

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE PERIPHERY?  
THE CASE OF THE RPP OF TURKEY

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study the entry of social democracy to the political agenda in Turkey. It examines the political context of this process. In the analysis of this process, the dissertation scrutinizes political developments within the RPP and inner party struggles for the left of center. However, it focuses on the influence of the newly emerging left movements on the Republican People's Party, and conceptualizes this influence as the primary reason for Republican People's Party's position change. The relations between those actors and the influence of the newly emerging left on the RPP's coming to the left of center position is shown via three widely debated issues of the period, land reform, anti-imperialism and anti-americanism and planned development. The research was based on primary sources, among which were official party documents and reports, documents of the actors on the left, newspaper reports, journals of the period. The conclusions reached in the dissertation are as follows: There was a difference between the historical trajectories of social democratic movements in Western Europe and in the periphery. In the periphery, the questions pertaining to economic development were more significant than class-related ones. So in this dissertation, it is claimed that the absence of European type of social democratic formations in Turkey can be traced back to the political developments around the adoption of a left of center position by the RPP in the 1960s.

## ÖZET

Bu tez sosyal demokrasinin Türkiye siyasi gündemine girmesi üzerine bir çalışmadır. Bu sürecin siyasal bağlamı bu tezde ele alınmıştır. Tezde bu süreç analiz edilirken CHP içindeki gelişmeler ve parti içinde ortanın solu mücadelesi incelenmiştir. Ancak bu dönemde doğmakta olan sol hareketlerin CHP üzerine etkileri üzerine odaklanılmıştır ve bu etkiler CHP'nin pozisyonunun değişmesinin en önemli sebebi olarak kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Bu aktörler arasındaki ilişkiler ve yeni doğmakta olan solun CHP üzerindeki etkisi dönemin yoğun biçimde tartışılan üç konusu üzerinden gösterilmiştir. Bu konular toprak reformu; anti-emperyalizm ve anti-Amerikanizm ve planlı kalkınmadır. Araştırma üzerinde çalışılan dönemin birincil kaynaklarına dayanmaktadır. CHP'nin resmi belgeleri ve raporları, dönemin soldaki aktörlerinin belgeleri ve raporları, döneme ilişkin önemli süreli yayınlar tezde geniş biçimde kullanılmıştır. Tezin ulaştığı bulguların başında Batı Avrupa'da ve çevre ülkelerinde sosyal demokrat hareketlerin tarihsel yörüngelerinin farklı olduğu gelmektedir. Çevre ülkelerinde, gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerin tam tersine, ekonomik kalkınma ile ilişkili konular toplumsal sınıf ile ilgili konulara göre daha belirleyicidir. Bu nedenle tezde Türkiye'de Avrupa tipi sosyal demokrat oluşumların eksikliğinin kökenlerinin CHP'nin 1960'lı yıllarda ortanın solunu benimsenmesiyle sonuçlanan siyasal gelişmelerde aranması gerektiği iddia edilmektedir.

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## PREFACE

Social democracy as a working class movement emerged in the nineteenth century, and it achieved a phenomenal success in the twentieth century. However, the electoral and organizational success of social democracy, for a major part of the twentieth century, was limited to Europe. What, then, can we say about social democracy in the rest of the world? Could social democratic labor movements be successful beyond Europe? Could social democracy survive only in Europe? This dissertation seeks to answer these questions in the context of the Turkish experiment in social democracy, as a peripheral country.

In Turkey, the founder party of the republic, the Republican People's Party, or RPP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), started to identify itself as a political party standing on the left of center in the political spectrum in the mid-1960s. In Turkish political historiography, this event generally has been assessed as the beginning of the social democratic movement in Turkey. In fact, the history of the RPP was not harmonious for a transformation to social democracy. Until the 1960s, the RPP did not have any social democratic features. Moreover, it had always been hostile to the political left. Why did such a party identify itself as standing on the left center? Why did the RPP choose a social democratic orientation in the 1960s? These are the main questions for this dissertation.

To write a dissertation on this issue directly meant working with two different literatures at the same time, those of Turkish political history, and social democracy in general.

Although the RPP was one of the most important actors in Turkish politics during the Republican era, the academic literature on the RPP is remarkably limited. The scholars of modern Turkish history have not extensively analyzed the place of the RPP in Turkish politics, and the limited number of contributions are of a very descriptive character. While there is a large academic and non-academic literature on the history of the Turkish left, the RPP rarely figures in these analyses. Hence, the history of the RPP and that of the left generally remain separate in Turkish political writing. This dissertation presents a dynamic analysis of the RPP's transformation and the influence of the left on the transformation in question.

Second, this study aims to contribute to the academic literature on social democracy. I do not approach social democracy as a universal finished project. Social democracy is reconstructed in the peculiarity of every country and historical formation. However, the academic literature on the history of social democracy and analytical approaches to it provide important insights for the analysis of every case. This dissertation makes a contribution to this literature through the analysis of the Turkish experiment in social democracy as a peripheral country. In this context, the word "periphery" is used to designate less developed capitalist countries outside Europe.

This study is based mainly on primary sources for the period under study. The documents and publications of the RPP in this era were used as the primary sources for the analysis of the RPP. All election declarations, booklets, printed resolutions, programs, statutes, RPP Research Bureau reports, reports of the Party Assembly that

were presented to the Congress and all printed and archived documents of the party were examined. The secondary actors after the RPP for my work were the Workers Party of Turkey, or the WPT (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP*); the *Yön* (direction) movement; and the illegal Communist Party of Turkey, or the CPT (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP*). For the WPT, the program, the speeches of the party chairman and party spokespersons, the weekly of the party *Sosyal Adalet* (Social Justice) were used. The *Yön* movement published a weekly journal in this period named after itself, *Yön*. The whole collection of this journal was scanned for the dissertation. Articles from the CPT's journals, the resolutions and reports of the party and party administrators were collected in edited books by the Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları Vakfı, TUSTAV*). The materials in these books were used as primary sources for the CPT.

The whole collection of the daily *Milliyet* for the analysis period was investigated. The daily *Cumhuriyet* and the official newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*, were partially used in the dissertation as well. The important journals of the period, *Akis* and *Forum*, also were scanned for the analysis. Official materials like the records of the National Assembly and Constituent Assembly and government programs of the era also were used.

Last, several books, articles and memoirs related to the dissertation topic were used as secondary sources. In this framework, the first chapter on the delayed emergence of social democracy in Turkey and the second chapter which is about social democracy, are based on secondary sources such as academic and non-academic books and articles on the topic and the memoirs of important politicians.

The dissertation is organized in four main chapters and a conclusion chapter. The introduction is about the reasons for the delayed emergence of social democracy

in Turkey. Before 1960, there were no social democratic parties or organizations worthy of mention. The reasons for this situation will be discussed in this chapter. In this part, first the early RPP, the regime it established and its economic and social perspective will be scrutinized. Then the suppression of the left until the 1960s will be examined.

In the second chapter, social democracy within its historical and analytical dimensions will be analyzed. This chapter first will portray the evolution of social democratic parties. Then analytical approaches to social democracy will be evaluated. Last, the place of social democracy in peripheral countries and different trajectories of European and peripheral social democratic movements will be discussed.

The third chapter is about the making of the new political regime after the 1960 coup d'état and the RPP's inner account in the transformation era. First, a political backdrop of the period will be provided. For this reason, the making of the new regime and the role of the RPP in this process, the presence of the military in politics and last, the parties, elections and governments of the period will be discussed. Then the RPP's quest for a new direction will be evaluated in the context of the inner party struggles and the party's position concerning the working class movement and the legal right to strike. This chapter gives an inside look at the RPP's coming to the left of center in the first half of the 1960s.

The fourth chapter is about the actors on the left and their relations and influences on the RPP. As pointed out above, the actors on the left in this dissertation's analysis era were the Workers Party of Turkey, the *Yön* movement and the illegal Communist Party of Turkey in exile. First, the emergence of the left after the 1960 coup d'état and the position of the new regime with respect to the newly

emerging left will be discussed. Then the main characteristics of the actors on the left and those actors' position on the working class movement of the period will be assessed. Second, the relations between the RPP and the actors on the left were taken in hand via discussing the positions and perspectives of the actors on left about the RPP. Last, the three widely debated issues of the period, land reform, anti-Americanism and anti-imperialist rhetoric, and planned development will be scrutinized as the parameters of the relationship between the left and the RPP.

Last in the conclusion chapter, the main claims of the dissertation and its results are discussed.

The main focus of the dissertation is not whether the RPP has been social democratic or; neither is it to present a chronological history of Turkish social democracy. What the dissertation aims is to explore the political context of the process through which social democracy has come on the political agenda in Turkey. In this context, this dissertation is a study on the formation of the one of the two main political currents of Turkish parliamentary politics. It examines the RPP's coming to the left of center by highlighting the importance of its relations with the political left. In this framework, the main temporal focus of the study is the period when the RPP has come to position itself on the left of center. Therefore, the dissertation covers the era between the launch of the 27 May 1960 coup d'état and the 1966 Congress of the Republican People's Party, during which the left of center position was officially accepted.

From the 1960s to the present, the RPP has oscillated between a social democratic position and its historical roots in the early republican single party regime. This dissertation examines this oscillation that marks the making of a different trajectory of social democracy in a peripheral country.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION:

#### THE DELAYED EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

The Republican People's Party emerged just after the National Independence War. To the end of the Second World War, it governed the country as a single party. The authoritarian policies that were conducted by the party also were affected by the authoritarian regimes of the inter-war era. The regime of the RPP did not allow political organizations on the left wing or organized working class activities. Thus the party generally is considered within the context of the interwar era's authoritarian parties. Interestingly, the party started to define itself on the left of center in the mid-1960s.

The RPP's redefining itself on the left of center in 1965 was a very significant change for the party. In this era, western social democracy had become one of the main references of the RPP. However, in the previous years, the party had not had any direct relation with social democracy. Social democracy had not been able to become an important political power in Turkey in these years.

In fact, there had been several attempts to construct social democratic movements. However, those who made the attempts failed. In the following chapters, the question of why the RPP came to the left of center in the 1960s will be discussed.



However this question is also crucial as why social democracy did not become an important political power in Turkey before the 1960s. Thus this introduction chapter of the dissertation focuses on this question.

To answer such a question in a unique way is not possible. It is obvious that the industrial working class was underdeveloped in quantitative and organizational terms in those years. However, apart from class structural reasons, several historical constraints caused social democracy's late arrival on the Turkish political agenda. These constraints emerged for two reasons.

The first one is about the early stages of the RPP. In the single party era, under the RPP rule, there was an authoritarian administration that suspended many rights and freedoms, most precisely the right to organize. No political or social movement, including social democracy, was able to organize under those circumstances. Thus the first part of this chapter will be on the main characteristics of the early RPP and the regime it established.

The second constraint is directly related to the first one. It is the suppression of the left. Apart from short democratic periods, the political left and organized labor movements were legally banned in Turkey. Socialist, social democratic or communist organizations were suppressed until the 1960s. Therefore the historical background for the lack a left movement in other words the suppression of the left to the 1960s will be taken in hand in this part.

## The RPP in the Early Republican Period

The RPP emerged as the political organization of the National Independence War.<sup>1</sup> After the war, it became the main apparatus of the establishment of the single-party rule. The single-party regime that prevailed from 1925 to 1946 did not allow any organized political activity during this period. The story of the Republican People's Party (as the main carrier of social democratic principles after 1960s) to the end of Second World War would become an appropriate introduction for a better understanding of the Turkish case. So this part analyzes the structure, organization and development of the party. On the other hand it ascertains the character of the regime in the single-party period.

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<sup>1</sup> Although the RPP has been one of the central actors in Turkish politics for more than eighty years, the literature on the history of the RPP is limited. For years, Suna Kili's book *1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler: Siyaset Bilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme* was the only academic study that covered the story of the main cornerstones for the RPP. Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler : Siyaset Bilimi Açısından bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976). This book was written with an old modernization perspective. The Republican People's Party's quest for center left was evaluated as the natural outcome of the modernization project. Two general histories of the RPP are worth mentioning. The first one, Fahir Giritlioğlu's *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*. (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965). The second one is Hikmet Bila's *CHP Tarihi* which had several editions. Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-2009* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008). Although these two books are non-academic in character, they are useful to understanding the long historical evolution of the party. In recent years, two Ph.D. dissertations written by political scientists are also important. The first is by Hasan Bulent Kahraman entitled "The Making and the Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies." (PhD Dissertation: Bilkent University, 1999). And the second one is Sinan Ciddi's *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2008). Although these two works are political science studies, the writers have approached the topic from its historical background. Thus the history of the RPP came onto the agenda indirectly.

## The Emergence of the RPP

The RPP was the political and organizational continuation of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (ADRAR). This association has a key role in modern Turkish history because it organized the early stages of the national independence war. Then in 1927, the First Congress of the RPP announced the congress as the second congress of the party.<sup>2</sup> According to the congress resolution, the first congress of the RPP had been convened in 1919 in the city of Sivas as the ADRAR Congress.<sup>3</sup> This resolution reflected a point of view that was very common for the RPP and new political elite of the country,<sup>4</sup> that the national independence war was the main provider of legitimacy for the new political elite.

Turkish historical writing on the national independence war and early republican period has been dominated by Mustafa Kemal's *Great Speech* that was delivered in 1927 Congress of the RPP.<sup>5</sup> With the first sentence of the Great Speech "I landed at Samsun on the 19<sup>th</sup> May, 1919,"<sup>6</sup> Mustafa Kemal asserted that he had

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<sup>2</sup> For the congress, see Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), p. 68-73.

<sup>3</sup> Mustafa Kemal led two congresses before the establishment of the National Assembly. The first one was the Erzurum Congress that was convened in July 1919. The Erzurum Congress was a regional congress that covers the Eastern Anatolian Defense of Right Association. The Sivas Congress was held in September 1919, and it was a national congress.

<sup>4</sup> Hakkı Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayın, 1999), p.67.

<sup>5</sup> For the English edition, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal* (Leipzig: K: F. Koehler, 1929). *Speech* has become the main source for the historical works on the period. The critical assessments on the *Great Speech* or using unofficial materials like memoirs have been very uncommon for Turkish historiography.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.9.

initiated the National War with his landing at Samsun, a city in northern Anatolia.<sup>7</sup> For Mustafa Kemal, he carried a “national secret” that foresaw the organization of a national war and then to found a national state as “To summarise what I have been saying, I may add that it was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organisation, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and in the future of the nation and which I kept to myself in my own consciousness as a national secret.”<sup>8</sup> So ADRAR became the first organization to implement this secret.<sup>9</sup> This perspective became the official and academic narrative of the historical writing on the Turkish National Independence War and its organization.

ADRAR was essentially a federation of associations that was organized throughout the Anatolian and Thracian territories of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>10</sup> ADRAR defined itself as an Ottoman patriotic, Islamist organization and claimed independence from all political party activities.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the ADRAR was basically composed of the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress. Mustafa Kemal described this situation as follows:

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<sup>7</sup> For a critical reading of the Great Speech, see Cemil Koçak. “Nutuk ve Diğerleri,” in *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 173-199; Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk’ün Nutuk’u* vol.1 (İstanbul : İletisim Yayınları, 1994).

<sup>8</sup> Atatürk, p.20.

<sup>9</sup> However a revisionist thesis has been put forward by Erik Jan Zürcher that points to the importance of the CUP and its cadres in the national struggle. In other words, he points at the continuity rather than change from the constitutional Ottoman Empire to Republican Turkey. See Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: the Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984).

<sup>10</sup> Mete Tunçay. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999), p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

Formerly, anyway, many of us were among the founders and members of this association (CUP). Adherents of this association, which vanished into history by the decision of its last congress, and many of the members of the subsequent Renovation Party (*Teceddüd Fırkası*) attended or adhered to ADRAR founded with great efforts and dedication and they (adherents of the CUP and the members of the Renovation Party) accepted the program of this association (ADRAR).<sup>12</sup>

After the foundation of the national assembly in Ankara in 1920, groupings and group alignments began in the parliament. As a principle of the Sivas Congress, the assembly would avoid political party activities. However, political groupings as a result of parliamentary politics occurred in the assembly. There were basically five groups, the Solidarity Group (*Tesanüt Grubu*), the Independence Group (*İstiklal Grubu*), the Group of the Defense of Rights (*Müdafa-i Hukuk Zümresi*), the Reform Group (*Islahat Grubu*) and the People's Group (*Halk Zümresi*).<sup>13</sup> However in the spring of 1921, the activities of those political groups were ended. Mustafa Kemal led the establishment of the Group of the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.

The group of the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia was established on 15 May 1921, with 261 of 351 MPs. This group worked as a political party group in the parliament.<sup>14</sup> The other remaining 90 MPs formed the opposition to Mustafa Kemal administration. Most of the opponent deputies established a new group in July 1922 named the Second Group of the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia

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<sup>12</sup> Vaktiyle zaten birçoğumuz o cemiyetin müessis ve azasından bulunuyorduk. Son kongresi kararıyla tarihe intikal eden mezkûr cemiyetin müntesipleriyle bilahare teşekkül eden Teceddüt Fırkası mensuplarının kısm-ı küllisi büyük milletimizin azm-i bülendinden doğan ARMHC'ne iştirak veya iltihak etmiş ve bu cemiyetin programını kabul eylemiştir. Ibid., p.28.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.35. In addition to that groups two political parties also has been established. Those parties were Turkey Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Fırkası*) and Turkey People's Socialist Party (*Türkiye Halk İştirakuyun Fırkası*).

<sup>14</sup> Ahmet Demirel. *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet: İkinci Grup* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995), p, 223.

and Rumelia or the Second Group.<sup>15</sup> Now there were two unofficial political parties in the National Assembly.

In August 1922, Turkish military forces initiated an offensive that was called the Great Offensive (*Büyük Taarruz*) and the occupying Greek army was forced out of Anatolia. After the conclusion of the Armistice, peace negotiations began in Lausanne. The activities and power of the political opposition in the first parliament disturbed Mustafa Kemal about the ratification of the peace treaty. The First Group of Mustafa Kemal was not enough to control the decisions of the assembly. So at the end of 1922, he announced the intention of establishing a political party after the conclusion of the peace treaty with the words “after consolidation of peace, I have the intention to form a political party bearing the name ‘People’s Party’ that will be based on the principle of populism.”<sup>16</sup>

In April 1923, the National Assembly took the decision to renew the elections. The Lausanne Peace Treaty was to be ratified by the assembly. However, Mustafa Kemal was worried about the decision of the assembly because of the national borders issue and the future of the city of Mosul.<sup>17</sup> He discussed this situation in *Speech* as follows “the opposition in the Assembly wanted to use the Peace question as a means for giving free course to their passion. A certain section of

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<sup>15</sup> Generally in Turkish historiography this group was defined as a reactionary political group. However, critical works on the period assert that the Second Group was established against the personal administration of Mustafa Kemal in the first parliament. See Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet* and Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*. Ahmet Demirel describes the basic issues of conflict between the First Group and Second Group before the formation of the Second Group as the function and commitments of the government, use of the Assembly power, the Law of Supreme Command, the method of candidate determination in the elections of the deputies, the objectivity of the President of the Assembly Board, the Independence Courts, basic rights and freedoms. Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet*, p. 233.

<sup>16</sup> Giritlioğlu, pp. 27-28  
“Sulhun istikrarını müteakip Halkçılık esaslı üzerine müstenit ve Halk Fırkası namıyla siyasi bir fırka teşkil etmek niyetindeyim”

<sup>17</sup> Tunçay, p.42.

the Press took the trouble to stir up these passions with an astounding ardor. It was evident that it would be difficult to arrive at a solution of the Peace question in an Assembly in such a frame of mind; this was indeed very sad by the way.”<sup>18</sup>

Mustafa Kemal as the head of the ADRAR issued an election declaration titled “the Nine Principles” (*Dokuz Umde*). In this declaration he reiterated that in the new assembly, he would form the People’s Party and the ADRAR group in the assembly would change into the People’s Party. In addition, the party program would be issued in 1931 and to this date this Nine Principles served as the party program.<sup>19</sup>

The candidates were determined and the elections were strictly controlled by Mustafa Kemal. The candidates of the Second Group had no success in these elections. After the convention of the assembly, a party statute was prepared and on 9 September 1923 it was approved by the party group. Two days later, the founders applied for the foundation of the party. The first party administrative board was composed of Mustafa Kemal (President), Ismet İnönü (Deputy President), Recep Peker (Secretary General) and eight other members of the party board.<sup>20</sup> Although the party was founded in 11 September 1923 with a petition to the ministry of the interior affairs, the foundation day of RPP was determined as 9 September, that is, the date of approval of the party statute. This day was the anniversary of the end of

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<sup>18</sup> Atatürk, p, 601.

*Muhâlifler, sulh meselesini, Mecliste, ihtirasata vasıta ittihaz etmek istiyorlardı. Efendiler, bazı matbuat da, bu ihtirasatı, şayan-i hayret ve ateşin bir surette, tehalükle körükliyorlardı. Bu halet-i ruhiyede bulunan Meclis ile sulh meselesini intaç etmek müşkül olacağını görmek tabii, fakat mucib-i teessürdü.*

<sup>19</sup> For the text of Nine Principles, see Tunçay, p. 366. Erik Zürcher defines the nine principles as “the nine principles were a concoction of very broad statements on issues like national sovereignty on the one hand, and very specific proposals, designed to win the support of different social groups on the other”. Erik J. Zürcher, “Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: the Role of the People’s Party,” in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Eric J. Zürcher (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.104.

<sup>20</sup> They were Sabit, Celal, Cemil, Refik, Saffet, Münir Hüsrev, Kazım Hüsnü and Zülfü . Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-2009* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), p.37.

the National Independence War, with the liberation of İzmir, 9 September 1922.<sup>21</sup>

Therefore strong reference to the National Independence War was also reflected in the foundation date and foundation anniversaries of the party.

The RPP began to accept members apart from the national assembly in the summer of 1924 summer.<sup>22</sup> One of the main conditions for acceptance to the party was “not having taken a position against the national movement in the war era.” This position against the national movement included membership in the Entente Liberal (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf*) party,<sup>23</sup> had been the main political rival of the nationalists and encouraged a peace treaty in terms of the British demands.

As another example of party’s effort to tie its relation with the National Independence War was a telegram by İsmet İnönü. Just after the foundation of the RPP, the deputy party chair, İnönü, sent an ordinance to the local branches of the ADRAR that declared the conversion of the ADRAR local organizations into the RPP local organizations; “Working for the proper development of the peace period, the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia that liberated the whole country, will change into the People’s Party and all the administrative boards of the Association will continue to serve under the title of People’s Party Administrative Boards.”<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> On the foundation date of the party, see Orhan Özacın, CHP’nin Kuruluş Tarihi Üzerine,” *Tarih ve Toplum*, no.141 (September 1995), pp.4-7.

<sup>22</sup> Mehmet Kabasakal, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Parti Örgütlenmesi (1908-1980)* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1991), p.111.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p.112.

<sup>24</sup> Giritlioğlu, p. 41.

*Bütün vatan için; Halas-ı istiklal getiren Anadolu-Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, sulh devrinin feyizli inkişafatını temine sarf-ı mesai eylemek üzere: bu günden itibaren Halk Fırkasına inkılap edecek ve cemiyetin bütün idare heyetleri, Halk Fırkası idare heyetleri ünvanı ile, ifayı vazifeye devam edeceklerdir.*

For the transition from the ADRAR to the RPP, see İhsan Güneş, “Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti’nden Halk Fırkasına Geçiş,” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no.8 (March 1987), pp.427-442.



Consequently, by the end of 1923, the opposition group in the parliament had been eliminated and the parliament was controlled through the party discipline. However, the radical and moderate wings in the party began to disassociate. The proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923 became the most important turning point, because the republic had been proclaimed without the knowledge of many of the opponents who had been commanders in the national struggle.<sup>25</sup> The corruption claims about the population exchange and later the abolition of the caliphate had central importance in this disassociation process.

At last the new opponents in the assembly formed the Progressive Republican Party on 17 November 1924. The founders of the party were influential military officers like Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay.<sup>26</sup> One week before the foundation of the Progressive Republican Party, the People's Party changed its name to the Republican People's Party. The radical group in the parliament was not pleased with the opponent party; however, they did not block the activities of the new party.<sup>27</sup> Ali Fethi, from the moderate wing of the RPP, replaced Prime Minister İnönü, from the radical wing. Nevertheless the multi-party democracy experiment of Turkey lasted only a few months. A Kurdish uprising in February 1925 ushered in new single-party era that lasted more than twenty years.

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<sup>25</sup> For the rising political tension after the proclamation of the Republic, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Siyasal Muhalefet: Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (1924-1925)*, trans. Gül Çağalı Güven (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), pp, 53-78.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 96-97.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

### The RPP as the Single Party of the Regime

In February 1925, a Kurdish uprising began in southeastern Turkey.<sup>28</sup> The riot continued for two months and according to some records, the government forces had many more casualties in this struggle than it had in the National Independence War.<sup>29</sup> This event became an important turning point for the character of the regime.

The assembly was confused about the policy against the rebellion. The party group of the RPP was divided into two groups, the moderates and radicals. However, the radicals dominated. The moderate Prime Minister, Ali Fethi, was forced to resign after a ballot in the party group of the RPP.<sup>30</sup> A new cabinet was formed by İnönü, from the radical wing of the party. The İnönü cabinet passed a resolution called the Maintenance of Order Act (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) and established two Independence Courts.<sup>31</sup> The first article of the Maintenance of Order Act gave the government the authority to ban any organization, disturbance, incentive, initiative

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<sup>28</sup> The leader of the rioters was Sheikh Said.

<sup>29</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p.141.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.145.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.146. The Independence Courts was founded in the War of National Independence by the introduction of the High Treason Act (*Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu*). For the courts, see Ergün Aybars, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (İstanbul: Ad Kitapçılık, 1998). There are two periods in the history of Independence Courts. In the first period, from 1920 to 1923, these courts primarily dealt with the issues about the war. And in the second period from 1923 to 1927, the courts dealt with political crimes. The legal existence of the Independence Courts prevailed until 1949, although their organization had been removed in 1927. Aybars, p.408. The first aim of the courts was the prevention of the desertion, but gradually it took the missions to prevent the treason, defraudation, espionage, rebellions etc. For the decisions of the court, it did not need any evidences; the court was free to give decision with the conscience of the judges, and the judges had no responsibility for their decisions. At the beginning there is no public prosecutor in the courts, and the judges of the court were not lawyers, they were members of the parliament that were determined with the resolution of the parliament.

and publication if it is considered against the composure, order and security of the country.<sup>32</sup>

After the Maintenance of Order Act, many of the newspapers were closed down by the government. Opponent journalists and intellectuals were put on trial in the Ankara Independence Court. In June 1925, the İnönü government closed down the opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, on the basis of the Maintenance of Order Act. The RPP and its administration were the only political power in the country now.

As a result of the Maintenance of Order Act, all non-governmental organizations, the press and the opposition were placed under the control of the government. The Sheikh Said rebellion was the main reason for the Maintenance of Order Act, but it had greater consequences. İnönü said “Two years ago, the most important event we faced was not the action that emerged with the Sheikh Said rebellion. The real danger was the disorder and ambivalence that derived from the common life of the country.”<sup>33</sup>

After the elimination of the organized opposition and press, the new regime still was not relieved. The regime was suspicious about the opponent Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) politicians. Although many of the politicians of the new regime had CUP backgrounds, a small cadre from the CUP’s core annoyed the new regime. An unsuccessful assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal in İzmir gave the opportunity to eliminate this core group.

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<sup>32</sup> Tunçay, p.146.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 145.

*İki sene evvel karşısında bulunduğumuz hadisin en mühimi Şeyh Said isyanı ile tebarüz eden hareket-i fiiliye değildi. Asıl tehlike, memleketin umumî hayatında hasıl olan teşevvüş ve tezebzüb idi.*

In June 1926, an assassination attempt led by a former member of parliament<sup>34</sup> was uncovered in İzmir. The suspects were quickly arrested. Two independence courts were established, in İzmir and Ankara. In the İzmir independence court trials, the assassins and former officers of the Progressive Republican Party stood trial. In the Ankara independence court, former officers of CUP were trialed. The İzmir independence court adjudicated the death penalty for fourteen people. Then the Ankara court condemned four Unionists to execution.

After the elimination of the opposition, in August and September 1927, a two-tiered election was held.<sup>35</sup> The candidates were directly determined by Mustafa Kemal. Then in October 1927, a party congress was convened. In this congress, Atatürk read his *Speech*, which was written in a very polemical genre.<sup>36</sup> This congress was convened in an era in which the regime had become established.

During this congress, the Republican People's Party renewed its party statute,<sup>37</sup> putting determination of the party candidates in parliamentary election under the authority of the party presidential board.<sup>38</sup> The presidential board was composed of the chair, vice-chair and the secretary general of the party.<sup>39</sup> To the previous statute, the party board, which was a broader body, was authorized to

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<sup>34</sup> Ziya Hursit, deputy of Lazistan.

<sup>35</sup> During the single party period, the elections were held with two-tier model.

<sup>36</sup> Most of the text is on the National Independence War, and Mustafa Kemal accuses his opponents in a very severe way. See Koçak. "Nutuk ve Diğerleri," p. 175.

<sup>37</sup> For the statutes of the RPP see Doğu Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün CHP Program ve Tüzükleri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2008); Hakkı Uyar, *1923'ten Günümüze CHP Tüzükleri Üzerine Genel Bir Değerlendirme* (İstanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 2000).

<sup>38</sup> Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi*, p. 262.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

determine the parliamentary candidates.<sup>40</sup> So Mustafa Kemal, as the party chair, became the only person who determined the members of the parliament.

According to the 1923 statute of the party, the party chair was elected directly by the Congress of the party among the members of the party in the parliament. However, the 1927 statute stated that the chairman of the RPP was the founder of the party, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.<sup>41</sup> In this way Mustafa Kemal became the permanent chair of the party.

In this period, the Kemalist leadership initiated a secularist reform program. Erik Jan Zürcher describes the three elements of this program as “the first was the secularization of the state, education and law: the attack on the traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam of the *ulema*. The second was the attack on religious symbols and their replacement by the symbols of European civilization. The third was the secularization of social life and the attack on popular Islam it entailed.”<sup>42</sup>

The educational system was secularized by the law on the Unification of Education in 1924. Also in 1924, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations and the office of Sheikh al-Islam<sup>43</sup> were abolished. After 1925 all clothing was changed to the western style and the fez replaced by the brimmed hat. All Islamic sects were forbidden in 1925. The Swiss Civil Code and Italian Penal Code were adopted in 1926. The Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet in 1928. Also in 1928, the second article of the Constitution, which said that the

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.242

<sup>42</sup> Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp.194-195.

<sup>43</sup> Sheikh al-Islam is an administrative position in the Ottoman Empire that governed the religious affairs of the state.

religion of the Republic of Turkey was Islam, was removed.<sup>44</sup> Those reforms were also a new point in the historical conflict between the modernizer bureaucrats and the Islamic tradition.<sup>45</sup>

This radical reform program was also a radical rupture from the Ottoman state mind. This change required the transformation of the military and civil bureaucracy which had been taken over from the Empire. For this purpose, Special Committees (*Heyet-i Mahsusalar*) were formed in 1923.<sup>46</sup> The Special Committees first worked on purging military officers from the army who had not taken part in the national struggle.<sup>47</sup> Then after 1926 Special Committees in the civilian field were established and they also purged these kind of employees from the state administration.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, the old Ottoman bureaucracy was changed during the establishment of the new Republic.

The Maintenance of Order Act had a central role in the making of the single-party regime. The new regime abolished all opponent groups, and became the single power. It started the reform program, and did not face strong resistance. At this point, Turkey was at the crossroads. The Maintenance of Order Act was annulled in 1929 as a sign of the self-confidence of the regime. However, the Great Depression of 1929, public discontent and the international environment initiated a new search for politics in Turkey through a more authoritarian way.

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<sup>44</sup> For these reforms, see *ibid.*, pp. 195-198.

<sup>45</sup> For the place of religion and secularism and conflict between them in Turkish society, see Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun (eds.) (London: Hurst and Co., 1981), pp. 191-220.

<sup>46</sup> For the Special Committees, see Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle Heyeti Mahsusalar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

After the Great Depression, Turkey's search for new politics began with the establishment of a new opposition party. The Turkish ambassador to Paris, Ali Fethi Okyar,<sup>49</sup> founded the Free Republican Party, the FRP (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). There was collusion in the establishment process of the party. Mustafa Kemal directly attended this process and encouraged the establishment of the party. One of his closest friends, Nuri Conker, and his own sister, Makbule, joined the new party. Fifteen deputies from the RPP joined the new party,<sup>50</sup> which was founded in August 1930. The economic and social discontent during the Great Depression rapidly directed the people to the new party.

One of the most important differences between the new party and the RPP was in the economic field. The Free Republican Party was a liberal party in economic issues.<sup>51</sup> The party promised to encourage the foreign capital, and claimed to limit the interventions of the state on economic issues. The over taxation, railway policy, the obstruction of the free enterprise, difficulties in agricultural credits and corruption were the main criticisms of the Free Party program against the RPP government.<sup>52</sup>

In the local elections of 1930, the FRP gained 40 of the total 502 municipalities. Among the 110 cities that had more than 5000 inhabitants, the Free Party won the 15 municipalities.<sup>53</sup> It won two provincial municipalities, Samsun and

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<sup>49</sup> Ali Fethi Okyar was on the moderate wing of the RPP, and he was the Prime Minister before the Sheikh Sait rebel.

<sup>50</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 262.

<sup>51</sup> On the Free Republican Party, see Çetin Yetkin, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı* (İstanbul: Karacan Yayınları, 1982); Cem Emrence, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası: 99 Günlük Muhalefet* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006); Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006).

<sup>52</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p.264.

<sup>53</sup> Turan, Ali Eşref. *Türkiye'de Yerel Seçimle* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, p.58.

Silifke.<sup>54</sup> The officers of the FRP criticized the unlawfulness of the elections. The debates on the elections tensed the political environment. At last, Fethi had to close his party down in November 1930.<sup>55</sup>

The opposition party survived only three months. This short time of existence made the reason for the establishing the party unclear. One of the founders of the party, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, critically commented “This comedy (the establishment of the party and political developments after the foundation) had been staged to eradicate any bold effort like founding of a party or having thoughts of opposition. Yes, henceforward for many years nobody will dare to found an opposition party”.<sup>56</sup>

In December 1930, in Menemen, a small town in the Aegean region, six Islamic rioters from the Naqshbandi Order started an uprising, and killed three soldiers, including one reserve officer name Kubilay. The uprising was put down with harsh measures. There were 2200 detainees, 28 of whom were executed.<sup>57</sup> This rebellion ushered in a new period for Turkish politics after the closing down of the Free Party. As pointed above, the abolition of the Maintenance of Order Act in 1929 was a sign of the self-confidence of the regime. However, the case of the Free Republican Party and Menemen incident directed the search for Turkey in new

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> In Turkish historiography, this party was generally categorized as a reactionary organization. In other words, official historiography asserts that the opponents of the Turkish revolution attended this party, and the existence of this opposition party became a survival problem for the young Republic and the revolution. See *Tarih IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2001), pp. 198-200. However the intelligence reports about the founders, members and the local board members of the FRP that are written by the RPP local organizations does not reflect reactionary political activities accusations. On the reports, see Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, pp. 511-611.

<sup>56</sup> *Bu komedi sırf fırka teşkili, muhalefet fikri taşımak gibi cür'etleri ta kökünden kesip atmak içinmiş. Evet, bundan sonra artık çok uzun yıllar hiç kimse kendisinde muhalif fırka kurmak cesareti bulamaz. Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), pp. 95-96.

<sup>57</sup> Mete Tunçay, “Laiklik, Menemen Olayı” in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), p.573.



politics after the Great Depression in a more authoritarian way. Now it was clear that Turkey would be governed by a single party regime. Mustafa Kemal said in March 1931 “In the history of the nation, there are certain eras in which it is necessary to bring all the material and immaterial forces together and to conduct them through the same direction in order to achieve determined goals... In order to save the country and the revolution against domestic and foreign threats, it is required that all the Republican and Nationalist forces should be gathered in one place... The forces of the same type should be united in the way of common goal.”<sup>58</sup>

In April 1931, national elections again were held under the strict control of Mustafa Kemal. In 1931, the RPP did not determine candidates for a small number of seats in the parliament.<sup>59</sup> Thus it allowed the existence of a small independent group of deputies in the parliament. However the number of independent deputies was only 8 among 298.<sup>60</sup> The independent deputy election continued in 1935, 1939 and 1943 elections. The number of independents was respectively 9, 4 and 4.<sup>61</sup> So the number of the independents was far from an effective parliamentary control of the actions of the government.

In May 1931, the third congress of the RPP was convened with new deputies.<sup>62</sup> In this congress, the party program was accepted eight years after its

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<sup>58</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi: 1930-1945* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), p. 30.

*“Milletin tarihinde bazı devirler vardır ki; muayyen maksatlara erebilmek için maddi ve manevi ne kadar kuvvet varsa hepsini biraraya toplamak ve aynı istikamete sevk etmek lazım gelir... memleketin ve inkılabın içerden ve dışardan gelebilecek tehlikelere karşı masuniyeti için bütün milliyetçi ve cumhuriyetçi kuvvetlerin bir yerde toplanması lazımdır... aynı cinsten olan kuvvetler müşterek gaye yolunda birleşmelidir.*

<sup>59</sup> Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1952), p.561.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> For the third congress of the RPP, see Giritlioğlu, pp.89-99.

foundation. The six arrows of the party, Republicanism, Nationalism, Etatism, Revolutionism, Populism and Secularism, were codified in its new program. Those six arrows became constitutional principles in 1937.

The 1931 Congress abolished the body of party syndic (*Mutemet*).<sup>63</sup> In the 1920s, the party boards in the local organizations were elected in party congresses. However, the local chairs of the party in the cities that were named party syndics were appointed by the party center. The public discontent about the party syndics was the main reason for this abolition.<sup>64</sup> However this change was only a conversion of the name “party syndic” to “party chair.”

Generally the party chairs were members of the parliament. However, the party chairs in the cities were generally the deputies of other cities.<sup>65</sup> There are many examples of this case. For instance, Zonguldak deputy Halil Türkmen was the party chair in Kocaeli.<sup>66</sup> So the party organizations in the early RPP were controlled directly by the party center.

The party inspectors had central role in the control process in the party.<sup>67</sup> The functions of the party inspectors were taken over from the CUP. The party organization in the country has been divided into the regions of the party auditors,

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<sup>63</sup> Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi*, p. 245.

<sup>64</sup> Giritlioğlu, p.87.

<sup>65</sup> Cemil Koçak, “CHP-Devlet Kaynaşması (1936) Üzerine Belgeler,” in *Geçmişiniz Itinayla Temizlenir* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p.113.

<sup>66</sup> Other examples were Burdur deputy Halit Onaran, party chair in Maraş; Kütahya deputy Lütfü Kırdar, party chair in Balıkesir; Seyhan deputy Hilmi Uran, party chair in İstanbul; Malatya deputy Osman Koptagel, party chair in Erzurum; Yozgat deputy Avni Doğan, party chair in İzmir and Manisa. Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> On the party auditors in the RPP, see Cemil Koçak, “Tek Parti Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nde Parti Müfettişliği,” in *Geçmişiniz Itinayla Temizlenir* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009); Cemil Koçak, “Tek Parti Döneminde CHP Parti Müfettişliği’ne İlişkin Ek Bilgi(ler),” in *Mete Tunçay’a Armağan* Mehmet Ö. Alkan, Murat Koraltürk, and Tanıl Bora (eds.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

and the auditors had strong power over the party organization, in some cases beyond the party organization.<sup>68</sup>

One of the other interesting features of the RPP organization was the lack of party organization in some cities. For example, in 1936 the RPP did not have local organizations in 13 cities among the 63 total cities.<sup>69</sup> As clearly seen, these cities were in the southeastern region of the country, which was mostly inhabited by Kurds. After the 1925 Sheikh Sait rebellion, the RPP did not established local party organizations in the region. And the party controlled the region with a special organization called the General Inspectorships (*Umumi Müfettişlikler*).<sup>70</sup> The General Inspectorships was founded in 1927 and lasted de facto until 1947, and legally until 1952.<sup>71</sup> It was clearly contrary to the 1924 constitution, because it was beyond the limits of the constitution with its character of extra-ordinary organization.<sup>72</sup>

Just before the 1931 Congress, Recep Peker was appointed the secretary general of the party. Peker was a well-known pro-authoritarian politician who admired the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of the period. So he sought to direct the party structure in a party-state mechanism. In this period, the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*) were closed down and the newly founded People's Houses

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<sup>68</sup> Koçak, "Tek Parti Döneminde CHP Parti Müfettişliği'ne İlişkin Ek Bilgi(ler)," p.676.

<sup>69</sup> Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi*, p. 261 Those cities were Tunceli, Bingöl, Muş, Ağrı, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Şanlıurfa, Mardin and Hakkari Harald Schöler, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik, Hemşehrilik, Alevilik* trans. Yılmaz Tombul (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.49.

<sup>70</sup> For the General Inspectorships, see Cemil Koçak, *Umumi Müfettişlikler: (1927-1952)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.14.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.13. The First General Inspectorship was founded in 1927. It comprise eight provinces in eastern and southeastern Turkey. For the first General Inspectorships, see ibid., p. 53-154. In this period, five General Inspectorships were established, and three of them in the east and southeastern part of the country. Ibid., p.23 The martial law that was issued after the 1925 rebellion had been put down in 1927, thus the General Inspectorships replaced Martial Law. Ibid., p.73 General Inspectors worked as state governors and had the power on the military and civil bureaucracy in the region. So the General Inspectorships had a key role in the establishment and development of the single-party regime.

(*Halkevleri*) took over their functions and properties. The People's Houses were directly associated with the Republican People's Party. The party also established offices of the People's Houses in the villages named People's Rooms (*Halkodaları*). To the end of the single-party era the numbers of the People's Houses ran to 4000.<sup>73</sup> Similar to the closure of the Turkish Hearths, Turkish Masonic lodges were closed down in 1935, and all the properties of the lodges were given to the People's Houses.

In the same year, the Turkish Women's Association (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) was closed. The state authority was annoyed by all organizations and structures other than the state and the party body. This point was very similar to the definition of etatism as stated by one of the prominent intellectual of the regime:

Etatism is the system that regulates from above the economic, social and even moral life and activity and directs these toward a national ideal; that organizes (the nation) with a view to establishing social justice in economic life; that aims to embrace within the comprehensive vision and orderly activity of the state all national forces, activities, and capabilities, especially the economic ones. Everything within the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state. Here is today's formula of etatism.<sup>74</sup>

In the new direction of the regime, the place of the press was crucial. In August 1931, the National Assembly accepted the Press Act (*Matbuat Kanunu*). The 50<sup>th</sup> article of the Act stated that the government had the right to close down any newspaper or magazines that makes publication contradictory to the general politics of the government.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti*, p. 88.

<sup>74</sup> Başgil, Ali Fuat, "Dördüncü Kongre Münasebetiyle," *Siyasal Bilgiler* No.50 (1935), p.3, quoted from Parla, *Corporatist Ideology*, pp. 256-257.

<sup>75</sup> Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti*, pp.69-70.

In 1935 May, the fourth congress of the party was convened.<sup>76</sup> In this congress, the integration of the party and the state was accepted. Then in 1936, the party and the state were integrated with a circular by Ismet İnönü, Prime Minister and Vice President of the party. To the circular, the governors in the provinces became the party chairs, and the minister of the internal affairs became the party secretary general. This resolution did not aim at the control of the state by the party; on the contrary it aimed the absorption of the party by the state.<sup>77</sup> The party had 1,237,504 members and 25,941 district and village organizations in 1936.<sup>78</sup> So the regime did not endure any autonomous organization even its own political party organization.

The secretary general of the party, Peker who prepared a report on the party-state mechanism that admired the fascist party organizations resigned just three days before the circular of Ismet İnönü that integrated the state and the party.<sup>79</sup> The report of Peker designed an autonomous party structure that controlled the state body. However, the state absorbed and controlled its own party. Consequently, this point was the main difference between the perspectives of Peker and the regime.

Also in the 1935 Congress of the RPP, the program of the party was renewed. The program reflected the aim of constitution of the lack of the political plurality. According to the 41<sup>st</sup> article of the program, the aim of all of the degrees of national education was to bring up the citizens to be the adherents of the principles of the

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<sup>76</sup> For the congress, see Giritlioğlu, p, 100-112.

<sup>77</sup> Cemil Koçak, “CHP-Devlet Kaynaşması (1936) Üzerine Belgeler,” p. 109; Giritlioğlu, p.113.

<sup>78</sup> Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945: Dönemin İç Ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma* vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003)p. 161.

<sup>79</sup> Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi*, p. 84.

party, Republicanism, Nationalism, Etatism, Revolutionism, Populism and Secularism.<sup>80</sup>

The party congresses in the single-party period were convened every four years. Most of the delegates were the MPs of the party. So the number of elected congress delegates was limited. In the 1927, 1935, 1939 and 1943 congresses of the party, the numbers of elected delegates who attended the congresses were, respectively, 45, 160, 210 and 276.<sup>81</sup> The numbers of members of parliament that also attended the same congresses were 333, 383, 418 and 420.<sup>82</sup> So the delegates from the party organization were always in minority. Therefore the demands of the party organization did not reflect to the general congress of the party.

In November 1938, Mustafa Kemal died and İsmet İnönü became the new president.<sup>83</sup> İnönü had served as prime minister in the Atatürk era, but he had been removed from office in 1937. During İnönü's presidential period, the policies of Atatürk era were continued, but under the conditions of the Second World War, the restraints on society were tightened.

After İnönü's coming to the Presidency, Celal Bayar continued as Prime Minister to January 1939. He resigned before the 1939 elections.<sup>84</sup> Refik Saydam, former Minister of interior affairs and Secretary General of the Party, became the new Prime Minister.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Giritlioğlu, p.103.

<sup>81</sup> Esat Öz. *Otoriterizm ve Siyaset: Türkiye'de Tek-Parti Rejimi ve Siyasal Katılım, (1923-1945)* (Ankara: Yetkin Basım Yayım ve Dağıtım, 1996).

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> For İsmet İnönü's presidential era, see Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945: Dönemin İç Ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p.224.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid..

During the 1938 Congress of the RPP, İnönü was declared the permanent chair of the party.<sup>86</sup> The Congress named Atatürk Eternal Chief and İnönü National Chief.<sup>87</sup>

The party-state mechanism continued in this period. However, the unification of the party and the state bodies was abolished at the February 1939 party congress.<sup>88</sup> As pointed out above, in 1936, the party and the state had been integrated by a circular by İnönü. Thus the governors in the provinces had become the party chairs, and the minister of the internal affairs had become the party secretary general. So at the 1939 congress, this unification was ended. An independent group (*Müstakil Grup*) in the party was formed with 21 members in the parliament between 1939 and 1943.<sup>89</sup> Then after 1943 elections, the group had 35 representatives.<sup>90</sup> The members of the independent group were determined from the MPs of the RPP, and they were dependent on the party chair. These deputies served as the parliamentary control of government actions. However, those attempts were not able to form the accountability of the political regime.

The victory of the democracies in the Second World War and the internal reasons for the transition to a multi-party regime brought an end to the single-party period. Thus in January 1946, the Democrat Party was founded by a group of RPP deputies and the single-party era came to an end.

Consequently, the regime in Turkey was not of a classical party-state character in this period. The function of the party was more than an instrument of the

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<sup>86</sup> Kili, p.85.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Tunaya, p.561.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

regime. So instead of using the phrase “RPP’s single party regime” it is more appropriate to identify the RPP as “the single party of the regime.”

### The Economic and Social Perspectives of Kemalism

In this part, the economic and social model of Kemalism that was called populism will be discussed. The populism principle of Kemalism basically was inherited from the CUP, and it became one of the six principles of the RPP that were called the Six Arrows. The Unionist and Kemalist policies suppressed the organized labor movement and substituted a solidarist and authoritarian political and social model. In the economic realm, this model aimed at the creation of a national economy and national bourgeoisie. So class struggles and class politics were restrained by legal means.

It is crucial that there was continuity in the field of the economic and social policies between the CUP and Kemalism. The economic and political thought and policies of the CUP basically were shaped in the Second Constitutional Period. In this period, the CUP constructed a solidarist political view that had its main sources of inspiration in the French Third Republic and Emile Durkheim.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> On the Solidarism of the Second Constitutional period, see Zafer Toprak, “İkinci Mesrutiyet'te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, No.1, (Spring 1977), pp. 92-123; Zafer Toprak, "Social Project in the Second Constitutional Period (Mesrutiyet): Solidarity, Profession and National Economy," in *The Great Ottoman, Turkish Civilisation -2- Economy and Society*, Ed. Kemal Çiçek (Ankara; Yeni Türkiye, 2000), pp. 245-263.



The solidarism of the CUP was theorized by Ziya Gökalp, who defined solidarism as social populism (*İçtima-i Halkçılık*).<sup>92</sup> Gökalp's populism aimed at abolition of class differences and struggles in terms of the organization of professions.<sup>93</sup> The war had increased social injustices and it also had brought the capital accumulation in some hands mainly because of the national economy policies.<sup>94</sup> Therefore Gökalp's thought carried a strong emphasis on ethics. The social effects of the First World War were the main reason of the problematization of the ethics by Gökalp.<sup>95</sup>

Taha Parla describes the main features and references of Gökalp's thought as follows:

The social-political theory and model of society and polity that characterized this school of thought was solidarist corporatism, which rejected liberalism and Marxism. It was no coincidence that among the European thinkers he had come to familiar with, Gökalp acknowledged Emile Durkheim as his source of inspiration. Through most of what Gökalp wrote, runs Durkheim either verbatim or with slight changes here and there, except in a few respects. Gökalp was indebted to Durkheim not only for the latter's views but also for an introduction to the views of other European corporatist thinkers, with whose works he became acquainted through Durkheim.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Toprak, "Social Project in the Second Constitutional Period," p.246.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Toprak, Zafer. *İttihad-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi: Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye'de Devletçilik, 1914-1918* (İstanbul: Homer, 2003), p.202.

<sup>95</sup> Toprak, "Social Project in the Second Constitutional Period."

<sup>96</sup> Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp: 1876-1924* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), p.42 . Taha Parla differentiates Gökalp's social and political thought from the practices of Kemalism. For him, Gökalp's solidarist corporatism is a pluralistic form of corporatism, but Kemalist corporatism is authoritarian etatist and more similar to the fascistic corporatism. See *ibid.*, pp. 120-128.

In the CUP period, the economic policies, basically after the Balkan Wars, had been based on the National Economy project.<sup>97</sup> To establish a national economy and to create a national bourgeoisie became the ultimate aims of the CUP government. In fact, the importance of the national economy was explained to the CUP leaders by a Russian political immigrant named Alexander Parvus. Parvus published several articles in the Unionist journal *Türk Yurdu* and described the dependence of the Ottoman economy after the debts of the Tanzimat period.<sup>98</sup> Against this dependence relation, Parvus offered the industrialization of the Ottoman economy in a rapid way through national economic policies and etatism.<sup>99</sup> With the Parvus effect, Ottoman intellectuals ascertained such concepts as financial capital, imperialism, economic dependency, and financial yoke.<sup>100</sup>

An Ottoman Jewish intellectual Tekin Alp (Moiz Kohen) pointed out the importance of the national economy as one of the requisites of a nation state. He was influenced by the German economist Frederich List.<sup>101</sup> So Tekin Alp argued the centrality of the national economy and a national bourgeoisie and national banking for the industrialization and economic development.<sup>102</sup>

The economic program of the CUP was defined by the committee itself as

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<sup>97</sup> On the National Economy of the Young Turks, see Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Millî İktisat", 1908-1918* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982); Feroz Ahmad. "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks 1908-1918," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008).

<sup>98</sup> Toprak, "Social Project in the Second Constitutional Period," p.261.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Zafer Toprak, "Nationalism and Economics in the Young Turk Era (1908-1918)," in *Industrialisation, Communication et Rapports Sociaux en Turquie et en Méditerranée Orientale*, eds. Jacques Thobie et Salgur Kançal (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), p. 262.

<sup>102</sup> Toprak, *İttihad-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi:*, p. 61.

“the elaboration of laws defining the relations between employees and workmen; the distribution of land to the peasants (but without encroaching on the rights of landowners) as well as credit for the peasants at moderate rates of interest; the alteration of the existing system of titles and the gradual adaptation of the cadastral system; state supervision of education, with the state schools open to all races and creeds; the introduction of Turkish in elementary schools and the opening of commercial, agricultural, and technical schools, and finally general measures to ensure the economic progress of the country and the development of agriculture.”<sup>103</sup>

Above all, the most important legacy of the Ottoman period to the Republican era was in the field of labor organizations and the right to strike. After the proclamation of the Second Constitution in July 1908, worker strikes began in every corner of the Empire. Almost half of the working class in the Ottoman Empire participated in the 1908 strikes.<sup>104</sup> The government banned strikes in October 1908 by a governmental decree (*Tatıl-i Eşgal Kanunu Muvakkatı*). In August 1909, the parliament accepted the Strike Law (*Tatıl-i Eşgal Kanunu*).<sup>105</sup> By this law, workers’ organizations were banned. As the right to strike is a collective right, by this act the right to strike was also banned, although the act mentions the right to strike of the worker.<sup>106</sup> In 1936, the worker strikes legally banned. The right to strike, the right to organize and the right of collective bargaining were given to the workers in the 1960s.

Turkey had had a decade of wars that finished in 1922, and a great demographic transformation had come about in this period. Eighteen percent of the

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<sup>103</sup> Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1952), pp.208-210, is quoted by Ahmad. “Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie”, p.30.

<sup>104</sup> Yavuz Selim Karakışla. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 1908 Grevleri,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 78 (1998), p.188.

<sup>105</sup> On the Strike Law, see Zafer Toprak, “1909 Tatili Eşgal Kanunu Üzerine” *Toplum Bilim*, no.13 (1981); Gülmez, Mesut. “Bir Belge, Bir Yorum: 1909 Tatili Eşgal Yasası ve Grev,” *Toplum Bilim*, No.12 (1980); Güzel, M. Şehmus. “Bir Yanıt” *Toplum Bilim*, No.13 (1981).

<sup>106</sup> Toprak. “1909 Tatili Eşgal Kanunu Üzerine” , p.146.

Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire had died during the war.<sup>107</sup> The percentage of the non-Muslim population had fallen from 18% to 2.6% with the war and the population exchange.<sup>108</sup>

The change in the demographic structure changed the economic structure.

Çağlar Keyder describes this situation:

The impact of the exchange on Turkey's future development was significant, both in the composition of social classes and in the formation of the official ideology. As for social classes and their relationship with the state, the principal consequence of the departure of Ottoman Christians was the subsequent decimation of what could best be described as the nascent bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire, i.e., those who had achieved a degree of independence from the state in exploiting a market potential and in creating the foundations of a civil society in the form of a network of autonomous organizations. The Turkish Republic was thus left with a greatly diminished potential for independent bourgeois accumulation and for an autonomous society that could emancipate itself from the state.<sup>109</sup>

Thus in this period, the economic structure and entrepreneurial strata was Turkified. Nationalism and populism, as the official ideologies of the state, formed a solidarist and corporatist social structure. However the Turkish case was different from the European corporatist regimes of the inter-war era. In the Turkish case, corporatist policies did not take on the character of a complete system.<sup>110</sup> The main

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<sup>107</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), p.112.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "The Consequences of the 'Exchange of Populations' for Turkey," in *Crossing the Aegean: The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey*, ed. Renee Hirschon (Oxford: Berghahn, 2003).

<sup>110</sup> Ahmet Makal, "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Dönemi ve Korporatizm Tartışmaları," in *Ameleden İşçiye: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi Çalışmaları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp.107-112.

reason for this difference was the unorganized character of Turkish society.<sup>111</sup> In other words, there were no important class organizations or occupational organizations. Moreover, the establishment of class-based associations was forbidden by the 1938 the Law of Associations.

The period of the National Independence War was a break in the application of the populism principle. In this period, the populism was on the basis of professional representation and it promised direct suffrage for the people.<sup>112</sup> So the populism had a democratic essence and egalitarian social goals. However, in the Republican period, the populism returned to the populism of the Unionist period.<sup>113</sup> Thus the period of the National Independence War was also exceptional for the relationship between the working class and the state. The social and political conditions of the war had obliged the ruling elite to tolerate the working class activities.<sup>114</sup> However, after the war, the attitude of the regime towards the working class dramatically changed. Feroz Ahmad writes:

The Kemalist understood the potential power of the workers and socialism in a society living in an ideological vacuum.... socialism remained a threat to the 'classless' corporatist ideology they were proposing for the new Turkey, a threat that had to be defeated before it grew too powerful.... the resolve of the regime to control and then repress the workers' movement suggests that the Kemalists were viewing it with concern as a potential rival to official ideology.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>112</sup> İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık," *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), p. 1931.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ahmad, Feroz. "The Development of Class Consciousness in Republican Turkey", in *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, 1839-1950*, ed. Donald Quataert and Erik J. Zürcher (London: IB Tauris, 1995), p.79.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

As pointed out above, Kemalist populism rejected the existence of social classes, it arguing the inexpediency of class struggles. Instead it proposed the organic solidarity of Turkish society.<sup>116</sup> It claimed that there was no need other than the political party of the regime because different political parties represented different class interests, and there were no classes. Mustafa Kemal concluded this thought:

This nation very often was pained by political parties. Let me put to you that in other countries parties have been formed and are being formed on the basis of economic objectives, to be sure. Because there are various classes in those countries. In return for a political party that is formed to protect the interests of a class, another party is formed with the purpose of protecting the interests of another class. This is very natural. Well known are the consequences that we witnessed thanks to political parties that have been formed as if there existed in our country separate classes. Whereas when we say People's Party, not only parts but the whole of the nation is included..... It is thus I see our nation. Therefore it is not possible to separate into classes practitioners of various occupations because their interests are compatible with one another, and all of them comprise the people.<sup>117</sup>

Similarly, the 1931 program of the RPP prescribed the shape of the corporatism of the regime. The program stated the economic and social perspective of the party as

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of division of labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The farmers, handicraftsmen, laborers, and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The aims of our party are to secure are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish

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<sup>116</sup> On the Kemalist Populism, see Ahmet Makal, *Türkiye'de Tek Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 1920-1946*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), pp.45-160.

<sup>117</sup> Taha Parla and Davison, Andrew. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p.61-62.

harmony of interest. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude, to the amount of work.<sup>118</sup>

Harmonious with the populism conception of the regime, the National Assembly accepted the Work Act in 1936. This legislation was inspired by the fascist Italian Work Act. It brought some protective measures in the individual working relations.<sup>119</sup> However, in the collective field, it strictly limited the rights of the working class. Workers did not have the right to organize trade unions or right to strike.

For the continuation of such a regime 141<sup>st</sup> and 142<sup>nd</sup> articles of the Turkish Penal Code had central importance. These two articles were adopted from 1926 Italian Law for Protecting the State in 1936.<sup>120</sup> To these articles, political activities aimed at the abolition of one of the social classes by force would be punished.<sup>121</sup> In 1938, the “by force” phrase was removed from the article.<sup>122</sup> These articles served to punish class politics and class struggles.

Consequently, in this period, the Kemalist principle of populism rejected the existence of different classes and class interests. The frame of the Kemalist populism principle basically was shaped by the Second Constitutional era's national economy policies. The relationship pattern between the employers, employees and the state continued in the Republican era. The organization of the working class was

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<sup>118</sup> Özbudun, Ergun. “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), p.88.

<sup>119</sup> On the 1936 Work Act, see Makal, “Türkiye’de Tek Parti Dönemi ve Korporatizm Tartışmaları,” pp.104-107.

<sup>120</sup> On those articles, see Özek, Çetin. *141 - 142* (İstanbul : Ararat yayınevi, 1968); Çelenk, Halit. *141-142 Üzerine* (Ankara : Anka Yayınları, 1976).

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p.122.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p.79.

prohibited and the right to strike was not recognized. To establish class based organizations was not allowed until 1947 and the right to strike and collective bargaining only accepted in 1963.

### The Repression of the Left to the 1960s

Until the 1960s, socialism and socialist organizations were illegal in Turkey. There was continuity between the imperial and republican eras in terms of the suppression of the left. Although there were short and exceptional periods, the general attitude of the state was to ban legally socialist activities. This situation continued until the 1960s without major changes. Within this framework, the suppression of the left became one of the main reasons for social democracy's delayed emergence. Therefore this part of the chapter deals with the suppression of socialism by the state in both the imperial and republican eras.

Worker-friendly organizations had emerged in the Ottoman Empire in the last years of the nineteenth century. Three kinds of worker organizations existed in the late Ottoman Empire.<sup>123</sup> The first category was the philanthropic organizations.<sup>124</sup> The Phil-Worker Association (*Ameleperver Cemiyeti*) was one of the well-known examples of these. The second type was the true worker organization.<sup>125</sup> The best

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<sup>123</sup> For this three kinds, see "Tanzimat ve Batılılaşma" in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988) pp.1814-1817.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> On the true worker movement in late Ottoman Empire, see Lütü Erişçi, "Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfının Tarihi" in *Sosyal Tarih Araştırmaları* (İstanbul : TÜSTAV, 2003); Kemal Sülker, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1973); Yavuz Selim Karakışla "The Emergence of Ottoman Industrial Working Class, 1839-1923" in *Workers and the Working Class in*



example of this kind was the Ottoman Labor Association (*Osmanlı Amele Cemiyeti*), formed in 1894<sup>126</sup> as a secret organization. It lasted only one year, when it was closed down and the officers of the association arrested by the absolutist regime of the Sultan Abdulhamit II.<sup>127</sup> Although there were several attempts to organize worker organizations, until the Second Constitutional period, no influential worker organization or socialist party emerged. Finally, the third kind was the Fraternity Associations and Pension Funds that had nearly no political effect.<sup>128</sup>

In the penetration process of the socialist political thought and activities in the Ottoman Empire, the ethnic and religious minorities played a crucial role.<sup>129</sup> Feroz Ahmad argues that religious minorities, the Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and Jews, had closer ties with Europe and new ideologies like nationalism and socialism entered the empire from Europe.<sup>130</sup> Therefore, for Ahmad, the minorities had a key importance in introducing socialism in this era.<sup>131</sup>

The Muslim elements of the Ottoman Empire remained distant from socialism. Mete Tunçay writes:

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*the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 1839-1950* Donald Quataert, Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.) (New York: Tauris 1995); Aclan Sayılğan, *Türkiye'de Sol Hareketler (1871-1972)* (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2009).

<sup>126</sup> “Tanzimat ve Batılılaşma,” p.1815.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> For minorities and socialism, see Paul Dumont and Haupt, George, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Sosyalist Hareketler* Tuğrul Artunkal (trans.) (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977); Mete Tunçay and Erik Jan Zürcher (Eds.) *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923* (London: British Academic Press 1994).

<sup>130</sup> Feroz Ahmad “Some Thoughts on the Role of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in the Genesis and Development of the Socialist Movement in Turkey (187-1923)” in *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923*, ed. Mete Tunçay and Erik Jan Zürcher (London: British Academic Press 1994), pp. 13-14.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

Before the constitutional period of 1876, the ideas of socialism and communism were regarded negatively in the Turkish language press on the grounds of irreligiosity and immorality. Interestingly, the term most often used, Collectivism (*İştirakiyet*), then evoked the old Iranian Zoroastrian religion and was represented as partaking in the sexual promiscuity attributed to it.<sup>132</sup>

Nationalism became one of the main components of the socialist policies in the Ottoman Empire. Although socialism developed as an internationalist political ideology, the Second International's socialism had a position on the nationalities of the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg Empires that strongly emphasized the self-determination right of those nationalities.<sup>133</sup> For instance, one of the well-known politicians and theorists of the Second International, Rosa Luxemburg, claimed that “the dead weight of Turkish rule was even incapable of generating capitalism – and thus, ultimately socialism; the sooner it was destroyed and split up into constituent national parts the better- and then this backward area might catch up with the normal process of historical dialectic.”<sup>134</sup>

The proclamation of the Second Constitution brought a relative political plurality to Turkish political life. Between 1908 and 1913, the Ottoman Empire experienced a limited multi-party experience. But after 1913, the dictatorship of the CUP began which lasted until the end of the First World War. Socialist politics were easily suppressed in this era. Socialism could not become influential among the Ottoman Turks in this partially pluralist period. For this reason, one of the most prominent historians of Turkish political movements, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, describes

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<sup>132</sup> Mete Tunçay “In Lieu of a Conclusion,” in *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923* Mete Tunçay and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.) (London: British Academic Press 1994), p.163.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ahmad, “Some Thoughts,” p, 17 quoting from Peter Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg* (London: n.p. 1966).

the socialist milieu as having been the weakest among the ideological movements in the Second Constitutional era.<sup>135</sup>

In this period, the socialist movement gathered around a group led by Socialist (*İştirakçi*) Hüseyin Hilmi.<sup>136</sup> This group formed the Ottoman Socialist Party (*Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası*) in 1910. This party never had deputies in the parliament. However, there were a few socialist parliamentarians in the Ottoman Parliament from the ethnic and religious minority groups.<sup>137</sup> Hilmi's group published several journals named *İştirak* (Sharing), *İnsaniyet* (Humanity), *Sosyalist* (Socialist) and *Medeniyet* (Civilization) and all of them were closed down under martial law.<sup>138</sup>

In Paris, Dr. Refik Nevzat formed the Paris branch of the Ottoman Socialist Party.<sup>139</sup> The Paris branch, like the party itself, was not able to be a powerful political organization.

After the Balkan War and the beginning of the dictatorship of the CUP, opponent politicians were arrested and sent into exile to Sinop (a city in northern Anatolia).<sup>140</sup> 1913 marked the end of socialist activities in Ottoman political life until 1918. During the period between 1908 and 1913, the Ottoman Socialist Party was not able to organize the working class in an effective way. However, it conducted a

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<sup>135</sup> Tunaya, p.12.

<sup>136</sup> On Hüseyin Hilmi, see Foti Benlisoy and Doğan Çetinkaya, "İştirakçi Hilmi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol.8, Murat Gültekingil, ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp.165-183.

<sup>137</sup> Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar I, 1908-1925* (İstanbul: B.D.S. Yayınları, 2000), p.34.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p.32.

<sup>139</sup> Refik Nevzat was a former Unionist. He has become a socialist after 1908 with the influence of French socialists. On Dr. Refik Nevzat and the Paris section of the Ottoman Socialist Party, see *ibid.*, p.34.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

libertarian political struggle against the authoritarian policies of the CUP, and stood on the opposition front.<sup>141</sup>

Between 1913 and 1918, there was almost no socialist activity. Mete Tunçay notes two important developments that were the main exceptions of this situation.<sup>142</sup> The first one was the arrival of the Russian Alexander Parvus, who introduced several socialist concepts to the Turkish intelligencia. The second development was the attempt of the CUP to attend to a conference of European socialists in Stockholm. As discussed above, Parvus was a Russian revolutionary and member of the German Social Democratic Party.<sup>143</sup> He served as an adviser to Unionists on economic issues.<sup>144</sup> He published several articles in the journals of the CUP in which he discussed the dependence of the Ottoman economy because of the capitulations, and proposed a “National Economy.”<sup>145</sup> The Stockholm conference of the European socialists was about to overcome the schism in the European socialist movement and to ensure peace for the First World War.<sup>146</sup> However the delegates determined by the CUP to influence the socialists were not approved by the congress.<sup>147</sup>

After the CUP period, Turkey entered a new pluralist era. Hundreds of political organizations were established in a few months after the end of the war. In

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<sup>141</sup> “Meşrutiyet, İşçi Hareketi ve Emperyalizm” in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 1843.

<sup>142</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar*, p.37.

<sup>143</sup> For Parvus, see Asim Karaömerlioglu, “Helphand-Parvus and his Impact on Turkish Intellectual Life” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, no.6 (November 2004), pp.145-165.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p.145.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p.153.

<sup>146</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar*, p.37.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

this period, there were also several socialist party initiations. However, none of those parties became influential.

In Istanbul, the group of Hilmi formed the Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*).<sup>148</sup> This party organized several strikes, and became influential under the occupation conditions of İstanbul. It was able to convene its congress in İstanbul in 1919. It was a political organization that adhered to the principles of the Second International. The head of the Paris branch of the Socialist Party of Turkey, Dr. Refik Nevzat established a link between the Second International and the party.<sup>149</sup> This branch attended the 1919 Bern, 1919 Amsterdam and 1920 Geneva congresses of the Second International.<sup>150</sup> The change in the occupation conditions and the rise of the activities of the socialists in the Communist International's line devitalized the group of Hüseyin Hilmi.<sup>151</sup>

The Socialist Party of Turkey was dissolved after the mysterious assassination of Hüseyin Hilmi in 1922. Also in this period, the Social Democratic Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası*) and Ottoman Work Party (*Osmanlı Mesai Fırkası*) were established in İstanbul. However they had almost no impact on politics and dissolved in a short time.

The other important socialist group in İstanbul formed around the journal *Kurtuluş* (Liberation). This group formed the Turkey Worker and Peasant Socialist Party (*Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası*). It also supported the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal. Therefore *Kurtuluş* was closed down by the

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<sup>148</sup> For the Socialist Party of Turkey, see Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar*, pp.38-41.

<sup>149</sup> "Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Sosyalist Hareket," in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*. vol.6, p. 1867.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p.1868.

İstanbul government after the occupation of İstanbul. In the summer of 1921, this group began to publish a journal titled *Aydınlık* (Light) and thereafter this group was called the *Aydınlık* group.<sup>152</sup> This group adhered to the Communist International and the party and the journal was like a legal extension of the Communist Party of Turkey.<sup>153</sup> After the end of the Independence War the activities of the *Aydınlık* group was suppressed. The political activities of this group and *Aydınlık* journal, like other organizations, were banned after the promulgation of 1925 Maintenance of Order Act (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). Some of the leaders of the movement fled abroad, and others were tried in Independence Courts and punished in 1925.<sup>154</sup>

In Anatolia there were several socialist initiations. The National Struggle against the Allied Powers had made Soviet aid crucial. Therefore, the Ankara government tolerated leftist movements. Among them the Green Army (*Yeşil Ordu*) and People's Group (*Halk Zümresi*) in the parliament are worthy of mention.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, the Ankara government established an official communist party called the Communist Party of Turkey.<sup>156</sup> However, after a conflict between the Ankara government and paramilitary groups, the Anatolian left was eliminated.<sup>157</sup>

Among the socialist movements of this period, the Communist Party of Turkey founded by Mustafa Suphi was the most important. Suphi was a political opponent who had been exiled to Sinop by the CUP. He then had escaped away to

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<sup>152</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar I*, p. 171.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., pp.84-91.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p.92.

<sup>157</sup> These paramilitary groups was led by Circassian Ethem. Ibid., p.104.

Russia.<sup>158</sup> During the war and the Bolshevik revolution, he became a communist activist. He established the Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) in Baku in September 1920. The Communist Party of Turkey was the only party that was recognized as the Turkish section of the Communist International.

The CPT leadership supported the national independence war, and then they decided to go to Ankara to take part in the National Struggle and to negotiate with the Ankara government on the organization problems.<sup>159</sup> However, they were not able to reach Ankara. Fifteen leaders of the party, including the chairman Mustafa Suphi, were killed on the way.

In this period, there were two important organizations that had direct relation with the Communist Party of Turkey. The first was the above-mentioned *Aydınlık* group. The latter was the Turkey People's Socialist Party (*Türkiye Halk İştirakıyın Fırkası*).<sup>160</sup> The activities of this party, like those of other socialist groups, were ended in the suppression process of the left following the conflict between the Ankara government and paramilitary groups.

After the 1925 Martial Law all political opposition including the socialists were outlawed. Then socialism was represented almost solely by the Moscow-oriented and officially banned illegal CPT that was the Turkish section of the Communist International.

To the 1960s, the illegal CPT was the only address of the left. However, it was exposed to several police operations; among them the operations in 1927, 1938, 1944, 1946 and 1951 were important. So in the era to the 1960s, the Turkish left was

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<sup>158</sup> For information about Mustafa Suphi, see Emel Akay, "Mustafa Suphi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, vol.8, Murat Gültekingil, ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp.138-164.

