from international judicial principles. However, the New Democracy government had already internationalized the Aegean disputes before 1981 and PASOK inherited this internationalization of the Aegean and used it as an instrument of Greek nationalism against Turkey throughout the 1980s. The pre-PASOK period provided an extensive perspective for PASOK to combine the national interests of Greece in the Aegean Sea with international law, in particular with international support for Greek claims in accordance with the international regulations on the seas. In that sense, it is important to understand the dynamics of the internationalized Aegean disputes before PASOK to clarify Papandreou's aggression towards Turkey when any political crisis happened over the Aegean Sea.

5 For instance, the threat perception from Turkey had also been developed by Konstantinos Karamanlis after the 1974 Cyprus intervention and Papandreou simply narrated it with a popular phrase: "the threat coming from the east". Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, "Policy Entrepreneurs and Foreign Policy Change: The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement in the 1990s", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2012): 605. Also, Tsakonas and Tournikiotis argue that despite differences in style, both Karamanlis and Papandreou showed remarkable continuity in agreeing that Turkey was Greece's major security concern. See, Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, "Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The 'Expectations-Reality Gap'", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2003): 303.

§ 5.2 Internationalization of the Aegean Dispute before PASOK Came to Power

When PASOK came to power in October 1981, the Aegean dispute had already been heated up in front of the UN Security Council and ICJ, and an international awareness had been created by Greek diplomacy under the New Democracy rule of 1974-1981. Greece's attempts to internationalize the Aegean dispute were accelerated particularly after the 1974-1976 continental shelf process. The crisis in 1976 created a risk of armed conflict between two NATO allies in the Aegean. When the Turkish government gave permission to the *Hora* on 6 August 1976 for seismic research in disputed areas of the Aegean Sea, it increased the tension immediately and both states alerted their armed forces. The crisis escalated quickly and even public opinion in both countries began to show apprehension for a possible armed conflict. Especially, the national newspapers in Greece did not wait to exacerbate the situation and they mentioned Turkish aggression in the Aegean Sea by saying that *Hora* is playing with fire.⁶

The Greek government called the UN Security Council meeting at short notice on 10 August 1976 and claimed that Turkey's continuing research work in the Aegean Sea meant the violation of Greece's sovereign rights and asked the UN Security Council to call Turkey to stop provocative attempts in the Aegean Sea. In addition, the Greek government asked the UN Security Council to enforce Turkey for bringing the case, which caused tension between two states, to the ICJ in order to find a solution on an equal and legal basis. The Greek government also accused Turkey

6 *Apogevmatini*, 10 August 1976.

of following a harsh policy for the preparations of the compromis⁷ which was necessary to apply to the Court.⁸

During the session of the UN Security Council on 12 August 1976, Dimitrios Bitsios, the Greek Foreign Minister, stated that his government did not want to open any discussion about Greece's sovereign rights on the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea and he said that the Greek government wanted the case to be brought to the ICJ. He added: "*The UN was not in time to stop the tragedy of Cyprus; it must now prevent a new tragedy in the Aegean.*" The Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador İlder Türkmen, responded to Bitsios' accusations that the Hora was threatening peace and security in the Aegean Sea, and his words are more interesting to quote than the Greek representative's: "*If there is a threat against peace, this threat is arising from the Greek Government and its dream to convert the Aegean Sea into a 'Greek Lake'.*" Moreover, the Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, said before the UN Security Council on 13 August 1976: "*Any tension existing in the Aegean was caused by 'unwarranted harassment' of a Turkish civilian ship carrying out research outside Turkish territorial waters; until the shelf was delineated, he said, the respective claims of Greece and Turkey were equally valid and the question could only be solved by negotiation.*"⁹

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- 7 Compromis: Article 36, Paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. Such cases come before the Court by notification to the Registry of the ICJ of an agreement known as a special agreement, which is called a compromis, and concluded by the parties especially for this purpose. Bingbin Lu, "Reform of the International Court of Justice – A Jurisdictional Perspective", *Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (30 June 2004): 4.
- 8 For further details about Greece's application to the UN Security Council and Council's resolution on the issue, see Leo Gross, "The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January, 1977): 34-39.
- 9 For the discussions in the UN Security Council session on 12-13 August 1976, "Confrontation over Continental Shelf Rights in Aegean Sea-Decisions of UN security Council and International Court of Justice", *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Vol. 22 (October 1976): 27990-27991.

In fact, these recriminations between the two representatives were a kind of diplomatic battle during the UN Security Council session. However, Turkey's argument seemed to be clearer than the Greek one. Turkey maintained her position and explained to the UN Security Council that the charges of violations of Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea were false, because the *Hora* was doing exploration work outside Greek territorial waters, where the borders of the continental shelf had not yet been determined. Furthermore, Turkey indicated that while the *Hora* was doing research within the legal basis of international law, it was harassed by Greek air and naval forces and claimed that Greece was arming the Dodecanese Islands in defiance of the Lausanne and Paris Treaties.¹⁰

The UN Security Council did not accept the Greek claims, but tried to find a compromise between the two states. On 25 August 1976, the Council accepted the resolution introduced by USA, UK, France and Italy. The Council recommended that the Turkish and Greek governments solve the disputes over the Aegean by direct negotiations in accordance with UN principles and asked the parties to do their best to decrease the tension in order to facilitate the negotiation process.¹¹ With this resolution, the UN Security Council avoided making a preference between the parties of the conflict, and, on the other hand, while it recommended that the conflict be solved with first-hand negotiations, at the same time it asked the parties to take possible contributions of the ICJ into consideration. In other words, that resolution of the UN Security Council neither supported Turkey, nor favored Greece.

10 In that case, especially from 1974 onwards, Greek policy-makers have considered Turkey as a threat to Greece's territorial integrity over the Aegean islands. Turkey insisted on Dodecanese islands' demilitarized status, but Greece claimed the right of self-defense against Turkey's Aegean Army. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, "Security Regimes and Regional Stability: The Case of the Greek-Turkish Arms Race" in *Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War*, eds. Christodoulos K. Yiallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonas, (New York & Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2001): 149.

11 UN Security Council, *Official Records Thirtyfirst Year; Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1976* (New York: United Nations, 1977): 15-16.

Alongside the UN Security Council, the Greek government also applied to the ICJ on the same day. Greece demanded from the Court a temporary injunction on two issues: First, Greece demanded from the ICJ that any kind of scientific research and exploration work should be avoided in the areas contiguous to the islands and disputed continental shelf areas where Turkey gave exploration licenses and privileges, without the consent of the other state or the Court's resolution on this case. Second, the Greek government demanded from the ICJ that any further military steps and behaviours that could endanger peaceful principles between the parties should be avoided. In addition to the temporary injunctions, Greece also asked the Court to make assignments about these issues: the Greek islands, which were the parts of Greece's sovereign lands, had their own continental shelf in accordance with enforceable international law and principles; the limits and direction of the continental shelf between Turkey and Greece in the aforementioned areas of the Aegean Sea should be determined according to enforceable international law and principles; Greece had sovereign exclusive rights for exploration and control of its natural resources within the continental shelf; Turkey did not have any right to undertake actions such as exploration and control of the resources in Greece's continental shelf without permission from the Greek government; such activities by Turkey threatened Greece's sovereign and exclusive rights to conduct exploration, control and do scientific research related with the continental shelf; and Turkey should not continue its activities in the continental shelf areas which would be determined by the Court.¹²

The ICJ discussed the Greek demands for temporary injunctions and made an order for these demands in September 1976. In its order, the ICJ stated that any exploration work in the conflicted areas would not mean loss of rights of the parties that they already had and would not mean the creation of new legal rights that they had not had before. Also, it was

12 For the details of Greece's application to the ICJ, see Alona E. Evans, "Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey) (Jurisdiction)", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (July, 1979): 493-505.

clearly stated in the decision that the seismic research conducted by Turkey should not have any feature that could harm the seabed and the natural resources beneath the seabed. Turkey was not to take any action related to usage of the resources or their allocation. Furthermore, the Court decided that, in this case, there was to be no possibility of danger of causing any irradicable harm to the rights of the other party, in this case Greece.¹³

After the UN Security Council resolution and the ICJ's order, the first meeting was held between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and Dimitrios Bitsios, in October 1976 in New York. At this meeting, the parties decided to meet in Bern and Paris again to discuss the details of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries. The Turkish and Greek representatives met in Bern between 2-11 November 1976. During the Bern meetings in November 1976, the parties agreed on keeping the content of the meetings confidential and displaying a sincere, detailed and trustful approach in order to sign an agreement on the principles for the limitation of the continental shelf after the negotiations, which would be based on mutual consent.¹⁴

After the Bern Meetings, the Bern Agreement between Greece and Turkey was signed on 11 November 1976. According to the Agreement, both countries agreed, by maintaining their own positions and arguments, to take responsibility for not declaring the details of the agreement and proposals during the meetings in any other environment, and they decided not to make any statement and not to leak any information about the content of the negotiations, if it was not decided to do so jointly. Moreover, the parties decided to take the responsibility to avoid any kind

13 For further details about the ICJ order of September 1976 in English, see International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order of 11 September 1976* (I.C.J. Reports, 1976): 3-14.

14 Fuat Aksu, "Kıta Sahaneliği", Accessed on October 3, 2020, doi: <http://www.turkish-greek.org/ikili-iliskiler/uyusmazliklar/ege-denizi-ne-iliskin-uyusmazliklar/k-ta-sahaneli-g-sorunu>

of political action which could harm the negotiations on the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea and to avoid any initiative or behaviour which could push the other party towards distrust.¹⁵ Furthermore, both parties decided to search into international law and precedent rules in order to create the basic principles and practical criteria which would be implemented for the limitation of the continental shelf between the two countries and they agreed to establish a joint committee which would be composed of national representatives.¹⁶ After the declaration of the Bern Agreement on 11 November 1976, the tension between Turkey and Greece decreased for a while and a new era was opened. The Turkish and Greek prime ministers met once more in 1978 at the Montreux Summit. They reviewed the relations between the two parties and they decided to continue the talks in an environment of mutual trust.

It is possible to say that the Bern Agreement established a tranquility between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean for a while. At this point, it should be mentioned that the agreement cannot be considered as a progressive step for the solution of the continental shelf issue. However, the Bern Agreement played a conciliatory role in decreasing the tension between Greece and Turkey and establishing the dialogue in order to continue with the bilateral talks. Ambassador A. Suat Bilge, who signed the agreement for Turkey, said: “*It was only a procedural arrangement which showed how the conflict would be resolved. The main principle of the Agreement was that the limitation on the continental shelf would be determined according to another agreement which would be reached through talks.*”¹⁷

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- 15 Haritini Dipla, “The Greek-Turkish Dispute Over the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf: Attempts of Resolution” in *Greece and the Law of the Sea*, ed. Theodore C. Kariotis, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997): 162-163.
- 16 Hulusi Kılıç, *Türkiye ile Yunanistan Arasında İmzalanan İkili Anlaşmalar; Önemli Belgeler ve Bildiriler (Bugünkü Türkçe ile Tam Metinleri)* (Ankara: T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yunanistan Dairesi Başkanlığı, 1992): 308-309.
- 17 A. Suat Bilge, *Büyük Düş: Türk-Yunan Siyasi İlişkileri 1919-2000* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000): 237.

In the meantime, after the order on the temporary injunctions by the ICJ in September 1976, the Court discussed the Greek demands on the determination of the limit of the continental shelf between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea in December 1978. Before examining the basis of the conflict, the Court needed to verify whether it had judicial authority to take on this case or not and asked the parties to explain their arguments about the Court's judicial authority on this case. After both parties had submitted their arguments, the Court discussed the issue and decided on 19 December 1978 that it lacked jurisdiction to take on this case for the limitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, and thus, the Greek demand to determine the continental shelf was dismissed.¹⁸

Greece's attempts to internationalize the Aegean dispute to provide a legitimacy for Greek claims in the Aegean seemed to fail after that conclusion by the ICJ. However, the characteristics of the Greco-Turkish dispute on the Aegean remained constant. The dispute was merely frozen by the Greek government and the ineffective process of bilateral talks began while Greece's full membership of the EEC was about to be finalized. After all, the tension between Turkey and Greece changed dimension, because it was a period of change in Greece, as the country was integrating with Europe and Konstantinos Karamanlis was about to lose the government to the popular socialist leader Andreas Papandreu. Therefore, in that short period of time, Karamanlis most probably did not wish to keep Greece's agenda busy with conflicts with Turkey and mostly focused on European integration, because all other issues, except Europeanization of the country, were secondary to him.¹⁹

Although the tension over the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece decreased at the end of the 1970s, this was only temporary progress and when the traditional foreign policy strategies were reconsidered in the

18 International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment of 19 December 1978* (I.C.J. Reports, 1978): 45.

19 George Kaloudis, "Transitional Democratic Politics in Greece", *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2000): 51.

early 1980s, the political tension increased again. In fact, the disagreements which would be inherited by PASOK were very deep and Greece's obstinacy for gaining international legitimacy for Greek expansionism in the continental shelf issue became much more visible during the annual UN Summit in October 1980. The Turkish Foreign Minister, İlder Türkmen, and the Greek Foreign Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis held a meeting, and Gürün quoted Mitsotakis' arguments at the meeting: "*It will suffice me to say that the continental shelf is a question of law rather than a political conflict. I see that it is very difficult to settle the conflict over joint control of the resources or the limitation of the continental shelf. For that, we must refer to the international law concerning equity. If we cannot agree on the principles and if we cannot obtain any positive result from the bilateral talks, it would be necessary to appeal to international arbitration. As the arguments of both parties are well known, the most reliable way is to go to arbitration.*"²⁰

However, the approach which Mitsotakis narrated reflected the unchanging positions of both states on the Aegean dispute and it signaled the strong possibility of a dead end in the issue of the continental shelf. Turkey's position did not change, either. Turkish Foreign Minister İlder Türkmen responded to Mitsotakis, as Gürün quoted: "*The continental shelf issue is a political issue. In this respect, we prefer to have bilateral talks, and still, we do not consider any other platform. We should continue to trust the negotiators who are conducting the bilateral talks.*"²¹

Greece could not gain any geopolitical advantage in the Aegean through those attempts towards international institutions between 1976-1981. Karamanlis was unable to convince Turkey to change her position and the international arbitration did not favor Greek government, either. However, despite the failure of the internationalization of the Aegean dispute, Karamanlis government constituted a strong background for Greek diplomacy of the future and his successor Papandreou. More precisely,

20 Kamuran Gürün, *Fırtınalı Yıllar Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995): 197.

21 Ibid. 197.

Karamanlis was able to reorient Greek foreign policy towards Europe, but he could not succeed in extending the Greek sovereignty over the disputed areas of the Aegean Sea because of Turkey's strong national considerations.²² Papandreou took a step forward towards establishing Greek hegemony over the Aegean, but he encountered a strong Turkish challenge, too.

From 1981 onwards, when Papandreou took over the government, he began to use international law and institutions as tools for adopting his tension-oriented policies regarding the Aegean dispute towards Turkey.²³ In fact, the Papandreou period represented a change from Karamanlis' moderate diplomacy-oriented Aegean policy to a tension-oriented one. This change in Greek Aegean policy was actually strongly fundamental. Turkish-Greek relations during the PASOK era in Greece deteriorated, and the dialogue between the two states was sometimes cut. The change in Greek Aegean policy with Papandreou caused fluctuations in bilateral relations and the Aegean dispute turned into a vague situation as a result of Papandreou's rigid, tension-oriented strategy.

§ 5.3 PASOK's Aegean Policy through Territorial Waters

When Papandreou became Greek prime minister in late 1981, he believed that the United States and the Western Alliance was favoring Turkey in the continental shelf and territorial waters disputes in the Aegean Sea. One of Papandreou's main arguments on the Greek foreign policy was

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- 22 Ali Dayıoğlu, İlksöy Aslım, "Reciprocity Problem between Greece and Turkey: The Case of Muslim-Turkish and Greek Minorities", *Athens Journal of History*, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (January 2015): 42-43.
- 23 For instance, soon after PASOK came to power, Papandreou started the attempts towards NATO in order to involve the Alliance in Greco-Turkish disputes, including Aegean, in favor of Greece. Dionysios Chourchoulis and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, "Greek pereceptions of NATO during the Cold War" in *NATO's First Enlargement A Reassessment*, eds. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016): 43.

based on this so-called favorable position of Turkey against Greece. Before he came to power, PASOK's popular leader criticized Greece's integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) and NATO membership, and he even promised Greece's exit from NATO when he came to power.²⁴ Interestingly, Papandreou developed his criticisms of Karamanlis' ND government regarding Greece's membership of the EEC and NATO with an aggressive approach in relations with Turkey.

When he won the elections, from the beginning of his government period, Papandreou adapted his pre-government rhetoric on anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism to his new foreign policy conceptualization against Turkey. In other words, Papandreou's anti-Westernism began to turn into a kind of anti-Turkey rhetoric after he came to power.²⁵ Papandreou's foreign policy towards Turkey in the early period of his governance was built on claims about Turkey's revisionism on the Aegean. When he defined Turkey's revisionism, Papandreou used his narratives of pre-government times on anti-imperialism by replacing the West with Turkey, as an imperial threat to Greece's national frontiers who followed revisionist policies. Thus, Papandreou's PASOK opened a path for legitimization of aggressive policies against Turkey on the Aegean and was able to introduce a defiant nationalist Greek foreign policy with a greater appeal to both the domestic and international public.²⁶

PASOK's disaffection for Greece's alignment to the Western Alliance was directly related with that belief in Turkey's revisionism on the Aegean. In that sense, PASOK started to develop a new conception of a security threat by putting Turkey at the core. Soon after Papandreou came to power, his first demand from NATO was to guarantee Greece's eastern

24 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks", *Foreign Policy*, No. 45 (Winter 1981-1982): 161.

25 Papandreou's anti-Westernism turned into an anti-Turkey rhetoric in foreign policy because of his strong belief in USA's favor of Turkey against Greece. Larrabee explains the correlation between Papandreou's anti-Western worldview and his anti-Turkey political view, see Ibid. 164-165.

26 Constantine Melakopides, "The Logic of Papandreou's Foreign Policy", 573-574.

borders against Turkey. Papandreou, by saying eastern borders, was referring to the string of Greek islands off Turkey's Western Anatolian coast. Furthermore, PASOK began to ask NATO to stop favoring Turkey, as they believed, in the disputed issues over the Aegean Sea. In fact, Papandreou, in his very early period of governance as a populist politician, was constructing a control over the Greek armed forces to integrate the army generals into his new threat conceptualization of Turkey²⁷ and he aimed to obtain some political guarantee on protecting Greece's eastern frontiers, or the islands, against Turkey. After a while, the PASOK government's demands on guarantee of the eastern frontiers from NATO turned into a kind of bargain to remove his objection about Greece's NATO membership and to strengthen his position in the country as a political leader protecting Greek national interests in the Aegean and security concerns about Turkey.²⁸

In Papandreou's conceptualization, the Aegean dispute was not something to negotiate with a revisionist Turkey as it was a complex assortment of different issues, such as the continental shelf and territorial waters between Greek and Turkish lands and those were closely related with Greece's national integration including the territorial control of the seas. Papandreou always expressed the background of the problem as a territorial one that included the hundreds of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, many of them located within a few miles of Turkey's western shores. In that sense, a conflict became inevitable when Papandreou took over

27 Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997): 114.

28 Kalaitzidis and Zahariadis argue as follows: "Papandreou believed that NATO did not provide guarantee for the territorial integrity of Greece. Papandreou in December 1981 refused to endorse of NATO's Council of Defense Planning the joint communique. ... it turned out this was merely an exercise in domestic public relations because the government did not withdraw Greek officers from NATO's joint exercises. Neither did it recall military attaches from the integrated command. ... PASOK's government did not do what it had promised to do during the campaign; it did not withdraw Greece from the NATO alliance". Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?", 108.

the government from Karamanlis, because he began to claim the Aegean dispute as a national security problem for Greece arising from Turkey's threats to Greece's territorial integrity over the Aegean.²⁹

Papandreou's sensitiveness on Greece's eastern frontiers gave rise to a discussion on the borders of the territorial waters of the two states in the Aegean Sea. The changing perception of the security threat for Greece under Papandreou's rule brought another issue into question: If Greece's national frontiers were six miles from the Greek islands to Turkish shores, then would not Greece need military protection on these islands? The answer to that question was positive. At this point, it is much more understandable why Papandreou criticized the NATO Alliance for favoring Turkey instead of protecting Greece's frontiers from a so-called revisionist ally. In the 1980s, Greece's military forces, as a NATO member, were structured and disposed against the security threat from the Communist Bloc. However, Papandreou was now uttering Turkey as a security threat for Greece and mentioning settling more and more Greek military on the islands of the Aegean in order to protect the borders of Greece from Turkey.³⁰

PASOK developed its claims about the eastern frontiers from the first days of the government period and that famous eastern frontier issue was identified with the sea borders from a military perspective, which meant the territorial waters of Greece. Papandreou's and the Greek Army's frames of mind did not differ from each other. The military high command in Greece historically considered Turkey as expansionist against Greece, and so did Papandreou in the early 1980s. According to Papandreou's new foreign policy concept, in which Turkey had been put in the center as the main security threat, the strengthening of the Greek

29 The gradual recession of the economy in Greece since 1978 gave Papandreou the incentive to exaggerate the Turkish threat to Greek national security in order to instrumentalize the foreign policy in the domestic political consumption. C. Damalas-Hydreos and C. A. Frangonikolopoulos, "Towards an Explanation of Greek Foreign Policy", *Paradigms*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1987): 122. Papandreou immediately began to use the Aegean dispute as a tool.

30 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks", 166-167.

Armed Forces was regarded as a complementary factor in his aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey. Before PASOK came to power, Papandreou aimed his criticisms at Karamanlis' government in that sense and he argued that their negotiation policy on the continental shelf issue weakened Greek foreign and security policy as a whole. According to Papandreou, Greece's sovereign rights on the continental shelf and territorial waters, which naturally emerged from international principles, were non-negotiable in any case. Despite the conciliation period of 1978-1981 in Greco-Turkish relations, PASOK's election victory and coming to power soon after as the new ruling party of Greece broke the silent period and accelerated the domestic popular support for Papandreou which made him place more focus on escalating the tension with Turkey through the Aegean disputes.³¹

From 1982 onwards, Papandreou revealed his opinions about the Aegean disputes as non-negotiable for the Greek government.³² Instead, he pointed out the international principles and agreements which, he claimed, accorded the right to determine the limits of the continental shelf and territorial waters unilaterally. Papandreou's approach was challenging to Turkey and to the spirit of the bilateral relations of the two neighboring countries. Although Greco-Turkish relations included many different problematic issues in history, the will of both states on negotiating the problems had always remained constant, except for a short period of time after Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. In that sense, Papandreou's approach to Turkey was new and challenging. That challenging approach provided a basis for a dead end in the ongoing processes to discuss the issues between the two neighboring states. Papandreou was now picturing a new perspective in which he concluded Greece's eastern

31 Ibid. 170-171.

32 Papandreou, in an interview with Harvard International Review, pointed out his strong intention to preserve the status quo in the Aegean in favor of Greece and he said that they were not willing to give up even an inch of their soil. Andreas Papandreou and Margarita Mathiopoulos, "Interview: Looking Inward, Reaching Out", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1982): 29.

frontiers unilaterally without any discussion with Turkey. Furthermore, he was drawing the sea frontiers by starting from the islands very close to the Turkish coast and maintaining that these islands formed a political continuum with the Greek mainland and with increased regional penetration, and thus, he was considering the Aegean Sea as a Greek internal sea.³³

Although many considered it as inexperience in diplomacy, Papandreou was not inexperienced and he was as serious as a long-experienced diplomat to determine Greece's sea borders from the nearest Greek island to the Turkish coast. This was a new type, post-modern Greek irredentism surrounded by Papandreou's populist nationalism in the history of Greco-Turkish relations. In that sense, Papandreou's strategy was built on two main legs: The first one was to create a national awareness around PASOK's populist nationalism against Turkey and the second one was to create a stronger international awareness of Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea.³⁴

In accordance with the first aim, Papandreou and his colleagues used the nationalist methods to raise awareness about Greece's national interests in the Aegean through the Greek public by hostility towards Turkey. For this reason, Papandreou successfully prioritized Turkish threat in the Aegean in his new foreign policy narrative and constructed that 'threat perception' as a constant element of his foreign policy conceptualization of Turkey. That totally new foreign policy conception by PASOK, which was full of aggressive components, such as unsubstantiated Turkish expansionism in the Aegean, inevitably created an antagonism towards Turkey and it became the top priority of the policy-making process in the

33 S. Victor Papacosma, "Legacy of Strife: Greece, Turkey and the Aegean", *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1984): 308.

34 Papandreou constructed his foreign policy strategies on populist nationalism for domestic mobilization and providing security for Greece in the international arena. John C. Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984): 382-383.

Greek foreign policy bureaucracy and PASOK government.³⁵ The conceptualization of the threat coming from the east which threatened Greece's sovereign rights on the eastern frontier in PASOK's nationalist narrative became widespread among the domestic public with the populist propaganda and after a while, it created a fear among ordinary people of a possible Turkish invasion which would begin with the Aegean Islands.

Once Turkey had been conceptualized as a hostile actor, or more precisely, as a possible invader from the east, then Papandreou defined the abstract Greek-Turkish frontier on the Aegean Sea as a battlefield in the Greek foreign policy-making process. Thus, in PASOK's narrative, Greco-Turkish negotiations on the Aegean disputes became out of the question, since in such a narrative, to negotiate for the dispute was equal to negotiating Greece's national frontiers with a hostile neighbor in the east who constituted a threat for Greece's territorial integration. In that case, Greece was placed as the state trying to keep the status quo in the Aegean, whereas Turkey was defined as the revisionist state trying to break the status quo against Greece. Papandreou's argument was mainly based on that status quo state (Greece) – revisionist state (Turkey) conceptualization in which the status quo state was always bound to lose in any negotiation. At this point, the most important result of this concept of the status quo was the conjunctural mobilization of the domestic public for PASOK's national struggle against Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Briefly, Papandreou put Greece in the position of a possible loser in the eyes of the Greek public, if her frontiers in the Aegean were opened to negotiation.³⁶

Despite Papandreou's distant and sometimes aggressive approach to negotiations with Turkey on the Aegean disputes, there still was an ongoing diplomatic communication between lower-level authorities from

35 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010): 116.

36 In fact, as regards foreign policy, Papandreou failed to mobilize the society against Turkey and in order to compensate that fact, he began to pursue wild foreign policy initiatives towards the danger from the East, Turkey, and he justified his position of staying within the NATO to guarantee Greece's eastern frontiers. C. Damalas-Hydreos and C. A. Frangonikolopoulos, "Towards an Explanation of Greek Foreign Policy", 124-125.

both sides. Even in July 1982, the diplomatic officials of the two states, Giannis Kapsis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Fahir Alaçam, Turkish Ambassador in Athens, reached to abstract agreement for forbidding official statements which comprised any aggressive perspective about the Aegean dispute. However, when Turkey considered it as a step towards starting a new dialogue with the PASOK government on the Aegean issues, Papandreou intentionally regarded this Turkish consideration as a sign of her revisionist policy on the Aegean and immediately cancelled all diplomatic meetings with the Turkish side.³⁷ This was actually a strategy for mobilizing the Greek public around PASOK's nationalism on the Aegean which had successfully been constructed on the idea of an imagined enemy on the eastern borders of Greece.

The second leg of Papandreou's and the PASOK ruling elite's strategy for following a policy of hegemony-motivation on the Aegean towards Turkey was to alienate Turkey within the context of international law. At this point, luck was on the side of Papandreou's PASOK as the UN accepted the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in December 1982. The Convention defined territorial waters as the maritime zone of a coastal state whose borders could be extended to a maximum of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of that coastal state. It was referred to as a zone where the coastal state has full sovereignty, whereas all military and civilian naval vessels of other states have the right of innocent passage, or transit passage, in the strait areas. The Convention accepted the adjustment of these sea boundaries as a maritime delimitation and from 1982 onwards it was ratified by the signatory states and became a norm of international law.³⁸

The problem which was reflected in the Greco-Turkish conflict over the Aegean was related with the 12 nautical miles issue. The Convention accepted coastal states' territorial waters up to a maximum of 12 nautical

37 Ibid. 117.

38 Haralambos Athanasopoulos, *Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea A Case Study in International Law* (Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland&Company, Inc., Publishers, 2000): 70-73.

miles from its baseline. However, the Convention placed a limitation on the determination of the frontiers of territorial waters. If the 12 nautical-mile extension overlapped with another state's territorial sea zone, then the limits of territorial waters were to be determined with a median point between the states' baselines.³⁹

In the Aegean Sea, there was an implicit agreement between Greece and Turkey on the limitation of the territorial waters. Greece had extended her territorial waters from three to six nautical miles in 1936. Greece executed a six nautical-mile zone in territorial waters for long years and Turkey did not object to that decision of the Greek government until 1964. In 1964, the Turkish government extended Turkey's territorial waters to six miles, too, but still that six-mile regime for territorial waters did not create any disturbance or conflict for either side. In other words, both Greece and Turkey enjoyed the six-mile zone in territorial waters without any intervention in each other's maritime territories. However, especially from 1980 onwards, the Turkish view on the territorial waters delimitation started to change. This was also related with the ongoing negotiations in the UN which opened the way for the 12 nautical-mile delimitation for the coastal states. When the 12 nautical miles principle gained importance in the negotiations as a principle for the delimitation of the territorial water zone, Turkish diplomacy foresaw that it would pave the way for a new and stronger argument for Greece to increase her claims in the Aegean disputes. Then, the Turkish diplomatic and governmental authorities began to claim that the 1936 decision of the Greek government, which extended the Greek territorial sea zone to six nautical miles, could not be considered as a rightminded approach, and that the border in Greek-Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean Sea should be determined by bilateral negotiation, moreover, the Turkish authorities began to emphasize Greece's hidden agenda to transform the Aegean Sea

39 For further details about the territorial waters in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, see Tommy T. B. Koh, "The Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Straits and Archipelagoes under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea", *Malaya Law Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (December 1987): 163-167.

to a Greek lake.⁴⁰ The changing Turkish perspective on the territorial waters issue strengthened Papandreou's hand for his claims of Turkish revisionism in the Aegean. Thus, when he came to power, Papandreou could easily misuse the changing Turkish view for his conceptualization of a threat from the east and the 1982 UNCLOS merely became a tool for that political abuse.⁴¹

Despite the other definitions at the Convention related to the exceptional maritime areas, that 12 nautical miles definition was enough for PASOK and Papandreou to rub their hands with glee. The 12 nautical-mile territorial waters delimitation constituted a strong reason for Papandreou's PASOK to claim Greece's maritime frontiers in the east against Turkey. Although the 12-mile principle included exceptions for sui generis cases, such as the Aegean, it paved the way for Papandreou's government to claim a 12-mile territorial waters delimitation from the Greek islands to Turkey's Anatolian coast. Soon, Papandreou and Greek foreign policy authorities began to develop a discourse for Greece's legitimate right to a 12 nautical-mile territorial border in the Aegean Sea emerging from international law.⁴²

When the UNCLOS accepted the 12-mile principle for delimitation of the territorial waters, the PASOK government began to use that principle to accompany their argument for the non-negotiable characteristic of

40 Turkey's concern was that a large part of Aegean Sea would come under Greek sovereignty resulting in the geographical restriction. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece The Aegean Disputes A Unique Case in International Law*, 138.

41 Greece during UNCLOS III strongly kept her position on prioritizing the national security interests and objected to the more extensive rights to the other states for international navigation. Anastasia Strati, "Greece and the Law of the Sea: A Greek Perspective" in *The Aegean Sea after the Cold War Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, eds. Aldo Chirico, Andre Gerolymatos, John O. Iatrides, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000): 91.

42 An archipelago concept which contained the geographical, historical, traditional and cultural unity of the islands and the mainland was developed in order to determine the maritime frontier between the nearest Greek island to the Turkish coast and Anatolian mainland. Emmanuel Roucounas, "Greece and the Law of the Sea" in *The Law of the Sea The European Union and Its Member States*, eds. Tullio Treves and Laura Pineschi, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997): 231-232.

