

A Game of Two Halves:
The Making of Professional Football in Turkey, 1946-1963

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Abstract

“A Game of Two Halves: The Making of Professional Football in Turkey, 1946-1963”

Sevecen Tunç, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2019

Professors Cengiz Kırılı and Şevket Pamuk, Dissertation Advisors

This dissertation examines the professionalization and popularization of football in Turkey in the period 1946-1963 from a social history perspective. Utilizing an extensive research based on the empirical-analytical model, it explores the transition of Turkish football from an amateur, participant-based sport into a professional mass spectator game. Focusing on a period when Turkish society was itself undergoing a significant transformation, this dissertation asks how changing social, political, demographic, and economic dynamics played role in the transformation of football and its cultural production.

The belated move towards professionalism in the post-World War II era, albeit without conceding the game to free-market forces, resulted in an incomplete, hybrid mode of professionalism, that would develop around public service values instead of a business logic. In this regard, this study lifts the lid off the peculiarities that give Turkish professional football its current shape.

One of the inspirations for this dissertation is the conception of football as a “total social phenomenon” to use Marcel Mauss’s term, that illuminates the historical development of the wider society. Guided by this perspective, this study contributes to the recognition of football as a subject of serious academic research in Turkey and expands the horizon of the international sports history literature by offering a non-Western case study.

80,000 words

Özet

“İki Devreli Bir Oyun: Türkiye’de Profesyonel Futbolun Oluşumu, 1946-1963”

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Bu tez sosyal tarih perspektifinden 1946-1963 arası dönemde Türkiye’de futbolun profesyonelleşmesini ve kitleselleşmesini ele alır. Ampirik-analitik modeli temel alan geniş bir araştırmadan faydalanarak, Türk futbolunun amatör ve katılımcı temelli bir spordan profesyonel ve kitlesel bir oyuna dönüşümünü irdeler. Türkiye toplumunun da önemli bir dönüşümden geçtiği bir döneme odaklanarak, değişen sosyal, siyasi, demografik ve ekonomik dinamiklerin futbol ve onun kültürel üretiminde nasıl rol oynadığını sorgulamaktadır.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde gecikmiş bir şekilde ve oyunu serbest piyasa güçlerine terk etmeden profesyonelliğe geçiş, piyasa mantığı yerine kamu hizmeti değerleri çevresinde gelişecek eksik ve melez bir profesyonellik örneği yaratmıştır. Bu anlamda bu çalışma Türkiye’de profesyonel futbola bugünkü şeklini veren hususiyetleri de açığa çıkarma çabasıdır.

Bu tezin ilhamlarından birisi de futbolun toplumun tarihsel gelişimini de aydınlatan, Marcel Mauss’un ifadesi ile “topyekûn bir toplumsal fenomen” olarak kavramsallaştırılmasıdır. Bu perspektiften hareketle bu çalışma bir yandan Türkiye’de futbolun ciddi bir akademik araştırma konusu olarak kabulüne katkı sağlamayı hedeflerken aynı zamanda Batı-dışı bir örnek sunarak uluslararası spor tarihi literatürünün ufkunu da genişletmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

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Famous or fameless...
To those who made the history of football in Turkey

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BJK	Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club (Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü)
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
FB	Fenerbahçe Sports Club (Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü)
GDPE	General Directorate of Physical Education (Beden Terbiyesi Genel Direktörlüğü)
GS	Galatasaray Sports Club (Galatasaray Spor Kulübü)
LPE	Law on Physical Education (Beden Terbiyesi Mükellefiyeti Kanunu)
RPP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
TFF	Turkish Football Federation (Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu)
TS	Trabzonspor Club (Trabzonspor Kulübü)
TSA	Turkish Sports Association (Türk Spor Kurumu)
UTSC	Union of Turkish Sports Clubs (Türkiye İdman Cemiyetleri İttifakı)

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Now it's time to spend with family and friends the time I have stolen from them over the course of these years and to set sail for new horizons.

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Preface

History plays a key role in the popular discourse of football. While old memories pepper daily football conversations, fans enjoy recouring to a past that is believed to be full of triumphs. Fans seek ways of supporting their claims about the games with historical references. History appears to be not only an inspiring metaphor, but also the richest resource for the formation and promotion of fan identities. When Fenerbahçe fans sing

A history lies in your past
Long live Fenerbahçe.

the fans of Galatasaray respond

History writes only the facts
And history is written by Galatasaray.

Although they are opposing parties of the fiercest rivalry in Turkish football, they share a common understanding of history that is nostalgic, mythical, and selective.

Of course, in reconstructing the past, fans do not necessarily require an objective foothold. According to William Baker, sport and particularly football, more than most forms of human activity, lends itself to myth-making.¹ The narrative and visual universe of football has always been underpinned by mystification, aestheticization and propaganda.² In their vision of the history, argues Berryman, fans have a strong tendency to misinterpret, oversimplify, misrepresent, and even falsify the actual record.³ They reinvented the past through the myth of a “golden age.” Football of the past is believed to have been better because it was not sullied by professionalism, politics and violence.

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- 1 William Baker, “William Webb Ellis and the Origins of Rugby Football: The Life and Death of a Victorian Myth,” *Albion* 13, no. 2 (1981): 117.
 - 2 Tanıl Bora, *Karhanede Romantizm* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006): 86.
 - 3 Jack W. Berryman, “Introduction,” in *Essays on Sport History and Sport Mythology*, ed. Donald G. Kyle and Gary D. Stark (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1990): 3.

Those glorious years ended “because the old virtues were forgotten, moral decay set in, pleasure and vice overcame discipline and self-sacrifice, the old certainties and hierarchies dissolved.”⁴

Golden age myths can be found not only in the historiographies of sports clubs, but also in sports journalism, commentary, and public debate. It has a dual function. On one hand, the epic narrative of the past ensures the mass appeal of football as a system of values and memories on an ongoing basis.⁵ On the other hand, the retention of the glorious past serves as a mechanism for protecting against possible future degeneration. During turbulent moments in Turkish football such as moral crises, incidents of violence, match-fixing and corruption scandals, the golden past is urgently and nostalgically recalled. It is a cliché in sports that journalists commemorate old football heroes for superior virtues such as morality, sportsmanship, and amateur spirit. In a similar manner, spectators of the past are described as pure and harmonious.

I remember the football of the times when it was played with an amateur spirit. The time of Can, Lefter, Mehmetçik Basri... How did this wonderful football, these players and spectators vanish? They were the naiads of our early youth. Now they are gone. I remember. At the end of the game especially if Fenerbahçe won we would wait hours at the doors of İnönü Stadium and knock each other over to reach Can's, Lefter's hands. There were no blades or axes. There was no monstrous swearing in the stands. Believe it or not, no curses from that time stick in my mind. I only remember the "bir baba hindi" rhyme. Who threw those stones? Who frightened away the naiads? Football was like a ballet recital. There was no television, no football magazine shows. No chit chat on football for hours. The beauty of football was the amateur

4 Anthony D. Smith. “National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent,” in *Nationalism Critical Concepts in Political Science*, vol. 1, ed. A. Smith and John Hutchinson (London: Routledge, 2000), 1403.

5 Tahsin Yücel, *Söylemlerin İçinden* (Istanbul: Alakarga Yayınları, 2014).

spirit of the players. There were flowers thrown onto the playing field by spectators. There were civilized cheerleaders.⁶

Depicting the football milieu of the 1950s as aesthetic and naïve as a ballet, the author of this quotation fails to see the game in the context of its time. The past, just like the present, was not unsullied by swearing, violence, and other fatalities surrounding the game. The 1950s have especially become a reference for describing the golden age of Turkish football, a decade that contrarily bore the torments and tensions of an important transition from amateurism to professionalism, paving the way for a series of remarkable changes to the game's development. At this point, one might ask if there is a link between the problems that supposedly corrupted contemporary Turkish football and the processes of professionalization and commercialization that took place after the Second World War. Other questions follow: How did football become the most popular sport in Turkey and an indispensable part of the everyday lives of Turkish people? Did the diffusion of the game take place in a bottom up or a top down manner? What were the practical and cultural motivations of the politicians to employ the popularity of the game? How did football play a role in the rise of a Turkish national identity, if at all? It only stands to reason that all these overarching questions can be augmented with others.

According to Martin Polley, if questions that address the relation of football to wider social, economic, and political dynamics are not raised by historians, then ahistorical and mythological invocations of the past will continue to determine our historical knowledge and inform our everydayness.⁷ In turn, another famous sport historian Wray Vampley argues that the "prime duty" of sport historians is to "set the sports record straight, and thus prevent myths from becoming conventional wisdom."⁸ This is only possible by adopting a critical perspective through a "forensic interrogation and a cross-examination

6 Münir Göker. "Futbolun Su Perileri," *Cumhuriyet*, January 13, 2002. For the original Turkish, See appendix B.

7 Martin Polley, *Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1998), 17.

8 Wray Vampley, *Pay Up and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1975-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 13.

of those who propagate mythical versions of the past,” such that the researcher turns from being a mere observer or narrator of the past into what Elias termed a *mythenjager* - a hunter or destroyer of myths.⁹

As far as Turkish sports historiography is concerned, it is obvious that the existing literature is weak in terms of analytical ability, methodology, and content and also bedeviled by an abundance of myths. Moreover, most of the works accept the basic assumptions of earlier studies unquestioningly and thus repeat the same mistakes. This is what Yiğit Akın called “the vicious circle of Turkish sports historiography.”¹⁰ In this regard, any scholarly endeavor to analyze football and its interplay with other social, economic, and political dynamics must break this circle and challenge long-lasting myths in the historiography of football in Turkey. It will undoubtedly contribute to the recognition of football as a serious academic subject and expand the horizon of the growing intellectual and popular interest in the game. It is this perspective that galvanized this social history of football in Turkey, with its particular focus on the post-World War II transformation of the game.

9 Quoted in Joseph Maguire, “Common Ground? Links Between Sports History, Sports Geography and the Sociology of Sport,” *Sporting Traditions* 12, no. 1 (1995): 9.

10 Yiğit Akın, “‘Not Just a Game’: Sports and Physical Education in Early Republican Turkey (1923-51)” Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003: 18-19.

“You’re just a tourist with a typewriter, Barton.
I live here; don’t you understand that?”

– Ethan & Joel Cohen, *Barton Fink*

Introduction

In years following the Second World War, Turkish football embarked on a new, irreversible journey from an amateur past towards a professional future that altered the social, economic, and political landscape of the game forever. Turkish football was made in its early modern form with the emergence of new commercial dynamics, the geographical growth of clubs and competitions, and a great expansion in terms of numbers of people playing, watching, and writing about the game. On one hand, football, losing its connections to Kemalist body politics, acquired new values and meanings that made it literally the “people’s game.” On the other hand, as the political regime converted into a multiparty system, the game’s interplay with politics flourished. Football, during those years, incorporated into what E. P. Thompson originally termed “the theatre of the gentry” and at the same time it served as “the counter theatre of the people.”¹

This dissertation explores the transformation of Turkish football from an amateur, participant-based game into a professional, mass spectator sport. It further looks at how it became a popular recreation and a central aspect of social life in the post-World War II era. It particularly focuses on the transition from amateurism to professionalism, which was supposed to open up new

1 Quoted in John Hargreaves, “The State and Sport: Programmed and Non-Programmed Intervention in Britain,” in *Politics of Sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 243.

possibilities for Turkish football. I argue that demographic, political, and economic dynamics played a crucial role in the development of the original, distinctive path of Turkish football towards becoming a professional, mass spectator sport.

The post-World War II era is commonly described as a transition period when Turkish society had undergone a massive transformation. Turkey, which had been until then a closed society under a single party government for more than twenty years, finally moved towards an open, competitive political regime in 1945. With the transition to multiparty politics, the rural masses emerged as one of the important forces in Turkish political life for the first time in Turkish history.² Especially after the Democrat Party (DP) came to power in 1950, the transformation of Turkish society reached an unprecedented momentum. During this period, economic progress was manifest in the expansion of market relations, commodification of agriculture, and an industrial leap with the foundation of middle-sized industrial plants and state factories. These were accompanied by a series of improvements in both transportation and communications. All these developments stimulated rural-urban migration, particularly to three large cities: Istanbul, İzmir, and Ankara. The 1950s were an era shaped by the emergence of new power groups in politics, and an upsurge in social mobilization that led to a blurring of the distinction between the urban and the rural.

According to many, the modernization process in Turkey started a new phase under the impact of the international, post-war conditions in the 1950s.³ Although the start of the country's Westernization process generally dates

2 Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, 8th ed. (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), 93-4.

3 For a discussion of this literature, see Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, eds., *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday Modern Turkey* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002); Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987); Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993); Esra Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State and Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

back to the Tanzimat period, the Turkish people were directly faced with modernization in the 1950s. While the immediate consequences of this social dynamism and response to modernization from above were manifest in the 1950 elections, its consequences would eventually be translated into cultural and social formations. For instance, Özbek explains the emergence of *arabesk* (in English, arabesque) music in the 1960s in this context, as "the first massive popular cultural formation" in Turkey that is neither elitist, nor emerged in a top down manner.⁴

The post-1950 period, as Ergin emphasizes, allowed the people to become actively involved in cultural politics and challenge the very idea of the center created by the republican elite in the previous period.⁵ The popular masses not only emerged on the political stage as the electorate for the first time in Turkish history, but also emerged on the social and cultural scenes as the new makers of the modernization process in the aftermath of the war. It is because, as Bozdoğan and Kasaba noted,

the ultimate character and direction of the project of modernity in countries like Turkey will be determined not by the will of state elites but in that zone where state forces come into contact with social structures which they try to mold after an idealized vision.⁶

In Turkey, football, of which amateur sport ideologues in the early republican era had disapproved, attracted the masses and succeeded in becoming the most popular sport after World War II. By virtue of its growing popularity among the masses, the cultural production of the game was also exposed to change. Just like arabesque music, Turkish football acquired a hybrid character in this new phase of modernization. The hybridity of Turkish football manifest itself in cultural and administrative terms, one stemming from the rapid popularization of the game and the other from the incomplete nature of its

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- 4 Meral Özbek, "Arabesk Culture: A Case of Modernization and Popular Identity," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Reşat Bozdoğan and Sibel Kasaba (University of Washington Press, 1997), 173–88.
 - 5 Murat Ergin, "On Humans, Fish, and Mermaids: The Republican Taxonomy of Tastes and Arabesk," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 33 (2005).
 - 6 Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan, introduction to *Rethinking Modernity*, 13.

professionalization. The game's invasion by alternative discourses and power groups resulted in further calls to prevent the degeneration of Turkish football in those years. While the cultural contradictions inherent in arabesque music were being expressed through the *whiskey* and *lahmacun* (Turkish pizza with spicy meat filling) dichotomy, the cultural elite expressed the hybrid nature of Turkish professional football through the metaphor of wearing sabots - simple shoes associated with the traditionalism and ultimately backwardness - with tuxedo - reflecting the West and modern clothing codes.

"The unexpected effects of people's resistance and reorganizations"⁷ transformed the cultural production of football as well as the values and meanings that were attached to the game. In this regard, I interpret football as both an object of modernization as well as a challenge to that very process. This dissertation claims that the historical experience of football in Turkey constitute an invaluable resource for understanding the post-WWII Turkish society by offering an important site where the tensions as well as the articulations between the rural and the urban, the traditional and the modern, and the elite and the populace are reflected.

§ 1.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

For the last two decades, the development and diffusion of association football have been a source of intense debate in sports historiography. One of the salient features of this debate is its focus on the transition from amateurism to professionalism, which were functionalist normative values supposed to conduct the sporting activity.⁸ Although professionalism gradually superseded amateurism as the dominant feature of world football throughout the twentieth century, the degree and speed of this transition differed from one country to another depending on the local and global politico-historical contexts. In this section, I rethink amateurism and professionalism, the principle concepts

7 Joel Migdal, "Finding the Meeting Ground of Fact and Fiction: Some Reflections on Turkish Modernization," in *Rethinking Modernity*, 254.

8 Roy McCree, "Modern Sport, Middle Classes and Globalization in the Post-war Caribbean 1945-1952: Variations on a Theme," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25, no. 4 (March, 2008): 200.

driving this dissertation, in an international context and discuss the legalization of professionalism and its consequences in different cases.

The international literature on the early development of professional football was largely restricted to certain countries in Europe and Latin America and thus compromised mostly the interwar years when professionalism was legalized in the majority of these countries. On the contrary, Turkish experience occurs in a different time zone as a result of various socio-economic and political reasons. Nevertheless, the literature still offers important insights to uncover the class dimension in the longlasting conflict between amateurism and professionalism as well as to reveal the fact that professionalization was boosted by a series of other processes such as capitalist industrialization, urbanization, population growth, and technological developments.

This dissertation benefits from the case studies of other countries and cultures to unearth the distinctive features of the Turkish case, without claiming to be a comparative research. By historicizing the concept of professionalism in the framework of processes such as industrialization, urbanization, modernization, and liberalization, I extend the analysis of the official recognition of professionalism in Turkish football beyond the level of mere legislative practice and probe the sociocultural and political meanings attached to the game.

In order to understand the professionalization of football as a process that implies not only an administrative transformation but also a change in the value system, one should carefully look into the institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of amateurism. Amateurism is simply doing things for their own sake without the expectation of any material gain in return. Professionalism constitutes its antithesis and can be said to refer to deriving from sport, entirely or partly, the means of existence. It is often associated with gross ambition, gambling, and moral laxity.⁹ According to Allison, amateurism exists in a wide range of human activity, but only in sports has amateurism been

9 Richard Gruneau, "‘Amateurism’ as a Sociological Problem: Some Reflections Inspired by Eric Dunning," *Sport in Society: Commerce, Media, Politics* 9, no.4 (2006): 572; Stephan Wagg, Carlton Brick, Belinda Wheaton and Jayne Caudwell, eds. *Key Concepts in Sport Studies* (London: Sage, 2009), 10-15.

carefully defined and redefined as the terms “amateur” and “professional” have become earmarks of moral, social, economic, and political conflicts in society.¹⁰ Despite the centrality of the concept to sport, amateurism is subjective and thus difficult to strictly define. According to Holt, amateurism comprises a set of distinctive sporting ideals and practices, stressing voluntary association, active and ethical participation, and the repudiation of commerce and gambling.¹¹

Amateurism was developed as a sporting ethos in Victorian public schools in the mid-nineteenth century to articulate a world view and promote the distinction of the British aristocratic class. The ideal of the “gentleman amateur” was an “invented tradition,” to use Hobsbawm’s term, for nurturing “the corporate sense of superiority of elites” against the increasing influence of the working class in sports.¹² The amateur ethos spread throughout the world owing to the sporting pioneers in various societies who were urban elites from upper class families as well as admirers of the British aristocracy. Thanks to the paramount virtues of fair play, sportsmanship, self-discipline, obedience, and loyalty that are embodied in the notion, even capitalist promoters of professional sports later adopted the amateur rhetoric, and amateurism thus survived as an influential ideological discourse.¹³

However, amateurism was neither a consistent nor sustainable ideology. To explain from the perspective of Bourdieu, an athlete can easily convert his bodily capital (performance) to symbolic capital (success) and to economic one (money or reward). In the case of football, for instance, the labor or performance of the player gains a monetary value as the game becomes a popular sport and attracts larger crowds to the playing field. This inevitably transforms

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- 10 Lincoln Allison, *Amateurism in Sport: An Analysis and a Defence* (London: Routledge, 2001), 3.
 - 11 Richard Holt, “The Amateur Body and the Middle-class Man: Work, Health and Style in Victorian Britain,” *Sport in History* 26, no. 3 (December, 2006): 352.
 - 12 Robert W. Lewis, “The Genesis of Professional Football: Bolton-Blackburn-Darwen, the Centre of Innovation 1878-85” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 14, no. 1 (April, 1997): 22.
 - 13 McCree, “Modern Sport,” 200.

the relationship between the player and his club. The football player gains financially from his performance - maybe not in the form of direct payments due to the prohibition of professionalism, but in the form of university scholarships, job opportunities, or clandestine payments.¹⁴ Due to the ruling classes' insistence on amateurism, professionalism emerged around the world after a period of shamateurism in which amateur and professional dynamics were interwoven. As Ben-Porat explains for the case of Israel, most football clubs adopted a double-edged policy in the pre-professional era. Formally, they remained loyal to the code of amateurism, but informally and in practice, clubs had their own policies regarding proper compensation for their players.¹⁵

In almost all countries including Britain, the de facto implementation of professionalism was followed by its de jure recognition. The process of professionalization first began in the mid-nineteenth century, in the Lancashire triangle between Bolton, Blackburn, and Darwen. This was an exclusive region where "industrial capital was stronger, class divisions were sharper and working class was more manifest."¹⁶ The incursion of the working classes into football stimulated processes of commodification and professionalization in the game that would spread and eventually lead to the official recognition of professionalism by the English Football Association in 1885.¹⁷ In world football in general, it was always industrialized areas with high population densities where the lead in the game's road to professionalism was taken since the circumstances in such areas were propitious for the emergence of mass spectatorship.

The advent of professionalism in Britain constituted an important change that implied the gradual defeat of old aristocratic elites who traditionally controlled the game. Instead, the bourgeoisie came onto the stage. "Entrepreneurs, club committees, boards of directors and others began to seek the best

14 Ibid.

15 Amir Ben-Porat, "Six Decades of Sport, from a Game to Commodity: Football as a Parable," *Sport in Society* 12, no. 8 (2009): 1008.

16 Robert W. Lewis, "The Genesis of Professional Football," 23.

17 Ibid.

athletes which money could buy, and a willing public, prepared to pay to witness highly skilled entertainers, provided much of the wherewithal to finance this growing professionalism.”¹⁸ Many countries witnessed a similar power struggle in the transition from amateurism to professionalism in which ruling classes lost their absolute hegemony to industrialists who took the initiative to become the first sport entrepreneurs and to integrate the game into the market economy.¹⁹

After the legalization of professionalism, British football was gradually incorporated into the capitalist market economy. Labor relations between football clubs and players were extensively reorganized in the clubs’ favor. Players began to sign one-year contracts with their clubs with a maximum wage under the Football League’s retain-and-transfer system. The standard procedure for football contracts gave players no rights to transfer during the contract or after its termination. However, the foundation of a players’ union, the Professional Footballers Association, in 1907 helped challenge the system. By 1963, the retain-and-transfer system and the maximum wage were abolished, and players assumed a newfound freedom.²⁰

Open professionalism stimulated a series of further developments including the proliferation of clubs and players, increased competition, and rapid commercialization, privatization, and business involvement. Heavy investment was made in stadiums and other facilities, the organization of events as well as the league system were improved, and many sports clubs assumed corporate status with shareholders and limited liability. Clubs began to seek private financing to increase their competitive power in the market for players and coaches. Increased media coverage of football following the game’s popularization created new direct and indirect advertising opportunities for the business sector. Although the financial input from companies was not on par with that of present-day business, open professionalism stimulated the interest

18 Vamplew, *Pay Up*, 54.

19 Lewis, “The Genesis of Professional Football,” 23; David Goldblatt, *The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Soccer* (London: Penguin, 2006), 171-226.

20 Jonathan Magee and John Sugden, “The World at Their Feet’: Professional Football and International Labor Migration,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 26, no. 4 (2002): 424.

of numerous companies and personas. In time, advertising, sponsorship, financial transparency, and professional accounting practices became crucial to the running of the game.

In all respects, the official recognition of professionalism was a milestone in the development of modern football. The benefits of professionalization became evident with the improvement of football drills and skills, the sophistication of youth development programs, the modernization of coaching and referee education, the specialization of sports media, and the improvement of international football relations. Beside these technical developments, the legitimization of monetary relations changed the socio-cultural meaning attached to the players as well as the game. Football was no longer a participant-based game implying a class distinction in favor of the aristocracy. Rather, it was a professional, mass spectator sport in which not only were more and more people and institutions involved, but the “mass potential of spectators” became a determining factor in the game’s survival.

The development of professional football, argues Giulianotti, came “into a complex, dialectical relationship with specific traditional values and established power structures” in various societies.²¹ Although Britain presented the world of football with a market-driven model of professionalism with a strong business logic, not all countries adopted this model. In certain societies where the institution of amateurism was strong and the sport was considered an integral public service, hybrid solutions were found. In France, for instance, though contractual ties began to govern relations between players and their clubs after the advent of professionalism, not all bridges with amateurism were cut. Instead of privatization, which characterized the British model, clubs remained non-profit associations managed on a voluntary basis.²²

If one considers the British case as the standard, rather than an exception in the evolution of football, the rest of the world was late to embrace professionalism. The interwar era was a significant time period for the diffusion of professional football and its mass popularization in continental Europe and Latin America. In most advanced football nations - except the Low Countries,

21 Richard Giulianotti, *Sport: A Critical Sociology*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 33.

22 Pierre Lanfranchi and Alfred Wahl, “La Professionnalisation Du Football En France (1920–1939),” *Modern and Contemporary France* 6, no. 3 (1998), doi:10.1080/09639489808456436.

Denmark, Sweden and Germany – the spectacular rise in gate receipts as a result of the mass attendances at the stadiums had naturally led to growing monetary relations between clubs and players and accordingly professionalism was eventually recognized during those years.

According to a range of scholars including Goldblatt, Gruneau, Hargreaves and Dunning, a series of important, related processes boosted the launch of professional football in these countries. Among these were the consolidation of an industrial system based on wage labor, the reorganization of working hours, and the emergence of new urban communities.²³ Due to crucial reforms that reduced the length of working hours, young men in European and Latin American cities were released at the end of shorter working days and had the weekends and leisure time to themselves. As a result, the leisure market from theatres to taverns, and cinema to dance halls expanded. The working classes, among the many ways to spend their new-found freedom displayed particular interest in football.²⁴ The game swiftly integrated into this new leisure system and transformed by the new culture industries. There was a spectacular rise in match attendance along with an expansion in the number of football clubs that paralleled the growth of urban population.

According to Goldblatt, there were three poles of growth for professional football in the interwar years: Central Europe, the Western Mediterranean, and Latin America. Even though the preconditions for the professionalization of the game such as industrial and urban growth existed in almost all cases, there were cross-cultural differences in the growth of professional football depending on socioeconomic and political contexts. While Central European professional football was born from the collapse of an empire and the death of an old social order, professional football in Latin America was born of a tumultuous process of emergent economic development and social change. What distinguished the Western Mediterranean was that the game developed as an economic and social phenomenon and at the same time that it became a national institution.

23 Roy McCree, "Professional Soccer in the Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago, 1969-1983" *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 35, no.199 (2000): 199-218.

24 Goldblatt, *The Ball*, 172-176.

The first country after the Home Nations to recognize professionalism in European football was Austria, the birthplace of Wunderteam, a great team of the interwar years. The rapid growth of urban areas combined with a concurrent increase in population and economic change at the turn of the twentieth century provided the impetus for the popularization of football among the working classes. According to Hugo Meisl, the famous coach and creator of the team who made the decision as secretary of the Austrian Football Association, the official recognition of professionalism and launch of the first professional league in 1924 was merely the legalization of what was already in practice.²⁵ Geographical proximity, as John Bale argues, played a key role in the spread of professionalism in continental Europe.²⁶ Czechoslovakia and Hungary followed Austria establishing their own professional leagues in 1925 and in 1926 respectively. Both were responsive decisions to prevent the emigration of local players to neighboring countries where professional leagues had already been founded.²⁷

In South America, Brazil was the first country to embrace professionalism. According to many scholars, changes to the sporting code were part of a broader racial democracy political project of the Vargas government. Democratic openings such as the incursion of the working classes into the game with the coming of professionalism in 1933 supported government claims that Brazil was indeed a racial democracy.²⁸ Professionalization of football in Argentina and Chile was also part of populist projects of their governments. Like elsewhere in the world, rising working-class participation in football overwhelmed the first generation of elite leaders, eventually resulting in the legalization of professionalism. Duke and Crolley for the case of Argentina and Elsey for the case of Chile further claim – in opposition to the general assump-

25 Ibid., 196-210.

26 John Bale, *Sports Geography*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 51.

27 Gyozo Molnar, "Hungarian Football: A Socio-historical Overview," *Sport in History* 27, no. 2 (2007): 299-303.

28 Paulo Fontes and Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda, eds., *The Country of Football: Politics, Popular Culture and the Beautiful Game in Brazil* (London: Hurst, 2014), 48.

tion that football depoliticizes the masses - that football clubs in these countries democratized the political sphere by integrating migrants into urban politics. Clubs functioned as important vehicles for immigrant communities, not only to reinforce identity, but also to learn political skills and gain access to political channels.²⁹

On the other hand, football in the Western Mediterranean – the third pole of growth for professional football - has a close relationship to the national question. In Spain, where professionalism was legalized in 1926, the game functioned as an instrument of regional nationalism. Since the aristocratic amateur coterie in the country was weak, a professional football league was created in 1928, earlier than France and Italy, – despite the country’s economic underdevelopment. Provincial business elites who had no moral problem with paying players took the lead in open professionalism. On the other hand, due to resistance from sport officials, the move towards professionalism in Italy was gradual. The Italian Football Federation changed the status of football players to ‘non-amateurs’ in the *Carta di Viareggio* (Viareggio charter) of 1926. This was a crucial step on the road to professionalism. In 1929, the federation officially recognized professionalism through the formation of Serie A, the country’s first professional football league.

Among the three countries of the Western Mediterranean, France accepted open professionalism at the late date of 1932. As elsewhere in Europe, football became the most popular mass spectator sport in France during the World War I. Increasing public interest encouraged businessmen and club managers to become involved in the game as well as to improve the competitiveness of their teams. Jean-Pierre Peugeot III, boss of Peugeot Automobiles, the car company, created FC Sochaux in 1929 in the region of Peugeot’s home town and factory complexes, and he initiated the formation of the country’s first professional football league. The process of the professionalization of French football differs from that of the rest of Europe in the sense that the clubs of small- and medium-sized towns which were backed by paternalistic,

29 Vic Duke and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 18, no. 3 (2001): 93–116, doi:10.1080/714001587; Brenda Elsey, “Promises of Participation: The Politics of Football Clubs in Chile, 1909–1962” PhD diss., Stony Brook University, 2007.

family-owned firms became the flagbearers of professional football, instead of the sports clubs of large cities. Moreover, professionalism changed the lives of neither footballers nor clubs completely. Professional football players regularly practiced other occupations. Professional football far from represented a real trade possessing rules, codified ethics, representative bodies, training programs, career prospects, and promotions. Although contractual ties began to govern relations between players and their clubs, not all bridges were cut with amateurism. The clubs themselves remained non-profit associations based on the law on associations and were managed on a voluntary basis. Sport scholars such as Lanfranchi and Wahl use the term “incomplete professionalisation” to describe this peculiar situation.³⁰ The game became professionalized in accordance with amateur values and a public service mentality instead of with a business logic.³¹

While most Latin American and European countries launched their first professional leagues in the interwar years, there were also nations that completed this transition as late as the 1990s. Despite the presence of conditions for the emergence of mass spectatorship, football remained amateur in Germany and Scandinavian countries. The deep-rooted amateur ethos in local sporting cultures played a significant role in the belatedness of open professionalism.³² As Taylor puts it, “in many cases, professionalism was checked by the strength of the amateur ethos among football’s early participants and administrators.”³³ Especially in societies where physical culture policies were strictly based on amateurism, professionalism was repressed at the expense of the game’s development. Grenaue argues that thanks to the moral qualities of fair play, sportsmanship, obedience, and discipline amateurism evokes, even the capitalist promoters of professional sports would keep alive the amateur rhetoric as the romantic notion of free human expression in sport.³⁴ Karl Boer

30 Lanfranchi and Wahl, “La Professionnalisation.”

31 Geoff Hare, *Football in France: A Cultural History* (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 25-31.

32 Goldblatt, *The Ball*, 218-222.

33 Matthew Taylor, *The Association Game: A History of British Football* (London: Pearson Longman, 2008), 64.

34 Gruneau, “‘Amateurism’ as a Sociological Problem,” 572.

notes that in the case of Nigeria, the retention of strict amateurism led to the advent of a professional league in 1990 only after a long period of shamateurism. “Ironically, the same amateurism had largely been abandoned in England itself, the officials of the colonial state wishing to maintain an ideal in Africa which was not maintainable in Europe.”³⁵

In many third world countries where “politics and economics were interwoven in [football’s] management,”³⁶ the ideological rupture from the amateur ethos came within the context of a transition to a market economy. In most, including Israel, Iran, Algeria, and Syria, professionalism was eventually legitimized, within the ongoing process of opening the country to outside world, as an external requirement: a global force for improving the standards of the national game and catch up to modern football nations.³⁷ For instance, Megheirkouni argues that Syria promoted professionalization of its sports system after 2000 when Syrian economy moved from a centrally planned socialist economy to a social market.³⁸ In a similar vein, Amara and Henry discuss in the case of Algeria that the official decision to promote professionalization of football in 1998 represents a shift from post-independence Algeria state socialism to the adoption of elements of market liberalization in the sports system.³⁹ However, as these scholars underscore, the adoption of professional

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- 35 Wiebe Karl Boer, “Nation Building Exercise’: Sporting Culture and the Rise of Football in Colonial Nigeria,” PhD diss., Yale University, 2003: 393.
- 36 Amir-Ben Porat, “From Community to Commodity: The Commodification of Football in Israel,” *Soccer and Society* 13, no. 3 (2012): 452.
- 37 Mahfoud Amara and Ian Henry, “Between Globalization and Local ‘Modernity’: The Diffusion and Modernization of Football in Algeria,” *Soccer and Society* 5, no. 1 (2004): 1–26, doi:10.1080/14660970512331390974; Majd Megheirkouni, “Syrian Sport on an International Stage: Evaluating the Sports Movement between 1970 and 2013,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 14 (2014): 1820–30, doi:10.1080/09523367.2014.940907; Babak Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class: Conflict and Contestation in the Development of Football in Iran,” *Soccer and Society* 5, no. 3 (2004): 356–70, doi:10.1080/1466097042000279607; Amir Ben-Porat, “Cui Bono? Arabs, Football and State,” *Soccer and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 496–511, doi:10.1080/14660970.2014.919277; Porat, “Six Decades of Sport, from a Game to Commodity: Football as a Parable,” *Sport in Society* 12, no. 8 (2009).
- 38 Majd Megheirkouni, “Syrian Sport,” 1821.
- 39 Amara and Henry, “Between Globalization and Local ‘Modernity,’” 1.

code as a Western norm of sports practice as well as Western liberal values did not come in a globally homogenous form.⁴⁰ It is because “[football’s] birth and its continued life and development into the twenty-first century have intersected with important cultural and historical processes such as colonialism, the rise of nationalism, women’s liberation, urbanism, industrialization, state building, globalization and political revolt. The game has been influenced by these developments and has helped shape them as well.”⁴¹ In line with this argument, this historical account of Turkish football also seeks to explore the reinterpretation and indigenization of professionalism in Turkish football as well as to unearth the articulation of social, ideological, political, and cultural struggles within Turkish society through the prism of football.

§ 1.2 Marking the Field: Turkish Football Historiography

The historical study of football is inversely proportional to the game’s popularity in Turkey. The general marginalization of sports in Turkish scholarship originates from a traditional presumption that sport is a frivolous subject of inquiry. Furthermore, academic snobbery, the hegemony of “opiate theories” related to football, and scant interest in mass culture and the lives of ordinary people further contributed to the lack of understanding of the subject. Although sports in general and football in particular have acquired an intellectual glamour in the last twenty years in Turkey, sports history as an academic sub-discipline has yet to flourish. In the absence of academic and analytical studies, the literature heavily rests on descriptive works such as biographies of notable athletes and popular writing on leading clubs and ancient Turkish sports. This dissertation addresses this void and acknowledges the importance of football not only as popular recreation but as a political instrument and an invaluable source of identity reinforcement in twentieth-century Turkey.

Football entered the Turkish-Ottoman geography in the late nineteenth century via the British Levantines and non-Muslim communities living in

40 Ibid.

41 Alon Raab, “Soccer in the Middle East: an introduction,” *Soccer and Society* 13, no. 5-6 (2012): 620.

port cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Thessaloniki.⁴² In its inception, football was an elite, amateur game that reflected the class distinction and cultural supremacy of non-Muslims who had strong economic and social bonds with the outside world vis-à-vis the Turkish populace. In a short time, the game attracted the interest of the Turkish community, especially of urban, educated elites who were interacting with Europeans and non-Muslims in a period of rapid modernization.⁴³ Starting in the 1910s, Turkish nationalists, recognizing the potential of football for the construction of national identity, integrated the game into the nationalist movement which promoted a broad range of activities in the economic, cultural, and political spheres.⁴⁴

In the eyes of the pioneers of Turkish sport, amateurism constituted the ethical framework of football and of modern sports in general. Modern sports were utilized for the health and physical education of future generations in the process of nation building. In this regard, amateurism offered Turkish sports officers an ideological ground upon which implement policies that would prove that sport should be undertaken for loftier goals than commerce or entertainment.⁴⁵ However, as Baker points out, the application of amateurism to the administration of sports was highly subjective and depended on social class, nationality, regional identity, and gender.⁴⁶ In the early republican era, Kemalist policy makers, inspired by the Soviet model of formal amateurism

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- 42 Cüneyd Okay, "The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of Soccer in Turkey: 1890-1914," *Soccer and Society* 3, no.3 (2002): 2.
- 43 Cem Emrence, "From Elite Circles to Power Networks: Turkish Soccer Clubs in a Global Age, 1903-2005," *Soccer and Society* 11, no.3 (2004): 242-43.
- 44 Birgit Krawietz, "Sport and Nationalism in the Republic of Turkey," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 3 (2014): 336-46, doi:10.1080/09523367.2013.865602; Cüneyd Okay, "Sport and Nation Building: Gymnastics and Sport in the Ottoman State and the Committee of Union and Progress, 1908-18.," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 20, no. 1 (2003): 152-56, doi:10.1080/714001845.
- 45 Gruneau, "Amateurism' as a Sociological Problem," 575.
- 46 Norman Baker, "Whose Hegemony? The Origins of the Amateur Ethos in Nineteenth Century English Society," *Sport in History* 24, no.1 (2004): 2.

and anti-commercialism, rejected the elitism and social exclusionism of bourgeois amateurism.⁴⁷ Instead, they protected amateurism as an official value system to promote voluntarism, sportsmanship and mass participation in sports. However, there was always a tendency to monetize football in line with the game's rising popularity. The first covert professional players in the country emerged in the first years of the twentieth century as early as the inception of the game.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, professionalism did not acquire a legal status until the Professionalism Bylaw was eventually enacted in 1951.

In line with the theoretical discussion in the previous section, I argue that the advent of professionalism in Turkish football owes much to certain processes including urbanization, population growth, industrialization, liberalization, and the transition to democracy after World War II. Through a series of critical discussions of various social, cultural, and political changes in the relationship between football and society starting in the mid-1940s, this dissertation analyzes the conditions that facilitated the complex transition of Turkish football from an amateur past to a popular, professional future. It fills an important gap in the research by raising certain questions driven by the limitations of the existing literature. Although it is widely accepted that Turkish football underwent a crucial transformation under the new domestic and global conditions after World War II, researchers have abstained from analyzing this process in elaborate way. This is one of the main weaknesses of Turkish football historiography: most sports historians have confined their work to what Akın has labelled “the established paradigms of modern Turkish historiography.”⁴⁹ The literature thus rests heavily on the early republican period when sport was regarded as an important component of the Kemalist modernization project and amateurism was its ideological ground. Considering that sports history is not recognized in Turkish academia, researchers found it safer to reproduce historical knowledge in the framework of official historiography instead of focusing on the turbulent period when Kemalist sporting ideals were at the cusp of losing their currency. The insufficiency of secondary

47 Robert Edelman, *Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the U.S.S.R.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4-20.

48 Mehmet Yüce, *Osmanlı Melekleri* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2014), 76.

49 Yiğit Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 19.

resources further discouraged young researchers in the field from studying the post-World War II period.

With an aim of uncovering a critical juncture in the historical development of Turkish football, the author of this dissertation aspired to go beyond the comfort zone of Turkish sports historiography by focusing on a period which has hitherto hardly been analyzed. However, as Akın previously emphasized, studying in any of the “marginal” fields of the social sciences embodies certain obstacles and limitations.⁵⁰ If one of the difficulties for this particular study is the lack of academic works on the post-WWII development of football in Turkey, the other is the shortage of archival documents. This is because not only the culture of keeping archival records was underdeveloped in Turkey, but also sport-related documents were never considered noteworthy to be saved in official archives, as Fişek once noted.⁵¹ In this regard, neither state nor official sports institutions or private sports clubs unfortunately surprised the author of this study with their poor archival materials.

In the absence of archival resources, this research has heavily concentrated on the printed press material. For an exhaustive historical investigation of the past, a wide range of daily newspapers and sports journals of the period under question were examined. However, since the traditional repository of documentary records generally reflect the worldview of the ruling elite, this study also made use of oral histories, photographs, fictional texts, and movies to excavate the experiences of football players as well as fans.⁵² This primary research is backed up by three distinct bodies of literature including works on the post-World War II history of Turkey, Turkish sports historiography – albeit the presence of limited number of works in the genre –, and the international literature on the historical experience of the game’s professionalization.

“The discovery and analysis of primary sources alone does not make history,” argues Arthur Marwick, “but without the study of primary sources there

50 Akın, “Not Just A Game,” 10.

51 Kurthan Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi* (Istanbul: YGS Yayınları, 2003), 13.

52 Mike Huggins and Mike O’Mahony, “Prologue: Extending Study of the Visual in the History of Sport,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 28, no. 8–9 (2011): 1089–1104, doi:10.1080/09523367.2011.567765.

is no history.”⁵³ Although the theoretical and methodological debates have been becoming widespread in international sports historiography, the consensus among sport historians is still to provide a narrative of events from a reconstructionist perspective.⁵⁴ However, the exhaustive primary research embodied in this dissertation was not only an academic choice; but also an obligation. The fact that there is almost no scholarly work on the issue preceding this study has compelled me to dig more into primary evidence. Following the tradition of theoretical eclecticism in British sports historiography, I seek to conduct a dialogue between theory and evidence and develop analytical insights firmly informed by evidence.⁵⁵ I avoid the use of theoretical vocabulary in order to make sense of the game as a part of the general history of modern Turkey for a non-specialist audience. As Holt elaborated upon, football has to be explained in terms of things beyond itself, but it still has to be enjoyed for its own sake: “Celebration and analysis can and should go hand in hand.”⁵⁶

One aspect of this study the author has regrettably confess is the absence of women’s voice due to the fact that their role as both football spectators and players remained largely marginalized during the period of this study. Although sociological studies on the axes of gender, hegemony, patriarchy, and sport considerably increased in recent years parallel to women’s struggle and their visibility in the field of sport in general, there still lacks fully-fledged works on women’s relationship with sport from a historical perspective. In this regard, the role of women as spectators, players, and administrators as well in Turkish football history deserves a subsequent study to itself.

Despite the lack of full-fledged work on the post-war transformation of Turkish football, there are analytically-informative studies that unearth the connections between the post-war football boom, liberalization, populism,

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- 53 Quoted by Martin Johnes, “Archives, Truths and the Historian at Work: A Reply to Douglas Booth’s ‘Refiguring the Archive,’” *Sport in History* 27, no. 1 (2007): 128-129.
 - 54 Andy Harvey, “Team Work? Using Sporting Fiction as an Historical Archive and Source of Developing Theoretical Approaches to Sport History,” *The International Journal of History of Sport* 30, no. 2 (2013): 132.
 - 55 Joseph A. Maguire. “Studying Sport Through the Lens of Historical Sociology and/or Sociological History,” *Sport in Society* 14, no. 7-8 (2011): 876-881.
 - 56 Richard Holt, *Sport and the British: A Modern History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 11.

and multi-party politics. Addressing the particular weaknesses of Turkish sports historiography, this study also builds on the strengths of recent contributions to the literature coming from both academic and popular-intellectual circles.

For instance, Gökaçtı's standout book on the political history of Turkish football hints at the peculiarities of Turkish professional football. He asserts that the strong state patronage of Turkish football stems from the historical lack of a bourgeoisie to initiate and develop the professionalization and commercialization of the game. He further indicates the ideological split among Kemalist policy-makers on the issue of amateurism versus professionalism. According to him, post-war political and economic conditions that provided a suitable ground for professionals to challenge the amateur hegemony and implement their own policies.⁵⁷

In line with Gökaçtı's arguments, Irak explains, in his piece on Turkish sports diplomacy after the World War II that it became impossible for Turkish football authorities to insist on amateurism at a time when the country was urgently searching alliances with Western powers.⁵⁸ In addition to these, a recent, fresh contribution to the debate came in the form of Barış Alp Özden's dissertation on working-class formation in the period between 1946 and 1962. Contextualizing football as a rising popular leisure activity, Özden argues that improvements in working and living conditions among the working classes in the aftermath of the World War II made football a literal "the people's game."⁵⁹

Building on the contemporary, fruitful approaches of these scholars who dared to venture into sports history, I contextualize certain themes and concepts such as the weakness of the bourgeoisie, the strong culture of amateurism and a 'public service' ethic, political patronage, and the tardy incursion of

57 M. Ali Gökaçtı, "*Bizim İçin Oyna*" *Türkiye'de Futbol ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 181-217.

58 Dağhan Irak, "From Battlefields to Football Fields: Turkish Sport Diplomacy in the Post-Second World War Period," in *Turkey in the Cold War: Global Influences, Local Manifestations*, ed. Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 158-73.

59 Barış Alp Özden, "Working Class Formation in Turkey 1946-1962" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2011), 105-126.

the working classes and adopt a broader perspective to explore the peculiarities of professional football in Turkey. I claim that the historical experience of professionalism in Turkish football is a complex formation and hybrid interaction of various cultural and sporting discourses that thus provide an invaluable example of “belated modernity.” By emphasizing Turkish professional football’s belated, state-assisted, and incomplete emergence and hybrid nature, I contribute to new studies on the alternative modes of professionalization that deviate from the notion of a single, universal modernity modelled on British football in general.

This study deploys the notion of “incompleteness” in two respects. First, from a comparative perspective with the British case, the term “incomplete” is used to describe a peculiar situation in Turkey: despite the official recognition of professionalism, football community including club executives, football players, and the official administrators of the game maintained the amateur model by refusing to apply the rules of the free market to football. This hybrid model indicated a state-assisted professionalization under which football clubs were dependent on state subsidies for large-scale investments.⁶⁰ As a result, Turkish professional football developed in a distinctive culture which “on the one hand, harbors modern rationalized principles centered on rules, merit, performance and measurement; on the other hand, traditional values that are influential, centered on privilege, patronage and personal connections.”⁶¹

The other dimension of ‘incompleteness’ manifests itself in the geographical diffusion of professional football. Taylor’s assertion that “professionalism was an innovation that took time to spread” is also valid for the case of Turkey.⁶² Except for the cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, football in the country remained a local and amateur environment until the foundation of the second division of the National Professional League in 1963. Although the First National Professional League was established in 1959, it failed to reflect regional diversity since only teams from the three major cities participated. In most Anatolian cities, the game continued in old-style, local amateur leagues

60 Hare, *Football in France*, 22.

61 Giulianotti, *Sport*, 33.

62 Taylor, *Association Game*, 63.

with regional cups and tournaments. However, when the so-called “city-club movement” was initiated by the establishment of professional clubs bearing the name of the city and the term ‘sport’, the cards of Turkish football were shuffled afresh.⁶³ In the mid-sixties, professional football in Turkey began to develop along the lines of hometowns and turned into a matter of “city representation” reproducing “imagined social differences among Anatolian cities.”⁶⁴ For this reason, this study covers the period up to the establishment of the second division of the National Professional Football League. Subsequent developments that accompanied the emergence of new provincial dynamics in Turkish football starting in the mid-1960s deserve a thorough examination that is not possible within the limited scope of this study.

The contribution of the dissertation is threefold. First, an analysis of Turkish football and its social significance at the PhD level not only expands the horizon of growing, popular-intellectual interest in the game, but also contributes to the academic recognition of sports history as a subfield of social history in Turkey. Secondly, the broader impact of this research stems from its particular focus on a neglected period in Turkish historiography. Although the 1950s were a substantial era when Turkish society underwent massive transformation, social history studies of the period are limited.⁶⁵ Given the scarcity of new tools and angles to explain the project and process of Turkish modernization, this study introduces football as an alternative mode of representation and as a “total social phenomenon,” to use Marcel Mauss’s term, that offers “one of the most visible sites of tension between old and new values, between competing social and cultural models.”⁶⁶

Last but not least, this dissertation contributes to the international literature on sports history by offering a non-Western case study. Although the empirical-analytical model in sport studies is recently on the decline due to the

63 Yiğit Akın, “Ana Hatları ile Cumhuriyet Döneminde Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Politikaları,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 103 (2005): 53–92.

64 Cem Emrence, “From Elite Circles to Power Networks,” 244.

65 Asım Karaömerlioğlu and Emre Balıkçı. “The Forgotten People: Turkey’s Artisans in the 1950s” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 40, no.2 (April, 2013): 184.

66 Hare, *Football in France*, 3–4.

epistemological and methodological salvos of postmodernism, there is still a need for studies that incorporate sport into “holistic notions of society” in non-Western contexts.⁶⁷ Such studies not only dilute the Western influence in international sports historiography by offering new perspectives and important insights into general problems but also help constitute, transmit, and transform sporting cultures.

§ 1.3 Dissertation Outline

According to Richard Holt, a pioneering scholar in the field, sports historians either opt for a thematic structure or prefer a chronological narrative form throughout their studies. They “do not simply tell stories. ... [I]n each case, they tend to see past events in terms of context.”⁶⁸ This dissertation adopts a chronological narration with a strong emphasis on certain themes and historical categories in order to facilitate both the writing and reading comprehension. It consists of five chapters, apart from the introduction and conclusion in which findings are discussed. This study does not purport to give a complete account of Turkish football history; rather, the chapters focus on specific themes related to the post-World War II transformation of the game.

The second chapter following this introduction focuses on the early republican period and provides a historical background for the study. The chapter explores how the institutionalization of amateurism as a sporting ethos shaped Kemalist body politics and played role in the belated advent of professional football in the country. While football’s march towards professionalism accelerated on the international stage in the 1920s, sports authorities in Turkey were urgently searching for a consistent sports policy for the new nation-state. On the other hand, in line with the consolidation of official physical culture and sports policies throughout the thirties, the disbelief of the regime in football gradually increased. Aspects of football that were incompatible with Kemalist physical culture were also questioned in order to explain growing tension between sports clubs and the regime.

⁶⁷ Douglas Booth, *The Field*, 19.

⁶⁸ Richard Holt, “Historians and the History of Sport,” *Sport in History* 34, no. 1 (2013): 3.

Centered on the transition from amateurism to professionalism, the third chapter opens with a brief account of the socioeconomic context of the post-World War II. It covers the period from 1946 up to 1952 when the first professional football league was established. Although the legalization of professional football was later postponed, political reconciliation on the issue shows the changing approach of the state towards sports and physical education in the aftermath of the war. Additionally, this chapter covers the inauguration of Mithatpaşa Stadium in 1947, a milestone in the development of football into a popular mass spectator sport. The stadium which became an urban landmark in the post-war years, offered city dwellers opportunities for social interaction, identity reinforcement, and urban integration.