<sup>159</sup> Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar I*, p. 102.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., pp.97-98.

represented only by the CPT, but this party was not able to function in legal ways and most of its cadres were in jail or in exile. Unsurprisingly, there were political attempts on the left that were independent from the discipline of the CPT. However, none of them were able to become influential.

In 1927, the clandestine communist party came out into the open after a disagreement between Şefik Hüsnü and Vedat Nedim. They were old and current secretary generals of the party. When the disagreement crystallized, Vedat Nedim denounced Şefik Hüsnü, other leaders and the Ankara, Eskişehir, İstanbul and İzmir organizations of the party.<sup>161</sup> After one and half years in prison, Şefik Hüsnü went abroad. The leader cadre of the party was sent to prison or fled abroad. So the party leadership had been counteracted by the regime. However, a number of communists continued political activities in illegal ways. And each activity elicited the reaction of the regime via police operations.

In 1929, the Maintenance of Order Act was repealed. However the regime continued to suppress the political left. In 1929, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and President Mustafa Kemal gave harsh speeches on communist activities.<sup>162</sup> As an example, Mustafa Kemal concluded his views on the issue of communists in Turkey as follows:

Turkish nation is not such a group who will not understand the secret and black aims in the deliriums of factious, wretch, homeless, nationless half-witted people who intend to work against the Turkish nation and country's high interests. The communists in this country are not only composed of those arrested and imprisoned by us. I will closely deal with those issues."<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Sayılğan, p. 150

<sup>162</sup> Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol AkımlarII, 1925-1936*, (İstanbul: B.D.S. Yayınları, 1992), p.68

<sup>163</sup> "Türk Milleti, kendisinin ve memleketinin yüksek menfaatleri aleyhine çalışmak isteyen müfsit, sefil, vatansız ve milliyetsiz sebükmağızların hezeyanlarındaki gizli ve kirlî emelleri anlamayacak ve onlara müsamaha gösterecek bir heyet değildir... Bu memleketteki komünistler, yalnız bizim tevkîf ve hapsedtiklerimizden ibaret değildir. Bu işlerle bizzat yakından alakadar olacağım."



This speech was considered a declaration of war by the CPT.<sup>164</sup> However the party was too weak to wage such a war against the Kemalist regime.

In the 1930s, Turkey had a short freedom of expression era,<sup>165</sup> during which several classics of socialist literature were translated into Turkish.<sup>166</sup> However, this period did not last so long. Socialism was considered a threat to the regime.

In 1935, at the 7<sup>th</sup> and the last congress of the Communist International, the congress decided on the establishment of United Fronts led by the communists against the fascism.<sup>167</sup> One year later, the political and organizational activities of the CPT were ended by the decision of the Communist International. This decision was called Decentralization or *Seperat* decision.<sup>168</sup> The Communist International advised the CPT to work in legal ways and within the Republican People's Party.<sup>169</sup> Therefore the activities of the party finished. However, the suppression policy of the regime on the left did not end. In 1938, fifteen communists including Nazım Hikmet, Kemal Tahir and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı received punishments for inciting the navy to revolt.<sup>170</sup> When the Second World War started, socialist activities in Turkey were

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“Türkiye’de Burjuva Cumhuriyeti” in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988) p.1891.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ahmad, “Development of Class Consciousness”, p.93.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> “Tek Parti Diktatörlüğü” in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988) p.1928.

<sup>168</sup> For the decision, see Tunçay, *Türkiye’de Sol AkımlarII*, p.126.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> “Tek Parti Diktatörlüğü” in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p.1930.

very limited. Within this framework, the main political activities of the party were against the German effect in Turkey and racism.

After the end of the Second World War, the ban on the establishing class based organizations was abolished in May 1946. Thus two socialist political parties were established in 1946. The first one was the Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*) led by Esat Adil Müsteceaplıoğlu.<sup>171</sup> Second, the cadres of the Communist Party of Turkey established the Socialist Laborer Peasant Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi Köylü Partisi*).<sup>172</sup> The founder of the party was a veteran communist, Şefik Hüsnü. These two parties were closed down in December 1946. Seven other socialist party initiations had very little influence.<sup>173</sup> In the new multi-party period, there was no place for socialist parties.

In this period, under the illegal conditions, the CPT continued to organize political activities. The amnesty campaign for Nazım Hikmet and formation of the Turkish Peace-Lovers Association were the two main activities of this period's left.<sup>174</sup> On the other hand, the CPT started to organize illegal party organization in several cities that were directed by Zeki Baştımar. However in 1951, a new police operation ended all activities of the party.<sup>175</sup> Many of the party officers were sent to prison or went into exile. The number of trialed communists in the case was 167.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> On the SPT, see Özgür Gökmen "Çok-Partili Rejime Geçerken Sol: Türkiye Sosyalizminin Unutulmuş Partisi" *Toplum ve Bilim*. No.78 (1998). For a biography of Esat Adil, see Emin Karaca, *Unutulmuş Sosyalist: Esat Adil (Esat Adil Müsteceaplıoğlu'nun Hayatı, Mücadelesi ve Eserleri)* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2008).

<sup>172</sup> "Tek Parti Diktatörlüğü," p.1935.

<sup>173</sup> Mete Tunçay, "Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde Sosyalizm (1960'a kadar)" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, p.1954.

<sup>174</sup> "Demokrat Parti Dönemi" in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.6, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988) p.1960.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 1961.

<sup>176</sup> Mete Tunçay, "Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde Sosyalizm", p.1954.

This operation caused the complete destruction of the CPT. The party was not able to be organized again in Turkey until the 1970s.

Consequently, the left in Turkey was suppressed until the 1960s by the legal restrictions and police operations. Under those circumstances, the illegal CPT became the only focal for socialist politics. Although there were attempts to establish different socialist organizations, they were not able to stay in existence for any length of time. In this way, the state did not allow an organized political movement of the working class. Thus the lack of legal socialist and communist political organizations and movements until the 1960s directly affected the formation of the social democracy in Turkey.

## Conclusion

The main topic of this chapter was the reasons for the delayed emergence of social democracy in Turkey. The anti-democratic character of the political regime in the early republican period that was founded by the Republican People's Party was the primary reason for this delayed emergence. The regime did not allow organized opposition, and it did not include any pluralist features. The suppression of the left in such a regime was also one of the main reasons of the delayed emergence of social democracy in Turkey.

This chapter made obvious that the early RPP had more organizational and political peculiarities than the western type of political parties. The adaptation of

such a party into a democratic and pluralist political environment was an important question. The transition to the multi-party politics became the starting point of this problem for the party. The party was under the influence of two antithetical forces, the necessity to transform the party and adapt it to the new political conditions. The 1960s presented new challenges for the RPP.

The new direction of the RPP in the second half of the 1960s, the left of center, changed many aspects of the party. However, one can hardly claim that the final product of this transformation was a new social democratic party in the Western European sense. So the history of the RPP became one of the main obstacles to the social-democratization of the party. In this framework, the peculiarities of the Turkish case as a peripheral country raise new questions. What are the main differences in the social democratic politics between European and peripheral countries? What are the historical constraints on the development of social democracy in peripheral countries? Is it possible to define a universal social democratic model? How does social democracy change over time? Answer to these questions will be sought in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT AND IDEOLOGY

Social democracy played a central role in the making of modern societies. In the twentieth century, it became one of the main political powers that shaped the political structure of European countries. In organizational and electoral terms, social democratic parties were very successful. After the 1980s and 1990s, social democracy began to spread beyond Europe. In this process, social democratic movements were organized in many peripheral countries. Today the international solidarity organization of the social democratic parties, the Socialist International, has 112 full members from 95 different countries. Social democracy, which emerged as the movement of working class in late nineteenth century Europe, has become one of major forces that has taken a central role in the making of the modern world.

In western academia, there is an intensive literature on the history and theory of social democracy. This literature provides useful insights for the analysis of the topic at hand. As discussed above, the main focus of this dissertation is the emergence of social democracy in Turkey. More specifically, this dissertation deals with the question of how the socialist left influenced the making of the social democratic movement in the Turkish case. In order to analyze this topic, it is also necessary to deal with questions such as how social democracy evolved, and what

are the main differences in different countries and regions in social democratic politics. Theoretical explanations on social democracy also must be evaluated in this context. Thus this chapter aims to answer these questions.

For this purpose this chapter is organized in three parts. In the first part, the historical evolution of social democracy and its relationship with other wings of the left will be assessed. Then in the second part, an analysis of social democracy with class and society perspectives will be given. In last part, peripheral experiments with social democracy will be taken in hand.

### The Evolution of Social Democratic Parties

Modern political parties emerged in the second half of nineteenth century in Europe. The social democratic working class party was the vanguard of this party model. In the early stages, the economic and social demands of the working class were represented by the liberal democrats. Then social democratic parties were founded as the political organizations of the working class. Social democratic working class parties in different countries had similar demands like the eight-hour work day, the prohibition of child employment, universal male suffrage and peace.

The socialist parties had organizational peculiarities. Bottom-up, well organized and disciplinary party organization were typical of social democratic parties of the period. In his outstanding work on the history of European left, Geoff Eley describes this situation as “the modern mass party, which became the prevailing model of political mobilization in general between the 1890s and the 1960s, was

invented by socialists in the last third of the nineteenth century.”<sup>177</sup> Thus the social democratic political party was a new type of political organization that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as the organization of the working class itself.

In this context, the first important socialist party was founded in Germany in 1863. Until this year, there was a coalition between the liberal parties and labor organizations that was called the lib-lab coalition.<sup>178</sup> Under the lib-lab coalition, labor supported liberal democratic politicians. This support was the direct result of the heritage of the 1848 revolutionary uprisings. In the 1848 revolutions, the working class and liberal democrats were on the same front.

The lib-lab coalition, however, entered a crisis in the 1860s.<sup>179</sup> The main worker organization of the period, the Workers Educational Union (*Arbeiterbildungsvereine*, WEA) was divided as a result. The name of this new organization was the General German Workers’ Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein*, ADAV). This was the first party of the working class in the world. The founder of the party, Ferdinand Lassalle, was an opponent of the lib-lab coalition. From Lassalle’s point of view, the working class should remain it distant from the bourgeoisie and become organizationally and ideologically autonomous.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.24.

<sup>178</sup> On the lib-lab coalition, see Stefan Berger, *Social Democracy and the Working Class in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany* (New York: Longman, 2000), pp.39-48; Ralf Roth “Bürger and Worker: Liberalism and the Labor Movement in Germany, 1848 to 1914” in *Between Reform and Revolution*, pp. 119-134; Hermann Beck “Working Class Politics at the Crossroads of Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism,” in *Between Reform and Revolution*, pp. 63-82.

<sup>179</sup> Berger, p.46.

<sup>180</sup> Toni Offermann “The Lassallean Labor Movement in Germany: Organization, Social Structure and Associational Life in the 1860s,” in *Between Reform and Revolution*, p.88.

ADAV defined its mission as to “enlighten workers about their class situation and to press for universal, equal and direct male suffrage.”<sup>181</sup>

The reaction of the supporters of the lib-lab coalition was the foundation of a new association called the Federation of German Workers’ Associations (*Verband Deutscher Arbeitervereine*, VDAV) that was to encourage the workers to support the liberal democrats.<sup>182</sup> However, this organization was not able to prevent the crisis of the liberal – labor alliance.<sup>183</sup> The Federation of German Workers’ Associations was divided between the socialist majority and liberal democrat minority. At last, it was also split up in 1869, and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*, SDAP) was founded by the socialist majority.<sup>184</sup> Among the founders of the party, Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel were the most important ones who were also deeply influenced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.<sup>185</sup>

These two parties (the Social Democratic Workers’ Party and the General German Workers’ Association) merged in Gotha in 1875.<sup>186</sup> This new party, named the Social Democratic Party of Germany, became very successful in electoral and organizational terms. The party participated in the first elections in 1877, and received 9.1% of the total votes. The enactment of the Anti-socialist Law in 1878 did not end the development of the socialist movement.<sup>187</sup> Barclay and Weitz describe

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., p.99.

<sup>182</sup> Berger, p.49.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p.50.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p.51.

<sup>187</sup> Anti-socialist law was enacted in Chancellor Bismarck era. This law banned socialist activities and organizations. However, socialists might be in politics as independents. On the other hand, many of



the effect of the Anti-socialist Law as “driven underground or into exile by Bismarck’s Anti-socialist law from 1878 to 1890, socialism took on its heroic cast, a movement of faith and progress propagated by a persecuted minority. When the law lapsed more or less concurrently with Germany’s powerful drive into the first rank of industrial nations, the SPD was well poised to recruit supporters from the ever growing numbers of industrial workers.”<sup>188</sup>

When the anti-socialist law was abolished in 1890, the party had 19,7% of the total votes cast. The voting rate of the party increased in every election. The social democratic vote had been only 2% in 1871.<sup>189</sup> At last, social democratic party became the largest party in Germany with 34,8% of the total votes in 1912. In addition, the party constructed a huge organization. When the founder of ADAV, Ferdinand Lassalle, died in 1864, the ADAV had only had 4600 members.<sup>190</sup> Fifty years later, the number of SPD members was higher than one million.<sup>191</sup>

The success of the German social democrats encouraged the establishment of socialist parties in other European countries. The two important general histories of the European left point to the last years of the nineteenth century for this development of the foundation of social democratic working class parties. Donald Sassoon writes that in the last decade of the nineteenth century, almost in all

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socialist politicians went exile in this period. The side effect of the law became on the composition of the German social democratic movement. Lassallean reformism lost its strength in German social democracy. On the contrary, Marxism was getting strength. Offermann, p.89.

<sup>188</sup> Barclay and Weitz, pp.3-4.

<sup>189</sup> On the social democratic performance in elections and social democratic electorate, see Jonathan Sperber, “The Social Democratic Electorate in Imperial Germany” in *Between Reform and Revolution*, pp. 167-194.

<sup>190</sup> Beck, p.71.

<sup>191</sup> Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism* (New York: New Press, 1996), p.11.

European countries socialist parties had been founded.<sup>192</sup> Geoff Eley notes that the middle third of the nineteenth century became a separation point between the socialists and the liberals.<sup>193</sup> Socialists established their own parties in the last third of the nineteenth century.

Table 1. Emergence of European Working Class Movement

	Found	Universal Male Suffrage	Peak Membership before 1914	National Trade Union Federation	Workforce engaged in Industry (%)	Pre-1918 electoral peak (%)
Austria (SPO)	1889	1907	89,628 (1913)	1893	23.5 (1910)	25.4 (1911)
Belgium (POB)	1885	1893		1898	45.1 (1910)	30.3 (1914)
Britain (LP)	1900	1918		1868	44.6 (1911)	7 (1910)
Denmark (SDF)	1876	1901	57,115 (1914)	1898	24 (1911)	29.6 (1913)
Finland (SDP)	1903	1899	85,027 (1906)		11.1 (1910)	47.3 (1916)
France (SFIO)	1880	1848	93,218 (1914)		29.5 (1906)	16.8 (1914)
Germany (SPD)	1875	1871	1,085,905 (1914)	1891	39.1 (1907)	34.8 (1912)
Italy (PSI)	1892	1919	47,098 (1901)	1906	26.8 (1911)	21.3 (1904)
Netherlands (SDAP)	1881	1917	25,708 (1913)	1906	32.8 (1909)	11.2 (1905)
Norway (DNA)	1887	1898	53,866 (1914)	1899	26 (1910)	32.1 (1915)
Sweden (SAP)	1889	1907	133,388 (1907)	1898	24.7 (1910)	36.4 (1914)
Source: Donald Sassoon, <i>One Hundred Years of Socialism</i> (New York: New Press, 1996), p.10; Geoff Eley. <i>Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000</i> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 63-70.						

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p.9.

<sup>193</sup> Eley, p.31.

Socialist parties in European countries were almost simultaneous: Belgium, 1885; Norway, 1887; Austria and Sweden, 1889; Italy, 1892 (See Table 1)<sup>194</sup> In France, small socialist parties and groupings came together and established the French Section of the Workers' International (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*, SFIO) in 1905.<sup>195</sup> In the Great Britain, trade unions formed the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 that became the Labour Party in 1906.<sup>196</sup> So at the start of the twentieth century, almost all European countries had social democratic parties similar to the German model, the SPD.

In fact, one of the main reasons for the international penetration of social democratic parties and the commonalities between those parties was the existence of organizations known as the workingmen internationals. The first international (International Working Men's Association) was founded in 1864. However, there was no nationally organized political party in this period except for the German parties.<sup>197</sup> On the other hand, it had a heterogeneous character. Albert Lindeman describes heterogeneous structure as

The most important contingent by far was that of the English trade unionists, whose goals for the International centered around protecting labor standards in England against the importation of cheap foreign labor. In addition to this large delegation were some surviving Owenites and Chartists, Proudhonists and Blanquists from France, Polish democrats, and nationalist revolutionaries from some countries as Ireland and Italy, for whom the social question was secondary in importance.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> Eley., p.63.

<sup>195</sup> For information on the French social democracy, see Ladrech and Marlière, "The French Socialist Party," in Ladrech and Marlière.

<sup>196</sup> For British Labour Party, see Geoffrey Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); P. Webb, "The British Labor Party," in Ladrech and Marlière.

<sup>197</sup> Eley, p.39. For the analysis of the relations between the German social democratic parties (ADAV and SDAP) and the First International, see Roger Morgan, *The German Social Democrats and the First International, 1864-1872* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>198</sup> Lindeman, pp.121-122.

The First International was dissolved in 1876 because of the conflict between anarchists and Marxists.

The Second International was formed during the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the French revolution in Paris, and it was dissolved with the outbreak of the First World War. As pointed out above, social democratic parties were founded almost in all European countries in the era of the Second International as the political organizations of the working class.

In the Second International era, the German social democratic movement was the main model for the working class of Europe. One of the main features of German social democracy was its amalgamated character. The German social democratic movement contained both Lassallean working class reformism (in other words trade union pragmatism) and Marxist orthodoxy. Until the First World War, Marxist orthodoxy and reformism both prevailed in German socialist democracy. The party programs of the SPD were clear examples of this situation. The first program of the SPD that was approved in Gotha in 1875 had a more Lassallean perspective.<sup>199</sup> In *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Karl Marx presented his negative views on this program.<sup>200</sup> Then after the anti-socialist law, the party program was renewed in Erfurt in 1891.<sup>201</sup> In this program, Marxist orthodoxy had more influence than the first program, although this program was a balanced amalgamation of reformism and Marxism.

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<sup>199</sup> Berger, p.51.

<sup>200</sup> Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (New York : International Publishers, 1989).

<sup>201</sup> For the text of the program, see Bertrand Russell, *German Social Democracy* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 137-141.

The program was composed of three sections. In the first section, the program reflected a Marxist perspective, and assessed the current political situation from a Marxist point of view.<sup>202</sup> As an example, the program described the economic situation from a classical Marxist perspective as

Hand in hand with this monopolizing of the means of production goes the supplanting of scattered small businesses by colossal businesses, the development of the tool into the machine, and a gigantic growth of the productivity of human labor. But all the advantages of this change are monopolized by the capitalists and great landlords. For the proletariat and the sinking intermediate layers— small masters, peasants— it betokens growing increase of the insecurity of their existence, of misery, of oppression, of slavery, of humiliation and of exploitation.<sup>203</sup>

And the political settlement of the question was put forward as

private property in the means of production, which was formerly the means of securing to the producer the possession of his own product, has today become the means for expropriating peasants, handicraftsmen, and small producers, and of putting the non-workers, capitalists and great landlords in possession of the product of the workers. Only the conversion of capitalistic private property in the means of production – land, quarries, and mines, raw material, tools, machines, means of communication – into common property, and the change of the production of goods into a socialist production, worked for and through society, can bring it about that production of a large scale, and ever growing productiveness of human labor, shall develop, for the hitherto exploited classes, from a source of misery and oppression, into a source of the highest wellbeing and perfect universal harmony.<sup>204</sup>

However in the second and third sections of the program, a reform proposal was presented. In the second part, the reforms concerned all of society, such as universal, equal, and direct suffrage; proportional representation; abolition of all laws

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p.137.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p.138.

that placed women at a disadvantage compared with men in matters of public or private law; abolition of all laws that limited or suppressed the free expression of opinion and restrict or suppress the right of association and assembly; and the secularization of schools and free medical care.<sup>205</sup>

In the third section, the program stated a reform proposal for the protection of the working class, with items like the fixing of a normal working day, the prohibition of gainful employment of children under the age of fourteen, and an uninterrupted rest period of at least thirty-six hours every week for every worker.<sup>206</sup>

So the first part of the program reflected Marxist prescriptions about the future of the capitalist regime. The ideological and political frame of the party was shaped by this part. However, the second and third parts of the program reflected the reform proposals of trade union pragmatism. In this era, it was obvious in the program that German social democracy oscillated between reform and revolution.

This position of the social democratic working class movement between reform and revolution was very common in almost all European countries, and it continued until the First World War. So in the Second International's period a social democratic working class party had both Marxist and reformist wings together. However, the British case was the main exception. Marxism had very little influence on the development of the British social democratic movement. Until the First World War, socialism was not very popular in the working class milieu in Britain.<sup>207</sup> The early socialists were mainly from the middle-classes.<sup>208</sup> When the Labour Representation Committee was founded in 1900, the main components were trade

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p.140.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p.141.

<sup>207</sup> Sasson, p.15.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

unions, the Fabians, the Independent Labour Party and the Social Democratic Federation.<sup>209</sup> It is important to note that among those actors trade unions were the strongest.<sup>210</sup>

Marxist tendencies were represented only in the Social Democratic Federation, and this organization was not strong enough to transfer Marxism into the LRC and then the Labour Party. So the trade union pragmatism became the predominant perspective of the Labour Party.<sup>211</sup>

In fact, this peculiarity of Britain and its political and economic conditions directly affected the emergence of German revisionism. The thoughts of the father of revisionism, Eduard Bernstein, crystallized while he was living in London as a political refugee between 1888 and 1901.<sup>212</sup> Bernstein's main opposition was to Marxist collapse theory. For him, the proletarianisation and immiseration thesis was falsified by the economic developments through the twentieth century.<sup>213</sup> He stated his views on Marxist catastrophe theory as follows:

I have opposed the view that we stand on the threshold of an imminent collapse of bourgeoisie society, and that social democracy should allow its tactics to be determined by, or made dependent upon, the prospect of any such forthcoming major catastrophe.... Supporters of this catastrophe theory base their view largely on the arguments of Communist Manifesto. They are wrong in every respect.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Geoffrey Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.17.

<sup>212</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.16.

<sup>213</sup> On the political thought of Eduard Bernstein, see Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York : Collier Books, 1962); Manfred B. Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For Bernstein's writings on revisionism, see Eduard Bernstein, *The Preconditions of Socialism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., pp.1-2.

In this framework, then he proposed a new model for economic development of modern societies, and a new way for the social democratic movement that was called revisionism.

The First World War became an important turning point for the social democratic parties of Europe. The political developments that came true during the war shaped the fate of the social democratic movement in the twentieth century. Two decisions of the parties were crucial in this process. The first decision was about whether to support the war by votes in the parliament on war credits or not. The second decision was about how the social democratic working class parties would act vis-à-vis the Bolshevik Revolution.

In the Second International's era (1889-1914), the social democratic parties opposed the war and the international solidarity of the working class movement was considered to have a strong basis against a general war in Europe. Donald Sassoon writes, "at the founding congress of the Second International (July 1889) and at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, the vast majority of member parties committed themselves to averting war by all possible means and should war nevertheless erupt, to using crisis to bring about a social revolution."<sup>215</sup> In this way, the social democratic working class of every nation would be against the war and they would be in solidarity with other nations' working classes as put forward in the last sentence of the Communist Manifesto: "Workers of the world unite! You have nothing to lose, but your chains."

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<sup>215</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.27.



However, this was not the case. All social democratic parties in Europe supported the war.<sup>216</sup> The only exceptions were the Russian and Serbian socialists.<sup>217</sup> Then the social democratic working class parties attended bourgeoisie governments. Supporting the war credits in the parliament and attending war cabinets created two direct effects on the social democratic working class movement. The first one was the collapse of the Second International. The socialist parties of the Second International were in the governments of the fighting nations. Second, the social democratic milieu of a country was divided between the supporters and opponents of the war. At the beginning, the supporters were in majority and they voted for the approval of the war credits. However, near the end of the war, the tensions between the right and left wing of those parties were crystallized. This division between the supporters and opponents of the war cabinets brought the division of the parties.

The second important decision of the social democrat working class parties involved the Bolshevik revolution. Now again they had to make a decision whether support and follow the Bolsheviks or not. In fact, the Bolshevik revolution was a surprise for the social democrats of Europe, and they had sympathy for the revolution because of the abolition of tsarist absolutism. The Bolsheviks designed a centrally organized communist movement that was directed from Moscow. They removed social reformists out of the socialist ranks. The new party was to be revolutionary and disciplined. It was to be the vanguard of the proletariat and should not embody reformists in the party cadres.

Thus the European social democrats had to decide whether they supported this project or not. In this framework, Lenin initiated the establishment of a new

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid., p.28.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

international. He put twenty one conditions for the membership of the new international. Those conditions were mainly about organizational issues rather than ideological or political ones.<sup>218</sup> The parties that adopted these conditions would be accepted to the membership of the Communist International. The conditions required the expulsion of all reformists from the party ranks, to support the Soviet Union and to be in the discipline of the Communist International. According to the conditions, all parties would call themselves communist.<sup>219</sup> Thus within two years communist parties were established in almost all European countries. Other remaining socialist parties formed a Second International, and then united with independent socialists (Second and a Half International) in 1923 with the new name of the Labor and Socialist International (the LSI).<sup>220</sup>

Consequently, after the First World War, socialism was divided into two main camps that would never merge again. On the one hand, the communist parties, and on the other hand, social democratic parties.<sup>221</sup>

In the relationship between the reformist and revolutionary socialists, the inter-war era saw confrontation and then cooperation. The key words of the confrontation phase were “social fascism” and the “third period.” After the First World War, revolutionary uprisings in Europe were defeated.<sup>222</sup> The expectations for

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<sup>218</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.33.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Eley, p.179.

<sup>221</sup> For Carl E. Schorske, the developments in the First World War were not the main reason of the division of the German social democratic movement. In fact, from 1905 on, the party was divided between revisionism and revolutionary socialism. The division of the party in the war period was the result of this schism between the left and right wings of the party since 1905. See, Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917 : The Development of the Great Schism* (New York : Harper & Row, 1972).

<sup>222</sup> For the revolutionary uprisings of the period in Central and Western Europe, see Chris Wrigley (Ed.), *Challenges of Labour : Central and Western Europe, 1917-1920* (London: Routledge, 1993).

a world revolution were postponed. Socialism in one country became the predominant policy of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1920s. Under those circumstances, in the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, the “social fascism” and “third period” theses were accepted. From this point of view, a third period was opened in the international capitalist system. This third period, for Comintern, was a crisis era of the capitalist countries. The results of world capitalism’s contradictions under the crisis were to be “sharpening class divisions, imperialist war, colonial unrest, and growing antagonism on the part of the 'capitalist states' towards the USSR.”<sup>223</sup> For Comintern, under the conditions of the third period, communists should struggle primarily against the social democrats as the social democrats were identified as the principal social support of Fascism.<sup>224</sup> Thus the communists labeled the social democrats social fascists.<sup>225</sup> From this point of view, social democrats divided the working class movement, and paralyzed its political activities. Therefore social democrats had served the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Then for the cooperation era, the “United Front against Fascism” became the main motto. The “social fascism” discourse was abandoned after the Nazi’s coming to power. During the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the third period and social fascism discourses were officially abandoned. The new policy was to construct a national united front against fascism. François Furet describes this new environment as

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<sup>223</sup> Worley, p.1.

<sup>224</sup> Furet, p.195.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

The new tactic adopted by the Seventh Congress was to make the unified front of the working class the spine of the coalition and to surround it with the anti-Fascist Popular Front, in which the Communists posed temporarily as champions of the bourgeois heritage. The dictatorship of the proletariat and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie were still the ultimate goal: the prescribed path, however, was different. The French experience of 1934-35, lauded by Dimitrov, was henceforth the model for the International. The Popular Front had replaced the 'class against class' approach.<sup>226</sup>

In the 1930s, the Spanish civil war and the Popular Front in France became the clear examples of the new strategy. However, the 1930s became an era of catastrophe for social democracy. The social democrats were not powerful enough to provide the survival of the fronts. In Europe, communism and fascism were rising, while liberalism and reformist social democracy declined. Social democracy was at the edge to perish in Europe. In this era, the only exception was the Swedish case.

In his classical work on Scandinavian social democracy, *Politics against Markets: the Social Democratic Road to Power*, Gosta Esping Andersen claims that Swedish inter-war social democracy was deeply influenced by Austro-Marxism.<sup>227</sup> According to him, Austro-Marxism, after the WWI, rejected Kautskyan<sup>228</sup> and Leninist ideas, and adopted an original socialist thinking.<sup>229</sup> On the one hand, Kautsky represented Marxist orthodoxy in social democratic politics. On the other hand, Lenin was the symbol of the Bolshevik Revolution and communist ideology. In this framework, Austro-Marxism was an amalgamation of Bernstein's and Kautsky's thesis (an amalgamation of revisionist and orthodox social democracy). Max Adler and Otto Bauer were the main figures in this theory, and they argued that

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p.222.

<sup>227</sup> Gøsta Esping Andersen, *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp.20-24.

<sup>228</sup> For the political thought of Karl Kautsky, see Massimo Salvadori, *Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938*. Trans. Jon Rothschild (New York : Verso, 1990).

<sup>229</sup> Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, p.20

state became more autonomous from the bourgeoisie, and capitalist development produced status differentiation not polarization of the classes. Andersen identifies the political strategy of Austro-Marxism as constructive rather than destructive. On the other hand, Austro-Marxists argue that the working class should establish class alliances with peasants and the middle classes. Andersen writes that the Swedish social democrats stood very close to the Austro-Marxists in those aspects. In the Swedish case, when the working class demanded reformism, the social democratic party did not insist on Kautskyan or Leninist orthodoxy. Instead, they easily adopted reformism. At this point, Austro-Marxists became the main ideological reference for the Swedish social democrats. Thus the social democratic working class movement in Sweden was able to create the only successful example of the inter-war period.

As pointed out above, the inter-war era was a catastrophe era for the social democratic working class movements of Europe.<sup>230</sup> However, the Swedish social democrats were able to provide the continuation of the democratic regime and implementation of social and economic reforms. The main reason for the success of Swedish social democracy was its pragmatism. Political developments after the First World War exemplified this pragmatism.

The Swedish social democrats formed a coalition government with the liberals in 1917.<sup>231</sup> However the coalition was dissolved in 1920. In these years, a

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<sup>230</sup> On the interwar social democracy, see Gregory Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Sheri Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998).

<sup>231</sup> On the Swedish social democratic movement, see Walter Korpi, *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions, and Politics in Sweden* (London: Routledge, 1978); Klaus Misgeld and Karl Molin, *Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); Tim Tilton, *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991); Richard Scase, "Social Democracy in Sweden," in *Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe*, ed. William Paterson and Alastair Thomas (New York: St Martin's Press, 1977).

very important change occurred that shaped the fate of the Swedish social democrats. This was about the percentage of working class votes in the total votes cast.

Just before WWI, the number of workers in the total electorate reached its peak. However, after this peak, the percentage of the industrial workers in the voting cast gradually decreased.<sup>232</sup> The Marxist prescription in the proletarianization of the whole society was falsified. So a social democratic party had to establish cross class alliances in order to have a majority in the parliament. The success of the Swedish social democrats was to discern this development earliest in Europe.

When the coalition with the liberals ended in 1920, the social democrats had two choices.<sup>233</sup> The first choice was to follow the communists and attempt a revolution. The second was to establish cross class alliances, most precisely with the peasants. By doing the latter, the social democrats increased their voting rate throughout the whole 1920s, and established three short coalition governments.<sup>234</sup> Then in the 1932 election, the social democrats had the majority in the parliament and the SAP became the dominant party of the country to the 1970s.<sup>235</sup>

The program of social democratic reformism prioritized social welfare policy, progressive taxation, economic planning, industrial democracy and the socialization of industry.<sup>236</sup> The social democratic party identified its main aim as the founding a new society called the “People’s Home.” The party chair Per Albin Hansson described the “People’s Home”:

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<sup>232</sup> On the stabilization of the numbers of the working class members, see Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.23.

<sup>233</sup> Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.162.

<sup>234</sup> Scase, p.324.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Tilton, *Political Theory*, p.39.

The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. Swedish society is not yet the people's home. There is a formal equality, equality of political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society remains and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails.<sup>237</sup>

Under the conditions of the fall of liberalism and the rise of fascism and communism, the Swedish social democrats were able to construct a third way. It was obvious that the interwar period was a catastrophic period for the social democrats of Europe, and Sweden became the only exception. In the postwar era, the European social democratic movement recovered and reorganized itself. In this reorganization, the Swedish experiment in social democracy became an important reference point.

After WWII, the social democratic parties in Western Europe recovered themselves. Social democracy became once again one of the major political forces of these countries. However, the political environment in the postwar Western Europe was very different. Parliamentary democracy, welfare state and Keynesianism became hegemonic and those new developments directly influenced the formation of social democratic movements. Eley describes the new economic model and its influence on social democracy:

At the apex was the state. Postwar industrial relations required a corporatist triangulation: labor won tangible economic benefits and political influence; capital won the space for a new accumulation strategy based on Fordism,

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<sup>237</sup> Berman, p.163.

meaning workplace deals combining high wages, productivity, and a modernized labor process, linked to consumer-driven growth; and the state won a new role overseeing this large-scale societal compromise... The entire package presumed a future of economic growth. An unparalleled capitalist boom incited social democrats to amazing optimism, now guided not by belief in capitalism's inevitable collapse but by the humanized certainty of its prosperous future.<sup>238</sup>

However, the adaptation of the social democratic parties to the postwar developments was undertaken in different ways. Parties that had more reformist features more easily adapted themselves. The Scandinavian and British working class parties were the best examples of this situation. On the other hand, parties that had more Marxist class party characters had great difficulty adapting themselves to these developments. The German Social Democratic Party is one of the main examples of this case.

In organizational terms, the SPD easily recovered itself. At the end of 1946, the party enrolled 700,000 members and had 8000 local branches.<sup>239</sup> This was a great success for the party after its demolition by the Nazis. However, the party was not successful in the elections. The Marxist class party character of the SPD was not harmonious with the new conditions, and the party failed to attract the votes of classes other than those of the working class. The voting rates of the party in the 1949, 1953 and 1957 elections were respectively 29.2%, 28.8% and 31.8%.<sup>240</sup> The Christian democrats, the main rival of the party, won 31%, 45.2% and 50.2% of the total votes in these elections.<sup>241</sup> These electoral defeats caused reform pressures in the party.

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<sup>238</sup> Eley, pp.316-317.

<sup>239</sup> Berger, p.180.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.



Under those circumstances, during the 1959 Bad Godesberg Congress, the SPD adopted a new program. In this program, the SPD abandoned its class party character, and attempted to be a catch-all or people's party. The program of the SPD stated its definition of democratic socialism:

Democratic Socialism, which in Europe is rooted in Christian ethics, humanism and classical philosophy, does not proclaim ultimate truths – not because of any lack of understanding for or indifference to philosophical or religious truths, but out of respect for the individual's choice in these matters of conscience in which neither the state nor any political party should be allowed to interfere.”<sup>242</sup>

In this period, the social democratic parties of Western Europe had similar trajectories to adapt themselves to the postwar conditions. In this framework, Berger writes

In the 1950s, a variety of social democratic parties across Europe... distanced themselves from Marxist heritage. They made their peace with organized religion and the nation state, and they endorsed Keynesianism and welfare state capitalism. Their motif was the same: a common desire to win votes among non-working class strata of the electorate.<sup>243</sup>

The history of social democracy did not end with being a catch-all party in the 1960s. After this period, important transformations in social democracy also took place. However this dissertation deals with the changes in Turkey in the 1960s. Therefore the story of the evolution of social democracy will end at this point.

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<sup>242</sup> For the English text of the program, see *Godesberg Program of the SPD (November 1959)*. Retrieved August 17, 2011, from German History in Documents and Images Web site: <http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Parties%20WZ%203%20ENG%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>243</sup> Berger, p.189.

## Analytical Approaches to Social Democracy

The social democratic ideology and movement have been debated in academic literature by several analytical approaches. This literature mainly covers issues such as class structure's effect on the social democratic movement, class formation, the revision in social democracy, and relations with other left-wing organizations.<sup>244</sup>

In this framework, for the analysis of social democratic politics, generally two different approaches are implemented. The first one is based on class perspective. This approach claims the centrality of class in the analysis of social democracy. The second approach is closer to a societal perspective. The key words of this perspective are solidarity, cross class cooperation and primacy of politics. These two perspectives are also crucial for the definition of social democracy. In this part of the chapter, I will elaborate on these two perspectives.

The academic literature on social democracy is basically dominated by the writings of Adam Przeworski.<sup>245</sup> He is one of the most important analysts of social democracy within the class perspective.

Przeworski situates his views on the emergence of social democratic politics with three decisions of the social democratic parties. He states these decisions:

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<sup>244</sup> For a detailed analysis of the literature see Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Kees van Kersbergen, "Contemporary Research on Social Democracy," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18 (1992).

<sup>245</sup> Przeworski's analysis mainly represented in Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, (New York: Cambridge University, 1986). And the main theses of the book were based on the empirical findings of one Przeworski's other works titled Adam Przeworski. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).

Whether to seek the advancement of socialism within the existing institutions of the capitalist society or outside of them; whether to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely on multi- or even non-class support; and whether to seek reforms, partial improvements, or to dedicate all efforts and energies to the complete abolition of capitalism.<sup>246</sup>

Thus Przeworski theorizes the development of social democratic movements in capitalist societies according to the decisions of the parties. But these decisions have some structural constraints. Those constraints might be seen more clearly with the basic theses of Przeworski.

Przeworski has three main theses on social democracy in capitalist societies. The first one comes from a statistical fact. In no mature industrial society, does the rate of manual workers in the electorate have the majority.<sup>247</sup> Thus the natural result of this fact might be concluded that social democratic movements are unable to enjoy electoral success while they continue their pure working class party character. Then all social democratic parties need to seek the votes of people other than workers. Thus these parties should try to establish cross class alliances, and the second proposal starts at this point. This alliance requires a revision that brings the demands of the voters other than those of the workers to the agenda.

Przeworski's second thesis argues that there is a trade-off between the votes of workers and those of the other electorates. When parties revise their programs in order to get the votes of other electorates, they lose some of the votes of the workers. This situation is proposed as the answer for the question as to why these revisions do not always build the majority for working class parties. Therefore, the electoral

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<sup>246</sup> Przeworski, *Capitalism*, p.3.

<sup>247</sup> See the part on electoral dilemma Ibid., pp. 23-29.

trade-off between the votes of workers and those of others creates the electoral dilemma that is identified by Przeworski as

Social democrats have not succeeded in turning elections into an instrument of socialist transformation. To be effective in elections they have to seek allies who would join workers under the socialist banner, yet at the same time they erode exactly that ideology which is the source of their strength among workers. They cannot remain a party of workers alone and yet they can never cease to be a workers' party.<sup>248</sup>

Third, Przeworski proposes that when the social democratic labor parties take government power, their economic programs cannot be successful.<sup>249</sup> If these parties implement radical policies like nationalization or high taxation, the capitalist class will take some measures such as disinvestment. So for the workers, the wages that come from capitalists as short-term benefits are preferable to the long-term gains of the transformation of capitalism or the road to socialism. Thus the socialist transformation of society is not possible by social democratic reformism. Przeworski calls this process the constitution of the material bases of the consent, because "hegemony consists of exploitation with consent."<sup>250</sup>

These conclusions of Przeworski that were derived from the structural constraints of social democratic movement in capitalist societies make the social democratic transformation of capitalism nearly impossible. Therefore reformism, as a political movement of the working class has no chance to create the socialist transformation. The position of Przeworski reflects the constraints of the class perspective in the analysis of social democratic formation in the capitalist societies.

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>249</sup> See Ibid., pp. 42-46.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

Such a perspective fails to explain the success and longevity of the social democratic movement. However, a societal perspective would overcome this difficulty.

Przeworski, as pointed out above, argues the indispensable unsuccessfulness of cross-class alliance for the social democratic labor movements. However, many cases, most precisely the Scandinavian case, empirically conflict with Przeworski's argument. Gøsta Esping Andersen, in his significant analysis on Scandinavian social democracy titled *Politics against Markets: the Social Democratic Road to Power* makes clear why the social democratic parties of Nordic countries became unusually successful. He takes in hand the social and political bases of social democracy and the political alignment in Sweden, Norway and Denmark.<sup>251</sup> He also puts forth a societal perspective.

The relationship between Andersen's theory of social democracy and Przeworski's social democratic movement definition provides important insights. For Andersen, classical definitions of social democracy are insufficient to explain the link between social democracy and the social structure, state and historical development of the country.<sup>252</sup> Such definitions use criteria like label, membership in the Socialist International and the organizational peculiarities of social democratic movement.<sup>253</sup> However, for Andersen, Przeworski's definition is very different from those kind of definitions.<sup>254</sup> As discussed above, Przeworski uses the three strategic choices of the social democratic movement in order to define it. Those choices are

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<sup>251</sup> For the comparative analysis of Andersen's social democratic theory with Foucault's governmentality concept and Habermas' procedural democracy, see Kevin Edward Olson, *Rethinking the Welfare State: A study in the Foundation of Social Democracy*. PhD Dissertation: Northwestern University, 1995.

<sup>252</sup> Andersen, *Politics against markets* p.6.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

Whether to seek the advancement of socialism within the existing institutions of the capitalist society or outside of them; whether to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely on multi- or even non-class support; and whether to seek reforms, partial improvements, or to dedicate all efforts and energies to the complete abolition of capitalism.<sup>255</sup>

Andersen is in agreement with Przeworski on the importance of the first and second decisions on the formation of the social democratic movement. However, he objects to the third clause about reforms and revolutions.<sup>256</sup> He puts forth that we have no way of knowing if a given reform will have long-term revolutionary consequences, because there is no generally agreed upon theory on the cumulative consequences of the reforms.<sup>257</sup> So, for Andersen, reforms might create revolutionary influences in cumulative form.

After these references to Przeworski, Andersen proposes his own third criterion

Once social democrats had chosen parliament as their battleground, once they had acknowledged the broader class alliances, their strategy for political mobilization and class solidarity had to include efforts to influence government policy. Instead of Przeworski's faintly teleological criterion, then, I offer the following: social democracy is a movement that seeks to build class unity and mobilize power via national legislation"<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> Przeworski, *Capitalism*, p.3.

<sup>256</sup> Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, p.6.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., p.9.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., p.10.

Andersen also categorizes theories on social democracy into three groups. The first one is the Leninist critique or the Leninist theory of social democracy.<sup>259</sup> From this point of view, social democracy will be crushed by long-term developments. As for the second approach, Andersen cites the bourgeois – or sociological critics of social democracy.<sup>260</sup> Those critics consider social democracy to be a declining movement because of the modernization of the societies. Last is the social democratic theory which includes mainly the theories of Bernstein, Kautsky, the Austro-Marxists and the Swedish social democrats.<sup>261</sup>

After evaluation and comparison of those theories Andersen put forwards his own theory, which has a three-layered character. The first layer is the given class structure of the country that set the limits for social democratic mobilization.<sup>262</sup> The second layer, Andersen says, “consist of giving a collective identity to an aggregate of discrete ‘empty slots’; it is the establishment of social community whose collective purpose is class representation.”<sup>263</sup> The third layer is the class alliance.<sup>264</sup> Although the working class is the main base of the social democratic movement, social democrats establish cross-class alliances for having parliamentary majorities. This three layered analysis takes Andersen to a new conclusion as

The forces of class structural change constrain social democracy’s capacity to assume state power unless it is both able and prepared to forge political

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid., p.13.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., pp.14-17.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., pp.17-26.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid., p.26.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., p.36.

alliances with other classes. In this respect, the future of democratic socialism has always been decided by classes other than strictly the working classes.<sup>265</sup>

This explanation makes the success of the social democratic parties of the Nordic countries clear. According to Andersen, the Great Depression was the turning point for the Nordic countries.<sup>266</sup> Prior to this, there was no peasant – worker coalition except for the early struggle for universal suffrage. But after the Depression, the Nordic parties (more precisely the Swedish party) became the “people’s home,” unlike many European parties. This new alignment in politics necessitated the revision of the party. Andersen writes that, “Ideologically social democrats were compelled to define their historical task and responsibilities as an affair of ‘the people,’ not of the proletariat alone.”<sup>267</sup> Thus ideological purity and orthodoxy was replaced by “heightened importance of politics.”

Similar to Andersen’s “heightened importance of politics,” Sheri Berman argues the “primacy of politics” for social democratic movements. Berman’s perspective assumes the prominence of ideas in the determining of the real world of politics. Thus she argues that through the twentieth century, politics were shaped by the rivalries of different ideologies. Among them, the social democratic thought has become the most successful, and the twentieth century was formed by this ideology. Berman’s summarizes the success of social democracy and its place in European history:

rejecting the economism and passivity of liberalism and orthodox Marxism, and eschewing the violence and authoritarianism of fascism and national

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<sup>265</sup> Ibid., p.38.

<sup>266</sup> See Ibid., pp. 314-324.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., p. 316.



socialism, social democracy was built on a belief in the primacy of politics and communitarianism – that is, on a conviction that political forces rather than economic ones could and should be the driving forces of history and that the ‘needs’ or ‘good’ of society must be protected and nurtured – and represented a non-Marxist vision of socialism. It was the most successful ideology and movement of the twentieth century: Its principles and policies undergirded the most prosperous and harmonious period in European history by reconciling things that had hitherto seemed incompatible – a well-functioning capitalist system, democracy, and social stability.<sup>268</sup>

In the above pages, societal and class perspectives were outlined. This dissertation is inclined more to the society perspective. On the other hand, Karl Polanyi’s “counter-movement” conception also indicates such a societal perspective. Polanyi describes a double movement that governed the dynamics of modern society for a century.<sup>269</sup> On the one side there is the market that expands continuously, but on the other there is a counter-movement checking the expansion of the market. According to Polanyi, against economic liberalism, the counter movement or the social protection principle:

aiming at the conversation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – primarily but not exclusively, the working and the landed class- and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods.<sup>270</sup>

So the definition and functioning of social democracy is very closely related to this social protection and counter movement conception.

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<sup>268</sup> Berman, p. 6.

<sup>269</sup> Karl Polanyi. *The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), p. 136.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., p. 138-139.

According to Polanyi, fascism and socialism are the results of the counter movement.<sup>271</sup> However he argues that the difference between them is not primarily economic, but moral and religious, and what separates them is freedom<sup>272</sup>. Both socialism and fascism accept society as a reality, the thing that separates them is the decision about freedom, whether it will be upheld or not. In the case of fascism and socialism, Polanyi clearly demonstrates that the words of society and nations might be used interchangeably for the definition of counter movement.

As discussed above, Berman considers the centrality of cross class alliance and primacy of politics for the success of social democracy. Very similar to Berman's "primacy of politics," Andersen indicates "heightened importance of politics." These principles also construct the independent character of social democracy that is separated from liberalism and Marxism. The success of social democracy in the Nordic countries comes from its taking political struggle to the center of its agenda. Thus social democrats struggled without suspending freedom. It is obvious that this characteristic of social democracy made it hegemonic in those countries through the electoral successes.

In this part, the relevance of the class and society perspective in the history and analysis of social democracy was discussed. The aim of this part was not to answer the question what is social democracy. Nevertheless, I tried to indicate how we can discuss social democracy and what the main analytical tools are for this discussion. However, there is a question about the relevance of these analytical tools for different societies and regions, and the possibility of social democracy beyond European countries.

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<sup>271</sup> See the last chapter, "Freedom in a Complex Society," in *Ibid.*, pp. 257-268.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267.

## Social Democracy beyond Europe

This part of the chapter deals with the question of whether social democratic movements are able to exist in countries outside of Europe or not? Social democratic working class movements emerged in European countries, but they extended beyond Europe after the overspread of industrial capitalism. However, the social democratic movements did not become influential political actors outside of Europe until the 1980s. For this period, one can hardly claim that there was a remarkable social democratic party or movement in the periphery, where progressive politics oscillated between Marxist revolutionary movements and national populism.

As stated above, social democracy is not a universal finished project. It dynamically changes in time and space. It is obvious that there are major differences in policies, organization and social bases of the social democratic movements of different countries and regions. First of all, I should indicate that it is not possible to mention a unique European social democratic model. However, it is possible to categorize a group of traditions for different European countries. The first distinction is between northern and southern European social democratic movements.<sup>273</sup> As relatively well-developed countries, the north European cases are more focused on

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<sup>273</sup> For the studies on the groupings in European social democracy see Donald Sassoon (Ed.) *Looking Left: Socialism in Europe after the Cold War* (New York : The New Press, 1997); Perry Anderson , Patrick Camiller (Ed.) *Mapping the West European Left* (New York : Verso, 1994); Luke Martell with Christien van den Anker (Ed.) *Social Democracy: Global and National Perspectives* (New York : Palgrave, 2001); Stephen Padgett, William Paterson *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London: Longman, 1991); Giuliano Bonoli and Martin Powell (Ed.) *Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe* (New York : Routledge, 2004); Robert Ladrech and Philippe Marlière (Ed.) *Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organization, Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

the distribution of wealth and social democracy as a class movement became more significant. In southern European countries, principally before the 1980s, the welfare and social security system was not well-developed and democracy's institutionalization had several problems. Thus social democracy came onto the agenda relatively late in those countries. On the other hand, democratization and economic development came to occupy more place in those cases than the northern European countries.

A third category occurred after the cold war: the post-communist societies of Europe. The social democratic movement in many of those countries had been legally banned during the cold war. After the end of the cold war, they had a very different environment for social democratic politics, mainly derived from the transition to the market economy and liberal democracy.

Although it is not possible to situate the Turkish experiment in one of these groups, the reasons for the differences and commonalities might be useful for the analysis of the formation of the social democratic movement in Turkey.

Social democracy, in general, was considered a political alternative only appropriate for mature capitalist societies. Such a perspective assumes that the primary concern of social democratic labor movements is the redistribution of resources. So in the countries other than mature capitalist ones, the development of social democratic labor movements is impossible because of the deficient economic sources. However, there is an important question about whether social democratic movements: did occur in all western countries or not? The answer of this question is negative, because there are some exceptions to the emergence of strong social democratic labor movement in some industrial societies.

The most common example of this exception is the United States. In fact, the American exception in the lack of social democratic politics is a widely debated issue by social scientists that was started for the most part by a well-known German historian named Werner Sombart. More than one hundred years ago, Sombart asked why there was no socialism in the United States.<sup>274</sup> He noted that American capitalism was more successful than European capitalism. Thus, the American working class had better economic and social conditions than European workers. This economic success of American capitalism transformed an ordinary American worker into “a sober, calculating businessman without ideals.” Therefore, a social democratic working class movement was not able to develop in the United States.

Sombart’s article was published in 1905. Social scientists began to study the question, generating an intensive literature on the explanation. There are many different explanations for the reasons of this exception. However, the American case obviously demonstrates that the social democratic working class movement does not necessarily emerge in all industrial societies.

In this framework, John Kautsky’s book, *Social Democracy and the Aristocracy*, is a classic work on American exceptionalism in social democracy.<sup>275</sup> Kautsky asserts that the American case falsifies the old theory that prescribes the emergence of the social democratic labor movement per se after industrialization.<sup>276</sup> Then Kautsky points to another important prerequisite for the emergence of social

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<sup>274</sup> On the Sombart question and literature on American exceptionalism, see Jerome Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered” *Socialist Register*, 16 (1979); Eric Foner, “Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?” *History Workshop Journal*, no. 17, (Spring, 1984); Seymour Martin Lipset, “Why No Socialism in the United States?” in Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar (eds.), *Sources of Contemporary Radicalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 31-149.

<sup>275</sup> John H. Kautsky. *Social Democracy and the Aristocracy: Why Socialist Labor Movements Developed in Some Industrial Countries and not in Others* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002).

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3.

democratic labor movement: the existence of an aristocratic class and the democratic struggle of the left against it. In societies that have an aristocratic class, society was organized according to the aristocratic rules and privileges and they maintain the top positions in institutions like the army, church, bureaucracy and monarchy, which divided society into different classes.<sup>277</sup> So after industrialization, when the number of workers increased in addition to their struggle with the capitalists, they also struggled with the “measures of exclusion and discrimination” of the aristocratic class.

Against this aristocratic class consciousness, workers created their own class consciousness. So Kautsky argues an approach divergent from the general view on class formation by emphasizing the importance of aristocratic remnants. The answer for why socialist labor movements did not develop in societies like the US was formulated with the lack of those aristocratic remnants and thus the democratic struggle of the left against them. Consequently, the literature on social democracy obviously demonstrates that social democracy does not necessarily emerge in all industrial mature societies. On the other hand, in peripheral countries, the situation is a bit more complicated.

We have an important question in the context of this dissertation. Can social democracy survive only in mature capitalist societies or can it survive in peripheral countries? The 1980s and 1990s became the turning point for this question. For years this question generally was answered negatively. The left had been represented by the Marxist left and national populism in the periphery until these years. Latin America was the most important example of this situation. In Latin America, communist parties dominated the progressive politics. Alan Angell describes the

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<sup>277</sup> Ibid., p.4.

importance of communism in Latin American left and the reason for this situation as follows:

The starting point for any historical discussion of the left in Latin America has to be the communist parties of the various republics. The communist party has special claims to historical importance because of the universality of its claims, its existence in almost every Latin American country, and its international links with the Soviet Union. In no small measure the importance of communism in Latin America derives from the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution. Communist parties in Latin America were seen as the direct representatives of an international movement of world revolution giving them an importance beyond their electoral appeal or political power.<sup>278</sup>

So the political sphere of the left mainly dominated by the communists.

On the other hand, social democracy's electoral base (the working class) in those countries supported the populists or right wing parties.<sup>279</sup> Then the Cuban Revolution in 1959 became an important model for national liberation movements.<sup>280</sup> Thus the political left got within the range of guerilla movements after 1960s. This period also became the rising era for military dictatorships in Latin America. So the development of social democracy had crucial constraints in those countries. However, these circumstances dramatically changed after the 1980s.

On the question of why social democracy did not become an alternative until the 1980s in Latin America, an edited book titled *Social Democracy in Latin America* provides important insights. First, the book indicates that the heritage of Iberian bureaucratic patrimonialism was powerful in Latin America. The editor of

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<sup>278</sup> Alan Angell, "The Left in Latin America since c. 1920." *Latin America since 1930 Economy, Society and Politics*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.163-164.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p.166. On the other hand, on the place of the working class in Latin American, see Ian Roxborough. "The Urban Working Class and Labour Movement in Latin America since 1930." *Latin America since 1930 Economy, Society and Politics*. Ed. Leslie Bethell. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>280</sup> On the effect of Cuban Revolution on Latin American socialism, see *ibid.*, pp. 195-209.

the book, Menno Vellinga states the direct results of this Iberian bureaucratic patrimonialism as strong presidentialism, political centralism, authoritarianism, corporatism, clientelism and personalism.<sup>281</sup> Under these circumstances, with industrialization the labor movement became a part of corporatist structure.<sup>282</sup> Most of the Latin American countries were not mature capitalist, so there was a lack of bourgeoisie hegemony for those countries. It is clear that the class formation of the working class was possible with the existence of a bourgeoisie class to identify itself against. Thus, in this way, the question of why social democracy did not become an alternative until the 1980s for those countries is answered by Vellinga. But also in the Latin American countries that had bourgeoisie hegemony social democratic alternative emerged again late. According to Vellinga, the reason for this exception was the devastating pressure on labor organizations and strong paternalism.

As discussed above, the two alternative responses to free market capitalism in Latin America were Marxism and traditional populism. The radical political environment in the 1960s caused the emergence of a radical political elite in this period that remained distant from social democracy. However, their attitude changed in the 1980s. Vellinga cites two major experiences that transformed the attitudes of the old radical elites of the 1960s regarding social democracy.<sup>283</sup> First, they experienced the importance of the liberties and human rights that had been discounted as liberal-bourgeoisie tricks before the military dictatorship's extreme repression. Second, the great social cost that had been created by these military regimes' economic restructuring programs had changed the attitudes on social

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<sup>281</sup> Menno Vellinga, "The Internationalization of Politics and Local Response: Social Democracy in Latin America," in Menno Vellinga (Ed.). *Social Democracy in Latin America: Prospects for Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) p. 12.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid., p.4.



reformism in a positive way. Vellinga cites key reasons for the increasing attention to social democracy for Latin America as the hard line attitude of Socialist International against the dictatorships; Euro communism, which decreased the difference between communism and social democracy; the power of social democracy in Southern Europe; and lastly the fall of communism.<sup>284</sup> Thus social democracy emerged as the alternative of old populism and neo liberalism as the third road, called *tercera via*, after the 1980s.

As explained above, after the 1980s and 1990s, several peripheral countries had success with social democratic experiments. This success also created an academic interest in the social democratic achievements in the periphery. In this framework, a book entitled *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery* deals with this success in Kerala, Costa Rica, Mauritius and Chile. The book states five important achievements of these social democratic regimes in the fields of health, education, poverty, advanced social security system and democratic civil society.<sup>285</sup>

The authors conclude two main differences between the social democracies of the core and periphery that creates the main difficulty for social democracy in the periphery. One of these obstacles was external and the other was domestic. First, these regimes, the main objectives of which were to orchestrate economic development and equity, had some external constraints mainly derived from globalization.<sup>286</sup> These institutions made the rules of the game disadvantageous for the global south. Second, there was a “divergence of sequence” of industrialization, democratization and social citizenship in the core countries relative to the

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<sup>284</sup> See Ibid., pp.4-8.

<sup>285</sup> See, Richard Sandbrook; Marc Edelman; Patrick Heller and Judith Teichman. *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 9-12.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid., p.19

periphery.<sup>287</sup> Thus at the center they occurred at different times, but in the periphery they all overlapped. When we consider the centrality of class formation and the class compromise in the history of western social democracies, the peripheral regimes' difficulty in achieving industrialization, democratization and social citizenship at the same time without a strong material base becomes more obvious. So this class compromise appears as a more fragile element of these regimes.

Consequently, the emergence and the development of social democratic labor movements had distinctive features for every other social formation. The problems about the discourses of modernization and economic development became the main two differences that shaped the destiny of the social democratic movements of Europe and other countries.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, social democracy and its historical and analytical dimensions were discussed. As seen in above parts, the major transformations in world history also changed social democracy. The social democratic parties of Western Europe emerged as the political organizations of the working class. The First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution caused the irreversible division of the socialist movement between democratic socialists and communists. During this period, the social democratic movement maintained its class political character. However, after the

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<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

Second World War, social democratic parties began to be catch-all parties rather than class parties.

It is obvious that the emergence and formation of social democracy is a European issue. However, social democracy went beyond Europe after the 1980s and 1990s. Before this period, political left and progressive politics had been represented by communist or nationalist populist movements in the periphery. For this era, one can hardly claim that there were true social democratic movements in the periphery in the Western European sense. On the other hand, the social democratic movements of Europe and periphery had different political agendas. The social democratic movements in the periphery gave primary importance to the development question. On the other hand, class and class politics were central to the western European experiment in social democracy. So social democracy should not be conceptualized as a universal finished project. It is reconstructed in the reality of every case and every historical transformation.

The next two chapters will be about the emergence and early making of social democracy in Turkey. The analysis will cover the years between 1960 and 1966.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 1961 CONSTITUTION, NEW REGIME AND THE RPP

This chapter and the main dissertation discussion begin with the year of 1960 in Turkey. It is not a coincidence, but a conscious historiographical choice. This year reflects historical change rather than continuity. The 27 May 1960 military coup and 1961 constitution started a new period for Turkish politics and society that lasted until the next coup in 1980.<sup>288</sup> The new system that accompanied the constitution in 1961 changed many aspects of Turkish politics, society and economy.

In this period, Turkey as a peripheral country had its first experiment in social democracy. As discussed in the previous chapter, peripheral countries had different trajectories for the formation of social democratic movements. The RPP was the main actor for this new experiment in social democracy. The newly emerging left became the main factor that shaped this position change for the RPP. This influence of the left will be main question of the next chapter, but in this chapter I will deal with the political backdrop and inner developments within the RPP as the secondary factors that caused the RPP's coming to the left of center.

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<sup>288</sup> Many of the historians of the modern Turkey called the new period the Second Republic. As an example, see Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 253-291.

The new constitution conducted proportional representation in the parliamentary elections.<sup>289</sup> Moreover, through the Senate and the Constitutional Court, the constitution provided more effective supervision of the government. Most importantly, the basic rights and freedoms and the foundations of the democratic political life were strengthened by the new constitution.

Turkey's economic policy was changed to one of Import Substitution Industrialization.<sup>290</sup> This model, based on a brisk and expanding market, foresaw the protection of the domestic market by import substitution. Development planning was the main apparatus for this model, which brought high wages and high subsidies for a brisk domestic market.

The 1960s was a decade of transformation for Turkey. This transformation is obvious in the demographic indicators. The total population in 1960 was 27,754,820.<sup>291</sup> It increased to 35,605,176 in 1970. Along with this growth, urbanization became an important dimension of the demographic transformation of the country. The population living in province and district centers was 8,859,731 in 1960, and became 13,691,101 in 1970. However, the increase in the population in towns and villages was moderate, rising from 18,895,089 in 1960, to 21,914,075 in

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<sup>289</sup> On the new political regime with the 1961 constitution, see Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, (1789-1980)* (İstanbul: YKY, 2007), pp. 364-431; Mümtaz Soysal, *100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1969), pp.62-289; Suna Kili, "1961 Anayasası ve Devlet Anlayışı," in *27 Mayıs 1960 Devrimi, Kurucu Meclis ve 1961 Anayasası*, ed. Suna Kili (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), pp.51-70; Walter F. Weiker, *1960 Türk İhtilâli*, Trans. Mete Ergin. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1967).

<sup>290</sup> For the economic policy of the period, see Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp.110-114; Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987) pp. 141-163; Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005), pp.117-144; Kuruç, Bilsay. "1961 Anayasası ve Planlı Ekonomi," in *27 Mayıs 1960 Devrimi, Kurucu Meclis ve 1961 Anayasası*, ed. Suna Kili (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), pp.71-86; İzzettin Önder, "1961 Anayasası'nın Ekonomik Modeli," in *27 Mayıs 1960 Devrimi, Kurucu Meclis ve 1961 Anayasası*, Ed. Suna Kili (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), pp.87-105.

<sup>291</sup> The statistical data that are used in this part are quoted from Statistical Indicators of Turkish Statistical Institute. See *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2010* (Ankara: TÜİK, 2010)

1970. In addition, the literacy rate among the adult population (15 years of age and over) rose from 38.09% to 53.61%. Urbanization and migration were the major reasons for the social change in the country in this era, although the majority of the population continued to live in the rural areas.

The statistical data on employed population by economic activity demonstrate that Turkey maintained its population employed in agricultural sector (agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting). From 1960 to 1970, there was a minor decrease in this population from 9,737,489 in 1960 to 9,281,024 in 1970. However, it is obvious that there was a decrease in the share of population employed in the agricultural sector. This share was 74.9% in 1960 and it decreased to 66.1% in 1970. This decrease was related to the increase in the share of the manufacturing, services, wholesale and retail trade and construction sectors.

The new constitution stated the social rights of the citizens and defined the Turkish state as a social state.<sup>292</sup> The right to organize free trade unions for the workers, the legal right to strike and collective bargaining came into Turkish legal system by this constitution. At the same time, the political left came into the legal field. Organized worker movements and left politics came onto the agenda after 1960. The classic literature of socialism was translated into Turkish. A socialist party was represented in the parliament. Socialist journals with circulation in the tens of thousands began to be published in this period. This situation also effected the establishment. The right increased its anti-communist tone and attempted several political violence initiations. The Republican People's Party directed its way through social democracy. However, this was not an easy process. There were several

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<sup>292</sup> For the text of the 1961 constitution, see *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*. Trans. Sadık Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat (Ankara: n.p. 1961).

struggles in the party, and the party was divided two times. Many things began to be discussed in the RPP, including the historical legacy of the party.

In this context, this part of the chapter claims that the new regime after 1961 constitution was an initiation of the pro-RPP political elites that aimed at the adaptation of the Turkish society to the developments of the postwar period. The above mentioned changes were directly related to this aim. In fact, this attempt at adaptation had come onto the agenda after the Second World War. Many developments such as the transition to the multi-party politics, the recognition of the right to establish trade unions, and the establishment of the Ministry of Labor were directly related to this change. However, this process was interrupted by the beginning of the cold war. Anything that was associated with socialism was out of the question now. Then in the 1960s, this change reasserted itself.

Ivan Berend describing the main characteristics of the changes in postwar Europe,

In postwar Western Europe it worked in a democratic system, based on deliberate cooperation of independent partners. Wage and profit moderation monitored by the state led to higher investment activity and growth. The state was not an external entity but an integrative, stabilizing factor, part of the productive and self-correcting market economy.... The rich Western welfare state with its redistributive mechanism, social, health care, and educational policy successfully counterbalanced sharp income disparities, promoted equal opportunity, and added an economic factor to democratic institutions. It also added a social factor to economic growth.<sup>293</sup>

It is crucial that the new regime aimed at the changes that had occurred in postwar Europe, but the success at reaching those developments is doubtful.

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<sup>293</sup> Ivan T. Berend, *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 191.

So in a large spectrum from an extended social security system and new social rights to the construction of left and right in Turkish political life should be conceptualized in the context of the postwar changes in Europe. The analysis of these changes is necessary for the scrutiny of the relationship between social democratic and the socialist left in Turkey, which is the main topic of this dissertation.

In this context, this chapter of the dissertation was organized to answer the above-mentioned questions. The first part provided an historical overview of the major political events. Then in the second part, the RPP's oscillation in this period between left and right was scrutinized.

### Political Backdrop

After the 27 May 1960 coup d'état, the regime in Turkey was reconfigured by a new constitution. However, it was doubtful whether the designation would be successful or not. The new period started with new questions and new challenges.

Now Turkey was in the transition from a military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy, and there was an open question about what would be the main features of the new democratic regime? In this framework, this section of the chapter presents a general discussion of important political events of the period, or in other words, presents an historical backdrop for the rest of the chapter.



## The Making of the New Regime and the Role of the RPP

Many of the changes in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s were caused by the new constitution and the new regime. For this reason, it is obvious that the preparation of the constitution and the staff that prepared it both have crucial importance. The makers of the constitution were mainly law and political science professors from Istanbul and Ankara Universities. However, the constitution reflected the influence of the Republican People's Party at every level of preparation. One of the important observers and politicians of the period described this group of professors as the law *ulema* of the RPP.<sup>294</sup> This description of the makers of the text of the constitution reflected the truth for the constitution making process. Thus this part of the dissertation examines the role of the RPP in constitution making and in the developments leading to the referendum. On the other hand, this period saw the rise of the left in Turkish politics and the RPP's positioning itself on the left of center. It is crucial to understand that those changes were directly related to the new constitution and the new regime. Thus the analysis of the constitution making and revealing the role of the RPP in this process is necessary in the context of the major political developments of the era.

On 27 May 1960, the coup was easily launched.<sup>295</sup> There was no organized resistance to the junta. The assembly was closed down and the government was removed from office. The high-ranking members of the Democrat Party were

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<sup>294</sup> Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Politikada 45 Yıl* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p. 227.

<sup>295</sup> On the 27 May coup d'état, see Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, *İhtilâlin İçyüzü* (İstanbul: Uygun Yayınevi, 1965); Akgün, Seçil Karal, *27 Mayıs: Bir İhtilal, Bir Devrim, Bir Anayasa* (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009); Bedîî Faik, *İhtilâlciler Arasında Bir Gazeteci* (İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1967); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1993); Sinan Onuş *Parola: İnkılap : 27 Mayıs'ı Yapanlar Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Kaynak, 2003).

arrested. So the junta took complete control of the country within a few hours.

Normally the junta had sustained the constitution. For them, the mission of the junta was not only to transfer the political power to the civil authority, but also to establish a new regime that would never change into a majority dictatorship.<sup>296</sup>

The university professors as the upper strata of the bureaucratic class were the main allies of the officers in the creation process of the new regime. One day after the coup, they started to fulfill this responsibility. The law professors from Istanbul University prepared a report on the military coup and the future regime with the demand of the junta. According to the report, the Democrat Party government had lost its legitimacy and a provisional government had to be established in order to continue public services, to respect human rights and freedoms, and to protect public interests.<sup>297</sup>

The second point of the report was about the need for a new constitution. The report pointed at the necessity for a new constitution: “To replace the existing neglected, the ineffective constitution of the state, which has become unable to operate at all, a new constitution is required that will realize the rule of law and establish state bodies and ensure the functioning of social establishments based on the principles of justice and fairness, and in line with the foundations of democracy.”<sup>298</sup> For this purpose, the Istanbul commission was charged with the preparation of a draft constitution. The intention to establish a new regime based on a new constitution was on the agenda just one day after the coup.

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<sup>296</sup> For them, the Democrat Party had lost its legitimacy and had attempted to establish a dictatorship.

<sup>297</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 May 1960.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*

*Devletin ihmal edilmiş, işlemez, işleyemez hale gelmiş anayasası yerine bir hukuk devletinin gerçekleşmesini sağlayacak, devlet organlarını kuracak ve sosyal müesseselerin hak ve adalet prensiplerine, demokrasi esaslarına dayanmasını temin edecek bir anayasa.*

For the preparation of the new constitution, a Constituent Assembly (*Kurucu Meclis*) was authorized. It convened in January 1961.<sup>299</sup> The Constituent Assembly was composed of two houses. The upper house was the National Unity Committee, which was formed by the members of the junta just after the coup. The lower house was the Assembly of Representatives.

The members of the Assembly of Representatives were determined according to the Act of Election of the Assembly of Representatives.<sup>300</sup> According to the Act, the members of the Assembly were determined by quotas that were President (10), National Unity Committee (18), Provinces (75), Republican People's Party (49), Republican Peasant Nation Party (25), Bar Associations (6), Press (12), Former Combats Federation (2), Chamber of Craftsmen (6), Youth (1), Trade Unions (6), Chambers (10), Teachers Associations (6), Agriculture Associations (6), Universities (12), Judicial Bodies (12).<sup>301</sup> Also ministers became the members of the Assembly.

As seen, the group of the RPP was the second largest group in the Assembly after the province representatives. Only 75 of the representatives were elected by the provinces. Furthermore, the province representatives were not elected by the electorate directly, the voting system for the province representatives was in a three-tier model.<sup>302</sup> The junta was not certain about the election of the Assembly of Representatives by direct voting because of the potential power of the Democrat Party electorate.<sup>303</sup> This three-tier model gave more advantage to the RPP-oriented

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<sup>299</sup> On the convention of the Assembly, see *Milliyet*, 7 January 1961.

<sup>300</sup> Tanör, p.369.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., pp.369-370.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., p.370.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

representatives. Because of this voting system, as will be discussed below, the majority of the province representatives were also pro-RPP politicians.

The Assembly of Representatives formed a Constitution Commission with twenty members. The Constitution Commission was responsible for the preparation of the final draft of the constitution that would be deliberated in the Assembly of Representatives. The Commission benefited from two drafts. The first one was the survey draft that was prepared by the professors of the Istanbul University Law Faculty. Those professors were the same group that had prepared the report just after the coup.<sup>304</sup> Then three members from Ankara University were added to this group<sup>305</sup>

The second draft was prepared by the professors of the Ankara University Faculty of Political Science. This draft was used as auxiliary by the Constitution Commission. The differences between two drafts were about how the new democratic system would operate and what would be the place of the new institutions under the new regime. So, different from the Istanbul draft, the Ankara draft was not doubtful about universal suffrage and political parties.<sup>306</sup> On the other hand, the Ankara draft did not propose to weaken the executive power, contrary to the Istanbul draft.<sup>307</sup>

In the Assembly of Representatives, the majority was taken by the pro-Republican People's Party members. From the party quota of the RPP, the party had 49 members in the assembly. In addition many of the province and occupational

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<sup>304</sup> The names of the professors were Sıddık Sami Onar, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, Ragıp Sarıca, Naci Şensoy, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and İsmet Giritli.