Greek legitimate rights in the Aegean. Papandreou's government immediately started to underline the absolute and unalienable feature of the rights of the coastal states defined in the Convention. PASOK's argument was so simple: Athens was not obliged to consult the delimitation of the territorial waters and other disputes on the Aegean, since the right to extend the territorial waters zone up to 12 nautical miles has already been accorded to Greece. Moreover, the Greek governmental authorities began to question the existing 6-mile balance between the two states and they stated the new conditions resulting from the 12-mile principle. Thus, Papandreou's PASOK began to re-evaluate the older tradition of the 6-mile implementation which had created a long-standing balance in the Aegean. In short, Papandreou's PASOK absolutely refused any negotiation with Turkey for delimitation of the territorial waters, and on the contrary, they considered the 12-mile limit as an ascribed new status which would give the right to extend Greece's maritime borders towards the Turkish coast.⁴³

Although Article 123 of the Convention regulated the necessity of co-operation between neighboring states about the delimitation of territorial waters and Article 300 clearly forbade the misuse of the 12-mile principle against the rights of another state, the Greek government did not take these regulations into consideration as obligatory clauses and developed an approach towards the certainty of the 12-mile principle for Greece even in special circumstances like the Aegean issue.⁴⁴ It was an argument that confirmed Turkish worries about the 'Greek Lake' which increased the tension in the Aegean. For this reason, from the early 1980s onwards, especially when Papandreou's anti-Turkish rhetoric on the Aegean disputes became more evident, Turkey also began to question the innocence of the 1936 decision on extending the Greek territorial waters

43 Asteris C. Huliaras, "The Foreign Policy of the Greek Socialists (1981-1986): Forces of Continuity and Change", 79. Also see, Van Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens", 212.

44 Krateros M. Ioannou, "The Greek Territorial Sea" in *Greece and the Law of the Sea*, ed. Theodore C. Kariotis, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997): 121-125, 128.

limit to six miles by raising a discourse on Greece's hidden strategy to establish full Greek hegemony over the Aegean Sea.⁴⁵

Apart from the legal dimension of the issue, the introduction of the 12-mile rule as an international legal principle elicited the subconscious political intentions of Greek foreign policy makers to extend Greek geographical hegemony over the Aegean.⁴⁶ They had to explain the guarantees for freedom of navigation and innocent passage, since they were aware of the enormously increasing Greek territorial expansion on the Aegean Sea, which was in fact an international maritime area.⁴⁷ The government admitted, in fact made an assurance, that if and when the Greek government extended the limit of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, the freedom of navigation emerging from the right of innocent passage would be provided to all neighboring and other states. Even some Greek international law experts argued that if the guarantee of innocent passage was not adequate to provide innocent passage in practice for naval vessels of neighboring and other states, the Greek government would unilaterally establish special sea corridors to guarantee innocent passage.⁴⁸ Such an argument was an indirect admission of the Greek government's irredentist aims in the Aegean Sea against Turkey. This meant that the Greek government had already accepted the extension of Greece's

45 Turkey did not object to Greece's extension of territorial waters to six miles due to the necessity for maintaining the alliance with Greece against revisionist Italy in the Mediterranean Sea in the mid-1930s. Fuat Aksu, "Preservation of Demilitarized Status of the Aegean Islands for the National Security of Turkey", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol. 7 (2002): 109.

46 If the Greek territorial waters were extended to 12 nautical miles, Greece would acquire 71.53 percent, almost three quarters, of the Aegean Sea, the open sea area would decrease to 19.71 percent, and Turkey would acquire only 11.9 percent of the Aegean Sea. For further details on the projection of the 12-mile principle in the Aegean Sea, see Tullio Scovazzi, "Maritime Limits and Boundaries in the Aegean: Some Maps with Legal Commentaries" in *Aegean Issues: Problems - Legal and Political Matrix Conference Papers*, ed. Seyfi Taşhan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1995): 83-84.

47 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 184.

48 Ibid. 183.

territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in advance and did a favor to neighboring countries, Turkey in this case, and to other states for innocent passage in a sea which would be under full sovereignty of Greece.

It was an evident and strong change in Greek foreign policy from the modest attitude of Papandreou's predecessor, Konstantinos Karamanlis, to a presumptive approach which provoked Turkey's sensitiveness towards the Aegean dispute. After the UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, PASOK designated a constant position on defending the right of the 12-mile delimitation in territorial waters. Papandreou and the Greek diplomats never attempted to extend Greece's territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, but they always underlined that non-extension to 12 miles of Greek territorial waters did not mean renouncement of that right of Greece and they insistently stated that Greece would put the 12-mile right into practice in the near future when it would be proper for national interest in their statements.⁴⁹ In other words, although PASOK imagined and intended to take full control of the Aegean Sea, Greece's political and military power did not allow them to do this. However, Papandreou held the 12 miles issue as a threat against revisionist Turkey, in his narrative, like the sword of Damocles hanging over Turkey's head.

It is also obvious that PASOK's new and challenging political behavior towards Turkey about the Aegean disputes created deep concerns in Turkey. The discussions in the Turkish Parliament between the deputies and the members of the government show that the PASOK government in Greece may resort to a *fait accompli* to expand Greece's territorial waters. At the session held on March 7, 1984 in the Turkish Parliament, when deputy Kamran İnan requested from the government to make a statement regarding the information that Greece could resort to a *fait accompli* to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean, then the Minister of State of the time, Mesut Yılmaz, who spoke on behalf of the Turkish government,

49 Cihan Dizdaroğlu, "Understanding Turkish-Greek Relations Through Securitization and Desecuritization: A Turkish Perspective", (PhD Dissertation, Kadir Has University, 2017): 75-76.

declared that the territorial waters regime in the Aegean would be maintained within the existing status quo and Turkey would not allow any fait accompli.⁵⁰

PASOK's uncompromising attitude towards the Aegean dispute through identification of non-negotiability brought the dispute to an irreversible situation and provoked Turkey to recall casus belli.⁵¹ Indeed, the casus belli issue was brought to the agenda by Turkey before the PASOK period. On the first occasion in 1976, Turkey had indirectly declared casus belli with Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil's letter to the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dated 15 April. Çağlayangil mentioned in his letter that Turkey was aware of Greek intentions to extend territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and it would be considered by Turkey as an occasion for war.⁵² Turkey's indication of casus belli in fact meant a serious and de facto warning from the Turkish side for a possible armed conflict in the Aegean Sea because of Greek actions to break the balance in the Aegean basin. However, Papandreou was so possessed with the abstract definition of revisionist Turkey, since then Greek policy makers and diplomatic authorities interpret casus belli as an explicit violation of the prohibition of the threat and use of force in Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter which signified the grounds for peaceful relations between the states in the structure of the international system.⁵³

The tension on the Aegean front increased when the TRNC was proclaimed in November 1983. Papandreou perceived it as a planned Turkish

50 *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 17, Cilt: 3, Yasama Yılı: 1, 7 March 1984: 63-65.

51 Casus Belli: An act or event that provokes war, or an occasion for war.

52 Erdal Şafak transmits Çağlayangil's letter to Kissinger, in which Turkey's clear intention of casus belli against Greece's policies in the Aegean Sea is mentioned, from Şükrü Elekdağ, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey of that period, in the newspaper Sabah in April 2005. See, Erdal Şafak, "Casus belli var mı, yok mu?", *Sabah*, 9 April 2005.

53 Greece addressed that opinion officially to the UN in 1995. Angelos M. Syrigos, *The Status of the Aegean Sea According to International Law* (Athens and Brussels: Sakkoulas and Bruylant, 1998): 342.

action against Greece's national sovereignty over the Aegean, which directly violated Greece's legitimate rights arising from international law. PASOK's reaction to the proclamation of the TRNC was to combine Greek strategies in the Aegean on expanding through territorial waters with Cyprus strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, Papandreou created a battlefield in the seas from the North Aegean to Cyprus, which was adopted as a 'New Defensive Dogma' based on the idea of protecting Greece's expanded maritime frontiers in the Aegean and Cyprus against the Turkish threat.⁵⁴ With the 'New Defensive Dogma', the PASOK government built up a new and challenging defense policy against Turkey by incorporating all priorities in Thrace, the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, the imagined expansion of the territorial zone in the Aegean with Papandreou's populist nationalism actually surpassed the capabilities of Greece to realize such commitments. More precisely, Greece did not have any military power to protect Cyprus, and at the same time, she did not have any political power to extend maritime frontiers to 12 miles. Papandreou's populism resulted in a spread of the defensive strategies to a wider geographical area where Greece did not have capability to implement them. Despite the gap between PASOK's new defensive policy and military capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces, Papandreou did not hesitate to construct his populism on the unreal abilities of Greek diplomacy and the army to fulfill his ambitions.

By the end of 1983, as a result of the territorial waters dispute and Cyprus conflict, Greco-Turkish relations appeared to be at the lowest point since Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. However, the changing domestic dynamics in Turkey slightly opened the door for new opportunities to discuss the conflicts over the Aegean. Turgut Özal came to

54 Yorgos A. Kourvetaris, "The Southern flank of NATO: political dimensions of the Greco-Turkish conflict since 1974", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXI (Winter 1987): 431-435. Also, To Vima briefly analyzes the Joint Defence Doctrine of Greece and Greek Cypriot side and questions what Greece gained. See *To Vima*, 6 September 1998.

55 Van Coufoudakis, "The Cyprus Question: International Politics and the Failure of Peace-making" in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou, (London and New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003): 127.

power in Turkey in November 1983 and Özal behaved carefully in his statements on Greco-Turkish relations so as not to show any reaction which would be considered as a threat by Papandreou. However, the military and diplomatic environment in Turkey still regarded Papandreou as a Greek nationalist and unbalanced populist leader who threatened Turkey's interests in the Aegean. On the contrary, Özal's attitude to Papandreou was quite different. Özal was trying to introduce a challenging strategy in Turkish foreign policy by promoting a peaceful and pragmatist perspective, and he usually stated his goodwill for the solution of the Greco-Turkish disputes by placing more emphasis on economic issues.⁵⁶

Turgut Özal, soon after he became prime minister in Turkey, became aware of convincing Papandreou and the Greek people about Turkey's peaceful policies as the key factor. Özal frequently impressed that Turkey did not have any expansionist plans on the eastern frontiers of Greece and he emphasized that PASOK's tension-oriented policies created the same fearful environment in Turkey which caused a huge mutual mistrust in both countries' politicians to handle the issues in the Aegean.⁵⁷ Özal many times tried to open the door at least to discussing the possibility of any negotiation with goodwill, although the Turkish diplomatic military authorities were hesitant about this. However, Özal's personal initiatives were not enough to break Papandreou's tough diplomacy. Papandreou replied to Özal's initiatives that Greece would open a dialogue with Turkey only if Turkey accepted the status quo in the Aegean.⁵⁸

Despite the initiatives taken by Özal to discuss the territorial waters issue and disputes on the Aegean, the PASOK leadership reacted to them with an intense disbelief. Papandreou said that the Turkish army generals and diplomatic establishment were using Turkey's new liberal prime minister to hide Turkey's real intentions for expanding towards Greek territory. Heraclides cites Papandreou's speech at the 1st Congress of

56 Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt II 1980-2001)*, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010): 102, 109.

57 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 118.

58 *The Times*, 20 December 1986.

PASOK in May 1984 and the speech clearly shows how strongly Papandreou believed, or pretended to believe, in Turkey's chauvinism and expansionism on the Aegean: "*Ankara's immediate aim was to draw Athens into a dialogue; the next short-term aim was co-sovereignty in the Aegean, the division of the continental shelf of the Aegean into two, the joint exploitation of the seabed and the demilitarization of the Greek islands; in Cyprus 'the cycle of invasion and occupation' was to be consolidated with the declaration of the 'pseudo-state', thereby establishing de facto partition; and the long-term goal was to question the sovereignty of the Greek islands and of Thrace*".⁵⁹

Papandreou and the PASOK ruling elite constantly kept their position not to open any line for discussion of Greece's sovereign rights on the 12-mile sea frontiers. Moreover, the government began to implement the new defense policy by mobilizing the Hellenic Armed Forces collaterally with tension-oriented aggression towards Turkey in the territorial waters dispute. From mid-1984 onwards, Greek military forces were transferred from the Bulgarian border to the Turkish border and to those Aegean islands which were located close to Turkey's Western Anatolian coast, due to a possible Turkish attack.⁶⁰ Furthermore, many of those islands in the North and Eastern Aegean were fortified with new military equipment and arms, in spite of the explicit provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne which banned the armament of the Aegean islands under Greece's sovereignty.⁶¹

59 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 118-119.

60 Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", 110.

61 Re-organization of the Hellenic Armed Forces according to PASOK's aggressive Aegean policy actually reflects the thought of possible armed conflict with Turkey in the decision-makers' minds. Hatzadony explains Greece's military re-organization under PASOK rule and its main reasons as follows: "Essentially the new doctrine was a reorganization and redeployment of the armed forces in response to the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Before 1974, the Greek Army was stationed along the borders of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with one infantry division along the Turkish border in Thrace. The 1985 reorganization, however, deployed an entirely new Army Corps - D Corps' - along the Turkish border. It is the only corps in the Greek Army that is maintained at 100%

A significant characteristic of Papandreou's policies on the territorial waters dispute was to bring it to the agenda as a problem of sovereignty. Greece under Papandreou's rule accepted the 12-mile principle as a given sovereign right to draw the maritime frontiers and rejected any discussion with Turkey. In fact, this was a kind of expansionist aim through the principle of international law, despite its controversial definition even in the Convention itself. PASOK's argument was persistent about the sovereignty of Greece over the 12-mile maritime frontier in the Aegean and the right to declare that the 12-mile territorial waters zone was under the sovereign authority of the Greek government. Moreover, the PASOK rulers and Greek diplomacy considered the Greek islands as belonging to the territorial integrity of mainland Greece and they claimed the right of Greece to determine territorial water zones unilaterally without any negotiation with Turkey. According to Papandreou's view, there was nothing to negotiate about the territorial waters delimitation and he did not even accept the existence of the dispute. It was a clear intention to seize the majority of the Aegean Sea and the Greek government displayed a policy of transforming the international regime to a domestic one by evaluating the 12-mile principle as an absolute acceptance which would be applied to the mainland and to the islands as well.⁶²

Therefore, Papandreou pursued his tension-oriented policy towards Turkey and initiated a process for the establishment of a militia army in the Aegean Islands.⁶³ The tension between Greece and Turkey increased

combat readiness. In addition to Army redeployments, four new air bases were built in the Aegean for the Air Force, becoming operational in the late 1970s. The new doctrine was based on Turkey's new Fourth Army of the Aegean". John G. Hatzadony, "Greece and NATO: A Study of Policy Divergence and Alliance Cohesion", (Masters Theses, Eastern Illinois University, 1996): 70.

62 Sevin Toluner, *Milletlerarası Hukuk Dersleri Devletin Yetkisi (Yer ve Kişiler Bakımından Çevresi ve Niteliği)*, 91-94.

63 Athanasios Platias, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence" in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991): 99.

to a position of danger because of the dispute and Papandreou's uncompromising political behaviour on the delimitation of territorial waters. Even Özal had to send a rigid message to Papandreou and he made a severe statement to the Turkish press to show Turkey's position, although he took some initiatives to make contact with Papandreou. Özal stated that in the case of Greece extending her territorial waters limit to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, Turkey would take the necessary measures including military action.⁶⁴ This was the message to recall *casus belli*.

Despite all the nationalist mobilization of both the bureaucratic elite and Greek people around PASOK's struggle with so-called revisionist Turkey in the Aegean, the intensive efforts of the Greek diplomatic authorities through the international public to subsidize Greece's 12-mile maritime borders in the Aegean Sea did not produce a satisfactory result for the government. PASOK was faced with the bitter price of punitive military expenditure in the domestic arena, and pressure from Western Allies, in a sense the Great Powers of the post-modern world, to cease its tension-oriented policy towards NATO ally Turkey.⁶⁵ Once again in Greek political history, this time the populist socialist government of PASOK failed to see the huge gap between the political vision of territorial expansion and the political and military capabilities to realize this expansion.

Greece was politically and militarily incapable of realizing the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles, even in the 1980s. Although Papandreou pushed this by constructing a nationalist narrative, the real dynamics of geopolitics once again prevented Greek governments from carrying it out. When PASOK was re-elected in the legislative elections of

64 Yücel Acer, *The Aegean Maritime Disputes and International Law* (London: Routledge, 2017): 31.

65 For an interesting analysis of US involvement in the Greco-Turkish dispute in the 1980s, see Theodora Kalaitzaki, "US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 117-120. Also, see Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2010): 124-126.

June 1985, Papandreou showed a tendency to make contact with Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal to discuss the Aegean disputes. Thus, an informal meeting between Papandreou and Özal was arranged secretly at the Davos Summit of January 1986, which would be hosted by Klaus Shwab, the Chairman of the Davos Economic Forum of that period. However, the correspondent of a Turkish newspaper learned about the Papandreou-Özal meeting and when it was published in the Turkish press,⁶⁶ Papandreou cancelled the meeting and it could not be held, and the two prime ministers could only have had a short and quick conversation on the occasion of another session in Davos in January 1986.⁶⁷

PASOK's populist policies in the first half of the 1980s and military expenditure as a result of the new defense doctrine caused stagnation in the Greek economy. The European Community reacted to Greece's economic situation with an austerity program and the Greek government had to adopt a serious economic stabilization program in October 1985.⁶⁸ Economic stagnation, together with the coercive impetus of Greece's allies in the European Community and NATO, enforced Papandreou to re-allocate the resources for economic production which were allocated for military expenditure. This re-evaluation of the economic situation brought the sustainability of tension-oriented policies towards Turkey into question and Papandreou had to take a step back in his government's policies towards Turkey from early 1986 onwards.⁶⁹ However, as all arro-

66 *Milliyet*, 29 January 1986.

67 Fırat is giving further details about the cancelled meeting of Papandreou-Özal in January 1986, see Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", 111.

68 George S. Alogoskoufis, "Fiscal Policies, Devaluations and Exchange Rate Regimes The Stabilisation Programmes of Ireland and Greece", *The Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (April 1992): 227. Greece's military expenditure had already increased to 7% of the country's gross national product (GNP) by the end of 1982. See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1983-1984* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983): 124-125.

69 For instance, Eleftheros Tipos newspaper, in early 1987, accused of Greek government being coward by mentioning that the government is not attaching importance to the oil

gant politicians imprisoned in the abstract environment created by nationalism, he was not an exception who would accept his mistakes with virtue. He began to bargain with Turkey for possible reconciliation on the Aegean, which was actually enforced by the Western Allies. The PASOK government asserted three preconditions for starting a dialogue with Turkey, which were almost impossible for Turkey to accept. Firstly, Turkey had to accept the existing status quo in the Aegean including Greece's right to extend the territorial waters to 12 miles; secondly, Turkish Armed Forces had to leave Cyprus; and thirdly, Turkey had to denounce the 'pseudo state' of the TRNC.⁷⁰

These pre-conditions were impossible for Turkey to accept. However, they contributed to safeguarding Papandreou's popularity in the domestic political arena. Although Papandreou put forward such conditions for a Greco-Turkish dialogue, by the end of 1986, the economic conditions in Greece and international system were forcing his government to decrease the tension in the Aegean. However, his expansionist subconsciousness was much stronger than predicted and he still did not agree to discuss Greece's imagined 12-mile territorial frontiers in the Aegean Sea. Most probably, naively believing that Turkey would accept Greek expansion in the Aegean to 12 miles, he seemed to intend to discuss only the continental shelf issue if Turkey would agree to go to the ICJ.⁷¹ Thus, de-

exploration activities in the North Aegean for appeasing Turkey and it gave provocative headlines saying we will pay for Papandreou's cowardice. *Eleftheros Tipos*, 24 February 1987. I Kathimerini accepted Papandreou's government's concerns that the investments in oil exploration around Thassos would increase tension. *I Kathimerini*, 21 February 1987.

70 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 119.

71 Christos Rozakis, "To Diethnes Nomiko Kathestos tou Aigaiou kai i Ellinotourkiki Krisi Ta Dimeri kai ta Diethni Thesmika Zitimata" in *I Ellinotourkikes Scheseis 1923-1987*, eds. Aleksis Aleksandris, Thanos Veremis, Panos Kozakos, Vaggelis Koufoudakis, Christos L. Rozakis and Giorgos Tsitsopoulos, (Athens: Gnosi, 1991): 324-327.

spite Greek diplomacy's ambivalence to take action through European institutions to prevent Turkey's moves for integration at first,⁷² Greek diplomats in Brussels after a while began to raise difficulties against Turkey's attempts for an association agreement with the EC and bargain with EC authorities to protect Greece's so-called 12-mile maritime frontiers in the Aegean Sea against Turkey.⁷³

The territorial waters issue, which was considered as a legal opportunity by PASOK to expand the maritime territories of Greece, created a deep mistrust of Greek diplomacy, the Greek government and Papandreou himself in Turkey. In fact, there was no real Turkish threat to Greece in the Aegean and Turkey was not aggressive and expansionist towards Greece, because Turkey was also struggling with domestic political and economic problems at the same time which restrained her from developing any aggression towards her neighbors. However, as Heraclides argues, Papandreou presumably did not remove that nominal Turkish threat from the agenda in order to close the political ranks around himself at domestic level and to extract more military and economic support from the Western Allies to maintain his populist leadership in the country.⁷⁴

Moreover, Papandreou raised the question of that so-called Turkish threat on the Greek domestic agenda to try to erase the memory of his earlier anti-imperialist commitments about NATO and the EC which he could never attempt to realize. The strong nationalist expression of the threat coming from the east actually legitimized Greece's need for the NATO alliance and helped Papandreou to cease his anti-NATO rhetoric

72 *Eleftheros Tipos*, 2 April 1987. *I Kathimerini* criticized Papandreou's early strategy for ignoring EC's importance against Turkey. *I Kathimerini*, 24 February 1987.

73 Papandreou always raised the issue of the Aegean disputes in front of the EC institutions. He threatened Turkey in his speech in the European Council by saying that Turkey's road to the EC passed through Athens. Christos L. Rozakis, *I Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki kai oi Europaikes Koinotites* (Athens: Idrima Mesogeiakon Meleton, 1987): 112.

74 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 120.

without any criticisms from the domestic public.⁷⁵ More importantly, Turkey became aware that Papandreou's aggression was intended to protect his power in Greece, and after a while his bargaining behaviours against Turkey came to be considered as bluff by his Turkish counterparts and Greek diplomacy's efforts began to be blighted. In the end, the result of Papandreou's tension-oriented policy on the territorial waters issue was a dangerous miscommunication between two neighboring states of the Aegean which led to mutual misunderstanding and a deep lack of confidence. Under these circumstances, Turkey considered that the territorial waters issue would lead to an armed conflict. Although Papandreou did not show any serious intention to take further steps or make any concrete attempt to extend the territorial waters to 12-miles, he strongly raised the issue in his political discourse, which could provoke any action in the Aegean. Although a gunfight did not occur because of the territorial waters conflict, the other disputed area, the continental shelf problem, was a ticking bomb for igniting a major crisis in the Aegean.

§ 5.4 1987 Continental Shelf Crisis

Papandreou's political aggression towards Turkey through imagined territorial frontiers of Greece in the Aegean Sea brought Greco-Turkish relations to a dangerous point, where any small misunderstanding or miscommunication could lead to an armed conflict. The possibility of an armed conflict appears when expansionist visions of the political elite combine with misunderstanding or miscommunication. That was what

75 As Kalaitzidis and Zahariadis explain the relation between PASOK's nationalism towards Turkey and its policies towards the Western Alliance, PASOK transformed its socialist declaratory policy in order to establish nationalist credentials, and to pursue a nationalistic, albeit pragmatic operational policy that appealed to public opinion. Greece's relative military weakness and economic dependence on the Western Allies constrained the foreign policy options and tempered Papandreou's foreign policy preferences and declarations which in fact served Turkey's objectives. Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?", 111.

happened in early 1987. A miscalculated strategy and wrong decisions by the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy opened the path for such a possibility of armed conflict in the Aegean in March 1987.

The famous crisis of the continental shelf issue of March 1987 has long been discussed in the literature of Greco-Turkish relations from the historical, political and judicial perspectives. Many political analysts argue that the crisis of March 1987 was the result of Papandreou's miscalculated strategies towards Turkey which were constructed by the PASOK political elites and Papandreou himself in an attempt to restore PASOK's decreasing popularity in the second half of the 1980s.⁷⁶ Although this argument is partly true, it is incomplete. On the one hand, it was a political move by Papandreou to strengthen the national sensitiveness of the Greek public by inflaming the dispute in the Aegean in order to prevent PASOK from losing power due to increasing domestic economic unrest. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Papandreou in fact was the successor of a long expansionist tradition of the Greek political elite and in many respects, he shared the aims of political Hellenism.

In that sense, Papandreou had similarities with Eleftherios Venizelos. The famous political leader of modern Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos was a liberal politician, yet he embraced the Megali Idea wholeheartedly; he wanted to make history by finalizing the territorial projections of the Megali Idea and promoted the armed campaign in Anatolia which resulted in the Asia Minor disaster. Sixty years after Venizelos, Papandreou acted with the same motivation in a post-modern way, enabled by international law. When the UN adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea with principles which strengthened the hands of coastal states such as Greece, Papandreou had the opportunity to expand Greece's maritime territories by using those international judicial principles as a tool to

76 PASOK, by using the crisis with Turkey in the late 1980s, has strongly polarized the political arena in Greece in a period of financial crisis, the bailout agreement and the enforcement of strict austerity measures. Ioannis Andreadis and Yannis Stavrakakis, "Dynamics of Polarization in the Greek Case", *The Annals of the American Academy*, No. 681 (January 2019): 160.

complete the Hellenism's visions for the Aegean. In other words, both the territorial waters and continental shelf crisis in the 1980s were not only cases promoted by a socialist politician, they were also parts of the long tradition of an expansionist strategy of a corporate foreign policy bureaucracy which have been warmed up by an excited populist politician.⁷⁷

The continental shelf issue was never solved but it was frozen by the Bern Agreement of 1976. As it is mentioned above, in Bern, Greece and Turkey agreed not to commence any exploration activity in the Aegean Sea beyond their 6-mile territorial waters zone. This was a temporary solution between two NATO allies to ease the tension in the Aegean and Greek governments did not take it onto the political agenda as the country was in the process of integration with the EC at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. Despite the bitter characteristics of the Aegean conflicts for domestic politics, Greek governments during the EC accession period under Karamanlis' prime ministry followed a negotiation policy with Turkey. The main motivation of the Karamanlis governments was to secure Greece's position in the Western Bloc by obtaining EC membership, and for this reason Karamanlis paid special attention not to cause any conflict with another ally, Turkey.⁷⁸ However, when PASOK came to power, Papandreou handled the issue as a problem of sovereignty, just as he did for territorial waters.

77 On the Turkish side, it is generally believed that Papandreou embraced the Greek expansionist understanding and this was reflected in the Greek press, too. For instance, *Ta Nea* wrote that Turkey believed Greece had followed an expansionist policy since the independence. *Ta Nea*, 15 February 1987.

78 European integration has already started to become a phenomenon in the 1970s and Karamanlis regarded Greece's entry to EC as a political and economic advantage. As Trombetas argues, to remain outside the EC would mean that Greece would not participate in the central decision-making and the building of the unified Europe. But, in order to be the member of the unified Europe Karamanlis had to ease the tensions with Turkey and he had strongly been criticized by PASOK for making concessions during the accession process in the issues related with Turkey's territorial challenges at Greece's expense. T. P. Trombetas, "The Political Dimensions of Greece's Accession to the EC: Commitment or Retrogression?", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (April 1983): 65, 67.

Papandreou and the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy in the early 1980s evaluated the clauses of the Bern Agreement as invalid, because the Greek and Turkish governments had never held any talks on the continental shelf dispute since 1976. Then, Papandreou's government declared that Greece had renounced her responsibilities arising from the Bern Agreement and announced that they would start petroleum exploration activities in the Aegean Sea again.⁷⁹ In other words, they concluded from that invalidation of the Bern Agreement that Greece had the right to conduct exploration and drilling activities outside the 6-mile territorial waters zone and also because their conception of the territorial waters frontier was 12 miles. PASOK's ruling elite comprehended, and it was also the predominant assessment among the bureaucratic elite, that the Aegean continental shelf was legitimately Greek.⁸⁰

At that point, the Papandreou government was challenged with a legal issue related with controlling the activities of the international company, Denison Mines Ltd., which was performing drilling operations in the territorial waters zone of Greece in the Aegean Sea. Denison Mines Ltd. was a multinational entity formed from Canadian, American, German and Greek companies. The Canadian company Denison Canada held 62%, the German company Winteshall Germany owned 11.25%, the American company Hellenic Oil USA held 9%, another American company Whiteshield USA held 7% and the Greek Public Oil Company owned 10% of the shares of Denison Mines Ltd. Denison's exploration deadline was 1 April 1987 and at this point Papandreou's government was faced with two options, either to allow the exploration to continue, possibly igniting a Greek-Turkish crisis, or to stop Denison's activities.⁸¹

The company was not authorized to conduct exploration outside Greece's 6-mile territorial waters zone, especially in the disputed areas

79 Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): 61-62.

80 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 120-121.

81 For further details about the structure and activities of Denison Mines Ltd., see Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish "Threat" during the 1987 Aegean Crisis", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May 2007): 102.

beyond the 6-mile limit. By that time, Denison Mines Ltd. was drilling around Thassos island and the drilling activity could not be extended beyond the 6-mile zone, as it was the disputed area between Greece and Turkey. However, the PASOK government announced on 18 February 1987 that the Greek Public Oil Company would buy the majority of the shares of Denison Mines Ltd.⁸² This was an attempt to take control of the company, as Papandreou's government stated that they had decided to hold the majority of the shares because of the significant strategic importance of the expected reserves around Thassos and Samothrace in the North Aegean.⁸³ Moreover, it was declared that Denison Mines Ltd. would be authorized by the Greek government to continue drilling activity eight miles to the east of Thassos island, which meant the disputed area outside the 6-mile Greek territorial waters zone.⁸⁴ This was a clear violation of the 1976 Bern Agreement which definitely forbade any exploration work outside the territorial waters for both countries. This act of the PASOK government ignited the crisis of March 1987.⁸⁵

On the Turkish side, the Papandreou government's move was regarded as a new attempt by the Greek government to expand the maritime frontiers to the disputed areas of the Aegean Sea with a fait accompli, because Greece's intention to expand territorial waters to 12 miles was still so fresh and the Turkish government had always been in an alarmed position for an unexpected move by Papandreou in the Aegean. Therefore, the Greek government's authorization of the North Aegean Petroleum Company for drilling outside the 6-mile zone was evaluated as an attempt to legitimize Greece's claims for 12-mile territorial waters, and

82 *Eleftherotipia*, 19 February 1987.

83 Marcia Christoff Kurop, "Greece and Turkey: Can They Mend Fences?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998): 9.

84 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 121.

85 At this point, the Greek opposition also provoked Papandreou. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the leader of the main opposition, said that the PASOK government did not have courage for drilling in the east of Thassos and made statements stating that they would start to drilling activities in the region soon after they came to power. *Eleftheros Tipos*, 5 March 1987, 7 March 1987.

this was more than enough to alarm Turkey. The statement by Ambassador Yalim Eralp, Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in that period, gives some clues about Turkey's attitude to the Greek government's decision: "*Greece's decision on performing petroleum exploration work outside the territorial waters means violation of the 1976 Bern Agreement which prescribes avoidance of such actions until a bilateral agreement between the two countries on the continental shelf issue is reached. Turkey has adhered to the agreement with the greatest sensibility until now, and avoided any kind of action related with the continental shelf. Greece should also end the violations within this framework. Otherwise, Turkey would do everything necessary to protect its rights and interests in the Aegean.*"⁸⁶

Despite the high tension in Turkey, Nazmi Akıman, Turkish Ambassador in Athens, made a great effort to keep the diplomatic channels operative so as to ease the increasing crisis and discussed the issue with the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. Interestingly, this process showed how strong the corporatist effect was on the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy, who were not able to restrain their irredentist instincts against Turkey. Moreover, it revealed how unreasonable they could behave when any opportunity arose to extend Greece's frontiers, whether on land or in the sea.

The Turkish Ambassador went to the Greek Foreign Ministry on 28 February and met with Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Giannis Kapsis to discuss the possibility of gaining an assurance to stop the activities beyond the 6-mile limit. However, Kapsis' reaction to Akıman confirmed the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy's misreading of the ongoing situation. Kapsis harshly specified that the Greek government had the legitimate right to decide where and when drilling would be implemented in

86 Cited in Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2008): 167. Greek press evaluated Turkey's approach as barbaric which is despising the rules of the civilized world, blackmailing and provocative. *I Kathimerini*, 17 February 1987.