Chapter four depicts the vivid landscape of football in the fifties with the launch of professional leagues in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. This chapter, on one hand, reflects the tensions and torments of the early period of professional football by addressing crucial problems both on and off the field. On the other, it demonstrates the footballization of Turkish society, by examining the increase in the number of clubs, match attendance, and in gate revenues as well as rising competition among clubs. It focuses on the Istanbul Professional League from 1952 to 1959, the first and foremost professional league in the country. Keyder stated that the cultural doors of Istanbul were mostly closed to new-comers during the years of migration.⁶⁹ In this regard, İnönü Stadium stood out as an exception.

Chapter five begins with the simple premise that, as Akin noted, the post-war transformation of Turkish football was the product of a complex, multi-dimensional process, and the multiple factors involved, therefore cannot be explained independent of the transformation of Turkish society under Democrat Party rule.⁷⁰ The first part of this chapter unearths how Turkish football was incorporated into a political strategy of the Democrat Party based on populism and patronage. The second deals with the tardy process of football's commercialization through game's interplay with business circles in its early professional period.

69 Çağlar Keyder, "Arka Plan," in *Istanbul Küresel ile Yerel Arasında*, ed. Çağlar Keyder (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000), 9–40.

70 Akin, "Ana Hatları ile," 77.

The sixth chapter of this work offers a thematic explanation of how football became an indispensable part of everyday life in Turkey. The first part of this chapter examines the professional player, shedding light on his socioeconomic background, labor relations, on-field performance, and penetration into a rising celebrity culture. The second part explores the emergence of the new, expressive, emotive fan culture. Through empirical findings on positive expressions of support, it challenges the existing literature of football fandom which overemphasizes violence and other football-related disorders. The last part of the chapter deals with the ‘indirect’ consumption of professional football through the distant media sources such as the print media, radio, cinema, and newsreels.

The seventh chapter, the conclusion, summarizes the dissertation’s arguments from a panoramic perspective. The chapter uncovers the link among the problems that are supposed to have corrupted contemporary Turkish football and the game’s post-war transformation. Finally, I discuss how the move towards the nationalization of professional football, with the establishment of second and subsequent divisions of professional leagues, led to the disappearance of long-lived clubs in Turkish football and the erosion of local football cultures and traditions in different regions of the country.

A Historical Outlook: Football and Body Politics in Early Republican Turkey

It is hard to tell why, but opponents of this game [football] - or to be precise, of this science, - are quite numerous. Lots of people see football as a rough game. We, as footballers, obviously do not and should not tolerate this... The majority in the United Kingdom opposed railroads when they were built [and] printing presses when they appeared in Germany, but time defeated those conservatives. Football will pass along the same path and it already has.¹

In 1919, these words of Burhan Felek, a Turkish sports pioneer, appeared in *Futbol*, the first sport newspaper of the country, and reflected the different perspectives on football in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Since its inception, football suffered not only from religious bigotry but also from those who did not see the game as a proper instrument for raising “a healthy and robust generation.”² The prediction of this author, on the other hand, that even

1 Quoted by Hamza Çakır, “Türk Basınında İlk Spor Gazetesi ‘Futbol,’” *İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi*, no. 26 (2008): 174. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

2 Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 97.

the government would ultimately recognize football and that it would be played in schools and military was incorrect. The sports ideologues of the new Republic of Turkey that replaced the Ottoman Empire with a highly-centralized political structure approached football with suspicion. The interwar years, when European and Latin American football headed towards professionalism witnessed the struggle of decision-makers in the early republican Turkey to incorporate football into their nationalist body politics. However, the sports culture imposed from above was based on amateurism, and it was clear that football and the amateur ethos were uncompromising. The negative attitude of Turkish sport bureaucrats, albeit not all, with respect to football molded the development of the game even as its dissemination along the populace could be prevented.

This chapter argues that amateurism which formed the ideological framework of sports and physical education policies in the early republican years played a crucial role in the historical experience of professional football in the country. This chapters sets the stage by locating Turkish football in the early years of the republic and shows how the institutionalization of amateurism as a set of sporting values and ideals turned the game into the “foremost enemy of Kemalist physical culture.”³ It maps out the landscape of early republican sports culture with its institutions, organizations, and official policies that not only amplified amateurism but at the same time stigmatized professionalism. This stigmatization would complicate the legal and moral legitimation of professionalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, which I broach in the course of the ensuing chapters.

§ 2.1 Establishing a Kemalist Physical Culture and the Contradictions of Football

The early republican years bore the stamp of an intense reform program by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his government after absolute political hegemony in the country was secured in the mid-1920s. According to Zürcher, the years from 1926 until the end of the Second World War was the “Golden Age of

3 Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 151.

Kemalism,” which was how the Republican People’s Party formulized the regime’s official ideology.⁴ The aim of this new ideology was twofold. While Kemalist elites tried to erode the influence of the Ottoman past on the new generations, the social, political, and economic life of the nation was being modernized along scientific, Western, secular lines. The process of Westernization, as Alemdaroğlu argues, was not limited to the transformation of daily practices, but also entailed the physical transformation of the human body.⁵ In this regard, the fitness of the population was a significant concern and was to be achieved through physical education and sports.

During the period when the Kemalist regime was being established, both mass and elite sports were burgeoning across the European continent. On one hand, the spread of spectator sports such as football and boxing as well as the growth of bi-national and multinational sporting competitions created a transnational sport culture at the elite level. On the other, fascist and communist dictatorships promoted nationalist mass-oriented sport cultures rather than consumer-oriented, elite-centered, record-seeking spectator sports. According to Barbara Keys, the rise of mass spectator sports created a challenge for regimes such as fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Union that were also seeking to mold the sociocultural sphere along nationalist and authoritarian lines.⁶ In Germany, for instance, English sports and particularly football were seen as direct threats to the *Turnen* gymnastics system, the well-established, distinctly German physical culture movement. *Turnen*, an integral part of “the national movement that had actively promoted the political unification of the German people and democratization of society”⁷ was one of the prominent sporting cultures that inspired Kemalist elites in Turkey who were making their own nationalist body culture.

4 Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2011), 16.

5 Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey,” *Body and Society* 11, no. 61 (September, 2005): 64.

6 Barbara Keys, “Soviet Sport and Transnational Mass Culture in the 1930s,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 3 (July, 2003): 413–34.

7 Udo Merkel, “Milestones in the Development of Football Fandom in Germany: Global Impacts on Local Contests,” *Soccer and Society* 8, no. 2–3 (April, 2007): 223–25, doi:10.1080/14660970701224426.

The dilemma between elite and mass sports also concerned republican elites. In this context, argues Yiğit Akın, the early development of Turkish physical culture was a struggle between competitive sports, particularly football, and physical education.⁸ This tension mainly resulted from an instrumentalist approach towards sports and physical education. Turkish policy makers sought to improve the people's physical and moral capabilities, maintain social control and equip youth with the required physical and mental skills for military service and industrial development.⁹ For this purpose, they created a physical culture that eschewed individualism, malignant rivalry and record seeking and instead glorified collectivity and mass participation. Amateurism formed the ideological and ethical framework of this nationalist body politics. A combination of amateur virtues such as volunteerism, self-sacrifice, character building, team spirit, involvement in multiple sports, and focus on processes and progress rather than scores or outcome was used to encourage people to participate actively in sports and physical education.¹⁰

Undoubtedly, sport and physical education also constituted an important component of Kemalist bio-politics.¹¹ While currents of a crude social Darwinism shaped thinking about the relationship between the nation and its members' bodies, Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic, declared that Turkish sport was an issue of race – that is, an issue of eugenics.¹² The identification of sport and health was so strong that a sport bureaucrat once claimed that stadiums should be constructed throughout the country even before hospitals.¹³ Although physical concerns came first, there was another important

8 Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 46.

9 Akın, "Not Just a Game," 23.

10 Norman Baker, "Whose Hegemony?," 1–16.

11 Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 43.

12 Harun Özmaden, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlk Spor Teşkilatı Türkiye İdman Cemiyetleri İttifakı (1922-1936)'nın Yapılanma Sürecinde Beden Eğitimi ve Sporun Fonksiyonları, Fonksiyonlardaki Değişimler ve Toplumsal Hayata Etkileri," PhD diss., Marmara Üniversitesi, 1999: 89-105.

13 Ibid.

role attributed to sport. Sport was regarded as an excellent tool with the capacity to get rid of the image of the Ottoman Empire as the “sick man of Europe” while at the same time acquiring international recognition as a new, modern country.¹⁴ In the eyes of Kemalist elites, “international sport is even more important than international diplomacy to establish friendships among nations.”¹⁵ In this regard, they placed particular importance on participating in regional and international sporting competitions, as well as organizing friendly sporting contacts with foreign countries.¹⁶

Among these efforts, the element of sports clubs assumed a key role in extending sports throughout the country. Many sports clubs established in the late Ottoman period continued their activities in the republican period as new sports clubs were added to their number. The three big clubs of Istanbul - Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray, which were founded at the start of the twentieth century stood out among these clubs were an inseparable part of the official sports organization. As Akın stresses, these clubs have dominated the Turkish sports system due to their deep-rooted past, social status, and the close relations of their members with the regime as well as their competitive successes.¹⁷

The 1930s, when Kemalist physical education policies were consolidated, witnessed a growth of pressure on sports clubs that had previously held a relatively autonomous position. This increasing pressure stemmed mainly from football.¹⁸ In the eyes of Kemalist policy makers, football was an individualist, competitive sport with a strong tendency for outbursts of violence and thus constituted a threat for national solidarity that was being intensely promoted by the corporatist Kemalist project. Apart from this, football was turning people who were expected to participate actively in healthy physical activities into

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- 14 Demet Lüküslü and Şakir Dinçşahin, “Shaping Bodies Shaping Minds: Selim Sırrı Tarcan and the Origins of Modern Physical Education in Turkey,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 30, no. 3 (2013): 195–209, doi:10.1080/09523367.2012.742067.
 - 15 “Diplomasi ve Spor,” *Türkspor*, December 23, 1930.
 - 16 Özgehan Şenyuva and Sevecen Tunç, “Turkey and the Europe of Football,” *Sport in History* 35, no. 4 (2015): 567–79.
 - 17 Akın, “Ana Hatları ile,” 71.
 - 18 Gökaçtı, “Bizim için Oyna,” 14.

mere spectators, which contradicted the ideal of nationwide physical and moral regeneration. The Turkish “nation [did] not need teams that can score goals against Arsenal, but [did] need hundreds of thousands of young men who could carry a load in snowy weather for at least twenty kilometers.”¹⁹ For these reasons, football was considerably deprived of the elite support given to other sports during the early republican years.

Alongside these factors, another that played a role in the development of suspicion towards football was the fact that the game was more prone to monetization than other sports. Kemalist sport bureaucrats sought to instill a sense of spirituality in sport, dissociating it from the vulgarity of materialism and capitalism. Actually, this anti-commercialist sentiment was confined neither to sport nor to Turkey. “Practically everywhere in the interwar world” it was possible to “find great refusals of capitalism’s ‘disenchantment of the world’ and an intellectual search for more real, authentic and essential.”²⁰

As covert forms of professionalism and acts of stadium violence mushroomed along with the game’s increasing popularity, skepticism towards football quickly turned into an anti-football campaign among sports policy makers that not only showed itself at the discursive level but reflected in crucial institutional changes and certain legal measures.

§ 2.2 Administrative Changes and the Institutionalization of Amateurism

Modern sport, which was introduced to late Ottoman society as a set of progressive, Western practices, was integrated into the republican cultural transformation agenda by Kemalist policy makers in the framework of “public service.” Throughout the twenties and increasingly in the thirties, the republican

19 “Türk milletinin Arsenal’e gol atacak takımlara değil, karlı havada bir yükü en az yürmi kilometre taşıyacak yüz binlerce gence ihtiyacı vardır.” Osman Şevki Uludağ, “Beden Terbiyesi Genel Direktörlüğü 1941 Yılı Bütçe Kanunu Layihası ve Bütçe Encümeni Mazbatasına Hakkında Müzakereler,” *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre 6, Cilt 18, İçtima 2. Quoted in Akın “Ana Hatları ile,” 67.

20 Ian McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 37.

elite not only supported the institutional development and national diffusion of modern sports but intervened in sports clubs and their organizational structure in order to maintain control over the field. In the eyes of republican elites, amateurism needed to be protected from professionalism as leverage to commence people that sport could be done for loftier goals than commerce or entertainment, -such as military training, public service, physical education, and personal health.

The institutionalization of the amateur ethos was as old as the institutionalization of football in Turkey. It could be traced to the foundation of the Istanbul Football Association (IFA), the country's first federative sporting organization, in 1903. One mission of the IFA was to curtail professionalism in the game.²¹ Almost twenty years later, when the Union of Turkish Sports clubs (UTSC), the first national administrative organization of the Turkish Republic, was founded, "the protection and promotion of amateurism (*heveskarlık*)" became an institutional obligation. To become a member of the UTSC, for instance, an athlete was required "not to have done sports for material gain or acquired benefits in any form." As far as the administrative structure of the UTSC was concerned, federations affiliated with the union were also charged with the responsibility to implement and promulgate amateur principles.²² However, as competition intensified among football teams with the formation of regular leagues and tournaments, amateurism would soon turn into "the curtain behind which professionalism was hidden."²³

UTSC was a semi-independent association of sports clubs that was formed in 1922 with the mission to arrange schedules, referees, and fields for games, mainly in four major cities of the empire, including Trabzon, Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir. After the republic was founded, it became responsible for coordinating all sport matters as well as spreading sport and physical education on a

21 Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi*, 439-441.

22 Özmaden, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlk Spor Teşkilatı," 57-134.

23 Ferit Karşlı, "Amatörlük mü Profesyonellik mi," in *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* (1936-1938) *Seçilmiş Spor Makaleleri*, ed. Suat Karaküçük (Ankara: TDFO, 1992), 284.

nationwide scale.²⁴ However, the UTSC was a sports body that prioritizes competitive, performance-oriented sports. Despite the multi-sport orientation of existing clubs, the union was predominantly concerned with football.²⁵ Therefore, amateur sport ideologues soon began to find the UTSC ineffective for restoring physical condition of the people - that is in “teaching the Anatolian people to do sports like a European.”²⁶ Especially with the rise of a monetization trend in football, the UTSC was subject to more and more complaints from the government. These complaints eventually led to an administrative change in which the UTSC was replaced by a “real nation-wide sports organization.”²⁷

The establishment of the Turkish Sports Association (TSA), according to the reports by Carl Diem, one of the most influential sports administrators of Nazi Germany, coincided with the formal unification of the state and the party in 1936.²⁸ The TSA represented the start of statism in the field of sports and physical education and functioned as an organ of the Republican People’s Party with a separate budget.²⁹ However, if the establishment of the TSA marked “one of the intermediary peaks of state intervention into the field of physical culture,” its replacement by the General Directorate of Physical Education (GDPE) marked another.³⁰ While all the institutional transformations of the 1930s were designed to maintain the national diffusion of sports and physical education under state control, the GDPE was founded in 1938 particularly to execute the Law on Physical Education (LPE). The LPE was passed

24 Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 53–71.

25 Özmaden, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlk Spor Teşkilatı,” 75.

26 Aka Gündüz. “Görüşler: Ya Hep Ya Hiç,” *Milliyet*, September 7, 1934; Sadun Galip, “Görüşlerin Yazıcısı Aka Gündüz Beyefendiye,” *Milliyet*, September 13, 1934; “İdeal Türk Tipi” *İspor Postası*, December 9, 1936.

27 Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 65.

28 Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Kemalist Republic,” in *The State and The Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Iran and Turkey*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: Tauris, 2007), 95–110.

29 Yavuz Tanyeri et al., “T.C. Hükümetlerinin Beden Eğitimi ve Sporla İlgili Uygulamaları (1923–2001),” *Beden Eğitimi ve Spor Bilimleri Dergisi* 1, no. 3 (2017): 88.

30 Akın, “Not Just a Game,” 64.

on June 29, 1938, by the Grand National Assembly after Sadi Irmak's report illustrating the relationship between physical education and eugenics. The GDPE, the new umbrella organization of Turkish sport, was affiliated directly with the Prime Ministry "to centralize the physical education for schools, military, and the public under the same roof."³¹

The law made physical education and sports compulsory for the general public. The regulation stated that it is obligatory for young men between the ages of twelve and forty-five years and women between the ages of twelve and thirty years to exercise four hours a week.³² The LPE was the first law in the world to make physical education and sports obligatory for its citizens, and it was created on the cusp of the Second World War.³³ In this regard, its importance was "based on the fact that physical education and sports came to be considered a public service and became established among the public duties of the state."³⁴

The LPE introduced the legal compulsion for young people to become members of youth clubs and to do physical training in their spare time. According to the law, the governor of each province was responsible for the implementation of physical education activities in their region. Three articles in the law were crucial for the increase of sports clubs, and facilities in the country. According to Article 13, youth clubs were to be formed in every residential district, community, or settlement with more than fifty young people. If the number of young people was less than fifty, sports groups were formed instead of clubs. On the other hand, Article 21 made it obligatory for all workplaces

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- 31 Rahmi Apak. "Yeni Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu," *Ülkü 1933-1950 Seçilmiş Spor Makaleleri*, ed. Suat Karaküçük (Ankara: TDFO, 1993), 144.
- 32 Lüküslü and Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies," 204.
- 33 Sait Tarakçıoğlu, "A Failed Project in Turkey's Sports History: The Law on Physical Education of 1938," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 14 (2014): 1807–19, doi:10.1080/09523367.2014.940906. Arzu Öztürkmen similarly notes that the daily French sports newspaper *L'Auto* described Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the first leader in the world to make physical education obligatory. See A. Öztürkmen "Mehmet Fetgeri Şuenu ve Kadında Terbiye-i Bedeniye," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 37, (March 2002).
- 34 Tarakçıoğlu, "A Failed Project," 1810.

employing more than 500 workers to establish sport complexes and to hire a trainer.³⁵

Article 10 of the law allocated an important role to municipalities concerning sports. “According to Article 10, every province was a PE [physical education] region and the province governor was in charge of the issue. Also, PE and sports activities would be directed by mayors, district governors and village headmen in their regions.”³⁶ This task was combined with the provision of building game and sports venues in clauses of the Municipal Law 1930. Fişek points out that municipalities did not prioritize this new task due to inadequate finances; nonetheless, this law importantly reveals the organic, legal binding of sports and local governments.³⁷ Provincial private administrations and municipalities began to allocate funds for local sports in 1934 with the support of the RPP.³⁸ As in France, the laws and incentives in Turkey defined sport as a public service, resulted in the growth of football being influenced by the public sector and the patronage of the state.³⁹

Although this law was regarded as a “failed project”⁴⁰ in Turkish sports history, it paved the way for the formation of sports clubs and groups that would later provide the infrastructural and institutional basis for football’s march towards becoming the country’s most popular sport.

Independent of their sphere of influence, the administrative, legal, institutional, and practical changes in the field of sport and physical education served one ultimate goal: mass-participation in sports. The GDPE and LPE created new localities - in addition to the military, public schools, and People’s Houses - which functioned as progressive agents of the sports regime. In these places, participation in various sports was promoted in accordance with amateur ideals. Instead of being funneled them into a single sport, men and women alike

35 Ibid. 1180-1181.

36 Tarakçıoğlu, “A Failed Project,” 1811.

37 Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi*, 252-328.

38 Metin Kılıç, “Tek Partili Dönemde Türkiye’de Modern Sporun Teşekkülü,” *Tarih Okulu*, no. 14 (2013): 27-53.

39 Hare, *Football in France: A Cultural History*, 29-32.

40 Tarakçıoğlu, *A Failed Project*, 1819.

were raised as all-around athletes and expected to participate in national festivals as well as regional, national, and even international competitions.

Participation in different sports, according to Akin, was encouraged at the expense of football because sports authorities saw the game as an obstacle to the creation of a well-trained, healthy nation. To decrease the popularity of the game, an artificial division between compulsory and optional physical activities was created and football, unsurprisingly, was among the optional sports. Beyond this, sports clubs were targeted as they prioritized football and encouraged rivalry. An essay that appeared in *Spor Postası* said that Kemalist youth should be rescued from the clubs that survived from the Ottoman era and that remained ignorant of “the national cause.”⁴¹ In 1930, the National Education Ministry sent a letter of instruction to its regional branches that prohibited the participation of students in sports clubs.⁴² Although pedagogical concerns such as growing rivalry among the students of different schools was stated as the reason, policy-makers actually wanted to deal a blow to sports clubs. In addition to these measures, attempts to abolish or merge some sports clubs as well as to change their names were undertaken for the purposes of punishing the clubs, decreasing the influence of football, and diminishing the football-related tensions in the society. On March 12, 1941, in the Official Gazette of Turkish Republic (*T.C. Resmi Gazete*), the country’s official, national daily that publishes official legislation and other announcements, a list of sports clubs that the Council of Ministers had decided to merge was published. The clubs that were to merge were typically rival clubs in the same locality. While some successfully merged as a new club - such as the Haliç club that formed after the İleri Bozkurt and Fener Yılmaz clubs were abolished - the merger of Karagömrük and Vefa, two fierce rivals in the same district, was not be achieved.⁴³

Parla and Davison argue that along the Kemalists’ progressive march towards an organic, classless society, any political, social, or sporting alternatives

41 “Mücadeleden Yılmamak” *Spor Postası*, November 10, 1934.

42 *Türkspor*, July 10, 1930.

43 For a list of sports clubs forced to merge into a single body, see *Official Gazette of Turkish Republic*, March 12, 1941.

that contradicted Kemalist principles were stigmatized as dangerous.⁴⁴ The strong reaction to football can also be considered in this context, as a part of a general fear of the failure of the very project of modernization and nation building. With its extreme anti-football content, the magazine *Spor Postası* reflected the ideas and arguments of the opposition to football. For instance, one of the contributors to the magazine - a pro-militarist sports administrator - claimed that the hegemony of football in Turkey was the main reason for the nation's failures in international sporting contests. In his article entitled "Damn Football," he invited sports authorities to do their duties and get rid of that "football addiction."⁴⁵ From a similar perspective, another article published in the magazine asked Recep Peker, a powerful Kemalist leader in the government, "to demolish the doors of commerce and end the empire of football which was against Kemalist progress."⁴⁶ In his own magazine *Gol*, Refik Osman Top, another sporting pioneer of the era, lamented that sports in Turkey could not develop under the negative influence of football.

Despite the fact that sport has an ancient history in Turkey the concept of sports in our country consists of five or ten football youths left by football establishments under the name of clubs from neighborhoods to the middle of stadium wearing colorful jerseys in front of the public. Given that this is the case, sports in this nation must be considered a ball game.... [F]ootball appears to be a circus whose spectators increase with every passing day... [W]e see that football accustoms youth to ambition, greed, competition, rivalry, bad habits, and aggressiveness. This is why we have to set the football movement aside and ensure the progress we require by paying attention to our traditional and national sports. Italy's great Galila organization extended their national sports everywhere by taking care that, rather than football, the

44 Andrew Davison and Taha Parla, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004): 217-18.

45 İ. Kanok, "Kahrolsun Futbol!," *Spor Postası*, no. 132, October 19, 1936.

46 "Anadolu Gençliği Ne Olacak?," *Spor Postası*, no. 126, September 7, 1936.

youth prepare for life with a healthy and strong physical education owing to the sports institutions of the national socialists... Sports and the military go hand in hand in the twentieth century. Today's requirements have taken sport out of a narrow framework to the head of daily practice.⁴⁷

Top's statement reflects the tension between football and body politics, between mass and elite sports, and between the expectations and the reality. As Krawietz argues, the presence of an aggressive propaganda favoring athletic disciplines other than football "does not imply that the populace has wholeheartedly and actively accepted such offerings" in Turkey.⁴⁸ Edelman's argument told for the case of Soviet Union is important for explaining why these sorts of sporting campaigns and impositions from above inevitably failed: People preferred football which they thought of "as an opportunity for pleasure and fun, an arena of male bonding, a chance to exhibit the joking cynicism and irony of all sport fans and a place to idealize heroes of their own, rather than the state's, choosing."⁴⁹

§ 2.3 The Issue of Covert Professionalism

In the early republican era, there were two important football organizations at the national level. The first was the Championship of Turkey which was played since 1924 on an elimination basis among only the champions of local leagues. In 1937, a league was formed in which the teams of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir participated. While called the National League, the organization was weak in terms of reflecting a national integrity.⁵⁰ In Anatolia, except certain cities such as Trabzon, Kocaeli, and Bursa in which local rivalries became the driving force of the local sports culture, football enthusiasm cannot be comparable

47 Refik Osman Top. "Türk Spor Kurumundan İstediklerimiz," *Gol*, no. 12-13, 1936. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

48 Krawietz, "Sport and Nationalism," 343.

49 Edelman, *Serious Fun*, 6-7.

50 Mehmet Yüce, *İdmançı Ruhlar Futbol Tarihimizin Klasik Devreleri: 1923-1952, Türkiye Futbol Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 345-404.

with the big three cities. Nevertheless football, despite an insufficient number of leagues and tournaments on a nationwide scale, had initiated its march towards becoming the most popular sport throughout the country. There were local leagues in certain provinces, but due to the limited number of participating teams, these leagues lasted a short time. Football enthusiasts thus tried to satisfy their appetites through friendly matches and tournaments between cities.

The local rivalries created club fanaticism during the early republic, which was another reason Kemalist policy makers became cool to football. In certain regions ethnic, political, and cultural division came to determine football identities, as well. In these cases which contradicted Kemalism's principle of solidarity, solutions such as closing a club were undertaken even in small towns such as Ayvalık.⁵¹

As part of local rivalries, clubs tried through various methods to obtain good players, who were anyway scant in numbers. Although amateurism determined the ideological framework of sport, there was covert professionalism wherever there was competition.⁵² But its prevalence vary depending on the dose of the competition and spectator interest. Istanbul was undoubtedly the city where these types of covert relations in football were most common. The success achieved by the Altınordu Club – of which Sadrazam Talat Paşa was the honorary president (*hami reis*) during the 1910s and was seen as the team of the military wing of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) - can be assessed along these lines. It entered into a great rivalry against Fenerbahçe, where the civilian wing of the CUP gathered, took the leading players of Fenerbahçe on board, became the best team in Istanbul in a short time, and became champion in two successive years in 1916-17 and 1917-18. As Gökaçtı underscores, the Altınordu members received the support of the government and did not have any equipment shortages in contrast with other clubs that suffered tremendous challenges during the war years.⁵³ In fact, while players of other teams were drafted into military service and sent to fight at the front,

51 Gökaçtı, "Bizim İçin Oyna," 148-49.

52 Mehmet Yüce, *Romantik Yürekler Futbol Tarihimizin Yeni Devreleri: 1952-1992, Türkiye Futbol Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 17-103.

53 Gökaçtı, "Bizim İçin Oyna," 54.

Altınordu players were exempted from conscription altogether. Refik Osman Top, a footballer of the time, explained in his memoirs that

The time for the league matches rolled around in 1332 (1916). The usual buying and selling of footballers among the clubs started... This player trade was managed by people who were selfish and put their clubs at the top of their priorities ... One day ... I first met Altınordu members on occasion of football games. They took me into their clubhouse and made an offer for me to play at Altınordu ... I replied to the club that I would accept the offer but that I was being shipped off with my military unit despite the fact that I was very ill. The president of Altınordu was Aydınoğlu Raşid Bey at that time. He postponed my military service during those weeks. Within four days, I started a new tour in the Postal and Telegram Ministry communications room. I took advantage of this offer to be excused from military service.⁵⁴

On the other hand, the first covert professionals to be subjected to discipline were also Altınordu players. Hasan Basri Bey and Dalaklı Hüseyin Bey were both fired from their clubs when it was learned that they had agreed to play for a Greek team in return for money while they were playing for Altınordu.⁵⁵ It was clear that such sanctions could not prevent covert professionalism. Moreover, covert professionalism was prevalent in other spectator-drawing sports such as boxing and wrestling - not just football. According to Mehmet Yüce, Galatasaray boxer *Küçük Kemal* (Kemal the Little) and Fenerbahçe fighters Nuri and Selami were the pioneers of professionalism in their sport in the 1920s. Under the patronage of the president of the Boxing Commission, Eşref Şefik, the fights drew intense interest. Fighters received a share of the gate revenues that naturally increased. Similarly, at the start of the 1930s, the Haliç Club terminated its football division, turned to wrestling, and brought good wrestlers from around Turkey to Istanbul. Club administrators gave jobs to wrestlers relative to their performance.⁵⁶

54 Yüce, *Osmanlı Melekleri*, 296. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

55 Yüce, *Romantik Yürekler*, 25.

56 "Pehlivanlar Amatör mü Profesyonel mi" *Türkspor*, no. 16, January 16, 1932.

Covert forms of professionalism continued to dominate Turkish football in the early republican era as football players increasingly demanded a share of gate revenues in line with game's growing popularity. In due course, it became common knowledge that most clubs paid their best players under the table. Hiçyılmaz claims that professionalism became well-known among the public as both a moral and a sporting term in the thirties due to a campaign launched by the press.⁵⁷ After the declaration of the salaries that popular players such as Fenerbahçe's Büyük Fikret and Galatasaray's Mithat were receiving from their clubs, professionalism became a hot topic for public debate. "Seven or eight years ago, when footballers successfully pushed the ball upfield," Vâlâ Nureddin reminisced in a piece written in 1944, "the people shouted sarcastically 'increase his wage, increase his wage!'"⁵⁸ His account reveals that spectators of the time were aware that footballers were paid.

The benefits obtained by athletes against their performances were not limited to money. Beşiktaş was able to draft Hakkı Yeten after the club directors paid the player's indemnity in order to quit military school and took on the tuition of the private İnkılap High School in order for the player to complete his high school education.⁵⁹ Jobs were the most popular favors footballers received in the period of covert professionalism. Interestingly, clubs continued to commence footballers to transfer via this method even in the 1950s when professionalism was official. For example, in the year that professionalism was adopted, Halil received no payment to transfer from Eyüp to Beykoz other than to start working for a salary of 110 lire a month at the Beykoz Shoe Factory. Halil continued to work at this plant up until retirement although he had quit playing football.⁶⁰ A career was the social security insurance of playing football. That granting players jobs was so popular was linked to the fact that

57 Ergun Hiçyılmaz, *Türk Spor Tarihi* (Istanbul: Demet Ofset, 1974), 56-57.

58 Vâlâ Nureddin, "Maçlara Talebenin de İştirak Ettirilmesi Üzerine Yükselen İtirazlar," *Akşam*, February 15, 1944.

59 "Hakkı Yeten ve Hayatı," *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, no. 45, 1949.

60 Fethi Aytuna, "Halil Gezmen - Naylon Gibi Esnek Kaleci," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, February 22, 2017. <https://dinyakos.com/2017/02/22/halil-gezmen-naylon-gibi-esnek-kaleci/> (accessed January 18, 2019).

receiving direct payments was taboo in the anti-professional sports culture. Muammer Tokgöz recalls that Fenerbahçe's famous president, Hacı Muhittin Bey, put money in the pockets of suits he had tailored for his football players since he thought it was shameful to directly hand cash to them.⁶¹

Consequently, professional dynamics developed in the climate of theoretically amateur national sports. The sports dailies of the times clearly expressed this situation as follows:

All of the big Istanbul clubs protect their jobless football players. They employ them in businesses where they are based. Considering that youth having completed a high school education cannot find a decent job despite trying a thousand ways, it can be seen that clubs are powerful enough to ensure a more or less satisfying income to men playing ball with their feet. Additionally, their training costs are paid. Their school tuition fees are paid. There are even players who ask for jobs for their fathers and brothers. It is hard to claim that footballers in Turkey are clean amateurs when this is the case.⁶²

Kemalist policy makers, even statisticians, were aware that professionalism was becoming an international norm in football and that it was not possible for Turkey remain outside the trend. However, in their eyes, any commercial or business involvement in sports meant a shift in focus from the national question - that is, the health of the masses - to the recreational needs of the public. A statement by Akyürek, the president of the UTSC, reveals that bureaucrats did not want to leave such an important national issue as sport in the hands of businessmen: "We cannot let Turkish youth, who should be raised in a pure ethic, be enslaved by the interests or arbitrariness of this or that capitalist. Sport is done for sport's own sake, but also for national defense. Therefore,

61 Fethi Aytuna, "Muammer Tokgöz - Şenlikköy Çayırılarından Milli Takıma," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published December 26 2016. <https://dinyakos.com/2016/12/26/muammer-tokgoz-senlikkoy-cayirlarindan-milli-takima/> (accessed January 11, 2019).

62 "Bizde Hangi Çeşit Profesyonellik Yürür?," *Top*, no.6, December 29, 1934. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

doing sports in return for money would be the homicide of the national interests.”⁶³ Professionalism would only become acceptable after the Turkish people formed the habit of physical training and the goals of the Kemalist physical culture were completely achieved. As Kemalism set out to create conditions for democracy without being democratic during the single party era, sports officials adopted an anti-professional attitude to prevent professionalism from emerging ahead of time.

During the thirties, when liberalism was being disfavored and statism gained wider currency in Turkey, any sporting project that opposed the will of the government was directly labelled either an “uprising” or a “pro-professionalism” enterprise.⁶⁴ The rise of authoritarianism also revealed itself with increasing intolerance of debates on professionalism. For instance, while one decision made at the annual congress of the UTSC in 1926 was to examine the status of the professional player in FIFA laws and regulations, in the annual congress of 1932, Recep Peker declared that the government was completely opposed to professionalism and would thus directly refuse any attempt towards it.⁶⁵ When the three big clubs of Istanbul - Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, and Beşiktaş - had a dispute with the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) concerning the distribution of gate receipts during the 1931-32 season, a rumor emerged that clubs were attempting to withdraw from the league in order to establish their own professional one.⁶⁶ With the intervention of the UTSC and its severe warning to the clubs, the attempt did not end up with the launch of a professional league.

Another project that gave the impression of professionalism took place in 1933 with the formation of a team that would represent Turkey against foreign teams. This ‘select’ team was supposed to bring the best players of the country together and function as a medium - a bridge between Europe and Anatolia. After playing against foreign teams and learning their skills and techniques from them, the team was to travel throughout Anatolia and organize games

63 “Sporda Mesut Adımlar,” *Gol*, no.10, 1934.

64 “Ulusal Küme İşinin Amacı Nedir?,” *Top*, no:6, December 29, 1934.

65 Özmaden, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlk Spor Teşkilatı,” 111.

66 “Üç Büyük Kulübümüz Ayrı bir Lig mi Yapacaklar?” *Türkspor*, October 10, 1931.

with local teams in order to teach European football to local players. Unsurprisingly, the project was regarded as an attempt towards professionalism and severely criticized in statist journals of the time.⁶⁷

Levent Cantek argues that in the early republican era, there was a tendency among Kemalist elites to expound any notion, even ones directly related to capitalist development, within a cultural context.⁶⁸ In line with his argument, the rigid anti-professional, anti-football discourse of the thirties was also produced out of cultural content. To put it bluntly, in critiques of professionalism, there was no mention of the lack of finances and infrastructure required to sustain professional football. The ruling elite interpreted professionalism as moral decay - a stain on the honor of the Turkish athletes. What Gürbilek argues in the context of the literary and political discourse of modern Turkey also is also valid for the sporting discourse of the thirties.⁶⁹ Football players received their share of the general moral critique by being portrayed as *züppe* (dandy) by the advocates of amateurism since they disregarded national goals and preferred money and fame. Football players were assumed to be bad examples for younger generations because football was not seen as an occupation: "Being a journalist, a doctor, or a lawyer can be an occupation for earning money, but ... there cannot be commerce or revenue in sports clubs where cultivating fit citizens for national defense is the aim."⁷⁰ In his novel *Dizlerine Kapansam*, Peyami Safa classified sport, along with cinema and Beyoğlu - a European neighborhood in İstanbul which has historically been the city's cosmopolitan center of culture and entertainment, in the category of snobbishness, a divergence from traditional, national values.⁷¹

Considered from this perspective, it is understandable why the supporters of professionalism always prioritized the rehabilitation of the professional

67 *Türkspor*, March 28, 1933; "Savulun... Profesyonellik Geliyor!" *Yedigün*, April 26 1933.

68 Levent Cantek, *Cumhuriyet'in Büluğ Çağı: Gündelik Yaşama Dair Tartışmalar (1945-1950)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 26.

69 Nurdan Gürbilek, "Dandies and Originals: Authenticity, Belatedness, and the Turkish Novel," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2-3 (2003): 609.

70 Rahmi Apak. "Yeni Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu-3," *Ülkü*, no. 12, September 1938, quoted by Kılıç, "Tek Partili Dönemde," 40.

71 Server Bedi (Peyami Safa), *Dizlerine Kapansam* (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1937).

footballer's image and thus responded to the critiques in a moral context as well. The promoters of professionalism consistently emphasized that professionalism should be seen as an honor rather than a shame. In this regard, the statements of Ulvi Yenel are a telling example. Yenel was a prominent defender of professionalism in the thirties who would become the president of the TFF in the Democrat Party era and would promulgate the Professionalism Bylaw in 1951. He wrote a piece in *Stad* in 1939 in which he addressed the urgent need to separate professionalism and amateurism in order to make the exact leap forward that France had made a couple years earlier. According to Yenel, "amateurism is a pleasant, honorable activity while professionalism is an occupation, and like all other occupations, it also deserves respect and honor."⁷²

The advocates of professionalism based their arguments on two grounds. First, the growing covert professionalism needed to be taken under control. Unless the "professionalism in the guise of amateurism" that had prevailed for decades was abolished, they argued, Turkish football would remain condemned to failure.⁷³ Secondly, professionalism was legitimized as a requirement of modernization.⁷⁴ According to Adil Giray, it was not possible for nations lacking professional sports clubs to succeed on international stage. Adopting a similar approach, another author, Osman İbrahim, wrote that it was impossible for Turkish football players to compete with Western counterparts "who devoted their lives to football and earned their bread and butter through the game."⁷⁵

2.3.1 A Professional Challenge: Ateş-Güneş Club (1933-38)

With respect to the debates on professionalism during the thirties, the Güneş Club deserves special mention. The club was founded by a group of athletes who separated from Galatasaray Club in 1933. In Turkish sports history, this separation is said to have resulted from a disagreement among club members

72 Ulvi Yenel. "Amatör müyüz?," *Stad*, no.7, December 25, 1939.

73 *Cumhuriyet*, October 5, 1936.

74 *Cumhuriyet*, October 24, 1934.

75 *Ispor Postası*, October 20, 1934.

on the issue of amateurism and professionalism.⁷⁶ According to the general account, defenders of amateurism including Ali Sami Yen, the president of the club, were opposed to transferring in players from outside Galatasaray High School in order to sustain the organic relationship between the school and the club. On the other side, the opposition group led by Yusuf Ziya Öniş, a prominent defender of professionalism, and believed that new players should be transferred in to improve the team's athletic performance.

In the 1932-33 football season, Galatasaray finished fifth the Istanbul league, which was a disappointment for club members. During the season, Eşref Şefik, a sports author and member of the club, continuously wrote pieces critical of the team, which eventually led to his expulsion from the club.⁷⁷ This incident accelerated a process that would eventually result in the establishment of a new club called Ateş-Güneş (Fire-Sun), a name that recalls the red and yellow colors of Galatasaray. The name was later changed to Güneş upon the request of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, who never deprived club members of his support.

To understand the dynamics behind the story of Güneş, the close links between the club and the İş Bank clique must be taken into consideration. Aka Gündüz, in his appraisal of the foundation of Güneş in his column in *Cumhuriyet*, pointed to three leading figures behind the club's formation.⁷⁸ The first was Cevat Abbas Gürer, the president of the club, aide-de-camp of Atatürk and board member of İş Bank. The second was Yusuf Ziya Öniş, one of the founders of the UTSC, the first president of the TFE, and the president of Istanbul office of İş Bank. The last name mentioned by Gündüz was that of Celal Bayar, who was the founder of İş Bank and the leader of the liberal wing of the RPP.

76 Cem Atabeyoğlu, *1453-1991 Türk Spor Tarihi Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Fotospor Yayınları, 1991), 127.

77 "Galatasaray ve Eşref Şefik Bey," *Türkspor*, no. 15, January 7, 1933.

78 Aka Gündüz. "Ateş Güneşte Güneşlendim," *Milliyet*, September 21, 1934.

After Bayar was appointed as the Minister of the Economy by Atatürk in 1932, the İş Bank clique led economy policy in favor of the private sector.⁷⁹ In the eyes of the extreme statist, the clique was sabotaging state entrepreneurship by protecting the private sector at the expense of the public. Although the İş Bank clique recognized the need for state intervention in order to create a strong, viable private sector, they disliked excessive control because it undermined the freedom and autonomy of the propertied class and prevented the growing business community from organizing on their own.⁸⁰ Apart from these sporting leaders, Eşref Şefik, Adil Giray and Kemal Rıfat Kalpakçioğlu were among the founders of the club and also known as supporters of professionalism in sporting circles. Seen in this light, Güneş Club was the liberal opposition - an expression of discontent with increasing state intervention that left no room for the presence of businessmen, private autonomy, and the independent development of football.⁸¹

The club directors relied economically on İş Bank adopted an aggressive transfer policy to become successful. The directors of the club transferred the best players from various clubs, even ones outside İstanbul, by offering educational opportunities in Turkey and abroad as well as employment opportunities in the offices of İş Bank. Owing to Bayar's political power and Atatürk's support, the club resisted statist pressures until 1938. The close relationship with Atatürk, by itself, was an important source of the club's power. First of all, the *aide-de-camp* to Atatürk Cevat Abbas, was the club president. Second, Atatürk, himself, twice visited the clubhouse in İstanbul. Club directors and members expressed admiration and love for Atatürk through social and sports activities organized in his name where he was rather praised in speeches, songs, and poems. The club members regularly sent him telegrams on national holidays. They proposed that the UTSC declare May 19 as 'Atatürk Day' in 1934, and the following year, celebrations of May 19th were held around the

79 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, 41; Tanıl Bora, "Celal Bayar," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Vol.2* (İletişim, 2004), 546-54.

80 Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 5. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006), 64-65.

81 Sevecen Tunç, "Ateş Güneş Kulübü (1933-1938)," *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 13 (2011): 159-175.

country. Love for Atatürk and loyalty to Kemalism were reflected in the emblem of Güneş on which there was a sun representing Atatürk out of which were rising six arrows representing the six principles of Kemalism.

Despite its lifespan of only around six years, the Güneş club acquired significant success and fame. The club started to compete in the lowest league in 1933 but was elevated to the first division of the league in 1935 when Kemal Rıfat Kalpakçıoğlu became president of the Istanbul district of the Turkish Football Federation. At the end of the 1937-1938 season, the club ranked among the top three with the same number of points as Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe. The president of the TFF was Sedat Rıza İstek, who was also one of the founders of Güneş, declared Güneş the championship winner by applying an unprecedented method of averaging.⁸² Soon after winning both the titles of Istanbul Football Champion and National League Champion in the same season, the club was abolished by its members.

Some sport historians claim that the club directors had to abolish the club upon the death of Atatürk when they lost their primary source of power and legitimacy. For Güneş there was almost nothing to do to resist after his loss. İnönü, upon becoming the new president of the Republic, isolated both Bayar, who resigned from the government, and the liberal wing during the Second World War. However, even before these developments, the promulgation of the LPE and the foundation of the GDPE left no room for the survival of the club. When the single party regime came to an end in 1945, the people around Güneş would reemerge on the football scene with demands of democracy and liberalism, and some club members would even enter politics on the side of the Democrat Party. For instance, Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü became two of the four founders of the party while Eşref Şefik and Kemal Rıfat Kalpakçıoğlu, founders of Güneş, also went into politics in the Democrat Party. Similarly, Ulvi Yenil, one of the founders of the Ateş-Güneş, became a DP member and was appointed as president of Turkish Football Federation soon after the party came to power. It was under his presidency that the Law on Professionalism was enacted. It is equally interesting that Yusuf Ziya Öniş was reelected as the president of Galatasaray after thirty years in 1950.

82 “Şampiyonluğu Hangi Kulüp Kazandı,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 7, 1938.

§ 2.4 The Anti-Football Campaign in Wartime

Fear of the approaching war crystallized the dilemma between mass sports and football, which was gradually becoming popular. The state increasingly intervened in the field of sports to fight against covert professionalism and reduce the hegemony of football which was believed to be an obstacle to the development of other sports. During those years, described by Kurthan Fişek as “the period of sports mobilization,”⁸³ sports policy became more authoritarian with the Law on Physical Education dated 1938, the ban in 1939 forbidding students from playing for professional clubs, and the Amateurism Law promulgated in 1941. Although the aim was to encourage mass participation in sports, the target of this policy multitude of policies was football. The objective was to break its hegemony.⁸⁴ Another issue was that the measures had unintended conclusions. The laws and implementations put into force during the war years served the development of both football and professionalism, as covert professionalism would remain secret for a while.

Considered from a broader perspective, all the measures enacted for this purpose were in line with a general trend in European football. On one hand, football leagues in Europe suffered from a loss of players and spectators following military call-ups; on the other, they were subject to increasing state intervention. Even in England where football was considerably “untouched” since its inception, the government fearing communal gatherings, placed tight restrictions on match attendance. In France, the Vichy government attempted to reform the sport altogether by adopting a sport-for-all policy given the abnormal conditions of war. The logical consequence of this policy, according to Geoff Hare, was amateurism.⁸⁵ The government tried to outlaw professionalism in various ways such as disallowing transfers, forcing professionals to play for the club with which they were registered before the war, and placing a limit on the number of players that a club could take on. In Central Europe, anti-

83 Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi*, 310-15.

84 Nüzhet Baba. “Milli Küme Maçlarının Bıraktığı İntibalar,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 1, 1941; “Sporda Amatör müyüz?,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 19, 1941.

85 Hare, *Football in France*, 23-4.

professionalism went hand in hand with anti-Semitism under the influence of Nazism which labelled professional player as “the misled victims of a liberalist bad spirit.”⁸⁶ On the eve of the war, there was a similar scene was in Vienna and German Bohemia. With the re-adoption of amateurism as the only legitimate sporting code, professional leagues were liquidated.

In many ways, Turkish football mirrored social, political, and economic developments in wartime Turkey and were ultimately intertwined the country's overall destiny. By the outbreak of the World War II, Turkish football, like the country itself, turned inwards due to the interruption in international encounters with foreign teams. Indeed, Turkish football entered a stagnant phase during war years as it closed inwards and many clubs experienced financial trouble. After 1937, the national team had no international matchups, while the contact of urban teams and those of *Halkevleri* (the People's Houses) with the Soviets was cut off upon the deterioration of diplomatic relations. Also, there was a striking decrease in international matches among private clubs. Unquestionably, star players serving as soldiers who were recruited to military teams accounted for the lion's share of their success. In addition to military teams, the workplace-based sports clubs founded with respect to the LPE as from 1938 also contributed to competition in local football leagues. Kağıtspor in Kocaeli; Kömürspor in Zonguldak; Sümerspor in İstanbul, Kayseri, and Ereğli (Konya), the Milli Mensucat teams in Seyhan and Malatya; Demirspor teams in Adana, Ankara, and Eskişehir were among successful worker teams of the forties.⁸⁷ These clubs which were actually intended to acquaint the working classes with physical activity in their places of business, played a crucial role in popularizing football among the working classes, contrary to the primary purpose.

The ban on military personnel and students from joining civilian clubs also came under these circumstances in 1939. According to Abidin Daver, this was a mistake because instead of weakening the power of football, the ban

86 Rudolf Oswald, “Nazi Ideology and the End of Central European Soccer Professionalism,” in *Emancipation Through Muscles: Jews and Sports in Europe*, ed. Michael Brenner Brenner and Gideon Reuveni (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 156–71.

87 Özden, “Working Class Formation,” 114.

reduced interest in other sports given the absence of young school-boys.⁸⁸ Along similar lines, Burhan Felek argues that one undesired consequence of this law was covert professionalism; the decline in the number of players playing for the clubs led to an increase in the price of available players.

The evidence suggests that the ruling elite strove to break the hegemony of football through rules, regulations, and measures as well. To give an example, teams competing in the National League received both grants from the GDPE to recover travel expenses and a share of the gate revenues. At the beginning of the 1938-1939 season, the directorate decided to reduce the grants and the share of gate receipts given to clubs. This decision was met by strong opposition from larger clubs whose matches undoubtedly took in the highest gate revenues. Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray withdrew from the league for one season, but the federation maintained the implementation. As will be later discussed, the issue of revenue distribution would remain a chronic problem between top clubs and the TFF in the ensuing years as well.

Until the Amateurism Law was passed in 1941, there was only a de facto obstacle, not a legal one, to open professionalism. However, this law established certain clear restrictions on the awards, compensation, and transportation fees given to footballers by their clubs, thus indicating that the regime was not completely against professionalism. As Eşref Şefik states, “the business of amateurism-professionalism against which even *the Europeans* are helpless, was not so simple as to be handled with a single decision.”⁸⁹ As with other practices, this decision would have unintended consequences and according to a footballer of the period, Naci Barlas, it would serve to increase covert professionalism just as the National Protection Law strengthened the black marketing.⁹⁰

88 Abidin Daver, “Karar Yanlıştır,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1939.

89 Emphasis mine. Eşref Şefik, “Gene Karışık Hava,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1941.

90 “Naci Barlas: Bölüm 6,” published July 4, 2009. <http://maratonalmaty.blogspot.com/2009/07/naci-barlas-6.html> (accessed July 23, 2018).

2.4.1 *Failure of the Law on Physical Education*

Considered from a wider perspective, the failure of Kemalist physical culture policies not only to reduce the impact of football but also to bring about mass participation in sports - symbolizes the resistance of the public masses to modernization driven from the top down. The public chose football over other branches of athletics, and just as amateur sports ideologues feared, the masses were reduced to the position of an audience. This pointed to the birth of a sports culture wherein spectators were passive rather than active participants.

The failure of Kemalist physical culture policies was evident after the implementation of the LPE terminated by the end of the war. The fifth government of Recep Peker (1946-47), unlike its predecessors, did not include an obligation to participate in sports in its program, and thus ending the period of “sport mobilization.”⁹¹ According to Tarakçıoğlu, the state also had no incentive to further pursue a project that based on the youth development models of Germany and Italy after these two countries were defeated in the war. Further, the death of Atatürk, who was the will behind the project, led to demotivation among policy-makers.⁹²

Although the LPE, which was expected to create to a revolutionary change in the physical habits of the people, was enforced through state apparatuses and state-supported journals, it failed to fulfill the expectations of its creators. The foremost reason among many for this failure was the insufficiency of sports complexes and institutions. The number of available physical education teachers and coaches was also below the required level. Infrastructural incapability prevented the regime from reaching the remote parts of the country.⁹³ Eighty percent of the population still lived in rural areas and imposing exercise in a society where inactivity was traditionally appreciated was more difficult than expected. For a society in which “sitting was regarded not only as the

91 Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi*: 310-15.