<sup>305</sup> They were İlhan Arsel, Bahri Savcı and Muammer Aksoy.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 372.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid.

representatives was related to the RPP. The famous journalist of the period and the son in law of İnönü, Metin Toker, writes

For example, Kemal Satır and Kasım Gülek from Adana, Muammer Aksoy from Antalya, Şevket Adalan from İzmir won the elections. Istanbul sent four RPP members as representatives that are İlhami Sancar, Şahap Gürler, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and Lütü Engin. Under those conditions, it did not become hard that the RPP had the absolute control and majority in the Constituent Assembly.<sup>308</sup>

Similarly, one of the official party reports states that the party had 175 members in the Constituent Assembly.<sup>309</sup> On the other hand, the daily *Milliyet* gives the number of RPP representatives in the assembly as 142 with occupational, regional and party representatives.<sup>310</sup> Consequently, although there are different numbers on the pro-RPP representatives in the assembly, it was obvious that the RPP was the major power in the Constituent Assembly, and not surprisingly, the constitution would reflect the perspective of the RPP in many aspects. On the other hand, apart from quantitative majority in the assembly, the RPP had the majority of the key commissions of the assembly.

In the preparation process of the constitution, two commissions had crucial roles, and the RPP had direct influence on these commissions. The first one was the commission for the preparation of the Act of Constituent Assembly, and the second was the Constitution Commission of the Representative Assembly. The first

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<sup>308</sup> Toker, Metin. *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, 1944-1973*. vol.5 *Yarı Silahlı, Yarı Kûlahlı Bir Ara Rejim, 1960-1961* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), pp.212-213.

*Örneğin Kemal Satır'la Kasım Gülek Adana, Muammer Aksoy Antalya, Şevket Adalan İzmir'de seçimleri kazandılar. İstanbul, temsilci olarak dört CHP'liyi, daha doğrusu CHP listesinin dört üyesini, İlhami Sancar'ı, Şahap Gürler'i, Prof. Tunaya'yı ve Lütü Engin'i kurucu meclise gönderdi. Bu durumda CHP'nin kurucu mecliste tam bir egemenlik –ve çoğunluk- sağlaması güç olmadı.*

<sup>309</sup> *CHP Halk Hizmetinde Neler Yaptı: 20 Kasım 1961-18 Şubat 1965* (Ankara Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1965), p.75.

<sup>310</sup> *Milliyet*, 31 December 1960.

commission was led by Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu.<sup>311</sup> Feyzioğlu had been a deputy from the RPP before the military coup. At that time, he had left politics and become rector of Middle East Technical University. However, he was a member of the RPP, and one of the leaders of the progressive wing of the party. Moreover, he became again deputy in 1961 and 1965 elections from the RPP, and took part in the cabinet of İsmet İnönü as vice prime minister. This commission that was led by Feyzioğlu prepared the final draft of the Act of the Constituent Assembly. So the structure of the Constituent Assembly mainly was determined by this commission. Under those circumstances, the RPP's majority was not a surprise when the members of the Constituent Assembly were determined.

The second commission that should be pointed was the Assembly of Representatives' Constitution Commission. The commission had twenty members, and the origins of the members of the commission make clear the point about the role of the RPP.<sup>312</sup> Among the twenty members of the commission, eight members had become members of the Assembly of Representatives from the RPP quota.<sup>313</sup> Other than these members, Muammer Aksoy had been elected province representative from Antalya by the RPP electorates, and then he became the spokesman of the commission.<sup>314</sup> Muin Küley had been elected from the quota of the Bar Associations and he was a member of the RPP.<sup>315</sup> Ragıp Sarıca, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, and

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<sup>311</sup> For the commission, see Ibid., 3 November 1960.

<sup>312</sup> Muammer Aksoy, Sadık Aldoğan, Nurettin Ardıçoğlu, Amil Artus, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Hazım Dağlı, Turan Güneş, Münici Kapanı, Enver Ziya Karal, Coşkun Kırca, Emin Paksüt, Muin Küley, Ragıp Sarıca, Bahri Savcı, Celal Sait Siren, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Mümtaz Soysal, Cafer Tüzel, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Abdülhak Kemal Yörük. *Milliyet*, 10 January 1960.

<sup>313</sup> Those members were Turan Güneş, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Emin Paksüt, Mümtaz Soysal, Enver Ziya Karal, Celal Sait Siren, Coşkun Kırca, Cafer Tüzel. Ibid., 6 January 1960.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

Münci Kapani were appointed by the National Unity Committee; Bahri Savcı was elected from the quota of the universities; and Tarık Zafer Tunaya was elected from the city of Istanbul as an independent candidate.<sup>316</sup> Lastly Amil Artus was the minister of Justice.<sup>317</sup>

All of those members of the commission were pro-RPP representatives. Only the representatives of the Republican Peasants' Nation Party, RPNP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) were the exceptions.<sup>318</sup> At last it was obvious that the number of the RPP-oriented members of the commission was sixteen, which made up an absolute majority among the twenty members. Consequently, as clearly seen, the RPP had direct influence on the three important bodies (the Constituent Assembly, the commission for the preparation of the Act of Constituent Assembly, and the Constitution Commission of the Assembly of Representatives) that had crucial role in the making of the new constitution and the new regime.

Under those conditions, not surprisingly, the constitution reflected the views of the RPP about the new regime. In fact, those views had been codified two years before the preparation of the new constitution as the Declaration of the Primary Aims in the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP. In those days, the RPP had been under the pressure of the Democrat Party, and had sought for a new direction for itself. Thus democratization had become the main aspect of this new direction. The similarities between the text of the constitution and the Declaration of the Primary Aims were remarkable. Almost all the demands of the declaration were codified with the new constitution. The three important parts of the declaration was as following:

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Those representatives were Sadık Aldoğan, Nurettin Ardıçoğlu, Hazım Dağlı, Abdülhak Kemal Yörük. Ibid.

1. Anti-democratic law, mentality and practice will be abolished
2. The constitution will be changed according to the democratic principles
  - A. The freedoms of thought, speech, press, science, consciousness; the legal right to strike and the objectiveness of state broadcasting will be approved.
  - B. The State Presidency will be made neutral
  - C. The audit by the legislative power on the executive power will be effective and actual
  - D. Second House of the Parliament will be established.
  - E. The Supreme Council of Judges will be established as required by the foundations of Independent Court and nonpartisan judicature. This Council will be responsible for all the dealings concerning the guarantees for judges.
3. These measures will be taken for the establishment of democratic regime:
  - A. The elections will be held in free, fair and honest way and a proportional election system that is appropriate for the country will be conducted.
  - B. Internal Regulation of the Parliament will be changed, and the neutrality of the President of the Parliament will be provided. The freedom of speech, the immunity and the concerns of question and interpellation will gain their real character.
  - C. The right to prove and declaration of property will be approved.<sup>319</sup>

Consequently, the 1961 constitution started a new period for Turkey, and the Republican People's Party was the most influential power on the preparation of the constitution. Through the end of the 1950s, an urban opposition had crystallized

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<sup>319</sup> On the Declaration of Primary Aims, see *Milliyet* 15 January 1959. For the full text of the declaration, see appendices.

1. Anti- demokratik kanun zihniyet ve tatbikatı kaldırılacaktır.

2. Anayasa demokratik esaslara göre değiştirilecektir.

A. Düşünce, söz, basın, ilim ve vicdan hürriyetleri ile grev hakkı devlet yayın vasıtalarının tarafsızlığı tanınacaktır.

B. Devlet reisliği tarafsızlığa kavuşturulacaktır.

C. Teşrii organın icra üzerindeki murakabesi fiili ve müessir olacaktır.

D. İkinci meclis kurulacaktır.

E. Bağımsız mahkeme ve tesirden uzak hakimlik müessesesinin zaruri kıldığı "yüksek hakimler şurası" kurulacaktır. Hakimlerin teminatıyla ilgili bütün muameleler bu şuraya bağlanacaktır.

3. Demokratik nizamın tesis için şu tedbirler alınacaktır:

A. seçimler dürüst, eşit ve serbest yapılacak ve memlekete uygun nisbi bir seçim tarzı bulunacaktır.

B. Meclis içtüzüğü değiştirilecek ve meclis başkanlığının tarafsızlığı sağlanacaktır. Milletvekillerinin söz hürriyeti, dokunulmazlığı soru ve gensoru müesseseleri gerçek hüviyetlerini kazanacaktır.

C. İspat hakkı ve mal beyanı tanınacaktır.



against the DP government, and the RPP had become the main focal of this opposition. Progressive and postwar European-oriented views had gained prestige in this period. The RPP carried out this perspective of opposition; however, this perspective also changed the RPP at the same time. In fact, the party did not reflect a unique party character. There was a double movement. On the one hand, the progressive and reformist wing in the party growing in strength. On the other, the traditional supporters and historical heritage of the party resisted change in the party and the country.

During the 1960s, the party was oscillated between those two lines of progressive and conservative. This quest for direction in the RPP will be discussed below in detail. However, it is crucial to note at this point that after 1961, the main source of power for the progressive wing became the new political and social environment that was constructed by the new constitution. The 1961 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections came under those conditions.

## Parties, Elections and Governments

The 1960s became a new period not only for the RPP and the left, but also for all political actors. Moreover, the political alignment on the left and right in parliamentary politics started in this decade. For this reason this era is also crucial for the history of the right in Turkey. Within this framework, the dynamic relation between right and left shaped the agenda of the right. Thus while the left was rising during the period, anti-communism started to be the core political element of right's political discourse. Under those circumstances the most important power center of the political right of the period became the main focal of anti-communism.<sup>320</sup> So this part of the chapter aims at elaborating the related major political developments of the period between 1960 and 1966 most precisely the new political parties, elections of the period and the right's anti-communist discourse related to the rise of the left.<sup>321</sup>

Just after the 27 May coup, the junta affirmed that the elections would be held after the preparation of the new constitution. The elimination of the 14 radical officers<sup>322</sup> in the National Unity Committee in November 1960 and the establishment of the Constituent Assembly in January 1961 were direct signs of the intention of the transition to democracy. Under those circumstances, the Constituent Assembly finished the work on the new constitution on the first anniversary of the coup, on 27

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<sup>320</sup> This center was the Justice Party, which will be discussed in this part.

<sup>321</sup> The rise of the left will be the main issue of the next chapter.

<sup>322</sup> Those officers and their dispute with the other members of the NUC will be discussed in the below parts.

May 1961.<sup>323</sup> On 9 July 1961, the constitution was put to a referendum and was approved by the electorate.<sup>324</sup>

The 1961 constitutional referendum was the most important sign of the transition to free political activities, and the actors' positions in the referendum process carried clues about the political divisions of forthcoming period. Before the referendum, the political parties had declared their support for the constitution. The most important part of propaganda for the referendum was radio speeches. In the first week of July 1961, there were radio speeches of military administration and political party leaders on the new constitution.

The attitude of the junta on the referendum was clear. The leader of the junta, Cemal Gürsel, demanded yes votes for the constitution and declared that the transition to the normal order was conditioned to the approval of the constitution.<sup>325</sup> On the other hand, the leaders of the political parties supported the constitution in their speeches on radio. Moreover, the RPP held a public demonstration for the approval of the constitution.<sup>326</sup> Among political parties, the only different approach came from the Justice Party.

The Justice Party was founded after the military coup in February 1961. The main aim of the party was to secure the support of the Democrat Party electorates. For the voters of the DP, there was a rivalry between the Justice Party and another newly founded party, the New Turkey Party, NPT (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*). The leader of the Justice Party was Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was a retired general and chief of the

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<sup>323</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 May 1961.

<sup>324</sup> For the referandum, see Cemal Aygen, "Memleketimizdeki Secimler ve Neticeleri" *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. 17, no.1(1962) pp. 214-216.

<sup>325</sup> *Milliyet*, 5 July 1961.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, 4 July 1961.

general staff.<sup>327</sup> One week after the coup, he became the chief of the general staff. However, he was retired by the junta in August 1960.<sup>328</sup> The most important feature of the party was that the administration and local organizations were mainly based on DP supporters.<sup>329</sup>

The Justice Party electorate was not content with the new regime and the new constitution. However, the leader of the party, Gümüşpala, declared his parties' support for the constitution in his radio speech on the referendum.<sup>330</sup> In fact, his position was to become neutral about the constitutional referendum, in other words, his attitude was a covered no. Furthermore, Gümüşpala claimed that there were controversies between the constitution and the statute and program of the Justice Party.<sup>331</sup> However the pressure of the National Unity Committee and president Gürsel forced him to declare his support for the constitution.<sup>332</sup> After all, the organization and electorate of the Justice Party did not support the constitution at the ballot boxes. The daily *Milliyet*'s report about the situation in the Justice Party headquarters after the referendum as a "secret pleasure" reflected the general consideration of the party administration and the grassroots.<sup>333</sup>

The results in the referendum were not satisfactory for the RPP or the junta. The constitution was only able to get 61% yes votes. The number of provinces in

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<sup>327</sup> For the Justice Party, see Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>330</sup> *Milliyet*, 2 July 1961.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., 20 June 1961.

<sup>332</sup> As an example, see Ibid., 13 May 1961; 14 May 1961; and 5 July 1961.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.. 11 July 1961.

which the no votes for the constitution were in the majority was eleven.<sup>334</sup> Those cities were well-known supporters of the DP governments. It was obvious that the closed DP remained influential in Turkish politics. Under those circumstances, the Constituent Assembly dissolved itself in September, and the date of the elections was determined as 15 October 1961.

The October 1961 elections were held by joining both the existing and newly founded political parties. Before the military coup, there had been three parties in the parliament, the Democrat Party, the Republican People's Party and the Republican Peasant's Nation Party, the RPNP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*). The coup had been launched against the DP, and all the cadres of the DP had been arrested. The party had been closed down by a court decision in September 1960.<sup>335</sup> Under those conditions, for the parliamentary life there were two outstanding parties, the RPP and the RPNP. The leader of the RPNP was Osman Bölükbaşı, who had carried out a determined struggle against the DP government during 1950s.<sup>336</sup> The RPNP was a conservative party. It had had only four deputies in the parliament before the coup. The aim of the party was to stand in the space that had been left by the DP. However, the electoral rivalry raised by the newly founded political parties obstructed this aim.

Not surprisingly, political activities had been banned by the junta after the coup. On 13 January 1961, the ban on founding political parties was abolished.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Those provinces were Sakarya, Denizli, Bolu, Aydın, Bursa, Çorum, Kütahya, Manisa, İzmir, Samsun and Zonguldak. Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad. *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p.234. Aygen adds this list the city of Diyarbakır, see Aygen, p. 215.

<sup>335</sup> The reason of closure was non-convening party congress. Ahmad and Ahmad, p. 223. For the story of the closure of the DP, see Cemal Özbey, *Demokrat Partiyi Nasıl Kapattırdım* (Ankara: Emek Basım, 1961).

<sup>336</sup> For the political life of Osman Bölükbaşı, see Fatih Artvinli, *Osman Bölükbaşı Seraba Harcanmış Bir Ömür* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007); Deniz Bölükbaşı. *Türk Siyasetinde Anadolu Fırtınası: Osman Bölükbaşı* (İstanbul : Doğan Kitap, 2005).

<sup>337</sup> *Milliyet*, 14 January 1961.

New parties that wanted to stand in the elections had to be established by 13 February 1961.<sup>338</sup> By this date, more than 10 new parties were founded.<sup>339</sup> Only four parties were able to pass the organizational threshold to take part in the elections. Those parties were two old, the Republican People's Party and the Republican Peasant's Nation Party; and two newly founded parties, the Justice Party, and the New Turkey Party.

As discussed above, for the electorates of the DP, the New Turkey Party was the main rival of the Justice Party. The leader of the NTP was Ekrem Alican, who had been a member of the DP.<sup>340</sup> However, he had resigned from the party in 1955, and then joined the Freedom Party. After the closure and joining of the FP to the RPP, he had not joined the RPP. After the coup, he had become minister of finance in the junta government. This point became the main disadvantage of the party for attracting the voters of the earlier DP.

One month before the elections, former prime minister Adnan Menderes and two ministers (Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu) were executed, and many of the DP officers were imprisoned for several years, after a mock trial.<sup>341</sup> In the election campaign, the Democrat Party, its leaders and its heritage were a taboo. Several politicians and candidates were detained during the campaign for this reason. Many of them were members of the Justice Party, including the chairmen of the party in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir.<sup>342</sup> Thus the pressure of the military administration

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 24 January 1961.

<sup>339</sup> Weiker, p. 102.

<sup>340</sup> On Ekrem Alican and NTP, see Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku Ve Siyasi Bilimler Açısından 1965 Seçimlerinin Tahli* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966), pp.198-209.

<sup>341</sup> On the trials, see Weiker, pp.37-68.

<sup>342</sup> Faik, p. 159.

was not limited to the above mentioned speeches of the members of the junta, but also showed itself in the detentions of the leaders of the party.<sup>343</sup> However, despite of all political pressures, the Justice Party was able to be the main rival of the RPP in the 1961 elections.<sup>344</sup>

The elections were held on 15 October 1961 with the new election system. Before the 1960s, the voting system in Turkey had been a majority system. However, the 1961 elections were held with proportional representation by the D'Hondt system.<sup>345</sup> The new Election Law had been approved in the Constituent Assembly in May 1961.<sup>346</sup> With this new election law, the small political parties had more advantage for fair representation in the parliament.

The results were a big surprise for the junta and the RPP (see Table. 2). The RPP had the highest vote, but there was a decrease relative to the 1957 elections. No party had the majority of the seats in the parliament. Thus the period of coalitions began in Turkey. Senate elections were also held on the same day. The voting rates in the senate elections were not so different. However, the JP had over-representation in the senate relative to the other parties because of the majority system in the senate elections (see Table 3).

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<sup>343</sup> As a general treatise on the relations of the Justice Party and the military, see Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi* (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

<sup>344</sup> For the election declarations of the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party for the 1961 elections, see Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara, 1961); Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Neler Yapacak: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1961 Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1961).

<sup>345</sup> Abadan, p.85.

<sup>346</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad, p. 233.

Table 2 The Result of the 1961 National Assembly Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	DEPUTIES
JP	3527435	34.8	158
RPP	3724752	36.7	173
RPNP	1415390	14.0	54
NTP	1391934	13.7	65
INDEPENDENTS	81732	0.8	0
Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No:513, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii			

Table 3 The Result of the 1961 Senate Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	SENATORS
JP	3560675	34.5	71
RPP	3734285	36.1	36
RPNP	1350892	12.5	16
NTP	1401637	13.0	27
INDEPENDENTS	39558	0.39	0
Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No:513, pp.xx-xxi			

In the period between October 1961 and February 1965, İsmet İnönü established three governments. The first one was a coalition between the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. The second government was established between the RPP, the RPNP, the NTP and independent deputies. The last one was a minority government of the RPP with independent deputies.

The basic questions did not change during the governments of the period. Those questions that played central role in the formation and decomposition of the coalition governments were about the military-civilian relations and the place of the military in the new regime, land reform, taxation of the agriculture, planning, and an amnesty for the DP politicians.



After the 1961 elections, İnönü, as the general chairman of the leading party, was appointed to form the government. No party volunteered for a coalition with İnönü's RPP.<sup>347</sup> However, the threat of a new military intervention forced the JP to form the coalition. The leader of the JP, Gümüşpala did not take part in the government. Like Gümüşpala, many of the leaders of the Justice Party did not take part in the government.<sup>348</sup> İnönü became the prime minister, and the two parties had equal seats in the cabinet.

During this government, there was an unsuccessful coup attempt in February 1962. The cabinet was unable to initiate the reforms that had been prescribed by the new constitution.<sup>349</sup> The amnesty for the former DP politicians was one of the main problems for the cabinet.<sup>350</sup> The two leaders of the coalition were under the pressure of opposition in their parties. At last the coalition was abolished in May 1962. It only survived seven months.

İnönü formed a new cabinet with the small parties in the parliament. The partners of the coalition were the RPP, the NTP, the RPNP and the independents. The attitudes of the small parties in the coalition made the reforms that were prescribed by the constitution impossible. İnönü had no choice but to make concessions for the continuation of the government. The small partners of the coalition were discontent about the government. So all components of the cabinet had doubts about the future of the government. At this point, the results of the municipal elections in November 1963 showed that the small parties were rapidly

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<sup>347</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy* (London: Westview Press, 1977), p.212.

<sup>348</sup> Tanel Demirel, p. 35.

<sup>349</sup> Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p.215.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

weakening (see Table 4). At last, the RPNP and the NTP withdrew from the government.

Table 4 The Results of the 1963 Municipal Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE
JP	4.344.185	45.48
RPP	3.458.972	36.22
RPNP	292.596	3.06
NP	295.523	3.09
WPT	37.898	0.40
NTP	621.600	6.51
INDEPENDENTS	500.315	5.24
Source: Mahalli Idareler Seçimi Sonuçları (Ankara: Başbakanlık, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1963)		

Another military intervention attempt occurred in May 1963. This will be discussed below. The attempt was easily suppressed. Then the junta members were put on trial and two of the leaders of the junta were executed. Thus now the suppression of the military coup attempt and the execution of the junta leaders created deterrence to a new coup attempt. So the chaotic environment for the civil military relations and threat to the democratic regime by the juntas were ended to a considerable extent. Thus under the new conditions, the parties did not need İnönü led governments for the safety of the democratic regime. However, there was a new crisis that created the necessity of the formation of a new government led by İnönü, the Cyprus issue.

On 21 December 1963, the Greek Cypriots directed aggressions against the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Because of the conflict on the island, Turkey and Greece were on the edge of war.<sup>351</sup> Under the crisis conditions, İnönü formed his

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<sup>351</sup> For the crisis, see Oran, v.1, pp.720-734.

third cabinet, composed of the RPP and independent deputies. Among the parties in the parliament other than the RPP, only the NTP parliamentary group gave a yes vote for the new government. Thus the new cabinet was able to receive the vote of confidence with the support of only a small majority in the parliament.

In this new government, reforms were not part of the plans. The government did not have the majority in the parliament, but it was able to continue until February 1965. There were two main reasons for continuation of the government, the state of the Cyprus issue, and the parties were not sure about how it would be possible to form a new government in this divided structure of the parliament. However, with the election of the new leader of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel, the JP was able to bring down the İnönü government.<sup>352</sup> Demirel had the opportunity in February 1965 in the budget voting. İnönü had to resign after the vote, because his government's budget had not been approved by the parliament. This was the end of the İnönü period.

During the period, the Justice Party won the struggle over which of the parties would be the continuation of the Democrat Party and take its electorate. The results of the 1961 elections, the 1963 local elections and the 1964 senate elections were the main indicators. In the 1964 senate renewal elections, the Justice Party passed the 50% (see Table 5). The rivals of the JP were very close to vanishing. At this point, a very important change occurred in the leadership of the Justice Party.

The chairman of the party changed in 1964. The leader of the JP, Gümüşpala, died in June of that year. The new leader of the party would be elected during the party congress. There were three candidates, Saadettin Bilgiç, Süleyman Demirel and

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<sup>352</sup> For a biography of Demirel, see Ayşegül Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider Süleyman Demirel* (İstanbul: Bengi Kitap Yayın, 2008).

Tekin Arıburun. However, the main rivalry was between Demirel and Bilgiç.

Demirel was the candidate of the moderate wing in the party, and he was also supported by the big capitalists and the leaders of the new regime.<sup>353</sup> In the congress, he was elected the general chairman of the JP in November 1964.

During the period, the RPP held three congresses, in 1961, 1962 and 1964.<sup>354</sup> In those congresses, the dominance of İnönü over the party was strengthened.<sup>355</sup> The opposition of Kasım Gülek was crushed by İnönü. However, the divided structure of the party between the conservative and progressive fractions continued in this era.

Table 5 The Results of the 1964 Senate Renewal Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	SENATORS
JP	1,385,655	50.03	30
RPP	1,125,783	40.8	19
RPNP	83,400	3.00	-
NTP	96,427	3.50	-
INDEPENDENTS	64,498	2.30	1
Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No: 513.			

As stated above, in February 1965, the third İnönü government was brought down by the opposition parties in the budget voting. The new cabinet was a coalition of all parties in the parliament except the RPP. A moderate and independent senator

<sup>353</sup> Tanel Demirel, p. 38.

<sup>354</sup> For the congress, see Kili, pp. 135-160.

<sup>355</sup> For the political developments of the period in the party, see Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP XV. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu*, (Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1961); Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP XVI. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu* (Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1962); Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP XVII. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu, 16 Kasım 1964* (Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1964).

Suat Hayri Ürgüplü became the new prime minister.<sup>356</sup> The leader of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel, attended the new cabinet as the vice prime minister. The main responsibility of the new government was to take the country to the new elections in safety.

In this period, İnönü's RPP initiated the recovery of its public image and rebuilt itself in a more radical and progressive way. In the beginning, İnönü declared that the opposition of the RPP would be in a moderate way, and he stated the cases under dispute between the government and the RPP as development planning, partisanship and the security of elections.<sup>357</sup> After the fall of the İnönü government the Executive Board of the RPP issued a declaration<sup>358</sup> in which the party declared that it would continue its reformist political line, and would follow the land and the state personnel reform projects.<sup>359</sup> In fact, the RPP in government had not able to realize many of the reforms that had been stated in the 1961 constitution. Therefore it had been harshly criticized by the intellectuals in the party line and progressive wings of the public opinion. Moreover, this attitude of the party had resulted in the disengagement of several important members of the RPP.<sup>360</sup> So İnönü's aim was to repair this public image. Thus in opposition, İnönü's RPP initiated a more radical position relative to its government era.

In opposition, the RPP defined itself in a reformist political line and was reactive to the conservative parties. Then the RPP attempted to attend the progressive

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<sup>356</sup> Suat Hayri Ürgüplü had been elected to the Senate from the JP list as an independent candidate.

<sup>357</sup> İsmet İnönü "Muhalefette Görevimiz" *Akis*, vol.32. no.560 (11 March 1965).

<sup>358</sup> For the declaration, see Kili, p. 209.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> As examples, Fatih Rıfıkı Atay and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who had been members of the party for more than 40 years, quit the party. Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 217.

front in a timid way. This attempt was the direct result of the new political conditions and the attitude of the other parties rather than the choice of the RPP. The left of center that will be discussed in the below parts came onto the agenda under those circumstances. Thus the RPP entered the 1965 October elections with the discussions about the left of center. The elections were a disappointment for the RPP. The votes of the RPP fall below the 30% for the first time (see Table 6).<sup>361</sup>

Table 6 The Results of the 1965 Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	DEPUTIES
JP	4,921,235	52.90	240
RPP	2,675,785	28.70	134
RPNP	208,696	2.20	11
NP	582,704	6.30	31
TWP	276,101	3.00	14
NTP	346,514	3.70	19
INDEPENDENTS	296,523	3.20	1
Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No: 513.			

As discussed above, the conservative wing of the RPP had been more powerful in the government era of the party.<sup>362</sup> This faction had been led by Ferit Melen. On the opposite side, there was the progressive wing. The leader of this group

<sup>361</sup> The 1965 elections brought important changes to the Turkish electoral system. The first one was the National Remainder System, which provided more proportional representation than the former D'Hondt system had. Not surprisingly, this model worked in the favor of the small parties. With the new system, the RPP aimed at preventing a possible single-party government of the JP. On the other hand, the small parties concentrated on the more fairly representation in the parliament that was in favor of them. The second change was about technical issues during the elections. With those elections, compound ballot paper was used and electoral commissions were formed for every ballot box. For the changes in 1965 elections, see Abadan, pp. 91-98; William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 3 (May, 1980), pp. 405-407.

<sup>362</sup> In the next section of this chapter, the RPP's quest for direction and inner-party struggle will be discussed.

was Turhan Feyzioğlu. However after the elections, İnönü's leadership was under question and the position of the above-mentioned factions had central importance for the future of the party. The potential candidate against İnönü was Feyzioğlu. However, roles in politics rapidly change. In the course of political events after the 1966 Senate elections, a left of center faction that was led by Bülent Ecevit emerged and struggled against the conservative wing, the head of which was Turhan Feyzioğlu.

The RPP abandoned the left of center discourse after the 1965 elections. The party entered the 1966 June senate elections with no reference to it. However the election results were not much different from those of the 1965 October elections (see Table 7). Those results caused the re-emergence of the left of center group, and in four months this group, which was led by Bülent Ecevit, took control of the party. All those political developments in the RPP will be elaborated in detail in the following sections. However, it should be remarked at this point that all of those developments were directly related with the rise of the left. As a dynamic relation, the rise of the left caused the rise of anti-communism in the discourse of the right, and the Justice Party became the leader of this new attitude.

Table 7 The Result of the 1966 Senate Renewal Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	SENATORS
JP	1,688,316	56.90	35
RPP	877,066	29.60	13
RPNP	57,367	1.90	1
NP	157,115	5.30	1
TWP	276,101	3.00	1
NTP	70,043	2.40	1
INDEPENDENTS	980	0	-
Source: 5 Haziran 1966 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Kısmi Seçim Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1967) Yayın No.525.			

When Ragıp Gümüşpala, the leader of the JP, died in June 1964, it had been obvious that the JP had become the successor of the DP. According to the results of the 1963 municipal and 1964 senate elections, the Justice Party was the most important candidate for the government in the 1965 elections. With its new leader, Süleyman Demirel, the JP brought the İnönü government down. The Justice Party attended the new cabinet as the major party, and it was the main candidate for government in the 1965 elections.

One of the main features of Süleyman Demirel's political line was his harsh anti-communist rhetoric. Basically, in the elections process Demirel increased this anti-communist tone. He attacked all wings of the political left. In fact, his anti-communist rhetoric had started in his congress speech in which he had been elected the general chairman of the party. He had declared that communism had begun to be a major threat in the Middle East, and there was a pessimistic picture<sup>363</sup> that could only be changed when the political power was given to its real owners.<sup>364</sup> Thus Demirel claimed that the governing RPP was not the real owner of the political power, but his party was. So his party was the only political movement that was able to fight communism in an effective way.

After the congress, Demirel as the new opposition leader claimed that the government had not been influential against the activities and publications of the leftists.<sup>365</sup> Then he demanded measures against those activities.<sup>366</sup> Thus it is clear that Demirel demanded the prohibition of the left movement, including its publication activities.

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<sup>363</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 November 1964.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 January 1965.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*



Demirel's trip to the Black Sea region in the summer of 1965 was crucial for his struggle against the left. This visit marked the open declaration of Demirel's anti-communist campaign. In Samsun, Demirel claimed that "the people are worried about the left movements...The left demands to change the whole system...They attack to property, wealth, earnings, honor and everything. Their methods are lying, slander and deceit....the purpose of the extreme left is communism"<sup>367</sup>

From Demirel's point of view, communism in Turkey lurked under the cover of reformism and progressiveness. The left was a bloc the elements which were communist, hiding under labels like reformism and progressiveness. In this way, Demirel categorized the political groups in Turkey between left and right; and for him, all the components of the left movement aimed at communism.

For Demirel, one of the reasons for his party's decision about the fall of the İnönü government was the government's uninfluential position in the struggle against the left. He thought the İnönü governments had tolerated the left in the country. Thus their new government and the future government after the elections would not tolerate the left. During this Black Sea trip, Demirel stated similar messages in different cities.<sup>368</sup>

In this period, Demirel constructed his anti-communist politics as a classical conservative politician. The following words of Demirel make clear his position:

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid., 13 June 1965.

*Sol cereyanlar geniş çapta halkımızı huzursuz ve tedirgin etmektedir... Bütün sistemi değiştirmek isterler... Mülkiyete servete, kazanca, itiyara ve herşeye hücum ederler. Metodları yalan, iftira ve tezdirdir... Aşırı solun gayesi komünizmdir.*

<sup>368</sup> The cities were Samsun, Ordu, Trabzon and Rize. See the daily *Milliyet* of the week. *Milliyet* 13-20 June 1965.

The pressure of the extreme left movements has not disappeared yet. We must be very vigilant. I am asking the defenders of Nazım Hikmet:<sup>369</sup> Is Nazım Hikmet a traitor or a hero? We are enemies of communism. We are decided to struggle against communism without being daunted. Communism will not be able to enter Turkey, because 98% of our nation is Muslim. From now on we should be able to say we are a Muslim nation.<sup>370</sup>

Demirel continued to use this discourse against the Workers Party of Turkey<sup>371</sup> and the RPP to the end of the election campaign. In the last days of the campaign, Demirel attempted to construct the relation between the land reform and communism as indicated by his remarks

The RPP attempts to provoke the landless, poor peasants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and agricultural workers by putting forward the land reform. It is easily possible to understand the change of the aim in the RPP. The reason for this change is the shift of the RPP to the left of center. In this respect, the RPP is in exact collaboration with another party that brings extreme leftists, convicted communists and the henchmen of Moscow together. The RPP has explicit consensus with them. However, it is necessary to state that the Workers Party's aim with the land reform conception is a step further than the RPP. The Workers Party regards this issue as the first level of communization of Turkey from the village level. If the land reform is made as the RPP requests, the large and medium landowner in Turkey will be vanished. All land parcels will become small.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>369</sup> Nazım Hikmet was a communist poet who served in prison more than fifteen year. He had fled the country and passed the eastern bloc. Hikmet had died in June 1963. The weekly *Yön* published several poems of Hikmet. Nazım Hikmet and his poems became one of the dispute topics between left and right during the period.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 30 June 1965.

*Aşırı sol cereyanların baskısı ortadan kalkmış değildir. Gayet uyanık olmaya mecburuz. Nazım Hikmet'in müdafilerine soruyorum. Nazım Hikmet vatan haini midir yoksa kahraman mıdır? Biz, komünizm düşmanınız. Komünizmle yılmadan mücadeleye kararlıyız. Komünizm Türkiye'ye giremeyecektir. Çünkü milletimizin %98'i Müslüman'dır. Biz, artık Müslüman milletiz diyebilmeliyiz.*

<sup>371</sup> Workers Party of Turkey is the socialist party of the 1960s Turkey that will be one of the main analysis units of the next chapter.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., 08 October 1965.

*CHP, toprak kanununu ileri sürerek, topraksız, yoksul çiftçileri, ortakçıları, kiracıları, tarım işçilerini tahrik etmeye çalışıyor. CHP'deki bu hedef değişikliğini kolaylıkla anlamak kabildir. Bu hedef değişikliğinin sebebi CHP'nin artık ortanın soluna kaydırılmış olmasıdır. CHP bu bakımdan aşırı solcular, mahkum komünistleri, Moskova uşaklarını bir araya getiren başka bir parti ile de tam bir işbirliği halindedir. Toprak reformu anlayışında da onlarla tam bir fikir birliği halindedir. Yalnız şunu söylemek lazım gelir ki İşçi Partisi'nin toprak kanunu ile gütmek istediği hedef CHP'den daha ileridir. İşçi Partisi bu meseleyi Türkiye'yi köy kademesinden komünistleştirmek için ilk merhale*

In the same speech, Demirel's views about the WPT went further:

This party started to work with agitating the landowner peasants like the communists did in Russia. The Workers Party conceives you as the enemy of sharecroppers and laborers. It accuses you of exploiting the sharecropper that you cultivate together, gain together and share together. It seeks to provoke them to rebel against you ...<sup>373</sup>

Consequently, Demirel's Justice Party used a strong anti-communist rhetoric before and during the election campaign. In this way Turkey entered the left-right dispute with the extremist discourse of the right that was represented by the JP. So an anti-communist right was represented by Demirel before the entrance of the left to the parliamentary politics.

The Turkish Association to Combat Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*, TACC) was the main organization of this anti-communist movement with Demirel's JP. The Association was founded in 1963 in Izmir, and rapidly grew until 1965. In 1965, the number of local branches of the TACC increased from 27 to 110.<sup>374</sup> The president of the TACC İlhan Darendelioğlu claimed that they had taken 37 districts into its black list where the WPT has strong organization.<sup>375</sup> Moreover he

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olarak ele alıyor. Eğer Halk Partisi'nin istediği gibi toprak reformu yapılacak olursa Türkiye'de büyük ve orta çiftçi tarihe karışacaktır. Bütün toprak parselleri küçülecektir.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid.

*Bu parti tıpkı Rusya'da komünistlerin yaptığı gibi toprak sahibi köylüleri, tahkir ile işe başlamıştır. İşçi Partisi, sizi, ortakçının, marabanın düşmanı olarak tadavvur ediyor. Sizleri beraber çalıştığınız, toprağı beraber işleyip beraber kazandığınız, mahsulü beraber bölüştüğünüz ortakçılarınızı sömürmekle itham ediyor. Onları size karşı ayaklandırmak istiyor.*

<sup>374</sup> For information on the Association, see İlhan Darendelioğlu, *Türkiyede Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler, Bildiriler, Cemiyetler, Basın* (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1968), pp.353-360.

<sup>375</sup> Yön, "AP Meşruiyet Dışına Düşüyor," Yön, no. 119 (9 July 1965), p.4.

declared that they would make them (communists) repent they had opened these organizations.<sup>376</sup>

The anti-communist campaign gave results in a few months. The political activities of the WPT faced violent reactions, as pointed out above. In October 1964, the publisher and translator of the Turkish translation of Babeuf's writings were prosecuted.<sup>377</sup> In 1966 March, a fifteen year old secondary school student named Gürbüz Şimşek was detained because of communist propaganda put forward in an exam paper prepared for a history lesson. In the paper, the student had compared the leaderships of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Lenin.<sup>378</sup> The Gürbüz Şimşek case created public discontent. The progressive wings of the society appropriated the student, and Prof. Muammer Aksoy became the lawyer for Şimşek at the trials.<sup>379</sup> Şimşek was acquitted after seven months of trial.

Thus, the anti-communist political attitude in Turkey was represented basically by Süleyman Demirel in this period. The local organizations of the Justice Party and the Turkish Association to Combat Communism became the basic instrument of their struggle. Thus the development of the socialist left in Turkey was now under the violent threat of anti-communist political organizations.

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid.

<sup>377</sup> *Milliyet*, 14 October 1964; 28 January 1964.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid., 10 March 1966.

<sup>379</sup> Ibid., 1 October 1966.

### The Presence of the Military in Politics

The 27 May 1960 military coup was the first direct action of the army in the republican period. However, it was not the last one. Although a new constitution was prepared and political power was transferred to the elected governments in 1961, there were several coup attempts and direct political actions of the army in the following years.

Two counter effects existed together. On the one hand, Turkey was a country in which the military had launched a coup and abolished the political system, including parliament and government. On the other hand, the social basis and electorate of the DP remained standing. Therefore, there were several parties that contested each other to take the support and votes of the Democrat Party's electorates after the return to the democratic regime. So the specter of the DP was in the background and the military was negotiating for presence in the political regime. The existence of these two effects together created a dilemma for political life and political actors. Within this framework, this part of the chapter aims at elaborating the military side of this dilemma.

The most important sign for the transition to democratic life was the foundation of the new political parties and the electoral process through the elections. However, before the elections, the military administration determined the rules of the political game by extra-ordinary instruments.

The rivalry between the political parties over the votes of the Democrat Party disturbed the army. They attempted to limit the rivalry with a protocol that would be codified by threatening political parties. Thus the base of the electoral rivalry was limited by a protocol that was signed by the leaders of the political parties on 5 September 1961.<sup>380</sup> The negotiations about the agreement took a week.<sup>381</sup> The name of the protocol was the National Agreement (*Milli Anlaşma*).<sup>382</sup> This protocol was the product of the military's direct pressure on the political parties. According to the protocol, the political parties concluded to accept the political program of the junta and not to question the role of the military in politics.<sup>383</sup>

As discussed above, the results of the 1961 elections were a surprise for the army. The parties that were the continuation of the DP had voting rates higher than expected. Under those circumstances, various fractions in the army considered that the 27 May 1960 coup was not successful and it was not radical enough. Thus from this point of view, a new military coup was needed to implement the reform program.

In this framework, just after the 1961 elections, a new junta planned to seize the political power by a coup. The thirty-eight officers who were leaders of the junta signed a protocol one week after the elections on 21 October 1961.<sup>384</sup> The protocol aimed at taking political power before the convention of the assembly. It would close

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<sup>380</sup> For the protocol, see *Milliyet*, 5-6 September 1961.

<sup>381</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad, p. 237.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> The articles of the protocol was about not to use the 27 May intervention, Islam and Yassıada trials for political purposes; to protect the Atatürk reforms; not to criticize the election policy of the National Unity Committee; to contravene extreme left and right, and not to make propaganda of separatism. Ibid.

<sup>384</sup> For the signers and text of the protocol, see Faik, pp.173-175.

down all political parties, abolish the election results and national unity committee, and will give the coup to the real and eligible representatives of the nation.<sup>385</sup> It was obvious that these representatives were the members of the junta. In reality, the junta did not launch a coup; however this protocol served as a threat toward civilian politicians.

The 21 October protocol and its threat were influential. Three days after the protocol the political party leaders concluded an agreement in a meeting attended by the president, the chief of the general staff and the commanding officers of the army.<sup>386</sup> The name of the agreement was the Çankaya (The name of the Presidential House) Protocol.<sup>387</sup> According to the agreement, the leaders of the political parties (İsmet İnönü, Ragıp Gümüşpala, Ekrem Alican and Osman Bölükbaşı) promised to elect Cemal Gürsel as the new president, not to change the conditions of the officers that were discharged from the army,<sup>388</sup> and they promised that an amnesty for the DP politicians was not on their agenda for the present.<sup>389</sup> This protocol was an obvious violation of the constitutional regime. The threat of the military had affected the political party leaders, and a compromise had been provided. The new constitutional regime began under those unconstitutional circumstances.

One of the main political questions of the period was the factionism in the army. Factions also occurred among the members of the National Unity Committee. The most important factional division in the Committee arose from a dispute about

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<sup>385</sup> Ibid., pp. 174-175.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid., p.168.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid.

<sup>388</sup> In the military rule era, many officers that were considered to be pro-Democrat Party or against the junta were discharged from the military.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid.

the late or early transfer of political power to civilians by elections. This dispute was solved in November 1960 with the elimination of the group that argued for the late transfer of political power. Those fourteen members of the National Unity Committee, all of whom were low-ranking officers, were sent abroad.<sup>390</sup> After the elimination of the fourteen radicals, there was the risk of the low-ranking officers taking initiative for a new coup attempt. It should be noted that the young officers were the main actors of the coup in 27 May 1960. There were only five generals among the thirty-eight members of the National Unity Committee.<sup>391</sup> On the other hand, many of the generals, including the chief of the general staff, were detained by the junta. So the 27 May coup was the action of a junta that was organized and led by young officers.

Under those circumstances, when the military rule was ending, many elements of the army administration were aware of the risk of a new coup by low-ranking officers. So their reaction was the formation of an organization named the Armed Forces Union (*Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği*).<sup>392</sup> The union was composed of several generals and colonels. The main aim of this union was to prevent an attempt of low-ranking radical officers and control of the army by the high-ranking officers. The chief of the general staff, Cevdet Sunay, was in direct contact with this group for the safety of the newly establishing regime against a new coup attempt.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>390</sup> The fourteen officers were Alparslan Türkeş, Orhan Kabibay, Orhan Erkanlı, Muzaffer Özdağ, Rifat Baykal, Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Ahmet Er, Dündar Taşer, Numan Esin, Mustafa Kaplan, İrfan Solmazer, Şefik Soyuyüce, Muzaffer Karan and Münir Köseoğlu.

<sup>391</sup> Those five generals had attended the initiation through the last phases of the coup. Weiker, pp. 132-133.

<sup>392</sup> For the Armed Forces Union, see Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, pp.170-172.

<sup>393</sup> Faik, p.104.



The Armed Forces Union prevented a new military coup and helped in the transition to parliamentary politics. So with the Armed Forces Union, high ranking officers consolidated the political power and captured the initiative from the low-ranking officers. However, the election results became a big surprise for the army. The above-mentioned 21 October protocol was the response of the army to this surprise.

The 21 October protocol and the compromise of the political party leaders were not enough to stop a new coup attempt. Now the factions in the army were competing with each other to lead a new coup. Under those conditions, on 9 February 1962, the Armed Forces Union signed a new protocol to take power before the month of March came.<sup>394</sup> The reason for the protocol was to prevent a colonels' junta in Ankara. The Ankara junta that was controlled by the commander of the military school, Colonel Talat Aydemir opposed the transition to the democratic regime. They proposed long lasting military rule and the initiation of a reform program under this new regime. In fact, the coup consideration of the Armed Forces Union was the prevention of this colonel's coup by another coup. However, the chief of the general staff, Cevdet Sunay, and the air forces did not support the military intervention. Under those conditions, the Armed Forces Union was to take initiative in spite of the chief of the general staff and the air forces. For this reason, the Armed Forces Union cancelled the coup plan. Thus the only group that might launch a military coup was the colonel's junta in Ankara that was led by Aydemir.<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> For the story of the coup attempt, see Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy* p.179; Faik, pp.185-225.

<sup>395</sup> For the coup attempts and political events of the period from Talat Aydemir's perspective, see Talât Aydemir, *Ve Talât Aydemir Konuşuyor* (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1966).

This new situation gave İnönü the chance to dispatch the Aydemir junta. The reaction of the junta against İnönü's pounce became a rebellion. However, the rebel, or in other words the first coup attempt of Aydemir, was quelled easily by İnönü government. At last the Aydemir junta ended the intervention attempt, and the government forgave the insurgents. However they were forced to retire. The coup attempt was bloodlessly foiled.

The second attempt of Aydemir took place in May 1963. This rebellion was also unsuccessful. As a result of the coup attempt, seven soldiers died and twenty-seven were injured.<sup>396</sup> After the trial of more than one hundred insurgents, the two leaders of the junta, Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gürcan, were executed. This became the last coup attempt initiated by low-ranking officers.

The military coup attempts of this era reflected the reaction against the heritage of the DP. The members of the junta claimed the necessity of reforms that were prescribed by the constitution. For them, the composition of the parliament made the initiation of the reforms impossible. For this reason, the results of the constitutional referendum and elections were the main source of discontent in the army. However, the two unsuccessful coup attempts and the end of the insurgents on the gallows demonstrated that the era of the coups initiated by the low-ranking officers was over. The military coup attempts of the low-ranking officers were defeated by the high-ranking officers and civilian politicians. However, the tutelage of the high-ranking officers on the political life was institutionalized at the same time.

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<sup>396</sup> Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç İhtilâlin Hikâyesi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1966).

## The RPP's Quest for Direction

The RPP began to define itself on the left of center on the political spectrum before the 1965 elections. This new definition of the party itself on the left of center was caused by the emerging left in Turkey, in other words, the left's pressure directed the party to clarify its political direction. So, the influence of the left that will be scrutinized in the next part was the primary reason for this new position. However, coming to the left of center was not only an immediate political reaction, but also the result of a debate within the party that stemmed from the 1950s. The RPP had an accumulation of democratic and radical proposals and pressures in the party that began at that time.

Within this framework, this part of the chapter takes an inside look at the RPP for party's coming to the left of center and quest for a new direction.<sup>397</sup> For this purpose, in the first section, political developments and major changes in the party will be scrutinized. In the second section, the RPP's political stand vis-à-vis labor and the labor movement will be elaborated. This issue will be taken in hand as a case study of how the RPP changed in this era. In this framework, this issue is also crucial to clarify the nature of the change in the party's direction.

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<sup>397</sup> The influences from outside the RPP will be elaborated in the next chapter.

### Inner Party Debates and Developments

RPP carried on an intense debate about the direction of the party during the 1950s and the 1960s related to the difficulties that the RPP faced in the multi-party political system. In the multi-party period, the political and social conditions forced the RPP to change itself. At the same time, this period was the era of ultimate prestige for post-war European social democracy. Under cold war conditions and Keynesian welfare state practices the political ideology and the agenda of European social democracy dramatically changed. Geoff Eley writes, “Here was the terrain of the Left’s main non-Communist tendency after 1945 - a social democracy increasingly shedding the Marxist tradition, increasingly nervous about the class struggle, and increasingly skeptical about transforming capitalism by revolution.”<sup>398</sup> Normally those changes directly affected the RPP, in other words it decreased the gap between the party and European social democracy.

This effect might be seen in the renewal of the party program during the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP in 1953. In this congress, the 36<sup>th</sup> article of the party program was rewritten to state, “The main source of value which must be protected and made the foundation of national existence is the citizens' effort (work). It is the duty of the state to take the necessary measures to provide employment opportunity for the citizen according to his intellectual and civil capacities, to provide jobs for the unemployed and protect labor from exploitation with due regard for the employers'

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<sup>398</sup> Geoff Eley. *Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 314.

rights. Our party considers the job security of every citizen an inviolable right.”<sup>399</sup> So before the 1960s, the post-war social democracy of Europe had started to influence the perspective of the RPP on economic and social problems.

After the 1950 elections, the RPP in opposition faced many troubles. Because of the majority system in the elections, the RPP was represented by a small group in the parliament. In the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections, the RPP were able to get 69, 30 and 173 seats, respectively. However in the same elections, the DP had 408, 490 and 419 deputies.<sup>400</sup> Despite its big majority in the parliament, the Democrat Party government had undertaken many measures to weaken the RPP, including expropriating the properties of the RPP in 1953.<sup>401</sup> Furthermore after 1959, the DP sought to limit basic political and civil rights. However, the biggest difficulty for the RPP was to adapt the party to the new political conditions of the country.

The RPP was an organization that had been shaped in and for the single-party period. The program, political ideology and the organization of the party were not very harmonious with the pluralistic political conditions.<sup>402</sup> So under the new circumstances, the party had to renew itself, in other words the RPP sought a new direction under the new conditions. This quest was shaped by two tensions, the rivalry between the RPP and the DP, and the rivalry within the party.

The pressure of the DP forced the RPP into a position in which the RPP advocated basic rights and democratic principles. The above mentioned “Declaration of Primary Aims” became one of main examples of this situation.

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<sup>399</sup> CHP Programı (Ankara, 1954) quoted from Kemal H. Karpat, “The Turkish Left,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 2 (1966), p.180.

<sup>400</sup> Kili, p. 519.

<sup>401</sup> Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-2009*, p. 130.

<sup>402</sup> For the RPP’s perception of politics and society in the single party era, see Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

The subsequent electoral defeats directed the party to broaden its electorate. Thus the party tried to clarify its program and political ideology. The dissatisfaction with the DP government arose mainly from the urban areas. In fact, the RPP was not powerful in the Marmara, the Aegean and Thrace that were more developed regions.<sup>403</sup> This situation continued in the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections.<sup>404</sup> In the 1957 elections, the only province to the west of Ankara in which the RPP had the majority was Uşak.<sup>405</sup> However, after economic problems and 1958 devaluation,<sup>406</sup> the voters of the urban areas left from the DP. So the RPP began to organize this urban opposition. As a result, the rivalry put the choices of continuing the classical line of the party or transforming the party in a more progressive way and more sensible to the popular demands. The party seems to have chosen the latter, in a timid way.

The second rivalry, the rivalry within the party, arose from the question of the administration of the party. During this period, the general chairman (İsmet İnönü) and the secretary general, Kasım Gülek, were in competition and disagreement.

During the 1950s, Kasım Gülek, deputy of Adana, had been the secretary general of the RPP. In this period, the secretary general of the party had been elected directly by the general vote of the party congress. So Kasım Gülek had been able to continue his post in spite of İsmet İnönü's will with the support of delegates of the party in the congresses. As an example, in the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP in 1953, İnönü proposed a change in the statute of the party about the election of the secretary

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<sup>403</sup> Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 116.

<sup>404</sup> Ibid.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid.

<sup>406</sup> In August 1958, the DP government declared an economic recovery program.

general of the party.<sup>407</sup> According to the proposal, the secretary general would be elected from the executive board, differently from the previous practice when the secretary general was elected by the direct vote in the party congress. The RPP congress supported Kasım Gülek. Therefore İnönü's proposal was not approved by the congress. However, in 1959, Kasım Gülek had to resign because of a political scandal. Thus after Gülek's departure from the office, İnönü became the only influential figure in the party body. This gave İnönü self-confidence and then the opportunity to renew the party. Thus the strength of the intellectuals in the party that came from *Forum* magazine and the Freedom Party increased. Many of the party officers and ministers of the post-1960 era came into political scene in this period.

As a reaction to those two tensions, İsmet İnönü tried to direct the party in a more progressive way. In this process, three developments became significant. The first one was the joining of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) to the RPP.<sup>408</sup> The Freedom Party had been founded by a number of DP members because of the disagreement about the "right to prove" (*İspat Hakkı*)<sup>409</sup> in 1955. The party stood for liberal democratic views and planned economic development. Many of the liberal intellectuals of the period supported or joined the party.<sup>410</sup>

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<sup>407</sup> For the congress and the proposal, see Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-2009*, pp. 131-134.

<sup>408</sup> For the Freedom Party, see Diren Çakmak, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Bir Muhalefet Partisi Örneği: Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 2, no. 3 (2008); Burak Özçetin and Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Hürriyet Partisi: Cilt 7 Liberalizm*. Vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); Burak Özçetin, *Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party* (MA Thesis: METU, 2004).

<sup>409</sup> In this period, the journalists did not have the right to prove the corruption claims against politicians. Thus they do not accuse the politicians because of this prohibition.

<sup>410</sup> Çakmak, p. 178. The most important of them were Turan Güneş, Aydın Yalçın, Şerif Mardin, Münici Kapani, Muammer Aksoy and Coşkun Kırca.

Many members of this group were also publishing the *Forum* magazine.<sup>411</sup>

The Freedom Party was not able to succeed in the 1957 elections and it joined the RPP in 1958. In the 1959 Congress of the RPP, ten members who had come from the Freedom Party was elected to the Party Assembly of the RPP, which was composed of forty members, and two of them were also elected to the Executive Board.<sup>412</sup>

Çağlar Keyder writes the effect of the Freedom Party as follows:

Having the support of liberal intellectuals and the progressive bourgeoisie, the platform of the urban coalition represented by the new party was far more influential than is suggested by its short life, which ended when the splinter group in the parliament joined forces with the RPP. This joining of forces injected new energy into the tired ranks of the RPP; a group of young, technocratic-minded and well-educated recruits changed the character of the opposition platform.<sup>413</sup>

The second development was the foundation of the RPP Bureau of Research and Documentation (*CHP Araştırma ve Dökümantasyon Bürosu*) in January 1958.

Turhan Feyzioğlu, Bülent Ecevit and Osman Okyar were the founders of the bureau.<sup>414</sup> The working group of the bureau had mainly come from the Research Committee of the Freedom Party.<sup>415</sup> Osman Okyar became the chief of the Bureau and Doğan Avcıoğlu was the vice chief. Before the 1960 coup, the bureau published fourteen documents. The last document of the bureau was published in 1965, and it was the thirty-fifth publication of the bureau.

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<sup>411</sup> Except Aydın Yalçın, the intellectual group in the Forum supported the RPP.

<sup>412</sup> Turan Güneş, *Türk Demokrasisinin Analizi* (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2009), p.264

<sup>413</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), p.42.

<sup>414</sup> Toker, Metin. *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, 1944-1973. vol.4, Demokrasiden Darbeye, 1957-1960* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), pp.32-33.

<sup>415</sup> Hikmet Özdemir, *Doğan Avcıoğlu Bir Jön Türk'ün Ardından* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), p.16.



The bureau was active until the foundation of the Constituent Assembly, because many of the members of the bureau became the members of the Assembly. Then after the elections, some of the bureau members took part in İnönü governments as ministers. Consequently the bureau had its golden era before the coup.

The reports of the bureau met with great interests. Social questions were the primary area of interest of the Bureau. The titles of some of the reports that were published provide a better understanding of the work of the Bureau. Studies were conducted on the state personnel, the workers, economic development, social problems, democracy, election results, the cities and housing problem, the freedom to form unions, the criticism of 1960 Budget, and the Turkish peasantry.<sup>416</sup>

The third development was the foundation of the youth branches of the party in 1953. Their first chairman was Suphi Baykam, who would be very influential in the party administration in the first half of the 1960s.<sup>417</sup> Many of the important politicians of the RPP started their political careers in the youth branches,<sup>418</sup> which became central in the process of the RPP's rapprochement with reformist and progressive political thought. Kemal Karpat describes this influence of the youth branches on the RPP as:

The young generation of intellectuals got their training in the youth branches of the Republican Party.... At its fourteenth convention in 1957 the Republican Party decided to expand the activities of its youth branches, since these seemed to respond best to new social ideas. They were involved in the

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<sup>416</sup> For the list of reports of the RPP Bureau of Research and Documentation, see Orhan Özacın, *CHP Bibliyografya Denemesi* (İstanbul: Fatih Ofset, 1993), pp. 66-72.

<sup>417</sup> For the political life of Baykam, see Alptekin Gündüz, *En Sevdiği Güneşti: Dr. Suphi Baykam'ın Fırtınalı Yaşamı* (İstanbul: Piramid Yayıncılık, 2004).

<sup>418</sup> Ibid., p.501. Bülent Ecevit, Altan Öymen, Ali İhsan Göğüş and Hikmet Çetin were the most prominent examples.

students' demonstrations before the revolution of 1960, and played a leading part in organizing resistance to the Democrats' drive to silence the opposition. Their underground activities in April-May 1960 were inspired by a revolutionary elan which has been maintained to the present day. Until the revolution of 1960, there were about 295 Republican youth branches in the country; the number went up to about 530 in 1961, comprising roughly 25,000 energetic young members.”<sup>419</sup>

To conclude, the political and social developments of the 1950s changed the party in many ways. However, the direction of the party was not so clear. The party still had both the progressive wing and the classical RPP heritage wing. In the 1960s, the party had a new exam, the subject of which was the experiment with the left.

After the 1960 military coup, there were two important tasks for the RPP. The first was to hasten the transition to democratic rule and the second was to influence the constitution making process. It is clear that the party became successful because of those two tasks. This period was an interlude for the renewal project of the party. Although the results of the 1961 elections were a disappointment for the RPP, it became the governing party as the leading coalition partner until February 1965. So the discussions in the party about the renewal of the direction of the party were put aside.

The conservative wing in the party increased its power during the government period. The party was accused by progressive and radical intellectuals of making concessions to the coalition partners. However, when the third İnönü government was brought down in February 1965, a new era for inner-party struggle started, and it changed the party in many ways.

After the fall of the government, İnönü attempted to restructure the RPP with a more reformist and radical discourse. Normally, the 27 May was the main reference for radicalism in this period. In May 1965, the RPP admitted three of the fourteen

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<sup>419</sup> Karpat, “Turkish Left,” p.180.

radical members of the National Unity Committee who had been sent abroad in November 1960.<sup>420</sup> Also another officer who had prepared the plan of 21 May coup attempt of Colonel Talat Aydemir also joined the party.<sup>421</sup> It is crucial that the names of those new members were integrated with radicalism. Thus the RPP was entering the 1965 election platform by strong reference to reformism and radicalism in this way. İnönü described his new position as

Today, there are great reform movements. Our party has embraced them. Our struggle will be to achieve them. Concerning reforms, no party will be able to pass beyond the RPP. Our election struggle will be for the principles that advance the country.... 27 May started a new age. The rules subsist in the constitution for a state based on welfare and justice. As the RPP, we embrace those principles that prevail in the constitution, we will struggle for them and we will implement them after the elections. The ones who are against the revolutions are directing unjust accusations at us. We will be patient. The friends from the National Unity Committee who have recently participated in our party have adopted our principles on their own will. The ones who are afraid of improvement and reform are defaming those friends. We are thoroughly pleased at having those friends who stand with us.<sup>422</sup>

As discussed above, the period from the fall of the İnönü government in February 1965 to the summer of the same year was again a period of seeking for the RPP. The party strengthened its radical and reformist discourse. The National Oil campaign and the new land reform policy were the most important components of

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<sup>420</sup> *Milliyet*, 8 May 1965. Those officers were Orhan Kabinay, Orhan Erkanlı and İrfan Solmazır.

<sup>421</sup> This officer was Mustafa Ok, and then he had an important role in left of center debates. For the role of the Ok in the 21 May coup, see Talat Aydemir, p. 194.

<sup>422</sup> *Milliyet*, 24 May 1965.

*Bugün büyük ıslahat akımları vardır. Partimiz bunları benimsemiştir. Mücadelemiz bunların gerçekleşmesi için olacaktır. Reformlarda hiçbir parti CHP'yi geçemeyecektir. Seçim mücadelemiz de memleketi ileriye götürecek prensipler için olacaktır... 27 Mayıs yeni bir devir açmıştır. Refah ve adalet temellerine dayanan bir devlet için anayasada hükümler mevcuttur. CHP olarak Anayasada mevcut bu prensipleri benimsedik, mücadelesini yapacağız ve seçimlerden sonra da uygulayacağız. Devrimlere karşı olanlar bize de haksız isnadlarda bulunmaktadırlar. Sabırlı olacağız. Aramıza yeni giren eski MBK'ci arkadaşlar, prensiplerimize sahip çıkmışlar, aramıza seve seve girmişlerdir. Yenilikten ve ıslahattan korkanlar bu arkadaşlara da dil uzatmaktadırlar. Biz bu arkadaşların aramızda bulunmasından sevinç duymaktayız.*

this new discourse.<sup>423</sup> In the public opinion, 27 May seemed very similar to radicalism. For this reason, the party accepted three radical officers of the 27 May junta as members, and made them deputies in the 1965 elections, as mentioned above. The conservative wing had gained strength in the party during the government period. This had created discontent for the progressive wing of the party. So those efforts of İnönü aimed at repairing the public image of the party and realigning the RPP in a more radical way. Thus the left of center discourse began to be discussed again.

The left of center started to be used with the RPP in the summer of 1965. This new definition started an intense debate. However the left of center definition for the RPP was not introduced for the first time conducted in the summer of 1965. There are several examples of the RPP having used this term before. For instance, İsmet İnönü had mentioned the left of center in 30 April 1965 for his party. In the Party Assembly of the RPP in which the preparations for the elections was discussed İnönü declared his views: “anyhow the People’s Party will maintain its position on the left of center and it will not leave it to anybody.”<sup>424</sup>

It is also remarkable that the left of center definition had been considered suitable for the RPP and its leaders by many public opinion makers, before it was used by İsmet İnönü. For instance, one of the prominent journalists of the period, Abdi İpekçi, defined the place of the RPP as the left of center because of the views of İnönü and Ecevit in their speeches at the Working Assembly.<sup>425</sup> However, İpekçi

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<sup>423</sup> Those issues will be taken in hand in detail in the next chapter.

<sup>424</sup> *Milliyet*, 1 May 1965.

<sup>425</sup> *Ibid.*, 26 January 1965.

claimed that everybody in the RPP did not share those views by pointing at the power of the conservative wing in the party.<sup>426</sup>

So it is obvious that the words “left of center” were not a new issue when it came onto the agenda in 1965 summer. However, it was perceived as a big change and surprise in the election campaign. Ten years later, Ecevit described this situation as

An interview of İnönü with Abdi İpekçi was published in *Milliyet*. İnönü declared for the first time that the RPP is on the left of center. Afterward, Nihat Erim and İsmail Rüstü Aksal declared that they had previously used same words in explaining the RPP’s position. I remember when I was in the government I had said in a panel that was held at the Ankara Medicine Faculty, we are on the left of center. The term did not rebound at all when we used it; however it brought a deep discussion when it was used by İnönü.<sup>427</sup>

In fact, the reason for the discussion was not only its mentioning by İnönü as Ecevit claimed, it had been used even five years earlier. In the era of the military regime, İsmet İnönü and İsmail Rüstü Aksal (secretary general of the party in this period) had met on Heybeliada in order to determine the direction of the party.<sup>428</sup> The meeting had continued ten days and “left of center” was determined as the direction of the party.<sup>429</sup> This direction also was published in the media. The weekly *Akis* defined the decision of İnönü and Aksal as “the RPP will stand on the left of center. Normally, it is always possible for the foundation of the parties that are on the more

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<sup>426</sup> Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1975.

*İnönü’nün Abdi İpekçi ile yaptığı bir mülakat Milliyet gazetesinde yayımlandı. Orada sayın İnönü kendi ağzından ilk kez CHP’nin ortanın solunda bir parti olduğunu söylüyordu. Daha önce bu sözü Nihat Erim ve İsmail Rüstü Aksal kendilerinin ifade ettiklerini sonradan söylemişlerdi. Ben de hükümette bulunduğum sırada Ankara Tıp Fakültesinde yapılan bir açık oturumda ortanın solunda olduğumuzu söylediğimi hatırlarım. Fakat tabii bizim ağzımızdan çıktığı vakit hiçbir yankı uyandırmamış olan bu terim, İnönü tarafından kullanılınca büyük gürültüler kopardı.*

<sup>428</sup> Toker, v.5, p.135.

<sup>429</sup> Ibid.

left”<sup>430</sup> So whether by İnönü or by others, the left of center had been mentioned before by representatives of the RPP. The reactions just before the 1965 elections were mainly caused by two main factors. First, in this era the political left in Turkey gained space, and there was the possibility of the losing more radical, reformist and left-wing voters of the RPP to the Worker Party of Turkey. Second, the Justice Party needed such a slogan “left of center” in order to increase the anti-communist tone in the election campaign process.

As pointed in the above part, İnönü’s RPP was accused by the Justice Party of supporting communism, and Demirel constructed an anti-communist discourse in the election campaign. His speeches during his Black Sea visit are the best examples of this discourse. The second focal point of the anti-communist activities was the local organizations of the TACC. It is interesting that President Cemal Gürsel was the honorary president of the TACC. This proved a formidable problem for the RPP and İnönü, because they were being accused by the TACC leaders. Therefore, İnönü forced Gürsel to resign from this position through public statements. At last, Gürsel resigned from the honorary presidency in July 1965.<sup>431</sup>

Thus it is possible to categorize İnönü’s attempts to reply to the accusations of the right in two ways. On the one hand, he confronted the right with speeches on the TACC. On the other, the left of center was brought onto the agenda by İnönü in order to differentiate his party from the left.

İnönü declared his views on the anti-communist activities and the TACC:

The RPP is being accused of atheism and communism. The campaign is executed by the KMD that was established by the members of the Justice

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<sup>430</sup> Akis, no.315 (31 August 1960).

<sup>431</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad, p.293.

Party. This is an SS organization. Moreover, the President has strengthened their venture by accepting the honorary presidency of the Association. The President should leave the chair of this SS organization. The necessary inquiry about the Association should be done. It is clear that we will consider the government responsible for the situation rather than the irresponsible persons or associations.<sup>432</sup>

Thus, after the accusations of the Justice Party, İnönü attempted to bring the left of center discourse into discussion. As pointed above, his aim was to bring an end to the accusations of the right by differentiating his party from the left. Contrarily, this new discourse increased the accusations. The Justice Party used a new and influential slogan that was “the left of center, the road to Moscow” (*Ortanın Solu, Moskova’nın Yolu*). So İnönü’s plan to differentiate his party from communism with this new discourse failed. İnönü demanded to explain the difference between left of center and communism by Nihat Erim by an article. In this article, Erim claimed that left of center had become well known after Franklin Roosevelt’s usage of this phrase.<sup>433</sup> Thus Erim attempted to relate their left of center to the US and Roosevelt’s New Deal. For Erim, Roosevelt was the first implementer of the Keynesian full employment policy.<sup>434</sup> Erim pointed that Roosevelt had been accused of being socialist or communist by the conservatives because of his New Deal policy.<sup>435</sup> According to Erim, Roosevelt had rescued capitalism and free enterprise from dying with his reforms and radical measures, and Roosevelt had not only

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<sup>432</sup> Yön, “İnönü McCarthy’ci Gidişe Dur Dedi” Yön, no.121 (23 July 1965). p.4. *CHP dinsizlik ve komünizmle suçlanmaktadır. Kampanya AP mensupları tarafından kurulmuş bulunan Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri tarafından yürütülmektedir. Bu bir SS teşkilatıdır. Üstelik Cumhurbaşkanı da derneğin fahri başkanlığını kabullenerek SS’lerin cüretini arttırmıştır. Cumhurbaşkanı bu SS teşkilatının başından çekilmelidir. Dernek hakkında gerekli takibat yapılmalıdır. Durumdan sorumsuz kişileri ya da dernekleri değil hükümeti sorumlu göreceğimiz tabiidir.*

<sup>433</sup> *Ulus*, 17 July 1965.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*

rescued capitalism, but also millions of American citizens from being suppressed, from exploitation, from hunger, and from living contrary to humanity.<sup>436</sup>

A few days later, İnönü gave an interview to the daily *Milliyet* (the above mentioned interview that was given to Abdi İpekçi) about the left of center.<sup>437</sup> He pointed to Erim's article and he also constructed the relation between left of center and Roosevelt. For İnönü, the left of center of the RPP has some similarities with the inter-war policies in the United States. He pointed that a recovery period had started in US after the Great Depression, and now Turkey had similar conditions and needed tough measures for economic development. Thus he claimed that the conservative policies were not able to accomplish the economic development, and the measures apart from the normal measures were called on the left of center. He defined the agenda of left of center as the development plan, fiscal reform, land reform, oil action and similar measures.<sup>438</sup> The RPP's economic policy was on the left of center because of its *etatist* character.<sup>439</sup>

Thus İnönü claimed that the RPP was on the left of center since its foundation because of its etatism principle. On this issue İnönü concluded his views stating that "the RPP is an etatist party as its structure, and with this character, its economic mentality is surely on the left of center. Etatism was the par excellence relief of development in the 1923's exhausted country. Also today it is a central element of our economic life".<sup>440</sup> Thus he equated the left of center with the history and the etatism principle of the RPP against the accusations of the right.

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<sup>436</sup> Ibid.

<sup>437</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 July 1965

<sup>438</sup> Ibid.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.



However, this tactic was not able to put an end to the right's accusations. As a next step, İnönü decided to equate the left of center with the constitution against the accusations of communism. In an interview in weekly *Kim*, he repeated his views that were published in Abdi İpekçi's interview. The only important addition of İnönü about the left of center was that İnönü claims the constitution stood on the social basis, and it was also on the left of center.<sup>441</sup> İnönü reiterated the same views in his radio speech before the elections.<sup>442</sup>

Consequently, the coming of the left of center to the agenda was not an organized and conscious political choice. It emerged in the discussions about the elections. Two factors played a central role. The first one was the rise of the political left in Turkey with the Workers' Party of Turkey and the *Yön* movement. By the left of center discourse, the RPP tried to prevent its radical electorates' leaving the party.

The second impact came from the right. The right wing parties, most precisely the JP, accused the RPP of communism. Once, İnönü argued that the first DP had accused the RPP of atheism, the second DP (the JP) accused the RPP of communism.<sup>443</sup> So the RPP similarly tried to set itself apart from communism with this new discourse. However, when the accusations went on, the left of center was equated with the constitution and the history of the RPP. So the party stated that there was nothing new. Thus the left of center was brought onto agenda by İnönü as a remedy for the left and as a shield for the right. However, the political developments after the elections became so different from this planning.

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*CHP bünyesi itibariyle devletçi bir partidir ve bu sıfatla elbette ortanın solunda bir ekonomik anlayıştaadır. 1923'teki harap memlekette devletçilik nasıl tek ve esi, yardımcısı olmayan bir kalkınma çaresi idiyse, bugün de ekonomik hayatımızın temel bir unsurudur.*

<sup>441</sup> *Kim*, no:369, (12 August 1965).

<sup>442</sup> *Ulus*, 5 October 1965.

<sup>443</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 July 1965.

In the year from the 1965 October elections to the 18<sup>th</sup> congress of the RPP in October 1966 the destiny of the RPP was changed. During the 18<sup>th</sup> congress, the left of center became the official party policy and its proponent and the leader of the left of center faction, Bülent Ecevit became the secretary general of the party. It is remarkable that the eminent success of the left of center at the 18<sup>th</sup> congress was a big surprise, because the left of center discourse had been considered as the main reason of the defeat in the 1965 elections. The elections results had minimized the prestige of the left of center for the party. Therefore the RPP had abandoned this discourse after the elections.

So the left of center's becoming the official party policy was the result of inner-party debates and struggles that occurred in 1966. Thus, in the pages below, this struggle for the left of center that made this new discourse the official party policy will be scrutinized.

After the elections, the party assessed the results of the elections in the parliamentary group and party assembly. Those discussions took two months and continued to the end of December 1965. The party assembly discussions on the election results and left of center were started on 19 November 1965 and took ten days.<sup>444</sup> The debates in the Party Assembly were published in several newspapers and the weekly *Yön*, although the assembly meeting was closed to the press.