Greece's sovereign territorial waters and continental shelf area.⁸⁷ Moreover, the spokesman of the Greek Government also declared that the Bern Agreement, introduced by the mutual wills of the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers of the period, Bülent Ecevit and Konstantinos Karamanlis, was not in force any more, since it was considered by the PASOK government as a kind of arrangement and preparatory document for Greco-Turkish disputes in the Aegean. In the statement made by the spokesman, it was also clearly stated that the agreement was only a commitment for application to the ICJ during the period of talks and that when the talks went into deadlock, the Bern Agreement lost its validity.⁸⁸ It was a declaration to confirm that Greece did not consider herself as adherent to the 1976 Bern Agreement any more. Kapsis' and the spokesman's messages were so clear that the Turkish Ambassador considered that the Greek government was intentionally taking control of Denison Mines Ltd. for drilling in the disputed areas beyond the 6-mile maritime zone and transmitted this to the Turkish government in exactly this way.⁸⁹

After the Kapsis-Akıman meeting and the Greek Government spokesman's statement, the Turkish view of the Greek government's intentions on the Aegean was clarified. Precisely, Kapsis made the Turkish government believe in Greece's new expansionism in the Aegean through such a constructed crisis on the continental shelf issue and the Turkish military and foreign policy authorities decided to take measures to prevent the Greek government from achieving a *fait accompli* in the Aegean Sea. On 1 March 1987, the Turkish government gave a diplomatic note to the Greek government and it was explicitly stated in the note that any exploration activity for oil in the disputed continental shelf areas would constitute a violation of the Bern Agreement of 1976 and that Turkey would

87 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish "Threat" during the 1987 Aegean Crisis", 104.

88 Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 168.

89 Eugenia Vathakou, "International Crisis and Peace Processes as Autopoietic Systems in World Society: Examples from Greek-Turkish Relations", (PhD Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 2003): 214-215.

react to such an act in accordance with the legitimate rights emerging from international law.⁹⁰ From that moment on, the crisis began to turn into a risky conflict which had the capacity to lead to an armed one. The Turkish note provoked Papandreou's nationalist narrative and the Greek government did not retreat. Even worse, Greek military exercises in the Aegean were announced, the decision of the Turkish government to send the oceanographic vessel Piri Reis accompanied by Turkish military ships followed and the situation reached a dead end with the risk of a gun-fight.⁹¹

Papandreou and the Greek foreign policy authorities intentionally created the background to the crisis after Turkey's decision to send the Piri Reis to the Aegean with warships escort.⁹² Indeed, the Greek government's attempts for taking control of the drilling company operating in the North Aegean and authorization for exploring outside the Greek 6-mile territorial waters were not narrated in the domestic political discourse. Papandreou and the government authorities addressed the issue when the Turkish vessel went into international waters of the Aegean for carrying out exploration work.⁹³ Papandreou, successfully and with a political anger spiced with ultra-nationalist propaganda slogans,⁹⁴ declared the Turkish activity to be a violation of Greece's sovereign continental shelf zone. Papandreou's public statements were full of anger, and the populist prime minister did his best to handle the issue with a heroic narrative in order to obtain a wide range of public support in the country.⁹⁵ Once he said that the Turkish ship would be prevented from conducting

90 Turkey's moves against Papandreou's policies were immediately reflected in the Greek press like Turkey escalated the crisis. *Ta Nea*, 11 March 1987.

91 *Ta Nea*, 21 March 1987. *The Financial Times*, 25 March 1987.

92 Papandreou considered Piri Reis' departure to Aegean as a new challenge and expansionist move from Turkey. *I Kathimerini*, 20 March 1987.

93 *Eleftherotipia*, 3 March 1987.

94 Papandreou claimed that Turkey threatened to occupy the entire Aegean. *Ta Nea*, 10 March 1987.

95 Papandreou continued to provoke Greek public against the occupation of the Aegean by the Turks. *Ta Nea*, 17 March 1987.

any exploration work in the continental shelf area of Greece and that the Greek government would react not by words but by actions.⁹⁶ In another statement after the meeting of the Council of the Ministers on 19 March, Papandreou was even more enraged and targeted the USA, too. He repeated that the Greek government would not let the Piri Reis perform any exploration in the Aegean Sea and he indicated that if Greece's neighbors continued their aggressive behaviours, the Greek Army would teach the Turks a lesson.⁹⁷ He added that if the USA showed a tendency to support Turkey in this crisis, Greek government would close American military bases in Greece.⁹⁸ Papandreou extended his angry position to the USA, most probably to escalate the crisis to the international systemic level in order to involve the USA and other NATO allies in it for the benefit of Greece.

On the other side, the Turkish government's reaction was not calmer. Although Turkey did not close the door on the negotiations to decrease the tension, Turgut Özal's government responded with a harsh statement pointing out Turkey's interests in the Aegean. Prime Minister Özal was in London on that day and his statement to the BBC did not seem to take any step backward: *"If the Greeks take action to explore petroleum in international waters, we, although it would be in a different part of the Aegean Sea, also have certain rights to explore petroleum by sailing into international waters. However, if they enter international waters by claiming that area as their territorial waters and if they take any action against our ships it would be casus belli. ... For this reason, it is not true that Turkey would conduct exploration in international waters by using force. No, this is not the case. The real case is that if Greece does it, Turkey will start to conduct exploration, too. There is nothing other than the*

96 Cited in Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 169.

97 There were news that Greek jetfighters were loaded bombs for a possible air raid, *Eleftheros Tipos*, 24 March 1987. Eleftherotipia wrote about action plan for a strike by addressing Papandreou's statement on teaching Turks a lesson. *Eleftherotipia*, 28 March 1987.

98 Cited in Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 169.

right we have to protect our research ship, because Papandreou said in one of his statements that they would prevent our ship from exploration. We also stated that if Greek ships do not conduct exploration in the conflicted areas, our ships will also stay in our territorial waters. In other words, if Greece directly takes that course, we will extend our exploration work to the international waters as they did'.⁹⁹

Immediately, the Greek government declared a partial mobilization of the Hellenic Armed Forces and alerted the Greek Navy and Greek jetfighters harassed the Piri Reis in the Aegean Sea many times.¹⁰⁰ It is almost impossible to know whether Papandreou really believed in the possibility of armed conflict with Turkey. However, it is clear that Papandreou's behaviour in escalating a crisis with Turkey was not a reasonable one.¹⁰¹ In the short term, he could make a political profit with his abilities to popularize the issue around the nationalist feelings of Greek society, but in the long term, the crisis would cause him to lose, because the Greek government did not have the financial power to pursue any armed conflict and the Greek people were aware of this, as the economic situation began to worsen in 1987. Escalating the crisis with a nationalist rhetoric contributed to Papandreou's popularity in early 1987 and he saved the day for a while, but the worsening economic situation caused him to lose power two years later. However, Papandreou defined the situation on 19 March 1987 as the protection of Greece's vital national interests and he even pointed out the possibility of a limited armed conflagration with Turkey in the Aegean Sea by referring to the limits of diplomacy.¹⁰²

99 Cited in Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 169-170.

100 The Hellenic Armed Forces were congratulated in the press for their effective mobilization during the critical hours of the crisis. *Ta Nea*, 27 March 1987.

101 The military plans were discussed by high level military and civil authorities for the possible combat. *To Vima*, 28 March 1987.

102 *Ta Nea*, 20 March 1987. Greek government officials also pushed the limits of diplomacy and they explicitly expressed PASOK government's territorial ambitions towards the Aegean Sea which increased the possibility of an armed conflict. For instance, the Minister of Defence, Ioannis Charalambopoulos made a statement on the 19th of March that the Aegean Sea is Greek and it will remain Greek. Also, Deputy Foreign Minister Kapsis told

The course of events showed that both Papandreou and the foreign policy bureaucracy shared the common target of creating a *fait accompli* for realizing Greece's claims on expanding its territorial waters to 12 miles and for forcing Turkey to accept Greek claims on the continental shelf. The aim on that point seemed to be to ensure Greek supremacy over Turkey in the geopolitical conflict in the Aegean. However, the strategy was condemned to fail, because it had not been fictionalized well enough and it had not been supported by other necessary components, such as economic and military power. In addition, the strategy could not have been put into the practice simultaneously with the foreign affairs bureaucracy's planning and the government's action.¹⁰³ In the last instance, Papandreou was a populist politician and he had to count every other possibility to maintain his power in the government. In other words, the Greek foreign affairs bureaucracy, most probably, could not predict that Papandreou, as a politician, would surrender because of other force majeure reasons, such as the worsening domestic economic situation and pressure from other NATO allies.¹⁰⁴

to Turkish Ambassador Akıman that the Aegean Sea is almost a Greek lake and Turkey should not be bothered with this. See Eugenia Vathakou, "International Crisis and Peace Processes as Autopoietic Systems in World Society: Examples from Greek-Turkish Relations", 218.

- 103 For instance, the Greek foreign affairs bureaucracy was unaware of Papandreou's intentions to purchase the shares of the Denison Mines company. The deputy Foreign Minister of the time, Giannis Kapsis, confesses in his memoirs that Papandreou did not inform either the Greek diplomatic authorities or the defence ministry authorities about the purchase of the shares of Denison Mines. He adds that the first time they heard it from Papandreou was in a cabinet meeting in mid-February 1987 and it was a surprise for everyone. See Giannis P. Kapsis, *Oi 3 Meres tou Marti*, 39-40. For an analysis on miscommunication between Papandreou and the Greek Foreign Ministry in general, see P. C. Ioakimidis, "The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, eds. Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis and Neville Waites, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999): 145, 153.
- 104 Constantine P. Danopoulos, "Regional Security Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1988): 273.

In that sense, a very critical detail quoted by Vathakou is rather important to understand the lack of coordination between Papandreou and the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. Giannis Boutos, a former minister in the ND government before 1981, independent deputy in the Hellenic Parliament during the March 1987 crisis and a close friend of Andreas Papandreou, played a crucial role in the prevention of the crisis without any gunfight. Boutos had also good relations with Turkish Ambassador Nazmi Akıman and he met with the Turkish Ambassador at the peak of the crisis. Boutos and Akıman discussed the content of the crisis and Boutos learned the Turkish side's claims and position on the continental shelf. However, he realized that there was a lack of communication between the Greek Prime Minister's Office and Greek Foreign Ministry, as Akıman's attempts towards the high-level Greek diplomatic authorities were unknown among the Hellenic Parliament and the Government. Boutos met with Prime Minister Papandreou in his residence and informed him about the Akıman-Kapsis meeting and Kapsis' sharp responses to the Turkish ambassador about the ongoing crisis without consulting with Papandreou. As far as Vathakou directly cites from the interview with Boutos, Papandreou seemed surprised of Kapsis' misperceptions about the crisis after the meetings with Akıman and he was worried about the escalation of the crisis to close combat because of Kapsis' flippant talk with the Turkish Ambassador. From that moment on, Papandreou became aware of the severity of the ongoing crisis and Boutos went to see the Turkish Ambassador on behalf of Papandreou. Papandreou's assurances for Greece's retreat were transmitted to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens by Giannis Boutos: the Greek government agreed not to buy the shares of Denison Mines Ltd. and gave a promise to stop oil exploration to the east of Thassos island outside the 6-mile territorial waters zone.¹⁰⁵ As soon as Akıman received the assurances he contacted the Turkish

105 Eugenia Vathakou, "International Crisis and Peace Processes as Autopoietic Systems in World Society: Examples from Greek-Turkish Relations", 223, 227-229. Greek newspapers later transmitted Turkish leaders' evaluations on Greece's retreatment, *Eleftheros Tipos*, 4 April 1987.

Prime Minister Turgut Özal, and Özal made the statement that ended the crisis on 28 March 1987 in which he mentioned Greece's suspension of oil drilling and Turkey's withdrawal of vessels from the region.¹⁰⁶

An armed conflict in that Greco-Turkish crisis in the Aegean would constitute a huge diplomatic challenge to the NATO alliance, and US and NATO authorities became involved in the situation to prevent the crisis from becoming a gunfight. Moreover, the increasing tension did not mobilize the Greek public around PASOK as it was expected and thus diplomatic communication between the governmental authorities of the two countries was restored. Especially with the efforts of the NATO Secretary General Peter Carrington and US diplomacy to ensure stability in the Aegean,¹⁰⁷ the tension had been eased. The Greek government gave a notification to Turkey through diplomatic channels that they had suspended oil exploration work in the conflicted areas of the North Aegean. In addition to this, the Greek Public Oil Company also declared that their plans for petroleum exploration work in the areas east of Thassos island had been suspended.¹⁰⁸ Besides, the Greek government also took a step backwards. The spokesman of the Greek Government made a statement on Athens Radio and said that the Greek Public Oil Company had no plans for petroleum exploration work in the area east of Thassos and that the Denison Mines company had canceled its plans.¹⁰⁹

The continental shelf crisis in March 1987 had changed the direction of the relations between Turkey and Greece and this crisis brought very important points of the relations out. First of all, Papandreou's attempt to destroy the restrictions introduced by the Bern Agreement had failed. Papandreou himself and the diplomatic authorities often referred to the

106 *Eleftherotipia*, 30 March 1987. When the Kapsis-Akıman meeting was reported in the press, the opposition immediately accused Papandreou of deceiving the Greek people and selling the country. *Eleftheros Tipos*, 30 March 1987.

107 Despite the considerable discontent of US administration with Papandreou's policies, US diplomatic authorities have always been in favour of a stability in the Aegean. *I Kathimerini*, 4 March 1987.

108 Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 170.

109 Cited in Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, 170.

invalidity of the Bern Agreement in the process resulting in the continental shelf crisis, but it was understood that this argument lacked any political and judicial background and that it was used merely as a populist political tool to try to realize expansion in the Aegean. It collapsed and both states declared that they would not attempt petroleum exploration work outside their territorial waters, in the conflicted areas, anymore. In other words, Papandreou had to accept the principles of the Bern Agreement after paying an expensive price for the crisis. In an interview in late 1987, Papandreou himself admitted the price paid as a result of the tension-oriented policies towards Turkey: "*It is not out of sheer madness that we spend seven percent of the country's GNP for arms when we need hospitals, schools, and capital*".¹¹⁰ It is also apparent from the discussions in the Turkish Parliament that the economic reasons were quite effective on Papandreou's failure to take the tensions with Turkey further. The responses of the Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu to the deputies, who questioned the attitude of Turkish foreign policy towards Greece after the meeting of Papandreou and Özal at the Davos Summit in 1986, acknowledge that business circles in both countries have had influence on both Papandreou and Özal in overcoming the tensions and initiating a Turkish-Greek rapprochement for a long time.¹¹¹

The other significant result of the March 1987 crisis was Papandreou's inadequate diplomatic efforts¹¹² and uncoordinated diplomacy between

110 Eugenia Balodimas, "America and the Aegean Crisis", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (November 1987): 34. The share of Greece's defence spending in the GDP always remained above 6% during PASOK rule. See George M. Georgiou, Panayotis T. Kapopoulos and Sophia Lazaretou, "Modelling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defence Spending Dynamics", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1996): 231.

111 *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 17, Cilt: 25, Yasama Yılı: 3, 25 February 1986: 296-298.

112 *I Kathimerini*, 12 April 1987.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The PASOK government had shown an accusatory approach to the European allies of NATO and to the USA.¹¹³ Besides, the Greek Foreign Ministry periodically informed the Warsaw Pact about the developments during the crisis and Papandreou even sent his Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias to Sofia in order to discuss the issue with communist Bulgaria, and Papandreou's government temporarily closed the American Military Base in Nea Makri near Athens during the escalating period of the tension.¹¹⁴ The American government's reaction to that move of Papandreou was severe and moreover, his political and diplomatic approach during the March 1987 crisis caused the emergence of seriously doubtful evaluations within the NATO alliance.¹¹⁵ However, most important of all, the March 1987 crisis triggered the process of the fall of Papandreou from power. Under the worsening economic conditions, accompanied by huge corruption scandals within government circles, harsh criticisms of PASOK from opposition parties and press began to increase and Papandreou's popularity was turned upside-down.¹¹⁶ For example, Greek newspapers immediately began to attack Papandreou harshly by criticizing him of pursuing a foreign policy which is characterized as a two-faced domestic consumption policy and they ridiculed him

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- 113 There were some comments in Greek press criticizing Papandreou for his approach to the USA. I Kathimerini mentioned that Turkey's propaganda was successful to gain US support because of Papandreou's anti-American discourse. *I Kathimerini*, 15 March 1987. But, in general USA and NATO were regarded as the actors motivating Turkey for provocative acts in the Aegean. *Ta Nea*, 12 March 1987, *Eleftherotipia*, 23 March 1987.
- 114 Hasan Ünal, Theodora Kalaitzaki, Eylem Altunya, "Greek and Turkish Perceptions of US Mediation Efforts for Conflict Resolution from 1950s to Mid-1990s", *Bulgarian Historical Review*, Issue 3-4 (2005): 98.
- 115 When the Greek government realized the seriousness of the USA, probably in order to get square with the Americans, Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, one of the most influential ministers of Papandreou said that Greece would serve the interests of the US in the region better than Turkey, but the USA did not understand it. *Eleftheros Tipos*, 31 March 1987. *Ta Nea* mentioned that the USA is the only responsible country to improve the relations between Greece and Turkey. *Ta Nea*, 12 April 1987.
- 116 Robert McDonald, "Greece's Year of Political Turbulence", *The World Today*, Vol. 45, No. 11 (November 1989): 195-197.

by saying “*national hero ready to punish the eternal enemy*”.¹¹⁷ While Papandreou reckoned on raising a nationalist mobilization around himself, in fact, he accepted Turkey’s position on not carrying out any activity beyond the 6-mile territorial waters zone which had been agreed in the Bern Agreement of 1976.¹¹⁸

Although the parties continued to have considerable doubts,¹¹⁹ both Greece and Turkey promised not to attempt any further oil exploration activity outside the 6-mile territorial limit for the moment and the risk of armed conflict was temporarily reduced. Furthermore, after the crisis calmed down with Özal’s statement, Papandreou sent a message to Özal through the Turkish Ambassador in Athens and stated his wish not to experience such a dangerous crisis any more between the two neighboring countries. Along with some other statements for appeasing the tense environment, the two leaders maintained a direct and secret communication until autumn 1987. Foreign bureaucracy in both countries was excluded during these secret talks between the two prime ministers and a background was created for a bilateral meeting between two leaders.¹²⁰ In this regard, it is possible to come across debates and criticism particularly at Turkish side. At that time, the opposition deputies in the Turkish Parliament accused the Turkish government of hiding the content of the negotiations from the Turkish Parliament and conducting the meetings with Greece within a limited political circle and Mesut Yılmaz, the Turkish Foreign Minister of the time, implicitly accepted in his response to the deputies in the parliament that during the process leading to Davos, the Turkish and Greek prime ministers were contacted and the problems

117 *Eleftheros Tipos*, 30 March 1987.

118 Christos Limperis, *Poreia se Taragmenes Thalasses* (Athens: Poiotita, 2000): 338.

119 *I Kathimerini*, 8 April 1987.

120 Papandreou’s secret negotiations at that time was criticized by the Greek foreign bureaucracy. P. C. Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions”, 154.

were directly discussed between the leaders and argued that this had a positive effect on easing tensions between the two countries.¹²¹

Although the tension was over, the deep disagreements on the content of the dispute and the different approaches related to the characteristic of the conflict, in both the political and judicial dimensions, remained.¹²² The Davos Summit of January 1988 played a crucial role in opening the path for face-to-face discussion by the political leaders of the two neighboring countries. However, the Papandreou-Özal meeting in Davos merely established a ground for the future by restoring direct diplomatic communication and trust between the two countries rather than solving the problems in the Aegean. The dispute over the continental shelf remained unsolved during the Davos process of 1988. While the Greek side insisted on resolving the dispute by taking it to the ICJ, the Turkish side, although they did not close the door for the ICJ in principle, was in general against taking the case to the ICJ and favored the idea of resolving the dispute through first-hand negotiations between the two states.¹²³ At this point, the Turkish government has also admitted that no steps have been taken to resolve the Greco-Turkish disputes in Davos. Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz, in his parliamentary speech on 8 March 1988, in which he evaluated the Davos meeting, declared the official opinion of Turkey regarding Davos spirit by saying that Turkish-Greek problems are complex and entrenched, Davos does not constitute base for the solution of the problems, rather it just creates a ground for the formation of trust between the two countries.¹²⁴

121 *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 18, Cilt: 2, Yasama Yılı: 1, 2 February 1988: 77-83.

122 After the March 1987 crisis, Papandreou continued to narrate his policies based on the idea of not negotiating and conceding anything for Greece's vital interests. *To Vima*, 1 April 1987.

123 Since the end of the crisis, Turkey consistently insisted on discussing the disputes through bilateral negotiations. *I Kathimerini*, 17 April 1987. Papandreou always kept the traditional Greek position towards resolving the issues through ICJ. *I Kathimerini*, 7 March 1987.

124 *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 18, Cilt: 3, Yasama Yılı: 1, 8 March 1988: 395.

In that sense, Papandreou had to change his ambitions towards the continental shelf together with the extension of the territorial waters. As the continental shelf issue had caused a deep crisis between the two NATO allies, Greek foreign policy had been damaged and had lost prestige and trust at an international level because of Papandreou's populist and incoherent political behaviour in Greece's international relations. Therefore, in the upcoming years, Greek diplomacy had to shift its strategy towards seeking international legitimacy and stronger international support for the extension of territorial waters and continental shelf.¹²⁵

The most important outcome of the March 1987 crisis and Davos process is that Turkey evaluated PASOK's policies towards Turkey as a post-modern interpretation of traditional Greek expansionism in the Aegean. At the Davos meeting, Özal strongly warned Papandreou that Turkey would not allow any Greek expansionist intention towards Turkey from the Aegean and also Papandreou seemed to realize that his tension-oriented policies towards Turkey were in fact the reflections of the historical foreign policy tradition of Greece, which had an irredentist character.¹²⁶ As the course of events began to put Greece in a difficult position in international politics against Turkey, Papandreou in Davos had to soften his harsh stance on the content of Turkish-Greek relations. In return, as a gesture of goodwill to Greece, Turkish government, at a time when it was very difficult to establish any association in the country and civil society organization was under pressure, and the shadow of the Turkish-Greek problems was still quite palpable, has allowed the establishment of Turkey-Greece Friendship Association, which would operate in İstanbul, with the decision of the Council of Ministers dated February 2, 1988.¹²⁷

Papandreou also had to accept bilateral discussion of the problems between Greece and Turkey and it was decided to form a Political Committee. The Political Committee held two meetings in 1988. The first one

125 Eugenia Balodimas, "America and the Aegean Crisis", 33. *I Kathimerini*, 18 April 1987.

126 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 123.

127 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-18-1-2/Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı (1928-)/593-681-7, 2 February 1988.

was held in Athens and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Karolos Papoulias and Mesut Yılmaz, on 27 May 1988. And, the effect of conciliation was first seen in the moderation of the visa regime between the two countries. Soon after the agreement reached in Athens, it was decided to exempt Turkish and Greek citizens with diplomatic and service passports from visa. The Turkish government put this decision into effect immediately with the decision of the Council of Ministers dated June 20, 1988,¹²⁸ thus, albeit it was limited, the way for visa-free travel between the two countries was paved.

Although the Athens MoU on CBMs of May 1988 was not a problem-solving document, it was a significant step taken by the PASOK government towards accepting the existence of the Greco-Turkish conflicts and the importance of bilateral discussions between Greece and Turkey. Both parties agreed in general terms, such as avoiding the possibility of close combat during their actions in the Aegean and respecting each other's rights. The Second Political Committee meeting was held in Ankara on 5-8 September 1988 and a similar document which stated the goodwill in general terms was accepted.¹²⁹ The first positive reflection of the MoU signed in September 1988 on the relations was within the framework of NATO. Turkey, previously vetoed Greece's participation in NATO activities due to the crisis. But, immediately after the agreements, Turkish government approved the participation of Greece in the memorandum of understanding for the development of the NATO Identification System.¹³⁰

Despite the reconciliation process from April to autumn 1988, Papan-dreou, who mobilized the Greek public around socialist-leaning nationalism, could not have abandon the tension-oriented foreign policy towards Turkey in one moment, and so it happened. The Greek public could

128 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-18-1-2/Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı (1928-)/603-731-7, 20 June 1988.

129 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 125.

130 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 30-18-1-2/Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı (1928-)/610-772-1, 27 November 1988.

not accept a Greco-Turkish rapprochement enforced by the international conditions and soon after he returned from Davos, Papandreou was exposed to harsh criticism from both inside PASOK and opposition parties. Furthermore, the Greek Foreign Ministry kept its distance from Papandreou's policy shift and Papandreou encountered pressure from both the civil and military bureaucracy.¹³¹ In fact, as Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz explained in his parliamentary speech on 29 November 1988, Davos process has been conducted by Turkey's initiative from the very beginning onwards. Despite Greece has put preconditions forward at the beginning of the Davos process, Turkey has not accepted any of Greece's conditions and Turkish diplomacy could have made Papandreou step back and initiated an unconditional dialogue.¹³² This, in a sense, a statement expressing that Papandreou had to sit at the diplomacy table by retreating in his struggle with Turkey without any precondition at the end of his aggressiveness with no results.

In the 1980s, the Greco-Turkish problems dominated the national life in Greece and even determined the evolution of Greece's internal affairs.¹³³ So, politically weakened Papandreou could not withstand that pressure coming from the actors of the established order in Greece, and he immediately turned away from the Davos reconciliation by defining the Davos process as his mistake. However, he did not have any power to construct a new political challenge to Turkey and merely continued to create obstacles against Turkey's application for full membership of the EC.¹³⁴ In other words, when he understood that he was losing his popularity even in his own party and among electors, he returned to his clas-

131 Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Imagined Enemies*, 124.

132 *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 18, Cilt: 18, Yasama Yılı: 2, 29 November 1988: 116.

133 *Eleftheros Tipos*, 3 March 1987.

134 Ronald Meinardus, "Third-party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes" in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991): 162-163. Papandreou's one of the main argument against Turkey's EC accession was that Turkey would be the Trojan Horse of the USA in EC. *Eleftherotipia*, 14 March 1987.

sical perception of the threat coming from the east and continued to accuse Turkey of violating Greece's rights in the Aegean.¹³⁵ However, he could not find any supportive argument and political power to raise any other nationalist mobilization among Greek society by using Turkey, because it was too late to recover his popularity after being damaged by such an ambivalent attitude in foreign policy behaviour.¹³⁶

For an overall assessment of Papandreou's post-modern type of expansionism towards Turkey through the Aegean disputes with a constructed nationalism accompanied by socialist tendencies, it should be categorized under three time phases during his rule. In the first phase, from his accession to government in 1981 to the period when he started to lose political power in the 1985 elections, he built up a heroic narrative against so-called expansionist Turkey, a narrative which he in fact used as a fundamental argument for his expansionist projections. In the second phase, from the mid-1980s until late 1988, Papandreou put his nationalist narrative into practice by increasing tension-oriented policies, in order to expand Greek territorial waters and continental shelf zones with a *fait accompli*. However, in the final phase, when his personal charisma and political leadership was not enough to create a whole national consensus about the national issues of Greece in Davos and afterwards, he returned to his constructed nationalism to save the day, but ultimately, he had already lost. In fact, the discourse of Turkish threat, which Papandreou oftenly used to legitimize his rhetoric about Turkey, created an obsessive "fear of Turkey" among Greek people that persisted even after PASOK,¹³⁷ rather than creating a strong mobilization around the national courses.

135 Nigel Clive, "Letter from Greece – mid-December 1988", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 1989): 78.

136 Papandreou had already started to lose his popularity in 1986. PASOK lost the municipal elections in three major cities, Athens, Thessaloniki and Pireaus in October 1986. Paul B. Henze, "Out of Kilter – Greeks, Turks & U.S. Policy", *The National Interest*, No. 8 (Summer 1987): 81.

137 Vamık D. Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, *Türkler ve Yunanlılar Çatışan Komşular*, 205.

Andreas Papandreou himself actually did not believe in the Turkish threat from the beginning onwards. He used the sensitiveness of Greek society towards Turkey, or rather, the phenomenon of the Turkish threat among Greek people, to establish his dominance of Greek politics as an outsider.¹³⁸ He admitted to US governmental officials in 1976, long before he came to power: "*I may not believe in a Turkish threat, you may not believe in a Turkish threat, but the Greek public believes in it, and that makes it Greek reality and you have to deal with it in those terms*".¹³⁹ Furthermore, when he came to power in October 1981, he admitted similar perceptions of himself to Fahir Alaçam, Turkish Ambassador in Athens in that period, by saying that his real desire was to resolve the Greco-Turkish conflicts and a return to the days of the Venizelos-Mustafa Kemal friendship of the 1930s.¹⁴⁰ However, his words to the US and Turkish officials were not coherent with his political practices throughout the 1980s. Although Papandreou was an outsider before coming to power, he reconciled with the established order after he acceded to the government. In the historical context, he tried to place himself in Greek history as a politician who achieved Greece's territorial ambitions like many of his predecessors. However, like Eleftherios Venizelos, he failed and lost power in the end.

138 Aurel Braun, *Small-State Security in the Balkans* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1983): 243.

139 Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955* (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1990): 154.

140 Kamuran Gürün, *Fırtınalı Yıllar Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları*, 362.

The Turkish Minority in Greece as a Foreign Policy Phenomenon for the PASOK Government of the 1980s

§ 6.1 Instrumentalization of the Minority in Greco-Turkish Relations

The Turkish Minority in Western Thrace has always been a sui-generis case to examine in terms of inter-state relations between Turkey and Greece in general, strategic estimations for the international political rivalry between the two states and more specifically, its instrumentalizing character for the tension-oriented foreign policy of Greece towards Turkey during the 1980s. The Minority also has a distinctive place among other national minorities in Europe in every sense with its special status as a foreign policy tool in Turkish-Greek relations. The Turkish Minority of Western Thrace has succeeded in remaining as a strong political entity in the complex, and sometimes chaotic, political environment of Greece since the status quo was established with the Treaty of Lausanne. Yet, the minority population, from peasants to elites within the minority, constructed a tradition of political struggle until the 1980s, despite several cases of political and social oppression. When PASOK came to power in 1981, Andreas Papandreou's left-populist government met with an ethnic

challenge to Greek national identity from the minority at the north-easternmost corner of the country.

6.1.1 *The Attitudes of Greek Political Actors towards the Minority after 1974*

Greek democracy was damaged during the military regime and the political actors were subjected to the rules and practices of dictatorship. However, Greek politics has a strong tradition of being accustomed to a chaotic atmosphere and this traditionality enabled the actors in the political arena to survive under the Junta regime and to return to the stage after the military government fell. Three main actors appeared as the driving force for the restoration of democracy in Greek politics during the post-authoritarian era: the center and conservative right, mainly organized under New Democracy under the leadership of the old-school politician Konstantinos Karamanlis; the center left, divided into different parties, where the Center Union under the leadership of Georgios Mavros and PASOK under the dynamic and passionate leadership of Andreas Papandreou were the leading movements; and the communist factions, accepted for the first time as legal movement in the political history of the country, mostly represented by the KKE.¹

Karamanlis' New Democracy government mainly focused on adopting and implementing the new constitution and integrating Greece into the European Community after the monarchy was abolished. However, during this process of democratization and integration into the European Community, sensitive national policy issues, most of them related with Turkey, were assumed to be fragile for the national interests of the country. The minority issue was included in this assumption and the Karamanlis government was successful both in proceeding with the integration in Europe and in leaving the minority and human rights issues aside.

1 For a further analysis about the political forces in Greece in the post-Junta period, see Roy C. Macridis, "Elections and Political Modernization in Greece" in *Greece at the Polls The National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, ed. Howard R. Penniman, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981): 9-18.

