

THE MUSLIM MILLET OF AUTONOMOUS CRETE:
AN EXPLORATION INTO ITS ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Elektra Kostopoulou, “The Muslim Millet of Autonomous Crete: An
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This work is a reevaluation of nineteenth-century Cretan history. It aims to examine the manifold transformations of the island society during its transition from Ottoman rule to a brief period of autonomy and ultimate integration into Greece. The time period studied in this dissertation captures some of the variables that continue to vex modern historiography. While there is a tendency to think of the Ottoman Empire exclusively as an Islamic or perhaps proto-Turkish polity that ruled over non-Muslim minorities foreign to the essential character of the Ottomans, the history of Muslim populations in provinces that did not end up being part of the Republic of Turkey—such as Crete—is identified with imaginary minorities foreign to the locals. My exploration of Cretan history challenges the above approach by focusing on the continually evolving profiles of Muslims and Christians in Ottoman and Autonomous Crete through the examination of data collected from primary archival sources and published material produced during this period in the Ottoman Empire, Greece, western Europe, and Crete. This dissertation suggests that ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ in the Eastern Mediterranean were not clear-cut, monolithic, proto-national categories, but constantly changing communities that interacted with each other through networks influenced by a variety of contingencies. The period deserves to be studied in its own right, rather than to continue to use it to legitimize certain ‘truths.’

ÖZET

Elektra Kostopoulou, “Girit Müslüman Milleti: Kaynakları ve Etkileri Üzerine Bir Araştırma”

Bu araştırma on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Girit tarihine yeni bir bakış açısı getirmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı Girit toplumunun Osmanlı yönetiminden ayrılıp kısa bir bağımsızlık dönemi sonunda Yunan toplumu ile birleşmesi süreci içinde yer alan bir takım çok yönlü tarihsel aşamayı belirlemek ve değerlendirmektir. Ele alınan konu çağdaş tarih yazımında süregelen bazı aksiyomatik sorunlara yeni bir açıdan bakılmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Geleneksel yöntem Osmanlı politik modelini tek boyutlu bir hükümet biçimi olarak nitelendirmekte ve bu boyutu da münhasıran ‘İslâmi’ veya ‘proto-Türk’ olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu yöntem İmparatorluğun gayri-Müslim tebaalarını Osmanlı’nın esas niteliğine tamamen aykırı birimler olarak nitelendirmekte ve günümüzde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti toprakları dışında yer alan Osmanlı vilayetlerinde yaşamış olan Müslüman nüfusu ise yerli nüfusa kıyasla sanki yabancı bir azınlıkmiş gibi tanımlamaktadır. Girit bu konuda mükemmel bir misal teşkil etmektedir. Bu tez incelenen dönem sırasında Yunanistan, Osmanlı, Batı Avrupa ve Girit’te mevcut birinci el malzemeye dayanmak suretiyle sözü geçen geleneksel yöntemi eleştirmeye, Girit’in her iki cemaatını tanımlayan parametreleri ortaya koymaya, ve bu iki cemaatın esnek profillerini çizmeye azmetmektedir. Bu çalışma ayrıca Doğu Akdeniz coğrafyasında yaşamış olan ‘azınlıkların’ ve ‘çoğunlukların’ monolitik proto-ulusal birimler değil de sürekli olarak değişen ve birbirleriyle kesişen dinamik toplumlardan oluştuğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu görüş çerçevesi içinde on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Girit tarihi yazımı bir takım çağdaş ‘hakikatları’ meşrulaştırmaktan ziyade bu dönemin özünü anlamak amacına yönelik kendi kendine meşru bir araştırma alanı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

GAK= Γενικά Αρχεία του Κράτους (General State Archives of Greece)
OBA= Osmanlı Bankası Araştırma Merkezi (Archive of the Ottoman Bank Research Center)
BOA= Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (State Ottoman Archive)
SGAC= Εφημερίδα της Κρητικής Πολιτείας (State Gazette of Autonomous Crete)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The year 1897 is the one chosen by numerous—mainly Greek—scholars to mark the divide between the end of the Turkish 'yoke' and the beginning of 'liberation' on the island of Crete. At the same time, it is the date referred to as the 'beginning of the end' by another group of scholars who focus on the Muslims of Crete with claimed impartiality, or even with a somewhat retrospective melancholy.¹ From this point of view, 1897, the year of one of the numerous Christian rebellions on the island against the Ottoman authorities, is certainly perceived as a turning point in the island's

¹ Greeks, more than any other community of scholars, have explored diplomatic archival sources relevant to the issue since a very early date. Although the present study questions most of the conclusions presented by the Greek literature, the value of archival information contained in these works is beyond doubt. This author disagrees only with the tendency of the majority of these works to interpret the Cretan Question as the result of European policies and conspiracies, which created obstacles to the age-old dream of the Cretans for union with Greece. For some examples see Ioannis D. Kondilakis, *Ιστορία και γεωγραφία της Κρήτης: History and geography of Crete* (Athini: w.p., 1903); Vasilios Psilakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης από της Απωτάτης αρχαιότητος μέχρι των καθ'ημάς χρόνων: History of Crete from Furthest antiquity to our era* (En Haniis: Nea Erevna, 1909); Stefanos N. Dragoumis, *Ένωσις, Κρητικόν υπόμνημα: Unification, Cretan memorandum* (En Athines: Leonis, Paraskevas, 1909); Stephen Ladas, *The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: MacMillan Press, 1932); I. D. Mourellos, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης: History of Crete*. 3 vols (Iraklion: Eleftheras Skepseos); T.G. Tatsios, *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898* (Washington D.C., 1967); T.G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898* (New York: East European Monographs, 1984); Th. Detorakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης: History of Crete* (Iraklio Kritis: Detorakis Th., 1990); Giorgis Manousakis, *Kritikes epanastaseis, 1821-1905: Cretan Revolutions 1821-1905* (Crete, 2004).

On the contrary, most Turkish scholars who have so far dealt with nineteenth century Crete, use the Ottoman archives in a selective way in order to present the island as a bi-religious, culturally independent society that had been attached to the Greek state through conspiracies and maneuvers against the Muslims. See, for instance, Mithat Isin, *Tarihte Girit ve Türkler: Crete and the Turks from a historical perspective* (Ankara: Askeri Deniz Matbaasi, 1945); Basbakanligi, T.C. Basbakanligi, Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu Osmanli Arsivi Daire, ed., *Arşiv belgelerine göre Balkanlar da ve Anadolu da Yunan Mezalimi: The atrocities of the greeks in the Balkans and Anatolia through the archival sources*, Vol. 22 (Ankara, 1995).

For a descent scholarly study, which is based on thorough archival research, see Ayse Nukhet Adiyekke, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908): The Ottoman Empire and the Cretan Question* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2000). For a quite interesting and updated doctoral dissertation on the 1897 war see Pinar Senisik, "The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Cretans, Revolts and Diplomatic Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1895-1898," Phd thesis, Bosphorus University, 2007. Although I disagree with most of the conclusions of the last two studies and with the perspective of their authors, both of them are scholarly works the arguments of which are based on archival sources, and which provide the researcher with valuable information.

history that also had profound influence on developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece. For this reason, the first three chapters of this study will discuss developments up to 1897, placing emphasis on connections and breaks between the island realities before this date and developments after it. These chapters will present Crete through the mirror of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and Greece. My aim is to thereby connect the main theme of my forth chapter, what I call the "Muslim millet" of Autonomous Crete, with the historical framework of its creation. In other words, I shall try to demonstrate why, in my view, the bi-religious Cretan polity that emerged after the turmoil of 1897-1898, though having been dominated by the Greeks indeed, should not be dismissed as merely a step-phase leading to the island's final integration to Greece in 1912.

The main reason for this choice has been that the characteristics of Autonomous Crete raise historical questions that cannot be addressed without reference to the island's past. What is aimed at in this study is not an exhaustive account of events, nor an in-depth analysis of the dynamics within which they occurred. The goal here is to stress that the case-study of Crete offers an illustrative example of how historical transformations, radical as they might be, contradict with linear, retrospective narratives, such as stories of gradual national redemption or stories of imperial decadence. For this reason, although the four main chapters are organized along a more or less linear chronological outline concluding with local developments after 1897, I deliberately have chosen to introduce the issue by briefly discussing first the period of Autonomy, which shall be treated last in the main chapters. In this way I hope to demonstrate that, even without entering into an in-depth discussion of eastern Mediterranean structures, any honest examination of the plain events during the period under scrutiny suggests that the latter cannot be

understood without looking back into the preceding years and decades. This introduction's chronological point of departure, therefore, shall be the Cretan conflict of 1897. The literature dealing with this conflict almost always addresses its possible causation and causes. The present discussion, therefore, will begin with the question of whether looking for objective 'causes' for historical events is productive. To illuminate this statement, let us focus on Crete.

It could be argued that the replacement of the Orthodox Ottoman governor of Crete (*Vali*) Karatheodoris Pasha in the summer of 1896 created the occasion for conflict leading to the uprisings and massacres of 1897-1898. True, the fact that the Pasha was recalled to Istanbul caused great indignation among the inhabitants of the island. His departure was followed by Christian attacks against the Muslims, and Muslim violence against the Christians. Before long, the inhabitants had started to attack each other on sight. The most popular slogan among Christian insurgents was "union with Greece," while groups of Muslim irregulars responded violently to such demands, taking the law into their own hands and reclaiming the past glory of local Islam. In brief, by 1897, the island was on fire. Nevertheless, the crisis did not seem to be related only to the Pashas's replacement. One should not forget that equally significant surges of violence had previously occurred a number of times on the island. Even the uprisings in question had started, in fact, against the governor himself. Thus, even if the crisis grew worse indeed after the replacement of the Christian governor with a Muslim one, it seems that the above incident had little to do with the reasons behind the conflict.² What then were the actual reasons for the

² On the crisis of 1895-1897 see *Documents diplomatiques: conflit greco-turc, avril-septembre 1897* (Athenes: Constantinides, A, 1897); *Notes addressed by the representatives of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia to the Turkish and Greek governments in regard to Crete* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1897); *Reports on the situation in Crete* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1897); *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Crete* (London, 1897); *Correspondence respecting the negotiations for the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Greece* (London:Harrison,

crisis in 1897?

The existing scholarly and popular literature on Crete provides us with three main answers to the question. According to the first approach, the source of the problem was the island's political dependency on the Ottoman Empire, the official religion of which was Islam. The majority of the Cretans having always been Christian-Greeks, Cretan loyalty belonged with the state of Greece rather than with the sultan. A somewhat different version of this approach suggests that the Ottoman sultan lacked legitimacy not only because the Ottomans had no 'historical connection' with the island, but also because his regime was unsuccessful in terms of modern administration. Instead of governing the island with impartiality, the local authorities constantly discriminated against the Christians, provoking them with corruption, oppression, and massacres.

Contrary to the above, the second approach suggests that the Ottoman sultan was the only legitimate sovereign of Crete until 1897 and that the Ottomans were faced, in fact, with constant anarchy because of their moderate administration. Despite honest Imperial efforts to negotiate with the Christian locals, and in spite of the generous concession of privileges to the island, the local Christians missed no opportunity to revolt. Within this perspective, according to some, the locals were ungrateful; according to others, the local Christians themselves were manipulated by the conspirators of the Greek state and the spread of aggressive Greek nationalism on the island. This variation of the second approach is similar to the third one, which agrees with the view that the two communities used to live peacefully under the Ottoman regime. The last approach claims that, nevertheless, the local balance was

1898); Victor von Strantz, *The Greco-Turkish War of 1897: from official sources/ by a German staff officer*, trans. F. Holton (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898); *Préliminaires de paix, signés à Top-Hané, le 6/18 sept. 1897, entre le ministre des affaires étrangères de Turques et les ambassadeurs des grandes puissances, et Traité définitif de paix, conclu le 22 nov. /4 déc. 1897, entre la Turquie et la Grèce* (Constantinople: Osmaniye, 1898).

disturbed not by Greek nationalism, but by European 'imperialism.' When the Great Powers started intervening in the island's affairs, religious radicalism, national fanaticism, and conflict came alive between communities that hitherto lived together; not in perfect peace, perhaps, but at least in a context of coexistence and mutual cooperation.³

The above approaches provide a good example of the ways one can try to contextualize the conflict between Christians and Muslims in late nineteenth century Crete. Yet the main problem remains that most studies on the issue in question project either the image of homogenous religious communities that have always been mutually exclusive, or a vision of the Cretan locality as an entity with eternal characteristics, occasionally influenced by external agents that were by definition alien to its genuine character. Within this perspective, the study of Cretan society becomes synonymous with the study of a functional system, organized around very

³ The first approach is supported by the majority of Greek scholars, while the second and third ones appear to be in line with the mainstream Turkish literature on the issue. Yet the third approach is certainly less popular than the second one. More particular, the third approach, which is the most recent one, has started to develop in line with diplomatic developments between the two countries (from the late 1990s to the crisis of 2007/2008) and a mutual tendency to favor political rapprochement. Within this context, Crete has been scholarly re-examined from a different perspective, since the island constitutes a central point of reference in the flourishing literature on the exchange of populations between the two countries after the First World War. Thereby, special focus is currently put on the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece in 1923, which has recently started to be presented as a mutual catastrophe blamed on nationalism and imperialism. In this way, the concerned scholars attempt what they describe as "an objective approach to the issue." See for instance, Kemal Ari, *Büyük Mübadele, Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925): The Exchange of Populations, The forced emigration to Turkey* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayinlari, 1995); Mihri Belli, *Türkiye - Yunanistan Nüfus Mübadelesi Ekonomik Açıdan Bir Bakış: The Exchange of Populations between Turkey and Greece from the Economic Point of View* (Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 2004); Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomasi ve Göç, Türk Yunan Mübadelesinin Öteki Yüzü: Diplomacy and emmigration, The Other Face of the Greek-Turkish Exchange of Populations* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 2006).

One more recent tendency of historiography is to shift perspective from high policies to everyday practices. See, for instance, *Crossroads of history. Experience, Memory, Orality*. XIth International Oral History Conference at Istanbul (15-19 June 2000), Konstadinos Tsitselikis, ed., *H Ελληνοτουρκική ανταλλαγή πληθυσμών. Πτυχές μιας εθνικής σύγκρουσης: The Greek-Turkish exchange of populations. Aspects of a national conflict* (Athina: Kritiki, 2006). Such approaches provide the researcher with interesting information and a refreshing new perspective. The main difference between this author's approach and the above literature, however, remains that the latter seems to be dominated by the will to present relevant events as a catastrophe that has to be blamed on one group or another.

specific norms. Communities end up being identified with specific cultures self-conscious of their existence; with systems defined by specific values; and with quasi-concrete historical units that responded to internal or external stimuli more or less passively.

The above approaches are useful to a certain extent, especially when used in a comparative way. Nevertheless, they all contradict the fundamental argument of the present study, which is that transformation and change should not be interpreted as historical anomalies that need to be explained (not to mention 'cured'). Quite to the contrary, I would suggest that the long-term existence of every cultural community or, even life *per se*—the very essence of human history—involves by definition change. Moreover, the nineteenth century is known to have been the era when this diachronic quality of human civilization became more obvious than ever before, due to developments that stimulated very rapid socio-economic transformations and radically altered the human understanding of time and change. In the same vein, the nature of conflict in general and the nature of Cretan conflicts in particular were (and remain still) defined by changing practices rather than specific causes. If we accept this basic notion, we can then agree that the whole question of what were the reasons for the Cretan conflict of 1897 needs to be cast in new light. In my view, therefore, all three approaches discussed above are misleading, especially when treated separately, because no real 'answer' can (or should) be given to historical 'situations.'⁴ By analyzing historical processes, researchers can allow for some patterns to emerge, but they cannot provide teleological explanations as to how and why specific events may have occurred.

Let us then illustrate the above general remark by turning our attention

⁴ For a classic discussion of “societies” and “actors” see Alain Touraine, “The Voice and the Eye: On the Relationship between Actors and Analysts,” *Political Psychology* 2, no. 1, (1980), 3-14.

once again towards the case of Crete. By 1897, according to the worried reports of foreign observers and diplomats, both Muslim and Christian Cretans seemed capable of almost any act. In that context, the regulars that had arrived from Istanbul in order to support and protect the Ottoman administration only made things worse. Riots, assassinations, fights, looting, arson, and all manner of severe aggression were reported constantly. The local authorities could not prevent them from happening, neither could the numerous diplomats, military attachés, and naval forces of the Great Powers who were sent to the island after 1896 to mediate in the conflict. It is probably true that the latter eventually succeeded in deterring some of the actors in the conflict from further violence. Thus, the European military presence appears to have prevented much of the potential daily bloodshed. Yet animosity among the locals was so great that nobody could really act effectively towards restoring peace. Quite to the contrary, all external interferences and interventions seemed only to add to the obstacles standing in the way of a peaceful solution.

The landing of Greek troops and supplies at Cretan bays starting in February 1897, under the command of Colonel Vasos, was yet another cause for fighting. On the one hand, the Christian insurgents claimed the right to be protected by Greek military forces on grounds that the actions of Ottoman officials were in constant violation of their own pacifist pledges. The local authorities and most of the Muslim Cretans, on the other hand, saw the landing as a direct violation of the Empire's sovereign rights and demanded that further military action be taken against the insurgents. At the same time, the Great Powers, who had wished to establish peace and order in Crete for their own diverse reasons, tried to prevent further conflict between Muslim Ottomans and Christian Greeks. The situation that derived from all these is best reflected in the main eye-witnesses' own words. On the 10th of

March 1897, British Rear-Admiral Harris wrote to Admiral Sir J. O. Hopkins:

I understand that the Greek regulars are before Candanos, and if so, they would appear to countenance the atrocities which are committed on Mussulmans [*sic*] in that neighborhood.

"Of course, under these conditions it is very difficult to keep in hand a fanatical population, who have inherited a strong spirit of vendetta, when their adversaries are having all the best of it.

"Despite the fire opened by us on the insurgents on the 21th February, the native Moslems fear that we are betraying them. The uninterrupted procession of the Greek regulars from place to place in the west of the island, using guns to batter down the old strongholds, and the continued presence and activity of the Greek fleet, lend colouring to this idea. Moreover, the continual arrival of refugees escaped from Candanos and Selinos district, some mutilated and others with reports of horrors that lose nothing in their repetition, has worked them up to a high pitch of excitement, which it may be eventually impossible to prevent from breaking out into an émeute.⁵

A few days later, Colonel Vassos responded to similar accusations in a letter delivered to Vice-Admiral Canevaro:

In this document, which is in my possession, the aforesaid Representatives [*sic*] of the Powers solemnly promise that the Mussulmans of Candanos shall be disarmed, and that it shall be made impossible for them to injure the Christians in any way...

"This, Sir, is a very formal, a very definite promise. The Christians accordingly trusted blindly to it. And how has Europe kept her word? During the night of last Wednesday, the 13th (25th) March, the Mussulman authorities at Canea distributed arms to these Mussulmans, and even to boys of 14, and the next day they allowed them to leave Canea, before the eyes of everyone, to recommence the massacre of their Christian fellow-countrymen. Where was the solemn promise of Europe then? Where the impartiality of the European Representatives at Canea? Where was even the elementary humanity which one has a right to expect even from those who follow the profession of war?⁶

⁵ Real-Admiral Harris to Admiral Sir J. O. Hopkins, "Revenge (Suda Bay, 4 March 1897)," in *Reports on the Situation in Crete/ Turkey*, no. 9 (1897), 7-10.

⁶ Enclosure 1 in No. 7. "Colonel Vassos to Vice Admiral Canevaro, Camp d' Alikianou, 18 (30) Mars, 1897," in *ibid.*, no. 9, 35-37.

Moreover, since parallel to the above developments, the issue of Crete had become a pretext for debate in almost every part of central Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and Greece, it is interesting to see how the Cretan conflict was presented outside of the island. Greek newspapers in particular were flooded with articles and reports related to Crete; the crowds were demanding union with Greece; the king and the government were openly threatened; and European diplomacy was condemned for not leaning towards a solution favorable to the interests of Christian Greeks. Thus, the certainly heterogeneous Greek public sphere was, at that point, united in one direction:

What is then, the invisible power that prevents you [the Greek King] from acting? What kind of secret words cause you to hesitate and to shiver? Now, that the united European public opinion wears down the European Governments that still withstand [union with Greece]; now that—thanks to your forced “heroism” (χάρης εις τον εξηναγκασμένον ηρωισμόν σας!)—Philhellenism has become a European fashion; now, you decided that it is the time to compromise!

“And yet, the voice of the Greek people was quite clear: “We will not surrender.” This is the solid hope of the entire nation; of those of us who are free, and those of us who are still enslaved. Are you, I wonder, planning to conform to this decision of ours? We are not to pre-judge your behavior. But we cannot help noticing that you have started finding the threat of the Great Powers more tremendous than the Greek people’s rage. Yet be certain, Sire, that you are wrong to despise such manifestations. For, if you prove yourself untrustworthy of the Greek people, the only remaining pleasure shall be revenge (η εκδίκησις θα είναι η μόνη ηδονή); the denial of so many wishes, the failure of so many expectations shall be followed only by revenge.⁷

⁷ "Αλλ' ο ελληνικός λαός σας είπε καθαρά. Δεν υποχωρούμεν ούτε βήμα. Αυτή είναι η επιθυμία ολοκλήρου του Έθνους, δούλου και ελευθέρου. Εννοείτε να συμμορφωθήτε προς την απόφασιν ταύτην; Ημείς δεν προδικάζομεν την διαγωγήν σας. Βλέπομεν όμως ότι η απειλή των Δυνάμεων, αρχίζει να σας τρομάζει περισσότερον από την αγανάκτηση του ελληνικού λαού. Βεβαιωθήτε, όμως, ότι πολύ άσχημα εκάματε να περιφρονήσετε τοιαύτην εκδήλωσιν. Διότι εάν φανήτε ανάξιοι της εμπιστοσύνης του, η εκδίκησις θα είναι η μόνη ηδονή, ήτις απομένει από την διαψευσιν τόσων πόθων και την βαράθρωσιν τόσων προσδοκιών." *Empros* (Athens), 28 February 1897.

This somewhat theatrical Greek response to the Cretan events, which was very well illustrated by the press, was inspired by immediate and emotional rather than long-term and strategic concerns. Consequently, when the Cretan insurrection was followed by a full-scale war between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, the Greek public continued to appear devoted to the slogan “freedom of Crete or death (*ελευθερία ή θάνατος*).” However, when the disastrous failure of the Greek army on the battlefield led to an uncontested military victory of the Ottomans, Greek citizens rapidly changed their minds about the survival value of warfare.⁸ The performance of the army was perceived as humiliating; and one should not forget that the military disaster followed a long period of financial mismanagement and economic crisis. Thus, this most unfortunate defeat caused a major internal crisis with far reaching political, financial, and social consequences.⁹

In the Ottoman capital, during the same period, civil actors were not even allowed to criticize or comment on the choices made by the regime. Thus, the discourses of the Ottoman newspapers—at least those allowed to circulate—were

⁸ A very characteristic instance of the above described situation in Greece was the book published by the supporters of the governmental party, after the war, in order to answer to heavy criticism of the opposition against the government’s decision to enter the war. The book consisted of a very detailed summary of press publications before and after the war and it demonstrated in a very illustrative way how the government was almost forced to the war by the same forces of the opposition that a year after blamed the government for the great defeat, see *Ο πόλεμος ένεκα του Κρητικού ζητήματος, Αναμνήσεις εκ της δημοσιογραφίας: The War for Crete, Memories from the press*, Vol. 1,2 (En Athines: Deligianni k Adelfon Kalergi, 1898).

For a more detailed sample of the relevant discourses with regard to the war see *Εφημερίδα (Efimerida)* (Athens), *Ακρόπολη (Akropoli)* (Athens), *Άστυ (Asti)* (Athens), *Εστία (Estia)* (Athens), *Σκρίπ (Skrip)* (Athens) and *Εμπρός (Empros)* (Athens), for the period 1897-1898.

⁹ On the impact the 1897 defeat had on Greek political thought see Athanasios N. Vernardakis, *Τα μετά την καταστροφήν, ή, Τί εστοίχισεν ο πόλεμος και τί ποιητέον δια την ανόρθωσίν μας: After the disaster, or, what the war's damage was and what we should do to set things up* (Athens: Korinnis, 1898); Kostandinos D. Svolopoulos, *Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, 1900 - 1945: Greek foreign policy, 1900-1945* (Athens: Estia, 1992); Giannis N. Gianouloupolos, *Η ευγενής μας τύφλωση: εξωτερική πολιτική και εθνικά θέματα από την ήττα του 1897 έως τη Μικρασιατική καταστροφή: Our noble blindness: Foreign policy and national issues from the 1897 defeat to the Asia Minor catastrophe* (Athens: Vivliorama, 2001).

more indicative of the state's considerations than of the public opinion.¹⁰ By and large, the unavoidably amicable relationship between the official press and the state projected the efforts of the regime to convince the public about its pacifist inclinations. Cretan affairs were presented in no different a fashion. In other words, the Greek insurgents appeared to be always guilty and the Muslims never at fault. More importantly, the Imperial government used every occasion to underline that it shared the feelings of the Great Powers, and that it always acted with a view to maintaining general peace and order:

With regard to the affairs of Crete, within these last few days, according both to rumors circulated by telegraph agencies and to the precious information obtained by us, it is obvious that under the present context there is no likelihood of war.

"It is true that the Greek newspapers try to spread news of an imminent war by attaching and publishing a mass of stupid ideas and thoughts, locally conceived; but the military action approved by the Great Powers and the force of almost 200,000 soldiers mobilized and sent by the Sublime Porte to the Greek borders, has forced these Greek political demagogues (Yunan 'ukalâ-i siyâsiyesini) to think much, much better before they talk...

"...The Sublime Porte shall continue step by step and gradually—from a state of peace, tranquility, and calm—to issue edicts that improve public infrastructure and secure the happiness and comfortable life of its subjects, just as the objectives of modernity (meslek-i 'umrân) command. The Sublime Porte did not and shall not take not a step back from this point and from this aim.¹¹

¹⁰ Nadir Ozbek, "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005), 59-81.

Apparently, such phenomena were not unknown to earlier European polities: "Just as the public sphere was socially heterogeneous, so was it politically multi-directional. It was not an agenda but a space in which all kinds of opinions could be expressed...In most parts of Europe for most of the time, the relationship between the public sphere and the state was amicable and mutually supportive." See T. C. W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, Old Regime Europe 1660-1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12-13.

¹¹ "Girid hâdisesi hakkında şu bir kaç gün zarfında gerek telegrâf ajanslarının tebliğ eylediği rivayât ve gerek bizim destres olduğumuz ma'lûmât-ı galiye harbiyenin zuhûr etmeyeceğini mübeyyendir. Gerçe Yunan gazeteleri makalat-ı harb-i juyâne derc ve neşr ile efkâr ve ezhân-ı ahaliyi envâ'-ı türrehât ile imlâya gayret ediyorlar isede Düvel-i Mu'azzama'nın itti haz ettiği tedâbîr-i zecrîye ve hükümet-i seniye'nin iki yüz bine karîb olmak üzere hudûdda cem' ve tahşid eylediği kuvâ-ı askeriye Yunan 'ukalâ-ı siyâsiyesini khayliden khayliye düşürmüştür...Hükümet-i seniye sulh ve râhat ve ârâmı ve huzûr içinde olarak meslek-i 'umrân perverisinde devâmıyla hâkim olduğu nıkâtın derece derece ma'mûriyetini ve tabi'yesinin refte refte-i muzher rifâh ve sa'âdet olmasını te'mîn edecek...bu

Yet the war did happen and, although the Ottoman army prevailed, the 'victorious' Empire was not to enjoy a triumph. In November 1898, just after the war, the Ottoman province of Crete became autonomous. By the end of that year, Imperial troops and administrative authorities were forced to leave the island, marking the passage from direct Ottoman rule to a new regime, that of Autonomous Crete. Hence the diplomatic maneuvers of the sultan's representatives caused uneasiness among the various groups concerned about the future of the Ottoman Muslim populations and Imperial domains. Overall, the regime was unable to suppress domestic discontent and publications abroad regarding the "humiliating loss of Crete."¹² Consequently, Sultan Abdülhamid II came under increasing criticism.

In short, the mutually unprofitable war caused widespread public animosity towards the authorities, both in Greece and in the Empire, although public discontent was openly expressed by the domestic press only in the case of Greece. The sultan, at the same time, was accused openly abroad and secretly at home of allowing the Empire to decay and of "selling off" Crete.¹³ In both cases the conflict

noktadan bu maksattan hiç bir vecihle 'udûl etmemiştir..." *İkdâm* (Istanbul), 25 March 1897.

¹² For instance, the journals *Mesveret* and *Mizan* that were distributed in the capital and provinces by the CUP network, were openly protesting the loss of Crete. Similarly, the last known activity of the anti-regime, religious group "talebe-i ulûm (students of Islamic learning) has been the distribution of a leaflet in Istanbul after the war of 1897, according to which the Ottomans were obliged on religious grounds to rebel against the regime of Abdülhamid II, among other things because of the loss of Crete: "What happened to Egypt, which is the way to Mecca? Who possesses Tunis? Where did Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eastern Roumelia go? To whom was Crete given?..." in M. Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 51, 89.

¹³ For an example of the traditional approach which presents Abdülhamid as a "censorship-sultan" and a madman see Cevdet Kudret, *Abdüllhamid devrinde sansür: Censorship during the era of Abdullhamid* (Istanbul: Gun Haber Ajansi Basın ve Yayıncılık, 2000). For a more nuanced interpretation of the same issue and on the ways some public actors cooperated with the palace see Ebru Boyar, "The press and the palace: the two-way relationship between Abdülhamid and the press, 1876-1908," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 69 (2006), 417-432.

reminded one how uncertain the political, financial, and ideological bases of local power structures were. The obvious question to ask at this point is: was 1897 perceived as a victory, at least by the local Christian Cretans? The answer to this question seems to be no, as their triumph proved also to be dubious. Some of them remained dissatisfied because the island was still not integrated into the Kingdom of Greece, perceived by them as their “mother land,” while others, who at that point in time viewed autonomy as the best solution, were soon disappointed to realize that autonomy was the principal basis of the Cretan State only in theory. With regard to the Muslims, at the same time, it was obvious that the majority of them was displeased both by the war and by the political developments that followed. Nevertheless, it is also true that an important number of Muslim inhabitants refused to leave.

The nature of the general dissatisfaction within the local communities might best be grasped if we consider the hybrid character of the new polity. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that the autonomous state was supposed to accomplish a double mission: first, to satisfy the national aspirations of the Christian majority; and second, to provide the island with an administration capable of upgrading the local socioeconomic structures in line with European modernity. It should be emphasized at this point that the 1897 war can be perceived at two different levels. At the first level, it could be described as yet another among the many local conflicts between Muslims and Christians, between the locals and the central administration or, between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. At the second level, however, the effort to establish order and peace could be interpreted as an attempt to differentiate between what was perceived as a 'backward' past and the dynamics of 'progressive' future. In this respect, as the authority who had the power to decide over the future of Crete

was, in fact, neither the Ottomans nor the Greeks but the United Navy of the Great Powers, local events were necessarily connected to broader dynamics.

It is useful to take into consideration, furthermore, the argumentation behind foreign intervention and the grounds on which the Powers legitimized the island's occupation by their forces. By and large, local conflicts and acts of extreme violence between Christians and Muslims were perceived by the representatives of the Western powers as backward reactions, leftovers of an 'Oriental' nature. The admirals' canons, at the same time, made it clear that all grand old 'dragons' of the past had to be slain by the sword of western modernity's 'heroes.' The conflicting interests that lay hidden in such a-historical generalizations, however, deserve more attention and thus shall be examined in greater detail in the third chapter of this study. In any case, all parties were eventually forced to agree, though some unwillingly, to the hybrid nature of the new regime. Crete was placed simultaneously under the sultan's high suzerainty, the protection of the Great Powers (Britain, France, Italy and Russia), and the delegation of Prince George, second son of the (Danish) King of Greece. As to the local actors, they were granted a local parliament of representatives, consisting of a majority (2/3) of Christian and a minority (1/3) of Muslim deputies.¹⁴

Yet the parliament's actual participation in the legislative process was limited, since the prince was “subject to no restraint.”¹⁵ Furthermore, it seems that

¹⁴ See *Σύνταγμα της Κρητικής Πολιτείας: Constitution of the Cretan State* (En Haniis: tip. tis Kritikis Politias, 1899).

¹⁵ According to Eleftherios Venizelos and historians following his legacy, the crisis (which became known as the Therisso uprising) was to be blamed on the Prince's autarchic behavior, as well as on the democratic deficiencies of the first constitution, see Eleftheriou K. Venizelou, *Αγόρευσεις επί του άρθρου 34 του Συντάγματος κατά τη συνεδρίαση της 10ης Νοεμβρίου 1906 της Β' Συντακτικής Συνελεύσεως: Allocution on the article 34 of the Constitution during the meeting of 10th November 1906, Second Constitutional Assembly* (Hania: Kriti, 1906); Kostandinos D. Svolopoulos, *Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και η πολιτική κρίσις εις την αυτόνομον Κρήτην, 1901 - 1906: Eleftherios Venizelos and the political crisis in Autonomous Crete* (Athens: Ikaros, 1974).

the personal arrogance of the High Commissioner, Prince George, was offensive to the Christian local leaders, who had fought the actual war and therefore expected to be treated with greater deference. Thus, when the prince decided to take the initiative of seeking the Greek annexation of Crete, Eleftherios Venizelos and his followers plotted an armed uprising against the regime, strongly objecting to the project (1905-1906).¹⁶ The uprising once again divided the Cretans, though this time not along religious lines, since the rebels embarked upon a direct course of collision with the prince and the royal family of Greece. The result of the turmoil was that Prince George was eventually forced to resign and was replaced by Andreas Zaimis. Moreover, a new constitution was drafted and the parliament was accorded greater executive, legislative, and judicial authorities.¹⁷

The new status quo was not to last either. Dramatic developments within the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire once again brought the island community to the brink of conflict. Briefly, the Eastern Mediterranean entered the twentieth century amidst widespread clashes between armies—self-proclaimed progressive forces—and dynasties forced to accept the role of the 'old regime.' To be more specific, in July 1908 the CUP (*Committee of Union and Progress*), a secret organization with roots in Macedonia, headed an insurrection against Abdülhamid II. The restoration of the constitution, which had been shelved thirty years earlier, helped the sultan avoid being deposed, but only for a very short period. In 1909, he

According to the Prince himself, however, the main responsible for the crisis was Eleftherios Venizelos, who kept objecting the will both of people and of the Prince, for union with Greece, due to his personal ambition. See Georgiou, Prigipos tis Ellados, *Αναμνήσεις εκ Κρήτης 1898-1906: Memories from Crete 1898-1906* (Athens: Adel. G. Rodi, 1959).

¹⁶ On Eleftherios Venizelos see Lili Makraki, *Cretan rebel: Eleftherios Venizelos in Ottoman Crete*. Translated by T. Kirkis (Athens: Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapezis, 2001).

¹⁷ *Σύνταγμα της Κρητικής Πολιτείας, 1907: Constitution of the Cretan State* (En Haniis: Tip. tis Kiverniseos, 1907).

was replaced by Sultan Mehmed V Reşad, considered to be a puppet of the CUP regime.¹⁸

Almost simultaneously, in October 1908, the Christian majority of the Cretan parliament had voted in favor of the island's union with Greece. The Muslim representatives objected to the decision. Nevertheless, the stormy developments in the Imperial capital had obviously left the Muslim populations in a state of insecurity and confusion. Upon these developments, it was for the Great Powers once again to step in, claiming the right to protect the 'innocent Cretan civilians,' in the name of an absent Muslim authority.¹⁹ Since European diplomats and arms were much more convincing than both a deposed sultan and a newly established regime, the Greek king and his government rejected the union. But then it was the turn of the Greek militants and secret unions to move against the king of Greece, in order to fight “παλαιοκομματισμός” (conservatism and partisanship) since, according to them, monarchy had brought upon the nation several disasters, among which they included the failure to annex Crete. In May 1909, therefore, an organization consisting of militants, the “Military Association” (Στρατιωτικός Σύνδεσμος), launched a *coup d'état* against the Greek political authorities, forcing the government and the royal family to comply with its will.²⁰

Back in Crete a month earlier, in April 1909, the Liberal politician Eleftherios Venizelos was elected prime minister of the island. Soon enough, that

¹⁸ Mardin Serif, *The genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: 1962); Hanioglu, *Young Turks in opposition*. On the transformations of the Ottoman political thought that led to the Young Turk Revolution see M. Sukru Hanioglu, “Garbılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica* 86 (1997), 133-158.