In the party assembly meetings, it is clearly seen that the party assembly was divided into two parts are in favor, the other against the left of center. It is most likely that those discussions were made under the conditions of the probability of İsmet İnönü's removal from the office. Therefore, the discussions reflected the positions for the new composition of the party after İnönü. The most important

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<sup>444</sup> For the discussions, see *Milliyet*, 20-30 December 1965; *Yön*, "CHP'de Ortanın Solu Kokteyli," *Yön*, no.139 (26 November 1965), pp.4-5.

spokespersons of these two different views about left of center were Emin Paksüt on the one side and Bülent Ecevit on the other.<sup>445</sup> It is notable that the discussions about the left of center were mainly about the land reform, national oil, and the tax reform.<sup>446</sup>

As pointed out above the reactions against the left of center aimed at affecting the new composition of the party after İnönü. Turhan Feyzioğlu's speech purposed to balance the two factions and to strengthen his position as the leader of the party after İnönü. *Yön* assessed this position:

The chairman İnönü, who decided to withdraw from the chairmanship at the first opportunity, is on the one hand looking for a viable successor and, on the other hand endeavoring to give a direction to the party. Aksal, the successor that first comes to mind, responded negatively to the idea of becoming the chairman. But İnönü, after Aksal's rejection, is considering Satır.... Aksal or Satır is the leader of a transition period. Once the transition period is over, Prof. Erim or Prof. Feyzioğlu is expected to take over the chairmanship. Prof. Feyzioğlu has attracted attention by departing from İsmet Pasha's line during the discussions in the party assembly. Feyzioğlu, while defending the reforms, wanted the total abrogation of the left of center slogan. Consequently, by removing the right-left division, Feyzioğlu hopes to unite both sides around himself."<sup>447</sup>

The discussions of the parliamentary group of the RPP started on 7 December 1965 and ended on 23 December 1965. Similar discussions continued in the

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<sup>445</sup> Yön, "CHP'de Ortanın Solu Kokteyli,".

<sup>446</sup> Ibid.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid.

*CHP Genel Başkanlığı'ndan ilk fırsatta kesinlikle çekilme kararı alan Genel Başkan İnönü, bir taraftan kendi kanatlarıyla uçabilecek bir halef ararken, öte yandan da partiyi belli bir yöne kavuşturma çabası içindedir. İlk akla gelen halef Aksal genel başkanlık fikrini kesin bir hayır ile karşılamıştır. Ama İnönü Aksal'ın red cevabı üzerine Satır üzerinde durmaktadır... Aksal ya da Satır bir intikal döneminin liderleridir. İntikal dönemi atlatılınca Genel Başkanlığa Prof. Erim'in ya da Prof. Feyzioğlu'nun gelmesi beklenmektedir. Prof. Feyzioğlu Parti Meclisi tartışmalarında, İsmet Paşa'nın eğiliminden ayrılarak dikkati çekti. Feyzioğlu reformları savunmakla beraber, ortanın solu sloganının unutturulmasını istedi. Feyzioğlu böylelikle parti içindeki sağ-sol bölünmesini ortadan kaldırarak her iki kanadı da etrafında toplama ümidindedir.*

parliamentary group. However, the parliamentary group was more close to the left of center policy.<sup>448</sup>

In both of the declarations of the Party Assembly and Parliamentary group, the left of center was supported. Thus the party took the decision to continue this policy.<sup>449</sup> However, contrary to the resolutions, the party abandoned the left of center discourse. So with the beginning of the year of 1966, the party did not use the phrase left of center at any time. This situation was very remarkable for the other political parties. The opponents of the RPP pointed that the RPP had abandoned the left of center. For example, the two vice presidents of the Justice Party, Talat Asa and Aydın Yalçın, claimed that the RPP had abandoned the left of center, and the Justice Party was very happy with this retreat.<sup>450</sup> It should be remarked that the RPP did not officially deny the left of center, but the party did not use the phrase. The only exception during the 1966 June Senate Renewal Elections campaign was in a speech by Bülent Ecevit in the radio on behalf of his party.<sup>451</sup>

Three weeks after the Senate elections, the daily *Milliyet* reported that a new group in the party had emerged.<sup>452</sup> The leader of the group was Bülent Ecevit. It was a surprise for an observer of the RPP in the first half of the 1960s because Ecevit had never become a pretentious politician or a member of the leading group in the party. In the beginning, the progressive faction of the party was organized at home

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<sup>448</sup> *Milliyet*, 11 December 1965.

<sup>449</sup> For the declarations, see Ibid., 30 November 1965; 24 December 1965. Four members of the parliament that were Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu, Fethi Çelikbaş, Sedat Çumralı and Sırrı Atalay opposed the declaration.

<sup>450</sup> *Milliyet*, 17 May 1966; 27 May 1966.

<sup>451</sup> Kili, p.222.

<sup>452</sup> *Milliyet*, 27 June 1966.

meetings, and there was no leader at that time.<sup>453</sup> Ecevit's leadership for the group occurred because of his unpretentious character, and the members of the group considered that Ismet İnönü would not oppose him.<sup>454</sup>

Ecevit was not an influential political actor at that time in the inner-party power relations. The most important evidence of this situation was written in Ismet İnönü's personal notes. When İnönü considered resigning from the general chairmanship of the party after 1965 election defeat, he had discussed matters with 22 important politicians of the party.<sup>455</sup> Ecevit was not in the list.

When the above-mentioned news of the *Milliyet* was published, the political organization of the left of center group had progressed. According to the news, Ecevit would go and witness all parts of the country, and explain the left of center to the local organization of the party until the general party congress in October.<sup>456</sup> The aim of the group was defined as bringing a cadre to the party administration in the party congress that was young and believed in the left of center.<sup>457</sup> Thus, by this news, the emergence and political activities of the group became known by the public.

In June and July 1966, the common parliamentary group of the RPP was convened in order to discuss the election results and left of center discourse. In those discussions, Ecevit emerged as the most important supporter of the left of center. The

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<sup>453</sup> The members of the group were Bülent Ecevit, Muammer Aksoy, Turan Güneş, Sadi Pencap, Nazif Aslan, Sükrü Koç, Muammer Erten, Orhan Birgit, Hayrettin Uysal, Murad Öner, Selahhattin Hakkı Esatoğlu, Lebit Yurdoğlu, Mustafa Ok, Cemal Reşit Eyüpoğlu and Fikret Ekinci. Altuğ, p.134.

<sup>454</sup> Kayhan Sağlamer, *Ecevit Olayı: Bir Başbakanın Dogusu* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1974), p.204.

<sup>455</sup> They were Fuat Sirmen, Kemal Satır, İsmail Rustu Aksal, Turhan Feyzioğlu Nihat Erim, İlhami Sancar, Ferit Melen, Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, Kemal Demir, Turan Şahin, İbrahim Öktem, Nüvit Yetkin, Cihat Baban, Turan Güneş, İlyas Seçkin, Hudai Oral, Muammer Erten, Tahsin Bekir Balta, Orhan Öztrak, Cahit Zamangil and Fethi Çelikbaş. İnönü, *Defterler*, p.976-977.

<sup>456</sup> *Milliyet*, 27 June 1966.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid.

secretary general of the party, Kemal Satır, and Bülent Ecevit declared that there was unity on the basic questions in the party.<sup>458</sup> Thus it became clear that the initiation of Ecevit was not against the party administration. In the parliamentary group meeting, Ecevit opposed a retreat from the left of center, and argued that the party should emphasize its reformist and populist character.<sup>459</sup>

On 7 July, the sessions of the parliamentary group ended. In his closing speech, İnönü attempted to balance the left of center discussions in the party. He claimed that the RPP was on the left of center, but it was not a socialist party. Three members of the group proposed to publish the speech of İnönü as the closing declaration of the meetings.<sup>460</sup> However, the opponent deputies and senators objected this proposal because İnönü had claimed that the RPP was on the left of center. The harsh debates in the group ended with a decision that integrates the speech of İnönü and draft declaration of the 76 opponent parliamentarians. İnönü accepted the decision, because the opponents had the majority. However, Ecevit's left of center group opposed this decision. At last, the decision was approved. According to the opponents' declaration, the left of center was used to imply the place of the RPP in the spectrum of political parties in a western definition. The left of center was not a new principle for the RPP, and it only functioned to differentiate the RPP from the left (basically, the WPT).<sup>461</sup> Thus this term denoted the power of the RPP's fight against communism.<sup>462</sup>

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<sup>458</sup> Ibid., 30 June 1966.

<sup>459</sup> Ibid., 7 July 1966.

<sup>460</sup> Those members were İrfan Solmaz, Orhan Kabibay and Orhan Erkanlı. *Milliyet*, 8 July 1966.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid.

After those meetings, Ecevit began to tour the country for the local congress of the party. In those congresses, Ecevit claimed that the RPP would not retreat from the left of center. The new movement in the RPP was a movement for dynamism in the party. If the RPP retreated from the left of center, the party would be weakened and divided.<sup>463</sup>

The second disagreement between İnönü and opponents emerged in the Party Assembly in August. Before the Party Assembly, on 3 August, a parliamentary group gave a memorandum to İsmet İnönü in which they claimed the left of center weakened the party. The memorandum had been signed by fifty parliamentarians. In his diary, İnönü noted the memorandum as a *tour de force*.<sup>464</sup> According to the news, the number of opponent group members was almost 100.<sup>465</sup> The assembly sessions started on 9 August. When the party assembly sessions ended on 11 August 1966, the text of the closing declaration became a crisis.<sup>466</sup> İnönü prepared a declaration draft, but the opponents did not approve the draft.<sup>467</sup> The crisis was overcome by postponing the preparation of the declaration.<sup>468</sup> One day later, the declaration was issued in a balanced way.<sup>469</sup> However, the disagreement in the party became clear after the memorandum issue and declaration crises. Moreover the opponents mentioned replacing İnönü during the party congress.<sup>470</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> For the speeches of Ecevit, see *Miliyet*, 1 and 8 August 1966.

<sup>464</sup> İnönü, p. 968.

<sup>465</sup> *Milliyet*, 6 August 1966.

<sup>466</sup> *Ibid.*, 12 August 1966.

<sup>467</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>468</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>469</sup> For the declaration see, *Ibid.*, 13 August 1966.

<sup>470</sup> *Ibid.*, 12 August 1966.

As mentioned above, Feyzioğlu had preferred to take a balanced position between two factions in the inner party debates after 1965 October elections. Now, under the new circumstances, he perceived that the opponent group was more powerful. Thus he initiated the leadership of the group. Under those circumstances, on the one side, were the opponents of İnönü that was covertly led by Turhan Feyzioğlu. This group attacked İnönü because of the left of center discourse. However, the ulterior motive was the formation of the party after İnönü. On the other hand, there was the left of center group that was led by Bülent Ecevit. This group supported İnönü's leadership, but proposed a new direction for the party. The 1966 congress arrived under those circumstances as a battle ground for both fractions.

The 18th congress of the RPP started on 18 October 1966, and lasted four days. The struggle between the 76s and the left of center showed itself at the beginning of the congress. For the election of the presidential board of the congress, there were two lists. Muammer Aksoy was the candidate of the left of center group, and Sırrı Atalay was the candidate of the 76s.<sup>471</sup> The voting demonstrated that the left of center was more powerful among the delegates of the congress. Muammer Aksoy received 640 votes, 74 more than Atalay.<sup>472</sup>

In the congress, there was another candidate for party general chairmanship Kasım Gülek. So İnönü should not lose the support of the group of 76s. Under those conditions, İnönü attempted to construct a balanced position. In the opening speech, İnönü claimed that the RPP was on the left of center but it was not and would not be a socialist party.<sup>473</sup> Thus İnönü tried to satisfy the demands of the two groups.<sup>474</sup> On

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<sup>471</sup> 76s is the name of the group of 76 opponent parliamentarians.

<sup>472</sup> Ibid., 19 October 1966.

<sup>473</sup> İsmet İnönü, *Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün 18. Kurultayı Açış Konuşması: 18.10.1966* (Ankara: C.H.P Ulusal Basımevi, 1966).



the other hand, in the opening speech, İnönü demanded from the congress to clarify the left of center consideration of the party.<sup>475</sup> Thus he relinquished the settlement of the dispute to the congress.

On the second day, Turan Güneş and Turhan Feyzioğlu gave speeches as the representatives of the two groups.<sup>476</sup> Turan Güneş said that the RPP had lost the elections not because of the left of center discourse, but because of a group of administrators.<sup>477</sup> Therefore, for him, the problem was not ideological or political, but administrative. He said that a contradiction existed between the former Party Assembly decision and İnönü's speech. Then he asked whether the left of center was progressiveness as İnönü claimed or a simple phrase as the Party Assembly stated. Thus he referred to the party assembly decision in August. By this way, Güneş argued an obvious conflict between the opponents of the left of center and party chair İnönü. Thus, according to Güneş, the congress had to choose its side.

Feyzioğlu's speech was mainly about the solidarity problem in the party.<sup>478</sup> He demanded not to criticize the party organs and members, and he opposed the discourses on the groupings in the party. He attempted to represent himself to the congress as being more progressive than Ecevit. Other speeches on this day were not as influential on the congress.<sup>479</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> Ibid.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>476</sup> *Milliyet*, 20 October 1966.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

The most important speech of the third day was given by Bülent Ecevit.<sup>480</sup> Until that day, the left of center group had become successful. Ecevit's speech reinforced the success of the group. In the speech, he claimed that the opponents of the left of center were mainly against Atatürkism. He asserted that the main difference between the left of center and extreme left was about the commitment to democracy. Ecevit defined his group's democracy conception as western democracy, and considered the western democracy of this period as the social democracy that embraced social rights. For this reason Turkish democracy should be a social democracy.<sup>481</sup> Ecevit's views on the left center were a repetition of his newly published book, *Ortanın Solu* (Left of Center).<sup>482</sup> This book had been published just before the Congress. In fact, it was a collective work of the left of center faction. However, it was published with his name. The main aim of the book was to describe the left of center consideration of the faction. In many ways, it was influenced directly by western European social democracy. The programmatic proposals of the book were very similar to the 1965 election declaration and the party program of the RPP. So it was obvious that the faction did not propose a radical break in the party's direction. However, they wanted to revise the discourse and priorities of the party.

The elections which were the most important part of the congress were held on the fourth day. İnönü was reelected party general chairman with 929 votes.<sup>483</sup> Kasım Gülek was able to receive only 230 votes.<sup>484</sup> These results were not a surprise.

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<sup>480</sup> Ibid., 21 October 1966.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

<sup>482</sup> Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu* (İstanbul: Kim Yayınları, 1966).

<sup>483</sup> *Milliyet*, 22 October 1966.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid.

There was no important struggle for party chairmanship. However, the election of the Party Assembly would be held under real competition.

For the Party Assembly, there were three different lists that were prepared by left of center faction, the opponents and party headquarters. In the elections, 23 members entered the Party Assembly that was composed of 42 members from Ecevit's list.<sup>485</sup> So left of center faction had the majority in the Party Assembly. Ecevit's way to the secretariat general was opened, and on the 24 October 1966 in the first session of the Party Assembly he was elected secretary general of the party with 31 votes out of 42.<sup>486</sup> It is remarkable that Ecevit had been proposed as the secretary general to İnönü by Nihat Erim, but İnönü had rejected this proposal.<sup>487</sup> Almost all sources for the period reveal that İnönü did not want Ecevit for this position. Ecevit had come to this position with the power of his group, although İnönü had supported the strengthening of this group.

After this congress, the RPP entered a new phase in its political history. The left of center group now had control of the party administration. The congress accepted the left of center as the official party policy. In the declaration of the 18<sup>th</sup> congress, this decision was declared: "the 18th Congress of the RPP precisely confirmed that our party is on the left of center among the political movements by its ideas, ideals and practices and general character that were pursued since the RPP's foundation."<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>485</sup> Ibid., 23 October 1966.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid., 25 October 1966.

<sup>487</sup> Nihat Erim, *Günlükler, 1925-1979*. Vol.2. ed. Ahmet Demirel, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005) p.835.

<sup>488</sup> *CHP 18. Kurultay Bildirisi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966). For the text of the declaration, see Appendices.

To summarize, this part of the chapter was about the inner developments of the RPP as it came to the left of center. The changes in the RPP's position were obvious in the party's political stand vis-à-vis labor and the labor movement. For this reason, the next section will be about the relations between the RPP and workers as a case study of the direction of the RPP's change.

### The RPP and the Workers

On 28 May 2000, on the 75<sup>th</sup> birthday of Bülent Ecevit, there was a conversation in the daily *Sabah* between Bülent Ecevit and Murat Yetkin, a correspondent.<sup>489</sup>

Murat Yetkin: What you believe was your biggest success, your biggest contribution in the government?

Bülent Ecevit: My whole political life.

Murat Yetkin: All right then, what is the biggest success in your political life?

Bülent Ecevit: My contribution to the enactment of the acts number 274 and 275 when I was the Minister of Labor in 1963. That is to say, the acts that grant the right to workers to establish free trade unions, endowed with the rights to organize strikes and collective bargaining.

Murat Yetkin: I'm surprised. I was expecting an answer like Cyprus, European Union candidateship or the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan.

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*CHP 18. Kurultayı, CHP'nin kuruluşundan beri izlediği fikirler, ülküler ve icraatı ile genel karakterinin, siyasal akımlar arasında Partimize ortanın solunda yer verdiğini kesinlikle tespit etmiştir.*

<sup>489</sup> *Sabah*, 29 Mayıs 2000.

- Hükümetteki en büyük başarınızın, en büyük katkınızın ne olduğuna inanıyorsunuz?
- Bunu 'bütün siyasi yaşamım' olarak yanıtlayabilirim.
- Peki o zaman, siyasi yaşamınızın en önemli başarısı nedir?
- 1963'te Çalışma Bakanı iken çıkmasına katkı sağladığım, 274 ve 275 sayılı yasalar. Yani işçilere özgür sendika kurma hakkı ve grevli, toplu sözleşmeli sendikacılık yapma hakkı veren yasalar.
- Şaşırdım. Çünkü ben Kıbrıs, ya da Avrupa Birliği'ne üye adaylığı, ya da Abdullah Öcalan'ın yakalanması gibi bir yanıt bekliyordum.
- Hayır benim için işçilere özgür sendika hakkının verilmesi hepsinden önemlidir. Çünkü ben bir solcuyum.

Bülent Ecevit: No, for me, it is more important than all of them - to grant the workers the right to establish trade unions because I am a leftist.

Ecevit was correct. The legalization of the right to strike was the biggest success of his political life. This event shaped not his political life for the era, but also his whole political career.

In July 1963, two laws named as the Trade Union Act and the Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Act were enacted in the Parliament. By those laws, free trade unionism became possible in Turkey, and the working class emerged as a strong political power. In fact, the legalization of the right to strike was one of the most important changes with the 1961 constitution. The transformations during the 1960s and 1970s were directly related to the using of this right.

The legalization of the right to strike produced several unexpected results. The most important of them occurred in the political field. The right to strike and union legislation became crucial for the development of left and the change in the RPP. The coming of the party to the left of center and the emergence of Bülent Ecevit as an important political figure was related directly to this issue.

As discussed above, the first half of the 1960s clearly demonstrated that the RPP's position had changed. First and foremost, in its political stand vis-à-vis labor and the labor movement. In the previous section, how the RPP arrived at the left of center was scrutinized. Thus in this section this change will be elaborated in the context of a case study, that is, the relations with and perspective about the labor movement.

For this purpose, first the legalization of the right to strike will be taken in hand both in the processes of constitution making and preparation of the laws

concerning the workers. Then, the working classes' struggle for the right to strike will be discussed. At last the RPP's policy and views on this issue will be evaluated.

In fact, the issue of the legal right to strike did not suddenly emerge in the 1960s. It came onto the Turkish political agenda as it had in many countries after the Second World War. The opponent Democrat Party had taken the legal right to strike into its official party program in 1946.<sup>490</sup> At that time, the Republican People's Party had opposed this right. The labor minister of the period, Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, had repeatedly refused this right as the President İsmet İnönü had.<sup>491</sup> Furthermore the under-secretary of the Labor Ministry, Fuat Erciyas, had proclaimed that whoever demanded the right to strike were not Turkish.<sup>492</sup> Under those circumstances, the RPP, as the governing party made remarkable attempts in order to prevent the legalization of the right to strike. For example, the government officials arranged meetings with the trade unions and forced them to announce that the trade unions do not demand the legal right to strike.<sup>493</sup> In those efforts, government officials succeeded and several trade union officers made such statements.<sup>494</sup>

After the transfer of the political power to the DP in the 1950 elections, the DP took the right to strike in its government program.<sup>495</sup> One year later, the DP prepared a draft titled the Strike and Lockout Act.<sup>496</sup> But this draft never became

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<sup>490</sup> "Demokrat Parti Programı" in *Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı: Demirkırat Alfabeti*. Ed. Basideİcra, (Ankara: Demokrat Parti, 1992), p. 123

<sup>491</sup> Kemal Sülker, *Türkiye'de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler* (İstanbul: Tüstav İktisadi İşletmesi, 2004), p.65.

<sup>492</sup> Ahmet Makal, "Türkiye'de 1946-1960 Dönemindeki Grev Tartışmaları ile Grevler Üzerine Bir Çözümleme Denemesi," in *Ameleden İşçiye : Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi Çalışmaları* (İstanbul : İletişim, 2007), p.274.

<sup>493</sup> Buğra, Ayşe. *Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Politika* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), p.163.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>496</sup> Makal. p.279.

official. Gradually, the right to strike was excluded from the successive government programs of the Democrat Party.<sup>497</sup> However, in the 10<sup>th</sup> congress of the RPP in 1953, the party changed its program's 38<sup>th</sup> article and recognized the right to strike.<sup>498</sup> So the two major parties of Turkey changed their roles in the opposition and in power about the right to strike.

At the end of 1950s, the political debates on the right to strike had crystallized. The most important effort came from a very small party. The Freedom Party prepared a draft in 1957, but they could not bring it onto the agenda of the assembly.<sup>499</sup> In 1959, in the 14<sup>th</sup> congress of the RPP, it promised the guarantee of the right to strike in the Declaration of Primary Aims. Furthermore, in 1959, all trade unions were united on the issue in the second Assembly of Representatives of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Turk-İş*).<sup>500</sup> At last, almost all social and political power centers supported the right to strike except the Democrat Party and the big capitalists. But this period closed with the 27 May 1960 coup d'état.

The recognition of the right to strike as a constitutional right by the 1961 constitution was a key event for the following period's developments. So the process of constitution making and the role of the actors in this process have crucial importance for the analysis of the political developments of this era.

As pointed out above, in the preparation process of the constitution, there were two main drafts, called the Istanbul and Ankara drafts. Below, the related

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<sup>497</sup> Buğra, p.164.

<sup>498</sup> Makal, p.275.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., p.279.

<sup>500</sup> Sülker. *Türkiye'de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler*, p.109.

articles of “the draft of Professors of Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences”, “the draft of Istanbul University Law Faculty Professors” and “the Constituent Assembly’s Constitution Commission’s draft” will be cited. Moreover before the draft of Constituent Assembly’s Constitution Commission, several sub-commissions were established for the preparation of different parts of the constitution. So I will add also the sub-commissions’ draft’s article before the article of the draft of the Constituent Assembly’s Constitution Commission.

The draft of Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences

Article 19

“The strike for the working people, the lockout for the employer is a right. The law determines the form of using and the limits of this right. A just wage is the right of the working people.”<sup>501</sup>

The draft of Istanbul University Law Faculty Professors

Article 46

“Workers have the right to strike in order to improve their economic and social situation. This right cannot be used for political purposes. The law designates who can use the right to strike among public employees. The way and conditions of using the right to strike is regulated by law. The working people have the right to make collective bargaining.”<sup>502</sup>

From the Report of Sub-Commission

Article 42

“The way and conditions of using the right to strike is regulated by the law.

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<sup>501</sup> *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası : İzahlı, Gerekçeli, Anabelgeli ve Maddelere Göre Tasnifli Bütün Tutanakları ile.* (ed.) Kâzım Öztürk. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür yayınları, 1966. *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi İdari İlimler Enstitüsü Gerekçeli Anayasa Tasarısı Madde 19.*

*Çalışanlar için grev, işverenler için lokavttir. Bu hakkın kullanma şeklini ve sınırını kanun tayin eder.*

*Adil bir ücret çalışanların hakkıdır.*

<sup>502</sup> *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi hocaları tarafından hazırlanan anayasa taslağı*

*Madde 46*

*Çalışanlar, iktisadi sosyal durumlarını düzeltmek gayesiyle grev yapma hakkına sahiptirler. Bu hak, siyasi gayeler için kullanılamaz.*

*Kamu hizmetinde çalışanlardan hangilerinin grev hakkını kullanabileceklerini kanun gösterir.*

*Grev hakkının kullanılma şartları ve tarzı kanunla düzenlenir.*

*Çalışanlar, kollektif sözleşme yapma hakkına sahiptir.*



Workers have the right to strike and collective bargaining in order to improve their economic and social situation.”<sup>503</sup>

#### The Constituent Assembly’s Commission’s Drafts

##### Article 46

“Workers have the right to strike and collective bargaining in their relation with the employers with the aim of protecting or improving their economic and social situation.

The use and exceptions of the right to strike is regulated by law.”<sup>504</sup>

At this point, before discussing the final text of 1961 constitution, a short analysis is needed about the changes in the above noted drafts and parliamentary discussions in the constituent assembly. Both the drafts of Ankara and Istanbul stated the legal right to strike. However, the Ankara draft also mentioned the right of lockout for the employers. Both drafts brought the right to strike also for the public sector. But the Ankara draft pointed that some of the public servants would be excluded from this right that would be determined by the law.

The Istanbul draft limited the using of the right to strike with the aim of improving the social and political status of the working people. So it forbade political strikes, sympathy strikes, and general strikes etc. The Ankara draft had an interesting sub-article that guaranteed just wages for the working class as a constitutional right. It is clear that the process from those drafts to the final status of the constitution the

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<sup>503</sup> *TC Temsilciler Meclisi Anayasa Komisyonu Başlangıç, Genel Hükümler Ve Temel Haklar Alt Komisyonu Raporu*

*Madde 42*

*Çalışanlar, iktisadi sosyal durumlarını düzeltmek gayesiyle toplu sözleşme ve grev yapma hakkına sahiptirler.*

*Grev hakkının kullanılma şartları ve tarzı kanunla düzenlenir.*

<sup>504</sup> *TC Anayasa Tasarısı ve Anayasa Komisyonunun Raporu*

*Madde 46*

*İşçiler, işverenlerle olan münasebetlerinde, iktisadi ve sosyal durumlarını korumak veya düzeltmek amacıyla toplu sözleşme ve grev hakkına sahiptirler.*

*Grev hakkının kullanılması ve istisnaları kanunla düzenlenir.*

article on the right to strike changed against the working people. The extent of the right was gradually limited at every step.

The sub-commission of the Constitution Commission of the Constituent Assembly protected the right to strike for the working people, which was meant not to limit the right only for the workers. This draft did not recognize the lockout as a right as the Istanbul commission did. But it limited the aim of the strike with improving working people's economic and social situation. When the constitution came to the constitutional commission of the Constituent Assembly, the commission limited the right to strike only to workers. Thus civil servants were excluded. This draft also strengthened the limits of the right. It added a phrase (in their relation with the employers) to the sentence "the aim of protecting or improving their economic and social situation." So the right to strike was strictly limited to the affairs of the workplace and employer-employee relations. Moreover, the word "exception" gave the legal basis for the limits, postponement and obstruction for use of the right to strike.

This draft article was discussed in the Assembly of Representatives and some offers of change were made.<sup>505</sup> Then on behalf of the commission, Muammer Aksoy

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<sup>505</sup> Bahir Ersoy, Ömer Sami Coşar, Feridun Şakir Ögünç, Seyfi Öztürk, Şerafettin Yaşar Egin, Dündar Soyer, Cahit Zamangil, Suphi Batur, Fethi Çelikbaş and Rifat Çini spoke about the article. Bahir Ersoy and Ömer Sami Coşar demanded to add "according to the democratic principles" to the phrase of "use and exceptions of the right to strike is regulated by the law". This suggestion might change the situation in favor of workers against the limitations. Feridun Şakir Ögünç offered to determine the limits and exceptions of the right to strike as a long article in the constitution. Seyfi Öztürk, Şerafettin Yaşar Egin, Cahit Zamangil proposed to change the article according to Bahir Ersoy's suggestion. Suphi Batur asked Muammer Aksoy a technical question about when the using of the right will begin. Dündar Soyer brought the right to lockout to the agenda and recommended the right to lockout to be put to the constitution, but, on the other hand, he proposed the word "working people" instead of "workers". Rifat Çini reminded the rights of the employers and wanted the lockout right as a constitutional right. Fethi Çelikbaş's speech was about his support to the Muammer Aksoy's answers. As the spokesmen of the commission Muammer Aksoy answered all the speeches and refused all change suggestions. For the speeches, see Kâzım Öztürk, ed., *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası: İzahlı, Gerekçeli, Anabelgeli ve Maddelere Göre Tasnifli Bütün Tutanakları ile*. v.2 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1966), pp. 2054-2066.

advocated the article. Almost all of the speakers made several proposals about the article.<sup>506</sup> However, all proposals were refused by the Assembly.

At the National Unity Committee, a member of the committee, Ahmet Yıldız, proposed to add the words “the rights of the employers” to the phrase “the exercise of the right to strike, and the exceptions shall be regulated by law.”<sup>507</sup> The committee accepted this proposal. When this proposal came to the assembly, the commission did not accept the proposal in its report. In the previous sessions of the assembly, the assembly had not changed any part of the commission’s article. Feyzioglu made a speech and supported the proposal.<sup>508</sup> The aim of adding this phrase was to limit the lockout right of the employers by law. The Assembly of Representatives did not refuse the proposal of the National Unity Committee, so the proposal was accepted and the last status of the article became:

The 1961 Constitution Final Text  
Article 47

In their relation with their employers, workers are entitled to bargain collectively and to strike with a view to protecting or improving their economic and social status.

The exercise of the right to strike, and the exceptions thereto, and the rights of employers shall be regulated by law.<sup>509</sup>

As clearly seen, the legal right to strike entered into the constitution with major changes in the drafts, and gradually was limited from one draft to another. The

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<sup>506</sup> For the proposal see Ibid., pp. 2068-2074.

<sup>507</sup> Ibid., p.2074.

<sup>508</sup> See Ibid., pp.2074-2076.

<sup>509</sup> *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, p.13.

*İşçiler, işverenlerle olan münasebetlerinde, iktisadi ve sosyal durumlarını korumak veya düzeltmek amacıyla toplu sözleşme ve grev hakkına sahiptirler.*

*Grev hakkının kullanılması ve istisnaları ve işverenlerin hakları kanunla düzenlenir.*

proposals that aim to extend the use and to interrupt the limitation, postponement and obstruction of the right were not approved in the Constituent Assembly. At this point, the RPP's strength in the constituent assembly should be noted. However, the acceptance of the right was more important than the legal questions concerning the using of the right.

After the recognition of the right to strike as a constitutional right, the legal changes were to be fulfilled in two years according to the 7<sup>th</sup> temporary article of the 1961 constitution. The 7<sup>th</sup> article was as follows “the laws concerning the establishment and activities of the new organs, Institutions and councils prescribed by this constitution shall be enacted within six months at the latest, beginning from the first session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the other laws stipulated by this Constitution shall be enacted within a period not exceeding two years.”<sup>510</sup> However, this was not a spontaneous process. It was shaped by the struggles of the working class both in the periods of military administration and parliamentary democracy. So the changes in the working class movement and the struggle of the working class for this right have crucial importance.

Just after the coup, the administration of the only Turkish Trade Union Confederation, *Türk-İş*, was under dispute, because the chairman of the Türk-İş, Nuri Beşer, had declared his loyalty to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes before the coup by a declaration.<sup>511</sup> One week after the coup, Nuri Beşer resigned because of the pressure from the trade unions.<sup>512</sup> Then a pro-RPP administration took their place in Türk-İş.

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<sup>510</sup> *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, p.45.

<sup>511</sup> “Türk İş,” in *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*. vol.3, ed. Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996), p.331.

<sup>512</sup> *Ibid*.

The new Türk-İş administration openly demanded the legal right to strike. In fact, the demands of the Türk-İş from the National Unity Committee were mainly about two topics. The first one was the legal right to strike and the autonomy of the trade unions.<sup>513</sup> The second topic was to give the necessary direction to Turkish trade unionism. This demand pointed the opening of the trade unions that had been closed down by the DP government, and the second point was the problem of the membership of the Türk-İş in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.<sup>514</sup> The demands of the Türk-İş were approved by the military administration. The closed trade unions rapidly reopened and Türk-İş became a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This membership became very influential on the later development of the Türk-İş. Also, the trade unions became members of the International Federations for their branch of profession.

In this period, the trade unions directly demanded and struggled for their rights. The military administration was permissive to the trade unions in the beginning. For the junta, the support of a nation-wide organized and trade union confederation with hundreds of thousands members was crucial. However, military administration gradually changed its attitude and began to object the demands of the trade unions.

The Trade Unions of Istanbul continued the position of Turk-İş on the legal right to strike in their reply to the query of the constitution.<sup>515</sup> They pointed out the necessity of a democratic political environment and demanded broad social rights and freedoms. The trade unions demanded the right to strike in constitutional

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<sup>513</sup> Ibid.

<sup>514</sup> Ibid.

<sup>515</sup> On the reply of İstanbul trade unions, see *Milliyet*, 10 July 1960.

guarantee. Furthermore, they wanted the abolition of anti-democratic laws and the death penalty.<sup>516</sup> Minister of labor Cahit Talas, two weeks after the coup, stated that the legal right to strike and collective bargaining would be provided for the workers under the new regime, and the workers assurances would be changed into a social security system.<sup>517</sup>

Under those circumstances, the trade unions initiated direct actions with self-confidence. On 28 September 1960, the vice President of Türk-İş, Celal Beyaz, claimed that if the right to strike was not given, it would be taken by force.<sup>518</sup> On 9 October, the trade unionists of the petroleum workers went on a hunger strike in İzmit.<sup>519</sup> On 16 January 1960, two thousand workers in Istanbul arranged a meeting for the legal right to strike and collective bargaining. Also on 22 March 1961, the workers attempted to organize a mass demonstration.<sup>520</sup> However, the demonstration could not be held, because it was not permitted.<sup>521</sup> The workers had to be content with a chamber meeting.<sup>522</sup>

In this period, the minister of labor, Cahit Talas, prepared a draft entitled the Strike Act,<sup>523</sup> which the trade unions resisted. For them, the draft had broad exceptions for the right to strike, and the articles of the draft were not clear.<sup>524</sup> Thus

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<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid., 9 June 1960.

<sup>518</sup> Ibid., 28 September 1960.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid., 9 October 1960.

<sup>520</sup> See *ibid.*, 26 March 1961.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid.

<sup>523</sup> On the debates about the right to strike and the draft of Cahit Talas, see *ibid.*, 7 June 1961; 15 June 1961; 31 July 1961; 8 August 1961.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid., 15 June 1961.

these exceptions would increase in the practice because of the lack of clarity of the text.<sup>525</sup> The government had the last decision for the cancel or postponement of the strike. This was the most important point the workers opposed. For the workers, a joint commission of the employers and the employee should have the last decision instead of the government.<sup>526</sup> Then again the government's draft strictly limited the firms and sectors in which to use the right to strike was not possible. The trade unions also opposed this limitation. For them, the right to strike had to be valid in all work places except military places.<sup>527</sup> As clearly seen, the opposition of the trade unions was derived from the limitations on the legal right to strike.<sup>528</sup> At last, the draft of Talas for the trade unions and right to strike was suspended and this issue was held over for the elected government after the elections.

After the opening of the parliament and the formation of the coalition government, the struggle of the workers accelerated. The struggles were in several forms. In the period after the elections of October 1961 to the approval of Strike and Trade Unions Act in July 1963, the number of the direct actions of the workers was 182.<sup>529</sup> Among them, the number of strikes was 16.<sup>530</sup> In this period of workers activities, two of them had central importance. The first one was the meeting of trade unions in Saraçhane, Istanbul, on 31 December 1961; and the second was the strike in the Kavel cable factory.

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<sup>525</sup> Ibid.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., 8 August 1961.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid.

<sup>529</sup> M. Şehmus Güzel, *Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketi : 1908-1984* (İstanbul : Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), p.197.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid.

The Saraçhane meeting was organized by Türk-İş in Istanbul Saraçhane square on 31 December 1961. 140 different worker organizations attended the meeting.<sup>531</sup> The number of participants in the meeting was more than 100,000 workers. Trade unionists from several occupations gave speeches. The meeting accepted a declaration which had three important points.<sup>532</sup> The first point demanded freedom for trade union activities.<sup>533</sup> The second point was about the right to strike, which they immediately claimed.<sup>534</sup> Third, the workers declared that if the legalization of the right to strike was not provided, the workers would not be responsible for the strikes.<sup>535</sup> The meeting ended without any problem, and the governor of Istanbul thanked the workers.<sup>536</sup> However, the decided stance of the workers and the slogan of the meeting that was “we also have a say” was enough to bring the demands of the workers onto the agenda.

The second important attempt of workers was the strike at the Kavel cable factory in Istanbul.<sup>537</sup> The strike lasted from 31 January to 4 March 1963.<sup>538</sup> 173 workers who were members of the *Maden-İş* trade union went on strike although the strike act has not been enacted yet. The workers resisted against the police operations. Under the reconciliation of Labor Minister Bülent Ecevit, the strike was

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<sup>531</sup> *Milliyet*, 1 January 1962; “Miting” *Yön*, no.3 (3 January 1962).

<sup>532</sup> For the declaration, see *Ibid.*

<sup>533</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>534</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>535</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>536</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>537</sup> For the strike in Kavel, see Zafer Aydın, *Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü Kavel 1963* (İstanbul, Tüstav İktisadi İşletmesi, 2010).

<sup>538</sup> Güzel, *Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketi : 1908-1984*, p.196.



ended. Although this strike was illegal, the workers were forgiven by a temporary article of the new acts for work life.<sup>539</sup>

Other than those two activities, the workers had activities for the legal right to strike and increase in the wages. On 25 November 1961, the employees of Sümerbank struggled for the right to strike in Izmir.<sup>540</sup> On 3 May 1962, workers walked to Ankara in an event called “the march of the starving people.”<sup>541</sup> Although there was no right to strike, workers launched strikes. For example before Kavel, on 25 July 1962, cleaning workers went on strike in Izmir.<sup>542</sup> Thus the deliberations on the legalization of the right to strike in the parliament were made under the pressure of the workers by all those activities.<sup>543</sup>

In August 1962, the İnönü government sent the draft of Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Act to the parliament as a government draft that had been prepared by the Ministry of Labor. The draft foresaw the right to strike in the process of collective bargaining.<sup>544</sup> If the bargaining is unsuccessful, there was a mechanism of reconciliation.<sup>545</sup> The right to strike was provided after this process.<sup>546</sup> The lockout was provided for the employers as a right with the draft as strike was provided for workers.<sup>547</sup> The reason statement of the draft declared that the aim of

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<sup>539</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>540</sup> Ibid., p.195.

<sup>541</sup> Ibid., p.196.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid.

<sup>543</sup> For the chronology of workers struggle in the period, see Tüm İktisatçılar Birliği, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Mücadeleleri Tarihi* (Ankara: Tüm İktisatçılar Birliği, 1976), pp.112-114; pp.151-159.

<sup>544</sup> On the draft, see Kemal Sülker, *Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler*. (İstanbul: Tüstav, 2004), p. 221.

<sup>545</sup> Ibid.

<sup>546</sup> Ibid.

<sup>547</sup> Ibid.

both of lockout and strike is to reach the collective contract.<sup>548</sup> The draft was consulted in the commission, the Assembly and the Senate. The most important change in the draft was made in the commission. The commission for the draft changed a point that if the employer did not come to the collective bargaining, the workers had the right to strike.<sup>549</sup>

There had been several sessions on the act, but there were two groups of sessions first on the whole of the act, second on the articles of the act. On the whole of the act, all political parties in the parliament expressed their views on 17 and 18 April 1963. It is interesting that all political parties were in agreement with the strike and lockout act. The constitutional obligatory character of the right to strike was important in this consensus in the parliament. The Republican Peasantry Nation Party and the New Turkey Party were the coalition partners of the Republican People's Party, so their speeches were in defense of the draft. In this context, Orhan Apaydın,<sup>550</sup> on behalf of the New Turkey Party, and Cevad Odyakmaz,<sup>551</sup> on behalf of the Republican Peasantry Nation Party, spoke. Then, Mehmet Sağlam advocated for the draft in the name of the Republican People's Party.<sup>552</sup>

The spokesmen of the opposition parties (the Nation Party and the Justice Party) criticized the draft. The spokesman of the Justice Party, Saim Kaygan, argued that the draft did not want a strong unionism in Turkey.<sup>553</sup> He criticized the limits of

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<sup>548</sup> Ibid.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid., p.222.

<sup>550</sup> For the speech of Orhan Apaydın, see *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*. (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1963), v.16, pp. 368-374.

<sup>551</sup> See Ibid., pp. 384-389.

<sup>552</sup> See ibid., pp. 389-393.

<sup>553</sup> Ibid., pp. 382-384.

and process on the strikes. He pointed out that this act was far from democratic unionism. For a full criticizing of the draft, another spokesman of the Justice Party, Şadi Pehlivanoğlu, spoke.<sup>554</sup> He pointed that Turkey was late in giving this right, but Turkish workers did not have to struggle for this right. He put the right to strike forward as the victory of humanity in the struggle for the democratic world, and claimed that the Justice Party criticized some points of the act that had strict limits on the rights of workers.

Bülent Ecevit,<sup>555</sup> as the minister of labor, and Coşkun Kırca,<sup>556</sup> as the head of the commission gave answers to the criticisms of the Justice Party spokesmen. This debate reflects the classic debates between the spokesmen of the government and the opposition parties. However, the support of the political parties to the right to strike was the success of the Türk-İş administration. Türk-İş was aptly able to direct the political parties for the good of the working class.<sup>557</sup>

On 19, 24 and 26 April 1963, the articles of the Draft were debated. And on the 26 April, in the voting, the draft was accepted with a big majority. 251 Member of Parliament voted, and 245 of them accepted the act. The only deputy that gave a non-content vote was Fikret Filiz. Members of the parties had accepted the draft including opposing Justice Party and its spokesmen in this act, Saim Kaygan and Şadi Pehlivanoğlu.<sup>558</sup>

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<sup>554</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 393-395.

<sup>555</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 395-402.

<sup>556</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 402-413.

<sup>557</sup> For such an explanation of the legislative activities, see Yön, “İleri İşçi Kanunları,” *Yön*, no.71 (24 April 1963).

<sup>558</sup> See *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, v.16. pp. 549-552.

In the Senate, a commission was founded and this joint-commission took the issue and prepared some new change proposals for the act.<sup>559</sup> The voting on the proposal the draft was held on 10 July 1963. In the Senate the act was accepted by all the senators that attended the session.<sup>560</sup> Then in the National Assembly the act and changes were approved.<sup>561</sup> The act was published in the official journal on 24 July 1963 and the law numbered 275. The legal right to strike now had been provided for the workers in Turkey.

Consequently, the right to strike was not the result of the obliging character of İnönü, Ecevit or the RPP. The struggles of the workers for their rights had central importance. In the above parts, how the right to strike entered the 1961 constitution (in the constitution making process, the extent of the right had been gradually limited) and how the draft of Cahit Talas had failed have been demonstrated. It is also crucial that the right to strike was not opposed in the parliament by the opposition parties. The only oppositions against Ecevit's draft were caused by its deficiencies, and the opposition stated that the draft of Ecevit was outdated from the democratic world. Thus in addition to the struggles of the workers, the conjuncture should be noted as the secondary main reason for the legalization of the right to strike in 1963.

Within this framework, with conjuncture, I refer to the new economic and social model of the post-27 May era and new constitution. On the new model after 1960, Çağlar Keyder implies two crucial points that are the defining features:

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<sup>559</sup> For the commissions' proposals and the speeches in the parliament see *T.B.M.M. Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, v.12 (Ankara: T.B.M.M. 1963), pp.764-807 and *ibid.*, v. 13, pp. 89-145. In the senate speeches WPT senator, Niyazi Ağırnaslı opposed lots of articles that narrows and limits the right to strike.

<sup>560</sup> See *T.B.M.M. Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, v.13, pp. 244-245.

<sup>561</sup> *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*. v. 19. pp. 535-540.

“politicization of certain economic allocation mechanisms and the constitution of a domestic market.”<sup>562</sup> In this framework, the constitution of a domestic market was directly related to the redistribution of income.<sup>563</sup> So the new rights for the workers served for “constitution of a domestic market” via “the redistribution of income.” Thus Keyder summarizes this situation as “The right to unionization, collective bargaining and strikes, obtained by the workers, as well as the widened domain of social security, emerged as entitlements handed out to workers in accordance with the requirements of the new model of accumulation.”<sup>564</sup>

The position of Bülent Ecevit as the labor minister of the period is worth mention. As pointed out above, his labor ministry was critical for his political life. In a country in which the working class movement was newly emerging, the minister of labor who administered the process about the legalization of the right to strike was normally remembered as an important politician. Ecevit used this chance well. However, as explained in the above pages, the acts that are numbered as 274 and 275 were not the success of Bülent Ecevit alone. The success of Ecevit was his administration of the process and the harmony of his policy with Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s will. With this harmony Ecevit became one of the only two ministers<sup>565</sup> who served all three of the governments of İsmet İnönü in this period.<sup>566</sup> The position of Ecevit took the attention of observers of the era. For example, Walter

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<sup>562</sup> Keyder, *State and Class*, p. 150.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>564</sup> Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>565</sup> The second one was İlhami Sancar as the Minister of Defense. It was very normal in a political environment in which there are many juntas and military coup attempts.

<sup>566</sup> Orhan Koloğlu, *Kim Bu Ecevit* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2001), p.263.

F. Weiker in his treatise on the 1960 coup and following period cited Ecevit as one of the potential leaders of the RPP after Ismet İnönü.<sup>567</sup>

When Ismet İnönü became responsible for forming the government as prime minister, the candidate in his mind for the ministry of labor was Kemali Beyazıt,<sup>568</sup> a medical doctor. The first labor minister in Turkey had been Sadi Irmak, who was also a doctor. From İnönü's point of view, the work of the labor minister was very harmonious with the occupation of medical doctor, because of the consideration of the labor issues regarding public health and public hygiene. It is interesting that Bülent Ecevit became the Minister of Labor with the pressure of Turhan Feyzioğlu.<sup>569</sup>

Ecevit's views on the social questions and the works in the Research and Documentation Bureau of the party made him a good choice for the ministry of labor. The main agenda for the minister of labor would be the legalization of the right to strike. Ecevit's previous views on the question (mainly his articles in the daily of the party, *Ulus*) and İnönü's position made him convenient for this ministerial post.

The debates about the right to strike quickly started when Ecevit came to his ministerial position. On 22 November, workers sent him telegrams for their right to strike and collective bargaining.<sup>570</sup> One week later, in Ankara, workers started to

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<sup>567</sup> Weiker, p.109.

<sup>568</sup> Toker, Metin. *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, 1944-1973. vol.6 İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı, 1961-1965* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), p.32.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid.. Feyzioğlu was the leader of progressive-reformist wing in the party in this period. However after the left of center's coming into agenda, Feyzioğlu will be opponent of this policy and the main rival of Ecevit after 1966. Their rivalry will end with the resignation of Feyzioğlu and his group from the RPP and foundation of a new party in April 1967.

<sup>570</sup> *Milliyet*, 23 November 1961.

grow strike beards with the same demands.<sup>571</sup> On this issue, Ecevit declared that his first responsibility was to provide the acts for the legal right to strike and collective bargaining in his first days in the ministry.<sup>572</sup> His efforts found support from prime minister İnönü. İnönü stated his government views as “the five thousand years old mentality of suppression of the worker by the employer will be abolished... right to strike and collective bargaining will be given to the workers. I believe that the workers will use those rights in discreetly.”<sup>573</sup>

Ecevit rapidly convened the Working Assembly in January 1962. In the opening speech of the assembly meeting, he declared that the legal right to strike would be given to the workers, and the social justice is an important element of the constitution.<sup>574</sup> In the assembly, Ecevit made several speeches and pointed out that they would give extended rights to the workers.<sup>575</sup> This attitude of Ecevit was not approved by the big capitalists. In the working assembly, one of the employers’ representatives, Şahap Kocatopçu claimed that Ecevit was a biased minister and stood on the side of the workers.<sup>576</sup>

In February and March, the draft of Ecevit was debated in the public opinion. The draft came to parliament in August.<sup>577</sup> During the period, the struggle of the workers increased. Basically, the above-mentioned Kavel strike made the right to strike a difficult issue for Ecevit. However, the acts were approved in July 1963.

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<sup>571</sup> Ibid., 28 November 1961.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid., 12 December 1961.

<sup>573</sup> Ibid., 20 January 1962.

<sup>574</sup> Ibid., 23 January 1962.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid., 28 January 1962.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid.

<sup>577</sup> Ibid., 27 August 1962.

In Ecevit's ministerial era also the Social Insurances Act was passed into law. By this act, the Workers' Insurance changed into Social Insurance. However, the act did not provide the aims of the First Development Plan and 1961 constitution.<sup>578</sup>

Consequently, the labor ministry of Ecevit ended in February 1965. During the 1960s and the 1970s, Ecevit's career in the labor ministry was depicted as his being the hero of the working class, and the legalization of the right to strike was considered to have been done by the grace of Ecevit. However, political developments in the 1965 election process period reflect a different perspective. One of the most dramatic examples of these political developments was about the voting behavior of worker-populated cities. As an example, the election results of the main coal mining city in Turkey, Zonguldak, are remarkable. Before 1965 elections, Ismet İnönü was doubtful about whether Ecevit would become successful in the primary elections in the province of Ankara or not.<sup>579</sup> For this reason, the party nominated Ecevit as the Zonguldak candidate from the quota of workers. However Ecevit's candidacy decreased the votes of the RPP dramatically in Zonguldak.<sup>580</sup> The party could only get two of the nine Zonguldak deputies.<sup>581</sup>

On the right to strike, Ismet İnönü, almost in all speeches about the topic, indicated that the right to strike had been accepted by the new constitution, so the party dealt with the issue as a commandment of the new constitution. In the RPP's discourse, the development and development planning had a crucial place. Thus İnönü related the right to strike and the planned development. For İnönü, social

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<sup>578</sup> For the assesment of the Act, see Nadir Özbek. Ed. *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'si'nde Sosyal Güvenlik ve Sosyal Politikalar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı / Emeklilik Gözetim Merkezi, 2006), pp. 277-314.

<sup>579</sup> Sağlamer, p.192.

<sup>580</sup> Ibid.

<sup>581</sup> Ibid.. The RPP had three seats from Zonguldak in 1961 elections.



justice and development planning had to be considered in the same manner. This relation between the new constitution, social justice and the development planning might be seen in the speech of Ismet İnönü after the legalization of the right to strike:

Turkish worker by itself is the main pillar of the nation's development, progress and upward movement action. We as the government consider the Turkish worker in such a perspective and work for furnishing instruments and demands of the workers in order to facilitate the fulfillment of their duties in the nation's development and progress. Worker rights, social rights and social order are the main elements of the new constitution.<sup>582</sup>

Thus İnönü declared that the RPP accepted the right to strike of the workers under those conditions and limits. In another speech, the Prime Minister İnönü concluded his views on the right to strike as “to provide development of the worker rights is our duty. The right to strike and collective bargaining should be given to the Turkish worker. Turkish worker will use this in a perfect way. I believe in that the trade unionism will produce good results in our economic life.”<sup>583</sup>

The programs of the government that were led by Ismet İnönü in this period might provide a better understanding for the right to strike conception of the RPP.

The programs stated the right to strike as:

The First İnönü Government Program:

The government will work on the legislation and the institutions to provide social security measures that are underlined in the economic rights and duties by our constitution. The acts that regulate the right to strike and collective bargaining that will be used by the workers with the aim of protecting or

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<sup>582</sup> Ulus, 25 July 1963.

*Türk işçisi, milletin kalkınması, ilerlemesi ve yükselmesi davasının başlı başına bir yüksek sütunu, direğidir. Hükümet olarak türk işçisini bu gözle görüyoruz ve milletin ilerleme ve yükselmesinde kendisine düşen vazifeleri yapmasını kolaylaştırmaya, vasıtalarını, istemlerini vermeye çalışıyoruz. İşçi hakları, sosyal haklar ve sosyal düzen, yeni anayasanın esas unsurlarıdır.*

<sup>583</sup> Ibid., 20 January 1962.

improving their economic and social situation will be brought before the Parliament.<sup>584</sup>

The Second İnönü Government Program:

The Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-out Act Proposal that was prepared for making reached our working life to the mature democratic countries' effective and harmonious order will be our government's one of the proposals that will be brought before the Grand National Assembly.<sup>585</sup>

A closer look at those statements makes clear the perspective of the governments. First, the implication of the constitution is crucial. The first statement points the articles of constitution about the economic and social rights and duties. Thus the government conceptualized the right to strike in the manner of the new constitution. On the other hand, the program stated that the right to strike would be used with the aim of protecting or improving workers' economic and social situation. This was also in common in the related article of the 1961 constitution. The importance of the statement came from its limitation of the right to strike. By this statement, it was declared that the strikes with political aims like general strikes or sympathy strikes were forbidden. Then again, the program of the second İnönü government argued that those laws on union legislation and the right to strike aims at reaching Turkey's working life to the mature democratic countries' effective and harmonious order. The main point of this statement indicates that the new acts would

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<sup>584</sup> "İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı'ndaki Birinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 27 Kasım 1961" in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. Ed. İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), p.335. *Anayasamızın iktisâdi haklar ve ödevler arasında önemle belirttiği sosyal güvenlik tedbirlerini sağlamak için mevzuat ve müesseseler üzerinde çalışılacaktır. İşçilerin iktisâdi ve sosyal durumlarını korumak veya düzeltmek amacıyla kullanacakları toplu sözleşme ve grev hakkını düzenleyici kanunlar Yüksek Meclise sunulacaktır.*

<sup>585</sup> "İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı'ndaki İkinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 2 Temmuz 1961" in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. Ed. İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), p.361. *Çalışma hayatımızı ileri demokratik ülkelerdeki verimli ve ahenkli düzene kavuşturmak üzere hazırlanan Toplu Sözleşme, Grev ve Lokavt Kanunu tasarısı, Hükümetin Büyük Millet Meclisine kısa zamanda sunacağı tasarılarından biri olacaktır.*

not give permission to the use of the right to strike for the violation of the effectiveness and harmony of the working life.

Above all, the RPP's position on the right to strike was somehow different in the party program. The program identified the views of the party on the right to strike:

Our party gave importance to the protection of the worker rights and the measures that provide the settlement of the disputes. Among other issues, the party was convinced about the development of conciliation that will be operated in a rapid and easy way. If the disputes between the employer and employee cannot be settled by the commission of conciliation, the party recognizes the strike for the workers lock-out for the employer as natural rights in the framework of protecting public order in a democratic way.<sup>586</sup>

As clearly seen, the party highlighted the mechanisms of conciliation instead of strike. The right to strike came onto agenda, if the dispute could not be settled by the commission of conciliation.

Bülent Ecevit, as the Labor Minister of the period, had leading role in the legalization of the right to strike. Ecevit's views on the issue might provide a better understanding of the RPP's perspective about the right to strike. Three resources are useful for explaining Ecevit's views. They are an article written by Ecevit in 1973 on labor issues in Turkey, an interview with Ecevit in 1989 about the labor movement in Turkey, and the speeches of Ecevit in the parliament on the strike and trade union acts.

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<sup>586</sup> CHP Programı, p.15.

*Partimiz, işçi haklarının korunmasını ve ihtilaflarının hallini sağlayacak tedbirlere önem verir. Bu meyanda, uzlaştırma müessesesinin kolay ve çabuk işleyecek şekilde geliştirilmesi lüzumuna kanidir. İşçi ve işveren arasındaki anlaşmazlık uzlaştırma kurullarında hallolunamazsa demokratik manasında amme nizamını koruyacak esaslar dairesinde grevi işçinin ve lokavtı işverenin tabii hakları olarak tanır.*

Ecevit related the emergence of a strong labor movement in Turkey with the new environment after the 27 May 1960. For him, “the emergence of labor as a new social and political force” was one of the main characteristics of the era after 27 May.<sup>587</sup> Then he argued that this new labor movement was adherent to the principles of Atatürk and democracy.<sup>588</sup> Ecevit concluded his views on the relation between the new regime and emergence of the labor movement as

The reestablishment of democracy in Turkey on a sounder basis after the Revolution of 1960, the social rights introduced and guaranteed by the new Constitution, and the new atmosphere of freedom have provided fertile ground for the rapid development of a free and democratic labor movement in Turkey in recent years.<sup>589</sup>

As pointed out above, before the enactment of Trade Union and Strike Acts, the working class struggled for its rights. Ecevit was very aware of the meaning of the new developments. For him, the working class emerged as the only subject for political and social activities of its own. Ecevit described the actions of the workers and the effects of the actions

The period between the rise of social and economic awareness and discontent and the granting of satisfaction through constitutional and legal means constitutes a most critical period in the history of Turkish labor. Indeed, the turbulent years of 1962 and 1963 crystallized labor's political and cultural attitudes, as well as the direction of their future actions. Initially, the workers organized spontaneous mass meetings without the initiative or participation of any elite group, not even the university students. The workers denounced social and economic injustice in these meetings and demanded the implementation of the social and economic provisions of the new constitution. Barefoot workers marched in Istanbul and Izmir, the industrial

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<sup>587</sup> Bülent Ecevit, “Labor in Turkey: As a New Social and Political Force” in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. Ed. Kemal H. Karpat. (Leiden: Brill, 1973) p. 151.

<sup>588</sup> Ibid.

<sup>589</sup> Ibid., p. 174.

and business centers of Turkey. In Ankara, the capital, such a march was stopped just at the steps of the Parliament building while Parliament was in session. Posters, attacking the "greedy boss" or the "dirty capitalist" appeared for the first time in Turkey.<sup>590</sup>

This portrayal of Ecevit brought a question onto the agenda - how the working class would conduct itself in politics.

Ecevit was hopeful about the initiation of a social democratic politics from the working class activities. He said

The new laws were then only six months old. Very few collective agreements had been signed yet, and few of the workers had benefited from the material advantages provided by the new rights. But these rights, being officially granted, gave the workers recognition as a group, a sense of pride, self-confidence, and hope for the future. Incorporated in the legal-political system and allowed to share economic benefits, they no longer felt like "the underdog," and gave up the use of violent methods in order to attain their objectives. The following statement by the Executive Committee of Türk-İs , in a Report to the Fifth Convention of the Confederation held in Bursa in 1964, best expresses this new philosophy: Labor union movements have followed two different paths; first, the evolutionary unionism as we see in the free world today, and, second, the revolutionary unionism as opposed to the first one . . . We, the Executive Committee, inspired by the unionized labor circles of Turkey, consider it our duty to make clear that our path should be the path of evolutionary unionism, and that revolutionary methods cannot be a positive course for us.<sup>591</sup>

As discussed above, Ecevit was adamant about the adherence of the working class to democracy. The working class did not support the coup attempts. Thus the working class' attitude about the military coup attempts of Talat Aydemir was the main evidence for Ecevit. Ecevit wrote,

Some disgruntled military officers, exploiting the social unrest and discontent among the people, attempted two coups in 1962 and 1963. They claimed that the Turkish parliamentary democracy was ill-founded, immature, and not equipped to solve the country's social and economic problems. Quite a few

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<sup>590</sup> Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>591</sup> Ibid., p. 154.

intellectuals shared this conviction and gave their open or implicit support to these attempted coups. Yet, it is remarkable that workers did not support the revolutionary officers or the intellectuals. They were among the first to condemn such actions in strong terms.<sup>592</sup>

From Ecevit's point of view, the democratic political order and the strength of the working class were directly related. For him, the working class was very aware of that "without real democracy free trade unionism cannot exist."<sup>593</sup> Then Ecevit claimed that many people understood that "democracy cannot function properly and cannot be sufficiently secure without a free trade-union movement."<sup>594</sup> Consequently Ecevit's article on the labor movement in Turkey had strong signs from the social democracy of Western Europe.

Bülent Ecevit's views on the labor and the right to strike reflect some differences in his speech in the parliamentary sessions about the Trade Union Act and Strike Act. Ecevit indicated that the right to strike had been provided by the working class of the western democracies in a long and bloody struggle.<sup>595</sup> Those struggles had divided the western countries via class consciousness.<sup>596</sup> So the Turkish parliament was giving this right to the workers without those struggles, and this was a great service to society and history.<sup>597</sup> This perspective neglected the importance of the working class activities and struggles in the process of union legislation and the legalization of the right to strike. Thus the great service to society

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<sup>592</sup> Ibid., p.175.

<sup>593</sup> Ibid.

<sup>594</sup> Ibid.

<sup>595</sup> *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, v: 16, Birleşim: 75, 18.4.1963 (Ankara: TBMM, 1963), p.395.

<sup>596</sup> Ibid.

<sup>597</sup> Ibid.

and humanity had been made by him and his party instead of the parliament as the undertakers of the laws.

In 1989, Ecevit went further. For him, the struggles of the workers were not very important.<sup>598</sup> Ecevit identified the workers' struggle in this era as individual, and said it did not affect the process of the enactment of the laws. In this period, there were a small number of struggles, and their effect was negligible.<sup>599</sup> Ecevit claimed that he, as the minister of labor himself, had encouraged and tolerated the actions of the workers. Thus Ecevit, from this point of view, argued that the real reason for the enactments had been the constitution and the obliging character of his party.

The Union and Strike Acts have been criticized by many scholars and politicians because of the limitations on and deficiencies about the right to strike. Ecevit also accepted the deficiencies and the limitations. However, for him, the benefits of the 1963 acts were greater than the deficiencies.<sup>600</sup> From Ecevit's point of view, the deficiencies rose from the structure of the RPP and the structure of the coalition that had been led by RPP.<sup>601</sup> In this interview, Ecevit stated three deficiencies. The first deficiency of the acts was the situation of the civil servants. For Ecevit, they should have recognized the right to strike of the civil servants by those acts, but they could not.<sup>602</sup> The second deficiency was political. After the acts, the working class in Turkey did not lead other working people and peasants. Thus

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<sup>598</sup> M. Şehmus Güzel, "Bülent Ecevit'le Söyleşi: Düünden Bugüne İşçi Hareketi" in *İşçi Tarihine Bakmak*, p.161.

<sup>599</sup> Ibid.

<sup>600</sup> Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>601</sup> Ibid.

<sup>602</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

they did not struggle for the rights of the weak persons in the society, and did not influence social and political conditions enough.<sup>603</sup> The third deficiency for Ecevit was about industrial democracy. For Ecevit, they should have provided the participation of the workers in the administration, profit and responsibility.<sup>604</sup> Ecevit declared that this participation would have been more possible in the public sector.<sup>605</sup>

As discussed above, Ecevit defined the reasons for those deficiencies as the structure of the RPP and the structure of the coalition that had been led by RPP. With these words Ecevit pointed at the conservative wing in the RPP and the conservative coalition partners of the party. He had done as much as it was possible under those conditions. He also indicated that he had suspended the draft of Cahit Talas because of the inadequacy of the draft.<sup>606</sup> Instead he had benefited from the works of the RPP Research Bureau.<sup>607</sup> Thus Ecevit gave prominence to his party's and also his own (Ecevit was one of the important members of the bureau) contributions for the union legislation instead of the struggle of the working class for the rights.

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<sup>603</sup> Ibid.

<sup>604</sup> Ibid.,p.157.

<sup>605</sup> Ibid.,p.157.

<sup>606</sup> Ibid.,p.169.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid.



## Conclusion

In April 1962, the Labor Minister Bülent Ecevit complained in a RPP Party Assembly session: “Before I became minister, I would become angry with the ones who said the RPP was a conservative party. But I see that the RPP has come into a conservative party position.”<sup>608</sup> These two sentences reflected the general way of thinking of progressive political elites about the RPP during the İnönü governments’ era.

Before 1960 coup, the RPP had been the main focal of the opposition against the repressive DP government for the urban elites. The party had been influenced by the progressive reformist political movements of this period. This perspective had been reflected in the new constitution. The new regime with its new constitution promised a stable political regime and economic development. Reform was the key word at this point. However, the three governments of the RPP in the first half of the 1960s were a flat denial of this reformist program. The above-quoted sentences of Ecevit reflected this disappointment because of the denial of the reform program. As discussed above, Ecevit argued that one of the two reasons of deficiencies of the union and right to strike legislations as the conservative wing of the RPP.

During these governments’ era, the conservative wing of the RPP had been more powerful than the progressive wing and had blocked the reform programs with the support of right wing coalition partners. At this point, the fall of the third İnönü government in February 1965 became a turning point. The party radicalized its discourse and reforms again entered the agenda of the party. Then a new phase in the

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<sup>608</sup>Ecevit complains in the Party Assembly. See, Yön, “CHP,” *Yön*, no.16 (4 April 1962), p.6.

struggle of the conservative and progressive wings of the RPP started. The newly emerging working class movement and the legislation of the right to strike had significant importance in this process.

Thus the left of center emerged under those conditions, and the party aimed at equating the left of center with the so-called reformism of the party. At last, the group of left of center won the struggle. The RPP identified itself as a political party on the left of center and the opponents were expelled from the party administration.

Thus the era from the first through the second half of the 1960s became a period in which the progressives abandoned their hopes for the RPP and set their sites on the emerging left. Thus İnönü's left of center discourse aimed both at distracting the interests on the left and differentiating the RPP from the left against the accusations of the right. At this point the emergence of the left, actors standing on the left and their relations with the RPP emerged as other important dimensions of the RPP's coming to the left of center, all of which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE RPP AND THE LEFT

After 27 May coup, the place of the left under the new regime was not clear.<sup>609</sup> It was obvious that the left was on the agenda now. However, the features and strength of the left were under question. The quest in the RPP for a new direction was interrupted after being the governing party. The governments of the RPP were coalition governments. Thus the RPP was not able to make its coalition partners agree on the reforms that were prescribed in the constitution. For this reason, the party diverged itself from the leftist and radical intellectuals.

However, the same period became also the development era for the left. The Workers Party of Turkey gained an influential political party character in this period. Moreover, also in this era, it was country-wide organized and crystallized its ideological direction. The workers movement initiated a decided struggle for the right to strike. After the legalization of this right, the working class masterfully used it to improve its economic and social conditions. The *Yön* movement also emerged in

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<sup>609</sup> For the general studies on the socialism of the period, see Ergun Aydınoglu, *Türkiye Solu, 1960-1980: Bir Amneziğin Anıları* (İstanbul : Versus Kitap, 2007); Ergün Aydınoglu, *Türk Solu, 1960-1971: Eleştirel Bir Tarih Denemesi* (İstanbul : Belge Yayınları, 1992); Haluk Yurtsever, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş: Türkiye Solu 1960-1980* (İstanbul : Yordam, 2008); Mustafa Şener, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset : YÖN, MDD ve TİP* (İstanbul : Yordam Kitap, 2010); Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Soldaki Bölünmeler 1960-1970 : Tartışmalar-Nedenler-Çözüm Önerileri* (Ankara : Toplum yayınları, 1970); Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980* (New York : Brill, 1992); İlhan Akdere and Zeynep Karadeniz, *Türkiye Solu'nun Eleştirel Tarihi, 1908-1980* (İstanbul : Evrensel Basım Yayın, 1996).

this period. It reshaped the radical intellectuals and met them with a certain kind of socialism. Last, the Communist Party of Turkey in exile was centralized in this era. However, the space for the left under the new regime was not guaranteed. The struggle of the left was to attain this space.

In the era between February 1965 and October 1966 the place of the left became guaranteed, because political developments after the end of the period of İnönü governments provided space for the left. The left gained space in the political arena thanks to these developments. Then after, in this era, socialism was a part of the parliamentary politics of Turkey.

Within this framework, it is obvious that the left began to develop in Turkey in the first half of the 1960s out of the RPP; moreover, in spite of the RPP. Nevertheless, it directly affected the RPP. The outside dimension of the political process that created a new direction for the RPP will be the main topic of this chapter.

For this purpose, this chapter is organized in three main parts. In the first part, the actors on the left as *Yön* movement, the Workers Party of Turkey and the Communist Party of Turkey will be examined. In the second part, the assessment of the Turkish left of the RPP will be discussed. Therefore, these parts will map the political positions of the different wings of the left and the interactions between those groups and the RPP. Last, in the third part the three widely debated issues of the period will be taken in hand in the context of their position in the relationship between the RPP and the left: land reform, anti-Americanism and economic planning.

## Actors on the Left

The changes in the RPP's direction took place in the presence of the new actors on the left. In this framework, this part of the chapter will evaluate how these actors were situated with respect to each other. These actors were mainly the Workers Party of Turkey, the *Yön* movement and the Communist Party of Turkey. In this context, the first part will be about how the left came onto the agenda in this period. Then the actors on the left and their positions will be evaluated, respectively. Last, these actors' approaches to the position and the role of the working class will be elaborated in the third part.

### The Coming of the Left onto the Agenda

After the coup, the official statements of the junta leaders indicated that there would be space for a socialist party under the new regime. Just one day after the coup, Cemal Gürsel answered the question of whether left-oriented parties would be able to participate in the elections, saying "I am libertarian. I respect rights. Socialist parties are useful for establishing social order in the country. If they are necessary, they are established and attend the elections."<sup>610</sup> In this interview, Gürsel answered

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<sup>610</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 May 1960.

the same question about the foundation of a communist party: “Does this country need such a party? I do not suggest it needs one. If it is necessary it also will be established and participates in.” Gürsel gave several similar speeches about the future existence of socialist parties during this period.<sup>611</sup>

Despite these speeches, the pressure on the left continued in this period. The result of the socialist publishing efforts was a clear example of this situation. A well-known communist activist, Mihri Belli, and one of his colleagues, attempted to publish a journal called *Yeni Yol Sosyalist Dergi* (New Way Socialist Journal) on those days.<sup>612</sup> This journal would function in the legal ground. However, the first issue of the journal was seized by the martial law. On the first page of the journal, there were the pictures of Cemal Gürsel and Nikita Khrushchev. Mihri Belli and four more colleagues were arrested. They were sent for questioning in the office of the intelligence service in Istanbul.

Apart from publishers, socialists from several occupations faced interrogations and detentions. Socialist artist İbrahim Balaban and four friends were arrested on the charge of making communist propaganda with an art exhibition in Bursa.<sup>613</sup> In Eskisehir, socialists were arrested.<sup>614</sup> In May 1961, three writers of the daily *Tanin*, including the famous humorist Aziz Nesin, were detained.<sup>615</sup> They were released two months later.<sup>616</sup>

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<sup>611</sup> For similar speeches by Gürsel on the issue, see *ibid.*, 7 August 1960; 9 August 1960 and 26 March 1961.

<sup>612</sup> Mihri Belli, *Mihri Belli'nin Anıları: İnsanlar Tanıdım*. Vol.2 (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), pp.69.71.

<sup>613</sup> *Milliyet*, 08 July 1961.

<sup>614</sup> *Ibid.*, 08 June 1961.

<sup>615</sup> *Ibid.*, 19 May 1961.

<sup>616</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 July 1961.

One other socialist put on trial was Mehmet Ali Aybar, the future leader of the Workers' Party of Turkey. Aybar had sent a letter to Gürsel on 19 November 1960.<sup>617</sup> In this letter, Aybar had expressed the hope from the regime of a progressive politics after the coup.<sup>618</sup> However, he thought the detentions of the socialists crushed those hopes.<sup>619</sup> The main point of the letter concerned the regime after the constitution's entrance came into force. Aybar stated his view about the new regime saying

To say that there is a real democracy, it is essential to allow for the organization of the left wing made up of the labor force and the groups that stand with it under public security as a political power against the right formed by the capital and the several groups bounded by it. This is the criterion. A regime that does not allow existence of the left wing is not democracy regardless of its label.<sup>620</sup>

Then Mehmet Ali Aybar proposed the abolition of the 141<sup>st</sup> and 142<sup>nd</sup> articles of the penal code, which banned class politics. One month later, he arranged a press conference in Ankara, and declared similar views.<sup>621</sup> However, his statements did not appear in the press the next day, because the government had decided to enact the publication ban had been regarding the press conference. Then he was interrogated by the martial law administration. Aybar was put on trial because of the letter to

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<sup>617</sup> For the full text of the letter, see Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Cemal Gürsel'e Mektup," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm: Seçmeler, 1945-1967* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968).