92 Tarakçıoğlu, “A Failed Project,” 1814-15.

93 Ibid.

most natural but also the most respectable posture of man,”⁹⁴ it can be understood that the people were positioned as spectators made football more popular.

The failure of the project also manifested itself in its unintended consequences. As mentioned previously, new sport entities were formed in different localities such as neighborhoods, workplaces, and factories in accordance with the LPE. These clubs had to confine their activities to football and wrestling due to a lack of sport complexes and equipment for other, more demanding sports. However, as James Walvin argued,

no other sport [than football] lent itself so easily and cheaply to the varying conditions of urban life. It was simple to play, easy to grasp and could be played on any surface under any conditions, by indeterminate numbers of men. It needed no equipment but a ball, and could last from dawn to dusk. Football could be played by anyone, regardless of size, skill and strength.⁹⁵

The sports clubs continued their football activities even after the law was suspended. Most of these entities turned into official sports clubs after 1946 following the enactment of the new Association Law. As frequently reported in the press, workplace-based football clubs (*müessesese kulüpleri*), which offered football players employment opportunities even before the official recognition of professionalism, created unfair competition in Turkish football.⁹⁶

94 Akin, “Not Just A Game,” 161.

95 James Walvin, *The People’s Game: The History of Football Revisited* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1994), 47.

96 For a broader discussion of the workplace-based clubs, see Şevket Rado, “Futbol Oynayan Memurlar,” *Akşam*, February 16, 1947; “Lig Maçlarının Birinci Devresi Bitti,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no:13, January 19, 1948; “Mensucat Gençlik Kulübü,” *Türkspor*, no:4, February 12, 1951; A. Babür Ardahan, “Defterdar,” *Türkspor*, no:5, February 19, 1951.

§ 2.5 Concluding Remarks

Football which was introduced to Turkish society as a private initiative by the British Levantine and Greek communities during the late Ottoman period, became “the problematic child of Kemalist physical culture” in the early Turkish Republic.⁹⁷ This was mainly because football, in many respects, was considered incompatible with amateurism that formed the ideological framework of official physical education and sport policies.

The purpose of physical education and sport in general was defined in the contexts of health, education, and military training, and accordingly, sports clubs were to serve as venues for mass participation in sports. The rising popularity of football, which was increasingly sullied by violence, covert professionalism and fierce competition, was regarded as a threat to the realization of these nationalist goals. It is for this reason that, in line with the increasing political authoritarianism of the single party regime, the ruling elite’s relatively moderate attitude towards football and sports clubs during the twenties was gradually replaced by a harsh, authoritarian one in the thirties.

From an international perspective, that the state elite in Turkey disapproved the game stood out as an exception in the interwar years. While Perón in Argentina, the Vargas regime in Brazil, and fascists in Europe utilized the game for political and social mobilization, Turkish political authorities exhibited a hostile attitude towards football and its potential for collective gatherings.⁹⁸ The creation of a robust, healthy nation was the ultimate goal of the sport and physical education policies; thus, the people were encouraged to actively participate in sports, not to remain passive like football spectators.

In this regard, the promulgation of the LPE constitutes a unique exception. As the first legislation of any country to make physical education and sports obligatory for its citizens, the law reflected the regime’s rising concerns for military training, public health, and mass participation in sports on the cusp of the World War II. The Kemalist sport ideologues tried to incorporate football into the official body politics by dissolving its detrimental elements in an

97 Akin, “Ana Hatları ile,” 71.

98 Emrence, “From Elite Circles,” 243.

amateur ethos. Despite the failure of the law, the institutionalization of amateurism indicates the injection of a persistent mentality of public service into the field of sports, one that would later shape the historical experience of football in Turkey.

Furthermore, the power of bureaucracy in contrast with the weakness of business circles prevented football from developing as a private initiative and independent of the state. It resulted in bureaucratic hegemony over sports clubs, not only in terms of bureaucratic scrutiny, but also with respect to decision-making processes. The ruling elite of football in the early republican years was a narrow community composed mostly of bureaucrats, urban elites, and a limited number of middle-class businessmen who intermingled with the state apparatus. In this regard, it was unsurprising that the same people that on the boards of government sports institutions and those of sports clubs. Although the influx of people in football after the World War II diminished the power of the old ruling elite, a more profound change in this composition would require much more time.

Moving the Goalposts? The Transition from Amateurism to Professionalism

The radical changes in the international political system following the Second World War were soon reflected in Turkey's political, economic, and social structure. It was a time, in words ascribed to İsmet İnönü, "when a new world order [was] being established and Turkey [was] seeking a place within it."¹ The consequences of the political elite's efforts to integrate with the West were not only political and economic. As Kaynar underscores, any notion in the scope of the social sciences was subject to radical changes.²

In all respects, the transition to multiparty system was the turning point. This new political orientation created a "great but haphazard societal dynamism."³ Getting rid of the repressive policies of the single party regime, people of different social, political, and economic orientations began to voice their ideas and demands for self-governance and liberty while denigrating government intervention and authoritarianism. In this respect, the field of sport was no exception. "The Law on Physical Education that we enacted ten years ago

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- 1 Mete Kaan Kaynar, "Önsöz" in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. M. Kaan Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 12.
 - 2 Kaynar, "Türkiye'nin Ellili Yılları Üzerine Bazı Notlar," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, 15.
 - 3 İlkey Sunar, "Demokrat Parti ve Popülizm," *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi Vol.8* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 2076-86.

under the pressures of a worldwide depression in imitation of totalitarian and fascist methods of the time is now living its last days,” announced Adil Giray, delightedly, in 1949. “The sorts of laws and institutions in the countries we took as models were all abolished – except in satellite states - after the Second World War.”⁴

Giray’s quotation reflects the optimism of those who had long opposed the existing sport system and sought a more liberal sporting regime. It was during those years the question of professionalism reappeared on the sporting agenda, especially due to the influence of the media. Although the implementation of professionalism as a policy and the move towards the modernization of Turkish football is generally considered a success of the Democrat Party since the relevant laws and regulations were promulgated and professional leagues were launched when they were in power, professionalism in football was initially recognized in the National Sports Congress of 1946. The Republican elite had decided to loosen their sport and physical education policies in the aftermath of the war even before the Democrats came to power. To rectify this oversight, this chapter focuses the period from 1946 to the promulgation of the Professionalism Bylaw in 1951 and examines debates and discourses regarding the issues of sports administration and professionalism would eventually result in the code’s de jure recognition.

Acknowledging that the route towards professionalism was shaped by domestic and international developments after World War II era, this chapter unearths the elements that gave the Turkish mode of professional football its peculiar character. I argue that the acceptance of professionalism in Turkish football was a product of a complex process in which bureaucratic and civilian, sporting and non-sporting factors were involved. The process was shaped by the local cultural, political, and historical contexts, as well as by external

4 “Dünyanın buhranlı günlerine rastlayan devirde on sene evvelki zihniyet ve düşüncelerin baskısı altında totoliter ve faşist usullere özenerek kabul ettiğimiz beden terbiyesi kanunu son günlerini yaşamaktadır. O zamanlar kendimize örnek tuttuğumuz bazı yabancı memleketlerdeki bu neviden kanun ve teşekküller ikinci dünya harbinden sonra –peyk memleketlerde hariç- tamamen ortadan yok olup gitmiştir.” Adil Giray, “Haftanın Notları,” *Akşam*, January 23, 1949.

threats and challenges. Although the promulgation of the Professionalism By-law initiated some early steps towards market liberalization in sports, this chapter argues that it did not create a total transformation of the sports system. The advent of professionalism did not go beyond the mere legalization of de facto professional relations between clubs and players. Instead, the law offered clubs a more favorable position vis-à-vis the players in employment relations. Moreover, the hybrid formula found for sports clubs that allowed them to keep their status as civic associations, instead of adopting a corporate status played a role in the incomplete professionalization of football in Turkey.

§ 3.1 Setting the Stage: Turkey in the Post-World War II Era

Defined as a period of transition, the years following the end of the Second World War witnessed an array of massive developments such as a transition to multiparty politics, Turkey's relocation in international politics, urban growth, a population increase, and rising social dynamism, most of which were new experiences in Turkey. The defeat of the Axis powers and the emergence of the United States as the dominant world power completely changed the international climate in favor of liberalism and democracy. Karpas argues that the change in international politics in favor of Western democracy provided its advocates with a legal and moral foundation from which to more strongly defend their claims against the single party regime.⁵ While most countries adopted new political strategies to move closer to the West, Turkey had an additional reason: the increasing Soviet threat. To keep the Soviet Union and other communist states at bay both politically and culturally, Turkey preferred to build up its ties with Western powers. The country's alliance with the West guaranteed its inclusion in the Marshall Aid plan and subsequent participation in the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1952.⁶

In fact, the circumstances that forced the ruling RPP to introduce a multiparty regime concerned both with the changing international conjuncture

5 Kemal H. Karpas, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), 129.

6 Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006), 108.

and growing domestic pressure. According to Ahmad, “it was the erosion of the political alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite, the landlords, and bourgeoisie which made the status quo impossible to maintain.”⁷ The 1945 Law on the Provision of Land to Farmers created bitterness among land holders and crystallized the discontent within the ruling RPP. The private sector, which had flourished in the previous era, no longer tolerated state interventionism and economic and political restrictions. Encouraged by the changing international climate, their representatives in the party increased their pressure to open the system to opposition.

In 1945, İnönü allowed new political parties to be established and to operate freely. In 1946, a split within the RPP gave birth to the Democrat Party. Immediately afterwards, a fierce electoral struggle began between the Democrats and the Republicans. Although their party programs hardly differed, the opposition DP successfully channeled the discontent of the masses with the RPP government into political change. For the first time in Turkish politics, which had been a monopoly of state elites for years, the agency of the masses was recognized. The people were no longer passive recipients of social and economic policies but active participants in social, political, and economic processes.⁸ This set a new process of social mobilization and equally important, broad popular participation into motion.⁹

According to Cem Eroğul, the general principles of the new party fell under two headings: democracy and liberalism. While the Democrats declared “democracy” as the purpose of the party’s foundation, there were two dimensions to their use of “liberalism.” They sought to reduce government intervention as much as possible to liberalize the economy on the one hand, and to increase the rights and freedoms of individuals to liberalize the public sphere,

7 Ibid., 102-103.

8 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 93-94.

9 Kemal H. Karpat, “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 3 (October, 1972): 349.

on the other.¹⁰ Celal Bayar claimed in one of his speeches that it was they who would make the country a “world of freedoms.”¹¹

On the other side, İnönü, sensitive to changing international and domestic conditions in the aftermath of the war, followed a policy of loosening the reins of statism and liberalizing the regime. While declaring the departure from extreme statism, *Cumhuriyet* pointed out the commonality of the economic policies of the two rival parties:

The statism or state control that was initially implemented in our country in a rational and mild manner became excessive especially during World War II, leading to justified criticism and complaints. Concerning the economic status of our country, the American Thornburg wrote and stated that Turkish private capital remained stagnant for this reason and that we need to activate our own national capital before importing foreign capital from abroad. Both the RPP as well as the Democrat Party are prone to the implementation of statism in a rational, mild manner.¹²

Among the steps taken by the RPP government were liberalizing the Press Law and the Law on Association, granting universities administrative autonomy, promulgating the Law on Labor Unions, and loosening its protectionist economic policies. After official obstacles to establish associations were reduced by changes made to the Law on Association in 1946, the number of associations in the country skyrocketed. The most important sign of the new direction towards economic liberalism occurred in 1947 when in the General Assembly of the RPP accepted the economic demands of the business classes and

10 Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 4th ed. (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), 210-13.

11 “Celal Bayar’ın Adana’daki Nutku.” *Akşam*, January 5, 1949.

12 “Aşırı Devletçilikten Vazgeçerken” *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1948. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

reinterpreted statism as “a principle of substantially facilitating private entrepreneurship.”¹³ The relative liberalization of the regime created space for people to raise civic demands. This was reflected in the pluralism and diversification of the press with the publication of new newspapers and magazines with relatively unrestricted content. In political sphere, it was reflected in newly-founded political parties. And in social life in a boom in the number of associations established. While there was a total of 205 associations in 1938, this number increased to 733 by 1946 and to 2011 by 1950.¹⁴

The time for DP rule came in the general election of 1950. The Democrats campaigned vigorously by adopting a critical tone vis-à-vis RPP leaders and policies and by frequently appealing to religious sentiments. The popularity of its political gatherings turned into actual electoral support, and the DP won 53 percent of the vote. The electoral victories of the Democrats continued throughout the fifties in the next two general elections. However, after coming to power, Democrats soon began to adopt the reflexes of a single party regime that they had frequently criticized when in the opposition. Their rule would end in May 1960 when the Turkish military intervened in the civil sphere for the first time in Turkish history, closing the DP. The main leaders of the party including Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Affairs Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were executed, the constitution was suspended, and a council was appointed by the junta administration.

§ 3.2 Post-War Football and Demands for Change

From the end of World War II until 1951, important developments that affected the professionalization of Turkish football took place. The first was that the pressure and authoritarian attitude of the RPP concerning sports and physical education was replaced by a more liberal approach. The RPP not only suspended the implementation of the LPE law but also significantly reduced its

13 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 93-101.

14 Emin Kirman, “Çok Partili Döneme Geçiş Süreci ve Türk Siyasal Kültüründe Muhalefet Olgusunun Gelişimi (1946-1950)” Master's thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, 2006: 97.

pressure on sports clubs. On top of this, during the National Sports Congress of 1946, the RPP gave the green light to professionalism. Although the transition to professionalism would be prolonged, the RPP felt obligated to authorize these practices as a result of changing national and international dynamics.

Another important development was a boom in the number of clubs due to the amendment to the Law of Associations in 1946. This amendment made it easier to establish associations, allowed the establishment of new sports clubs all over Turkey and allowed sports organizations that formed unofficially in the scope of the LPE to become official.

The number of football teams in the Istanbul Amateur League, which had been thirty on average during the war years, rose 83 percent in the first six years following the war.¹⁵ According to a report in *Galatasaray Sports Newspaper*, the sports clubs affiliated with the GDPE peaked at 1000 up from 565 between 1948 and 1951.¹⁶ Most of these clubs were only active in football and wrestling. Interestingly, in contrast with the 100 percent increase in the number of clubs, the number of athletes registered with the Directorate increased only 10 percent over the same period of time. The atomization of sport culture indicates that people, despite the efforts of the Republican elite to promote active participation in sports, preferred to remain physically passive even while taking an active part in the sport as spectators, fans, club members, or directors.

The post-war rise in the number of sports clubs signifies a rupture from the Kemalist body politics that was enforced from above. It further indicates that daily life was being reorganized not according to the state's enforcements but in tune with the aspirations of the masses. An entertainment-starved people rejected the pedagogical missions of the state with respect to their leisure time. The growing popularity of cinema and football, the emergence of window-shopping as a leisure-time practice, and the arrival of magazine content in the press indicate the loosening state control over the social fabric.

15 Ayhan Yarkın, *Istanbul Amatör Futbolunun 100 Yılı* (Istanbul: Mart Matbaacılık, 2001), 5.

16 Nejat İren, "Bu kadar Çok Kulüp Türk Futboluna Zararlıdır," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 159, February 26, 1951.

Although illegal payments to amateurs had taken place since the game's early development, the growth of football clubs and the intensification of competition after World War II led to the expansion of the system of hidden professionalism. Paralleling the expansion of football, problems that occurred in the league tables and the allocation of fields increased ongoing criticism of the GDPE.¹⁷

As the task of supervising, controlling, and organizing football became increasingly burdensome, the directorate neglected its primary missions regarding the development of amateur sports. According to Vala Nureddin, a famous journalist of this era, the GDPE, which was supposed to be "the institution of the amateurs" did not allow the big clubs to escape its control and thus resorted to "muddling-through" (*idare-i maslahatçılık*) as the only way to maintain its governance.¹⁸ Turning a blind eye to the changing conditions of Turkish football, the GDPE insisted on anti-professionalism as a political attitude. Like Nureddin, many sports journalists of the time revealed the need for a new governing body in charge of just football - particularly of professional football - while the GDPE would remain concerned with amateur sports. However, the subsequent administration of football and amateur sports would remain under the same organization - not only because bureaucrats did not want to lose control over a field that they still interpreted within a framework of public service but also because the bourgeoisie was not strong enough to implement a business model for football.

Interestingly, critics of the directorate by those who sought a more liberal sports system borrowed considerably from the anti-RPP discourse of the Democrats. Themes such as excessive bureaucracy, clientelism, malformed policies, state intervention and corruption were frequently used to describe the institution's inefficiency. The directorate was blamed for irregularities and failures in the field of sports and physical education and was considered anti-democratic as its presidents and ranking officials were appointed by the government instead of an electoral mechanism. This, in the eyes of opponents, led to poor management due to the officials' lack of knowledge of sports and their

17 Necmettin Önder, "Kulüplerin çoğalmasi karşısında," *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, December 10, 1950.

18 Adil Giray, "Türk Futbolünde Profesyonellik," *Akşam*, May 9, 1947.

administration. Although there were certain improvements to the sports infrastructure with the establishment of new stadiums and facilities as well as with the increase in the number of sportspeople after the institution was founded in 1938, the directorate was believed to comprise a bulky bureaucracy with redundant highly-paid officials, which in turn led to inefficiency in the allocation of resources.¹⁹ This bureaucratic structure was also related to the institution's affiliation with the Ministry of Education.

The owners of these criticisms were figures gathered around the Democrat Party that had been recently founded. In a short time, the themes of the criticism aimed at the RPP turned into the promises of the Democrat Party with respect to the field of sport. Democrats, when in the opposition, claimed that they would immediately replace the current directorate with an autonomous, democratic one if they came to power. The new governing body they would found would be under the direct supervision of the Prime Ministry, not the Ministry of Education. This implied not only more autonomy for both clubs and federations but also an attempt to purge sport of its educational and pedagogical connotations. In this context, the idea to move the TFF's head office from Ankara to Istanbul was a symbolic rupture from the state, but at the same time it indicated the influence of Istanbul's big three clubs, Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, and Beşiktaş.²⁰ Another priority for the new sporting body was declared: a free electoral system would end the "sport dictatorship" and enable "self-governance."²¹ "If the law for a new sports system got through the parliament," Burhan Felek hoped, "the state will no longer intervene in sports, the governors will give up giving orders, and athletes simply paddle their own canoes."²²

Along with the transition to a multiparty regime, requests, and demands voiced loudly in the field of sports were among the main factors forcing the RPP towards a change of attitude. The most important of these steps was the

19 Adil Giray, "B.T. Teşkilatının Aksak Tarafları," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 154, 1951; Burhan Felek, "Yeni Spor Teşkilatının Zorlukları," *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1951.

20 *Milliyet*, October 1, 1954.

21 Adil Giray, "Spor İdarecilerinin Seçimi Arifesinde," *Akşam*, January 19, 1951.

22 Burhan Felek, "Yeni Spor Kanunu," *Cumhuriyet*, January 16, 1951.

National Sports Congress held in February 1946. The Ministry of Education declared the aim of the congress “to examine and discuss issues related to physical education and sports which are instrumental in the education of youth and to analyze scientific and experimental issues according to national education principles.”²³ With the broad participation of sports officials, experts, athletes, club directors, journalists, sociologists, educationists, authors, architects, doctors, and military officers, the congress was divided into eight commissions each of which was dedicated to a particular topic.

The most discussed subject on the agenda of the congress along with the issue of changing the GDPE was the official recognition of professionalism. Measures taken to prevent professionalism during World War II years had done no good; in fact, in some cases they caused an undesirable increase in covert professionalism. As Ali Naci Karacan stated, the insistence of policy makers on “orthodox amateurism” caused trouble not only for football but also for two other sports that followed football in popularity: boxing and wrestling.²⁴ For instance, the Turkish Boxing Federation did not give professional licenses to member boxers, so leading boxers of the time such as Aleko Topakozma and Necati Korkut had to obtain professional boxing licenses from the European Boxing Union in order to compete in professional bouts in Turkey.²⁵

In wrestling, athletes faced even more serious problems. Soon after returning from the 1948 Olympic Games in London having a total of twelve medals, national wrestling team including Nasuh Akar, Yaşar Doğu, Gazanfer Bilge, and Halil Kaya - along with Ruhi Sarıalp, a bronze medalist in track and field - were awarded twenty-five thousand Turkish lire by the Association for the Protection of Athletes. The Secretary General of the National Olympic Committee of the time, Burhan Felek, campaigned that these athletes be considered professionals, resulting in their being prevented from participating in the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games.

The fact that the subject of professionalism was taken up by the commission on Ethical Topics in Sports during the congress held in 1946 indicates the

23 *Akşam*, March 1, 1946.

24 *Milliyet*, July 15, 1952.

25 *Cumhuriyet*, November 3, 1950.

RPP's moral rather than economic perspective on the issue. Eşref Şefik, a member of the commission, later confessed that in the general assembly, they - the advocates for professionalism - struggled against those stigmatizing professionalism as "evil and harmful."²⁶ In another essay, Şefik wrote that he never forgot the difficulty of convincing the general board that professionalism was legitimate and that the term professional was an innocent one that could be used for athletes.²⁷

In the commission on Moral Issues in Sports were leading figures in sporting circles: former sportspeople, sport journalists, and administrators. Among them were Firuzan Tekil, Zeki Rıza Sporel, Eşref Şefik, Abdülkadir Karamürsel, Osman Müeyyed, Muslih Peykoğlu, Muvakkar Talu, Sadullah Çiftçioğlu, Mithat Ertuğ, Suavi Cevad, and Cemal Gökdağ.²⁸ Firuzan Tekil, a prominent member of Fenerbahçe Club and later a DP deputy, wrote in *Fener Sports Newspaper* that these commission delegates, under the chairmanship of Fikret Yüzaltı, worked late hours, sometimes without having break to eat on the report they prepared in favor of professionalism. The report on would later be accepted after a fierce discussion in the general assembly.²⁹

According to Tekil, the sports officials in the congress adopted the democratic code of practice of asking the opinions of all club directors.³⁰ However, Tekil ignored was the fact that football players whose legal rights and liabilities were literally in question, were not represented in the committee and thus excluded from the decision-making processes. The first draft of the Professionalism Bylaw confirms this argument. According to the bylaw, clubs were allowed to sign professional contracts for up to three players, which was an effort to take top players who were rotating among clubs under control. Eşref Şefik later admitted that since most of the people on the commission were club

26 Eşref Şefik, "Futbolde Profesyonellik" *Maçspor*, October 25, 1948.

27 Eşref Şefik, "Bizde Açık Profesyonellik Neden Olmuyor?" *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, no: 46, 1949.

28 Firuzan Tekil, "Kimler Başladıysa Onlar Bitirmeli," *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 25, March 20, 1947.

29 "Profesyonellik," *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 6, November 18, 1946.

30 Firuzan Tekil, "Profesyonellik Başlıyor" *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 7, November 18, 1946.

directors who aspired to defend their own interests, not those of football players, the first draft law on professionalism was one-sided in this respect.³¹

Following the congress, negotiations among the GDPE, the TFF, and the representatives of sports clubs were initiated, and draft regulations and laws were immediately prepared. However, the council of the GDPE soon declared that the adoption of professionalism had to be postponed due to the approaching Olympic Games of 1948.³² If professionalism were introduced before the games, the best football players in the country would be expected to adopt a professional status and lose the right to participate to the Olympics. This was not desirable for sporting authorities who placed special importance on the 1948 Olympics in London. Turkish sports teams at the national and club levels had hardly engaged in international sports competitions since the mid-thirties. For these authorities, to show up in the first summer Olympics after a twelve-year hiatus caused by the outbreak of war positioned as a modern, Western state was an opportunity that could not be passed. Ironically, this international sports event led to the postponement of the acceptance of professionalism, but the poor performance and undisciplined behaviors of Turkish footballers during the games resulted in increasing demand for a transformation of the sports system and a move towards professionalism.

§ 3.3 The Inauguration of İnönü Stadium and Relaunch of International Matches

The inauguration of İnönü Stadium, the first modern stadium of İstanbul with the highest seating capacity, was the most important development in Turkish football in the period between 1946 and 1951. The opening of the stadium indicated the emergence of a mass “paying public,”³³ which was a prerequisite for the sustainability of professional football and thus an accelerator of Turkish football’s transition to professionalism.

31 Eşref Şefik, “Beden Terbiyesi Teşkilatı Kalkıyormuş,” *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, no. 55, 1949

32 Füzruzan Tekil, “Profesyonellik ve Olimpik Oyunlar,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 24, 1947.

33 Vamplew, *Pay Up*, 58.

The construction of a modern stadium in Istanbul was actually decided upon in 1937 when Henri Prost submitted his comprehensive master plan for the city.³⁴ The Italian architect Paolo Vietti-Viola, who also designed a stadium representing the power of the regime in Ankara, was again given the duty to prepare the architectural plan. Viola designed a stadium in an ancient Roman style with monumental iron gates, bronze reliefs on the walls, and statues of seminude athletes on two towers adjacent the stadium. The aim of constructing such a stadium was not only sporting but also symbolic. During the celebrations held on 19 May 1939 - the National Youth and Sports Day - the mayor and governor Lütü Kırdar, equated stadiums with schools and said that “the nations’ defense is dependent on the athletic youth of a nation as seen in these bloody days in Europe.”³⁵

The stadium, regarded as the heart of sports and physical education in Istanbul, was not designed for single sport. Like German and Italian stadiums, the venue had the athletic tracks surrounding the infield. Outside the stadium, were tennis courts and open-air spaces for mass sports activities. The tracks had the additional function of taking the focus off the stands, unlike the British model known for the predominance of the stands as well as the closeness of the spectators to the field.³⁶ However, in short time, football became the dominant activity, and the stadium came to be a cradle of football cradle. Contrary to the initial plan and principles, efforts to build capacity to maximize crowd attendance were constant in ensuing years.

During the war years, Turkish football underwent a period of stagnation due to the problems of the insufficiency of its stadiums. The completion of İnönü Stadium’s construction was postponed due to problems about cash proceeds. Taksim Stadium, which used to host the gate-taking games in the city, was demolished during the formation of Taksim Square in 1940. Therefore,

34 Candaş Bilal and Halûk Zelif, “Mega Events in Istanbul from Henri Prost’s Master Plan of 1937 to the Twenty-First-Century Olympic Bids,” *Planning Perspectives* 26, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 621–34, doi:10.1080/02665433.2011.599931.

35 *Cumhuriyet*, May 20, 1940.

36 Juan Luis Paramio, Babatunde Buraimo, and Carlos Campos, “From Modern to Postmodern: The Development of Football Stadia in Europe,” *Sport in Society* 11, no. 5 (September, 2008): 519.

important matches were held either at Fenerbahçe Stadium in Kadıköy or Şeref Stadium within Çırağan Palace, the capacities of which were unable to satisfy the demand. After a long period without a proper stadium, the football community was delighted by the inauguration of İnönü Stadium in 1947. The stadium, with its capacity of over twenty-five thousand, also provided a suitable field on which Turkish football authorities could realize their goal of ‘internationalization’.

3.3.1 *Turkish Football on the International Stage*

Turkish football “which had closed itself like a covered woman”³⁷ during the war years, also began to move towards integrating with world football after World War II. In the early republican years, Turkey prioritized sports events and competitions with other countries in line with Turkish foreign policy. Of the twenty-two friendly games played by the Turkish national football team between 1923 and 1939, eighteen were against the Eastern Bloc countries. Turkey, as Edelman puts it, was unique in that the country was willing to play against Soviet teams that were under a football embargo imposed by Western football authorities.³⁸ However, in the post-war international conjuncture, when Turkey sought to keep the Soviet Union at bay and to integrate with Western powers, Turkish football authorities preferred to develop relations with the Western teams. The changing orientation notwithstanding, in diplomatic relations football came to function, in Irak’s words, “like a membership ID card to the bloc Turkey was engaged with.”³⁹

From a comparative perspective, Turkey’s approach to sport and particularly to football at the international level changed in line with the emergence of a new goal. In international sports events of the single party period, sportsmanship, friendship, and goodwill were the driving values in line with the amateur ethos. In the new world order after the war, it is seen that although the

37 “Kendimizi Tanıtalım,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 11, January 5, 1948.

38 Edelman, *Serious Fun*, 39.

39 Irak, “From Battlefields to Football Fields,” 159.

ideals of “goodwill” and “recognition through participation” were maintained, a winning mentality began to gain traction and became an important concern for the sporting authorities.⁴⁰

One of the earliest instances that demonstrates Turkey’s willingness to be a part of Western football took place in 1947 when FIFA asked the TFF for a list of players to invite for a European mixed team that was to play against the English national team in a private match. The evidence suggests that the Turkish sporting public regarded the invitation of Turkish players “to play among the top players of European countries” as an important development for Turkish football in its march towards Europe.⁴¹ Starting with Greek and Austrian national teams before the Olympic Games in 1948, the TFF organized friendly games with the national teams of Israel, Sweden, Germany, Iran, and Spain, which were all first-time matchups. This diversity increased after the transition to professionalism with matches against Portugal, Belgium, Scotland, Holland, and Brazil.

The desire to open Turkish football to the outside world was also visible at the club level. Wealthy sports clubs, especially those in Istanbul, increased the number of football matches with foreign teams in the aftermath of the war. Fenerbahçe, for instance, having hosting foreign teams for friendly games forty times during the 1930s, organized forty-two international friendly matches at İnönü Stadium alone in the first five years following its opening. In 1951, during the two-months off season, the stadium hosted eleven different teams from different countries including Germany, Israel, Yugoslavia, Austria, Brazil, Scotland, England, and Sweden.⁴²

Beşiktaş’s match against Sweden’s AIK FC at the opening ceremony of İnönü Stadium in 1947 and Fenerbahçe’s match against the Austrian team Wacker at the reopening of Fenerbahçe Stadium following renovations in 1948 illustrate the symbolic importance of internationalism. Beşiktaş’s footballing visit to the United States and Galatasaray’s to England in 1950, both of which are firsts in Turkish history makes it obvious that this rising international attitude corresponded to bilateral relations, not unilateral ones.

40 Şenyuva and Tunç, “Turkey and the Europe of Football,” 572.

41 Cihat Arman. “Gözümüzü Açalım,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 18, February 3, 1947.

42 *Milliyet*, June 12, 1951.

In Istanbul, most of the international friendly games were organized by the three big clubs through a profit and cost sharing collaboration, rarely with the participation of Vefa, which was the fourth largest club in the city. Neither the GDPE nor the TFF could prevent the interruption of the Istanbul league due to the frequency of these organizations.⁴³ The big clubs were encouraged by the fact that they were better represented on the commission in charge of the organization of the league. On the other side, the postponement of league matches was disadvantageous to small teams that could only keep fit via regular league games since they lacked the training facilities and money to organize friendly games. When Beykoz which beat Fenerbahçe in the last game of the first half of the 1948-49 football season, lost 5-1 against Galatasaray in its first game in the second half, a correspondent stated that the reason for the team's decline was the extension of the break due to the big clubs' international friendly matches.⁴⁴ The system was severely criticized for not providing the clubs equal rights and ruining the competitive balance in favor of the big clubs. As one journalist put it, "as long as three of five members of the [league organization] commission were from these clubs, it is not possible for this ship to move forward and for small clubs to escape discrimination."⁴⁵

International matches were an important source of gate receipts for the clubs and a rewarding opportunity for football players to improve their game. The footballers of the early professional era noticed that they learned many new skills and techniques from foreign opponents. Vefa's Muammer Tokgöz once said that during a friendly game with a foreign team, the opponent's control with the knee was received with astonishment in the stadium and received applause from both spectators and local players.⁴⁶ Galatasaray's Suat Mamat,

43 Süleyman Tekil, "Futbol İşlerimiz," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no.20, March 8, 1947; Saim Turgut Vefa, "Eski Sporcular Nasıl Giyinirlerdi," *Akşam*, January 25, 1947; Kemal Halim Gürgen, "Lig Maçlarımıza Yeni Bir Düzen Vermek Lazım," *Akşam*, April 26, 1947.

44 "Lig Maçları Yine Tehire Uğradı." *Akşam*, January 23, 1949.

45 "Küçük Kulüpler Mağdur Oluyor." *Akşam*, February 6, 1949.

46 "O dönemde İstanbul'a haftada bir Brezilya takımları gelirdi. Ben onları seyrederdim. Brezilyalıların futbola estetik katan hareketleri vardı. Sonra basketbol salonuna gider kendi kendime çalışırdım. Bu sırada elde ettim bu melekeyi." Quoted in Aytuna, "Muammer Tokgöz."

known as the king of overhead kicks, explained how he improved his skills as follows: “Those times Brazilian teams were visiting Istanbul once a week. I liked to watch them. They had the moves that gave football a sense of aesthetics. After the games, I used to go to the gym and work by myself. By this means, I got these skills.”⁴⁷

In fact, the rise of football matches with the teams from Western countries after a long period of introversion intensified critical judgements of Turkish football itself. On one hand, opening up to the outside world created a tangible basis for comparison with Western football in terms of the technical, physical, and moral aspects of the sport. The inferiority complex vis-à-vis the professional foreign teams went so far that one journalist used a giant-dwarf dichotomy to describe the position of Turkish teams to the foreign ones.⁴⁸ What was claimed to be lacking in Turkish football players was not talent, but discipline and training. In line with the economic mindset of the era, the sports press defined Turkish footballers as “raw material” with the potential to become top players in the world market as long as being processed through professionalism.⁴⁹

All these changes created an opportunity for the advocates of professionalism. In a period when sport-specific relations with the outside world was consistently growing, the advocates of professionalism sought to remove the issue from its moral context and strongly defended it as an external pressure, projected due to the rising global connectedness. The poor performance of Turkish teams against foreign opponents reflected the fact that Turkish football fell behind European teams in terms of both technical and tactical capacity, especially due to its isolation during the war.⁵⁰ In this regard, professionalism was offered as the only way to catch up to Western football standards.

47 Aytuna, “Suat Mamat - Futbol Sahalarında Bir Sanatçı,” *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published December 26, 2013. <https://dinyakos.com/2019/02/03/suat-mamat-futbol-sahalarinda-bir-sanatci/> (accessed February 16, 2019).

48 “Kendimizi Tanıtalım,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 11, January 5, 1948.

49 Firuzan Tekil, “Profesyonellik Başlıyor,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 7, November 18, 1946.

50 Burhan Felek, “Gülerler mi,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 15, February 2, 1948.

§ 3.4 Destigmatizing Professionalism in a New Epoch

The increasing popularity of football in Turkey after World War II, like elsewhere in the world, made the question of amateurism and professionalism a pressing issue. Especially with rising gate revenues after the opening of İnönü Stadium, players started to demand a share of the receipts. Although it was no secret that many received payments, the decision makers at the General Directorate and the Turkish Football Federation were not prepared to move away from rigid amateurism.

Amateurism, according to Gündüz Kılıç and many opinion leaders in the field of sports, was nothing more than a self-deception. As the influence of the working classes gradually increased both in the stands and on the field, football went beyond being a leisure activity for the young boys of upper-class families. The new working-class player started asking for a larger share of the gate receipts in line with their increase. The decisive voices of professionalism in the press agreed that covert professionalism was the most difficult sports system for club directors and sports administrators alike to handle.⁵¹ It had three main consequences: inefficient administration, low standards of play, and unequal distribution of financial rewards.

There was a consensus that under the rules of shamateurism, the balance of power favored players. In their employment relations with the clubs, they were practically free agents in the absence of official contracts. A club could retain its players only so long as it was prepared to make covert payments. The undisciplined, spoiled behaviors of players both on and off the field were related to this freedom as clubs were unable to assert control over their players. Another handicap the clubs encountered due to the lack of contracts was that players had the freedom to leave their clubs unexpectedly in the case a lucrative offer came from another. To repress this possibility, certain measures were taken. In 1947, the four big clubs of Istanbul signed an agreement guaranteeing that they would not transfer players among each other. The same year, the GDPE which was unable to deal with the continuous footballer trafficking

51 Bedri Gürsoy, "Futbolumuzu Gizli Profesyonellikten Kurtarmalıyız," *Akşam*, January 27, 1949.

throughout the year, declared a period between June 15 and July 15 as the official transfer month. These provisional measures were futile attempts to postpone the inevitable professionalism. As one journalist put it, implementing professional practice in a sporting system still ruled by the principles of amateurism was no different from “wearing tuxedo with rawhide sandals.”⁵²

Another consequence of covert professionalism was related to the fact that football was not a full-time occupation for players. This was thought to restrict the competitive power of Turkish football in the international arena. It was not rational to expect international success from Turkish players who were deprived of regular, scientific coaching and training camp opportunities since they worked in other occupations at the same time.⁵³ According to Nuri Bosut, a former national referee, it was impossible for Turkish football, which “aspired to keep up with the world,” to remain amateur.⁵⁴ Professionalism could become more acceptable when seen as an external obligation.

The migration of domestic players to foreign countries was another consequence of covert professionalism. On account of the opening of the Turkish football through international contacts, Turkey was a new, lucrative market for foreign football managers, especially those from Italy. Şükrü Gülesin, Beşiktaş’s forward, was the first Turkish player to be transferred to a foreign team and to become professional in the aftermath of the Second World War. He contracted with the famous Italian team Palermo in 1950 and later transferred to Lazio. In 1951, three Turkish footballers followed Şükrü to play in Italy. Bülent Eken, Galatasaray’s national player, went to the second division team Salernitana; Lefter Küçükandonyadis, a Greek-Turkish striker for Fenerbahçe, to Fiorentina; that same and Adalet’s Bülent Esel to Spal. Same year, Garbis Istanbuluoğlu, an Armenian-Turkish player also tried his luck with Nimes Olympique in France. However, unable to get his transfer fee, Garbis soon returned to his local team, Vefa.

52 Mahmut Atilla Aykut, “Transfer Modası Karşısında Amatörlük İflas Etmiştir,” *Maçspor*, July 12, 1949.

53 Orhan Ferdi. “Profesyonellik,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no.6, November 11, 1946.

54 Nuri Bosut. “Profesyonellik Talimatnamesi,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 1951.

Like the Latin American cases, the advocates of professionalism used the migration of footballers to support the claim on that the need for the official recognition of professionalism was urgent. TFF president Ulvi Yenel stated that “this migration could result in the deterioration of Turkish football since the country does not have a sufficient number of players for export.”⁵⁵ The advent of professionalism was supposed to prevent the players from going abroad to make a living from football.

In 1949, the General Directorate finally decided to take foreign assistance to restructure the sports system. E. J. Holt, the Director of the Organization of the London Olympic Games, was invited to write a report on the current situation and prepare a proposal for further improvements. While a German sport expert had been invited to transform the sports system in the previous era, he was replaced by a British expert in the post-war years. After his inspections, Holt asserted that the problems in the system did not stem from the fact that sport system was directly under the control of the state but that high-ranking sport officials of high rank lacked knowledge of both sports as well as its administration.⁵⁶ He also drew attention to points which had already been made by Turkish sport experts concerning professionalism. According to Holt, open professionalism should be launched in order to rescue Turkish football from instability and poor quality, and a national professional league should be established accordingly.⁵⁷

There is much evidence on the fact that sport decision-makers began to abandon the rigid amateur physical culture policies in the aftermath of the war. The implementation of the Physical Education Law was suspended and the work on the Professionalism Bylaw and the establishment of a betting company were initiated. The appointment of Ulvi Yenel, a prominent defender of professional football, as the president of the Turkish Football Federation can also be seen in this context. Yenel was a well-known bureaucrat who had served in several state institutions and was a leading figure in sports who had played football for Galatasaray when at Galatasaray High School and for Servette Football Club while obtaining his higher education in Sweden.

55 Sulhi Garan. “Ulvi Yenel ve Sporcu İhracatı,” *Türkspor*, no.28, July 30, 1951.

56 Gökaçtı, “Bizim İçin Oyna,” 179.

57 “Türk Futbolü,” *Maçspor*, October 18, 1949.

Despite these attempts towards a more liberal sports policy, the RPP government neither recognized professionalism nor changed the existing sports system. On the other hand, Democrats contented themselves with uncovering covert professionalism by enacting the law - but without touching the existing sports system.⁵⁸ They followed a populist strategy of taking on important sports figures of the country as deputies and assigning them the task of defending the demands and wants of the sports community in the parliament.

When the DP came to power, the football community was hopeful that the new government would solve long-lasting problems in the field of sports. Adil Giray formulized the major expectation from the Democrats “to transform the sports system on a more democratic and liberal basis like in other developed and democratic countries.”⁵⁹ However, this does not mean that state’s role in the field was refused. A hybrid system in which the public and private function jointly to provide, develop, and govern athletes, programs, facilities and events would remain, but with a transition from an authoritarian to a liberal model. In Tekil’s words, the relationship between the state and the clubs should be like the one between the Marshall Plan and the Europe.⁶⁰ What was expected from the Democrats was in line with their economic ideal. Of minimizing the role of the state in sporting affairs, narrowing the bureaucracy, decreasing public expenditures, and extending the zone of private entrepreneurship.⁶¹ The state’s role would thereby be reduced to that of a financial backer, especially in cases when “private enterprise and capital in no case could deal and also in the economic affairs having the value of public service.”⁶²

Defining the revision of the GDPE as the main goal of the DP government, Osman Kavrakoglu explained the need for the transformation of the sports administration:

While the mandate of the General Directorate of Physical Education as it was initially founded was to deal with the overall sports culture of

58 *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Minutes of General Meeting), Dönem 9, Birleşim 4, May 31, 1950.

59 Adil Giray, “Yeni Spor Teşkilatımızın,” *Akşam*, January 7, 1951.

60 “Beden Terbiyesi Kongresi,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 8, 1950.

61 *Official Gazette of Turkish Republic*, no.7523, June 3, 1950.

62 *Ibid.*, 18579.

the country, it unfortunately neglected this task, wrapped up in the rivalry among clubs, showed weaknesses such as efforts to make cliques, look after friends and relatives, and take sides, causing incredible waste. And it was finally subject to a major revision, as we all know. A new bill to be prepared will give a real identity to the Physical Education General Directorate, and this organization will stop being a paid intermediary for struggles and rivalries among clubs, will introduce sports into schools with their true meaning, and will be transformed into a useful mechanism... The new organization had to abandon its former field of activity between clubs and to adopt a brand-new working style between schools.⁶³

According to Kavrakoğlu, the GDPE should be reorganized as two separate institutions - one in charge of the physical education of the masses and the other in charge of mass spectator sports such as football.⁶⁴ He claimed that with the new law, sports clubs would be rescued from the tutelage of the government. Instead of a state-led institution, a committee composed of club representatives would organize inter-club relations. By this means, clubs would be given a free hand with respect to economic, social, and sporting activities, and the role of the state would be confined to backing the beneficial activities of sport entities, supervising them, and helping out with the establishment of large-scale investments that could not be realized by private entrepreneurship. In addition to these, Kavrakoğlu declared that the recognition of professionalism in football would come in order to regulate the relationship between clubs and players and prevent covert professionalism.⁶⁵

Following Kavrakoğlu's statement, rumors concerning the new sports institution - called the Turkish Sports Union (*Türk Spor Birliği*) - that was to replace the GDPE peppered the sports press. Burhan Felek, writing in favor of

63 "Fenerbahçe Başkanı Rize Milletvekili Osman Kavrakoğlu ile Bir Konuşma," *Akşam*, January 6, 1951. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

64 "Beden Terbiyesi Kongresi Sona Erdi," *Milliyet*, November 10, 1950; "Spor Kongresi Devam Ediyor," *Milliyet*, November 8, 1950.

65 "Fenerbahçe Başkanı," *Akşam*, January 6, 1951.

the new system his column in *Cumhuriyet*, asserted that state-led sports systems which only remained in the Soviet countries must be replaced by self-governing institutions like the UTSC which had ruled Turkish sports for around fifteen years.⁶⁶ The changes to the sports system were also designed to “terminate the monopoly of the club directors who stayed in power for years like the single party government.”⁶⁷ On the other side of the coin, were some authors who were pessimistic about the new law. They argued that the new sports system was able to respond to the expectations of neither football players nor club directors because it was prepared by those who were strong advocates of amateurism.⁶⁸ Focusing on sport for the masses with an educational option, the new law did not pay attention to the problems of mass spectator sports.

In fact, tensions in the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime were evident in sporting discourse as binary oppositions such as the state versus sports clubs, amateurism versus professionalism and sport for the masses versus mass spectator sports. Only a few people were concerned with real problems regarding the sustainability of professional football, such as infrastructural, organizational, and financial capacity. Refik Osman Top underscored that it was too early for a shift to professionalism in Turkish football, which had been on the sporting agenda “to imitate the West.”

In order to achieve the advent of professionalism in our country, first we need to have approached sports as they did in advanced societies and we must enter into this decorum after having worked like they have and having achieved their level. Professionalism has its own particular lines – qualities - with lots of clubs, many playing fields, and a constantly increasing fan base of spectators with each passing day. All this must be adjusted together and was molded into a harmonious

66 Burhan Felek, “Müstakil Teşkilata Dair Düşünceler,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 20, 1951; Burhan Felek, “Yeni Spor Teşkilatının Karşılaşacağı Zorluklar,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1951.

67 Adil Giray, “Kulüplerde Tekel İdaresi Kuran İdareciler,” *Akşam*, March 10, 1951.

68 Adil Giray, “Yeni Spor Kanunundan Beklediklerimiz,” *Akşam*, February 10, 1951; Haluk San, “Türk Spor Birliği,” *Akşam*, February 16, 1951.

template. Taking the huge expenses of our major clubs into consideration, no competition or progress can be achieved with a single field and three clubs. Professionalism is not yet an issue that can be urgently discussed in our country.⁶⁹

As seen in Top's statement, the increasing gate revenues after the launch of İnönü Stadium in 1947 encouraged club directors, especially those of Istanbul's big three clubs. However, gate revenues by themselves were not sufficient for the sustainability of a professional team. As in the case of French football, the foremost resource following gate receipts was state aid.⁷⁰ In the draft law, it was particularly mentioned that state assistance would continue in the forms of both direct subsidies and municipal grants. Another source of revenue, according to Article 16, was to be generated by the establishment of a state betting company based on those of Scandinavian and West European countries.⁷¹ The issue of a betting company would become a divisive topic of discussion and inquiry. However, as Eşref Şefik pointed out, in the absence of inter-city competitions and a competitive balance among teams, maintaining a betting company was not logical.⁷² Despite promises in the early fifties, the Democrats were able to found the company only in 1959 following the establishment of the First National Professional League. The state continued to assist professional football in ensuing years, and the process of professionalization remained under the wing of the state, and of course, politicians.

Despite long-lasting negotiations involving the GDPE, TFF, the Ministry of National Education, sports experts, and club directors, the law concerning Turkish Sports Union did not get through the parliament. The GDPE maintained its position as the highest governing body of national sporting affairs. Nevertheless, Democrats kept their second sporting promise. "Under the

69 Refik Osman Top, "Bizde Profesyonellik Şimdilik Olmaz," *Türkspor Alemi*, no. 13, April 16, 1951. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

70 İbrahim Çürüksulu, "Futbolda Profesyonellik," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 158, February 19, 1951.

71 Osman Karaca and Ali Oraloğlu, "Müşterek Bahsin Tarihçesi 2," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 157, February 12, 1951.

72 Eşref Şefik, "Yeni Spor Birliği Kanunu," *Cumhuriyet*, January 30, 1951.

leadership of the Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray clubs and as an outcome of the intense, fruitful works of the federation, professionalism in Turkish football, has plainly rescued from covert professionalism in September 1951.”⁷³

However, the essential question was if Democrats would be able to keep their promises during their ten years in power. Economic independence was a of most priority in order to gain autonomy and evade government intervention. Turkish state, the main financer of sports in the country, could have encouraged this move towards a more liberal, free-market model as part of a policy of reducing the size of the public-sector budget. However, it was not until 1960 that the betting company came into service. More, the promised transformation of Turkish sport system did not take place and the GDPE continued to govern the sporting field. Democrats, instead of abolishing it, only inquired into corruption in the institution.⁷⁴ The political elites’ preference to continue to finance sport was the precursor of a new hybrid system in sports in which organic ties with the state would never be cut off.

§ 3.5 “Goal! Albeit Foul Play”: The Promulgation of the Professionalism Bylaw

The Professionalism Bylaw prepared by the TFF was accepted by the GDPE’s advisory board in a meeting on 10 September 1951 and went in effect on 21 September 1951. The articles in the first part of the bylaw concerned the sports clubs that were to form professional football teams. The second was concerned with the foundation of professional leagues, the third was on the contracted players, and the forth on their transfer issues. The fifth part was the financial and sixth on penal issues, and transitional provisions comprised the last part of the law. The law basically gave the de facto professionalism a de jure character.⁷⁵

73 Sulhi Garan, “Mesele Doğurmakta Değil,” *Türkspor Alemi*, vol.2, no. 49, December 31, 1951.

74 “Beden Terbiyesi Teşkilatında Tespit Olunan Suistimaller,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 23, 1951.

75 “Profesyonelliğin Temeli Fiilen Atıldı,” *Türkspor Alemi*, no. 49, December 31, 1951.

The bylaw allowed all the sports clubs with amateur football teams to establish professional teams provided they fulfill certain requirements. First, the clubs were only allowed to pay professional players and to employ officers to deal with administrative and financial issues, but they were to continue to operate as associations under the law on Associations. Secondly, clubs that aspired to form a professional football team had to show the federation their bank accounts which had to maintain an amount at least 10 percent more than the annual salaries of their players. A professional team could be a mix of amateur and professional players, but there had to be at least six professionals. Those unable to form a professional team that would remain amateur could only employ two contracted players.

Considering the high cost of forming and maintaining professional teams, certain provisions were taken to protect the future of other branches of sport in the clubs. First, clubs were obliged to use at least 30 percent of revenues generated from football games, cups, and tournaments to fund amateur sports. Secondly, those forming professional football teams would also invest in amateur football and form amateur teams that were expected to participate in amateur leagues. For the sports clubs, this meant that amateur football would lose its function as a leisure activity for people from various ages and become identified with youth development to cultivate young talents for professional teams.

In many respects, the law had an apparent, biased character that favored football clubs over professional players. The law was used by club executives to “control the players who were completely professional under the veil of amateurism, prevent problems resulting from informality, and regulate the already persistent professionalism.”⁷⁶ Under the new conditions, clubs were able to make contracts of at least one and at most five years with the players. The rights of the players, including one month paid leave, life and accident insurances, and coverage of medical costs in case of injury were protected under the law. However, the payment football players could get was limited to a range between 1250 and 5000 lire, including monthly salary, match bonuses, and

76 Ibid.

subsidies. This maximum wage was less than the earnings of top players in the era of covert professionalism.⁷⁷ Another important practice that diminished the bargaining power of players in their employment relations was the restriction put on transfers to foreign clubs. By law, transfers abroad were subject to the private permission of the federation.

While a professional player could change clubs only during the transfer month, July, an amateur could convert to professional status by signing a contract with his own club at any time. If an amateur wanted to sign contract with another club, he was obliged to pay an amount six times his new monthly salary as compensation to his former club. If the amateur changed clubs without signing a professional contract but became a professional within the same year, he was obliged to pay the same amount.