From a realistic point of view, it was not easy for any democratic actor in Greece to remove the traces of the anti-Turkish policies formulated by their predecessors, because there are two simple and distinctive reasons for the inheritance of anti-Turkish policies: Firstly, anti-Turkish discourse in Greece has a historical background. Secondly, it has a correspondence through the Greek public, who constructed the Turkish existence in Greece as an enemy element, or the pro-Turkey element as providing a risk for Greece's well-being.²

State policies on the minority issue were strongly centralized during New Democracy rule between 1974-1981. New Democracy under Karamanlis' leadership was a kind of coalition of the business elite, conservative and nationalist factions and rightist intellectuals. This coalition took over the corporatist governance tradition in collaboration with bureaucracy and thus it was inevitable that it would develop a security approach to the minority issue. New Democracy's main concern about the minority was to prevent minority members from politicizing with a motivation of the 'Turkish' problem in Greece. The result was increasing political and administrative control over the minority's social, political and economic life. The minority issue was directly linked with the security threat coming from Turkey, and the political issue in the Eastern Macedonia and Thrace region, where the Turkish Minority lives, was placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³ The Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion – KYP) was the actor behind the curtain for carrying national policies out on the minority. In other words, the New Democracy government made a division of labor between the

2 For a comprehensive field study showing the reactions and thoughts of the Greek majority towards the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, see Nikos Bozatzis, "Occidentalism and Accountability: Constructing Culture and Cultural Difference in Majority Greek Talk About the Minority in Western Thrace", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2009): 437-446.

3 For centralization of minority policies during New Democracy rule in the post-authoritarian era, see Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace", 212-213. This is an extraordinary administrative practice typical to Greece. Political issues related with the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace are still under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Service. The Foreign Ministry was responsible for the international aspect of the minority issue with Turkey, while the Intelligence Service was in charge of suppressing minority people to prevent a domestic trouble. The local intelligence offices in the prefectures of Thrace worked intimately with local governors' offices. For example, the governor of the Prefecture of Rhodope of the time, Panagiotis Fotias, who was an expert on the minority, was appointed by Karamanlis himself to implement central government policies on the minority and he played a key role in strengthening the control of the central authority over the minority during his post.⁴ Fotias' era in Rhodope is still alive in the memories of minority members as a period of oppression.

The seven years of New Democracy rule after the collapse of the military regime was relatively a successful transition period in Greece in terms of the restoration of democracy, adoption of the constitution, bringing of tranquility and integration into the European Community. However, at the same time, it was a period of strengthening of old traditions related to foreign policy and security with a new perception of the threat from Turkey and the Turkish Minority question in the country. Mostly for that reason, the minority turned out to be a political threat for the bureaucratic and political elite of the New Democracy government and security policies regarding the minority were prioritized rather than social and economic policies. The main reason for that prioritization was the uneasy atmosphere in Greece arising from the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the Greek political elites most probably had fears of a possible Turkish invasion through the lands of Thrace where the Turkish minority lived. Larrabee and Lesser touch upon this anxiety which existed in Greece at that time: "*With the precedent of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus in mind, some Greeks worried that Turkey might seek to exploit discontent among Greece's Turkish minority and use it as a pretext to launch an attack against Greece and retake Western Thrace*"⁵.

4 Gerçek, 16 April 1981.

5 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): 95.

The anxiety in the minds of the Greek political elites, mainly arising from the possibility of war with Turkey, together with the bureaucracy who had a corporatist tradition, compelled democratic governments of the post-Junta period to follow security-oriented policies regarding the minority. As a result, minority policies were strongly centralized in the hands of the Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Service in the second half of the 1970s.⁶

On the left side of the political spectrum in Greece, the communists and center left differed from each other in their approaches towards the minority problems. While the center left, mostly represented by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK from the post-1974 period onwards, seemed to be more uncertain about the minority issue and were inclined towards official policies, on the other hand, KKE and the radical leftist groups seemed to be more realistic about the minority problems in the country and to be more open to accept the social and ethnic problems in Western Thrace. The communists had never been in the government and they had never ruled the country. Their openness mostly arose from being in conflict with the corporatist bureaucracy and established order and for this reason they could draw a picture of the minority problem in Western Thrace with discretion, while the center-right New Democracy was in total denial of any existence of a minority problem in the region and PASOK tended towards that standpoint, too. Especially from early 1980s onwards, Communist deputies visited the region quite often after they were elected to the parliament and they discussed the issue with local minority notables to determine the socio-political demands of the Turkish population.⁷

6 Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, "Regions, minorities and European policies: A state of the art report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)", Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Project report (D1 and D2) prepared for the EUROREG project funded by the European Commission Research DG, Key Action Improving the SocioEconomic Knowledge Base (contract no. CIT2-CT-2003-506019): 9.

7 K. Kappos, Deputy from the Communist Party of Greece visited Western Thrace in May 1989 and explained the administrative oppression of the Minority to the Greek public.

However, KKE had never been in a decisive position either in the government or in the bureaucracy. For this reason, they were able to stay clear of the foreign security worries which were dominant in the political atmosphere of the time. As a result of this relatively comfortable position when compared with New Democracy and PASOK, the communists could make more pointed evaluations, although these assessments could not be put into action to deal with the minority issues at a national level. On the other hand, the efforts of the communist politicians and deputies in post-authoritarian Greece made a strong contribution to the extension of awareness about the minority problem in the region of Western Thrace. To be more precise, communist politicians had a distinctive place among other leftist factions in Greece for the adoption of a new understanding of minority rights and freedoms in the post-modern international environment from the 1980s onwards.⁸ On the contrary, apart from the Communist Party of Greece, all other small leftist factions and the leading leftist party PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreu, sank into traditional security perceptions about the minority issue, with his rigid rhetoric after he started to rule Greece from 1981 onwards.

See *Birlik*, 30 May 1989. Moreover, KKE was the only political party whose minority candidates could make their election campaign speeches in Turkish before the 1981 and 1985 legislative elections. Also, the Communist Party published a proposal for the solution of minority problems in Western Thrace in December 1988 which mentioned the ethnic characteristic of the minority conflict in Western Thrace. See *Birlik*, 6 June 1989.

- 8 For example, due to their ineffective position among the mainstream political forces and two-party polarization in the political arena of Greece in the post-Junta period, the left wing parties like KKE have not traditionally enjoyed the support of the Turkish Minority before. This considerably changed from the 1980s onwards and there was large minority support especially for the Left Coalition since the 1990s. Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, "Regions, minorities and European policies: A state of the art report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)", 10.

6.1.2 *PASOK's Approach to the Minority before Coming to Power*

PASOK was founded in September 1974, just before the legislative elections, upon Andreas Papandreou's arrival in Greece from exile, as the successor of the PAK, the political organization of leftist exiles abroad under Papandreou's leadership. PASOK under Papandreou's leadership appeared on the stage as a radical movement in terms of breaking the traditional ties with central movements of the left in the past and strong leadership to achieve this process of disengagement by introducing new and peculiar policy suggestions for the social and economic problems of the country. Disengagement from the tradition of the past in leftist politics meant a unique socialist narrative in the case of PASOK. Both Soviet-type communism and Western-type social democracy were strongly criticized in PASOK's campaigns between 1974-1977 and the party positioned itself in a harmony of socializing economic policies and defending the national interests of Greece against all kinds of imperialist threats. In Greece, anti-Americanism among the citizens gained significant strength, since the great majority of Greek people believed that the United States had supported and tolerated the military regime during the dark years of 1967-1974. This belief easily turned into strong political anti-Americanism after the collapse of the Junta. In PASOK's political discourse, anti-Americanism symbolized a sui-generis Greek type of socialism which gave priority to the creation of a strong identity, opening of different channels of communication with different classes of Greek society and emphasis on radicalism of the Greek people through social liberation and socialist transformation.⁹

However, the discourse on building a strong relationship with different classes of society mostly referred to the social classes by excluding different ethnic and religious groups in Greece. When Turkey intervened in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and neither the United States nor the NATO alliance could develop any counter move to prevent Turkish intervention in Cyprus, anti-Americanism, combined with the hatred from the

9 Christos Lyrantzis, "Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of bureaucratic clientelism?", *West European Politics*, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (1984): 110-111, 113.

Junta times, was replaced with a belief that Turkey and the Turks were the favored ones in the Western Alliance, in the eyes of the Greek people. At this point, PASOK's ultra-radical socialist narrative started to fall into a nationalist perspective which put more emphasis on Greece's and the Greek people's interests and security against the threat from Turkey and the Turks.¹⁰ Moreover, it became more clear that PASOK's class-oriented narrative did not mean anything in terms of the situation and ethnic problems of the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace. The Turks of Western Thrace were totally ignored by PASOK's policy makers. The party itself started to focus on the Turkish threat more and more after the 1977 elections, as they became a power alternative, and reached almost the same point as the ruling New Democracy on security sensitiveness which led to the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of different ethnic and religious minorities in Greece.

PASOK's approach to the minority issue before coming to power was not to be outdone by the government. Indeed, in some cases PASOK deputies and party authorities were much more wishful to cover the minority problem than the New Democracy government. When the government brought a resolution to the parliament about the administration of minority waqfs in the prefectures of Xanthi, Rhodope and Evros, it received stronger support from the PASOK party group than expected. The resolution later caused a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Greece, gave the authority to the central government to appoint the board members of the waqfs and re-define the aims of the waqfs and gave it absolute control over the budgets of the waqfs. It was a clear attempt to break the

10 PASOK was an ultra-radical socialist party at the beginning. Andreas Papandreu promised to socialize the economy, as well as education and health. He was strongly opposed to NATO membership and European integration by Greece, and he even declared disapproval of NATO membership. However, this radical narrative was not reflected in the form of votes in the legislative elections of 1977, and PASOK managed only to be the third party and take only 13.6% of the votes and 12 seats in the parliament. Andreas Papandreu moderated his radical rhetoric in the campaign of the 1977 elections and he started to give more focus to national interests of the country. For a detailed analysis of PASOK's change in foreign policy discourse from 1974 to 1981, see John C. Loulis, "Papandreu's Foreign Policy", 377-380.

structure of the minority waqfs which were important independent institutions in regulating the social and religious activities of the minority. The PASOK party group did not evaluate this as a violation of rights and freedoms, on the contrary, they perceived minority institutions in Western Thrace as a political threat to the national security of Greece and they did not consider it risky for the central government to interfere with the minority's freedoms through the waqfs. The PASOK deputy from Rhodope, Dimitrios Vradelis, addressed the parliament on behalf of the PASOK group during the negotiations on the resolution about the waqfs and he declared the support of PASOK to pass the resolution in the parliament by stating potential security risks coming from the minority itself and from minority organizations.¹¹

PASOK's open support for a government resolution which was used as a political tool to interfere with the fundamental freedoms of the minority was the sign of a shift from a radical socialist movement to a more center leftist popular party. PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreou transformed their image from a socialist-leaning class-oriented organization to a moderate party with a leftist narrative to attract central voters by reconciling the old and new generation party elites and by restructuring the party organization.¹² By the beginning of the 1980s, most Greek citizens were seeking an alternative way to change the 40-year conservative government tradition of the country. Andreas Papandreou was an opportunist rather than a sincere socialist and he saw that the path to power passed through the hands of citizens whose worries about national issues, such as the threat from Turkey, were as strong as they were about other social and economic problems of the country. In the end, PASOK, which had begun its journey with a radical socialist narrative, was transformed into a party holding the flag of nationalism with anti-Turkish

11 *İleri*, 5 December 1980. *İleri* gives further details about the debates on the resolution. See *İleri*, 12 December 1980, 19 December 1980.

12 Michalis Spourdalakis, "Securing Democracy in Post-authoritarian Greece: The Role of Political Parties" in *Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, (London: Routledge, 1996): 173, 175.

expressions. The result was the sacrificing of freedoms of different social, ethnic and religious group in Greece for national security during PASOK rule in the 1980s. This was especially valid for the Turkish population in Western Thrace.

6.1.3 *Shift from Greek Citizens to Turkish Spies*

In the legislative elections of 1977, PASOK took 25.3 percent of the total votes, won 93 seats in the Hellenic Parliament and became the second political power in the country alternative to the New Democracy. The success of the strong opposition to the conservative New Democracy government between 1977-1981, as well as a good understanding of society's need for a historical transformation in the country with the emphasis on non-privileged majority against privileged minority, were accompanied with a simple but forceful slogan of 'change' during the campaign for the elections in October 1981. The result was astonishing for PASOK and historic for Greek politics. PASOK took 48.1 percent of the total votes and won 172 seats in the parliament. For the first time in the political history of Greece, a leftist party came to power with a decisive victory in the elections.¹³

Before taking control of the government, PASOK had already started to transform its discourse and political conception from popular socialism to a statist socialist understanding, attaching more emphasis and importance on the national security issues. In one sense, this can be considered as a necessary opportunism to access power by taking broad-based popular support from different social classes who were sensitive to the nationalist issues, such as the Turkish threat and feeling of loss in Cyprus. In the meantime, PASOK, as the first leftist movement to take over the government in modern Greek history, was faced with the necessity, or the cold fact, of being reconciled with the bureaucratic elite of the country. However, PASOK still had radical elements in its party organization and

13 George Th. Mavrogordatos, "The Emerging Party System" in *Greece in the 1980s*, ed. Richard Clogg, (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1983): 80, 89.

many of Papandreou's comrades shared radical socialist views with their communist fellows. Being aware of that reality, the party leadership tried to open a third way in order to overcome the dilemma of being a radical socialist party and being reconciled with the bureaucratic forces. In this sense, Papandreou's mental agility was the most advantageous tool that PASOK had. Papandreou successfully embraced popularity among Greek people and worries about the traditional bureaucracy by transforming PASOK's political notion from popular socialism to nationalist discourse by emphasizing Greece's independence in the foreign policy, particularly against Turkey.¹⁴

The new, previously unattempted and politically risky combination of a nationalist type of socialism and the traditional bureaucracy's corporatism was interestingly successful in the Greek case during PASOK governance of the 1980s. Papandreou played political chess and he won in the long term. PASOK, as a strongly popular single party government, captured and mobilized the corporatist bureaucracy through socialist discourse about an independent Greece against the Turkish threat. Then PASOK, as the ruling party, started to use institutional bureaucratic mechanisms to control the capillaries of society, such as the labor unions, associations of public employees and different ethnic and religious groups in Greece.¹⁵

PASOK's changing political understanding from populist socialism to nationalist socialism with an anti-Turkish framework put the Turkish population of Western Thrace in a position of potential danger to Greece's national security. One of the prominent members of the PASOK cabinet, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giannis Kapsis, who was a well-known figure as the government's agent among the members of the Turkish Minority and the minister responsible for the minority issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Western Thrace in May 1984 and his dialogue with minority members is interesting to understand the

14 Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?", 106-107.

15 Dimitris A. Sotiropoulos, "The remains of authoritarianism: bureaucracy and civil society in post-authoritarian Greece", 240.

PASOK ruling elite's perception of the minority. Hasan Hatipoğlu in the local Turkish newspaper, *Akın*, cited the dispute between the deputy foreign minister and Turkish villagers about the ethnic identity of the minority. Kapsis visited a coffee house in the village of Echinós (the village is named as Şahin in Turkish, which means hawk) and he discussed the problems of the people living in the highlands areas of Xanthi. There, he declared that the government would open a new secondary school in the village and highly qualified teachers from Saudi Arabia would be brought to the school. The villagers told to deputy foreign minister that they demanded Turkish teachers from Turkey for the school, as their ethnic identity was Turkish and they needed to be supported for sufficient Turkish education in the school. Kapsis' answer symbolized the PASOK government officials' worries about the term 'Turk'. He said that the villagers were not ethnically Turkish and that the Greek government would not provide any Turkish teachers for their educational needs, and besides, he emphasized that there was no Turkish minority in Greece.¹⁶ The debate between the Turkish villagers and PASOK cabinet member Giannis Kapsis reflected PASOK's policy differentiation about a vital social and ethnic problem of the country. Kapsis' rejectionist approach to the villagers' claim about Turkish identity actually reflected PASOK's radical change to nationalist socialism arising from the perception of a national threat from Turkey in the case of ethnic Turkish trouble. In other words, acceptance of the Turkish presence in Western Thrace would mean acceptance of the Turkish character of Western Thrace and this would lead to a horrific imagination of Turkish expansion into 'Greek Thrace'.

This policy shift by PASOK's ruling political elite resulted in consideration of the Turks of Western Thrace as possible helpers in Turkey's prospective move against independent Greece. Such a worry was a reality in the behaviors of both national and local PASOK politicians and they embodied this anxiety in their political attempts towards policy makers.

16 Hasan Hatipoğlu, "Batı Trakya Azınlığımızla İlgili Yeni Bir Senaryo Filme Alındı", *Akın*, 24 May 1984. Hatipoğlu also gives details about the discussions by Turkish villagers about the economic problems of the Turkish minority with Giannis Kapsis. However, Kapsis seemed not to discuss the claims of the minority members, as Hatipoğlu states.

Although it is possible to find many examples of this anxious political behavior, it is quite interesting to quote one secret incident unveiled by Abdülhalim Dede, a Turkish journalist from Xanthi, in his local Turkish newspaper, “Trakya’nın Sesi” (Voice of Thrace) to show how PASOK politics about the minority issue were radicalized during the ruling years with the corporatist bureaucracy’s security concerns. The PASOK deputy Dimitrios Vradelis from the prefecture of Rhodope, and the mayor of Komotini from PASOK, Andreas Stoyannidis, visited Athens together with the Bishop of Komotini and Maroneia Damaskinos, a deputy of New Democracy from Rhodope, the president of the Body of Lawyers of Rhodope and the president of the Rhodope Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The delegation visited PASOK cabinet members, the Deputy Prime Minister Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giannis Kapsis. They told them that the members of the minority in Western Thrace were dangerous and that the Greeks of Thrace were in a dangerous situation, and they discussed the ways to find a radical solution to the minority problem in Thrace. They demanded that PASOK government should prevent the Turks in Western Thrace from employment and to distribute the Turks to different regions in Greece.¹⁷ Dede, in the next number of his newspaper, also questioned the silence of the Turkish assembly members in the Municipality of Komotini about this case and he pointed out their position of despair under PASOK’s nationalism towards the Turkish Minority.¹⁸

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- 17 Abdülhalim Dede, “Komotini Despotu ve Azınlığımız”, *Trakya’nın Sesi*, 17 March 1988. Dede explains that the visit of this delegation to Athens arose from the strong political mobility of the Turks after the central government’s oppressive policies towards Turkish identity of the minority in Western Thrace.
- 18 *Trakya’nın Sesi*, 24 March 1988. Dede targets the Turkish assembly members of the Municipality of Komotini, Ahmet Haciosman, Ahmet Taşkın and Molla Mehmet, as to why they did not make any explanation about their fellow party members’ attempts against the Turkish minority. In the article, he tries to find a relation between the political behaviors of local Turkish minority politicians and their membership of PASOK. Later on, Ahmet Haciosman was elected to the Hellenic Parliament from PASOK and he was PASOK deputy for the Prefecture of Rhodope between 2007-2015.

Despite the fact that this extraordinary attempt came from low level political figures, the very high level attention from the PASOK cabinet, such as the deputy prime minister and deputy foreign minister, shows the dominant attitude of PASOK's ruling elite about the minority issue. Their discussion of distribution of the Turks of Western Thrace to other areas of the country was related with the anxiety of ruling elite about the perceived Turkish threat in the 1980s.¹⁹ They saw the minority members as dangerous elements who could support Turkish interests in 'Greek Thrace' and the Minority was naturally evaluated as a security challenge for Greece's national unity as the result of such a perception. PASOK's conceptualization of the ethnic Turkish minority affair in Western Thrace with the perception of a security threat coming from Turkey advanced the minority issue from a domestic problem to an international one. Thus, PASOK governments slid into a complex political fear correlating every problem regarding the Turkish Minority with Turkey.

6.1.4 *The Minority as a Political Tool*

The Minority's disputable ethnic identity in the minds of PASOK's governing elite caused almost as much confusion as the officers of the military regime had had one decade before. There were three main reasons for this confusion: first, when the domestic political problems related to different social groups were characterized by an affirmative approach to the assumption of having a homogeneous society, it brought about a challenge to the governing authorities regarding what those social groups had in reality, namely, ethnic identity or religious belonging.²⁰ The PASOK

19 Dia Anagnostou, Anna Triandafyllidou, *Regions, minorities and European integration: A case study on Muslims in Western Thrace, Greece* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2000s): 7.

20 In the Greek political environment different social groups have been excluded from political participation because of different reasons, such as their political beliefs or their social belonging. Pollis argues the characteristic of exclusion in the Greek politics as follows: "Political identity was eliminated as one component of Greekness thereby reset-

elite were faced with this challenging contradiction: they knew that Turks were living in Western Thrace, but they fell into the same error of absolute acceptance of a homogeneous society in Greece and this presumption forced them to deny the existence of the Turkish population in Western Thrace.

Secondly, the presumption of homogeneity about the population in the Greek case reveals a kind of imagined perception of a domestic threat to the social unity of the country. For this reason, not only the Turkish existence in Western Thrace, but also other different ethnic identities were totally denied. For example, the Vlachs, Slavic speaking groups in the north-western part of the country and the Catholic population in the Aegean islands were also admitted as ethnic Greeks, whereas they are not.²¹ Although PASOK came to power with a charming slogan of ‘change’, the idealization of change did not refer to any turndown in social policies on the multi-ethnic character of the country. On the contrary, the political status-quo of different social groups was protected, and it was strengthened in the case of Western Thrace by rising Greek nationalism during PASOK rule.

Thirdly, rising nationalism related to rejecting the multi-ethnicity of Greece resulted in an international conflict with eastern neighbor Turkey. The PASOK elite tended to cover the minority issue as a domestic problem in general. But the sui-generis characteristics of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and Greek nationalism together put the issue on the international agenda. The system established by the Treaty of Lausanne

ting not only the boundaries of the political community, but also those of the Greek nation and hence of Greek national identity. As far back as the Metaxas era and throughout the post-World War II decades, to be Greek necessitated, in addition to the classic features of ethnicity, conformity to a political identity as defined by the state. Adherence to the official ideology, inclusive of the unique superiority of the Greek organic polity...”. Adamantia Pollis, “Modernity, Civil Society and the Papandreou Legacy”, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997): 64.

- 21 Lambros Baltsiotis, “Minorities in Greece: State Policies and Administrative Practices” in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Minority Issues in the Balkans and the EU May 16th, 2007, Istanbul*, eds. Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu and Fuat Aksu, (İstanbul: OBİV, 2007): 123-125.

put Turkey into a kin-state position for the Turks in Western Thrace, and thus rejection of the Turkish presence in the region created the risk of international disagreement. Moreover, Greek nationalism surrounding the rejection of Turkish identity of the minority increased the disagreement to the level of a conflict mainly because of one of the core notions of nationalism: a relevant domestic threat, in this case the existence of the Turks in Western Thrace, was transformed into a foreign policy tool towards an external threat, in this case Turkey. The practices for overcoming this domestic minority threat related with Turkey were political aggression on institutions symbolizing the ethnic and religious identity of the minority and intense obstruction of political representation of the Turks in Western Thrace.²²

6.1.4.1 Divide and Rule Strategy and the Legacy of the Coordination Council of Thrace to PASOK

PASOK's instrumentalization of the Minority as a foreign policy tool has a long-standing past dating back to the late 1950s. The Greek ruling elite and bureaucracy have always considered the Minority in Western Thrace as a political instrument in their relations with Turkey, with an integrated approach which brings the minority issues away from a socio-political domestic conflict to a strategic subject in the international relations of the country.

From the late 1950s onwards, the government's minority policies were institutionalized in a foreign policy-oriented frame of mind through secret organization under the authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Coordination Council of Thrace (CCT) was established secretly in 1959 in order to formulate exclusive and inclusive minority policies of the Greek government, by Evangelos Averoff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time. The CCT operated until 1969 and it was active especially during Georgios Papandreou's Center Union government in the mid-

22 Dimitris Antoniou, "Western Thracian Muslims in Athens: From Economic Migration to Religious Organization", *Balkanologie*, Vol. IX, No. 1-2 (2005): 83.

1960s. The CCT was organized in a multiple structure under the authorization of the Foreign Ministry and fulfilled the need to represent and to implement the minority policies of the Foreign Ministry in Western Thrace by ensuring the coordination of security institutions in Western Thrace with the orders and decisions of governmental authorities about minority issues. The Governors of Xanthi, Rhodope and Evros prefectures, the Director of the Political Affairs Department in Thrace appointed by the Foreign Ministry, the high-ranking military officer of the Third Army Corps of the Hellenic Armed Forces stationed in Western Thrace and the representative of the Greek intelligence service were the senior members of the CCT. Thus, the CCT was an organization of the Greek government which was composed of political, military and intelligence authorities to conduct Greek national policies on the minority issue under the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The CCT's main task was to issue the necessary orders and directions from the central government to the local authorities in Western Thrace and to coordinate and to observe the application of the minority policies developed and decided by the Greek Foreign Ministry.²³

Christos Iliadis' valuable archival research gives some clues about the state's mentality, which structured the CCT as an institution implementing the government's minority policies which were constructed on a political fear of possible ethnic conflict in Greece. On that point, Iliadis' approach is quite revealing: "*The CCT archives unveil a secret discourse of power that to a great extent has defined ethnic politics in Greece. Both the establishment of the CCT and its operation reveal a powerful institution that, out of the light of any public view, became the main actor in the area instituting a regime of exceptions on the basis of the "threat" the minority created for the Greek authorities. This official secret highlights the existence of what can be called a "state" and a "para-state," with minority*

23 Christos Iliadis, "The Emergence of Administrative Harassment Regarding Greece's Muslim Minority in a New Light: Confidential Discourses and Policies of Inclusion and Exclusion", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2013): 412-413.

issues approached in Greece with modes of political practices crossing both areas".²⁴

The CCT's function in Western Thrace had mostly been realized through the perception of a threat from the Turkish presence in the region arising from their Turkish identity. Therefore, the policy implementations of the CCT were mostly aimed at erasing, or dissolving the consciousness of the minority members towards Turkish ethnic identity which had been constructed since the minority fell under Greek rule in 1920. At that point, the policies towards different ethnic identification were introduced within the Minority to make Turkish identity insignificant, or more precisely, to nullify ethnic Turkish awareness among the minority members. It was a strategy of divide and rule by dividing the Minority into sub-ethnic identities and particularly practiced through promoting Pomak identity as a distinctive one within the Minority.²⁵ On the other hand, that strategy opened a very long path for the next generation of Greek ruling elites to attack any of the Minority's ethnic identity claims related with Turkishness.

Again, Iliadis' archival works provide very revealing evidence about Greek governments' divide and rule strategy through the deployment of a coherent Pomak policy by the CCT. For Greek governments, establishing a political influence over the Pomak-speaking members of the Minority and elimination of the Turkish effect on the Minority became a top priority. The minority polices developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by the CCT in the region are summarized by CCT officials as

24 Ibid. 413.

25 As Iliadis transmits: "The head of the council described the purpose of the policy for Pomaks as follows: 'If there is a genuine policy we have to apply in Thrace, it is to approach the Pomaks and keep them away from the Turks'". Iliadis also argues that as a result of this view, the CCT provided financial source from the secret funds to health centers, mosques and agricultural cooperatives in Pomak villages. The CCT officials also tried to persuade Slavic-speaking Muslims not to use Turkish in their daily lives. Christos Iliadis, *I Thraki apeileitai Aporriti allilografia Tourkiki stratigiki – Mistiki politiki – Meionotikes omades* (Athens: Vivliorama Kentro Ereunon Meinotikon Omadon, 2018): 149.

follows: “*The Greek administration should maintain and increase its influence among the Pomaks, creating a political rupture between them and the minority Turks*”.²⁶ For that purpose, the governments funded especially mosques and schools in the areas where Pomak-speaking minority members lived to prevent them from integrating into the Turkish mobilization of the Minority. Moreover, the mountainous areas of Western Thrace where the Pomak-speaking people mostly lived were made a forbidden zone to cut their communication with the political mobilization through Turkishness in the cities and other areas of the region. It was a significant isolation policy of the central authorities to cut every kind of communication between the minority members and the isolation lasted for more than 30 years until the late 1990s. Isolationist practices towards the minority members who lived in the mountainous areas of the region were quite discriminatory, affecting the daily lives of people. For example, it is understood from a parliamentary question by Sadık Ahmet, who was a deputy in the Hellenic Parliament from 1990 to 1993, to the Minister of Spatial Planning, Public Works and Environment on 20 January 1993 (APPENDIX C) that although the local municipality permitted the construction of a simple village house in a village in the forbidden zone, the central authority canceled the permission for the reason that even a building permit for a village house in that zone was under the central government’s authority.²⁷ However, the result of these kinds of implementations was not satisfactory for the central government in the long term. It created a feeling of punishment among the Pomak-speaking people of the Minority and a stronger motivation to integrate under the Turkish identity appeared, which strengthened the mobilization through Turkishness in Western Thrace instead of weakening it.

26 Christos Iliadis, “The Emergence of Administrative Harassment Regarding Greece’s Muslim Minority in a New Light: Confidential Discourses and Policies of Inclusion and Exclusion”, 414.

27 Vouli ton Ellinon, Diefthinsi Koinovouleftikou Elegchou, Arith. Prot. Erotiseon 4350, Imerominia Katathesis 20-1-93, Erotisi: Aneksartitou Voulefti, Nomou Rodopis, Sadik Amet Sadik, Athina 20 Ianouariou 1993.

The CCT left a legacy of administrative oppression over the Minority in the long term with the transformation of its policies during the following governments of New Democracy in the 1970s and especially of PASOK after the transition period to democracy. That legacy had a reciprocative effect on the relations between the Minority and the central government which caused a secession from each other. The long-standing application of the administrative measures over the Minority and the central government's attempts to favor the Pomak-speaking people of the Minority to promote multi-ethnicity caused an integrated marginalization of the Minority as a whole, whether Pomak-speaking or Turkish. That secession of both actors in the conflict led to the development of a stronger Turkish consciousness among the members of the Minority and caused more aggressive policies and measures from the central government against the symbols of Turkishness in Western Thrace. The minority issue was constructed as a national concern with the CCT's implementations and although the CCT had ceased to exist by the end of the 1960s, the minority issue remained as a threatening national concern for the next generation rulers.²⁸ This is particularly valid for the PASOK period. There are very strong similarities between PASOK's policies on the minority issue and the CCT's implementations in Western Thrace, which reveals PASOK's inheritance of the CCT's legacy. The PASOK governments of the 1980s continued to consider the minority as a security issue among the national concerns of the state and developed a more severe aggression towards the institutions of the Minority which symbolized Turkish identity.

6.1.4.2 PASOK and the Turkish Identity in Western Thrace

PASOK drifted into a nationalist character in the foreign policy-making process and this characterization was very much clear in the conflict with Turkey in PASOK's political narrative on problematic issues. This drift into nationalism mainly arose from a socialist type of anti-Westernism

28 Christos Iliadis, "The Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece: 'Confidential' discourses, reciprocity and minority subjectivity during the emergence of the policies of discrimination (1945-1966)", (PhD Dissertation, University of Essex, 2011): 292-293.

which is unique to PASOK. The PASOK government applied a radical policy change from its predecessors and started to perform strong anti-Western campaigns in the foreign policy-making process soon after it came to power in 1981. As a loyal ally of the Western Bloc during the late Cold War period, Turkey was usually in the first place on PASOK's foreign policy agenda, with the claims such as that US and NATO allies were favoring Turkey against Greece.²⁹ As it is indicated in the previous chapters, it is understood that at the beginning of the 1980s, the policy makers of PASOK believed that the Western Alliance favored Turkey for irredentist aims against Greece. That belief caused an angry discourse against the West and it was complemented by an imagined hostility against Turkey from PASOK's ruling elite. The hostility to Turkey was reflected in troubles with the minority as a reactionary political behavior against anything symbolizing or recalling the image of the 'Turk' in Greece.

The reflections of hostility to Turkey on the minority policies of PASOK cannot be understood without comprehending the menacing relation between Turkey and the Turkish Minority for PASOK. Turkey was not only a threat to Greece's strategic aims in foreign policy, but especially after the Cyprus intervention in 1974, it was also considered as a threat to the territorial integrity of Greece. In such kind of a threat definition, Western Thrace, geographically the neighboring region to Turkey, became a springboard for breaking territorial integrity and the Turkish presence in Western Thrace was instrumentalized as a natural ally of Turkey for those expansionist aims. From this point of view, Turkey was always considered as the protector of the Turks in Greece and as an enemy that always kept the Turks of Western Thrace under control to destabilize Greece.³⁰

29 John C. Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy", 383. Loulis argues that Papandreou thought the Western Alliance encouraged Turkey for its expansionist aims against the territorial integrity of Greece.