¹⁹ Henri Lombard, *L'occupation internationale en Crète de 1900 à 1906* (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1908).

²⁰ Vasileios S. E. Tsihlis, *Το κίνημα του Γουδύ και ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: The Goudi movement and Eleftherios Venizelos* (Athens: Politropo, 2007).

election would prove to be instrumental in the future both of the island and of the Greek state since Venizelos, despite his ongoing clash with the Greek monarchy, claimed to be the main advocate of Greece in Crete. According to him, these two positions were in no way contradictory. In 1907, for instance, he made a suggestion as to how the Cretan state might demonstrate its loyalty to Greece without having to depend on the monarchy's delegates, via the introduction into the Cretan state-mechanisms of "the spirit of Greek law."²¹ In other words, Autonomous Crete did not need a royal High Commissioner, since the enforcement of a literal version of the Greek legislation on the island was enough to function as a liaison with "mother-land Greece." Apparently, such creative ideas made Venizelos very popular in Greece. Consequently, the groups that supported the Military Association in Athens decided to call him to take the lead of the nation, not of Crete but of Greece as a whole.²²

In other words, since the Great Powers appeared to be still opposed to the union of the island with Greece, the supporters of the Military Association decided instead to integrate the island's prime minister into the Greek government. True, Venizelos was the ideal candidate for such a task. First, by having participated in the military insurrections in Crete, he had gained the reputation of a fighter; hence he had become the embodiment of the vision of the 'liberation' of Hellenic populations not by diplomats and monarchs, but by fighting 'patriots.' Second, he was already established as a promising politician at the international level, and a number of Europeans were commending him on his good knowledge of French, his "civilized

²¹ *Εστενογραφημένα Πρακτικά της Δευτέρας Συντακτικής Συνέλευσης των Κρητών: Proceedings of the Constitutional Meeting of the Cretan Chamber* (Hania: typ. tis Kiverniseos, 1907).

²² Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, "Venizelos' Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912," in *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. P. Kitromilidis (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).

charm,” and his leadership skills.²³ Last but not least, he had expressed actively on various occasions his long-standing antipathy towards the royal family of Greece. In addition to all these, he was promoted by the majority of Greek newspapers and had managed to win the support of the militants in power.²⁴ As a result, in October 1910, the Cretan Eleftherios Venizelos became the Prime Minister of Greece, although Crete was still in theory an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire.

In the meantime, the political upheaval continued both in the capital of Istanbul and in almost every province of the Ottoman Empire. It is difficult to say how exactly the Cretan Muslims responded to the above developments. It seems, for instance, that the Cretan branch of the CUP, *Girid İttihad-ı Osmaniyan Cemiyeti* (the Cretan Society of the Union of Ottomans), had been active in the mid 1890s,²⁵ without having yet become a prominent actor in the affairs of the island.²⁶ The branch became more active after 1906, protesting against the Greek plans for annexation of the island, mainly through publications in Europe.²⁷ Nevertheless, at a local level, the activities of the CUP had very limited impact. One could argue, therefore, that the majority of Muslims who had remained in Crete after 1897 was trying to adapt to the new situation by defending Muslim communal and individual

²³ See for instance the following memoirs, Lord Howard of Penrith, *Theatre of Life: Life Seen From The Pit 1863-1905* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1935), Makraki, *Cretan Rebel*, 233-387.

²⁴ See the papers of the following newspapers for the period between 1909 and 1910: *Athine* (Athens), *Esperini* (Athens), *O Hronos* (Athens), *I Patris* (Athens), *Nea Imera* (Athens), *Nea Ellas* (Athens). It is interesting to note that although some of these papers were quite aggressive against each other for instance—*Nea Imera* and *Nea Ellas*—they mutually supported Venizelos in 1910.

²⁵ Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 86-87, 89.

²⁶ See Commander of Crete to the Chamberlain's office (September 9, 1897), *Girid Fırka-ı Hümayûn Kumandanlığıyla Muhaberat Kaydına Mahsus Defterdir*, BOA- YEE, 36/ 139-45/139/ XVIII.

²⁷ Similar publications caused a lot of friction in the Cretan Parliament since some of the Christians deputies were accusing the local Muslims of conspiracies against the local regime and of circulating rumors about massacres and murders of locals Muslims, see *Proceedings of the Cretan parliament*, December 1908.

interests through passive negotiations. Besides, between 1897 and 1912, the Eastern Mediterranean could only be described as a world of constantly and radically changing loyalties. Hence, it was probably difficult for the local Muslims to surmise what might lie in store for them. Indeed, the Balkan War that broke out in 1912 led to one more political change on the island.

When the regimes of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, which acted in the name of large Slavic-Christian populations in the Balkans, decided to unite their forces against the Ottoman Empire's new regime, the Greek army entered the war on the side of the Christians.²⁸ The defeat of the Unionists at the battlefield was a crushing one, and its symbolic value was immense for, the Balkan wars (1912-1913) were fought both over contested territories and over symbols of progress. In short, the victory of the Balkan states legitimized their own right to exist,²⁹ whereas the defeated CUP was in a way deprived of the right to represent future reforms, progress, and successful administration. In other words, according to the rhetoric of the victorious states, the Committee, which a few years ago had managed to depose Abdülhamid II as a tyrant and an autocrat, was no longer accepted as representing something new but rather as a simple substitute for the Ottoman "ancient regime."³⁰

In Athens, the Greek annexation of Thessaloniki and southern Macedonia

²⁸ For the cultural relationships and rivalries between Greece and the other Balkan countries see D. J. Cassavetti, *Hellas and the Balkan Wars* (New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1914); Dimitris Tziovas, *Greece and the Balkans; Identities, Perceptions and the Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment* (Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd, 2003).

²⁹ Although some European circles continued to see the Balkan States as "a group of demanding children", after the Balkan Wars the latter had gradually started to be included in international conferences and to make demands. See R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Problem of Small Nations and the European Anarchy," edited by U. C. Nottinham, *Montague Burton International Relations Lecture* (London, 1939).

³⁰ Palmira Brummet, "Ottoman cartoon maps: Imagining Space, Identity, and Nation in the Istanbul Popular Press, 1908-1913," in *The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and "Black Holes" contributions in honour of Colin Imber*, eds E. Kermeli and O. Ozel (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2006); Andre Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

was celebrated triumphantly. As a result, both in the Greek capital and in the Cretan port cities nothing could stop the enthusiastic crowds from demanding the Greek annexation of Crete. The CUP was in no position to respond to such demands and neither were the Great Powers. Thereby, the annexation was at last realized in an atmosphere of joy and exultation. In December 1913, Prime Minister Venizelos and King Constantine (both humble and reconciled for the sake of the day) raised the Greek flag at Hania (Canea), marking the official end of Ottoman sovereignty in Crete. The island was proclaimed a Greek province and all Cretans were to become citizens of Greece.

The Greek press presented the ceremony as the happy ending of a fairy tale, although the memories of civil conflicts were still kept alive by the supporters of the royal family. The latter were unwilling to forget so easily that Venizelos had rebelled against the then High Commissioner, Prince George, when he had asked the Powers for union with Greece.³¹ In any case, it seemed that by 1912 all Christian locals had finally agreed that the future of the island belonged with the nation-state of Greece. At the same time, the Muslims of the island did not really seem to find their place in the general euphoria. True, in a few photographs taken by Greek reporters, some Muslims appeared indeed to openly celebrate the “national liberation” of Crete.³² But how real or spontaneous were such reactions? How were the events really perceived and interpreted by the Muslims who stayed on in Crete after 1912?

Although the present issue is not really to answer the above question, one

³¹ Some newspapers were supporting Venizelos against the royal family, while others the royal family against Venizelos. For instance, newspaper *Skript* remarked that those who were against the Prince when he was asking union with Greece (meaning Venizelos), were daring enough to claim that the final result was due to their efforts, see *Skript* (Athens), 6 December 1913, 1.

³² See *Empros* (Athens), 5 December 1913, 1.

cannot avoid considering it. Inevitably, questions such as this one are directly related to my attempt to focus on the Muslim populations of Autonomous Crete, which are often left in the shadows of historical research.³³ True, this dissertation will primarily concern itself with developments in the Eastern Mediterranean in the nineteenth century, focusing on the Muslim presence in Crete only from 1897 to 1908. While the study of a particular period of time is important—crucially important, indeed, for a well-structured historical research—it somehow destroys the diagnostic ability of the researcher.³⁴ To put it differently, the position taken in this work is that every local community is a dynamic unit in itself. Its cultural and demographic components constantly change in time and space. Similarly, a community is the product of constant interaction among local actors, and between the local actors and their economic, political, ideological, and even geographical environment. Therefore it is impossible to describe the local community accurately by examining, exclusively, an isolated period of time.

Nevertheless, studies that try to deal with geographic or cultural units throughout very long periods are usually condemned either to oversimplify or to promote a monolithic and linear understanding of history. In this study, I do not

³³ One of the first attempts to address the issue of the Cretan Muslims has been the doctoral dissertation of Manolis Peponakis, submitted to the department of History and Archaeology of Aristotelio University, in 1994, under the supervision of Ass. Prof. John Alexander. Although the present author disagrees with most of the conclusions and selective use of sources of that dissertation, the latter constituted one of the first attempts by a Greek scholar to focus on the Muslim community of Crete, see Manolis G. Peponakis, *Εξισλαμισμοί και επανεκχριστιανισμοί στην Κρήτη (1645- 1899)* (Rethimno: Nea Hristianiki Kriti, 1997).

³⁴ New research approaches, focusing on transnational processes and on patterns of transformation are applied nowadays by a variety of social scholars. Yet with regard to historical research this is more difficult to be done, since the spectrum of analysis tends to be either much wider or more specific. See Stephen Castles, “Studying Social Transformation,” *International Political Science Review: Revue Internationale de science politique* 22, no. 1 (2001), 13-32. From the 1980’s onwards, historians had engaged in a debate about whether or not historical studies can discuss both structures and events “trying to chart observed changes in historical fashion rather than making value judgments.” See Lawrence Stone “The Revival of Narrative,” *Past and Present* 85 (1979), 3-24.

claim to break this vicious circle. What I will concentrate on, however, is the idea that regardless of what a researcher knows (or does not know) about Crete before and after 1897, it was by no means obvious to the inhabitants at the time in question what their future would be;³⁵ nor could one say what would be the destiny of other polities, or how global developments would affect and be affected by the Cretan microcosm.

All of this is to say that any attempt to place the Muslim Cretans into the larger historical context, or just to narrate the events that affected their history, is fundamentally at odds with traditional national narratives, which assert that from the nineteenth century on, the history of the Eastern Mediterranean was moving in a linear fashion to a predictable conclusion. Contrary to such an approach, I have suggested that change is a universal and timeless expression of human history, in both individual and communal terms. Everything moves constantly, although when the motion is very rapid and continuous, or very slow and imperceptible, both the observer and the bearer of change may have the illusion that everything is static. Moreover, change constitutes a permanent process *per se* rather than the path to the realization of a historical essence (as in the creation, for instance, of the eastern Mediterranean states the way they exist today). Yet constant transformation involves, also, constant anxiety about the future. Maybe it is precisely this individual anxiety shared between researchers and the objects of their research that lies behind the popularity of historical works with somewhat mystical connotations. Thus, even scholarly literature often reveals elements of morality tales that transform the “bold

³⁵ Developments during First World War constitute the most telling example. If Greece would have allied with the powers that lost the war, the future of Eastern Mediterranean might have been very different. See, for instance, the account of the commander of the French forces during the international occupation of Crete, P.-E. G. Bordeaux, *L'occupation Internationale De La Crète (1897-1909), La Participation Française, Notes Et Souvenirs* (Thonon: Societe d'edition savoyarde, 1946), 38-39.

process of selection, adaptation, and innovation” into an *epos* of triumphal tone and proportions or, to a tragic melodrama.³⁶

The issue of minorities is certainly one of the most loaded themes within this context. Yet, from my point of view, like every other reflection of human history, the creation of minorities is also nothing but a dynamic process subjected to constant change. Therefore, the emergence of what I call—for reasons that shall be explained in the fourth chapter—the early twentieth century Muslim '*millet*' of Autonomous Crete and its transformation into a minority after the island's union with Greece, cannot be discussed without referring to the long transformations of the island society during the nineteenth century. The massive Muslim immigration from Crete had started due to these transformations and had continued, according to a variety of oral and archival sources, throughout the Balkan Wars and the First World War.³⁷ It was because of these enduring political and social changes that large numbers of Muslims decided to abandon their religious identity, or their land; and it was because of the decision of the many to leave that new constraints and opportunities were created for the few who stayed on.³⁸ Throughout this process, the Muslim community of Crete was gradually reduced in size and started to be treated ideologically and structurally as a minority until it officially became one after the union of Crete with Greece.³⁹ In the same vein, although the island was to remain

³⁶ Richard Seaford, “Immortality, Salvation, and the Elements,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 90, (1986), 1-26.

³⁷ On the massive Muslim emigration from the Balkans and the islands of eastern Mediterranean see Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman population (1830-1914): Demographic and Social Characteristics* (The University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, Wis., 1985), 55-57.

³⁸ Nilgür Kiper, *Resettlement of Immigrants and planning in Izmir during the Hamidian Period Graduate School of Engineering and Sciences of Izmir Institute of Technology* (Izmir: Izmir Institute of Technology, January 2006).

³⁹ According to the 1880/1881 Ottoman census of population the Muslim inhabitants of Crete were 73,487 and the Christians 204, 680, see H 129/ M 1880 in BOA Ş.D TNZ 2373, presented for the first

under Ottoman sovereignty until the Balkan Wars, one may suggest that since 1898, or even earlier, the Ottomans continued to control Crete only in theory. However, this strikes me as too facile an argument, despite its alluring plausibility.

It seems to be true that after the 1897 war, Istanbul lost almost completely its legislative, judicial, and executive control over Crete. Still, an important Muslim community remained on the island until 1923. Only with the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece did the situation change. Was the thirty-year period described above nothing but a monolithic, short transition from an Ottoman province to a 'homogenous' Christian-Greek Crete? I rather doubt it and would suggest instead that the period cries out to be studied in its own right. The ambiguity of the Cretan Muslims' status was in part a reflection of the endless transformations in the Ottoman Empire and Greece, which were fighting at that time a battle for land, identity, and power in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁰ Moreover, although it is perhaps easy to explain why large numbers of Muslims left the island of Crete, it is not so easy to glean the reasons that inspired some of them to stay.

In order to demonstrate this, a modest attempt will be made in this study to explore Crete both as a real geography and as a symbolic space; a mirror-locality that captured the tense relationship between the two major concepts of the nineteenth century discourse on sovereignty: the Empire and the Nation-State. It is far beyond

time by Adıyeke, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit bunalımı*.

In 1923, at the same time, the Muslims of Crete who were to be deported from Greece numbered only 23,021. See Yildirim, *Diploması ve Göç*, 102.

⁴⁰ See, for example Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Bruce Masters, ed., *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and İstanbul* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jens Hanssen, *Fin de siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Nezar Alsayyad, "Whose Cairo?," in *Cairo Cosmopolitan*, ed. P. Amar and D. Singerman (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006).

On the particularities of Greek nationalism, see Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία, 19ος αι.-1919 : οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το Μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο ελληνικό έθνος: Asia Minor nineteenth c.-1919: the Christian-Greek communities: From the Millet of the Rums to the Greek nation* (Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 1998) and Sia Anagnostopoulou, *The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the nation-states. A long and difficult process* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2004).

my scope to address every aspect of such a complex relationship.⁴¹ Attention will be given, instead, to changes of power and to connections between unique and unitary transformations. To put it differently, Crete is not to be located on an up-to-date political map, but in a collection of earlier political projects and strategies, some of which failed to materialize. In what follows, therefore, I shall discuss the long process that has led to the island's 'hellenization' and union with Greece, by focusing on Cretan Muslims and by suggesting that several aspects and phases of this process contradicted undoubtedly with its conclusion. It seems to me that only after forgetting about the present 'results' of Cretan history and the 'truths' of our age, can we try to allow for the history of the island first to exist and then, perhaps, to be written.

⁴¹ The idea that nineteenth century Europe was a homogenous community of states has long been challenged by scholars, willingly or unwillingly. See Stefan Berger, ed., *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe: 1789-1914* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

For a similar discourse with regard to the Ottoman case, see Selim Deringil, "From Ottoman to Turk: Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey," in *Making Majorities. Constituting the nation in Japan, Corea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*, edited by D. C. Gladney (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998).

On the Greek case see Paschalis M. Kitromilidis, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy* (Great Britain: Variorum, 1994).

CHAPTER II

THE EMPIRE

History, Historiography, and Tragic Irony

This chapter is about tragic irony, reforms, and revolutions. It is thus appropriate to start the discussion with a famous argument put forth by İlber Ortaylı. As suggested in Ortaylı's classic, *The longest century of the Ottoman Empire*, the nineteenth century Empire had danced a tragic dance in the sense that the famous ottoman reforms, once proclaimed as a rebirth, had eventually come to signal the end of the Ottoman state.¹ This author's understanding of tragic irony, however, is quite different from Ortaylı's. I prefer to consider the dynamics of life not tragic but coincidental, since they are full of unlimited potentials from which only limited realities come into being. Thus, there is a distinct difference between the notion of tragedy and the mere unpredictability of life.²

Even if historical developments are indeed not tragic but haphazard, historical research still bears a form of tragic irony. The researcher always knows the ultimate (and possibly tragic) outcome of a given historical situation while its protagonists were necessarily ignorant of it. Thus, the researcher's understanding of past "reality" is often very different from the ways the relevant individuals and groups had actually

¹ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı: The Longest century of the Empire* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).

² Berel Lang, "The Limits of Irony," *New Literary History* 27, no.3 (1996), 571-588.

experienced or foreseen it. In the same vein, one could argue that the comparative use of historical sources is also characterized by tragic irony. The irony lies, for instance, in the contrast between the multiple perspectives of a given situation; or, in the multiple meanings of a given verbal or ideological construction when used by different actors.

In this chapter, I shall try to demonstrate that tragic irony belongs to the realm of scholarly inquiry and not to historical situations themselves. From this point of view, nineteenth century Ottoman reforms are viewed here not as a story of tragic loss, but as a dynamic transformation open to a variety of contemporary and retrospective interpretations. In short, the general perspective of this chapter may be described as follows: in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman world had undergone multiple transformations, resulting from dynamic interactions between state and society; center and provinces; and, past realities versus contemporary ideas about progress.

On the one hand, the regime had tried to adapt successfully to the necessities of the era through a number of reforms. On the other hand, every alteration in the Imperial structure and system influenced the life and behavior of communities and individuals that shared the—proverbially obscure—status of Ottoman subjection. Hence, while struggling to find their way within given situations, the above-mentioned communities and individuals had modified the Imperial framework through their individual and collective strategies.³ In this respect, my argument is that nineteenth century Ottoman transformations were realized due to and, in turn, had accounted for, a multiplicity of experiences. But the occasion for change lay mainly with two forces: Revolutions and

³ For the concept of “practice history” and the ways individuals modify social structures through their individual and collective strategies see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a theory of practice*, trans. R. Nice (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Reforms. In this respect, I shall try to situate our specific case-study, the island of Crete, in the broader nineteenth century Ottoman context, examining it not as an isolated community, but as one of the many provinces reshaped through revolutions and reforms. Before doing so, however, it would be useful to provide some more information about the general framework.

In brief, it seems that administrative centralization and military reorganization had become the slogan of successive Ottoman reforms, at least from the end of the eighteenth century onwards.⁴ At the same time, new economic and ideological patterns—such as nationalism and capitalism—were developing within and around the Empire independently of the regime’s initiatives. Hence, I would suggest that early nineteenth century Ottoman reform was an answer to internal needs and external influences, which mobilized a complex matrix of resistance against—but also cooperation with—the regime. All this is to say that one instance of such resistance had proven to be quite alarming for the future of the Ottomans: the Christian uprising of the Morea in 1821, which became broadly known in Europe as the “Greek Revolution” or the “War of Independence.”⁵

The Morea War and the Cretan Janissaries

One may suggest that there were no significant differences between the Morea uprising and prior Christian rebellions, a phenomenon the Ottoman authorities had certainly

⁴ Eldem, *The Ottoman City*, 197.

⁵ Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασης του 1821: History of the 1821 Greek Revolution* (Thessaloniki: Ad. Stamoulis, 2007).

become accustomed to. Moreover, the number of uprisings breaking out throughout the Empire, almost simultaneously with the 1821 Morea events, suggested that the local tensions may have had something to do with wider issues of imperial control. Therefore, there may have been nothing peculiar about that particular uprising. And yet it so happens that this event led to the establishment of the first independent nation-state on formerly Imperial lands.

Hence, the national character attributed to the “Greek struggle” (at least by some of its leaders) in conjunction with the support that the “Greek cause” had gained in Europe, lead to a major defeat for the Ottomans; if not in terms of territorial losses, then certainly in terms of Imperial prestige. Our discussion of Ottoman Crete shall thus start with an examination of internal and external strategies concerning the foundation of independent Greece. This development was celebrated by Greek and European forces alike as the first national victory against a non-national, ancient-regime, creating a model to be followed for future revolts.

At the same time, the Great Powers of the time had indeed supported Greek independence both theoretically and actively. One has to remember, however, that their support was itself of a rather dynastic character, quite far removed from principles of “national self-determination.”⁶ In Great Britain, for instance, what was striking about popular response to the war was the very limited credence given to nationalist aspirations, despite the widespread sympathy towards the Greeks.⁷ Moreover, even if the

⁶ *Acte du congrès de Vienne du 9 Juin 1815, avec ses annexes. Edition officielle et collationnée avec le texte de l'instrument original déposé aux Archives de la Chancellerie de cour et d'état* (Vienne: Imprimerie Imperiale et Royale, 1815).

⁷ See Frederick Rosen, *Greek Nationalism and British Liberalism, Etisia Dialeksi "K.TH. Dimara," 1997* (Athina: Kedro Neoellinikon Erevnon Ethnikou Idrimatos Erevnon, 1998), 73-75.

uprising was recognized by the European powers as a national struggle, its characterization as a “people’s revolution” would become popular only much later.⁸ The Greeks, for their part, had already made it clear, starting with their very first declarations after 1821, that they expected a seat at the table among the European family of states. Within this context, both local revolt and foreign protection were based on the grounds that Greeks shared with European dynasties the legacy of antiquity and a common religion.⁹

In this manner, Greece became an independent Kingdom in 1832 under the joint protection of Russia, France, Britain, and Bavaria. Furthermore, since there was no Greek king to rule the new state, Bavaria not only provided its protection, but also furnished Greece with its first king (Otto/Othon I). Evidently, from the perspective of the European rulers, Christian Greeks needed protection and were not prepared to be self-governed. In any case, the establishment of Greece as a nation-state was a major diplomatic defeat for the Ottomans and represented a significant challenge to their own legitimacy. The Ottoman rulers found the league of dynasties, to which they hoped to be admitted, fighting against them and making decisions contrary to their interests.

Of even greater importance was that the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece also embodied a threat for the future: if it succeeded as a political project, it could become an alternative model and a challenge to Ottoman sovereignty throughout the

⁸ See George Finlay, *History of the Greek Revolution, and of the reign of King Otho* (London: Zeno. Original edition, 1877/1971).

⁹ Georgios Varouhakis, "The idea of "Europe" in Nineteenth Century Greek Political Thought," in *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*, ed. P. Carabott, 16-30 (London: King's College, 1995).

Eastern Mediterranean. For the time being, however, the small territory ceded to the Greeks mitigated any such lofty aspirations and seemed to condemn them to a permanent state of weakness. Indeed, a great proportion of the Ottoman lands claimed by the Greeks during the war were not incorporated into the new state. Such was the case of Crete.

Almost simultaneously with the Greek Revolution, Crete became the scene of numerous Christian uprisings that are commonly described by current scholarship as national, since the Christian leaders—or at least some of them—were in direct contact with the Greek rebels. Moreover, not only did the Cretans rise up against the Ottoman authorities, but they also tried to establish an independent regime, the “Provisional State of Crete.” The declarations issued by the insurgents asserted the emergence of a self-appointed locality that, furthermore, claimed to be Greek. In May 1822, for instance, the Cretan Assembly was convened at Armenous Apokoronou to vote the so-called “Provisional Constitution of Crete,” a document very similar in spirit to the provisional constitutions issued by the contemporary national congresses of Greece. Moreover, in 1823, the rebellious Greek government decided to claim Crete by appointing Emmanouil Tompazis as Greek Commissioner of the island. Tompazis arrived to the island the same year, along with a small group of Greek volunteers.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the Cretan movement was unsuccessful. In fact, the forces controlled by the insurgents were neither large nor united, but they all had the advantage

¹⁰ Detorakis, *History of Crete*, 317-350; Giorgis Manousakis, *Κρητικές Επανάστασεις 1821-1905: Cretan Revolutions 1821-1905* (Crete: Ethniko Idrmima Erevnon kai Meleton " Elefterios Venizelos," 2004), 1-10.

of a good knowledge of the island's topography.¹¹ Yet the local Ottoman regulars were soon to be backed by much better armed and trained Egyptian troops that suppressed the insurgents violently and swiftly. The few years of random guerrilla war that ensued, furthermore, manifested the lack of unity among the rebellious forces. To put it differently, it seems that the Cretans were worn down by the weight of numbers and by constant rivalries among them and their "brothers-in-arms" from the Greek mainland. In any case, when the Greek state was founded and officially recognized by the Great Powers of Europe, Crete was not part of it. Can we still claim then that the Cretan uprisings constituted part of the national revolution?¹²

If the question of "what is a nation?" is not an easy one, "what is a national revolution?" has proven to be equally difficult. Despite the conviction of many scholars that national phenomena could best be explained with reference to the late eighteenth and nineteenth century concept of the "nation-state" as it arose in the West, the variety, ambiguity, and fluidity of relevant phenomena allows, I believe, only for one general conclusion: "nation," or "national," is whatever is named as such by a given group of people, the claims of whom are (for whatever reason) internationally recognized.¹³

Within this context, it seems to be true that the foundation of the Greek Kingdom had sanctioned every Cretan fight against the Ottoman regime as national, even if the island became part of the Greek territories much later. In other words, from the

¹¹ It seems that the local forces consisted mainly of Sfakiotes (from western Crete), see William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927* (Frank Cass and Co. LTD., 1966).

¹² F.-C.-H.-L. Pouqueville, *Histoire de la Régénération de la Grèce* (Paris: Firmin Didot Père et Fils 1824), III: 498-526.

¹³ For a general discussion of nationalism see Vincent P. Pecora, ed., *Nations and Identities Classic readings* (Malden Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001).

nineteenth century onwards scientific and popular Greek literature regarded Crete to be Greek. Is it then adequate to accept that early nineteenth century Cretan uprisings constituted a national revolution? The question is irrelevant here in as much as this author does not think that “nationalism” can be objectively conceptualized. Thus, the only thing to be said here is that, for reasons to be examined later on, a linear revolutionary narrative was gradually constructed with regard to Crete, not only fed by Greek nationalism, but also feeding it.

In this respect, it is not a surprise that even nowadays the nineteenth century history of Crete is often narrated as a series of bloody revolutions against a dynastic 'yoke.' Part of this is due to the fact that nation-states and nationalism are still with us whereas the Ottoman Empire is long gone.¹⁴ This chapter, however, is an attempt to focus on Crete as an Imperial province, suggesting that local developments until 1912 should be examined as relevant to Ottoman internal politics. Yet I do not aim to question the significant impact of Greek nationalism on Cretan affairs. My only argument is that selective attention to nationalism contributes to ignoring other, equally important aspects of Cretan particularities, which interacted with local 'national' phenomena in a critical way.

I have already argued, for instance, that the Cretan uprisings after 1821 had something to do with Greek nationalism. But what does the above statement really

¹⁴ This is still the mainstream approach adopted by Greek scholarly and popular literature. See for instance the following quotation, “Although the Greek state was established in 1830, the island of Crete was not incorporated with the mainland. Nevertheless Crete had also risen in the spring of 1821 and remained in a state of uprising (with only a short interruption) until the time the nation was restored, had confined the Turks in the forts of the towns only, and compelled them to ask the Egyptians for help (the latter actually governed the island until 1841); the island had also offered rivers of blood to the national Struggle, on its own territories as well as at the other places (Peloponnesus, Attica etc.) where its population had taken refuge,” in Nicholas B. Tomadakis, *The Cretan Revolution 1866-1869* (Chania: Second International Cretological Congress Literary Society "Chrysostomos," 1966), introduction.

mean? In other words, were there other possible reasons that the locals decided to support a rebellion against the Ottomans? Which other factors initiated conflict in the Ottoman Empire in the 1820's? And which of them were relevant to the island of Crete? By asking the above questions, one realizes that the Greek uprisings had occurred almost simultaneously with the abolition of janissaries by Sultan Mahmud II's regime, the most violent instance of which were the events of 1826 in Istanbul.¹⁵ It seems plausible to think that Cretan uprisings had something to do with the anti-janissary action, since janissaries reportedly represented a substantial proportion of Crete's Muslim population.

According to studies relevant to this issue,¹⁶ it seems that Cretan janissary power had reached its peak during the thirty years preceding the 1821 revolution. During the first decades after the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1660, the central administration had probably tried to keep the numbers of janissaries limited, responding to the complaints of the local Christians.¹⁷ However, the janissaries gradually increased both in number and in power, since the Imperial center lacked the means to efficiently control

¹⁵ Virginia Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of military reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830," *International History Review* XXIV (2002), 253-77.

¹⁶ For a general introduction on the origins and development of the janissary corps see Godfrey Goodwin, *The janissaries* (London: Saqi Books, 1997).

¹⁷ The Cretan janissary troops were organized in two different corps: the local corps and the Imperial corps. In 1737, their total number was estimated to be around 3,500 of a total number of 7,500 soldiers. The locals were constantly complaining about the janissary behavior and, for this reason, they often addressed the local magisterial authorities, namely the *müftü* or the *kadı*, or the central administration, asking for help. On numerous occasions, their complains were taken into consideration and action was taken against the janissaries, Peponakis, *Forced Conversions*, 46.

For some interesting examples of the ways the janissaries were integrated into the Cretan society see Nikolaou S. Stavriniidou, *Μεταφράσεις Τουρκικών Ιστορικών Εγγράφων αφορώντων εις την Ιστορίαν της Κρήτης: Translated Turkish Transcripts relevant to the History of Crete*. Vol. A', 1657-1672 (1067-1082) (Vikelea Dimotiki Vivliothiki: Iraklio, 1986); Elif Bayraktar, "The implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of faith as actors in the Kadi court," MA thesis, Bilkent University, 2005); Maria Varouha, Fotini Hereti, and Marinos Sarigiannis. *Ιεροδικείο Ηρακλείου, Πέμπτος Κώδικας (1688-1689): Iraklioy Holly Court, fifth Code (1688-1689)*, ed. A. Zahariadou (Iraklio: Vikelea Dimotiki Vivliothiki, 2008), Vol. II.

Crete. In this way, the janissaries were incorporated with the local elite and they managed to control an important part of the island's urban revenue. In some cases, for example, they would monopolize tax farming; in others, they would establish numerous tax-free religious endowments (*vakf*).¹⁸ At any rate, their incomes would remain out of the central state's reach.

It seems that janissary power in Crete grew even more in the second half of the eighteenth century as a result of the internal turmoil caused by the Christians, and parallel to the state's first serious attempts to centralize control. To put it differently, the collisions between Christian and Muslim "armatoli" (*αρματολοί*; armed bands), the Christian uprisings in favor of Russia during the 1768-1774 war,¹⁹ and a series of similar events, allowed for the Muslim military force to take further liberties against its potential rivals. Within this context, while the Christians were challenging the Empire's legitimacy, the Imperial center was slowly losing control also over most of the Muslim Cretans, although the latter were supposed to be the Empire's armed supporters and defenders.

In fact, Cretan janissaries were hardly defending the interests of the central

¹⁸ On Iraklio (Candia) see Molly Greene, *A shared world: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 33-44, 87-95, 98, 104-5, 155, 161, 167-168.

¹⁹ Individual or family biographies often constitute very illustrative examples of broader historical processes. See for instance the history of the Tsouderos family, from the Agios Vasilios district, and its gradual transformations. With regard to our discussion, the example of the two brothers Giakoumis and Melhisedek is quite telling. Giakoumis was one of the leaders of the region's armed bands. After assassinating two janissaries, he escaped to Egypt where he was recruited as an irregular. But the relatives of the janissaries found him and had him murdered. Thus in 1821, his brother, the abbot of Perveli Monastery, became one of the leaders of the Greek revolution, protesting his brother's murder and the confiscation of the monastery-lands by armed janissaries. See I.D. Mourellou, *Κρητικά βιογραφία (Συμβολή εις την ιστορίαν των επαναστάσεων 1821-1866-1878-1896-1897): Cretan biographies (A contribution to the history of the revolutions 1821-1866-1878-1896-1897)* (Athens: Estia, 1931), 29-59.

regime. One should not forget that by that time, the corps under scrutiny were no longer an elite military force. For instance, according to Tournefort, as early as 1710 to 1721 almost all of the Muslim Cretans were registered as janissaries and were permanently residing within the island's citadels (the port-towns).²⁰ The hinterland of the island, on the other hand, was in a state of constant anarchy since nobody cared or dared to restore order. The janissaries, especially, were exiting the castles not in order to fight in the name of the sultan, but to loot. In order to understand this, one must consider the nature of Cretan fortifications. When Crete passed from Venetian to Ottoman rule in 1669,²¹ it came with a network of Venetian castles that were much superior to ordinary Ottoman fortifications.²² This resulted in high concentration of military forces within and around the four major castles and port-towns of the island (Hania, Rethimno, Iraklio, and Lasithi). The highland areas, on the contrary, were never completely brought under full Ottoman control.

This argument is consistent with the observation that in periods of turmoil local armed bands would freely roam the hinterland. This phenomenon, closely related to the

²⁰ This is probably an exaggeration. Yet if this is how foreign visitors were perceiving the situation in Crete, it is plausible to suggest that Crete was ruled by the local janissary regime rather than by an absent and abstract central administration. See Joseph Piton de Tournefort (1717), *Voyage d'un botaniste. L'Archipel grec* (Paris: Maspero, 1982), Vol. 1: 102.

See also the following quotation «Tous les Musulmans de la Crète étaient habitués au maniement des armes et formaient des Janissaires qui, là comme dans tout l'Empire ottoman, se distinguaient par leur turbulence.» In Fosses, *La Crète*, 46.

²¹ The western parts of the island were conquered by the Ottoman forces in 1645, but the conquest of the eastern parts was rendered more difficult, among other things, by the superiority of the Venetian fortifications there. Thus, the Ottomans expanded from the west into the rest of the island, first through the hinterland. The conquest was completed in 1669. See Green, *A shared world*, 13-110.

²² Giuseppe Gerola, *Monumenti Veneti nell'isola di Creta* (Venezia: R. Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, M. CM. VI), Vol. 1.

One possible reason for this was that the Ottoman patterns of territorial control were based (at least in theory) on constant movement rather than on permanent garrisons in a given province. See Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica* II (1954), 103-129.

particular nature of Cretan geography and to its patterns of settlement, was also to be found in other regions with similar characteristics, a good example being the Morea.²³ In brief, Crete was but one of the provinces that in the late eighteenth century appeared to be misgoverned. The hinterland was in a state of general disorder and the corruption of janissaries, who controlled castles and ports, was beyond doubt. Hence, when the central regime finally came to the realization that the Empire's military structure was in dire need of reform, one imagines that Crete was one of the provinces that would be most profoundly affected.