In order to establish a professional league in a city, there had to be at least eight participating professional teams. If the sufficient number to form a professional league could not be reached, professional teams were allowed to participate in the local amateur league. An organizational committee composed of club representatives and a non-voting federation officer was in charge of the organization of the professional league, the league schedule, and the distribution of gate revenues. According to the bylaw, in the absence of consensus on the distribution of revenues, 30 percent of the gross revenues generated from league games would be distributed equally among the participating clubs, and the rest would be shared in line with their ranking. Objections could be made to the federation as a final arbiter.

As soon as the law went into effect, sports clubs signed official contracts with top players who were already getting under-the-table payments. Almost all the players for Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, and Vefa became professionals.⁷⁸ However, the football community was divided about the implementation of professionalism. While some claimed that the advent of professionalism “moved Turkish football move closer to the European football,” those in search of a British model of professionalism were totally disappointed.⁷⁹ For

77 Ferit Karslı, “Profesyonellik,” *Ulus*, September 23, 1951.

78 “Profesyonelliğin Temeli Fiilen Atıldı.” *Türkspor Alemi*, no. 49, December 31, 1951.

79 *Milliyet*, December 28, 1951.

them, the bylaw was prepared in response to the needs of certain clubs instead of satisfying the needs of the football community as a whole. Vala Nureddin interpreted this hybrid form of professionalism as “a goal, albeit foul play.”⁸⁰ According to him, the law had three major consequences. First, the GDPE, which was legally supposed to protect the rights and interests of amateurs, instead consolidated its own power by taking provisional measures and remaining within the sphere of the influence of the big clubs. Second, the clubs acquired opportunities to generate considerable revenues by establishing professional teams. While continuing not only to benefit from certain subsidies and privileges but also being exempt from taxes by maintaining their affiliation with the GDPE as amateur clubs. Lastly, with the maximum wage limit, top players were precluded from earning large amounts of money.

Although the laws and regulations did not leave room for sports clubs to adopt a corporate model, demands to do so emerged as early as the mid-1950s. In a piece appeared in the daily *Spor* in 1956, a sport journalist lamented that the benefits of professionalism were limited to the discovery by the big clubs of İstanbul of nameless footballers who previously lived in the remote parts of the country. However, as he further argued, “unless the opportunity to evolve into companies is given to clubs, the expected benefits to from professionalism cannot be maintained.”⁸¹

According to another account in *Spor*, Galatasaray directors asked TFF president Hasan Polat for switching to a corporate model.⁸² The request of Galatasaray was declined, and Turkish sports clubs would wait more than thirty years to become true, profit-making enterprises. Only in the 1980s the sports clubs in Turkey, starting with Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, and Beşiktaş -known as the Big Three of Turkish football, began initiating their profit-maximizing

80 Vala Nureddin. “Gol! Fakat Faul!,” *Akşam*, October 5, 1951.

81 Yavuz İsmet Anıl, “Profesyonel Kulüplerimiz Şirket Haline Gelmelidir,” *Spor*, November 1, 1956.

82 “G.Saray Klübü Şirket Haline Gelemiyor,” *Spor*, October 19, 1956.

projects, investments, and enterprises via their own companies and partnerships while they were maintaining their association status as non-profit organizations.⁸³

§ 3.6 Concluding Remarks

Following World War II, the liberalization of the political regime galvanized demands for the transformation of the sport system in Turkey. As a result of changing national and international dynamics, the RPP government felt obliged to replace its authoritarian sport and physical education policies with more liberal ones. The government not only suspended the implementation of the LPE but also significantly reduced pressure on sports clubs. Moreover, the government decided principal to transition to professionalism at the National Sports Congress of 1946, although its launch would later be postponed.

After games began being played at İnönü Stadium, the attendance of a large paying public at the games strengthened the arguments of the advocates of professionalism. Those who had strongly criticized the authoritarian sports policies of the RPP government would join together in Democrat Party circles. They eventually succeeded in securing the acceptance of professionalism in 1951, but failed to make fundamental changes to the sports system.

As this chapter indicated, the belated decision to abandon from amateurism in football was based mainly on three important developments. First was the rise of the domestic demands with respect to the issue under the new, liberal political regime. Second was external pressure that emerged due to the need for Turkish football to modernize after it opened up to the outside world. Third was the urgent need for policy makers to take the growing covert professionalism under control. Ultimately, professionalism was officially recognized, but hypocritically, without allowing sports clubs to incorporate. Due to its incomplete character in terms of the missing business logic and the uneven diffusion throughout the country, professionalism failed to be a breakthrough

83 Tuğrul Akşar, *Endüstriyel Futbol* (Istanbul: Literatür, 2005). For a discussion on the administrative, legal and tax-related advantages of organizing under the Law of Associations, see: Murat Başaran and Tezcan Atay, *Spor ve Sporunun Vergilendirilmesi ve Vergi Avantajları* (Istanbul: Yaklaşım Yayınları, 2003).

for the existing sports system. Turkish football, contrary to expectation, did not become autonomous because the financial dependency on state subsidies and tutelage continued for sport entities. In this regard, the promulgation of the Professionalism Bylaw did not go beyond regulating labor relations between clubs and players.

The Launch of Professional Leagues

Last Sunday, Galatasaray beat Fenerbahçe 3-1. The giant city of Istanbul is still shaken by the echoes of this football stage. At the coffeeshops, bars, markets, inns, streets, ferries, trains, buses, all the Istanbulites of different places, backgrounds, and classes are match-crazy, club-crazy. Students, apprentice artisans, newspaper distributors, greengrocers, plasterers, shoemakers, tailors, barbers, businessmen, merchants, civil servants, the unemployed, lowlifes, grasshoppers, rogues, boatmen, porters, brokers, 30-, 40-, and 50-year-olds, heroes, soldiers, kids, women, girls, scholars, the stupid, the blinds, wastrels, the deaf, mutes, the disabled, invalids, all the cats, dogs, birds, and fish... All the places, people and things of the city are occupied with this...¹

The words of Reşad Ekrem Koçu, a prominent Turkish historian known for his *Istanbul Ansiklopedisi*, after the game between Fenerbahçe and

1 Reşad Ekrem Koçu “Yağmur Kuşağı.” *Milliyet*, December 24, 1954. For the original Turkish, See appendix B.

Galatasaray on 19 December 1954 evokes the strong passion for football in the city of Istanbul in the 1950s. In that match, which attracted an estimated crowd of twenty-five thousand spectators to Mithatpaşa Stadium, previously called İnönü, records for both match attendance and gate revenues were broken.

This chapter maps out the football's landscape of the early professional period from 1952 to 1963. During this pre-national era, professional football was organized on regional basis mainly in three cities, but made a decisive progress towards nationalization after the foundation of the first division of the National Professional League in 1959. The 1960s witnessed the establishment of professional city clubs with full backing of local notables, businessmen and municipal authorities and in line with rising peripheral nationalisms.

This chapter focuses on the first professional leagues established in Turkey's leading urban centers: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Turkey underwent a process of footballization during this period with the growth of clubs, competitions, as well as a great increase in terms of the numbers playing, watching and writing about the game. Particular attention will be paid to Istanbul, the foremost address of professional football in Turkey. Istanbul, even in the early republican years after the city lost the political power to Ankara, remained the football capital of the country. In the aftermath of World War II when political and economic power again shifted to favor Istanbul, the city relentlessly consolidated its football hegemony.

§ 4.1 A Brief Panorama: Football in the Fifties

Without doubt, football has been omnipresent in the Turkish public and private spheres since its inception. However, the post-World War II years saw the footballization of Turkish society not only through the rising hegemony of the game in Turkish culture but also through the growing connections between the game and politics. Monoculture of football over other sports indicates the failure of the multi-sport approach of amateurism in the previous era. But why did tens of thousands of spectators throng to the stadiums to watch a match? The need for entertainment and fun does not seem sufficient to explain the

people's enthusiasm for football during the period under question. The cultural power of football derived from the fact that spectators interpreted the game in a non-sporting way.

Rethinking this process of footballization through the tools and concepts used to explain the post-war urbanization in Turkey, it seems fair to argue that while the economic transformation of the game with the advent of professionalism was a pulling factor that made football more appealing for the masses, the loss of interest in other sports in line with the decline of amateurism and its multi-sport approach can be regarded as a pushing factor. Furthermore, improvements in transportation and communications which Sencer defines as transmitting factors in his book *Türkiye'de Kentleşme (Urbanization in Turkey)*, also played a pivotal role in the footballization of Turkish society.²

Recently, a large, growing body of literature has investigated the positive correlation of football clubs and the process of urbanization. As Holt has revealed, the number of sports clubs tends to rise in periods of rural migration and population growth as it becomes more difficult to feel a sense of belonging to the ever-expanding cities.³ One can consider the growth of sports clubs in post-World War II Turkey in the context of urban transformation. According to the data derived from the GDPE archives, there were only 14 sports clubs in Turkey when the first national sports organization - UTSC - was established in 1922. This number increased to 300 until 1936 when the UTSC was replaced by the TSA. Following the promulgation of the law of physical education of 1938 that accelerated the foundation of new sports clubs and groups, the change in the law of association facilitated the foundation of new sports clubs as well as the formalization of the existing ones. By the mid-fifties, the number of sports clubs would reach to 1364 in the country. Out of this 1364, 1091 were youth clubs, 174 were specialized clubs, and 99 were military clubs. The province of Istanbul headed the list with 162 sports clubs, followed by Ankara, Balıkesir, and İzmir. Strikingly, 396 of these clubs adopted Fenerbahçe's yellow and dark blue as their official colors, while 289 were Beşiktaş's black and white

2 Yakut Sencer, *Urbanization in Turkey* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1979), 67-68.

3 Richard Holt, "Working Class Football and the City: The Problem of Continuity," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 3, no. 1 (1986): 5-17.

and 165 were Galatasaray's yellow and red. This was clear evidence of the nationwide popularity of Istanbul's three big clubs.⁴

As far as the number of sports clubs are concerned, it is no doubt that Istanbul had the lion's share. The city underwent crucial processes of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization that would eventually change the sociocultural structure of the city. During the period in question, Istanbul's population grew from around 860 thousand in 1946 to 1 million in 1950, and it reached around 1.5 million by 1960. In line with this population growth, the number of sports clubs doubled, reaching around 150 in 1960.⁵ This number excludes the small-sized clubs that were not registered to the General Directorate.

As many historians argue in other cases, these football clubs came to play a pivotal role in allowing individuals to express their local and cultural identities.⁶ Football communities, which have always been fluid and open to change, as Anthony Cohen indicates, were subject to rapid expansion in Istanbul, in line with the rural-urban migration. The migrants not only became new supporters and members of the existing clubs but also sought to "display *their* geography through their football support" by forming new neighborhood teams.⁷ The emergence of new clubs, most of which were small-scale neighborhood clubs bearing the name of a new locality, would boost the football competition of the city. These clubs had a dual function in terms of identity-reinforcement. While football facilitated the integration of migrants into urban life on one hand, it helped reproduce the old, communal bonds of kinship for those who had migrated from the same or nearby villages to the same urban settlements.

4 Quoted by Esin İsmet. "An Interesting Statistic," *Spor*, December 23, 1956.

5 "Kulüplerin Artışı Üzerine," *Akşam*, December 23, 1960.

6 Tony Blackshaw, "Contemporary Community Theory and Football," *Soccer and Society* 9, no. 3 (2008): 325-26, doi:10.1080/14660970802008959.

7 Anthoy Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. (London: Tavistock, 1985), quoted by Adam Brown, Tim Crabbe, and Gavin Mellor, "Introduction : Football and Community—Practical and Theoretical Considerations" 9, no. 3 (2008): 307.

Most of the clubs were either neighborhood- or workplace-based, and both their players and administrators were mostly from the community itself. Club presidencies remained largely in the hands of the rich in these neighborhoods, who were mostly merchants or self-employed men. As one sports journalist put it, club directors of the past who were “gentlemen, educated, from high families, and held a respected position in the society” were increasingly replaced by “those who had been doing portage up until the last war.”⁸ It was these war profiteers, Keyder argued, who initiated the everlasting rural migration in hope of commingling with the privileged classes.⁹

Being president of the local football club was a source of social prestige in the local community but also a way of extending the prestige beyond the local community and gaining wider recognition. It was no mere coincidence that most local club presidents were associated with the Democrat Party, either as members or as district heads. Football clubs, as is later discussed in detail, played a key role in political networking.

The expansion of football throughout the fifties, characterized by the rising number of teams, players, members, and administrators gradually undermined the hegemony of the old ruling elite. As Özden claims, football began to take on the characteristics of a mass working-class sport in Turkey during those years.¹⁰ This phenomenon was undoubtedly enhanced by economic developments. The economic miracle in the first half of the decade not only turned Turkey into a consumer society but also led to the participation of lower classes in economic prosperity for the first time. This meant the direct consumption of football became available to more people. This resulted in a considerable change in the cultural production of the game due to the levelling out of middle-class values. Although the popularization and professionalization of Turkish football was a watershed for stimulating the rupture between the upper classes and the game, this does not mean that

8 Şevket Soley, “İdareci Dediğin Tipler Böyle Olur İşte,” *Akşam*, April 1, 1956.

9 Keyder, “Arka Plan,” 20.

10 Özden, “Working Class Formation in Turkey, 1946-1962,” 105-127.

the powerful and socially dominant abandoned football. On the contrary, they continued to run the game, to it as a political tool, to gain social status from it and, consciously or not, to exploit it as a vehicle of social control.¹¹

Due to the decline of amateur ideals and the emergence of new power groups, conventional social stratifications lost their binding power and the cultural hegemony of the elite was gradually defeated. The power shift in football created moral panic which was part of a broader discontent with the cultural transformations the country was undergoing during those years. The sports press was full of news and articles reflecting fear about the outbursts of “the invaders” whose presence in the stands became overwhelming.

After the launch of professional leagues, organizational structure of football acquired a three-tiered hierarchy. The myriad of small clubs, most of which were locally-based and not officially registered to the directorate, occupied the lowest tier. Since their players were mostly students who could only play during the season when school was out, these teams were also called ‘summer teams’. Although the motive for their foundation was declared as “popularizing sport among the youth,” which had a public health dimension, most were only active in the field of football.¹²

In the middle of the hierarchy were an ever-growing number of amateur teams registered with the directorate. Like the non-federated ones, these clubs played a representative role for the neighborhoods and districts in which they were based. Despite their best efforts, these clubs received sparse attention from state agencies and policy makers. They used local coffeehouses (*kahvehane*) as their administrative centers and had basic financial problems that revolved around the issues of obtaining a playing field and the required equipment. Although they received a certain amount of aid from the Physical Education Directorate, they were dependent on the support of local notables.¹³

On the top of the football hierarchy were the professional leagues in which the professional teams of the wealthiest clubs competed for money, fame, and

11 Duke and Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People,” 100.

12 “Genç Spor Kulübü,” *ÖzFenerbahçe*, no:34, July 16, 1956.

13 “Bahariye G. Kulübü,” *ÖzFenerbahçe*, no:32, July 2, 1956.

prestige. Although the Professionalism Bylaw was promulgated in September 1951, the Istanbul Professional League began with difficulty in the early days of 1952 due to problems with the transfer and licensing system. According to the Professionalism Bylaw, at least nine players with a professional contract were required for the establishment of a professional team. However, the launch of a local professional league required the participation of a minimum eight professional teams. After this requirement was reduced to six in 1955, professional leagues in Ankara and Izmir could be founded.¹⁴ Outside of these three cities, only Adana Demirspor and Milli Mensucat clubs in Adana managed to form professional football teams. However, their application to participate in the Ankara Professional League was declined by the federation. In other cities, local leagues maintained their amateur status.

The tension between amateurism and professionalism over funding problems continued for years after professionalism was accepted. As authors of the period frequently brought up, amateur clubs were neglected when amateur sports and professional football were placed under the same administrative structure. Both sports authorities and club directors prioritized the professional teams with respect to funding, allocation of resources, stadiums, and other facilities. As Sırrı Alıçlı stated, “no one pursued *clientless* athleticism while there was the sport of football that drew tens of thousands of fans.”¹⁵

By 1959, there were 100 clubs competing in a total of five amateur leagues, some of which with more than one division. Due to the boom in the number of sports clubs in the 1950s, the directorate faced problems with respect to the funds, the allocation of playing fields and arrangement of fixtures, the management of the leagues, and the assignment of referees. Amateur clubs in Istanbul generally complained about the federation’s discriminatory approach. In 1959, amateur clubs of İstanbul’s local leagues sent a telegram to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in order to have their complaints about the TFF heard by the highest possible authority.¹⁶ As the Directorate of Physical Education

14 *Milliyet*, June 15, 1955.

15 Emphasis mine. Dr. Sırrı Alıçlı. “Bizde Spor Kulüpleri ve Sporcuların Sigortası,” *Akşam*, May 8, 1953.

16 *Milliyet*, November 26, 1959.

did not pay the allowances of these amateur clubs due to a financial crisis it was suffering, the message included the following:

We take a youth from the neighborhood and place him on a team. Then, professional clubs take this young man away with attractive offers. We are the step children of the directorate. In full contradiction of the law, the organization protects professionals... If they want to prevent amateurism from dying in Turkey, they should add ten-kuruş revenue stamps to the national league match tickets. The revenues derived from these aid stamps will keep amateur clubs from closing their doors.¹⁷

Sırrı Alıçlı wrote a series of articles in *Akşam* daily newspaper in 1953, about the consequences of the hybrid sports system. According to the author, there was no possibility of amateur and professional athletes realizing separate aims under the same roof. Furthermore, amateur athletes were subject to constant neglect and even harassment in professional clubs.¹⁸ For these reasons, the government should not allow amateur and professional athletes to be together in the same club, he argued. The state should only protect amateur organizations, and professional clubs should be allowed to use government facilities such as stadiums only after meeting certain national administrative and financial obligations.¹⁹

This discussion about the dual structure of the sports system continued through the 1950s with additional commentaries from various authors and sporting pioneers. The newspaper reports agreed that “like in all [of Turkey’s] close neighbors in Europe” the TFF should be independent and the GDPE should focus only on amateur sports.²⁰ However, this view would not be widely accepted in an order dominated by the wealthy football clubs that were able to enjoy political tutelage. On the other side of the coin, those who were dissat-

17 *Milliyet*, August 5, 1959. For the original Turkish, See appendix B.

18 Dr. Sırrı Alıçlı. “Amatörlük Profesyonellik,” *Akşam*, July 31, 1953.

19 Dr. Sırrı Alıçlı. “Sporda Profesyonellik,” *Akşam*, November 27, 1953.

20 Alp Zirek. “Teşkilatın Değişmesi Lazımdır,” *Türkiyespor*, November 9, 1954.

ified with this model of professional football that was open to state intervention and dependent on its financial backing continued to criticize “the Eastern mindset”²¹ that prevented Turkish professional football from catching up to Western standards in terms of technical and commercial capability.

§ 4.2 Istanbul Professional League (1952-1959)

On January 5, 1952, a rainy day in Istanbul, the spectators invading the stands of Mithatpaşa Stadium witnessed the first professional football match of the Istanbul Professional League and in Turkish sports history. The game was played between Galatasaray and Kasımpaşa and ended with the 2-0 victory of Galatasaray, the first runner-up of the Istanbul League in the previous season. The Istanbul Professional League, starting in its first season, was to become the most important force in the history of football in Turkey until the establishment of national professional leagues. For eight seasons, the league spearheaded football’s transition not only from amateurism to professionalism but also from a participant-based amateur sport to mass spectator sport.

Nevertheless, it is hard to say that the launch of the Istanbul Professional League gave a particularly different pulse to Istanbul’s football life. Rather, it was a continuation of the first division of the previous Istanbul Amateur League, in terms of club composition and competitiveness as well as the league’s organization and point scoring system. The participating teams were the same as those that participated in the first division of the amateur league and included Beşiktaş, Beykoz, Emniyet, Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, Istanbulspor, Kasımpaşa, and Vefa. After open professionalism was adopted, these clubs signed contracts with their top players – that is, with at least with nine of them – in order to have the right to compete in the new league.

The teams participating to the Istanbul Professional League in its first season were the most powerful of Istanbul in terms of fanbase, on-field success, and finance. In addition to the Big Three - Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, and Fenerbahçe - were there two mid-size neighborhood-based clubs (Beykoz and

21 İslam Çupı, *Mağlubu Anlatmak*, Barış Karacasu and Yavuz Yıldırım, eds., (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009), 22.

Kasımpaşa), two school-based clubs (Istanbulspor and Vefa), and one institution-based club (Istanbul's Police Station's Emniyet).

In the second season, the number of clubs rose in the league to ten with the participation of Beyoğluspor and Adalet, both of which had finished first in their respective groups in the Istanbul Amateur League. Founded by the Greek community, Beyoğluspor was one of the oldest sports clubs in the city. Adaletspor was comparatively a new one, established after World War II years in the Adalet Textile Factory. These two clubs were politically and economically strong in addition to their sportive superiority over others in the amateur division. Above all else, Beyoğluspor, which was the strongest representative of the Greek Orthodox community in football, had a considerable fan base. Adaletspor based on a factory owned by Süreyya İlmen, a well-known businessman and philanthropist. It secured the transfer of many players from other teams, most notably Fenerbahçe, by making attractive offers such as job opportunities at the factory to star players. As Adalet made a name for itself with its aggressive transfer policy, its matches started to draw the interest of the public. Believing that the club's participation in the professional league would attract larger crowds and thus increase overall revenues, the federation made a last-minute change to their status and called off the playoff game in order to promote both clubs into the professional league.²²

Due to the demands from below, a second division of the professional league would be formed in 1956. The clubs participating were long-established neighborhood teams of the city, including Galata, Beylerbeyi, Davutpaşa, Hasköyspor, Üsküdar Anadoluspor, Feriköy, Yeşildirek, Sarıyer, Karagümrük, Eyüp, Taksim, and Süleymaniyespor.

4.2.1 *From Statism to Populism? Rebranding İnönü Stadium and Beyond*

In line with football's rising popularity, new concerns in terms of expanding the game's social spaces emerged in the 1950s. In this regard, the post-war period not only saw the construction of new stadiums, whether small or large such as Vefa, Beykoz, Mecidiyeköy, and İnönü stadiums but also continuous

22 "Lig Maçları Bugün Başlıyor," *Akşam*, September 25, 1952.

renovation work to increase the seating capacity of the existing stadiums. In addition to those mentioned above, Şeref, Eyüp, Anadoluhisarı, and Fenerbahçe stadiums also hosted either amateur or professional football league games in Istanbul. Beside proper stadiums and fields, the parks in which recreational activities had traditionally took place since the Ottoman period as well as market gardens (*bostan*) were turned in new playing grounds for football. While Istanbul experienced a boom in entertainment due to the diversification of urban space and the emergence of new leisure patterns, football which replaced traditional recreational activities, became the most popular entertainment for an entertainment starved people.²³

Among the venues related to football, the foremost was unquestionably İnönü Stadium. In addition to its high seating capacity, the stadium was differentiated from the rest with its fabulous location at Dolmabahçe. Although on match days going to the stadium could be “torture instead of fun” due to throngs of people flooding the streets and traffic backing up, arriving at the stadium by bus or *dolmuş* (shared taxi) along the Eminönü or Bebek lines, the tram from Sirkeci, or ferries from various ports was convenient.²⁴ Soon after its inauguration in 1947, the venue became an urban landmark. In this regard, the rebranding of the stadium had a very symbolic significance.

In 1951, the city council of Istanbul Municipality, on which the Democrat Party held the majority, decided to change the name of İnönü Stadium.²⁵ Mithat Paşa was an Ottoman statesman known for his liberal attitude and administrative reforms. The discussion of his remains, which were in Taif and were to be brought back to Turkey, was on the agenda during those days. The objective of renaming the stadium Mithatpaşa rather than İnönü was to wipe the early republican past from urban memory.

Mithatpaşa Stadium, with its new name, belonged to the General Directorate of Physical Education. The fact that no club of İstanbul had a stadium

23 G. Gürkan Öztan and Serdar Korucu, *Tutku, Değişim ve Zarafet: 1950’li Yıllarda İstanbul* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017), 15-17.

24 *Cumhuriyet*, August 26, 1958.

25 “İnönü Stadının ismi Mithatpaşa olarak Değiştirildi,” *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1951.

with this capacity, including the Big Three, explains the importance of the stadium. This stadium hosted a significant proportion of professional league matches, national matches, and international games. The state, which was supposed to be the patron of amateur clubs and athletes, gave the stadium over to the service of professional clubs. Vala Nureddin expressed it thusly: it turned Mithatpaşa into the “tax free commercial venue of professional clubs.”²⁶

Sulhi Garan claimed that clubs with professional football branches should leave the GDPE and establish an independent federation, and asked why they had not done so.

Do you think that they [the sports clubs] are afraid the GDPE will not permit the use of Mithatpaşa Stadium? If the top three clubs of the professional league together, forget a monument such as Mithatpaşa Stadium. They could have built a stadium similar to the ones with outdoor stands popular in the largest sports centers of the world or London’s 100 thousand capacity Wembley Stadium with a partial wooden roof, Belgrade’s 60-thousand-seat Partizan, the Prater Stadium in Vienna with the same capacity, Paris’s Colombe Stadium.²⁷

Even the largest stadium, Mithatpaşa, failed to satisfy the demand especially for the important games. There was consensus among the sporting public about the urgent need to build a stadium with a higher capacity than Mithatpaşa. Although no new stadium was inaugurated, the capacity of Mithatpaşa was increased with the construction of new stands after the adjacent gas plant was decommissioned in 1961. To post evening games, the stadium lighting was added the next year.

26 Va-Nu. “Beden Terbiyesinin Tenkidi,” *Akşam*, August 6, 1953. When İnönü Stadium opened and clubs began to generate large gate revenues starting in 1947, debates arouse about the taxation of the clubs via an amusement duty. However, the club executives strongly reacted to the supporters of such taxation and accused them of being “wealth enemies.” See “Amatör Kulüplere Vergi.” *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, no. 39, July 4, 1949; “Profesyonellik Statüsü Münasebetiyle.” *Türkspor Alemi*, no. 38, October 29, 1951.

27 Sulhi Garan. “Profesyonel Futbol Federasyonu,” *Türkiye Spor*, October 27, 1954. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

Istanbul took the lead in professional football not because of Mithatpaşa's high capacity, but because the city had the potential to fill this stadium. The observations of a correspondent from *Milliyet* evidence for the rise of gate revenues in the Istanbul Professional League:

While the turnover from league matches made the club executives happy, we observe that the interest in football is constantly increasing and we are pleased in this regard. The earnings from matches that were not even enough to meet gate and ticket booth costs are now lining the pockets of executives. The Istanbulspor-Emniyet match at Şeref Stadium sold tickets for more than 600 lire... If you look at the records, no game played between these teams sold these many tickets. The turnover from Mithatpaşa stadium on Sunday was a record for Galatasaray-Beykoz matches. 14,534 spectators rarely came to even the most important matches.²⁸

In the fifties, "record" became a magical word to define the consistent boom in match attendance and gate revenues. For instance, the match between Portuguesa and Beşiktaş in 1951 reported record match revenues for İnönü Stadium. According to *Milliyet*, the game was followed by 21,913 spectators, and 41,437 Turkish lire were generated in total.²⁹ One year later, 23,481 spectators paying 39.991 Turkish lire came to Mithatpaşa Stadium to see a match between Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş. The game broke the records for the Istanbul Professional League in terms of both attendance and revenue.

Total gate receipts for the 1953-1954 season in the Istanbul Professional League was announced as 895,743.50 lire, and the following season would generate a revenue of 1.176.932 lire. The revenue almost doubled in the 1955-1956 season with a sum of 2.044,966 Lire.³⁰ Due to continuing expansion of the audience and increasing ticket prices, gate receipts would escalate in ensuing years. The last season of the Istanbul Professional League generated a total of

28 *Milliyet*, December 14, 1954. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

29 *Milliyet*, May 5, 1951.

30 *Milliyet*, July 7, 1956.

3.151,692 lire in total.³¹ This upward trend continued after the formation of National Professional League. During the 1959-60 season, a total of 380 league matches attended by 1,814,547 people were held, and nationwide gate revenues reached to 8,737,719 lire.³² These numbers are official accounts. However, a significant number of people attended the games without tickets. For instance, the league match between Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray in 1955 was followed by 26,305 people according to official count. This was a new record, outdistancing the attendance at a national match against Spain, even though the ticketless spectators that pervaded the L stands were excluded.³³ In the matches of the Big Three, national matches, and international friendly games at the club level there was sometimes the problem of black marketing resulting from great interest in excess of stadium capacity.

Indeed, black market for match tickets soon became one of the big problems for the Istanbul Professional League in the early fifties. Black marketing of tickets became a new, informal occupation discovered by rural migrants who were unable to find jobs in formal sectors.³⁴ During the 1950s, the Democrat Party tried to prevent black marketing in several ways such as increasing security and policemen around the stadiums and increasing ticket prices as a part of a general fiscal policy on black marketing and unfair profiteering. Sport columns of the fifties were full of articles about the arrest of ticket scalpers. The transition to a ticket barrier system at the stadium gates and later the launch of season tickets diminished the problem.

Football's unparalleled popularity in urban life also demonstrated itself with long lines of people who wanted tickets before they went on the black market in front of the ticket offices at Mithatpaşa Stadium during the nights before the big games. In this regard, Benokan's observations illustrate the vivid atmosphere surrounding the stadium and offer insight into the new football culture:

31 *Milliyet*, February 18, 1959.

32 *Milliyet*, June 14, 1960.

33 "Yurtta Olup Bitenler," *Akis*, no.45, 1955.

34 Sinan Yıldırım, "Köylüler ve Kentliler: Ellili Yılların Dönüşen Yeni Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Kültürel Coğrafyası," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, 543-551.

- Zarif lovers... Dem drinkers...
- Bring me a tea, but make sure it contains no synthetic dyes...
- Come on sugar lovers...

Last night from 22:30 until morning we listened to these sounds in front of Dolmabahçe stadium. This place has a literature of its own. ‘Zarifçiler’ (tea lovers), ‘demciler’ (strong tea lovers) are terms for the tea drinking crowds. Do you know what ‘sugar lovers’ could be? All you need to do is to turn the corner towards the (N) stands. Five or ten people gathered are playing craps under the shaky light of two candles placed on a cobblestone block. Aficionados sprawled on the barriers are lying on newspapers they have thrown on the ground to wait for morning. They are waiting for the match; the street sellers lined up opposite are waiting for them... If there are forty hawkers, ten of them are *köfte* (meatball) sellers. Samovars are steeping plenty of tea. The best trade, though is fried *palamut* (bonito). Selling superbly. As time goes on, the number and types of sellers increase. *Salep* (hot beverage of milk and ground orchid root), *simit* (bagel), *börek* (a savory pastry), desserts, tangerine stands, and finally the bingo men... Their sounds reverberate everywhere. There is also a solution to protect against the cold. Armfuls of wood burn in plenty of bonfires.³⁵

Those unable to enter Mithatpaşa Stadium on match days found innovative formulas to follow the games. After the demolition of the gas plant, people began to watch matches on the hills on the Taksim side located between the stands “new open” (*yeni açık*) and “numbered” (*numaralı*) stands. This place which had an open, panoramic view of the field hosted thousands of football lovers whose number sometimes reached even five thousand. This place soon began to be known as “moochers’ stands” and later – in the 2000s - became popular as *Beleştepe*, a compound word of *beleş* implying free and *tepe* meaning hill. An entrepreneur established rudimental stands - that was reminiscent of the stands inside the stadium – by digging a place for 25 kuruş to stand up

35 T. Benokan. “Stad Kapısında Bir Gece,” *Milliyet*, November 17, 1956. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

and watch the match. The lines of seats that were called first, second, and third class based on their closeness to the football field. In line with the increases in ticket prices, the price of digging a seat at Beleştepe also increased.³⁶

While the urban elites watched the matches from their VIP boxes inside the stadium, the new residents of Istanbul enjoyed themselves at *Beleştepe* that were open to public for a comparatively sensible price. The street vendors who were forbidden to enter the stadium during the games were ready at Beleştepe with an abundant range of products.

In addition to its social and cultural roles, football also played an economic role in the migrants' integration to urban life. It created its own consumption demands – especially on match days –, which were recognized as new employment opportunities by the street vendors. It was known that the formal job market in the city did not have the capacity to absorb the rapidly increasing numbers of migrants. Street vendors and stands came to the rescue of people who recently migrated into the city and could not find employment in the formal sector.³⁷ Although this work did not require great amounts of capital or expertise, it required the ability to monitor a demand that changed and diversified under various conditions as well as to take advantage of temporary, short-term business ventures. These new business possibilities allowed people to earn enough money to meet their daily requirements - that is, “subsistence urbanization.”³⁸ The stadium and its surroundings possessed tremendous potential in this sense. Street vendors appeared around the stadium on match days not only with their products such as bagels, peanuts, quinces, sodas, pumpkin seeds, and sandwiches, which they could also sell anywhere else, but also with football-related products such as team flags, scarfs, and seat squabs.

36 “Gazhane Kalktı,” *Milliyet*, November 7, 1961.

37 Yıldırım, “Köylüler ve Kentliler,” 561.

38 M. Cengiz Yıldız, “Kent Yaşamının Değişmeyen Marjinalleri: Seyyar Satıcılar ve İşportacılar,” *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 18, no. 2 (2008): 350.

4.2.2 *The Big Three vs. the Little Seven: The Issue of Competitive Balance*

In addition to problems concerning the capacity of the stadium and its allocation to the football teams, one of the most serious problems for the Istanbul Professional League was the distribution of gate receipts. Since the launch of the Istanbul Professional League, the league committee had always made decisions on issues such as league schedule, timetable, stadium selection, and revenue distribution looking out for the interests of the Big Three.³⁹ Objections made by the other clubs were avoided with the threats of the Big Three to quit the league or to play their B teams in league games.⁴⁰

Policies favoring these İstanbul clubs amplified the already existing gap between them and the rest. “Seeing themselves as above even the official sports institutions and even exploiting the state itself,”⁴¹ these clubs owed their hegemonic power in Turkish football to their political influence, large fan community, and sporting superiority. These clubs had supporters occupying such crucial positions not only in sports institutions but also in the government who did not refrain from serving their clubs’ interests. On the other side were there fierce rivalries; these clubs required each other’s presence for survival and thus developed collective strategies for their common benefit. Taking common action on such issues as referee selection, league schedule, season tickets and the organization of private international matches as well as inter-city tours, stadiums, and the distribution of gate receipts, they acquired a privileged position in Turkish football. They neither hesitated to enjoy political patronage by making DP deputies club presidents nor to collaborate together in order to eliminate Adalet Club which threatened their power. As Yiğit Akın argued, political elites implemented clientelist measures in Turkish football strengthening the big three clubs’ hegemonic power, and as a natural consequence, they deprived Turkish football of competitive balance.⁴²

39 “Hasılat İhtilafında Dördüncü Toplantı,” *Milliyet*, August 26, 1955.

40 “Üç Büyükler Ligi Terkedecekler,” *Milliyet*, January 16, 1957

41 Dr. Sırrı Alıçlı. “Bizde Spor Kulüpleri ve Sporcuların Sigortası,” *Akşam*, May 8, 1953.

42 Yiğit Akın, “Ana Hatları ile Cumhuriyet Döneminde Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Politikaları,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 103 (2005): 82.

On the other side of the coin, there were seven other clubs in the first division professional league whose economic prosperity was dependent on a more equal distribution of gate receipts. Since sporting success was a matter of economic prosperity, as Giray put it, the increasing economic power of these clubs was to bring them more success and thus increase competition in the league. The rise of competition would attract larger crowds to the stadiums which would mean more income on behalf of all the clubs in the league.⁴³ Haluk San, a famous sport journalist of the era, claimed that the three big clubs led to unequal development in Turkish football.

These big clubs benefit from each privilege offered them by the GDPE. Alongside clubs that can act as they wish with gate revenues exceeding hundreds of thousands of lire and GDPE aid of more than ten thousand of lire, there are clubs like Emniyet with ticket sales of less than ten thousand lire and aid in range of three thousand lire. Last year, Emniyet was not even admitted into Dolmabahçe stadium. (...) Before all else, if we want our professional football to advance, we have to act with justice and fairness.⁴⁴

Since the federation, the government institution responsible for the administration of professional football, was unable to provide this fairness, other teams in the league finally searched for other solutions. In this regard, events at the beginning of the 1955-56 football season stand out as an example that explains the dominance of the Big Three and power relations in Turkish football.

According to the latest amendments to the law, 30 percent of total gate revenues were to be distributed equally among all ten teams and 70 percent of the revenues were to be distributed according to the teams' season ranking. However, Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş, Adalet, and Vefa who finished the 1954-55 season in the first five places, respectively, wanted to change the system and asked that 70 percent of the total revenue be distributed among themselves and 30 percent among the others. In the first round of voting in

43 Adil Giray, "Fenerbahçe Kasımpaşa Maçından Notlar," *Akşam*, November 14, 1953.

44 Haluk San, "Haftanın Dedikoduları," *Akşam*, August 16, 1953. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

the League Organization Committee, the proposed system was accepted by eight votes to two. But in the second round, representatives of the last five teams in the league declined the offer. They asked for the initial formula to be implemented. Furthermore, “in order for Turkish football to prosper, they wanted all the small teams to play their matches at Mithatpaşa Stadium.”⁴⁵

There were also problems among the first five clubs. On the 23 March 1955, the big three clubs of Istanbul signed a friendship pact to “organize and direct their friendship and relationship.”⁴⁶ According to this agreement, these teams would not transfer players from each other. National and international tournament organizations would be arranged collectively. This agreement encouraged the clubs to not refrain from sacrificing for the benefit of each other and solidify the hegemony of the big three teams. This agreement forced Vefa and Adalet to take sides with the remaining teams to create an alternative power bloc against the friendship pact, which was later called the Block pact.

Against the Big Three, which decided to organize a trust over Turkish sports, the block pact was formed by those who “claimed to be sabotaged on financial terms.”⁴⁷ In their declaration, their demands concerned for four issues. The first was the allocation of Mithatpaşa Stadium. The block pact asked for equal opportunity with the Big Three to play in Mithatpaşa Stadium on the weekends. Secondly, they want the previous system of gate receipts distribution to be reimplemented. Third was the issue of season tickets, which was according to *Akşam* was the real reason behind the disagreement. Although big teams were able to earn under any circumstances, even individual ticket sales, “a season ticketing system favored small teams, consequently helping these teams to make them financially survive.”⁴⁸ The declaration of the block pact ended with a notice for the GDPE and the Ministry of Financial Affairs to investigate the accounting books of the big three clubs. Although the Professionalism Bylaw decreed that a club with a professional football team had to distribute 30 percent of their revenues from football to amateur branches,

45 “Lig Maçlarında Hasılat Taksimi Yeni Çıkmazında,” *Milliyet*, August 30, 1955.

46 “Fener-Galatasaray Paktına Beşiktaş ta Dahil Oldu,” *Milliyet*, March 24, 1955.

47 “7 Kulüp Üç Büyüklere Karşı Birleşiyor,” *Milliyet*, January 9, 1957.

48 “Profesyonel Birinci Küme Kulüpleri İhtilafa Düşerek Ayrıldılar,” *Akşam*, January 3, 1957.

it was suspected that the Big Three drew on this amount for their professional teams.⁴⁹

The formation of the block pact “to end the hegemony of the three clubs” was successful only with respect to maintaining season ticketing; the rest of their demands went unfulfilled in the 1955-56 season.⁵⁰ However, at the end of the season, tension among clubs rose again. The victory of Adalet over Beşiktaş in the last game of the season dropped Beşiktaş to fifth place. According to the regulations, the team that completed the league in fifth place should play its matches against the last three teams not at Mithatpaşa, but at another stadium. For instance, Beykoz, which finished fifth in the previous season, held its matches against Kasımpaşa, Beyoğluspor, and Emniyet at Fenerbahçe Stadium. However, the Organization Committee changed the rule, which had been in practice for years, deciding that the first five teams were henceforth to play all of their games at Mithatpaşa. In this way, Beşiktaş continued to enjoy this privilege.⁵¹

The block and the friendship pacts were like the governing power and opposition in Turkish football. Before the meetings of the organization committee, they gathered in separate groups and to decide how to defend their collective demands.⁵² Since being formed in the mid-fifties, the block pact members achieved certain acquisitions such as the maintenance of season tickets and the determination of the league schedule by draw instead by the assignment of the federation, due to their collective power in the decision-making processes. However, in 1957, the pact dispersed due to tensions among the clubs resulting from income differences. When the organization committee met at the beginning of the 1957-58 season to make decisions about the upcoming season, almost all the decisions were made “in accordance with the wishes of

49 “Blok Pakt Üyeleri Üç Büyükleri İtham Ediyor,” *Milliyet*, January 10, 1957.

50 “Kombine Bilet Kaldırılmıyor,” *Milliyet*, January 15, 1957; “Bölge Müdürü Cihanoğlu 3’lerle 7’leri Anlaştırdı,” *Milliyet*, January 17, 1957; “Kombine Biletler Çıkacak,” *Akşam*, January 15, 1957.

51 “Beşiktaş Bazı Maçlarını Mithatpaşa Stadı Dışında mı Yapacak?,” *Milliyet*, April 29, 1957; “Beşiktaş Mithatpaşa’da Maç Yapacak,” *Milliyet*, July 26, 1957.

52 “Üç Büyükler Ligi Terkedecek,” *Milliyet*, July 31, 1957.

the Big Three.”⁵³ Interpreted as “the victory of the Big Three against the Little Seven,” the decisions of the committee following the disappearance of the block pact revealed that the sovereignty of the Big Three was difficult to extinguish.⁵⁴

4.2.3 *A Never-Ending Problem in Turkish Football: The Referee*

Another serious problem in the early period of professional football in Turkey was the issue of referees. Criticism of referees fell in three main categories. First, Turkish referees were claimed to lack sufficient knowledge of the rules of the game. Second, they were unable to take full control of the game and the players. Third, most referees were either supporters or members of a club, so their decisions were claimed to be biased. As a result of these general assumptions, football authorities decided to organize referee courses and training to improve the capacities of the referees and develop new ones in the fifties. Beside this, two interesting implementations were put into practice as a temporary solution. The first was importing foreign referees. Seven foreign referees were appointed during the 1954-55 season in the Istanbul Professional League along with ten native referees. Moreover, no matches were assigned to referees from Istanbul throughout the season; local referees were recruited from other provinces.⁵⁵ The administrators of the three major clubs believed that matches refereed by foreigners drew more spectators.⁵⁶ Among fifteen games played between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe during the eight seasons of the Istanbul Professional League from 1952 to 1959, nine were ruled by foreign referees from various countries such as Italy, Belgium, and England.

Concerning the issue of foreign referees, the sporting public was divided. Some thought that foreign referees would set back the development of Turkish refereeing, while others, like Ulvi Yenil, the head of Turkish FA, believed that

53 “Yediler Üçlerin Teklifini Kabul Etti,” *Akşam*, August 9, 1957.

54 “Tertip Komitesi Bugün Toplanıyor,” *Milliyet*, July 24, 1957; “Üç Büyükler Tertip Komitesinden Çekildi,” *Milliyet*, August 4, 1957; “Büyükler Ligi Terketmiyor,” *Milliyet*, August 8, 1957.

55 *Milliyet*, May 19, 1955.

56 “İtalya’dan Hakem Gelecek,” *Akşam*, April 19, 1952.

Turkish referees had much to learn from their foreign counterparts.⁵⁷ A former referee, Sulhi Garan, pointed out that this practice threatened the future of Turkish football and that the Turkish refereeing institution needed to be aided and improved.⁵⁸ After the right to assign referees was taken from the professional league organization committee in the middle of the fifties and given to the referee committee connected to the federation, in order to eliminate the foreign referee implementation a new method tried and referees were assigned as triple delegations between Izmir, Ankara and Istanbul.⁵⁹ However, the door was left open to the foreign referees by the ambiguous statement that “league games are necessarily to be ruled by a native referee *as long as there is no exigency*.”⁶⁰ The love for foreign referees continued during the first years of the National League.

§ 4.3 Ankara Professional League (1955-1959)

The founding of a professional football league took place in Ankara and Izmir, four seasons after it did in Istanbul. There was consensus on the fact that Istanbul was the football capital of the country, and even the capital city of Ankara was condemned to be described through analogies of Istanbul origin. Of the three major clubs in Ankara, for instance, Ankaragücü was likened to Fenerbahçe, due to its large number of fans and economic strength, while Gençlerbirliği, formed by students from Ankara Boy’s High School, was a metaphor for Galatasaray due to its elitist, school-based origins. Hacettepe, on the other hand, was deemed to be similar to Beşiktaş because of its ties to the neighborhood.⁶¹

Ankara football’s most dominant club was doubtless Gençlerbirliği during the amateur period of 1924-1951, having thirteen local championships. In the professional local league starting with the 1955-56 season and lasting up until

57 “Ecnebi Hakemler Meselesi,” *Akşam*, May 6, 1952.

58 *Milliyet*, May 13, 1952.

59 *Milliyet*, August 9, 1955.

60 Emphasis mine. “Federasyon Reisi Hasan Polat Dün Konuştu,” *Son Posta*, August 17, 1955.

61 Tanıl Bora and Levent Cantek, “Ankara Futbolu: Memleket Futbolunun Kenar Senti,” *Ke-bikeç*, no. 9 (2000): 202.

1959. Hacettepe won two, and, Ankaragücü and Demirspor had one championship each. Compared to Izmir and Istanbul, as Yüce mentioned, local football arrangements in Ankara functioned in a more planned manner. Giving priority to international rather than league matches following from the desire to earn income, the leagues in Istanbul and Izmir experienced delays. Ankara was more systematic in terms of the continuity of league games and other private organizations.⁶² It can be thought that this discipline originated from the influence of the military and bureaucracy in Ankara football.

As in Istanbul, the number of clubs in Ankara increased during the years following the war. According to an article in *Spor Haftası* magazine in 1951 a total of thirty-three clubs competed in the local football leagues in Ankara, which consisted of three divisions. All these clubs except for Gençlerbirliği, Ankaragücü, and Demirspor were established in or after 1945, and the majority were based on the military and state institutions. The leading military clubs were Havagücü (the team of airforces), Karagücü (the team of army forces), and Harbiye (the team of military college). Among institutional clubs, Ankara Demirspor belonged to the State Railways and Telspor to the Post Office-Telephone-Telegram directorate that would later be named PTT. A sugar factory team that merged in 1958 with Hilal Gençlik was called Şekerhilal in 1962. Ankaragücü was the team of the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Company. The strongest among them was Ankaragücü which survived on the funds deducted from the salaries of the employees of the company. It was observed that civilian clubs survived in the professional period with the patronage of few businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians.⁶³ Attorney Mustafa Deliveli, businessman Fuat Hızal, cinema operator Abdullah Özgörür, and the son of former prime minister and Fenerbahçe fan Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Aydın Saraçoğlu, were figures kept Hacettepe alive while one of the first photographers of the city and sports shop owner Hafi Araç, along with bureaucrats and politicians

62 Yüce, *İdmançı Ruhlar*, 111.

63 Bora and Cantek, "Ankara Futbolu," 202-5.

İsmet Sezgin and Hasan Polat looked out for Gençlerbirliği after the advent of professionalism in the 1950s and 1960s.⁶⁴

According to Altay's legendary player Vahap Özaltay, who published a sport magazine called *Profesyonel* in Ankara, the Ankara clubs could not sufficiently draw on their districts and surrounding provinces; therefore, the main source of football players remained the armed forces.⁶⁵ Many football players coming to the capital from Istanbul and Anatolia would play football for teams such as Karagücü, Havagücü, and Harbiye. Footballers played on a volunteer basis on military teams in order to secure easier military service. In line with the increasing number of troops especially during World War II, military teams became stronger. Harbiye became the Ankara local league champion three times and won first place in Turkey twice during the war.

Military teams that achieved success with well-trained players caused a civilian-soldier conflict that was "the eternal problem of football in the capital."⁶⁶ This tension increased during the war, causing incidents of violence at matches played between civilian and military clubs. For example, at the Harbiye-Ankaragücü match played on 1 November 1941, the score was 3-2 with Harbiye in the lead. A goal scored by Ankaragücü was notified due to a player being off-side, and the referee called the game early. In the ensuing chaos, the referee could only escape from the thousands of fans collected in front of the stadium with a police escort.⁶⁷ The tension continued after the war and finally caused the league to split up after six matches of the 1954-55 season were already played. Civilian teams initiated a new league called the White League, and the military teams organized their own under the name Green League.⁶⁸ When professional competition among civilian clubs first kicked-off in Ankara in September 1955, the military teams began to lose their power.

64 Ibid.; Oktay Arıca, "Gençlerin Canlı Tarihi. Oktay Arıca Nam-ı Diğer Paçoz Oktay," *Gençlerbirliği S.K Supporters Page*, March 23, 2007, <http://www.gencler.org/roportajlar.php?id=34> (accessed May 30, 2018).

65 Vahap Özaltay, "Ankara Futbolu," *Profesyonel*, November 8, 1952.

66 Cezmi Başar, "Sil Baştan mı?," *Türkiye Spor*, November 6, 1954.

67 Yüce, *İdmançı Ruhlar*, 240.

68 Başar, Cezmi, "Sil Baştan mı?" *Türkiyespor*, November 6, 1954.

Similar to the İstanbul league, the Ankara Professional League consisted of the teams in the Ankara First Division in the previous season. These were Hacettepe, Ankaragücü, Demirspor, Gençlerbirliği, Otoyıldırım, Yolspor, Güneşspor, and Hilal. Matches were played at the two largest stadiums of the city - the Ankaragücü Stadium, which was put in commission in 1932, and the 19 Mayıs Stadium, which opened in time for the 1936-37 season. The increase in the number of teams wanting to join the Ankara Professional League resulted in the formation of a second division during the 1957-58 season. Despite the growth of the number of professional teams, interest in football in the capital did not close to that in Istanbul. As Bora and Cantek discussed, the mass of spectators in the 1950s in the Ankara stands did not know the rules of football. Unlike Istanbul fans, "they did not hassle the referee, [and] it was initially accepted that the one blowing the whistle was right."⁶⁹

However, when teams came from Istanbul to Ankara for friendly games, spectators at the stadium interestingly cheered in favor of the visiting team. "Seventy percent of these enthusiasts," wrote a correspondent, "were either from Istanbul originally, or they have a Fenerbahçe melancholy in their hearts, or they yearn for Galatasaray, or are a hardcore fan of Beşiktaş, or are appreciative of Vefa."⁷⁰ Similarly, Cantek and Bora indicated that through the years as the dose of professionalism increased, the majority of even top-level managers of professional teams in Ankara were at the same time members of one of the three big Istanbul clubs.⁷¹

The lack of interest in Ankara-based clubs was directly related to the low quality of the football and the weak competition among clubs. First, there were an excessive number of clubs in Ankara in proportion to the city's population. This lowered the possibility of talented players coming together on a single team and was thus reflected on the field as poor game quality. Additionally,

69 Bora and Cantek, "Ankara Futbolu," 203-4.

70 "Ankaralılar Neden Lig Maçlarına Rağbet Göstermezler?," *Spor Haftası*, no. 2, September 24, 1951.