<sup>618</sup> Ibid., p.181.

<sup>619</sup> Ibid.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid.

*Gerçekten de demokrasi vardır denilebilmesi için, sermayenin ve ona bağlanan türlü zümrelerden kurulu sağ kanat karşısında, emek gücünün ve ondan yana olan türlü zümrelerin kurduğu sol kanadın, kanun güveni altında politik bir kuvvet olarak teşkilatlanması şarttır. Mihenk budur. Sol kanada hayat hakkı tanımayan bir rejim, etiketi ne olursa olsun, demokrasi değildir.*

<sup>621</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi*, vol.1 (İstanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1988), p.82.

General Gürsel and the press conference. Although he was acquitted, like many other socialists, it was obvious that the aim of the trials was intimidation.

The state radio broadcasts of the era show of the official view of the new regime about the left.<sup>622</sup> In his work on the state radio, Uygur Kocabaşoğlu states that anti-communist broadcasting in Turkey increased after the 27 May military intervention.<sup>623</sup> He defines the characteristics of this anti-communist broadcasting. The first feature is an emotional character rather than a scientific challenge against communism.<sup>624</sup> The second feature is the success of the program formats<sup>625</sup> which were edited more successfully than the capabilities of the Turkish state radio administration. The third one is that the radio presented the speeches of persons who had escaped from countries like Hungary, East Germany, and Cuba to the western bloc.<sup>626</sup> Thus Kocabaşoğlu points out the impossibility of these programs having been produced by the Turkish state radio.<sup>627</sup> He states that foreign aid (US aid) was accepted for these broadcasts. However, he claims that although foreign aids were made, this broadcasting reflected the perspective of Turkish state authority.<sup>628</sup> Then again it is noteworthy at last that this study of Kocabaşoğlu demonstrates that the anti-communist tone of the broadcasting increased after the 27 May military

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<sup>622</sup> Yalçın Küçük, in his book entitled *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, refers to the dissertation of Uygur Kocabaşoğlu and uses the findings of Kocabaşoğlu as evidence of the anti-communist character of the new regime. For a book edition of the the dissertation, see Uygur Kocabaşoğlu. *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna: TRT Öncesi Dönemde Radyonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Türk Siyasal Hayatı İçindeki Yeri* (Ankara: S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu, 1980).

<sup>623</sup> Ibid., p.417.

<sup>624</sup> Ibid.

<sup>625</sup> Ibid.

<sup>626</sup> Ibid.

<sup>627</sup> Ibid.

<sup>628</sup> Ibid.



intervention. This point is crucial to understanding the new regime's stance on socialism and socialist movements.

Consequently, the story of the socialists in the period was similar to each other. On the one hand, the regime put pressure on socialist activities. Many of the socialists of the period were detained. On the other hand, the leaders of the regime through official statements declared that the socialist politics would be free, and the detained socialists were acquitted. Under those conditions, the most important development was the foundation of the Workers' Party of Turkey on 13 February 1961 by twelve trade unionists from Istanbul.<sup>629</sup>

### Workers Party of Turkey

From February 1961 (the date of the foundation of the party) to the beginning of 1962 (Mehmet Ali Aybar's coming to power), the Workers Party of Turkey was not able to become an influential political party due to the founders' position on party administration. As mentioned in the previous part, the founders were twelve trade unionists and they were doubtful about intellectuals joining the party. They wanted full control of the party by workers. Under those circumstances, the organization of the party was the biggest problem. When the Party Assembly convened in August 1961, the party was able to be organized only in six

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<sup>629</sup> The name of the founders were Kemal Türkler, Avni Erakalın, Şaban Yıldız, İbrahim Güzelce, Rıza Kuas, Kemal Nebioğlu, Hüseyin Uslubaş, Salih Özkaray, İbrahim Denizci, Adnan Arkin, Ahmet Muşlu, Saffet Göksüzoğlu.

provinces.<sup>630</sup> Moreover, the organization of the party in those cities was not completed. Under those circumstances, the WPT was unable to participate in the 1961 elections because it could not pass the organizational threshold to enter the elections.

The chairman of the party, Avni Erakalın, resigned from the WPT and became a candidate for deputy from the New Turkey Party with the condition of returning to the Workers Party of Turkey after the 1961 elections.<sup>631</sup> However, he was not able to enter into parliament. As 1961 was ending, the party was unorganized, unable to attend the elections and did not have a chairman.

The founders of the party decided to renew the party leadership and transform it into a true socialist party. They considered several candidates for leadership from a large political spectrum.<sup>632</sup> At last, the founders agreed on Mehmet Ali Aybar and that night, visited Aybar's home and asked him to be the party leader.<sup>633</sup> After a short hesitation, Aybar accepted their offer.<sup>634</sup> Then on February 1962, by a declaration in a press conference, the founders of the party invited Mehmet Ali Aybar to the party leadership.<sup>635</sup> Then, again during a press conference, Aybar declared that he accepted

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<sup>630</sup> Those provinces are İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Kocaeli, Mersin and Adana. Artun Ünsal, *Umuttan Yalnızlığa: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2002), p. 92.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>632</sup> The names of the some of the candidates were Mehmet Ali Aybar, Ali Fuat Başgil, Cahit Talas, Orhan Tuna, Orhan Aarsal, Sadi Irmak, Cemil Sait Barlas, Ziyaettin Fahir Fındıkoğlu, Nadir Nadi, Ali Rıza Arı, Ekmel Zamil, Sabahattin Zaim, Yaşar Kemal, Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, Esat Çağa, and Esat Tekeli. Gökhan Atılğan, *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı* (İstanbul: Yordam Yayınları, 2009), p.186.

<sup>633</sup> Aybar, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi*, p.204.

<sup>634</sup> Ibid.

<sup>635</sup> For the declaration of the founders, see Mehmet Ali Aybar "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Bildirisi," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm Seçmeler 1945-1967* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968), pp.191-194.

the position.<sup>636</sup> During this period, Aybar was on trial on the charge of communist propaganda for having sent a letter to the president Cemal Gürsel and for holding a press conference. However this situation did not change the decision of the founders.

One of the other reasons for this change was emergence of the Laborers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Çalışanlar Partisi*). This event, which will be evaluated in below was organized by the only trade union confederation in Turkey, Türk-İş. When the establishment of the Laborers Party of Turkey was declared, the WPT without delay stated that there was no need to found a new workers party.<sup>637</sup> The secretary general of the party, Olcayto İlder, and chairman of the TWP in the city of Istanbul, Bahattin Kocamanoğlu, arranged a common press conference.<sup>638</sup> They claimed that the new party was for the best interest of other parties and private interests. If there were two parties for the workers, the votes would be divided.<sup>639</sup> The trade unionists who were the members of the WPT resisted this initiation in the Representatives Assembly of Türk-İş.<sup>640</sup> However, the establishment of the Laborers Party of Turkey quickened the transformation of the Workers Party of Turkey.

The first attempt of Aybar in the party general chairmanship position was to change the party statute. With the new statute that was approved in April 1962, the political party character of the WPT was strengthened, and the party exited from the yoke of the founders.<sup>641</sup> After Aybar's coming to power, many socialist intellectuals

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<sup>636</sup> For the speech of Mehmet Ali Aybar, see Mehmet Ali Aybar "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Bildiri Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ali Aybar'ın 9 Şubat 1962 Günlü Demecinin Metnidir," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm Seçmeler 1945-1967*(İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968), pp.195-196.

<sup>637</sup> *Milliyet*, 19 January 1962.

<sup>638</sup> Aybar, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi*, p. 193.

<sup>639</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>640</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>641</sup> For an assessment of the statute, see Ünsal, pp.155-182.

joined the party.<sup>642</sup> A small party named the Socialist Party also joined the WPT.<sup>643</sup> Thus the party gained cadres from the intellectuals, not only from the trade unionists. However Aybar was determined about the working class party character of the WPT. Thus the new party statute guaranteed the place of the working class in the party. At this point, the 53<sup>rd</sup> article of the statute became crucial as it stated that half of the delegates and the organs of the party would be from the workers.<sup>644</sup>

As discussed above, before Aybar, the organization of the WPT had been a real problem. The new administration attempted to establish local organizations and within two years had organized in all districts of seventeen provinces.<sup>645</sup> The party had organizations in provincial centers and some of the districts in eight provinces.<sup>646</sup> The establishment of those local organizations was crucial, as it made it possible for the WPT to be eligible to enter the elections.

The organization of the party throughout country wide created an anti-communist reaction. The meetings of the party were raided. The party faced violent actions from the anti-communist right. For this reason, Aybar and party administration visited Prime Minister Ismet İnönü on 22 December 1962 and discussed the attacks on the party.<sup>647</sup> İnönü agreed that their government had the

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<sup>642</sup> For example, Adnan Cemgil, Yaşar Kemal, Cemal Hakkı Selek, Nihat Sargın, Fethi Naci, Behice Boran, Sadun Aren became the members of the party in those days. Ibid., p.96.

<sup>643</sup> Ibid.

<sup>644</sup> Ibid., p.159.

<sup>645</sup> These provinces were Adana, Ankara, Bilecik, Bolu, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Edirne, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, İçel, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Sakarya and Tunceli. Sargın, v.2, p.1117.

<sup>646</sup> They were Aydın, Balıkesir, Çankırı, Çanakkale, Konya, Manisa, Maraş and Samsun. Ibid.

<sup>647</sup> Aybar, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi*, p.226.

responsibility of providing for the safety of the political parties that worked in the constitutional regime.<sup>648</sup>

Under those circumstances, a speech by President Cemal Gürsel was very influential. Gürsel answered the question about the discontent of the other parties with the WPT: “certainly it does not suit for them. The WPT will take votes from them. But the establishment and development of this party is necessary for our country. I welcome the WTP with friendship.”<sup>649</sup> With those words, Gürsel declared that the new regime would include a socialist party in the political party system.

In February 1963, Niyazi Ağırnaslı joined the WPT.<sup>650</sup> Then Esat Çağa followed him. With the representation in the parliament, the WPT had the opportunity to apply to the constitutional court for the laws, which were considered contrary to the new constitution by the party. Among the applications, two of them concerned the death penalty and the 141<sup>st</sup> and 142<sup>nd</sup> articles of the penal code that forbade the class based politics.<sup>651</sup> Those cases became the beginning for the parliamentary struggle of the WPT, and the first socialist voice in the Turkish parliamentary system.

The first elections in which the WPT participated were in November 1963.<sup>652</sup> These elections were municipal elections. In the elections, the party was able to win only 35,507 votes, or 0,4% of the total electorate.<sup>653</sup> The most important part of the elections for the WPT was the opportunity to speak on the radio. Aybar started his

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<sup>648</sup> Ibid., p.227.

<sup>649</sup> Sargın, v.2 p.1098.

<sup>650</sup> Ibid., v.1 p.136.

<sup>651</sup> Ibid., p.137.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid.

<sup>653</sup> Ibid.

radio speech in an out of the ordinary way: He welcomed the workers, peasants, and salaried citizens.<sup>654</sup> He used a class-based discourse and strongly argued the necessity of social justice for the democratic political life.<sup>655</sup>

The WPT convened its first congress in İzmir in February 1964.<sup>656</sup> During this congress, the new program of the party was approved.<sup>657</sup> The program was admired by different wings of the left. With this congress, the WPT, in Turkish political history, became the first legal socialist party that was able to convene a congress till the 1960s. Thus within a few years, the new leader, Mehmet Ali Aybar, and the new leadership of the party became successful in their project of strengthening the party in order to participate in the elections and avoid illegality. At last, the party has transformed from an uninfluential party of a group of trade unionists into a well-organized and influential socialist party.

In this period, the WPT rapidly prepared itself for the parliamentary elections. Its organization was expanded throughout the country, and as a result, the party began to be mentioned in the public opinion. The new election system, which was called the National Remainder System, guaranteed that the votes for the WPT and other small parties would not be uninfluential.<sup>658</sup> The votes of the small parties would be fully represented in the parliament. Under those conditions, as mentioned above, an anti-communist reaction against the WPT was constructed. The meetings

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<sup>654</sup> For this speech of Aybar, see Mehmet Ali Aybar “Seçimde Oyuna Gelme” in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm Seçmeler 1945-1967* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968), pp.301-307.

<sup>655</sup> Ibid.

<sup>656</sup> For the congress, see Sargın, vol.1 pp. 189-220.

<sup>657</sup> Türkiye İşçi Partisi *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı* (İstanbul: Ersan Matbaacılık, 1964).

<sup>658</sup> National Remainder System is not a widespread election system. It functions for fully representation of the minor parties.

of the party were attacked by the groups organized mainly by the Justice Party and the Turkish Association to Combat Communism local branches.

1965 started with a surprise for the WPT. Aybar's radio message for the New Year was censored. In the censored part of the message, Aybar claimed that a party that defended the interests of the laboring people was participating in the elections for the first time.<sup>659</sup> This censorship demonstrated that the bias against socialism and the WPT was limited not only to the local attacks on the party, but also deployed in the public establishments.

In this period, the WPT continued its organizational development. According to the press report of the party in February 1965, the party had fully organized in twenty-one cities.<sup>660</sup> The WPT had province and county organizations in seven cities.<sup>661</sup> So in the coming elections, the WPT would participate as an organized political party. However, the new cabinet tried to block its entrance to the elections. The ministry of Interior Affairs claimed that the WPT had not been able to be really organized in 15 cities, the minimum condition for being part of the elections.<sup>662</sup> Under those circumstances, the WPT would not be able to participate in the elections according to the ministry of interior affairs. However, the party applied to the Supreme Electoral Board and the board decided that the party was eligible.<sup>663</sup>

The activities of the WPT faced with many anti-communist violent reactions. Among them Akhisar and Bursa offensives were crucial. In Akhisar, the WPT

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<sup>659</sup> Sargın, vol.2, p.1136.

<sup>660</sup> Ibid.. p.1138. those cities were Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, İstanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, Bilecik, Sakarya, Ankara, İzmir, Samsun, Gaziantep, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Bolu, İçel, Aydın, Maraş, Adıyaman, Adana and Eskişehir.

<sup>661</sup> Ibid.. Those were Manisa, Çanakkale, Zonguldak, Tokat, Yozgat, Hatay and Konya.

<sup>662</sup> Sargın, vol.1, p. 263.

<sup>663</sup> Ibid.

organized a meeting about the social and economic questions of tobacco growers.<sup>664</sup> In the meeting, the chairman of the party, Aybar and party members was attacked by the TACC local branch with stones.<sup>665</sup> The signboard of the party was come down by the protestors. In Bursa, the provincial congress of the WPT was raided by the TACC and Justice Party members.<sup>666</sup> Many WPT members were injured in the congress. The attack against the WPT created a reaction against the Justice Party and the TACC. Many politicians, such as President Cemal Gürsel and Bülent Ecevit, condemned the attacks.<sup>667</sup> The party then faced attacks in Eminönü, Aydın, Adana, Turgutlu and Silifke.<sup>668</sup> After that, the party was faced with the operations and investigations. For example, the party office in the city of Kocaeli was raided by the police.<sup>669</sup>

The WPT did not respond to violent attacks in kind. It continued to support and advocate the 1961 constitution and to struggle in the legal way. The party representatives pointed the constitutional rights and stood the legal grounds. The party administration used a cautious discourse in the political activities. For example, the party representatives did not use the word *sosyalist* (socialist) for their party until the entrance into the parliament.<sup>670</sup> They preferred to use the word “*toplumcu*,” which is a synonym for “socialist” in Turkish.<sup>671</sup> However, this word was considered

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<sup>664</sup> *Milliyet*, 6 March 1965.

<sup>665</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>666</sup> İlhan Selçuk, “Ham Hayallerin Sahipleri,” *Yön*, no.119 (9 July 1965), p.3.

<sup>667</sup> Yön, “AP Meşruiyet Dışına Düşüyor,” *Yön*, no. 119 (9 July 1965), p.4; Bülent Ecevit, “Devlete İsyan Eden Bir İktidar Partisi,” *Milliyet* (7 July 1965).

<sup>668</sup> Sargın, v.2, p.1147.

<sup>669</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1141.

<sup>670</sup> Ünsal, p.185.

<sup>671</sup> *Ibid.*



as more moderate for the masses. In this framework, the word “socialist” did not enter the party statute until 1968.<sup>672</sup>

In May 1965, the WPT attempted to construct a link between the party and the military intervention of 27 May 1960. This was a tactic that was conducted by the party administration to strengthen the legitimacy of the party and to protect itself from the attacks of the anti-communist right. The declaration of Aybar on the 27 May intervention is a clear example of this attitude:

We regard 27 May as the continuation of our Independence War under new conditions, for the reason that 27 May is our national resistance against a government that was under the command of domestic and foreign exploiters and had lost its legitimacy. Just like 45 years ago. 27 May is to protect our national independence and sovereign rights.... 27 May is basic human rights, social justice and real democracy. 27 May is reformism; our tenacity for reaching civilized societies and immediately getting out from exploitative reactionary order with radical transformations. 27 May is planned development and development with non-capitalist way. 27 May is peace. It is our second step after our Independence War on the way of tomorrow's socialist, progressive and happy Turkey. And 27 May is the constitution to which all our nation said yes...<sup>673</sup>

Furthermore, the WPT admitted one of the fourteen radical members of the National Unity Committee, Muzaffer Karan to the party membership. Fourteen other officers joined the party. The message statement by Aybar during the joining ceremony of Karan makes the perspective of the WPT clearer: “A link between the

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<sup>672</sup> Ibid.

<sup>673</sup> For the text of the message, see *Sosyal Adalet*, no.15 (June 1965), p.24.  
*27 Mayıs'ı Milli Kurtuluş Savaşımızın yeni şartlar altında devamı sayıyoruz. Çünkü 27 Mayıs, dış ve iç sömürücülerin emrinde meşruluğunu kaybetmiş bir iktidara karşı milletçe direnişimizdir; tıpkı 45 yıl öncesi gibii.. 27 Mayıs, milli bağımsızlığımıza, egemenlik haklarımıza kıskançcasarılıktır.... 27 Mayıs sosyal adalettir; temel insan haklarıdır; gerçek demokrasidir. 27 Mayıs, devrimcilik; köklü dönüşümlerle sömürücü, gerici ekonomik ve sosyal düzenden bir an önce sıyrılma, uygar toplumlara yetişme azmimizdir. 27 Mayıs, barıştır; yarının toplumcu, ileri, mutlu Türkiye'sine giden yolda Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan sonar ikinci adımımızdır. Ve de 27 Mayıs, milletçe evet dediğimiz anayasadır.*

WPT and the 27 May has been constructed. There was this link in the past. Now it has been strengthened more.”<sup>674</sup>

Consequently, the WPT transformed itself under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, and in the 1965 elections the party won fifteen seats in the parliament. The violent acts of the anti-communist right did not stop the development of the party, and the WPT improved its organizational body and political stance in this period. The parliamentary struggle of the party started a new era in Turkish parliamentary politics.

### The Emergence and Development of the Yön Movement

*Yön* was a weekly journal that was published between 1961 and 1967.<sup>675</sup> It was prepared in Ankara, but published in Istanbul. The founding group of the journal had six members.<sup>676</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu was the most important contributor to *Yön*. He was also the managing director and licensee of the journal. He determined the editorial line and framework of the journal. The writers of the *Yön* were not limited

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<sup>674</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad, p. 291.

<sup>675</sup> On the *Yön* Movement, see Hikmet Özdemir. *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı, Yön Hareketi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986); Gökhan Atılğan. *Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2008).

<sup>676</sup> They were Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhami Soysal, Hamdi Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu and İlhan Selçuk. Three of them (Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal and Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu) were on the masthead of the journal. On the other hand, two of the group members (İlhami Soysal and İlhan Selçuk) were writing for other newspapers, so their contribution was only giving articles for the *Yön*.

to the founders. Many of the progressive intellectuals of the period published articles in the magazine.<sup>677</sup>

*Yön* was generally considered not only a weekly journal, but also a political movement, because the journal became the voice and platform for seeking a defined development program. The name of the journal reflected this position.<sup>678</sup> One of the founders of the journal explained how they decided on the name *Yön* for the journal: “We asserted to show that this is the way out for Turkey, which is worrying about its non-direction. Thus the word *Yön* was very convenient because of its brevity and relevance to the aim.”<sup>679</sup>

It started to be published with a declaration in its centerfold that was signed by many intellectuals of the period. The number of the signatories at first was 164, and then 878 more people also signed the declaration.<sup>680</sup> The four important points of the *Yön* declaration were:<sup>681</sup>

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<sup>677</sup> The most prominent examples were Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Niyazi Berkes, Sadun Aren, İdris Küçükömer and Fethi Naci.

<sup>678</sup> The meaning of the word *Yön* in Turkish language is ‘direction.’

<sup>679</sup> Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, p. 240.

<sup>680</sup> For the list of the signers, see Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, pp.315-327.

<sup>681</sup> For the declaration, see *Yön*, No.1 (20 December 1961), pp.12-13.

1. Atatürk devrimleriyle amaç edinilen çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmanın, eğitim davasını sonuçlandırmanın, Türk demokrasisini yaşatmanın, sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirmenin ve demokrasi rejimini sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmanın, ancak iktisadi alanda hızla kalkınmakta, yani milli istihsal seviyesini hızla yükseltmekte göstereceğimiz başarıya bağlı olduğuna inanıyoruz.
2. Bugün Türk toplumuna yön verebilmek durumunda bulunan öğretmen, yazar, politikacı, sendikacı, müteşebbis ve idareci gibi kimselerin, belli bir kalkınma felsefesini ana hatları üzerinde anlaşılmaya varmalarını zaruri sayıyoruz
3. Kalkınma felsefemizin hareket noktaları olarak, bütün imkanlarımızı harekete geçirmeyi, yatırımları hızla artırmaya, iktisadi hayata bütünüyle planlamayı, kitleleri sosyal adalete kavuşturmayı, istismarı kaldırmayı ve demokrasiyi kitlelere mal etmeyi zaruri sayıyoruz. Varmak istediğimiz bu amaçlara yeni bir devletçilik anlayışıyla erişebileceğimize inanıyoruz.
4. Yeni devletçiliği, yukarda belirttiğimiz amaçlara erişmek için mutlaka başvurulması gereken şuurlu devlet müdahalesi şeklinde anlıyoruz.

1. We believe in that in order to achieve the degree of modern civilization aimed at by the Atatürk revolutions, to solve the problems concerning education, to perpetuate Turkish democracy, to realize social justice and to found a strong basis for Turkish democracy, depends on the success of the rapid development in the economic field, that is to say, a rapid increase in the level of national production.
2. We consider it compulsory that the people that direct Turkish society today like teachers, writers, politicians, trade unionists, entrepreneurs and administrators should come to agreement on the main lines of a certain philosophy of development.
3. We consider it compulsory to mobilize and effectively manage our resources, to increase investments rapidly, to plan economic life entirely, and to provide social justice for the masses, to abolish exploitation and to appropriate democracy to the masses as the starting points of our philosophy of development. We believe that we can reach those purposes that we want to achieve, with a new understanding of etatism.
4. We regard the new etatism as necessary conscious state intervention in order to achieve the afore mentioned purposes.

Thus the *Yön* movement constructed a developmentalist political discourse.

Increasing the national production played a central role in this discourse. In this framework, the *Yön* movement gave special importance to the elites of society, and it evaluated the consensus within the elites on a specific type of development program as necessary. This program was based on a new etatism which was directed by “the conscious state intervention.” Consequently, the political agenda of *Yön* movement was rapid development by state-directed economic planning. In many peripheral countries, socialism was considered a means of rapid development that provided more than the capitalist system. So it is obvious that *Yön*’s socialism and development perceptions should be assessed as integrated concepts. However, it is doubtful that the *Yön* movement continued with the same publication line and same perspective that was framed in the declaration during its seven years.

The 1960s in Turkey was a period in which society and politics rapidly changed. Thus in the publication period of the *Yön*, the journal and its publication

policy also shifted several times. These shifts were crucial in the context of *Yön*'s relationship with the left and the RPP.

Gökhan Atılgan periodizes *Yön*'s revolutionary discourse and the position against the government into five sub-periods.<sup>682</sup> According to him, in the first period between winter 1961 (the publication of the *Yön*) and 1962 autumn (the initial resignations of the State Planning Organization administration), the journal aimed at directing the governing RPP, bureaucrats and senators<sup>683</sup> to a reform program.<sup>684</sup> At the same time, *Yön* aimed at uniting the power of opposition outside parliament with the above-mentioned direction attempt.

In the second period, *Yön* oscillated between the evolutionary socialist reformism and insurrection.<sup>685</sup> During this period, the *Yön* movement organized the Socialist Culture Association, SCA (*Sosyalist Kültür Derneği*). Thus *Yön* was in search of a democratic socialism with a long-term perspective, like Fabianism.<sup>686</sup> However, at the same time, the journal aimed at giving a revolutionary way to the potential military coup. In this period, the journal was banned by the martial law on the grounds supporting the coup of Talat Aydemir.

According to Atılgan, the third period began with the reopening of the journal in September 1964 and ended with the October 1965 national elections.<sup>687</sup> In this period, the journal sought an anti-imperialist government. The *Yön* group was very hopeful about an election victory of an anti-imperialist bloc composed of the RPP

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<sup>682</sup> For the periodization of Atılgan, see Atılgan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, pp. 151-238.

<sup>683</sup> Senators who came from the National Unity Committee.

<sup>684</sup> Ibid., p.152.

<sup>685</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>686</sup> Ibid., p.173.

<sup>687</sup> Ibid., p.176-193.

and the WTP.<sup>688</sup> When the 1965 election results started a new period, the *Yön* movement surrendered its democratic transformation perspective of the country.<sup>689</sup> Atılgan defines this period of the journal as the preparation for the revolution. This period ended with the closure of the journal in 1967 June.

The foundation of the Socialist Culture Association, SCA, was also related to the *Yön* movement. Many of the founders of the SCA were also writers at *Yön*. The former secretary of the State Planning Organization, Osman Nuri Torun, became the head of the Association.<sup>690</sup> The statute of the Association defined the aim of the Association as “the socialist culture association that considers labor as the essential value of society, analyzes the necessary conditions for the establishment of a real democratic order that will abolish all kinds of exploitation, ascertain the cultural bases of such an order and work for their dissemination.”<sup>691</sup>

As pointed above, the SCA reflected emulation to the Fabian Society. The foundation of the SCA received positive reactions from the progressive parts of society. Moreover, the foundation of the Association was welcomed by the secretary general of the Socialist International Albert Carthy with a letter.<sup>692</sup> However, in the following years, the change in the strategy of the *Yön* movement made the SCA unnecessary for the movement. Under those circumstances, the organization and influence of the SCA gradually disappeared.

During the period, the *Yön* movement supported the WPT against the accusations of communism that were made by the right. However the stand of the

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<sup>688</sup> Ibid., p.179.

<sup>689</sup> Ibid., p.193-217.

<sup>690</sup> Ibid., p.276.

<sup>691</sup> Ibid., p.193-217.

<sup>692</sup> Ibid., p.278.

*Yön* against anti-communism did not translate directly into support for the WPT. Several times *Yön* writers harshly criticized the WPT and its leaders. The main reason for the criticism was their different conceptions of socialism. As pointed above, socialism and rapid development were clearly integrated topics in *Yön*'s way of thinking. The political and social elites had central importance for *Yön* in economic development. In this framework, *Yön* opposed the WPT's working class-based socialism conception. For *Yön*, the main actor of politics should be the intellectuals rather than the immature working class of Turkey.

According to *Yön*, the most important question was to rescue the country from dependent situation.<sup>693</sup> Thus it is inaccurate to say that the WPT gave priority to the socialist struggle because the nationalist struggle against imperialism was the essential point.<sup>694</sup> So the WPT was disarranging the progressive powers. In other words, the WPT struggled in two pitched battles.<sup>695</sup> *Yön* proposed that priority be given to the nationalist struggle against imperialism and to differentiate it from the socialist struggle.

Consequently, the *Yön* movement marked emergence of intellectual socialism, which aimed at rapid developmental of the country. It is important to note that the *Yön* movement was not welcomed by the WPT, and the relations of those two groups became problematic. The main source of the conflict between them was their different conceptions of socialism. However, during its publication period, *Yön* became the most important political debate platform for the emerging left, and it brought into discussion many taboos for the Turkish public opinion.

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<sup>693</sup> Doğan Avcioğlu: "TİP'e Dair," *Yön*, no:168, (17 June 1966).

<sup>694</sup> Ibid.

<sup>695</sup> Ibid.

## The Communist Party of Turkey in Exile

The Communist Party of Turkey was the traditional party of the Turkish left, but it was not an organized political movement in Turkey in the era under discussion. Moreover, it was an illegal party. The party was not able to recover itself after the 1951 police operation.<sup>696</sup> With this operation many of the members of the party were detained. After the operation, the 141<sup>st</sup> and 142<sup>nd</sup> articles of the penal code that punished socialist activities were strengthened. The operation abolished the unity in the party and the relations between the members of the party deteriorated. Under those circumstances, the CPT was not able to organize in the 1950s.

At the beginning of the 1960s, many members of the party fled to the Eastern Bloc.<sup>697</sup> One of those members, Zeki Bařtım̈ar, attended the 22<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961 as the representative of the CPT.<sup>698</sup> This event became the beginning of the re-centralization of the CPT. The re-centralization was criticized by many of the Turkish communists. For them, Bařtım̈ar did not represent the Turkish communist movement, and the new CPT was composed of a small group of immigrants.<sup>699</sup> On the other hand, from their point of view the

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<sup>696</sup> For the 1951 operations, see Aclan Sayılğan, *Türkiye'de Sol Hareketler* (İstanbul: Doęu Kütüphanesi, 2009), pp.241-288; and for the judgment, see *1951 TKP (Türkiye Komünist Partisi) Tevkifatı: Esbab-ı Mucibeli Hüküm* (İstanbul: BDS Yayınları, 2000).

<sup>697</sup> Erden Akbulut, "Sunu" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Arařtırma Vakfı, 2003), p.7.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid.

<sup>699</sup> See, Belli, pp. 26-30



intent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to get one more vote among the communist parties of the world against the Communist Party of China, because the open conflict between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties emerged in this period.<sup>700</sup> This group, which was led by Mihri Belli and Reşat Fuat Baraner, was not very active in this period, but it became well-known after the emergence of opposition in the WPT after 1966.

In April 1962, the party conference of the CPT was convened in Leipzig.<sup>701</sup> During the conference, the foreign bureau of the party was formed with five members, Zeki Baştımar, İsmail Bilen, Nazım Hikmet, Aram Pehlivanian and Abidin Dino.<sup>702</sup> Nazım Hikmet died in 1963 and Abidin Dino did not attend the meetings of the committee and instead of those two members, Bilal Şen and Gül Benderli were appointed to the foreign bureau.<sup>703</sup>

In the 1962 Conference of the foreign bureau, Zeki Baştımar submitted a report to the conference<sup>704</sup> in which he discussed the current political events of the period from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. He assessed the developments in the party after the 1937 decentralization decision. In the conference, he also submitted a report that had been presented in the 22<sup>nd</sup> congress of the CPSU.<sup>705</sup> The conference discussed his reports.

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<sup>700</sup> Ibid.

<sup>701</sup> Erden Akbulut, "Sunu" in *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002), p.7.

<sup>702</sup> Ibid.

<sup>703</sup> Ibid.

<sup>704</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi "Zeki Baştımar'ın Raporu," in *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002) pp.47-82.

<sup>705</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "SBKP XXII. Toplantısı Raporu" in *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002), pp.83-90. During the conference, the debates on the reports and the resolution of the congress were not so clear. In general, the conference members declared their loyalty to the international communist movement

In 1963, the Foreign Bureau was changed into the Central Committee of the party, and Zeki Bařtıṁar became the First Secretary of the Central Committee.<sup>706</sup> For years the party was legally banned and the leaders of the party lived in exile. During the Stalinist period, many members of the party in exile were sent to Siberia. Now again the party tried to be organize itself in exile. At this point, the foundation of the Workers' Party of Turkey changed the situation.

After Aybar became of the party chairman, many socialist intellectuals joined the WPT. Many of those intellectuals were related to the CPT.<sup>707</sup> As pointed out above; the WPT gained strength during the period and was organized country-wide. Working class struggles became a central issue for Turkish politics in this era. Under those circumstances, in March 1963, the CPT pointed out that socialism in Turkey was developing, and the CPT should avoid polemics with the socialist groups in Turkey.<sup>708</sup> Within this framework, the CPT supported the WPT and did not initiate direct political activities in the country. On the other hand, the CPT did not end its existence. For this reason, one of the members of CPT defines the relations of the two parties as a covert agreement that was never signed.<sup>709</sup> On the one hand, the CPT supported the WPT, and on the other it continued its existence in exile.

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and the CPSU. Then they noted the importance of the inner-party education activities. The debates were mainly periphrases. For the decision of the conference, see Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "1962 Konferansı Kararı," in *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Arařtırma Vakfı, 2002), pp.91-98.

<sup>706</sup> Akbulut, Sunu, p.8.

<sup>707</sup> As an example, Behice Boran had become the member of the CPT in 1942. Atılgan, *Behice Boran*, p. 455.

<sup>708</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi "Türkiye Komünist Partisi Dış Bürosunun 25/3/1963 Tarihli Kararı," in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Arařtırma Vakfı, 2003), p.42.

<sup>709</sup> Naciye Babalık, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nin Sönümlenmesi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005), p,76.

Many of the members of the CPT in Turkey joined the WPT. However, the sentenced CPT members did not join the party. The CPT used a careful language about the WPT.<sup>710</sup> Thus the CPT declared that it limited its political activities to the propaganda of scientific socialism.<sup>711</sup> Within this framework, the Communist Party of Turkey concluded its activities on three issues: the attempt to organize Turkish workers in European countries, radio broadcasting from the Eastern Bloc (the name of the radio of the CPT was Our Radio, *Bizim Radyo*) and the publication of a journal named *Yeniçağ* (New Age).

The development of socialism on the one hand and the anti-communist right on the other changed the policy of the CPT. Through 1965 the CPT constructed a policy called the United Front. To this policy, all progressive forces should be united in this progressive front. This new policy created opposition in the party. An opposition movement led by Bilal Şen emerged in 1965 and was purged immediately from the party.<sup>712</sup>

The WPT leadership was uncomfortable about the support of the CPT. The WPT was doubtful about potential accusations against the party from the right-wing movements, and legal constraints. Within this framework, the meeting of WPT senator Niyazi Ağırnaslı with the first secretary of the CPT central committee in Budapest became the reason for the resignation of Ağırnaslı from the WPT.<sup>713</sup>

In this period, the CPT's perspective on the *Yön* movement was somehow different from its attitude toward the WPT. From the Communist Party of Turkey's

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<sup>710</sup> Ibid., p.75.

<sup>711</sup> "Türkiye Komünist Partisi Dış Bürosunun 25/3/1963 Tarihli Kararı," p.42.

<sup>712</sup> For the documents on the emergence of the opposition and inner-party struggle, see Erden Akbulut, ed., *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1965 Tartışmaları* (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2004).

<sup>713</sup> Sargın, vol.1, p.253.

point of view, the *Yön* movement members were reformists and CPT defined the *Yön* movement as revolutionaries of the petite-bourgeoisie.<sup>714</sup> In an article, the CPT described the *Yön* movement: “the *Yön* movement that calls itself as socialist, but in reality it circulates the idea of the progressive wing of the national bourgeoisie.”<sup>715</sup>

However, the *Yön* movement’s perspective on the CPT was more rigid. It defined the CPT as “a group of miseries who are salaried and only 6-7 people and it is able to survive only abroad.”<sup>716</sup> Avcıoğlu described the effect of Moscow on the CPT, and claimed that the CPT determined all of its policies according to the Soviets.<sup>717</sup> Another writer of the *Yön*, İlhan Selçuk, claimed that they were against both the imperialism of the USA and the USSR. So they were against the CPT, because it was a tool of the USSR against Turkey.<sup>718</sup>

Consequently the CPT was not an influential political actor in Turkey in this period. It was organized abroad, and conducted its political activities in a more limited way. In addition, its support of the WPT was in accurate form. However, the CPT was the traditional party of the Turkish left, and many of cadres of the WPT had political activities in the CPT. On the other hand, the divisions in the Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s had its origins from the divisions in the CPT.

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<sup>714</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, “Bilal Şen Tarafından Hazırlanan Seminer Notu: Komünist ve İşçi hareketindeki Ters Akımlar Üzerine,” in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.46.

<sup>715</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, “Türkiye’nin Ekonomik ve Politik Durumu ve Bazı Meseleler: Yakup Demir’in Mart 1963 Tarihli Raporu,” in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.18.

<sup>716</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Komünist Partisi Meselesinin İçyüzü,” *Yön*, no.158 (8 April 1966). *TKP, ancak yurt dışında tutunabilen, ücretli 6-7 kişilik bir zavallılar topluluğudur.*

<sup>717</sup> Ibid.

<sup>718</sup> İlhan Selçuk, “Türkiye Komünist Partisi,” *Yön*, no. 157 (1 April 1966), p.5.

## The Left and the Working Class

With the enactment of the Trade Union Act and the Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Act in July 1963, the working class gained important tools for political and social struggle other than universal suffrage. In many ways, the right to strike improved the social conditions of the working class. The number of unionized workers in 1960 was 282,967.<sup>719</sup> It increased to 834,680 in 1967 and to 2,362,787 in 1971.<sup>720</sup> Real wages in the cities had nearly doubled from 1963 to 1977.<sup>721</sup> However the most important aspect of the right was that it enabled the working class to be an influential political actor.

After the legalization of the right to strike, the working class attained the possibility of struggling for their economic and political conditions. So the right to strike had central importance in the formation of the working class in Turkey. Adam Przeworski describes his view on what is the class as follows:

E. P. Thompson once said that ‘class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition.’ ‘In the end’ this statement is correct, but we must understand more precisely what it means. It does not mean that classes organize themselves spontaneously, once and for all, or in a unique manner. What it does mean is that classes are the continual effects of

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<sup>719</sup> M. Şehmus Güzel, *İşçi Tarihine Bakmak* (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2007), p.117.

<sup>720</sup> Ibid.

<sup>721</sup> Pamuk and Owen, p.112.

the totality of struggles, struggles that assume particular forms given the organization of economic, ideological, and political relations.<sup>722</sup>

Thus in Turkey, as a country in which the working class and left had been suppressed for years, the right to strike made possible the “continual effects of totality of struggles.”

The emergence of the left in Turkey in this era and the RPP’s coming to the left of center was also related to the rise of the working class movement. Within this framework, this part of the chapter will be about the approaches of the actors on the left to the position and the role of the working class in politics for the reason that political positions of the actors on the left are seen first and foremost in their political stand vis-à-vis labor and the labor movement. Therefore, the perspectives of the Workers Party of Turkey, the *Yön* movement and the Communist Party of Turkey about the working class and the right to strike will be elaborated in this part.

The views of the Workers Party of Turkey on the working class are crucial as the party of the Turkish socialist movement of the period. It is evident that the working class was the main political subject in the WPT's understanding of politics. So the legal rights and political, social and economic conditions of the working class were very important for the party. Without any exception, the party stood on the side of the working class in every discussion that was related with the workers. On the other hand, one can hardly claim that the WPT advocated the total salvation of the working class through the top-down establishment of socialism; instead, the party had an intensive reform program for the working class.

The assessment of the party for the political conditions of the first half of the 1960s and the place of the working class in the political life under those conditions

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<sup>722</sup> Adam Przeworski. “Proletariat into a Class: The Process of Class Formation” in *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.71.

are worth to note. According to the WPT, the turning point for the working class was the 27 May military coup. In the program of the WPT, the party stated that after the 27 May the social and economic questions began to be discussed in a free way and the working class emerged as a strong power.<sup>723</sup> The Saraçhane meeting of 1961 December was the most glorious movement of the successful working class actions.<sup>724</sup> Events such as the march of construction workers, the meetings of the working class against the exploitative foreign capital and the strike movement as soon as the right to strike was recognized by the new constitution also were stated in the program of the party. Thus the WPT indicated that the right to strike has become one of the main instruments of the working class' struggle.

On the other hand, the party stated that the working class not only dealt with its own questions, but also with the major social and political questions of the country.<sup>725</sup> For the WPT, all those issues indicated that the Turkish working class has attained the political consciousness. The most important sign of this consciousness was the foundation of the WPT. Thus the party defined itself as the party of the working class. This definition was stated in the introduction part of the program: “The Workers Party of Turkey is the party of all citizens who live by their labor.”<sup>726</sup>

The strike issue was stated clearly in the program. The party considered labor as the most supreme value, and it aimed to organize society economically and morally.<sup>727</sup> On the trade unionism, collective bargaining and the right to strike, the

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<sup>723</sup> *TİP Programı*, p.49.

<sup>724</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>725</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>726</sup> *Ibid.*, p.14.

<sup>727</sup> *Ibid.*, p.83.

WPT promised to abolish all the limitations and deficiencies.<sup>728</sup> Then the party promised to abolish lock-outs.

The response of the party to specific questions related to the working class reflected a similar perspective. The union legislation and the legalization of the right to strike were appropriate examples of this situation. For the party, the new legislations for the working life were not enough. For this reason, the chairman of the party, Mehmet Ali Aybar opposed the determination of 24 July as worker's day.<sup>729</sup> For him, this was a protest day because the new laws limited the rights of the workers. It was a regression from the constitution. Aybar also identified the lock out right of the employers as a violation of the constitution.

The most important part of Aybar's perspective is about the agency question of the new rights. As pointed above, it was an important question whether the workers had gained those rights by their own struggle or whether those rights had been handed to them by the governments. Aybar obviously claimed that governments had not given the rights to the workers as a benevolent act. The inclusion of worker rights in the new constitution, the acceptance of democracy and social justice by the constitution were the results of the workers' struggles. Aybar also claimed that the working class had struggled for their rights in Turkey since 1845. According to him, the first strike of working class in Turkey had taken place in 1872. So the recent results had been brought about by a hundred years of struggle of the workers.

After the legalization of the right to strike, strike actions started one after another. Aybar pointed out the power and penetration of the strike movements.<sup>730</sup>

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<sup>728</sup> Ibid., p.132.

<sup>729</sup> Aybar, "24 Temmuz Bir Protesto Günüdür" in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p. 315.

<sup>730</sup> Aybar, "Güzel, Mutlu Günler Uzak Değildir ve de Asıl Yüreğimiz Korkusuz, İnancımız Bütündür," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p. 362.



The right to strike, he argued, was not only important for the development of political consciousness of the working class, but also for democracy to have a strong base. The right to strike led for the adaptation of the basic rights by the people. The workers' going on the strike created a revolutionary social environment that triggered the use of the other basic rights.

For Aybar, multi-party democracy was a balanced regime between the social forces that represented the capital and the labor, and in the course of history this balance had changed in the favor of the labor.<sup>731</sup> He claimed that it was possible to argue that democracy began and developed with the strikes in the west. The people, who are the real owners of the democracy, gave voice to the problems of their country through strikes, and increased their weight in the administration of the country. Thus Aybar proposed regarding the working class movement and strikes not only from the economic perspective but also from a political perspective. This was the most important peculiarity of the WPT in the Turkish left, because it considered the working class as the primary actor of politics.

The *Yön* movement had some differences from other actors on the left about the position of the working class in left politics. The working class was not the primary actor of politics for the *Yön* movement. It considered the main reasons for this situation the working class' so-called weakness and lack of unity. On the other hand, *Yön* was very sympathetic to the working class and the use of the right to strike. Almost in every issue, the *Yön* movement stood on the side of the working class. So it is possible to define the policy of the *Yön* movement as having been class friendly, while the WPT had a class-based perspective.

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<sup>731</sup> Ibid., p.363.

Within this framework, Doğan Avcıoğlu criticized the WPT on the issue of the agency problem for socialist politics:

The administrators of the WPT put the question of class leadership as the most important problem without considering the development stage of Turkey, the position of social forces and current situation. The leaders and intellectuals of the party took an ill-tempered position against the ones who considered it irrelevant under the current conditions putting forward the leadership of working class as the most central question for socialist development. This dogmatic attitude directed them to underestimate the role of intellectuals, youth and several powers against the status quo in the socialist movement.<sup>732</sup>

Then Avcıoğlu offered a new way for the WPT:

To get to the stage of socialism is a work that requires much time. First we must open the way that leads through socialism. For this reason, instead of iterating well-known socialist slogans, it is necessary to remove the obstacles on the way of socialism and to give priority to the formulas that are able to bring together all powers against the prevailing status quo. So, priority must be given to the problem of social justice and rapid development in freedom and to the unification of all revolutionary forces on the anti-capitalist and anti-feudal struggle. If the current objective conditions of the country is considered, to give central importance to the class leadership is useful only for dissolving the powers.<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>732</sup> Avcıoğlu, Doğan, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi'ne Dair”, . Yön, no. 50 (20 November 1962).

*Bir defa TİP idarecileri, Türkiye'nin gelişme safhasını, sosyal kuvvetlerin durumunu ve mevcut ortamı göz önünde tutmadan, sınıf önderliği davasını, en önemli mesele olarak ortaya attılar. Parti liderleri ve entelektüelleri işçi sınıfı önderliği meselesinin, içinde bulunduğumuz şartlar altında, sosyalist gelişmenin en hayati davası şeklinde ortaya atılmasını mevsimsiz sayanlara karşı, hırçın bir tutum takındılar. Bu dogmatik tavır onları, aydınların, gençliğin ve statükoya karşı olan diğer çeşitli kuvvetlerin sosyalist hareketteki rolünü küçümsemeye itti.*

<sup>733</sup> Ibid.

*Sosyalizme ulaşmak uzun zaman isteyen bir iştir. Önce sosyalizme giden yolu açmak lazım. Bu sebeple malum sosyalist sloganları ardarda sıralamak yerine, sosyalizm yolundaki engelleri kaldıracak ve statükoya karşı olan, bütün kuvvetleri toplayabilecek formüllere öncelik vermek lüzumludur. Bu bakımdan, sosyal adalet ve hürriyet içinde hızlı kalkınma davasını ön plana almak, bunun için gerekli anti-kapitalist ve anti-feodal mücadele etrafında bütün devrimci kuvvetleri bir araya getirmeye çalışmak, gerçekçi bir davranış olacaktır. Sınıf önderliği davasının ön plana alınması, memleketin bugün ki objektif şartları göz önünde tutulursa, kuvvetleri dağıtmaktan başka bir işe yaramaz.*

After the 1965 elections, the *Yön* movement congratulated the WPT on its election success, for having secured 15 seats in parliament.<sup>734</sup> However *Yön* claimed that the WPT had taken the votes of civil servants, youth and teachers rather than those of the “calloused hands,” or in other words, the working classes.<sup>735</sup> *Yön* defined the politics of the WPT in the election process as populist and a relic of nineteenth century romanticism, and invited the party to realism.<sup>736</sup> Thus *Yön* claimed that the workers and poor peasants in Turkey did not vote for the socialists, but the civil servants, youth and teachers did. So the success of socialism in Turkey was only possible with the struggle of the progressive forces, more precisely the intellectuals.

The WPT, as mentioned above, had a different conception of socialism from that of the *Yön* movement. The WPT continued its objection to the *Yön* during the period. When the declaration of the *Yön* journal was published, the *Yön* administration asked the views of Mehmet Ali Aybar. Aybar objected to the planning and etatism conception of the *Yön* movement. He said the planning should have a socialist essence and it should be applied by the representatives of the working class, at least to be audited by this class.<sup>737</sup> From Aybar’s point of view, the planning was only able to be in the interests of the people under those conditions.<sup>738</sup> He said that the declaration neglected the necessity of a large labor party.<sup>739</sup> Thus the declaration

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<sup>734</sup> *Yön*, “Sosyalizmin Romantik Dönemi Artık Mutlaka Kapanmalıdır,” *Yön*, no.133 (15 October 1965) p.4.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid.

<sup>736</sup> Ibid.

<sup>737</sup> *Mehmet Ali Aybar’ın Müdaafaları ve Mektupları 1946-1961*. Barış Ünlü, Ed. (İstanbul : İletişim, 2003), p. 173.

<sup>738</sup> Ibid.

<sup>739</sup> Ibid.

expected the liberation and development from the old exploitative class.<sup>740</sup> The survival of Turkish democracy and development was conditioned by the emergence of the masses as a political power.<sup>741</sup> Aybar wrote this reply before he became the general chairman of the WPT. Once in the chairman position, he and his party continued those views. Similarly another theorist of the party, Behice Boran, in answer to the critics of the *Yön*, wrote “many of our intellectuals that seem on the side of socialism, particularly the ones who announce their ideas by their writings, do not consider socialism as a working class ideology and movement and they do not feel it necessary to take part and work in it.”<sup>742</sup>

Although the *Yön* movement had such a perspective on working class’ role and position in politics, it directly joined the political party foundation initiation of the trade unions in this period. This was the foundation of the Laborers Party of Turkey.<sup>743</sup> After 1961 October elections, the only trade union confederation of Turkey, Türk-İş initiated to form a political party.<sup>744</sup> On 15 January 1962, in the Assembly of Representatives of the Türk-İş, chairman Seyfi Demirsoy declared that there was the necessity of a worker’s party in Turkey.<sup>745</sup> He said that there were only

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<sup>740</sup> Ibid.

<sup>741</sup> Ibid.

<sup>742</sup> Atılğan, *Behice Boran*, p. 275.

*Sosyalizmden yana görünen aydınlarımızın pek çoğu – özellikle yazılarıyla fikirlerini belli edenler – sosyalizmi öncelikle bir işçi sınıfı ideolojisi ve hareket olarak görmüyorlar ve bunun için de işçi sınıfı ile kader Birliği edip hareketlerinin ve teşekküllerinin içinde yer almak ve çalışmak gerekliliğini duymuyorlar.*

<sup>743</sup> For the reason of the initiation of the Laborers Party of Turkey, see see Gökhan Atılğan, “Türk Siyasal Hayatında ve Emek Tarihinde Kritik Bir Uğrak: Türkiye Çalışanlar Partisi Girişimi” *Toplum ve Bilim* 116 (2009), pp.160-164.

<sup>744</sup> For the Laborers Party of Turkey, see Atılğan, “Türk Siyasal Hayatında ve Emek Tarihinde Kritik Bir Uğrak”, pp. 157-186; Koç, Yıldırım. “Türkiye Çalışanlar Partisi Girişimi (1962).” *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi*, v. 21, no 197 (1997), pp. 72-80.

<sup>745</sup> *Milliyet*, 16 January 1962.

two worker deputies in the parliament.<sup>746</sup> This situation demonstrated that the workers should get together around a political idea in other words around a political party.<sup>747</sup> One day later, the daily *Milliyet* reported that the workers' party would be established in February.<sup>748</sup> The next day the foundation of a political party and unionization of the workers around this party was accepted in the voting of one of the sessions of the Assembly of Representatives of Türk-İş.<sup>749</sup> The name of the new party would be the Social Security Party.<sup>750</sup> In this meeting, the resignation of the workers from other parties and their joining the new party also was approved.<sup>751</sup>

The program of the new party was prepared by a commission that included many of the writers of *Yön*.<sup>752</sup> Among them, Mümtaz Soysal and Türkkaya Ataöv had central importance in the preparation process of the party program.<sup>753</sup> Under those conditions, the new party planned to defend the rapid development that was based on etatism, as stated in the declaration of *Yön*.

The party founders determined the foundation date as 19 May, the day on which Atatürk had landed at Samsun and began the national struggle. However, the party was never founded.<sup>754</sup> This failed effort is remembered as the attempt of the

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<sup>746</sup> Ibid.

<sup>747</sup> Ibid.

<sup>748</sup> Ibid., 17 January 1962.

<sup>749</sup> Ibid., 18 January 1962.

<sup>750</sup> Ibid.

<sup>751</sup> Ibid.

<sup>752</sup> Those writers were mainly Mümtaz Soysal, Türkkaya Ataöv, Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhami Soysal, Sadun Aren, Muammer Aksoy and Bahri Savcı. Atılın, "Türk Siyasal Hayatında ve Emek Tarihinde Kritik Bir Uğrak" p.164.

<sup>753</sup> Ibid., p.167.

<sup>754</sup> For an assessment of why the party was not founded, see *ibid.*, pp.173-179; Koç, p.80.

Türk-İş administration to form a party with the intellectual support of the *Yön* movement.

On the union legislation and the legalization of the right to strike, *Yön* indicated the general conservative character of the parliament.<sup>755</sup> However, according to *Yön*, this conservative parliament issued a progressive union and strike act.<sup>756</sup> From *Yön*'s point of view, the main reason for this situation was the success of the Türk-İş administration.<sup>757</sup> Thanks to the Türk-İş administration's success, the reactionaries in the parliament were treated in a progressive way. *Yön* identified the attitude of the right-wing deputies on the strike issue as the progressiveness of the reactionaries.<sup>758</sup> *Yön* assessed the legislation as follows:

A conservative parliament is about to pass a very progressive Labor Law. The government, after months of long negotiations with the main unionists, sent parliament considerably satisfactory draft bills but these bills were vetoed by the parliamentary joint committee to the disadvantage of the laborers. A conservative parliament was expected to render the government bills unrecognizable by being even more conservative than the commission. But just the opposite happened. The parliamentary groups that became the advocates of labor rights with a sudden inspiration embraced the many of the demands of Türk-İş. The JP, on the other hand, adopted all the views of the Türk-İş.<sup>759</sup>

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<sup>755</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Sendikacılık Asıl Şimdi Başlıyor," *Yön*.no.70 (17 April 1963).

<sup>756</sup> Ibid.

<sup>757</sup> Ibid.

<sup>758</sup> Ibid.

<sup>759</sup> Ibid.

*Muhafazakar bir parlamento oldukça ileri işçi kanunlarını kabul etmek üzere bulunuyor. Hükümet belli başlı sendikacılarla aylar boyu süren müzakerelerden sonra, parlamentoya tatminkar sayılabilecek tasarılar göndermiş, fakat bu tasarılar Meclis karma komisyonunda işçiler aleyhinde bozulmuştu. Muhafazakar bir parlamentonun komisyonu da geçerek, hükümet tasarılarını tanınmaz hale getirmesi beklenirdi. Aksi oldu. ani bir ilhamla işçi haklarının savunucusu kesilen parlamento grupları, Türk-İş taleplerinin çoğunu benimsediler. AP ise Türk-İş görüşlerinin tümünü kendine maletti.*

The *Yön* movement was not convinced about the role of the working class in politics because of the strength of the working class. The workers in Turkey would have very progressive acts as a result of the new legislations.<sup>760</sup> However the workers were not strong and were not in unity.<sup>761</sup> Under those circumstances, the new acts would not work for the benefit of the working class.<sup>762</sup> Like the constitution, the new union and strike acts stood a step further than society.<sup>763</sup> Thus the workers had to become strengthened by the solidarity and unity.<sup>764</sup> *Yön* concluded its views on the issue as follows:

Our workers will have very progressive trade union, strike and collective bargaining act. This is a good and beneficial step. But the prevailing mentality of the society and the power relations in the society fall behind these acts. As a matter of fact, the Constitution is a way ahead the society too. For this reason, in the implementation phase, the most progressive provisions are rendered useless. For this reason the union leaders and the workers should not trust the acts more than then themselves in the first flush of victory. The order that the workers yearn for can only be ensured by their strengthening in unity and solidarity. As long as the trade unions are loose and weak, even the strongest acts cannot provide much benefit.”<sup>765</sup>

As pointed above, *Yön* had a class-friendly perspective rather than a class-based one. Thus it is obvious that *Yön* was always the supporter of the working class

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<sup>760</sup> *Yön*, “Türk İşçisi Yeni Bir Yolun Başında” *Yön*.no.70 (17 April 1963).

<sup>761</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>762</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>763</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>764</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>765</sup> *Ibid.*

*İşçilerimiz, oldukça ileri sendika, grev ve toplu sözleşme kanunlarına kavuşacaklardır. Bu, iyi ve faydalı bir adımdır. Fakat topluma hakim zihniyet ve toplumdaki kuvvet ilişkileri bu kanunların çok gerisindedir. Nitekim, Anayasa da toplumun çok ötesindedir. Bu sebeple, uygulama safhasında en ileri hükümler kuşa dönmektedir. Onun içindir ki sendika liderleri ve işçilerimiz, zafer sarhoşluğuna kağılmayıp, kanunlardan çok kendi güçlerine güvenmelidirler. İşçilerimizin özledikleri düzen, birlik ve dayanışma içinde kuvvetlenmeleriyle gerçekleştirebilecektir. Sendikalar, dağınık ve zayıf bir manzara arzettiği müddetçe en ileri kanunlar dahi çok fazla bir kazanç sağlamaz.*

in their struggle. Almost all the activities of the working class were reported in the journal in a positive way. And *Yön* stood on the side of the labor in all disputes as a class-friendly movement. The Kavel case was one of them. *Yön*'s position on this case was stated as follows:

We have legislated a progressive Constitution that protects labor rights. Nobody objected to writing these rights down on paper. But when it comes to the implementation of these rights, the government and the employees raise hell about it. We cannot tolerate the Kavel workers who strike maturely for the employment of their active unionist friends. Some media do their utmost to turn the public opinion against the strikers. The government is pouring out threats on the union leaders: 'there is sedition. Seditonist trade unions are supposedly deceiving the workers. They should be withheld. In their opinion the head of these messy communists should be cracked. The workers should have applied to ministry instead of making a strike etc.'<sup>766</sup>

The Communist Party of Turkey, as an illegal communist party in exile, carefully followed the working class and its activities in Turkey. Within this framework, the party also referred and evaluated the legalization process of the right to strike as well as the strike movements in its special party reports and declarations.

In his report on economic and political issues in Turkey, the secretary general of the CPT, Zeki Baştımar, stated the right to strike with a special emphasize.<sup>767</sup>

According to him, the era between 1960 and 1962 had been critical for the trade

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<sup>766</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Tahammülsüzlük" *Yön*. no.62 (20 February 1963).

*İşçi haklarını koruyan ileri bir anayasa yaptık. Bu hakların kağıt üzerine yazılmasına kimse itiraz etmedi. Fakat sıra bu hakların kullanılmasına gelince, hükümette ve işveren çevrelerinde kıyametler kopuyor. Aktif sendikacı arkadaşlarının da işe alınmasını sağlamak amacıyla, büyük bir olgunluk içinde grev yapan Kavel işçilerine tahammül edemiyoruz. Bir kısım basın, kamuoyunu grevciler aleyhine kışkırtmak için elinden geleni esirgemiyor. Hükümet sendika liderlerine tehditler yağdırıyor: 'Yok efendim, tahrik varmış. Tahrikçi sendikacılar, işçileri kandırıyorlarmış. Bunlar tevkif edilmeliymiş. Pis komünistlerin kafaları kırılmalıymiş. İşçiler neden bakanlığa başvuramazlarmış da grev yapmaya kalkışarlarmış vs. vs.*

<sup>767</sup> "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik ve Politik Durumu ve Bazı Meseleler," pp. 28-34.



union movement in Turkey.<sup>768</sup> In this period, unionism in Turkey had grown rapidly.<sup>769</sup> He cited the main struggles of the trade unions in the period, and the division in the working class movement of the period between the activist and passivist poles.<sup>770</sup>

In Baştımar's analysis, basically the Kavel strike marked a turning point for this division of the working class. He indicated that many leftist trade unionists had split with Türk-İş afterward.<sup>771</sup> He criticized this decision and defined split as sectarian.<sup>772</sup> The unity of the working class was crucial, and the resignation of the activist unionists was a mistake.<sup>773</sup> In a different place but in the same manner, the CPT indicated that the unity for the working class was crucial.<sup>774</sup> In this report, it is claimed that the bourgeoisie tried to disrupt the unity of the working class, and used different bourgeoisie parties for this purpose.<sup>775</sup> So the central point in this analysis was the class consciousness. The party argued that if the class consciousness was provided, the division attempts of the bourgeoisie might be altered.<sup>776</sup>

As pointed out above, the CPT was very careful about the strike movements in Turkey. Thus for the party, the unity in the political and social activities with the

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<sup>768</sup> Ibid.. p.28.

<sup>769</sup> Ibid.

<sup>770</sup> Ibid.. pp.28-29.

<sup>771</sup> Ibid.

<sup>772</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>773</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>774</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Türkiye'de Sendika Hareketinde Son Gelişmeler, M. Şenol (Bilal Şen)," in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.112.

<sup>775</sup> Ibid.

<sup>776</sup> Ibid.

trade unions was crucial. The party concluded its views on the strikes in Turkey as follows:

Those strikes that are initiated against the land lords and capitalists that intermediate for foreigners are preparing the happy future of Turkey. Turkish communists consider those examples as only premises of a great strike fight. The circumstances in Turkey have matured for the realization of the great strikes in the near future that draw attention of the international worker movement. The developing worker movements are on the way that surprises the ones who are hopeless for Turkey.<sup>777</sup>

The CPT was very aware of the change with the 27 May military coup. The party argued that the military administration had given some concessions to the trade unions for accepting the support of the unionists.<sup>778</sup> The CPT claimed that in the preparation process of the new constitution, the workers had struggled for the worker rights' to be included in the constitution.<sup>779</sup> The party gave the account of those struggles of the working class in this report.<sup>780</sup>

It is obvious that CPT assessed those activities and moreover the political activities of the trade unions in a positive way.<sup>781</sup> However, one can hardly claim that the CPT had a political perspective that placed the working class at the center of its activities. The CPT had determined its political line harmonious with the policy of

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<sup>777</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Türkiye'de Yeni Grev Hareketleri Hükümetin Artan Baskısı" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.163.

*Toprak ağalarına, yabancılara aracılık eden büyük sermayecilere karşı girişilen bu grevler, Türkiye'nin mutlu geleceğini hazırlamaktadır. Türk komünistleri bu örneklere Türkiye'de büyük bir grev savaşının yalnızca ön habercileri gözüyle bakmaktadır. Yakında milletlerarası işçi hareketinin dikkatini üzerine çekecek ölçüde büyük grevlerin olması için Türkiye'de şartlar olgunlaşmıştır. Gelişen işçi hareketleri, Türkiye hakkında ümitsiz olanları şaşırtacak yöndedir.*

<sup>778</sup> "Türkiye'de Sendika Hareketinde Son Gelişmeler," p.101.

<sup>779</sup> Ibid.

<sup>780</sup> Ibid., pp. 102-111.

<sup>781</sup> Ibid., pp. 110-111.

the Soviet Union. It was very pleased with the development of socialism and working class movement in Turkey. However, the party was too weak to directly affect this development. Thus the reports and declarations of the party on those kind of issues only aimed at not disturbing the newly emerging working class movement and more importantly the CPT assessed the activities of the socialist and working class movement harmonious with the cold war strategies of the eastern bloc that directed the party.

In conclusion, the new legislations on labor rights, most importantly on the right to strike were central for the construction of left politics in this period. Within this framework, the different wings of the left had different perspectives on this issue. *Yön* held that the labor movement in Turkey did not have a unique character and was not strong enough to effect the political questions of the country. The WPT, as a socialist party, took the questions of labor to the center of its agenda, and assessed the laboring class as the primary actor in politics.

Those actor's positions on the working class and the right to strike had central importance in the RPP's direction change. As pointed out in the previous chapter, it was crucial that the right-wing parties did not have objections to the new legislations in the parliament. The only objections of the right-wing parties on the drafts in the parliamentary sessions were about the limits and deficiencies of the draft bills. Under those circumstances, the RPP's policies and views about the working class that was considered by the party to be reformist could not become influential. The party was not able to get the support of the working class with this perspective. At the same time, the right to strike had improved the material conditions of the laborers and increased their militancy.

In addition to all these events, the emergence of the socialist movement created the main difficulty for the RPP. Under the conditions of the existence of the socialist political movement, the RPP's old discourse did not attract the working class' attention. The emergence of the left of center as a new discourse was related directly to these new developments. After these explanations, we can pass onto the relationships between the left and the RPP.

### The Relationship between the Left and the RPP

The RPP's redefining itself on the left of center was related directly to the relations between the RPP and the left and the perceptions of the left about the RPP. Within this framework, this part of the chapter looks at how the actors on the left were situated with respect to their views about the RPP and with respect to their relations with the RPP. The actors on the left were the same as in the above parts, the *Yön* movement, the Workers Party of Turkey and the Communist Party of Turkey.

During the period, the *Yön* movement approached the RPP from a critical perspective. In fact, this approach aimed to direct the party in a progressive direction. *Yön* was very aware of the divided structure of the RPP. Thus the journal explicitly supported the progressive wing. However, the conservative wing of the party was more powerful during the coalition government's era, and even the name of *Yön* was enough to irritate the conservative wing.

As an example, in one of the Party Assembly sessions in April 1962, İbrahim Öktem (a member of the Party Assembly) proposed the establishment of a

commission that would determine the direction of the party.<sup>782</sup> The translation of the word “direction” in Turkish is “*Yön*.” So, the mentioning of the word *Yön* in a proposal created a big controversy in the Party Assembly.<sup>783</sup> The conservative wing protested the use of the word. Öktem was obliged to change it to its synonym, *istikamet*.<sup>784</sup> Thus the negotiation of the proposal in the Party Assembly became possible with this change.<sup>785</sup> However Öktem’s proposal for the establishment of a commission that would determine the direction of the party was rejected.<sup>786</sup> This event is an example of how the *Yön* movement and the words “new direction” disturbed the conservative wing in the RPP.

In fact, the founders of the *Yön* had been very close to the RPP in the previous years. Doğan Avcıoğlu had started his journalism career at the weekly *Akis*<sup>787</sup> and then he had worked in the Research Bureau of the RPP.<sup>788</sup> He had been elected to the Constituent Assembly for the 1961 constitution from the quota of the RPP.<sup>789</sup> Like Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal also had attended the Constituent Assembly from the quota of the RPP.<sup>790</sup> The financier of *Yön* Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, was a former deputy of the party and also he was a member of the Constituent Assembly from the RPP. However, after the coalition government, the RPP and the *Yön* movement broke

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<sup>782</sup> *Yön*, “CHP,” *Yön*, no.16 (4 April 1962), p.6.

<sup>783</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>784</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>785</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>786</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>787</sup> *Akis* was a weekly pro-RPP journal of the period owned by son in law of İsmet İnönü, Metin Toker.

<sup>788</sup> Özdemir, *Doğan Avcıoğlu*, p.15.

<sup>789</sup> *Ibid.*, p.16.

<sup>790</sup> *Ibid.*

away. Metin Toker wrote “unfortunately benefiting from Doğan Avcıoğlu did not become possible after 1961 and both sides did not get the better of this situation.”<sup>791</sup> Nevertheless, some of politicians of the RPP, like Turan Güneş and Sırrı Hocaoğlu published several articles in *Yön*. Moreover many of the members of the party signed the declaration of *Yön* journal.

In order to understand how the *Yön* movement evaluated the RPP, it is important to analyze the assessment of the *Yön* movement of the early Republican People’s Party. On this issue, the main problematic of *Yön* was the social bases of the RPP in the single party period. The social base of the RPP in the early republican era had been mainly the nobles of the Ottoman past.<sup>792</sup> For this reason, the party needed to diverge itself from populism. The RPP government connoted gendarmerie and tax collection for the ordinary people.<sup>793</sup> *Yön* described the early Republican People’s Party and related it to the 1960s elections defeats as follows:

The then bona fide revolutionists embraced the populism principle, they couldn’t build the principle on a steady foundation. Pursuing populism in politics was left to the Ottoman lords, who had no concern with the public and the revolutionists cooperated with the nobles instead of removing the obstacles between them and the public. Under those circumstances, the departure from populism was predestined. As a matter of fact, despite the good faith of the revolutionists, only the gendarmerie, tax-collecting and coercion are left in the public memory about the RPP administration. Therefore, large masses of people even backed the exploitative staff that came to power in the 1950s, just because they had loosened the grip of despotism of the gendarmerie and tax-collecting, and they seemed to be closer to the public. During the administration of the National Unity, creation of the impression in the public that the old coercion era is back through the re-establishment of the supremacy of the bureaucracy that got used to look down on the public, increased the longing for the Menderes era. This must

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<sup>791</sup> Toker, v.4, p.33.

<sup>792</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Cepheler Beliriyor,” *Yön*, no.44 (17 October 1962), p.3.

<sup>793</sup> Ibid.

have been the main reason behind the easy success of the parties against the RPP in the elections.<sup>794</sup>

*Yön* also questioned the reformism principle of the RPP.<sup>795</sup> The RPP's reformism principle did not have an economic essence. For *Yön*, this situation directly affected the relations between the RPP and the people.<sup>796</sup> The reforms of the Atatürk period had not been initiated in economic fields.<sup>797</sup> Thus the social bases of the party could not be changed under those circumstances.<sup>798</sup> İlhan Selçuk wrote,

These results (the election defeat of 1965) should not be surprising. Formerly, the People's Party was a reformist party. Reforms were carried out only in a figural manner. Deep transformations could not be achieved in the economic realm. By the time the decision on "multi party regime" was taken, what were visible in the scenery of Turkey were villages dominated by the *aghas*, towns under the hegemony of the nobles, cities in the palm of comprador organizations' hands... What would a reformist administration mean for the people, if the administration only remained on the political surface and did not touch down the people in economic terms! Besides, the People's Party had lost its revolutionary characteristics even years before the Atatürk's

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<sup>794</sup> Ibid.

*O zamanların iyi niyetli devrimci kadrosu, halkçılık ilkesini benimsediği halde, bu ilkeyi sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmayı becerememiştir. Halkçılık politikasının yürütülmesi, Anadolu ve halkla hiçbir ilgisi olmayan Osmanlı Efendisine bırakılmış, devrimci kadro, halkla arasındaki engelleri kaldırmak yerine, eşrafla işbirliği yapmıştır. Bu durumda halkçılıktan gittikçe uzaklaşılması mukadderdi. Nitekim halkın hafızasına da devrimci kadronun bütün iyi niyetlerine rağmen CHP idaresinden yalnızca jandarma, tahsildar ve baskı kalmıştır. Bu yüzden geniş kitleler 1950'de iktidara gelen sömürücü kadroya bile, jandarma ve tahsildar istibdadını hafiflettiği ve halka daha yakın gözüktüğü için dört elle sarılmışlardır. Milli Birlik idaresinin halk yukardan bakmaya alışık bürokrasinin hakimiyetini tekrar tesis ederek, kütlelerde eski baskı devrinin geri geldiği intibasını yaratması Menderes devrine duyulan hasreti arttırmıştır. CHP'ye karşı partilerin seçimlerde sağladığı başarının temel sebebi bu olsa gerek.*

<sup>795</sup> Reformism was one of the six principles of Atatürk. It was identified as supporting the Atatürk reforms that were called revolutions. The six principles were symbolized as six arrows in the RPP's flag.

<sup>796</sup> İlhan Selçuk, "Devrimciliği Yitirince," *Yön*, no.133 (15 October 1965), p.5.

<sup>797</sup> Ibid.

<sup>798</sup> Ibid.

death. The Anatolian people had lived under the RPP administration during this frozen situation and the poverty years of Second World War...<sup>799</sup>

Thus the *Yön* movement constructed a relation between the social order of the single-party era and the concessions of the coalition governments' period of the 1960s. The policies of etatism, religion and education in the coalition governments were questioned by the *Yön* movement.<sup>800</sup> Mümtaz Soysal described the position of the *Yön* movement for the RPP governments as follows:

The RPP is perfectly aware of how far it has moved away from reformism by making concessions over and over again. It is clearly evident that the deterioration in the realms of etatism, religion and populism has caused discontent in the conscious minds. Now, to what extent is it honest to try to show them as the "cost of democracy" and is it obligatory to choose those paths to secure democracy? Actually, may be a very simple tactic lies behind the concessions that were made due to quite different reasons and evaluations about the society and political staff behind considering these concessions as tightly bound to democracy. This tactic is to add the support of the persons who believe in democracy to the support of the landowners, commercial peoples and lawyers.<sup>801</sup>

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<sup>799</sup> Ibid.