The most serious efforts to reform the janissary corps from within were realized under Sultan Mahmud II. Yet when these projects failed, the sultan decided that he had no other option than to violently “wipe janissaries off the face of the earth.”²⁴ The slaughter that followed the janissary revolt against the reforms in the capital, was massive and of unprecedented brutality. This development was traumatic for the Ottoman world, and its effects were felt not only in the capital but also in the provinces. Nor should it be forgotten that the destruction of the janissaries was coupled with the confiscation of bektaşî property and the transfer of their revenues from their provincial holdings to the sultan's treasury.²⁵

The bektaşî, a dervish order found in practically all Ottoman territories, including

²³ Is it a coincidence, for instance, that very similar structures were to be found in the Morea just before the 1821 uprising? On this issue see the very interesting article by Anna Vlachopoulou, "Like the Mafia? The Ottoman military presence in the Morea in the eighteenth century," in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, transformation, adaptation*, eds. A. Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete-Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), 123-135.

²⁴ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream; The story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (New York Basic Book, 2005), 430-446. See also C. MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828* (London, 1829).

²⁵ Robert John Barnes, *An introduction to religious foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden-New York-Kobenhavn-Koln: E.J. Brill, 1987), 87-88, 90-91.

Crete, was closely associated with the janissaries both in theory and in practice. The founder of the order was the patron saint of the janissaries, and the janissaries had often endowed land and property to the pious foundations of the order. This practice, established through the centuries, resulted in the creation of decentralized networks of capital accumulation which, under the pretext of sacrality, escaped the Sultan's control and jurisdiction. In the days of Mahmud II, however, bektāṣi power was no longer deemed acceptable by the government. Thus, the Sultan resurrected old charges of heterodoxy leveled against the order, approving executions and confiscations directed against its leaders and convents.²⁶

By and large, developments in Crete on the eve of the Greek revolution were in line with the broader situation described above. According to foreign observers, the state of affairs on the island was extremely alarming to the Ottoman regime. In 1813-1817, for example, the castles of Crete had been attacked by earthquakes, plague epidemics, and riots. According to rumors, moreover, the local janissaries in alliance with the majority of local Muslims, who had been openly questioning the authority of Istanbul's representatives on the island, were ready to revolt against the sultan and to establish an independent Cretan state—though certainly not a Greek-Christian one—under the protection of Great Britain.

Under these circumstances, it seems that entire villages had begun to convert to Islam.²⁷ In the context of the present study, it would not be fruitful to focus on this

²⁶ On the Bektāṣi order see J.K. Birge, *The bektashi order of Dervishes* (London, 1937; S. Faruqi, "The Tekke of Haḡi Bektaş: Social Positions in Economic Activities," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7 (April 1976).

²⁷ Peponakis, *Η εσωτερική κατάσταση στην Κρήτη*, 55-65. On the plague see Th. Detorakis, "Η πανώλης εν Κρήτη. Συμβολή εις την ιστορίαν των επιδημιών της νήσου: The plague in Crete. Contribution to the

phenomenon, as interesting as it might be. The salient point here is that for a very short period, one could argue that Cretan revolts against the Sultan were identified more with local Islam than with Christianity. Yet things changed rapidly after the violent suppression of the movement, the decapitation of the local pashas who cooperated with the janissary forces, the public execution of large numbers of janissaries, and the outbreak of the Greek revolution. Under these new circumstances, apparently, conversions to Islam came to a halt. Moreover, when Ottoman regulars arrived to the island in order to punish the locals for the revolt, it seems that at least some Muslims had joined the Christian insurgents in the Cretan highlands.²⁸

The Population of Early Nineteenth Century Crete

This study does not aim to accurately calculate the island's population at that time. Nevertheless, a brief reminder of relevant estimates can serve as a very good basis for an understanding of the dynamics described here. The striking contradictions between the figures given by different studies constitute a very telling example of the difficulties embodied in such a task, mainly with regard to data relating to a time period prior to middle nineteenth century. More specifically, due to the lack of official registers, researchers are forced to use extremely subjective sources, such as diplomatic

history of the island's epidemics," *Epistimoniki Epetiris Filosofikis Sholis Pan. Athinon*, no 21(1971-72):118-136; Nikos Andriotis, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Ανατολικής Κρήτης (16ος-19ος): Population and Settlements in Eastern Crete (16th-nineteenth century)* (Iraklio: Vikelea Dimotiki Vivliothiki, 2006), 242-246.

²⁸ H. Gastonnet des Fosses, *La Crète et L'Hellénisme* (Paris: Ancienne maison Charles Douniol, 1897), 95-96.

correspondence, diaries, travelogues, local histories, and geographies, the selection of which is further colored by each researcher's own subjectivity.

For instance, even studies that challenge the mainstream approaches of the nationalistic literature in Turkey and Greece end up being somewhat influenced by the sources they try to question.²⁹ Most Greek researchers, on the one hand, take it for granted that the majority of the Cretan population consisted of Greek-speaking Christians and, although they do not try to conceal the existing historical indications to the contrary, they attempt to explain away such data by treating them as anomalies and aberrations, always underlining the temporary character of such dynamics. Turkish researchers, on the other hand, tend to overestimate any reference to a substantial Muslim presence in Crete, without really examining the nature of their sources, or the conditions under which such demographic data were collected.

With regard to the period at stake, for instance, Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke suggests that, until the Greek revolution, the Muslim population was gradually growing, estimating that on the eve of 1821, the Muslims constituted about two-thirds of a population of almost 300,000.³⁰ Manolis Peponakis, at the same time, uses different sources that leads him to a similar—although perhaps less exaggerated—conclusion. He

²⁹ See for instance the very important contribution to Cretan demographic history by Nikos Andriotis, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Ανατολικής Κρήτης*.

³⁰ “Bu çabanın müslüman nüfus oranını ne derece artırdığı kesin olarak bilinmemekle birlikte XVIII. y.y.ın ikinci yarısında Ada'nın 300.000'ye yakın bir nüfusa sahip olduğu şeklinde bir tablo ortaya çıkmaktadır.” See Adıyeke, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı*, 79. The author bases her estimation, mainly, on the following sources: Victor Bhrard, *Les affaires de Crete* (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1898), 63; Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1892), 1: 540. After having examined the same sources, I can confirm that both of them clearly refer to a Muslim majority on the island in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the first one stating that the Muslims numbered 200,000, while the Christians only 60,000; and the second one stating that the Muslims numbered 200,000, the Christians 150,000, and the Jews only 200. However, the problem here is that these authors wrote on Crete a century after the events that they also had their own political agenda. Thus, any use of their records without questioning their accuracy is quite problematic.

agrees that according to a variety of sources the number of Muslims was as high, or even slightly higher, than the Christians. Pouqueville, for example, writes that in 1813 there were some 110,000-120,000 Christians on the island, versus 130,000 Muslims.³¹

However, Peponakis puts forth that Christians were forced to convert to Islam against their will, due to extreme poverty and oppression.³² For this reason, he argues, large numbers of them remained crypto-Christians (*κρυπτό-χριστιανοί*). In this way, he explains the fact that after the 'national liberation' of 1821, the numbers of those who converted to Islam had dropped impressively and conversions back to Christianity had started.³³

This study takes a slightly different stand from the above mentioned works, suggesting that, regardless of what the exact numbers of Cretan Muslims may have been before 1821, the difference in proportion before and after the Greek revolution cannot be explained only in terms of Ottoman oppression or tolerance. The first problem with such an approach is that the rise of Islam in Crete seems to have been a symptom of the loss of control of the central, Imperial, Islamic regime. The second problem is that such an understanding of the story is mainly based on sources produced later, when Cretan affairs were dramatically different. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that demographics were rapidly changing in Crete at the time of the Greek revolution. But is

³¹ Nevertheless, the data provided by Pouqueville can be easily questioned. The main argument he tries to make is that the Muslims were not as numerous as was commonly believed and that, in fact, a great number of them could not fight, since there were among them some black servants, 12,000 worthless beggars and 70,000 women. As to the Greeks, since 36,000 of them appeared to be paying the poll-tax, Pouqueville suggests that some 22-24,000 of them were capable fighters. But, for obvious reasons, the above demographic analysis is extremely problematic, see Pouqueville, *Histoire*, 302-303.

³² "...εξ' αιτίας της φτώχειας και της καταδυνάστευσης." See Peponakis, *Η εσωτερική κατάσταση στην Κρήτη*, 68-84.

³³ Ibid., 70-84.

this proof that Cretans had been harboring secret identities as Christian-Greeks? Or is it, on the contrary, proof that peaceful local Muslims were gradually eliminated, deported, or forced to convert to Christianity due to the aggressiveness of Greek nationalism? In my view, both of the above interpretations are wrong, since the case of Crete illustrates only the fluidity and ambiguity of any discussion based on identities.

The Kourmoulides

The semi-legendary, semi-historical story of Kourmoulides is a very good illustration of the way in which history combines contradictions with fixed identities, and with patterns of subordination to these identities. According to the most widespread version of the story, circulated in Crete during the first years after the 1821 revolution, the Kourmoulides were among the wealthier inhabitants of Megalo-Kastro (Iraklio); a very powerful family, or clan, established in the district of Kouse (in the plain of Messara)³⁴ that had openly renounced Christianity almost immediately after the conquest. They were said, however, to have retained their Christian faith in secret and to have been handing it down to their descendents for over a century. Thus, every Kourmoulis was secretly baptized and had two names: one Muslim and one Christian.

The family was also said to have enjoyed a great influence and to have, on numerous occasions, protected the Christians from Muslim oppression. Moreover, according to rumors circulating almost simultaneously to the Greek revolution, at least

³⁴ As noted by N. Andriotis, at the eparchy of Pirgiotissas in 1881 (Επαρχία Πυργιώτισσας), where the Kouse (Κουσές) district belonged, the Muslims were the majority in all of the four settlements at the eparchy. In 1900, however, they were no longer the majority in none of them. See Andriotis, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Ανατολικής Κρήτης*, 212-213, 411, 418.

half of them had decided to confess to the castle's pasha that they were Christians in order to be executed and redeemed by martyrdom. Nevertheless, always according to the same sources, they eventually chose not to do so because of fear, not for themselves, but for the many others whom they would have left behind, since they knew that many priests and 'holy men,' who had helped them over the years, would inevitably also be put to death.³⁵ They remained nominally Muslims, therefore, until they openly declared their faith and fought for it in 1821.³⁶

The name of the Kourmoulides was also associated with three martyrs, executed outside the walls of Rethimno in 1824 by local soldiers, when they refused to convert to Islam, declaring that "they were born Christians and Christians they would die." This story, strange as it may be to our understanding—since the heroic answer came from the members of a family of notorious crypto-Christians—apparently made perfect sense to the locals. When the Bishop of Rethimno, who had gone near the spot of their execution at night, saw light descend on the bodies of the Kourmoulides, the local community decided that they had earned the crown of martyrdom. In the end, their clothes were cut off and distributed to be used for healing of the sick, and Rethimno thus gained its very own Christian heroes.

Last but not least, the most remarkable member of the family was a certain Hüseyin-Agha, "whose personal exploits before the outbreak of the Greek revolution would fill a volume, and who also distinguished himself as a leader in the early history

³⁵ This story is almost identical with an earlier record of a very similar event. See Sir Paul Rycout, *The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, Anno Christi, 1678* (London: John Starkey, 1679), 289.

³⁶ Robert Pashley, *Travels in Crete* (London;Cambridge: Pitt Press, 1837), 1:105-106.

of the war with the Turks, under his Christian name of Captain-Mihalis Kourmoulis.”³⁷ Hüseyin Kourmoulis was known as a fearsome janissary of the early nineteenth century, to whom the local community of Sivas³⁸ attributed the most horrendous deeds. After the 1821 revolution and the abolition of the janissary corps, however, Kourmoulis revealed his real religion, declaring that he had always been secretly a Christian, and started slaughtering the “infidels” with a passion that turned him into a legend among the local Christians.

Thus, Kourmoulis became part of the local folklore. Almost a century after his death, the Christian inhabitants of the region were still inspired by his example. During the 1897 uprising, for example, Manousos Koundouros—one of the rebel leaders—would write in his memoirs that he had used his spare time to visit the remains of Kourmoulis’s tower, the most well-known monument of the region.³⁹ Moreover, the legendary hero “Captain-Mihalis” of the internationally acknowledged Cretan novelist Nikos Kazantzakis (February 18, 1883, Iraklio, Crete, Ottoman Empire - October 26, 1957, Freiburg, Germany) seems to have been inspired at least partly by similar local legends. Although Kazantzakis’s “Captain” is clearly a Christian, commonly identified with the local captains of later revolutions, if we treat him more as a symbol than as an actual character, Captain-Mihalis seems to bear the characteristics of all notorious insurgents of Crete, Christian or Muslim. In short, his most distinguished—and maybe

³⁷ Andriotis, *Πληθυσμός και Οικισμοί της Ανατολικής Κρήτης*, 107.

³⁸ Eparchy of Πυργιώτισσας (Pirgiotissa) in Eastern Crete. Today it part of the Municipality of Τυμπάκι (Timpaki). See *ibid*, 408.

³⁹ Manousou R. Koundourou, *Ημερολόγιον; Ιστορικά και Διπλωματικά αποκαλύψεις; Η απελευθερωτική Επανάστασις της Κρήτης και η Αρμοστεία αυτής: Journal; Historical and Diplomatic revelations; The Liberating Cretan Revolution and its Residency*, ed. Spir. G. Vardaki (Athens: G. H. Kalergi kai Sia, 1921), 275-276. See also Psilakis. *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 3, 54.

his only—heroic quality is his refusal to compromise with anyone or anything and his constant battle against everyone, including himself.⁴⁰

Once again, the heroic elements of this character might sound strange to us. Similarly, the whole literature on the “solitude” of the Cretan highlands (or of the Cretan soul) may appear charmingly naive or parochial. This is a matter of personal interpretation. What appears to be a fact, however, is that there was a bloody contest for “bravery” fought among Christians and Muslims, in the context of which religion did not really matter all that much.⁴¹ The half-Muslim, half-Christian culture of war described above appears in every aspect of local cultural production: folk music, literature, customs, and historical narratives.⁴² Moreover, it has been projected as the trademark of the Cretan highlands to this day. And although in Greece the 'half-Muslim' part of the equation is almost absent from contemporary cultural conceptualizations of

⁴⁰ For the novel see Nikos Kazantzakis, *Ο Καπετάν Μιχάλης (Ελευτερία Ή Θάνατος): Captain Mihalís (Freedom of Death)* (Athina: Ekdosis Nikos Kazantzakis, 1964). For a discussion of the hero see Peter Bien, "Ο Καπετάν Μιχάλης, an Epic (Romance?) Mangué." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, no 5 (1987): 153-73.

⁴¹ Historians and anthropologists working on honor-battle and the cultural logic of male violence often associated it with elite groups. Yet in lots of nineteenth century provincial Mediterranean societies the rituals of the duel appeared to have both elite and plebeian connotations. See Thomas W. Gallant, "Honor, Masculinity, and Ritual Knife Fighting in Nineteenth-Century Greece," *The American Historical Review*, no 105 (2) (Apr.,2000):359-382.

For the most well known anthropological study of violence in mountaineer Cretan societies see Michael Herzfeld, *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁴² The nineteenth century Cretan heroic folk-songs, recorded by Pashley, constitute a very telling example of this culture. The first group of lyrics that follows was celebrating the heroism of a Christian chieftain, while the second one that of a Muslim one:

1) *The song of Sfakians*: “They all decreed, Grabusa's rock//That from the foe they'd wrest//Nor, in Grabusa, would permit//One Musulman to rest. // And Buzo-Marko 'twas, who first // Did on the rampart stand,//And seven soldiers there did he // Cut down with his good brand.”

2) *The death of Glemedh-Ali*: “The Sfakina struck off the head// Of Glemedhaki true,// And, like a standard, in his hand// He held it up to view.// For many hearts with grief he had racked,// And would have racked still more: //So may each man his eye-sight lose// Who shall his fate deplore!// Ye Turks and Janitsaries all// To th' mosque why don't ye fly?// To gaze upon Glemedh-Ali,//The pride of every eye!” In Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, I:78-79, 108-110.

Crete—or is presented as impersonating the 'enemy'—one still wonders how the story of Kourmoulis would have played out if developments in the Morea and Istanbul had unfolded differently in 1821-1829.⁴³

The Period of Mehmed Ali

In the same vein with the previous section, one wonders what the future of Crete would have been if the military reforms of Sultan Mahmud II had not been combined with an attempt to deal with decentralized forces not only through military violence, but also through negotiation. For instance, the governor of Egypt (Mehmed Ali Pasha) was one of the most dangerous such decentralizing forces, enjoying significant military power and substantial foreign protection. Mehmed Ali was one of the Empire's most important local actors, both feared and admired for, under his leadership, Egypt appeared to be advancing towards full autonomy and successful modernization more than any other Ottoman province. In addition, Mehmed Ali was the first to successfully enforce the law of massive violence directed against opposition forces, and became famous for brutally eliminating the military class of the Mameluks in Egypt.

The bloody massacre of his enemies and confiscation of their properties had helped Mehmed Ali—both spiritually and materially—to radically reform the Egyptian army and navy.⁴⁴ And it was with the hope for the intervention of this army and navy in

⁴³ On the particularities of Cretan localism and its integration to Greek nationalism see the very interesting article by Michael Herzfeld, "Localism and the Logic of Nationalistic Folklore: Cretan Reflections," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no 45 (2) (Apr., 2003):281-310.

⁴⁴ Louis Lacroix, *Iles de la Grèce* (Paris: Firmin Didot frères, 1853), 580-588; Khaled Fahmy, "The era of Muhammad "Ali Pasha", 1805-1848," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge,

the Morea, and later on in Crete, that the sultan was desperate enough to ask Mehmed Ali for support in 1824, promising him the governorship of these two provinces in exchange. However, the campaign of the Morea was eventually lost. Despite their early successes, the joint Ottoman-Egyptian forces were eventually defeated by the combined Anglo-French-Russian fleet at Navarino. The campaign of Crete, at the same time, was a great success. As a result, Mehmed Ali was to be awarded only the governorship of Crete.⁴⁵

The chaotic situation in Crete thus becomes more comprehensible when viewed within the larger picture. Mehmed Ali's intervention repressed janissaries and Christian rebels alike and brought him the governorship of the island for ten years (1830-1840).⁴⁶ In this way, the Ottoman sultan was able to avoid the secession of Egypt while he no longer had to deal directly with the anarchy reigning on the island. As to the Cretan dynamics, one could argue that they were affected by these developments as much as they were affected by the establishment of the Greek state. The Egyptian administration labored to modernize the island's structures, to reform society at all levels, and to do away with military anarchy.⁴⁷ A bilingual state-sponsored newspaper was published for the first time,⁴⁸ a census was realized in order to secure effective taxation, and expensive

1998), 139-79.

⁴⁵ Finkel. *Osman's Dream*, 431-432.

⁴⁶ The above development also pleased his protective-power, France. See Ch. Lasoche, *La Crète ancienne et moderne* (Paris: Société Française d'Éditions d'Art, 1898), 130-140.

⁴⁷ Detorakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 340, 399.

⁴⁸ See *Vekayi-i Giridiyye* (Hania), 1248/1832-7.

public-works were undertaken.⁴⁹

The cost of these modernizing ventures, at the same time, resulted in a crushing burden of taxation on the underdeveloped island, both on Christians and Muslims. In this context, Greek nationalism continued to provide disaffected Christians with an ideological pretext to revolt. In fact, the Muslims were even more discontented, since they had to pay new taxes—such as the wine-tax—from which they had been previously exempted.⁵⁰ Yet the Christians were always taking the lead in questioning the legitimacy of the authorities. Was it because the vista of Greek nationalism provided them with stronger ideological arguments? Or was it because the most reactionary Muslim elements had already been expelled? Both answers could be true.⁵¹ In any event, in 1833 when the Christians attempted to protest the new regime with the support of some Muslims, they were violently discouraged from doing so by the public execution of their leaders.⁵²

As to the Muslim armed irregulars, the new administration proved to be energetic, impartial, and strict enough to secure the respect—or the fear—of everyone. According to contemporary sources, the general Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Naili

⁴⁹ See “Statistical Appendix” in Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 2:299-327. The data he provides, however, are not very useful, since he only calculates the Muslim and Christian families of each district.

⁵⁰ Peponakis, *Εξισλαμισμοί και Επανεκχριστιανισμοί*, 91.

⁵¹ However, the fact that in 1838 a committee of Christian Cretans in exile addressed Great Britain asking her to proclaim Crete a British colony, suggests that Greek nationalism was still not the only option for Christian Cretans, see Detorakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 355.

⁵² About the movement that became known as “το κίνημα των Μουρνιών” (the Mournies movement) and the violent measures taken by the island’s authorities that immediately put the uprising down see A.P. Stergelli, “Η συγκέντρωση των Μουρνιών και τ’ αποτελέσματα της στις Εκθέσεις του Foreign Office (Αύγουστος-Δεκέμβριος 1833): The Mournion meeting and its results in the Reports of Foreign Office (August-December 1833),” in *Pepragmena 3th Diethnous Kritologikou Sinedriou* (Athina, 1974), 311-320.

Pasha managed to inspire the strongest belief in his military capacities through the merciless repression of unruliness. Moreover, he had some of the local troops replaced by Egyptian and Albanian corps arriving from Egypt. The advanced weaponry, firm order, and lack of tolerance of the newcomers forced large numbers of Cretan Muslims to abandon the island, since their previous activities were no longer allowed under the new regime.⁵³ That does not mean, however, that the former socio-economic networks of the Muslims were completely dismantled. Nor does it mean that the new conditions did not offer new opportunities. Far from it, the local society was transforming together with the Empire and would continue to do so for more than a century of revolutions and reforms.

The Gülhane Edict

What came to be known as the *Tanzimat* era (the period of reform) officially began in November 1839, when the recently enthroned Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid had the *Gülhane Edict* proclaimed by his foreign minister Mustafa Reşid Pasha. Almost twenty years later, in February 1856, his brother and successor promulgated the second important “Reform Edict,” known in Turkish as the *Islahat fermanı*. These documents are often treated together by scholars, as they are considered to be the main legal manifestations of the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876). Thus, the period of reform is commonly

⁵³ Joseph Mirepoix, *Essai sur l'histoire de la question Crétoise* (Monpellier, 1912), 35. One should not forget that after his successful term in Crete Mustafa Naili Paşa was transferred to Istanbul. Moreover, in 1840 he was appointed *sadrazam* (grand vezir) of the Ottoman Empire. See Enver Ziya Karal, 1988. *Osmanlı Tarihi VI. Cilt. Islahat Fermanı Devri 1856-1861: Ottoman History VI. volume. The Age of the Reform Edict 1856-1861* (Ankara: Turk Tarihi Kurumu Basimevi, 1912).

presented as a consistent entity. Indeed, it would be appropriate to accept that the *Tanzimat* era was truly conditioned by some repeated patterns, the most typical of which were the following: first, the universal will to save the Empire through reforms; and second, the central presence of an elite of bureaucrats in the whole process.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, striking differences were also to be found between the two edicts, due to changes in the internal frame of the Empire, the global economy, and the wider international scene.⁵⁵

By and large, in 1839, the Ottoman ruling elite was still rather well-received by the other European Powers, as long as the Ottomans continued to grant them extensive trading privileges and because of a universal fear of Russia. To put it differently, the fragile equilibria between the major European powers of the time constituted the framework within which the Empire's position was set. With regard to Crete, the general conviction was that, after the Napoleonic wars, the Eastern Mediterranean was in need of stability. Thus, the erratic actions of the Egyptian Governor Mehmed Ali were no longer supported. When the latter marched against the Ottomans in May 1838 demanding Egypt's independence, therefore, the European powers mobilized against him. Although Mehmed Ali proved his military skills by crushing the Ottoman navy once again, he failed to convince the Powers to entrust Egypt with self-governance. In

⁵⁴ For a classic study of *Tanzimat* as a process of westernization and bureaucratic reform see Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, no 13(3) (Dec., 1968):451-470.

⁵⁵ Halil Inalcik, "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, no 5 (1973):97-127; Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil Inalcik ve D. Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Cengiz Kirli, *Sultan Ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri" 1840-1844: The Sultan and the Public Opinion: "News Reports" During the Period of Ottoman Modernization* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009).

fact, it would be beyond inaccurate to suggest that there was harmony of interests among the Powers at that time. Mutual suspicions and discordant ambitions were ramified enough not to allow for clear-cut alliances. Yet, a compromise was eventually reached. The governorship of Egypt was confirmed as hereditary, but the rest of the provinces previously promised to Mehmed Ali were lost to him.⁵⁶

In this way, Crete was brought again under direct Ottoman control at a time when the regime appeared confident enough to attempt the revival of a purified Muslim Empire. Thus, when a few years later the sultan decided to realize a visit to some of the trouble provinces of the Empire, in order to understand the actual situation and source of turmoil, Crete was included in his itinerary. According to the sultan's own writings, peace and prosperity could prevail in the Empire only through mutual understanding between authorities and people, and reforms suitable to different populations and local particularities.⁵⁷ From this point of view, the combination of tolerance and reform was in harmony with the underlying Islamic character of the reform edict of 1839. In both cases, an abstractly permissive Islamic attitude towards different religions and ethnographic practices was presented as the driving force of Imperial reformation, against fanaticism and corruption.

To this way of thinking, the proclaimed enemy was not heterogeneity but moral perversion. Progress was thus identified not only with the adaptation to the structures of

⁵⁶ Muhammed H. Kutluoglu, *The Egyptian Question (1831-841). The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reaction of the Sublime Porte* (Istanbul: Eren Press, 1998).

⁵⁷ “Vedia-i ilâhiye olan bunca ibadullahâ edna derece bile teaddi vukuuna şefkat-i şahanemiz kail olmak ihtimali olmadığından memelik-i devlet aliyemizden bazıları görüp ahval-i hakikiyelerini bizzat anlamak ve badehu sair mahallerin halini dahil anlardan oldukça istidlâl ile ona gore cümlelerin refah ve âsâyışını biavnihî taâlâ ikmâl etmek niyet-i hayriyesiyle bu defa bittevfık Allahu taala Rumeli canibine seyahat-i seniyyemiz tasdim kılınmıştır.” The above quotation is from a letter of the Sultan regarding his trip to Rumeli. His letter regarding Crete was quite similar. Quoted in Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 102-103.

modernity, but also with the restoration of traditional Islamic virtues. At the same time, the reformers sought to advertise the principle of equality. One should keep in mind that this last ideological orientation was serving nicely both political and financial causes. For, the gradual abolishment of the main fiscal privileges of the Muslims, which had followed the proclamation of the 1839 edict, was probably destined to provide the central treasury with the fiscal means to cover the significant financial cost of the reforms.⁵⁸

In theory, the capitation tax (*cizye*) was traditionally collected only from non-Muslim subjects. Muslims, for their part, had to serve occasionally in the army when necessary. This distinction, however, ceased to formally exist when the conscription system established by Mahmud II in 1838 was reformed by the *Tanzimat*. According to the basic *Tanzimat* conscription law of 1845, all Muslim subjects of the Sultan were required to serve a specific number of years in the reformed Ottoman army (*asker-i nizamiye*). The Muslims who chose to avoid military service were obliged to pay a special tax (*bedl-i nakdi-i askeri*). Thus, while the distinction between religious communities was maintained, the Muslims were now offered the 'privilege' to pay a financial substitute for their military service. Moreover, the *Tanzimat* tried to abolish tax-farming, imposing new taxes on all of the Sultan's subjects.

Despite the fact that the new system was not actually enforced in the provinces, the declaration of the relevant order in February 1838 made the basic aims of the early

⁵⁸ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript," *Die Welt des Islams*, no 34 (1994):173-203; Cengiz Kirli, "Sultan Ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Journalleri" 1840-1844: The Sultan and the Public Opinion: News Reports During the Period of Ottoman Modernization" (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009).

Tanzimat clear.⁵⁹ Simultaneously, foreign merchants had gained one more advantage over the Ottomans, since only the latter had to pay the internal custom dues.⁶⁰ The preceding interpretation of equality, however, managed to offend the sensibilities and interests of the Muslims while simultaneously failing to appease non-Muslim complaints. In Crete, for instance, local Christians responded to the new legislation with one more uprising, expressing also their discontent for the island's return to direct Ottoman administration. Yet, the half-hearted rebellion made it relatively easy for the Ottoman rulers to handle the crisis.⁶¹

At any rate, the island community in the 1840's appeared to be somehow different from what it had been a few years earlier. The Egyptian administration's serious attempts to modernize the island's structures and the frequent movements of merchants, soldiers, and slaves between Crete and Egypt, had redefined the Cretan population once again.⁶² As a result, the first period of the *Tanzimat* was experienced in Crete as a process far more complex than an isolated examination of the—rather too generalized—central Islamic reforms might suggest. With regard to the local population, one very important development was that the Christians had become the island's obvious majority in numbers. According to R. Pasley, in 1834 the rural population consisted of about 81,000 Christians and 27,000 Muslims. As for the three chief cities, *Megalo-*

⁵⁹ Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *Cambridge University Press* 6, no. 4 (Oct., 1975): 421-59.

⁶⁰ Quataert, *The Age of Reforms*, 763-764.

⁶¹ Emm. Zabetakis, "Συμβολή εις την καλύτεραν γνώσιν της επαναστατικής περιόδου του 1841 εν Κρήτη: Contribution to the better understanding of the revolutionary period of 1841 in Crete," *Kritika Hronika*, no 10 (1956):171-214.

⁶² Sir John Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London: W. Clowes), 1840.

Kastron (Iraklio), *Rhythimnos* (Rethimno), and *Khania* (Hania), they were still held by majorities of Muslims. Pasley calculated that their total population amounted to about 12,000, 3,200, and 5,800 respectively.⁶³

The accuracy of the above data is, of course, disputable. Yet they point toward an unquestionable drop in the Muslim population, despite the fact that the predominantly Muslim character of the urban centers does not escape attention. The obvious question here is what may have shifted the demographic rates in favor of the Christians? A possible answer would be that many Cretan Muslims, who were in fact crypto-Christians, took advantage of the new conditions to openly revert to their old faith. Nevertheless, it seems that conversion to Christianity was still a dangerous, and certainly not that profitable, decision to make. Thus, such cases remained rather limited.⁶⁴ Moreover, the whole population of the island in 1834 appeared to have dropped to about half its level at the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821. The fall in the numbers of Muslims was then probably the result of long periods of fighting, numerous casualties, and significant emigration.⁶⁵

Moreover, as mentioned above, the reforms limited the benefits of being a

⁶³ More detailed information is not provided by the author. See Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 2:326.

⁶⁴ On the issue of conversion see Selim Deringil, "There Is No Compulsion in Religion": On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839-1856," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no 42 (3) (Jul., 2000):547-575. Issues of property were also to be taken into consideration on numerous occasions of conversion. For Crete, see the examples of Christian converts who lost their properties to their still-Muslim relatives. See Peponakis, *Εξισλαμισμοί και Επανεκχριστιανισμοί*, 100-101.

⁶⁵ See for instance the following example in Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 2:121 :“We arrive soon after sunset in the little village of Vliithias, the only male inhabitant of which is a young Mohammedan, in whose house we took up our abode. The rest all are widows. In many places in Crete the number of widows is large: and in one village of Lasithi they actually form the entire population, as is so nearly the case here. These are striking instances of the depopulating and exterminating character of the late war, so different from those carried on between civilized nations, with whom the effects on population, as even under the most rigorous conscriptions of Napoleon, are almost imperceptible.”

Muslim—in Crete or elsewhere—by burdening the 'faithful' with a number of new taxes. According to Christian complaints, however, the local Muslim notables saw the return to direct Ottoman governorship as their salvation, and sought relief from the state's new fiscal policies by bribing the new authorities, oppressing the locals, and violating the law.⁶⁶ In this respect, Crete was not a unique case. Hence, it seems that due to the state's willingness to enforce heavy taxation in principle, and its inability to do so with impartiality and efficiency in practice, the pace of reforms was not speedy enough. As a result, by the middle of the century, the incomplete modernization of the Imperial structures was still reflected in the weakness of the army and in recurrent social turmoil.

The Crimean War

The poor performance of the Ottoman army against Russia during the Crimean war (1853-1856) left the Empire in need of European support.⁶⁷ The Ottomans could not deny that it was only thanks to the intervention of the European powers that their common enemy had been warded off; nor was this happening for the first time. As we have seen, foreign intervention had worked in the past, both against and in favor of the Ottomans.⁶⁸ While on earlier occasions the Ottomans were considered by the other European powers almost their equals, in 1856 something had changed. First, the danger was greater. A potential Russian victory would have been much more disastrous for the

⁶⁶ Berard, *Affaires de Crète*, 68-69.

⁶⁷ Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: an Empire Besieged* (Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2007).

⁶⁸ See, for instance, the examples of Greece and Egypt.

Ottomans than any past secession of provincial rebels, even if the last ones were of the military genius of a Mehmed Ali, or of the symbolic weight of a Greek state. Second, by then the social dynamics both in Europe and in the Ottoman world had irremediably changed.

The gradual emancipation of the masses, the growing demand for political and social reform, and the rise of populism, together constituted broader dynamics that manifested themselves in very different ways within very different frameworks. Yet one could say that the general trend of the era was that, although political elites continued to monopolize global decisions, it had become crucial for their survival to learn how to please—or to manipulate—their people in a ‘modern way.’⁶⁹ At the Paris Conference of 1856, for example, it became clear that the attitude of the European powers was influenced both by their specific interests and by the—still vague in some places, but steadily growing—will of the European people, facing the struggle for the emancipation of ‘Christian nations’ from under ‘the Turkish yoke,’ with something more than sympathy.⁷⁰

Within the Ottoman Empire, at the same time, the war against Orthodox Russia had caused uproar among the Orthodox subjects of the sultan. The fact that the defeat was only averted with the help of Christian Europe did not work in favor of the Muslim sovereign's prestige. Once more, the trouble rushing down upon the Ottoman regime was dangerous in terms not only of territorial losses, but also of legitimacy. In short, with regard to diplomacy, the Empire was demoted from the status of a European power to

⁶⁹ See for instance the following mainstream textbook of European history, Richard Lodge, *A History of Modern Europe, The Students' Modern Europe*. (London: John Murray, 1887).

⁷⁰ Seton-Watson, *The Problem of Small Nations*, 1-2.

that of a buffer state on the fringes of Europe. With regard to ideology, at the same time, one of the traditional pillars of pre-nineteenth century 'Ottomanism' was collapsing. The traditional distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects had been one of the Empire's fundamental principles, with the corollary that non-Muslims would pay the taxes to support the elite group of Muslim warriors.⁷¹ In practice, this principle was constantly violated since an Empire so large and heterogeneous could not be ruled according to any single pattern.⁷² The value of the argument, in this case, lies in discourses and not in actual practices.⁷³ Thus, what I suggest here is that the Crimean War marked the violent transformation of Ottoman Islam, since it broadcast to the world that the notorious 'Muslim warriors' were no longer all that successful. That impression—and actual situation—provided the Concert of Europe with the argument—and actual power—to force the Muslim Empire to reform.

To summarize, an important difference between the reform edict of 1839 and that of 1856 was the change of the status of the Ottoman Empire within the international context. The first edict was issued in the name of a still-powerful regime, which was aware of its weaknesses and was trying to deal with them. The second edict, however, was designed under the strong influence and suggestions of the European powers and it was a sign that the Ottoman regime was forced to accept a drastically different

⁷¹ See Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

⁷² See for instance the following very interesting article by Gabor Agoston, "A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, no 9 (2003):15-32.