71 Bora and Cantek, "Ankara Futbolu," 206.

most skilled players went to Istanbul to continue their careers instead of staying in the capital.⁷² For example, Ankaragücü's Recep Adanır, and Mustafa Ertan – nicknamed *Beton* (concrete) – were famous footballers who transferred to Beşiktaş in the 1950s. When Adalet lured Fenerbahçe's top players in the mid-fifties, Fenerbahçe directors turned to the Ankara market and secured the transfers of Yüksel Gündüz from Güneşspor, Abdullah Matay and Orhan Çakmak from Ankaragücü, Karagücü's Selahattin Ünlü, and Hacettepe's Akgün Kaçmaz and Burhan Sargın.

The hegemonic power of Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, and Fenerbahçe was regarded as a problem for the development of football in Ankara, as well. According to Fikret Altınel, the Ankaragücü president, Istanbul's big three did not want Ankara clubs to prosper. When these teams came to play in Ankara, they earned more than the host teams due to their popularity. They then used this income to buy the best players in Ankara. To break this unfair cycle, club representatives in Ankara organized a meeting and decided to charge Istanbul teams fixed fees: 25 thousand lire for games played at 19 Mayıs and 20 thousand lire for ones at Ankaragücü Stadium. Another incident of collective action against the Big Three started with the TFF's decision to organize the final of Prime Ministry Cup in Ankara to be held on 30 March 1958. It was the first time that Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe would play against each other in Ankara. The authorities decided that the game would be played at 19 Mayıs Stadium although it was previously planned to be closed until September due to renovation work. A few days before the game, forty clubs from Ankara submitted a petition to Prime Minister Menderes requesting that the game be held in Ankaragücü Stadium. Since Ankaragücü was a smaller stadium, this meant that Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray could generate less gate revenue. Despite severe criticism from the Istanbul press concerning the attitude of the Ankara clubs, Menderes agreed to the request and the game was eventually played at Ankaragücü Stadium.⁷³

72 Vahap Özaltay. "Ankara Futbolu," *Profesyonel*, November 8, 1952; "Basri Hakkında," *Profesyonel*, December 6, 1952.

73 "Ankara Kulüpleri Galatasaray ile Fenerbahçe'nin Başkentte Maç Yapmasına Muhalefet Etmekte," *Akşam*, March 8, 1958; "A.Gücü Stadı M.Paşa'dan Küçük," *Akşam*, March 25, 1958; "Başvekil Emrederse...", *Akşam*, March 26, 1958.

§ 4.4 İzmir Professional League (1955-1959)

Football activities that started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in İzmir within the city's Levantine and non-Muslim communities became prevalent among Turks with the establishment as of Altay, Karşıyaka, and Tü rk yurdu clubs in the 1910s and - following the declaration of the republic - with the addition of Altınordu, Göztepe, the merger of Altın Ay and Sakarya into İzmirspor in 1920s. Although new clubs were added to these leading clubs, the number competing throughout the 1930s and 1940s in the İzmir Local League never exceeded eight.

When the İzmir Professional League was established in 1955, the league consisted of ten teams: Altay, Altınordu, Göztepe, Karşıyaka, İzmirspor, Kültürspor, Demirspor, Yün Pamuk Mensucat, Ülküspor, and Egespor. While Demirspor was an institutional team that belonged to the State Railways, Yün Pamuk Mensucat was the team of a factory belonging to İzmir's renowned Levantine Giraud family. One of İzmir's first Turkish Muslim teams, Tü rk yurdu, changed its name in 1946 to Ülküspor was a feeder team between the first and second divisions. Egespor was also among the weakest clubs in the league. Kültürspor, located in Kültürpark - where the İzmir International Exhibition took place - was similar to Adalet in Istanbul in the sense that it had the financial backing of local businessmen. The club managed to secure the transfers of important players from Altınordu, just as Adalet did from Fenerbahçe.⁷⁴

Clubs in İzmir which had stronger connections with the city's hinterland managed to recruit players from nearby towns and provinces. Göztepe's first professional football player, Güler Aksel, was playing in Manisa Gençlik when

74 Cezmi Zallak. "Mevsim Başında İzmir Kulüpleri Arasında," *Son Posta*, September 18, 1955; Fethi Aytuna, "Matteo Vitali: 100 Lira Alan Padişahı," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published August 31, 2015. <https://dinyakos.com/2015/08/31/matteo-vitali-100-lira-alan-padisahı/> (accessed March 1, 2019).

he was discovered by Manisa's parliamentary deputy Cevdet Özgirgin and referred to the Göztepe Club.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, İzmir, like Ankara, could not prevent Istanbul from grabbing up its best players. Galatasaray's legendary scorer Metin Oktay, Fenerbahçe's goalkeeper Ergun Öztuna (*Puşkaş Ergun*), and Vefa's golden boy Arif Dökel, all from İzmir - are important examples. The perspective of a humorist writing for *Spor Haftası* reflects the distribution of roles in the triangle of Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir in terms of football transfers.

In Ankara, neighborhood shopkeepers built a safe market using a system of reputation and credit instead of by increasing capital. But while military firms in Ankara had some chances to import the civilian firms could only export to Istanbul... When we come to İzmir: As usual, there were good exports and they sent their most valuable items to Istanbul.⁷⁶

According to Erkan Velioğlu, a leading player for Altınordu, it had İzmir's highest number of fans. Altınordu was followed by İzmirspor, Karşıyaka, Altay, and Göztepe.⁷⁷ Still, in league matches –except for derbies- the ten thousand spectator capacity of Alsancak Stadium was hardly filled.⁷⁸ During the 1955-56 season, spectator and revenue records were broken in a match played between İzmirspor and Altay, which were the first and second place teams from the previous season. Fourteen thousand lire of income were derived at the match watched by ten thousand people.⁷⁹ However, this total was not even one third of the revenues of the Fenerbahçe-Galatasaray match played at

75 Fethi Aytuna, "Güler Aksel - Göztepe'nin İlk Profesyonel Futbolcusu," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published December 18, 2012. <https://dinyakos.com/2012/12/18/guler-aksel-goztepenin-ilk-profesyonel-futbolcusu/> (accessed December 28, 2018).

76 Yalı Çapkını. "Oyuncu Pazarı Açıldı," *Spor Haftası*, no. 3, October 1, 1951. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

77 Fethi Aytuna, "Erkan Velioğlu - Her Daim Altınordulu," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published November 26, 2012. <https://dinyakos.com/2012/11/26/erkan-velioglu-her-daim-altinordulu/> (accessed January 3, 2019).

78 *Sabah Postası*, April 1, 1957.

79 *Milliyet*, October 31, 1955.

Mithatpaşa Stadium the season before. For Izmir teams, private games to which Istanbul teams were invited were a better source of income than league matches. Therefore, the leading clubs of the city invited Istanbul teams and - albeit rarely - foreign teams either in the season breaks or during religious and national holidays. People also came to these matches from surrounding provinces.⁸⁰

The largest turnover was gathered at matches of the Big Three. In the expression of one correspondent, “Any team other than Fener, Beşiktaş, and Galatasaray could not bring spectators to the field even no matter what it does.”⁸¹ The superiority of the Big Three was a given. The primary objective of extending them invitations was economic rather than athletic. Rather than winning against them, gate receipts were important for the club directors. It is striking to note that although the games played between Izmir and Istanbul teams were not competitive, the matches between Izmir and Ankara teams were challenging. When two clubs from these cities played against each other, it was a struggle for superiority because “both sides claimed to be the first football city following Istanbul.”⁸² Intercity football competition was born long before the national league was established.

Neither Izmir and Ankara clubs nor any other city club had a chance against Istanbul teams. This was an accepted fact in Turkish football. Potential attendance, economic superiority, and stadium advantage favored Istanbul. There were few, minor arguments against this during the process of the National League. One important reaction was that of Belig Berer who quit his position at the Football Federation. Beler was a former athlete and a politician in the Democratic Party. He was, Gündüz Kılıç asserted, “trying to save football in Izmir from becoming an orphan.”⁸³ It was stated in the media that he came into conflict with Orhan Şeref Apak during meetings at the federation. He abstained from talking about the disputes related to the federation, saying only that if there was no fair treatment of Izmir teams, the clubs from Izmir

80 “Beşiktaş Şehrimizde İki Maç Yapacak,” *İleri Demokrasi*, May 19, 1955.

81 Erdoğan Sungur. “Maçın Tenkidi,” *Sabah Postası*, January 11, 1957.

82 “Ankaragücü-Altınordu Bugün Karşılaşıyor,” *Sabah Postası*, January 19, 1957.

83 *Milliyet*, June 17, 1958.

would not join the National League.⁸⁴ In an article, Gündüz Kılıç approved of Beler who had reminded the federation of its primary objective which was “to develop football throughout the whole country.”⁸⁵

Table 4.1 Number of professional teams in professional football leagues before the establishment of the first National Professional Football League in 1959

	Istanbul Professional Leagues (First and Second Division)	Ankara Professional Leagues (First and Second Division)	Izmir Professional League	Professional Teams in the Professional Leagues in Total
1950	0	0	0	0
1952	8	0	0	8
1955	10	8	10	28
1959	22	17	10	49

§ 4.5 Towards a National Professional League

The founding of a national football league was a subject of discussion since the 1930s but was repeatedly postponed due to transportation and infrastructure problems. The topic put on the agenda in the 1950s due to both internal and external reasons. Professional football was mainly restricted to certain cities; in other words, the periphery was unable to benefit from the opportunities of professional football, which contradicted the values the Democrat Party represented. Talented footballers from different regions of Anatolia chose Istanbul, Izmir, or Ankara teams in order to earn money from football, widening the gap between football at the center and the periphery.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, following the lack of success of the national team, especially at the 1954 World Cup, a national league as an “external” obligation, as well.⁸⁷

84 *Milliyet*, June 5, 1958.

85 Gündüz Kılıç. “Haydi Diploma Sormayalım Amma,” *Milliyet*, June 17, 1958.

86 Adnan Fuat Aral. “Milli Lig İstiyoruz,” *Son Posta*, July 15, 1955; M. Ali Oral. “Profesyonel Milli Kümeye Doğru Hazırlıklar,” *Son Posta*, July 24, 1955.

87 *Milliyet*, November 22, 1954.

The horizontal organization of professional football under a national league structure was also part of modernization efforts for Turkish football. In all countries where football had become a popular mass spectator sport - led by Europe -, there were national leagues. While there were one million licensed players in West Germany, the World Cup champion, a journalist for *Spor Haftası* reported, this figure was around seventeen thousand in Turkey.⁸⁸ A nationalization movement was needed for young talents in the country to be discovered and for the competitive power of national football to increase. Such an enterprise was regarded not as innovation but as the “eventual completion of a requirement.”⁸⁹ As in many countries, a national league in Turkey would also have “a key function in the confirmation of the territorial integrity of the nation and in ensuring its functionality,” as Bora and Erdoğan emphasize.⁹⁰

The key factors that would ensure the sustainability of a professional league at the national level was the fans, the fields, and the gate revenues. It was impossible that fan interest would evolve into a sufficient revenue that could pay the costs of a professional club. Therefore, municipalities and local authorities played a key role in the development of professional football. On the other hand, the reactions to the decision of the federation to establish the Professional National League importantly disclosed the economic difference among clubs. An administrator from Vefa claimed that the expense of away games that would become mandatory in the national league would challenge low income clubs. A Fenerbahçe administrator voted for the National League, announcing that revenues would increase.⁹¹

While some early steps towards the nationalization of professional football in the country were taken with the launch of the Republican Cup in 1952 and

88 “Türkiye Ligine Doğru,” *Spor Haftası*, no. 4, October 8, 1951.

89 Ibid.

90 Tanıl Bora and Necmi Erdoğan, “Dur Tarih Vur Türkiye: Türk Milletinin Milli Sporu Olarak Futbol,” in *Futbol ve Kültürü*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), 225.

91 “Milli Lige İtirazlar Başladı,” *Akşam*, July 22, 1958.

later the Federation Cup in 1956, these organizations far from reflected a “market integrity” in professional football.⁹² Even the same was true of the first professional league founded in 1959. Until the establishment of the Second Division of the National Professional League in 1963, only one club from outside İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir participated, and only one season (Adana Demirspor, 1960-61). Accordingly, National League news continued to be reported in a regional manner as İstanbul Football, Ankara Football, and İzmir Football. The expansion of professional football from the center to the periphery started with the establishment of the second professional league in 1963 and the participation of three new clubs: Mersin’s Çukurova İdmanyurdu, Adana’s Demirspor, and Bursa’s Bursaspor.

Established by the merger of the amateur teams of the city, Bursaspor was a pioneer of the city club movement that became prevalent in Anatolia. City clubs founded to represent the city in the national stage in just about every province of Turkey - from Trabzon to Eskişehir – followed the Bursa model. Expenditures that accompanied the establishment of a professional team such as the TFF’s 100 thousand lire deposit, the expense of professional players, and the costs of away games could not be met by any single amateur club, so various amateur clubs of a city would merge and be named in the form of *city-spor*, and come to possess a professional football team.

The leading figure behind the establishment of professional city clubs was Orhan Şeref Apak, the Federation President who promoted this ‘city-club’ model that required the mobilization of all the urban resources to create a single professional club to represent the city. Akın mentions that throughout the 1960s, the increasing impact of the “local” in Turkish politics also meant that professional football would advance atop an intense pro-city/country wave.⁹³

92 *Milliyet*, August 29 1952; November 26, 1959. After the Turkish Football Federation initiated a star system according to which any club can add a golden star to its emblem for every five championship titles it wins, Beşiktaş made a formal application in 2002 for its two Federation Cup titles to be counted. Although the federation acknowledged that those titles were not predecessors of the Turkish National Championship, they were accepted as valid for the country’s star system. After this decision, Beşiktaş could add a second star to its emblem.

93 Akın, “Ana Hatları ile,” 81.

The establishment of city-clubs everywhere in Turkey had consequences specific to Turkish football. Because amateur clubs in cities joined to become a single club, local football culture and its dynamics were destroyed. A striking example is Trabzon. Two fierce rivalries, established at the start of the 1920s, İdmanocağı and İdmangücü were compelled to merge to allow the city to be represented on the professional stage. When fans of the two clubs who were different politically and culturally, refused to join, political authorities threateningly intervened. The merger was completed in 1967, and Trabzonspor would join the the Second Division. Only nine years after its move into a professional league as a city club, Trabzonspor won first place in the National Professional League, becoming the first team to bring home a championship to Anatolia. But the two important historical entities, İdmanocağı and İdmangücü, went out of existence; their rivalry which had become an urban ritual, their fan cultures, and their historical heritage disappeared.⁹⁴

This was the dilemma for the nationalization of professional football in Turkey. While the periphery began to be represented on national football scene via these city clubs, many old clubs of Istanbul, İzmir, and Ankara vanished into thin air. Most of them which were unable to afford the costs of away games that accompanied with the nationalization of the league. They either extinguished themselves or maintained a presence in amateur and recreational football leagues. The situation was worse for the sports clubs of the non-Muslim communities such as Taksim, Kurtuluş, and Beyoğluspor. The governments' discriminatory policies against non-Muslim citizens caused the conditions of these minority clubs to deteriorate. For instance, Beyoğluspor, which was in the first National Football League between 1962 and 1964, swiftly plummeted to an amateur league after the Cyprus crisis in 1964.⁹⁵ The "nationalization" of professional football functioned as "a bulldozer," to use Erten's

94 Sevecen Tunç, *Mektepliler, Münevverler, Meraklılar: Trabzon'da Futbolun Toplumsal Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2011), 155-88.

95 Arat Saadetyan, "Beyoğluspor'dan PAOK ve AEK'e," *Demokrat Haber*, published October 12, 2004. <https://www.demokrathaber.org/roportajlar/beyogluspordan-paok-ve-aeke-h39454.html> (accessed July 20, 2018).

metaphor, that uprooted local cultures and destroyed the diversity in Turkish football.⁹⁶

Table 4.2 Number of professional teams in the national professional football leagues (1959-1968)

	National Professional League First Division	National Professional League Second Division	National Professional League Third Division	Total Professional League Teams	Number of Cities Participating
1959	16	0	0	16	3
1959-60	20	0	0	20	3
1960-61	20	0	0	20	4
1961-62	20	0	0	20	3
1962-63	22	0	0	22	3
1963-64	18	13	0	31	5
1964-65	16	16	0	32	6
1965-66	16	22	0	38	11
1966-67	17	33	0	50	20
1967-68	17	40	17	74	38

§ 4.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter maps out the landscape of the early professional period of Turkish football from 1952 to 1963. It is argued that during those years, Turkish society underwent a process of footballization with a booming interest in the game that was reflected in the emergence of football clubs and communities. The key role football assumed for identity reinforcement at a time when the country was going through processes of urbanization, migration, and population growth was significant to its transformation into a popular, mass spectator sport. In addition to this, football became a legitimate money-making occupation after the advent of professionalism, eventually imposing its monoculture and sweeping away the amateur ideal which advocated a multi-sport approach and particularly admired the athletes with a wide range of skills.

⁹⁶ Bağış Erten, “Futbolun Yeni Gerçekleri,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 2018.

After the promulgation of the Professionalism Bylaw, professional football in Turkey was organized on a regional basis with the launch of local professional leagues in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Istanbul remained as center of attention with respect to professional football, as in the previous period, while the Big Three were cherished above other clubs. The superiority of these clubs was accepted in advance even by football authorities themselves who implemented certain policies and regulations with an aim to protect the interests of the Big Three instead of maintaining a competitive balance among football clubs and cities.

The geographical incompleteness of professional football in Turkey was also an important factor that negatively affected the competitive balance. Although the nationwide diffusion of professional football was initiated by the foundation of First National Professional League in 1959, the process gained momentum only after the launch of Second Professional League in 1963. Nevertheless, due to the biased politics of football, city clubs founded in the 1960s were destined to lag behind the top clubs in Istanbul in terms of fan base and reputation as well as sporting and cultural legacy.

The Political Economy of Turkish Football in its Early Professional Era

One week after the Democrats won the general elections, Ali Naci Karacan, *Milliyet*'s lead editor, wrote a piece giving the new government advice as "a mere citizen" and made an analogy between football and politics. According to Karacan, the new political regime after the transition to democracy resembled football, with the emergence of fierce rivalries and competition among political parties for electoral wins. Since a football club's success depended 50 percent on the team's skills and capacity and 50 percent on its supporters, Karacan warned Democrats to sustain good, fair governance and never to neglect public wants and expectations.

During the Democrat Party rule in Turkey, the interplay between football and politics, which was always extensive, reached new heights. As Benoit demonstrates, the game became highly politicized on the international scene.¹ Turkey, as a country aspiring to integrate with the Western world, benefited from the game's potential as an agent of diplomatic relations and a source of political propaganda. But beyond this international perspective, the transition to a competitive political regime gave birth to controversial, complex, elusive formations in the interplay between football and politics. The relationship

1 Macon Benoit, "The Politicization of Football: The European Game and the Approach to the Second World War," *Soccer and Society* 9, no. 4 (2008): 532–48.

came to be reciprocal as football began to offer politicians new discursive tools, organizational networks, infrastructure, and voting masses under multi-party politics.

A growing body of literature investigate the two main models of state-sport relations. The Northern, liberal model of Great Britain treats sport as essentially dependent on individual initiative, and its organization and regulation are thus left to national federations as the sports' governing bodies. State intervention exists in some cases but is limited to legal regulation of sporting activities and financial backing of especially sport complexes and facilities. In the Southern (Latin) model, on the other hand, the intervention of the state is seen as necessary for the development of sport, which is in turn considered a public service.² This state tutelage can readily turn into political patronage and an obstacle to accountability and the democratic functioning of the system. As will be scrutinized throughout this chapter, the Turkish case is an archetype of the Latin model.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Departing from the premises above, the first part of this chapter seeks to understand the interplay between football and politics in the aftermath of World War II when politics became the fundamental, centrifugal arena of social struggle among the masses and business and political elites.³ On one hand, football connected people to political parties and served as a site of political critique and participation, especially in big cities which were experiencing a process of urban expansion. On the other, introducing new strategies of populism and patronage to football, Democrats used the mass popularity of the game for political and social mobilization, unlike the ruling elite of the single party years.

In light of the discussions in the first section, the second part focuses on the game's economy in its early professional period. It unearths the links between sports clubs, political power, and new business forces that tardily penetrated the game.

2 Hare, *Football in France*, 29.

3 Betül Yazar, "Politics of/and Popular Culture," *Cultural Studies* 22, no. 1 (2008): 48-9.

§ 5.1 The 3 P's of Football: Politics, Populism, and Patronage

Democrats, despite staying in power for only one decade, left an indelible mark on Turkish politics. The decade they were in power was an “apprenticeship period of populism” in Turkey, to use Boratav’s words, and witnessed perhaps the earliest examples of the hybridization of politics, football, and media.⁴ While elitist discourses, approaches, and policies were rapidly being abandoned, metaphors of the most popular leisure activity of the people began to pepper daily and political language.

The Democrat Party who managed to transform the elitist populism of the single party era into a populist one. During this period, people believed for the first time that they had the power to influence political trends and decision-making processes, although they were still unable to form an alternative to the existing political system. Populism - as a political “trick” of the Democrats - was evident in various social and cultural spheres in line with the growing practical and discursive sensibilities towards public wants and expectations. While bureaucratic groups continued to exhibit traditional suspicion of popular mobilization and created moral panic in the society, business circles logged into the system by developing patronage-induced relations.⁵

According to İlkey Sunar, if one pillar of the Democrats’ political legacy was populism, the other was patronage.⁶ The clientelist politics of the DP was based on coalitions in which goods and services were exchanged for the support and loyalty of clientele groups.⁷ Football clubs did not hesitate to join this coalition of patronage. In this regard, Turkish football owed its great dynamism not only to legalization of professionalism and its growing popularity - which was fueled by the DP’s populism -, but also to its capacity to integrate into patronage relations with the system.

Four main actors comprised in the organization of Turkish football, and the relationships between them determined the role of politics in football as

4 Korkut Boratav, *İktisat ve Siyaset Tarihi Üzerine Aykırı Yazılar*, 2nd edition (Istanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1990), 10.

5 Feridun Cemil Özkan. “Ellili Yıllarda Türkiye Ekonomisi,” *Türkiye’nin 1950’li Yılları*, 42.

6 Sunar, “Demokrat Parti ve Popülizm,” 2082-84.

7 Ibid.

well as of football in politics. The state (represented by politicians), the governing bodies (represented by the TFF and the GDPE), the football clubs, and fans were the key actors in the network. The TFF was responsible for the running of the game and was answerable only to the state via the GDPE. The clubs, many of whose chairmen and directors doubled as politicians, were governed by TFF rules and regulations. Because of the exceptional ties between football and politics, the role of fans was of utmost importance.

Evidence for the growing interplay among these actors in the early era of professional football is available in many forms. This period witnessed the emergence of the new political notion called of the athlete deputy (*sporcu vekil*). The term is extensively used to describe deputies who were typically ex-football players and were charged by the sports press with “representing the interests of Turkish football” in parliament.⁸ The athlete deputies and deputy candidates were mostly in the Democrat lineup since the party was keener to use the game’s popularity to increase its social base. According to a newspaper report, among the deputy candidates of the DP in the 1957 elections were football heroes of the previous decade such as Fenerbahçe’s Fikret Kırkan, Altay’s Vahap Özeltay, and Gençlerbirliği’s Hasan Polat. In addition, national football referee Osman Yeşeren and head of the Ankara district of the GDPE Ziya Ozan were also DP candidates. Significantly, only one name on the list - Vefa’s legendary player Galip Haktanır - mentioned as an RPP candidate.⁹

Another indicator of football’s intertwinement with politics was the the deputy-president model adopted by Istanbul’s Big Three. It is unsurprising that sports clubs in this new professional order preferred to establish organic ties with the political party in power through club members and presidents. It is no coincidence that four members of Fenerbahçe’s 1950 board were at the same time deputies of Democrat Party. According to Gökaçtı, even before professionalism was officially approved, Fenerbahçe’s debts exceeded its revenues, so it had no alternative other than to maintain close ties with the government in power.¹⁰ In subsequent years, Fenerbahçe took care that its presidents including Osman Kavrakoğlu, Zeki Rıza Sporel, Agah Erdem, and

8 “Sporcu Milletvekilleri ile Yapılacak Toplantı,” *Akşam*, May 10, 1956.

9 “Milletvekili Adayı Sporcular ve Vekiller,” *Milliyet*, September 17, 1957.

10 Gökaçtı, *Bizim İçin Oyna*, 212.

Medeni Berk (but with the exception of Bedii Yazıcı) were deputies of the Democrat Party.

The picture was no different at the other two big clubs. Four of seven presidents of Beşiktaş (Salih Fuat Keçeci, Danyal Akbel, Nuri Togay, and Enver Kaya) in the same era were also DP deputies. Galatasaray had three presidents from within the Democrat circles before a DP deputy, Sadık Güz, became club president in 1957. Suphi Batur, a GS High School graduate and a DP deputy, served as GS president from 1946 to 1950.¹¹ Batur, who left the DP for the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) in 1948, was replaced by Yusuf Ziya Öniş in 1950, soon after the Democrats came to power. Öniş, a football pioneer, fierce advocate of professionalism, and well-known bureaucrat, also had close ties with Celal Bayar and the Democrats. Öniş's successor, Ulvi Yenil, who ran the club from 1953 to 1954 after serving as TFF president, was vice president of the Democrat Party of Istanbul Province. After the military coup in 1960, Yenil was also charged at the Yassıada trials along with other important football authorities of the time such as Sadık Giz, Nuri Togay, Osman Kavrakoğlu, Agah Erozan, Medeni Berk, and Firuzan Tekil.

Many clubs outside the Big Three did not refrain from relying on the political power sooner or later. In the election in 1955, Selahattin Karayavuz, a Democrat Party deputy from Trabzon, was elected as chairman of the Vefa Club.¹² Mehmet Çolakoglu, who took on the presidency of the Beykoz Club in 1957, was simultaneously the branch president of the Democrat Party District Office of Beykoz. Feriköy's president Abdurrahman Yazgan was simultaneously a member of the Democrat Party and was among those who stood trial at Yassıada.¹³

Some politicians preferred the title of honorary president rather than to actively enter club politics. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was a Galatasaray

11 Mustafa Çufalı, *Türk Parlemento Tarihi, TBMM 8. Dönem (1946-1950)*, Vol. 3, (Ankara: TBMM Kültür Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2012), 966.

12 "Vefa İdare Heyetini Üyeler İbra Etti," *Sabah Postası*, January 9, 1957.

13 Fethi Aytuna, "Necati Karakaya: Spiker, Spor Yazarı, Kulüp Başkanı," <http://dinyakoskrampon.blogspot.com/2012/09/necati-karakaya-spiker-spor-yazar-kulup.html> (accessed September 20, 2018).

club member and the honorary president of Beşiktaş, Sırrı Yırcalı, the DP deputy of Balıkesir, was honorary president of Karagümrük, and another Democrat Party member, Yusuf Ziya Öniş, was honorary president of Sarıyer.¹⁴

Though rare, there were club presidents affiliated with the RPP. For instance, Karagümrük's president was İbrahim Sevin, the head of the Fatih district of Republican People's Party. Ali Sohtorik, the head of the RPP in Istanbul Province and father-in-law of Erdal İnönü, was the president of İstanbulspor between 1958 and 1967.¹⁵ These wealthy businessmen provided financial support to their clubs, allowing them to carry out successful transfers and ensuring that they maintain their presence in the professional football. The transfer of Galatasaray's Kadri Aytaç to Karagümrük Club in 1958 caused a sensation. However, as these deep-rooted clubs did not have the wide fan base, intense media interest, and government support that the Big Three enjoyed, their influence significantly decreased once the city clubs proliferated with the establishment of professional national leagues.¹⁶

Whether in the form of directing a club, supporting a club through other activities, or simply attending a game, involvement in football began to offer bigger opportunities for politicians to become known to wider public. As Duke and Crolley demonstrates,

it facilitates networks for political canvassing and encouraging the loyalty of the local community. It is usual for the names of politician to appear on lists of honorary *socios* for most clubs and it has gradually become a normal way of creating political propaganda. It is common practice during the presidential elections at football clubs, for rival political opponents to stand as candidates and run campaigns against one another, thereby merging the structure of football and politics.¹⁷

The situation was no different for amateur football clubs. Grossly neglected by the state and policy makers, small-scale neighborhood teams maintained their

14 *Milliyet*, May 16, 1955.

15 Can Dünder, *Anka Kuşu Erdal İnönü Anlatıyor* (Istanbul: Can Yayınları, 2012), 223.

16 Gökaçtı, 'Bizim İçin Oyna,' 197-200.

17 Duke and Crolley, "Fútbol," 101.

presence under the aegis of local merchants and businessmen who saw football not only as an instrument of social prestige but also as a stepping-stone to a political career. Newly established sports clubs, especially those in big cities, soon became the sporting, social, and political centers of their neighborhoods. It was no coincidence that clubhouses were generally located in neighborhood coffeehouses, which were historically sites for the performance of masculinity and male socialization. Furthermore, these places provided the people with new opportunities for political participation, which proliferated after the transition to multi-party regime.

Clubs offered politicians their organizational capacity, access to an extensive, social network, and connections to groups with positive reputations in the community. Politicians benefited from the popularity of well-established football clubs such as Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş, and Galatasaray for political propaganda. On the other, they used small-scale clubs, which functioned not only as the sporting but also as political centers of neighborhoods, to expand political participation at the grassroots level.

As far as the interplay between football and politics is concerned, the politicization of the stands should also be taken into consideration. Mithatpaşa Stadium, which hosted thousands during regular games, at the same time served as a site of political critique and participation. Similar to coffeehouses, stadiums and football clubs – which were crucial spaces of male socialization – democratized political sphere by integrating migrants into urban politics. Writing in 1961, Gündüz Kılıç noted that the spectators could not keep from talking about the Yassıada trials, economic conditions, and politics enough to watch the game.¹⁸ The rituals of spectators – either in the form of posters or collective chantings – also conveyed political meanings reflecting political and social discontent in times of high political intensity.

This politicization was also a consequence of spectators' exploration of their own collective power in a period of transition to multiparty democracy. The concentration of people circled around a field inside the stadium provided opportunities for collective identity, conflict, and struggle that symbolized

18 Gündüz Kılıç, "Uyan Ey Seyirci Uyan," *Milliyet*, February 1, 1961.

larger antagonisms.¹⁹ In a game between Konyaspor and Akşehir İdmanyurdu, Akşehir fans exhibited hostility towards their neighboring city by shouting “Damn those from Konya and long live Adnan Menderes!”²⁰ Sporting opposition turned into political opposition. Another interesting incident took place in Mardin was later retold by Çetin Altan in *Milliyet*. At a football game in the local stadium, rival fans started quarreling after a referee’s contradictory goal decision. The gendarmerie was also involved in the fight. Tension among the gendarmerie and people continued after the game and reached a level that over two thousand people blockaded the government office of the city shouting “We want freedom, we want justice!” The political discontent in the region, according to Altan, was mobilized at a football game by those who had learned the taste of street demonstrations as part of recent democratic improvements in the country.²¹

In recent years, there are an increasing number of studies on the interplay between football and politics in Latin America. Many scholars argue that in Latin American countries such as Chile and Argentina where the development of football preceded democratic politics, the game constituted a social model around which the political system was constructed. Because newly-founded political parties had no adequate organization of their own, they borrowed the infrastructure of football and its neighborhood-based clubs.²² Elsey argues that in the case of Chile, football came to function as a vehicle for integrating working classes into urban politics. According to her, football clubs were central to the maintenance of a more inclusive democracy in the society:

They took the discourse of Chilean democracy, oft-touted by middle- and upper-class politicians, seriously. Their belief in political solutions to their problems showed the influence of this discourse as well as the experiences in their daily interactions with local politics.²³

19 Karen Elizabeth Warner, “Soccer Fans, Language Politics, and the Ambivalence of Nationalism in Galicia, Spain,” PhD Diss., Yale University, 2006: 126.

20 “Konyalılarla Akşehirlielerin Arası Açıldı,” *Milliyet*, January 24, 1956.

21 *Milliyet*, May 9, 1962.

22 Vic Duke and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol,” 93–116; Brenda Elsey, “Promises of Participation,” 3–31.

23 Elsey, “Promises of Participation,” 7.

This description is equally applicable to the Turkish context. During the 1950s, football clubs in Turkey provided a platform for the increasing urban population where they could expand their political practices, discourses, and experiences. Moreover, football fans established fan associations to support and widened their means of participation in club politics. For example, the fan network known as the Save Feriköy Committee acted to salvage the club from its difficult circumstances, while a society founded in Ankara called the Fenerbahçeliler Kulübü was a body where fans of the club from Ankara's political and business circles came together.²⁴ On the other hand, the Association of Fenerbahçe Supporters (*Fenerbahçeliler Cemiyeti*) founded in Istanbul in European İstanbul in Sıraselviler, rather than on the Asian side where the Fenerbahçe club is headquartered, won mention for a time for its opposition to the administration of the Fenerbahçe Club.²⁵

Beside this, intra-club politics is another excellent example that shows the merging structures of football and politics. It became common practice during the general assembly meetings and presidential elections at football clubs for rival political opponents to stand as candidates and run campaigns against one another. The presidential candidates and political groups borrowed from political discourse, using not only rhetorical tools but also political techniques to get elected. Especially the electoral processes of the Big Three resembled general elections also in terms of media representation, as well. Opposing groups released their lists of board member candidates and their administrative programs days before the elections, and the sports press followed the electoral process carefully by publishing detailed reports and interviews reflecting the reciprocal controversies of the rival groups. In line with the Democrats' increasing pressure on the political opposition in the second half of the fifties, tension among rival groups within clubs escalated. This intra-club rivalry led by Fenerbahçe's Muhittin Bulgurlu and Remzi Tosyalı, Galatasaray's Sadık Giz and Osman Kapanı, and Beşiktaş's Sadri Uşuoğlu and Nuri Togay marked

24 "Fenerbahçeliler Kulübü," *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 77, March 8, 1948; "Ankara Fenerbahçeliler Kulübü Açıldı," *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 88, 1948.

25 Sedat Taylan, *Biz Fenerbahçeliler* (Istanbul: Halk Basımevi, 1965).

this period. There were even incidents when assembly meetings were postponed or resulted in police intervention with the use of tear gas due to violent outbursts.²⁶ Sometimes club administrations tried to silence the rising opposition groups. In 1957, the administration of Fenerbahçe not only tried to close the Association of Fenerbahçe Supporters in which their opponents were clustered, but also to expel them from the club.²⁷ Similar to that of Fenerbahçe, the Galatasaray administration tried to prevent the foundation of the Galatasaray supporter association which constituted an alternative to the group in power.²⁸

Football constituted an important channel through which people were mobilized through the “inclusionary” populism of the Democrat Party. Democrats managed to integrate football clubs and communities into the social coalition they constructed around a strong populist discourse and patronage system. In addition to nationalism and anti-communism - around which the working classes that constituted the “street force of the Democrats” (*sokak gücü*) were mobilized - football became an ideological impetus that motivated the masses towards social, political as well as sporting goals.²⁹ Football communities, including supporters and club directors, participated in the welcoming ceremonies at airports organized for politicians.³⁰ Similarly, the courtesy visits of football teams and club directors that reaffirmed ties between clubs and politicians became common during the fifties.³¹

At this point, it seems fair to mention Prime Minister Menderes’ particular interest in football. Adnan Menderes, the Democrats’ political leader, was a former football player for İzmir’s Altınordu and a passionate football lover. In 1937, as a deputy from Aydın, he was assigned to TSA president. After he be-

26 “Beşiktaş Kongresi Dün Tehir Edildi,” *Akşam*, April 1, 1957.

27 “Kavrakoğlu Deklarasyonu,” *Akşam*, August 23, 1957.

28 “Sosyal Lokale Dair,” *Akşam*, April 20, 1957; “Kulübümüzle Sosyal Lokalin Alakası Yok,” *Akşam*, April 26, 1957.

29 M. Hakan Koçak, “Ellili Yıllarda Emek Rejimi ve Emek Hareketi” in *Türkiye’nin 1950’li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaan Kaynar (Istanbul: İletişim, 2015), 88.

30 “Fahri Başkanımız Sayın Adnan Menderes’i Karşıladık,” *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, May 5, 1952.

31 “Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar Beşiktaşlıları Kabul Etti,” *Türkspor Alemi*, no. 13, April 16, 1951; “Celal Bayar ve Menderes Sporcuları Kabul Ettiler,” *Akşam*, February 24, 1956.

came president, Menderes continued to display interest in sports - and football, in particular - in a manner that was clearly understood by the public. He showed up at football matches on his own as well as together with foreign guests, he reorganized the Prime Ministry Cup, and he built personal relationships with football players and club administrators. While maintaining his Galatasaray membership, he accepted the request of Beşiktaş to become the club's honorary.

Unquestionably, the shortcut for a football club to gain some privilege was to establish contact with the prime minister. Since even the most powerful clubs in the country operated on a tight budget, they inevitably relied on the state's financial and legal support for large-scale investments such as stadium and sport facilities. For Galatasaray, the acquisition of Kuruçeşme Island was the biggest benefit of state patronage. In 1957 within the framework of a public construction operation in İstanbul started by Adnan Menderes, the demolition of Galatasaray's aquatic sports facility in Bebek was on the agenda. Through the interventions of Galatasaray president DP deputy Sadık Giz through Adnan Menderes, Kuruçeşme Island, which was due to become a public café, was purchased by the Galatasaray club.³²

Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe had similar plans. Beşiktaş President Nuri Togay, who was also a member of the Democrat Party, met with Menderes to obtain a promise to "develop a formula for the allocation [of Mithatpaşa Stadium] to Beşiktaş by the concerned ministry and institutions."³³ In 1960, before the military coup, Fenerbahçe directors visited Menderes and asked for financial support to establish a new and modern stadium.³⁴ Fenerbahçe members requested permission from Adnan Menderes for another Democrat Party deputy, Medeni Berk, to become Fenerbahçe president and further asked for financial

32 Gökaçtı, 'Bizim İçin Oyna' 206-7; "Galatasaray Bir Ada Satın Aldı," *Akşam*, April 21, 1957.

33 Yalçın Doğan. "Beşiktaş'ın Stat Sancısı," *Milliyet*, May 18, 1991.

34 Selami Özsoy, "Siyasi Sempati Aracı Olarak Futbol: Türkiye'de 2015 Milletvekili Seçim Kampanyalarında Gazetelere Yansyanlar," *International Journal of Science Culture and Sport* 4, no. 1 (August, 2016): 238.

support for the construction of a new stadium.³⁵ Menderes replied to Fenerbahçe administrators that “we spent thirty million for the drinking water of a single village, therefore we recognize no limit to the service to be given to our Fenerbahçe,” summarizing the populist approach of the government politics with respect to football.³⁶ Although neither this project nor other promised sport-related investments could be carried out by the Menderes government, which was toppled by the coup in 1960, Democrats left the heritage of populism and patronage to football.

In comparison with the single party period, there were two crucial developments behind the change in politicians’ approach towards football. First, masses rose to the political stage as ‘voters’ through the transition to a multi-party regime. Second, football matured into a game with a genuine mass following and popular profile. Football fans were no longer mere spectators but constituted the masses, voters, and consumers. Their diverse roles explain why both politicians and business circles wanted to become involved in the game. It is noteworthy the process of hybridization between football and politics which was intensified by the DP would be adopted and sustained by subsequent governments. A great transformation was observed in the elitist mentality of amateurism represented by the single party regime that was centrally dominant. Interestingly, despite his distant attitude towards football, İsmet İnönü gave an order for the Vefa and Altınordu clubs to be received into the Professional National League in 1962.³⁷

5.1.1 *Big Dream, Big Failure: A Stadium with a Capacity of 100 Thousand*

The project of a “stadium with a capacity of 100 thousand” is one of the most interesting cases in the early period of Menderes’ populist politics. The insufficiency of football stadiums was one of the most important barriers to the

35 *Milliyet*, December 19, 1957; January 24, 1960.

36 Gökaçtı, ‘*Bizim İçin Oyna*,’ 213.

37 *Ibid.*, 270.

development of professional football in the country. The issue occupied a significant place both as a subject of discussion in the sports press and also as an electoral pledge in intra-club competition within football communities. Citizens wanted sports stadiums and Democrats, with the political strategy aimed of appealing to the everyday demands of the public through populist promises, were ready to respond their demands.³⁸ “The redevelopment of Istanbul” became a primary target for Democrat Party politicians who blamed the previous Republican administration for neglecting Istanbul for twenty-seven years. After coming to power, they channeled large amounts of funds towards this goal, and Prime Minister Menderes personally supervised these redevelopment works. This period saw the demolition of old buildings, the expropriation of many properties, the opening of new roads, and the construction of gigantic boulevards. These works largely shaped modern Istanbul into what it is today. In this regard, the construction of a new and big stadium instead of renovating existing ones was in line with Menderes’ populist and “pro-constructionist”³⁹ (*inşacı/imarçı*) urban strategy. However, as Murat Toklucu asserts, the construction of that stadium would be “the biggest public disappointment in the history of football in Turkey.”⁴⁰

Because of “the increasing enthusiasm for football and number of teams in Istanbul,” Mithatpaşa Stadium, the biggest of the city, failed to satisfy the needs of the football community in the fifties.⁴¹ After the city’s popular clubs fell into financial trouble due to the postponement of league matches in the stadium, sporting circles reasserted the demand for the construction of a big, modern stadium, just before the general elections in 1954.⁴² Due to the high demand for tickets and the insufficient capacity of Mithatpaşa Stadium, black market sales of match tickets was one of the leading problems in the first half of the fifties. In the mid-1950s, the transition to a toll gate system at the stadium and the launch of season ticket sales helped reduce the black-market

38 “Vatandaş Spor Sahası İstiyor,” *Akşam*, April 2, 1954.

39 Tanıl Bora, “Adnan Menderes,” in *Türkiye’nin 1950’li Yılları*, 342.

40 Murat Toklucu, “100 Binlik Stat,” *Socrates Düşünen Spor Dergisi*, no. 5 (2015), 119.

41 Adil Giray. “İstanbul’un Saha ve Tesisleri İhtiyaca Kafi Gelmiyor,” *Akşam*, August 29, 1954.

42 Şevket Soley. “Modern Din Spor,” *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, no. 56, December 17, 1956.

problem. However, as one journalist put it, football lovers were unable to watch the game “not of the inadequacy of their incomes, but because of the inadequacy of the stadium’s capacity.”⁴³ The real question was not unfair profit from informal ticket sales but how this demand to attend matches could be converted into revenue for the clubs and Turkish football in general.

When the Democrat Party came to power, it was rumored that Istanbul would have a big and modern stadium, but the capacity of this stadium was not mentioned until 1954.⁴⁴ Its capacity was for the first time mentioned as 100 thousand seats after the 19 December 1954 Fenerbahçe - Galatasaray match. The game was played at Mithatpaşa Stadium, and the attendance of 24,531 broke records for spectator numbers and revenues. On top of this, the match was discussed for days due to the huge crowd and tense atmosphere around the stadium. Many people thought it was a turning point in the history of Turkish football:

The recent Galatasaray-Fener match took place in an atmosphere of excitement and interest unrecorded in our 50-year football history. The match is complete, days have elapsed, high-spirit mood is still on. There is no end to the column fulls of stories in newspapers. We consider the Sunday match that occupy hundreds of people young, old and sports fans or not, has gone beyond all expectations and become the beginning of a new age in Turkish football - a noteworthy event. If Mithatpaşa stadium were available, those fans coming to see the match would have tripled rather than been 25 thousand.⁴⁵

Sports circles reached a consensus that club revenues would jump threefold with a 75-80 thousand capacity stadium.⁴⁶ The stadium with a capacity of 100

43 Kerim Kanok. “Bu Muammayı Artık Çözelim,” *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, no. 41, September 3, 1956.

44 Toklucu, “100 Binlik Stat,” 119.

45 “Mithatpaşa Stadı İçin Enteresan Bir Teklif,” *Akşam*, December 25, 1954; Adil Giray, “Dünyanın En Küçük Şehir Stadı Mithatpaşadır,” *Akşam*, December 10, 1954. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

46 Alp Zirek. “Büyük Stad-Büyük Hasılat,” *Türkiye Spor*, November 3, 1954.

thousand was announced for the first time a week after this game by the Governor of Istanbul, Kerim Gökay. In a short time, sporting circles initiated a public campaign for the stadium, which would be appropriated by the Democrats as a populist promise targeting the football public. As Toklucu noticed, the project remained on the political agendas of right-wing parties - except during the general elections of 1961 - until the late 1990s.⁴⁷

What gave the project its populist character was not only that it was continually put forward by right-wing parties as an electoral promise that was never actualized but also that it addressed a quantitative magnificence from a comparative perspective with the West instead of answering the concrete needs of Turkish football. It is because of that a discord arose between the promoters of the campaign including fans and members of top clubs and the defenders of grassroots football who highlighted the importance of neighborhood football stadiums and grounds to the game's development.⁴⁸ Despite suggestions to renovate and expand the small-scale neighborhood stadiums such as those of Vefa, Anadoluhisarı, Eyüp as well as Mithatpaşa Stadium, top clubs lobbied top politicians and publicized the stadium project through mainstream media.⁴⁹

In 1955, municipal and sports authorities announced that the stadium would be constructed in the Langa district.⁵⁰ However, as land prices began to increase in this region due to the ongoing rumors - even before an official declaration -, the location was changed to Bayrampaşa. According to an architect who wrote for *Cumhuriyet*, the new stadium, which would obviously be constructed on the city's periphery, would inevitably bring traffic and transportation problems. Instead, he argued, Mithatpaşa Stadium, which was at the heart

47 Toklucu, "100 Binlik Stat," 119.

48 Şevket Soley. "Büyük ve Küçük Stad İş Hallolunduğu Gün," *Akşam*, February 27, 1956; Adil Giray. "Kendi Kendimizi Tenkit," *Akşam*, February 21, 1957.

49 "Bu Sene Futbol Maçları Çok Alaka Çekti," *Akşam*, December 31, 1954. Şevket Soley. "Büyük ve Küçük Stad İş Hallolunduğu Gün..." *Akşam*, February 27, 1956; Adil Giray. "Kendi Kendimizi Tenkit," *Akşam*, February 21, 1957.

50 "Langa'da 100 bin Kişilik Bir Stadyum İnşa Edilecek," *Akşam*, February 9, 1955.

of the city and had many transportation alternatives from both sea and land should be expanded through the construction of a second deck.⁵¹

In 1956, the legendary victory of Turkish national team against the Hungarians in a friendly game reinvigorated the stadium campaign. Menderes used this victory as an argument that the "sports loving public and youth already deserved it" and made a promise to implement the project.⁵² After the investigative tour of a group of sporting authorities including the Istanbul General Directorate of Physical Education Regional Director Selahattin Cihanoglu, in Europe, it was announced that the stadium would be located in Levent and its architectural plan would be based on the Hungarian model. However, the location was changed several times. Although the group of athlete deputies in parliament along with TFF president Hasan Polat and GDPE President Nizamettin Kırşan presented a comprehensive report on the stadium to the prime minister in 1957, operations relating to land expropriation were constantly be postponed and construction was initiated.⁵³

On the other side of the coin, the football community and the mainstream media were ready to pressure the political authorities. One of the most interesting examples of football fans adopting demanding language was in this sense. When Menderes visited Mithatpaşa Stadium to watch the national match between Egypt and Turkey in 1957, thousands of spectators chanted: "We want the 100 thousand capacity stadium!"⁵⁴ This incident was regarded as a success of the football public that "benefited from the prime minister's presence in the stadium."⁵⁵ After this "public achievement," the process accelerated with the organization of an architectural competition for the stadium.⁵⁶ Expropriation costs for the lands being considered for the stadium were increasing and the GDPE and Istanbul Municipality could not afford the cost. The establishment of a mutual betting company to be maintained by the state

51 Quoted by Adil Giray, "Mithatpaşa Stadı için Enteresan Teklif," *Akşam*, December 25, 1954.

52 "Olimpiyat Stadının Yeri İyi Tespit Edilmeli," *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, no. 33, July 9, 1956.

53 "Stadyum Projesi Başvekile Sunulacak," *Akşam*, February 22, 1957.

54 *Milliyet*, May 21, 1957.

55 "Yüzbinlik Statta Menderes Var;" "100 Bin Kişilik Stadyum," *Akşam*, May 23, 1957.

56 "Stadyom Davası Halledilemiyor," *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, no., 7, January 9, 1956.

was on the agenda in order to create financial resources.⁵⁷ Although the 100 thousand capacity stadium remained an empty promise that occupied the sporting agenda of the country during the DP period, it fostered the formation of Spor-Toto, which would become, in the next decade, the largest source of revenue for football clubs.

§ 5.2 Open Professionalism, Tardy Commercialization

Although sports clubs in Turkey neither adopted company status nor became profit-making businesses after the adoption of open professionalism, certain changes occurred in the game's economy. It was during those years that commercial terms such as import, export, profit, loss, customer, and revenue began to pervade the sporting discourse as reflected in the press. Moreover, an economic rationality began to drive the administrators of the clubs for the first time. On one hand, the expenditures gradually increased as a result of the growing transfer fees, player salaries, and match bonuses as well as the administrative expenditures of the clubs. Especially after the national professional leagues were founded, some clubs could not cope with the rapid growth in transportation and accommodation costs. On the other hand, there were crucial developments that directly enhanced the revenues of the clubs: the growth of spectator attendance and corresponding gate revenues, the penetration of new commercial forces into the game, and the eventual launch of a state betting company in 1960.

Notes written in 1941 by Ali Sami Yen, the founder of the Galatasaray Sports Club, provide insight into the historical development of club economies in Turkey as well as the incipient monetarization of football before the advent of professionalism.

In 1905-6 we did not collect dues. Books weren't kept, either. Money was collected to meet any requirement and fees were deducted until the needed amount was met. Collection of dues started in 1907. This was recorded in tables. Book records are seen after the declaration of constitutional monarchy in 1908. It would have been careless to keep

57 "On Seneden Evvel 100 Binlik Stada Giremeyeceğiz," *Akşam*, October 8, 1958.

books before then. Our annual income in 1909 was one lira ninety kuruş; our overall expenditures were one lira seventy-six kuruş. No matter how inexpensive living costs were at that time, this tiny figure is an economic measure of how small we started. Bookkeeping became regular in 1911, as the collection and expense figures exceeded a hundred lire reaching 196 lire one kuruş thirty para. It was in 1921, sixteen years after the inception of the club, that we passed the thousand lira threshold. That year general collections reached 3098 lire eighty kuruş, while costs amounted to 3521 lire eighty-two kuruş. The figure of 10 thousand lire was first exceeded in 1935 when the club was thirty years old. Overall, revenues that year were 12,422 lire 36 kuruş and we spent 2590 lire 32 kuruş for sports. We paid 11,408 lire 3 kuruş for administrative expenses.⁵⁸

The management of club economies in line with the expansion of club budgets, Yen emphasized, became an important concern for club administrators. Following the transition to professionalism, most clubs with professional football teams - led by the Big Three - began to form “accounting departments on a modern basis.”⁵⁹

Although revenues such as regular state-subsidies, participants donations (*teberru*), membership fees, small-scale sponsorships, and the financial backing of the local businessmen remained as significant for the the Istanbul Professional League as in the pre-professional era, the share of gate revenues considerably increased. The total gate revenue generated in the Istanbul Professional League in the 1953-54 football season rose from 895 thousand to 1176 thousand Turkish lire in next season.⁶⁰ This rise was the result of both the increasing number of spectators and as well as increases in ticket prices. Nevertheless, by 1954, 80 percent of the total income of the Big Three came from gate revenues.⁶¹ A correspondent who watched a match between Fenerbahçe

58 “Ali Sami Yen Spor Hayatımızın Tarihçesini Yapıyor,” *Kırmızı Beyaz*, October 13, 1941. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

59 “Fenerbahçe Murakıplarının İstifası Meselesi,” *Milliyet*, December 29, 1955.