30 Dimostenis Yağcıoğlu, "From Deterioration to Improvement in Western Thrace, Greece: A Political Systems Analysis of a Triadic Ethnic Conflict", (PhD Dissertation, George Mason University, 2004): 111. Yağcıoğlu adopts David Easton's political systems analysis

The characteristics of relations between the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and Turkey is not something peculiar to the PASOK period. However, the significant feature of the PASOK period in this characterization is that PASOK, as a radical socialist party, could not become any different from its predecessors, and indeed, PASOK itself became even more skeptical and distrustful towards the minority because of that relation with Turkey. In addition to this, the nationalist effect on the PASOK government's policy-making process combined with that skepticism turned into an anti-Turkish character in the case of Western Thrace.³¹

As the relation between the Turks of Western Thrace and Turkey was regarded as a threat to national unity and territorial integrity, the institutions which symbolized the identity of the minority were sacrificed to the aggressive reaction of the PASOK government. Just two weeks after, but definitely not by accident, the establishment of the TRNC on 15th November 1983, the Greek government limited the activities of the Komotini Turkish Youth Union and the Turkish Teachers' Union of Western Thrace on 1st and 2nd December, 1983. The signs of these Turkish associations were taken down, as their names included the phrase 'Turkish'.³² It was

methodology to explain the relations between the Turks of Western Thrace and Turkey, and other actors as well.

- 31 After 1974, Greek official ideology became that Turkey planned to turn Western Thrace into a 'Second Cyprus'. Katerina Mantouvalou, "Equal recognition, consolidation or familiarization? The language rights debate in the context of the minority of Western Thrace in Greece", *Ethnicities*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2009): 481. Baskın Oran argues that PASOK inherited and maintained this policy in its practices. Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, 282-283.
- 32 The roots of both associations go back a long way. The Komotini Turkish Youth Union was established in 1928 and in the upcoming years it became a socio-political center for the Turks of Western Thrace to introduce active reactions against the political pressure of Greek governments, and today it is still seen as a symbolic political center for the struggle of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace. The Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace was established in 1936. The teachers were the only highly educated class within the minority for long years and the Teachers Union, as an organization, symbolized both the socio-political elite class within the minority and a place where belonging to Turkish identity was strongly promoted.

an aggression not towards the institutions themselves, but towards the institutional Turkish entity which they represented with their Turkish names. Soon after the restrictions were imposed on the two associations in Komotini, the anti-Turkish policies of the government were extended to another minority city, Xanthi, and the Turkish Union of Xanthi shared the same fate and its activities were also put under administrative control.³³ The aggression from the PASOK government was not expected by the minority and it is possible to see the shock effect of that political aggression through the minority newspapers. All of the local minority newspapers evaluated the situation as an attack by the central authority on their Turkish identity.

In this sense, it is worth taking a look at the minority newspapers in order to understand the minority's expectations before and disappointments after the October 1981 legislative elections and the developments that the real-politik produced after PASOK took over the government. PASOK's ruling period started with hopes for radical 'change' in minority policies, as it promised the change to all relevant social classes in the country. However, PASOK's efforts to control the bureaucratic mechanisms in the country began soon after the election victory and the rumors of a possible change of Governor of Rhodope were widespread around the region. The prediction by İleri, one of the popular periodical minority newspapers, about radical change in the local bureaucracy would explain the deep disappointment about the expectations from PASOK before the elections. It was a hazardous period for the minority when the PASOK government started to practice its own radical policies on the minority

33 The Turkish Union of Xanthi is the oldest minority association in Western Thrace. It was established in 1927 by Turkish intellectuals and journalists in Xanthi. Although Komotini has the role of a political center for Western Thrace, Xanthi has always been a more industrialized city and developed region for agricultural production. For long years, Xanthi represented the wealthier and better-educated community among the Turks of Western Thrace. For this reason, the Turkish Union of Xanthi had a significant intellectual character among other institutions of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and the association still continues its struggle before international courts to reintroduce its 'Turkish' name.

and this process reflected strong worries about the minority's socio-political future among the intellectual classes of the minority itself. İbrahim Onsunoglu, in his article in *İleri*, tried to find out the truth about the change of governor in Rhodope and he had doubts about the change of governor after PASOK took power. Onsunoglu described the nationalist and discriminative policies of the New Democracy government against the minority by mentioning reasons and consequences and finding out the responsibility of the Governor of Rhodope as the implementer of the central government's policies towards the minority at the local level. He said that the Governor of Rhodope would change after PASOK's coming to power in Greece and he tried to make an explanation about the minority's voting behavior (approximately 65% of the minority members voted for PASOK in the October 1981 legislative elections) with a cynical style by placing responsibility on the governor in the New Democracy period, Panagiotis Fotias, regarding anti-democratic practices in the region of Western Thrace. Moreover, Onsunoglu made very interesting deductions to emphasize his doubts about the new governor who would be appointed by the new PASOK government: that the practices of New Democracy's governor had caused minority members to vote for PASOK, and that the new governor who would be posted by the PASOK government would cause minority members to vote for the Communist Party of Greece in the following elections.³⁴ The cynical style of İbrahim Onsunoglu in *İleri* shows the awareness of the minority regarding PASOK's shift in nationalist policies towards the minority which had been implemented by the bureaucratic elite for decades.

Onsunoglu's evaluation about the new PASOK government was exceptional in the minority. The majority of intellectuals in the minority had positive hopes for Greece's new radical socialist government. For example, the young deputy candidate from the minority, the lawyer Ahmet Kaşıkçioğlu, on the PASOK list, expressed his reactions with sloganized words: "*The PASOK government will change the destiny of all proletariat, workers, peasants, all working classes, pensioners, poor people, women,*

34 İbrahim Onsunoglu, "Kakanın Şakası Şimdi Biz Ne Yapacağız", *İleri*, 6 November 1981.

*all exploited ones, oppressed ones, excluded ones, those whose rights are violated, those whose freedoms are limited, all non-privileged classes. It will build the long-awaited people's power by providing social justice, equality, liberation, freedom, humane life with honor, a festival of peace and socialism. PASOK can be a gate of hope for us, the Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace, who are the most excluded ones, whose rights are violated the most, who are the most exploited and oppressed ones in this country. Our minority's dark destiny can be changed now and here."*³⁵

Onsunoğlu's doubts and Kaşıkçioğlu's optimism, which was mostly because he was the candidate deputy from the PASOK list, represent the clash among the minority elites. Indeed, the optimists were dominant at the early age of the PASOK government. However, the practices within the short period of 1981-1983 reduced the optimists to a minor position. The radical change in the local minority periodicals' views of the PASOK government and expectations from PASOK reveal the sensitivity about ethnic identity. Another well-known local Turkish newspaper among the minority, *Akın*, mentioned the positive expectations from PASOK very clearly in October 1981. The article on evaluation of the election results indicates the strong hope for change in minority policies, too, and it recalls the promises of PASOK to provide equality for minority members and to end racial discrimination against the minority.³⁶ The minority members suffered from discriminative policies during the New Democracy period and this discrimination arose from the worries about the Turkish presence in Western Thrace and targeted Turkish identity.

The change that PASOK promised during the 1981 campaign was also perceived as a promise for change related to ethnic discrimination. However, two years later the minority suffered from strong disappointment because they saw that PASOK's promise of 'change' did not meet the minority's expectations. It is possible to understand the relation between PASOK's perception of minority problems and foreign policy. PASOK,

35 *İleri*, 16 October 1981. Kaşıkçioğlu uses these sloganized hopes not only for the Turkish Minority, but also for all citizens, whether ethnic Turk, or not.

36 Reşit T. Sali Oğlu, "Son Seçimlerin Getirdikleri", *Akın*, 24 October 1981.

from the beginning of its rule, evaluated the minority issue as a problem to be managed with their Turkish counterparts, rather than as a domestic socio-economic problem. When Papandreou visited Komotini in May 1983, he was the first prime minister to visit Komotini for 29 years after Konstantinos Karamanlis' visit in 1954 and his speech in the city square gave some clues about his thoughts on the minority issue. The meeting in the square was crowded and almost half of the crowd was made up of Turks who came to listen to the passionate new leader of the country who promised them 'change'. 65% of them had voted for Papandreou in the elections and inherently they expected Papandreou to implement his promises for change on the minority, too. However, Papandreou in his famous speech in Komotini city square addressed Greece's rights arising from the Treaty of Lausanne, the balance of power in the Aegean, Cyprus, the relations with Turkey and problems in the Aegean Sea.³⁷ He did not touch on any issue related with the minority, rather, he gave a speech to soften the Greeks in the crowd by drawing a picture of the strong new leadership of Greece against Turkey. It was the first substantial disappointment for the minority members from the PASOK leader and the minority realized PASOK's ignorance about the minority issue, and they even realized that PASOK's leader excluded the minority members from his promise of 'change'.

The negative approach of Papandreou towards the Minority that he revealed during his visit to Western Thrace was carried into practice a couple of months later with the restrictions on the activities of the Minority's historical institutions in December 1983, right after the declaration on the establishment of the TRNC. The minority newspaper, *Akın*, reflected the reaction of the minority towards the prohibition of minority associations by the PASOK government and cited very interesting details about the justification for the prohibition of the minority associations. The newspaper, in its leading article, expressed the deep disappointment towards the socialist PASOK party and it mentioned that during a period

37 *İleri*, 20 May 1983. *İleri* evaluates Papandreou's visit to Western Thrace as a huge disappointment for the Turkish Minority.

of socialist government which prioritized equality among citizens, the associations which symbolized fundamental freedoms were prohibited. More interestingly, the *Akın* newspaper related the prohibition process by translating the official writings of the Governor of Rhodope. The Governor of Rhodope was posted to the office by the PASOK government and it was understood that he acted to prohibit the minority associations by the will of the central government in Athens. As the *Akın* newspaper cited, the Governor of Rhodope applied to the Court of First Instance of Rhodope and demanded the prohibition of the activities of Turkish associations in the city of Komotini by underlining possible conflicts between Christians and Muslims due to Denktaş's so-called government in the occupied Cyprus lands. For this reason, the Governor asked the court to prohibit the signs of the associations that included the phrase 'Turkish', to exclude all 'Turkish' phrases in the official writings and seals of the associations and to make arrests if those prohibitions were not obeyed.³⁸ After the Governor's application, the local court prohibited the activities of the associations and after a five-year appeal process, the Greek Court of Appeal approved the local court's decision by referring to the threat arising from Turkish ethnic identification. The Greek Court of Appeal clearly stated that there were no ethnic Turks in Greece, and so, using the term 'Turk' on the names of any association might cause public disorder in the country.³⁹

The details of the governor's application to the court, in which a clear relation with the Cyprus issue was mentioned, and the Greek Court of Appeal's concern with denial of Turkish existence in Greece give clues about the correlation between the minority issue and the foreign policy which was established by PASOK's ruling elite, or more specifically, the

38 *Akın* gives the news with exciting headlines, as "A historical event: all Western Thrace is shaking, the signs of the Turkish Youth Union and Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace are dismantled and taken away, our associations which have been in existence for half a century are left unnamed", *Akın*, 8 December 1983.

39 For the full text of the decision of the Greek Court of Appeal in Greek, see *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 17 January 1988.

foreign policy makers. The minority issues were not defined within the perspective of fundamental rights and freedoms by the PASOK policy makers. Rather, the minority was instrumentalized as a tool against Turkey's strategic moves towards Greece, and when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established, the Minority's Turkish identity was targeted and the Minority was punished as a strategic response to Turkey.⁴⁰ In this sense, the prohibition of Turkish associations was just a symbolic reaction, whereas the actual motivation behind this move was rather a foreign policy strategy than a domestic case. Even though it was clearly known that the term "Turkish" in the names of associations was just an adjective, all these policies on prohibition of Turkish associations were processed to impose the idea of the non-existence of any Turkish population in Western Thrace. It would not be an exaggeration to consider that this motivation directly resulted from the negative perception by the PASOK government regarding bilateral relations with Turkey and the imagined worries about challenges from Turkey, and from the Minority as an arm of Turkey reaching into Greece, to the territorial integrity of Greece.

The minority press was also consciously aware of the fact that the situation was not a domestic problem, but rather a foreign policy issue to be discussed between the Greek and Turkish governments. Akin was trying to convince the policy makers and governments of both sides to start negotiations to solve the aggressive practices of the PASOK government towards Turkish identity in Western Thrace by mentioning that the Minority was not a security threat to the national unity of Greece.⁴¹ Moreover, the evaluation of the Governor of Rhodope points out the central government's and bureaucracy's world of thought about the Minority. The

40 Olga Demetriou, "Prioritizing 'ethnicities': The -uncertainty of Pomak-ness in the urban Greek Rhodope", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2004): 107.

41 Akin truthfully reflects the characteristic of the government's aggression by referring to Greco-Turkish bilateral relations and underlining it in its headlines as "Continue to struggle in unity, with great patience and resilience, our Minority is waiting for the two states to sit at the negotiation table". *Akin*, 7 February 1984.

governor said that the minority associations seemed to represent foreign nationals, especially nationals of Turkey, with the phrase ‘Turkish’ in their names.⁴² This approach alone indicates the central authorities’ definition of the Minority. Even though they clearly knew the phrase ‘Turkish’ was just an adjective referring to ethnic identity, the Minority clearly symbolized the conflict in Greek-Turkish relations.

To sum up, the optimism about the ‘change’ expected from PASOK and extensive disappointment after the real-politik showed its cold face resulted in tension between the Minority and PASOK government through the limitation of the freedom of organization because of the Turkish identity of the Minority.⁴³ While this tension helped the PASOK government to instrumentalize the minority issue for foreign policy strategies, it also allowed the Minority to realize that the issue was not a domestic problem anymore and that it had become an international political tool for both the Greek and Turkish governments. Moreover, the situation opened up a new way for the PASOK government to extend its hands to religious issues, such as the election of muftis, and the political representation of the minority.

6.1.4.3 PASOK and the Religious Freedom of the Minority: PASOK’s Approach to the Mufti Problem

The PASOK government’s introduction of radical changes in national political life in Greece had an acceleratory effect on repressive official state policies in Western Thrace, instead of facilitating the minority members’ daily life, especially when backward social and economic conditions are taken into consideration. Aggression related to the ethnic identity of the minority was not the only component of the instrumentalization of the minority issue in the foreign policy making process for the issues related with Turkey. The minority’s ethnic identity was strongly intermingled with religious characterization. This was not something specific to the

42 *İleri*, 17 February 1984.

43 Pervin Hayrullah, *Balkan Savaşlarından Sonra Batı Trakya Türklerinin Sosyo-Kültürel Hayatı ve Eğitim Tarihi* (Xanthi, Komotini: BAKES Yayınları, 2020): 174.

Turks of Western Thrace, as almost all of the Turkic and Muslim communities of the Balkan peninsula had this identity amalgamation against the Christian majorities as defensive characteristics. Muslim was synonymous with Turkish in the complex political history of Balkan politics and the historical animosity between Christian and Muslim populations of the Balkan nations was developed in parallel with being Muslim and being Turk. In this sense, when the constitutional identity of a country forced an ethnic definition such as being Greek, being Bulgarian etc., then the religious belonging became a distinctive feature for minority groups against the majority.⁴⁴

The identity issue in Turkish communities of the Balkans was usually supported by Islamic belonging and it was used as a tool to Turkify the minority groups under a single identification.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in the case of the Balkans, religious and ethnic belonging always supported each other according to political conjuncture. At one time, religious identity became dominant within the minority, then at another time, ethnic identity surpassed the religious one.

The supportive characteristics of the ethnic and religious belongings of the Turkish, or Muslim communities in the Balkans in defining their identity caused the ruling classes, which generally came from the majority, to make a distinction regarding which identity they should accept. Difficulty in separation of ethnic and religious identity, which were always strongly alive as supportive elements for each other, put both in the firing line when the identity of the minority group was troubled, and this was especially valid for the case of Western Thrace.

When the PASOK government reacted against the minority's Turkish identity by targeting Turkish names and prohibiting the activities of mi-

44 Hugh Poulton, "Islam, Ethnicity and State in the Contemporary Balkans" in *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, eds. Hugh Poulton, Suha Taji-Farouki, (London: Hurts&Company, 1997): 18-21.

45 Baskin Oran, "Religious and National Identity Among the Balkan Muslims: A Comparative Study on Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo", *CEMOTI, Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien*, No. 18 (July-December 1994): 323.

minority associations, they most probably did not count on any counter-reaction from the religious leaders of the Minority and underestimated the power of the religious leaders, or muftis, on the minority population. Although the Minority's religious character never included any kind of fundamentalism, most of the minority members in Western Thrace had a conservative type of daily life and the religious affiliation of social life in Western Thrace put the muftis in a more significant position among other political and intellectual elites of the minority. For example, the High Council of the Minority⁴⁶ was headed by the Mufti of Komotini in general and the muftis can be regarded as de facto political leaders of the Minority. Besides, they were at the top of the political hierarchy of the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace and they also had judicial authority for issues related with civil law, such as marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance.⁴⁷ In addition, the muftis' roles also changed from an ordinary religious personality to a more mobilized political character by the beginning of the 1980s when the Minority started to face anti-democratic challenges in an era of democratization and Europeanization of the country. For instance, during the conflict over agricultural land which took place in the village of Eulalo⁴⁸ (İnhanlı in Turkish) in Xanthi prefecture,

46 The High Council of the Minority is an institution specific to the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace which gathers different social and political factions of the minority under the same roof. The Council was established in 1980 by different representatives of the minority. Today, its name has changed to the Advisory Council of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace, and the muftis and Turkish deputies, both current and previous ones, are permanent members of the Council. Mayors from the minority, presidents of the minority associations, the president of the Vaaz and İrşad Committee and representatives of sub-districts are temporary members.

47 Cem Şentürk, "Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu: Batı Trakya Türk Azınlığının Siyasal Örgütlenme Sürecine İlişkin Bir İnceleme", (MSc Thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2006): 55.

48 Conflict of Eulalo: In April 1982, the title deeds of some agricultural lands which belonged to Turkish minority members were annulled and then expropriated. Thereafter, in autumn 1983, those agricultural lands were distributed to Greek villagers illegally, and the Turks, whose lands were dispossessed by force, prevented Greek villagers from entering the lands and farming. The tension between Turkish and Greek villagers led to a

Mustfa Hilmi, the Mufti of Xanthi and Hafız Hüseyin Mustafa, the Mufti of Komotini personally attended the demonstration organized by the villagers and showed their support for the villagers and their solidarity with them. The active roles of the muftis during the Eulalo conflict strengthened their position as leading actors among the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace.

The legal status of the muftiates in Greece had first been determined by the İstanbul Agreement which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. In the second article of this agreement, it was ordained that the muftis should be selected through the submission of the Muslim community by the appointment of the governmental authority.⁴⁹ That article of the agreement was adopted by the law in 1882 to regulate the election process of muftis in Greece. In the upcoming decades, the Treaty of Athens, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Greece after the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, developed further details regarding the practices of Muslim traditional law in Greece. In this treaty, the election of muftis by the Muslim community, in other words Muslim minority members, was agreed on, similar to the İstanbul Agreement. Later on, by the law number 2345 in 1920 on the Election of Muftis and Chief Mufti and Management of Incomes of Waqfs Belonging to Muslim Communities, the provisions of the Treaty of Athens were adopted to domestic law and the issue of election of muftis by community members was resolved. The same method was adopted and a tradition, or more significantly a reconciliation regime, for the election of muftis was structured between the ruling authorities and the Muslim community. As the election of muftis by Muslim community members was guaranteed by national law in Greece, the details on the election of muftis are not mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. There is no description in the clauses of

low level of violence, and soon after the independent Turkish administration was declared in Cyprus, nine of the Turkish villagers were arrested on 20 December 1983 and sentenced to prison after a short trial.

49 Tevfik Hüseyinoğlu, Mehmet İmamoğlu, *Yunanistan'da Başmüftülük Müftülükler ve Müftüler (1913-2014)* (Xanthi, Komotini: BAKES Yayınları, 2017): 55.

the Treaty of Lausanne about the election of religious leaders and instead, there is a general emphasis on the recognition of religious freedoms. However, the domestic law on the election of the muftis was regulated by the codes adopted in 1882 and 1920 and a traditional law was constituted on the election of muftis in Western Thrace. From 1920, when the region fell under Greek rule, until 1985, the muftis were elected by the proposal of the Muslim community leaders and the notable persons in the Minority and appointed by the government authority. This tradition was practiced for 65 years and there was no conflict between the Minority and government, because the government always appointed the person as mufti who had been proposed by the Minority by considering the sensitiveness and socio-political balances within the Minority. For these reasons, there was no demand for a general ballot to elect the muftis from the Minority members and the mufti election procedure remained as a restricted process between the Minority leadership and the central government.⁵⁰

The Eulalo Conflict was both a turning point for the muftis to act as the political leaders of the minority and for the PASOK government to start to implement aggressive policies on the minority in 1982. The conflict gave the opportunity to the PASOK government to take the case as a kind of social proof of the so-called threat coming from the minority challenging the national security of Greece. Parallel to this, due to their role in solidarity with the Turkish villagers and supporting the demonstrations, the muftis who were appointed by the Greek government appeared as the leaders of Turkish challenge in Western Thrace against the Government of Greece in addition to their religious leadership position in the minority. The PASOK government realized that Turkish identity was strongly engaged with Muslim identity, or vice versa, in Western Thrace.⁵¹ From that point of view, political aggression towards Turkish

50 Ibid. 161-162.

51 The awareness of Turkishness in the political meaning developed among the Minority in Western Thrace in the early 1980s. In this, together with the role of muftis in the social events, Turkey's increasing involvement in minority issues has also been effective.

associations was not sufficient alone for eliminating the imagined threat to national unity coming from the Minority and for completing PASOK's irrevocable political obsession towards nationalism against the minority.

PASOK had the opportunity to oppress the muftiates in Western Thrace when Hafız Hüseyin Mustafa, the Mufti of Komotini, died on 2 June 1985. By coincidence, the legislative elections were held on that day, too. PASOK took 45.8% of the total vote, won 161 seats in the Hellenic Parliament and came to power alone once more.⁵² Minority issues were postponed in the agenda during the campaign of the 1985 elections. However, PASOK's ruling elite did not forget the irritation about the socio-political role of the muftis among the minority population during the Eulalo Conflict and soon after the elections they took action regarding the muftiate issue.

The new PASOK government in 1985 did not consult with the minority notables for the appointment of a new mufti after Hafız Hüseyin Mustafa's death.⁵³ They most probably thought that the Greek government did not have the control over the muftiates. Their political behavior on the muftiate issue was rather an attempt to take control of the institution in order to prevent it from being a political tool which could be used as a threat to intervene in minority issues by Turkey.

The appointment of the new mufti was concealed and the Minority's community leaders learned it from the Governor of Rhodope when they were invited to the governor's office to discuss the mufti issue. As we learn from the minority newspaper İleri, Hafız Yaşar, Mustafa Jandarma and İbrahim Şerif were the community leaders in the minority delegation that were invited to the governor's office, and teachers from the minority theological school, the madrasah, Hasan Müezzîn, İsmail Bıçakçı, Hüseyin

Christina Borou, "The Muslim Minority of Western Thrace in Greece: An Internal Positive or an Internal Negative "Other"?", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 2009): 15.

52 Nigel Clive, "The 1985 Greek Election and its Background", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1985): 502.

53 *Akıń*, 10 June 1985.

Paşaoğlu and Ali Osman were included in the delegation, too. It was hastily issued to the delegation that Rüştü Ethem, who was a hodja working as a preacher in Komotini, was appointed as the surrogate mufti by the government, without any proposal from the Muslim community leadership as it had always been practiced before and the governor asked the delegation to accept this appointment as a *fait accompli* on 4 June 1985.⁵⁴ This was an immediate government decision two days after Hafız Hüseyin Mustafa's death without any consultation with the minority.

Although there was not a problem with his personality, the PASOK government's oppression against the Turkish identity of the Minority made the Minority sensitive about the mufti issue and the newly appointed mufti was not accepted by the majority of minority members. Rüştü Ethem resigned from the office on 5 June 1985 and the prominent leaders of the Minority demanded the appointment of another person by issuing a note to the Governor of Rhodope on 6 June. However, the Governor of Rhodope did not respond to the demands and the Minority, which had never demanded election for the office of mufti by general vote before, developed an extra sensitiveness in the tense environment of the first half of the 1980s and took the initiative to hold a general vote for the office of Mufti of Komotini with a note to the Governor of Rhodope on 15 July 1985.⁵⁵ Soon after the government's intentions about the election of the new mufti were made public, the Minority's reaction to the government's *fait accompli* showed itself through the newspapers. Moreover, the newspaper *Akın* was the first one to be evidently told about the demands for the election of a new mufti by community members.⁵⁶ The demands for mufti elections from the minority had always been declined by

54 *İleri*, 7 June 1985.

55 Tevfik Hüseyinoğlu, Mehmet İmamoğlu, *Yunanistan'da Başmüftülük Müftülükler ve Müftüler (1913-2014)*, 166-167.

56 The minority newspaper *Akın* mentioned the minority's perspective about the new mufti's election. After Hafız Hüseyin Mustafa's funeral, *Akın* printed in large typeface on its front page that "our new religious leader will be elected according to the provision of paragraph 6, article 11 of the Treaty of Athens, dated 14 October 1913, which states that the muftis are elected to their offices by the Muslim community in their districts". This

the government. The minority held elections for the office of mufti and İbrahim Şerif was elected as Mufti of Komotini, but this election was declared illegal and the government appointed Cemali Meço as the new Mufti of Komotini. The result of the election crisis extended as far as a duality in the muftiate. Today there are two mufti offices and muftis in Komotini and Xanthi, one appointed by the government and the other elected by the Minority. This duality manifests itself even in daily language among minority members. While minority members are talking about the muftis, they generally feel the need to emphasize the separation between the two muftis: the term “elected mufti” is used to define the legitimate one according to the Minority who is elected by Muslim community members, while the term “appointed mufti” is used to mention the illegitimate one according to the Minority who is appointed by the government.

At this point, one important question comes to the mind. Throughout the historical process, mufti offices in Western Thrace had never had any significant trouble with the central government. Besides, Greek governments had always taken concerted steps and established coherent relations with the Minority about religious issues. For more than sixty years, the relations between the central authority and religious leadership in Western Thrace were reconciled with each other and it is even possible to say that there was a kind of implicit agreement between them: the muftis did not demand any political authority from the central government and the central government did not disturb them in their socio-political comfort zone within the Muslim community.

The implicit relation between the muftis and central authority had been broken by the early 1980s and reached the level of a political crisis in 1985. It was not only a crisis between the Minority and the central government, but it turned into a triple crisis with Turkey’s involvement and

looks like a counter reaction to the PASOK government’s action against the minority’s demands regarding the mufti election. Here, Akin seems to be striving to defend the minority’s will in determining the new mufti. *Akın*, 10 June 1985.

it added an international character to the issue.⁵⁷ There are two main reasons underlying the conflict over the mufti issue. Especially after 1974, when the Turkish intervention in Cyprus occurred, there was a legacy of war terminology between Greece and Turkey about the identification of the Minority in Western Thrace. While Turkey insisted on defining it as the Turkish national minority, Greece used exclusively the term Muslim religious minority. For this reason, the conflict over terminology of the identification of the Minority was reflected in the inter-state clash between Greece and Turkey by nationalist-leaning arguments ignoring ethnic and religious realities in the region.⁵⁸ On the Greek side, the conflict over the identification of the Minority was composed of two parts: the ethnic denominations of the associations and the strengthening ethnic reference of religious institutions especially after the Eulalo Conflict in 1983. Both the associations and muftiates were transformed into components of the ethnic identification of the Minority in Western Thrace in the tense environment of PASOK's ruling period of the early 1980s, and thus, the muftiates were put in the firing line just two years after the closure of the associations by the PASOK government.

Secondly, within a wider perspective, the inter-state conflict over the mufti issue is related with the motivation for control over representativity of the Minority in Western Thrace by the state authority. Not only Turkey, but also Greece, the PASOK government and bureaucratic administration of the time, aimed to win political control over the Minority's religious elite as their controversial policies clashed.⁵⁹ Thus, the mufti issue represented a phobia for the PASOK government which was used by their rival Turkey and the PASOK ruling elite regarded the position of

57 PASOK government, intentionally or unintentionally, transformed the mufti issue to an international conflict with Turkey. When Cemali Meço was appointed as mufti by PASOK government, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Giannis Kapsis supported his appointment from the government by claiming that the Mufti of Xanthi was appointed by the government, too, in the previous years. Tevfik Hüseyinoğlu, Mehmet İmamoğlu, *Yunanistan'da Başmüftülük, Müftülükler ve Müftüler (1913-2014)*, 391-392.

58 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "The Legal Status of Islam in Greece", *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 44, Issue 3 (2004): 411.

59 Ibid. 417.

mutfi as an institution to be eliminated for the sake of the national interest of Greece. However, the mutfi case was just the second step after the prohibition of the associations. The struggle for the elimination of the threat coming from the Minority was not completed yet, as the Minority's political representation became a challenging phenomenon during the depressed late period of PASOK rule in the second half of the 1980s.

6.1.4.4 PASOK and the Independent Political Representation of the Minority: The Case of Sadık Ahmet

Restriction on social representation through the associations and oppressive policies on freedom of elections for the religious authorities of the Minority brought the situation to a complicated conflict both between the central government and the Minority, and the Greek government and their Turkish counterparts. Looking back from the present, prohibition of associations and violation of the right to elect the religious leaders actually seemed to be components of a triple political strategy of the PASOK government to eliminate the possible Turkish challenge to Greek national security through the Turkish Minority issue. The last phase of this triple strategy was to prevent minority representatives in the Hellenic Parliament from any mobilization around the political struggle of minority members at the local level.

The government was considerably successful, from its own point of view, in establishing a psychological control over minority deputies in the Hellenic Parliament. To be more precise, there was a kind of mutual bargain between Turkish deputies in the parliament and governmental authorities. The deputies, because of belonging to the Minority, or having Turkish ethnic identity, had always been seen as an unreliable and dangerous element who might have been involved in activities to dissolve the national unity of Greece. During their parliamentary activities, they were always under intense scrutiny from their party authorities because of this anxiety about national security. This possibility of being accused as traitors put them in a stressful and inconvenient position during their legislation period, and of course, did not let them break party discipline

related to oversensitive national security concerns, such as the minority issue.⁶⁰

Minority deputies in the parliament during the legislative period of 1981-1989 hardly touched upon any issue about the problems of the minority in order to dispose of possible aggressiveness by their party authority and even somehow of aggressiveness by the state bureaucracy, or the established order in the country. The strict party control over their legislative activities also caused them to be charged with being passive about uttering minority problems in the Hellenic Parliament by the Minority itself. Although the deputies were elected to the parliament by the votes of minority members, it is possible to say that there was a deep disappointment about their passiveness towards defending minority rights at the national level and their factionalism in between themselves.⁶¹ However, it is also possible to argue that both the minority members and minority deputies knew that deputyship was just a symbolic position for the Minority, and the minority deputies, who were aware of this, did not themselves make any effort to break this comfortability arising from this symbolic status during the legislation period.

For instance, Orhan Hacıbram, deputy candidate on the PASOK lists at the legislative elections of 1977 and 1981, resigned from his party in April 1984 with a depiction of strong criticism of socialist PASOK's discriminative and nationalist policies on the Minority.⁶² This resignation generated a debate within the Minority about the positions of minority deputies in the parliament and they were invited to do the same as Orhan Hacıbram had done. Celal Zeybek, former minority deputy from Xanthi between 1977-1981 and a respected notable in Xanthi, invited the other

60 Burcu Taşkın, "Political Representation of Minorities: A Comparison of the Greek-Orthodox Minority of Istanbul and Muslim-Turkish Minority of Western Thrace", (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul Bilgi University, 2014): 289-290, 293.

61 Aydın Ömeroğlu, *Belgeler ve Olaylar Işığında, Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Batı Trakya Türkleri ve Gerçek -I-* (İstanbul: Avcı Ofset, 1994): 141.