*Bu sonuçlara şaşmamak gerek. Halk Partisi vaktiyle bir devrimci partiydi. Ama devrimleri daha çok biçimsel anlamda yürüttü. İktisadi alanda köklü dönüşümleri gerçekleştiremedi. Çok partili rejim kararı verildiği anda Türkiye'nin manzarasına bakanlar şunları görüyorlardı: çoğunlukla ağalık düzeni içinde yaşayan köyler, eşraf takımının egemen olduğu kasabalar, ve kompradorlar örgütünün avucu içindeki şehirler... bir devrimci yönetim, salt siyasi düzeyde kalırsa ve iktisadi kesimde halk katlarına inemezse, o devrimci yönetimin halk için ne anlamı vardır. Üstelik Halk Partisi yönetimi daha Atatürk'ün ölümüne yakın yıllarda devrimci niteliğini yitirmişti. Bu donmuşluk içinde ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın yokluk yıllarını CHP yönetiminde yaşadığı Anadolu halkı.*

<sup>800</sup> Mümtaz Soysal, "Boşluk!," *Yön*, no.31 (18 July 1962), p.3.

<sup>801</sup> Ibid.

*CHP, son yıllarda taviz üstüne taviz vermekle devrimcilikten ne derece uzaklaştığını, pekala bilmektedir. Devletçilik, eğitim, din ve halkçılık alanlarındaki gerilemelerin uyanık kafalarda yarattığı kırılganlık açıkça ortadadır. Şimdi bütün bunları demokrasinin bedeli olarak göstermek ve demokrasiyi kurtarmak için bu yollara sapmanın zorunlu olduğunu göstermeye çalışmak ne dereceye kadar dürüstçe bir tutumdur. Aslında toplumsal bünyenin ve siyasi kadronun başka nedenleri bambaşka hesapları yüzünden ortaya çıkan tavizleri demokrasiye sıkı sıkıya bağlı saymanın gerisinde belki de çok başka bir taktik yatmaktadır; toprak sahiplerinin, tüccarın ve kasaba avukatlarının desteğine bir de demokrasiye inanmışların desteğini katmak.*



As a result, until the end of coalition government, the *Yön* movement approached the RPP from a very critical perspective. However, the fall of the İnönü government changed position. The *Yön* attempted to direct the RPP to the construction of a progressive wing against the emerging right and the American impact on Turkish politics. *Yön* argued that the İnönü governments had become unsuccessful, but it praised the foreign policy of the RPP.<sup>802</sup> According to *Yön*, the main source of power of the RPP was this foreign policy.<sup>803</sup> Then it invited the RPP to the anti-imperialist bloc.<sup>804</sup> Thus *Yön* assessed the government period of the RPP and defined the new opposition platform as

Today's main opposition party, even after a disappointing period of government, still exists as a great power thanks to the personality of their leaders and its efforts to pursue a dignified foreign policy. As necessitated by its social structure, the main opposition party, which tends to oppose with seemingly progressive but empty slogans, should be forced to place itself in the anti-imperialist structure by internal and external pressure but also by friendly efforts. Even if these efforts do not end up with positive results, they are useful in terms of the clearness they will ensure in the Turkish political life and it is also a necessity under the current circumstances. In Turkey, a new and exciting era of opposition is starting. Socialists should be the soul and the brain of this struggle.<sup>805</sup>

Thus the *Yön* movement sought a progressive coalition between the RPP and the WPT in the 1965 election process.

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<sup>802</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Muhalefet Asıl Şimdi Başlıyor," *Yön*, no.99 (19 February 1965), p.3.

<sup>803</sup> Ibid.

<sup>804</sup> Ibid.

<sup>805</sup> Ibid.

*Günün ana muhalefet partisi, hayal kırıklığı yaratan bir iktidar devresinden sonra dahi, liderinin kişiliği olan ve haysiyetli bir dış politika uygulama yolundaki çabaları sayesinde, hala büyük bir güç olarak ortadadır. Sosyal yapısı gereği, görünüşte ilerici, boş sloganlarla muhalefet yapma eğiliminde olan ana muhalefet partisi, içte ve dışta yürütülen ısrarlı, fakat dostça çabalarla anti-emperyalist mücadelede açık seçik yerini almaya zorlanmalıdır. Bu çabalar olumlu bir sonuç vermese dahi, Türk politika hayatına bir açıklık getireceği için yararlıdır ve bugünkü şartlar altında bir zorunluluktur. Türkiye'mizde yeni ve heyecan verici bir muhalefet dönemi başlamaktadır. Sosyalistler, bu mücadelenin ruhu ve beyni olmak durumundadırlar.*

When the left of center came onto the agenda in the summer of 1965 during the election campaign, the *Yön* movement defined the position of the RPP oscillating between the necessity and fear of being opened to the left.<sup>806</sup> *Yön* claimed the ambiguity of the left of center policy of the party.<sup>807</sup> For the *Yön* movement, the political struggle of the period was not for socialism, but for the essential condition of development that was economic independence.<sup>808</sup> *Yön* claimed that this policy was able to be successful only with the involvement of the RPP in the progressive forces.<sup>809</sup> Thus under those circumstances, the struggle in the RPP became crucial for the *Yön* movement. Doğan Avcıoğlu, as the most important contributor to *Yön*, demanded the deepening of the left of center policy by making the choice between the necessity of being opened to the left and the heavy pressure of the right.<sup>810</sup>

Although the left perception of the *Yön* movement was very different from the Ecevit's left of center group, the *Yön* movement obviously supported this group against the right wing in the RPP. As pointed out above, the struggle between the left of center group and the opponents (the 76s) was crystallized in the summer of 1966. In those days, *Yön* directly intervened in this struggle and attacked the 76s group. Avcıoğlu assessed the meaning of left of center in the party and the result of retreat from it as

Although the 'left of center' slogan led to loss of some votes and divisions within the party, it was important because 'left of center' was the expression of a tendency towards a change in the structure of the RPP. Therefore, retreat

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<sup>806</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Ortanın Solu," *Yön*, no.122 (30 July 1965), p.3.

<sup>807</sup> Ibid.

<sup>808</sup> Ibid.

<sup>809</sup> Ibid.

<sup>810</sup> Ibid.

from the left of center means retreat from the change in the structure of the RPP.<sup>811</sup>

Then Avcıoğlu stated the retreat from the left of center as the end of reformism for the party.<sup>812</sup> The movement said about the political activities of Bülent Ecevit, “Ecevit carries on the struggle of protecting the principles of the RPP intimately and courageously by itinerating from congress to congress.”<sup>813</sup> Thus, from *Yön*’s point of view, change was an ontological question for the party and the left of center symbolized this change.

When the contradictions between the progressive and conservatives emerged in the Party Assembly sessions in August 1966, the *Yön* movement again clearly supported the left of center group. *Yön* described the situation of the right wing in the RPP as defeated. This attitude was again open support for the left of center group.

*Yön* wrote of the circumstances after the Party Assembly sessions:

The rightist memorandum givers<sup>814</sup> that came to the party assembly in the hope snubbing Ecevit’s group sustained a complete defeat with the challenge of İnönü. The memorandum givers made an effort to prevent the left of center thesis of Ecevit in the congresses. However, the declaration of the Party Assembly, which was written by Erim and İnönü, countenanced the group of Ecevit that did not demand anything rather than the complete execution of the party program and to speak freely within the frame of the program.”<sup>815</sup>

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<sup>811</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Orta Yolculuk,” *Yön*, no.173 (22 July 1966), p.3.

*Ortanın solu sloganı kısa sürede bir miktar oy kaybetmeye ve partiden ayrılmalara yol açsa dahi CHP’de bir yapı değişikliğine yönelmenin ifadesi olduğu için önemliydi. Ondan vazgeçiş CHP’de bir yapı değişikliğinden vazgeçiş anlamına gelmektedir.*

<sup>812</sup> Ibid.

<sup>813</sup> *Yön*, no.174 (29 July 1966), p.5.

<sup>814</sup> By mentioning the memorandum givers, *Yön* was referring to the memorandum that is given to İnönü by the opponent group of the 76s.

<sup>815</sup> *Yön*, “CHP Sağcılar İkinici Manşta Hezimete Uğradılar,” *Yön*, no.177 (19 August 1966), p.4. *Parti meclisine Bülent Ecevit grubuna haddini bildirmek için gelen sağcı muhtıracılar, İnönü’nün karşı çıkması üzerine tam bir yenilgiye uğradılar. Muhtıracılar kongrelerde Ecevit’in ortanın solu tezini önleme çabasıındaydılar. Ne var ki İnönü’nün Erim ile birlikte kaleme aldığı tebliğ, esasen parti*

Then in the 18<sup>th</sup> congress of the RPP, Avcıoğlu demanded the complete disbanding of the right-wing of the party.<sup>816</sup> According to Avcıoğlu, to that date, the RPP had been able to keep two groups together.<sup>817</sup> Those groups were conservatives (the group of *aghās*, nobles and compradors) and the reformist middle strata.<sup>818</sup> In fact, it was impossible to keep them together under the same political party.<sup>819</sup> So the leaders were advised to abandon the efforts to reconcile the left-right struggle in the party.<sup>820</sup> This was an open call to İnönü to support the left of center group in the congress.

Consequently, the *Yön* movement aimed at directing the RPP in a more progressive way during the period. In this framework, *Yön* continued its critical perspective regarding the RPP. However, the fall of the İnönü government became the turning point. After the fall of the government, the *Yön* movement attempted to construct a progressive alliance. Thus the publications about the RPP were directed by this attitude in this era. In this context, the struggle for the left of center in the RPP was supported by the *Yön* movement, although they did not agree with the program of the left of center group in the RPP.

As the second actor on the left, the Workers Party of Turkey and its relations with and perspectives on the Republican People's Party are important. The

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*programının tam ve eksiksiz uygulanmasından öte bir talebi olmayan Ecevit grubunun, programı çerçevesinde istedikleri gibi konuşabileceklerini tescil etti.*

<sup>816</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "CHP İçindeki Mücadele," *Yön*, no.176 (21 October 1966), p.3.

<sup>817</sup> Ibid.

<sup>818</sup> Ibid.

<sup>819</sup> Ibid.

<sup>820</sup> Ibid.

emergence of the Workers Party of Turkey was an important change for Turkish parliamentary politics because the party had brought new expressions in political life. As discussed above, the Workers Party of Turkey had been founded in February 1961. However, it had not been able to participate in the 1961 October elections. One year after the foundation of the party, the founders invited Mehmet Ali Aybar to the party chairman position. After Aybar's coming to power, the party entered a transformation period. The new leadership changed the party into a well-organized and ideologically consistent socialist party. In 1965 elections, the party got 15 seats in the National Assembly. It was the first and only time; a socialist party has been represented in the Turkish parliament. Its existence by the critics and potential alliances was deeply influential on the RPP. The existence of a socialist party on the left side of the RPP shaped the political agenda and direction of the RPP.

Before Aybar, the WPT did not get the attention of the public opinion including the RPP's. However, after Aybar's coming to power, as mentioned above, an anti-communist reaction and attacks on the meetings of the WPT came to pass. In the government period of the RPP, İnönü never mentioned the WPT in any speeches. Moreover, the RPP ignored the political violence against the WPT. So the WPT was alone in its struggle against the extreme right.

On the other hand, it is necessary to differentiate between the anti-communism of the RPP and that the Justice Party. During the period, basically after Demirel, the JP used a tough anti-communist discourse. As mentioned above, Demirel, almost in every speech during the election campaign, had condemned the WPT, the RPP and all left publications.<sup>821</sup> İnönü, on the other hand, used a more cautious language. It is noteworthy that he was also accused by the right of tolerating

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<sup>821</sup> Demirel's anti-communist discourse was evaluated in the previous chapter.

the communists. Thus İnönü's RPP did not stand on an anti- communism like Demirel.

Aybar was also one of the major political ideologues of the WPT. After his coming to the party leadership, many socialist intellectuals joined the party. Among them, Behice Boran had central importance. The positions of those two politicians in the early Republican People's Party were very similar. Aybar considered the RPP as the last representative of the Ottoman type state perception and administration.<sup>822</sup> In the Ottoman administration, the economic organization had been directed by the state, and political relations had been based on those economic relations.<sup>823</sup> Aybar described the character of political relations in the Ottoman Empire as centralist, monopolist and despotic.<sup>824</sup> He asserted the reason for the emergence of several political parties after the Second Constitutional period was the political struggle of the bureaucratic class and *agha*-comprador class.<sup>825</sup> Thus he described the Committee of Union and Progress and the Republican People's Party as the parties of the bureaucratic class. From his point of view, the Entente Liberal, the Democrat Party and the Justice Party were the parties of the *agha*-comprador class.

Behice Boran's perspective on the governments of the early RPP was not so different from that of Aybar. Boran described the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic as "The centralist, authoritarian and top-down state understanding and practice that had been taken over from the Ottoman Empire was continuing. In fact, a bureaucratic stratum that is commanding everything was

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<sup>822</sup> Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p.8.

<sup>823</sup> Ibid.

<sup>824</sup> Ibid.

<sup>825</sup> Ibid., p.10.

representing the state.”<sup>826</sup> According to Boran, this bureaucratic stratum based mainly upon large landowners, nobles of township and newly emerging bourgeoisie (the group of major merchants and contractors).<sup>827</sup> The second level on which the bureaucratic stratum was based was the industrialists and bankers whom the state sought to make powerful with the assistance, but they could not be anyway.<sup>828</sup> Boran identified the early RPP as the party of those classes.

As mentioned above, in the main development era for the WPT, the RPP was the major partner of the coalition governments. This period was shaped by two tendencies for the WPT. First, the party was transformed from an uninfluential party of a group of trade unionists, to a well-organized socialist party and gained strength by this way. Second, the party was faced with violent political reactions of the right. So in this process, the WPT declared its position by criticizing the governing RPP as an opposition party, and put forward its differences with the RPP. On the other hand, the most important demand of the WPT from the RPP in this period was to take action for the security of the political activities of the WPT.

Under the RPP government, Aybar differentiated between his party and RPP on the issues of democracy, reforms and constitution as

The second major danger (the first one is some of the politicians in the Justice Party) that threatens our democracy comes from the ones who seem to defend the constitution and the principles of the Independence War, but in reality they neglect the constitution. Some of the RPP administrators represent this danger. Since the constitution was approved in the referendum, the RPP is governing. But it maintains the fascist acts<sup>829</sup> in force. And it has not still

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<sup>826</sup> Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları* (İstanbul: Gün Yayınları, 1968), p.18.

<sup>827</sup> Ibid.

<sup>828</sup> Ibid.

<sup>829</sup> Aybar refers to the 141<sup>st</sup> and 142<sup>nd</sup> articles of the penal code.

touched at the reforms that are prescribed by our constitution. In fact, the RPP is not sincerely loyal to the constitution.<sup>830</sup>

The second important aspect of the relationship between the WPT and the RPP was the safety of the WPT's political activities. For this purpose, Aybar and party administration visited prime minister Ismet İnönü on 22 December 1962.<sup>831</sup> In this meeting, the WPT delegation made a complaint about the attacks on the WPT, and demanded security for their political activities.<sup>832</sup> İnönü was not very happy with the meeting.<sup>833</sup> However, he pointed out that the WPT had been founded on legal grounds and the government was responsible for providing a secure environment for the political parties that worked on legal grounds.<sup>834</sup> On the same day, there was also a Meeting for Protesting and Condemning Communism in Ankara that was organized by the Türk-İş administration.<sup>835</sup> From Aybar's point of view, that those two events occurred on the same day was not a coincidence.<sup>836</sup> Moreover, to him, it was a message and threat to the WPT delegation to change their political position.<sup>837</sup>

Under those circumstances, the WPT changed its strategy, and attempted to engage the attention of the progressive wing in the RPP. For this reason, the WPT

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<sup>830</sup> Sargın, v.2, p.1132.

*Demokrasimizi tehdit eden ikinci büyük tehlike, Anayasayı, Kurtuluş Savaşı ilkelerini savunur görünerek , gerçekte anayasayı savsaklama yolunu tutanlardan gelmektedir. Bu tehlikeyi de bazı CHP yöneticileri temsil ediyor. Anayasamız halkoyundan geçerek yürürlüğe girdiğinden beri CHP hükümet ediyor. Oysa faşist kanunları hala yürürlükte tutuyor. Ve anayasanın emrettiği reformlardan hiçbirine el sürmüyor. Aslından CHP de anayasaya gönülden bağlı değildir.*

<sup>831</sup> Aybar, *TİP Tarihi*, v.1, p.228.

<sup>832</sup> Ibid., p.227.

<sup>833</sup> Ibid.

<sup>834</sup> Ibid.

<sup>835</sup> Ibid., p.228.

<sup>836</sup> Ibid., p.226.

<sup>837</sup> Ibid.



pointed out the fascist character of the attacks against the WPT. Now the RPP was the governing party and powerful. So after the fall of the RPP from government and the destruction of the WPT, the RPP would be the new target.<sup>838</sup> Then the aggressors would direct their activities to the RPP.<sup>839</sup>

Within this framework, the fall of the İnönü government in February 1965 changed the manner of the relations between those two parties. The RPP attempted to change its political position into a more radical and progressive way and İnönü attempted to decrease the power of the conservative wing in the party. The WPT evaluated the fall of the government as a political operation of the United States, and indicated the efforts of the US ambassador in Ankara.<sup>840</sup> According to the WPT, a national alliance against the forces of the new government needed to be established.<sup>841</sup> The RPP also changed its policy towards the WPT. İnönü declared his view on the WPT as “those kinds of parties exist in every country.”<sup>842</sup> He noted that it was not just to be doubtful about the WPT.<sup>843</sup> In this process, İnönü claimed that there was no danger of the extreme left in Turkey, but there was the danger of the extreme right.<sup>844</sup>

In the election campaign, the two parties came under accusations of being communist. So under those circumstances, their campaign mainly was directed to defend themselves against those accusations. In this context, the adversary they had

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<sup>838</sup> Sargin, p.1103.

<sup>839</sup> Ibid.

<sup>840</sup> Ibid., p.1138.

<sup>841</sup> Ibid.

<sup>842</sup> *Milliyet*, 30 July 1965

<sup>843</sup> Ibid.

<sup>844</sup> Ibid.

in common was the Justice Party. This situation made the RPP and the WPT drew closer to one another. The WPT declared that it regarded the foreign policy of the RPP positively because of the RPP's policy against the USA after the Cyprus event.<sup>845</sup> Same attitude might be seen on the RPP side. Through the elections, İnönü approved of the WPT. He claimed that no party (except the WPT) other than the RPP brought ideas and principles in the state administration. Only the WPT was a political organization that stood on a strong base and had ideas for the problems.<sup>846</sup>

After the 1965 elections and the Justice Party's coming to power, the competition between the RPP and the WPT started again. On the other hand, the RPP had abandoned the left of center discourse in this period. Under those circumstances, the WPT had claimed that the reformism and left of center policies of the RPP were a fallacious.<sup>847</sup> The only choice for the progressives was to support the WPT. For the WPT, the RPP did not consider the source of reactionaries from domestic and foreign exploitation.<sup>848</sup> Thus the WPT argued that one could hardly claim that the RPP advocated a progressive approach. For the WPT, the left of center had come onto the agenda because the RPP had wanted to put an end to the change pressures. Sadun Aren claimed that the RPP might be dissolved if it did not mention the left of center.<sup>849</sup> Aren said, "it became source of hope because of it stated the left of center."<sup>850</sup> So the left of center discourse aimed to prevent this annihilation.

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<sup>845</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Hem Suçlu Hem Güçlü," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p.421.

<sup>846</sup> İnönü, p. 86.

<sup>847</sup> Sargın, p.1171.

<sup>848</sup> Ibid.

<sup>849</sup> *Milliyet*, 13 December 1965.

<sup>850</sup> Ibid.

On the other hand, the success of the Ecevit's left of center group in the RPP congress did not create enthusiasm on the WPT side. Behice Boran described her party's position on the success of left of center as "according to us, there is neither a new lunge nor opening to the left in the left of center of the RPP. Contrarily there is the effort for preventing left."<sup>851</sup> Within this framework, the WPT did not differentiate between the left of center conceptions of Ismet İnönü, Bülent Ecevit and the conservative wing in the RPP.

Consequently, during the period, the WPT stood in a very critical position against the RPP except for the era of election campaign. The reason for this exception was the accusations of the right and radical public opinion's unofficial alliance expectation. On the other hand, the critics of the WPT forced the RPP to declare its left of center policy. The RPP needed to differentiate itself from the WPT in the electoral process.

The Communist Party of Turkey's stance on the RPP is my other topic. As discussed above, the CPT in this period was an illegal political organization, and the main activities of the party were organized in foreign countries, basically in the eastern bloc. However the party followed political developments in Turkey (including developments concerning the RPP) and reported them in the CPT circles.

The CPT's perceptions about the RPP of the single-party period reflected signs about its existing political strategy. The main reason for the CPT's criticisms of the RPP was its etatism and populism principles and conceptions. The CPT stated its views on the early RPP and its populism and etatism principles as:

The party in the government (in the single party era) that represents the interests of the bloc of national bourgeoisie and land owners; does not accept

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<sup>851</sup> *Milliyet*, 31 October 1966.

the difference of interests between the employer and employee; the land owner and farm laborer; does not recognize to defense the interest of workers against the employer.<sup>852</sup>

Many of the CPT leaders had lived under the pressure of the single-party rule of the RPP. So their personal experience and their party's illegal status in this period were significant in this conception.

The view of the CPT on the 27 May military intervention and following governments of İnönü is also critical for understanding the era at hand. For the CPT, the political struggle between the DP and RPP and the events before and after the 27 May had to be assessed in the context of a conflict of interest between the two parts of the reactionary bourgeoisie.<sup>853</sup> The CPT identified the place of the RPP in 27 May as "a certain part of the reactionary bourgeoisie whose political aims are the same but it could not get equal share from the pillage of the country was launched a coup d'état by the military."<sup>854</sup> So for the CPT, the political aims of the DP and the RPP were the same. However the RPP failed to get an equal share of the pillage of the country, and made the military launch a coup in 27 May 1960.

The CPT was very aware of the conflict between the two wings of the RPP during the İnönü governments. From the CPT's perspective, the İnönü governments took no notice of overspread of reactionarism, because İnönü's RPP perceived itself as related to the reactionarism by organic links.<sup>855</sup> The CPT identified the progressive wing of the RPP as the representative of national bourgeoisie. So for the CPT, the

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<sup>852</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi "Komünist Enternasyonalı'nın VII. Kongresi'nin 30. Yıldönümü" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p. 343.

<sup>853</sup> "Zeki Baştımar'ın Raporu", p. 47.

<sup>854</sup> Ibid.

<sup>855</sup> "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik ve Politik Durumu ve Bazı Meseleler", p.18.

discontents of the progressive wing were rising in importance because of this organic links with reactionarism.<sup>856</sup> The CPT claimed this marked the emergence of disintegration signs in the party.<sup>857</sup> Within this framework, the division in the RPP between the conservatives and progressives called by the CPT a division between the representatives of the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie.

It is crucial to note that during the RPP governments' era, the CPT considered that there was no important difference between the RPP and the other parties. In this framework, the secretary general of the party Zeki Başıtar referred to one of the speeches of Nikita Khrushchev.<sup>858</sup> In this speech, Khrushchev claimed that the only difference of the American parties of Democrats and Republicans were their emblems.<sup>859</sup> Democrats use donkey, and Republicans use elephant. Thus for Başıtar, the Turkish case is not so different, and differences in Turkish political parties does not go beyond the symbols.<sup>860</sup>

After all, the CPT dramatically changed its attitude toward the RPP after the fall of İnönü government in February 1965. On the reasons for the fall of İnönü government, the CPT claimed that the RPP tried to get closer with the Soviets; it did not join NATO's common nuclear force (Multilateral Force) and tried to solve the Cyprus question with peaceful methods.<sup>861</sup> For the CPT, the main motive that

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<sup>856</sup> Ibid.

<sup>857</sup> Ibid.

<sup>858</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Zeki Başıtar'ın 1962 Konferansı'ndaki Son Sözü," in *TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002), p. 104.

<sup>859</sup> Ibid.

<sup>860</sup> Ibid.

<sup>861</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Demokratik Milli Cephe, S. Üstünel" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p. 276.

brought RPP to this position was the demand and struggle of the people.<sup>862</sup> Thus the CPT argued that the RPP tried to conduct a national policy, and this attempt made the US worried and annoyed.<sup>863</sup> On the other hand, the CPT pointed out that the fall of İnönü government was made by the Justice Party with the direction of the Ambassador of the USA.<sup>864</sup>

Before the establishment of the Ürgüplü government,<sup>865</sup> the CPT made a call for the establishment of a United Front. It defined the components of the United Front as Atatürkist People's Party members, the deputies and senators that were against the JP dictatorship, trade unionists, patriotic youth, officers and intellectuals.<sup>866</sup> The CPT described the responsibility of the new government of the United Front as "to prevent the attacks of wild reactionaries, to enforce all the democratic reforms that are prescribed by the constitution, to rescue the national independence of the home land from NATO and its imperialists' effect."<sup>867</sup> In fact, this united front policy had been inspired from the United National Front policy of the Comintern parties of the inter-war era. Similarly the emergence left of center movement in the RPP was considered in a sympathetic way by the CPT. Thus the direction of the RPP to the left of center was evaluated by the CPT as "It was

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<sup>862</sup> Ibid.

<sup>863</sup> Ibid.

<sup>864</sup> Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>865</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, after İnönü's government, independent senatos Suat Hayri Ürgüplü established a new government in 1965. The main mission of the government was to take the country to the coming 1965 October elections.

<sup>866</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Kapitalist Olmayan Gelişme Yolu ve Türkiye Gerçeği: Türk Basınında Uzun Zamandır Tartışılan Problemler Üzerine, Ahmet Akıncı" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p. 230.

<sup>867</sup> Ibid.

obvious that the left wing of the national bourgeoisie in the Republican People's Party started to predominate."<sup>868</sup>

Consequently, the CPT evaluated the issues concerning the RPP in a very schematic way in this period, and assessed the RPP of being the party of the national bourgeoisie. The party was critical on the RPP during the RPP's government period. However, after the fall of the last RPP government, the CPT gave prime importance to the RPP in the United Front policy. Within this framework, the CPT considered the RPP to be in a progressive front against the rising anti-communist right. Thus the CPT argued that the left of center group in the RPP was the representative of the left wing of the national bourgeoisie.

### Three Widely Debated Issues

#### The Parameters of the Relationship between the Left and the RPP

The development of socialism in the first half of the 1960s was the primary reason for the RPP's coming to the left of center. Therefore, an analysis of the relations and interactions between the RPP and the actors on the left is also necessary for an analysis of the changes in the RPP. However, to follow and to analyze this relationship is only possible via analyzing the main parameters of this relationship. In the above parts, the general perspectives of the actors on the left about the RPP were scrutinized. The perspectives about the place of working class were also evaluated. Within this framework, this part of the chapter examines the main parameters of the

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<sup>868</sup> Ibid., p. 348.

relationship between the RPP and the actors on the left. These were the three widely debated issues during the period, the land reform, the nationalist discourse on the form of anti-Americanism and last the development planning or planned development conception. Thus in this part, the relationship between the RPP and the actors on the left and the RPP's coming to the left of center will be assessed in the context of the related themes as the parameters of the relationship between the RPP and the left.

These three issues are central to follow the influence of the left on the RPP and the RPP's coming to the left of center. In all parts, the same structure was implemented. First, the importance of the issue for the period and political and the legal developments on the related issue are scrutinized. Then the positions of and interactions between the RPP and the actors on the left are evaluated.

### The Issue of Land Reform

In 1971, Reşat Aktan, professor of Agricultural Economics and later Minister of Agriculture, argued that no topic other than the question of land reform had occupied the agenda of the public opinion and the political and administrative circles in Turkey in the 1960s.<sup>869</sup> For Aktan

Since the 27 May, the discussions and studies on the land reform have been continuing in the ministries, universities, press and other concerned circles. In this time many reports, drafts, documents were prepared; conferences and

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<sup>869</sup> Reşat Aktan, "Türkiye'de Toprak Reformu Çalışmaları" in *Toprak Reformu ve Ekonomik Gelişme* (İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Konferans Heyeti, 1971), p.65.



panel discussions have been organized, and articles and books written. However, the land reform issue has not been disappeared, its importance has not decreased. More importantly, the problem has not been solved. Still, particularly since 12 March, land reform has an issue that has been asserted determinately and is one of the most dynamic topics of the period.<sup>870</sup>

The Land Reform attempt of 1945 has become one of the major topics of Turkish social and economic history. Although land reform was as important as in the 1960s as it had been in the 1940s, Turkish historiography does not deal with the land reform discussions and attempts of the 1960s in detail. It is obvious that the land reform issue was one of major topics of Turkish politics after the 1960 military coup. The new constitution had prescribed it. In the period between 1960 and 1965, there were eight attempts at land reform. Moreover, all of the governments of the period promised to realize the land reform in their government programs.

The issue of land reform should be considered in the context of the planned development conception of the period. A radical land reform was on the agenda in the draft of the First Five Year Development Plan. The planners considered land reform as a requisite for the modernization of agriculture and solving the unfair distribution of income and financing the development, but it was not able to be passed in the High Planning Council.<sup>871</sup> The taxation of agriculture also was directly related to the land reform and planned development conception. Thus land reform,

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<sup>870</sup> Ibid.

*Toprak reformu üzerinde bakanlıklarda, üniversitelerde, basında ve diğer ilgili çevrelerde 27 Mayıs 1960'dan bugüne kadar hemen aralıksız olarak tartışmalar ve çalışmalar yapılmaktadır. Bu arada, birçok raporlar, tasarılar, belgeler hazırlandı; açık oturumlar, konferanslar tertip olundu; makale ve kitaplar yazıldı. Gene de konu eskimedi, yıpranmadı ve ateşi sönmedi. Bundan daha önemlisi, sorun henüz çözümlenemedi. Hala, ve özellikle 12 Mart'tan beri, üzerinde kararlı bir şekilde durulan, günün en can alıcı konularından birisini toprak reformu teşkil etmektedir.*

<sup>871</sup> Necat Erder, "Türkiye'nin İlk Planlama Deneyimi," in *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Çöküşü 1960-1980*, Ed. Ergun Türkcan (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2010), p. 237.

like the planning and taxation of agriculture was one of the main themes of radical politics in this era.

The land reform issue did not suddenly come onto the agenda in the 1960s. Almost since the foundation of the Republic, it had been discussed by intellectual circles and the state elites. One of the early planners of the 1960s, Attila Karaosmanoğlu, stated that once he asked İsmet İnönü why they had not attempted land reform in the Atatürk era<sup>872</sup> and İnönü replied that it had been on their agenda.<sup>873</sup> During the single-party period, they intended for the land reform.<sup>874</sup> However, they had considered that they were newly founding the state.<sup>875</sup> Under those conditions, making land reform may have created the appearance that the regime had designs to defile the bread of the people.<sup>876</sup>

Despite this anecdote, it is possible to claim that they had attempted the land reform. In 1930, the ministry of interior affairs prepared a draft that entitled the Land and Settlement Act.<sup>877</sup> However, this act did not make it to parliament. Bills of the some individual deputies and uninfluential efforts and studies of several ministries did not give results during the 1930s. Atatürk, in his annual addresses to the Parliament in 1936 and 1937, indicated that the country needed a land reform that would allow the peasants to have land to work and live on:

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<sup>872</sup> Attila Karaosmanoğlu, *İzmir Karşıyaka'dan Dünya'ya* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), p.142.

<sup>873</sup> Ibid.

<sup>874</sup> Ibid.

<sup>875</sup> Ibid.

<sup>876</sup> Ibid.

<sup>877</sup> Reşat Aktan, "Problems of Land Reform in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 20. no.3 (1966) p. 319.

It would have been appropriate to liquidate the remnants of the Ottoman statues, but it is absolutely urgent that every Turkish farming family own as much land as it can live and work on. The solid foundations and development of the country rest on this principle. ... The foundation of our national economy is agricultural. Therefore we emphasize agricultural developments a great deal. First of all, there should remain in this country no former without a piece of land of his own. More important than this is that under no circumstances should the farmer's holding which is just enough for his living be broken up. The size of the land which can be operated by large farmers should be limited according to the population density and fertility of each region.<sup>878</sup>

After the Second World War, the single-party regime put the land reform issue onto the agenda. This reform attempt and its political consequences have been discussed at length in the historical writing on Turkey.<sup>879</sup> The bill for the land reform that was prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture came to the parliament in 1945 and passed with some revisions.<sup>880</sup> The most important revision was about the farmer homesteads that had been prescribed by the bill were removed in the parliament. By this law, from 1947 to 1962, 1.8 million hectares of land were distributed to 360,000 farming families.<sup>881</sup> More than 95% of the distributed lands were public lands.<sup>882</sup>

Asım Karaömerlioğlu writes that the land reform attempt of 1945 reflected the conservative modernization perspective of the single-party regime:

In Turkey, the goals of and intentions for land reform were less radical than conservative: attaching peasants to their villages, broadening the size of the propertied peasant class and thereby recruiting them to the regime, forestalling leftist or radical movements, and securing the privileged position

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<sup>878</sup> Ibid.

<sup>879</sup> For the assessment of different explanations about the land reform attempt of 1945, see Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Elite Perceptions of Land Reform in Early Republican Turkey," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 27 no.3 (2000), pp.117-118.

<sup>880</sup> For the text of the LPRF, see *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu* (İstanbul: Çelik Matbaası, 1945).

<sup>881</sup> Aktan, Problems of Land Reform, p.321.

<sup>882</sup> Ibid.

of the political elite made up the primary rationale of land reform attempts in early Republican Turkey.<sup>883</sup>

In the Democrat Party era, the land reform issue was put aside. However, it returned to the agenda with the 27 May military coup when the new constitution prescribed it. The 37<sup>th</sup> article of the constitution that regulated the land ownership stated:

The state shall adopt the measures needed to achieve the efficient utilization of land and to provide land for those farmers who either have no land, or own insufficient land. For this purpose the law may define the size of tracts of land according to different agricultural regions and types of soil. The state assists farmers in the acquisition of agricultural implements.<sup>884</sup>

The second part of the 38th article of the constitution, which was about the expropriation, prevented a radical land reform because article stated that the period of the payment would not exceed ten years.<sup>885</sup> It is obvious that for the implementation of a radical land reform, a longer duration of payment was needed. This part of the article about the duration of the payment said,

The form of payment of the true equivalent values of land expropriated for the purpose of enabling farmers to own land, for nationalization of forests, for afforestation and for accomplishing the establishment of settlement projects, shall be provided by law. Where the law deems it necessary that payment shall be made by installments, the period of payment shall not exceed ten years. In this event, the installment shall be paid in equal amounts and shall be subject to interest rates prescribed by law.<sup>886</sup>

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<sup>883</sup> Karaömerlioğlu, "Elite Perceptions of Land Reform," pp. 129-130.

<sup>884</sup> *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, p.11.

<sup>885</sup> Ibid.

<sup>886</sup> Ibid.

It is noteworthy that the 27 May military rule initiated and then supported the land reform. Several times, president Cemal Gürsel declared his support of the land reform. However, when his speeches are scrutinized, it is clear that the land reform conception of the military rule was directly related to the Kurdish question. For example, Gürsel once stated that they had prepared the land reform to solve the problem of the people and land question of the East.<sup>887</sup> Then he guaranteed the property rights of the landowners from other regions, and he claimed the difference of the East.<sup>888</sup> Gürsel indicated that they would confiscate the lands of the sheikh's and *aghas*.<sup>889</sup> This policy intersects with the attitude of the regime to the *aghas* of the south eastern Turkey. Just four days after the coup, 485 important Kurdish land owners and opinion leaders were detained and sent to a camp in the city of Sivas.<sup>890</sup> There was no accusation, no question or no trial. In October 1960, the camp was closed, but 55 of the *aghas* were prohibited to return to their cities by the Forced Settlement Law.<sup>891</sup> They were relocated to cities in western Anatolia. In 1962, the Forced Settlement Law was abolished, and the *aghas* returned home.

Doğan Avcıoğlu identified the forced settlement law of the National Security Committee as “an initiation that is so limited and questionable with race and party discrimination”.<sup>892</sup> Thus it is possible to claim that the land reform conception of the military rule had a racist bias against Kurdish landholders, and that they considered

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<sup>887</sup> *Milliyet*, 19 August 1960.

<sup>888</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>889</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>890</sup> İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller* (Ankara: E Yayınları, 1969), p.328.

<sup>891</sup> On the Law, see *Ibid.*, pp.333-335.

<sup>892</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1969), p.690.

that the settlement of the Kurdish question might be possible by a radical land reform. The anti-feudal discourse of the reason for the Forced Settlement Law also reflected such a perspective. Consequently, the land reform intention of the period aimed not only at social equity or efficiency in agriculture, but also the forceful settlement of ethnic and political questions.

As pointed out above, in the period from 1960 to 1966, there were eight attempts at the land reform.<sup>893</sup> Among them, five were land reform draft acts, and three were official reports on the issue. Below, those attempts will be discussed further.

The first attempt started just two months after the coup.<sup>894</sup> The Prime Ministry sent an order to the ministry of agriculture about land reform and demanded the foundation of a commission composed of the representatives of ministries of state, agriculture, interior affairs, finance and development and housing. This commission would prepare a report on the land reform issue. In one month, the commission prepared a report titled the “First Report about the Provisions on the Land Reform” in which the commission concluded its views on the land reform and land questions and order in Turkey. Then the commission put forward several proposals and recommendations to the Prime Ministry. This report was the first attempt at land reform and it reflected the decisiveness of the military administration on the issue.

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<sup>893</sup> On the discussions about the land reform in the period, see İsmail Şener, *Toprak Reformu ve Tarım Reformu* (İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Konferans Heyeti, 1971); *Toprak Reformu Semineri 26-27 Mayıs, 1965 /Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu Toprak Reformu Semineri* (Ankara: Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu, 1966); Türkiye'de Toprak Reformu Semineri : 6-8 Haziran 1968; Bildiriler, Tartışmalar (Ankara : Sevinç Matbaası, 1968); *Toprak Reformu ve Ekonomik Gelişme* (İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Konferans Heyeti, 1971).

<sup>894</sup> For the attempts, see Aktan, *Türkiye’de Toprak Reformu Çalışmaları*, pp.68-71.

The second attempt started with the reply of the Prime Ministry to the commission in which it demanded two tasks. The first one was the preparation of a draft that mentioned the amendments and changes in the current regulations on land reform. And the second was the preparation of a land reform act. The commission completed the required tasks; however, the drafts were not passed into law.

After those preparations, the first land reform draft was finished and reported to the prime ministry just two months before the 1961 elections. The aims of the draft were cited as to give land to landless farmers, consolidation, to improve sharecropping and tenancies; to ensure that the country's lands' always producing according to their potential, to establish example villages and farms, to help the newly established farms' equipment, and last to improve and to increase agricultural production.<sup>895</sup> This draft did not pass into law because of the coming elections, the opposition of the political parties and the prorogation of the constituent assembly.

After the transition to the parliamentary rule, the former draft was taken into agenda with minor amendments and changes. The new draft was reported to the prime ministry. However, it was not reported to the assembly because the first government of İnönü was dissolved at that time.

During the second İnönü government, a new draft was prepared. However, this draft also was not able to be passed into law before the disintegration of the government. This was the third unsuccessful government draft for the land reform.

As mentioned in the above parts, the third İnönü government was a minority government by the RPP with independent deputies. Thus the party was more determined about the land reform. The minister of agriculture, Turhan Şahin, prepared a fourth draft for the land reform. This draft was the only draft that was able

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<sup>895</sup> Ibid., p.71.

to come to the parliament. The İnönü government had succeeded at setting off the process for this draft. Thus the government submitted a resolution for the draft that provided the joint discussion of the draft by the commissions. In this way, the party aimed at fastening the legalization process of the bill. It is interesting that almost 30 deputies from the RPP did not attend the voting and government's submission failed to get the necessary votes.

The Ürgüplü government was the last government that took the land reform issue onto its government program until the governments of the 12 March intervention. The draft of ministry of agriculture in this period was a major regression in the reformist character of the land reform issue. However this moderate draft also did not leave the ministry of agriculture.

In the 1965 October elections, Süleyman Demirel's JP won and Demirel established the new government. From this date on, the land reform issue was off the agenda, and the term *land reform* replaced by a type of agricultural reform that was considered mainly as the technical modernization of agriculture and modification of credit possibilities. Land tenure was not an important question for the succeeding governments.

The draft bill of Turhan Şahin, in the era of the third İnönü government, was the most important of the land reform attempts, because it was the only one that was able to come to the parliament. An evaluation of the reason statement for the draft might be useful for a better understanding of the land reform issue of the period. The reason for the act claimed the legislation of the land reform was imperative for the economic and social development of the country<sup>896</sup> although agriculture was the

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<sup>896</sup> *Toprak Reformu Kanun Tasarısı ve Gerekçesi* (Ankara: Tarım Bakanlığı, 1965), p.1



most important sector of the national economy.<sup>897</sup> The production level of agriculture was low because of the structural problems of the sector, and it was not harmonious with the economic development in general.<sup>898</sup> Moreover, those problems hindered development, although the agricultural sector has crucial for financing the development.<sup>899</sup> For those reasons, the statement argued that agriculture should be reorganized and improved.<sup>900</sup> Thus the statement identified the function of the land reform as fulfilling those aims.<sup>901</sup>

According to the draft, the only reason for the land reform was not economic but also social, legal, technical and political.<sup>902</sup> The implication on the social aspect of the land reform was crucial. Land reform served also to provide a just and appropriate distribution of income and wealth.<sup>903</sup> This point is crucial. As pointed out above by Karaömerlioğlu, the relation between the Kemalist project of conservative modernization and the land reform attempts of early republican period was clear.<sup>904</sup> The draft declared that the political aim of the act was to serve for the creation of a stable and rooted agricultural society.<sup>905</sup> So the perspective of the draft is very similar to the above mentioned project.

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<sup>897</sup> Ibid.

<sup>898</sup> Ibid.

<sup>899</sup> Ibid.

<sup>900</sup> Ibid.

<sup>901</sup> Ibid.

<sup>902</sup> Ibid.

<sup>903</sup> Ibid.

<sup>904</sup> See, Karaömerlioğlu, "Elite Perceptions of Land Reform," pp. 129-133.

<sup>905</sup> *Toprak Reformu Kanun Tasarısı ve Gerekçesi*, p.1.

On the land reform perspective of the RPP, the program of the party and the programs of the İnönü governments are better for starting the analysis. The first İnönü government, which was a coalition with the JP, described the land reform in its program as “The legal measurements that will realize the land reform in convenient and balanced with the spirit of our constitution and the economic and agricultural body will be delicately prepared.”<sup>906</sup> The program of the government committed the government that to realizing the reform. However, the program limited the reform to the constitution’s prescription and also the government stated that the land reform would be harmonious with the economic and agricultural structure of the country.

The land reform was again in the program of the second İnönü government. In this program, government declared its views on the land reform thus,

We trust in the necessity of some reforms in the social and economic body in order to accomplish strong agricultural development in our country. First of all, a land reform is needed in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the realities of the country and requirements of our agricultural development question. For this purpose, a preliminary project will be brought under the Grand Assembly’s scrutiny and approval after the government’s delicate work and given its last shape.”<sup>907</sup>

Thus again the RPP cited constitutional provisions as the main reason why the party would not initiate a radical reform.

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<sup>906</sup> “İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı’ndaki Birinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 27 Kasım 1961” in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. Ed. İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), p.330. *Toprak reformunu, Anayasamızın ruhuna, ekonomik ve zirai bünyemize uygun ve dengeli şekilde gerçekleştirecek kanuni tedbirler dikkatle hazırlanacaktır.*

<sup>907</sup> “İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı’ndaki İkinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 2 Temmuz 1962” in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. Ed. İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), pp.355-356. *Yurdumuzda zirai kalkınmayı gerçekleştirmek için sosyal ve ekonomik bünyede bazı reformlar yapılmasının zaruretine inanıyoruz. Bunların başında, Anayasa hükümlerine, yurt gerçeklerine ve zirai kalkınma davamızın icaplarına uygun bir toprak reformu gelmektedir. Bu maksatla hazırlanmış olan ön proje, Hükümetçe dikkat ve titizlikle incelenip nihai şeklini aldıktan sonra en kısa zamanda yüksek Meclisin tetkik ve tasvibine sunulacaktır.*

The third İnönü government's program was the program that described the land reform in the most detailed way. The program emphasized the necessity of the land reform:

The realization of the land and agriculture reform that has been on the agenda for long years has become our one of the major issues that should be dealt with in a most serious and rapid manner. We are of the opinion that if this issue is not courageously taken in hand now, it will create new difficulties in the economic and social fields that will make the settlement of the question more difficult.<sup>908</sup>

Then the program stated that the land reform would provide that agricultural activities would take place under the most economically and socially favorable conditions and it would be in accordance with the constitution's principles.<sup>909</sup> The program defined the aim of the land reform act "to make the landless peasant landowners, to equip poor farmers with the necessary means to cultivate, and the collection of very fragmented fields into more suitable and efficient units for cultivation".<sup>910</sup>

The position of the İnönü governments on land reform was somewhat complicated. It is striking that the ministry of agriculture that was responsible for the Land Reform was not taken by the RPP in the first and second coalition

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<sup>908</sup> "İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı'ndaki Üçüncü Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 30 Aralık 1963" in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. Ed. İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), p. 386. *Uzun yıllardan beri üzerinde durulan tarım ve toprak reformunun gerçekleştirilmesi, en önemli ve süratle ele alınması gereken başlıca meselelerimizden biri haline gelmiştir. Bu konunun şimdi cesaretle ele alınmamasının yakın gelecekte iktisâdi ve sosyal alanda meselenin çözümünü daha da güçleştirecek gelişmelere yol açabileceği kanısındayız.*

<sup>909</sup> Ibid.

<sup>910</sup> Ibid.

*Topraksız köylünün toprak sahibi yapılması, yoksul çiftçinin toprağı işleyecek imkânlarla teçhiz edilmesi, çok bölünmüş tarlaların iktisâdi işletmeye elverişli üniteler halinde toplanması olarak anlıyor.*

governments.<sup>911</sup> The minister of agriculture in the first government was Ali Cavit Oral, from the Justice Party, and then Mehmet İzmen, from the New Turkey Party, in the second government.<sup>912</sup> The positions of the coalition partners were critical at this point. The big landowners were very influential on the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party. However, the constitutional prescriptions directed the right wing to construct a modified discourse. Feroz Ahmad writes,

Since it was impossible to take an open stand against land reform, for it had the sanction of the constitution and the plan, the opponents of land reform tried to demonstrate that it would be harmful for the economy and that the government would be better advised to use its resources to reform agriculture in order to increase productivity. This could be done by land reclamation, irrigation, the increased use of fertilizer, improved seed, mechanization, pest control, increased credits and other measures of this kind.<sup>913</sup>

The conservative wing of the RPP was also against the land reform. The voting on the Turan Şahin draft was an obvious example of this situation. When this bill came to the parliament, the party attempted to avoid long discussions in the commissions and assembly. For this reason, a joint commission was to be formed and the bill would be rapidly brought on to the agenda of the Parliament.<sup>914</sup> However, almost 30 RPP deputies that represented the interests of the big landowners did not attend the voting.<sup>915</sup> This voting brought the end to the Turan Şahin draft.

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<sup>911</sup> Kili, p.199.

<sup>912</sup> Ibid., p.200.

<sup>913</sup> Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p.278.

<sup>914</sup> Kili, p.201.

<sup>915</sup> Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, p. 448.

The actions of these deputies were protested by many of the local party organizations.<sup>916</sup> The local administration of the party in the capital city, Ankara, protested their behavior with a declaration.<sup>917</sup> The party started a discipline inquiry for those deputies, but their protests and inquiries were fruitless.<sup>918</sup>

In the first government of İnönü, Ali Cavit Oral, from the Justice Party, was the minister of agriculture. Oral was a politician who was very well known to be against the land reform.<sup>919</sup> He had been minister of agriculture in 1948 and the assessment of his ministerial position is that he worked to prevent the land reform.<sup>920</sup> However, the third İnönü government was more determined on the land reform. It is interesting that in the formation process of the third İnönü government, İnönü offered the ministry of agriculture to Turhan Feyzioğlu, but he did not accept this ministry.<sup>921</sup> Feyzioğlu was a very important politician in the RPP and the leader of the progressive and radical wing of the party. Thus İnönü had aimed to increase the profile of the ministry of agriculture, and to simplify the legislation of the land reform.

It is noteworthy that the party program of the RPP was not clear on land reform issue. According to the official party program of the period, the RPP did not mention land reform. Instead it promised to give land to the landless or having less land farmers at cheap cost and credits.<sup>922</sup> However, the political developments

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<sup>916</sup> Kili, p.201.

<sup>917</sup> Ibid.

<sup>918</sup> Ibid.

<sup>919</sup> Yön, "Nereden Nereye Geldik," *Yön*. No. 28 (27 June 1962).

<sup>920</sup> Ibid.

<sup>921</sup> Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları*, v.6, p.184.

<sup>922</sup> *CHP Programı*, p.11.

through 1965 changed the attitude of the party. Before the elections, the party stated in its election declaration that it would realize land reform. The issue took a major place in this document.<sup>923</sup> The party promised to realize the earlier land reform bill.<sup>924</sup> The RPP argued that in the previous parliamentary period, other parties had cooperated to prevent land reform.<sup>925</sup> Thus the RPP needed to secure enough deputies in the parliament to realize the reform.<sup>926</sup> The party aimed at attracting the votes of farmers by their commitment to the land reform. However, it was not able to get those votes. This situation brings the question of why the farmers did not vote for the supporters of the land reform, but for the opponents. This question is also related to a new question of whether land reform was necessary or not.

The classic explanation for the necessity of land reform argues the unfair structure of the land tenure via the results of the general agricultural census. Below, one of those explanations raised by Professor of Agriculture and later administrator of the Workers Party of Turkey, Suat Aksoy, in a very popular paperback titled *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi* (One Hundred Questions about Land Reform Issue in Turkey) will be summarized.<sup>927</sup> The first point came from the land tenure structure. To the general agricultural census in 1963, 8.78% of the total farmer families had no land, and 36.1% of the total farmer families had land of less than 20 decares.<sup>928</sup> On the other hand, 15,352 families that was only 0.4% of the total farmers

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<sup>923</sup> For the view of the party on the land reform, see Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Söz Veriyor - 1965 Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri Seçim Bildirgesi* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayınları, 1965), pp.76-79.

<sup>924</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>925</sup> Ibid.

<sup>926</sup> Ibid., p.77.

<sup>927</sup> Suat Aksoy, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1969).

<sup>928</sup> Ibid., p.105.

held 1,844,432 hectares lands of the total 17,142,777 hectares.<sup>929</sup> So the 15,352 big landowners with more than 500 decares was only 0.4% of the total farmers. They held 10.75% of the total lands.<sup>930</sup>

On the other hand, many of the villages in Turkey were located in the forests. The second development plan pointed out that 37% of the total villages in Turkey were located in forests.<sup>931</sup> The population in those kinds of villages was almost 7 million.<sup>932</sup> At this time, the population of the whole country was 31 million. The Second Development Plan did not consider the development of those villages in their place as possible.<sup>933</sup> Consequently, a perspective such as that of Aksoy's was hegemonic in this period among the Turkish left and to such an assessment, the structure in the land was the main reason for land reform necessity.

A contrary explanation comes from Çağlar Keyder, years after this discussion on land reform. Keyder approaches the same statistics from a different perspective. In 1950, the number of farmer families who cultivated their own land was 2.3 million.<sup>934</sup> In 1962, it became 3.1 million.<sup>935</sup> The increase in those numbers was 35%.<sup>936</sup> He also points to the increases in the number of all cultivated lands, used

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<sup>929</sup> Ibid., p.106.

<sup>930</sup> Ibid.

<sup>931</sup> Ibid.

<sup>932</sup> Ibid.

<sup>933</sup> Ibid.

<sup>934</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Türk Tarımında Küçük Meta Üretiminin Yerleşmesi (1946-1960)", *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*. Şevket Pamuk Zafer Toprak. ed.(Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1988), p.164.

<sup>935</sup> Ibid.

<sup>936</sup> Ibid.

credits, tractors and demographic transformation.<sup>937</sup> His qualitative explanation for those statistics is about the mode of production. According to Keyder, the post war era was a period for the transition to petty commodity production,<sup>938</sup> which sanctified the market and property.<sup>939</sup> The success of the Democrat Party and the Justice Party is hidden for these parties' understanding of this transition.<sup>940</sup> For Keyder, the left was waiting for the development of capitalism in agriculture and constructed its political discourse for the wanted proletarians in the agriculture.<sup>941</sup> Similarly the RPP, by its historical heritage, mobilized itself against the *aghas* who had lost their former status, looked to the peasants and constructed its discourse on the poor peasants.<sup>942</sup> Because of failure of the land reform attempts and the elections results of the rural regions, among the two explanations, Keyder's assessment seems more realistic.

When the speeches and messages of İnönü in the first half of the 1960s are scanned, it is possible to claim that the word "reform" was one of the most used words in İnönü's vocabulary. However the land reform issue became prominent with the third government. Thus, for İnönü, land reform was indispensable in the third government era.<sup>943</sup> İnönü identified land reform as the main deficiency of the development question in Turkey.<sup>944</sup> As discussed above, planned development was

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<sup>937</sup> Ibid.

<sup>938</sup> Ibid.

<sup>939</sup> Ibid., p.167.

<sup>940</sup> Ibid., p.173.

<sup>941</sup> Ibid.

<sup>942</sup> Ibid.

<sup>943</sup> *Ulus*, 12 December 1963.

<sup>944</sup> Ibid.



central to İnönü's discourse. Harmonious with this situation, İnönü related the planned development and the agricultural sector. He indicated that the government put land reform at the forefront in the development plan.<sup>945</sup> The government would initiate a land reform that would not ruin the economic and social life of the country.<sup>946</sup> Then İnönü related the land reform initiation to the government's aim of increasing the income level of the peasants.<sup>947</sup> At last, he concluded his views on the possibility of the reform as follows "such crucial issue could not be solved in the first and second governments. Now we can."<sup>948</sup>

As shown above, the right-wing parties opposed land reform. The Justice Party declared that it was worried about the right of property.<sup>949</sup> İnönü called the criticisms of the land reform as undue.<sup>950</sup> The only principle for the land reform that had emerged after years of work was that the reform could not be against property rights.<sup>951</sup> Then İnönü reminded everyone that the property right was guaranteed by the constitution in any case.<sup>952</sup> One point also should be indicated, that the land reform issue started to be mentioned again and again after the fall of the government. Thus the aim of the RPP was to give the message that the government of the party had fallen because they had tried to initiate the reforms.<sup>953</sup>

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<sup>945</sup> Ibid.

<sup>946</sup> Ibid.

<sup>947</sup> Ibid.

<sup>948</sup> Ibid.

<sup>949</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad, p. 271.

<sup>950</sup> *Ulus*, 4 June 1964.

<sup>951</sup> Ibid.

<sup>952</sup> Ibid.

<sup>953</sup> Ibid.

On the other hand, Bülent Ecevit's views on land reform are remarkable. In one of his articles on land reform, he implies that reform had taken place in the Ürgüplü government's program.<sup>954</sup> He indicated that the government had consciously delayed and impeded the reform bill.<sup>955</sup> For Ecevit, the government aimed at gaining time by stalling the assembly with tactics because it did not want land reform in real.<sup>956</sup> Ecevit argued that government circles claimed that the peasants did not subscribe to the land reform.<sup>957</sup> The peasants were learning more and more about what land reform was and adopting it, because politicians and intellectuals told them about it.<sup>958</sup>

Ecevit claimed that the opponents of the land reform tried to obstruct this activity of the politicians and intellectuals, and that the attempt to change the functioning of the state radio was a clear example of this situation.<sup>959</sup> On the other hand, Ecevit indicated that the government circles had labeled the supporters of the land reform communists.<sup>960</sup> For Ecevit, the government dishonestly declared its support for land reform, but it asserted that its land reform conception was different from those of Mao or Lenin.<sup>961</sup> Then Ecevit argues that if a land reform could have been realized in those countries, it was impossible to emerge such figures as Mao or Lenin.<sup>962</sup>

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<sup>954</sup> *Milliyet*, 14 April 1965.

<sup>955</sup> Ibid.

<sup>956</sup> Ibid.

<sup>957</sup> Ibid.

<sup>958</sup> Ibid.

<sup>959</sup> Ibid.

<sup>960</sup> Ibid.

<sup>961</sup> Ibid.

The focus on land reform, land reform as a tool against the extreme left, became prominent with the coming of the party to the left of center. This change came out also with the accusations of the right. Under those circumstances, İnönü did not withdraw the land reform claim of the party; on the contrary, he strengthened the tone in the party's discourse on the subject.<sup>963</sup> Thus he constructed the land reform initiation of the party as the primary principle of the party's new line as the left of center. İnönü, like Ecevit, put the land reform issue forward as one of the main differences of the party from the so-called extreme left. For İnönü, the WPT (he implies the party, but does not mention its name) abuses the peasants with a new discourse that took the word "slaves" to the center.<sup>964</sup> Thus İnönü argued that his party would execute land reform as a remedy to the abuses of the extreme left.<sup>965</sup>

*Yön* gave special importance to the land reform issue as a journal that made the words "development" and "reform" its main slogans. The land reform took central place in the declaration of the *Yön* movement.<sup>966</sup> In the declaration, *Yön* indicated that one of the main missions of modern etatism was the replacement of the *aghas* by cooperatives and organized farmers through land reform.<sup>967</sup>

In 1962 June, when the draft of Cavit Oral was prepared, *Yön* reported the 1945 Law for Providing Land for Farmers.<sup>968</sup> The title obviously reflected the mission and the content of the article that was "from whence to where we have

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<sup>962</sup> Ibid.

<sup>963</sup> For this perspective that were stated in election speeches, see *Ulus*, 30 September-5 October 1965.

<sup>964</sup> Ibid., 30 September 1965.

<sup>965</sup> Ibid.

<sup>966</sup> Bildiri, *Yön*. No. 1 (20 December 1961).

<sup>967</sup> Ibid.

<sup>968</sup> Nereden Nereye Geldik, *Yön*. No. 28 (27 June 1962).

come.”<sup>969</sup> In the article, the emergence and development of the 1945 law was assessed.<sup>970</sup> The article argued the radical character of the 1945 land reform bill, but it pointed out that the land reform bill had been deformed in the parliament.<sup>971</sup>

According to *Yön*, the same minister of agriculture, Cavit Oral degraded the law in 1948.<sup>972</sup> Afterward, the article brought the new bill for the land reform onto the agenda.<sup>973</sup> It harshly criticized the new bill, and claimed that the new reform proposal could not be assessed as a reform plan.<sup>974</sup>

In the same issue of the journal Doğan Avcıoğlu wrote about the land reform bill of the first coalition government, saying

There is a prevailing deception. The landlords and their spokesmen, who are aware of the fact that the dynamic forces with their soldiers, workers, youth and the socialist intellectuals are for the land reform, are trying to deceive the people with draft land reforms. These men are showing off as if they are making real land reform. Actually a large scale reform is partially obstructed by the constitution. The constitution accepted to pay the real worth of the lands -that are confiscated as a consequence of the landlords and their handlangers' pressures in the constitutional assembly- in a short time, like 10 years. In countries where the land reform is done genuinely, the compensations are planned to be paid fairly in 30 – 40 years. As a matter of fact, the constitution, which was accused unjustly, adopted the principle for the payment of the compensations in 20 years which were determined according to their tax value.<sup>975</sup>

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<sup>969</sup> Ibid.

<sup>970</sup> Ibid.

<sup>971</sup> Ibid.

<sup>972</sup> Ibid.

<sup>973</sup> Ibid.

<sup>974</sup> Ibid.

<sup>975</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Toprak Reformunun Temel Şartı” *Yön*. No. 28 (27 June 1962). *Bir aldatmacadır gidiyor. Zinde kuvvetlerin, askeriyle, işçisiyle, gençliğiyle ve toplumcu aydınlarıyla toprak reformuna taraftar olduğunu bilen ağalar ve ağaların sözcüleri, toprak reform u tasarılarıyla çocuk kandırmaya çalışıyorlar. Bu adamlar sıkılmadan toprak reform yapıyoru diye çalım satıyorlar. Aslında büyük çapta bir reform hareketi, anayasa ile kısmen kapanmıştır. Anayasa, Kurucu Meclisteki ağaların ve yordakçıların tazyikiyle kamulaştırılan arazinin 10 yıl gibi kısa bir zaman içinde, hem de gerçek bedelinin ödenmesini kabul etmiştir. Gerçekten toprak reformu yapmak isteyen memleketler ise, 30-40 yıllık bir devre zarfında adil bir tazminat ödemek yoluna gitmektedirler. Nitekim haksız*

Thus Avcioğlu argued that the progressive wings of the society supported land reform, but current drafts were the deceptions that were created by the big landowners.<sup>976</sup> Then Avcioğlu also discussed the difficulty of radical land reform because of the limits that had been framed by the constitution.<sup>977</sup> For Avcioğlu, this was not a surprise, because the *aghas* dominated the politics of the country.<sup>978</sup> Avcioğlu assessed the relation between the politics and land reform as “it is impossible to make a reform against the interests of the aghas, if they have corner in the country’s fate.”<sup>979</sup> Then Avcioğlu argued that the big land owners suggested that land reform was against the democratic principles, and land owners labeled the supporters of the land reform as enemies of democracy.<sup>980</sup> However the real democracy would come to the country by abolishing the political power of the *aghas*, and the land reform would be main instrument of this abolishment.<sup>981</sup> Avcioğlu concluded his views on land reform by identifying it as a political question.<sup>982</sup> Under those circumstances the land reform was a revolutionary act, and the country had no endurance for the postponement.<sup>983</sup>

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*olarak suçlu görülen bizim eski anayasa da, o tarihlerde bir toprak reform yapmak, gerçekten istendiği için, arazinin vergi değerini ölçü almış ve bedelinin 20 yılda ödenmesi esasını benimsemiştir.*

<sup>976</sup> Ibid.

<sup>977</sup> Ibid.

<sup>978</sup> Ibid.

<sup>979</sup> Ibid.

<sup>980</sup> Ibid.

<sup>981</sup> Ibid.

<sup>982</sup> Ibid.

<sup>983</sup> Ibid.

*Yön* intervened also in the process of the land reform by publishing special and shocking reports. In November 1962, it published the summary of the Jacoby report,<sup>984</sup> which had been written by one of the experts of the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), Erich H. Jacoby, on the request of the State Planning Organization. In the report, Jacoby indicated the deficiency of the Oral draft, and offered a more radical land reform program.<sup>985</sup> However, the Jacoby report was removed like the tax reform of Kaldor by the government from the text of the First Five-Year Development Plan. The content of the report also was not revealed to the public opinion.<sup>986</sup> By publishing a summary of the report, *Yön* again brought the land reform to the attention of the public opinion.

The only draft for land reform that was supported by *Yön* was a bill of Turan Şahin.<sup>987</sup> However, this support was limited. *Yön* indicated the problems of the reform project, but it argued that under those circumstances only such a reform is possible.<sup>988</sup> According to *Yön*, there was nothing in the reform bill from the left doctrines, and the aim of the bill was to realize regular capitalist farming in agriculture.<sup>989</sup> The draft did not remove feudalism, but forced the feudal class to cultivate their lands in a more rational way.<sup>990</sup> The article argued that the unionization action of the small farms and the creation of cooperatives were more

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<sup>984</sup> “Hükümetin Gizlediği Yeni bir Rapor: Jacoby Raporu,” *Yön* no .50. (28 November 1962).

<sup>985</sup> Ibid.

<sup>986</sup> Ibid.

<sup>987</sup> “Toprak Reformu Tasarısı”, *Yön*, no. 94 (15 January 1965).

<sup>988</sup> Ibid.

<sup>989</sup> Ibid.

<sup>990</sup> Ibid.

important than the redistribution of land for the bill.<sup>991</sup> Despite those deficiencies of the land reform bill, the big land owners initiated action against it.<sup>992</sup> In the same issue of the journal, Avcıoğlu also reworded the above views in a different article. However, he gave support to the bill despite of his criticisms of it.<sup>993</sup> For him, under those circumstances, it was not possible to make a more radical reform.<sup>994</sup>

The agricultural questions, most precisely land reform, were very important for the Workers Party of Turkey. This was not a surprise in a country in which almost 80% of the population lived in villages. The emblem of the party was composed of a wheel and spike that symbolized the workers and the peasants. The slogan written on the party emblem was “land for the peasant, employment for everyone.”

The party indicated that the shift of the national economy from agriculture to industrialization was crucial in order to become a mature society and to escape from backwardness.<sup>995</sup> However agriculture should not be neglected. The WPT argued that industrialization would also help the development of the agricultural sector.<sup>996</sup> The party claimed that it was not possible to realize an agriculture reform for the benefit of the people without a radical land reform.<sup>997</sup> The party considered that the land

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<sup>991</sup> Ibid.

<sup>992</sup> Ibid.

<sup>993</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Reform Tasarısını Destekliyoruz,” *Yön*, no. 94 (15 January 1965).

<sup>994</sup> Ibid.

<sup>995</sup> *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı* (İstanbul: Ersan Matbaası, 1964), p.85.

<sup>996</sup> Ibid.

<sup>997</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

reform should aim at making landless peasants landowners and limiting exploitative land ownership.<sup>998</sup>

On the implementation of the land reform, the WPT planned to establish a central technical organization.<sup>999</sup> However, the participation of the peasant masses in the implementation of the land reform was necessary. Thus the WPT aimed at giving a democratic essence to the land reform. The WPT indicated the failure of the former land reform attempts. Thus the land reform of the WPT would satisfy the land necessity of the landless peasants both qualitatively and quantitatively. The participation of the peasants in the land reform would be by the village committees.<sup>1000</sup> The members of the village committees would be elected directly by the landless people and would have small and medium land owners.<sup>1001</sup> Then the WPT limited the land ownership of the expropriated landowners to 500 decares.<sup>1002</sup>

The chairman of the party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, differentiated between the land reform and agricultural reform conceptions. For him, the constitution's prescription for land reform was to expropriate the big land owners' lands, and to distribute them to landless people.<sup>1003</sup> Then Aybar assessed the agricultural reform as supporting the big landowners. The agricultural reform would only advance the interests of the land owners, and the landless peasants would go on to work as slaves.<sup>1004</sup>

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<sup>998</sup> Ibid., p.88.

<sup>999</sup> Ibid., p.89.

<sup>1000</sup> Ibid., p.90.

<sup>1001</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1002</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1003</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "İçten ve Dıştan Sömürülüyoruz," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p.370.

<sup>1004</sup> Ibid.



In May 1963, the general administrative board of the WPT was convened in the southeastern Anatolian city Gaziantep. The meeting of the party was raided by unknown persons. The assessment of the party on the raid was that this event had been planned and implemented by the land owners.<sup>1005</sup> The party claimed that the land owners of the region had hired men to raid the meeting of the party because of the WPT's land reform policy.<sup>1006</sup>

As discussed above, the land reform issue was mentioned in all the government programs until the Demirel governments. So Aybar's speech on the first Demirel government's program was crucial. He argued that the government program stated that the peasant would get lands.<sup>1007</sup> For Aybar, this was not an honest promise, because the government did not explain the sources of the distribution. Aybar asked the Demirel government which land would be distributed by the government. Thus Aybar indicated that this attitude of the Demirel government was a violation of the 1961 constitution, because the constitution prescribed the expropriation of the land from *aghas* and their distribution to landless peasants.

For Aybar, poor peasants demanded land from the *aghas* and also they demanded freedom.<sup>1008</sup> So the land question was the question of liberation. The program of the government did not mention land reform at all. It did not also mention the former drafts at all. So it was impossible to rescue the peasant with such a policy of the government.

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<sup>1005</sup> "Toprak Ağalarına Rağmen" *Sosyal Adalet* (13 May 1963).

<sup>1006</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1007</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Aybar'ın Konuşması" in *TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) Parlamentoda 1963-1966*. Turhan Salman (Ed.), v.1 (İstanbul : TÜSTAV, 2004), p.98.

<sup>1008</sup> Ibid.

The land reform also had an important place in the parliamentary activities of the party, which gave a land reform bill to the parliament.<sup>1009</sup> Then it also interpellated for the government for the reason that the government had not realized the land reform that was prescribed by the constitution.<sup>1010</sup>

Last, the speeches of the party representatives on the radio for the 1965 elections give an idea of the land reform conception of the party.<sup>1011</sup> Almost in all of the speeches, the party representatives mentioned a radical land reform. However, among all of them, one was the most exciting. This speech was given by an ordinary peasant named Hamdoş from the city of Gaziantep.<sup>1012</sup> In the speech, he described the current situation of the Turkish peasants and their relations with the land owners. According to him, the poor peasants were deceived by the land owners.<sup>1013</sup> The peasant suggested that land owners conducted their activities for the good of the peasants, and this was a deception.<sup>1014</sup> The land owner acted in his own interests, and exploited the poor peasant.<sup>1015</sup> He argued that he learnt this information from the WPT. In the past, the peasants had had nobody to guide them, but now they had the Workers Party of Turkey on their side.<sup>1016</sup>

The importance of the speech of Hamdoş arose from the WPT's different perspective on land reform. As pointed out above, the WPT did not foresee a top-

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<sup>1009</sup> Sargın, v.1, p. 342.

<sup>1010</sup> Ünsal, p.199.

<sup>1011</sup> Türkiye İşçi Partisi, *Yaşasın Emekçiler, Yaşasın Türkiye : Türkiye İşçi Partisi 10 Ekim 1965 Milletvekili Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları* (Ankara : Sosyal Adalet Yayınları, 1966).

<sup>1012</sup> Ibid., p.27.

<sup>1013</sup> Ibid., p.29.

<sup>1014</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1015</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1016</sup> Ibid.

down centralized change. It declared the democratic essence and poor peasants' participation in its land reform project. The speech of Hamdoş reflected such a perspective.

The primary aims of Communist Party of Turkey were the entrance to the village and strengthening in the village.<sup>1017</sup> In a resolution of the CPT in 1963, the alliance between the workers and peasants was stated as being crucial for the creation of the national front and leading of the working class in this front.<sup>1018</sup> These principals made the land reform issue a priority for the CPT.

In the report to the party office, secretary general Zeki Baştımar presented importance of agriculture for Turkey through demographic and economic statistics.<sup>1019</sup> He established a causal link between the development of the village and the development of the whole country.<sup>1020</sup> Without the development of the village, development of the country would be impossible.<sup>1021</sup> The first condition for the development of the village was land reform.<sup>1022</sup> He wrote that all honest persons and patriotic intellectuals of the country understood this truth. He related the worsening of the agricultural sector with Turkey's entrance into the NATO alliance. The dependency relations with the USA had weakened the agriculture in Turkey.<sup>1023</sup> Then he claimed the alliance between the comprador bourgeoisie and the big land owners, and the relation of this alliance with U.S. imperialism. On the other hand,

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<sup>1017</sup> "Türkiye Komünist Partisi Dış Bürosunun 25/3/1963 Tarihli Kararı", p.41.

<sup>1018</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1019</sup> "Zeki Baştımar'ın Raporu," p. 51.

<sup>1020</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1021</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1022</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1023</sup> Ibid.

Baştımard declared the weakness of the Communist Party of Turkey in the villages since the foundation of the party.<sup>1024</sup> This emphasis was crucial for the party's strategy of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

In an article published in *Yeniçağ*, the journal of the party, Ahmet Akıncı indicated that the 1919-1923 bourgeois revolution had not been able to realize land reform.<sup>1025</sup> For Akıncı, also the period after the revolution had been an era in which many promises had been given to the peasants, but none of them had been kept.<sup>1026</sup> After an analysis of the agricultural statistics, Akıncı declared the necessity of land reform. He reported that within the framework of the CPT's land reform conception, land reform had to aim at abolishing big land ownership, which blocked the development of the forces of production in the villages.<sup>1027</sup> He identified the basis of land reform as the free redistribution of lands of big landowners, vakıf lands and public lands to the landless and peasants with small landholdings.<sup>1028</sup> Akıncı argued that if the expropriated land had national importance, it should be organized into cooperatives or state farms.<sup>1029</sup> The current state farms should be protected and transformed into model farms.<sup>1030</sup> Until the transition to socialism, rent and land tenure relations should be arranged according to the interests of the national democratic state and peasants.<sup>1031</sup> By passing through non-capitalist development, socialism should be established after the maturation of the material and technical

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<sup>1024</sup> Ibid., p.79.