⁷³ Even as late as 1825, the Imperial press had issued an Ottoman translation of a well-known, ninth century Arabic treatise on Islamic law of war, in order to encourage the janissaries to fight more enthusiastically. According to C. Finkel, in this way Sultan Mahmud tried to cloak his military reforms in familiar language and to have his reformed army considered Muslim rather than western in inspiration, see Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 434.

conception of the world and of its own place in it. Yet reform was still for the Ottomans an internal need. At the same time, the growing ideological conflict between non-Muslim subjects and the Muslim regime indicated that the need to find new negotiation patterns in order to promote a modern administration was critical to internal stability. To put it differently, after the Crimean War, it became obvious that the character of the 1839 edict was somewhat paradoxical, since it was mainly trying to legitimize the idea of reform and of modern citizenship among non-Muslim populations on the basis of Islam. In light of this, it makes sense that the draft of reforms should have been designed along the lines of a different “invented tradition” in 1856.⁷⁴

Ottoman Reform and non-Muslim *Millets*

Similar to previous attempts, the reforms of 1856 evolved around centralizing the Empire. Only this time, the leaders of the Empire's different religious communities were brought into the discussion.⁷⁵ In other words, the 1856 edict gradually institutionalized the Ottoman religious communities, the “*millets*,” for the very first time. True, the edict

⁷⁴ Selim Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no 35 (1) (Jan., 1993):3-29.

⁷⁵ The answer to the question of whether the millets were part of the Ottoman state, or just the buffer-area—or the negotiation locus—between the Islamic state and the non-Muslim public of the Empire, is open to interpretation. Moreover, the issue was open to interpretation even during the period in question. In the second half of the nineteenth century, for instance, a number of prominent Christian statesmen suggested that the *Rum-milleti* could survive and defend its rights only by being part of the Ottoman state. One well-known supporter of this idea was Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha, who later on became governor of Crete. In 1872, during a debate over the issue of the Bulgarian Church, Karatheodori suggested that the claims of the Hellenic-Orthodox Church had no value if the Ottoman army would not agree to enforce them. For this reason, suggested Karatheodori, it was only to the interest of the Patriarchate to be considered as part of the Ottoman state. See *Λόγος εκφωνηθείς υπό του Κ. Αλεξάνδρου Καραθεοδωρή: Speech by Mr. Alexandros Karatheodoris* (Tipis Vizadidos, 30 January 1872).

was proclaimed in the name of tradition. Instead of praising an abstract Islamic virtue, however, it referred to the imaginary establishment of the *millet*-system by Mehmed Sultan, “the Conqueror,” in the fifteenth century. According to the story quoted in the edict, after the fall of Constantinople, Fatih Sultan had accorded the three major non-Muslim communities of the Empire—the Orthodox Christians, the Armenians, and the Jews—the privilege of autonomous administration. In fact, the edict was the first occasion in which the example of Mehmed the Conqueror was invoked to provide the new reform program with indisputable Imperial gravity. Historical research, at the same time, suggests that this legend had little to do with pre-nineteenth-century realities.⁷⁶

By and large, the profound diversity characterizing Ottoman subjects in time and space was not strictly related to confessional particularities. Quite to the contrary, a number of scholarly studies suggest that a variety of different factors accounted for differences of status among the Ottomans. Although privileges were often granted to—and revoked from—different groups of non-Muslims and Muslims by various sultans, this pattern was often totally irrelevant to the idea of an Imperial administrative apparatus based on semi-autonomous religious communities. In other words, it seems that the practice of rewarding Ottoman communities with privileges—and degrees of autonomy—was defined and redefined by dynamics such as the special qualities of their members, the particularities of each time and place, the policies of the different rulers, and the international context. Consequently, if there has been indeed a pre-modern tendency towards communal organization, Empire-wide this trend was oriented more

⁷⁶ Paris Konortas, "From Ta'ife to Millet: Ottoman terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, eds. D. Gondikas and C. Issawi (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1999).

towards the particularity of each locality than to the centralized and well-defined religious communities.⁷⁷

Within the Imperial framework described above, Crete had always been one among the numerous localities that constituted 'unique cases.' In the pre-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, for a local community to be unique and exceptional was rather the norm. At the same time, Cretan 'uniqueness' reflected the objective particularities of the island: its geography, its population, the local economic and social patterns, and the nature and time of its integration into the Empire. Numerous scholars suggest that Crete had been the last significant Ottoman conquest in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, while some of them argue that the patterns of administrative incorporation and of settlement of the agricultural land were quite different from earlier conquests, others suggest that Crete's landholding system did not constitute a break from Ottoman tradition.⁷⁹ One way or another, the point deserves to be stressed that, regardless of how

⁷⁷ For some illustrative examples see Adbul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria 1575-1650* (Beirut, 1985); Suraiya Faroqhi, *Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands, 1480-1820* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995); Christoph K Neumann, "Ottoman Provincial Towns from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century : A Re-Assessment of Their Place in the Transformation of the Empire," in *Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Thomas Philipp, Jens Hanssen and Stefan Weber, 130-44 (Beirut, Heidelberg: Orient-Institut der DMG, Ergon-Vlg., 2003); Nicolas Vatin, and Gilles Veinstein, eds., *Insularités ottomanes* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose : Institut français d'etudes anatoliennes, 2004).

⁷⁸ The best known analysis of the above described dynamics belongs to Molly Greene: "The Ottoman conquest of Crete is best seen not as an Iron Curtain of Islam thrown up around the eastern Mediterranean. Rather it marked the final extension of Ottoman Political control over a world in which Muslims were already active participants, as well as the last gasp of the Venetian ultramarine. Americans are used to thinking of Europe as the Old World, but from the point of view of Europe in the early modern era it was the Mediterranean that was old," in Greene, *A shared world*, 12.

⁷⁹ On similar patterns and strategies in Crete see Stavrinidis, *Μεταφράσεις*; Halil Inalcik, "The emergence of big farms Ciftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants," in *Land Holding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, ed. T. Keyder (Albany: Suny Press, 1991); Molly Greene, "An Islamic Experiment: Ottoman Land Policy on Crete," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, no 11(1) (1996):60-78; Allaire Brumfield, "Agriculture and Rural Settlement in Ottoman Crete, 1669-1898," in *A Historical Archeology of the Ottoman Empire: Breaking New Ground*, ed. L. C. Uzi Baram (New York: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 2000); Antonis. Anastasopoulos, "In Preparation for the Haji: The Will of a Serdençençi from

scholars prefer to conceptualize the essence of the Ottoman administrative and economical tradition, the Cretan reality was not in contradiction to the main tendencies witnessed in the Eastern Mediterranean in the late seventeenth century.

By and large, it seems that the island lay—in a number of ways—far from the capital's reach. In other words, it seems that from the first years of the conquest to the nineteenth century, Crete remained under the control of local economic and political elites made up of soldiers, landlords, tax-collectors, and pious foundations (both Muslim and Christian). Within this context, one of the significant benefits that accrued to those who chose a Muslim identity over a Christian one was that they could enroll in the janissary corps, thus gaining access to considerable privileges. As mentioned above, the main sources of revenue for Cretan Muslim soldiers seem to have been tax-farming, provincial pious foundations, and looting.

The establishment of numerous *vakfs*, on the one hand, was an effective way to maintain inheritable properties within a family, or at least, within the local community. But such a practice required a certain status and power.⁸⁰ Looting, on the other hand, was a much more common and more direct practice of acquiring wealth. By looting, in a Cretan context, I do not mean the traditional right of the soldier to pillage a newly

Crete (1782)," *Archivum Ottomanicum* , no 23 (2005/06).

⁸⁰ In this respect, the study of Crete may provide an alternative example to Barkan's and Vryoni's famous thesis that dervishes or Bektāṣi fighters preceded the arrival of the army (and thus promoted conversion to Islam). See Omer Lutfu Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir İskan ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak Vakıflar and Temlikler I: İstila Devrinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Vakfiyeler: "vakfs" and "Temliks" as a Method of Expansion and Colonization 1: Turkish Dervishes and inscriptions., " *Vakıflar Dergisi* , no 2 (1942): 283,304; Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*, (Berkeley: 1986), 359.

Consequently it might answer the question of why whole villages converted to Islam within the last centuries of Ottoman presence in the Balkans, Crete, or Anatolia. The Cretan example of "permanent battle" for the conquest of the hinterland, which in the Ottoman context appeared to be quite common, may explain some of these dynamics. See also Deringil, "There is no compulsion in religion," 554-555.

conquered land, but rather a constant battle between the citadels and the country-side that, by remaining in a state of anarchy, constituted a permanent battle-field to be conquered and pillaged. It should be no surprise, therefore, that a significant number of the locals appeared to have converted to Islam in order to benefit from the above mentioned conditions. In any case, the local converts did not hesitate to murder in cold blood their countrymen. At the same time, it was recorded as rather common for Muslims to stand as godfathers to the children of their Christian friends.⁸¹ The evidence for this comes from a variety of sources.⁸²

At the same time, Cretan Christians appeared also to maintain similar rituals of fight and cooperation. Moreover, similarly to the local Muslim pious foundations, Christian monasteries were also granted the right to hold tax-free properties and to manage significant estates.⁸³ In addition, these monasteries were often protected by local Christians organized in armed bands.⁸⁴ Thus, one may suggest that the mixed networks

⁸¹ Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 1:10.

⁸² On converts and on the savageries of the soldiers in question, especially of the Candiots, see M. Pitton de Tournefort, *A Voyage into the Levant* (Paris, 1717), 32; F. W. Sieber, *Travels in the island of Crete in the Year 1817* (London, 1823), 25-26; Pouqueville, *Histoire*, 33.

On court cases concerning Christian converts during the early years of the Ottoman conquest of Crete see Green, *A shared world*, 37-40. Green suggests that conversions in Crete appeared to be more numerous than conversions in the area of the Balkans. This reality, according to her, could be explained by reference to the long extension of warfare in Crete that paralyzed the local structures. This argument is very interesting, if we agree on comparing Crete to the Balkans as two distinct geographical units. Yet, what if we decide to focus instead on these Balkan territories where the rate of conversions was equally high? What if instead of comparing Crete as a whole to the Balkans, we compare mountains to mountains and port-cities to port-cities? What if we differentiate between the administrative and economic centers of the Balkans and the hinterland? True, the above questions cannot be answered in the context of the present study. My only argument here is that the issue of conversion has multiple ramifications. Thus, in order to compare Crete to different Ottoman territories, one needs accurate data for each province. And this is something we certainly lack, at least previous to the nineteenth century.

⁸³ N.V.Tomadakis, *Ιστορία της εκκλησίας της Κρήτης επί Τουρκοκρατίας (1646-1898). Αι Πηγαι: History of the Cretan Church under the Turkish regime (1646-1898). A) The sources* (En Athines, 1974)

⁸⁴ See for instance, the case of the Tsouderoi family in Mourellou, *Κρητικά βιογραφία*, 29-33, 40-59. Another famous example is that of Abbot Gabriel and insurgent Const. Yaboudakis, at Arkadi in 1866,

of Muslim and Christian pious foundations with Muslim and Christian armed bands, constituted a very important aspect of the economic, social, and political affiliations in mid-nineteenth-century Crete, mainly, for three interrelated reasons.⁸⁵ First, local mosques and churches symbolized a visible ideological authority replacing the ambiguous—and somehow foreign—legitimacy of the distant political centers of Istanbul and Athens. Second, the Foundations controlled a sizable part of the island's rich agricultural resources without paying taxes to the capital. Third, the *vakf* and monastic lands were much more convenient for market and export-oriented production compared to the *miri* land (state-owned land). Thus, the pious foundations appeared more appropriate not only for the maintenance of a traditional kind of agricultural land-holding, but also for realizing the transition to a more trade-oriented local economy.⁸⁶

Tomadakis, *The Cretan Revolution*, 11-12.

As an example, see also the case of *Lakiotes* (in Western Crete), as described by Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, III:149-150: "...The Lakiotes acted a most conspicuous and honorable part in the war. This was partly owing to their active habits, caused by the mountainous nature of their country; but still more to their having been accustomed to the use of fire arms, both for the chase on their neighboring mountains, and for less innocent objects, which in so wild and savage a state of society as that which existed in Crete, before the outbreaking of the Greek revolution, used constantly to offer themselves. In those times they used often to have petty wars with the Turks: that is a Lakiote would cut off a Turk who had given him what he thought a just cause of offence and, if the perpetrator of the crime was found out, the Pasha would come to the village with a sufficient force, and burn his house..."

In brief, the above described state of affairs emerges spontaneously almost from every written record of events regarding nineteenth-century Crete. It is obvious that, similarly to the Muslims, the Christians replaced the lack of effective local administration with pious foundations, representing—visually and functionally—their continuous sedentary presence, and with armed bands that operated around the pious foundations, especially in the hinterland. The local, inter-communal bounds between these two different forces are indicated at by almost every instance of Christian rebellion, since the relations between abbots, priests, and insurgents were beyond doubt. This author's argument is not that a solid Christian community was to be found in Crete; neither that all monasteries and churches had gained territorial independence from external Imperial or religious centers. In any case, it seems that the above described patterns were quite typical although there have been also numerous examples of quite different tendencies.

⁸⁵ For a very interesting case-study see Antonis Anastasopoulos, "Δερβίσηδες και Δερβισηκοί τεκέδες στην Κρήτη των αρχών του 19ου αιώνα. Θρησκευτικές, οικονομικές, και κοινωνικές λειτουργίες: Dervishes and Dervish Lodges in early nineteenth century Crete: Religious, social, and economic functions," *Pepragmena tou TH' Kritologikou Sinedriou* C1:139-150.

⁸⁶ Brumfield, *Agriculture and Rural Settlement in Ottoman Crete*, 22, 39.

It is true that the limited number and imperfect nature of our sources does not allow for a full description of pre-nineteenth century Cretan socio-economic realities without some degree of speculation. This is a considerable weakness with respect to this chapter's main arguments. Nevertheless, the character both of the *Tanzimat* reforms and of the Cretan reactions they triggered, pointed in the same direction. To be more specific, it appears that—from the point of view of the central administration—the crisis was to be blamed, at least partly, on the unofficial autonomy that had gradually been formed in a number of Ottoman provinces. Consequently, two of the main aspects of the 1850's reforms, namely centralization and secularization, were challenging exactly these kinds of informal autonomies at the heart of which laid religious institutions.⁸⁷ In short, there is good reason to suggest that middle nineteenth century Cretan reforms and revolts should be examined as part of the constantly changing Ottoman world.

Modernization and Westernization

In the preceding sections I have briefly referred to the main differences between the two Ottoman edicts of reform. Yet some of the terms and concepts I have used demand further clarification. For instance, I have suggested that one of the proclaimed aims of *Tanzimat* was the modernization of Imperial structures.⁸⁸ What did this exactly mean,

⁸⁷ Although I do not agree with the argument that the Ottoman society “offered a contrast with Western Europe,” the particularities of Imperial religious foundations and the patrimonial system developed around them offered a contrast with what European modernity stood for (at least in theory). See Serif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no 11 (3) (Jun., 1969):258-281.

⁸⁸ Quataert, *The Age of Reforms*, 765. For an example of mainstream European approaches see Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders; Europe 1800-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), introduction.

apart from the fact that a growing number of governmental officers were to be trained, educated, and employed in order to design and apply an ambitious program of reforms that touched upon every aspect of life? By and large, the Ottoman understanding of modernization was clearly bound to concepts and practices such as liberal trade, secular education, impressive construction projects, adopting new technologies, maintaining an efficient permanent army, and spreading the idea of modern citizenship, justice, and equality before the law. At the same time, however, modernization was meant to serve the homogenization of the Empire and of its people. In other words, Ottoman modernity also meant effective state control over a well defined population, more profitable taxation, and loyalty to the state. In this way, the new Ottoman state was to be represented more by its civil servants than by the sultan himself.

Moreover, Ottoman reform was also perceived as a process of integration with the West; a process of "westernization." The Ottoman paradigms of the previous centuries could no longer be followed for the simple reason that all evidence seemed to suggest that when compared to its contemporary western Powers,⁸⁹ the Ottoman regime was no longer competitive either in military and economic, or in ideological terms. Thus, for the time being, the only thing the regime seemed to wish for at an international level was to be accepted (or even just protected) by the European powers identified as the West. That was obvious enough. It was equally obvious that the essence of the West, both as perceived by the Ottomans and in general, was quite ambiguous.

The example of the "nation-state" is ideal in order to illustrate this argument. Despite that fact that scholarly literature often presents nineteenth century "nationalism"

⁸⁹ What I mean by "western Powers" is going to be further discussed in the following chapters.

as identified with ideological movements most popular in the Empire's west, that does not mean that those 'western' communities were necessarily any more homogenous or more 'national' than the Ottomans. By this I mean that, similar to the Ottoman Empire, most nineteenth century states were certainly representing heterogeneous populations that usually did not share the same language, religion, origins, or a common understanding of history, tradition, and geography.

At the same time, most nineteenth century European regimes appeared interested in expanding, maintaining, or reclaiming the lands of their previous expansions.⁹⁰ In this framework, small independent polities based on at least one common cultural factor—language, or religion, or locality—were rarely promoted. Having said that, autonomous or semi-autonomous states that could function as parts of the era's naval empires were largely promoted. In other words, in the second half of the nineteenth century, imperial models of administration were transforming rather than dying. In this framework, the only way for an imperial state to continue to exist was to develop mechanisms capable of dealing with multiculturalism. Moreover, the legitimacy of nineteenth century empires seemed to be bounded to two concepts: efficient modern administration and historical continuity, not necessarily of a "nation" but certainly of an imagined civilization.

In this sense the Ottoman reforms were serving a state that was modernizing,

⁹⁰ In the words of Ussama Makdisi, "In the Age of Western-Dominated Modernity, every nation creates its own orient." See Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review*, no 107 (2002):768-796. This author certainly agrees with the above argument. In other words the 'Orient,' that is the cultural area to be conquered and 'disciplined' by the West, existed both within and at the borders of late-nineteenth century western Europe. The boundaries between the "western" and the "oriental" were extremely abstract and flexible. See also, E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire 1875-1914* (London: Abacus, 1987); W. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Eugen Joseph Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France 1870-1914* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001).

above all, for its own sake.⁹¹ The erratic ramifications of the process cannot be easily described in this study. Suffice it to say that in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century came to its fullest expression as a combination of two tendencies: devotion to secularization, science, and logic; and implementation of myths, traditions, and folklore in order to construct a metaphysical conception of self. Furthermore, the above combination was experienced by the Ottomans both as the promise of cultural expansion and as the threat of sectarianism or nationalism. In short, from an Ottoman perspective, reform constituted a constant struggle to maintain a balance between the 'future' and the 'past,' the 'empire' and the 'nation.'

Nevertheless, reform could not easily be imposed from the top down.

Reorganizing the Empire became the product of a double negotiation between the state and the different civil and religious groups it wished to represent, on the one hand; and with the European powers it wished to please, on the other. It should not be forgotten that the Ottoman state of the time was financially, politically, and diplomatically speaking, weak. Therefore it was largely incapable of executing unpopular decisions without risking total chaos, and of violently prevailing over its rivals—both abroad and at home—without facing the risk of total destruction. Within this vicious circle, the inability of the state to protect the life and property of its subjects (or citizens to be) opened the door to increased European patronage and interference. The intrusion of a ramified European protection, which was ideological, financial, and political, in nature, further undermined the mechanisms of an efficient Ottoman central administration. This situation brought about new problems that were begging for new solutions; and new solutions were to be found through further foreign intervention, which in turn caused

⁹¹ Eldem, *The Ottoman City*, 199.

again, new problems.⁹²

Reforms and Revolutions

Why do revolutions occur? With regard to the Empire in question, it appears that nineteenth century uprisings, rebellions, and revolutions were closely related to the process of reform, since the projects of the central administration often proved either unsuccessful or quite challenging to well-established provincial networks. From the middle nineteenth century onwards, an alternative to dependence on the West might have been the success of Ottoman reforms and the subsequent emergence of a flexible, loyal to the state, and liberal Ottoman public-sphere. Yet diverse groups of Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans did not welcome such a change and reacted violently to the reform projects. Those who collaborated, at the same time, were most of the time interested in promoting their individual short-term profit, and did not seem to be much concerned about the future of the Empire.

In support of this claim, one has only to examine the simultaneous occurrence of turmoil everywhere in the Empire, from the Arab lands to the Balkan Peninsula,⁹³ with

⁹² See, Fatma Muge Goccek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of the Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jens Hanssen, *Fin de siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class* (Princeton, 2006). The above studies offer some characteristic examples of the above described process. Yet, this author strongly disagrees with the idea that a “fatal force” had worked against the Empire. According to me, the Empire in question was a complex of shared experiences, cooperation, and conflicts. Moreover, since in the nineteenth century it would have been impossible to accurately predict what the future of the Ottoman world would be, any retrospective reference to mutually exclusive communities of 'friends' and 'rivals' of the Empire is quite problematic.

⁹³ See Gul Tokay, "Osmanlı-Bulgaristan ilişkileri: Ottoman- Bulgarian relations," in *Osmanli* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yay.,1999):319-328; Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and

each effort to implement reform. In fact, the local dimensions of each such example were equally important to broader dynamics. Nevertheless, if we accept that temporality is as necessary as territoriality for the development of communal affinity and belonging, we should agree that provincial uprisings were directly linked to the socio-economic and political changes taking place in the Empire and the world at the time. We should also accept that the confrontation between old and new Ottoman values was directly influenced by conflict between old and new Ottoman elites, although due to the complexity of forged alliances it was often very difficult to make clear-cut divisions between them.

Viewed in this light, the uprisings that broke out in Crete during the late *Tanzimat* were hardly exceptional. What came to be known as the uprising of *Mavrogenis* in 1858, for example, was in fact a direct reaction to reforms with which the local Christians disagreed, and to the failure of the Ottoman state to implement the popular reforms that the local Christians were promised.⁹⁴ To be more specific, the insurgents rose up against the local authorities, complaining about the corruption and absolutism of the new governor Veli Pasha, who according to them failed to deliver equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, as had been specifically promised in the reform edict of 1856. On this occasion, the insurgents respected Ottoman legitimacy and addressed their complains to the Ottoman capital and to the European consular

Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no 34 (4) (2002):601-617; Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class* (Princeton, 2006); Tom Gallagher, *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989, from the Ottomans to Milosevic* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) 27-32.

⁹⁴ Giannis Gridakis, *Σφάζετε, σφάζουμε: Η Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1858: γεγονότα και διπλωματία: You massacre us, we massacre you: The Cretan Revolution of 1858: Events and diplomacy* (Athina: Ellinika Grammata, 2007)

authorities.⁹⁵

However, equality in justice and education, as well as in eligibility for public posts, government positions, and military service, also meant equality in taxation between the political center and the provinces, as well as implementation of a series of new taxes. This aspect of the reforms was favored neither by Christians nor by Muslims.⁹⁶ The Christians in particular reacted against the centralizing power of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul, the delegates of which were authorized by the *Tanzimat* to collect the taxes paid by the *Rum milleti* in the Ottoman provinces.⁹⁷ In this case, the Christians addressed the European powers questioning the legitimacy of the Empire as a whole.

It should not be forgotten that during the period under scrutiny Crete had started to become known in western Europe as an island endowed with considerable archaeological wealth. For example, in the same year as the uprising of *Mavrogenis*, one of the most significant archaeological discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean was made in Crete by the French archaeologists G. Perrot and L. Thenon. When the two men had found and transferred from Crete to France the famous *plate of Gortyne*, an excellent sample of archaic inscriptions, the island sprang to prominence among archaeologists and antiquarians, attracting growing European attention.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Detorakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 359.

⁹⁶ Shaw, *Ottoman Tax Reforms*, 430-431.

⁹⁷ Manolis Peponakis, "Η εσωτερική κατάσταση στην Κρήτη το 1859-1860 και η ρωμαιοκαθολική προπαγάνδα: The internal situation in Crete in 1859-1860 and the Romeo-Catholic propaganda," Rethimno: Reprint from the issues 18-19 of *Nea Hristianiki Kriti* (1999/2000), 198-199.

⁹⁸ Michel Breal, "Un ancien texte de loi de la Crête," *Revue Archéologique ou Recueil de documents et de Mémoires Relatifs a l'étude des Monuments, a la Numismatique et la Philologie de l'antiquité et du moyen âge* (December 1878), 1-2.

For a variety of similar reasons, it seems that the central Ottoman regime saw the benefits of compliance and acted in favor of a peaceful solution. The Pasha was replaced and an Imperial decree (*firman*) was issued on 7 July 1858, granting the Cretans financial, judicial, and administrative privileges, and exempting the island from integration with the central Muslim and Christian administration. In fact, a central administrative apparatus that could efficiently control the provinces existed, for the time being, only in theory. The favorable exemption of Crete from central regulations, therefore, may have been a temporary administrative necessity. One way or another, it was agreed in 1858 that local administration would be handled by local councils of Muslim and non-Muslim elders, with the mutual participation of the Muslim and non-Muslim clergy.⁹⁹ Despite this development, however, thousands of Cretans converted to Catholicism during this period.

The activity of Catholic and Protestant missionaries on the island had been quite old but not particularly significant. Yet missionary activity suddenly became a source of danger that challenged both the Christian and Muslim establishment due to the alarming dimensions of local conversion to Catholicism in 1859. The activities of French missionaries and diplomats, in particular, who had by then managed to take the lead in proselytism, challenged not only Ottoman legitimacy, but also Greek nationalism and the interests of the other European powers. In London, for example, both the Greek ambassador (Spiridon Trikoupis) and Her Majesty's government openly expressed their

⁹⁹ From that date on, the councils of the elders were authorized to decide upon cases of family and patrimony-law. See Konst. G. Fournaraki, and A. Ploumidei, *Ειδικοί Νόμοι παρά τοις Χριστιανοίς και Οθωμανοίς της Κρήτης, τεύχος τρίτον: Special Regulation Concerning the Christian and Ottoman Cretans* (En Haniis: Mesogeios), 3:1895.

discontent with the relevant events. Eventually, the French Catholics found themselves forced to stop similar activities due to the reaction of London rather than Istanbul.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, this development may have been related to the simultaneous secret plans of another group of Christian Cretans to revolt against the Sultan and to establish an independent Cretan state under British protection.¹⁰¹ With respect to these events, the only thing that can be said for certain is that the obvious and profound diversity of Cretan political loyalties was directly influenced by individual interests and material needs.

To put it differently, the Catholic missionaries had managed to convince the locals that by becoming Catholics they would automatically be accorded French citizenship, hence be excused from taxation, tariffs, and tonnages;¹⁰² similar enticements seemed to motivate those in favor of British protection. In short, therefore, it is obvious that the middle nineteenth century Ottoman tax-reforms caused discontent on all sides and fierce reactions especially from the Christians. It seems that the relative silence of the Muslims, at the same time, reflected a weakness to react rather than satisfaction with the new taxes, even if according to the widespread Christian complaints the local Muslim elite was still profiting from taxation through bribery and corruption.

The crisis ended in the following year, when the locals became convinced of the

¹⁰⁰ Peponakis, *Εξισλαμισμοί και επανεκχριστιανισμοί*, 111-113.

¹⁰¹ One of the leading figures of the movement, which was called *κίνημα αντεπαναστατών* (counter-revolutionaries movement) was the teacher *Ελισάβετ Κονταζάκη Βασιλακοπούλα*. See Detorakis, *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 359.

¹⁰² Emm. Zabetakis, "Προσπάθεια προσηλυτισμού των Κρητών εις τον Καθολικισμόν κατά τον ΙΘ αιώνα: Attempts to proselytize the Cretans to Catholicism during the nineteenth-century," *Kritika Hronika*, no 10 (1957):171-214; Peponakis, *Η εσωτερική κατάσταση στην Κρήτη*, 16; Kallia Kalliatiki- Mertikopoulou, *Τα "προσηλυτιστικά" στην Κρήτη, 1859-60: Conversion in Crete, 1859-1860* (Iraklio: Eteria Kritikon Istorikon Meleton, 2005).

benefits of semi-autonomous administration that was granted to the island by the sultan. In an ironic way, therefore, it could be argued that the Ottoman bureaucratic attempts to centralize the Empire led to the first modern institutionalization of the Cretan locality. Moreover, it could be argued that the success of the reactions against the reforms led to the establishment of a local pattern to revolt against the initiatives of the political center since, in 1858-1859, disobedience was not confronted let alone punished. Hence it probably is not a coincidence that in the second half of the nineteenth century, almost all Cretan political protagonists were identified with the model of the 'agonist.'

The Uprising of 1866

While it proved impossible to challenge Cretan un-official 'autonomies' in the early years after the second Imperial Reform Edict was issued, fewer than ten years later the central authorities tried again to impose the new system on the island. By and large, enforcement appeared to still pose a problem, since the Christians would rise up in arms against the central regime every time the latter attempted to put new regulations—particularly new tax-regulations—into effect. The main source of Christian consternation was the corruption of the local authorities that made the burden of already heavy taxes unbearable. Whatever the reason, the fact was that one more general uprising broke out on the island in 1866. This time, however, the regime proved much less tolerant than before. Hence the uprising resulted in a series of Christian massacres by the Muslim regime, although the initial reason of controversy was in fact the conflict between the province and the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul.

The issue around which matters coalesced was the so-called "monasteries

question.” In the context of the *Tanzimat*, it was decided that the island’s rich monastic funds should be used to finance Christian secular education. This specific regulation derived from the reform edict of 1858 that established, as we have seen, the *millets* as religious communities represented by their respective head-institutions in Istanbul, which had the right and duty to oversee communal education, justice, and finances throughout the Empire.¹⁰³

It is important to mention at this point that this kind of ‘religious administrative autonomy’ was clearly designed to promote modernization, secularization, and centralization. A number of new institutions were, therefore, gradually established under the aegis of the Orthodox Patriarchate in order to serve similar missions. One of the most significant new institutional divisions was the "Mixed Council," that was organized in the early 1860's with the duty to supervise the financial functions of the Orthodox Imperial Foundations under the direct jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul. The most important difference between the “Mixed Council” and older committees or societies of the kind was that its members came both from the clergy and the laity, and that the Council was—in theory—representing the Orthodox *millet* as a whole.

The organization of the Council afforded secular forces the right to manage ecclesiastical properties throughout the Empire for the first time. The Council was in control of the pecuniary resources of Imperial Orthodox Provincial Sees and of the pious foundations directly attached to the Patriarchate (*σταυροπηγιακές μονές*). Consequently,

¹⁰³ See Roderic Davison, "Turkish Attitudes concerning Christian-Muslim equality in the nineteenth century," *American Historical Review*, no 59 (4) (1954):844-864; *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: ISIS, 1999).

it was authorized to collect funds for the financing of communal education and health-care, and to regulate the election of the administrative committees that would manage the Patriarchate's pious foundations.¹⁰⁴ The new system, therefore, radically undermined clerical and provincial monopolies over religious properties, causing significant turmoil in the provinces.

Within this context, Cretan uprisings again constituted a rather typical case. On the one hand, administrative centralization was perceived by a number of Christians as an eloquent threat lying over the island's monastic treasuries and the local networks functioning around them.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the gradual secularization of the *millet's* administration satisfied some of the rising urban forces, which supported the new system. As a result, tension developed between heterogeneous rival parties, which could be roughly described as laity versus clergy, or center versus periphery. On this occasion, the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats and the Council had common interests against the powerful Cretan monasteries, elders, and clan chiefs, who wished to keep the incomes of the Christian pious foundations under their control. Consequently, it was not a paradox that turmoil between the Council and the locals led to a revolt against the state.

¹⁰⁴ Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, "Ο Νόμος Του Μιλλέτ: Ο Ρόλος Του Διαρκούς Εθνικού Μικτού Συμβουλίου Στη Διαχείριση Των "Υλικών" Υποθέσεων Του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου (1860-1922): The Millet-Law: The Role of the Permanent Ethnic Mixed Council to the Management Of "Material" Issues of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (1860-1922)," in *Το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο Και Η Οικονομία Του Γένους* (Athina: Ekdosis Trapezas tis Ellados, 2007), 138.

¹⁰⁵ It has to be mentioned here that my interpretation of the issue under scrutiny does not agree with the ways mainstream Greek literature presents the matter. See for instance the following quotation in Tomadakis, *The Cretan revolution*, 5: "The monastery question, incurred the exploitation of the large monastery property on the part of the conquerors through the upper clergy, considering that the latter were compelled to purchase the Throne of Crete they wanted to fill: the bishop from the metropolite, the metropolite from the patriarch who, in turn, had to pay the exorbitant amounts to the viziers and other exploiters of Constantinople. Enlightened young Cretans suggested that the disposal of the resources of monastery property should be placed under the control of the elders (and of the people consequently), to which idea the Metropolite of Crete, who was not a Cretan, opposed."

On the 2nd of May 1866, the chief-representatives of the Christians gathered at Boutounaria and delivered to the representatives of the Sultan a written petition requesting exemption from certain taxes, maintenance of their 'traditional' autonomy, and of their right to carry guns. At the same time, however, they complained about the lack of modern infrastructure on the island and about the continuing Christian inequality before the law.¹⁰⁶ In this respect, the content of the petition was quite interesting in as much as the authors tried to question the right of the regime to enforce reforms by reference to its weakness to implement modernity. In the same vein, the Christians appeared to initially believe that recourse to violence was not necessary, and that the regime would accept their demands—as had happened on previous occasions. Nevertheless, when the Pasha (and later on Khedive) of Egypt Ismail, who had his own political agenda,¹⁰⁷ attempted to interfere with the issue, sending his army to Crete to impose 'tranquility and reform,' the already tense situation on the island was considerably complicated leading to a general Christian revolt.

Before further discussing developments on the island, it is illuminating to see how the Christian claims were interpreted by the rest of the world. Some foreign observers characterized the Cretans as well-informed citizens that were rightfully

¹⁰⁶ Papadanagnostis. *Μποντζουνάρια, τη 2 Μαΐου 1866. Αγαπημένε μου σύντεκνε...: Boutzounaria, 2th May 1866. My dearest sintekne....* (1866).

¹⁰⁷ It is known that during that period Ismail Pasha was seeking to achieve greater independence from Istanbul. His involvement in the Cretan uprising of 1866, therefore, could be interpreted as a demonstration of military power destined to impress or even indirectly challenge the Sultan. Indeed, an Imperial *firman* issued on 27 May 1866 changed the order of succession in Egypt to one of primogeniture in his own line, securing the right of Ismail to increase the size of his army, coin his own money and confer titles. Eventually, on 8 June 1867, Ismail was granted the title of *khedive* and the province was afforded autonomy. Nevertheless, later violent developments in Crete and some of Ismail's own initiatives caused the growing discontent of the Sultan, see P.J. Vatikiotis, "Ismail Pasha," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds Th. Bianquis P. Bearman, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

defending their rights.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, however, others suggested that the endless Cretan demands had exhausted the patience of European diplomats. The same circles implied that the Cretans were consciously taking advantage of European public sympathy with their cause in the name of common religion.¹⁰⁹ Such opinions were frequently expressed by the supporters of monarchism in Europe, who considered the Ottoman Empire a legitimate ruler constantly attacked by armed insurgents and foreign conspirators. From their point of view, not only should the Christian monarchies of Europe not support Cretan uprisings, but they should actually condemn them since the battles in question challenged the legitimacy of Monarchy and Empire as institutions.¹¹⁰

In other words, the Cretan uprising of 1866 lent itself to ideological confrontation among different states and political groups in Europe, well reflected in the press and popular publications. For example, mainstream Russian and Greek newspapers supported the insurgents in the name of Christianity, contrary to governmental newspapers in England and France, which defended the Ottoman Empire in the name of

¹⁰⁸ See for instance De l'insitute Beule, "La Crête et la question d' Orient," *Revue des deux Mondes*, no 67 (XXXVIIe an-1867); Henri Couturier, *La Crête. Sa situation au point de vue du droit international*, Paris: A.Pedone, 1900, 44-66. In brief, the above authors maintained that Crete should be 'protected' by France, and strongly objected similar initiatives of Great Britain or Russia.

¹⁰⁹ The argument that Europe was bound to help Greek Cretans in the name of Christianity was very popular among the Greeks. Moreover, one has to pay special attention to the aggressive tone characterizing publications criticizing those initiatives of the European powers that were not supportive of Greece. See for instance, K.G. Verkos, *Εν Δάκρυ επί των εν Κρήτη της τουρκικής θηριωδίας θυμάτων και μια λέξις προς την πεπολιτισμένην Ευρώπην: A tear for the victims of Turkish atrocities in Crete and a word towards "civilized" Europe* (En Wiourgervo: Klinis Epitropi, 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 1866).