62 *İleri*, 13 April 1984. Orhan Hacıbram criticized the PASOK government for implementing oppressive nationalist policies on the Turkish Minority since it took power in the 1981 elections.

minority deputies not to behave as partisans and to resign from their parties to show their solidarity with the minority society while the PASOK government was denying the Turkishness of the minority and violating religious freedoms in Western Thrace.⁶³ Ahmet Faikoğlu's⁶⁴ response to these invitations is interesting to quote in order to show the passiveness of the minority politicians in the political parties during those years: "*It should not be forgotten that PASOK is the government today. The problems which are related with our minority's right and law must be discussed within the government and the party today, as it was done before during the preceding governments' ruling period.*"⁶⁵

Minority politicians had limited freedom in the political parties to deal with the issues related with the Minority. During PASOK's ruling period in the 1980s, the Turks of Western Thrace experienced quite a lot of social and political difficulties. Their fields were expropriated without any compensation, minority people who graduated from universities in Turkey were prevented from employment and their diplomas were not recognized, minority students in high schools were not able to graduate, people could not get simple permission for simple works, such as for renovating their own houses, and Turks could not obtain a driving license for a long while, etc. These kinds of social pressure on the minority population became quite common during PASOK governance. In addition to all of those, political pressure on the ethnic identity and religious freedom played a role in excluding the minority members from social, economic and political life both at local and national level. The deputies in the parliament could not deal with these issues strong enough because of the political parties' fragile national security perception and the topics

63 *İleri*, 27 April 1984.

64 Ahmet Faikoğlu was elected to the Hellenic Parliament from the PASOK list from the Prefecture of Xanthi in the legislative elections of 1985. However, Faikoğlu became a prominent minority politician during the minority's struggle for recognition of Turkish identity in the late 1980s.

65 *İleri*, 4 May 1984. Faikoğlu was a PASOK member and deputy candidate when he gave this interview to *İleri*.

related with the Minority's problems remained unsolved, or even un-raised.⁶⁶

In this socio-political and economic environment, the question of independent representation of the Minority arose as a necessity. However, the Minority did not dare to develop a political organization around an independent political entity or leadership until the mid-1980s. Actually, the idea of independent political representation of the minority in the Hellenic Parliament was discussed by the Minority's notable politicians before the 1981 elections. The idea of the creation of an independent Turkish ticket was suggested by Hasan Hatipoğlu, the owner of the Akın newspaper and a famous political character within the Minority. However, the minority politicians could not reach a solution for independent representation. There were two reasons for this, the first of which was an attempt by old-fashioned minority politicians who could not be on the candidate lists of the two big parties, New Democracy and PASOK. They tried to create a ticket for themselves rather than an honest political independence of the Minority. Secondly, independent representation had never been attempted before in political history and the Minority itself was quite inexperienced in this respect. Almost all the minority politicians who discussed becoming independent deputy candidates had fear and doubt as to whether they could attract enough minority votes to gain a seat in the Hellenic Parliament.⁶⁷ Independent representation was discussed before the 1985 elections, too, and it was attempted. However, the same fear of ineligibility and inexperience resulted in failure to elect independent deputies from the Minority. Also, none of the minority politicians could risk their possible seat in the parliament and their lack of support for independent candidates in the 1985 elections prevented the Minority from achieving an independent political representation in the Hellenic Parliament. An independent political movement under such conditions, in which political pressure by the central government was so strong and mi-

66 Dimosthenis Dodos, *Eklogiki Geografia ton Meionotiton* (Athens: Eksantas, 1994): 34.

67 Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace", 250.

minority politics was so weak, could only be achieved by a political character from outside the system who did not have any anxiety about losing his political and social position within the Minority.

Sadık Ahmet was such a person. He came from a peasant family from a small village of Rhodope. Although he studied under difficult economic conditions, he received the degree of doctor of medicine from the School of Medicine of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki with only his family's poor support from the fields.⁶⁸ He was outside the political contest of ambitious minority notables and most probably he did not have much to lose. This made him fearless towards changing the Minority's political destiny in the second half of the 1980s. For this reason, his political struggle for minority rights and freedoms is extraordinary and is worth discussing.

After he obtained the degree of doctor of medicine, he was appointed to the State Hospital of Agrinio and then to the State Hospital of Karditsa. He returned to Western Thrace in 1978 and he had worked in the State Hospitals of Alexandroupoli and Komotini until 1984.⁶⁹ He observed the Minority's political situation as an outsider of minority politics and he was not involved in any political activity, because the political activities within the Minority were mostly handled by urban notables until that time, such as journalists and wealthy families of the Minority. However, as a Turkish doctor, he experienced deep discrimination from the authorities and he saw how he was excluded from daily working life when compared with his Greek colleagues and he began to involve in the social problems of the Minority when he was studying on his medical specialization.⁷⁰

This period of his posts in the hospitals in Alexandroupoli and Komotini was a kind of turning point for him to see the government's approach towards Turks in the country and his ideas on the Minority's

68 Mehmet Koca, *Dr. Sadık Ahmet Fırtınası* (Bursa: Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği Bursa Şubesi, 2012): 44-45, 54.

69 Ibid. 56-57.

70 Cafer Alioğlu, *Hayatım ve Anılarım* (Bursa: Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği Bursa Şubesi, 2020): 63.

struggle developed during this period. A parliamentary question which he submitted to the Minister of the Interior when he was a deputy in the Hellenic Parliament on 25 January 1993 about a minority member who could not obtain a license to open a pharmacy for years (APPENDIX D) summarizes his observations on the discriminatory policies of the central government throughout the 1980s and explains his motivation in struggling for the Turkish identity of the minority at national level:

“Dear Minister,

Mr. Nouri Oglou Giouksel, a pharmacist, a resident of Xanthi, submitted his supporting documents to the Prefecture of Xanthi 11 years ago to open a pharmacy. He was not approved for a pharmacy license.

Three years ago, he withdrew his documents from the Prefecture of Xanthi and submitted them to the Prefecture of Rodopi. But also in the Prefecture of Rodopi, the discrimination continues and he is kept waiting for the granting of this license. So, until today, the Prime Minister’s declaration of equality and equality without discrimination between citizens of different origin has not been implemented.

I have asked numerous questions, as a Member of Parliament, to the Ministries of Interior, Health and Welfare. I have also informed the Prime Minister and all those in charge in the Government orally on this issue, but until today the rigid and steely insistence of Greek Governments on injustice, discrimination and inhumane treatment has continued relentlessly.

...

Today in the Greek Parliament I will have the opportunity to hear from the responsible Minister if his Government has respect for the fair demands of a citizen or will continue the discrimination and violation of human rights that are perpetuated against people who are not of Greek origin, regardless of the fact that they are Greek citizens and are fulfilling their obligations to the state.

The Minister is asked:

*Will the pharmacist Nuri Oglou Giouksel have the coveted license to open a pharmacy to support his family or not?"*⁷¹

Indeed, the content of that parliamentary question in 1993 reflects the proof of the inadequacy of the minority deputies to struggle for the problems of the Minority in the 1980s, especially for the Turkish identity of the Minority. They were never courageous enough in the Hellenic Parliament to question the discriminatory practices of the central government in Western Thrace. For this reason, he could see that the minority deputies in the parliament could not do anything to overcome ethnic discrimination against the Turks of Western Thrace and he believed that being a politician within the Minority meant merely preserving the personal interests of a limited number of wealthy people in the Minority. At this point, the idea of an independent political struggle was awakened in his mind.⁷² He believed that the Minority was exposed to discrimination because of its ethnic identity, that all social and economic pressure was the result of the Minority's ethnic identity and that the Turkish ethnic denomination of minority people must be made acceptable nationwide. Moreover, according to his belief, this could only be achieved by an independent struggle outside the parliament.

The minority issue was strongly instrumentalized in the hands of the PASOK government by the mid-1980s and the field of political activity for minority deputies and non-governmental actors was very much limited by both the government and state bureaucracy. As the PASOK government continued to characterize the minority issue from a foreign policy perspective rather than a domestic one, the struggle of the Minority became more international and independent. As a result of this mutual hustling between the government and the Minority, the first organized and active reactions to PASOK policies were developed outside of Greece, especially in Germany. Aydın Ömeroğlu, a Western Thracian Turkish stu-

71 Vouli ton Ellinon, Diefthinsi Koinovouleftikou Elegchou, Arith. Prot. Epikairon Erotiseon 102, Imerominia Katathesis 25-1-93, Ora Katathesis 10.30, Epikairi Erotisi tou Aneksar-titou Voulefti, Nomou Rodopis, Sadik Amet Sadik, Athina 25 Ianouariou 1993.

72 İbrahim Onsunoğlu, "Sadık'ı Arayacak mıyız?", *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 9 August 1995.

dent at the University of Hamburg, developed the idea of a signature campaign. This idea was new and extraordinary at that time and it was implemented by the Association of Western Thracian Turks in Düsseldorf. More than ten thousand signatures were collected and submitted to European institutions, to the Council of Europe and to the European Parliament in 1985. This campaign created a realization about restrictions on freedom and human rights violations in Western Thrace by the European public and the PASOK government felt disturbed and embarrassed in the international arena. To be more precise, this was the result of PASOK's mistaken approach to the Minority: the more the issue was turned into a foreign policy-oriented case, the more it became internationalized by minority members.⁷³

Sadık Ahmet adopted this idea of a signature campaign at domestic level. A realization was created at international level, but even the Greek public itself did not know much about the troubles in Western Thrace and his idea of creating a national realization in Greece was more important. Until the time he appeared on the stage of the Minority's political theatre, the minority issues were mostly discussed and debated within the limited environment of the minority notables, or the minority politicians and governmental authorities. What made Sadık Ahmet extraordinary is that he found a way out of this vicious circle completely with his personal effort and initiative.⁷⁴

Despite the reservations and warnings of the Minority's prominent political figures, and of the Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association where he was the secretary general, he started a signature campaign in Western Thrace in 1985. Since Sadık Ahmet's signature campaign was considered as a reaction to the PASOK government, it created a fear among minority politicians that the Minority would face

73 Aydın Ömeroğlu, *Belgeler ve Olaylar Işığında, Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Batı Trakya Türkleri ve Gerçek -I-*, 142-143.

74 Mehmet Koca, *Dr. Sadık Ahmet Fırtınası*, 62-63.

stronger political and administrative restrictions from the government.⁷⁵ However, he collected 1300 signatures for the manifesto titled “Complaints and Demands of the Muslim-Turkish Minority of Western Thrace Living within the Boundaries of the Hellenic Republic” and he was taken into custody in August 1986 while he was returning from a circumcision operation in a village in Evros Prefecture. Furthermore, he distributed another memorandum signed by more than 10,000 minority members, titled in English as “Grievances and Requests of the Turkish-Moslem Minority Living in Western Thrace”⁷⁶ in an international conference on democracy and human rights held in Thessaloniki in September 1987.

These attempts resulted in the counter-reaction of the state bureaucracy against the Minority’s political demands for fundamental freedoms. Sadık Ahmet was put on trial and he was sentenced to 30 months in prison in June 1988. Moreover, the Sadık Ahmet case turned into a political crisis between the PASOK government and the Minority, since the case itself was not just a struggle against the government’s socio-political pressure on the Minority, it was also a challenge to the government which had hoped to overcome the conflict about the Minority’s Turkish identity after the closure of the associations and taking control of the muftiates. In other words, PASOK’s miscalculated strategy on erasing the Turkish identity in Western Thrace was converted into an ethnic mobilization in Western Thrace and this mobilization came into political existence around the leading political figure of Sadık Ahmet before the minority people. The signature campaign, the bureaucracy’s obstruction of his political activities and his trial turned him into a phenomenon which none of the minority politicians could ever be before. In addition to all this,

75 Aydın Ömeroğlu, *Belgeler ve Olaylar Işığında, Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Batı Trakya Türkleri ve Gerçek -I-*, 145. During the general assembly meeting of the Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association in January 1986, İsmail Rodoplu asked the Association to support Sadık Ahmet’s signature campaign. However, the executives of the Association did not support the campaign. Ömeroğlu also claims that some executives of the Association visited the Governor of Rhodope and told him that Sadık Ahmet was running a campaign against PASOK.

76 For the Turkish and Greek text of the memorandum see, *Akın*, 14 November 1987.

Sadik Ahmet developed a response to PASOK's nationalism with a Turkish nationalist view accompanied by the Minority's sui generis social dynamics. The events and developments between 1988-1990 had the character of a clash between Greek nationalism imposed by the socialist PASOK government in Athens and Turkish nationalism in Western Thrace spread by Sadik Ahmet and his followers in the Turkish villages and towns of the region.⁷⁷

§ 6.2 From Foreign Policy Problem to Domestic Conflict

During the PASOK governance that lasted for almost all the 1980s, political conflicts in Western Thrace, directly or indirectly, were related with PASOK's timidity towards the Turkish presence in Greece. The reality of Turkish existence in Western Thrace had always been a delicate and challenging issue for PASOK governments for mobilizing society around socialist values and constructed sociological identity of 'Greekness' which PASOK needed it for socialist mobilization. In other words, PASOK could not achieve socialist mobilization in the country by denying 'Greek' sensitiveness and this caused the PASOK elite to harmonize 'Greekness' and socialist values. Thus, a very unique Greek type of nationalist socialism existed as a political phenomenon in Greece during the 1980s.⁷⁸

77 For further details about the Minority's politicization with Turkish nationalism in the 1980s, see Dia Anagnostou, "Collective Rights and State Security in the New Europe: The Lausanne Treaty in Western Thrace and the Debate about Minority Protection" in *Security Dilemmas in Eurasia*, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos, (Athens: Nereas Press, 1999): 128-139.

78 Katsambekis and Stavrakakis explain the relation between PASOK's populism and its Greek nationalism in a very descriptive way: "...what is crucial to revisit is what PASOK's populism "actually" did regarding the construction and representation of the Greek people. Did it play a key role in identifying the Greek people with the Greek nation in terms that one would be entitled to recognise its ideology as primarily national-populist? ... a significant part of the Greek society was deprived by the post-war regime of *ethniko-frosini* of the very right to belong to the nation. In this sense, restoring the people as

Despite the fact that the majority of Greek people consented to PASOK's nationalism with a socialist character, it was challenged by the minority in Western Thrace. The 'Greekness' of PASOK socialism inevitably led to troubles with the historical and imagined enemies of Greek identity, and the biggest imagined enemy of 'Greekness', Turkey and the Turks, occupied the first place in this sense. Thus, Turkish existence in the Greek territories always stirred the Greek memory about Turkey and as a result, this existence was considered as an international issue rather than a national one. When considered as a foreign policy issue, the PASOK elites became stuck in the Western Thrace issue by ignoring the Turkish reality in the region and they persistently imposed the 'Greekness' side of their socialist worldview on the Turks of Western Thrace.⁷⁹

That imposing of 'Greekness' by the PASOK government was mainly reflected as restraints in two areas: on social entities and on political representation of the Minority. Therefore, the political antagonism which aimed for ideological control over the minority became the common

rightful co-participants within the national community seems more of an act of symbolic recognition, an act of egalitarian incorporation, than the culmination of an ethno-nationalist project. ... It was a populist politics of inclusion and incorporation that predominantly defined PASOK's discursive strategy during the 1970s and 1980s, something which was also crucial for its ascendance to power; and here a re-appropriation of national membership from right-wing elites obviously had a prominent, yet overdetermined, place.", Giorgos Katsambekis and Yannis Stavrakakis, "Revisiting the Nationalism/Populism Nexus: Lessons from the Greek Case", *Javnost – The Public*, Vol. 24, Issue 4 (December 2017): 397.

- 79 As Çakmak argues, from the 1980s onwards, international organizations, especially the Council of Europe have strongly criticized Greece for its discriminative practices towards the Turks in the country. In the reports, Greece was identified as a homogenous country where "the notion of Hellenism" or a strong Greek national identity has historically been emphasized and continues to influence modern Greek society. Gizem Alioğlu Çakmak, "Greek Nationalism Versus Europeanization: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism?", *Journal of Balkan Research Institute*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (December 2019): 220.

characteristic of the legacy of anti-Turkish formulation of the state's minority policies.⁸⁰ The minority associations were closed because they recalled the 'Turkishness' of the minority and other attempts were also made to prevent the independent political representation of Turkish Minority. The result was political chaos in Western Thrace and an ethnic conflict on a national level during the last decade of the PASOK government.

6.2.1 *Dead End and Political Turmoil in Western Thrace in 1988 – 1989*

The situation in Western Thrace came to a dead end by 1988. The restrictions on the Komotini Turkish Youth Union, Turkish Union of Xanthi and Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace combined with Sadık Ahmet's political struggle for Turkish identity of the Minority against the PASOK government created a tension between the central government and the Minority that was almost impossible to moderate. After Sadık Ahmet was taken into custody in Evros because of his signature campaign, he was released a couple of days later. However, his case was filed by the Evros Court by the end of 1987 and it was announced that his trial would be held on 28th January 1988. In addition to Sadık Ahmet's trial, the Greek Court of Appeal approved the closure of the Komotini Turkish Youth Union and Turkish Teachers Union of Western Thrace by referring to the public threat arising from emphasis on their Turkish names in November 1987. However, this decision of the Court of Appeal was hidden and it was not declared to the minority associations. The associations' lawyer was notified about the Court of Appeal's decision on 5th January 1988 and the decision created a strong indignation among the Minority. Both cases were considered as a clear offense against the Minority's Turkish identity and lit the fuse of the events of January 1988.⁸¹

80 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "Minority Mobilisation in Greece and Litigation in Strasbourg", *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2008): 45.

81 *Akin*, 15 January 1988.

The judicial bureaucracy in Greece followed traditional methods to suppress the emergence of political mobilization around Turkish identity in Western Thrace. Although Sadık Ahmet was put on trial, in reality it was his political movement that was on trial and this caused him to be a popular leader for political reaction pouring out in the region. The traditional understanding of the minority issue led the bureaucracy to close the minority associations, but what the judicial bureaucracy could not predict was that the political mobilization was at such a high point that ordinary people of the minority did not need any institutional organization to show their reaction against the socio-political pressure carried out by the PASOK government.

The process leading to the 29 January 1988 events started after the decision of the Court of Appeal was learned by the Minority. The High Council of the Minority decided to protest against the latest developments in its meeting on 25th January 1988 and decided to organize a march in Komotini, to close all the minority schools for one day and to notify all related bureaucratic institutions about these decisions. The first protests happened on 26th January, without any organization, just by the call of local Turkish newspapers and almost five thousand Turks attended the 26th January protests.⁸² It is understood that the crowd in this first uncoordinated protest caused apprehension among governmental authorities and the government's response to this was a stronger pressure on the next protest which was held on the 29th January.

The High Council of the Minority agreed to hold the protest march on Friday, 29th January, after the Friday pray, from the Komotini Old Mosque, which is a central place for Muslims in the city, to the Governorate of

82 Trakya'nın Sesi gives the number of protestors on 26th January as more than 4000, approximately 5000. In this protest, a commission was established by the protestors and they submitted the minority's demands to the Governor of Rhodope, Zizis Bekos, as follows: 1) The associations which are closed must be allowed to operate with their historical names, 2) Attacks on the minority because of its ethnic background must cease, and 3) The government must recognize the minority's Turkish identity. *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 28 January 1988.

Rhodope. However, the local governmental offices prohibited any marching and it was announced both in Greek and Turkish via Radio Komotini that it was prohibited to hold a rally on that day in the city center for any reason. Nevertheless, thousands of minority members from all around Western Thrace started to gather in Komotini to join in the protest march. Although all the entrance points of the city were closed by police barricades and even more security power was reinforced from neighboring prefectures, more than twenty thousand minority members came together with the call of the High Council of the Minority.⁸³ It was the first organized and coordinated protest meeting in the history of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace. The protest meeting started without any incident, some of the minority notables gave speeches to the crowd and the High Council of the Minority even canceled the march to the Governorate and deputy Ahmet Faikoğlu announced to the crowd to dismiss. However, while the protestors were dismissing peacefully, the Governorate made a huge mistake and prohibited the Friday prayers in all mosques in Komotini. This prohibition stirred the protestors up, the police started to intervene with violence and the protest meeting turned into a violent clash. The police forces started to take many people into custody, the crowd started to march to the Governorate, the security forces lost control over the protestors and when the police violence on the minority people increased, the protest meeting turned into irrepressible violent chaos. Many minority people were wounded and arrested.⁸⁴ To be more precise, the first organized protest meeting in the history of the Minority was drenched in blood as a result of nationalist oppression.

The events of 29 January 1988 and the violence during the protests was the explosive moment of the tension between the government and

83 Baskın Oran gives the number of protestors as 20,000. See, Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, 189.

84 Akın gives details about the arrested and wounded protestors. According to Akın, 35 people, some of them heavily, were wounded during the clash and 6 people were arrested. The names of the arrested protestors are Mustafa Boşnak, Necmi Muhacir, Cahit Hüseyin, Yakup Mehmet, Ahmet Ahmet and Fehim Kalenci. See, *Akın*, 4 February 1988.

the minority. The more the government rejected the Minority's ethnic belonging, the more the Minority was mobilized around ethnic Turkish identity. Soon after the decision of the Court of Appeal on the associations in which Turkish identity was considered a threat to public order in the country and legally ignored, the Minority reacted as "we are Turks" in the streets.⁸⁵ In this sense, the closure of the associations was the secondary reason for the events. The main motivation of the Minority was to keep and promote Turkish identity against the government, more briefly, the Minority rioted against PASOK's nationalism on 29th January 1988 by clinging to Turkish identity. From that day onwards, 29th January created a national consciousness among minority members, and, today Western Thracian Turks still commemorate 29th January as National Resistance Day.

The government's policies on the Minority in Western Thrace became a systematic oppressiveness mostly characterized by administrative measures and attempts to prevent the Minority from independent representation in the Hellenic Parliament. PASOK was confronted by strong opposition from the center right and corruption scandals in the country put Andreas Papandreou's popular leadership in a difficult position. Not only at national level, but also at local level in Western Thrace dissatisfaction with the PASOK government was at its highest point after the events of January 1988. In this environment, the independent movement led by Sadık Ahmet gained strong popularity among the Minority and minority members became candidates from independent lists in the legislative elections of June 1989. In Rhodope Prefecture, an independent 'Trust List' was formed and Sadık Ahmet, İsmail Rodoplu and Sabahattin

85 "Turkishness" was the dominant slogan in the 29th January protests. The crowd cried out "we are Turks" during the protests. The local minority newspapers also gave the news about 29th January by strongly underlining the 'Turkishness' character of the 29th January meeting. *Trakya'nın Sesi* used the following expressions: "The Minority Turks reared up", "the Minority Turks roared", "the Minority Turks shouted out". See *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 4 February 1988. Another minority newspaper, *Akın*, gave the news about the 29th January protests by putting out the headline "the sound of 'we are Turks', 'we are Muslims' rang out in Western Thrace". See, *Akın*, 4 February 1988.

Emin became deputy candidates from this 'Trust List'.⁸⁶ In Xanthi Prefecture, an independent 'Prosperity List' was formed and Mehmet Emin Aga, Kadir Yunusoğlu, Rasim Murcaoğlu and Mustafa Çakır became deputy candidates from this list.⁸⁷

The PASOK government, which had implemented anti-Turkish policies in Western Thrace since the beginning of the 1980s, was definitely not accustomed to seeing independent deputies in the Hellenic Parliament who were carrying the banner of 'Turkishness' in Greece. The government took severe measures to restrain the election of independent Turkish deputies from Rhodope and Xanthi and did not consider violating the basic right to elect and be elected as risky under these conditions. The election campaign of the independent candidates was inhibited by the police in many places, the customs gate at the Greek-Turkish border was closed in order to prevent Western Thracian Turks who lived in Turkey from coming to Greece and voting for the independent candidates, tax penalties were imposed on Turks and international journalists were not allowed to go to Komotini or Xanthi to follow the elections. Moreover, state officials and army officers from other cities were moved to Komotini to increase the ethnic Greek population to vote for Greek candidates and the independent candidates were expected to receive an insufficient number of votes to cross the threshold and not to be elected.⁸⁸ However, all of these administrative measures had a force majeure character and were not enough to ruin the political mobilization of the Turks in Western Thrace which had already reached its strongest level when the election date came.

86 Akın, 25 April 1989.

87 Akın, 26 May 1989, 4 June 1989.

88 Before the June 1989 elections, the election threshold in the Prefecture of Rhodope was around 17,500. After the state officials and army officers were moved to Komotini, this increased to 19,250. This means that around 1750 officers were settled in Komotini before the elections. For further details of the measures taken by the PASOK government before the June 1989 elections, see Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, 205-206.

The result of the June 1989 legislative elections was gladsome for the independent candidates of the Minority and for the first time in the political history of Greece, Turkish-origin deputies were elected to the Hellenic Parliament without any political party affiliation. Sadık Ahmet was elected to the Parliament from Rhodope as an independent deputy. He received 22,472 votes out of the total of 79,960 votes in the prefecture. Besides, the Trust List of independent Turkish candidates obtained 25,131 votes out of the total in the Prefecture of Rhodope and was placed first before New Democracy and PASOK. In Xanthi, the Prosperity List of independent Turkish candidates could only receive 9,052 votes out of the total of 63,347 votes and none of the independent candidates could be elected to the Parliament.⁸⁹ However, the results in Rhodope were enough to consider the long-lasting struggle of the Minority against the government's anti-democratic implementations as victorious. From the beginning of the PASOK government until its fall in the June 1989 elections, populist nationalism was imposed on the Minority mostly in four ways: limiting social activity and religious freedom, preventing political representation by repressing Turkish identity and excluding the Minority from economic activity. The sum total of these implementations accompanied by the populist nationalism of PASOK inflated the tension between the Minority and government during the 1980s and resulted in a social explosion with the 1988 events and June 1989 election results. PASOK's political elite and the bureaucratic elite fought to eradicate any discourse on the Turkish existence in Greece and used the Minority as a foreign policy tool against the enemy coming from the east, Turkey. However, at the end of their governance period they caused independent Turkish representation in the

89 Akın gives detailed statistics for the results of the June 1989 elections in Rhodope and Xanthi. Political mobilization of the Turkish minority resulted in election success in Rhodope. However, in Xanthi, the minority votes were divided between different Turkish candidates in the Prosperity List, PASOK and New Democracy. Although all Turkish candidates in Xanthi received 18,206 votes out of the total of 63,347 in the prefecture, the Prosperity List could obtain only half of these minority votes and could not elect any independent Turkish candidate to the Hellenic Parliament. For further details about the June 1989 election results in Rhodope and Xanthi Prefectures, see *Akın*, 26 June 1989.

Hellenic Parliament and left a legacy of domestic ethnic conflict in Western Thrace.

6.2.2 *PASOK's Legacy: The Ethnic Minority Problem in Western Thrace*

The results of the June 1989 elections brought a governmental crisis to Greece. The conservative right-wing New Democracy under the leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis defeated PASOK and won the elections by obtaining 44.3% of the votes and gaining 145 seats in the parliament. However, New Democracy could not gain a majority in the parliament to form a government and none of the political parties in the parliament could reach an agreement on forming a coalition government.⁹⁰

The governmental crisis of summer 1989 actually made PASOK's final years of corruption and economic instability even worse. Although PASOK lost power, nationalism was constructed on strong cornerstones during the populist decade of 1981-1989 and it was inherited by both the bureaucratic elite and following governments. Despite the fact that a domestic conflict was arising in the north-easternmost part of the country, even that political and economic crisis of the late 1980s was still not enough to ease the worries about the ethnic Turkish agitation in Western Thrace in the minds of the bureaucratic elite. They seemed to be quite far from understanding the socio-economic reasons behind Sadık Ahmet's election victory and increasing Turkish nationalism around Turkish identity of the Minority as a counter-reaction to PASOK's populist Greek nationalism.⁹¹

90 For further details about June 1989 Greek legislative elections its political consequences, see Panayote Elias Dimitras, "Greece", *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 8, Issue 3 (December 1989): 270-280.

91 A policy paper, which Meinardus is referring to, agreed upon by the party leaders Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Andreas Papandreou and Charilaos Florakis shows how the political elites are far from understanding the situation in Western Thrace. In the paper, the party leaders consider the increasing population of Turks in the region as a danger, and

Although Sadık Ahmet's position in the Hellenic Parliament was quite pleasing for the Turks of Western Thrace, it was very irritating for the governmental authorities and bureaucratic elite. On 10 July 1990, he submitted a parliamentary question to the Ministers of the Interior and National Economy about the clear discrimination towards the Turks in Western Thrace (APPENDIX E). The parliamentary question uncovers the disgraceful act of the central government while distributing financial investment in the Prefecture of Rhodope. The government issued funds to the villages where ethnic Greeks lived and did it by discriminating against the areas of the prefecture where Turkish villages were located:

"On Wednesday, 11/7/90 and at 20.00 hours, the program of Public Investments of the Prefecture of Rodopi in the Prefectural Council was discussed. As can be understood from the proposal of the Investment Program, it concerns only (1/3) -a third- of the Rodopi Prefecture. It is a clear violation of equality and equal rights of the citizens and of equality between the citizens. The discrimination against the minority also contradicts the Government's program statements. Investments are not made in areas where there is an absolute need, but where there is expediency.

The Ministers of the Interior and National Economy are asked:

- 1) Why does the Prefecture of Rodopi make this discrimination in order to divide the people of Rodopi into two?*
- 2) Can half of the residents of Rodopi be Greek citizens and the other half be from another country?*
- 3) Do you think that with such an investment program, economic growth will take place in the humiliated remote areas of Thrace?"⁹²*

they propose to prevent Greek elements from leaving the region, to purchase the lands belong to Turks in a systematic way, to employ minority members outside the minority areas, to control the waqf administrations in order to limit the influence of the Turkish Consulate in Komotini, to transfer the judicial power of the muftis to Greek authorities and to strengthen the presence of the state in the region. Ronald Meinardus, "Muslims: Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies" in *Minorities in Greece Aspects of a Plural Society*, ed. Richard Clogg, (London: Hurst&Company, 2002): 91-92.

92 Vouli ton Ellinon, Diefthinsi Koinovouleftikou Elegchou, Arith. Prot. Epikairon Erotiseon 89, Imerominia Katathesis 10-7-90, Ora Katathesis 12.30, Epikairi Erotisi: tou Aneksar-titou Voulefti, Nomou Rodopis, Sadik Amet Sadik, Athina, 10/7/1990.

This was the irritating type of question that the political and bureaucratic elite of Greece did not want to hear in the Hellenic Parliament and the reason behind the attempts to keep the Turkish deputies away from national representation was to avoid discussing the minority problem at national level. So, bureaucratic measures were hardened to hinder independent representation of the Minority in the parliament. More precisely, the stricter precautions which were taken to prevent Sadık Ahmet and independent Turkish candidates from being elected again in the next elections proved to be the bureaucratic elite's mistaken position about the essence of social and political movements in Western Thrace. When none of the political parties could agree on a coalition, New Democracy and the Coalition of the Left formed an ad-hoc government to bring the country to the polls and it was decided that legislative elections would be held on 5th November 1989.⁹³ During the short period of campaigning for the November 1989 elections, the success of the independent movement under the leadership of Sadık Ahmet in previous elections impelled the bureaucratic authority to hinder any possibility of independent candidates being elected again to the Hellenic Parliament. Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif were deputy candidates from the independent list in the Prefecture of Rhodope and their candidacies were canceled for unusual reasons.

The local Election Board invalidated both Sadık Ahmet's and İbrahim Şerif's candidacies by saying that they did not complete their candidacy proclamation properly and failed to specify their candidacies in the previous elections in the official proclamation forms. Although the candidates applied to the Supreme Election Board, the Supreme Board approved the Local Board's decision and Sadık Ahmet could not be candidate in the November 1989 legislative elections.⁹⁴ However, the other candidate on the independent list, İsmail Rodoplu, received almost

93 For further details about the process leading up to the November 1989 legislative elections and election results, see Panayote Elias Dimitras, "The Greek parliamentary election of November 1989", *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 9, Issue 2 (January 1990): 159-163.

94 *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 26 October 1989.

all of the minority votes and was elected as independent deputy to the Hellenic Parliament.⁹⁵ The bureaucracy still did not intend to accept Rodoplu's winning of the elections and it is understood from the reminiscences of İbrahim Onsunoglu that the local authorities tried to disallow Rodoplu's deputyship in the evening of the election. Onsunoglu's reminiscences are also important for indirectly admitting and giving a clue about previous PASOK policies on the Minority from the experiences of a local PASOK politician in Rhodope. Onsunoglu quotes from Haralambos Dimitriadis, a powerful and famous politician in PASOK's provincial office in Komotini: "*... on the night of Sunday, 5.11.1989 when the elections were held, the members of the mechanism which gathered in the Governor's Office started to discuss how to rig the ballots in order to prevent Rodoplu from being elected as deputy after it was understood that he, as the only independent candidate, exceeded the designation threshold and definitely had been elected. A hardline PASOKist, who was old and famous for his obstinacy, under the negative experience of a similar retrospective case that had happened before related with Hasan Kaşıkçioğlu in 1981, stormed into the meeting room and threatened there: 'Dismiss right now! Or else, if you play a trick and do not declare that the Muslim was elected, I am inviting television channels here and I am revealing everything to them, not only the current ones, but also the cheating which was made to the detriment of Muslim candidates in the past!'*"⁹⁶

The reaction from a local PASOK politician actually shows the oppression which the Minority had to struggle with in the political sphere during PASOK rule of the 1980s. The ruling period of PASOK created an apprehension in the Minority for political demands and implementations of the PASOK governments which were inherited by the bureaucratic authority. The independent movement of Sadık Ahmet challenged this apprehension and inheritance. For this reason, the tension between the central authority and the Minority turned into a dead end by the end of PASOK rule and the central authorities' last actions to remove the dead

95 *İleri*, 10 November 1989.