<sup>1025</sup> "Kapitalist Olmayan Gelişme Yolu ve Türkiye Gerçeği," p.239.

<sup>1026</sup> Ibid., p.241.

<sup>1027</sup> Ibid., p.243.

<sup>1028</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1029</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1030</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1031</sup> Ibid.

conditions.<sup>1032</sup> Thus Akıncı claimed that only the socialism-oriented, non-capitalist development way would be able to realize these necessary reforms.

The CPT claimed that the bourgeois governments of the RPP needed the support of the feudal land owners.<sup>1033</sup> Thus, according to the CPT, the RPP, as the party of the bourgeoisie, opposed the economic demands of the peasants and land reform. The CPT argued that the RPP had resisted accepting the existence of a land question in Turkey for long years. This situation also was related to the RPP's denial of classes and class struggle.<sup>1034</sup> The result of this policy had led to the non-entrance of capitalism to the village, and the continuation of the villages' feudal and semi-feudal status.<sup>1035</sup> The settlement of all the problems of the villages in Turkey thus was conditioned with a radical land reform by the party.<sup>1036</sup>

The land reform issue also was related to the united front strategy of the party. A report written by one of the party officers, Veli Gündüz, claimed that democracy should not be established and rooted without economic and social transformation by reforms, which should aim at exterminating fascism and disarming reactionaries, and they should also be realized in bit by bit and step by step.<sup>1037</sup> Thus land reform should be the first step, because it was the most mature step than others;

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<sup>1032</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1033</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Türkiye: Gelişme Yolları, Yakup Demir, Ahmet Akıncı" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.315.

<sup>1034</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1035</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1036</sup> Ibid., p.316.

<sup>1037</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Veli Gündüz (Mustafa Fahri Oktay) Tarafından Hazırlanmış Seminer Notu: Demokratik Kuvvetlerin Önünde Duran ve Çözüm Bekleyen Meseleler Üstüne Düşünceler" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.200.

it could attract masses and it had power to create the united front.<sup>1038</sup> Land reform issue was the common parole of all the progressive wings of society for all those reasons and there was no other issue than land reform to create the basis for the construction of the united front.<sup>1039</sup>

For the CPT, land reform was an inevitable necessity for the country's development. The developmentalist thought of the period also was reflected by the party's discourse on land reform. The Secretary General of the Party, Zeki Baştımar, described a Turkish village as the big landowners holding 14% of the total farmers with 70% of the lands; and the small land owners as 69% of the total farmers with 28% of the lands.<sup>1040</sup> The big land owners not only owned the land, but also 3 or 4 villages, sometimes 40 villages; those villages also were bought and sold like the lands.<sup>1041</sup> For Zeki Baştımar, the most important part of the statistics was the existence of 750.000 peasants who did not have any land.<sup>1042</sup> Ninety percent of the houses in the villages were not appropriate for living; half of the peasants in Turkey had problems with drinking water; and only 250 of 40,000 villages had electricity, and 16,000 had schools.<sup>1043</sup> The conclusion of the statistics for Baştımar was that the reactionary groups work for the continuation of those conditions of the village in Turkey.<sup>1044</sup> Baştımar argued that politicians mentioned the development of the

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<sup>1038</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1039</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1040</sup> Türkiye Komünist Partisi, "Türkiye Gericiliğin Kıskaçında, Yakup Demir" in *1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP*, Erden Akbulut, ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2003), p.85.

<sup>1041</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1042</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1043</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1044</sup> Ibid., p.86.

village many times, but they had not realized the most important measure for this development, land reform, the main question.<sup>1045</sup>

In a conclusion, the land reform issue became one of the most important topics of the first half of the 1960s. The political alignments from right to the left shaped the political positions on the issue. The right wing parties and conservative wing of the RPP stood against land reform. The WPT advocated a radical land reform which would be executed in a democratic way with the participation of the landless people. The *Yön* movement was also in favor of a radical land reform project that would have a top-down implementation. The CPT defended a radical land reform that would disenable the agha–comprador alliance and weaken American imperialism. The RPP’s position might be concluded as both determined and timid. It was determined about the necessity of the land reform, but the party was unsure as to whether it should be in a radical sense or not. There were several deputies that were against the land reform project of the party itself. The parliament was dominated by conservative forces. For example, the yearbook of 1962 reported the number of deputies that identified themselves as landowner as 40.<sup>1046</sup>

The RPP became an obvious supporter of the land reform after the fall of the government. During the government era, the conservative wing in the party had been more powerful; however, after the fall of the government the progressive wing gained strength. Thus a radical land reform entered again on to the agenda of the party.

On the development of the position of left of center, land reform had central importance. To the end of the 1960s, the main slogan of the left of center was “land

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<sup>1045</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1046</sup> Tahsin Demiray. Ed. *Türkiye Yıllığı*. 1962 (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1962), p.226.

to the tiller, water to the user.” In such a country that was described by a prominent historian as “only one peasant stronghold remained in or around the neighborhood of Europe and the Middle East,”<sup>1047</sup> the support of the peasants had central importance for getting the votes of the majority and having the political power by democratic means. This situation shaped the agenda of the left of center in the proceeding years, and this change was related directly to the political left’s discourse on a radical land reform and struggle for the left of center in the RPP. The new land reform policy rapidly changed the social bases and the organization of the RPP. Some local supporters and deputies of the party faced the difficulty of whether to redefine themselves or abandon the front lines of the party.

### Anti-Americanism and Anti-Imperialism

The period between 1960 and 1966 saw a rise in the both political left and anti-imperialism in Turkey. After this period, anti-imperialism continued to be the most important aspect of the Turkish left and student movement. Thus the years between 1960 and 1966 were the crystallization era for the anti-imperialist discourse. In this era, one of the main elements of the progressive politics became anti-Americanism. This anti-Americanism was of a nationalist vein, and claimed that the conflict between the economic and political interests of Turkey and American imperialism. Thus anti-imperialism was considered as real nationalism in this

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<sup>1047</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*. (London: Abacus, 1995), p. 291.



conceptual framework.<sup>1048</sup> So the terms anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism and nationalism started to be mentioned together. Tanıl Bora writes that the anti-Americanism of the period was the basis for the leap of the Turkish left in the 1960s, and in the 1970s for the ideological hegemony.<sup>1049</sup> The words “basis for the leap of the Turkish left” fits this anti-Americanism. Any other theme other than the Anti-Americanism of the period made the political left get closer in the whole history of the Turkish left.

In this conception of anti-Americanism, the main elements of the conflict between the interests of Turkey and American imperialism involved the relations with the USA and related issues like the Cyprus question, oil policy and American policies in the Third World. The emergence of the anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion intersected with the effect of the discontent of the Turkish foreign policy makers from the USA effect on Turkey.

In fact, a political discourse which was composed of nationalism, anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism and socialism was not peculiar to only Turkey. Many of the national liberation movements of the postwar period constructed direct relations with anti-imperialism and socialism. Gökhan Atılğan, in an article on socialist nationalism discourse in Turkey, refers to Eric Hobsbawm’s book *Nations*

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<sup>1048</sup> It is possible to follow the continuity in the conception of nationalism, anti-imperialism and socialism in the history of the Turkish left. Those concepts were so influential in the political thought and practice of the early Communist Party of Turkey. See Gökhan Atılğan, “Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık (1920-1971),” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, v.8, Sol (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007); Suavi Aydın, “Türkiye Solunda Özgücülük ve Milliyetçilik,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, v.8, Sol (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

<sup>1049</sup> Tanıl Bora, “Türkiye’de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD / Amerika İmgesi: Amerika ‘En’ Batı ve ‘Başka Batı,’ in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, v.3, Modernleşm ve Batıcılık (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p.163.

*and Nationalism* on the relation between anti-imperialism, socialism and

nationalism.<sup>1050</sup> In this framework, Hobsbawm indicates this relation as follows:

The general movement towards independence and decolonization, especially after 1945, unquestionably identified with socialist/communist anti-imperialism, which is perhaps why so many decolonized and newly independent states, and by no means only those in which socialists and communists had played an important part in the struggles for liberation, declared themselves to be in some sense 'socialist.' National liberation had become a slogan of the left.<sup>1051</sup>

The same period also saw the emergence of the non-aligned movement. The first official summit for the non-aligned movement met in 1961 in Belgrade, six years after the Bandung Conference of 1955.<sup>1052</sup> Examples might be augmented. The economic and political independence also became influential concepts in academic circles. The dependency theory also emerged as a reaction against modernization theory. As an example, one of the main classics of the dependency school, the *Development of Underdevelopment* of Andre Gunder Frank was published in *Monthly Review* in 1966.<sup>1053</sup>

The unity in the western bloc started to be questioned. Under the De Gaulle presidency, France implemented an independence policy and withdrew from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1966.<sup>1054</sup> This period until the 1967 Arab – Israel War was also the golden age of Arab Socialism, or

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<sup>1050</sup> Gökhan Atılğan, "Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar" *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, v.64. n.3.2009, p.12.

<sup>1051</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.149-150.

<sup>1052</sup> Sally Morphet, "Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What Is the Global South Doing and Where Is It Going?", *Global Governance*. No.10 (2004), p.521.

<sup>1053</sup> Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" *Monthly Review*, vol.18. issue.4. 1966.

<sup>1054</sup> Jeremy Ghez and Larrabee, F. Stephen "France and NATO," *Survival* 51, no.2, (2009) p.77.

Nasserism.<sup>1055</sup> Consequently, the emergence of the anti-Americanism of Turkish left and the RPP's discontent with the effect of the USA on Turkey intersected with the above-mentioned international developments. Thus nationalism, in the form of anti-imperialism, became one of the main discursive characteristic of the Turkish left.<sup>1056</sup>

The foreign policy issues in Turkey became open to question in this era. In the past, issues in Turkish foreign policy had been dealt only by the foreign policy makers. The public opinion had known about the foreign policy as much as the governments allowed. The making of the public opinion about foreign policy had been strictly controlled by the state body. The political parties needed to be in agreement about the foreign policy issues. However, this situation changed in the 1960s.

Both the periods of single party and the early cold war, the issues in Turkish foreign policy was a taboo for the Turkish press. Also political movements were assessed in the context of the foreign affairs. During the Second World War, socialists and fascists were detained according to the developments in the war. The raid on *Tan* printing house in 1945 or the 6-7 September events of 1955 are classical examples of the regime's manipulation of the press on foreign policy issues. Under the cold war conditions, the regime had no tolerance of different perspectives on the foreign policy. This situation brings an important question: Why were the 1960s the turning point?

Many answers might be given, but the most important was about the emergence of a strong socialist movement in Turkey. There was a socialist party in

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<sup>1055</sup> For Choueiri, this golden age covered the period between 1956 Suez Crisis and 1970 the death of Cemal Abdul Nasser. Youssef M. Choueiri, *Arab Nationalism-- A History: Nation and State in the Arab World* (Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2000), p.179.

<sup>1056</sup> For further analysis of nationalist discourse of the Turkish left, see Atılğan, "Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968)", pp.1-26.

the political arena and socialism was on the agenda now. Thus one can easily claim that the criticisms of socialists as a basis for political struggle had changed the taboos regarding the foreign policy.

So this era brought discontinuity on the issue of foreign policy and public opinion. Duygu Sezer, in her dissertation on public opinion and foreign policy, argues that the period after the 27 May was an era in which the foreign policy issues became opened to question.<sup>1057</sup> For Sezer, before the 1960s, the foreign policy had been a taboo for Turkish society.<sup>1058</sup> However, during the 1960s, it exited from those closed doors and the debate on foreign policy issues between the ruler and the ruling began.<sup>1059</sup> According to Sezer, the opening of the foreign policy to question started in 1964 when the Cyprus issue entered a new phase.<sup>1060</sup>

As pointed out above, the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the era was in the form of anti-Americanism. Until the 1960s, the American effect on Turkey had been central. The USA started to become influential on Turkey after the Truman doctrine of 1947. After the Second World War, Stalin's USSR demanded bases on the Turkish straits and territorial concessions.<sup>1061</sup> At that time the Grand Alliance of WWII was dissolved, and the containment policy of the United States was put in practice. This policy was described by the theorist of containment, George F. Kennan, as follows: "it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant

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<sup>1057</sup> Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika* (Ankara : Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), p.xvii.

<sup>1058</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1059</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1060</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1061</sup> For those demands, see Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," in Baskın Oran (Ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp.501-509.

containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>1062</sup> The main instruments of the containment policy became the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.<sup>1063</sup> Thus by the Truman Doctrine, Turkey, like Greece, attended the western front in the newly emerging cold war.

The Truman Doctrine emerged with a speech by President Truman in 1947. In this speech Harry S. Truman declared that the Great Britain was not able to provide economic aid to Turkey and Greece, and then this would be the responsibility of the USA as follows:

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey....The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.....Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.<sup>1064</sup>

President Truman described the aim and function of the economic aid as

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside

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<sup>1062</sup> Mr X. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): p.575.

<sup>1063</sup> On the Long Telegram of Kennan and the relation between the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: The Deals. The Spies. The Lies. The Truth* (Penguin Books: London, 2007), pp. 27-34.

<sup>1064</sup> “Truman Doctrine,” in *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History*, Barton J. Bernstein and Allan J. Matusow (ed.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 251-254.

pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.<sup>1065</sup>

Then Turkey applied to the USA to join the Marshall Plan, and was accepted in 1948.

After the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the next important steps for Turkey were entrance to the Korean War in 1950 and becoming a NATO member in 1952.<sup>1066</sup> Turkey then became a loyal member of western alliance during the cold war. In international conflicts and in the United Nations, Turkey was a reliable ally of the USA, and took an important place in the south wing of the NATO alliance. However, the bilateral relations of Turkey and USA started to become problematic with the 1960s.

The foreign policy events in the first half of the 1960s that created disagreement between Turkey and the USA were basically the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U-2 issue and more importantly the Cyprus question.<sup>1067</sup> Those issues and the attitude of the US created doubts and discontents among the Turkish foreign policy decision makers. The main reason for those doubts and discontents were about the national security. The U-2 and the Cuban Missile Crisis issues were directly related to the USSR. Those issues indicated that Turkish security policies were dependent on the United States and NATO alliance. Then, the Cyprus issue obviously taught Turkish foreign policy makers that the United States might neglect Turkish security

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<sup>1065</sup> Ibid.. p.255.

<sup>1066</sup> For the general assessment of Turkish foreign policy between 1945 and 1960, see Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu" in Baskın Oran (Ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp.479-498.

<sup>1067</sup> For those questions, see Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in Baskın Oran (Ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp.681-691.

during major confrontations with the USSR, if the USA interests different from those of Turkey.

The issue of the international atmosphere was also crucial for the emergence of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The main characteristic of this atmosphere was the thaw in the cold war conditions. The cold war had several different sub-periods,<sup>1068</sup> during which the strategies of the USA and NATO changed. NATO changed its policy of massive retaliation to the flexible response in the 1960s. The developments in armed technology were the main reason for this change. Then this situation continued with the policies of peaceful co-existence and détente through the 1960s and 1970s. Under those circumstances, Turkey, as a medium-ranking state in the western alliance, was able to implement a relatively autonomous policy after the 1960s.<sup>1069</sup> If the thaw in the cold war had not occurred, Turkey would not have had the opportunity to implement such a policy. On the other hand, the left wing policies that were harshly suppressed during the cold war were a bit tolerated in this era in tandem with this change.

The RPP's position was different from that of the left. The policy of the party was not related to anti-imperialism. It reflected the so-called realist foreign policy perception of the Turkish political elites. The party was discontent with the influence of the USA on the Turkish politics and the peremptory attitude of the USA on the foreign policy issues in which the interests of Turkey and the USA conflicted. The effect of the USA on the fall of the third İnönü government and the American policy

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<sup>1068</sup> On the cold war, see John Lewis Gaddis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Michael Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Mike Sewell, *The Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ron Robin. *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001); Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949* (New York : Pearson/Longman, 2003); Charles S. Maier(Ed.), *The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996).

<sup>1069</sup> Oran, p.672.

on the Cyprus question was the most important examples. On the other hand, the party tried to diversify the foreign policy alternatives of the country. The Ankara agreement, which constructed the formal relations between the European Economic Community and Turkey, was signed in the era of the RPP governments.<sup>1070</sup> The place of the State Planning Organization was central in the signing process of the agreement, and it was assessed as harmonious with the planned development perspective of the period.<sup>1071</sup>

On the other hand, the party attempted to review the relations with the USSR. Consequently, it is not possible to assess the RPP's policy in the context of the anti-imperialist doctrines. However, the anti-American attitudes in the party were strengthened by the national interest perspective.

In the above parts, the Cyprus issue and its importance in İnönü governments' era were discussed. The importance of the issue will be dealt with in a more detail in this part. Because of the conflict on the island, there was a war risk between Turkey and Greece. Both of the countries were members of the NATO, and a war between them might destroy the south wing of the NATO defense conception. Therefore the Cyprus issue also was related to the USA. Thus the main aim of the USA's Cyprus policy was the prevention of a possible war between Turkey and Greece.

In June 1964, the two countries come to the brink of war. The conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots directed Turkey to initiate a unilateral military intervention. The Turkish government informed the US embassy in Ankara

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<sup>1070</sup> On the Ankara Agreement, see Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Baskın Oran (Ed.) v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp.831-837.

<sup>1071</sup> Fahri Aral (Ed.) *Planlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960'larda Türkiye'de Planlama Deneyimi* (İstanbul : Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), p.62.



of this decision.<sup>1072</sup> The USA Ambassador, Raymond Hare, demanded 24 hours from the İnönü government.<sup>1073</sup> The next day, he brought a letter from US president Lyndon Johnson that ended the decision of intervention. However, the tone and messages of the letter started a new period in Turkish–American relations. The adviser of İnönü on Cyprus issue, Nihat Erim, described the meaning of Johnson letter, saying “The effect of the Johnson letter on Turkish–American relations had been seen hitherto. We can say that to this date Turkey has been the only country where ‘go home’ has not been said to the Americans.”<sup>1074</sup>

The style of Johnson letter was not harmonious with the alliance relation between those two countries. Johnson protested and warned İnönü in a letter.<sup>1075</sup> As discussed above, the Johnson letter had two crucial points, one on the potential intervention of the USSR, and the other on the use of the military aid of the USA in the military intervention.<sup>1076</sup>

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<sup>1072</sup> Oran, 726.

<sup>1073</sup> Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk – Amerikan İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002), p.10.

<sup>1074</sup> Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara : Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1975). p.303.

<sup>1075</sup> Johnson put his position in these words “Ambassador Hare has indicated that you postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.” “Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966,” *Middle East Journal* 20 no.3 (1966:Summer), p.386. For an alternative interpretations of İnönü’s Cyprus policy as being “peaceful and American brokered settlement,” see Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Johnson Letter Revisited,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29, no.3 (July 1993).

<sup>1076</sup> “Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü,” p.387. The views of Johnson on those issues are as follows: “A military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” “I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished.

Johnson letter “both in wording and content” was a shock for the RPP government. İnönü responded to the letter with a harsh letter. However İnönü, before the Johnson Letter, had been discontent with the US policy on Cyprus. The most important sign of this discontent was an interview with a correspondent of *Time* magazine in April 1964. In this interview, İnönü gave a sharp message about his policy on the Cyprus question and this question’s possible consequences for Turkish-American relations. However *Time* did not publish this interview.<sup>1077</sup> A few days later, the daily *Milliyet* published the words of İnönü. The title of the article was “The Western Alliance Is Decomposed.”<sup>1078</sup> İnönü stated his views as “Our allies (the USA and Greece) compete with the far states (the USSR) that work for the decomposition of the alliance. We are patient for the alliance not to break down but to continue. If our allies become successful in their efforts to break the alliance, a new world is established.”<sup>1079</sup> The last words of the interview were the most remarkable part as “Turkey finds its place in this world.”<sup>1080</sup>

The Johnson letter was successful, and the İnönü government cancelled the decision to intervene on the island. However, İnönü indicated his position via a letter to President Johnson, as pointed out above. İnönü’s letter started with a protest to Johnson because of the letter’s crudity.<sup>1081</sup> İnönü’s response to Johnson on the

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Your government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”

<sup>1077</sup> On the story of the interview, see Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, “Sadece İnönü Düşündü, *Radikal* (12 January 2007).

<sup>1078</sup> *Milliyet*, 16 April 1964.

<sup>1079</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1080</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1081</sup> İnönü protested Johnson’s style with those words “your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its

potential USSR intervention was to question the necessity and power of the NATO alliance.<sup>1082</sup>

It is crucial to note that Turkey's rapprochement with the USSR was directly related to the rise of the problems with the USA. The bilateral visits were the symbols of this rapprochement. In 1964 October, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin visited Moscow.<sup>1083</sup> In January 1965, the Chair of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny came to Turkey.<sup>1084</sup> Then, in August 1965, Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü went to the USSR.<sup>1085</sup> In 1966, the chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin visited Turkey.<sup>1086</sup> The

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relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergence of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations. It is my sincere hope that both these divergence and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected." Correspondence between, p.388.

<sup>1082</sup> İnönü questioned the meaning of the alliance with those words "The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to project in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the north Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO should start discussing the right and the wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking the forthwith such an action as they deem necessary." Ibid., p.391.

<sup>1083</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu Işığında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Türkiye Politikası, 1964-1980* (İstanbul: DER Yayınları, 1995), p.39.

<sup>1084</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1085</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1086</sup> Ibid.

bilateral visits of the period were also continued by the Demirel government. In 1967, prime minister Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow.<sup>1087</sup>

As discussed above, anti-imperialism would be one of the main features and themes of the Turkish left in the following period. It played a crucial role in the rising left platform. The youth movement rose in an anti-imperialist way after 1968. The main emergence era for anti-Americanism occurred in this period. The RPP was invited to this front by all of the groups of the left. However, the attitude of the RPP on the issue was ambivalent. The party was indignant about the US, but it abstained from joining the front. Nevertheless the grassroots of the party was clearer on the issue.

University students were among the most important supporters of the party in the urban areas. According to a study in 1964 and 1965, the 47.7% of the Ankara University students supported the RPP.<sup>1088</sup> 35,8% of activists in the student organizations were supporters of the RPP.<sup>1089</sup> Thus it was clear that the university students in Turkey in the first half of the 1960s were mainly in the RPP's political line. It should be indicated that the youth and the radical wing of the party became very influential in the construction of this anti-Americanism.

On the other hand, one of the interesting events that happened in Ecevit's labor ministry period involved the representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Turkey, John Thalmayer. On 12 August 1962, the Federation of Turkey Construction Workers (*Türkiye Yapı-İş Federasyonu*) arranged

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<sup>1087</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1088</sup> Özer Ozankaya, *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966), p. 75. Emin Alper interprets the results of this survey as follows: "The rate of RPP supporters even rose to 70% when the students who had no choices were excluded." See Emin Alper, *Student Movement in Turkey from a Global Perspective, 1960-1971* (Ph.D. dissertation: Bogazici University, 2009), p.151.

<sup>1089</sup> Ozankaya, p.75.

a demonstration in Zonguldak Ereğli.<sup>1090</sup> In this demonstration, the American construction firm Morrison and İnönü government were protested.<sup>1091</sup> Thalmayer attended this demonstration and according to some sources he joined the organization of the demonstration.<sup>1092</sup> After the demonstration, the Ministry of Interior Affairs did not extend the residence permit of Thalmayer. Thus Thalmayer was deported from the country.<sup>1093</sup>

The decision of the government was protested by the Turkish trade unionists. However the chairman of the Türk-İş, Seyfi Demirsoy, supported the government. Bülent Ecevit, as the Minister of Labor, kept the government's position. Ecevit harshly criticized Thalmayer in a public speech on 26 August 1962, and defended the deportation decision.<sup>1094</sup> He also declared his support for the Morrison Company and foreign investments in Turkey.<sup>1095</sup> It is noteworthy that Thalmayer event occurred before the Cyprus question and the Johnson letter. Thus this event reflects the change in the conception of the American effect and foreign investments in Turkey.

It should be noted that the fall of the İnönü government was the turning point for the RPP's position change, the left's perspective of the RPP and the relations between the RPP and the left. From İnönü's and the party's point of view, the main reason for the cabinet's fall had foreign origins. İnönü thought the USA was the actor behind the operation against his government. In 1966, when the opposition in the

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<sup>1090</sup> On the meeting, see "Ereğli Yapı İşçileri Mitingi," in *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, vol.1, ed. Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996), p.405.

<sup>1091</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1092</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1093</sup> For the news about the deportation decision about Thalmayer and deportation, see *Milliyet*, 20 August – 1 September 1962; İlhan Selçuk "Hoş Geldi Johnson. Güle Güle Thalmayer..." *Yön*, no.37 (22 August 1962), p.3.

<sup>1094</sup> *Milliyet*, 27 August 1962.

<sup>1095</sup> Ibid.

party emerged, İnönü told his opponents to contact the Americans, because the Americans had found a new Prime Minister to replace him in February 1965 and now they might again find a new general chairman for the party.<sup>1096</sup> This perspective was not publicly stated by İnönü and the RPP representatives at that time. Nevertheless the WPT and the *Yön* movement, as will be scrutinized below, strongly emphasized this perspective. The student movement claimed the USA had influenced on the fall of the government with a powerful voice. The most important student leaders of the period issued a declaration in which they declared their views as follows:

It does not escape observation that, like those played in underdeveloped countries, American imperialism is in the planning of staging another act of Vietnam, Congo events in Turkey. In the budget sessions of the Parliament, although the alliance of the JP, RPNP, NP and NTP against the RPP government, and as a result their bringing the government down look like events that take place in every democratic country, the real face of these events is not as they seem to be. When the American Ambassador's visit to the JP and RPNP, and the last statement of Ahmet Oğuz, the leader of the RPNP, are evaluated in a systemic way, the real face of the action appears.<sup>1097</sup>

Demirel's former career in US Morrison Company and the above-mentioned meeting of USA ambassador Raymond Hare with the leaders of the opposition, including Demirel, before the budget voting was on the agenda now.<sup>1098</sup> İnönü's son-

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<sup>1096</sup> Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p.221.

<sup>1097</sup> *Milliyet*, 15 February 1965.

*Amerikan emperyalizminin geri kalmış ülkelerde oynadığı Vietnam, Kongo olaylarının bir perdesini Türkiye'de sahneye koyma hazırlıkları içinde olduğu gözden kaçmamaktadır....TBMM bütçe görüşmeleri sırasında CHP hükümetine karşı AP'nin ve CKMP, MP ve YTP ile işbirliği yapması ve neticede hükümeti düşürmesi gerçekte iktidar ile muhalefet arasında olan ve her demokratik ülkede rastlanan bir hal ise de, olayların gerçek yüzü hiç de böyle değildir... sistemli bir şekilde Amerikan Büyükelçisinin CKMP'yi ve AP'yi ziyaret etmesi ve CKMP lideri Ahmet Oğuz'un son beyanatı birleştirildiğinde işin gerçek yüzü ortaya çıkmaktadır.*

<sup>1098</sup> For those claims, see *Milliyet*, 3 January 1965; 15 January 1965; 15 February 1965.

in-law and the author of one of the most important book series on İsmet İnönü, Metin Toker, described the situation from their point of view:

When the ‘Holy Alliance’<sup>1099</sup> intensified their pressure, the groups against İsmet Paşa threw the masks from their faces and got into action. They were led by the USA. When Demirel and the ‘Holy Alliance’ declared their intention to bring İsmet Paşa Government down, the Ambassador of the United States in Ankara visited the JP and RPNP Headquarters in a spectacular way. There he met with Demirel and Ahmet Oğuz. Thus it was demonstrated that America stands in the Holy Alliance and the associates of the operation were made sure that they have the support of the America. It is interesting that whenever a (political) operation was conducted against İsmet Paşa, an American emerged in the political circles of Ankara. In the Aydemir case, it was Talbott. When a chancellor was sought to accept the brilliant plan of Johnson on the Cyprus question, General Porter was sent. Now, Hare is on the stage.<sup>1100</sup>

Then Toker quoted references to two articles in the weekly *Time* to show the American perspective. The original text of the quotations was as follows

Like almost everyone else these days, İnönü is trying to make domestic political capital by playing the anti-American game. Ever since the U.S. refused to back Turkey all the way against Greece over the embittered Cyprus issue, İsmet İnönü has demonstrated his independence from the U.S. by flirting with Russia.<sup>1101</sup>

Showing signs of desperation, İnönü’s government has resorted to anti-American tactics with an electorate convinced that Washington let Turkey down in the Cyprus dispute. At the same time, Turkey—long known as one

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<sup>1099</sup> The name of the parliamentary bloc against İnönü government.

<sup>1100</sup> Toker, v.6, p. 229.

*Mukaddes ittifakın çalışmaları bu haldeyken İsmet Paşa’ya karşı çevreler de maskelerini yüzlerinden atmış, harekete geçmişlerdir. Bunların başında Amerika vardı. Demirel ve mukaddes ittifak İsmet Paşa’yı düşürmek niyetlerini ilan ettiklerinde Ankara’daki Amerikan büyükelçisi, AP ile CKMP genel merkezlerini gösterişli bir tarzda ziyaret etti. Oralarda Demirel ve Ahmet Oğuz ile görüştü. Böylelikle Amerikanın mukaddes ittifakın arkasında bulunduğunu belirtiyor, darbenin ortaklarına da Amerikanın desteğine sahip oldukları hissettiriliyordu. Tuhaftır, İsmet Paşaya karşı ne zaman bir tertip yapılırsa bir Amerikalı Ankara’nın siyasi çevresinde boy göstermiştir. Aydemir olayında bu, Talbott idi. Kıbrıs konusunda Johnson’un parlak planını kabul edebilecek arandığında, gönderilen General Porter oldu. Şimdi Hare sahnedeydi.*

<sup>1101</sup> Time, “Turkey: Who Is Indispensable?,” *Time*, v.85, no.9, (26 February 1965).

of the West's staunchest allies—has begun flirting with Russia. Turkey and Russia have signed a cultural agreement, denounced by the Justice Party as a "document of treason," and last month Ankara warmly received a Soviet parliamentary delegation.<sup>1102</sup>

In conclusion, it is possible to identify the sentiment of İnönü's side about the relations with the US as a grand disappointment.

However, two campaigns in this period in which the main supporters were university students became central on the development of anti-Americanism. The first one was about the armament of the Turkish navy. The name of the campaign was "Nation Does" (*Millet Yapar*). The Nation Does campaign was organized by the daily *Cumhuriyet*. On 29-30 April and 1 May 1965, a *Cumhuriyet* correspondent named Yılmaz Çetiner published three articles about the US aid to the Turkish and Greek navies. According to him, the USA had changed the balance between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea in favor of the Greeks.<sup>1103</sup> The USA had given six destroyers, 44 landing ships and two submarines to Greece. However, Turkey had received no landing ships. So Greece had been chosen instead of Turkey by the USA.

After those articles, *Cumhuriyet* started a public campaign for aid to the navy.<sup>1104</sup> The full name of the campaign was "Nation Does So That the Others Do Not Give" (*Başkasının Vermediğini Millet Yapar*), or in short "Nation Does". During the campaign, bureaucrats, politicians, students, businessmen and ordinary people attended the campaign and donated money. *Cumhuriyet* gave news about the donations during May and June. The government formed a Navy Association (*Donanma Cemiyeti*) for the strengthening of the Turkish navy. This campaign gave

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<sup>1102</sup> Time, "Turkey: Ghost on the Go," *Time*, v.85, no.8, (19 February 1965).

<sup>1103</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1965.

<sup>1104</sup> For the campaign, see *Cumhuriyet*, May and June 1965.



weight to the nationalist sentiments against the US. The Cyprus question and danger of war with Greece were the main foreign policy issues during the 1960s. A campaign that claimed Greece was favored by the US over Turkey, not surprisingly it had become influential and the alliance with the US was questioned by the public opinion.

The second important campaign was called National Oil. This campaign was led by one of the writers of the journal *Forum*, Muammer Aksoy, who published five articles from May 15 to 11 July 1965 on the oil question.<sup>1105</sup> In those articles, he criticized the Minister of Energy and Natural Materials, Mehmet Turgut. The Oil Act had been passed into law in 1954. This Act gave the right to the foreign companies to seek oil. According to Aksoy, the foreign companies did not aim at finding oil. They did not find oil; moreover, they prevented Turkey from finding oil. Thus the big oil companies sold oil to Turkey at high prices. With this view, the student leaders of the period organized a National Oil campaign in which campaign they demanded a new Oil Act and promoted the use of national oil.

In fact, a national oil campaign had been called for by *Yön* journal at the end of 1964. *Yön* had been closed down after by the declaration of the martial law after the second military coup attempt of Talat Aydemir in May 1963. In September 1964, it again started to be published. National oil became central in this new publication period of the journal.<sup>1106</sup> At this point, an article by Fay Kirby Berkes on the oil question proposed a campaign on the oil question.<sup>1107</sup> Atılgan noted that several

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<sup>1105</sup> Muammer Aksoy, "Büyük Milli Davamız: Petrol Davasında Tehlikeli ve Utanılacak Çabalar" *Forum*, no.267 (15 May 1965); Muammer Aksoy, "Petrol Savaşında Yalan ve Demagoji Silahı ve Mirasyedilik" *Forum*, no.268 (1 June 1965); Muammer Aksoy, "Petrol Davamız" *Forum*, no.269 (15 June 1965); Muammer Aksoy, "Petrol Davamız" *Forum*, no.270 (1 July 1965); Muammer Aksoy, "Petrol Komisyonu ve Petrol Davamızı Baltalayan Bir Bakan" *Forum*, no.271 (15 July 1965).

<sup>1106</sup> Atılgan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, p.183.

<sup>1107</sup> Fay Kirby Berkes, "Yön'ün Yükselttiği Ses," *Yön*, no.84 (6 November 1964).

writers such as Çetin Altan and Muammer Aksoy in *Yön* had published similar articles.<sup>1108</sup> There were several small scale attempts at a national oil campaign. However, the initiation of a national oil campaign started in the spring of 1965. At this point the timing of the campaign was crucial. As discussed above, the political conditions had changed in the spring of 1965. The radicalization of the RPP and WPT's efforts to relate the party with the 27 May and Atatürkism accelerated in this period. Thus although the national oil campaign has been on the agenda for the progressives since 1964, the campaign was put into practice in the spring of 1965.<sup>1109</sup> National oil had an important place in the left of center discourse of the RPP.

In November 1965, 38 young faculty members from the law and political sciences faculties of Ankara University and Middle East Technical University issued a declaration protesting the foreign policy attitude of the United States in Vietnam.<sup>1110</sup> They demanded an end to the Vietnam War and an end of foreign intervention into the Vietnam War.<sup>1111</sup> They claimed that Turkey should stand on the side of the countries that fought for their independence. The co-signatories criticized the foreign policy attitude of the government which they felt demonstrated that Turkey was a satellite of the West. This declaration marked a change in Turkish foreign policy discussions. The foreign policy of the government was harshly criticized by the faculty members in the columns of the newspapers.

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<sup>1108</sup> Atılğan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, p.183.

<sup>1109</sup> In the summer of 1965, *Yön* started a new campaign against Coca-Cola. In this campaign *Yön* called for its readers not to consume Coca-Cola. For the campaign, see Yön, "Coca Cola Zehirdir İçmeyin," *Yön*, no.119 (9 July 1965).

<sup>1110</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 November 1965.

<sup>1111</sup> *Ibid.*

Anti-Americanism was central in the political discourse of the *Yön* movement. Doğan Avcıoğlu's articles and *Yön* journal's special world reports played central roles in this process. However, the articles in *Yön* were not the only activity. The *Yön* movement also published a book on American imperialism and American war doctrines, and the preface of the book was written by Avcıoğlu.<sup>1112</sup> Avcıoğlu's evaluation in this preface exactly reflected the perspective of the *Yön* movement on this issue. He argued that American war specialists had constructed war doctrines and the American administration had implemented these doctrines.<sup>1113</sup> The Vietnam case was the result of these doctrines that aimed to demolish national liberation movements. According to Avcıoğlu, the USA had not come to Turkey to prevent an attack by the USSR on Turkey. When the USSR threatened Turkey after the Second World War, the USA had left Turkey alone.<sup>1114</sup> However, when the USA needed military bases in Turkey, the USA became Turkey's advocate. He claimed that the foreign aid to Turkey was not for the economic development of Turkey, but for the armament of Turkey, which meant the security for the USA. To Avcıoğlu, the book by M. Fahri on American imperialism and American war doctrines had been written for the Turkish nationalists, because Turkish nationalists should know the truth about America.<sup>1115</sup> At last, Avcıoğlu quoted de Gaulle saying that the biggest danger for peace and stability in the world was the USA's great power. Avcıoğlu's preface was a clear example of the anti-American perspective of the *Yön* movement. In this framework, *Yön* represented its position as real nationalism, and according to the *Yön*

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<sup>1112</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Önsöz", in M. Fahri, *Amerikan Harp Doktrinleri* (İstanbul: Yön Yayınlar, 1966), p.5-6.

<sup>1113</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>1114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1115</sup> Ibid.

movement, the primary mission of Turkish nationalists was the struggle against American imperialism.

For the *Yön* movement, the national liberation movements in the Third World were very important for the retreat of the American hegemony. Thus the socialist struggle and national liberation movements were considered in the same context. Avcıoğlu wrote many articles on the policies of the USA in the Third World. According to him, the USA was the major threat to national liberation wars.<sup>1116</sup> The USA attempt to suppress all national liberation movements was called “counter insurgency theory” by the American elites.<sup>1117</sup> The Vietnamese case was the main example of this situation.<sup>1118</sup> Avcıoğlu argued that after the suppression of a movement, the USA established puppet regimes in those kind of countries.<sup>1119</sup>

In a different article, Avcıoğlu likened Turkey to those kind of regimes.<sup>1120</sup> He claimed that there was an alliance between the compradors and the aghas in Turkey.<sup>1121</sup> This alliance advocated the interests of foreigners over the national interests. He identified the components of the alliance as the servants of international capital. The agha – comprador alliance behaved with class consciousness, and their struggle was a class struggle.<sup>1122</sup> So against them, he called the forces on the side of labor to the class struggle. The primary task for this class struggle conception was the national struggle against American imperialism. The result of this situation, for

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<sup>1116</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Milli Kurtuluş Savaşları ve Amerika,” *Yön*, no.142 (17 December 1965).

<sup>1117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1120</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Avcıoğlu, Sınıf Mücadelesi Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik,” *Yön*, no.182 (23 September 1966).

<sup>1121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1122</sup> Ibid.

Avcıoğlu, was the unity of the social struggle and the national struggle.<sup>1123</sup> Under those circumstances, Avcıoğlu argued that the progressive forces of the society should take the responsibility of the national struggle. This approach to political struggle was very similar to his perspective on the national liberation movements in the Third World.

As pointed out in the above parts, the *Yön* movement had supported the left of center group in the RPP. For the *Yön* movement, the USA was against the RPP's coming to the left of center.<sup>1124</sup> The USA wanted a political party system in which there were two anti-communist parties that did not question the USA. *Yön* defined this party system as Philippine or Colombian type of democracy. For those reasons, the USA was discontent with the RPP's opening to the left with Bülent Ecevit. To *Yön*, the USA was worried about the formation of a front of the all leftists; in other words, the real nationalists.<sup>1125</sup> In a different article, Avcıoğlu compared the center left politics in Greece and Turkey by comparing Ecevit and Papandreou.<sup>1126</sup> Then Avcıoğlu indicated that the USA was not pleased with these two politicians.<sup>1127</sup>

After the *Yön* movement, the Workers Party of Turkey had central importance in the construction of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The personal histories of the party leaders were also harmonious with this policy. The leader of the WPT, Mehmet Ali Aybar, had criticized Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of the cold

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<sup>1123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1124</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "CHP'de Sola Açılış" *Yön*, no.187 (28 October 1966).

<sup>1125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1126</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Ortanın Solu ve Amerika" *Yön*, no.211 (14 April 1967).

<sup>1127</sup> Ibid.

war.<sup>1128</sup> Behice Boran was also the head of the Turkish Pacifist Association (*Türk Barışsever Cemiyeti*), which opposed the entrance of Turkey to the Korean War.<sup>1129</sup> After the WPT's entrance into the parliament, its primary agenda became anti-Americanism. In his first days of the parliament after 1965 elections, Aybar declared that American military bases were lands under American sovereignty.<sup>1130</sup>

It is crucial that after Mehmet Ali Aybar's coming to the party leadership, the independence issue became the primary focus for the party. The party assessed American imperialism as the main barrier before Turkey's development. On the other hand, the WPT differed from the other actors of the left on the issue of the struggle against imperialism. The party suggested a parliamentary struggle led by the working class against imperialism. The party opened the American effect to question in many ways.

For the assessment of the WPT's views of anti-Americanism, an analysis of the official party documents, most importantly party program, is crucial. The party program started with the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "we are the people who follow the doctrine that calls to fight collectively against imperialism that seeks to destroy us and capitalism that wants to swallow us all together as an entire nation."<sup>1131</sup> This reference to Atatürk brought the National Independence War and conceptualized that war as one against imperialism and capitalism. In this way, the WPT initiated to construct causal and organic links between the party and the

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<sup>1128</sup> See Barış Ünlü, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp.113-127.

<sup>1129</sup> Atılğan, *Behice Boran*, p.156.

<sup>1130</sup> Ünlü, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*, p.242.

<sup>1131</sup> *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı*, p.11.  
*Biz bu hakkımızı korumak, bağımsızlığımızı güven altında bulundurabilmek için, toptan, milletçe bizi mahvetmek isteyen emperyalizme karşı ve bizi yutmak isteyen kapitalizme karşı milletçe savaşmayı uygun gören bir doktrini izleyen insanlarız.*

authentic national struggle in Turkey. Then the WPT program defined nationalism as one of the main principles of the party.<sup>1132</sup> According to the WPT, Turkish nationalism was a reaction of Turkish people who had lived under a semi-colonial system for centuries. This reaction was against the foreign yoke and exploitation. Turkish nationalism was the expression of this reaction in the ideological field.<sup>1133</sup> Then the party indicated that it was against all kinds of exploitation and colonialism. It also argued that it was against exploitation and colonialism for Turkey and for all other countries.<sup>1134</sup> Thus the party positioned itself in the sight of Third World and national liberation movements.

On the foreign policy conception of the WPT and the party's view on the relations with the USA, a speech of Mehmet Ali Aybar in the assembly sessions on the Demirel government's program is revealing. In this speech, Aybar argued that the most important part of the government program was about the foreign policy and foreign relations.<sup>1135</sup> For Aybar, Turkey was a country that had been made underdeveloped by the imperialists. Thus the main condition for development was to oppose the foreign powers (imperialism and capitalism) that had made Turkey underdeveloped. Likewise, Aybar argued that the economic and political independence of the country should be cautiously protected.<sup>1136</sup>

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<sup>1132</sup> Ibid., p.79.

<sup>1133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1135</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Aybar'ın Konuşması" in *TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) Parlamentoda 1963-1966*. Turhan Salman (Ed.), v.1 (İstanbul : TÜSTAV, 2004), p.101.

<sup>1136</sup> Ibid.

According to Aybar, after the death of Atatürk, Turkey had fallen rapidly under the influence of the West; moreover Turkey became its satellite.<sup>1137</sup> Aybar indicated that such a policy was against the foundations of Atatürk, whatever its reason became. Then Aybar argued that 35 million square meters of the homeland was under the sovereignty of the USA.<sup>1138</sup> Without the permission of the USA, no agent of the Turkish state was able to even set foot on that land whatever his rank in the state body. Aybar indicated that Turkey had no authority over what went on in those bases. The main two points of Aybar's discourse were Atatürkism and independence. The national independence war was central in the intersection of those two points. Then Aybar again implied the underdeveloped situation of the country. He related this underdevelopment to the regress from Atatürk's independence principle.

Last, the CPT's views on the anti-Americanism will be evaluated here. The CPT was in the political line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For this reason, its views should have been in line with the Soviet Union's political strategy. The party had had a nationalist discourse since its foundation in terms of anti-imperialism. Thus the issues of anti-imperialism and nationalism in the form of anti-Americanism were central in the political discourse of the party.

During the 1960s, the party had supported the political activities of the WPT in Turkey. However, the leadership of the party did not reflect a unique character. Many of the former leaders of the party who live in Turkey, such as Mihri Belli and Reşat Fuat Baraner, were the opponents of the new party leaders, mainly Zeki Baştımar. This division of the party also influenced the political conception of the

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<sup>1137</sup> Ibid., p.102.

<sup>1138</sup> Ibid.



WPT's political line and the anti-imperialism issue. This division divided the political left in Turkey after 1966 by the thesis of national democratic revolution and socialist revolution.<sup>1139</sup> However in the analysis period of this dissertation, it is hard to mention a difference in the political strategy and anti-imperialist discourse of the WPT, the CPT leaders in exile and former leaders of the CPT.

The CPT's perspective on the issue should be considered in the context of the international solidarism of the communist parties and their struggle against the US imperialism. In this framework, for the CPT, American imperialism's aggressive face had shown itself out after the development of the socialist countries, the economic successes of the USSR and the disintegration of colonialism.<sup>1140</sup> The party identified the aim of the international alliances under the leadership of the USA as fighting against the socialist world and the overwhelming international communist and national liberation movements. Then it criticized the Turkish governments for taking part in those war organizations of the imperialists.<sup>1141</sup> For the party, the main reason for the economic problems, reactionarism and misery in the country was this war policy and war preparations. Thus the party identified the USA and its allies as the main threat against the world peace.

On the other hand, the American developmentalist discourse and economic and military aid were in perspective of the Communist Party of Turkey. According to the CPT, Turkey was not able to develop with the American aids. The party identified the aid as a new type of American colonialism.<sup>1142</sup> Under those

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<sup>1139</sup> For the place of the national democratic revolution thesis in Turkish left, see Aydınoglu, *Türkiye Solu*, pp.141-187.

<sup>1140</sup> "1962 Konferansı Kararı," p. 91.

<sup>1141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1142</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

circumstance, for the party an economic crisis was inevitable, and it had come before the 27 May military coup.

The CPT argued that the discontent of the ordinary people had crystallized before the 27 May, and the masses set hope to the new administration. However, the military administration did not solve the questions. For the CPT, the main sign for this situation was the military administration's declaration of loyalty to NATO and CENTO. Thus the party argued that the new administration was not aware of the real problem: American imperialism.<sup>1143</sup> The American monopolies controlled the economy, there were several American military bases in the country, and the country was economically, politically and militarily dependent on the USA. Under those conditions, the aid of the American administration was false aids, and their real aim was to make Turkey a focal point for the war.

The CPT's assessment of the RPP governments in terms of the USA was also important. According to the CPT, the İnönü governments blamed the economic and social crisis on the corruption of the previous governments.<sup>1144</sup> They had not dealt with the real problems of the country.<sup>1145</sup> Within this framework, the CPT argued that the RPP had rejected the request of the USSR to restore relations between the two countries. Thus the party concluded the position of Turkey as a focal point of war and provocation for the interests of the imperialists. However, this opinion about the RPP changed after the fall of the İnönü government.

As discussed above, the RPP had radicalized its political line and constructed a reformist discourse after the fall of the government. Under those conditions, hope

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<sup>1143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1144</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>1145</sup> Ibid.

for a progressive coalition after the coming elections had emerged. The CPT supported this policy with the united front strategy. It called for the creation of such a front, and invited the progressive wing of the RPP to join this front against the American imperialism and its effects in Turkey.

In conclusion, Turkey had always been a country that was responsive to foreign influences, and the political composition in the country was directly affected by them. So the emergence of a strong socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s was related to the thaw in the cold war and the rise of the problems between the USA and Turkey. On the other hand, socialist movements in Turkey reshaped Turkish nationalism and gave it an anti-American essence.

Within this framework, the RPP's coming to the left of center was related directly to those new developments. Under those circumstances, the European type of socialism was considered to be the new role model for the RPP. Bülent Ecevit's book *Left of Center* reflected such a perspective. Ecevit described Turkey in 1966 as a country under left pressures that came from four directions to the country.<sup>1146</sup> This geographical definition was used by Ecevit to indicate different kind of socialisms that would be influential in Turkey. The pressure that came from the North was the Soviet type of socialism. The southern pressure was the Arab socialism, and the eastern was the Chinese one. The last was from the West. He differentiated between the western type of socialism and the others for its devotion to the democracy.<sup>1147</sup> Clearly this emphasis on the West referred to Europe rather than the United States.

Consequently, the RPP policy on the relations with the USA should be considered differently from the anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism of the left.

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<sup>1146</sup> Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu*, p.27.

<sup>1147</sup> Ibid.

The change in the RPP's view on the issue started with the doubts about the USA on the security issues of the era, most importantly, the Cyprus question. After the fall of the last İnönü government, the RPP's covert view on this issue resembled anti-Americanism of the left. This development created a rapprochement between the left and the RPP. However, it did not reach a united front policy which had been expected by several wings of the left. In the process of the RPP's move to the left of center, the perspective on relations with the USA became the most important and the only topic that was adapted by the RPP from western social democracy. Thus on this issue, it is possible to see a resemblance between the RPP's stance and western social democracy, and the terms "social democrat" or "left of center" in the western sense might be considered as appropriate most on this issue for the RPP.

### The State Planning Organization and Planned Development

The post-war period saw the golden age of developmentalism. The word "development," like a mantra, received attention from all. The issue of development was considered within a planned context and development planning emerged as an important field of economics. Thus planned development became the main instrument of economic administration for nation states and international economic institutions in the post-war period.

The first development planning experiment emerged in the Soviet Union in the inter-war period. After the Second World War, the planned development conception was followed by many of the developed countries. However, it was the

key word for particularly the so-called developing countries. Kondonassis and others describe this development as

Prior to World War II economic planning was considered as a strategy only embarked upon by socialist countries. Socialist countries regarded comprehensive economic planning as a way of managing the economic life of society and that such planning was essential for the accurate establishment of priorities in the allocation of resources. After World War II, development literature was replete with concerns of economic dualism, fluctuating prices, unstable markets and low levels of employment. Economic development scholars such as Jan Tinbergen and Arthur Lewis advanced economic planning as the only institutional strategy for overcoming major obstacles to economic development and for assuring sustained economic growth. Consequently, comprehensive economic plans were adopted in many Eastern European and Latin American countries in response to broad macro economic problems of underdevelopment.<sup>1148</sup>

Just after the Second World War, the discussions about development planning started also in Turkey. In fact, Turkey had made a planning experiment in the interwar period. In 1934, the First Five-Year Industrial Plan had been prepared.<sup>1149</sup> This plan was an industry program aimed at foundation of nearly twenty factories owned by the state. However, the second plan had not been implemented because of the Second World War. In 1947, the Turkey Economic Development Plan was prepared that was called as the Vaner plan (the name of the planner).<sup>1150</sup> This plan had been prepared for the foreign aid that would be discussed by the United Nations.<sup>1151</sup> It is interesting that no one could see this plan except for a small group

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<sup>1148</sup> Alex Kondonassis, Anastasios Malliaris, Tade Okediji, "Swings of the Pendulum: A Review of Theory and Practice in Development Economics," *American Economist* 44 no1 (Spring 2000) p. 18.

<sup>1149</sup> On the industrial programs of the interwar period, see Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2002), pp.293-313.

<sup>1150</sup> For the plan, see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin. *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* (Ankara : OrtaDoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1974).

<sup>1151</sup> Oktay Yenal, "Planlamaya Dair: Dünyada ve Türkiye’de İktisadi Kuram ve Uygulamaları," in *Atilla Sönmez’e Armağan*, p.519.

of politicians and experts, until its publication by two professors in 1974.<sup>1152</sup> This plan was also not implemented. Then after, with the DP's coming to power in 1950, the governments remained distant from development planning.

However, developments after the economic crisis in 1958 directed the DP government to prepare a new development plan. This new direction was not voluntarily, because the decision to undertake development planning was the product of external and internal pressures.<sup>1153</sup> The DP's economic policies were criticized as being non-planned and non-programmed. This tendency intersected with the opposition of the intellectuals of the period. In this context, *Forum* magazine and later the Freedom Party were the main representatives of the planned development conception.<sup>1154</sup> It is interesting that the Freedom Party also prepared a development plan draft as the opposition's proposal.<sup>1155</sup> This opposition through the end of the 1950s was integrated with the Republican People's Party. The 1959 Declaration of the Primary Aims of the party revealed the effect of the new opposition. External pressures mainly came from the international institutions of the world economy. The OECD conditioned the economic aid to Turkey on the preparation of the development plan and foundation of a planning organization.<sup>1156</sup>

Under those circumstances, the visit of German minister of economy (later prime minister), Ludwig Erhard, to Turkey was the turning point. During the visit,

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<sup>1152</sup> Yalçın Küçük, "Türkiye'de Planlama Kavramının Gelişimi Üzerine," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, Special Issue, v.8 (1981) p.82. Those professors were Selim İlkin and İlhan Tekeli from Middle East Technical University.

<sup>1153</sup> Ali Somel, "Türkiye'de Planlı Kalkınma Efsanesi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol.9 *Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, Ömer Laçiner (Ed.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p.322.

<sup>1154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1156</sup> Ibid., p.323.

the DP government presented some investment programs to Erhard, who remarked that those programs could not be considered development plans.<sup>1157</sup> He advised the government to find foreign planning experts.<sup>1158</sup> In those days, a ministry for the coordination of the development plan was founded. The names of three development planners appear in the proposal of the OECD.<sup>1159</sup> The first one was a Norwegian planner, whose Marxist tendencies disturbed the Menderes government.<sup>1160</sup> The second choice was Holis Chenery.<sup>1161</sup> However, Chenery had prepared a report on the Turkish economy in 1953 and the government circles had been displeased with it, and Menderes had prohibited report's circulation. Thus the last choice was the Dutch planner Jan Tinbergen, who would win the first Nobel Prize in economics in 1969, was invited to Turkey for the preparation of the development plan. With Tinbergen came his assistant Jan Koopman, who was also responsible for the planning works. The bureaucratic group that was to assist these foreign experts mainly came from the Electrical Affairs Department.

However, the attitude of the government circles toward Tinbergen is worth questioning. Vedat Milor defines this situation as

Despite inviting Tinbergen and Koopman to Turkey, the treatment the letter received from the government shows that the DP did not really mean to institute economic reform in the country. Although a committee was formed of high-level civil servants who supposedly would be in charge of planning, the government made it very difficult for Koopman to receive any assistance

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<sup>1157</sup> Fahri Aral (Ed.) *Planlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960'larda Türkiye'de Planlama Deneyimi* (İstanbul : Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), p.23.

<sup>1158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1160</sup> “Besim Üstünel Anlatıyor,” in *Attila Sönmez’e Armağan: Türkiye’de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü 1960-1980*, Ergun Türkcan (Ed.) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p.320.

<sup>1161</sup> Ibid.

from experts in the ministry of finance and university circles, hence emasculating his efforts to obtain the required information for drawing up a plan.<sup>1162</sup>

Then Milor gave a report of the one magazine of the period as an example.

The news was as follows

Tinbergen has been coming to Turkey for the last few months. But the ex-government had, so to say, imprisoned him in a room of the Middle East Technical University. He could only get in touch with the so-called economists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Poor Tinbergen, isolated from all Turkish experts who were right in the middle of the Turkish economy and holding its pulse, was to make a 10-year plan- yes 10-year – for Turkey. How could Tinbergen make a 10-year Plan when he was doubtful of the accuracy of the information which was given to him by the genius diplomat-economists?<sup>1163</sup>

The most striking evidence of Milor on the issue of the isolation of the foreign experts on development planning is a letter written by Tinbergen to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the military rule after the coup.<sup>1164</sup> In this letter, Tinbergen reported he had not received the required data on the preparation of the development plan by the DP government, although they had promised to give them.<sup>1165</sup>

The 27 May 1960 military coup did not interrupt the work on the development plan.<sup>1166</sup> On the contrary the pace escalated. Then the military rule

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<sup>1162</sup> Vedat Milor, "The Genesis of Planning in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* no.4, (Fall 1990) p.11.

<sup>1163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1164</sup> Ibid., p.12.

<sup>1165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1166</sup> On the transition of the planning works from the DP government to the military rule, see Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, "Ayhan Çilingiroğlu'nun Hatıralarında Planlamanın Kuruluşu," in *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü 1960-1980*, Ergun Türkcan (Ed.) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), pp.142-147.



made plans to found planning organization just after the coup. In the program of the first Cemal Gürsel government, the establishment of an economic planning organization was promised.<sup>1167</sup> The program prescribed that the law concerning this organization would be enacted in the near future.<sup>1168</sup>

On the structure of the new planning perspective and planning organization, there were two main drafts called the Orel and İnan drafts.<sup>1169</sup> Tinbergen and Koopman submitted a memorandum on the planning organization just four months after the coup<sup>1170</sup> in which they stated the type of the planning suggested as

The type of planning it seems appropriate to apply in this country is not the interference, in considerable detail, of government agencies with the economic activities of the private sector. It should rather be the formulation of a desirable development of the country as a whole and its sectors, and of the necessary government action in the field of investment as well as in the field of economic policy in the more restricted sense of the word (taxes, subsidies, credit facilities, trade policy etc.). Accordingly there seems to be a need of long-term plans, mainly means as a guide to both government and business and annual plans, on which government action has to be based each year. The annual plans should be available at the same time as the budget.<sup>1171</sup>

As pointed out above, there were two main drafts, the Orel and İnan drafts.<sup>1172</sup> After discussions in the National Unity Committee, the Orel draft that was

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<sup>1167</sup> “Orgeneral Cemal Gürsel Başkanlığı’ndaki Milli Birlik Hükümetinin Programı – 11 Temmuz 1960,” in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)*. (Ed.) İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), p.320.

<sup>1168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1169</sup> For the assessments of the drafts, see Ergun Türkcan, “Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının Kuruluş Süreci,” in *Attila Sönmez’e Armağan: Türkiye’de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü 1960-1980*, Ergun Türkcan (Ed.), (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), pp.246-248.

<sup>1170</sup> For the text of the memorandum, see Cemal Mihçioğlu, “Devlet Planlama Örgütünün Kuruluş Günleri,” in *Prof. Dr. Fadıl H. Sur’un Anısına Armağan* (Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1983), pp.247-250.

<sup>1171</sup> Ibid., p.247.

<sup>1172</sup> Şinasi Orel was a Colonel and Secretary General of the Land Forces Command, and he was appointed for the preparation of a draft bill concerning the foundation of a planning organization by

more in keeping with the memorandum of Tinbergen than the İnan draft was selected after small modifications.<sup>1173</sup> On the last day of September 1960, the State Planning Organization was founded with the law on the State Planning Organization and the organization started to work on the preparation of the First Five-Year Development Plan for Turkey.

According to the act, the SPO was responsible for the preparation of five-year development plans, annual programs and master plans for sectors and sub-sectors.<sup>1174</sup> The critical body of planning affairs was the High Planning Council, which was composed of the prime minister, four responsible ministers, the under-secretary of the SPO and three department chiefs.<sup>1175</sup> Concerning the establishment of the SPO, the plans would be prepared by the SPO in conformity with economic and social policy goals that were determined by the government with the assistance of the High Planning Council.<sup>1176</sup> Then the draft plan of the SPO would be discussed and examined in the High Planning Council.<sup>1177</sup> Lastly it would be approved by the government and then by the Assembly.<sup>1178</sup> The SPO had an under-secretary that was

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Cemal Gürsel and Alparslan Türkeş. Then he became the first under-secretary of the State Planning Organization. Şefik İnan was the minister of Finance of the period.

<sup>1173</sup> Milor, p.16.

<sup>1174</sup> Ali Somel and Ekiz, Cengiz, “Türkiye’de Planlama ve Planlama Anlayışının Değişimi,” *A.Ü. SBF-GETA Tartışma Metinleri*, no.81 (Ocak 2005). p.14.

<sup>1175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1176</sup> For the English text of the law concerning establishment of the State Planning Organization, see *Planning in Turkey*, Selim İlkin and E. İnanç (Ed.) (Ankara: Middle East Technical, 1967), pp.311-315.

<sup>1177</sup> For the scheme for the planning practice, see Osman Nuri Torun, “The Establishment and Structure of the State Planning Organization,” in *Planning in Turkey*, Selim İlkin and E. İnanç (Ed.), (Ankara: Middle East Technical, 1967), pp.44-70.

<sup>1178</sup> The law concerning the establishment of the State Planning Organization.

responsible to the Prime Minister, and there were three department chiefs of the SPO on the economic planning, social planning and coordination.<sup>1179</sup>

Consequently in the period of the military rule, the makers of the coup and founders of the new regime prescribed a development plan perspective. This prescription was also reflected to the new constitution. The 129<sup>th</sup> article of the new constitution described the planning issue as

Economic, social and cultural development is based on a plan. Development is carried out according to this plan. The organization and functions of the state planning organization, the principles to be observed in the preparation and execution, and application and revision of the plan, and measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the plan, shall be regulated by special legislation.<sup>1180</sup>

Part of the article about the State Planning Organization was amended in the National Unity Committee sessions.<sup>1181</sup> There was no reference to the State Planning Organization in the draft constitution.<sup>1182</sup> In the National Unity Committee's constitution sessions one member proposed to add the State Planning Organization to the article.<sup>1183</sup> This proposal was approved by the Committee with the support of the president Cemal Gürsel.<sup>1184</sup> Then the Assembly of Representatives rejected the change that had been made by the National Unity Committee.<sup>1185</sup> Last, the joint

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<sup>1179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1180</sup> *Constitution of the Turkish Republic*, p.35.

<sup>1181</sup> For the process in Constituent Assembly and National Unity Committee about the 129<sup>th</sup> article, see *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası : İzahlı, Gerekçeli, Anabelgeli ve Maddelere Göre Tasnifli Bütün Tutanakları ile*. (ed.) Kâzım Öztürk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür yayınları, 1966), pp.3398-3423.

<sup>1182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1183</sup> Ibid.. p.3418. This member was Sami Küçük.

<sup>1184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1185</sup> Ibid.

committee approved the change and the article about planned development was included as cited above. The constitutional reference to the State Planning Organization came true with the pressure of the army. This reference had not been on the agenda of the Assembly of Representatives or its Constitution Committee (both were dominated by the RPP).

Thus after those developments, the preparation of the first development plan for the period of 1963-1967 started. Vedat Milor called the year between the foundation of the SPO and 1961 October elections the golden year of planning, and claims that this golden year finished with the October 1961 elections and coming of the civilian coalition government.<sup>1186</sup> After 1961, the planning issue became a source of conflict between the planners and the politicians. The planning perspective of the military rule era was not able to continue in the elected government's period.

The RPP's position on planned development was not clear and had some important problems. There were three important affects on the party's position about planning. First of all, the divided structure of the party between the progressive and conservative fractions was reflected on the party's planned development consideration. The right-wing political parties accused the RPP of protecting socialist planners. The newly emerging left criticized the RPP on the planning issue for its lack of reformism and the radicalism of the party. Under those circumstances, the RPP attempted to reposition itself on the development planning issue and had many position changes.

As pointed out above, the development planning and planned development understanding of the 1960s should be considered in the context of the radicalism of the 27 May coup. In fact, this radicalism took a further step with the *Yön* movement's

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<sup>1186</sup> Milor, p.19.

rapid development conception. The administration of the State Planning Organization and the *Yön* movement had similar planned development considerations and these two groups were in direct contact.

Within this framework, it is possible to categorize the political groupings with respect to their planned development conception in three main groups. The first supported the development plan, but they opposed the radical measures of the plan. The main components of this group were the right-wing political parties and the conservative faction within the RPP. They supported indicative development planning, a perspective shared by businessmen.<sup>1187</sup> In the second group there were the supporters of the both the development plan and its radical measures. They were the *Yön* movement, the SPO administration and the progressive faction in the RPP. This group oscillated between indication planning and imperative planning. As the third group, the WPT and the CPT should be mentioned as the true supporters of the imperative planning.

At this point, the radical measures of the development plan or structural reform projects should be explained in more detail. The most important and controversial of them were the land reform, taxation of agriculture, and the reorganization of state economic enterprises. As stated above, the RPP had a divided stance on the planning issue. Thus the conservative faction of the party and the coalition partners prevented the RPP from initiating the radical measures in planning. The prescription of the development plan for the annual development rate was 7%.<sup>1188</sup> For the realization of this rate, the estimated necessary saving rate was

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<sup>1187</sup> Ayşe Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994), p.134.

<sup>1188</sup> Necat Erder, "Türkiye'nin İlk Planlama Deneyimi," in *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan*, p.238.

18%.<sup>1189</sup> From the planners' point of view, to attain this saving rate was only possible with the implementation of the above-mentioned radical structural measures of the plan.

In this framework, Necat Erder<sup>1190</sup> identifies the structural reforms as land reform; tax reform; the reorganization of the state economic enterprises; the planning of the education, human resources and labor power; and lastly the socialization of the health services.<sup>1191</sup> The High Planning Council meetings became an arena of struggle between the supporters and opponents of the radical measures.

Among the reform subjects, land reform was the most dramatic. It could not even enter the agenda of the High Planning Council.<sup>1192</sup> The issue of reorganization of the state economic enterprises was also a source of conflict between the politicians and planners.<sup>1193</sup> There was a consensus on the projected production levels, but the necessary concrete measures to realize those projections were opposed by the politician members of the High Planning Council.<sup>1194</sup> Those issues made the main aim of the development plan (7 % annual development) impossible in the consideration of the planners. However, the most important issue that caused the formation of this consideration was about the taxation reform. In those days, the taxation reform denoted basically taxation of the agricultural sector.

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<sup>1189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1190</sup> The chief of the social planning department during the preparation of the first plan.

<sup>1191</sup> Ibid., pp.237-238.

<sup>1192</sup> Ibid., p.237.

<sup>1193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1194</sup> Ibid., p.236.

The reform program was based on a report that had been prepared by the English economist Nicholas Kaldor.<sup>1195</sup> The planners were aware of that the plan needed a financial model, and that the main source of this model was the agriculture.<sup>1196</sup> Thus the invitation of Kaldor was a conscious choice of the planners. It is possible to see this situation in the process of the appointment of Kaldor. The SPO applied to the British government for his appointment.<sup>1197</sup> However, the conservative British government of the period was not so keen on the appointment of a socialist, Kaldor, and the British government asked the SPO for three other names for the preparation of the report.<sup>1198</sup> The answer of the SPO was Kaldor, Kaldor and Kaldor.<sup>1199</sup>

Kaldor prepared a radical reform program as the SPO administration expected. He declared a 7 % development rate projection and a %18 necessary investment rate for the realization of this projection.<sup>1200</sup> For Kaldor, under those circumstances a 3% decrease in the rate of current consumption in the national income was needed.<sup>1201</sup> This decrease could be made possible with additional taxation or obligatory charges.<sup>1202</sup> Then Kaldor indicated that the income of the agricultural sector was 17.6 billion TL of the total 41.3 billion national income, or

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<sup>1195</sup> For the text of the report, see Nicholas Kaldor, "Türk Vergi Sistemi Üzerine Rapor," *Toplum ve Bilim*, n. 15-16 (1981-1982), pp.94-115.

<sup>1196</sup> Ergun Türkcan, "Birinci Kalkınma Planı ve Sonrası," in *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü 1960-1980*, Ergun Türkcan (Ed.) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p. 267.

<sup>1197</sup> Attila Karaosmanoğlu, p.109.

<sup>1198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1200</sup> Kaldor, p.95.

<sup>1201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1202</sup> Ibid.

%42.5.<sup>1203</sup> However the direct taxes paid by the agricultural sector were only 0.8% and the indirect taxes paid by this sector were a minimum 8%, maximum 10%.<sup>1204</sup> According to him, agricultural taxation was crucial for financing the economic development, but in Turkey the agricultural sector had been out of the reach of taxation since the Republican revolution.<sup>1205</sup> Income taxes on agriculture could not radically change the situation or help the financing of agriculture.<sup>1206</sup> Thus Kaldor proposed a property tax for land.<sup>1207</sup> The description of the tax was as follow

the tax basis is the average net product of agriculture, of each particular region and each particular type of land as defined for purposes of national accounting, not the market value of the land (as is the case present land tax), or the gross produce of the land (as was the case tithes system). The tax is progressive, taking into account the size of the land holdings of the individual farmer, and just a tax on the land itself, irrespective of the wealth of the owner.<sup>1208</sup>

This project was supported by prime minister Ismet İnönü, but rejected by the coalition partners and the conservative wing in the RPP. The rejection of the reform program made the investment projections of the development plan impossible. For the planners, under those circumstances, reaching the annual 7% growth rate was not possible. The planners proposed the government revise the growth projection to 6.5%, but the government rejected this proposal and revised the rate to 7.6%.<sup>1209</sup> This

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<sup>1203</sup> Ibid., p.97.

<sup>1204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1205</sup> Ibid., p.96.

<sup>1206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1207</sup> Ibid., p.98.

<sup>1208</sup> Kenan Bulutoğlu, "Financing Turkey's Development Plan" in *Planning in Turkey*, edited by Selim İlkin and E. İnanç (Ed.) (Ankara: Middle East Technical, 1967), pp.195-196.

<sup>1209</sup> Milor, p.25.



event brought on the resignation of the planners. The SPO under-secretary Osman Nuri Torun and his three assistants who were department chiefs of economic planning, social planning and coordination (respectively Attila Karaosmanoğlu, Necat Erder and Ayhan Çilingiroğlu) resigned in October 1962.

This group of bureaucrats had several characteristic features. All of them were well educated and young. The eldest, Osman Nuri Torun, was 38 and the youngest, Attila Karaosmanoğlu, was 28. The first planners were accused by the right of being leftist. Their radical reform programs had frightened the conservative wing, and the political power of the planners was not enough for the initiation of the reform projects. The accusations of being leftist were only related to the doubts of the rightists about the planned development and reform projects. They considered planned development and reform initiation a new path to a socialist administration.

As an example, in one of the parliamentary sessions, Fethi Tevetoğlu, a senator from the Justice Party identified the planners as perverse socialists with these words “it is our right to know and learn clearly and certainly that there is not relationship between the government program and opinions and ideas of these perverse socialists that have prepared our development plan.”<sup>1210</sup> This speech is an example of the anti-communist rhetoric of the period and the rightist common view about the planners and planning.

During the 1950s, the RPP had criticized the DP’s economic policies for its non-planned and non-programmed character. The words “plan” and “development” were in almost all of the speeches of İsmet İnönü. It is possible to see that those words were the most frequently used conception when the collected speeches of

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<sup>1210</sup> “Çağa – Tevetoğlu Tartışması” in *TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) Parlamentoda 1963-1966*, v.1 Turhan Salman (Ed.) (İstanbul : TÜSTAV, 2004), p.57.

Inönü are scanned.<sup>1211</sup> There are many examples of the understanding that the conceptions of the plan and development were important for İnönü. He stated his views on the foundation of the SPO and the place of planning under new regime as follows:

The Revolution administration handed-down an important achievement, which was planning organization. In the military rule period, the state planning organization entered the political and administrative life of the country. Despite being in the beginning era, the SPO reports factual calculations for the country's economic life and offers an insight into the economic goals of the country. In order not to remain underdeveloped, the planning should be the main motto in the public and private fields.<sup>1212</sup>

Inönü's understanding of development planning reflected the naive belief in the developmentalist discourse of the period. In this framework, an example from the memoirs of Attila Karaosmanoğlu is worth stating. In a visit of İnönü to the SPO as the Prime Minister, İnönü asked Karaosmanoğlu in how many years the national income would be doubled by the new plan.<sup>1213</sup> Karaosmanoğlu answered if everything went well, it took 10 or 12 years.<sup>1214</sup> İnönü remarked that he was too old to wait for ten years.<sup>1215</sup> He would want to see doubling of the national income,

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<sup>1211</sup> For the collected speeches of İnönü in this period, see İsmet İnönü, *Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşileri*. v.3 Ed, İlhan Turan. 1961-1965 (11.11.1961-26.02.1965), (Ankara: TBMM, 2004).