¹¹⁰ "Il existe en Crête des tribunaux mixtes, comme dans les autres parties de l'Empire; les Candiotes voudraient sans doute que le Sultan jetât les Turcs à la mer, pour n'avoir plus que des tribunaux grecs," in M. Alphonse de Callone, *L'insurrection Candiote et le réveil de la question d'Orient* (Paris-Berlin: E. Dentu-Stilke et Van Muyden, 1866), 1,2,17.
For a more moderate approach see Francois Nogues, *Examen des affaires de Crête suivi d'une Réponse a M.Saint-Marc Girardin et de quelques lettres sur d'autres questions Turks* (Paris: Librairie Centrale, 1866),1- 36.

universal imperial solidarity.¹¹¹ In this case, the debate was clearly colored by diplomatic antagonisms and political considerations. At the same time, social forces rival to imperial regimes were mobilized within the politics under scrutiny, turning the issue of Crete into one of revolutionary symbolism. Moreover, the latter were joined by a group of Ottoman political refugees in exile, who were hostile to the Empire and the *Tanzimat* regime.¹¹²

It is not a surprise, therefore, that contemporary European publications provided very different accounts on the events in question, since they were more relevant to each author's ideological and sociopolitical profile than to the actual state of affairs in Crete. Within this context, the only thing beyond doubt was that when Ottoman authorities and Christian locals failed to reach a mutual agreement, the last ones rebelled, demanding union with Greece. Nevertheless, despite the fact that independent committees of exiled Cretans and Greeks rushed to support the revolt, collecting money, provisions, and weapons, the official reaction of the Kingdom was quite reserved. One should not forget that the tiny Greek state was preoccupied at that time with issues challenging its own existence. Moreover, the Powers of Europe—with the exception of the Russian Empire—refused to provide Greece with their support. As a result, from a pragmatic point of view, a full-scale war between the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom may have been disastrous for the Greeks.

This chapter is not going to discuss in greater detail the ramified conflicts that arose among Greek political forces, local insurgents, revolutionary committees, and

¹¹¹ See for instance, M.A., *L'insurrection de Crète: The Cretan Insurrection* (Paris: L'imprimerie d'état, 1868).

¹¹² Anonymous. *Les Affaires de Crète, Réponse à la Brochure La Turquie et l'Europe* (Paris, 1867).

philanthropic organizations with regard to Crete;¹¹³ neither can it provide a detailed account of specific events or abstract ideological considerations among Ottomans, Greeks, Cretans, and Europeans. Nevertheless, I cannot avoid remarking that according to all evidence the negotiations between the Ottoman regime and the Christian Cretans that had started in 1866, ended three years later after the bloody massacre of the Christians.

That having been said, one needs to be aware that the phenomenon of massacres defies historical understanding.¹¹⁴ The violent developments in Crete between 1866 and 1869 may be explained in a number of different ways or from a number of different perspectives, such as aggressive Greek nationalism, oppressive Ottoman authorities, religious hatred between Muslims and Christians, or foreign intervention. Nevertheless, the comparative use of our sources points toward the futility of any attempts to accurately describe the reasons behind massive violence. For instance, the diplomatic correspondence and records of eye-witnesses with regard to the Cretan events provide us indeed with quite numerous sources of information. Yet very few—if any—can claim impartiality, since all of the concerned authors were influenced by their personal backgrounds and agenda.¹¹⁵ By this I do not mean to imply that the subjectivity of the

¹¹³ See the following chapter that focuses on the Kingdom of Greece.

¹¹⁴ "Faced with the subject of massacres, the researcher is confronted with three problems. The first is psychological in nature: avoiding a research topic that triggers horror and repulsion is understandable. The second is moral: faced with acts of pure savagery, how is it possible to prove "scientific neutrality"? The compassion felt for the victims leads spontaneously to the condemnation of their torturers. The third obstacle is more specifically of an intellectual nature: the phenomenon of massacre defies understanding," in Jaques Semelin, "In Consideration of Massacres," *Journal of Genocide Research*, no. 3 (2001), 377-89.

¹¹⁵ For a chronological framework of the main events see: *Η Κρητική Επανάσταση 1866 - 1869: εκθέσεις των εν Κρήτη Προξένων της Ελλάδος. Εκδίδεται επί τη εκατοστή επετείο της επανάστασεως υπό του Κέντρου Ερευνής της Ιστορίας του Νεώτερου Ελληνισμού της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών: The Cretan Revolution 1866-1869: Reports of the Greek Consuls in Crete* (Athine: Kedro Erennis tis Istorias tou Neoterou

sources under scrutiny is unique, since no record produced by humans can ever be objective. My argument is only that massive violence and 'martyrs' tend to acquire characteristics of a diachronic nature. They are specifically lauded as effective tools of mass persuasion and emotionally identified with any kind of struggle. In this way, narratives about the Cretan events of 1866 are more useful when examined as symbols of universal revolutionary martyrdom, rather than as sources of specific knowledge about the island.

The following chapter will discuss in detail the issue with regard to Greek nationalism. Here I only want to mention that the number of Christian victims in middle nineteenth century Crete was large enough to trigger popular anger in Christian Europe and very negative sentiments against the Ottomans. Consequently, when the Ottoman regime eventually accepted to negotiate with the Cretans and to grant them a number of new privileges, despite the fact that the Powers of Europe expressed their satisfaction, the people of Europe, as represented by their press and popular publications, appeared to have a different voice. In other words, although European imperial governments were quite sympathetic of Ottoman efforts to restore peace, that approach lacked public popularity. In this way, Crete became a debatable, politicized symbol among populations in social turmoil. By and large, the supporters of the revolution referred to "Christian martyrs," "Muslim tyrants" and "sacrificed heroes," despite the attempts of European

Ellinismou, w.y; Tomadakis, *The Cretan revolution*; T.G. Tatsios, *The Cretan problem*; Manolis Karellis, *Ιστορικά Σημειώματα για την Κρήτη. Από την Επανάσταση του 1866 έως την Κατοχή. Με ανατύπωσή της εκθέσεως ωμοτήτων του Καζαντζάκη, Κακρίδη, Καλιτσουνάκη: Some Historical Notes on Crete. From the 1866 Revolution to the Occupation. Reprinting of the report on brutalities by Kazantzaki, Kakridi, Kalitsounaki* (Iraklio, Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2005).

imperial circles to use neutral terms such as "insurgents" and "Imperial forces."¹¹⁶

At the same time, the issue of religion appeared to unite the majority of Europeans in common grief for the Christian victims. Even authors who accepted that the uprisings caused the death of innocent Muslims, and who differentiated between Ottoman soldiers and local peasants, held the sultan responsible for every vice and crime against Muslim Cretans. For instance, some of them wondered what would happen to the Muslim Cretans if the island was one day to be integrated with Greece. The Muslims would have then to either abandon their home-land and flee, or to suffer the expected revenge of the new rulers, who would certainly not forget the Terror of 1866.

In short, despite the variety of European interpretations with regard to the Ottoman Empire and Crete, the brutality of the relevant events and the growing social turmoil in central Europe against imperial governments, forced even the supporters of the latter to agree that "the Turks had handled the Cretan affairs as nothing more than real Orientals; they deserved to loose Crete—and now they deserve it ten times more—since they have proved that they are totally incapable of prudent administration."¹¹⁷ In this way, the distant island had gradually turned into a well-known symbol in central

¹¹⁶ In the context of popular social movements that had started to spread in Europe and Greece from the middle century onwards, Crete became the symbol of dynastic brutality and of massacres against the common people (Muslim and non-Muslim). See, for instance, the following quotation, "Les rapports par lesquels les agents diplomatiques essaieraient de pallier ou de cacher les désastres d'une lutte à mort seraient contrôlés par la presse; l'opinion publique, au bout de quelque temps, forcerait la main aux gouvernements... Les temps où un puissant de la terre pouvait se débarrasser de ses ennemis, sans retentissement, sont passés, dit-on, pour toujours- Et cependant la tragédie de la Crète est là pour prouver aux plus incrédules que cela peut se faire, même de nos jours, et que cette opinion publique qui, confiante dans les moyens de publicité et de contrôle de notre siècle, se croit bien renseignée et éclairée, peut devenir la Hope des grandes de la terre, tout comme avant l'invention de la presse et du télégraphe," in V. Vitelli, *Machiavel et Candie* (Athenes: J. Cassandreas, 1866), 15-16.

¹¹⁷ George Perrot, "Deux ans d'insurrection en Crète," *Revue des deux Mondes* 74 (XXXVIIIe an-1868): 859-903.

Europe, while the names of Cretan citadels and of their surrounding villages had gradually become European “household words.”¹¹⁸

The Organic Law: Late Nineteenth Century Ottoman Centralization and Decentralization

The massacres of 1866 produced a twofold result in favor of the local Christians. In the long run, Crete had gained significant international visibility that provided future Christian insurgents with European popular support. In the short run, the Empire was forced to negotiate with the insurgents and to accept some of their demands. After meetings held on the island on 8 January 1868, the two parts arranged for the issue of a new Imperial edict that granted Crete a semi-autonomous status, and local Christians administrative equality with the Muslims. The edict provided for the issue of a local constitutional charter called the Organic Law of Crete, according to which the Cretan bureaucratic, judicial, and administrative apparatus was to be staffed with both Christians and Muslims. Moreover, the island was granted by the Charter two official state-languages, Ottoman and Greek.¹¹⁹

The introduction of this amendment could be interpreted as something unique to Crete that contradicted the main principles of the late *Tanzimat*. This study, however, suggests the opposite, underlining the fact that such local arrangements were not limited to Crete. My argument is that, in the second half of the century, the idea of the locality

¹¹⁸ H.C. Lowther, "Among the Liars," *The Nineteenth Century* (May 1897), 1.

¹¹⁹ *Κρητικός Κώδιξ: Cretan Code* (En Haniis, 1893).

became central in the implementation of Ottoman reform, since *Tanzimat* bureaucrats were forced to adopt two different patterns of administrative re-organization. The first one promoted administrative centralization via the mechanisms of the *millets*. The second one promoted administrative decentralization in favor of negotiation and order. Therefore, one could argue that the organization of 'territorial communities' located in the periphery of the Empire and represented by the local institutions was as mainstream an administrative strategy as the organization of 'religious communities' represented by their institutions in the Imperial capital.¹²⁰

It is important to note, at the same time, that the *Tanzimat* promoted reform along the lines of religion in principle and towards administrative secularization in practice. Moreover, the regime's concern with matters of secular education, civil law, taxation, and administrative reorganization was in harmony with the simultaneous social rise of civil forces of all denominations. As a result, non-Muslim secular forces were integrated into the administrative apparatus together with their cultural particularities. For instance, although the Ottoman language continued to be the central-state's official tongue and the

¹²⁰ For some more examples of Ottoman territories that enjoyed an autonomous status, or were administered by a local regime, one can examine parallel to Crete the case of the Principality of Egypt, Samos, Bulgaria and Serbia, and Mountain Lebanon. On Lebanon see Emile Bouchet, *Le Liban Et L'administration Turque / Extrait Du Correspondent* (Paris: Librairie de Charles Douniol et Cie, 1878); Philip Khuri Hitti, *Lebanon in History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London, New York: MacMillan, St. Martin's Press, 1957). See also the quite interesting chapter XIII "Reforms and their Results: The Lebanon and Crete (1859-69), in Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*, 298-318. On the island of Samos see Thrasivoulos M. Malis, *Η Σάμος Υπό Το Αυτόνομον Πολίτευμα : Ιστορικά Σημειώσεις... : Autonomous Samos: Historical Notes*, (En Samo, 1912); Ioannis D. Vakirtzis, *Ιστορία Της Ηγεμονίας Σάμου, 1834-1912: The History of the Principality of Samos, 1834-1912* (Samos: Genika Arhia tou Kratous, Arhia Nomou Samou, 2005). On Serbia and Bulgaria see A. Ubicini, *Les Serbes De Turquie : Études Historiques, Statistiques Et Politiques Sur La Principauté De Serbie, Le Montenegro Et Les Pays Serbes Adjacents* (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865); Vladimir Yovanovitch, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation, or, the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities* (Geneva, London: H. Georg, Trübner & Co., 1871); William Miller, *The Balkans : Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896); William Eleroy Curtis, *The Turk and His Lost Provinces : Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia* Chicago (London: F.H Revell, 1903).

majority of bureaucratic employees were Muslim, reform demanded a dialogue with different cultures, languages, and traditions; upon which lots of non-Muslims were offered with the opportunity of a bureaucratic career.¹²¹

The point I try to make is that negotiation among the Empire's different religious, social, and territorial groups constituted a very important dimension of the late *Tanzimat*. In this respect, the Cretan reforms could be seen as a reversed model of the central ones. The main difference was that, in the case of Crete, the balance of power was clearly tipping in favor of the Christians. To illustrate, one may focus on Ottoman judicial changes with regard to the Empire and Crete. By and large, the *Tanzimat* legal reforms were traditionally treated by historians from the perspective of dichotomies such as religious versus secular. Our contemporary scholarship, however, has shown that the complexity of the process does not allow for such simplifications.¹²² In this respect, one can only suggest that the reforms mobilized large legal networks, which were trained through a new system of education, and which had gradually replaced the former intellectual networks of the *kadı* courts.¹²³ In this framework, the particularity of Crete

¹²¹ See İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği: The Tradition of Local Administration from the period of Tanzimat to the Republic* (Ankara: Hil Yayın, 1985); Bacqué-Grammont, Jean-Louis, and Edhem Eldem, eds., *De la Révolution Française à la Turquie d'Atatürk : la Modernisation Politique et Sociale : les Lettres, les Sciences et les Arts : Actes des Colloques d'Istanbul, 10-12 mai 1989* (Istanbul: ISIS, 1990); İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda. İktisadî ve Sosyal Değişim. Makaleler: In the Ottoman Empire. Economic and Social Change. Articles* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000); Nora Lafi, "Mediterranean Connections: the Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman reforms, c.1830-1910," in *Another Global City Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850-2000*, eds. P.-Y. Saunier and S. Ewen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹²² For a very interesting article on this issue see Avi Rubin, "Ottoman Judicial Change in the Age of Modernity: A Reappraisal," *History Compass* 7, no. 1 (6 Nov 2008): 119 - 40.

¹²³ For some more examples from different provinces see Mark S. W. Hoyle, "The Origins of the Mixed Courts of Egypt," *Arab Law Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (Feb., 1986): 220-30; Iris Agmon, "Recording Procedures and Legal Culture in the Late Ottoman Shari'a Court of Jaffa, 1865-1890," *Islamic Law and Society* 11, no. 3 (2004), 333; Leila Hudson, "Late Ottoman Damascus: Investments in Public Space and the

lies in the fact that the old Muslim legal networks were replaced by Christian ones, a development that had significant importance for the future of local Muslims.

The myth that the Ottoman polity consisted of an elite class of Turkish-Muslim oppressors exploiting the non-Muslim subjects has been quite popular in the literature of eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Nevertheless, a number of contemporary studies has clearly demonstrated that it was but natural that an Empire so large and long-lived was much more complex and contradictory.¹²⁴ For instance, in pre-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, one could find quite a few examples of Christian high-rank clergy, tax-farmers, land-lords, translators, Imperial delegates, governors, and even soldiers. Moreover, as indicated in the example of Crete, in some cases a simple conversion to Islam was enough for a Christian to become a janissary. No special training or language skills were required. The one thing that could not be found in the pre-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was a non-Muslim Ottoman judge (*kadı*).¹²⁵

In this respect, one could argue that the *kadı* court was the backbone of the Ottoman Muslim legacy in the provinces. One should not forget that the status of the *kadı* was contingent upon—at least in theory—an excellent command of the Ottoman language and a good knowledge of Islamic law.¹²⁶ Legal developments in the middle

Emergence of Popular Sovereignty," *Middle East Critique* 15, no. 2 (2006): 151-69.

¹²⁴ Christina Koulouri, *Clio in the Balkans* (Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE), 2002); , Christoph K. Neumann, "Bad Times and Better Self : Definitions of Identity and Strategies for Development in Late Ottoman Historiography, 1850-1900," in *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, eds. Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi, 57-78 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

¹²⁵ For a general discussion of Ottoman institutions of justice see, İlber Ortaylı, *Hukuk Ve İdare Adamı Olarak Osmanlı Devletinde Kadı: The Legal and Administrative Character of the Institution of the Ottoman Judge* (Ankara: Turhan kitabevi, 1994).

¹²⁶ Eyal Ginio, "Aspects of Muslim Culture in the Ottoman Balkans: A view from eighteenth century

nineteenth century, at the same time, and the first attempts to a civil codification of the *Shari'a* law (the *Mecelle*) did not initially contradict the Islamic character of Ottoman law, which had both religious and secular connotations.¹²⁷ In this respect, the Cretan Organic Law was different, since its issue shelved the legal legacy of the Ottoman court in favor of the non-Muslims, with the organization of mixed tribunals.¹²⁸

In fact, the Organic Law was never actually applied as such, since the period of peace and re-organization did not last long. However, its issue created a precedent that, once established in principle, became for the Christians a point of reference in making demands. Moreover, the process of legal transformation and constant revolt had—in a figurative way—separated the province from the Empire's erudite Muslim elite and administrative mechanisms of justice. Local Islam was thus faced with a challenge of significant proportions, which goes some way to explain the further fall in numbers of the Muslim population, as well as the marginal character of Muslim education.

In brief, the annihilation of the janissary corps in the first decades of the century along with the mid-century reforms had critically influenced the future of Cretan

Salonica," in *Greece and the Balkans; Identities, Perceptions and the Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, ed. Dimitris Tziouvas (Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd, 2003), 114-126.

¹²⁷ For the *Mecelle* see Dora Glidewell Nadolski, "Ottoman and Secular Civil Law," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 8, no. 4 (Oct., 1977): 517-43. For a number of interesting articles on pre-nineteenth century Ottoman justice and administration see Rossitsa Gradeva, *War and Peace in Rumelia* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2008), 101-214.

¹²⁸ It is far beyond the scope of this study to discuss issues as complex as the "secularization" of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, from the early modern period to the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms. In the same vein, this study cannot refer to the complexity of the *kadı* system. It would have been interesting to address the question of whether the *kadı* represented a civil or a religious authority. Nevertheless, relevant issues are not among this author's primary concerns. The only argument to be made here is that despite some efforts to the opposite direction (like the *Mecelle* reform), eventually the reception of non-Muslim linguistic and legalistic cultures overshadowed the Islamic "reformation" of the civil law, both at a central and at a local level, see Dora Glidewell Nadolski, "Ottoman and Secular Civil Law," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8, no 4 (Oct., 1977): 517-543.

Muslims: the elimination of the janissaries curtailed impressively the Muslim local tradition of war, a force of decentralization that previously appeared to promote, however, conversion to Islam; and the reforms challenged the status of Imperial Muslim Judges who, according to this author, had constituted a cornerstone of Ottoman Islam in the province, and an important link with the educational networks of the capital-city.

It is very difficult to assume precisely how the Cretan Muslims reacted to the developments mentioned above.¹²⁹ Indirect sources—mainly the reports of Consuls—inform us that lots of Muslims refused to accept the new regulations and institutional equality with the Christians: “One has to live among the Cretans for a period in order to realize the superiority complex of the Muslims. These people are used to being the masters. They will never accept the Christians as their equals.”¹³⁰ Lots of Christians, on the other hand, developed the idea that the Muslims were nothing but foreign oppressors, and than any cooperation with them should be avoided. Both communities, in other words, were divided between groups favoring some kind of cooperation, on the basis of a ‘shared locality,’ and groups that were mutually exclusive and rival to each other.

The above references to cultural radicalism might well be characterized as stereotypes. Nevertheless, even stereotypes correspond to something. In other words, it seems that polarization, religious fanaticism, and aggressive nationalism were, to some extent, related to the continuous Cretan conflicts and uprisings. Yet both the reasons and the results of turmoil were also tied to wider socioeconomic arrangements. This turmoil could not be explained only on the basis of national or religious identities. Although this

¹²⁹ For a general discussion of the issue see Davison, *Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality*.

¹³⁰ Berard, *Affaires de Crète*, 69-70.

study does not focus on economy, labor, and accumulation of wealth in nineteenth century Crete, one has to keep in mind that such dynamics were also at work.

By the 1870's, for example, the finances of Crete were in ruins. While the Imperial forces and insurgency fought over the charred villages, blown up monasteries, and ruined olive groves of Crete, the local economy was suffering significant material injuries, especially in the hinterland. One should not forget how heavily the Cretan economy relied on agriculture and stock breeding, and that even trade was based on the products of these activities.¹³¹ The local society was thus trapped in a vicious circle from which escape seemed hopeless. Moreover, the local financial crisis was further fed by—and further feeding—the wider Imperial one. The situation in Crete was indicative of the financial problems involved in the implementation of reforms throughout the Empire and partly caused by the provincial uprisings. Reforms, especially tax-reforms, caused turmoil; and turmoil created new financial problems both in the center and in the provinces. The Cretan uprisings, in other words—frequent though they might have been—were certainly not unique. At the time in question, reforms, violence, and famine were ravaging Anatolia;¹³² reforms, violence, sectarianism, and rebellion were redefining geography in Mountain Lebanon;¹³³ reforms, violence and uprisings were shaking the Balkans, mainly in places where the Slavic-speaking Orthodox populations objected to the financial and ideological dependency upon the Greek-Orthodox

¹³¹ Perrot, *L'île de Crète*, 903.

¹³² Finkel, *Osman's dream*, 479.

¹³³ Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 4 (2002): 601-17.

Patriarchate of Istanbul.¹³⁴

In brief, the evident desire of the *Tanzimat* to reach deep into the provinces provoked a variety of reactions and triggered a profound financial crisis. This situation made foreign loans a necessity, since the regime could no longer rely on domestic funds or domestic borrowing to stay afloat.¹³⁵ Hence, one could argue that administrative reforms constituted a major route that allowed European finance capital to flow into Ottoman markets through foreign loans. Of equal importance was the state's desire to expand telegraph, railway, and other industrial enterprises in order to put even the most remote provinces under direct central control.¹³⁶ Lacking domestic companies capable of launching such projects, British, French, and Austrian corporations found an open door to Ottoman lands, thus monopolizing entrepreneurial expansion.

It is important to underline, at this point, that European economic expansion in the Ottoman Empire had also clear ideological ramifications, since state-centralization was the imperative and the endeavor of implementing technological modernity in line with 'western' patterns of control. Nevertheless, technology was not the only means adopted. To give a different example with regard to the same period, the Ottoman Ministry of Public works started to supervise the collection of antiquities from the provinces to the capital-city. In June 1851, for instance, one of the Ministry's

¹³⁴ İlber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlarda Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi: National Churches in the Balkans in the Tanzimat Period and the Greek Orthodox Church.," in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadî ve Sosyal Değişim. Makaleler: Articles on economic and social change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. I. Ortaylı (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000), 285-290.

¹³⁵ On this issue see BedriyeTuncşiper, Arzu Tay, and Fatih M. Bayramoğlu, *Ottoman Empire's debt management in nineteenth century and role of the Galata Bankers (1838-1881)* [electronic source], A28 in mufad.org/index/

¹³⁶ Yakup Bektas, "The Sulta's messenger. Cultural constructions of Ottoman telegraphy 1847-1880," *Society for the History of Technology* 4 (2000): 56-78.

functionaries had the rare statuette of a nymph found in Crete sent to Istanbul. According to Wendy Shaw, the above incident suggests that a mechanism for the collection of antiquities may have been established at that time within the Ottoman context.¹³⁷ The capital city, in fact, did not yet have a museum where such archaeological findings could be displayed. Unsuccessful as they might have been, such programs were indicative of the orientations, goals, and constraints of the late *Tanzimat*, which linked the island to the Ottoman capital, and the Ottoman capital to the West.

No matter how heavily influenced by the West, *Tanzimat* centralization was an Ottoman phenomenon with its own characteristics. For instance, another aspect of the reform directly relevant to developments in Crete, involved the effort to bring provincial Muslim Pious Foundations under Istanbul's control. As we have already seen, almost simultaneously with the elimination of the janissary Corps, Sultan Mahmud II founded a new ministry for Imperial Religious Foundations (*Evkaf-ı Hümayûn Nezareti*), under the supervision of which fell—in theory—all the *evkaf* of the Empire.¹³⁸ The *Tanzimat* bureaucrats that followed adopted the same strategy and undertook a significant enterprise to bring the provincial *evkaf* holdings under Imperial control. Especially in the second half of the century, therefore, the Ministry hired increasing numbers of employees tasked with managing the uncountable finances of the foundations and putting an end to the corruption of provincial governors.

The officials of the Central *Evkaf* tried to do away with financial corruption in

¹³⁷ Wendy M. K. Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archeology, and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire* (California: University of California Press, 2003), 73.

¹³⁸ By this I mean both the foundations of the Sultans (*evkaf-ı selâtin*) and the Imperial foundations (*evkaf-ı hümayûn*). See John Robert Barnes, *Evkaf-ı Hümayun: Vaqf Administration under the Ottoman Ministry for Imperial Religious Foundations, 1839 to 1875* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1980), 87-102.

distant Imperial dominions such as Crete. In 1867, for instance, the Ministry tried to bring under its control the *evkaf* holdings of the island that had been previously under *de facto* independent administration. As noted by Barnes, however, both in the case of Crete and in general, corruption was not the only problem. The complexity of the relevant archives and regulations constituted a significant barrier to the progress of the project, since the newly hired employees of the Ministry were impressive in numbers, but presented a depressing lack of skills.¹³⁹ The new employees were neither sufficiently versed in the art of book keeping, nor sufficiently informed in the legal matters involved.

Ironically, the above mentioned efforts to good management had the opposite results. Instead of purging economy they burdened the state budget with significant new expenses. The result of all this was that the stock market crash of 1873 brought the Empire to the verge of bankruptcy, with the regime announcing in 1875 that it could not meet its debt repayments.¹⁴⁰ In the aftermath of the crisis, moreover, the regime was faced with new provincial uprisings and reactions. In order to illustrate the stalemate the Ottomans had reached, one could focus again on the case of Crete. During the crisis, promised public works failed to be materialized. At the same time, taxes were increased in response to the state's rising needs for new sources of revenue. Last but not least, a number of state-employees tried to profit from the fiscal chaos by exploiting the locals. As a result, the Cretans started to express their mistrust towards the authorities, accusing them of corruption, violation of the Organic Law, and financial misuses.

In 1874, for example, the local society objected strongly to the 2,5% rise of the

¹³⁹ Ibid., 148.

¹⁴⁰ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 54-80.

tithe that was violating the privileges granted to Crete a few years earlier. Eventually, the central regime accepted the validity of the objection, and repealed the regulation. The Cretans, however, continued to complain to the consular authorities that the money collected from them (250,000 *kuruş*) was never returned.¹⁴¹ What is interesting here is that as far as the new taxes were concerned, Muslims and Christians expressed a mutual discontent. Nevertheless, the local society appeared to be divided with regard to other aspects of the reforms. For instance, the local governors were often supported by the Muslim worthies—known in the local society as “*beyler/μπέηδες*,” against the Christians, who were often questioning the authorities. Moreover, the issue of 'equality' was also a source of turmoil. With regard to the Organic Law, for instance, the Muslims protested its issue and the Christians protested its non-implementation. In brief, ideological polarization was strengthened in Crete by local tensions and broader changes, despite the fact that mixed networks continued to operate at a business or a social level.¹⁴²

From the Young Ottomans to the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of Halepa

As discussed in the previous sections, Cretan turmoil appeared to be closely related to some of the broader failures of the *Tanzimat*, since Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the Empire were simultaneously questioning the regime for very similar reasons. A variety of conflicting ideologies started to develop with regard to what the

¹⁴¹ Rolin-Jaeque Myns, "Le droit international et la question d' Orient," *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, H (1876).

¹⁴² Couturier, *La Crète*, 67.

future of the Empire should be. One of the most popular such ideological movements was "Islamic Constitutionalism." The most celebrated agents of it, the Young Ottomans, were a group of intellectuals, who interpreted the reforms as an unsuccessful imitation of western ideological patterns and administrative functions. They maintained, therefore, that the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats were despotic delegates of the state, who failed to represent the people, and that their projects had led to the gradual degeneration of Islam, putting the integrity of the Empire in danger.¹⁴³ As a solution to the crisis, they proposed Islamic 'democratization' and reform.

The above conceptualization of the spirit of Islam was not very different from the main principles of European Enlightenment and the *Tanzimat*. Yet instead of the ideals of strong bureaucracy and enlightened despotism, the Young Ottomans were fond of Islamic participatory constitutional liberalism. That theoretical and very sophisticated concept of Islamic political liberalism, however, often had little to do with provincial realities, even if the reasons behind Muslim reaction in the periphery were similar to those of Muslim intellectual discomfort in the capital city. In Crete, for instance, the change of the local sociopolitical structures in favor of the Christians fostered Muslim radicalism and reactions against the central regime that had developed parallel to the Young Ottomans' movement, but had little to do with notions of democratization.

It seems that, from the Muslim point of view, even if the Cretan reforms were the outcome of military conflict and not of governmental initiatives, the regime was still to be blamed for failing to protect its Muslim subjects. In this respect, I think the direct and indirect Muslim violation of the Amendments in question had a double meaning:

¹⁴³ Serif Mardin, *The genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 18-20.

first, it was literally protecting the actual interests of the established Muslim networks; second, it could be interpreted as a symbolic reaction against the decline of Muslim prestige. In any case, the ultimate results of the violations were more Christian reactions and more foreign intervention.¹⁴⁴

In short, when the Cretan Christians revolted again in 1878, they tried to take advantage of the broader political turmoil that was violently challenging Ottoman legitimacy both at home and abroad. Muslim and Christian unrest was particularly violent in the Balkan provinces,¹⁴⁵ where the locals refused to accept submission to the Imperial authority of Istanbul, which was represented by the government, the Sultan, and the Patriarchates.¹⁴⁶ In the capital-city, at the same time, Muslim groups that could be roughly described as "Constitutionalists" and "Islamists" reacted to the provincial uprisings of the Christians by joining forces against Sultan Abdülaziz. By the end of 1876 the situation had become explosive, both in the Imperial center and in the periphery. Two Sultans were deposed within three months. Eventually, in August 1876, Abdülhamid the Second was enthroned by the conspirators, while the Empire was in a state of total chaos, and the cruel developments in the Balkan provinces were attracting

¹⁴⁴ N. Svoronos, "Η Ανατολική Πολιτική των Δυνάμεων και η Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1866: The Eastern politics of the Great Powers and the Cretan Revolution of 1866," *Ariadni* 1 (1983): 308-319. By and large, Greek literature treats the foreign intervention in Crete as having been extremely unfavorable to the Greek interests. My argument is that, quite to the contrary, the international visibility of the Cretan issue was a factor that influenced future developments in favor of the Christians.

¹⁴⁵ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. 1804-1999* (New York: Viking, 2000), 135-150, 249-270. Although my approach is very different from the author's with regard to the discussion of ottoman structures in the Balkans, the book provides a good chronological summary of wars and political conflicts. See also, Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History* (Phoenix: Modern Library, 2000), 106-118.

¹⁴⁶ Anastasia N. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 77-107.

again international attention.¹⁴⁷ Russian and British papers reported the—exaggerated or not—massacres of thousands of Christians in Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina, causing further social unrest in the Christian world and agitation against Muslim Ottomans.¹⁴⁸ Under this pretext, the representatives of the Great Powers assembled in Istanbul to decide what the future of the Empire would be.

The Sultan, however, influenced by the Young Ottomans, attempted to challenge direct European patronage and to take the initiative in defining and solving the Empire's problems. In December 1876, he promulgated a new Ottoman Constitution (*kanun-u esasi*), drawn up by Midhat Pasha,¹⁴⁹ and announced the establishment of the Empire's first Parliament in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the first Constitutional Period of the Empire proved impressively short, since the restoration of peace both at home and abroad was nearly impossible without the direct support of the Powers.¹⁵⁰

The situation became even worse for the sultan when, in April 1877, the Russian Empire declared war against the Ottomans in response to the events of 1876 that became

¹⁴⁷ Ruhi Turfan, *Abdülhamid'in Saltanatının İlk Günleri: The First Days of Abdülhamid as a Sultan* (Istanbul Erler Matbaası, 1983).

¹⁴⁸ J. A. MacGahan, *The Turkish Atrocities in Bulgaria : Letters of the Special Commissioner of The "Daily News," J.A. Macgahan, Esq., with an introduction and Mr. Schuyler's Preliminary Report* (London: Bradbury, Agnew and Co, 1876); W. E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London: J. Murray, 1876); D. Bugistre-Belleysan, *Les Intrigues Muscovites En Turquie : La Vérité Sur Les Massacres De Bulgarie* (Budapest, 1877).

See also Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, INC, 1995). Although the above author's account of atrocities against the Muslims seems to be exaggerated and his discussion is certainly one-sided, he provides an alternative to studies that exaggerate Christian casualties without ever referring to those of the Muslims.

¹⁴⁹ On Midhat Pasha and the Constitutional Movement see Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1968): 451-70.

¹⁵⁰ Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler (1876-1938): Political Developments in Turkey (1876-1938)* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001): 1.

known as the "slaughters of Bulgaria." Whilst the Russian army marched easily to the gates of Istanbul, a number of new uprisings broke out in the provinces—including Crete—and the constitution was shelved. Almost simultaneously, Austria and Britain mobilized their forces to stop the Russian army, and to constrain Russian claims. Eventually, in November 1878 all of the powers involved in the conflict (Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Italy and France) agreed to hold a council in Berlin to restore peace and European balance of power.¹⁵¹

The summit provided Christian Cretans with one more opportunity to address their demands to the European Powers. During the war, to be more specific, Cretan Christians had asked the Ottoman authorities for autonomy. When they addressed the Powers at the council, however, they asked for union with Greece. In any case, their requests were rejected, since none of the involved parties could at that point benefit from them.¹⁵² The Russian circles in power were not interested in Crete, because they had achieved the 'protection' of Orthodox Slavic populations in the Balkans.¹⁵³ From the point of view of British diplomats, on the other hand, claims over Crete were abandoned in exchange for the island of Cyprus, the control of which was bestowed to Her Majesty

¹⁵¹ Mihailo D. Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939); F.A.K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy : Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996).

¹⁵² *Décret et mémoire du 3/15 fevrier 1878 de l'Assemblée générale des Cretois adresses aux Puissances chrétiennes* (Athènes: Imp. Messenger d' Athenes, 1878).

¹⁵³ Most scholars suggest that the support of the Pan-Slavic movement received by the Russian society and government was never as great as had been hoped or feared by western Europe. At the same time, it seems to be true that especially after 1867, the movement in favor of the Christian Slavs became more popular than before, mainly due to the general dynamics that are going to be discussed in the following chapter. On this issue see Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, *Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and the Balkans 1830-1880: Images of the Self and Others* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1994).

by the sultan.¹⁵⁴

To some extent, the Pact of Halepa,¹⁵⁵ which ended the war in Crete in 1878, could be interpreted by the Ottomans as a diplomatic victory, as the island had remained under direct Imperial control. At the same time, the Empire's military and diplomatic humiliation did not allow for further negotiations with the Christians. As a result, the Organic Law was re-issued. According to it, the island would be henceforth represented by the local Chamber and a Muslim or Christian governor, with the right to organize local institutions and security forces under its jurisdiction, such as a local gendarmerie. Moreover, it was officially recognized that the Christians constituted the majority of the local population and should thus be represented accordingly in the local administration.¹⁵⁶ In this respect, it is plausible to suggest that the Pact of Halepa prepared the grounds for the island's further 'Hellenization.'

The 'Islamization of the Empire'

By and large, in the second half of the nineteenth century two general developments influenced the balance of power in Crete: the gradual 'Christianization' and

¹⁵⁴ It is often mentioned by secondary literature on Crete that Great Britain was trying to establish a protectorate on the island. Yet the relevant diplomatic sources suggest that the interest of British circles was quite limited with regard to the geopolitics of Crete. At the same time, Crete had a truly prominent place in the discourses of the Opposition, which used the island to criticize the anti-Christian policies of the Conservative government, see for instance W. E. Gladstone, *The Eastern Crisis; A Letter to the Duke of Westminster, K.G., from the right Honourable W. E. Gladstone* (London: John Murray, 1897). See also the third chapter of the present study.