96 İbrahim Onsunoglu, "Ölümler...", *Azınlıkça*, Sayı 66, (Eylül 2011): 23.

end resulted in a domestic ethnic conflict in Western Thrace. Besides the cancelation of their candidacies in the November 1989 elections, Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif were put on trial because of a message published in minority newspapers during the election campaign. Sadık Ahmet announced through the minority newspapers that the events of January 1988 and invalidation of his candidacy were because of Greece's policies of denial of the Turkish identity of the Western Thrace Minority and he would continue to defend the Turkishness of Turkish society.⁹⁷

Both men were accused of disrupting public order by separating the people by using the word "Turk". The trial was held on 25th-26th January 1990. The judgment was a scandal. It was clearly a non-objective judgment, the court was not independent and it was far from adhering to modern international standards. The judges laughed and shouted at the defendants by shouting "go to Turkey, if you are Turks", they told the participants in the court that "there is no Turkish minority here, there is a Greek minority". They let the audience shout against the defendants. They let the defendants speak for only 4-5 minutes to defend themselves, while they let the witnesses and prosecutor speak for more than 35-40 minutes. At the end of the trial, Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif were sentenced to 18 months in prison and they were sent to jail immediately. Sadık Ahmet addressed the ten thousand-strong crowd outside when he was leaving the court building: "*I am being taken to prison just because I am a Turk. If being a Turk is a crime, I repeat here that I am a Turk and I will remain so. My message to the minority in Western Thrace is that they should not forget that they are Turks*".⁹⁸ This judgment and prison sentence were the strongest reaction of the central authority against the claims of the Minority about its ethnic identity. The judgment represented a systemic political and administrative precaution policy against

97 *Gerçek*, 8 December 1989.

98 The Helsinki Watch Report gives very detailed information about the judgment process and what happened in the court by quoting the observations of international observers who attended the court. For further details, see A Helsinki Watch Report, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1990): 18-19.

any possible emergence of claims to 'Turkishness' in Greece. In other words, the total denial of the ethnic identity of the Minority was officially approved by the court decisions through the unfair judgment and imprisonment of political leaders of the Minority.

The tense process, as a result of PASOK's populist nationalism against the Turkish population of Western Thrace, including closure of the associations, pressure on the muftiates and religious freedom and prohibition of political representation of the Minority culminated in violence against the Turks in Western Thrace. When the High Council of the Minority decided to commemorate the events of January 1988 while the judgment of Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif was continuing the state authority provoked the ethnic Greeks in the city of Komotini. The Church of Komotini was used in this provocation and it was announced on the local Greek radio stations that the Bishop of Komotini and Maroneia was inviting Greeks to obstruct commemoration on 29th January 1990. In addition to this, Greek radio gave false news about the murder of a Greek man by a Turk in the State Hospital of Komotini. On 29th January 1990, some Greeks organized a counter-protest against the Turks in Komotini and the protest got out of hand and turned into violent attacks on Turks. Nationalist Greeks ran through the streets of Komotini and attacked Turks and shops belonging to Turks. 21 ethnic Turks, some of them heavily, were wounded and more than 400 shops were damaged. As the foreign observers said, during these vandal attacks, Greek shops were untouched, no Greeks were wounded and the police did not show any intention for an attempt to stop the ongoing destruction all day long.⁹⁹ The attack by Greeks on Turks on 29th January 1990 was most probably an organized hate crime resulting from long-lasting nationalist discrimination against the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and carried out under the protection of central security authorities.

99 Ibid. 20-21. Baskın Oran defines 29 January 1990 attacks of Greeks to Turks in Komotini as pogrom and finds similarities with the events of 6-7 September 1955 against Greek minority in İstanbul. See, Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, 191-193.

In brief, when PASOK came to power in October 1981, the Minority was suffering from heavy social and economic discrimination policies conducted by the military junta of the 1960s and conservative right New Democracy government of the 1970s. The PASOK period of the 1980s brought a radical change in the national political sphere of Greece, but at the same time, the dynamics of the PASOK age produced a populist nationalism with a socialist narrative which was unique to Greece. At the end of PASOK rule, the minority experienced the cold and bloody face of populist nationalism in the events of January 1988 and 1990 and Greece inherited an ethnic conflict at the end of the 20th century.

Conclusion

Many historians argue that the Megali Idea came to an end after the Greek armies' dramatic defeat against the Kemalist revolutionaries in Western Anatolia in September 1922 and that Greece's historical visions of reuniting the ancient lands of the Greeks on the two opposite shores of the Aegean were imbedded in the history. This argument might be indisputable if the Megali Idea is considered as a historical phenomenon of political aspiration for a traditional continental irredentism of the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the international system underwent a radical change, especially after the Second World War, which challenged the classical explanations of the notions and epistemologies of the terms and descriptions in international studies and political history studies as well. In that case, the Megali Idea is not an exemption from that change. Its notion was transformed from the interwar period onwards in the post-modern characteristics of the terms and descriptions in the international system. It was re-structured in a historical context and continuously inherited by every new generation of the ruling elite in Greece through the territorial disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean and the socio-ethnic disputes over the national integration discussions.

Greece experienced disastrous military losses in the Asia Minor campaign and a chaotic political destabilization in the interwar period. Furthermore, the country was challenged by the socio-economic challenges

of population movements and political oppression of dictatorship in the late 1930s. The Second World War brought Axis occupation and resulted in a brutal civil war between the communists and monarchists, whose cost was quite heavy in terms of socio-political schism and economic ruin. Consequently, the country and its ruling elites were faced with major challenges. First of all, providing national security and protecting territorial integrity by stabilizing the domestic political arena was the primary concern for the ruling classes in the early period of the post-war years. Secondly, the integration with the Western camp had to be consolidated to adopt the democratic model of the West in order to restore the political system and to achieve political stability in the country by marginalizing, or more precisely by excluding the communist and radical leftist groups. Finally, correlatively with the first two, social cohesion and economic development had to be sustained to instigate and mobilize society around the national priorities of Greece, where the majority of people were living under quite poor conditions.

This was achieved under Marshall Alexandros Papagos' governments of the early 1950s. Papagos, as the former chief commander of the Greek Army, introduced political stability by excluding the communists from the system and he successfully dissociated the moderate leftists and liberals from the legacy of the civil war by reconciling them with the new Western type of political structure and consolidating their position in the ruling classes. More particularly, the Papagos era actually represents the inclusion of the moderate leftists and traditional liberals into the newly established order of post-war Greece, which opened the political field for father and son, Georgios and Andreas Papandreou, who would play critical roles in the future of Greece by challenging the Greek political system in discourse but reconciling with it in practice. Thus, a tradition of centralized control of politics appeared in Greek political culture, in which the civil and military elites were placed together.¹ Furthermore, the Pa-

1 Louis Lefebvre, "The Socialist Experience in Greece", *International Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1989/1990): 34-35.

pagos era is the transition and restructuring period in Greek political history, in which integration with the West was achieved with the development of the new industrialist classes as the result of economic reconstruction through the Western capitalist model. Early industrialization attempts in the politically stable environment provided by Marshall Papagos opened the path for 'the reconciled schism' within the Greek ruling elites: The right including the conservative and bourgeois elements on one side and the left reconciled with the established order and bourgeoisie on the other side, in which the Papandreou family was placed.

The Papagos era, as a transition and reconstruction period of socio-economic development and political regeneration, reactivated the ruling elite and society around the national concerns of Greece. The Cyprus issue, which began to be a hot topic for both Greece and Turkey from the mid-1950s onwards, was the starting point for that socio-political reactivation in the country. When political stability had been assured and economic transformation had been achieved through industrialization, the nationalist visions re-emerged and the ruling classes were successfully mobilized around the territorial extension towards Cyprus with the excitement created by Enosis. Especially from 1955 onwards, when the Greek Cypriots' revolt against the British colonial administration and the massacres of the Turkish population on the island began, the enthusiasm of the ruling elites in Athens towards the Cyprus issue was noticeably re-awakened and shaped the framework of Greek diplomacy in the rest of the 20th century.

Enosis, which was broadly accepted by the ruling elites and other layers of the social structure, including the leftist working class, trade unions and civil society actors, constituted a dark shadow over Greece's relations with the allies in the Western camp, especially with Turkey. However, despite the heavy price to be paid, the elite mobilization was able to stay strong around the idea of Enosis because of its relevance with the historical continuous legacy. Economic development and democratic advancement were easily demoted to lower places on the national agenda in the post-war era by the ruling elites, although a wide range of the population still did not benefit from the economic transformation of

the late 1950s. As Stefanidis justly argues, Greece's ruling elites might have spent much more diplomatic effort to attract more foreign investment to sustain economic development in the late 1950s, but nationalist mobilization in the country did not falter between 1955 and 1957, even though nearly a quarter of the Greek workforce migrated abroad to search for better living conditions.²

Many of the analysts and politicians, the contemporaries of the Republic of Cyprus, in the 1960s thought that the Zurich and London arrangements for Cyprus would have fettered Enosis. However, those who argued in that way were as mistaken as those who claimed the demise of Megali Idea after the Asia Minor catastrophe. The Megali Idea and Enosis historically construct each other by transforming from classical continental irredentism to post-modern expansionist approaches through a wider geographical image of the Greek world. For this reason, those who could not comprehend the mutually constructing feature of the Megali Idea and Enosis stumbled into a miscalculation which resulted in the mass massacre of Turks in Cyprus throughout the 1960s. Enosis did not come to an end with the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, because the Megali Idea's legacy was still alive both in Nicosia and Athens.

Greece's liberal governments of the early 1960s, which were led by the father Georgios Papandreou and in which the son Andreas Papandreou served as minister, shared the common excitement of Enosis with their predecessors and strongly motivated the Enosis dreamers on the island, although they sometimes faced off with the realities of international relations which precluded the realization of Enosis. As I argue, the Megali Idea's legacy has always engendered an irresistible political passion for the ruling elites of Greece no matter what their political affiliation was. Despite the very poorly functioning democratic regime, in which the party competition was to a greater extent founded on past cleavages and which Spourdalakis and Tassis define as the cachectic democracy of the

2 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece 1945-1967* (London: Routledge, 2016): 350.

pre-Junta period,³ the son, Andreas Papandreou and his father, the prime minister of the time made significant efforts to realize social and economic reforms that favored the working classes in the country, yet at the same time, they were favoring of Enosis until they fell from power after some conspiracies in July 1965.

The reawakening of Greek nationalism towards the disputed areas did not remain limited to Cyprus. When the judicial declarations related to the territorial waters and continental shelf became generally accepted principles at international level, Greek policy makers did not delay in re-defining Greece's maritime borders in the Aegean with a motivation of geographical hegemony.

In particular, if modern Greek history is considered as a whole from 1829 onwards, Greek irredentism was interrupted twice on the timeline of political continuity: Once it became an unrealistic goal for a while under the politically chaotic and socio-economically disastrous environment of the 1920s. Later, it was momentarily forgotten during the Axis occupation in the Second World War and civil war years of 1946-1949. Enosis in the post-war era, until Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, played a very significant role in the re-mobilization of the Greek public around the construction of historically irredentist designs of the Greek ruling elite by restructuring the Megali Idea. When Enosis had been erased by the contests between the military regime in Athens and the leadership of the Greek Cypriots in Nicosia, the irredentist policies were assigned to the maritime extension in the Aegean Sea.

Accordingly, from the 1950s onwards, a new political culture in the foreign policy making process was formulated by the ruling elites by combining all symbolic beliefs in order to regenerate the national concerns about the Aegean maritime borderlands, Cyprus issue and monoethnic integration of Greece at domestic level. In that sense, the definitive concerns about the national issues of the Aegean, Cyprus and minority issues reflected the continuity of the historical context, which

3 Michalis Spourdalakis, Chrisanthos Tassis, "Party Change in Greece and the Vanguard Role of PASOK", *South European Society & Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3-4 (September-December 2006): 497.

was the reunification of the political geographical area of Greece, whose security was to be guaranteed by the political power of the state at international level. This continuous characteristic of the historical context could only be protected and sustained with a mass motivation of the public and ruling classes in the complex environment of international relations. Therefore, Papandreou governments in the 1980s felt obliged to provide that mass motivation by clinging to the only one instrument for it: Greek nationalism covered with populist narrative.

The historical context, which was symbolized by the Megali Idea before but which in modern times was transformed into 'the sovereign right emerging from international law', encumbered the political leaders to realize the goals constructed by the national issue characterization. In other words, nationalism, which was drawing significant popular attention from the large majority of Greek society, always forced the ruling elites to make a choice between following a foreign policy in accordance with the realistic dynamics of international relations and appeasing the public through populist narratives around the national issues. The latter was always more fruitful than the former for consolidating domestic political power through populist discourse, despite its bitter and costly results for the international relations of the state. At that point, the populist discourse of the ruling elites, which touched the sensitivities of the public through national concerns, especially on the Aegean and Cyprus conflicts, was successfully introduced as an instrument to cover up any possible social and economic challenge to the ruling classes. This success, which is in fact unique to the Greek political elites, provided a comprehensive legitimacy to the irredentist feature of the constructed national struggle against the enemies of the nation, in that case Turkey, who were preventing Greece from establishing an extensive hegemony over the Aegean.

Thereby, the legitimacy and public mobilization through the national issues arising from the legitimate characteristic of the national struggle attributed a strong patriotic image to the rulers, no matter whether they were rightist or leftist. In other words, any faction in the ruling class could have the opportunity to achieve power, if it could embrace the na-

tional concerns and their legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Greek citizens. That is how socialist PASOK was able to race to power with a large scale of popular support by systematically changing the party's political rhetoric from the democratic radicalism of the transition period of post-1974 to the nationalism of the government candidate in the pre-1981 period.⁴ Such a political culture, which had its roots in the classical times of the Megali Idea and was transformed in accordance with the post-modern phenomena of the international system, eventually created a socio-political dynamic of continuous struggle in the national issues of the Greek state, particularly the Aegean and Cyprus conflicts with Turkey and the challenge of ethnic diversification within Greece. More precisely, it created an interdependence between the socio-political future of the new generations of Greek society and the struggle for the national issues from which the ruling elites could produce a strong public mobilization to pursue their political power. Within this political culture, in a sense, the future of the Greek society has been tied to the success of the struggle for the national issues. The ruling elites' prioritization of the national issues in the political discourse more than any other social and economic problems which the nation had faced throughout the post-war period and society's consent for the underestimation of the socio-economic problems instead of handling them in a social consensus, created an extensive field of freedom for developing an arrogant populist political behaviour which aggrandized the national concerns.

Within the framework of these explanations of the continuity of nationalist motivation among the Greek ruling classes, I conclude that the political culture of the ruling elites in Greece, which was restructured by the post-modern Megali Idea, shaped the milestones of the foreign policy strategies whose significant characteristic was the absolute assumption of Greek nationalism's legacy for establishing geopolitical hegemony over the imagined Greek political geography. Indeed, the correlation between the nationalist-leaning populist foreign policy strategy and its pos-

4 Ibid. 499.

itive feedback from society in the domestic political arena always constructed the higher political issues and lower domestic political concerns together around the national issues, which always provided a strong historical and political instrument for sustaining the power of the elites over any other actor in the political sphere.

At that point, one may properly wonder why it was such a difficult choice for the ruling classes of Greece to follow reasonable foreign policies in accordance with the geopolitical realities of international relations instead of concerning domestic dynamics. The answer lurks in the question: As I have explained above, in the Greek case, foreign policy and domestic dynamics constructed each other, in other words, foreign policy and domestic policy were substitutes for each other in which governments could not produce any other challenging policy to annihilate that 'substitute situation'. In the relation between domestic and foreign policy, that characteristic of substitution produced a political cost for the ruling actors and created a concern about pursuing their political power in the government. For this reason, none of the Greek governments in the 20th century, including the socialist PASOK, could choose to implement realistic policies on Cyprus, the Aegean disputes and the minority issue, because the return on the realistic policy in foreign relations meant the loss of power in the domestic arena. In that case, we reach the answer to the question of why PASOK was transformed from a radical socialist party into a populist-nationalist phenomenon in the 1980s: The populist nationalism in the political environment of Greece was historically given; it was not constructed by every new political generation. PASOK and its leadership, as the members of the ruling elite of Greece, were the generation who inherited that given populist nationalism, too. Therefore, their socialist narrative in the 1970s was merely constructed cyclically in an indignation environment of the post-1974 era against Turkey and the Western powers, and thus, when PASOK came to power in 1981, they inevitably located themselves on the domestic side of the foreign-domestic policy equilibrium to consolidate their power in the government through an arrogant populist nationalism and struggle with the threat coming from the east, Turkey.

Furthermore, the historical legacy of Greek nationalism did not give any room for the ruling elites to adopt alternative policy instruments to transform the framework of Greek foreign policy. In fact, internationalizing of the characteristics of the disputes, further developments in international law and jurisprudence and the integration of economic activities and trade at a global level were the instruments that forced the states for decades to resolve the conflicts by avoiding possible armed conflicts. However, Greece's political culture in foreign policy did not allow the international instruments to be used for conflict resolution. Instead, Greek foreign policy makers could easily interpret any international tool to benefit the irredentist aims of the state. The reason for this was the disproportionate political concern for a possible loss of power at domestic level, if any compromise appeared on any national issue at international level. As a result of this, no matter if they were rightist, leftist, liberal or conservative, none of the components of the political elite could favor any new political course to challenge Greek nationalism's legacy and play the nationalist card against each other with populist discourses. This was most visible in the case of PASOK. When PASOK was in the opposition during the transition period of the late 1970s, it was a party flagging socialism in discourse. But, on the other hand, none of the other political parties could harshly criticize Karamanlis' government with an anti-Turkish motive for compromising with Turkey about the national interests of the Greek state in the Aegean and Cyprus, except Papandreou's PASOK.

PASOK's ruling period in the foreign policy making process indeed reflected the total refusal of geopolitical realities in the international relations of the country, which included more popular and nationalist discourse than its rightist and conservative predecessors. In that sense, PASOK did not change the historical direction of Greek foreign policy, on the contrary, traditional foreign policy was blessed more than by any other government through the internationalization of the Cyprus and Ae-

gean disputes, but by ignoring the universal characteristics of international principles and by interpreting them in line with Greek historical projections about Cyprus and the Aegean.⁵

This secession from the universality of international law was the result of the concern for possible loss of power in the domestic arena. This is especially valid for the PASOK leaders, who internationalized the Cyprus and Aegean disputes with their raucous discourse in the domestic political balances. PASOK internationalized the Cyprus issue more strongly than its predecessors had in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. However, this was at the same time accompanied by a dramatization of the Greek Cypriots with a populist narrative in domestic politics. Papandreou uninterruptedly mentioned the dressing of the wound to Greek pride in his speeches about Cyprus, which in fact reflected Greek anger about the territories lost to the Turks. At the same time, the policies on the internationalization of the Aegean disputes, especially through the 1982 UNCLOS, studiously followed the line of national dignity against Turkey which consolidated PASOK's political power within the country. According to Stefanidis, who evaluates Greek foreign policy from the perspective of Greek-Macedonian relations: "*Irredentism may be all but extinct but the defensive, ethnocentric, xenophobic and anti-Western version of Greek nationalism is still very much in evidence. Nor was the scope for making political capital out of foreign policy issues exhausted, as the Macedonian controversy of the early 1990s proved. That Greek foreign policy still has to be relieved of its heavy domestic nexus, cultural and political, must be counted as a failure of both the state and society*".⁶

The foreign policy of PASOK was considerably structured on the historical legacy of Greek nationalism and framed by a nationalist populism in the discourse. Some arguments tend to divide PASOK's political stance into two as the opposition party between 1974-1981 and the governing

5 Duygu Öztürk, "Yunanistan'ın PASOK'lu Yılları ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler" in *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Üzerine Makaleler Dağlar Dağlar Viran Dağlar*, ed. Yeliz Okay, (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2014): 143-144.

6 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece 1945-1967*, 353.

party between 1981-1989. Although, there are significant differences in PASOK's discourses of the pre-1981 and post-1981 periods, as I mentioned in the previous chapters, PASOK, in the last instance, was definitely a populist political phenomenon which strongly inherited the nationalist political culture of the old generation ruling elites and implemented identical foreign policy strategies towards the historical enemy, Turkey.

Although the party programmers and party leadership defined the democratic socialist characteristics of PASOK, in the end it was a leader party similar to its contemporaries in the Greek political sphere and consequently, the party's foreign policy views were mostly developed by a limited circle of the party leadership. The party's leader, Andreas Papandreou, developed his political views and anti-Western and anti-Turkish beliefs on Greek foreign policy from the events of recent Greek history in which Papandreou himself was a prominent actor. In that sense, his political evolution comprised a unique synthesis of populist nationalism, which prioritized the concerns of the Greek state and a romantic moralism in a socialist discourse⁷ which has caused recent historians to describe him as a populist phenomenon in recent Greek political history. That unique evolution, in fact, gives clues about his populism and his success in motivating his colleagues around that populism on foreign policy implementations in the government. The eight-year ruling period of PASOK is a summary of the practices of a political party which was populist to its people in the domestic arena and aggressively nationalist towards its neighbor Turkey in the international arena. Mainly for this reason, throughout PASOK governance of the 1980s in Greece, the primary concern of the state's foreign policy was the security dilemma and threat perception arising from the disputes with Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus.

Andreas Papandreou constructed PASOK's fundamental political arguments and narratives, which distinguished it from other political movements, on the dynamic agenda of Greece's foreign policy concerns which he himself described as national issues. In other words, PASOK's

7 Constantine Melakopides, "The Logic of Papandreou's Foreign Policy", 583.

foreign policy strategies towards the national issues determined its political stance in the domestic sphere, or vice versa. However, despite the discourse for change and revision in every aspect of Greek political life before coming to power, the party and its leaders were the inheritors of the substantial legacy of Greek nationalism on the historical timeline and their populist practices for the national issues throughout the 1980s clearly confirmed this. Furthermore, despite their promise to the public for a radical change, it was not possible for the PASOK leadership to implement this under a series of systemic and conjunctural constraints in international relations. The legacy of historical Greek aims and international systemic challenges pushed the PASOK governments of the 1980s to cling to Greek nationalism and populist pragmatism in order to consolidate their power, which was accompanied by hesitations against Turkey and significant contradictions in the foreign policy making process which always resulted in regressions in the conflicts.⁸

In particular, PASOK's inheritance of an established reality in the field of foreign policy, which historically included confrontation with Turkey together with Greece's strong integration into the Western system through EC membership and return to NATO's military wing in the early 1980s, dictated the adoption of a populist pragmatism in policy making towards national issues. At this point, both PASOK's ambitions on conflicting with Turkey for legitimizing its shift from socialism to pragmatist populism and the reluctance of the Western powers to favor Greece in the confrontation with Turkey helped to increase public anger against the West together with Turkey, which put PASOK's characteristic as the inheritor of historical nationalism out of the sight of political debates. Thus, PASOK found a comprehensive sphere and autonomy to follow the legacy of historical Greek irredentism through utilizing international instruments, such as international law and UN platforms, towards Greek claims on the Aegean and Cyprus. Indeed, the historical and central choices of Greek foreign policy on the Aegean, Cyprus and minority disputes largely

8 Thanos Veremis, "Post-1974 Greek Foreign Policy", *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1997): 99.

remained during the PASOK governance of the 1980s and designated the cornerstones of its foreign policy throughout its years in government.

If I were to explain PASOK's foreign policy strategy towards Turkey in one sentence, it would be that of a narrative which tried to promote the party's old promises towards the protection of Greece's national interests by achieving international peace,⁹ but which was in fact a populist-nationalist discourse used to humor the Greek public in the domestic field. PASOK introduced the phenomenon of the independent Greek foreign policy in the discourse, and in fact, Papandreou and his colleagues showed efforts to follow significantly different foreign policy, but those efforts represented the struggle with Turkey. However, at the end of PASOK's ruling period in 1989, Greece's position against Turkey neither took a step forward, nor took a step backward. Continuous nationalist rhetoric on the issues related with Turkey helped a lot to satisfy Greek people's susceptibility about Turkey and to increase the political dynamism of PASOK, and the popularity of its leadership, but at the same time, it caused the opposite consequences in the international arena.

The political choice of PASOK through aggression in the national issues, particularly the Cyprus conflict, Aegean disputes and Turkish minority's presence in Greece, created a Greek peculiarity in the international arena which disposed Turkey and the NATO allies, especially the USA and Britain, to develop suspicions about the real intentions of Greece. As a result, although PASOK increased its popularity within the country, Greece's international image was adversely affected and the nationalist behaviors of PASOK governments in international politics throughout the 1980s, which included irredentist touches in some respects, entailed the isolation of Greece. PASOK, as the first leftist movement in government in the modern history of Greece, therefore, was able to hang on to power with the charm of populist nationalism during the challenging decade of the 1980s in international relations, but this same

9 Eftalia Kalogeropoulou, "Election Promises and Government Performance in Greece: PASOK's Fulfillment of Its 1981 Election Pledges", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (May 1989): 299-300.

nationalism caused PASOK to fail to provide effective solutions to the real and vital foreign policy problems of the country.

As a last word, PASOK's foreign policy was progressively abandoned in the last years of its government and left a legacy of chronic inflammatory processes in the central choices in Greek foreign policy towards Cyprus, the Aegean conflicts and the minority issue. Deadlock in the Aegean disputes created an insolubility which always kept the possibility of armed conflict on the agenda, confrontation in the Cyprus issue resulted in the everlasting negotiations which amplify the social and geographical partition of the island and strong rejectionism on the existence of different socio-ethnic groups in the country resulted in an ethnic minority problem. As a consequence of these, the decreasing popularity and overthrow of PASOK in 1989 proved that it is not possible to radically rearrange the foreign policy of the state with insufficient capabilities and if the strategies are driven primarily by populist domestic political concerns by ignoring the international dynamics and realities. If there is obstinacy to enforce radical change without taking the insufficiency in capabilities and international realities into consideration, the result is the legacy of more complex foreign policy problems for the next generation, as in the case of PASOK.

Appendix A PASOK's Declaration on Governmental Policies
of 1981



ΜΠΡΟΣΤΑ ΣΤΙΣ ΕΚΛΟΓΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗ ΝΙΚΗ
ΤΟ ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. ΣΤΗΝ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ –
Ο ΛΑΟΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΞΟΥΣΙΑ

ΔΙΑΚΗΡΥΞΗ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ

I. ΟΙ ΑΡΧΕΣ, Η ΠΟΡΕΙΑ, ΟΙ ΚΑΤΕΥΘΥΝΣΕΙΣ ΜΑΣ

**II. ΤΟ ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΤΙΚΟΥ ΜΑΣ
ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ**

ΠΑΝΕΛΛΗΝΙΟ ΣΟΣΙΑΛΙΣΤΙΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ

ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ

ΑΝΤΙ ΠΡΟΛΟΓΟΥ: ΜΗΝΥΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΣΟΚ,
ΑΝΔΡΕΑ Γ. ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ
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ΤΟ ΠΑΣΟΚ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ
- Ο ΛΑΟΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΞΟΥΣΙΑ σελ. 7

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ΜΗΝΥΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΣΟΚ

ΑΝΔΡΕΑ Γ. ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟ ΛΑΟ,
26 - 7 - 81

1. ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΣΙΑ, ΤΗΝ ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΑΜΥΝΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑ ΕΙΡΗΝΗ, ΤΗ ΔΙΕΘΝΗ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ

A. ΤΑ ΕΘΝΙΚΑ ΜΑΣ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ

47. 'Η μονοδιάστατη και μονόπλευρη πολιτική της εξάρτησης, που ακολουθούσε η Δεξιά, καθώς και η τακτική των συνεχών υποχωρήσεων και ταλαντεύσεων, όδηγησαν τα Έθνικά θέματα σε αδιέξοδο και σε παραχωρήσεις κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων.

Τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. θα ακολουθήσει μία ριζικά διάφορη πολιτική για την αντιμετώπιση των Έθνικών θεμάτων, που δεν επιδέχονται αναβολή ή δισταγμούς. Αυτή η πολιτική *θά στηρίζεται στην άμεση θωράκιση της χώρας και σε μία γενική ανεξαρτητή, πολυδιάστατη, εξωτερική πολιτική.* Τα επί μέρους βήματα για την κατάκτηση των ανυποχώρητων στρατηγικών στόχων θά παίρνουν υπόψη τις εξοπλιστικές ανάγκες των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων της χώρας μας, καθώς και την εξέλιξη του συσχετισμού δυνάμεων στο διεθνές χώρο και ειδικότερα στην περιοχή μας.

48. Βασικός, στρατηγικός προσανατολισμός μας είναι η διάλυση και των δύο ψυχροπολεμικών μπλόκ: του ΝΑΤΟ και του Συμφώνου της Βαρσοβίας. Σ' αυτή μας τη στρατηγική εντάσσουμε και την αποχώρηση της χώρας μας από την Ατλαντική συμμαχία.

Όμως, *πέρα από το θέμα αρχής,* υπάρχει η φύση της Ατλαντικής Συμμαχίας και η *ιδιότυπη* σχέση της χώρας μας με αυτήν. Είμαστε η *μόνη* χώρα - μέλος του ΝΑΤΟ που *απειλείται* από χώρα - μέλος της Συμμαχίας. 'Η Συμμαχία είναι ανήμπορη (γιατί θέλει) να εγγυηθεί τα σύνορά μας από την Τουρκική απειλή. Τό αντίθετο ακριβώς ισχύει. Οι Τουρκικές βιομηχανίες εξοπλίζονται και εκσυγχρονίζονται, ενώ τόσο οι *δικαιώσεις* της Τουρκίας στο Αιγαίο όσο και οι *παραβιάσεις* της κλιμακώνονται επικίνδυνα.

Πέρα επίσης από την ιδιότητα αυτή της Ελλάδας στη Συμμαχία, υπάρχουν και *οι πρόσφατες πικρές εμπειρίες,* που αυτή επισώρευσε στο Λαό: *βασιλικό προέκδομα* του 1965, *η εφτάχρονη δικτατορία* και *ο Αττίλας στην Κύπρο.*

Σέ ότι αφορά στην άμυνα της χώρας μας:

α. Τό ΝΑΤΟ δέν έγγυάται τά σύνορά μας έπρός 'Ανατολάς.

β. Ταυτόχρονα, η διάταξη και η προπαρασκευή των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων της χώρας μας εντάσσεται στην αντιμετώπιση του Συμφώνου της Βαρσοβίας - και όχι στην ύπαρκτη απειλή της Τουρκίας στο Αιγαίο.

γ. Μέσα από τό ΝΑΤΟ είναι δυνατή η διαρροή πληροφοριών προς την Τουρκία.

δ. 'Ακόμα και στην έντελώς υποθετική περίπτωση του «έκ Βορρά κινδύνου» - ανύπαρκτου, όπως παραδέχτηκε ο ίδιος ο Υπουργός Έθνικής

...αυτήν αυτοματισμός επέμβασης για βοήθεια ούτε
...της Συμμαχίας.

...αυτή η Κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας προχώρησε σε
...της Συμφωνίας επανένταξης (Rogers) στο στρατιωτικό σκέ-
...του NATO - με τόν Άτιλα πάντα στην Κύπρο - ή όποια συνεπάγε-
...παράχωρησεις, προς την Τουρκία, απαραίτητων εθνικών κυριαρχι-
...μας δικαιωμάτων στο Αιγαίο, και την αποδοχή ουσιαστικής επικυ-
...ραρχίας του NATO στον εναέριο χώρο μας.

Τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. έχει ήδη δηλώσει, πώς θα φέρει τη
Συμφωνία Rogers στη Βουλή προς καταψήφισή της.