<sup>1212</sup> İsmet İnönü, *Başbakan İnönü'nün Radyo Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası: 1962)p.17.

*İnkılap idaresi bize mühim bir eser devretmiştir. Bu idare, fikir ve resmi teşekkül olarak Planlama Teşkilatını siyasi ve idari hayatımıza getirmiştir. Planlama teşkilatı daha başlangıç devresinde ve devletin bütün dairelerinden destek ve işbirliği yapılması lüzumunu anlattığımız sırada bize şimdiden iktisadi hayatımız için doğru hesağlar verecek memleketin iktisadi hedeflerine ışık tutacak bir harıktadır. İnancımız odur ki, neticede zararlara ve geri kalma tehlikesine maruz kalmamak için devlet işlerinde ve özel işlerde planlama usulüne bağlanmak lazımdır.*

<sup>1213</sup> Attila Karaosmanoğlu, p.119.

<sup>1214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1215</sup> Ibid.

wasn't it possible in five years.<sup>1216</sup> Karaosmanoglu answered İnönü as it was possible, but its costs would be huge and the state bureaucracy would create a trouble for İnönü's government.<sup>1217</sup> As a planner, he was able to advise doubling the national income in ten years.<sup>1218</sup> Then İnönü did not ask anything else and left the SPO building.<sup>1219</sup> This answer had been an important disappointment for İnönü. This event was an obvious example of naïve belief in the success of the development by planning.

The writings and memoirs of the planners demonstrate that no other prime minister was so keenly interested in the planning issue. He visited the SPO almost every week to obtain updates on the planning work.<sup>1220</sup> Then it is obvious that İnönü was the only prime minister who was respected by the planners. He had attended all the meetings of the High Planning Council, and before the sessions he studied the draft plan at length.<sup>1221</sup> The writings and memoirs of the planners demonstrate that no other prime minister dealt with the planning issue in such careful detail.

İnönü's first government program reflected a perspective that might be summarized as a belief in national development by the planning. The articles of the program on the planning and development were as follows:

The aim of the government program is to provide rapid development in the freedom order. The most practical remedy for this purpose is to make

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<sup>1216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1220</sup> Günel Kansu, *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT'nin Öyküsü*. (İstanbul: İşbankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004), p.539.

<sup>1221</sup> Ibid.

investment in the broadest sense by both public and private enterprise. For the efficiency of the public sector's investments it is necessary that above all the political power should be in favor of the planned development conception, the investments should be based on an appropriate plan and the required finances should be provided from convenient sources. We are decisive in benefiting from the works of the State Planning Organization in a profound way for selecting methods and measures that will satisfy our country's needs that are generally known.<sup>1222</sup>

The program of the second government indicated that the new government had become estranged from the first government's perspective. It gave a more important role to private enterprise than the public sector in contrast to the program of the first coalition.<sup>1223</sup> It also implied the importance of private property for the development in freedom.<sup>1224</sup> Afterward the program declared that the state should encourage the increase of the private enterprise's investments and should direct them to the fields that were needed for rapid and balanced development. The program limited the encouragement intervention of the state with fiscal and credit policy, the formation of capital market, guidance and providing technical information. So, for the program, the government would not directly interfere that was also incompatible with the current political system.

As clearly seen, the reformist character of the governments and the belief in planned development regressed from the first to the second government. In this way,

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<sup>1222</sup> “İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı'ndaki Birinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 27 Kasım 1961” in *Hükümet Programları (1920-1965)* (Ed.) İsmail Arar (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), pp.327-328 *Hükümet programının hedefi, hürriyet nizamı içinde hızlı bir kalkınmanın sağlanmasıdır. Bunun ameli çaresi, Devlet ve özel teşebbüs olarak, mümkün olan en geniş ölçüde yatırım yapılmasıdır. Devlet sektörü yatırımlarının verimli olabilmesi için, her şeyden önce siyasi iktidarın planlı kalkınma fikrine yakın olması, yatırımların isabetli bir plana dayanması ve mali kaynakların sıhhatli yollardan sağlanması şarttır. Memleketimizin umumiyetle bilinmekte olan çeşitli ihtiyaçlarını süratle giderecek usul ve tedbirleri seçerken, Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtının çalışmalarından ciddi olarak faydalanmak kararındayız.*

<sup>1223</sup> “İsmet İnönü Başkanlığı'ndaki İkinci Koalisyon Hükümetinin Programı – 2 Temmuz 1961” in *Hükümet Programları*, p.349.

<sup>1224</sup> Ibid.

the party started to lose its reformist, radical and progressive grassroots to the newly emerging *Yön* movement and the Workers Party of Turkey. However, the fall of the third İnönü government changed the situation. The party again radicalized its discourse and planned development again had an important place. However, the increases in the accusations of the right after the emergence of the left of center slogan directed the party to equate the left of center with the reforms that had been prescribed by the 1961 constitution. Development planning had been one of these reforms, and probably the most important one.

This attitude was expressed in the election declaration in 1965 as follows:

We have to close the distance between Turkey and the economically developed countries; to bring the Turkish people to the deserved level of living standard; to base democracy on strong economic, social and cultural foundations. For this purpose, to mobilize our all the national power and to value natural resources fully it is requires exact adherence to the principles of planned development and to make the ruling democratic planning discipline on the state order and social life.<sup>1225</sup>

Then the party concluded its views on the implementation of the development plan as the measures that were necessary for overcoming the problems on the execution of the First Five-Year Development Plan and assured that achieving the plan's aims were stated by the party so as to regulate the relationship between the government and the SPO in a more clear way, completing the establishment of planning bodies that would harmonize the works of state organization and the SPO, the establishment of a strong "social and economic studies association, the

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<sup>1225</sup> *CHP Seçim Beyannamesi*, p. 32.

*Türkiye'nin iktisadi bakımdan gelişmiş ülkelerle arasındaki mesafeyi kapatmak, Türk halkını layık olduğu yaşma düzeyine ulaştırmak, demokrasimizi sağlam iktisadi, sosyal ve kültürel temellere dayandırmak zorundayız. Bu amaçla, bütün ulusal gücümüzü hayata geçirebilmek ve tabii kaynaklarımızı tam değerlendirebilmek için, planlı kalkınma ilkelerine kesin bağlılık ve demokratik plan disiplini Devlet düzenimize ve toplum hayatımıza hakim kılmak gereklidir.*

reorganization of the state economic enterprises, to harmonize the general development with development of society in particular the development of the village, last giving importance to the underdeveloped regions basically the Eastern Anatolian region and the implementation of the priorities that were given to these regions in the plan.<sup>1226</sup>

After the RPP's position, the position of the *Yön* was essential because of the special relationship of the movement with the SPO administration and its influence on the progressive faction of the governing RPP. The *Yön* declaration, as analyzed in the previous chapter, was a manifest of the developmentalist discourse of the period. In the declaration, development planning was considered the main instrument of dynamic forces for transforming society. In *Yön*, several articles and secret reports were published on the development planning. The development planning was also crucial for the changes in *Yön*'s political attitude. The preparation process of the First Five-Year Development Plan had been an important disappointment for the *Yön*. Thus the power of the conservatives and the improbability of dynamic forces' coming to political power by free elections started to be questioned by *Yön* after the story of the First Five-Year Development Plan. The *Yön* movement's discourse on development planning became central to the emergence of discontents in the RPP and the search for a new direction.

As discussed above, *Yön* declaration was a clear example of the developmentalist political thought and radicalism of the period. The declaration had strong emphasizes on the development planning and state planning organization. However, planning was considered as broader than the SPO administration's initiative. According to *Yön* journal's declaration, the State Planning Organization

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<sup>1226</sup> Ibid., pp. 32-33.

was a technical body under the command of the political power, and as such SPO was unable to direct Turkey's development in a specific way, and it was a technical body that brought the special experts of the country together.<sup>1227</sup> *Yön* evaluated the first attempt by stating that a development strategy by the SPO as important, but not enough.<sup>1228</sup> According to the declaration, the success and gaining direction of the planning was conditioned on the elite's consensus on a clear development philosophy.<sup>1229</sup> Thus the *Yön* movement believed in the consensus of the bureaucratic elites rather than the elected governments' programs. This perspective from the *Yön* declaration was the main difference of the movement from that of the other supporters of development planning.

*Yön* journal gave special importance to the resignation of the planners, and after the event, harshly criticized İnönü and the RPP-led government because of the resignations.<sup>1230</sup> According to *Yön*, İnönü had tried to effect reconciliation between the planners and conservative politicians, but at last he had given concessions to the politicians and connived at the deterioration of the development plan.<sup>1231</sup> *Yön* described the planners as honest and honorable bureaucrats, saying that they had resigned for obviating people's being deceived.<sup>1232</sup> The planners had accepted all the changes made by the politicians.

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<sup>1227</sup> Bildiri, *Yön*, no. 1 (20 December 1961).

<sup>1228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1230</sup> *Yön*, "Plancılar" *Yön*, no.42 (3 October 1962).

<sup>1231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1232</sup> Ibid.

The opposition of the planners had been about the government's projection of a 7% annual development rate.<sup>1233</sup> They had argued that with the changes in the development plan, an annual 7% development rate had become impossible. However the politicians demanded the planners to declare the 7% development rate.<sup>1234</sup> Thus for the *Yön*, the real cause of the resignations had been the politician's insistence that the planners lie to the people.<sup>1235</sup> *Yön* described the conflict about the First Five-Year Development Plan as a conflict between the planners and politicians. This definition identified the conflict between the supporters and opponents of the radical measures of the plan. As pointed out above, the conservative branch of the RPP was the most important constituent of this politician group that opposed the radical measures of the development plan.

In 1963 January, Dogan Avcioglu discussed this disagreement in a different article.<sup>1236</sup> According to him this was not a classic politician vs. bureaucrat conflict. The parties of the conflict were instead revolutionaries and the supporters of the status quo.<sup>1237</sup> The RPP-led government stood on the bases of land lords and remnants of the medieval age, but it attempted to execute a rapid development and social justice policy that was against the interests of these groups.<sup>1238</sup> The RPP-led government was not able to become successful without solving this contradiction

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<sup>1233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1236</sup> Doğan Avcioglu, "Bir Intikal Devresi" *Yön*, no.58 (23 Ocak 1963).

<sup>1237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1238</sup> Ibid.



between the desire for rapid development and social justice and the interests of the land lords and remnants of the medieval age.<sup>1239</sup>

Avcıoğlu criticized the position of the RPP-led government in the preparation process of the First Five-Year Development Plan. He maintained this position in his book *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (Turkey's Order) in which he argued that the plan was not a socialist one and it only aimed at increasing domestic savings and providing broad opportunities to the domestic and foreign capital.<sup>1240</sup> However, he remarked that the JP and the opposition parties had labeled the plan as socialist. Their main reason for doing so was plan's intention to increase the saving and investment rates in the public sector, land reform and taxation of the big land owners.<sup>1241</sup> However, Avcıoğlu concluded that it was obvious that none of those measures were socialist.

Avcıoğlu categorized the disagreement between the planners and the RPP led governments in three areas.<sup>1242</sup> The first was about the land reform. The planners wanted a land reform based on a report of an expert from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.<sup>1243</sup> However the minister members of the High Planning Council rejected this plan without discussion.<sup>1244</sup> It was rejected without any discussion. The second issue involved the state economic enterprises. The planners proposed the restructuring and coordination of those enterprises. However, the ministers of the İnönü government rejected this proposal, because they did not

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<sup>1239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1240</sup> Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, p.778.

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1242</sup> Ibid., pp.778-779.

<sup>1243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1244</sup> Ibid.

consider that the state enterprises worked with the private enterprises in the mixed economy, but served private enterprise.<sup>1245</sup> Third, the taxation of agriculture was the most important issue. Under those circumstances, the realization of the aims of the development plan was dependent on coincidence.<sup>1246</sup>

The radical reform projects of the development plan were supported by the *Yön* movement. Land reform was one of the most important of these projects. Above, the position of the *Yön* movement on the land reform issue was scrutinized. The taxation of agriculture as a radical measure of the plan also was strongly supported by *Yön*. In this framework, the Kaldor report was considered crucial in the preparation process of the development plan. As pointed out above, the ministry of finance had prepared a report in opposition to that of Kaldor in which the taxation system in Turkey would be reformed. This reform proposal however was a moderate proposal rather than a radical reform that did not prescribe a property tax for land. Thus *Yön* published the criticisms of Kaldor of the moderate reform report.<sup>1247</sup> *Yön* published two summaries of the Kaldor report.<sup>1248</sup> *Yön* claimed that the government had hidden the report secret from the public.<sup>1249</sup> To the journal, the report demonstrated how a tax reform should be one that protected the principle of social justice.<sup>1250</sup>

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<sup>1245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1246</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1247</sup> “Vergi Komisyonu Raporu,” *Yön* no.32 (25 Temmuz 1962).

<sup>1248</sup> *Yön*, “Vesika, Kaldor Raporu,” *Yön*, no.23 (23 May 1962); *Yön*, “Kaldor Raporu, Niçin Gizlendi - Herkesin Anlayacağı Dille, Kaldor Raporu,” *Yön*, no.35 (15 August 1962).

<sup>1249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1250</sup> Ibid.

As pointed above, the declaration of the *Yön* journal was a manifesto of the developmentalist perspective of the period. Planned development and etatism were the mottos of this developmentalism. The cosignatories of the declaration were from several groups, including some RPP members. However Bülent Ecevit did not sign the declaration, because he did not agree with its etatism conception. He stated his objections with a note,<sup>1251</sup> in which he tried to reconcile etatism and free enterprise as follows:

Etatism should not be regarded only as state enterprise. It should be regarded as mechanism harmonizing the entire economic and commercial activities, the necessity of rapid development and the real needs of society with social justice, welfare and happiness for all. Such a conception of etatism does not provide advantages for state enterprise at the expense of private enterprise, or, obstruct all free enterprise activity and block entrepreneurial spirit. The purpose is to endow state enterprise with the entrepreneurial spirit and the private enterprises with the social responsibility of the state.<sup>1252</sup>

These perspectives of Ecevit and the *Yön* declaration would be the basis of the difference between the RPP and *Yön* movement after the emergence of the left of center discourse.

The Workers Party of Turkey, as a socialist party, proposed a radical break from the existing planning practices. Its development and development planning conception was very different from those of the other actors in politics. The WPT was very critical of planning perspective of the period. Its program on planned

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<sup>1251</sup> For the note, see “Bildiri” *Yön*, no.2, (27 December 1961), p.8.

<sup>1252</sup> Ibid.

*Devletçilik, yalnız devlet teşebbüsü devlet işletmeciliği olarak anlaşılmamalı; bütün kesimlerdeki iktisadi ve ticari faaliyetle, hızlı kalkınma gerekliliği ve gerçek toplum ihtiyaçları arasında, sosyal adalet, halkın refah ve mutluluğunu ön planda gözeten bir verimli ahenk kurma mekanizması sayılmalıdır. Böyle bir devletçilik anlayışına göre, önemli olan, devlet işletmeciliğine her türlü özel teşebbüs imkanını köstekleyici ve teşebbüs ruhunu baltalayıcı avantajlar sağlamak değildir; önemli olan devlet işletmeciliğine teşebbüs ruhunu, özel teşebbüse de devlet işletmeciliğinin toplumsal sorumluluğunu kazandırmak.*

development was a clear example of this. The party concluded its views on the plan and development as follows:

It is not possible for Turkey to develop by the private sector, in other words, in the capitalist order. Thus the salvation for Turkey is to enter a non-capitalist development way. The non-capitalist development way might be defined as a planned etatism which sides with labor; and a system in which laborers participate in its execution and audit. In such an order, the public sector is the basis and it is broad enough to command the economy. The private sector works and develops as the auxiliary of the public sector within the framework of this plan.<sup>1253</sup>

Thus planning, differently from the *Yön* and the RPP, was not merely a way for development, but also a way for the establishment of socialism. The WPT claimed that the development of Turkey was not possible with the capitalist way. The party identified its development conception as non-capitalist development, and gave special importance to labor in this new way.

The WPT introduced the development planning conception of the party as harmonious with the conception of democracy.<sup>1254</sup> This reference to democracy in the preparation and implementation of the development plan was the main peculiarity of the WPT among the political actors of the period. Thus according to the party the masses were to have authority in the determination of the plan's foundations and the distribution of the sources among the basic sectors, the preparation of the plan, and the general implementation of the plan and the implementation of the plan separately in the institutions.<sup>1255</sup> In the implementation phase, the planning organization would

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<sup>1253</sup> *TİP Programı*, p.64.

*Türkiye'nin özel sektör eliyle, yani kapitalist bir düzen içinde kalkınması mümkün değildir. O halde Türkiye için kurtuluş, kapitalist olmayan bir kalkınma yoluna girmektir. Kapitalist olmayan kalkınma yolu emekten yana ve emekçilerin yürütümüne ve denetimine katıldığı plânlı bir devletçilik olarak tanımlanabilir. Böyle bir düzende kamu sektörü esastır ve ekonomiye hâkim olacak kadar geniştir. Özel sektör plân çerçevesi içinde kamu sektörünün yardımcısı olarak çalışır ve gelişir.*

<sup>1254</sup> *Ibid.*, p.70.

follow the reaction of the people to the plan and would inform the planning center.<sup>1256</sup> Thus the rapid development of the country would be realized thanks to the enthusiastic work of the people because of the direct participation of the people in the plan's implementation and the people would see and understood that the plan worked for their benefit.<sup>1257</sup>

Apart from the democratic character of plan making, the party considered the development planning and development as the basis for an operative democracy. The party described the relationship between democracy and development as follows:

Our development question was taken inappropriately as our democracy question. Our development question is at an impasse, because we consider democracy only as a free election affair and neglect its social essence. Unless the weak character of the national economy is changed, it is absolutely impossible to realize the expected growth rate and progress in the lives of the people. Development based on social justice is a goal that is only possible by resolving the backward character of the national economy or, in other words, by initiating radical reforms.<sup>1258</sup>

Thus the democratic development planning conception of the WPT was the main difference of the party from the RPP and actors on the left.

The plan and democracy emphasis was important to Mehmet Ali Aybar, who identified the two main characteristics of his party on planned development.<sup>1259</sup> The

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<sup>1255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1256</sup> Ibid., p.71.

<sup>1257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1258</sup> Sosyal Adalet, "Durum ve Çıkar Yol" *Sosyal Adalet*, 24 Mart 1963. *Kalkınma davamız da, demokrasi davamız gibi ters konmuştur. Daha doğrusu demokrasiyi salt bir serbest seçim işi sandığımız ve onun sosyal özünü görmediğimiz için, kalkınma davamız bugün çıkmazdadır. Ulusal ekonominin bugünkü zayıf karakteri değiştirilmedikçe, beklenen kalkınma hızının sağlanması, hele emekçi halk yığınlarının yaşamında iyiye doğru bir gelişme olabilmesi katiyen mümkün değildir. Çünkü sosyal adalete dayanan kalkınma ulusal ekonominin geri karakteri giderilmekle, yani köklü reformlara girişmekle gerçekleşecek bir amaçtır.*

<sup>1259</sup> Aybar, "Bugünkü Koalisyon Türkiye'yi Geri Kalmışlıktan Kurtaramaz," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p. 296.

first one was the preparation of the plan under a real democratic order, in other words, the preparation of the plan under the control of the laborer citizens by free debate.<sup>1260</sup> The second characteristic was that the plan should be for the benefit of the labor in such an underdeveloped country as Turkey.<sup>1261</sup> Thus he claimed that the plan that had been prepared by the government under the leadership of the RPP was not to the benefit of labor.<sup>1262</sup> Such a plan was not able to change the underdeveloped features of the Turkish economy and society.

The other main difference of the WPT and RPP for Aybar in the economic field involved etatism conceptions. He stated his views on the issue:

The regime in Turkey is only open to land lords and capitalists. The regime is closed to laborers. The etatism of ours and that of the RPP are completely opposite. The economic system that we consider is a system that realizes social justice. Labor is the most supreme value. We claim everybody's taking share from the national income according to his or her labor.<sup>1263</sup>

Aybar defined the aim of the mixed economy conception of the RPP as making private enterprise and the land lords richer through state intervention.<sup>1264</sup> He argued that the RPP was under the control of the large land owners, big capitalists and bureaucrats.<sup>1265</sup> From the RPP's perspective, the state intervention in the

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<sup>1260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1262</sup> Ibid., p.297.

<sup>1263</sup> *Milliyet*, 20 August 1962.  
*Türkiye'deki rejim, yalnız toprak ağası ve kapitalistlere açık rejimdir. Emekçilere kapalı bir rejimdir. CHP'nin devletçilik anlayışı ile bizimki birbirine tamamen karşıttır. Bizim üşündüğümüz ekonomik sistem sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirecek sistemdir. En yüce değer emektir. Herkesin emeği ile ulusal gelirden pay almasını isteriz.*

<sup>1264</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "İçten ve Dıştan Sömürülüyoruz," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p. 371.

<sup>1265</sup> Ibid.

economy aimed to protect and develop private capital.<sup>1266</sup> However, for them, the state should be a state of the people.<sup>1267</sup> Thus the state's economic intervention should aim to finance all of the needs of the people.<sup>1268</sup>

The foreign capital issue was also a source of disagreement between the two parties. The Minister of Labor, Bülent Ecevit, replied to the accusations of the WPT regarding the exploitation of the Turkish workers by the foreign capital as rising from the obsessions, and defined those attempts as destructive and improper.<sup>1269</sup> Aybar replied "If the workers are not exploited, what is the source of the profit of capital... Capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the worker."<sup>1270</sup> Then Aybar asked why the foreign capital had come to Turkey, to get as much profits as it could get for its own country.<sup>1271</sup> In this way he constructed a classic socialist perspective of the period. The source of the profit was the exploitation of the labor.

Last, the perspective of the Communist Party of Turkey on development planning should be stated as the third actor's on the left in this era. The party was a true follower of the Soviet development planning perspective. Its views on the planning and development issues are also important for the understanding how this kind of socialism considered Turkey's development planning questions.

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<sup>1266</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Hedef Sosyalizmdir," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p.394.

<sup>1267</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1269</sup> *Milliyet*, 3 September 1962.

<sup>1270</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Emekçilerin İnsanca Yaşaması Gerekir," in *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p.224.

<sup>1271</sup> Ibid.

The secretary general of the CPT, Zeki Başımar, assessed the First Five-Year Development Plan in a report on the economic and political situation of the country. He was very critical on the development planning perception of the RPP-led government. For Başımar, one could hardly claim that the First Five-Year Development Plan would develop the country.<sup>1272</sup> At this point, the views of the CPT were very similar to those of the *Yön* movement and the WPT. However, the difference was on the origin of the development planning: development was only possible with socialist planning.

The finance of the development plan was also problematic for Başımar. There was an open question as to who would suffer for development. He argued that this plan laid the burden of the development of the country on the laborers.<sup>1273</sup> In this context, he discussed the property tax proposal of Kaldor. In the report, he cited the speeches of Tinbergen on financing the plan with the new taxation, and how the reform project had been prevented by several pressures groups (basically the big lawn owners).<sup>1274</sup> Thus for the CPT, the influence of the big capitalists and land owning class on the RPP was undeniable, and the government of the RPP was not able to prepare a plan that was for the benefit of the laboring class.

Başımar made a connection between economy administration, planning and imperialism. For him, Turkey's economy was regulated by the war doctrines of the imperialists.<sup>1275</sup> He argued that it was impossible to implement a development plan for the interest of the national economy under those conditions. He claimed that the plan had been investigated by the representatives of the foreign monopolies, and it

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<sup>1272</sup> "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik ve Politik Durumu," p.15.

<sup>1273</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1274</sup> Ibid., p.16.

<sup>1275</sup> Ibid.



had been transformed according to their interests. Başımar identified the reorganization of the state economic enterprises as a deception.<sup>1276</sup> The main aim of this reorganization project was to put the state economic enterprises under the control of the foreign monopolies.<sup>1277</sup> Within this framework, the RPP-led government was contained with these monopolies, and this government could not make a development plan that was against the benefit of them.<sup>1278</sup>

The CPT was peculiar among the actors analyzed in this part with its reference to imperialism in the development planning issue. Other actors did not relate the planning efforts and perspective of the government with imperialism. In fact, it was obvious that development planning had emerged at the end of the 1950s with the pressure of the institutions of the capitalist world economy. Thus the international context of Turkish development planning experiment had primary importance for the CPT.

As pointed out above, Ekrem Alican, as the vice-prime minister and chair of coalition partner party, affected the First Five-Year Development Plan in the High Planning Council. Başımar identified Alican as the representative of the indigenous capitalists who were dependent on the foreign monopolies.<sup>1279</sup> Then he said the economic view of Alican was that the private sector should be the basic for the national economy, and the public should be auxiliary to it.<sup>1280</sup> He argued that this perspective dominated the plan. Thus the development plan brought hope only to the

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<sup>1276</sup> Ibid., p.17.

<sup>1277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1278</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1279</sup> Ibid., p.17.

<sup>1280</sup> Ibid.

foreign monopolies and capitalists dependent on them.<sup>1281</sup> The cost of living had increased thanks to this policy.<sup>1282</sup> Under those circumstances, the government was not able to take the necessary measures that would satisfy the workers, peasants, intellectuals and the national economy.<sup>1283</sup> According to Baştımar, the progressive and radical faction within the RPP could not affect the development plan, because the perspective of the big capitalists that were represented by Alican in the government had dominated the framework of the plan.<sup>1284</sup>

The developmentalist discourse of the period also was shared by the CPT. The economy and society were considered as things that changed, and that change should be regulated by planning. From this point of view, the regulation of this change by planning was identified as development planning. This perspective was obvious in a report by a party officer, Ahmet Akıncı on non-capitalist development. In the report, Akıncı argued that there were two different explanations for the development of Turkey, capitalist and non-capitalist.<sup>1285</sup> The capitalist way was identified as dependency and debt.<sup>1286</sup> The non-capitalist way meant radical reforms and democratic transformations.<sup>1287</sup> In this way, Akıncı did not propose a direct transition to socialism. Instead he proposed a gradual transition. For Akıncı, gaining economic independence, the realization of the agricultural reforms, rescuing Turkey from the yoke of the foreign capital and the implementation of a planned economy

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<sup>1281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1285</sup> “Kapitalist Olmayan Gelişme Yolu,” p.233.

<sup>1286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1287</sup> Ibid.

might change the direction of capitalism's economic laws.<sup>1288</sup> Moreover, it might cause emergence and development of socialism's economic laws and socialist production relations.<sup>1289</sup>

Consequently, the development plan and planned economy had become one of the main debate topics in Turkish politics in the 1960s. The political parties and movements took position on the planned development according to their alignment on the right and the left. The RPP's timid behavior in the government on planning became one of the main accusations of the left against the party. Not surprisingly, the main struggle of the conservative fraction in the RPP in the preparation process of the First Five-Year Development Plan was against the SPO administration. As an example, the most important opposition to the Kaldor report in the government came from a minister from the RPP.<sup>1290</sup>

In this context, the progressives argued that the practices of the three RPP governments had demonstrated that the RPP was not the carrier of radicalism and reformism of the period. In fact, the main reason for this situation had been the rise of the conservative wing's power in the RPP during the government era of the party. Under those circumstances, the link between the RPP and reformism and radicalism had been severed during the government era of the party. This situation brought the accusations of the left (most precisely the criticism of the *Yön* movement) about the RPP's lack of reformism and radicalism. Thus in the process of the breaking of the link between the RPP and reformism – radicalism, the place of resignation of the

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<sup>1288</sup> Ibid., p.237.

<sup>1289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1290</sup> The Minister of Finance, Ferit Melen.

SPO administration and the structure of the First Five-Year Development Plan had crucial roles.

After the fall of the last İnönü government and the radicalization of the party's discourse, the RPP became a devoted supporter of planning. The party speakers in the 1965 election campaign put planning forward as the main priority of the left of center. Thus the political debates of the period raised the question of what the relationship was between economic planning and left. In the 1960s, the existence of this relationship was assumed as very strong. The political developments and the discourses of political actors on economic planning were signs of this situation. As an example, the activities and projects of the early planners were supported by the left. After the resignations, the planners took part in the Socialist Culture Association. The undersecretary of the SPO, Osman Nuri Torun, became the president of the SCA.<sup>1291</sup> The secretary general of the Association became Necat Erder, who was the former department chair for social planning in the SPO, and Attila Karaosmanoğlu was on the board of the SCA and was responsible for Research and Documentation.<sup>1292</sup> In the foundation process of the SPO, Sadun Aren who then would be one of the main leaders of the WPT, was considered for the position of chief of the economic planning department.<sup>1293</sup> However, the intelligence service reported that Aren as a communist, and he was not appointed.<sup>1294</sup>

Apart from the support of the left to the planners, all the actors on the left advocated a planned economy. However, the WPT differed from other actors on the

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<sup>1291</sup> *Milliyet*, 9 January 1963.

<sup>1292</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1293</sup> Attila Karaosmanoğlu, p.91 Moreover, the keys of the room of the department chief were given to Sadun Aren.

<sup>1294</sup> *Ibid.*

left with its implication of democracy for economic planning. For the WPT, the participation of the masses in the planning activities was crucial. On the other hand, the right wing parties and the conservative wing in the RPP opposed the radical reform projects of the planners. The right wing was suspicious about the relationship between the planners and socialism. Their most important evidence for this suspicion was the signature of the undersecretary of the SPO, Osman Nuri Torun, on the *Yön* declaration.

Again the same question - What was the relationship between economic planning and left? A scene from a session of the National Unity Committee might provide a better understanding of the perceptions about this question. “Is it possible or not, -to prove scientifically that socialism is the best regime?” The addressee of this question was one of the early planners and the chief of economic planning department, Attila Karaosmanoglu, in a session of the National Unity Committee, and the interlocutor was a member of the Committee.<sup>1295</sup> Karaosmanoglu answered that it was not a scientific problem, but he was on the side of some ethical concepts that were considered socialism such as social justice, equality of opportunity and fair income distribution.<sup>1296</sup> This dialogue between an economic planner and junta member demonstrates the confusions about economic planning and socialism. In other words, the answer of the above-mentioned question was host in this confusion.

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<sup>1295</sup> Attila Karaosmanoğlu, p.91.

<sup>1296</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusion

The 1960s was a difficult decade for the RPP. The three coalition governments that were established by the RPP ended in disappointment for the party administration and party members. In this government era, the RPP failed to put into practice the promises it had made that had emerged during its struggle against the Democrat Party and were transferred into the 1961 constitution. The RPP failed to have any election success in the 1960s. The party was defeated in all general, local and senate elections. Above all these difficulties, the RPP had a political direction question that arose from the developments that occurred outside of it. The emergence of the socialist movement forced the party to identify its political direction.

Socialism entered politics in this era. Although there were different socialism conceptions, the rising socialist movement shook the foundations of the country. The working class emerged as an important political actor with right to strike and free trade unionism legislations. Contrary to these developments on the left, an anti-communist discourse that sought to demolish socialism by force emerged on the right. The RPP's main question was to reposition itself in this rapid movement in the political spectrum. This point should be noted, that in the process of the RPP's defining itself on the left of center, both the left and right had influence. However, the main question was the existence of the left, because beyond the right's reaction, the left proposed a new program for the country.

In fact, the RPP could have denied that change was necessary for a long term. However, the emergence of the socialist movement changed the situation for the RPP. Through the 1965 elections, the fall of the RPP government became the

beginning of a new period in which it moved within the range of the left. Thus, the left of center came onto agenda as the result of this process.

Within this framework, in this chapter, the influence of the left in the emergence of the left of center was scrutinized. The left progressed out of the RPP moreover, despite the RPP. In fact, there was a resistance within the RPP against the new position. However, the pressure of the new movement and the left became stronger. The analysis of the major events of the period and the relations between the RPP and the left demonstrated that the fall of the RPP government in February 1965 was the turning point, after which the RPP came within range of the left, although this position vacillated. The real results came true in the second half of 1966.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, the RPP's coming to the left of center in the first half of the 1960s was scrutinized. In the early stages of the party, the RPP was not more than an instrument of the state to control society. It also suppressed the organization of the left and the working class. Why did such a party choose a left of center orientation in the 1960s? This question was central for this dissertation.

The chairman of the RPP, Ismet İnönü identified his party as standing on the left of center on the political spectrum in the 1965 election campaign. In Turkish historiography, the left of center initiation of the RPP is considered to mark the beginning of the social democratic experiment in Turkey. More than forty-five years has passed since this new definition. However, it is still doubtful that the RPP can be considered to have been a typical European style social democratic party. The RPP maintained both the characteristics of its single-party era's heritage and social democracy. However, in many ways, the historical heritage of the party prevailed.

After left of center's success in intra-party struggle during the 1960, the RPP entered a deep ideological discussion. Then in 1972, Bülent Ecevit became the new party chair. Under his leadership, the party identified itself as standing on the democratic left. Also in 1978, the RPP became the member of Socialist International. Although the party had orientation through western social democracy, it maintained its historical heritage which was the main obstacle of social democratization of the



party. The 1980 coup d'état closed down all political parties including the RPP. The grassroots of the party established several political parties. Among them, the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) under the leadership of Erdal İnönü became the strongest and true successor of the RPP. On the other hand, Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the RPP before the 1980 coup, did not join this party and established the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti). In 1992, the ban on the foundation of political parties of pre-1980 coup era was lifted, and the RPP was reopened. Deniz Baykal became the new leader of the party. Social Democratic Populist Party and the RPP merged in 1995. From 1995 to today, the social democratic tone of the RPP lost weight, but the historical heritage of the party became a more important reference point. Thus the party emphasized its nationalism and laicism principles in a stronger way, while it was losing its ties with the laborers and its democratic and libertarian features were dissolving. So after 1990s the social democratization process of the RPP was become reversed, and the historical heritage of the party got strength in the political agenda of the party.

Joseph Schumpeter notes the society specific character of each very country's experiment with socialism. According to Schumpeter, every country has its own socialism. He writes, "It is so absurd for other nations to try to copy Swedish examples; the only effective way of doing so would be to import the Swedes and to put them in charge." The idea that social democracy should not be conceptualized as a universal finished project and it is reconstituted in the reality of every country's social and political structure is also central to this dissertation.

However, it is obvious that although there are national and regional peculiarities, we have a number of characteristics to identify a social democratic movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, being the organization of the working class

is the first one. Second, social democratic working class movement has a commitment to parliamentary democracy and the peaceful transformation of society. Third, social democratic parties construct cross-class alliances in order to obtain a majority in the parliamentary system. It is possible to add more characteristics, but these are the most important and common characteristics that make up the core elements of social democracy.

Within this framework, the Turkish case, as an experiment in a peripheral country, had very important differences from the core elements of social democracy. Those differences make it difficult to identify the RPP as a western-type social democratic party. The left of center, in the 1960s, made the RPP a class friendly organization, but not a class-based political party, as happened in the western European cases. Economic development had a more central role than class politics. Thus, the left of center orientation of the party was presented as a more rapid and fair strategy for development. One of the main arguments of the dissertation is that this emphasis on national development could be seen as an important characteristic which distinguishes the historical trajectories of social democratic politics in the periphery from those in Western Europe.

In Turkey, there were no influential socialist parties or organizations until the 1960s. The main reason for this was that the political regime in Turkey did not allow any political opposition organizations. Under the authoritarian single party administration of the RPP, no political opposition had been allowed. Early socialist associations and parties, like many opposition organizations of the period, were closed down by the 1925 Maintenance of Order Act. This law became the turning point for the establishment of the single-party regime. The single-party era ended after the Second World War, and the Democratic Party as the main opposition was

established. However, under the conditions of the rising cold war, there was no space for the political left. Therefore socialist organizations were not allowed in Turkey until the 1960s.

As discussed above, the RPP in the single-party period was not more than an apparatus of the regime. Such a party's adaptation to the democratic and pluralist conditions was an important question. The 1950s saw a quest for a new direction for the party. In this period, the RPP began to give more importance to democratic rights and freedoms, and it became more responsive to economic and social questions. Social democracy's significance for the party in the 1960s came onto the agenda under those conditions.

The 27 May 1960 coup d'état started a new period in Turkey. The new regime was designed by a new constitution. In the preparation of the new constitution, the RPP was influential. In the Constituent Assembly and critical committees in the constitution-making process, the RPP was closely involved. So the RPP's views on the making of the constitution became central. However, the election results in 1961 were very different from what the military administration and the RPP expected. The RPP was not able to have a majority in the parliament.

Between 1961 and 1965, the RPP established three short-lived coalition governments. In these governments, the conservative wing in the RPP was more powerful than the reformist wing. Under those circumstances, the RPP started to lose its progressive and reformist supporters to the emerging left. The new discourse, "left of center" aimed to prevent this losing of the reformist and progressive electorate to the left. On the other hand, the Justice Party, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, constructed a strong anti-communist discourse in this era. This party accused the RPP of being leftist and protecting communists. Thus the RPP was under

the pressure of the anti-communist right and newly emerging left. Within this framework, the left of center discourse of İsmet İnönü aimed also to prevent the accusation of the right by differentiating the RPP from the left. So left of center was considered a remedy against the development of the left and as a shield against the accusations of the right. In fact, the fall of the third İnönü government in February 1965 was instrumental in the RPP's coming to the left of center. After the fall of the government the party radicalized its discourse, and reforms became its keyword.

When İsmet İnönü first declared, in the election campaign of the 1965 elections, the place of his party was the left of center, this new discourse was not easily adapted by the party body. The conservative wing of the party did not appreciate the new slogan. However, they do not react during the election campaign. Then the elections were a great defeat for the party. The party fell under the 30% of the votes for the first time in its history, while the main rival of the party, the Justice Party, passed 50% of the total votes. Under those circumstances, the left of center was considered as the main reason for the 1965 defeat. Therefore, the party abandoned the left of center discourse until the 1966 June Senate elections. No party spokespersons mentioned the left of center in any speech except a radio speech given by Bülent Ecevit. Then the inner party story of the left of center shaped in four months between 1966 June (Senate Elections) and October (the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP).

After the elections, a new group, led by Bülent Ecevit, was formed to support the left of center discourse. This group was successful in their inner party struggle and the left of center became the official party policy during the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP in October 1966.

The political developments within the RPP and inner party struggles for the left of center were discussed in detail in the Chapter Three. However, it is important for this conclusion part that the political developments outside the RPP (the influence of the newly emerging left) became more significant in the position change of the party. Before discussing these developments, I should conclude the discussion presented in the dissertation about the role of Bülent Ecevit in the RPP's position change.

Bülent Ecevit served as Minister of Labor in three governments of Ismet İnönü. The legalization of the right to strike and free trade unionism were not his own achievement. Those rights had been stated in the 1961 constitution. The opposition parties did not oppose the enactment of the laws concerning those rights. More importantly, the working class made a determined struggle for the right to strike and free trade unionism. Then in the early stages of the left of center's coming into agenda, Ecevit did not have important role. Ecevit and his group's role started after the June 1966 Senate elections. At first, this group supported İnönü against the conservative wing in the party, and then they struggled for the party congress in October 1966.

In his biography on Eduard Bernstein, Peter Gay claims that "if there had been no Bernstein, it would have been necessary to invent him." It is possible to explain the role of Ecevit with this example. For Gay, at the end of the twentieth century, economic and political circumstances required a reformist doctrine in Germany. Therefore Bernstein emerged as the theorist of this reformist doctrine. Within this framework, we have different questions, but the same answer. The question of "what would have happened to the left of center in the 1960s if there had

been no Bülent Ecevit” is different. The answer of this dissertation is the same, that “it would have been necessary to invent him.”

If the role of Bülent Ecevit, İsmet İnönü, other actors in the RPP or the RPP itself had secondary importance in the RPP’s coming to the left of center, who had the primary role? The answer is the newly emerging political left of the 1960s. The actors on the left in this period were the Workers Party of Turkey, the *Yön* movement and the Communist Party of Turkey. On the other hand, the working class emerged as an important political and social power after the legislations on free trade unionism and the right to strike.

As stated in the above chapters, the left and the working class movement in the 1960s developed outside the RPP; moreover, in many ways, in spite of the RPP. The party did not contribute to the development of the left or to the working class movement. However, this newly emerging left directly affected the RPP’s position. The emergence of a strong socialist movement became the main reason for the RPP’s shift to the left of center. The new political environment after the emergence of the left forced the RPP to redefine itself under the new circumstances. To analyze this influence is possible via scrutinizing the relationship between the RPP and the left.

The Workers Party of Turkey, the *Yön* movement and the Communist Party of Turkey were the main actors on the left in the first half of the 1960s. During the period, these actors’ opinions about the RPP were critical. They considered RPP to be an obstacle to the development of the left movement in Turkey. However the fall of the third İnönü government in February 1965 became the turning point. All of the actors on the left changed their position about the RPP. They expected an unofficial progressive front against the right wing. Concurrently, the RPP radicalized its political discourse and İnönü identified his party’s position as the left of center.

As mentioned in the dissertation, the new direction of the RPP was different from that of the western European social democratic movements. The social democratic parties of Western Europe emerged and developed as the political organizations of the working class. To the end of the nineteenth century, social democratic parties were founded in almost all European countries. Major changes in European politics and society transformed the social democratic movement. During the First World War, the socialist working class movement was divided into two camps between the reformist social democrats and the communists. Then the inter-war era became also a catastrophe age for the social democrats. The only exception became the Swedish social democratic party. The European recovery after the Second World War was also an era of recovery for social democracy. Nevertheless the class party model was replaced by the catch-all party. However, the working class continued to be the largest part in the social democratic party's electorate.

Although social democracy emerged and developed in mature capitalist countries, every mature capitalist society did not necessarily have a strong social democratic movement. The United States is the best example of this exception. On the other hand, there were no important social democratic organization in the periphery until the 1980s and 1990s. The two main currents of progressive politics in those countries were communism and national populism. However in the 1980s and 1990s social democratic governments started to emerge in the periphery. Within this framework, Turkey experienced a social democracy oriented movement relatively early as a peripheral country.

In this dissertation, the influence of the left on the RPP was scrutinized via three of the widely debated issues of period which marked the main parameters of

the relationship between the RPP and the actors on the left: the land reform, anti-Americanism, and planned development.

On the land reform question, the RPP's position was both determined and timid. The party considered the land reform as a necessary measure for the modernization of the agriculture and finance of the development plan. However it was unsure about that the land reform should be in a radical sense or not. The fall of the third İnönü government changed the position of the party on the land reform issue. Then left of center discourse of the party gave a special importance to that issue. As mentioned above, the main slogan of the RPP became "land to the tiller, water to the user" in the 1970s. This position change of the party that started after the fall of the third İnönü government were caused by the influences of both right and newly emerging left on the RPP.

The RPP's position on the USA-Turkey relations was different from the anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism of the left. As mentioned above, the RPP's policy reflected the so-called realist foreign policy perception of Turkish foreign policy decision makers. So the RPP had doubts and discontents about USA's policy on Cyprus question and the influence of the USA on the Turkish politics. On the other hand, the party considered the fall of the third İnönü government as an American operation. In this framework, the left wing political actors supported RPP's this new orientation. However this rapprochement was not a united front policy. On the other hand, this era saw a thaw in the cold war conditions. Thus new state in the cold war conditions and changes in Turkey's relations with the USA had central role in the emergence of political left in Turkey and RPP's position change.

Finally, planning and planned development had central place in RPP's position change and its relations with the left. The RPP led government did not



accept any radical measures (prescribed by the administrators of the SPO) in the development plan. The resignation of the early SPO planners was the direct result of this situation. Again the fall of the last İnönü government became the turning point. Then after, the party became a devoted supporter of planning. Thus when the left of center came to the agenda, planning was put forward as the main priority of the new discourse by the party administration. In this process, political left directly influenced RPP's attitude towards planning and planned development.

The analysis of the three widely debated issues of the period indicated the significance of the question of economic development through the left of center orientation of the political discourse of the RPP in the 1960s. The question of economic development was given priority and the emergence of social democratic politics was marked by the centrality of the problem of economic development to the political agenda. In this regard, the emergence of a social democratic political discourse in Turkey constitutes an example of the difference between the historical trajectories of social democratic movements in Western Europe and in the periphery where the questions pertaining to class relations are dominated by economic development related ones. The analysis presented in the dissertation was situated in a particular historical context and the characteristics common to the countries of the periphery were considered along with society-specific ones in an investigation which suggests that the absence of European type of social democratic formations in Turkey could be traced back to the political developments around the adoption of a left of center position by the RPP in the 1960s.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I

#### İLK HEDEFLER BEYANNAMESİ

Biz, C.H.P. 14. Kurultay üyeleri, tarih boyunca büyük medeniyetler ve devletler kurmuş olan Türk Milletinin tam ve kamil bir demokratik nizam içinde yaşama azmine tercüman olarak; demokrasi idealinin ve davasının takipçisi bulunan bütün idealist insanların çözülmaz bir topluluk halinde güçlerini ve mücadelelerini C.H.P. saflarında birleştirmekte bulundukları bu tarihi günlerde, yıllardan beri mücadelesini yaptığımız esasları bir kere daha tespit ve teyid ederiz.

Bu esaslar, insan cemiyetlerinin yüzyıllar ötesinden gelen şerefli tekamülünün inkar edilmez, iptal edilmez bir şekilde ferde ve topluluğa kazandırdığı ana haklar ve demokratik müesseselerdir.

- Hukuka ve milli iradeye müstenit idarenin imtihanını başarıyla vermiş bulunan büyük milletimizi ana haklardan ve demokratik müesseselerden mahrum etmek isteyen kuvvetlerin behemehal hüsrana uğrayacaklarına inanan,
- Aziz vatanımızı iktisadi, içtimai ve manevi sahalarda hakiki ve süratli olarak kalkındırmanın bu ana hakların ve müesseselerin biran evvel gerçekleşmesine bağlı olduğunu gören,



- Ve milletimizi çağdaş medeniyet seviyesine ulaştırmak maksadını güden devrimlerimizin son halkası olan demokratik rejimi kurma mücadelesinde, millet çoğunluğunun kendisi ile beraber olduğunu bilen,

#### C.H.P. KURULTAYI,

Güçbirliği hareketinin de temelini teşkil eden aşağıdaki esasları, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Büyük Millet Meclisinde gereken çoğunluğa kavuştuğunda, en geç ilk teşrii devrede gerçekleştirilecek hedefler olarak millet ve tarih huzurunda ilan ve taahhüt eder:

1. Demokratik inkişafımızı durduran, gerileten bütün antidemokratik kanunlar, usuller, zihniyet ve tatbikat kaldırılacaktır.
2. Anayasamız modern demokrasi ve cemiyet anlayışına uygun, halk egemenliği, hukuk devleti, sosyal adalet ve emniyet esaslarına dayanan bir devlet nizamına göre değiştirilecektir

#### A.- Bu Anayasada:

- Irk, cins, din, mezhep, siyasi fikir, içtimai menşe, doğuş ve servet farkı olmaksızın bütün Türklerin müşterek malı olan ana hak ve hürriyetler yer alacaktır.
- Düşünce ve söz hürriyeti, basın hürriyeti, ilim ve sanat hürriyeti, din ve vicdan hürriyeti, şahıs ve mesken masuniyeti, toplanma ve dernek kurma hürriyeti, mal ve mülk emniyeti, çalışma ve iktisadi teşebbüs hürriyeti, grev hakkı, sendika ve mesleki teşekküller kurma hakkı, kanun önünde eşit muamele görme ve amme hizmetlerinden eşit

olarak faydalanma hakkı, devlet yayın vasıtalarının tarafsızlığı gibi mensubu olduğumuz medeni alemin kabul ettiği bütün insan hak ve hürriyetleri ve hukuk devleti prensipleri Türk vatandaşlarına sağlanacak ve bu haklar sarıh bir şekilde tarif edilerek teminat altına alınacaktır. Bir Anayasa Mahkemesi teşkil edilmek suretiyle Anayasada yer alan bu hakların diğer kanunlarla daraltılması ve iptal edilmesi önlenecektir

- Teşrii organın icra üzerindeki murakabesi fiili ve müessir bir hale getirilecektir.
- Kanun vaz'ında ahengin ve muvazenenin temini için ikinci bir meclis kurulacaktır.
- Devletin ve hürriyetler nizamının temeli olan bağımsız mahkeme ve her türlü tesirden azade hakimlik müessesesinin zaruri kıldığı bir Yüksek Hakimlik Şurası ihdas ve hakimlerin teminatına müessir bütün muameleler bu şuraya tevdi edilecektir.
- Bir şahsın, zümrenin veya siyasi teşekkülün değil, devletin ve bütün halkın hizmetinde tarafsız ve kanuna bağı bir idareyi sağlayan hukuki esaslar, vazedilecek, kazai murakabe bütün idari tasarruflara şamil olacaktır.
- İçtimai adaletsizlik ve muvazenesizliklerden uzak, mamur ve müreffeh bir Türkiye'nin doğması için bütün fertleri maddi ihtiyaçların baskısından kurtarmak, herkese bedeni, fikri ve içtimai inkişaf imkanı sağlamak, cemiyetin temel unsure olan aileyi korumak hedeflerine yönelen sosyal haklar tanınacaktır.

Mevzuat yukarıda sayılan prensip ve müesseselerin ışıǰı altında tadil ve ıslah edilerek demokratik nizamın verimli bir tarzda işlemedi saǰlanacaktır. Bu meyanda bilhassa;

- Seçimlerin mevzuat ve tatbikat olarak serbest, eşit ve dürüst şartlar altında icrası saǰlam müeyyidelere baǰlanacak, milli bünyemize uygun bir nispi temsil usulü kabul edilecektir.

B.- Meclis İctüzüǰü milli murakabenin icaplarına göre, deǰştirilerek Meclis Riyaset Divanının tarafsızlıǰı saǰlanacak, Mecliste temsil edilen Siyasi partilerin hakları, vuzuha kavuřturulacak, milletvekilinin söz hürriyeti ve dokunulmazlıǰı, soru, gensoru, Meclis soruřturması gibi müesseselere gerçek hüviyetleri kazandırılacaktır.

C.- İdare ve siyaset hayatımızda ahlakı hakim kılmak ve her türlü suistimali önlemek gayesiyle amme hizmeti gören her şahsın vazifesiyle ilgili hareketlerinin murakabesi için ittihaz edilecek tedbirler arasında ispat hakkı ve mal beyanı yer alacaktır

CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİNİN ONDÖRDÜNCÜ KURULTAYI,

Bütün müşküleri yenmesini bilen milletimizin çok yakın bir gelecekte demokratik rejim davasını da tam olarak gerçekteřtireceǰine; Tahakküm ve baskı zihniyetinin milli irade tarafından tasfiye edileceǰine; Hakkın, adaletin, hürriyetin mutlaka zafere ulaşacaǰına, kesin olarak inanmaktadır.

## APPENDIX II

### CHP 18. KURULTAY BİLDİRİSİ

CHP 18. Kurultayı, CHP'nin kuruluşundan beri izlediği fikirler, ülküler ve icraatı ile genel karakterinin, siyasal akımlar arasında Partimize ortanın solunda yer verdiğini kesinlikle tesbit etmiştir.

CHP'nin genel karakterini gösteren ortanın solu deyiminin kapsamını, partimizin programında yer alan esaslar ortaya koyar.

CHP'nin belli bir çalışma döneminde yurt sorunları için ileri sürdüğü çözüm yolları, Kurultay Bildirileri ve yetkili organlarımızın programa uygun olarak karara bağladığı seçim bildirgelerinin sınırları içinde tesbir edilir.

Devrimci CHP, memleketimizin daima gelişen gerçeklerinin, ihtiyaçlarının ve çağdaş bilimin getirdiği yeni çözüm yollarının ışığı altında, yurt sorunlarını karşılayan tutarlı tedbirleri, programımızda yer alan Altı Ok'umuzda ifadesini bulan temel ilkelerine uygun olarak durmadan geliştirecektir. CHP, çağdaş uygarlığa ulaşma ülkümüzün gerektirdiği hamleleri ve reformları; Cumhuriyetimizin özünü teşkileden Atatürk Devrimlerine, 27 Mayıs Devrimine ve insan haklarına dayanan, milli, demokratik, laik vesosyal hukuk devleti ilkeleri içinde gerçekleştirmekte sarsılmaz bir azim sahibidir.

CHP; İnsan'ın yüce değerine ve insan kişiliğinin özgürlük içinde gelişmesi gerektiğine inanır. Bu amaçla, Devlet, İnsan'ın temel hak ve hürriyetlerini, fert huzuru, sosyal adalet ve hukuk devleti ilkeleriyle bağdaşmayacak surette sınırlayan

siyasi, iktisadi ve sosyal bütün engelleri kaldırır; İnsan'ın maddi ve manevi varlığının gelişmesi için gerekli şartları hazırlar.

CHP, hızlı ve planlı kalkınmanın zorunlu kıldığı yatırım kaynaklarının sağlanmasına, herkesin, kendi mali gücü oranında katılması gerektiğine inanır. Milli gelir dağılımında sosyal adalet, bu yoldan gerçekleştirilecektir.

CHP'nin ülküsü; hürriyet içinde, sosyal adalete uygun, hızlı ve planlı kalkınma sayesinde, sosyal haklara, sosyal güvenliğe ve her alanda fırsat eşitliğine dayanan hür, ileri ve mutlu bir Türkiye'ye erişmektir.

CHP'nin temel iktisadi görüşü, planlı, dengeli ve sosyal adalete uygun kalkınmanın, ancak, kamu kesiminde ekonomiye hakim nitelik taşımasıyla mümkün olabileceği yolundadır. Bunun yanı sıra, Partimizin, önemli bir özel kesimi, ferdin yaratıcı gücünden faydalanmak ve devletin kişi özgürlüğünü tehdit etmesini önlemek için temel şart sayar. Partimizin plan anlayışı; özel teşebbüsün yatırımlarını arttırmasını, bunları hızlı ve dengeli bir kalkınmanın teşvik edici ve – bu teşvikte doğrudan doğruya kontrollerden kaçınarak- vergi politikası, kredi politikası, sermaye piyasasının kurulması ve geliştirilmesi gibi dolaylı tedbirleri esas tutar. Devlet, özel teşebbüsün milli iktisadın gereklerine ve sosyal amaçlara uygun yürümesini; güvenlik ve kararlılık içinde çalışmasını sağlayacak tedbirleri alır.

CHP, bu nitelikteki bir karma ekonomiyi, özel teşebbüsün hakim olduğu liberal-kapitalist bir sisteme veya özel teşebbüsün yok edildiği kollektivist bir sisteme geçiş dönemi olarak görmez. CHP, devletçilik ilkesine uygun karma ekonomiyi, devamlı bir iktisadi sistem olarak kabul eder.

Atatürk Milliyetçisi Partimizin halkçılık ilkesi, bu iktisadi ve sosyal temel görüşler içerisinde, sınıf ve zümreler arasında kavgaya ve belli bir sınıfın egemenlik hakkına sahip olduğu rejimleri kesinlikle reddeder. CHP, bütün sınıf ve zümrelerin

üstünde Türk Milleti'nin varlığına ve her sınıf ve zümrenin üstünde Türk toplumunun yüksek yararlarının yer alması gerektiğine inanır. Bu amaçla CHP, sınıf ve zümreler arasındaki çıkar uyumsuzluklarını, başta toplum yararını göz önünde tutarak, uzlaştırıcı tedbir ve usullerle çözmeğe; bu sınıf ve zümreleri birbirleriyle bağdaştırmaya ve kaynaştırmaya çalışır.

CHP İleri Türkiye Ülkümüze ulaşmanın, ancak, 1965 Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri Seçim Bildirgemizde öngörülen – özellikle – toprak reformu, vergi reformu, idari reform, kamu iktisadi teşebbüsleri reformu, vergi hakları, sosyal güvenlik, sosyal hizmetler ve konut alanındaki reformlar, eğitim alanındaki hamleler, milli petrol davası ve diğer tabii servet ve kaynaklar için ileri sürdüğümüz tedbirler ve toplum kalkınması gibi gönül rızasına dayanan demokratik kalkınma metodlarına bağlı kalmakla mümkün olacağına yürekten inanır.

CHP'nin programı, dünyada mevcut partilerin herhangi birinin programının, kopyası veya taklidi değildir. CHP'nin programı, yalnız başına Türkiye'nin ihtiyaçlarından ve sorunlarından doğmuş tedbirlerdir. Bu esaslar içinde, CHP, sosyalist bir parti değildir ve olmayacaktır.

CHP halkçılık ilkemizin gereği olarak, büyük halk kütlelerinin yanında, onların yararına çalışan, onların sömürülmesine karşı çıkan ortanın solunda bir partidir.

Kurultay, yukarda belirtilen kayıtlarla, CHP'nin ortanın solunda bir parti olduğu bilincinin ve bunun söylenmesinin de, önemli ve ileri bir anlam taşıdığını tesbit eder.

CHP, bu hüviyetiyle, Anayasamızın yasakladığı bütün aşırı sağ ve aşırı sol akınlara ve demokrasi dışı eğilimlerin kesin olarak karşısında, akli ve sağduyuyu temsil eden tek kuruluştur.

Atatürk Devrimlerinin koruyucusu, Atatürk devrimlerinin takipçisi,  
Cumhuriyetçi, Milliyetçi, Halkçı, Devletçi, Laik ve Devrimci Cumhuriyet Halk  
Partisi, aziz halkımızın çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmasını candan arzulayan  
bütün Türk vatandaşları için tek ümit ışığıdır, tek ümit ışığı olarak kalacaktır.

### APPENDIX III

#### YÖN BİLDİRİSİ

Türk halkının, çok çeşit iktisadi, siyasi ve sosyal meseleler ortasında, kendisini bütün özlemlerine kavuşturacak bir yön aramakta olduğu bu günlerde, toplum hayatının çeşitli kesimlerinde görev almış olan bizler, altına imzalarımızı attığımız bu bildiri ile, ortak amaçlarımızı açıklamayı doğru bulduk. Böyle bir bildirinin meselemizi çözmekte faydalı olabilecek olumlu tartışmalara yol açacağını düşünüyoruz.

1. Atatürk devrimleriyle amaç edinilen çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmanın, eğitim davasını sonuçlandırmanın, Türk demokrasisini yaşatmanın, sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirmenin ve demokrasi rejimini sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmanın, ancak iktisadi alanda hızla kalkınmakta, yani milli istihsal seviyesini hızla yükseltmekte göstereceğimiz başarıya bağlı olduğuna inanıyoruz.

a) Atatürk devrimlerinin amacı olan Batılılaşmak, en geniş anlamıyla Batının istihsal seviyesine yaklaştığımız ölçüde gerçekleşebilir. Türkiye'deki istihsal seviyesi yükseldikçe, memleketin sosyal yapısı değişecek, şehir-köy ikiliği ortadan kalkacak, imkanlar genişleyecek ve Batı uygarlığının temeli olan akılcı düşünce kütlelere yayılacaktır.

b) Ne kadar çok gayret sarf edilirse edilsin, düşük bir istihsal seviyesiyle, kütlelerin



kültür seviyesinde esaslı bir yükselme sağlamak hayaldir. İşsizlik, açlık, çıplaklık, soğuk ve sefalet, kütlelerin eğitime yönelmesini engelleyecek, yaşama içgüdüsi, öğrenme merakından daha ağır basacaktır.

c) Demokrasi, her şeyden önce insan haysiyetine dayanan ve insanı üstün değer sayan bir rejimdir. Açlığa, işsizliğe, evsizliğe çare bulamayan bir rejimin, ne kadar üzerinde titrersek titreyelim, demokrasi olmaktan çıkması ve bir gün çökmesi tabidir. Türk demokrasisinin yaşatılması, açlığı, işsizliği ve evsizliği ortadan kaldıracak yüksek bir istihlal seviyesine götüren yolları bulmakla mümkün olabilir.

d) Milli gelirin hızla artmasına önem vermeyen bir sosyal adalet politikası da, yoksulluğun bölüşülmesinden öteye geçemeyecektir. Buna karşılık, sosyal adalete yer vermeyen bir kalkınma politikası başarısızlığa mahkumdur. O halde, sosyal adalet politikasının başlıca araçlarından biride istihlal seviyesinin yükseltilmesi olmalıdır.

2. Bugün Türk toplumuna yön verebilmek durumunda bulunan öğretmen, yazar, politikacı, sendikacı, müteşebbis ve idareci gibi kimselerin, belli bir kalkınma felsefesini ana hatları üzerinde anlaşımaya varmalarını zaruri sayıyoruz...

a) Yirminci yüzyılda haberleşme araçlarında ki gelişme sonucunda, kütleler, başka memleketlerde ki veya başka tabakalarda ki yüksek hayat standardının varlığını öğrenmekte ve asıl önemlisi, bu standarda erişmenin mümkün olduğunu görmektedir.

Yoksulluğumuz bu yüzden, artık daha ıstıraplı bir şekilde hissedilmektedir. Hızlı nüfus artışı ve meselelerimizin bu artışa uygun bir tempo ile ele alınmayışı, durumu daha da ağırlaştırmıştır. Türkiye, bugün ciddi bir iktisadi ve sosyal buhranın içindedir. Sosyal buhran, iktisadi buhranın tabi bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Geri bir tarım, artan ithal ihtiyacımızı karşılayacak kaynakları sağlamak şöyle dursun, hızla çoğalan nüfusun beslenme ihtiyacını bile karşılayamamaktadır.

Topraksızlık, artan nüfusu şehirlere doğru itmekte, şehirlere akan bu nüfusa iş ve mesken sağlanmasında güçlük çekilmektedir. Köklü tedbirler alınmazsa, gecekondular ve işsizlik önümüzdeki yıllarda, millet hayatını tehlikeli bir yarası haline gelerek sosyal ve siyasi düzenin bozulmasına yol açabilecektir. Hızlı nüfus artışı yüzünden, Türkiye nüfusunun yarısını 18 yaşından küçük gençler teşkil etmektedir. Son olaylarında açıkça ortaya koyduğu gibi çığ halinde gelen bu gençlerin büyük bir kısmına okul ve sağlam bir gelecek sağlamak mümkün olmamaktadır.

b) İşin hazin tarafı, Türkiye'nin kaderine hakim olabilecek durumda bulunan çevrelerde, karşı karşıya bulunduğumuz çetin meseleleri şuuruna henüz varılmamış olmasıdır. Bu çevrelerce benimsenen ve uygulanabilecek olan bir kalkınma felsefesi yoktur. Kalkınmanın anlamı bütün genişliği ile anlaşılamamıştır. Köklü reformlara girişmeden kalkınmanın başarılamayacağı ve buna karşılık kalkınma sonucunda toplum düzenine, insan davranışlarına bazı değişikliklerin geleceği unutulmaktadır. Bu yüzden hem kalkınma istenmekte, hem de köklü reformlara karşı konulmakta ve yeni davranışlar yadırganıp kötülenmektedir. Böyle bir tutumun sonucu olarak, toplum hayatının gidişinde söz sahibi bir çok kimse, dış yardımların biraz genişlemesiyle, turizmin geliştirilmesiyle, sebze ve meyve ihracını artmasıyla kalkınma davasının çözülebileceğine içten inanmaktadır.

c) Türkiye'nin kalkınmasını belli bir amaca yöneltmek, siyasi iktidarın emrinde teknik bir organ olan Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı'nın yetkisini aşan bir iştir. Gerçi, memleketin seçkin uzmanlarını bir araya getiren Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı bir kalkınma stratejisi çizerek, bu yolda ilk gayreti göstermiştir. Ama bunu yeter saymamak gerekir. Yapılacak planların yön kazanması ve başarıya ulaşması, ancak Türk toplumuna yön verebilecek durumda bulunan çevrelerin açık bir kalkınma felsefesi üzerinde anlaşmalarıyla mümkün olacaktır.

3. Kalkınma felsefemizin hareket noktaları olarak, bütün imkanlarımızı harekete geçirmeyi, yatırımları hızla artırmaya, iktisadi hayata bütünüyle planlamayı, kütleleri sosyal adalete kavuşturmayı, istismarı kaldırmayı ve demokrasiyi kütlelere mal etmeyi zaruri sayıyoruz. Varmak istediğimiz bu amaçlara yeni bir devletçilik anlayışıyla erişebileceğimize inanıyoruz.

a) Türkiye'nin iktisadi hayatında özel teşebbüsü ve devlet teşebbüsünü birlikte yaşatan karma bir sistem kalacaktır. Fakat, ağırlık merkezi özel teşebbüs olan bir iktisadi sistemin, bugünkü yapısıyla Türkiye'yi, hızla ve sosyal adalet içinde çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaştırabileceğini sanmıyoruz. İktisat ilminin ve tarihin ışığında, inanıyoruz ki, özel teşebbüse dayanan kalkınma yavaştır, ıstıraplıdır, israflıdır ve sosyal adaletle bağdaşması, az gelişmiş bir memlekette, imkansızdır. Böyle bir kalkınma, siyaseti geniş ölçüde iktisadi güce tabi kılması yüzünden, demokratik de değildir.

b) Özel teşebbüs kara dayanır. İktisadi sistemin itici kuvveti kardan ibaretse kalkınmanı çok yavaş bir tempo ile gerçekleşmesine, gelir dağılımındaki adaletsizliklerin artmasına, “her mahallede bir milyoner” felsefesinin yerleşmesine, milli servetin en faydalı işlere değil en karlı işlere akarak israf edilmesine, durgunluğun ve işsizliğin sık sık baş göstermesine katlanmak gerekir. Günümüzde, hiçbir az gelişmiş memleket bunları göze alamaz. Batı memleketlerinin kalkınmaları sırasında çok elverişli şartlara ve sömürgeciliğe rağmen, gelişme, yavaş, israflı, sıkıntılı olmuş, liberal, fakat gücünü genel oydan almayan idareciler altında gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ancak yirminci yüzyılda esas itibariyle istihsal seviyesinin yükselmesi sayesinde ki, Batı memleketlerinde ki, iktisadi sistem az çok tatmin edici bir şekilde işleyebilecek hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, batı sosyalist partileri, düşünürleri ve hatta liberal eğilimli siyasetçiler, kendi memleketlerindeki iktisadi

sistemin israfli olduğunu, zaruri ihtiyaçları ihmal ettiğini, hızlı bir gelişmeyi ve sosyal adaleti sağlamak bakımından da yetersiz kaldığını delilleriyle belirtmektedir.

c) Bu sebeptir ki, günümüzün gerçeklerine uygun yeni bir devletçilik anlayışına Türkiye için zaruri sayıyoruz. Ayrıca, özel teşebbüsün mutlaka verimli, devlet teşebbüsünün de mutlaka verimsiz olduğu şeklindeki yaygın düşüncenin, sağlam delillere dayanmayan ve geniş bir propaganda ile beslenen bir inanç olduğunu belirtmekte fayda görüyoruz. Verimli çalışma imkanlarına kavuşmak için, mesela İngiltere ve Fransa'da, bazı sanayi kollarının devletleştirilmesine gidildiğini hatırlatmak isteriz. Bir takım devlet işletmelerinin verimsiz kalış sebeplerini, devletçilikte değil aksine yeter derecede devletçi olmayışımızda ve devletçiliği sitemli bir şekilde uygulayamayışımızda aramak gerektiğine inanıyoruz.

4. Yeni devletçiliği, yukarda belirttiğimiz amaçlara erişmek için mutlaka başvurulması gereken şuurlu devlet müdahalesi şeklinde anlıyoruz.

a) Kalkınmayı hızlandırmak maksadıyla milli tasarrufun çoğaltılması ve milli gelirdeki artışların önemli bir kısmının tasarrufa yöneltilmesi, ancak geniş ölçüde ve bilgili devlet müdahalesi ile başarılabilir. Belli başlı tasarruf kaynaklarından biri olan vergilerde verimin artırılması, devletçilikle mümkündür. Çağımızda, vergilerde adalet şarttır. Fakat vergi adaletini sağlamak maksadıyla yüksek gelirlerden alınan vergilere karşı bugün yöneltlen en önemli itiraz, bunların yatırımları azaltmasıdır. Devletçilik, milli tasarrufu yatırımlara yönelttiği için bu itirazı önler. Bundan başka, devletçilik, kalkınmanın nimetleri ve külfetleri arasında denge yaratarak tasarruf fikrinin geniş halk kitlelerince benimsenmesini kolaylaştırır. Ayrıca, devlet işletmelerinin kazançları, vergi yoluna sapmadan sağlanan önemli tasarruf kaynağı olur. Yatırım imkanlarını artırmak maksadıyla, boş duran işgücünün istihsale yöneltmesi de, devletin demokratik, fakat planlı teşkilatlandırma gücü sayesinde

mümkün olabilecektir.

b) Bugünkü imkanlarımızla, daha iyi teşkilat ve idared içinde şimdikinden çok daha fazla çok daha verimli şekilde yatırım yapmanın mümkün olduğuna inanıyoruz.

Bunun için, iktisadi hayatı bütünüyle planlamak şarttır. Plan, iktisadi hayatı istenen amaçlara zamanında ve bütünüyle yöneltmeye imkan verecek yetkilerle araçları da beraberinde getirmelidir. Bunu sağlayacak belli başlı şartlardan biri de iktisadi hayatın çeşitli kesimlerine hakim olan kilit sanayilerin mutlaka devlet elinde bulundurulmasıdır. Devletçiliği ciddi planlamanın ciddi bir unsuru sayıyoruz.

c) Planlama büyük iktisadi birimlere geçmeyi zaruri kılar. Halbuki Türkiye'nin iktisadi hayatı, tarım, sanayi ve ticaret alanlarında çok ufak işletmelere dayanmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, çiftçiyi teşkilatlandırarak istihsal kooperatiflerinin geliştirilmesi, küçük sanatlarda kooperatifçiliğin yaygın hale getirilmesi, perakende satış yerlerini azaltmak malların müstahsilden müstehlike geçiş yollarını kısaltarak, sanayide olduğu gibi, tarım ve ticarete büyük birim esasının mümkün olduğu ölçüde yerleştirilmesi lüzumludur.

Devlet kesimin yanı sıra, geniş kooperatif kesimi, Türk iktisadi sistemini temelini teşkil etmektedir.

d) Devletçilik aynı zamanda gelir dağılımdaki adaletsizleri gidermek, sosyal güvenliği gerçekleştirmek, müstahsil ve müstehlikin mutavassıt bir zümre tarafından ezilmesini önlemek, bölgeler arasındaki dengesizlikleri ortadan kaldırmaya çalışmak içinde en elverişli sistemdir.

Çalışmayı toplumun en yüksek değeri haline getirmek, çalışmaya dayanan kazançları yüksek seviyeye çıkarmak, devletçiliğin temel hedefidir. Kol ve kafa gücünün satarak geçinenlerin ezilmesine seyirci kalan, arsa spekülâtörlerinin ve ticaret alanında istismarcı mutavassıtların haksız kazançlarına göz yuman ve bu gibilerin bir

yüksek devlet memurundan, fikir ve bilim adamından fazla kazanmasına ses çıkarmayan bir sistemin yirminci yüzyılda daha fazla sürüp gitmesine imkan yoktur.

e) Devletçilik, demokratik rejimin sadece bir şekilden ibaret kalmasını önleyip, demokrasinin kütlelere malolmasını sağlayacak temel müdahale vasıtasıdır. Planlı bir eğitim seferberliğine girişmek, Köy Enstitüleri ile açılan yolu genişletmek, milyonlarca işçi çocuğunu eğitim alanında ve memleket idaresinde herkesle eşit imkanlara kavuşturmak, yetişkinlerin eğitimi yoluyla kütlelere yükselme fırsatı hazırlamak ancak şuurlu bir devletçilikle mümkündür.

Sendikaların kuvvetlendirilmesi, ağanın teşkilatlanmış çiftçinin ve kooperatifin almasını sağlayacak şekilde toprak reformunun gerçekleştirilmesi modern devletçiliğin ödevidir ve bunlar ancak devlet müdahalesiyle başarılabilir.

Varmak istediğimiz amaçların şu veya bu noktası tartışma konusu edilebilir. Bu bildirinin yayınlanmasındaki maksat da bu çeşit tartışmalara yol açmaktır. Bugün içinde bulunduğumuz buhranlardan kurtulmanın birinci şartını, Türk toplumunun çeşitli kesimlerinde görev almış olanların ve millet kaderine hakim olabilecek mevkilere gelmiş bulunanların, düşüncelerini açıkça ortaya koyarak, bir temel kalkınma felsefesi etrafında birleşmelerinde görüyoruz.