60 *Milliyet*, May 19, 1955.

61 “Kulüplere de Yazık,” *Akşam*, April 14, 1954.

and Beşiktaş in the second season of Istanbul Professional League where fan and spectator revenue records were broken wrote about the interest in this match in his newspaper as follows:

Until now, we have not witnessed any game that drew as much interest at yesterday's Beşiktaş - Fenerbahçe match and gathered as many fans - even at the matches of the national team. In addition to fans completely filling even the narrowest space of Dolmabahçe Stadium, tens of thousands of curious spectators waited for the result of the match. Taşkışla and in front of the Technical University, the Maçka hills, and every place that could see the field was extremely crowded. In addition, the doors of the gas plant were broken, the top of coal heaps were invaded by fans, and the rooftops of factory buildings by ticketless spectators.⁶²

Apart from the rising popularity of the game, numerous reports, articles, and news in the press during the fifties reflect concern for how the people's increasing interest in football could be converted into revenues, particularly on behalf of the clubs. This concern drove debates varying from the expansion of stadiums and construction of new ones to increasing ticket prices and satisfying the demands and wants of spectators. However, despite the increase in club revenues, the imposition of an income tax on the clubs - and on players, as well - would deteriorate the clubs' budgets in 1960. Interpreting the taxation as "a disaster for Turkish football," the directors of clubs such as Karagömrük, Vefa, İstanbulspor, and Kasımpaşa asserted that the income tax would result in extinction of their clubs.⁶³ After their demand that the Finance Minister and Prime Minister Menderes exempt them from the income tax act was refused, club directors threatened to withdraw themselves from the organization, finally convincing the government to subsidize from them through Spor-Toto.⁶⁴ In addition, the first tax amnesty for sports clubs would come into force in

62 *Milliyet*, November 17, 1952. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

63 "Kulüpler İflas Tehlikesinde," *Milliyet*, January 16, 1960.

64 "Kulüpler Toto'dan Çekilme Kararında," "Klüplere Spor-Toto'dan Yardım," *Milliyet*, February 8, 1961.

1962 due to the efforts of Suphi Batur, Galatasaray's former president and Republican senate member.⁶⁵ In the following years, tax amnesty turned into a matter of political negotiation between powerful clubs, their large-scale communities, and the country's successive governments.

As Vamplew elaborately argues, growing match attendance and revenue figures had much to do with rising incomes and increasing time for leisure for the working classes.⁶⁶ In Turkey, the fifties witnessed not only an agricultural-led economic boom which resulted in income growth both for urban and rural groups, but also certain developments in favor of the urban classes such as weekends free, lunch breaks, and paid annual leave that resulted in an expansion of leisure time and activities in the urban realm.⁶⁷ According to Özden, both widespread working class attendance at movies and the dominance of working class in football during this period were closely tied to improvements in wages and shorter working days.

It is observed in the aftermath of the war that football had become the ruling passion of the majority of the urban population, surpassing boxing, horse racing and rowing although these too had large followings from all classes. The entrance fees to the stadiums probably fell in the early 1950s, however, total revenues from the game increased considerably as more people paid to enter the grounds to watch the events.⁶⁸

The masses, with their new-found money and freedom, preferred football to other sporting and entertainment choices to transcend the routine of everyday life. Imposing their own meanings on football, they made it a "national-popular"⁶⁹ game. Their rising economic and political importance also enhanced their position in the football community, leading to the eventual recognition

65 *Milliyet*, March 28, 1962.

66 Wray Vamplew, *Pay Up*, 15-74.

67 Koçak, "Ellili Yıllarda," 69-71.

68 Özden, "Working Class Formation," 121-122.

69 David Rowe, "Antonio Gramsci: Sport, Hegemony and the National-Popular," in *Sport and Modern Social Theories*, ed. Richard Giulianotti (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2004), 97-102.

of their agency. Nuri Bosut, a famous football referee, portrayed spectators as the clubs' *velinimet* (benefactors), a term used to define customers in traditional commercial discourse. Because, he argued, spectators were the primary source of the clubs' annual revenues, which reached into the hundreds of thousands of liras. According to him, football clubs should identify what interested these spectators in order to survive in the professional world of football.⁷⁰ In a similar vein, Gündüz Kılıç once warned football players with bad performance to fulfill their responsibility to spectators. According to him, the football players' "actual boss is not the club directors, but instead the spectators."⁷¹

Professionalization and spectacularization of football together have influenced the game's interaction with business since the early fifties in Turkey. This period witnessed the emergence of new commercial forces penetrating the game. The rise in media coverage of the game following its popularization created new opportunities for direct and especially indirect advertising for the business sector.

According to many scholars, the 1960s represent a turning point in the commercialization of international football as the political economy of the game went through a process of rapid modernization. Giulianotti argues that starting in those years, as star players and clubs were more deeply incorporated into the commodification of popular culture, the football experience became increasingly synonymous with track-side advertising, shirt sponsorships, television commercials, league and cup sponsorships, and the merchandising of club paraphernalia.⁷² In a similar vein, Turner considers the 1960s a key decade in British football that began with the abolishment of a maximum wage for professional footballers that led to the pop stardom of players such as George Best.⁷³ The key dynamic behind this new commercialism in the world of football was the arrival of commercial television. On the other hand,

70 Nuri Bosut. "İngiliz Oyuncularına Gol Başına Prim Verelim," *Milliyet*, April 5, 1960.

71 Gündüz Kılıç. "Seyredenler ve Edilenler," *Milliyet*, May 5, 1950

72 Richard Giulianotti, *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), 88.

73 Mark Turner, "From Local Heroism to Global Celebrity Stardom: A Critical Reflection of the Social Cultural and Political Changes in British Football Culture from the 1950s to the Formation of the Premier League," *Soccer and Society* 15, no. 5 (2014): 1-5.

however, the 1950s can be defined as an early phase in the development of a trilateral relationship among mass media, business, and the game. The recognition of professionalism entailed the domination of an economic rationality and motive in the football world and fostered business interactions with the cultural field. Although the financial input from companies was not on par with that of the present-day business, the fifties saw the growing interest of numerous businesses and personas in advertising and sales promotion via football.

The evidence suggests that after the advent of professionalism, business circles discovered new sport-related advertising and marketing strategies. Among these were the use of billboards surrounding the football fields, advertising on betting coupons, distributing flyers in the stands, marketing specifically of football-related goods and services, use of professional footballers to promote products, organization of forecasting contests, and sponsorship of radio programs, cups, and tournaments.⁷⁴

A comparison of advertising in the sports press before and after the Second World War better explains business involvement in football. In the sports magazines of the 1930s, for instance, regular advertisements of local shops selling both sporting and non-sporting goods and services appeared, as well as a number of national and even international companies from sectors such as banking, insurance, food, and cosmetics. While advertisers publicized themselves through the ads, they also provided significant funds for the newly-developing sport press of the period. It is crucial that advertising was constructed on a general discourse of sport, not solely on football - that is, it was compatible with the multi-sport approach of the period.

Another distinctive feature of the ads was the presence of local tailors and shoemakers as key groups of advertisers. These local craftsmen responded to specific, urgent needs of sportsmen in the absence of a sportswear manufacturing sector by either tailoring sport clothes or making sport shoes. Although it was rare to see advertisers from other cities than Istanbul because the distribution of sport newspapers and magazines were restricted, a footnote that orders from provinces were acknowledged was written in the ads. The ads of

74 *Milliyet*, March 4; December 7, 1960.

such local shops gradually disappeared in the fifties with the rise of sportswear shops that specialized in sports equipment. These new shops placed their ads not only in sports magazines but also in daily newspapers.

Before the war, sport-specific advertising campaigns for non-sporting goods and services as well as for sporting goods were demonstrated. The famous Swiss food and beverage company Nestlé marketed chocolate with the slogan: “The unique delicious chocolate most beloved by world sportsmen.”⁷⁵ In a similar vein, a famous national coffee company used a sport-specific context: “You can relieve the fatigue from football games and sports only by having a cup of roasted, grounded coffee from the sons of Mehmet Efendi.”⁷⁶ A wide range of businesses adopted a sporting discourse and targeted sportsmen in their ads because the readers of these magazines, as opposed to those in the post-war years, were limited to the sports community, composed mainly of athletes themselves, which indicates a small group in the absence of the masses.

However, in the 1950s, as the reader base of the sports press expanded, the requirement to express an advertising campaign in a sports context would not be necessary anymore. The sports press became more attractive for businesses from a wider range of sectors that promoted their products such as radios, tractors, and other mass-produced products. Unlike in Europe where alcohol beverage and cigarette companies and shops had always been the leading advertisers in the sports press, alcohol beverage ads first began to appear in Turkish sports press in this period.

By far, the most aspiring sector in sports advertising was banking. In the fifties, among the advertisers of the weekly *ÖzFenerbahçe* were ten banks, even more than that of the present day. Involvement of the banking sector particularly in football was not restricted to ads in the sports press. Bank ads were the most striking on advertising panels surrounding stadiums in Ankara and İzmir as well as in Istanbul. In many ways, they were the most aggressive institutions in sports advertising in the post-war years. In 1958, İş Bank exhibited one of the early examples of making football players the faces of the brand. In

75 *Gol*, no. 12, March 9, 1935.

76 *Gol*, no. 16, May 29, 1935.

its advertising campaign entitled “Why do account owners prefer İş Bank?” in *Milliyet*, the bank featured professional football players such as Saim Tayşengil from Galatasaray and Basri Dirimlili and Lefter Küçükandonyadis from Fenerbahçe along with figures from other walks of life.⁷⁷

Becoming public figures whose fame reached the remotest parts of the country, football players’ names and pictures began to be a characteristic of advertising. In 1959, Akfil Textile Factories, a company owned by Mehmet Ata Mermerci who was a well-known flag-bearer of liberal economic policies, further promoted its brand through the popularity of players. In *Milliyet*, an ad was published narrating the visit of three professional footballers – Birol Pekel, Metin Oktay, and Lefter Küçükandonyadis - to Akfil Factories for “investigating the products that were also exported to Europe.”⁷⁸ Similarly, another sector that approached footballers with a pro-business sentiment was cinema. Not only certain cinemas invited football teams to galas, promoting both their own cinemas and their films but also football players appeared for the first time in feature films.⁷⁹

The promotion of brand awareness was crucial for both old and new companies in an increasingly competitive environment in which new companies in different sectors and consumption products and services were diversified. In this regard, verbal mention of a brands through football in a radio program, over the stadium loudspeaker, or in daily conversation helped raise brand awareness. However, the increasing commercialization in football was met with suspicion. Those who believed in the pragmatic functions attributed to sports in general claimed that the communal aspect of sports was corrupted by commercial market pressures.

Recently, those using football and players as vehicles for advertising have increased. Some firms publish so-called American-like ads to promise gifts such as radios or watches to the player who scores the first goal at a game played by whichever teams, while certain busybody sports authors interview celebrity players to learn from the horse’s

77 *Milliyet*, October 19, 1958; April 30, 1959; November 16, 1959.

78 *Milliyet*, April 25, 1963.

79 *Milliyet*, January 22, 1954.

mouth whether they will score the first goal at a particular match - and they feel they are successful by filling the columns of their newspapers. I have never seen such selfish interests in any methods of advertising that would foil a football player from being useful to his team to personalize and to affect the fate of his team for the profit of a company. Radio for the first goal. Nice...⁸⁰

Many arguments about the commodification of football adopted a similar, negative attitude towards exploitative elements with respect to football players. Nevertheless, this tardy commercialization played a role in the incorporation of football into the everyday lives of consumers.⁸¹ In addition to the printed media, radio broadcasting became an important channel for national and international companies to advertise and increase brand awareness. Many companies organized or sponsored radio forecasting contests in which a considerable audience not only from Istanbul but also remote parts of the country participated.⁸² For the first time in 1955, İş Bank commissioned an advertisement during radio broadcast of the game between the Turkish and French national military teams. A journalist impressed by the “new discovery of the bank” later wrote that the company’s name remained in his mind although he did not remember much about the game.⁸³ Moreover, he was correct in forecasting the use of this advertising method by other companies, as well. Akfil sponsored a radio show called as *Football Talk* by Turgay Şeren, Eşref Şefik, and Eşfak Aykaç in 1963.⁸⁴ The name of the company was announced both in the opening and at the end of each episode of the show.

Like Akfil, Adalet was a leading manufacturing company in the fifties that also used the popularity of football to promote its brand, but in a more sophisticated way. The founder of Adalet Manufacturing was Süreyya İlmen, an entrepreneur who had also been in politics upon the encouragement of Mustafa

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- 80 Sulhi Garan. “Tehlike İşareti,” *Milliyet*, April 4, 1952. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.
- 81 Garry Crawford, *Consuming Sport: Fans, Sport and Culture*, *Consuming Sport: Fans, Sport and Culture* (London: Routledge, 2004), 117.
- 82 “Yapı ve Kredi Bankasının Türk Sporuna Hizmeti,” *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, no. 37, August 6, 1956; “Sedef Reklam İlan Eder,” *Akşam*, October 1, 1958; *Milliyet*, June 9, 1959.
- 83 Necdet Erdem. “Futbol Maçı ve Banka Reklamı,” *Akşam*, March 3, 1955.
- 84 *Milliyet*, May 17, 1963.

Kemal via the Free Republic Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which was the second attempt to establish an opposition party with a strong liberal approach during the single party government. While İlmen continued his political career by establishing his own party called the Party of Land, Property and Free Enterprise (*Toprak, Emlak ve Serbest Teşebbüs Partisi*), his son Atıf founded a football club bearing the name of their factory. According to Atıf İlmen's son, the Adalet Football Club was a project to "advertise of Adalet blankets." Since the factory did not receive aid from the Marshall Plan and fell behind new, modern factories, production extensively remained dependent on blankets. İlmen decided to invest in a football team thinking that if the club succeeded in getting promoted to the first division, it would be a huge advertisement for the factory.⁸⁵

For this purpose, the businessman made a considerable investment in his club by drafting the famous football manager Fahri Somer as the general secretary and by transferring in talented players, providing them opportunities for subsistence and employment even before the official recognition of professionalism. Lefter recounted in his memoirs that Adalet offered Fenerbahçe players 8 thousand Turkish lire in cash, 200 lire monthly, and tax-free income from two blanket machines.⁸⁶ Although Lefter chose to go for Fiorentina that same season, top players of the time such as Erol Keskin, Halil Özyazıcı, Selahattin Torkal, Samim Var, and Hilmi Ardağ accepted Adalet's offer. Meanwhile, Adalet carried out Turkey's first foreign professional player transfer and invited Malmö FF, the most successful club in Sweden, for a friendly match in Istanbul, increasing the club's popularity. However, since missing a strong fan support such as those of İstanbul's deep-rooted clubs led by the Big Three, the club could not manage to survive. Although Adalet's team was wiped from the stage of history parallel with the fate of its factory in the 1960s, Gökaçtı stated that the club took a significant place in Turkish football history as "an early example of the direct interest of the private sector in football"⁸⁷

85 Sevecen Tunç, "Profesyonelliğin Erken Çağında Sıradışı Bir Fabrika Takımı: Adalet (1945-1965)," *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 17 (2014): 166.

86 Haluk Hergün, *Lefter, Futbolun Ordinaryüsü* (İstanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2012), 90.

87 Gökaçtı, *'Bizim İçin Oyna,'* 186.

5.2.1 *Spor-Toto: The Betting Company*

The establishment of a public betting company emerged in sporting circles after the Second World War when the move to open professionalism was increasingly debated. The betting company was thought of as a “great rescuer” of Turkish sport that would help develop a financially self-sufficient system for Turkish sports and thus to diminish the role of state.⁸⁸ Operations regarding the issue started under the leadership of Vildan Aşır Savaşır, the head of the GDPE, with the translation of Swedish betting legislation.⁸⁹ However, for various reasons, it took a decade to build consensus on the issue and pass a law. According to Yenil, the 37-year time until Spor-Toto was launched in 1960 was a great waste that resulted in the rise of a gap between Turkey and other big states. Spor-Toto proved to be the biggest financial resource for Turkish sports.⁹⁰

During the 1950s, the sports press regularly organized forecasting contests that attracted considerable public interest. Some entrepreneurs aspiring to benefit from this potential began to organize private contests.⁹¹ But the General Prosecutor quickly acted to stop these individual entrepreneurs from doing so.⁹² After all, the right and responsibility to arrange mutual betting at football games should rest with this directorate “in order to be spent on issues beneficial to Turkish sports.”⁹³ Mutual betting was necessary for clubs to survive and for sports facilities to be built, according to GDPE Istanbul Regional Director Sait Selahattin Cihanoğlu.⁹⁴ Stories that the GDPE would start mutual betting at football matches started to show up in the press in the mid-

88 Ulvi Yenil, *Bir Forum Dolayısıyla Türk Sporunun Dünü Bugünü ve Yarını* (BTGM Yayını, 1969), 11.

89 “Tarihçe,” *Spor Toto Official Website*, <http://www.sportoto.gov.tr/sayfa/106/tarihce> (accessed February 20, 2017).

90 Yenil, *Bir Forum Dolayısıyla*, 11.

91 “Bahsi Müşterek,” *Yeni Özfenerbahçe*, no. 37, August 6, 1956.

92 “Kavrakoglu’nun Usuoğlu’na Cevabı,” *Yeni Özfenerbahçe*, no. 37, August 6, 1956.

93 “Futbol Müsabakalarında Müşterek Bahisler Tertibi Hakkında Kanun,” *Official Gazette of Turkish Republic*, no: 10201, Date of publication: May 9, 1959, Date of acceptance: April 29, 1959.

94 “Örnek Toto-Calcio Oluyor,” *Milliyet*, June 18, 1958.

1950s. Although it was reported in the summer of 1956 that mutual betting would be held in the next season, the project would be realized only in 1959.⁹⁵

A bill recorded in 1958 signed by Adnan Menderes to the Supreme Directorate of the Grand National Assembly stated that regulating the bets of spectators among themselves was required to make them useful to Turkish sports. As indicated in the bill, it was essential to bring betting games, which were a huge source of income in many advanced nations of Europe, to Turkey to build and develop sports facilities in the country. The 100 thousand capacity stadium would also be financed in this manner.⁹⁶ The model cited as an example since the project was first brought to the agenda was that of Italy's Toto-Calcio. Federation president Apak spoke with the president of Italian Football Federation regarding a project in Stockholm and received a commitment of support and aid.⁹⁷ With the support of foreign experts, a mutual betting project was set up along lines of the Italian model, and the respective law bill was submitted to the Grand National Assembly. In parliament, the draft law met with greater opposition than expected not only from opposition party deputies but also from the Democrat Party. First of all, opponents were frustrated with the use of the term 'betting' in the draft law. Since they associated betting with gambling, they were concerned about the morality of the youth and society as a whole. On the other hand, Hasan Polat, a Democrat Party deputy and former president of the TFF, claimed that they could forbid the participation of youth in mutual betting by establishing an age limit, like in Britain. With reference to Western examples, he emphasized that mutual betting was necessary for the development of Turkish sport:

Let us take Europe as an example: Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Germany, and Austria have been implementing sports betting for years and this has allowed the construction

95 "Önümüzdeki Sezon Tertiplenecek Futbol Maçlarında Bahsi Müşterek," *Milliyet*, July 31, 1956.

96 T.C. Başvekalet Kanunlar ve Kararlar Tetkik Dairesi, no: 71-812/3369 "Futbol Müsabakalarında müşterek bahisler tertibi hakkında kanun layihası ve maarif adliye ve bütçe encümenleri mazbataları (1/282)," Devre 11, içtima 2, no.219, December 19, 1958.

97 "Futbolda Bahsi Müştereki Doğru," *Milliyet*, April 24, 1956.

of marvelous sports facilities in these countries. The annual aid provided by the Law of Physical Education in our country for sports facilities is scant. The aid coming through treasury, local administrations, and contest turnovers is around 700-800 thousand lire. Given that this is the case, only mutual betting can make Turkey-wide improvement of sports possible.⁹⁸

As a result of the intense efforts of the Democrats, the draft law on mutual betting - with its new name Spor-Toto - was eventually accepted on 29 April 1959. It was only put into service on a nationwide scale in March 1960 due to postponement resulting from the fixation of dealers. The distribution of the income derived from Toto was carried out as follows: Half of the total revenue was to be given to the GDPE for the financing of stadium and sport facilities and the second half was to be distributed among the winners, there was no share for the football clubs. However, in March 1961, the clubs participating in the National Professional League convinced the government that they should receive shares by threatening to withdraw from the Spor-Toto organization.⁹⁹

The huge turnout for Spor-Toto reminded politicians of their long-standing dream of a 100-thousand-capacity stadium. Rumors appeared in pro-government newspapers that American companies would undertake the construction of the stadium in return for a large share of the Spor-Toto revenues. In ensuing years, Spor-Toto income was used for the construction, renovation, seeding, and lighting of city stadiums in Anatolia.¹⁰⁰ Between the years 1963 and 1967, "huge, expensive facilities" constituted nearly 80 percent of the GDPE's total expenses.¹⁰¹ This rapid process of infrastructural operations in the first half of the 1960s provided the basis for the diffusion of professional football and the nationalization of professional leagues.

98 "Müşterek Bahis Sporda Reformun Şartıdır," *Milliyet*, January 20, 1959. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

99 "Toto'dan Çekilme Kararında," *Milliyet*, February 8, 1961.

100 Toklucu, "100 Binlik Stat," 121-22.

101 Yiğit Akın, "Ana Hatları ile," 81.

§ 5.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter demonstrated the changing political economy of Turkish football in its early professional era. In Turkish sports historiography, football is frequently considered a vehicle for political activity in the same way it is in other parts of the world. While most researchers refer the presence of political patronage in football since the game's early development, they tend to ignore the evolution of the interplay between the game and politics, as a result of changing dynamics in both.

The first section of this chapter argues that the post-World War II years witnessed controversial, complex, and elusive intersections of football and politics. Although state intervention had previously asserted itself in various forms such as legal regulation, financial support, and provision of facilities and resources, populism-driven expressions of political interest in the game appeared under Democrat Party rule. The Democrats were delighted with the increase in football spectatorship which had been despised by policy makers in the single regime and accordingly did not hesitate to use it for social and political mobilization.

The tendency for politicians to become directors and chairmen of local clubs as well as to frequent matches increased in those years. After the urban transformation and given population growth, especially in Istanbul, migrants constituted not only the street force of the Democrats but also the football spectators filling Mithatpaşa Stadium. Welcoming and farewell ceremonies at airports for both politicians and football teams began to be organized. In time, this kind of ceremony and celebration became a public ritual in which the sentiments of nationalism, populism, and masculinity were demonstrated.

Moreover, the interplay between football and politics was frequently reflected in press reports about the visits of football teams and club directors to official authorities to submit their demands. As the chapter emphasized, this addresses the reciprocal character of the aforementioned relationship. Like in Latin American countries, football in Turkey supported politics in terms of discourse, organization network, and base support base after the transition to competitive politics. It also enjoyed state-assisted professionalization, in the absence of strong business dynamics, under the tutelage of politicians.

On the flip side of the coin, in line with the boom in the popularity of football, new commercial actors appeared seeking to penetrate the game with sport-related advertising and marketing strategies. However, as the second section of this chapter asserts, this commercialization was tardy given the absence of a business logic. Since the budget of sports clubs remained largely dependent on gate revenues as well as overt and covert state backing, the gap between the most popular clubs of Istanbul and ‘the rest’ further increased over time.

Football Boom: Actors, Structures, and Processes

In football's triumphal march towards becoming Turkey's most popular, commercialized sport, the 1950s constituted a watershed with crucial changes to all components that made football a people's game. This chapter unearths the changes to both the production and consumption of football by focusing on the key actors including football players, spectators, and the media. The main argument is that the consumption of football, both direct and indirect, expanded during those years. In line with its increasing popularity, the game went beyond the match-day experience and became an important element in the daily structuring of many people's lives.¹ It no longer affected only football fans and spectators, but the lives of all members of society. It took up more space in the press, commanded time on radio and served as the focal point of conversations.² According to Wann et al., the increasing exposure to football through different channels implies the game's indirect consumption.³ However, as Crawford asserts, this is a missing element in sports history since researchers focus predominantly on those who regularly attend live sporting

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- 1 Chris Stone, "The Role of Football in Everyday Life," *Soccer and Society* 8, no. 2–3 (2007): 169–84, doi:10.1080/14660970701224319.
 - 2 Daniel L. Wann et al., *Sport Fans: The Psychology and Social Impact of Spectators* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 17.
 - 3 Ibid., 95.

events and overlook how football is experienced and consumed in people's everyday lives away from the live venues.⁴

This chapter is composed of three main parts. The first sheds light on the production side of football, by analyzing the transformation of the player after the advent of professionalism. It focuses not only on the player's labor relations and his position in the football community, but also on his self-perception and public perception on which the tensions in the transition from amateurism to professionalism were reflected.

The second part offers a fresh perspective on direct consumption of the game by focusing on the spectator who the consumer of the spectacle offered by the player is. In one of his seminal pieces, Holt remarks that sports historians should think about "the loyalties of the crowds that gathered to watch professional football and the relation between these feelings and the broader transformation of urban life."⁵ Considering Holt's perspective, this section examines the motivations and desires of the football spectators by taking part in football either in or outside the stadium.

The last part deals with the indirect consumption of professional football in its early period and focuses on mass media sources (radio, television, print media) and cinema through which football penetrated into the ordinary lives of people. The development of the mass media in the aftermath of the war significantly increased the opportunities for audiences to connect the spectacular with everyday life. Football became not just something taking place at a specific location and time, but something that lived on in people's imaginations and conversations through social networks, friendships, mass media, and use of consumer goods - in their very identity.⁶

4 Crawford, *Consuming Sport*, 105-107.

5 Holt, "Working Class Football and the City," 6.

6 Crawford, *Consuming Sport*, 106.

§ 6.1 The Professional Football Player

Giulianotti describes the early phase of professional football after the transition from amateurism as “the early modernity of paid players.”⁷ Concerning the football player, there were two crucial changes in this early modern period: the emergence of an occupational subculture dependent on the industrial, social, economic, and cultural commonalities among players and the shift in their class composition.⁸

Since legalization of professional football offered players a route towards social recognition, money, and prestige, more young lower classes boys rushed to the game in search of life-changing opportunities that were denied in higher education, politics, and commerce. In line with this, there was a decreasing trend in the number of upper-class players. According to Şevket Rado, university students and children of “well-endowed families” were no longer interested in playing football. Rather, they preferred to watch the game from the grandstands of Mithatpaşa Stadium.⁹

The shift in the class composition of football players following the recognition of professionalism became easy to notice via the rise of Anatolian-born players. In new, constantly expanding urban communities, there was a new generation of players whose families had migrated from the countryside. Furthermore, as football came to be a profession or at least a money-making occupation in the eyes of the public after the advent of professionalism, playing football itself became a reason for young players to migrate. Big clubs for the first time initiated scouting visits to Anatolian cities to recruit talented players.¹⁰ Moreover, the Turkish National Amateur Football Championship came to function as an invaluable platform on which amateur players from Anatolia were staged and monitored by old hand football authorities. In addition to İzmir and Ankara, the cities having outstanding performances in this tournament - such as Adana, İzmit, Balıkesir, Samsun, Trabzon, and Eskişehir - were important wellsprings of footballers for Istanbul teams. Examples of the first

7 Giulianotti, *Football*, 107.

8 Giulianotti, *Football*, 107-109.

9 Şevket Rado, “Komisyoncu Gibi Sporcu,” *Akşam*, June 10, 1957

10 “Beşiktaşlı Üç İdareci Anadolu’da Oyuncu Arıyor,” *Akşam*, June 18, 1957.

football heroes of the early professional era include Beşiktaş's Nazmi Bilge from Trabzon and Mustafa Ertan from Adana, Fenerbahçe's Basri Dirimlili from Eskişehir and Mustafa Güven from Bursa, and Galatasaray's Nuri Asan and Cengiz Özyalçın who were both from Samsun.

Looking at the birthplaces of footballers on the national team provides an idea concerning the changing backgrounds of the players. While fifteen out of the nineteen players on the roster of the Turkey national football team for the 1936 World Cup were from Istanbul, for the 1954 World Cup only half of the twenty-eight players were from Istanbul. Meanwhile, the fact that the careers of these players born in various provinces such as Edirne, Mersin, Ankara, Tekirdağ, Bandırma, Silistre, Aydın, and Manisa were mostly maintained in İstanbul proves that Istanbul was the constantly increasing center of attraction for football.

While the older generation of players mostly shared a privileged, elite background and learned to play football in educational institutions with an amateur ethos, new generation of football players mostly having working-class background would predominantly learn to play in the streets and on the wastelands at the edges of neighborhoods. These different 'classrooms' inevitably lead to different value systems on and off the field. Nevertheless, this change did not mean that the old educational bonds of football were completely broken. Vefa High School continued to function as a grassroots organization of sorts for the Vefa Club. Galatasaray High School did the same for the Galatasaray Club, as did Kabataş Boys High School for Beşiktaş, Istanbul Boys High School for İstanbulspor. The private Boğaziçi College, where renowned football personality of the period Sabri Kiraz taught physical education, opened the door for young footballers. Leading football players of the time such as Ali İhsan Karayığit, Samim Emek, and Şükrü Ersoy were among those coming out of these schools.¹¹

For a young, talented player, entry into professional football was largely dependent on being noticed by a club director while playing in the streets or for school teams. Almost every district and neighborhood in Istanbul had its

11 Fethi Aytuna, "Samim Emek - İstanbul Futbolunun Emektarı," *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published February 9, 2017. <https://dinyakos.com/2017/02/09/samim-emek-istanbul-futbolunun-emektari/> (accessed March 1, 2019).

own local club bearing the name of the locality, and the players were mostly those born or at least who had grown up in that district. Despite the general, downward trend among players to commit to one club, most of amateur players remained embedded in their immediate communities, at least until being noticed by a professional football team.

Wealthier clubs drafted the best players, and the rest, due to limited budgets, only afforded players unwanted by the rich ones. After a player succeeded in signing as a contracted professional for a club, he could build a career depending on a combination of factors such as his own developing prowess and the team's success as well as his relations with his employers. In the football world of the 1950s, mobility among professional teams was high and it was not easy for a football player to start at the top and remain there throughout his playing career. There were frequent instances of players entering the game by joining a first division club but moving downwards through the ranks because they could not fulfil their early promise due to an injuries or other adverse circumstances. Although the vast majority of professionals spent their careers without gaining wide recognition, there were also players such as Metin Oktay, Basri Dirimlili, Kadri Aytaç, and Ergun Öztuna began at relatively low levels, had their abilities recognized, and then moved upwards into higher divisions to become the first football heroes of the professional era.

In its early period, professional football was a disturbingly one-sided affair. The employment relationship between a professional player and a football club paralleled those in the early professional era of British football in the late nineteenth century. In this period of traditional labor relations, professional footballers had little control over their labor. They were tied to their club, worked within the confines of a maximum wage, and had few prospects upon retirement.¹² Turkish professional footballers in their "early modernity" were also deprived of even basic rights until 1958 when professional players were given with the right to one month of paid leave as well as life and casualty insurance.¹³ In 1957, a professional player turned down the contract imposed by his

12 Vamplew, *Pay Up*, 115-118.

13 "Futbolcuya Maaşlı İzin Tanındı," *Akşam*, April 31, 1958.

club claiming that it “seized his freedom of life.”¹⁴ The depiction of the professional player as a commodity of his club was a symptom of the mentality concerning labor relations in Turkish football.¹⁵ Until the early 1960s, commercial terms such as import, export, and trade were frequently used in the press with respect to transfers. Adil Giray suggested avoiding from the use of the verb ‘to sell,’ which evoked slavery and human trafficking by replacing it with ‘to transfer.’¹⁶

For a professional player, injury was a major problem that could lead to an unexpected, early termination of a football career. For this reason, a parallel career was preferred. Because it was not a very demanding occupation compared to the training, camping, and tours of contemporary football, professional football allowed players to maintain another occupation in terms of time and labor. “Looking ahead while playing football,” most professional footballers including top players such as Recep Adanır, Hilmi Kiremitçi, and Basri Dirimlili engaged in other occupational activities along with their football careers. Top players went into business in textiles, automobiles, and manufacturing - the most profitable industries of the time.¹⁷ The majority of players extended their involvement with the game through second careers in management, coaching, and scouting while players such as Can Bartu from Istanbul and Önder Sapanlı from Izmir moved into football-related areas such as sports journalism.

In fact, the weakness of professional players vis-à-vis their clubs in their employment relations was a general problem in world football in those years. In the forties and fifties, Uruguay and Argentina, for example, saw industrial strikes in the football industry in which professional players collectively withdrew their labor to strengthen their bargaining power against club directors.

14 “Günay Beşiktaş’la Dün Anlaşamadı,” *Akşam*, May 15, 1957.

15 “Galatasaray Dün Seri Transferlere Başladı,” *Akşam*, June 14, 1957; “Pazar İlahları,” *Akşam*, December 22, 1954.

16 Adil Giray. “Satışa Çıkarılan Oyuncu Yerine Transfer Edilen Futbolcu Diyelim,” *Akşam*, June 26, 1956; “Kadri Aytac Basın Toplantısı Yapacak,” *Akşam*, July 15, 1958.

17 Sevecen Tunç, “Hayat’ın Yıldızları: 1950’lerin Türkiye’sinde Tüketim Kültürü, Futbol ve Şöhret,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 130 (2014): 147-148.

However, there was no class consciousness among players in Turkey, and the income gap between elite and average professionals created an obstacle to collective action.¹⁸ Two associations, the Footballers Association and the Sportsmen's Protection Society, were unsuccessful attempts to protect the rights of football players.¹⁹ The first football player's union, founded only in 1965, was, according to Turgay Şeren, unable to go beyond being a yellow union – that is the one collaborating with the employer.²⁰

Galatasaray's player Necmi Erdoğan indicated in a commentary written in 1954 that many professional footballers could barely live on the income they received. Striking rhetorical questions he asked of his colleagues demonstrated that players had neither bargaining power nor job security.

Have you ever read contracts you signed with the club? Have you ever considered what you can do against the endless authorities of your elder administrators? Did you ever read that your advancing age is the enemy of the sport you are practicing?²¹

In other respects, inflation that climbed to 28.5 percent in 1959 put many players with salaries fixed by their contracts in a difficult position. A group of players demanding pay raises stated the need for union activity as follows:

We are getting along with a limited income in Istanbul, the most expensive city of Turkey. We are meeting certain needs through the premium of games won. If we had a union, it would protect our rights and

18 Necmi Erdoğan, "Futbolcu Kardeşler Nereye," *Akşam*, December 10, 1954.

19 "Sporcuları Koruma Derneği Ne İş Yapar," *Akşam*, January 25, 1955; "Futbolcular Bir Cemiyet Kuruyor," *Akşam*, April 3, 1958; "Futbol-İş Sendikası Kuruluyor," *Milliyet*, July 26, 1964.

20 Sevecen Tunç, "Türk Futbolunda Sendikalaşma ve İngiltere Örneği," in *Sınıftan Sınıfa: Fabrika Dışında Çalışma Manzaraları*, ed. Ayşe Buğra (Istanbul: İletişim, 2010), 93.

21 "Kulüp ile aranızdaki mukaveleleri hiç okudunuz mu? İdareci olarak başınızda bulunan aüabeylerinizin naütenahi salahiyetlerine karşı sizin neyiniz var hiç düşündünüz mü? İlerleyen yaşınızın yaptığınız sporun düşmanı olduğunu hiç okudunuz mu? ... Büyük şampiyonların dahi sonunda sefaletle başbaşa kaldığını okudunuz mu?" Necmi Erdoğan, "Futbolcu Kardeşler Nereye," *Akşam*, December 10, 1954.

make our voice heard by related persons. Our contracts are fixed according to forex rates of several years ago. We want our situation to be noticed in this storm of price increases.²²

While most professionals scraped a living, elite players enjoyed astronomical fees and incentive premiums as well as salaries. The huge gulf in wages among players was an important problem for Turkish football in the early professional era. According to Orhan Menemencioğlu from *Akşam*, player fees rose steadily due to a shortage of qualified players. In fact, this was the vicious circle of Turkish professional football: instead of investing in youth teams and infrastructure and facility improvement, club directors used revenues for the transfer of top players by offering astronomical fees.²³ In this regard, the transfer of Kadri Aytaç deserves to be mentioned. Having played for both Galatasaray and national team, Aytaç was one of the best strikers on the market. Not only clubs in the domestic league such as Beyoğluspor, Vefa, and Fenerbahçe, but also from abroad such as French Nice and Italian Fiorentina had been eyeing the player since the mid-fifties. When he wanted to be sold from Galatasaray, his team captain and close friend, Turgay Şeren, gave a long speech constructed around the family values of Galatasaray, eventually convincing the striker to “prefer his own club to money.”²⁴ Nevertheless, after his contract as expired at the end of the season, Kadri preferred money and signed a two-year contract with Karagömrük FC in return for 57,500 Turkish lire. It was “the highest salary paid to a professional football player up to then in Turkish history.”²⁵

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- 22 “İstanbul gibi Türkiye’nin en pahalı bir şehrinde muayyen bir para ile yaşıyoruz. Birtakım ihtiyaçlarımızı ancak galibiyet primleriyle karşılayabilmekteyiz. Bir sendikamız olsaydı bizim hakkımız korur, sesimizi alakalı şahıslara duyururdu. Mukavelelerimiz bir, iki hatta üç sene önceki rayice göre tesbit edilmiştir. Bu zam fırtınasında durumumuzun nazarı dikkate alınmasını istiyoruz.” “Futbolcular Zam İstiyor,” *Milliyet*, March 4, 1959.
- 23 Orhan Menemencioğlu. “Futbolda Profesyonelliğin Kabulü ile,” *Akşam*, July 11, 1956.
- 24 *Milliyet*, April 14, 1955; July 17, 1956; “Mehmet Ali ile Şirzat Değiştirilemedi,” *Akşam*, July 10, 1956.
- 25 *Milliyet*, July 7, 1958.

Although there were certain rules and regulations which were guaranteed by the Professionalism Bylaw, there were “à la Turca” methods used in negotiations between clubs and players.²⁶ “Player kidnappings” was the most interesting transfer method that persisted until the early 2000s. The “kidnapping story” of young, talented player Muammer Tokgöz at the end of the 1950-51 season is a good example of relations between footballers and clubs when professionalism was not yet accepted. The Istanbul police team Emniyet wanted to transfer Muammer, who had left Vefa at the end of the 1948-49 season, for the 1950-51 season. However, for playing for the workplace-based clubs, being an employee of an institution was obligatory. So, Muammer started to work as a policeman following his transfer to Emniyet. As he performed successfully that season with his new team and attracted the attention of other teams, he was invited by Galatasaray administrators to train with their team. However, one day after a training, he was kidnapped by a “well-dressed gentleman” who introduced himself as an administrator for Fenerbahçe. They boarded a boat at the Galatasaray bridge and started a cruise tour of the Bosphorus when the administrator said he would not let Muammer go until he signed with Fenerbahçe. Although he was supposed to become a Galatasaray player, Muammer Tokgöz’s new team meanwhile became Fenerbahçe.²⁷

The news of player kidnappings increased after the launch of professional leagues. The first well-known incident of the period was Fenerbahçe’s goalkeeper Selahattin Ünlü in 1953. Although he decided to renew his contract with Fenerbahçe, Selahattin also orally accepted an attractive offer of 15,000 lire from Vefa. The Vefa directors came to the notary when he was about to sign with Fenerbahçe. He was forcibly put into a car and taken away. After spending days as a hostage, Selahattin finally convinced the Vefa directors that he had changed his mind, and resigned with his former club Fenerbahçe for two more seasons.²⁸

One of the most distinct features of the early professional period was that amateur and professional, traditional and modern, old and new coexisted together. For instance, despite the growing influence of professionalism, football

26 Şazi Tezcan, “Transfer Başıbozukluğu,” *Akşam*, July 10, 1958.

27 Aytuna, “Muammer Tokgöz - Şenlikköy Çayırılarından Milli Takıma.”

28 “Fenerbahçeli Kaleci Vefa ile Mukavele İmzalarken Kaçırıldı,” *Milliyet*, July 6, 1955.

players remained embedded in their local communities - that is, the organic relations between the player and the community were maintained. Representing their locality to the outer world, both amateur and professional players turned into be civic ambassadors of their communities. Since a local player historically acted as an exemplar of the spirit and behavior of the community he represented, his collective and even individual success was ascribed to the whole community.²⁹

Since amateur clubs mostly assumed the role of training talented players, there later draft by a larger club was a source of civic pride. For instance, the members of Cihangir FC, a neighborhood team from Istanbul, were proud of footballers such as Vahap Özaltay, Muzaffer Tokaç, and Samim Var who were raised in their club and became well-known national players.³⁰ Similarly, Ahmet Berman, who was born in Karagümrük, raised on the neighborhood team, and later became a top player for Beşiktaş was a local hero for his community. However, he was excluded from his local community when he declined the offer of his home team and decided to play for Galatasaray, which had offered a higher salary. The residents of Karagümrük neighborhood interpreted his decision as a betrayal and even quit talking to him in the local coffeehouse.³¹

Ahmet's situation was significant in terms of showing that players were expected to demonstrate personal traits and patterns of behavior that had traditionally been expected more of amateurs than professionals. Most people continued to give credit to players who demonstrated the same loyalty that they themselves - as being fans - exhibited. In the eyes of long-serving players, loyalty should be awarded. Recep Adanır, who had the iconic nickname *Baba*, was one. Adanır said that he never got in touch with any other clubs because of his strong commitment to Beşiktaş. "Even the youngest football players were getting paid thousands of lire monthly and also tens of thousands of lire

29 Brown, Crabbe, and Mellor, "Introduction: Football and Community," 304.

30 "Cihangir Gençlik Kulübü: Interview with Rıdvan Yelekçi," *ÖzFenerbahçe*, no. 21, April 16, 1956.

31 "Anten," *Tercüman*, July 20, 1959.

in transfer fees,” he once complained, “I was not even paid enough to compare with them.”³²

Since the age of the “one-club man” was coming to an end, Adanır’s statement, as one journalist put it, reflected “the agony of a mentality that has almost become history.”³³ Players began to place their personal ambitions above the needs of any given club. Even Beşiktaş’s iconic Baba Recep, after spending nine seasons with his beloved club, signed with Kasımpaşa in 1959 and with Galatasaray the following year. Baba Recep remembers first wearing the Galatasaray jersey in a match against Beşiktaş as follows:

I played against Beşiktaş in the first match I wore the red-yellow jersey. I was called by the Beşiktaş stands before that match and indicated my loyalty towards the fans of black and white by placing my hand on my heart. When I was later called by the Galatasaray stands to salute them, I showed the fans of yellow and red my foot. This meant that I was at this club only for football, but I was attached to Beşiktaş with my heart. Fans of both teams gave me a standing ovation for this move.³⁴

The gradual erosion of traditional values such as club loyalty constituted one major source of tension in the early era of Turkish professional football. Even sport journalists expected players to “act spiritually amateur but in occasion logically professional.”³⁵ Incidents such as Kadri Aytaç’s desertion from Galatasaray, Turgay Şeren’s negotiations with Fenerbahçe, and Ahmet Berman’s preference for Galatasaray over his neighborhood team were traumatic for the football public. Players who switched clubs after being trained in one club

32 “Daha ağzı süt kokan çocuklara binlerce lira aylık ve on binlerce lira transfer bedeli ödenirken bana onlarla mukayese edilemeyecek derecede az para veriliyor.” Orhan Koloğlu. “Sonuncusu,” *Akşam*, July 17, 1958.

33 Ibid.

34 “Gol Krallığım Elimden Alındı.” *Hürriyet*, published January 12, 2011. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gol-kralligim-elimden-alindi-16744105> (accessed May 8, 2017). For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

35 *Akşam*, October 23, 1956.

throughout their early career were deemed to have “left their father's home.”³⁶ As in France, this was the consequence of the fact that football in Turkey evolved around amateurism and family values. The first sports clubs established in the country had names associated with the home such as *yurt* and *ocak*. Clubs were families: footballers were children with club presidents as fathers. When the Fenerbahçe team at the airport was flying to Geneva for a friendly game, as Mustafa Güven, a young football player nicknamed as Mikro Mustafa, asked club president and former deputy of the Grand National Assembly from the Democrat Party, Agah Erozan, about the match bonus: “Dad, two thousand is in the pocket if we win, isn't it?”³⁷

In the contemporary cultural discourse of Turkish football fans, this period constitutes a crucial time full of anecdotes and myths of football players' loyalty to their clubs, which is defined either as ‘the love for the jersey’ or ‘the amateur spirit.’ The myths of the loyalty of Fenerbahçe's Lefter Küçükandonyadis, Galatasaray's Metin Oktay, and Beşiktaş's Recep Adanır, who were strongly identified with their clubs, were produced retrospectively. Even players, themselves, of the early professional era see themselves as the last representatives of the old virtues of amateurism such as club loyalty and commitment. Lefter, on a television program broadcast years after ending his football career, stated that despite the offers of other clubs for expensive deals he did not want to leave Fenerbahçe. He mentioned that his love for the club president Müslim Bağcılar, whom he called “my father, my elder brother,” swayed his decision. However, while he was playing in Paris in 1953, he gave an interview in which he confessed that he would return to Turkey and play at Beşiktaş with his close friend Şükrü Gülesin in the ensuing season. He added that as Fenerbahçe's legendary player, his decision would not offend anyone, as he was a professional player.³⁸

Given confusion of values, some journalists classified the issue as a matter of occupational ethics. As Metin Mete from *Akşam* formulated: “Can we still

36 Firuzan Tekil, “Amatör Hüviyeti Başka Küfranı Nimet Başkadır,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 43, July 14-19, 1947.

37 “Klüpler,” *Akis*, no. 282 (December 23, 1959): 34.

38 Metin Mete, “Profesyonel Futbolcudan Renk Sadakati İstenebilir mi,” *Akşam*, August 2, 1953.

ask for color loyalty from a professional football player?”³⁹ It was apparent that although the professional status of the football player was officially recognized, public consent required more time.

Professionalism is to make sports an occupation... If it is so, [the athlete] looks for opportunities to change clubs whenever there is more money. This leads to the disappearance of many good traits that, the sporting public expects such as togetherness, living together, thriving together, commitment to tradition, and loyalty to the club in which you were raised.⁴⁰

There were now some obligations and challenges for the football community that clashed with family values. Giulianotti argues that with the advent of professionalism, player-club relations acquired a new dimension that concerned - to use Bourdieu's and Foucault's terms - 'subjugation' and 'discipline.'⁴¹ The body of the player was subject to new forms of discipline. For instance, a player's diet and fitness turned into be objects of monitoring and regulation. However, in contrast with those of today, this sort of practices were not rigid at all. For instance, it was reported that Alderico Segala, the Levantine football player for Emniyet, had a heart attack during a game against Galatasaray because he had eaten too many Easter eggs before the game.⁴² The wealthier clubs were more professional with respect to such issues. They initiated training camps for the first time in Turkish football, removing players from family homes and placing them in training camps in Büyükada, Moda, Kadıköy, and Yeşilköy before the beginning of the new season or important games. Compared to the West, neither the norms and regulations that a professional player should obey nor disciplinary measures were well-established in Turkish football. While a footballer in the West was obliged to to train five days a week and

39 Ibid.

40 Dr. Sırrı Alıçlı, "Sporda Profesyonellik," *Akşam*, November 27, 1953. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

41 Giulianotti, *Football*, 108-109.

42 Fethi Aytuna, "Aldo - Son Golünü Hayata Attı." *Dinyakos: Turkish Sports History*, Published April 28, 2017. <https://dinyakos.com/2017/04/28/aldo-son-golunu-hayata-atti/> (accessed February 20, 2019).

could take leave only one day after the match day, Turkish professionals rarely trained more than three days a week. Especially for top professionals, skipping training and escaping from camps were common patterns. Players' addictions to night life was also considered a negative influence on their field performance. An incident involving Şükrü Gülesin while he was playing for Fiorentina Football Club was given as an example in a press report to show how meticulously professionalism was implemented in Italy. In Fiorentina, Şükrü went to a local pub where he was caught by a club director when a Fiorentina supporter informed on him. Despite being at his best in those days, Şükrü was punished with a one-month ban from playing and exclusion from premiums.⁴³

During the period in question, football players attracted more attention from the people as well as media. Sport coverage, for the first time, began to include information about the private, domestic lives of football players. In the 1950s, that football players - as popular figures in society - were integrated into the growing celebrity culture with their dress codes, consumption practices, and personal lifestyles.⁴⁴

The media which played a key role in transforming the local "terrace heroes"⁴⁵ of the past into the football stars, at the same time, promoted a negative image of the player by depicting them as the spoiled children of the new world of football. Some claimed that due to legal and administrative shortfalls in the Professionalism Bylaw, neither club directors nor managers could clamp down on top players of the era.⁴⁶ Şazi Tezcan addressed the problem of turning young football players into celebrities:

Sports writers dignify inexperienced boys who have no grasp of what life is so much that after they play well in a few matches and once they win the applause of club fans, ... these players immediately become celebrity footballers. The daily life of this child star - what he eats,

43 Şazi Tezcan "Futbolumuz ve Profesyonellik," *Akşam*, April 12, 1953.

44 Tunç, "Hayat'ın Yıldızları," 144-147.

45 Graham Kelly, *Terrace Heroes: The Life and Times of the 1930s Professional Player* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2005).

46 "Spor Tarihinde Görülmemiş Üzücü Hadiseler," *Akşam*, April 11, 1956. "Bu ne şımarıklık!," *Milliyet*, October 1, 1953.

drinks, loves - is announced in pages of interviews. Then this kid participates in our society as a spoiled brat with the opinion: 'I was a big shot and did not know it'.⁴⁷

Football stars who had been expected to be role models for younger generations were appearing in the newspapers as spoiled Western wannabes, “with their Italian outfit, last model automobiles and love affairs like Casanova.”⁴⁸ These “fake stars,” according to Gündüz Kılıç, a former player, football author, and manager, were “capricious, coddled, had influence over club directors, and received more than what was written on their official agreements because of their impositions so long as they were able to perform well and remain popular.”⁴⁹ Indeed, the stereotypical image of the football player as a “playboy” began to develop during those years.