Επίσης, τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. θα προχωρήσει στην απομάκρυνση των πυρ-
...των κεφαλών του NATO, πού βρίσκονται στη χώρα μας.

Τέλος, οι Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις θα τεθούν κάτω από αποκλειστικό Έλ-
...ληνικό έλεγχο, ώστε να είναι σε θέση να αντιμετωπίσουν την εξ' Ανα-
...τολών απειλή.

Σέ δ,τι αφορά γενικότερα στά μέτρα πού θά πάρει τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. γιά
τήν υλοποίηση της Έθνικής Άμυντικής και Έξωτερικής πολιτικής του,
θά λαμβάνονται ύπ' όψη οι έπιπτώσεις τους στό άξίωμα των Ένόπλων
Δυνάμεων. Τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ., μέ κανένα του βήμα και σέ καμιά περίπτωση,
δέ θά έπρέψει την ύποβάθμιση της έτοιμότητας των Ένόπλων Δυνά-
μεων της χώρας γιά την άμυνα μας από ξένη έπιβουλή.

48. Οι ξένες βάσεις δέν έχουν θέση στή χώρα μας, γι-
...τί *άντιστρατεύονται* την Έθνική μας Άνεξαρτησία, γιατί
δέν *προσφέρουν* γιά την άμυνα της χώρας μας σέ περιορι-
σμένο τοπικό πόλεμο και γιατί στην περίπτωση παγκόσμιας
σύγκρουσης *θά δώσουν σέ όλοκαύτωμα*.

Ταυτόχρονα, οι βάσεις *πληροφορών* μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθούν
προς όφελος της Τουρκίας, ενώ οι *επιχειρησιακές* βάσεις (Σούδα, Έλλη-
νικό) μπορούν να γίνουν όρμητήρια γιά έπίθεση εναντίον τρίτων χωρών,
μέ τις όποιες η Έλλάδα διατηρεί άριστες σχέσεις.

Τέλος, η ύπαρξη και μόνο των ξένων βάσεων αναπτύσσει άμεσα έν-
διαφέρον της ξένης αυτής δύναμης γιά τις πολιτικές εξελίξεις στή χώρα
μας, ενώ δημιουργεί μεγάλες κοινωνικές, οικονομικές και πολιτιστικές
διαστρεβλώσεις και παραμορφώσεις στις γεωγραφικές περιοχές, πού εί-
ναι εγκαταστημένες οι βάσεις.

Τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. αναγνωρίζει ότι πιθανότατα θά ύπάρξει, στή διαδικασία
της απομάκρυνσης των βάσεων, *μεταβατική περίοδος*, πού την χα-
κτηρίζουμε ως *στεγανιστική*. Αυτό, κατά κύριο λόγο, σημαίνει την *α-*
ποσύνδεση των βάσεων από τόν εθνικό άμυντικό σχεδιασμό.

Γιά όσο χρόνο - *στή πλαίσια ενός συγκεκριμένου χρονοδιάγραμμα-*
τος απομάκρυνσης των βάσεων - θά παραμείνουν οι βάσεις στό έδα-
φος μας, θά εξασφαλισθούν οι προϋποθέσεις, ότι η λειτουργία τους δέν
άντιστρατεύεται την έξωτερική πολιτική της χώρας και δέν βλάπτει τό έ-
θνικό μας συμφέρον. Έξυπακούεται βέβαια ότι η Έλληνική Κυβέρνηση

θά διατηρεί τό δικαίωμα *νά άναστέλλει* όποια η όποιες δραστηριότητες
των βάσεων δέν εκπληρούν τούς πάρα πάνω δρους, καθώς και τό δι-
καίωμα *νά καταγγείλει* τό χρονοδιάγραμμα και *νά απαιτήσει* άμεση απο-
μάκρυνσή τους, όταν τό απαιτήσει τό έθνικό συμφέρον.

50. Η άντιμετώπιση της κρίσης του Αιγαίου δέν επιδέχεται διστα-
γμούς και παλινδρομήσεις. Πρέπει να καταστεί σαφές, τόσο προς την
Τουρκία όσο και προς την Άτλαντική Συμμαχία, πώς τά χερσαία, εναέρια
και θαλάσσια σύνορά μας, καθώς και τά όρια της Έλληνικής ύφαλοκρη-
πίδας του Αιγαίου, *δέν είναι διαπραγματεύσιμα*. Αυτά τά σύνορα της πα-
τρίδας μας κατακτήθηκαν μέ αίμα και θυσίες και κατοχυρώνονται σήμε-
ρα από διεθνείς συνθήκες και συμβάσεις.

Διάλογος μέ την Τουρκία έχει νόημα μόνο στο μέτρο πού *δέν άφορά*
παράχωρήσεις απαραίτητων έθνικών κυριαρχικών
δικαιωμάτων. Δέ ζητάμε απόλυτως τίποτα από την Τουρκία - παρά
μόνο φιλικές σχέσεις ανάμεσα στους δύο λαούς, αλλά δέν πρόκειται να
παράχωρήσουμε ούτε μία σπιθαμή έδάφους.

Η ειρήνη στο Αιγαίο δέν κατοχυρώνεται μέ συνεχιζόμενες κατά στά-
δια ύποχωρήσεις απέναντι στον τουρκικό επεκτατισμό. Γιατί μία τέτοια
πολιτική αποθρασύνει την πολιτικοστρατιωτική σωβινιστική ήγεσία της
Τουρκίας και άνοίγει τό δρόμο σέ μία στρατιωτική άναμέτρηση ανάμεσα
στις δύο χώρες.

51. Η Κύπρος είναι γιά τό Έλληνικό Έθνος *πρώτο θέμα*. Είναι
ταυτόχρονα και κρίσιμο *διεθνές θέμα* - μία και συνεχίζεται η στρατιωτι-
κή κατοχή μεγάλου τμήματος ενός ανεξάρτητου και αδέσμευτου κρά-
τους - μέλους του Ο.Η.Ε. Άλλά η Έλλάδα, ως εγγυήτρια δύναμη, *έχει*
και νόμιμο δικαίωμα αλλά και χρέος, να συμπαρασταθεί ένεργά
στον άγώνα του Κυπριακού Λαού γιά την *αποχώρηση* των ξέ-
νων στρατευμάτων και βάσεων, γιά την *έπιστροφή* των προσφύγων
στις έστιές τους, γιά την *κατοχύρωση* της ελεύθερης εγκατάστασης και
διακίνησης, γιά τή *διαμόρφωση* ενός καταστατικού χάρτη πού, ενώ *θά*
κατοχυρώσει τό έναίο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, *θά παρέχει ίσα δι-*
καιώματα και τις ίδιες ύποχρεώσεις σέ όλους τούς πολίτες της - τόσο
τούς Έλληνοκύπριους όσο και τούς Τουρκοκύπριους.

Η συνεχώς επαναλαμβανόμενη άναφορά, από τις Κυβερνήσεις της
Νέας Δημοκρατίας, στην αρχή, ότι «η Κύπρος αποφασίζει και η Έλλάδα
συμπαρίσταται» άποτελεί *απαράδεκτο άλλοθι* της Δεξιάς γιά την ού-
σιαστική *έγκατάλειψη* της Ιερής υπόθεσης της Κύπρου. Η Κυβέρνηση
του ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. θά αναλάβει σταυροφορία γιά την *ένημέρωση* της παγκό-
σμιας κοινής γνώμης και την *κινήτοποίηση* διεθνώς όλων των δυνά-
μεων, πού είναι σέ θέση να συμβάλλουν στην προώθηση της δίκαιης
λύσης του Κυπριακού προβλήματος.

Οι *διακοινοτικές συνομιλίες* στην Κύπρο, υπό την αιγίδα του ΟΗΕ, έ-
χουν νόημα μόνο σέ δ,τι άφορά τή διαμόρφωση του *νέου καταστατικού*
χάρτη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Καί μπορεί να είναι καρποφόρες μό-
νο μετά την αποχώρηση των ξένων στρατευμάτων από τή Μεγαλόνησο.
Οι συνομιλίες, κάτω από τις παρούσες συνθήκες, δέν οδηγούν παρά
στην άποτελμάτωση του Κυπριακού και στην τελική άναγνώριση της δε

facto διχοτόμησης της Κύπρου. Γατί συνομιλητές είναι από τη μία μεριά η Κυβέρνηση της Κύπρου, ενώ από την άλλη είναι η *"Άγκυρα"* (και όχι η Τουρκακυπριακή Κοινότητα), της οποίας το κύριο διαπραγματευτικό όπλο είναι τα στρατεύματα κατοχής.

Η Κυβέρνηση του Π.Α.Σ.Ο.Κ. δε θα αποδεχθεί καμιά λύση που θα αποτελέσει αναγνώριση τετελεσμένων, και θα συμπαρασταθεί, με όλες τις δυνάμεις της, στον αγώνα του Κυπριακού Έλληνισμού για εθνική επιβίωση. Ταυτόχρονα θα προχωρήσει, χωρίς αναβολές, στο άνοιγμα του φακέλλου της Κύπρου, για να πληροφορηθεί επί τέλους ο Έλληνικός και ο Κυπριακός Λαός ποιοί είναι οι υπεύθυνοι για την Κυπριακή τραγωδία.

Β. Η ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΑΜΥΝΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ

52. Η εθνική αμυντική πολιτική προϋποθέτει συνεχή βελτίωση της ετοιμότητας των Ένδυνων Δυνάμεων, τον σύγχρονο εξοπλισμό και τη σωστή διάταξή τους.

Οι δαπάνες για την άμυνα έχουν απόλυτη προτεραιότητα. Η σωστότερη κατανομή τους και η ορθολογικότερη χρησιμοποίηση των σχετικών κονδυλίων συναρτάται απόλυτα με την ανάγκη εκσυγχρονισμού, αλλά και τη σταδιακή διαφοροποίηση των πηγών εξοπλισμού, ώστε να μην υπάρχει μονοσήμαντη εξάρτηση.

Ταυτόχρονα θα δώσουμε τη μάχη για την ανάπτυξη μιάς σύγχρονης Έλληνικής πολεμικής βιομηχανίας με αξιοποίηση της πύ υψηλής τεχνολογίας. Βασικό στήριγμα θα αποτελέσει η ανάπτυξη του βιομηχανικού γενικότερα τομέα και της εφαρμοσμένης έρευνας, ειδικά σε θέματα που αφορούν ηλεκτρονικά συστήματα.

Η έλλογανοποίηση της Πολιτείας έχει ως πρώτο μέλημα τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις, τις υπηρεσίες πληροφοριών, τα Σώματα Ασφαλείας, που θα πρέπει να προστατευθούν από οποιαδήποτε διείσδυση ξένου παράγοντα. Οι Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις, που επιμύζονται το κύριο βάρος της άμυνας, έχουν συνειδητοποιήσει, σε εύρυστη έκταση, ποιά είναι τα Έλληνικά συμφέροντα. Η τραγική έμπειρία της ξενοκίνητης δικτατορίας και η κατάληξή της, η τραγωδία της Κύπρου και η προκλητικότητα της Τουρκίας, έχουν εκμηδενίσει κάθε δυνατότητα για παραπλάνηση.

Η συναδέλφωση του Λαού με τα στρατευμένα παιδιά του θα αποτελέσει αδιάλειπτη φροντίδα μας αλλά και το κύριο στήριγμα της εθνικής αμυντικής πολιτικής.

Γ. Η ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΤΗ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ

Μία πολιτική Ειρήνης

53. Η εξωτερική πολιτική έχει αποφασιστική σημασία για το μέλλον της χώρας. Έπηρεάζει τις συνθήκες και τις δυνατότητες της εσωτερικής μας ανάπτυξης και προσδιορίζει το βαθμό

της Έθνικής μας Ανεξαρτησίας. Από την εξωτερική μας πολιτική εξαρτάται, άν, και σε ποίο βαθμό, πολιτικές και οικονομικές επιλογές ξένων κέντρων αποφάσεων επηρεάζουν την ελευθερία και την ευημερία του Έλληνικού Λαού.

Έρθε η ώρα να προχωρήσουμε στη διαμόρφωση μιάς νέας Έλληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Αυτό απαιτεί η επιβίωση του Έθνους. Δεδομένα για την Έλληνική εξωτερική πολιτική του Π.Α.Σ.Ο.Κ. είναι ότι:

α. Η Ελλάδα είναι χώρα που ανήκει ταυτόχρονα στην Ευρώπη, στα Βαλκάνια και στη Μεσόγειο και πρέπει να κάνει την παρουσία της αισθητή και στους τρεις αυτούς χώρους.

β. Η ένταξη των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών σε αντιμαχόμενους στρατιωτικούς συνασπισμούς, η στρατιωτική παρουσία των Η.Π.Α. στα σύνορα της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης, η εγκατάσταση ευρωπυραύλων στην Ευρώπη, η παρουσία των στόλων των υπερδυνάμεων στη Μεσόγειο, η συνέχιση των εξοπλισμών και η αποθήκευση πυρηνικών όπλων στα Βαλκάνια και στη Μεσόγειο, η ένταση στη Μέση Ανατολή και ο ανταγωνισμός των Η.Π.Α. και της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης για την εξασφάλιση σφαιρών επιρροής, δημιουργούν κρίσιμη κατάσταση, που υποβάλλει τοπικές διαμάχες και ενέχει τον κίνδυνο τοπικής ή και γενικής σύρραξης.

54. Η ανεξάρτητη Έλληνική εξωτερική πολιτική *δεν είναι πολιτική απομόνωσης*. Είναι ενεργός, δυναμική πολιτική, η οποία δημιουργεί εκείνο το πλέγμα διεθνών διασυνδέσεων, που έγγυαται την έδαφική ακεραιότητα και ανεξαρτησία της χώρας, καθώς και την εξυπηρέτηση των συμφερόντων της. Είναι πολιτική ρεαλισμού. Καμιά δέσμευση δεν πρέπει να αναλαμβάνεται χωρίς όρο, που να καθιστά την αποδέσμευση δυνατή, όταν η δέσμευση παύει να είναι εθνικά συμφέρουσα.

Κάθε συμμαχία ή δέσμευση στο διεθνή χώρο, πρέπει να στηρίζεται στην αρχή της διακρατικής ισοτιμίας και του αμοιβαίου σεβασμού. Πιέσεις και εκβιασμοί είναι απαράδεκτοι.

Μπορεί να υπάρχουν ιστορικές συνθήκες τέτοιες, που να υποχρεώνουν τη χώρα μας να συμμαχήσει άμυντικά με άλλες. Εάν μιά συμμαχία συμβάλει στην επίτευξη πραγματικά της εθνικής ανεξαρτησίας και στην προάσπιση της έδαφικής ακεραιότητας, άν είναι καθαρά άμυντικός συνασπισμός, και άν καμιά χώρα δεν προσπαθεί να επιβάλει την πολιτική της, τότε το Π.Α.Σ.Ο.Κ. είναι έτοιμο να εξετάσει την περίπτωση.

55. Η εξωτερική πολιτική της χώρας πρέπει να στηρίζεται στις αρχές της ειρηνικής επίλυσης των διεθνών διαφορών, της ενίσχυσης της διεθνούς ειρήνης και της ανάπτυξης σχέσεων φιλίας και συνεργασίας με όλες τις χώρες. Γι' αυτό το Π.Α.Σ.Ο.Κ. είναι, κατ' αρχήν, αντίθετο σε κάθε στρατιωτική συμμαχία ή συνασπισμό, ο οποίος:

α. Είναι δυνατό να στραφεί ενάντια στην ειρήνη και την αυτοδιάθεση των Λαών και

β. Να οδηγήσει σε παγκόσμια πόλωση και ιδιαίτερα του ευρωπαϊκού ή του μεσογειακού χώρου.

Η Ελλάδα θα συμβάλλει με κάθε τρόπο στις προσπάθειες για τη διά-

λυση των συνασπισμών που διαιρούν τον Κόσμο και την Εύρωπη.

Είμαστε ενεργά αλληλέγγυοι με όλους τούς Λαούς που αγωνίζονται για την εθνική τους ανεξαρτησία και μάχονται ενάντια στον Ιμπεριαλισμό. Προωθούμε την ειρήνη τόσο στην περιοχή μας όσο και σε παγκόσμια κλίμακα, σε πλήρη σύνδεση με την υπόθεση της 'Εθνικής 'Ανεξαρτησίας.

'Ετσι το ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. υποστηρίζει σταθερά τον αγώνα των Παλαιστινίων για την επιστροφή στην πατρίδα τους, σε μία ειρηνική Μέση 'Ανατολή, ελεύθερη από ξένες επεμβάσεις.

Θά συμπαρασταθεί σε κάθε απελευθερωτικό κίνημα, που αγωνίζεται ενάντια στα αποικιοκρατικά ή ρατσιστικά καθεστώτα.

Καταδικάζει την απροκάλυπτη αμερικάνικη προώθηση και υποστήριξη δικτατορικών, στρατοκρατικών και καταπιεστικών καθεστώτων, όπως στην Τουρκία και τη Λατινική 'Αμερική, καθώς και τις επεμβάσεις στα έσωτερικά άλλων χωρών, με οποιοδήποτε πρόσχημα και μορφή.

Τό ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ., για τούς ίδιους λόγους, καταδίκασε και τη Σοβιετική επέμβαση στο 'Αφγανιστάν.

'Υποστηρίζουμε ακόμα ότι η Πολωνία έχει τό δικαίωμα μόνη της να ξεπεράσει τό οποιοδήποτε προβλήματά της και να προχωρήσει στο δρόμο που χαράσσει η υπεύθυνη Κυβέρνηση και η βούληση του Λαού της.

56. Θά προχωρήσουμε σε ένα νέο προσανατολισμό *ευρωπαϊκής και μεσογειακής πολιτικής*, με βάση τις ακόλουθες αρχές:

1. 'Η Εύρωπη είναι ενιαία. Δέν την αποτελούν μόνο οι χώρες της Κοινής 'Αγοράς, αλλά και όσες δέ συμμετέχουν σ' αυτήν (π.χ. Αυστρία, Σουηδία, Νορβηγία, 'Ελβετία), καθώς και εκείνες της 'Ανατολικής Εύρωπης. 'Η ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική πρέπει να άφορά στο σύνολο των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών και να μην οδηγεί σε διαίρεση του ευρωπαϊκού χώρου.

2. 'Η στενή συνεργασία ανάμεσα στα ευρωπαϊκά κράτη επιβάλλεται από τό κοινό πολιτιστικό παρελθόν, τό κοινά οικονομικά και κοινωνικά συμφέροντα.

3. 'Η ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική δέ μπορεί να έχει ως στόχο τή δημιουργία μιάς νέας υπερδύναμης. Στόχος της πρέπει να είναι ένας γενικός μετασχηματισμός, που θά οδηγήσει στη δημιουργία μιάς συνομοσπονδιακής Εύρωπης.

Μιά Εύρωπη των Λαών, μιά συνομοσπονδιακή Εύρωπη, που θά περιλαμβάνει Δυτικές και 'Ανατολικές χώρες, αποτελεί δραμα επιθυμητό αλλά και πολύ μακρινό.

Είναι ένθαρρυντικό πάντως, ότι τό τελευταία χρόνια σημειώνονται όρισμένες θετικές εξελίξεις στην πολιτική χωρών ένταγμένων στους στρατιωτικοπολιτικούς συνασπισμούς των δύο υπερδυνάμεων. Πολλά ευρωπαϊκά κράτη παίρνουν θέση ή αναλαμβάνουν πρωτοβουλίες, με λιγότερο ή περισσότερο σοβαρές αποκλίσεις από τή γραμμή των πολιτικοστρατιωτικών μπλόκ. Στα πλαίσια αυτά, βαρύνουσα σημασία, για τήν ανάσχεση ειδικότερα των εξοπλισμών, έχουν οι σοβαρές αντιδράσεις, που εκδηλώνονται σε Δυτικές χώρες άπέναντι στα σχέδια για τήν εγκατάσταση νέων πυρηνικών όπλων στο έδαφός τους. Οι αντιδράσεις αυτές είναι αποτέλεσμα τής εκτίμησης, ότι με τό νέα αυτά όπλα θά αύξά-

νονταν οι πιθανότητες να αποτελέσει ή Εύρωπη όχι μόνο τό κύριο, αλλά ίσως και τό μόνο θύμα ενός ένδεχόμενου πυρηνικού πολέμου.

'Ο Βαλκανικός και Μεσογειακός χώρος είναι ιδιαίτερα σημαντικός για τήν οικονομική και κοινωνική ανάπτυξη τής χώρας μας. 'Η Κυβέρνηση του ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. θά προωθήσει ενεργά τή βαλκανική συνεργασία και τή σύσφιγξη των σχέσεων με τις χώρες τής Μεσογείου. Ειδικότερα:

Στό Μεσογειακό χώρο είναι αναγκαίο:

α. Νά απομακρυνθούν οι ξένοι στόλοι και όλα γενικά τό πυρηνικά όπλα και νά αποδυσμευτούν οι παράκτιες χώρες από πολιτικοστρατιωτικούς συνασπισμούς.

β. Νά συντονιστούν τό προγράμματα επενδύσεων και ή έμπορική πολιτική, νά αντιμετωπισθεί ενιαία ή δράση των διεθνών οργανισμών, που στηρίζουν τήν κυριαρχία του δυτικού μονοπωλιακού καπιταλισμού και νά υπάρξει ενιαία στάση στις διαπραγματεύσεις με τις βιομηχανικές καπιταλιστικές χώρες, στα πλαίσια του «διαλόγου Βορρά - Νότου».

γ. Νά ίδρυθεί ένα κοινό κέντρο 'Ερευνών για τήν ανάπτυξη τεχνολογίας, που θά εξυπηρετεί τις ανάγκες των μεσογειακών Λαών.

Στό Βαλκανικό χώρο θά πρέπει επίσης να επιδιωχθεί μακροπρόθεσμα:

α. Νά απομακρυνθούν όλα τό ξένα στρατεύματα και βάσεις, νά δημιουργηθεί αποπυρηνικοποιημένη και άπύραυλη ζώνη, νά υπάρξει αποδέσμευση από πολιτικοστρατιωτικούς συνασπισμούς.

β. Νά διευρυνθούν οι πολιτικές, οικονομικές και πολιτιστικές σχέσεις, με στόχο τή δημιουργία θεσμών, που θά εξασφαλίσουν τή μόνιμη συνεργασία.

57. Θά προχωρήσουμε, τέλος, σε μία πολύπλευρη συνεργασία με τις χώρες του Τρίτου Κόσμου προωθώντας τήν ένισχυση τής θέσης των χωρών αυτών στο διάλογο Βορρά - Νότου.

58. 'Η διαμόρφωση και ή ύλοποίηση μιάς νέας εθνικής στρατηγικής άπαιτούν χρόνο και προσπάθεια. 'Ο δρόμος δέν είναι ανόδοσπατος, αλλά είναι δυνατός. 'Απαιτούνται έπιμονή, σύστημα, σύνεση, έλιγμοι, διεθνή έρείσματα χωρίς εξαρτήσεις και πάνω άπ' όλα ή πιο πλατιά *λαϊκή συναίνεση στην εξωτερική πολιτική και ή εθνική όμοψυχία στην άμυνική πολιτική*.

Appendix C Sadık Ahmet's Parliamentary Question to the
Minister of Spatial Planning, Public Works and
Environment on 20 January 1993

ΒΟΥΛΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ
Σ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ
ΕΥΝΟΔΟΣ Γ

ΒΟΥΛΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ	
ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΜΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΥ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ	
Αριθ. Πρωτ. ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ	4350
Ημερομηνία Κατάθεσης	20.1.93

Ερώτηση:

Ανεξάρτητου Βουλευτή
Νομού Ροδόπης
Σαδίκ Αμέτ Σαδίκ

Υπουργείο: ΠΕΧΩΔΕ

Κύριε Υπουργέ,

Ο κ. Παλάκ Ισμαήλ Σαλή, είναι κάτοικος του ορεινού χωριού Οργάνης Νομού Ροδόπης που απέχει μόνο δέκα χιλιόμετρα από την Βουλγαρία.

Η κοινότητα Οργάνης είχε το δικαίωμα να χορηγήσει άδεια ανοικοδόμησης στους κατοίκους της Κοινότητάς της.

Ο τότε Πρόεδρος την άδειά του την έδωσε. Ο πολίτης έχτισε το οικοδόμημα όπως φαίνεται και από τα δικαιολογητικά τα οποία σας επισυνάπτω. Αργότερα όμως αμφισβητήθηκε η νομιμότητα.

Κύριε Υπουργέ, είναι αδικία την στιγμή που χορηγούνται σ' όλες σχεδόν τις άγονες περιοχές της χώρας τέτοιες οικοδομικές άδειες από Κοινοτάρχες να ακυρώνονται αυτές οι άδειες που έχουν χορηγηθεί από τις Κοινότητες των ορεινών περιοχών της Δυτικής Θράκης. Αυτή η εφαρμογή είναι και παράνομη και παράλογη. Εκτός του ότι του αφαιρέθηκε η άδεια η Δ.Ο.Η Κομοτηνής θεωρώντας το κτίριο αυθαίρετο του υπέβαλε και πρόστιμο.

Ερωτάται ο κ.Υπουργός:

- 1) Τί προβλέπει το Υπουργείο σας για τέτοιες περιπτώσεις, ώστε να δοθεί ένα τέλος στις εκκρεμότητες αυτές;
- 2) Η συμπεριφορά της πολιτείας έναντι των κατοίκων των ορεινών χωριών που στερούνται όλα τα αγαθά της σύγχρονης ζωής θα εξακολουθεί να είναι τιμωρία;

Αθήνα 20 Ιανουαρίου 1993

Ο ΕΡΩΤΩΝ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΗΣ

ΣΑΔΙΚ ΑΜΕΤ ΣΑΔΙΚ

Appendix D Sadık Ahmet's Parliamentary Question to the Minister of Interior on 25 January 1993

ΒΟΥΛΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ
ΣΤΗ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ ΠΡΟΕΓΑΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ
ΣΥΝΟΛΟΣ Γ

ΒΟΥΛΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ	
ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΗΡΙΑΚΟΝ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΡΑΤΕΙΑΣ	
Α. Πρωτ. Τηλεγράφου ΕΡΕΤΗΜΕΤΩΝ	102
Αριθμός Κατάθεσης	25-1-93
Α. Κατόχης	10-30

Επίκαιρη Ερώτηση
του Ανεξάρτητου Βουλευτή
Νομού Ροδόπης
Σαδίκ Αμέτ Σαδίκ

Υπουργείο: Εσωτερικών

Κύριε Υπουργέ,

Ο κύριος Νουρή Ογλού Γιουξέλ φαρμακοποιός, κάτοικος Ξάνθης, έχει υποβάλλει τα δικαιολογητικά του στην Νομαρχία Ξάνθης πριν 11 χρόνια για να ανοίξει φαρμακείο. Δεν του την ενέκριναν την άδεια ιδρύσεως φαρμακείου.

Πριν τρία χρόνια απέσυρε τα δικαιολογητικά του από την Νομαρχία Ξάνθης και τα υπέβαλε στην Νομαρχία Ροδόπης. Αλλά και στην Νομαρχία Ροδόπης τον περίμενε η διάκριση και η μη χορήγηση της άδειας αυτής. Έτσι μέχρι σήμερα δεν υλοποιήθηκε η εξαγγελία του κ.Πρωθυπουργού περί ισότητας και ισοπολιτείας χωρίς διάκριση μεταξύ των πολιτών ανεξαρτήτου καταγωγής.

Επειδή δεν του χορήγησαν την άδεια, έκανε προσφυγή στο Συμβούλιο Επικρατείας μήπως και δικαιωθεί. Αυστυχώς όμως και εκεί αμέτρητες φορές ανεβλήθηκε η δίκη. Την πρώτη φορά η Νομαρχία Ξάνθης δεν έστειλε τον φάκελλο στο Συμβούλιο Επικρατείας, την δεύτερη χάθηκε ο φάκελλος, την άλλη έλειπε κάποιο δικαιολογητικό, την επόμενη έλειπε το πόρισμα κάποιου ειδικού.

Έχω υποβάλλει αμέτρητες ερωτήσεις, σαν Βουλευτής στα Υπουργεία Εσωτερικών, Υγείας και Πρόνοιας. Επίσης έχω ενημερώσει προσωρινώς σχετικά με το θέμα αυτό τον κ.Πρωθυπουργό και όλους τους αρμόδιους της Κυβερνήσεώς του, αλλά μέχρι σήμερα η άδικη και ατολήνη αντίσταση των Κυβερνήσεων της Ελλάδας περί αδικίας, διάκρισης και αιάνθρωπης συμπεριφοράς συνέχισε ανελέητα.

Η πολιτεία για να τον στρατολογήσει όμως είχε τελείως αντίθετη στάση. Τότε τον θεωρούσε Έλληνα πολίτη

Σήμερα μέσα στην Βουλή των Ελλήνων θα έχω την δυνατότητα να ακούσω από τον υπεύθυνο Υπουργό αν η Κυβέρνησή του έχει τον σεβασμό στα δίκαια αιτήματα ενός πολίτη ή θα συνεχίσει η διάκριση και καταπίεση των ανδρώπων δικαιωμάτων που διακινδυνεύεται της βάρος των ανδρώπων που δεν έχουν ελληνική καταγωγή ασχέτως αν είναι Έλλη-

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νες πολίτες και αναπληρούν τις υποχρεώσεις τους έναντι της πολι-
τείας.

Ερωτάται ο κύριος Υπουργός:

Ο φαρμακοποιός Νουρή Ογλού Γιουξέλ θα έχει την πολυπόθητη άδεια
ιδρύσεως φαρμακείου για να συντηρήσει την οικογένειά του ή όχι;

Αθήνα 25 Ιανουαρίου 1993

Ο ΕΡΩΤΩΝ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΗΣ



ΣΑΔΙΚ ΑΜΕΤ ΣΑΔΙΚ

Appendix E Sadık Ahmet's Parliamentary Question to the
Ministers of Interior and National Economy on
10 July 1990

Β ο υ λ ή τ ω ν Ε λ λ ή ν ω ν

Ζ' Περὶδος Προεδρευομένης Δημοκρατίας

Σ ύ ν ο δ ο ς Α'

ΒΟΥΛΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ	
ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΓΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΕΥΝΑΣ	
Αριθ. Πρωτ. ΕΠΙΧΑΙΡΩΝ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΩΝ	89
Ημερομηνία Κατάθεσης	10-7-90
Ωρα Κατάθεσης	12.30 π.μ.

Επίκαιρη Ερώτηση:

του Ανεξάρτητου Βουλευτή

Νομού Ροδόπης

Σαδίκ Αμέτ Σαδής

Υπουργοί: Εσωτερικών

Εθνικής Οικονομίας.-

11/7/1990, ημέρα Τετάρτη και ώρα 20.00', συζητείται το «πρόγραμμα Δημοσίων Επενδύσεων του Νομού Ροδόπης στο Νομαρχιακό Συμβούλιο. Όπως φαίνεται από την εισήγηση του Επενδυτικού Προγράμματος αφορά μόνον (1/3) -ένα τρίτο- του Νομού Ροδόπης. Κατάφωρη παραβίαση της ισότητας ισοπολιτείας και ισονομίας μεταξύ των πολιτών. Η διάκριση που γίνεται εις βάρος της μειονότητας αντιτίθεται και στις προγραμματικές δηλώσεις της Κυβέρνησης. Οι επενδύσεις δεν γίνονται στις περιοχές που έχουν αυτή ανάγκη, αλλά εκεί που υπάρχει σκοπιμότητα.

Ε ρ ω τ ώ τ α ι: Οι κ.κ. Υπουργοί Εσωτερικών και Εθν.Οικονομίας

- 1.- Γιατί η Νομαρχία Ροδόπης κάνει αυτή την διάκριση, ώστε να διχάσει τον λαό της Ροδόπης στα δύο;
- 2.- Μήπως οι μισοί κάτοικοι του Νομού Ροδόπης είναι Έλληνες πολίτες και οι άλλοι μισοί είναι άλλης χώρας;
- 3.- Πιστεύετε ότι με τέτοιο επενδυτικό πρόγραμμα θα γίνει οικονομική ανάπτυξη στην υποβαθμισμένη ακριτική περιοχή της Θράκης;

Ο Ε ρ ω τ ώ ν:

Ανεξάρτητος Βουλευτής

Νομού Ροδόπης

Σαδίκ Αμέτ Σαδής

Αθήνα, 10/7/1990

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