¹⁵⁵ Halepa is a neighborhood in the town of Hania, where the relevant treaty was signed.

¹⁵⁶ Eleftherios Prevelakis, "Το καθεστώς της Χαλέπας και το φιρμάνι του 1889: The Halepa regime and the 1889 edict," *Kritika Hronika* 17 (1964):163-182.

'Hellenization' of the island population;¹⁵⁷ and the 'Islamization' of the Empire that led to its eventual 'Turkification,' though one should be careful not to confuse Islam and Turkish nationalism. This does not mean that there was no more place for Muslims in Crete, or for Christians in the Anatolian hinterland. Between the Council of Berlin (1878) and the Balkan wars (1912-1913), exclusive cultural identities—such as national identities—were unarguably strengthened. Yet the struggle of elites to maintain authority over groups as wide as possible led also to the parallel reinforcement of quite inclusive patterns of ideological identification.

This study will later try to sketch out a comparative description of late nineteenth century inclusive ideologies—both religious and secular—that had influenced Cretan affairs profoundly. In other words, I shall develop the argument that in early twentieth century Crete the Universal and the Local were interconnected through modern notions of ideological identification that were much more complex than mainstream nationalism. The foundation of new nation-states in eastern Mediterranean during the period under scrutiny did not replace older sociopolitical ideas, such as "the empire" or "the locality," but cast them in a new light.¹⁵⁸ This transformation was directly linked to military conflict, social clashes, political changes, and population

¹⁵⁷ In 1866 Callone, who didn't appear to be a fervor supporter of the "Greek cause," insisted in describing the non-Turkish population of the island as a mixture. More specifically, he wrote that the total population of the island numbered 300,000. Of them, 70,000 were identified as Turks and the rest as Latins, Greeks, Slavs, Arabs and Africans, see Callone, *L'insurrection Candiotte*, 20-21.

Nevertheless, contrary to early nineteenth century accounts, in the second half of the nineteenth century most sources referred to a clear Christian-Greek majority on the island. For instance, in 1868, Perrot was writing that the Cretan population consisted of 123,000 Christians and 49,000 Muslims. See Perrot, *L'île de Crète*, 903. Despite the fact that both the accuracy of the above sources and the validity of national-identities attributed to the locals by foreigners are quite disputable, it is yet clear that within a century the demographic dynamics of the island had radically changed.

¹⁵⁸ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*.

movements that altered older demographic realities both in the Ottoman Empire and around it.

In fact, it is almost impossible to adequately analyze the aforementioned demographic transformation in comparative terms, since any discussion of pre-nineteenth century Ottoman populations is hampered by a glaring lack of accurate data-sources. Nevertheless, even sources as inherently problematic as travelogues or tax-registers can help us to form a rough idea about Ottoman demographic realities. It is clear, for instance, that from the 14th century onward, the Ottoman polity was constantly transforming with respect to territory and population, ideology and functions, and power structure and culture. In this context, despite the fact that the Empire was commonly characterized by foreign powers as Muslim—or even as Turkish¹⁵⁹—its total Muslim population had not always been the majority in numbers. In the same vein, there were geographical territories under Ottoman suzerainty in which the Muslims were most of the time the minority in numbers.

From this point of view, early nineteenth century Ottoman efforts to reform that did not take into consideration non-Muslim subjects contradicted both with their contemporary reality and with Ottoman legacies of the past. In the second half of the century, however, and especially after 1878, the demographic profile of the Empire became very different. The Muslims had gradually become the clear majority. Nevertheless, the above development could not be interpreted as a success of Ottoman Islam, since it was only the result of the massive Muslim immigration from the Balkan

¹⁵⁹ As early as in the 17th century, for instance, the Ottoman army was referred to by foreigners as 'Turkish.' See, for example, Roger Palmer Earl of Castlemaine, *An account of the present war between the Venetians and Turk: with the state of Candia (in a letter to the King, from Venice)*. London: J.M. for H. Herringman, 1666).

territories and Caucasus, and of the secession from the Empire of wide lands in the Balkan hinterland, where the Christians were the majority in numbers.

In this framework, it is not a surprise that the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, which got its start under the patronage of the Christian powers of Europe over frustrated Muslim subjects and a humiliated Muslim regime, ended up being perceived as the ideological counterattack of Islam. Moreover, the ideal of "Islamic Parliamentarianism," was replaced by the regime with "Islamic Monarchy," reinforcing the status of the Sultan against the Empire's bureaucracy. At the same time, the Sultan embraced the principle of the *Tanzimat* that the Empire needed a modern state-machinery and technological infrastructure in order to become a well-governed state.

Under Abdülhamid II, in other words, the ideals of modernity were not challenged by the regime but combined with the principle of enlightened Monarchy that wished to purify the Muslim character of the state.¹⁶⁰ In this respect, a main difference between Sultan Abdülhamid and the early *Tanzimat* was that, while the latter had been preoccupied with internal reform, Abdülhamid decided to re-assume the title of the Caliph, spiritual leader and potential protector of the Muslims worldwide. The validity of the claim is not going to be examined here.¹⁶¹ What is important to underline is that

¹⁶⁰ Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

¹⁶¹ During the last decades of the nineteenth-century the issue of the Caliphate attracted growing interest in Britain and Italy, due to the colonialist activities of the above powers. Thus, a number of scholars tried to prove that the usual conception held at that time by Europeans, namely that the Ottoman Sultan was the Caliph, inasmuch as he had supreme spiritual power over all Sunni Muslims, was false. The studies in question, therefore, were less concerned with carefully interpreting Islamic Orthodoxy and more with the imperialist views of the relevant countries. One should not forget that the institution of the Caliph provided the Muslim populations in the colonies with a "center of political action against European dominion." See, for instance C. A. Nallino, *Notes on the Nature of the "Caliphate" in General and on the Alleged "Ottoman Caliphate,"* ed. Ministry of the Colonies, General Department of Political Affairs (Rome: Press of the Foreign Office, 1919).

the reintroduction of this title to the imperial ideological apparatus had both internal and external connotations, which could be characterized as imperialistic or *proto-national*.¹⁶²

The Ottoman Caliph claimed the right to represent the homogenizing 'community of Islam,' stopping Arab separatism from the Empire, and 'protecting' Muslims still living in lands politically controlled by Christians. The latter claim was, furthermore, related to the control of communal properties and pious foundations, both at home and abroad. One should not forget that Ottoman borders were far from being stable. In addition, even within the Empire, a number of localities had been granted a semi-autonomous status that resulted in a loss of central control over Muslim populations and Islamic foundations. A typical example of such dynamics was the case of Crete.

Crete under Abdülhamid II: Pious Foundations and the Rise of the Public-Sphere

During the twenty years that followed the issue of the Treaty of Halepa, the heterogeneous Cretan society continued to be defined by collaboration and conflict as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Yet these old dynamics were now unfolding around two important new spheres of popular representation: Constitutionalism and Journalism.¹⁶³ Did this development point to the rise of a dynamic public sphere on the island? The answer depends on our understanding of the public sphere. Some European commentators, for instance, would cynically remark that, in the case of Crete, the

¹⁶² François Georgeon, *Abdülhamid II : Le Sultan Calife (1876-1909)* (Paris: Fayard, 2003).

¹⁶³ Evaggelos Kofos, *Ελλάδα και το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα 1875-1881: Greece and the Eastern Question 1875-1881* (Athens, 2001), 214-216.

establishment of the local Chamber was a punishment rather than a public victory, since the Chamber was nothing but an arena where violent passions exploded. Moreover, the local Greek press was said to be full of exaggerations and all kinds of fabrications.¹⁶⁴ In the same vein, even well-known philhellenes such as W. J. Stillman, were commenting on the “fatal defects of the Greek race, its bitterness in personal rivalry, want of patriotic subordination, and the extravagance of political hostilities.”¹⁶⁵ Despite such interpretations, the fact that on a local level Cretan civil actors and public debates were directly and openly influencing political developments, was enough to differentiate the island from the Ottoman capital city.

Only a year after the first Ottoman Parliament’s initial convention, in 1878, the Ottoman constitution was shelved. Similarly, shortly after the rise of Abdülhamid II to the Ottoman throne, it became obvious that the new sultan did not welcome criticism by the press. For the above reasons, his reign is often characterized by contemporary scholars as “Abdülhamid’s autocratic regime.” Nevertheless, the sultan was careful enough to shelve—instead of dissolving—the Parliament, and to censor—instead of suspending—the press. One could thus claim that the central regime promoted public activities, but only when they were in favor of the Throne. Ottoman newspapers, for instance, were a vehicle for advertising imperial messages rather than expressing public sentiment. In the same vein, great emphasis was given to ceremonies that were carefully designed to promote the feeling—or the illusion—that the regime was visible and in communication with the 'people.' For the same reason, the sultan appeared to be

¹⁶⁴ Couturier, *La Crète*, 346.

¹⁶⁵ William J. Stillman, *The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8* (New York: Henry Holt And Company, 1874), 1-15.

particularly interested in maintaining a notion of legitimacy for the regime's actions, presenting the Empire as a well-governed modern state.

In this context, Imperial Ottoman discourses had changed indeed in favor of the ideal of the civil sphere. The regime seemed preoccupied with advocating concepts such as "civic duties" and "civil rights," although in practice civil *locii* could only exist if they were supportive of the Ottoman Sultan. In brief, under Abdülhamid, the Sultan's obvious wish to be popular and loved by the public was directly linked to the recognition of a public sphere, although the independent action of the latter was not allowed.¹⁶⁶ In this way, Ottoman public activities and the transmission of information had on the face of it adapted to the civil ideals of modernity. However, the ultimate orientation of such dynamics was not the emancipation of the Ottoman citizens but more efficient imperial control.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, contrary to the late *Tanzimat*, the Islamic character of the state was overly emphasized by the new regime, although the non-Muslim *millets* still constituted a central part of the administrative apparatus. In brief, the reign of Abdülhamid could be roughly described, on the one hand, as one more imperial attempt to create a conceptual and actual bridge between the Ottoman Empire and late nineteenth century Europe; and between Islam and European modernity. On the other hand, internal control and the security of the regime were also issues of high importance. Reforms were thus initiated—or continued—along the lines of the *Tanzimat*, in order to bring even the most

¹⁶⁶ In this respect, the Sultan's rule was by Ottoman standards "a new creature", see Deringil, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Aydın Bürokratının Dünya Görüşü Üzerine Bir Deneme*, 11; Edhem Eldem, 2004. *Pride and Privilege: a History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2004).

¹⁶⁷ İvrin Cemil Schick, "Osmanlı Döneminde Matbuat Kapitalizmi: Printing Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire," *Virgöl* 126 (2009): 58-63; Sinan Cetin, "Ordering the Books: Bookshops and their Catalogs in the Hamidian Istanbul," MA thesis, University of Bosphorus (2009).

remote provinces of the Empire under central control. In this respect, there was no ideological conflict between Abdülhamid's Islamic regime and the aspirations of the Modern State.¹⁶⁸

In this context, earlier projects for the introduction of modern technologies into the imperial structures were intensified, parallel to the obvious promotion of pious activities and tradition. In this way, multiple ideological and actual channels of communication were developed between Istanbul and the provinces. The former was reaching out to the latter via Islam and modern technology.¹⁶⁹ Thousands kilometers of telegraph lines were built, while railways and steamship companies were rapidly expanding. From the Holy Places—Mecca and Medina—to the Imperial capital, trains, electricity, and steam were traveling the literal and metaphorical distance between urban centers and remote villages, building a “hi-tech” Muslim network. Moreover, this newly established Islamic space coexisted with the increasing visibility of a more traditional one: the religious foundations. Newly built mosques, public fountains, and *medresses* (religious schools) were to be found next to train stations, municipal buildings, and secular schools; and while the telegraph cables were enabling the rapid transmission of information, the voices of the *muezzins* (criers calling the faithful to pray) continued to remind the faithful five times a day that in the Ottoman Empire Allah was singular, and Mohamed his only Prophet.

Muslim urbanization had received, in this way, new dimensions both on a central

¹⁶⁸ Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), 15-25.

¹⁶⁹ Jacob M. Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: a Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971); Bektas, *The Sultan's Messenger*.

and on a provincial level. For instance, according to the *salnameler* (yearbooks) of the *sancak* (district) of Hania in Crete, Muslim religious foundations had almost doubled during the period under scrutiny. In 1875-1876, there were 11 *cami* (mosque), 5 *tekke* (dervish lodge), 1 *medresse* (religious school), 9 *çeşme* (fountain), 2 *sebilhane* (fountain), and 2 *muvvakithane* (cloakroom) to be found in Hania, while in 1892-1893 their numbers were upped to 24 *cami*, 6 *mescit*, 14 *tekke*, 1 *medresse*, 9 *çeşme*, 2 *sebilhane*, 2 *muvvakithane*, and 1 *hastanede* (hospital).¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, the establishment of each such foundation meant the growth of the *vakıf* real estate property that was financing its functions.

One should not forget that the above impressive rise of Islamic communal properties in Crete was realized in a period when the local Muslim element had experienced an obvious loss of status in administration, justice, and numbers. From this point of view, it would seem that the growth of Islamic foundations became the most powerful Muslim vehicle for adaptation to the new conditions, in line with the gradual centralization of the Muslim community in the island's towns. At the same time, old and new foundations constituted a preserved religious space of public activity,¹⁷¹ which connected the island to the Muslim center, via the ideological, political, and economic ramifications of religion.

In pursuing this last line of thought, this study does not suggest that other Cretan institutions—such as the parliament or the press—were alien to Ottoman culture.

¹⁷⁰ *Salname-i-Vilayet- Girid*, sene 1292 ve *Salname I Vilayet Girid*, sene 1308-1310: *Year book of the Province of Crete, 1875, 1890-1892*.

¹⁷¹ For a list of Ottoman Muslim monuments in Crete see the following digital archive *Digital Crete: Mediterranean Cultural Itineraries*, <http://digitalcrete.ims.forth.gr/index.php>, implement under the framework of the Greek Operational Program Information Society, funded by the 3th European Community Support Framework.

Similarly, I do not wish to imply that the socioeconomic profile of Muslim Cretans was connected only to their religious identity. It is important to underline that this study addresses Cretan Islam in two complementary ways. First, as part of the Cretan locality; and second as part of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, these two aspects of the issue in question are often compared to each other in order to demonstrate the particularities of each case. In this respect, the fact that the sociopolitical structures in Crete had developed differently than in the Ottoman center and other provinces, does not contradict with the fact that the island was still under direct Ottoman control. On the contrary, I suggest that Ottoman experiences constituted, by and large, a process of constant transformation and continuous negotiation among cultures, geographies, and historical periods. In this respect, this study contrasts sharply with the argument that there was a clear cultural distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the West.¹⁷² Even if the growing economic-political dominance and advanced technology of western Europe were indeed the driving forces of Ottoman modernity,¹⁷³ the cultural components of it were the unique experiences of the diverse Ottoman populations.¹⁷⁴ From this point of view, the Cretan institutions and amendments of late nineteenth century did not contradict Ottoman reality. They were part of it.

¹⁷² In the past two decades, such traditional approaches have been questioned by an increasing number of scholars. See Huri Islamoglu-Inan, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy* (Cambridge, New York, Paris: Cambridge University Press, 2004, c1987), introduction.

¹⁷³ C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), introduction.

¹⁷⁴ For some different provincial examples that agree with my discussion of Crete see Koksall, Yonca. *Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State Centralization : A Comparison of the Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Ankara and Edirne*. Columbia: Columbia University, 2002; Toksoz, Meltem. "The Çukurova: From Nomadic Life to Commercial Agriculture, 1800-1908?" *Türk Şehir Tarihi* 6 (2005): 785-88.

Each institution to be found on the island was still an Ottoman institution. Beyond this very important difference of emphasis, however, one has to accept that the above framework was not immune to external influences that sometimes challenged its own existence. One powerful such influence was Greek nationalism. To give an example, since during the period under scrutiny the Greek Kingdom was indirectly claiming the island in the name of Christianity and the nation, the fact that the non-Muslims prevailed in numbers in the Cretan Chamber did not favor the Ottoman establishment; neither did the fact that all debates were to be held in the Greek language.¹⁷⁵ Another telling example with regard to the above discussion was the case of the local press. Before the issue of the Treaty of Halepa, the state Gazette *Κρήτη-Girit* used to circulate both in Ottoman and Greek.¹⁷⁶ This practice, however, had gradually faded out. As a result, the private papers that started to circulate on the island after 1878 were divided between the Christian (published in Greek) and the Muslim (published in Ottoman). Furthermore, since the Christian papers were more numerous and more competitive in terms of journalism, the Muslim press was indirectly marginalized. One should not forget that the Greek-speaking Cretan journalists could—and certainly did—make use of the dynamic Greek journalistic tradition, whereas their Muslim colleagues were offered the more conservative example of central Ottoman press.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ *Κρήτη-Girit: Crete* (Hania), 4 January 1879, no 496.

¹⁷⁶ The State Gazette *Κρήτη-Girit* (Crete) started being published in 1868, the year that the Organic Law was issued. The Gazette continued to be published until 1897. At the same time, from the Pact of Halepa until 1898, 23 major Greek newspapers and 3 Muslim ones circulated in Crete. See Giannis Z. Papiomitoglou, "Ο τύπος στην Κρήτη: The press in Crete," in *Ο Ελληνικός τύπος 1784 ως Σήμερα, Ιστορικές και Θεωρητικές Προσεγγίσεις, Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου, Αθήνα, 23-25 Μαΐου 2002: The Greek Press from 1784 to the present day, International Conference Proceedings, Athenes, 23-25 May 2002*, ed. Loukia Droulia, (Athina, Insitouto Neoellinikon Erevnon, 2005).

¹⁷⁷ In 1896, for instance, Kostadinos Ksanthis started publishing the weekly newspaper *Κρήτη* (Crete), to

One way or another, after the establishment of the local Chamber and the foundation of a number of private papers, two different civil spaces were created in Crete, along the lines of language and religion. At the same time, both communities continued to be internally ramified according to the diverse individual interests, ideological affiliations, and socioeconomic status of their members. In the same vein, conflict and cooperation continued to cross the boundaries of religion, leading to the creation of inclusive trans-religious networks. In this respect, although both communities participated more or less actively in the emerging urban public sphere of Crete, participation was directly linked to education, property, and gender. Illiterate groups and women, for instance, were excluded from any act of political representation.

At the same time, religious foundations—both Christian and Muslim—remained open to the above groups. Hence, even if religious foundations were far from promoting equality, they allowed indeed for more people to feel engaged in public activities. I would argue, therefore, that the ideological power of Cretan religious foundations was, among other things, derived from the fact that—on a lower level—they were more inclusive than modern institutions of representation, such as the Chamber. In any case, Christian and Muslim foundations constituted significant components of the island's modern landscape, both in metaphorical and in actual terms. In other words, while in late nineteenth century, the island was still characterized by an obvious lack of modern infrastructure, it would have been impossible to describe the Cretan landscape without frequent reference to the “crescent” or to the “cross”. In order to illustrate this argument, consider Dr. I. Hatzidakis, jotting down his first impressions from Crete in 1881, upon

support the Cretan cause, see Kostas Mayer, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: A history of the Greek Press* (Athine: A.Dimopoulos, 1957), A(1790-1900):117.

his arrival at Iraklio (Candia):

...as we were approaching the port, we could only just discern the skyline of the city of Iraklio...the minarets and palm-trees of which towered above the densely built neighborhoods...on the west we could see Όρος Στρόμβαλον (Mountain Stromvalon) and a small white chapel, standing like a pyramid on its crown...the port infrastructure, however, was rather disappointing. A steamship any bigger than ours would never make it to the docks...¹⁷⁸

Christian Pashas and Local Political Parties

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Cretan society appeared to be defined by a series of oppositions, complementary to each other: Religion versus Secularism, Participation versus Exclusion, Modernity versus Tradition. Within this matrix, nationalism and religious fanaticism were rarely the causes of tension. They were often, however, the most popular pretext for it. The ideological connotations of everyday conflict and collaboration, in other words, were shaped both by local interests and by the contemporaneous broader ideological models. In this respect, the mere existence of the Kingdom of Greece influenced profoundly developments in Crete for two reasons. First, Greek education provided Cretan Christians with an official national narrative regarding their past. Second, powerful Greek circles considered Crete part of their larger national project about the future.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Iosif Hatzidakis, *Περιήγησις εις Κρήτην: Tour of Crete* (En Ermoupoli: Nikolaos Varvaresos, 1881), 1-14.

¹⁷⁹ See the following chapter.

The 'Cretan Question' was directly connected both to the internal affairs and to the foreign policy of the Kingdom. More particularly, since the Greek public appeared to be very sensitive towards Crete, the national mission of 'liberating' the island was often used to serve Greek partisanship. Especially in the last decades of the century, associations, committees, and newspaper editors did not cease to support rebellion and war. In fact, the contemporaneous Greek governments officially tried to avoid such undertakings since, due to a variety of internal problems, the Greek state was in no position to send out a large military force against the Ottomans. The military and diplomatic problems with which successive Greek governments wrestled did not stop the very same politicians from using offensive nationalism as a political slogan when they were in the opposition, influencing dramatically developments in Crete. In short, the analysis of the period's events shows the following: lots of Christians, who for whatever reason were disappointed by the developments on the island, seemed to believe that they always had an alternative; namely, to deny Ottoman legitimacy and to address the European Powers asking for union with Greece. Lots of Muslims, on the other hand, reacted aggressively to such initiatives and used them as a pretext for challenging the Ottoman reforms.

It should be clarified here that the purpose of the present analysis is to underestimate neither individual patriotism nor religious faith. In truth, actual feelings cannot—and should not—be examined by historical research. The primary argument of this study is that comparative analysis suggests Cretan turmoil and collaboration appear to be too complex to be explained by plain devotion to a nation, a locality, an empire, or a religion. Between the years 1878-1889, for instance, the island was governed by Christian Pashas who, like their Muslim predecessors, engaged in conflict with the local

Christians. Furthermore, from 1878 on, the latter started to express their opposition to the authorities not only with armed rebellions but also with journalistic criticism. From this point of view, the conflict between local forces and the Christian Pashas reflected the tension between the central government and the province, rather than national ideals or religious hatred.

One should not forget that the above mentioned Christian Pashas—Kostakis Adosidis Pasha,¹⁸⁰ Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha, Fotiadis Pasha—¹⁸¹ were celebrated members of the central Ottoman elite, who represented one more hybrid ideology of the era: Helleno-Ottomanism. By Helleno-Ottomans we mean Ottoman subjects who openly identified with Greek nationalism and Orthodox Christianity, but who did so without challenging the Ottoman state. On the contrary, most of the representatives of this group had an elite status in the Ottoman Empire and were considered officials of a very high rank. The ideological ramifications of Helleno-Ottomanism, with regard to the differences between Rums and Greeks, will be discussed in the following chapter. The only thing to be mentioned here is that this phenomenon constituted a very good illustration of the hybrid character the late nineteenth century Ottoman regime had developed. In other words, despite the gradual 'Islamization' of the Ottoman state under Abdülhamid II, the Christians were far from being excluded from its mechanisms,¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Adosidis Pasha had become known for his attempts to modernize the island structures and to satisfy the demands of the community, see Manolis I. Pitikakis, "'Αδοσίδης Κωστή-Πασάς": "Adosidis Kosti-Pashas", *Driros B* (1938), 669-72, 90-94.

¹⁸¹ *Κωστάκης Αδοσίδης Πασάς* (Kostakis Adosidis Pasha), 21 January 1293/1877-16 November 1877; *Αλέξανδρος Καραθεοδωρή Πασάς* (Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha), 16 November 1293/1878- 30 November 1878. He left after 14 days, when he was promoted to Minister of Foreign Affairs; *Ιωάννης Φωτιάδης* (Ioannis Fotiadis), 2 January 1294/1879- 22 May 1301/ 1885, see *Mison* (1934), 201.

¹⁸² Sia Anagnostopoulou and Mathias Kapler, "Bin Yaşa Padişahımız: the *Millet-i-Rum* Singing the Praises of the Sultan in the Framework of Helleno-Ottomanism," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 23 (2005-

since they occasionally occupied a number of prestigious offices.¹⁸³

The reasons for this development may be found both in Ottoman internal strategies and in foreign considerations. The presence of a powerful *Helleno-Orthodox* elite within the Empire, in other words, indicated that the regime still claimed the right to represent Orthodox populations, or to create cultural bridges with Christian Europe. Within this context, the appointment of *Helleno-Ottomans* as governors of Crete could be viewed as an attempt to establish a more trustful relationship between the capital-city and the island's Christian majority. Nevertheless, neither *Helleno-Ottomanism* as a broader ideological phenomenon, nor the appointment of Christian governors in Crete as a particular administrative reality lasted long. Similarly, most nineteenth century Ottoman discourses on identity had eventually faded away. Why? The reasons could have been many.

For instance, one important ideological drawback of such 'identities' may have been that the 'people' of the Empire failed to connect with them. To put it differently, the late nineteenth century was characterized by a global cry for popular representation, of which the Ottoman regime appeared to be only marginally aware. As a result, despite isolated attempts to respond to relevant popular demands, the Ottomans (both Muslims and non-Muslims) continued to be perceived and act as an elite, in terms of geography and sociopolitical status.¹⁸⁴ In this respect, the majority of the Cretan locals had

2006):47-78.

¹⁸³ See the example of Karatheodori in following pages. See also, Johann Strauss, "The Millets and the Ottoman Language: The Contribution of Ottoman Greeks to Ottoman Letters (nineteenth - 20th Centuries)," *Die Welt des Islams, New Series* 35, no 2 (Nov., 1995):189-249.

¹⁸⁴ Michael Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship," *Sociology* 21, no. 3 (August 1987): 339-54.

repeatedly demonstrated that it did not identify with the group of people (elite-Ottomans) and the capital city (Istanbul) represented by the Christian governors of Crete.

In any case, the first Christian governor that got actively involved in Cretan affairs was Fotiadis Pasha, who was described by some as too autocratic and by others as too permissive.¹⁸⁵ What was his real character is not for us to decide, but three things were clear. First, he was representing the central authorities. Second, being the sultan's delegate, he was supposed not only to satisfy the Christians, but also to appease the Muslims. Third, it was during his service that conflict occurred not only between religious communities, but also between political parties. In short, at the time in question, Cretan society was divided for the first time between two political parties: the Conservatives and the Liberals. Both parties represented mixed groups of Muslims and Christians that tried to operate in a trans-religious political space; and yet, both of them remained influenced by nationalism and religious fanaticism. Consequently, not only did the parties fail to cross cultural boundaries between Muslims and Christians, but they also provided new reasons for conflict.

In this respect, political turmoil proved extremely damaging to the office of Christian governors, who found themselves in the midst of a change of era. On the one hand, they were expected to establish a balance between the interests of the central authority and the local community, the Muslims and the Christians, and the Conservatives and the Liberals. On the other hand, they were forced to deal with an

¹⁸⁵ Couturier, *La Crète*, 311; Zoi Mitsotaki, *Κωνσταντίνος Κ. Μητσοτάκης, Στην αυγή της Κρητικής Ελευθερίας (1868-1898)*; Kostadinou K. Mitsotakis, *At the dawn of Cretan Freedom (1868-1898)* (Athina: Ekdosis Papazisi, 2004): 160-161.

increasingly reactionary public sphere, avoiding recourse to violence and absolutism. Their mission was to combine 'enlightened despotism' with constitutionalism, so to speak. Nevertheless, these two administrative approaches rather contradicted with each other. For, all political parties capitalized on Muslim dissatisfaction and Christian opposition, pitting them against each other and, ultimately, against the office of the Governor. Nevertheless, since both Liberals and Conservatives lacked ideological coherence, it would be inaccurate to suggest that they influenced local developments according to specific systems of belief. Quite to the contrary, their ideology was directly shaped along the lines of the local conflicting interests.

The Liberals were initially identified with the rising urban elites, merchants, professionals, and entrepreneurs. In addition, they were supported by the vast majority of landless Muslims. The Conservatives, on the other hand, were identified with the 'establishment.' By the establishment I mean the deputies that cooperated with Fotiadis Pasha and who had managed to become, initially, the parliamentary majority. With regard to the Muslims, the Conservatives represented the interests of rich landowners, also known as the "Pashas" or "Agades" of the towns.¹⁸⁶ One thus could suggest that the parliamentary system in Crete became the vehicle for the political rise of the local 'bourgeoisie' that challenged economic mercantilism and the political conservatism of the 'old regime'. In the beginning, the establishment managed to prevail within the political arena by using the newly established institutions to its favor. Eventually, however, the Liberals would prevail.

From this point of view, it seems that the debates between the two parties had a

¹⁸⁶ Konst. G. Fournarakis, *Τουρκοκρήτες: Tourkokrites* (En Haniis: I. Giannakoudaki, 1929); Giannis Tsivis, "Χανιά 1252-1940: Hania 1252-1940," *Gnosi* (1993), 216-218.

strong class-character. Such an approach may be challenging to a certain extent, as it questions traditional, nationalistic readings of nineteenth century conflicts that tend to disregard any aspects of human identity other than an ambiguously conceptualized sense of nationality. Yet any methodological model of analysis is inadequate when based only on any one facet of individual identification, whether social, ideological, or biological. Hence, the belief of this author is that Cretan networks and loyalties were the result of a synthesis, under which conceptual dichotomies were subsumed as an ideological pretext and not as a mobilizing force of conflict. Thus, when the focus of historical research is directed only on any one of them disregarding the others, one fails to comprehend them.

Pious Foundations

Aside from the obvious clashes between the two religious communities, one could argue that Cretan conflict had not only ideological but also territorial connotations, as played out between urban and provincial populations. On the one hand, the walled port-towns—namely the island's citadels—constituted centers both of administration and of bourgeois economic activity. Thus, administrative and judicial authorities, army officials, rich landowners, merchants and entrepreneurs, shared the same urban territories. The island's hinterland, on the other hand, was divided between fertile plains and unapproachable mountains. The plains and some upland villages or fields were connected to the towns, via transactions and property networks. The remote highlands, at the same time, often remained out of the towns' reach.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ See for instance, Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 2:149-150; Lowther, *Among the Liars*, 700-701; D. G. Hogarth, *Accidents of an Antiquary's Life; with Forty Illustrations from Photographs taken by the Author*

In the second half of the nineteenth century, furthermore, parallel to the gradual evacuation of the Muslims from the hinterland, ideological conflict received more obvious territorial connotations. Since the Muslims preferred to reside closer to castles and the army, the upland Christian monasteries—and the communities functioning around them—formed zones of homogenous Christian populations. These communities were practicing mainly stock-breeding and agriculture, and rigidly maintained their patriarchal social structures.¹⁸⁸ At the same time, although a dynamic Christian civil society consisting of professionals, merchants, and entrepreneurs started to grow in the towns, the towns remained predominantly Muslim until 1897—and even later.¹⁸⁹

A very interesting dimension of the above mentioned urban character of the Muslim community was the growing centralization, on a local basis, of the properties of the Islamic Pious Foundations. From the middle nineteenth century on, the four major castles of Crete became the seats of four *Evkafs* (Directories of Islamic Pious Foundations). In this way, the management of religious real estates all around the island

and his Companions (London: Macmillan and Co., 1910): 77-87.

¹⁸⁸ The region of Sfakia constitutes the most well-known example of the above. See, for instance, the observations made by a British traveler in Crete in the middle of the nineteenth century :“It may now, however (the Apokorona district), be called the lowland territory of Sfakians, as they have little by little become possessors of considerable land within it since the Revolution, by obliging many of the Mahommedan population that in part peopled it to retire to the towns and sell their lands for what they could get; for the Sfakians so worried them by stealing their cattle or their produce, and so alarmed them by continual night-descents from their mountain-plains of Askyphe and Kalikrati above, and by wanton violence and bloodshed, too, when an opportunity offered of indulging in them without detection, that one by one the Mussulman peasants at length succumbed and retired,” see Captain T. A. B. Spratt, *Travels and Researches in Crete* (London: John Van Voorst, Paternoster Row, 1865), 2:122.

On the rich Monastery of Preveli at Sfakia see, Mihalīs M. Papadakis, *Το μοναστήρι του Πρέβελη στην Κρήτη: The Preveli Monastery in Crete* (Athina: Papadakis, Emm, 1978).

¹⁸⁹ According to the 1880/1881 ottoman population census the Muslims were the majority in the island's four biggest port-towns. More specifically, in Hania the Muslims numbered 9,488 and the Christians 3,278; in Rethimno there were 6,703 Muslims and 2,420 Christians; in Iraklio there were 14,592 Muslims and 6,401 Christians, BOA H 129 / M 1880, first presented by Adıyeke, *Girit*.

was centralized. The Directories controlled both pious properties in the hinterland, and the numerous endowments in the cities that formed an alternative urban space of mosques, shop-quarters, water deposits, fountains, and mansions. In this regard, one could argue that the religious connotations of the Muslim state continued to lie at the core of Cretan towns.¹⁹⁰

At the same time, the Directories constituted legal entities that were represented by their boards, and which were involved in capitalist activities linking the hinterland to the port-towns. To be more specific, the Directories participated in the local economy by leasing or selling land; by collecting revenue; by retaining capital in the name of the Islamic foundations and Muslim orphans; by lending money; and, in general, by investing. In this way, lots of Muslim and Christian Cretans—both in the hinterland and in the towns—were somehow connected to the *Evkaf*. Moreover, as it will be argued later on, the above semi-secular, semi-religious, Christian and Muslim urban space, which was formed on the island during the last decades of direct Ottoman control, continued to be of great importance in Autonomous Crete.

¹⁹⁰ The Director (and some times the accountant) of each *Evkaf* had the right to make property decisions that could increase the income of the foundations. Yet it was often all not that easy to examine how beneficial to the foundations were relevant decisions indeed. The following cases constitute very illustrative examples of the relevant state of affairs in Crete at the time in question and of the way the two confessional communities operated: In 1886, Ivraim Softadakis, *müteveli* (manager) of the properties of *Yussuf mosque* at Hania and Izzet Cemali Efendakis, accountant of the *Evkaf* of Hania went to court against the family of the late Huseyin Akif Nekib Ogul Esrefzade (or Safit Efendaki), former first secretary of the council of the Muslim elders of Hania, with the accusation that the defendant had squatted and tried to get real estate within the town of Hania that was bequeathed to the mosque. The court decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The court consisted of the president Mustafa Rahmi Tsaousade and the judges Ioannou Manousaki and Huseyin Natir Batrizade. The trial proceedings were held both in Greek and in Ottoman, see OBA, Dossier no 55: Doc 44 (8 October 1886); 45 (28 October 1886); 46 (21 January 1886). The same year (1886), the director of the *Evkaf* and Ottoman Orphan Bank of Hania, Ahmet Bey Karalaki went to court representing the foundations against Tsoulakis family that owed to the Bank 1,187. 20/40 *kuruş*. What is particularly interesting in this case is that the *Evkaf* was represented by the Christian attorney M.G.N. Stratigakis, and the Muslim defendants were represented by the Christian attorney Kost. Mitsotakis, see OBA, Dossier no 52: Doc 9 (8 February 1886); 10 (8 February 1886); 11 (2 December 1887); 12 (28 January 1886); 13 (8 March 1886); 14 (8 March 1886); 15 (1 May 1886); 16 (29 May 1886).

The Triumph of the Cretan Liberals

For a variety of reasons having to do both with new political realities and with older antagonisms, Crete had experienced virtually everything but internal peace from 1881 to 1897. The first intense parliamentary confrontation took place in 1881, when Fotiadis Pasha refused to confirm the Chamber's enactments. Upon this, the Christian deputies started a protest, transmitting their petitions to the European Consuls and submitting a memorandum that requested union with Greece. Nevertheless, since all Muslim deputies refused to sign the memorandum, the Governor managed easily to convince the Consuls to reject it.