The evidence suggests that the terrace power, with rising wants and expectations, negatively influenced players’ styles of play and patterns of behavior on the field. Garan asserted that most players, deprived of occupational ethics, exhibited populist behaviors such as objecting to referees, exaggerating even minor injuries, and using overwhelming body language especially to target the stands. These terrace heroes were the product of the new football order. In the new order, the wants of the spectators also became so crucial that they could terminate a football player’s career. Beşiktaş’s Coşkun Taş, who had been transferred from an amateur club in Aydın, explained why he quit football saying that the spectators no longer wanted to see him on the field.⁵⁰ On the flip side, it was these same spectators who glorified Metin Oktay and Lefter Küçükandonyadis and made them the most popular players of their time.

If we think of spectators as customers and the match as the essential product being sold, the quality of the game would determine customers’ satisfaction. “Good football,” which was defined as a match in which “the require-

47 Şazi Tezcan, “Soysuzlaşan Futbolumuz ve Şımarık Futbolcu,” *Akşam*, January 21, 1955. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

48 “Sahte Yıldızlar,” *Milliyet*, September 20, 1961.

49 “Sahte Yıldızlar,” *Milliyet*, September 20, 1961.

50 *Milliyet*, January 1, 1959.

ments of modern football” were fulfilled, was the only way to satisfy the expectations and to increase the football audience.⁵¹ For spectators, victory was more important than the aesthetic quality of the game. It is not only related to increasing competitive nature of football as a professional and commercial sport but also the growing significance of the game as an identity-marker in urban culture. In Elliot’s words, the goddess of Turkish football in the fifties was “not Beauty but Victory, a jealous goddess who demands an absolute homage.”⁵² The aesthetic value of the game became a matter of appreciation so as long as it contributed to victory. This transition from a *purist* to a *partisan* position among spectators reshaped the way football was played. Tarık Buğra, a famous journalist-novelist, explained this change as follows:

As with everything else, the idea of the classy football player also changed. I thought about the Fenerbahçe player Alaeddin, who was one of the present-day stadium gods, when I was watching a major game: I knew him to dribble the ball for several minutes within just a few square meters. Players facing him had their brains distorted and players filling Taksim stadium, which is now lost to history, – converted from the courtyard of a military barracks - used to eat it up. Alaeddin was a classy footballer. But if a second version of him came around, his fate would be to be booed, whistled at, and kicked off the team after a couple of tries. ... The concept of football has now changed: Now we have long passes, not holding onto the ball, and shots from every position near the goal line. In short, it is goals that the stands want. Lots of goals.⁵³

51 “Seyircinin Modern Futboldan Beklediği,” *Beşiktaş Sport Newspaper*, November 12, 1951.

52 R.K Elliot, “Aesthetics and Sport,” in *Readings in the Aesthetics of Sport*, ed. H. H. Whiting and D. Masterson (London: Lepus, 1974), 111.

53 Tarık Buğra, “Klas Futbolcu,” *Milliyet*, December 6, 1952. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

Goals were indeed the focal point of professional football through which spectators crowned their “collective effervescence.”⁵⁴ Even the quality of foreign teams was measured through the number of goals they scored. If spectators did not see goals in the first friendly game of a foreign team invited to Istanbul, they would not come to the other games of that team. This sometimes resulted in financial losses on behalf of clubs that invited that foreign team. To prevent this, Nuri Bosut once proposed paying premium to players on foreign teams for each goal they scored.⁵⁵ Although there is no evidence that this proposal was implemented, the idea of a monetary incentive for an opposing team to score is a striking example that explains the efforts of football authorities’ efforts to please spectators. In line with the increasing popularity of scoring, bonus payments became a widespread practice in the relationship between the club directors and players in the fifties. The public expectations were based on goals which could be scored as long as the football player had the incentive. In the movie *Aşk Yarışı* (Love race) released in 1962, when journalists tell the football player Fikret that “fans expect three goals from you,” he responds: “It might even be four if the club administrators loosen their purse strings.” Then an administrator joins the conversation and proposes the player an additional bonus so long as he keeps his promise.

6.1.1 A Football Fiction: *Gol Kralı*

In order to explain the nature of changes taking place in Turkish football, it is helpful to analyze Aziz Nesin’s well-known novel, *Gol Kralı*, (Goal king, a title earned by the top goal scorers in Turkish football) which was first published in second half of the fifties when professional football was at the height of its popularity. Nesin depicted a satirical social panorama of the period through

54 Emile Durkheim coined the term “collective effervescence” to indicate how communal gatherings intensify, electrify, and enlarge religious experience. Bringing people together in close physical proximity generates a kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. See Tim Olaveson, “Collective Effervescence and Communitas: Processual Models of Ritual and Society in Emile Durkheim and Victor Turner,” *Dialectical Anthropology* 26, no. 2 (June, 2001): 88-124. doi:10.1023/A:1020447706406.

55 Nuri Bosut, “İngiliz Oyunculara Gol Başına Prim Verelim,” *Milliyet*, May 5, 1955.

football in his novel published in 1957 at the start of Democrat Party's third and last term as unrest increased, the economy was souring, political polarization was reaching a summit and the government was establishing an increasingly authoritarian order. One of the most famous novels of the author, it was reprinted several times, translated into many languages, staged in theater and in a television theater play, and became a cinema film.⁵⁶

Nesin approached football from the perspective of a 'social mirror' in his novel *Gol Kralı*. Certain fundamental issues during the early period of professional football were used to represent social corruption, which was the dominant concern of the times. According to the author, football even surpassed politics as an area in which any person of any age or class could express him or herself without possessing any education or expertise:

If you ask a thousand people who Duvar Ahmet is, maybe one in a thousand would not know; the rest know him. You ask who a minister of the cabinet is, one out of a thousand may or may not know who he is...⁵⁷

In *Gol Kralı* moral and social concerns such as social corruption, erosion of moral values, and opportunism are criticized through the portrait of a football player. Football players' fondness for night life, spoiled behavior lack of vocational ethics, unjustified praise, and financial power are among the points criticized by the author. He would express this comedically in another article in which he found the term 'gol kralı' inappropriate during a time when the status of the striker status was rapidly rising:

There are no more kingdoms or lordships in our time: these are by-gones of history. Therefore, the term "gol kralı" is wrong. Since we are a republic, we should say "goal president of the year" or "goal prime minister of the year," rather than "goal king." When the king sits, he

56 Ali Eroğul, "Sait Hopsait'in Hikayesi, Gol Kralı," *Roman Kahramanları*, no. 18 (April-June 2014), 43.

57 "Bin kişiye Duvar Ahmet kimdir diye sorarsan, belki binde bir kişi bilmez, gerisi bilir. Oysa herhangi bir bakanı sorsan, belki binde bir kişi ya bilir; ya bilmez kim olduğunu..." Aziz Nesin, *Gol Kralı* (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1979), 159.

does not get up and the kingdom passes from father to son, but the goal prime minister is elected annually.⁵⁸

In Nesin's writings, he regards football as an opiate that pacifies the masses. In his words, Mithatpaşa Stadium is a "political mental hospital with forty thousand patients."⁵⁹ In his *Gol Kralı*, there are striking examples of the rapid monetization of football within its mass popularization. Examples include the issuing of bonuses to players by the club president in the case they win a match, a shoe company giving pairs of shoes to all the team players, and a restaurant providing dinners free of charge for a month – all while poor children are gambling on football games.

The success of a football team, victories in matches, being league champion, [and] winning games against foreign teams did not depend on players or coaches. Three things mattered: a sly administrator, having a senior person from the government become club president, [and] making rich people crazy about the club... When these three came together, administrators brought together the best of footballers and coaches and the team could ride high.⁶⁰

Gol Kralı is a significant literary work to understand the early professional phase of football in Turkey. While exaggerated, it also puts a finger on serious problems that would orient the future of Turkish football. While fiction, it is also an important resource for football history.

58 Artık zamanımızda krallık ve derebeylik kurumları yoktur, bunlar tarihe karışmıştır. Durum böyleyken "gol kralı" terimi de yanlışır. Madem ki cumhuriyetiz, öyleyse "yılın gol kralı" değil "yılın gol cumhurbaşkanı" ya da "yılın gol başbakanı" demeliyiz. Çünkü bilindiği gibi kral oturunca kalkmaz ve krallık babadan oğula kalıyorsa da gol başbakanı her yıl seçilmektedir. Aziz Nesin, *Sporcu Milletiz Vesselam: Spor Yazıları ve Öyküleri* (İstanbul: Nesin Yayınevi, 2013), 85.

59 Nesin, *Gol Kralı*, 43.

60 Ibid., 89-90. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

§ 6.2 Transformation of Spectatorship Towards a New Fan Culture

The evolution of spectatorship and its media representation was significant to the transformation of Turkish football in the post-war years. Not only did the football audience expand in terms of number during those years, but the act of spectating entered a new era as more expressive strategies of support were adopted. Not only the game's professionalization but also the inflow of migrant communities into football played a role in the rearrangement of the modes and intensity of fandom.

Football fandom in the post-war period functioned as “an integrative institution, helping to bring together in amity people from different classes and ethnic and religious groupings.”⁶¹ In Bakhtin's terms, the new, diversified fan rituals created a *carnivalesque* atmosphere in the stands where “the laws, prohibitions, and restrictions that determine the structure and order of ordinary, that is, non-carnival life are suspended.”⁶² In these moments of intense social unity, group ideals and identities are reaffirmed and social barriers are broken among group members.

It was in this era that the voice of fans began to be heard more by the press. The presence of large crowds in the stands were glorified even on newspapers' front pages, while such words as “tremendous” (*maḥşeri*) and “magnificent” (*muazzam*) were used to define spectators of unforeseen magnitudes. Contrary to the previous period when information about spectator experiences was scanned - except for incidents of fan violence -, their experiences began to be explicated in vivid narrations at the beginning of the match reports in the post-war period. More importantly, both the football press and authorities, for the first time, recognized the social agency of spectators by acknowledging their shared motivations, collective demands, and mass potential for influencing the game. It is not a coincidence that the term “twelfth man” was coined

61 Richard Giulianotti, “Football and the Politics of Carnival: An Ethnographic Study of Scottish Fans in Sweden,” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 30, no. 2 (1995): 194.

62 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Carnival and the Carnivalesque,” in *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*, ed. Storey J. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 251.

in Turkish football terminology for the first time during those years.⁶³ This change in the perception of football spectatorship also reflected a discursive shift. The term *meraklı*, an obscure term used for football followers to define their humble curiosity, was substantially replaced by the terms *seyirci* (spectator) and *taraftar* (fan), stressing the acts of “spectating” and “supporting.”

Going to a football game was no longer a spontaneous activity. Rather, it became a matter of time devotion, preparation, and investment for the team. Spectators began to be more involved in pre-match preparations to show their explicit support for their team. For instance, banners prepared on fabric or on metal boards were brought to the stadiums on match days. On the banners, there were coarse, provocative statements against the rival club or supportive messages for their own teams such as traditional fan slogans or quotations of popular songs of the time. The rise of obscene banners in the stadiums was undoubtedly met with the criticism of the press.

The verbal and physical attacks of impertinent spectators have recently taken a new but impertinent shape. It is the act of displaying notorious sayings written on fabric or paper banners hung from pillars at the stands. The open demonstration of disgusting words on banners in the stadiums, which are public places, will denigrate the amusement of football as the most popular branch of sport. Besides that, since this display will deteriorate the morality and discipline of youth who come to the stadium to watch the games, authorities should take measures and prohibit such shameful behaviors.⁶⁴

Though rare, visual depictions of team mascots, popular players, and coaches as well as historical sporting moments also appeared on the banners. Reflecting fans’ ability to respond immediately, a poster Galatasaray fans held up in the final game against Fenerbahçe for the first championship of the Turkish Professional National League constitutes a good example. One of the biggest banners seen in a Turkish stadium until that date, it depicted Metin Oktay’s

63 “Kozum Onikinci Adam,” *Milliyet*, December 28, 1963.

64 “M.Paşa Stadı’nda Türeyen Yazılı Hakaret Levhaları,” *Milliyet*, January 29, 1953. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

marvelous goal in the previous game between the two clubs, which later came to be widely-known as “the goal that torn the nets.”⁶⁵

Displaying posters, waving flags, dressing in team colors, releasing birds with team-colored balloons tied to their feet in the stadiums, drinking alcohol, exhibiting violence, and collectively yelling, singing, and swearing by spectators of the era paved the way for a new emotive, noisy, participatory, and vibrant fan culture.⁶⁶ The expanding practices of support were interwoven with a new urban culture in Turkey; fan rituals conveyed messages that could be considered an amalgam of the traditional and the modern as well as of the urban and the rural. It was no longer uncommon in the stadiums of Istanbul, İzmir, and Ankara to observe fan rituals such as spectators singing folk songs or playing *zurna* and bass drums.

In 1954, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, the Istanbul governor, decided to prohibit flags and banners in the stadiums declaring that they increased the tension among rival spectators. The sporting press opposed the prohibition of such elements that supposedly “increased the thrill of the games” and claimed that the stadiums would look “bare” in their absence.⁶⁷ Ironically, the ban ended with the display of a banner during a game at which the Gökay was also in attendance. On the banner held up in the open stands was written “Our Respected Governor! We do not throw stones, quinces or bottles. We are only raising our flags!” Gökay’s smile in response to this action was regarded as a permission by the crowds who held up their flags all over the stands again.⁶⁸

Not only visual but also vocal strategies of support were expanding. An increasing number of fans began to bring musical instruments such as drums, *zurnas*, accordions, bugles, and ratchets (*kaynana zırlıtısı*) to the stadiums. When these people bored of the music coming from the stadium speakers, they took out their instruments to make their own, which was called “terrace

65 *Milliyet*, June 15, 1959.

66 Can Bartu, “Küfürden Bir Fon Müziği İçinde,” *Akşam*, January 29, 1959; “Karagümrüklüler Galatasaray Maçına Saz Heyeti Getirecekler,” *Akşam*, February 10, 1959.

67 Kaleci, “Herşeyden Evvel Küfürü Yasak Etmeliydik,” *Akşam*, December 14, 1954.

68 *Milliyet*, December 21, 1954.

jazz.”⁶⁹ Furthermore, vocal fandom was also constructed through collective swearing (*mahut terane*) at the stadiums. For instance, chanting that the referee is a “faggot” is an excellent example for what sport sociologists define as “symbolic demasculinization.”⁷⁰ Albeit rare, there were also cases when spectators chanted “Longlive the Referee” (*Yaşa hakem*) or “Viva l’arbitro” if the referee was Italian.

6.2.1 *The Emergence of Football Violence as a Social Problem*

Physical violence, like verbal violence, was part of fan culture that gained a carnivalesque, extroverted character. Exemplified by physical and verbal attacks, field invasions, and various forms of crowd disorder, incidents of violence both on and off the field resulted in physical injuries and on rare occasions, death.⁷¹ The first known victim of football violence was a referee named Fikret Kayral. On 7 November 1948, a Deferdar player was shown a red card during the Elektrik-Deferdar match at Vefa Stadium. He kicked and punched the referee Fikret Kayral. Kayral was hospitalized and died three weeks after the incident. Following this incident, the executive board of the Deferdar decided to dissolve the club, and the press brought up violence as one of the fundamental problems of football.⁷²

In addition to players, fans also initiated violent incidents against the referee. *Fener* newspaper drew attention to the fact that these incidents had become common and claimed that fans would extract the ticket money from the referee if they did not like how he managed the game. According to the newspaper, security measures needed to be increased in parallel with the increase in the number of spectators. *Milliyet*’s Sulhi Garan also stated that security

69 Haluk Durukal, “Maç Saatinden Evvel Stadium,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1948.

70 Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy, and John Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches: Towards a Sociological Explanation,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 37, no.2 (June, 1986): 225.

71 *Milliyet*, November 25, 1954.

72 For details of the event, see Doğan Çetinkaya, “Hakem de Öldürmüştük! Bir Futbol Hakemi Fikret Kayral’ın Acı Sonu, 1948,” *Tamsaha*, (May 2006): 36-37.

measures at stadiums were inadequate and a second Fikret Kayral incident might occur if things continued as they were.⁷³

Whether physical or verbal, violence was regarded as a crime and the government was invited to “provide a calm and peaceful environment in the stands and to punish the criminals.”⁷⁴ In the second half of the 1940s, in addition to police and the gendarmerie, high-salaried security forces were employed as private officers at İnönü Stadium, and warnings to fans were broadcast from the stadium loudspeakers to prevent incidents of violence.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, the security organization, the GDPE, and the TFF failed to develop a permanent policy to prevent football violence. There were some palliative measures among solutions considered, such as banning flags and banners. A ‘swearword piggy bank’ created by the Kurtuluş Club in Eskişehir applied monetary penalties to cussing club members and was met by the press with interest.⁷⁶ In 1955, a practice initiated in Bursa was a local example of measures adopted in 2011 by the TFF against football violence. The Bursa Directorate of Physical Education decided to admit female spectators into the stadium free of charge with the idea that this would reduce violence in the stadium.⁷⁷

Mithatpaşa was the stadium where football violence was most visible, but it existed in other cities and in subsidiary leagues. For example, in 1954 during a Karşıyaka-Menemen match played in İzmir’s Menemen district, Menemen football players joined together with the local public to attack rival players resulting in the severe injury of three footballers.⁷⁸ In Ankara, an on-field fight between Mamakspor player İlhan Cavcav and Dışkapı player Vural end in the police station and was recounted in the papers as a “box match.”⁷⁹ In Afyon, in a local league match played between Doğanspor and Kalespor, the captain

73 “Çöplüğe Döndürülen Futbol Sahalarımız,” *Milliyet*, December 7, 1951.

74 “Ayva ve Şişe,” *Milliyet*, November 25, 1954.

75 “Yetkiner’e Mithatpaşa’da Beş Maç Yapılmaz diye Rapor Verildi,” *Akşam*, September 2, 1958.

76 Şevket Rado, “Küfür Sarfıyatını Azaltmak İçin,” *Akşam*, April 14, 1955.

77 Şevket Rado, “Stadyum Terbiyesi ve Kadınlar,” *Akşam*, January 16, 1955.

78 “Çirkin bir Hadise,” *Akşam*, May 24, 1954.

79 *Milliyet*, December 3, 1954.

of Doğanspor prevented a fan who angered by a referee decision from attacking the referee, but following the match, the referee was knifed to death by the same fan.⁸⁰

Although violent outbursts both in the stands and on the field were claimed to be no longer individual incidents, tangible cannot substantiate this claim.⁸¹ However, it is apparent that football violence became much more visible due a press that had invented the golden age myth - that football in the amateur era was better because it was not corrupted by violent acts. The invention of the myth was related to the fear of the old elites who were about to lose the control of the game.⁸²

In *Beşiktaş Sports Newspaper*, a journalist wrote an article titled “Fall in the Quality of Fans” wherein he claimed that the increase in the number of spectators gave a cosmopolitan character to the stands. According to Önder; this mass, compared to the spectators of the past, did not appreciate the amateur ideals of “sportsmanship, gentlemanship, and maturity.”⁸³ This moral panic overlapped with the general concerns about the increasing social mobility and dynamism in a period of urbanization, population growth, and transition to democracy. The rising fan dynamism was frequently contextualized within the notion of democracy.⁸⁴ After the Turkish national football team was defeated by the French national team at Mithatpaşa Stadium, a journalist from *Galatasaray* newspaper would portray the violent outburst as follows: “The angry fans pelted the visiting players with corncobs and fruit rinds at the end of the game. They might say, ‘We can throw garbage at the visiting team; after all, this is a democracy!’ Correct, there is a democracy...”⁸⁵

Although violent outbursts were observed among “high-class, collar-and-tie men who were accompanied in the stadiums by their wives” as Sulhi Garan

80 “Maçtan Çıkan Cinayet,” *Akşam*, January 11, 1954.

81 Necmi Tanyolaç, “Tribünleri Alkış Yerine Küfür Dolduruyor,” *Milliyet*, November 20, 1954.

82 Sulhi Garan, “Mithatpaşa Stadında Türeyen Yazılı Hakaret Levhaları,” *Milliyet*, January 29, 1953.

83 Necmettin Önder, “Seyirci Kalitesindeki Düşüş,” *Beşiktaş Spor Gazetesi*, November 27, 1950.

84 “Bu da mı Demokrasi?,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 152, January 8, 1951.

85 Ali Z. Orakoğlu, “Koçan Yağmuru,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 149, December 19, 1950.

once noted, it was mostly those in the open stands of Mithatpaşa Stadium that displayed different forms of exorbitance.⁸⁶ In the words of Halit Talayer, “the stands that were subjected to censorship” was the center of the new spectator culture which was characterized by abandonment to hedonistic excesses and the collective enjoyment of drinking, eating, playing, singing, and chanting.⁸⁷

While explaining football hooliganism in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, a considerable amount of the literature emphasized the fact that lower classes have a higher tolerance for violence, and hooliganism provided a public stage for fans to demonstrate their intolerance toward social norms and values.⁸⁸ In the case of Turkey, it can be argued that in addition to increasing competition and professionalism, the growing involvement of working class and migrant communities in football have played role in the rise of stadium violence; but it was not the same as organized incidents in Britain that involved classes among various fan groups and gangs.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, starting in this period, violence became an inseparable part of the carnival atmosphere of the stands in Turkish football, a component of the extroverted stadium culture, and a symbol of the break from the socially acceptable.

Noticing their own mass power during those years, fans consolidated their presence on the football stage by shows of mass strength outside of the stadium as well as inside. These organizations at the same time served as socio-political sites that allowed multiple interpretations of nationalism, masculinity, and fanaticism. In a match with Real Madrid during the European Cup, Beşiktaş was expected to lose by 7-8 goals, but returned home having scored a tie. As a result, players were met at the airport by a gigantic crowd as never seen before.⁹⁰ Alongside shows of affection such as meeting teams returning from abroad, celebrations, and fan marches, other active issues in football were threats and vandalism. For instance, in 1953, a group of Ankara-based

86 Sulhi Garan, “Kabahat Kimin?” *Milliyet*, April 15, 1952.

87 Giulianotti, “Football and the Politics of Carnival,” 194; Halit Talayer, “Bir Stadyumun Çilesi” *Milliyet*, October 20, 1951.

88 Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, “Spectator Violence,” 229-231.

89 Ibid.

90 *Milliyet*, November 17, 1952; March 14, 1955; *Akşam*, September 26, 1959.

Beşiktaş fans did not believe the news that Beşiktaş had lost a match to Vefa at the Çanakkale tournament. They throw stones at the offices of the Anadolu Agency that had published the story, and the incident was suppressed following the intervention of a truck full of police officers.⁹¹ Alongside this act of vandalism against the press was an example of protest against a club administration that took place in 1958. About 400 fans wishing for Gündüz Kılıç to return as Galatasaray gathered in front of the Beyoğlu facility of the club and tried to intimidate the club management by protesting.⁹² Gündüz Kılıç, who had the nickname ‘Baba Gündüz’, returned on the shoulders of the fans, and the problematic president Sadık Giz was replaced by Refik Selimoğlu within two years.⁹³

One of the most interesting fan rituals outside the stadium was the “coffin march.” Especially on the day of Istanbul derbies, fans from both sides walked through the streets of the city with coffins colored with the rival team’s colors or covered with its flag.⁹⁴ After a derby between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe in 1955, a group of Galatasaray fans carrying a yellow and navy coffin on their shoulders attempted to enter a famous Turkish delight shop owned by Fenerbahçe’s former president, Ali Muhiddin Hacıbekir, in Kadıköy. The shop owners prevented the attempted vandalism by shutting the shop and distributing Turkish delight to Galatasaray fans.⁹⁵ Since games among Istanbul’s big clubs attracted interest on a nationwide scale even before the establishment of a national professional league, such fan marches with coffins also took place in various cities such as Samsun, İzmir, and Antalya.⁹⁶

What gave the *carnavalasque* character to coffin marches was the metaphoric upheaval of both funeral and death, evoking sadness and silence. Recalling Bakhtin, during these marches, fans “celebrated temporary liberation

91 “Anadolu Ajansı Taşlandı,” *Akşam*, April 13, 1953.

92 “G.Saray İdare Heyeti Aleyhine Nümayış,” *Milliyet*, September 15, 1958.

93 “G.Kılıç G.Saray’a Döndü,” *Milliyet*, January 1, 1960.

94 “Tabut Her Zaman Ölü için Kullanılmaz Ya!,” *Milliyet*, February 23, 1953.

95 “Fenerbahçe Son Hadiselerde Galatasaray Taraftarlarını Kabahatli Buluyor,” *Milliyet*, March 21, 1955.

96 *Milliyet*, May 1, 1957; June 16, 1959.

from the prevailing truth and from the established order.”⁹⁷ Interestingly, the coffin marches became something that Turkish politicians borrowed from football. Both after the general elections of 1954 and 1957, Democrats used coffins with the RPP emblem in their victory celebrations.⁹⁸

6.2.2 *From Mascots to Amigos: Devoted Fans*

As fan identities were increasingly consolidated, devoted fans appeared with high levels of emotional investment in their clubs. Devoted fans differed from ordinary spectators not only via-à-vis the time and energy they devoted to their clubs, but also with respect to their clothing codes and leading role within the football *communitas*.⁹⁹ In this regard, Galatasaray’s Karıncaezmez Şevki, wearing yellow and red from head to foot, offers an insightful example of the fans who did not hesitate to use their bodies as new spaces for the expression of their fandom.

According to Necati Karakaya, Turkey’s first *amigo*¹⁰⁰ is Galatasaray member Karıncaezmez Şevki.¹⁰¹ Şevki Güney would dress in yellow and red from his shirt to even his socks. As a bus driver at the Istanbul municipality, Şevki Güney was fired from his job as he did not conform to the dress code, and his wife had divorced him due to “clubbism.” He then drove his 1948 Opel as a *dolmuş* (shared taxi), Güney decorating the car in yellow and red. In the fifties, Şevki Güney was one of the most colorful personalities of Istanbul as well as of Mithatpaşa Stadium.¹⁰² The Istanbul Security Chief, Orhan Eyüboğlu, called Şevki ‘Karıncaezmez’ as he would not even run over an ant due to his naïve

97 Quoted in Linda Hutcheon, “Modern Parody and Bakhtin,” in *Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges*, ed. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 99.

98 *Milliyet*, May 4, 1954; October 29, 1957.

99 Victor Turner, “Liminality and Communitas,” in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), 94–130.

100 Amigo, meaning friend in Spanish, is the term used for stadium leaders who lead fan chants and cheers in Turkey. The term was first used in the mid-sixties by a Beşiktaş fan group that called themselves *amigolar* (amigos).

101 *Milliyet*, March 26, 1970.

102 *Milliyet*, September 8, 1963.

character. Never missing any match of his team, Şevki sat in the front rows in the stands, waved his Galatasaray flag throughout the matches, and stood at attention for minutes saluting the team with a raised right hand whenever it scored a goal. He would face the stands and turn his back to the field to ensure that the fans cheered for the team.¹⁰³ Karıncaezmez Şevki represented fans outside the game and had a place at official and unofficial events regarding the club. Karıncaezmez Şevki also suffered his share of violence in the stands. In 1967, a fan who thought that Amigo Şevki was unlucky for Galatasaray threw him off the stands and broke his right arm. Şevki's arm was unsuccessfully treated and would have to be amputated after which he was outfitted with a prosthesis.

Apart from Galatasaray's Karıncaezmez Şevki, Karagömrük's Nizamettin and Gardrop Fuat, Fenerbahçe's Babahindi Süha and Asker Erdoğan, and Beşiktaş's Baba Orhan and Arap Necib were the first well-known devoted fans of Turkish football. The press named them as "terrace representatives." They, as Giulionotti argues, "viewed themselves as club members, an identity rooted in the unbreakable reciprocal relationship between fan and club."¹⁰⁴ Since they had a representative status for the club, Taylor described the relationship between them and their clubs as a "participatory democracy."¹⁰⁵ These 'representatives' also functioned as a bridge among the football communities of different clubs in terms of sustaining good relations. In this context, a statement by Gardrop Fuat, the terrace representative of Karagömrük, before the club's first match in the Professional League with Galatasaray deserves to be quoted.

We just recently rose from the Second Division to the First Division...

We are still guests at Mithatpaşa while Galatasaray is the owner of this location for the last fifteen years. This is why we will let them have their own space. In fact, we made some arrangements to facilitate their lives.

We had huge cardboard arrows made for Galatasaray fans to point

103 "Karıncaezmez Şevki M.Paşaya Veda Etti," *Milliyet*, September 8, 1963.

104 Richard Giulianotti, "Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 26, no. 1 (2002): 27.

105 Matthew Taylor, "Politics and the People's Game: Football and Political Culture in Twentieth Century Britain," *www.idrottsforum.org*, 2007 (accessed February 23, 2017).

their seats. We also prepared signboards explaining that they are the owners of this place. As a representative, I am going to visit Galatasaray's gentlemanly, extremely sportsmanlike, and sensitive fan, Karıncaezmez Şevki, in his office. Since we know him to be the leader, as a symbol of our affection for Galatasaray fans, I will present him a bouquet of his favorite yellow-red colors.¹⁰⁶

After the opening of İnönü Stadium in 1947, rival fans that had been set together until that time were encouraged to occupy separate places in the stands. Beşiktaş's most fanatic supporters began to occupy the open stands to the left side of the VIP box. Named as *Teksas* (Texas) stands, this area became a gathering place for the Beşiktaş's drumbeaters. Considering the popularity of American cowboy movies in Turkish popular culture at that time, it makes sense that this part of the stands was named *Teksas* and the group of supporters called *Amigos*.

Amigos, the first organized supporters' group in the Turkish football scene, were the most fanatic in Mithatpaşa stadium. They often displayed disorder and violence, flipped off the VIP box, and used profanity in their collective cheering.¹⁰⁷ Their presence in the stadium created discontent among the elite. The first attempts to decrease their power in the stands were to increase the ticket prices and to close the *Teksas* stands by breaking the group up.¹⁰⁸ However, these attempts were unsuccessful, and the influence of the *Amigos* increased over time. In the sixties, this fan group was involved in incidents such as the beating and kidnapping of footballers. Although they were renamed as '*amigo* gang' by the press, they preferred to be called 'fanatic supporters'.¹⁰⁹ Starting in the mid-sixties, *amigo* turned into a general term used to define devoted fans of various clubs who assumed the role of mobilizing fan groups in the stands to take collective action.¹¹⁰ After professional football spread to Anatolia in the mid-sixties, the term *amigo* was copied to name local

106 "Şiş Kebabı Fenerbahçe Tribününde Okunacak," *Milliyet*, November 29, 1958. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

107 *Cumhuriyet*, November 30, 1964.

108 *Milliyet*, June 11, 1952.

109 *Milliyet*, July 19, 1963; August 11-14, 1965.

110 *Milliyet* July 14-19, 1963.

fans. For instance, Sivasspor fans called themselves as *yığido*, a compound term derived from *yığit* (brave) and *amigo*. After Trabzonspor was founded in 1967, club directors searched for cheerleaders who they called *hamsigo*, deriving from *amigo* and *hamsi* (a fish species of symbolic, regional importance).

§ 6.3 Football, Media, and Popular Culture

6.3.1 *A New Start: Reading the Newspapers Starting from the Last Page*

Post-war domestic and international developments in the field of media and communications ushered in a new era of mass media in Turkey. By the end of the war, not only did unfavorable conditions resulting from the limited supply of paper and the strict control of the Press Directorate (*Matbuat Müdürlüğü*) disappear, but changes to Press Law and the expansion of state subsidies played role in the proliferation of newspapers and journals. The national dailies *Hürriyet* founded in 1948 and *Milliyet* in 1950 became the flagbearers of news reporting. Technical improvements such as new printing technologies like photogravure and offset printing, high quality papers, telephoto lenses, and intaglio printing also played a significant role in raising both the quantity and quality of the publications. According to Doğan Koloğlu, one of the most important developments in publishing sector took place in the sport press.¹¹¹

Sports became a theme for the first time in Ottoman press in 1895 in the columns of a daily in Thessaloniki, and a football match was reported as a news item for the first time in 1911 on the pages of Istanbul's *Tasvir-i Efkar*.¹¹² Although the interest of the media increased in the early republican period, dailies did not devote a regular page to sport news until the second half of the forties. Matches were covered in a couple of columns only following the match days. Therefore, as Halit Kıvanç, a leading sport author and commentator of

111 Doğan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan 21. Yüzyıla Basın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2006), 120-128.

112 Hakan Aydın, "İdman (1913-1914) İlk Kapsamlı Spor Dergisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme," *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 27, no. 2 (2009): 154.

the fifties, pointed out, “sport lovers looked forward mondays to read the sport weeklies *Kırmızı-Beyaz* and *Şut*.”¹¹³ However, after the war, sports and especially football gradually began to occupy more space in the press.

Vatan and *Hürriyet* particularly with their wide coverage during the 1948 Olympic Games, contributed to the process of making sport a daily affair - a part of the everyday routine. By the early 1950s, sport had become one of the most important topics in Turkish press.¹¹⁴ Almost every newspaper began to devote more space to it in their daily content. *Milliyet* was the first to put sports coverage on the last page, initiating the paper that initiated the “backwards-read gazette” fashion. It was observed that this newspaper allocated two or three pages to sports starting in the middle of the 1950s.¹¹⁵ It was also during this period that Cem Atabeyoğlu and Nuri Bosut, two leading figures of the football community, founded the country’s first sport news agency named as *Spor Ajansı* (Sports Agency).¹¹⁶

The sport that occupied these pages was football. A female journalist from one newspaper complained about the football mania among her colleagues as follows:

The sports service is on our floor. The rooms of the commentators open up to this hall. Whether we like it or not, we listen to football. We laugh with football, we are exuberant with football. We are full of football. We almost eat and drink football. Telephones rain all day long. Stories come and go... They were defeated, they won. Bets, gambling, guesses... Figures blow in the wind: 3-0, 5-2, 6-2... We swim in ‘goals.’ Sometimes you think the paper is published for the sake of football. ... I am jealous of footballers and football addicts. I look at photographs that occupy entire pages. Footballers chewing their food, a sideways glance and a mean look are all events. They are all on this page. Is there no one in this country who likes anything else? Let’s just say science is

113 Halit Kıvanç, *Futbol Bir Aşk* (Istanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2015), 17-18.

114 Ibid.

115 Koloğlu, *Osmanlı’dan 21. Yüzyıla*, 128.

116 Ergun Hiçyılmaz, *Türk Spor Tarihi* (Istanbul: Demet Ofset, 1974), 117.

dry and mean-faced. What about art? Rather than fanning an addiction that is burning in flames, is the press not be able shed light on other excitements?¹¹⁷

The interest that arose in football also made specialization mandatory. The newspapers were no longer satisfied with one or two sport authors; they began to employ a generation of young journalists who wrote only on the issues of sport. As a result, sports staff and writers started to be the most expert and sought-after employees. In addition, along with sports correspondence, sports photography became a separate specialty.¹¹⁸ According to Cem Atabeyoğlu, all these developments indicated the birth of sports journalism as a new profession.¹¹⁹ Journalists such as Atabeyoğlu, Halit Kıvanç, Erdoğan Arıpınar, Doğan Koloğlu, Abdülkadir Yücelman, and Babür Ardahan were the first representatives of this profession that became a regular branch of work. In later years, star players such as Gündüz Kılıç, Cihat Arman, Birol Pekel, and Can Bartu would join these journalists.

The first sport daily of the country - originally *Türkiye Spor* and later known just as *Spor* - was founded in 1953. Although its publication was short-lived due to administrative problems, the newspaper reached a circulation of 45 thousand copies.¹²⁰ Apart from daily publications, the rising popularity of football also paved the way for the publication of new sports magazines.¹²¹ The emergence of club magazines such as *Beşiktaş*, *Galatasaray*, *Gençlerbirliği*, *Fener*, *Sarı-Kırmızı*, *Yeni ÖzFenerbahçe*, *Sarı-Lacivert*, and *Vefa* embellished the country's sporting life. In 1948, the number of sports weeklies, which had been reduced to three during the war, increased to ten. Furthermore, ten daily

117 Neyyire, "Gazeteciden Gazetelere Sitem," *Milliyet*, March 10, 1957. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

118 İsmail Sivri, ed., *Futbol Yıllığı* (Istanbul: Şehir Matbaası, 1957), 13.

119 Cem Atabeyoğlu, *Türkiye'de Spor Yazarlığının 100. Yılı* (Istanbul: TSYD Yayınları, 1991), 41.

120 Kıvanç, *Futbol Bir Aşk*, 24-25.

121 Tolga Tellan and Nazife Güngör, "Türkiye'de Dergiciliğin Gelişim Sürecine Genel Bakış," in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İletişim: Kurumlar, Politikalar*, ed. Nazife Güngör (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2010), 229.

newspapers began to publish sports pages at least three days a week.¹²² By means of the national newspaper and weekly journal distribution company GAMEDA, which was established in the mid-1950s, the Anatolian population was able to follow the national and international news simultaneous with that of Istanbul.¹²³ Unquestionably, this development further expanded the followers of the game and the fame of top players throughout the country. By the end of the fifties there was “a large mass of people who read the newspapers starting from their last pages.”¹²⁴

It can be argued that all channels of mass media, from radio to cinema, provided people with new opportunities to participate in the cultural production of the game. Ömer Besim, an old athlete and writer in *Galatasaray* newspaper, ironically criticized the moral panic which emerged due to the expansion of the football community and the game’s changing cultural dynamics:

The sports of yesterday were really good. Newspapers never spoke about this issue; it spread through word of mouth; sports were performed within their own framework; it was watched and gone. Today in our country sport is so dead that political papers are pushing out their announcements and publishing ads for sports.¹²⁵

6.3.2 *Radio, Cinema, and Newsreels: The Visual and Narrative World of Football*

Radio broadcasting was a crucial factor in the transformation as well as transmission of the game to even the most remote segments of the Turkish population. The first radio station of the republic, Istanbul Radio, was founded in 1927 but ceased its broadcasting by 1936. Sportscasters such as Eşref Şefik, Sait Çelebi, Sulhi Garan, and Muvakkar Ekrem Talu were pioneers in this field.

122 “Bu Terazi Bu Kadar Sıkleti Çekmez!,” *Kırmızı Beyaz*, May 5, 1957.

123 Hasan Üstün, “Basında Dağıtımın Kurumsallaştırılması Yönündeki İlk Girişimler,” in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İletişim: Kurumlar, Politikalar*, ed. Nazife Güngör (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2010): 356; Koloğlu, *Osmanlı’dan 21. Yüzyıla*, 126.

124 “Millet,” *Akis*, no. 338, (December 18, 1960): 4.

125 Ömer Besim, “Ben Neye Çıldırımıyorum,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no. 5, November 24, 1947. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

Comparatively, the interest in sports of Ankara radio, which was established at the same date as its Istanbul counterpart was weak. There was a reaction when, in 1946, Ankara radio removed five-minute sports talk from its weekly program.¹²⁶ There was a strong demand from the populace for the reopening of Istanbul Radio. In June 1945, Istanbul Radio started test broadcasting with Eşref Şefik's live commentary on the European Wrestling Championship, but it was not until 1949 that the radio station finally started regular broadcasting.¹²⁷

With the reopening of Istanbul Radio, sports events in Istanbul began to be broadcast. In addition to important boxing bouts and wrestling matches in Lütü Kırda Convention Complex, football matches - especially city derbies and international games at İnönü Stadium - were broadcast by Istanbul radio and followed by thousands.¹²⁸ Similarly, Ankara Radio offered live broadcasts from 19 Mayıs Stadium. A sports journalist illustrated the role of radio in bringing the passion for football to the remotest parts of the country:

Parallel to the interest in Istanbul, a great love of sports rose up in Anatolia, too. Naturally, citizens outside our province can satisfy this desire only by listening to the games on their radios. We witnessed several times when we were in Anatolia that power plants that operated only at night were also activated in the daytime so that everyone could benefit from these broadcasts - and that the public heartily listened to these matches in their homes, coffeehouses and in public areas.¹²⁹

In addition to live commentary on sporting events, there were also sport programs in which match reports, interviews with players, and news from the international world of football were released. Among these programs, were Vahap Özaltay's *Futbola Dair* (About football) on Ankara Radio, and Sulhi Garan's *Spor Saati* (Sports time) and Eşref Şefik's *Spor Postası* (Sports post) on

126 Firuzan Tekil, "Profesyonellik Başlıyor," *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 7, November 18, 1946.

127 İskender Özsoy, "Türkiye Radyoları 75 Yaşında," *Cumhuriyet*, May 5, 2002.

128 "Radyoda Spor Yayınları," *Milliyet*, November 14, 1950.

129 Osman Karaca, "Maçlar ve Radyo," *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no: 131, 1950. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

Istanbul Radio. Leading companies of the time from various sectors such as Nuhun Ankara Pasta Factories, Sedef Film, and Akfil Factories sponsored these football programs.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, the sports service of Izmir radio, which was commissioned in 1950, would only went into action in 1957 after former athlete Necdet Varol became the director.¹³¹

Considering that the first live broadcast of a football match on television would only be held in 1966, the crucial function of radio broadcasting for the diffusion of professional football is obvious.¹³² By means of radio broadcasting, thousands of football fans from different parts of the country were able to follow the matches of the Istanbul Professional League. As far as the special role of radio especially in household women's lives is concerned, one can assert that the launch of football broadcasting on radio should have affected women's relationship with the game.¹³³ Women, whether willingly or not, became indirect consumers of football via radio which helped them learn and produce meaning about the game.

Despite a lack of information about radio's impact on gate receipts and game attendances, some news items indicate a slight decline in the number of spectators at the stadiums due to the broadcast of the games in Istanbul. However, Istanbul Radio had difficulties putting sport content into regular programs. Some important games that were expected to be broadcast were not, while unattractive ones were sometimes broadcast in succession. This imprecise broadcasting policy, which neglected the wants of the public, was often met with a reaction. The letter of a *Milliyet* reader from Adana touched on the issue:

We were so happy when we got to listen to Istanbul radio. We are, however, saddened that since the day it was established, it has not satisfied sports lovers. We are able to learn the scores of matches played in Istanbul mid-week only towards midnight on Ankara radio. However, it

130 "Sedef Reklam ve Müessesinin Istanbul Radyosundaki...", *Akşam*, October 15, 1958.

131 "Izmir Radyosu Spor Servisi," *Sabah Postası*, January 16, 1957.

132 Ömer Serim, *Türk Televizyon Tarihi 1952-2006* (Istanbul: Epsilon Yayınları, 2007), 32-33.

133 Caroline Mitchell, "Introduction: On a Woman's Wavelength?," *Women and Radio: Airing Differences* ed. C. Mitchell (London: Routledge, 2000), 3-4.

would have been appropriate to hear the results of these matches in the brief provincial newscasts. ... The authorities of Istanbul Radio are obviously unable to understand the feelings of those awaiting news from the sports heart of our country Istanbul.¹³⁴

Another critical issue for the football lovers was the qualifications of the broadcasters. The broadcasters usually got behind the microphone before the game to briefly summarize the previous games held between those teams. In the pre-game commentary, information about certain conditions that may affect the game such as the direction of the wind and the physical situation of the field were also given. As the game started, the broadcaster would first mention which team had taken which goalposts to enable his listeners to visualize the field, and then he tried to depict where the ball was in play. This was often accomplished by giving coordinates based on the stands such as “at the intersection of M and open stands” or “ten meters behind the press box.” These were the general broadcast methods; however, there was general discontent with the broadcasters of the fifties in Turkey. The primary goal of football broadcasting, argued Michael Oriard, was to “recreate the excitement at the stadium for listeners at home.”¹³⁵ However, pioneer broadcasters in Turkey were severely criticized for being incapable of both representing the atmosphere in the stands and the play on field. The narrations of Muvaffak Ekrem Talu, for instance, were regarded as lagging behind actual play while those of Eşref Şefik, who was good at synchronizing his accounts with the game, were criticized due to his intermittent speeches.¹³⁶ Beside this, Şefik was also criticized for reading too many telegrams from listeners and his excessive side comments, all of which disrupted the excitement of the game. According to a football fan from Erzurum, who wrote his views in *Galatasaray* newspaper, the purpose of broadcasting must be only to narrate the game for those not at

134 *Milliyet*, May 6, 1952. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

135 Michael Oriard, *King Football: Sport and Spectacle in the Golden Age of Radio and Newsreels, Movies and Magazines, the Weekly and the Daily Press* (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 42.

136 Vehbi Belda. “Dünyanın En Fena Spor Spikeri,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no: 111, November 28, 1949.

the venue.¹³⁷ Similarly, sportscasters for Izmir radio were criticized for their broken Turkish, non-radiophonic voices, and incompetence in match broadcasting.¹³⁸

Behind the incapability of pioneer broadcasters of the time lay the fact that none had an educational background in this profession. Şefik, Talu, and their successor Halit Kıvanç were initially sport authors. Talu spoke of the start of his career as a broadcaster as a complete coincidence, like “the discovery of penicillin.”¹³⁹ In a similar vein, Halit Kıvanç started his broadcasting career in Moscow where he went, as a sports correspondent, to follow a friendly game between the Turkish and Russian national teams.¹⁴⁰ Despite criticism, these pioneer broadcasters with their individual abilities and knowledge attracted people all over the country to listen to radio sportscasting and thus played a crucial role in the articulation of football into people’s everyday lives. According to Babür Ardahan’s report dated 19 February 1955, the majority of car accidents in Istanbul occurred while drivers were listening to matches on the radio. The Traffic Directorate of the city, the article explained, banned drivers from listening to football games for drivers by imposing a fine of 25 lire for the first infraction and by impounding the car radio for repeat cases.¹⁴¹

Cinema was another popular instrument through which football’s position as a part of everyday life was perpetuated in the fifties. While the fascination of radio for the football fans who live far from the heart of professional football was the “domesticity” and “immediacy” it provided, cinema brought moving images of the players to the mass audience.¹⁴² Football constituted an important part of cinema programs either in the form of a newsreel or directly as the theme of a movie. Huggins and Williams argue that sport was a regular feature in cinema newsreels between the wars in England and provided the

137 “İyi Spor Spikerine İhtiyacımız Var,” *Galatasaray Sport Newspaper*, no: 121, 1950.

138 “İzmir Radyosu ve Spor,” *Sabah Postası*, January 22, 1957.

139 “Mikrofonda Size Futbol Maçlarını Anlatan... Ben!” Istanbul Şehir Üniversitesi *Taha Toros Arşivi*, no. TT510485.

140 Halit Kıvanç, *Gool Diye Diye* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1983), 22-28.

141 “Trafığı Bozan Futbol, Milliyet,” *Milliyet*, February 19, 1955.

142 Garry Whannel, *Media Sport Stars: Masculinities and Moralities* (London: Routledge, 2002), 130.

most visual form of sporting news, albeit in a popular magazine format often delayed by days or even weeks after an event.¹⁴³ Although the production of newsreels disappeared by the mid-fifties due the growth of television,¹⁴⁴ they were still in circulation in Turkey in the years following World War II. In 1956, the daily *Milliyet* launched “Milliyet Film News,” a new service that produced motion pictures of important events of the week. The newsreels produced by *Milliyet* were screened in ten cities throughout Anatolia. The newspaper announced with pride that in their first newsreel, there were also motion pictures from the latest game of Turkish national football team with Poland.¹⁴⁵

Football games covered in newsreels were chosen from among the popular games - a match from the World Cup Tournament, a match of the Turkish national team, or a local derby in Istanbul. The films of matches abroad were usually brought to Turkey through the channel of a foreign film company – camera operators were rarely sent abroad. For instance, the motion pictures from World Cup matches were bought from a German motion-picture production company known as UFA (Universum Film-Aktien Gesellschaft). The newsreels of the 1954, 1958, and 1962 World Cups were put in circulation immediately after the end of the tournaments. Most were commentated by famous commentators of the time and drew considerable attention.¹⁴⁶ These newsreels allowed many people in distant parts of the country to see, sometimes for the first time national and international sporting events and stars about which they had only read. Newsreel football coverage provided cinema-goers with a sense of being a part of the crowd at the stadium.

If one function of newsreels was entertainment, another was pedagogical.¹⁴⁷ The target audience of the newsreels were not only football fans but also the football community composed of professional players, managers, and club

143 Mike Huggings and Jack Williams, *Sport and the English, 1918-1939: Between the Wars* (London: Routledge, 2005), 33.

144 Lisa Pontecorvo, “Film Resources,” in *The Historian and Film*, ed. Paul Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 18.

145 “Milliyet Film Haberleri,” *Milliyet*, November 19, 1956.

146 “Haftanın Filmleri,” *Milliyet*, May 23, 1958.

147 Firuzan Tekil. “Spor Filmleri,” *Fener Sport Newspaper*, no. 69, January 12, 1948.

directors. For instance, the movie *Şahane Goller* (Fantastic goals), which was about the 1962 World Cup, was advertised as “a movie from which lessons could be taken.” A review of the movie noted that “today, this sort of sport film is not only a ‘live lesson’ for sportsmen of the country, but also gives technical directors the opportunity to better learn their rivals and to create adjustments for their teams.”¹⁴⁸

It was also during those years that *Yeşilçam* (Green pine, a metonym for the Turkish cinema industry) movies increasingly used football as an overriding theme. The wide audience of *Yeşilçam*, as Dönmez-Colin mention, was comprised of lower-middle classes, and football, as an important part of the daily routine of these masses, inevitably entered the doors of Turkish cinema.¹⁴⁹ However, football, at least in the early years of Turkish cinema, was not used tell of the controversial changes in Turkish society. Rather, film directors exploited the popularity of the game to attract more people to cinema by using the game as a minor theme in the main narrative. According to Özgüç, the first movie in which a Turkish football player starred was *Ölünceye Kadar Seninim* (I am yours until I die), shot in 1949 by Kani Kıpçak. Bülent Eken, the famous Galatasaray player, acted in the movie in which scenes from a real Galatasaray match were also used.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, *İstanbul Çiçekleri* (Flowers of Istanbul) a movie by Muammer Çubukçu shot in 1951, opened with a scene from a FB-GS game.

Şenel claims that in Turkish cinema, football appears only as a parodic theme and was accompanied by inconsistencies, fallacies, and chaos. In this regard, one can argue that Turkish football movies have the conventional distance that escapist cinema maintains from the sociological realities of real life. According to Şenel, *Dümbüllü Sporcu* (The athlete Dümbüllü), shot by Seyfi Havaeri in 1952 and *İstanbul Yıldızları* (Stars of Istanbul), by Mehmet Muhtar

148 “Bugün birçok ülkede bu tip spor filmleri ülke sporcuları için canlı bir ders olduğu gibi, teknik adamlara da rakiplerini daha yakından tanımak ve yenilik yaratmak imkanı vermektedir.” “Dünya Kupası Heyecanı ve Ders Alınacak Bir Film,” *Milliyet*, April 15, 1962.

149 Gönül Colin Dönmez, *Turkish Cinema: Identity, Distance and Belonging* (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), 9.