At the same time, religious antagonism did not overshadow political partisanship. When after the first elections (1881) the Conservatives obtained the majority of seats in the Chamber, the Liberals questioned the validity of the result.¹⁹¹ As soon as the new Chamber met, they began accusing the governor of violating electoral law. Small-scale disagreements continued for a year. In 1882, the underlying tension was no more measured or secret, and shortly thereafter a new collision occurred. The occasion for conflict was the tithe paid in favor of the Islamic Pious Foundations. According to the Christian deputies, who insisted on the abolition of the relevant tax that constituted 1/8th of the island's incomes, the tithe should not burden both communities,

¹⁹¹ The electoral system of the time was instituted by the Organic Law and the Halepa Pact as following: the delegates that represented the island's eparchies at the General Assembly were elected by the local councils of the elders, who were elected by the tax-paying local mail populations. The Muslims were voting for the Muslim elders and the Christians for the Christian ones. The total number of the General Assembly's delegates was 80, from whom 49 would be Christians and 31 would be Muslims, see *Τάως, Περιοδική Έκθεση Ινστιτούτου Κρητικού Δικαίου: Talos, Periodical edition of the Institution of Cretan Law*, Hania (1994) D1:107-109.

as it was beneficial only to the Muslims. Furthermore, the Christians argued that continuing to collect the tax after 1878 was an arbitrary activity of the regime, since such a provision was not included in the Treaty of Halepa. From the governor's perspective, however, since the tithe was enacted prior to 1878, its collection was independent of the Treaty.

In any case, the Christian campaign against the tithe added fuel to the fire of Muslim indignation. At the same time, a common front of Christian-Muslim opposition was formed against the governor. As a result, when despite the continuous tension Fotiadis Pasha was appointed in 1884 Governor of Crete for four more years, indignation was at fever pitch. New elections were held in the same year amid great excitement and floods of passionate oratory by the Liberal press. Yet the result showed that the Conservative party was always dominant. The Liberals reprobated this outcome, lodging complains against the governor.¹⁹²

When the last one tried to re-enact the *Evkaf*-tithe, therefore, Liberal deputies and extra-parliamentary forces organized massive demonstrations against him. It is important to mention here that, on this occasion, numerous Muslim and Christian forces were mobilized together, forcing the governor to abolish the tithe and to repeat the elections. It was an epochal victory for the Liberals that, in this way, established civil society in Crete. If the symbolic violence of 1866 had legitimized the Cretan tradition of guerrilla-war, the symbolic popular reaction of 1884 legitimized increasing urban populism against the 'authorities.'

The liberal newspaper *Λευκά Όρη* (White Mountains), edited by Konstadinos

¹⁹² For the relevant events see *Kρήνη-Girid: Crete* 4 January 1879 (496); 1880 (526); 1 May 1881 (593); 5 May 1882 (634); 1883 (671).

Mitsotakis, became the main vehicle of journalistic opposition against the governor. The newspaper constantly complained about violations of the local regulations, attacking the governor in the name of freedom of press and of the right to control the authorities. This practice was new in Crete. In previous decades, each time the locals wanted to complain against the authorities they would address a foreign power and rise up in arms. In fact, these older patterns of reaction did not cease to exist after 1878. Yet the gradual empowerment of the local press established a new space of interactions with the authorities: a local civil society. From the part of the successive Pashas, at the same time, their constant observation by the press made it very difficult to deal with Cretan affairs in an autocratic way. Quite a few times, therefore, the latent rivalry between the two developed into open confrontation, resulting in limitations of the freedom of the press. For example, from 1881 to 1884, *Λευκά Όρη* circulated only randomly, as Fotiadis Pasha strongly opposed criticism against his office. Moreover, and for the same reasons, in 1887 the newspaper was officially constricted by Anthopoulos Pasha.¹⁹³

The above conflicts and confrontations appeared to be in favor of the Liberals who had gained, in this way, significant popularity. In other words, although in the first years after the foundation of the Chamber, the Conservatives were the obvious majority in it, the elections of 1885 produced a different result. The Conservatives lost a considerable number of seats to the Liberals, who became like this the majority. After their victory, the Liberals were ready to confront one more time the Christian Pasha. A petition asking for the Pasha's resignation signed by both Muslims and Christians was thus transmitted to Istanbul. The central administration was convinced. Fotiadi Pasha

¹⁹³ Mitsotaki, *Κωνσταντίνος Κ. Μητσotάκης*, 159-162, 228.

was forced to resign and Savva Pasha was sent to the island in his replacement.¹⁹⁴

The new Governor continued to interfere aggressively with the local political forces causing even more tension than his predecessor. Therefore, after a very short term, he was replaced by the more moderate Nikolaki Sartinski Pasha. Yet, against all hopes, the conciliatory efforts of Sartinski Pasha did not appease local passions.¹⁹⁵ The only comment one could make with regard to the local dynamics of the time is that they were based on a very fragile balance of power that could instantly be altered. To illustrate this, consider the British Consul Biliotti writing to his government in good faith during the elections of the provincial elders' councils in April 1889, that the locals had eventually managed to cooperate with each other.

According to Biliotti, the experiment of the general elections might have been a sign of future cooperation between Christians and Muslims, considering that the same people who a few years ago had been shooting each other on sight, were now coming together to form mixed parties. The Consul was also commending on the political agendas of the two parties, suggesting that the Conservatives were more peaceful and should be trusted more than the Liberals. For, while the first ones were earnest homemakers that respected law and order, the second were trouble-makers capitalizing on nationalism and chaos.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, future developments proved Her Majesty's representative wrong.

¹⁹⁴ *Κρήτη-Girid: Crete*. January-December 1885 (741-789); January-December 1886. (790-831).

¹⁹⁵ Eleftheriou Venizelou, *Η Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1889, Ένα άγνωστο ιδιόγραφο χειρόγραφο του Εθνάρχη: The Cretan Revolution of 1889, An unknown script of the Ethnarch* (Athina, 1971), 92-112, 107-111.

¹⁹⁶ *Correspondence respecting the affairs of Crete* (London: Harrison, 1889-1901).

More specifically, when the Liberals won the elections triumphantly, in 1889, they initiated a massive replacement of the local state-employees,¹⁹⁷ which was easily realized since the governor, contrary to the practices of his predecessors, chose not to interfere with the will of the majority. The moderate behavior of the governor allowed for more tension to be caused between old and new office-holders. The latter thus reacted violently, unwilling to accept their exclusion from the local judicial and administrative apparatus. Political acrimony intensified. The rival parties started questioning the eligibility of the elected deputies; and all sides accused each other of fraud during the elections. According to relevant rumors and mutual accusations, violence had been used against the peasants by both sides in order to gain their vote or to prevent them from voting for the opposite party. At the same time, both parties questioned the eligibility of their rival, elected deputies.

In this framework, literacy became a major issue of controversy with regard to the Muslim deputies in particular. The relevant debates reflected the ambiguous character of the local regulations. In the articles concerning the eligibility of the elected it was clearly specified that all Cretan deputies had to be literate. Moreover, it was accepted that Greek was to be the language of communication between Christian and Muslim representatives, although the Muslims were allowed to use the Ottoman language amongst themselves. What was not clearly explained, however, was whether the Muslims should be considered literate if they could read and write in Ottoman, but not in Greek. In other words, the practical meaning of being “a literate Muslim Cretan deputy” was still open to interpretation.

¹⁹⁷ See *Κρήτη-Γκρίδ: Crete*. January-December 1888 (913-984); January-December 1889 985-1132.

The following incident is a very characteristic example of the above. The elected Muslim representative of Apokoronou Eparchy, Ali Yanitzarakis (*Οθωμανός πληρεξούσιος Αποκορώνου Αλής Γιανιτζαράκης*), was among the Muslim elected representatives, the eligibility of whom was questioned. As a result, his fellow deputies decided to form a committee in order to test if he could write and read. Yet, according to some of them, literacy meant that the deputy should know how to read and write his name, while according to others, he should be able to read legal texts and regulations in order to participate in parliamentary procedures. To illustrate the problematic character of the situation, consider the debate between deputies I. Papadakis and E. Venizelos:

I.PAPADAKIS: I claim the opposite, Sir; he knows the alphabet, but he is not literate.

“E.VENIZELOS: Our interpretation of literacy is different. He was asked to read passages from the electoral law and he did so; it is true that he didn’t read trippingly. He made a lot of mistakes, and I’m forced to say so because otherwise my own knowledge of Greek is going to be questioned; but he read a number of Articles. Then, when he was asked to write something, he wrote—I think—“representative Yanitzarakis, Apokoronou, department of Canea;” but when he was asked to read from the newspaper, he replied “I’m not a *kiatipis* (scribe) to do so.” It is beyond doubt, therefore, that his knowledge of grammar is not really advanced and that he felt under a lot of pressure because the examination was too long. And yet, according to the relevant regulation, he has only to know how to read and write in order to be eligible for his position; and that, he does.”¹⁹⁸

These kinds of debates continued for a while but a mutual agreement was not achieved. As a result, the Conservatives tried to alter the result of the elections by issuing a declaration of the island's annexation to Greece.¹⁹⁹ Although the request was

¹⁹⁸ See the *Proceedings of the Cretan Chamber*, 5th Meeting, 4 May 1889, in Venizelou, *Η Κρητική επανάσταση*, 208 and 184-206.

¹⁹⁹ "Δήλωση περί Ενώσεως της Κρήτης με την Ελλάδα: Declaration for the Union of Crete with Greece.,"

made “in the name of the Hellenic nation,” the Liberals ranged themselves against it. The Greek government, at the same time, which busily concerned itself with internal projects, made clear that it had neither the power nor the will to “liberate” Crete. Following these developments, riots broke out all around the island. The Muslim press condemned the declaration, stating that the Ottoman Empire would never abandon an island conquered after so many sacrifices, and watered with the blood of so many heroes, only because the Christians were spoiled enough not to appreciate the privileges that had been granted to them. Moreover, according to the same sources, all problems were caused by Christian anarchy that was challenging the legendary Ottoman tolerance.²⁰⁰

As to the Liberals, they circulated conspiracy theories about Conservative provocateurs acting for the benefit of the Ottoman state. In other words, they argued that the acts of the Conservatives, which *de facto* had given political agitation the character of a rebellion, constituted national betrayal rather than a patriotic mission, as they provided the Ottoman authorities with an excuse to attack the locals. Indeed, after all moderating strategies had failed, the Ottoman regime suspended the Treaty of Halepa. Moreover, Crete was put under martial law and Shakir Pasha was sent to the island as Emergency General Governor, with the mission to suppress the rebellion. As a result, numerous Christians and Muslim politicians decided to escape. Eleftherios Venizelos and most of his supporters, for instance, resorted to Athens, where they were approached by

Lefka Ori (Hania), 8.5.1889,1; Mitsotaki, *Κωνσταντίνος Κ. Μητσοτάκης*, 34, 41, 350.

²⁰⁰ *Hakikat* (Hania), May 1889.

all kinds of different forces, both in favor and against a future rebellion.²⁰¹

The Halepa regime was thus abolished both in practice and in theory. Peace could not be easily restored, since the new Governor was powerless against the fanatics. In fact, it appears that both Muslims and Christians were divided between radicals and moderates. With regard to the Muslims, the radicals objected to any principle of equality and were in favor of an ultimate, violent solution against the Christians. They used local tension as a pretext for demanding restoration of Muslim power in Crete, and the severe punishment of the insurgents. Within this context, foreign observers were rather alert by the fact that the radicals appeared to have enough power at the sultan's government (the Porte) to undermine the moderate efforts of the Pasha of Crete. Rumors were thus circulated that if Greece was to provide the insurgents with further support, the Ottoman army was ready to march from Macedonia against Athens. The Greek government, on the other hand, was heavily criticized by the Greek public for constantly trying to avoid the war.

At the same time, according to different rumors, some powerful Muslim families had turned against Ottoman rule and wished to have the island placed under British protection.²⁰² From the part of the European Consuls, however, such plans were unwelcome. The Powers were quite sympathetic towards the Ottomans and considered their efforts to restore their authority over Crete absolutely legitimate. They made it clear, however, that their governments would not allow the Empire to march against the

²⁰¹ Venizelou, *Η Κρητική Επανάσταση*, 333-404.

²⁰² This rumor was circulated by the French journalistic press. According to the relevant sources, the Muslim worthies were so much in favor of a future occupation of the island by Great Britain that were joking about having a British tourist killed in order to force Great Britain to undertake action, Lasoche, *La Crète*, 242-245.

Kingdom of Greece, since the most probable outcome of such a collision seemed to be the Ottoman occupation of Greece.²⁰³ In brief, the ultimate result of all this was that rivalry was fast developing between Christian and Muslim Cretans. Despite the fact that the Chamber continued to meet, the Christians (to a man this time) refused to participate in the procedures or to cooperate with the new regime. In this framework, foreign influences only complicated matters more.

The Great Powers, in fact, were quite reluctant to get actively involved in a war against the Ottomans. Nevertheless, regardless of what the different governments argued, a very powerful civil society had by then been shaped in Europe against the Ottomans and Islam.²⁰⁴ Although, according to the relevant diplomatic correspondence, the “Cretan issue” was not really among the priorities of any European government of the time, it was often used by different political oppositions as a slogan. Moreover, the stereotypes against Islam that haunted Christianity in Europe were not the product of pure imagination. Indeed, in the last decades of the century, an epidemic of massacres against the Christians had broken out throughout the Empire, undermining any pacifist efforts to tolerant administration and causing widespread foreign reactions.

The Last Term of Karatheodori Pasha in Crete

Slaughters of Christians in provinces remote from Crete were influencing developments

²⁰³ *The Times* (London), 25.1.1890, 5.

²⁰⁴ “It would have been ungenerous to Turkey then, as was still hoped, seriously engaged in giving effect to the reforms she had so solemnly promised in 1856, to disturb the slumbering Eastern Question by mooted a plan of which a refusal, if made known, would have placed her in an invidious position. The position is now wholly different. She has herself trodden under foot those promises, bought from her with such an effusion of Western blood and treasure” see Gladstone, *The Hellenic factor*, 19.

on the island much more profoundly than one could have anticipated. When, for example, the large-scale massacre of Christian Armenians in Anatolia in the 1890's provoked a storm of acrimonious foreign protest, Cretan affairs gained growing visibility in Europe, representing one more example of Muslim brutality. Favored by broader European support, therefore, the Greek political refugees of 1884 returned to the island, and with the aid of groups of Greeks nationalists, started to organize against the authorities. The threat of a new armed revolt in Crete along with waves of European outrage, forced the central administration to compromise. As a result, in March 1895, Alexandros Karatheodori Pasha, one of the most well-known Helleno-Ottomans, was mobilized by the state and sent to the island for the second time with the difficult mission of pacifying Crete.²⁰⁵

The new Christian governor tried to bridge differences by addressing a common plague: the tattered local economy. When on the 26th of April 1895 he addressed the General Assembly for the first time, he adopted a conciliatory and optimistic tone. He sought to bring together the Cretan people, regardless of their religious affiliations and political aspirations. According to the new pasha, in other words, the island was trapped in a vicious circle. Political turmoil was relevant not only to ideological differences, but also to agricultural production heavily damaged by riots in this primarily agrarian local economy. Thus the solution to local problems was to bolster the economy through a series of emergency measures: freezing property seizures against financially ruined peasants; establishing an Agricultural Bank to support the farmers; improving the

²⁰⁵ On Alexandros Karatheodori and the Karatheodori family see Taki Hr. Tsonidi, *To Γένος Καραθεοδωρή 1740-1950: The Karatheodori Family 1740-1950* (Asprovalta: Melissa, 1989); Maria Georgiadou, *Constantin Caratheodory: Mathematics and Politics in Turbulent Times* (Berlin; New York: Springer, 2004).

taxation system; and starting a program of public works.

In the beginning, the efforts of the pasha appeared to inspire confidence in some of the locals to cooperate with him and pay taxes. Nevertheless, the newly established balance was based on the promise of developmental works that could not be realized without generous funding by the central government.²⁰⁶ Predictably, when Istanbul failed to respond to the pasha's pleas, Muslim and Christian radicals had new grounds to attack him.²⁰⁷ The situation was further complicated, once again, by the Consuls of the European powers, who were accusing each other of provoking chaos in Crete in order to serve their respective governments' needs. Even if none of the Powers appeared to be interested in the island directly, any disruption of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean was considered to be of great significance due to the explosive situation in Macedonia and Egypt, central at the time in European diplomatic games and negotiations. Aside from abstract strategies and conspiracy theories, however, it seems that the personal interests and preferences of the Consuls were also influencing their initiatives and actions.

To give a specific example, in September 1895 a group of Christians rose up in arms against the pasha, demanding the reenactment of the Pact of Halepa.²⁰⁸ French circles accused the British Consul at Hania (Canea) of supporting the Christian rebels,

²⁰⁶ The Assembly the Governor addressed on 26 April 1895, consisted of 35 Christians and 22 Muslims. In his opening speech, the Governor presented economic progress as the main way to reach local political stability, see *Proceedings of the 21th Meeting of the Cretan General Assembly* (26 April 1895 [A]), and Tsonidis, *To Γένος Καραθεοδρή*, 183-187.

²⁰⁷ Leonidas Kallivretakis, "A Century of Revolutions: The Cretan Question between European and Near Eastern Politics," in *Eleferios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. P. Kitromilidis (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2006), 29-30.

²⁰⁸ Mitsotaki, *Κωνσταντίνος Κ. Μητσοτάκης*, 52.

ignoring the fact that such a strategy would have been at odds with the broader orientations of British diplomacy. In truth, it seems that the Consul, Sir Alfred Biliotti, was indeed a good friend of one of the leaders of the uprising, a young man named Manousos Koundouros. In his irate answer to the above accusations, the Consul replied to his government that Manousos Koundouros was a charming, sweet fellow, the father of whom was working for the Ottoman authorities as a spy (*au service secret du gouvernement Turc*) against the Greeks. It was for this reason, claimed Biliotti, that he had originally petitioned Her Majesty's government to grant Manousos a scholarship to study law at the University of Athens.

According to the above account, Manousos was financially supported by the British because his father was working for the Ottoman authorities. Moreover, after having graduated from the University, he returned to Crete and was immediately appointed as a judge. Thus, the fact that Manousos eventually led the rebellion against Karatheodori Pasha and the Ottomans despite his family profile, caught the British Consul off-guard. In his defense, the Consul attributed Manousos's unexpected about-face either to his questionable mental state and diagnosis of depression, or to a well-organized conspiracy of which nobody was aware.²⁰⁹

In his own written account of the events, at the same time, Manousos accepted that his own thoughts and deeds appeared, at first glance, chaotic and inconsistent. Yet, he maintained passionately that his behavior and manner of speaking were much more

²⁰⁹ "Le fait qu'il ait pris la tête du mouvement a surpris tout le monde, car on le tenait pour un homme sage et modère. Il n'est pas riche et il abandonne ainsi un traitement de dix livres par mois: bien des gens pensent qu'il ne l'eut pas fait, s'il n'attendait quelque compensation. Il ne m'avait jamais dit un mensonge jusque-là, et, dans le cas présent, lui et son père m'ont trompé jusqu'à la dernière minute. L'un de ses bons amis, en la parole de qui je mets aussi toute ma confiance, m'affirme qu'il souffre d'une temporaire aliénation mentale..." in "Documentation", *Livre Bleu Anglais* (1897-1898), 25-30; "Documentation," *Livre Jaune Français* (1897); Berard, *Affaires de Crète*, 313.

authentic than those of some of his compatriots, who embraced the rebellion when it became popular, although they were originally against it. To be more specific, in his journal he particularly attacked Sfakianakis, Venizelos, Mihelidakis and a number of other local deputies, whom he characterized as "cowards." According to his cynical account, the above deputies pretended to be rebels only when the rebellion turned out to be successful.

Manousos argued that at the beginning of the uprising and while the people of Crete were in a state of mass revolutionary fervor, the above deputies were the only ones who agreed to meet with the Ottoman Governor and discuss "issues of agriculture," thus maintaining their "well-established servile sentiment and a kneeling down before the authorities (το επικρατούν εν τη νήσω τότε δουλοπρεπές φρόνημα)." As for himself, Manousos took pride in the fact that he had started preparations for a future rebellion as early as 1890. When he was appointed judge at Vamo, said he, he encouraged the Christian insurgents to attack Ottoman officials—wherever and whenever they could find them—reassuring them of an acquittal in his court of law. For, according to him, the Armenian massacres had created a great opportunity for a final solution in Crete, since Christian Europe would not allow for the Ottomans to respond to a future "extermination" of the Muslims.²¹⁰

The dynamics presented above offer a rather telling example of the multiple levels each Cretan insurrection constituted. By and large, however, beyond personal

²¹⁰ Koundourou, *Ημερολόγιον*, 1-2, 12-18, 142-144. At the same time, the opposite party claimed that acts of violence against Muslim civilians and casualties of this sort constituted boundaries against the future success of the "Greek-Cretan cause," see Elftherios Venizelos, "Προς τη συνέλευση των Κρητών: Presented in the Cretan Assembly," in *Mikres Silloges, K51 Arheia Emm. Tsouderou, Apostoli E fak28* (Athens: GAK, 7 July 1898).

opinions and intimate strategies, the general gap between the Ottoman capital city and the locals was the only obvious and stable factor of conflict. The mutual mistrust was inspired both by stereotypes and by actual facts. Due to central maladministration, on the one hand, the Cretans developed the habit of discrediting any initiative of the central state. Due to their constant recalcitrance against the state, on the other hand, the Christian Cretans became known as remarkably obdurate. Thus, it was easy for radical Muslims to blame every malice caused by non effective administrative strategies on the Christians, calling their compatriots to a war of revenge.

In brief, the general uprising against Karatheodori Pasha was only the last in a century of continuous reforms and rebellions that had reshaped the society of Crete, through moderate negotiations and brute violence. In this context, in 1895, history repeated itself one more time. When the moderate policies of Karatheodori Pasha failed, he was replaced by Turhan Pasha, who was coming to the island for the second time to enforce law in an absolute way. As a response, Conservative and Liberal Christians decided to forget their differences (for a while) and joined arms against the governor. The local Imperial force was backed with troops from Istanbul but failed to subdue the insurrection. The riots continued. In the midst of the local troubles, an armed force that reached the island from Greece complicated matters even further. Finally as we have seen, in 1897 the war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, despite European diplomatic efforts to avoid it,²¹¹ and the image of a peaceful Eastern Mediterranean was, once again, shattered.

²¹¹ *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale (1871-1914)); *Reports on the Situation in Crete* (London: Harrison and Sons, May 1897).

Conclusion

In the introduction of this study the author has suggested that developments in Crete after 1897 emanate a different light when discussed in relation to nineteenth century local transformations. In this respect, this chapter has been an attempt to discuss Cretan society as an Ottoman province directly influenced by Ottoman reforms and revolutions. In fact, such an analysis could be misleading without reference to the parallel rise of Greek nationalism. The existence of the Greek state indeed had played a crucial role in the transformation and eventual break up of the island's two major religious communities. Yet it must be emphasized that Greek nationalism had not influenced Cretan realities any more than Imperial strategies.

In short, throughout the nineteenth century, Crete remained an Ottoman province under direct Ottoman control, directly affected by the state's different administrative policies. After the proclamation of autonomy in 1897, however—and in parallel to the growing political turmoil in the Empire—Crete was transformed in the Ottoman Muslim imagination from an actual province to a symbol. Autonomy was interpreted as 'the loss of Crete' that was to be blamed on the Ottoman sultan. Thus, Crete became an excuse to revolt against the sultan and to take revenge on the Christians, particularly in the context of the Young Turk narratives.

From the Greek point of view, on the contrary, this process was reversed. The island emerged as a Greek symbol and pretext for revolt in the nineteenth century, when it was still under Ottoman control; and became a Greek province in 1912, when the Ottomans treated it already as an abstract idea. The following chapter, therefore, shall discuss how and in what varying circumstances Greek nationalism led to the

establishment of the Greek Kingdom and what that development meant for Crete. It has to be clarified here that this author treats nationalism as a force of change rather than disruption.

If pre-nineteenth century Crete was a locality quite remote from the Imperial center, 'shared' primarily among the locals, then in the nineteenth century the island was connected metaphorically to a variety of different worlds. The influence of Greek nationalism and Ottoman reforms changed Crete to a shared locality of a different kind, more heavily contested than ever before. On a local basis, everyday coexistence continued to be a synthesis of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the advanced communication technology and inclusive ideologies of late modernity afforded Crete a different kind of visibility. In a sense, at the turn of the century, Crete was more than ever before part of 'a shared world.'

CHAPTER III

THE NATION

The Greek Kingdom and Western Europe

In late nineteenth century Europe, the foundation of the Greek Kingdom was commonly treated as a development of immense historical significance. A number of European politicians and intellectuals considered modern Greece an ideal expression of modern-western virtue, due to the Kingdom's cultural relation to antiquity and to the fact that it was the first independent polity established on former Ottoman lands. From the middle of the century onwards, therefore, the foundation of the new polity had been attracting universal interest, symbolically conceptualized as the victory of a nation against a dynastic regime; the triumph of the people over oppressing elites; the success of the future over the past. During the Kingdom's early years of existence, however, the support European dynasties provided to the Greeks was inspired by quite different motives.¹

¹ See, for instance, the following examples illustrating both some of the mainstream European approaches to the Greek revolution and the ways the Greeks addressed themselves to a foreign readership. True, the relevant works presented a variety of often conflicting ideas regarding the place of Greece in Europe. Yet the revolution of 1821 was accepted by all as the beginning of the regeneration of the Greek-Hellenic nation. See David (un citoyen français), *Appel aux Nations en Faveur des Grecs* (A Paris: chez les marchands de nouveautés, 1821); Sir Richard Church, *Observations on an Eligible Line of Frontier for Greece as an Independent State* (London: J. Ridgway, 1830); G.-G. Gervinus, *Insurrection Et Régénération De La Grèce* (Paris: A. Durand, 1863); Nikolaos I. Saripolos, *Le Passé, Le Présent Et L'avenir De La Grèce* (Trieste: Schubart & Dase, 1866); W. E. Gladstone, M.P. "The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem," *The Contemporary Review* (1876): 1-27; George Finlay, *A History of Greece : from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877);

It could be argued that, when the Greek Kingdom was founded in May 1832, a small but ideologically loaded territory was seceded from the Ottoman Empire to be added into the Christian Crowns of Europe. Indeed, the Great Powers of the time decided that the Kingdom should initially be ruled not by the Greek people but by a Bavarian king, mainly for two interrelated reasons: the critical military and ideological contributions of European forces in favor of the Greeks, both before and during the “War of Independence;” and the obvious difficulty of the new state to survive without European patronage. In the view of the Powers, in other words, Greek political forces lacked administrative experience and Greek economic structures were quite parochial.

In order to better illustrate this argument, one might refer to the internal turmoil that had followed the revolution of 1821-1829, the series of political murders, the financial crisis, and the violent conflicts between various Greek forces, all of which made true independence seem quite impossible.² One should not forget, furthermore, that the Greek revolt against the Ottomans was ideologically legitimized not only as

Nikolaos Dragoumis, *Capo D'istria - La Régence - Le Règne D'othon*, trans. by Jules Blancard (Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot, 1890); Adolf Holm, *The History of Greece from Its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation* (London; New York: MacMillan, 1894-1898); W. Alison Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1897); W. Alison Phillips, *The Restoration*, ed. A.W. Ward and G.W. Prothero (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907).

See also, Karl Dieterich, *Deutsche Philhellenen in Griechenland, 1821-1822 / Auswahl aus ihren tagebüchern von Karl Dieterich* (Hamburg: Im Rommission bei Friederichsen De Gruyter, 1929); Mihalis G. Bakouris, *Οι Γερμανοί Φιλέλληνες στην Επανάσταση του 1821: German Philhellenes During the 1821 Revolution* (Pireas, 1971); Spiros Loukatos, *Ο Ιταλικός Φιλελληνισμός κατά την Αγώνα της Ελληνικής Ανεξαρτησίας, 1821-1831* (Athina: Elliniki Epitropi Spoudon N. A. Evropis, 1996); Panos Karagiorgos, *Πολιτισμικές σχέσεις Ελλάδας-Βρετανίας : Έρευνες και Μελέτες: Cultural Relationships between Greece and Great Britain: Researches and Studies* (Athina: Sillogos pros Diadosin Ofelimon Vivlion, 2002); Natassa Kastritsi, *Η Ελλάδα του 21 με τη Ματιά των Φιλελλήνων : Γαλλική Φιλελληνική Παραγωγή από τις Συλλογές του Εθνικού Ιστορικού Μουσείου: Greece in '21 through the Eyes of Philhellenes: the French Philhellenic Production through the Collections of the National Museum of History* (Athens: Istoriki ke Ethnologiki Eteria tis Ellados, 2006).

² On the long and painful process of the early state and government building in Greece see Giannēs Koliopoulos, John S. Koliopoulos, and Thanos Veremis. *Greece: The Modern Sequel : from 1831 to the Present* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 11-57.

'national,' but also as 'modern' since, with regard to effective administration and economic progress, the Ottoman governorship of the time was universally characterized as unsuccessful.³ According to leading European circles, the Greeks were not that different from their former 'masters,' even if most of their deficiencies were attributed to their very long subordination to the Ottoman 'yoke' rather than to their nature. In any events, Greek dependency on Europe was considered the only way to modernize the old structures of the new state, transforming the former subjects of the Sultan into actual citizens. In this context, the first administrative reform-projects were designed not by the Greek people, but by the cabinet of King Otto, first King of Independent Greece.⁴

In short, this study agrees with the argument that, contrary to later interpretations, the foundation of the *model*-Kingdom in early nineteenth century was *per se* serving the fundamental political and ideological values of imperial West, as expressed through its two theoretical self-representations: Modernity and Historical Tradition. With regard to modernity, it was commonly accepted that modern Greece could—and should—profit

³ Constantine Tsoukalas, "European Modernity and Greek National Identity," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 1, no 1 (1999):7-14. The particularities of Greek society and state are better understood when taking into consideration that the modern political state came into being in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries. It is also useful to keep in mind that modern Greece was one of the earlier nation-states to be found in eastern Europe, a factor that explains (partly at least) the politicization of Greek society, a development treated here as an expression of modernity. At the same time, the globally-wide prestige of ancient Greek history accounted for the identification of Greece with European modernity not only as an actuality but also as an abstraction still popular even today. As wrote by H. Lefebvre "We know that optimistic hypotheses (like this one, for example: The France of tomorrow will be the new Athens, the Greece of modernity) will probably appear naïve. And finally we know -and this is the most important thing of all- that the possibilities are determined;" see Henri Lefebvre, *Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes, September 1959-May 1961*, trans. by J. Moore. (London-New York: Verso, 1995), 15-16, and also 3-4, 168-239.

⁴ On the choice of the Bavarian Prince Otto as King of Greece see the Declaration of the Great Powers towards the Greeks. *Διακήρυξις των σεβαστών Συμμάχων Αυλών. Έλληνες! Declaration of the Worshipful Allied Courts* (En Nafplio, 1832).

See also the first speech the new King addressed to the people of Greece. Otto, King of the Greeks. *Θθων ελέω Θεού Βασιλεύς της Ελλάδος προς τους Έλληνας = Otto von Gottes Gnaden Koenig von Griechenland an das Griechische Volk: Otto Absolute Monarch of Greece under God, addressing the Greeks* (En Nafplio, 1833).

from the broader experiences of the Powers via the wise meditation of the Greek King.⁵ The reforms that were initiated by the cabinet of King Otto aimed—at least in theory—to create the necessary institutional framework for the protection of property rights and trade; to promote modern technology, secular education, urbanization, and industrialization; and to undertake new administrative projects and public works in order to safeguard efficient state control.⁶ With regard to historical tradition, at the same time, the Greek Kingdom was linked to a variety of conflicting interests and ideological aspirations, the most important of which were the spread of European Enlightenment and Orthodoxy.

At the time of the Greek Revolution, to be more specific, few educated Europeans could have been entirely unfamiliar with the historical allusion that Greece constituted the “cradle of western civilization.”⁷ The imaginary history of the Greek nation was bound to the history of a broader imaginary community, self-identified as the West. Yet

⁵ Konstantin Soter. Kotsowilis, *Ελληνοφιλία των Βαυαρών, Οθων Α' βασιλεύς της Ελλάδος* = *Die Griechenbegeisterung der Bayern unter König Otto I: German Philhellenism, Otto A' King of Greece* (Monaho, 2007).

⁶ Dimitrios N. Vernardakis, *Καποδίστριας & Οθων: Kapodistrias kai Othon* (Athine: Galaxias, 1967); Giannis K. Karakostas, *Ο βασιλεύς Οθων, το Οθώνειο Πανεπιστήμιο (Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών) και η Νομική του Σχολή: King Otto, the Othonio University (National and Kapodistriako University of Athens) and the Department of Law* (Athina: Ad. N. Sakkoulas, 2004), 1-50. On the Greek society and economy of the era see also, D.G. Tsaousis, ed., *Όψεις της ελληνικής κοινωνίας του 19ου αιώνα: Aspects of the nineteenth century Greek society* (Athina: Estia, 1984), 70-75; Hr. Hatziosif, *Η γηραιά σελήνη. Η βιομηχανία στην Ελλάδα 1830-1940: The Elderly Moon. Industry in Greece 1830-1940* (Athina: Themelio, 1993), 200-220; Artemis Yagou, "Facing the West: Greece in the Great Exhibition of 1851," *Design Issues* 19, no 4 (2003):82-90; Giorgos Dertilis, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Κράτους, 1830-1920: History of the Greek State* (Athina: Vivliopolion tis Estias I.D. Kollarou, 2005), vol. 1.

⁷ From the sixteenth century onwards Greece was presented as part of Europe in most European maps. In this respect, most Occidental travelers would visit the historically loaded territories of 'European East' looking for the hidden “cradle of European civilization, which might yet be discovered underneath the layer of the Ottoman presence,” see Lud'a Klusakova, "A European on the Road": in pursuit of "Connecting Themes" for Frontiers, Borders and Cultural Identities," in *Imagining Frontiers, Contesting Identities*, ed. S. G. Ellis and L. A. Klusakova (Piza: Plus Piza University Press, 2007):14.

such ties were very ambiguous, as neither of the cultural communities in question had specific, homogenous characteristics. A detailed discussion of all relevant issues is certainly out of this study's span, which focuses only on the island of Crete. This author's aim, however, is to examine Crete not as an isolated case-study but as an integral part of the nineteenth-century imagined 'Greek Empire.' In this respect, this chapter's main ideas cannot be explained without a brief reference to our contemporary scholarship on Greek nationalism and the West.

The argument that conceptual communities are the product of human imagination is certainly not original.⁸ Since the last three decades, an impressively rich literature has been produced on nationalism, suggesting that the Nation is a late eighteenth century ideological construction related to the economic and political developments of the era, primarily in north America and Europe. Similarly, a diverse literature on the West is available nowadays, critically analyzing the 'Western community' as an ideological construction with sociopolitical connotations, and with an imagined past, present, and future.⁹ A relatively common denominator among the most recent such studies is the

⁸ For a collection of texts on nationalism from Joseph de Maistre, J.G. Fichte and Giuseppe Mazzini to V.I Lenin and Virginia Woolf, and from Thomas Hobbes to Benedict Anderson, Salman Rushdie, Ernest Gellner and Edward W. Said see Vincent P. Pecora, ed. *Nations and Identities Classic Readings* (Malden Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001).

Even if we accept that the nation is nothing more than an "imaginary community," modern historiography is still haunted by nationalism. As put it by S.Grosby in his introduction "What is so important about the existence of the nations? Throughout history, humans have formed groups of various kinds around criteria that are used to distinguish "us" from "them." One such group is the nation. Many thousands, indeed millions, have died in wars on behalf of their nation...This is one of the reasons why it so important to understand what a nation is: this tendency of humanity to divide itself into distinct, and often conflicting, groups." Steven Grosby, *Nationalism. A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁹ By using the term "West" I do not mean to suggest that there is indeed such a thing as a well-defined western community, with a linear history. Quite to the contrary, I use the "West" as an abstraction, an imagined historical community that has been intellectually constructed by Europe from the late eighteenth century onwards, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996): 28-46.