150 Agah Özgüç, *Ansiklopedik Türk Filmleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Horizon International, 2012), 51.

and Orhan Atadeniz also in 1952, were early examples of Turkish football movies that comprise one of the most popular genres of *Yeşilçam* comedies.¹⁵¹ In addition to these, *Sevmek Günah mı?* (Is it a sin to love?) by Hulki Saner in 1958 and *Gönül Kimi Severse* (Whoever the heart loves) by Muzaffer Tema in 1959 can also be regarded as the early examples of football movies.¹⁵² Especially after the establishment of the National Professional League in 1959, there was a considerable rise in the number of football-related *Yeşilçam* movies. According to the research of Arslan, ten new football-related movies were shot during the 1960s.¹⁵³

The movie *Çam Sakızı* (Mastic), directed by Nevzat Pesen and released in 1962, illustrates the incorporation of football into urban culture in Istanbul. The movie tells the story of two sea captains who were fierce supporters of rival football clubs, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray. They carried passengers in Bosphorus in boats which bore the name of their respective favorite teams. The passengers' preference for either the FB or GS boat reflected their fandom. One day, these two men decided to hold a race to determine which team - and which captain - was superior on the condition that the loser would give his own boat to the winner. The movie successfully depicted how football had already become a central aspect of people's ordinary lives and an indispensable part of their identities by the early 1960s. Furthermore, with its powerful ending, the movie emphasized the everlasting friendship between these two clubs. The winning captain returned back the boat to his friend saying: "Keep your boat. If you are not here, I have nothing to do on the sea, either."

In the 1960s, it is observed that the film producers completely discovered and thus began to use the nationwide popularity of football players. For instance, Varol Ürkmez, the national goalkeeper who also maintained a high-profile private life, successively starred in three movies. Metin Oktay, the famous striker for Galatasaray, played himself in a movie called *Taçsız Kral* (The king without a crown), shot by Atıf Yılmaz in 1965. The same year, Şenol Birol

151 Erol Şenel, "Futbol ve Yeşilçam," *CineTele 2* (2012): 30.

152 Tunca Arslan, *Futbol ve Sinema: Meşin Yuvarlağın Beyaz Perde Serüveni* (Istanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2003), 138-41.

153 Ibid.

and Birol Pekel, two famous players of Fenerbahçe, whose transfer from Beşiktaş caused a stir at that time, starred in the movie *Şenol, Birol, Gool!*, which like the aforementioned ones, brought huge receipts to its producers. The football heroes of the time were turning into movie stars one by one. In the eyes of club directors, however, professional players should only be popular for their football, not for their private lives or acting. It was with such a mindset that Fenerbahçe directors banned their players from making films in 1965.¹⁵⁴

The close interaction between football and cinema in the post-war era was not limited to Turkish movies. During the fifties, foreign movies about football - and American football, as well - were also screened in cinemas. It is noteworthy that the titles of these films were translated into Turkish to include the word 'football' irrespective of their original title or contents. For example, an Italian football comedy, *L'inafferrabile 12* (The uncatchable 12) was translated as *Deli Futbolcu, Kubala* (The crazy football player Kubala), and the film *The Stars Search for Peace* was shown in Turkish theaters as *Asi Futbolcu Kubala* (Kubala, the rebellious footballer). Meanwhile, a Hollywood production about American football, *Bonzo Goes to College*, was adapted as *Bonzo Futbolcu* (Bonzo the footballer), and *That's My Boy* had the Turkish title of *Cancığer Kardeşler Futbolcu* (Chummy brothers are footballers). It is clear that the cinema industry opted for such titles to take commercial advantage of the popularity of football.

§ 6.4 Concluding Remarks

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey experienced a massive population flow from villages to cities and an accelerated pace of urban growth. For the migrants who faced problems to integrate into urban life, football offered an invaluable opportunity not only to feel oneself a part of urban culture, but also to transmute it. Football owes much of its popularity to the migrants' decisions to be players, supporters or members of a football club and were motivated by a desire to make money as well as for urban integration, visibility, companions, escape from work life.

154 "F.Bahçe'li Oyuncuların Film Çevirmesi Yasak," *Milliyet*, October 22, 1965.

Any study of the history of football from a social science perspective needs to focus on how football is experienced inside and outside the stadium by the spectators and performers of the spectacle. This chapter analyzed the changes to both the production and consumption of football and argued that in addition to the recognition of professionalism, the influx of migrants – particularly working-class men – into football also played role for the emergence of new typologies of football players, club directors, and spectators, as well.

As Anatolian-born players began to dominate Turkish football, a previous generation of players who were from among the urban, educated elite gradually retreated from the field. Nevertheless, the old elites continued to rule football as bureaucrats, board members, and presidents of the big clubs despite the rising interest of the *nouveau riche* in the game.

While the old elites became minorities occupying the VIP boxes at the stadiums and mostly maintaining traditional customs of deadpan spectatorship, the open stands hosted the birth of a dynamic fan culture influenced by the traditions and values brought by migrants. The act of spectating entered a new phase, that was slightly different from that of previous decades as more expressive, violent, and emotive strategies of support were adopted. The fifties also saw the emergence of fans who were strongly identified with their clubs. These devoted fans – and *amigos*, in particular – did not hesitate to demonstrate their football identities through their clothing and conduct. This dynamic fan culture, harboring strong football identities, and fierce rivalries on the level of small or big clubs can be considered a performative expression of something lost in the transitional phases of urban growth.¹⁵⁵

This chapter also argued that the game's indirect consumption accelerated during those years. In this regard, developments in mass media functioned as a catalyst for the expansion of the activity space of football beyond the stadium. I argued that the rapid penetration of football into the everyday lives of the people came not only with the proliferation of sport newspapers and magazines but also with the expansion of platforms such as radio, cinema, and newsreels.

155 Stone, "The Role of Football in Everyday Life," 170-174.

The role of mass media was also evident in the integration of football players into a celebrity culture that was newly emerging in those years. Contrary to common belief, the perception of football player as ‘playboy’ who is fond of night-life and women did not emerge recently. Stone argued that football was always so much a part of the *Zeitgeist* that it pervades cultural practices, perceptions, and interactions across many domains.¹⁵⁶ As discussed in this chapter through Nesin’s *Gol Kralı*, anxiety about moral degeneration promoted by old urban elites was reflected in the portrayal of professional players with their spoiled, dandyish patterns of behaviors. The football player became an object of hatred but at the same time an object of desire given his wealthy, vivid private life.

156 Ibid.

Conclusion

I finished my work. A funeral was passing by; I approached. When I saw Galatasaray flag on the coffin, I understood. Galatasaray had died; they were taking it to be buried. While looking at the coffin as it moved athletically, someone came up to me.

-Sir, what do you have to say about this?

-I don't know. They're making a joke, a joke...

-That's not what I'm not asking, sir. What do you have to say about Galatasaray's defeat?

-Me? I don't know. I'm not in the newspaper's sports desk.

- That doesn't matter. Do you think I'm a journalist? I sell lettuce on the corner.¹

Turkish football has come a long way in the years since its inception in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, becoming one of the top ten most valuable brands in world football.² Introduced to Ottoman society as an elite,

1 Cevat Ulunay, "Spor Sohbeti," *Milliyet*, May 5, 1957. For the original Turkish, see appendix B.

2 Aktif Bank Ekolig: Football Economy Report for 2014-2015 / 2015-2016 Seasons, www.aktifbank.com.tr, <https://www.aktifbank.com.tr/Documents/FOOTBALL-ECONOMY-REPORT.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2018).

amateur game by non-Muslim communities who regarded the game as a symbol of class distinction, football managed to develop on its own right and became the most popular, commercialized sport in Turkey. The game undoubtedly owes its popularity to the people themselves who not only denied the state's impositions on the field of sports but also changed the nature of football, by attaching their own values, meanings, and codes - just as they changed the nature of modernity itself.³

Developments in the aftermath of the Second World War crucially characterized the game and its future. As this study makes clear, Turkish football was considerably transformed during this period as a result of both national and international developments. This period witnessed a football boom in Turkish society. The number of clubs, players, and spectators, increased, and the game's interplay with other social, political, and economic dynamics strengthened. Moreover, this period harbored certain tensions and conflicts associated with the transition from amateurism to professionalism in Turkish football. Throughout this study, the transformation of Turkish football is taken as a seismograph to detect the dynamic social structure of the period vis-à-vis previous periods.

In the preceding chapters, I focused on the period between 1946 and 1963, which was the early era of professional football in Turkey in which the modern form of the game was made. I have argued that amateurism which provided the ideological and ethical framework for the Kemalist policy makers to implement their sport policies played a key role in the belated recognition of professionalism in Turkish football.

It is understandable why suspicion of the Kemalist elite towards football grew during the early republican era. Contrary to the endeavors of amateur sport ideologues to encourage mass participation in sports through legal and administrative regulations, football pacified people who were supposed to doing the physical exercise, turning them into mere spectators. Moreover, due to its potential for commercialization, fierce competition, and violence, the game was incompatible with the Kemalist corporatist ideology. Therefore, the grow-

3 Migdal, "Finding the Meeting Ground," 254.

ing popularity of football in Turkey in the interwar years was met great resistance from those strongly holding the values of statism or amateurism. In this regard, the second chapter of this dissertation, which traces the origins of amateurism as the essence of the ‘public service’ mentality in Turkish sports, provided a historical background to explain certain peculiarities that would appear during the transition from amateurism to professionalism in football.

As the third chapter demonstrated, the liberalization of the regime after World War II years galvanized demands in sporting circles for changes in the administration of sports and sports regulations. In this regard, the advent of professionalism became the primary concern for those aspiring to catch up with modern, Western football. Professionalism in football would ultimately be officially recognized, albeit in a hybrid model. The promulgation of the Professionalism Bylaw in 1951 ensured the recognition of professional contracts between football clubs and players but did not allow clubs to assume a company status. Sports clubs remained associations under the Association Law of 1946.

I have argued that this hybrid model stemmed from a dilemma that Turkish policy makers faced during the decision-making process regarding professionalization. On one hand, they felt obliged to recognize professionalism in order to suppress a growing, covert professionalism and to satisfy the demands from sporting circles. On the other, they still considered sport and physical education in the context of national service, and for this reason, they did not want to give the field of to the discretion of other power groups. As Hare asserted for the French case, the ‘public service’ mentality in Turkish football clubs that had been operating over half a century “was bound to militate against adopting a private business ethos.”⁴

On this point, one might ask whether any private initiative emerged in the field of sports and particularly of football that was afflicted with the bureaucratic hegemony. I argue that the weakness of the Turkish bourgeoisie played an important role in the belated, incomplete character of Turkish professionalization. Another significant difference between the development of Turkish professional football and the British model was there was no independent or

4 Hare, *Football in France*, 26.

autonomous industrialist class that had the capacity to initiate professionalism or to stand up against the bureaucracy and its amateur ethos. There were only short-lived examples of business involvement in football; the Güneş Club in the 1930s and the Adalet Club in the aftermath of the Second World War, both of which failed. In the conspicuous absence of a Turkish bourgeoisie, state backing became an imperative for the sport's development.

If the foremost request from sporting circles in the aftermath of World War II was professionalism, the replacement of the GDPE as the governing sports institution with a liberal, autonomous one was second. However, the hybrid solution to the issue of professionalism, I argued, showed that the Democrats would not be able to meet demands for the liberalization of the sports system, promises they had made during the time they were in opposition notwithstanding.⁵ When the TFF was finally given full autonomy by the Turkish National Assembly in 1988, some heralded the news as the rescue of Turkish football from "the prison of bureaucracy."⁶ For Turkish football clubs, adopting a business-driven market model became possible after this crucial move.

Bale asserts that strength of amateurism among football pioneers was a determining factor in the transition towards professionalism. In Turkey, insistence on the amateur ethos determined the timing of the arrival of professionalism and its regional peculiarities. This was demonstrated by the preference for a hybrid model that eradicated the possibility of a breakthrough in the existing football system. This dissertation argued that professionalism in this hybrid model only regulated the labor relations between football players and clubs - mostly in favor of clubs, which have been unable to control players in the era of shamateurism. While the rejection of free-market rules delayed commercialization and thus led to the rise of non-football dynamics - primarily political tutelage - the amateur ethos lives on at the rhetorical level where the family values around the game are cherished.

5 Fişek, *Spor Yönetimi*, 253.

6 *Milliyet* supplement, July 10, 1988. Granting autonomy to the federation did not mean that the influence of politics in football was avoided. When a 2006 candidate for president, Ayhan Bermek lost the elections, he reacted with Adnan Menderes's famous saying, "The regime can have a piece of wood elected if they make it a candidate." See *Milliyet*, January 24, 2006.

This dissertation investigated a power shift through the lens of football and likewise demonstrated that for the first time in Turkish football history, spectators were recognized as active components - as a “twelfth man” who had the power to socially, politically, and economically influence the game. The mass potential of spectators to transform football also constitutes a challenge to modernization from above. The masses which rejected the codes and values of Kemalist physical culture such as amateurism, an anti-football attitude, multi-sports approach, and mass participation, preferred to follow and play football among other sporting options. They made the game into a key marker of their local, regional, and national identities, as well. In this regard, Migdal’s general perspective for Turkish modernity is also valid in the context of sports: “The seemingly totalizing project has been buffeted, eaten away, changed from inside and out.”⁷

In addition to the launch of professionalism, the post-war transformation of Turkish football was tied to processes of urbanization and population growth. The rise of an urban population enabled the emergence of a paying public necessary for the sustainability of professional football, as was especially the case in Istanbul after the opening of Mithatpaşa Stadium in 1947. In this respect, the rising significance of spectators’ agency was not merely a reflection of a general populist discourse; it was also closely related to the increasing economic importance of the spectators.

The migrants embraced football as an instrument for urban integration, social mobility, identity-reinforcement, and visibility as well as an escape from work life. Counter to urbanization debates that focus on the cultural dichotomies of the urban and rural and of the elite and working classes, I emphasize the inclusivity of football which was a common ground both for old and new residents of Istanbul. Football owes its rapid popularization to the subcultural capital it offers - through daily conversations and mass media that it required no formal education. This apparently indicates that the subcultural capital of

7 Migdal, “Finding the Meeting Ground of Fact and Fiction: Some Reflections on Turkish Modernization,” 254.

football was not class-bound.⁸ Mithatpaşa Stadium, in this respect, represented an urban venue and a new landmark of the city where social, cultural, economic, and political distinctions and differences became blurred. The significance of football as ‘the new modern’ lies here: The masses appropriated football, a ‘problematic’ sport for the Kemalist modernizers in the previous era, for themselves by attaching their own values, codes, and meanings to it. This is what made football the *people’s* ‘modern’ game.

It is further argued in this study that consumption of football, both direct and indirect, expanded during the period under question. In this context, mass media sources such as print media, cinema, and newsreels assumed a key role in football’s evolution into an important element in the daily structuring of people’s lives. Starting in the 1950s, the game began to integrate into mass culture in Turkey. As Oskay emphasized with respect to the illusionary function of mass culture in terms of eroding the distinctions between rich and poor, ruler and ruled, and the free and prisoners, football played the role of blurring the margins of the urban and the rural in Turkish society during the period under question.⁹

In the case of Istanbul, the mushrooming of football clubs in the post-war years even as growth in the number of players remained modest is evidence of the community-creating power of the game. Club identities which were mostly neighborhood-based became a vehicle of distinction and recognition for new communities. The emergence of the new fan culture can also be considered in this context. As the sixth chapter showed, opportunities to display an urban identity were relatively restricted, so spectators of the early professional era invented new ways of support to create their own authentic, participatory, and dynamic fan culture and in this way succeeded in differentiating themselves from the traditional ‘barstool’ fans of previous years. In this regard,

8 Brendan Richardson and Darach Turley, “Support Your Local Team: Resistance, Subculture, and the Desire for Distinction,” *Advances in Consumer Research* 33, no. Wilson (2006): 175, doi:43008804.

9 Ünsal Oskay, *Yıkanmak İstemeyen Çocuklar Olalım* (İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 2014), 153-155.

I argue, football functioned as a form of reconceptualized resistance - the “desire of some minority groups to have their identities properly represented in the marketplace, rather than a desire for emancipation from the market.”¹⁰

Although it became a popular mass spectator sport, professional football’s spread in terms of clubs and competitions was uneven throughout the country. As depicted in the fourth chapter, the early professional era of Turkish football rested on three main cities: Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. This indicates another dimension of the ‘incompleteness’ of professional football in Turkey. The finding that emerges from this chapter is that the early professional era did diverged from the previous amateur period in terms of neither league composition nor competition among participating teams. The leagues continued to be organized at the city level with the participation of the same teams. However, the launch of a professional league in Istanbul before the rest of the country pulled players like a magnet to Istanbul, depriving other cities of their best players. This increased the disparity between Istanbul, as the center of Turkish football, and the periphery. Moreover, the Big Three of İstanbul, which were already well-known clubs, further expanded their fan base throughout the country as a result of the improvements in mass media. It was interesting to encounter news about football fans in Anatolian cities celebrating the championships of one of the Big Three even before the establishment of national professional leagues.

This study argued that the establishment of the second and third divisions of the National Professional Leagues also had important consequences for the future development of Turkish football. First, the nationalization of professional football brought about the erosion of local football cultures. The establishment of city-based clubs with professional football teams to represent the city on the national stage required the mobilization of resources. Due to the financial drawbacks of participating in the professional leagues, local amateur clubs merged.¹¹ Local football cultures, rivalries, and competitions - all of

10 Penaloza, L., and Price, L. (1993). Quoted in Richardson and Turley, “Support Your Local,” 175.

11 One can generally read the history of football in Turkey as a history of resource mobilization. Even clubs that are slightly older than the city clubs of the sixties, such as Beşiktaş, Beykoz,

which were maintained in the pre-national professional period - gradually disappeared in the mid-1960s. The emergence of monolithic city-clubs, almost all bearing the name of the city with the suffix of 'sport,' impoverished the football culture in general.

Moreover, the late participation of Anatolian cities in the professional competition resulted in a majority of people in Anatolia maintaining their sympathy for one of the Big Three instead of supporting the clubs of their own cities. In some cases, this led to the emergence of a peculiarity of Turkish football: the two-layered fan identity. Especially for rural-urban migrants, supporting a hometown club in conjunction with one of the Big Three was a way of sustaining bonds with their rural homeland, an expression of dependent urbanization.

Another central argument this dissertation puts forward is the legacy of populism and patronage of Turkish football of the Democrats. Although state interventionism was omnipresent since the game's inception, the interplay between football and politics became more controversial, complex, and elusive in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the early republican era, politicians' interventions in football reflected pedagogical concerns and stemmed from their dislike of the game's violence and harshness. The peak of state intervention, as Akın states, was the enjoinder of the prime minister İnönü against the clubs that followed an outburst of violence at a game between Güneş and Galatasaray in 1937.¹² Although football violence remained problem in the fifties, such interventions rarely occurred during those years. On the contrary, politicians sought ways to use football's popularity for their own political purposes as sports clubs, which needed state's financial backing, became

Karagümrük, İzmirspor, and Hacettepe, convey similar stories of club mergers and name changes. This is related to the historical fact of the gradual geographical expansion of football competition in Turkey. In the amateur and pre-national periods of Turkish football, sports clubs, which were founded formally or informally within neighborhoods mostly resorted to combining forces to represent their neighborhoods in local cups and tournaments. In the national professional period, these neighborhood-based clubs - even those who had been fierce rivals - were forced to merge to be able to represent the city on the national level.

12 Akın, "Ana Hatları ile," 72-73.

more dependent on tutelage of politicians during the turmoil of two intersecting processes: professionalization and popularization.

While politicians benefited from the popularity of well-established football clubs such as Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş, and Galatasaray and borrowed the skills, techniques, networks, and discourses from the football community, the clubs did not hesitate to incorporate into the patronage relations the Democrat Party offered. In this regard, the findings of this study demonstrated that the historical privilege of Istanbul's Big Three not only resulted from their popularity among the masses but also from their well-established, historical ties with politics and the bureaucracy. This state patronage would turn into an obstacle to accountability and the democratic functioning of the whole system in Turkish football.

The dissertation further argued that football assumed the political role of connecting migrants to political parties and served as a site of political critique and participation. The interplay between football and politics acquired new dimensions in the mid-sixties with the rising import of local political dynamics. In the late sixties, the diffusion of professional football throughout the country consolidated the influence of market relations and mass culture on the game.¹³ However, the development of business logic which accelerated in the late eighties following the separation of Turkish Football Federation from the government, resulted in financially underdeveloped Turkish football clubs. While the revenue streams of most clubs in Europe rested on membership fees and sponsorships, Turkish clubs were still dependent on the state's financial backing.¹⁴

In this dissertation, I challenged two main understandings; one popular and the other is academic. On one hand, by bringing an academic perspective to popular historiographies of Turkish football, I challenged the ahistorical and mythological invocations of the past that dominates the historical knowledge of football in Turkey. On the other, by studying the social history of Turkish football at the PhD level, I contributed to the academic recognition

13 Bora and Cantek, "Ankara Futbolu," 205.

14 Esin Esra Erturan-Öğüt and Mustafa Yaşar Şahin, "Political Clientelism in Turkish Sports Federations," *European Sport Management Quarterly* 14, no. 5 (2014): 556–66, doi:10.1080/16184742.2014.950307, 2.

of football as a serious subject, and expanded the horizon of a growing, popular-intellectual interest in the game.

Appendices

NOTE

Photographs could translate visual interpretations of cultural patterns, social behaviors and incidents into concrete facts through a careful collection and contextualization. In the Appendix A, I include the photographs as important historical materials and categorize them according to a thematic order.


Appendix A1 Football Spectators



Spectators following the game from the hill above Mithatpaşa Stadium in the late 1940s



Football fans watching a national match from the duhuliye, the dugouts that surrounded the field at Mithatpaşa Stadium that were preferred by working-class men and students, in the late 1950s



Fans climbing up the light tower to enter the stadium for free in the early 1960s
Feriköy fans preparing a poster of their beloved manager Gündüz Kılıç in 1959



A general view of the stands at a national football match at Mithatpaşa Stadium



Fenerbahçe fans in Mithatpaşa's stands in the late 1940s



Football spectators at Mithatpaşa's stands

Appendix A2 Football Players



Gündüz Kılıç and Bülent Eken signing autographs for children during the 1950 visit of Galatasaray to Britain



Beşiktaş's famous striker Şenol Birol signing autographs for children in his neighborhood (source: *Hayat*, no.10, 1960)



The goalkeeper Özcan Arkoç shaking hands with Hakkı Yeten, Beşiktaş's president, after signing a contract with the club in 1962



Vefa's professional football player Hilmi Kiremitçi operating a press machine in the plant where he worked (source: *Hayat*, no.3, 1960)



Ergun Öztuna, a young transfer from Karşıyaka to Fenerbahçe, playing football with children in his neighborhood in Istanbul (Source: *Hayat*, no.52, 1959)



National players Varol Ürkmez and Necdet Elmasoğlu in Rome in 1958 (source: Fethi Aytuna Archive)

Metin Oktay, a legend of the early professional era of Turkish football, in an ad for Turkish Airlines in the mid-1960s



Beyoğluspor, the football team of Greek community in İstanbul, on their sporting tour to Greece (source: İlhan Özgen Archive)



Varujan Aslanyan, the talented striker of the Armenian team Taksimspor, at Şeref Stadium in the late 1940s (source: İlhan Özgen Archive)

Appendix A3 Football, Politics, and Diplomacy



Adnan Menderes with the players at the final of the Prime Ministry Cup between Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray at Ankaragücü Stadium in Ankara on 30 March 1958



Menderes and Istanbul Mayor Mümtaz Tarhan watching a game at Mithatpaşa Stadium in İstanbul in the second half of the 1950s



Beşiktaş players with jerseys on which the name of Cemal Gürsel, the new president of Turkish Republic after the military coup, in 1960, was written



The players and executives of Beşiktaş Club at Yeşilköy Airport returning from their tour of the United States in June 1950



The Istanbul mixed team representing Turkey on the field for a friendly match against the Iranian national team in Iran on 28 October 1947



Turkish and Israeli players and sports authorities together in the invitation held for the honor of the visit of Turkish national team to Israel in October 1950



The Turkish and Czechoslovakian national football teams taking the field for a friendly game in Prague on 25 November 1956

Appendix A4 Football and the Media



Photojournalist at a football match at Mithatpaşa Stadium in the 1950s (source: İlhan Özgen Archive)



Photojournalists posing together before a game at Mithatpaşa Stadium in the 1950s (source: İsmet Gümüşdere Archive)



The front page of the first daily sports newspaper in Turkey, *Spor*, dated 16 December 1956. The cover of *Beşiktaş Sport Magazine* no. 133 in 1956 features Adnan Menderes on the cover.



Football-related covers of Akis, the famous political periodical of the time (clockwise from the top left, nos.91/ 1956, no.191/ 1958, no.291/ 1960, no.356/ 1961)



A newspaper advertisement for the film taken during the Turkey-Hungary national football match (source: *Milliyet*, 22 February 1956)



An advertisement for the football novel *Goal King* by Aziz Nesin (source: *Milliyet*, 11 February 1957)

Appendix B Quotations in the Original Turkish

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
xvi-xvii	6	Bir zamanların amatör ruhla oynanan futbolunu hatırlıyorum. Can'lar, Lefter'ler, Mehmetçik Basri'ler... O güzelim futbol, futbolcular ve seyirciler nasıl kayboldu? Onlar ilk gençliğimizin su perileri idiler. Şimdi kayboldular. Hatırlıyorum. Maç bitiminde hele Fenerbahçe galip gelmişse İnönü Stadi'nin kapılarında saatlerce bekler, Can'ların, Lefter'lerin elini tutabilmek için birbirimizi ezerdik. Ama hiçbir zaman döner bıçakları yoktu, baltalar yoktu. Tribünde inanılmaz küfürler yoktu. İnanır mısınız, o zamanlardan aklımda kalan bir küfür cümlesi de yok. Sadece 'bir baba hindi' tekerlemesini hatırlıyorum. O taşları kimler attı? Kimler kaçırdı su perilerini? Futbol bir bale resitali gibiydi. Televizyon ve televole yoktu. Saatler süren futbol üzerine geyik muhabbetleri yoktu. Futbolun bir güzelliği, futbolcunun amatör ruhu vardı. Seyircinin sahaya attığı çiçekler vardı. Düzeyli amigolar vardı.
26	1	Memleketimizde bu oyunun daha doğrusu bu fennin karşıtları nedendir bilinmez, oldukça çoktur. Futbolu kaba-saba bir oyun olarak görenler az değildir. Biz futbolcular, bunu elbette hoş görmeyiz, görmemeliyiz... İngiltere'de şimendöfer, Almanya'da matbaa ortaya çıktığında karşı olanlar çoğunlukta idi, ama zaman, o taassupları bertaraf etti. Futbol da böyle olacaktır ve futbol artık yolunu almıştır.
37-8	47	Türkiye'de sporun çok eski bir tarihi olmasına rağmen bizde spor telakkisi mahalle aralarından stat ortalarına kadar kulüp namı altındaki futbol teşekküllerinin renkli formalarla halkın önüne bıraktıkları beş on futbol gencinden ibarettir. Bu böyle olunca memlekette sporu yalnız top oyunu olarak telakki etmek lazımdır.... [F]utbol her gün seyircisi bir parça daha artan bir sirk manzarası almıştır... [G]örüyoruz ki futbol bu memlekette gençliği tereddiye, ihtirasa, rekabete fena yollara, kavgacılığa alıştırıyor. Bunun içindir ki futbol hareketlerini bir köşeye bırakarak bilhassa muhtaç olduğumuz genişlemeyi ulusal ve vatan sporlarına ehemmiyet vererek hazırlamalıyız. İtalya'daki büyük Galila teşkilatı, nasyonal sosyalistlerin spor kurumları futboldan daha ziyade gençliğin sıhhatile, kuvveti yaşaması ile iyi hazırlanması ile alakadar olarak vatan sporlarını her tarafa yaymışlardır... Yirminci asırda spor ve askerlik beraber gitmektedir. Ve bugünün icapları sporu dar çerçevesinden çıkararak içtimai işlerin başına getirmiştir.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
40	54	1332 senesi lig maçlarına başlanacak aylar geldi. Kulüplerde mütaad olan alım satım ticareti başladı... Bu oyuncu ticaretini kulüplerini ve menfaatlerini düşünen insanlar idare ediyorlardı... Bir gün ... Altınordulularla maçlar vesilesiyle tanışmıştım. Beni kulüplerine götürdüler ve bana Altınordu'yu teklif ettiler... Bu teklifi kabul edeceğimi fakat çok hasta olduğum halde askerlik dolayısıyla yakında sevk edileceğimi kulübe ihsas ettim. O zaman Altınordu Reisi Adınoğlu Raşid Bey idi. O haftalar içinde Raşid Bey'le görüştük. Ve dört gün zarfında posta ve telgraf nezareti muharebe salonunda yeni vazifeme başladım. Bu tecilden ben de istifade ederek askerlikten istemeyerek af edildim.
42	62	Büyük İstanbul kulüplerinin hepsi işsiz futbolcularını korurlar. Onları dayandıkları kurumlarda çalıştırırlar. Lise tahsilini bitirmiş gencin bin bir çareye başvurduğu halde geniş iş bulmakta güçlük çektiği düşünülürse çok defa orta tahsilini bitirmemiş bir ayaktopu oyuncusunun az çok doyurucu bir para bulmasını kolaylaştırmak için kulüplerin ne kadar güçlü olduğunu anlamak kabildir. Bunun dışında, idman giderleri ödenir. Okul taksiti ödenir, babaları ve kardeşleri için dahi iş isteyen futbolcular var. Durum böyle iken Türkiye'deki futbolcuların temiz amatör olduklarını iddia etmek zor.
60	12	Bizde önce makul ve mutedil bir şekilde başlayan devletçilik, bilhassa İkinci Dünya Harbi içinde ifrata doğru gitti, haklı tenkidlere ve şikayetlere yol açtı. Geçen yıl memleketimizin iktisadi vaziyeti hakkında Amerikalı Thornburg Türk hususi sermayesinin bu yüzden muattal kaldığını ve dışarıdan ecnebi sermayesi getirmeğe teşebbüs etmeden önce kendi milli sermayemizin işletilmesi lazım geleceğini söyledi ve yazdı. Artık CHP de Demokrat Parti de devletçiliğin makul ve mutedil hadde icrası fikrindeler.
76-7	63	Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğü kuruluş itibariyle memleketin umumi spor kültürüyle uğraşmak mecburiyetinde iken, maalesef bu vazifesini ihmal ederek, kendisini kulüpler arası rekabetlerin mecrasına kaptırmış, zümre gayreti gütmek, dost ve arkadaş hatrı kollamak, taraf tutmak gibi zaafı göstererek akla sığmaz israflara yol açmış ve nihayet hepinizin bildiği şekilde ciddi bir revizyona tabi tutulmak üzere ele alınmıştır. Hazırlanmakta bulunan yeni bir kanun ile Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğüne hakiki hüviyeti verilecek ve bu teşkilat kulüpler arası mücadele ve rekabetlerin ücretli bir ara bulucusu olmaktan çıkarılarak Türk çocuğuna spor kültürü verecek, sporu hakiki manasıyla mekteplere sokacak faydalı bir mekanizma haline ifrağ olunacaktır... Yeni teşkilat kulüpler arasındaki eski faaliyet sahasından ayrılmak ve mektepler arasında yepyeni bir çalışma tarzı ihdas etmek zorundadır.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
78-79	69	Bizde profesyonelliğin olabilmesi için her şeyden önce ileri cemi- yetlerdeki spora yaklaşmış olmak ve onlar gibi çalışarak ve bir hiza tuttuktan sonra bu dekorun içine girmeliyiz. Profesyonelliğin kendine mahsus çizgileri vasıfları bol kulüpleri birçok sahaları ve her gün biraz daha seyircisi artan bir kalabalığı vardır. Bunların hepsi bir arada ayarlanarak güzel ve ahenkli bir kalıba girmiştir. Büyük kulüplerimizin pek büyük masrafları göz önünde tutulursa tek saha ve üç kulüple rekabet ve inkişaf elde edilemez. Profesyonel- lik henüz bizde üzerinde ısrarla konuşulacak bir dava değildir.
85	1	Geçen Pazar Galatasaray Fenerbahçe'yi 3-1 yendi. Koca İstanbul hala bu futbol sahnesinin akisleri ile çalkalanıyor. Kahvehanede, meyhanede, çarşıda pazarda, handa hamamda, sokaklarda, vapur- larda, trenlerde, otobüslerde, boy boy, sınıf sınıf, tabaka tabaka, bütün İstanbullu maç, kulüp hastası... Mektepliler, esnaf çıraqları, gazete müvezzileri, manav, sıvacı, kunduracı, terzi, berber, iş adamı, tüccar, memur, işsiz, kopuk, pırpır, külhani, sandalcı, hamal, tellal, kırklık, ellilik, otuzluk, şehbaz yiğit, asker, çocuk, kadın, kız, alim, cahil, ipli ipsiz, kör, şaşı, şehla, sağır, dilsiz, kötürüm, yatalak, akla gelen ve gelmeyen kediler, köpekler, kuşlar, balıklar... Taş toprak her yer her taraf her şey büyük şehrin her teli her zerresi havası suyu hep bununla meşgul...
93	17	Bir genci mahalleden alıp yetiştiriyor, takıma koyuyoruz. Sonra profesyonel kulüpler bu genci cazip tekliflerle elimizden alıyor. Biz teşkilatın üvey evlatlarıyız. Çünkü teşkilat kanunun tam- amen aksine profesyonelleri himaye etmektedir. ... Türkiye'de ama- törlüğün ölüme mahkûm edilmesine mani olmak istiyorlarsa milli lig maçları biletlerine 10'ar kuruş pull ilave etsinler. Yardım pullarından elde edilecek gelir amatör kulüplerin kapılarını spora kapamalarına mâni olacaktır.
97	27	[Kulüpler] Beden Terbiyesi Mithatpaşa Stadı'nı vermez diye mi korkuyorlar dersiniz? Profesyonel ligdeki baştan sıra alan üç kulüp el ele verselerdi Mithatpaşa Stadı gibi bir abide değil; fakat dü- nyanın en büyük spor merkezlerinde çok revaçta olan üstü açık tribünlü yahut bir kısmı üstü tahta ile kapatılmış Londra'nın yüz bin kişilik Wembley, Belgrad'ın 60 bin kişilik Partizan, Viyana'nın bir o kadar seyircilik Prater, Paris'in keza Colombe Stadı gibi çoktan bir stad yapabilirlerdi.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
98	28	Lig maçları hasılatları kulüp idarecilerini sevindiredursun, bizler de futbola karşı alakanın gittikçe artmakta olduğunu görüyor ve bu bakımdan neşeleniyoruz. Birkaç sene evveline kadar, ancak kapı, gişe masraflarını karşılamaya bile kifayet etmeyen bazı maçların hasılatları şimdi idarecilerin ceplerini şişirmektedir. İstanbulspor – Emniyet maçı Şeref Stadi’nda 600 küsur liralık hasılat yaptı... Bütün kaynakları karıştırın, bakın, her iki takımın birbiriyle yaptığı hiçbir maçta bu kadar bilet satılmamıştır. Pazar günü Mithatpaşa stadından elde edilen hasılat ise, Galatasaray – Beykoz karşılaşmaları hasılatlarının rekoru idi. 14.534 seyirci evvelce en mühim maçlara bile zor gelirdi.
100	35	Zarifçiler... Demciler... Getir oradan bir çay, ama boyasız tarafından olsun... Haydi şekerciler... Dün gece saat 22:30’dan sabaha kadar Dolmabahçe stadının önünde bu sesleri dinledik. Buranın da kendine göre bir edebiyatı var. ‘Zarifçiler’, ‘demciler’, çay içenlere aid sözler. Ya ‘şekerciler’ de ne oluyor bilir misiniz? Bunun için (N) tribününe sapan köşeyi dönmek kafi. Bir parke taşının üzerine yerleştirilmiş iki mumun titrek ışığı altında beş on kişi toplanmışlar, barbut atıyorlar. Duhuliye gişesinin turnikelerine serpilmiş meraklılar, yere serdikleri gazete kağıdlarının üzerine uzanmış sabahı bekliyorlar. Onlar maçı bekliyorlar; etraflarına sıralanmış seyyar satıcılar da onları... Etrafta 40 satıcı varsa, bunun onu köfteci. Sıra sıra semaverlerde de çaylar demleniyor. Maamafih en iyi ticaret palamut tavaında. Gırla gidiyor. Saatler ilerledikçe satıcıların adedi ve nev’i de artıyor. Sal-epçi, simitçi, börekçi, tatlıcı, mandalinacı ve nihayet tombalacılar... Etraf bunların sesleriyle çınlıyor. Soğuğa karşı da care bulundu. Kucak kucak tahtalarla öbek öbek ateşler yakılıyor...
103	44	Bu büyük kulüpler beden terbiyesi teşkilatının her nimetinden istifade ederler. Yüz bin lirayı aşan hasılatları ve on binleri aşan beden terbiyesi yardımları ile istedikleri gibi hareket eden kulüplerin yanında mesela Emniyet gibi on bini bulmayan bir hasılat temin eden ve 3 bin lira gibi yardım gören bir kulüp de vardır. Hele Emniyet geçen sene Dolmabahçe stadının yüzünü dahi görmemiştir. (...) Her şeyden evvel profesyonel futbolumuzun kalkınmasını istiyorsak hakkaniyet ile hareket etmek mecburiyetindeyiz.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
113	76	Ankara'da havalisi esnafı ortaya sermaye artmadan itibar ve kredi ile iş görerek zararsız bir Pazar kurmuştur. Ancak Ankara'da askeri firmaların bir miktar ithalat yapabilmesine mukabil sivil firmalar yalnız İstanbul'a ihracatla meşgul olabilmişlerdi... İzmir'e gelince: Bermutat mühim ihracat yapmış ve en güzide mallarını İstanbul'a sevketmiş vaziyettedir.
134	45	Son Galatasaray-Fener maçı 50 senelik futbol tarihimizde kaydedilmeyen emsalsiz bir alaka ve heyecan havası içinde geçti. Maç oynanmış, aradan günler geçmiştir; heyecanı hala devam ediyor. Gazetelerdeki sütunlar dolusu neşriyatın sonu gelmiş değildir. Her türlü tasavvur ve tahmin hudutlarını aşan genç, yaşlı sporcu olsun olmasın yüz binlerce insanı meşgul eden Pazar günkü maçı Türk futbolünde yeni bir çığırın başlangıcı, dikkate değer bir hadise olarak vasıflandırıyoruz. Mithatpaşa stadı müsait olmuş olsaydı, maçı görmeğe gelenlerin sayısı 25 bin değil belki iki üç misli artacaktı.
137-8	58	1905-6 senesinde aidat toplamazdık. Defterler de tutulmazdı. Beliren her ihtiyacı karşılamak için para toplanır ve lazım olan miktar elde edilinceye kadar iade kesilirdi. 1907'de aidat toplanmaya başlandı. Ve cetvel halinde kağıtlara kaydedildi. Defter kaydına 1908'den yani meşrutiyetin ilanından itibaren tesadüf ediyoruz. Esasen ondan evvel defter tutmak çok ihtiyatsız bir hareket olurdu. 1909'da umumi senelik varidatımız bir lira doksan kuruş, umumi masraflarımız da bir lira yetmiş altı kuruş olmuştu. Hayat o zaman ne kadar ucuz olursa olsun bu küçücük rakam işe ne kadar aşağıdan başladığımızın maddi ölçüsüdür. 1911'de defter intizama girdi ve ilk defa tahsilat ve masraf rakamı yüz lirayı aşarak yüz doksan altı lira bir kuruş otuz para oldu. Bin lirayı ancak 1921'de yani kulübün kurulduğundan 16 sene sonra geçebildik. O sene umumi varidat üç bin doksan sekiz seksen kuruş, umumi masraf da üç bin beş yüz yirmi bir lira seksen iki kuruş olmuştur. 10 bin liralık rakamı ilk defa 1935 senesinde yani kulübümüz otuz yaşında iken aşmışız. O seneki umum varidatı 12422 lira 36 kuruş olmuş spor için 2590 lira 32 kuruş sarf etmişiz. İdari masraflar için de 11 408 lira 3 kuruş ödemişiz.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
139	62	Şimdiye kadar yapılan milli temaslarda bile d�nk� Beşiktaş Fen- erbah�e ma�ı derecesinde alaka �eken ve seyirci toplayan bir karşılaşmaya şahit olmamıştık. Dolmabah�e Stadi'nin en dar boşluğu bile seyirciler tarafından tamamen doldurulduktan maada kapılarının �n�nde on binlerce meraklı ma�ın neticesini bekledi. Taşkışla ve Teknik �niversite'nin �nleri, Ma�ka sırtları ve sahayı g�ren her yer son derece kalabalıktı. Bundan ba�ka Gazhanenin kapıları kırılarak k�m�r yığınlarının �st� ve fabrika binalarının damları, duhuliyesiz seyirciler tarafından istila edilmi�ti.
144-5	80	Son g�nlerde futbol ve futbolcuları reklam vasıtası yapanlar �o�aldı. Bazı firmalar –g�ya- Amerikanvari ilanlar ne�rederek, bilmem hangi takımların birbirleriyle oynadıkları ma�ta ilk gol� çıkaracak olan oyuncuya radyo, saat vesaire gibi hediyeler vadetmeye, bazı i���zar spor yazarları da ��hret olmu� futbolcularla g�r��erek o m�sabakada ilk gol� atıp atamayacağını a�zından ��renip mensup oldukları gazetelerin s�tunlarını doldurmakta ve sanki b�ylece bir marifet eylemektedirler. Şimdiye kadar pek �ok �e�idini g�rd���m reklam us�llerinde bir firmanın karı i�in elalemi mutazarrır ve bir cemiyetin –kul�b�n- makedderatına tesir eden ve bir futbolcuyu takımına faydalı olmaktan uzakla�tırıp �ahsile�tiren bu nevi �ıkarı do�rusu g�rmemi�tim. İlk gol� atana radyo. G�zel...
148-9	98	Avrupa'yı misal alalım: İtalya, İngiltere, İsve�, İsvi�re, Bel�ika, Fransa, Almanya ve Avusturya'da toto yıllardan beri tatbik edilmekte ve bu memleketleri spor tesisleri cephesinden ihya etmi� bulunmaktadır. Halbuki bizde spor tesislerine Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu m�vacehesinde yapılan yıllık yardım �ok c�zidir. Hazine, mahalli idare ve m�sabaka hasılatları yoluyla yapılan yardım 700- 800 bin lira civarındadır. Hal b�yle olunca T�rkiye �apında bir sportif kalkınmayı ancak bahsi ��sterek imk�n dahiline koyabilir.
162	34	Sarı kırmızılı formayla �ıktı�ım ma�ta Beşiktaş'a kar�ı m�cadele ettim. O karşılaşma �ncesinde Beşiktaş trib�n� tarafından �a�ırıldım ve elimi kalbime g�t�rerek siyah beyazlı taraftara olan ba�lılı�ımı ifade ettim. Daha sonra Galatasaray trib�nleri tarafarın- dan selamlanmak i�in �a�ırıldı�ımda ise sarı kırmızılı trib�ne aya�ımı g�sterdim. Bu demek oluyor ki ben sadece bu kul�pte futbol i�in varım Beşiktaş'a ise kalbimle ba�lıyım. Yaptı�ım bu ha- reketten dolayı iki takımın trib�nleri aya�a kalkıp beni alkışladılar.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
164	40	Profesyonellik, sporun meslek edinilmesidir. ... (Sporcu) hangi kulüpte fazla para bulursa oraya geçmenin yollarını arar ki, bu da sporun beklediği beraberlik, beraber yaşama ve beraber muvaffak olma, ananeye bağlılık kendini yetiştiren ana kulübe sadakat gibi pek güzel hasletlerin de ortadan kalkmasına sebep olacağından sporun hakiki gayesi tamamen ortadan kalkmış (olur).
165-6	47	Spor yazarlarımıza gelince; daha hayatın ne demek olduğunu kavrayamamış ... toy çocukları birkaç maçta güzel oynadı ve hatta kulüp taraftarlarının alkışlarını kazandı diye öyle bir şişiriyorlar ki bu oyuncu derhal meşhur ve maruf bir futbolcu olup çıkıyor. Yıldız payesi ile isimlendirilen bu çocuğun günlük hayatı, ne yediği içtiği, sevdiği sahifeleri dolduran röportajlarla ... ilan ediliyor. Ve bu çocuk da ben ne imişim de haberim yok kanaati ile cemiyetimize şımarık bir uzuv olarak katılıyor.
167	53	Her şey gibi klas futbolcu anlayışı da değişti: Büyük bir maçı, yani günümüzün stat ilahlarını seyrederken Fenerbahçeli Alaeddin'i düşünmüştüm: Ben onun üç beş metre kare içerisinde topla dakikalarca oynadığını bilirim. Karşısındaki oyuncuların beyni dönerdi ve Taksim'in artık tarihe karışan -kışla avlusundan muhavvel-stadyomunu dolduran seyirciler keyiften bayılırlardı. Alaeddin klas bir futbolcu idi. Fakat şimdi onun bir ikinci nüshası gelse, kaderi ıslıklanmak, yuhalanmak, bir iki denemeden sonra da takımdan atılmak olurdu. ... Zira futbol anlayışı artık değişti: Şimdi uzun paslar, top tutmamak ve on sekiz yakınlarında kazanılan her pozisyonda şüt. Yani ve kısacası tribünler gol istiyor, gol.
170	60	Bir futbol takımının başarısı, yani maçlarda zaferi, lig şampiyonu olması, yabancı takımlarla maçları kazanması için ne futbolcu ne antrenör önemliydi; bunlardan çok daha önemli üç şey gerekiyordu. Kurnaz bir idareci, iktidardaki partinin çok ileri gelenlerinden birini kulübe başkan yapmak, bir de zenginleri kulübün delisi haline getirmek... Bu üçü bir araya geldi mi, futbolcunun da antrenörün de en iyileri bulunur ve takım başarıdan başarıya koşardı.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
172	64	Kendini bilmez seyircilerin söz ve hareketle yapagelmekte oldukları taarruz son günlerde yepyeni fakat çok münasebetsiz bir şekil almış bulunuyor. Bu şekil, bir takım galiz ve edepsiz sözlerin bez veya mukavva levhalara yazılıp direklerle talik edilerek tribünlerde teşhir edilmesidir. Ağza alınmayacak kadar ayıp ve iğrenç kelimelerin umumi bir yer olan stadyumda levhalar halinde alenen teşhir olunması en revaçta spor şubesi olan futbolun temaşasını kötüleyecektir. Bu bir tarafa spor seyri için sahalara gelen gençlerin de terbiye ve ahlaklarını bozacağından alakalıların derhal bir tedbir ittihaz ederek ve haya duygularını rencide eden bu gibi hareketleri önlemeleri lazımdır.
180-1	106	Biz İkinci Kümeden Birinci Kümeye yeni geçtik. Daha açık konuşayım. Biz Mithatpaşa'da henüz misafiriz. Galatasaray ise bu yerin 15 yıllık sahibidir. Ona bu sebeple kendi yerini bırakacağız. Hatta kolaylık olsun diye bazı tertibat almış bulunuyoruz. Galatasaraylılara yerlerini işaret eden kartondan büyük oklar yaptırdık. Ayrıca onlara yer sahipleri olduğunu anlatan dövizler hazırladık. Ben temsilci olarak, Galatasaray'ın efendi ve son derece sportmen ve hassas taraftarı Karıncaezmez Şevki'yi makamında ziyaret edeceğim. Onu lider tanıdığımız için kendisine Galatasaraylılara olan muhabbetimizin bir cemilesi olarak çok sevdiği sarı-kırmızılı renklerden yapılmış bir buket vereceğim.
183-4	117	Spor servisi bizim kattadır. Fıkracıların odaları bu salona açılır. Yani ister istemez futbol dinleriz. Futbolla güler, futbolla coşarız. Futbolla doluyuz. Yediğimiz içtiğimiz futbolla olacak neredeyse. Bütün gün telefonlar işler. Haberler gelir gider. ... Yenildi, yendi. Bahisler, iddialar, tahminler... Havada bir çift rakam eser: 3-0, 5-2, 6-2... "Gol"lerde yüzeriz. Bazen, gazete, futbolun yüzü suyu hürmetine çıkıyor sanırsınız. ... Ben futbolcuları, ben futbol müptelalarını kıskanıyorum. Koca sahifeyi dolduran fotoğraflara bakarım. Futbolcunun lokmasını çiğneyişinden bir yan bakışına, kaş çatışına kadar hepsi bir hadisedir. Hepsi de bu sahifededir. Bu memlekette başka şey sevenler yok mu? Haydi ilim, kuru, asık yüzlüdür diyelim. Ya sanat? Basın alev alev yanan bir iptilaya körük olacağına biraz da başka heyecanlara ışık tutsa olmaz mı?
185	125	Spor dün hakikaten iyi idi. Çünkü gazeteler bu işten hiç bahsetmez, kulaktan kulağa yayılan spor da kendi çerçevesi içinde yapılır seyredilir geçer giderdi. Bugün memlekette spor o kadar öldü ki siyasi gazeteler ilanlarını atıp sporun reklamını yapmaya başladılar.

Page	Note	Original Turkish text
186	129	İstanbul'daki ilgiye muvazi olarak Anadolu'da da büyük spor sevgisi artmıştır. Tabiatıyla şehrimiz haricindeki vatandaşlarımız bu arzularını ancak radyolarının başında maçları dinleyerek giderebiliyorlar. Anadolu'da bulunduğumuz sıralarda sırf herkesin bu neşriyatlardan istifadesi olsun diye yalnızca gece işleyen belediye elektrik santrallerinin gündüz de faaliyete geçirildiğine ve halkın evlerden kahvehanelerden halkevlerinden hararetle bu temasları dinlediğine çok kere şahit olduk.
187-8	134	İstanbul radyosuna kavuştuğumuz zaman ne kadar sevinmiştik. Fakat kurulduğu günden bugüne kadar spor severleri tatmin etmediğini görmekle üzüntü içindeyiz. İstanbul'da hafta arasında yapılan maçların neticelerini Ankara radyosundan ancak gece yarısına doğru öğrenebiliyoruz. ... Anadolu'nun dört bucağında memleketimizin spor kalbi mertebesinde bulunan İstanbul haberlerini anbean heyecanla bekleyenlerin hislerini anlayamamak bugünkü İstanbul radyosunun durumunu doğurmuştur.
196	1	İşimi bitirdim. Kapının önünden bir cenaze geçiyor, toplandım. Tabutun üstündeki Galatasaray bayrağını görünce anladım. Galatasaray ölmüş, gömmeğe götürüyorlar. Sportif adımlarla ilerleyen tabuta bakarken yanıma tanımadığım biri sokuldu. - Şu hale ne dersiniz beyefendi? - Ne diyeyim? Şaka yapıyorlar, şaka... - Onu sormuyorum efendim. Galatasaray'ın kaybetmesine ne dersiniz? - Ben mi? Bilmem... Ben gazetenin spor kadrosunda değilim. - Ne çıkar efendim, ben spor muharriri miyim? Köşede marul satıyorum.

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