For a discussion on Orientalism and Occidentalism, see E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon,

idea that nineteenth century ideological suppositions about the Nation—or about the West—were based on rapidly developing connections of dependency among different human societies. There is no need for this study to examine these issues in greater detail. The only thing to be mentioned here is that the conceptualization of the Nation, the West, and the Orient, are perceived by this author as integral components of modernity. By West and Orient, I am referring not to geographical but to ideological categories, shaped by nineteenth century European production of knowledge. By European modernity, I mean the complex interaction between nineteenth century global economic activity and political thought, the most telling examples of which were the symbolic ramifications of the Industrial and French Revolutions.¹⁰

In this respect, it could be argued that the modern Greek nation was born when

1978); James G. Carrier, ed., *Occidentalism: Images of the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

For the argument that there were no casual factors that made Europe's industrialization inevitable, see Jack A. Goldstone, "The Rise of the West-or Not? A Revision to Socio-Economic History," *Sociological Theory* 18, no 2 (Jul., 2000): 175-94.

For the mainstream argument, with which I strongly disagree, that the inevitable emergence of the western community had started in the early modern years see Daniel Chirot, "The Rise of the West," *American Sociological Review* 50, no 2 (Apr. 1985): 181-95.

¹⁰ By "modernity" I mean the nineteenth-century emergence of certain patterns, the most important of which were the promise of rationality, growing global communication, a different understanding of synchronic time, conceptualization of power and control as a strategy, standardization of social interaction, and the emergence of a more inclusive state. On these issues see M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin Press, 1977); J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston: Beacon Press 1984), vol. 1; J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: MIT press, 1987); Cole Harris, "Power, Modernity, and Historical Geography," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81, no 4 (Dec., 1991): 671-83; David Owen, *Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault, and the Ambivalence of Reason* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997); Agnes Heller, *A Theory of Modernity* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1999)

On the impact of the Industrial and French revolutions see Peter N. Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998); Charles More, *Understanding the Industrial Revolution* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000); Robert Darnton, *What Was Revolutionary About the French Revolution?* (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 1996) Gary Kates, ed., *The French Revolution : Recent Debates and New Controversies* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997); Bailey Stone, *Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), introduction.

intellectuals started to narrate a number of seemingly unconnected experiences spanning from antiquity to the modern era, calling it 'the history of the Greek people.' This practice had become increasingly popular in Europe since the late eighteenth century, almost simultaneously with the emergence of an intellectual movement that became known as “European-Western Enlightenment.”¹¹ Of the many aspects of Enlightenment, only two are particularly important for our discussion of Greek nationalism: the intellectual attempt to establish universal and diachronic values defined as the essence of western civilization, in contradistinction to barbarism and obscurity; and the rapidly spreading popularity of such narratives, due to their strong emotional charm rather than conceptual coherence.

Enlightenment intellectuals considered the cultural products of antiquity to be the cradle and renaissance force of the West. Moreover, they perceived the West as a historical entity with consistent, specific characteristics. According to this author's understanding of the issue, however, the above intellectuals had acted less as rational representatives of universal humanistic ideals, and more as Benjamin's *Storyteller*, masterfully fabricating ancient and modern Greece within the spectrum of a fabricated West. In other words, in the same way “a man listening to a story is in the company of the storyteller,”¹² the relationship between Greece and the West was shaped via a

¹¹ On enlightenment, in general, and neo-Hellenic enlightenment, in particular, see Panagiotis Kondilis, *Ο Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός. Οι Φιλοσοφικές Ιδέες: The Neo-hellenic enlightenment. Philosophical Ideas* (Athina: Themelio, 1988); Peter Gilmour, ed., *Philosophers of the Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990); Paschalis Kitromilidis, *Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός. Οι πολιτικές και κοινωνικές ιδέες: Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment. Political and Social ideas* (Athina: Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapazis, 1996); John Sweetman, *The Enlightenment and the Age of Revolution, 1700-1850* (London; New York: Longman, 1998).

¹² Benjamin differentiates between storytelling and modernity (modernity viewed here as the product of printed capitalism) suggesting that “the earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of storytelling is the rise of the novel at the beginning of modern times. What distinguishes the novel from

mutually constructed tradition: the cultural and intellectual products of antiquity had become the "storyteller," in the company of whom western Europe was born as an entity; and later on, the West cannibalized that tradition to become the "storyteller" itself, in the company of whom modern Greece was born.

It is true that the period from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century had witnessed important changes in the ideological movements mentioned above. It is also true that both Enlightenment and Greek nationalism were represented very differently within different geographies and social circles. One of the more or less uncontested outcomes of such intellectual considerations was the idea that the Greek-speaking populations that still lived in on the lands of ancient Greek city-states were the actual descendants of the ancient Greeks. This idea, which was not in fact universally embraced, was yet quite popular in early nineteenth century Europe to legitimize the foundation of modern Greece.¹³

the story (and from the epic in the narrower sense) is its essential dependence on the book...What differentiates the novel from all other forms of prose literature- the fairy tale, the legend, even the novella- is that it neither comes from an oral tradition nor goes into it. This distinguishes it from storytelling in particular. The storyteller takes what he tells from experience-his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. The novelist has isolated himself...is himself uncounseled and cannot counsel others...The legitimacy it [the novel] provides stands in direct opposition to reality." See Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968). See also O. K. Werckmeister Winter, "Walter Benjamin's Angel of History, or the Transfiguration of the Revolutionary into the Historian," *Critical Inquiry* 22, no 2 (1996):239-267.

Yet the same way a quotation cannot capture the whole of Benjamin's work, what Benjamin tries to say (or does not try to say) here, with regard to the oral tradition, is not really important for the point I try to make. To be more specific, my argument is that, in the case of Greek nationalism, European 'western-ism', and Cretan localism, modernity did not erase but replaced the myths and collective "morality" of the storyteller with its own version of "tradition" and "experience." Quite to the contrary, I argue that the nineteenth-century tendency to standardize the notion of "knowledge" was still subjected to the fluidity of oral tradition, namely fabrications, subjective interpretations, didactic missions, and a somewhat mystic understanding of the "human common good."

¹³ On the idea of Europe in Greece see Paschalis K. Kitromilides, "Europe and the Dilemmas of Greek Conscience," in *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*, ed. P. Carabott (London: King's College, 1995), 1-16; Georgios Varouhakis, "The idea of "Europe" in Nineteenth Century Greek Political Thought," in *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship*, ed. P. Carabott (London: King's College, 1995), 16-30; Elli Skopetea, "The Balkans between

It has to be mentioned at this point that nineteenth century Europe was far from being united. Competition and conflicts pertaining largely to which group would become the West's leading force, occurred within and among European states almost constantly. It could be argued that, from the late eighteenth century onwards, the naval Empires of Great Britain and France had arisen as the model western states with regard to military power, effective administration, technological innovation, and economic growth.¹⁴ In the framework of European antagonisms, however, social identities were as important as political ones. In the second half of the nineteenth century, in other words, the gradual rise of trans-national *bourgeois* forces gave birth to a model European socioeconomic network, referred to by our contemporary scholarship as "western *bourgeoisie*."

One should not forget that human communities—such as nations or classes—are perceived in theory as homogenous entities despite their actual heterogeneity. The only point made here, therefore, is that collective identities, both socioeconomic and national, were central in nineteenth century European thought. Furthermore, they corresponded to some aspects of reality, despite their overly simplified imagined character that relied on fabricated dichotomies between the 'progressed' and the 'backward,' or between the genuinely 'good' and the 'bad.'¹⁵ Such narratives were indeed quite ambiguous and full of

the East and the West," in *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and the Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, ed. D. Tziouvas (Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd, 2003), 171-176.

On the idea of Greece in a European context see Phiroze Vasunia, "Hellenism and Empire: Reading Edward Said," *Parallax* 9, no 4 (October-December 2003), 88-97; Stuart Woolf, "Europe and its Historians," *Contemporary European History* 12, no 3 (2003):323-337.

¹⁴ C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*; See also Yannis Hamilakis and Momigliano Nicoletta, "Archeology and European Modernity," in *Archeology and European Modernity, Producing and consuming the "Minoans"*, ed. N. M. Yannis Hamilakis (Padova: Bottega d' Erasmo, 2006), introduction.

¹⁵ All recorded human history could be described as a series of different attempts to establish a sense of

difficult, controversial topics. Yet they became very popular and gained considerable momentum when they began to be associated with the idea of the 'people' struggling against the 'elite,' mainly in the second half of the century.

In this respect, Greek nationalism, which in the first decades of the century was still promoted by Europe's dynastic elites, had gradually changed. The direct economic-political dependency of the Kingdom on Europe did not cease to exist. Yet the forces rebelling against European 'ancient regimes' had gradually started to correspond with the Greeks in a more dynamic way, via the power of numerous 'storytellers.' The latter had managed to convince the people of Europe to embrace their charming stories about the future and the past; and to claim Ottoman territories not only by military means, but also via emotionally powerful narratives in the name of ancient Hellenes and modern Greeks.¹⁶

actual and symbolic unity among different groups of humans. In this respect, nineteenth century westernism, as I aim to describe it, was not unique. Thus, whenever I address phenomena such as the creation of the "nation," the "global community," or the "West," my aim is to address the particularities of late modernity rather than its 'uniqueness.' For a broader philosophical discussion of these issues see M. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996 [1953]); S. J. Heine, T. Proulx, and K.D. Vohs, "The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the coherence of social motivation," *Personality and Social Psychological Review* 10, no 2 (2006):88-111.

¹⁶ True, many late eighteenth century Europeans doubted that their contemporary 'ignorant' and 'indolent' Greek Christians were the descendants of ancient Greece, or that they had something (anything!) to do with the glory of antiquity. Nevertheless both the supporters of similar views and those who suggested that modern Greeks were indeed the descendants of the ancient Hellenes, influenced profoundly the association of Greek nationalism with the study of the classics. As a result, the majority of Greek intellectuals had early enough started to suggest that for the Greek nation to exist, the nation should learn to 'read' about its ancient origins (both literally and metaphorically). See D. Ioannis Evrigenis, "Enlightenment, Emancipation, and National Identity: Korais and the Ancients," www.i.umich.edu/UMICH/ceseuc (11 January 2007).

The Greek Kingdom and the Orthodox Empire

Aside from its association with western modernity and antiquity, Greek nationalism had also very strong religious connotations. Although it was indeed difficult to reconcile Orthodox Christianity with the ideals of secular modernity or antiquity, modern Greeks tried to do so via their language and religion.¹⁷ One should not forget that with regard to the Christian populations still living in the lands of the Ottoman Empire, whom the Kingdom of Greece wished to 'liberate,' Orthodoxy was even stronger a factor of identity-formation than language, since there were profound dialectic differences among the populations at stake.¹⁸ At the same time, despite dogmatic differences, Christianity constituted one more bond between the Kingdom of Greece and the European Powers that wished to control it. The only European Power concerned with the fact that the striking majority of the Greeks belonged to the Orthodox dogma was the Russian Empire.

In terms of military and political power, the nineteenth century Russian Empire was certainly included in the European Great Powers. Nevertheless, Russian influence on Greek nationalism deserves separate attention, since Russian protection stood for, and

¹⁷ Charles A Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852* (London: Cambridge U.P, 1969); Paraskevas Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία, Οι Περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης, Από το "Ελλαδικό" στο Βουλγαρικό Σχίσμα: Ethnos and Orthodoxy: the Adventures of a Relationship, From the Greek to the Bulgarian Schism*, (Iraklio: Panepistimiakes Ekdosis Kritis, 2003).

¹⁸ The best instance of this is the comedy script of a theatrical play published in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Dimitrios K. Vizadios, *Βαβυλωνία, ή, η κατά τόπους διαφθορά της ελληνικής γλώσσας : κωμωδία εις πράξεις πέντε / Εκδοσις δευτέρα <παρά του ιδίου συγγραφέως>. Επιμελώς διορθωθείσα μετά προσθήκης πολλών αστειοτέρων περιόδων, και της μεταθέσεως των σκηνών επί το τακτικώτερον: Babylon, or, the geographical degeneration of the Greek language: comedy in 5 acts /second edition by the same author. Corrected and published with the addition of many, much funnier periods, and with a better organizing of the play's scenes* (En Athines: Konst. Kastorhis, 1840).

was legitimized through, ideals very different from those of the modern West. Especially in the second half of the century, when the leading powers of the West, France and Great Britain, were identified even more profoundly than before with modernity, revolution, and economic-political liberalism,¹⁹ the Russian regime underwent internal changes in this direction in a much more conservative way.²⁰ True, the focused study of internal dynamics within the states in question suggests that, most of the time, revolutionary narratives had more symbolic than actual weight, and that such developments were certainly not unfolding in a linear, uninterrupted way. Nevertheless, if we accept that the idea of the West was more closely related to ideological tendencies than to actual practices, then we may suggest as well that the lack of legitimized internal revolutionary symbols differentiated the Russian regime from its contemporaries France and Great

¹⁹ True, the word “modernity” is used by scholars in a retrospective way in order to describe a given period of time. At the same time, the ideals of “change” and “revolution” were central indeed in the cultural and political production of the nineteenth century and, more particular, with regard to the ways artists, politicians, and intellectuals had tried to describe the rise of a common culture, which we now describe as “European Modernity.” These descriptions attributed to modernity and rapid change both negative and positive characteristics. For instance, Baudelaire used the word modernity in the mid-nineteenth century to describe the changing, fashionable, fleeting, and contingent in opposition to the eternal and immutable, see Peter Childs, *Modernism* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007): 12-19, 27-72.

²⁰ In this sense, I aim to discuss here only the difference of popular discourses, between societies self-identified as the West and those excluded from it. Within this context, although the political history of nineteenth century Great Britain is often described as a “reform without revolution,” while the character of British society and politics is often referred to as “evolutionary rather than revolutionary,” one should not forget, first, the ideological radicalism that characterized the rhetoric of the mid-nineteenth century British liberal party; and second, that “evolution” was legitimized in Britain only as the continuation of the seventeenth century revolt against the throne that had given birth to the British parliamentary system. Moreover, one should not forget that the intellectuals of the French enlightenment and supporters of political revolution used the seventeenth century British political developments as an idealized point of reference. Last but not least, western economic growth was identified with the particularities of industrial revolution that had “revolutionized,” social balances in the “western world.” See for instance, Ferenc Feher, *The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39-75; Jack A. Goldstone, “Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History: Rethinking the “Rise of the West” and the Industrial Revolution,” *Journal of World History* 13, no 2 (Fall 2002):323-389; Colin Jones and Dror Wahrman, eds., *The Age of Cultural Revolutions : Britain and France, 1750-1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

Britain.²¹

Despite an early will to modernize the Russian state apparatus, radical changes that could challenge the regime were successfully suppressed by the Tsars. In this respect, the Russian experiences were similar to the Ottoman ones. From a western perspective, both imperial regimes were gradually viewed more and more as anachronisms that could not last without having “their revolutions.”²² Nevertheless, both of them continued to promote reforms and to condemn revolutionary movements until the following century, when they both were eventually overruled.²³ In the period under scrutiny, in other words, both Russian and Ottoman regimes tried to link progress to imperial tradition in order to remain internally stable and externally powerful.²⁴ The Russian Empire, furthermore, proved capable not only of surviving, but also of expanding, by combining extensive military reforms with the dogma of religious protection.²⁵

Since late eighteenth century, it seems that Christian Orthodoxy was used as the

²¹ It is often suggested by scholars that from the point of view of most western European societies, in the last decades of the nineteenth century at least, Russia was identified with the 'Orient'. See for instance, Christopher Lloyd GoGwilt, *The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-Mapping of Europe and Empire Britain, Ireland, Continental Europe, and Africa* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution : Europe 1789-1848* (London: Abacus, 1996); William Moul, "Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no 4 (Aug., 2003): 468-489.

²² Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848-1875* (London: Abacus, 1995), 162.

²³ Nader Sohrabi, "Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908," *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no 6 (May 1995): 13-83.

²⁴ Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, eds., *Imperial rule* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2004).

²⁵ Ezra Mendelsohn and Marshall S. Shatz, eds., *Imperial Russia, 1700-1917: State, Society, Opposition* (DeKalb, IL, 1988).

emblem of the Russian regime²⁶ in promoting cultural homogeneity within the Empire and expansion abroad. In this way, the Orthodox Imperial Power started to challenge violently the survival attempts of its neighboring Ottoman regime. The two Ottoman-Russian wars of 1768-74 and 1787-1792 not only ended Ottoman control over the Black Sea, but also gave momentum to Tsarina Catherine's claims to the right of protection over Ottoman Orthodox Christians.²⁷ Such assertions constituted an open threat against the Ottomans, as they challenged the legitimacy of their rule over the Aegean Sea and the Balkans.²⁸ Thus, shortly before the Greek revolution of 1821, the Ottomans had experienced a great military defeat, and were faced with a significant ideological challenge that caused uproar among their subjects.²⁹

In 1770, for instance, the Christians of Sfakia, Crete, rose up against the Muslims.

²⁶ On ecclesiastical reforms in the eighteenth century Russian Empire and the relationship between the Church and the State see, G.L. Freeze, "Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36, no 82 (1985):82-102. The above author suggests that the reforms were intended to modernize the ecclesiastical infrastructure rather than to transform the Church to a state-institution. Yet it is important to underline here the significant involvement of the Russian throne to the issues of the Church and the growing interest demonstrated by Peter and Catherine the Great in replacing the Church with themselves, as the supreme authority of Christian orthodoxy. At the same time, it seems that religion in imperial Russia became the pretext for a broader social debate that resulted in challenging even the institution of the empire, see Scott M Kenworthy, "An Orthodox Social Gospel in Late-Imperial Russia," *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 1 (May 2006).

²⁷ Finkel, *Osman's dream*, 379.

²⁸ During the late eighteenth-century Russo-Ottoman wars, for instance, the Tsarina herself had officially addressed the Greek-Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, asking them to support the Russian army that "would liberate them from the infidel rule," see Catherine of Russia, *Ελέω Θεού ημεῖς Αικατερίνη δευτέρα βασιλῆς και αυτοκράτωρ πάσης Ρωσσίας, τοῖς αγιωτάτοις πατριάρχαις, πανιερωτάτοις μητροπολίταις, αρχιεπισκόποις... και πάσι τοῖς των ἐνδόξων ἐλληνίων λαῶν οἰκήτορσι...* [*Ἐν τέλει*] *Ἐδόθη ἐν τῇ τοῦ αγίου Πέτρου πόλει, Φεβρουαρίου 13, ἔτει ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνσάρκου οἰκονομίας Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀπῃ [1788] τῆς δε βασιλείας ἡμῶν εἰκοστῷ ἔκτῳ: Catherine II, Supreme under God Queen and Empress of Russia, to Your Holiness Patriarchs, to Your Eminence Metropols and Archbishops, and to all of you that live among the glorious Greek peoples...* (Saint Petersburg, February 1788).

²⁹ See David M. Goldfrank, "Policy Traditions and the Menshikov Mission of 1853," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. H. Ragsdale and V. N. Ponomarev (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press, 1993) 119-158, 153.

The uprising, which was retrospectively characterized as national, was directly related to the insurgents' reliance on the Imperial Navy of Russia. The main leaders of the movement were merchants directly affected by political developments around the Black Sea, which was gradually brought under Russian control.³⁰ In the name of their common religion, therefore, the Cretans were asking Russia to undertake the control and protection of the island. At the same time, almost parallel to the Cretan events, one more Christian uprising took place in Ottoman Morea (Peloponnese), with the direct involvement of the Russian agent Orlof. The final outcome of the war was unfortunate for the local Christians, and the violent suppression of the revolts by the Ottoman regime cost the Russians some of their most eager supporters on Ottoman lands.³¹ Nevertheless, the Russian Empire continued for a century to claim these lands in the name of religion, frequently encouraging the Christians to revolt.

By and large, the Russian claims were based on an interpretation of the past that may be described as follows: The Christian subjects of the sultan were the descendants of the oldest Orthodox Empire, namely the Eastern Roman Empire, also known as Byzantium.³² After the fall of the capital Constantinople to the Ottomans, however, the Eastern Roman Church had survived under the new regime only as a linguistic-geographical legacy. The political center of Orthodoxy, at the same time, had been moved to the Russian Empire. In this way, the Tsars had undertaken the right to

³⁰ Dimitrios A. Petropoulos, "Του Δασκαλογιάννη τα Τραγούδια: Daskalogiannis's Songs," *Kritika Hronika* 8 (1954):227-237; Detorakis. *Ιστορία της Κρήτης*, 307-312.

³¹ Tasos Ath. Gritsopoulos, *Τα Ορλωφικά : η εν Πελοποννήσω Επανάστασις του 1770 και τα Επακόλουθα αυτής: Orlofika: the Revolution at the Peloponnese and what had followed it* (En Athines, 1967).

³² Cyril Toumanoff, "Moscow the Third Rome: Genesis and Significance of a Politico-Religious Idea," *The Catholic Historical Review* 40, no 4 (Jan., 1955):411-447.

represent the center of imperial Orthodoxy and Byzantine tradition. In other words, both Christian Ottomans and the historical lands of the Eastern Roman Empire belonged with the regime of the Tsars.

Despite the fact that the above Imperial claims were in contrast with Greek nationalism, Russia was initially in favor of Greek independence, in as much as the new state was independent only in theory. It is important to note here that, in 1827, while the negotiations over the political future of the Greeks continued under the guardianship of France, Great Britain, and Russia, the Greeks had elected as Governor of their revolutionary state, Ioannis Kapodistrias, a former minister of the Tsar.³³ In this respect, the new polity seemed to be controlled predominantly by Russia, a development that caused various reactions. The Ottomans refused to officially recognize Greek independence, and the groups representing the interests of the other Powers refused to support the Greek governor. In short, the first political experiment of Greek semi-independence ended dramatically when Kapodistrias was murdered in 1831.³⁴ Following this, the Great Powers of Europe finally agreed to press for the Ottoman recognition of Greece as a Christian Monarchy under their joint protection.³⁵

³³ Stamatis Th. Laskaris, *Ο Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας : (ως Πρώσος Διπλωμάτης και Υπουργός των Εξωτερικών): Ioannis Kapodistrias: (as a Russian Diplomat and Minister of Foreign Affairs)*, Athina: Bayron, 1973).

³⁴ Hristos Loukos, *Η αντιπολίτευση κατά του Κυβερνήτη Ιω. Καποδίστρια 1828 - 1831: Opposition against the Governor I. Kapodistria 1828-1831* (Athina: Themelio, 1988).

³⁵ *Article explanatory and supplementary to article VIII of the Convention between the courts of Great Britain, Bavaria, France, and Russia, relative to the sovereignty of Greece, signed at London, April 30, 1833* (London: H. Harrison, 1833).

The Rums, the Greeks, and the "Great Idea"

During the first years after its foundation, the mere existence of the Kingdom was undermined by profound structural problems that could not be easily resolved. Despite the small size of Greece, the Greek populations presented striking heterogeneity. During the revolution, a sense of national union appeared to be indeed diffused into the mass of those discontented with the Ottoman regime. Yet this fragile homogeneity of mind began to quickly disappear after the proclamation of Independence, due to both internal and external reasons. For instance, ramified conflicts arose between mountaineer populations and islanders, rich landowners and landless peasants, small-scale entrepreneurs and merchants, or chief-insurgents and intellectuals.³⁶ At the same time, the European forces that tried to take advantage of the new state's divided realities represented a world of multiple pluralities often rival to each other. In this way, the profound socioeconomic, cultural, political, ideological, and territorial differences among the Greeks accounted for the continuous local turmoil that was often linked to conflicting foreign interests.³⁷

³⁶ Elli Skopetea, *To "Πρότυπο Βασίλειο" και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα; Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880): The "Model Kingdom" and the Great Idea; Aspects of the national question in Greece (1830-1880)* (Athina: Politropo, 1988), 23-68.

³⁷ Both the "war of independence" and the effort to modernize the structures of the Greek state had resulted to the state's dependency on foreign loans. To be more specific, from the very beginning of the 1821 war, the Greek forces found themselves indebted with loans, that they failed to take up for decades. For instance, as early as 1824, Great Britain provided an initial "independence loan" of 800,000£, which made the City of London the actual financier of the revolution. See *Greek loan* (London, 1832-1910); Anastasios D. Lignadis, *Το Πρώτον Δάνειον της Ανεξαρτησίας: The First Loan of Independence* (Athine: Ethiko kai Kapodistriako Panepistimio Athinon, 1970); Jon V. Kofas, *Financial Relations of Greece and the Great Powers, 1832-1862* (Colo; New York: East European Quarterly; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1981); Sophia Lazaretou, "Government Spending, Monetary Policies, and Exchange Rate Regime Switches: The Drachma in the Gold Standard Period," *Explorations in Economic History* 32, no 1 (January 1995): 28-50; William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free, The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge Open Book Publishers, 2008 [1972]), 205-311.

The first three political parties founded in Greece (the French, English, and Russian parties) constituted a very good illustration both of the Kingdom's dependency on Europe and of the rival interests among the locals.³⁸ Yet only a limited number of the Greeks identified with one of the parties. As to the others, some appeared to remain silent without any political representation; others followed the path of the outlaw, forming gangs of mountaineer bandits that on numerous occasions cooperated with the broader sociopolitical networks of the Greek society.³⁹ In this context, the continuous internal turmoil, the depressing reality of state finances, and the constant intervention of foreign powers in the state's internal affairs, caused widespread popular discontent that eventually brought the Bavarian King of Greece under scrutiny. After the official state bankruptcy of 1843, therefore, the Greeks rose up against their King, asking for the proclamation of a Constitution, which the regime had no choice but to accept.⁴⁰ The above outcome was in harmony with the broader revolutionary movements in contemporaneous Europe and with the gradual spread of Constitutionalism.⁴¹ Nevertheless, this important political change did little to solve the actual problems of the Greek state. Thus unable to find solution to the obvious deficiencies of the tiny

³⁸ John Antony Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Hering Gunnar, *Ta Πολιτικά Κόμματα στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1936: Political Parties in Greece, 1821-1936*, trans. T. Paraskevopoulos (Athina: Morfotiko Idrima Ethikis Trapezis, 2004).

³⁹ Ioannis S. Koliopoulos, *Περί Λύχνων Αφάς, Η Αησεία στην Ελλάδα (19ος αι.): When the Evening comes, Banditry in Greece (nineteenth century)* (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1996).

⁴⁰ *The Constitution of Greece* (Athens, 31 March 1844). See also, Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 47-59.

⁴¹ Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer, Economic "Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848," *The Journal of Economic History* 61, no 2 (2001):293-326.

Kingdom, the Greek political forces remembered once again the 'Rums.'

The argument that the Kingdom represented only a very small part of the broader Hellenic territories was as old as the Kingdom's foundation.⁴² In the middle of the century, the above vague idea gave birth to specific national arguments, used by local politicians as an excuse for past and present failures, and as a strategy for future growth. According to the ideology that became known as the "Great Idea," the limited territories of Greece coupled with the fact that the majority of Rums remained 'enslaved' to the Ottomans constituted the common source of misfortune for both Rums and Greeks. Evidently, the difference between Rums and Greeks was that the majority of the former still lived in the Ottoman Empire, while the latter were the citizens of the Greek state. From this point of view, the creation of the nation-state was interpreted as the beginning rather than the end of the nation's liberation. The national mission would be accomplished only when all Rums would become Greeks.

The "Great Idea" rested on two main assumptions. According to the first one, Greece was a Model Kingdom that represented western Modernity and was thus destined to liberate the 'Orient' from the backward, dynastic Ottoman regime. Such claims were never truly convincing, due to the obvious and ramified underdevelopment of the supposed Model Kingdom. According to the second assumption, the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan Peninsula had traditionally been Christian-Hellenic, hence the Greeks had the historical right to 'liberate' them. In fact, in the 1850's, the above

⁴² Aleksandros Rizos Ragavis, *Ο ελληνικός αγών και το υπόμνημα του κ. Α. Παγκαβή: The Greek struggle and the memorandum of mr. A. Ragavi* (Athini: Georgios Em., 1857); Anonymous, *Ο Όθων και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Otto and the Great Idea* (1862).

See also Konstadinos Th. Dimaras, "*Της Μεγάλης Ταύτης Ιδέας*": Σχεδιάσμα Φιλολογικό: "*With Regard to the Great Idea*" a Philological Project (Athine: Tip. Filikis Eterias, 1970), 35-41. For a general discussion of the different phases of the Great Idea see Skopetea, *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 269-347.

historical arguments were characterized by significant incoherence. The historical claim that the Ottomans had, centuries ago, conquered Christian-Hellenic lands was based on the legacy of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium), the imperial Orthodoxy of which contradicted the democratic ideals of polytheistic antiquity. At the same time, the uncontested idealization of antiquity haunted the national imagination of the Greeks and constituted their main bond to modern West. Greek historiography, therefore, was called upon to solve the above problems, affording the irredentist policies of the Kingdom with some ideological clarity.⁴³

In the second half of the century, talented Greek historians elaborated on the 'scientific' justification of the cultural continuity between Athenian Democracy and Orthodox Imperial Constantinople, using as their main tool the historical continuity of the Greek language in the lands in question. From this perspective, Byzantium was viewed as the missing link between the nation's polytheistic past and its Christian present. In the same vein, the historical battle between antiquity and Christianity was explained not as a rupture, but as a national linear transformation.⁴⁴ The above narratives were convincing enough to provide the Kingdom with theoretical arguments against Ottoman sovereignty. Yet Greece still lacked the military means to officially challenge

⁴³ Vaggelis D. Karamanolakis, *Η Συγκρότηση της Ιστορικής Επιστήμης και η Διδασκαλία της Ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, 1837-1932* (Athina: Geniki Grammatia Neas Genias, 2006).

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Konstadinos Paparrigopoulos, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους από των Αρχαιοτάτων Χρόνων μέχρι των Νεωτέρων, χάριν των πολλών Εξεργασθείσα : History of the Greek Nation from Antiquity to the Modern Era, studied for the Benefit of the People* (En Athines, 1860-1874); Spiridon I. Zabelios, *Βυζαντιναί Μελέται: Περί Πηγών Νεοελληνικής Εθνότητος απο Η μέχρι Ι εκατονταετηρίδος μ.Χ.: Studies of Byzantine History: Sources of the Neo-hellenic Nationality from 800 AD to 1000 AD* (En Athines: Tip. Filadelfes X. Nikolaidou, 1857).

See also Konstadinos Th. Dimaras, *Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος : η Εποχή του, η Ζωή του, το Έργο του: Konstadinos Paparrigopoulos: his Time, his Life, his Work*. (Athina: Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapezis, 1986); Ioannis Z. Ikonmidis, *Η Ενότητα του Ελληνισμού κατά τον Σπ. Ζαμπέλιο: The Unity of Hellenism according to Sp. Zabelio* (Athina: Iolkos, 1989).

the Ottomans. For this reason, numerous secret societies were founded by the Greeks in the name of the "Great Idea," with the mission to inspire the Christians to revolt and to liberate the Hellenic lands.⁴⁵

Crete was considered by the Greeks an essential part of the Hellenic lands at stake, since the majority of the locals consisted of Greek-speaking, Orthodox populations. Moreover, the island was already associated with Greece and Europe via the symbolic power of its mythology, although the nowadays famous Cretan archaeological sites would not come to light until a few decades later.⁴⁶ The most celebrated pages of Cretan mythology referred to the birth of the king of the Olympian Gods on the island, and to his subsequent abduction of Europe as follows: The King of the Greek Gods, Zeus, had come into the world in a Cretan cave and had been brought up by the Nymphs. A few mythological years later, when Zeus had already killed his father, married his sister Hera, and become King of the Gods, he had fallen in love with the Syrian princess Europa. In order to seduce her, he had transformed himself into a bull, tempted her to mount his back, and crossed the sea to arrive in Crete. The couple had shortly after given birth to three sons—Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Sarpedon—that were known in Greek mythology to have been the island's first kings and to have ruled over the Aegean

⁴⁵ See for instance Eftimios Th. Soulogiannis, *Μυστική Εταιρεία υπέρ του Αλύτρωτου Ελληνισμού και σχέδιο "Πολιτεύματος" των "Υπερορίων" Ελλήνων, 1839: Secret Company for the Benefit of Enslaved Hellenism and the "Constitutional Project" in favor of the Hellenes (who are forced to live abroad)* (Athine, 1977).

⁴⁶ This is only one of the various interpretations concerning the mythological symbolism of Crete, of Zeus, and of Europe. Zeus could be viewed as a symbol for a man, a king, a god, a star, or a weather effect. In any case, such symbols have been used to prove that Europe has had an ancient past, and that Crete belongs with western Europe. See for instance Arthur Bernard Cook, "The European Sky-God," *Folklore* 15, no 3 (Sep. 29, 1904):264-315; P. B. S. Andrews, "The Myth of Europa and Minos," *Greece & Rome* 16, no 1 (Apr., 1969):60-66. Ilias Zervos Iakovatos, *Η Νήσος Κρήτη, και οι Νόμοι του Μίνως, μετά της Σπαρτιατικής Πολιτείας: The Island of Crete and the Laws Issued by Minos, together with the Spartan City* (En Kefallinia: Tip. Kefallinia, 1861).

Sea and Anatolia.

In brief, the allegory of an island where, once upon a time, the divine scepters of antiquity had been united with the oldest symbol of Europe in order to rule over eastern Mediterranean, was instrumental in the construction of the national Greek narrative.⁴⁷ At the same time, the numerous Christian uprisings that had already taken place in Crete by the middle of the century were interpreted by Greece as bloody national revolutions against the Turkish yoke. From this point of view, the island was not only cited as proof of the nationalistic argument for ethnic regional continuity, but was also endowed with the symbolism of resistance against the occupier. In this respect, the mission to liberate Crete gradually became one of the main pillars of Greek irredentism.⁴⁸ Between the 1860's and the early 1880's, Greek historiography, journalism, and popular literature transformed Crete from an actual —quite remote—geography to a central national symbol.⁴⁹

If abstract feelings of national solidarity were very popular among the Greeks, their actual cooperation with the Rums in promoting their national projects proved to be far more problematic. At a theoretical level, the mission to liberate the nation was a source of unity for Greece. Passionate—though particularly vague—feelings of devotion to the enslaved Hellenic nation became a way to overcome a lack of unity within the Kingdom; to bridge melodramatically conflicting interests; to provide life with a sacred

⁴⁷ On the Minoan rule over the Aegean Sea see Chester G. Starr, *The Myth of the Minoan Thalassocracy Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 3, no 3 (1955): 282-291.

⁴⁸ Kiriakos Kritovoulidis, *Ζαμπελίου και Κριτοβουλίδου Ιστορία των επαναστάσεων της Κρήτης: Zambeliou and Kritovoulidou History of the Cretan Revolutions* (En Athines: Pheksis, Georgios, 1897)

⁴⁹ Kostas Mayer, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, A:106.

meaning; and to hide the everyday problems under an idea too 'great' to be easily questioned. Yet the glory of the enlarged nation stood above Greek smallness only insofar as the Rums remained an abstract and purified vision. Each time they appeared, in flesh and blood, to have actual demands and present their own ideas, conflict replaced solidarity with impressive swiftness.

One may suggest that, despite the profound differences among the Greeks, the small size of their Kingdom had gradually helped them to shape a somewhat common identity. True, it would be inaccurate to refer to middle nineteenth century Greece as a homogenous society. By and large, however, the Greeks seemed convinced that their particularities, their interests, and their efforts lay at the core of their nation.⁵⁰ From their perspective, the Rums were identified only with the nation's past glory. As to the nation's modern regeneration, that was to be realized by the Greeks. In this respect, the historical lands of the Rums were reclaimed by the Kingdom as a rightful heritage; the same way, one could argue, that the Modern West claimed the historical lands of eastern Mediterranean and western Anatolia, including Crete and the state of Greece.

From this point of view, although the 'enslaved' should be liberated, protected, and enlightened—in the name of common origins and tradition—their emancipation was to be realized through quite patronizing a process, in which the 'liberator' would take the lead.⁵¹ If the project were to meet with success, were the Greeks ready to equally share

⁵⁰ See Konstadinos Tsoukalas, *Κοινωνική Ανάπτυξη και Κράτος; Η Συγκρότηση του Δημόσιου Χώρου στην Ελλάδα: Social Evolution and the State; The Shaping of the Public Sphere in Greece* (Athens: Themelio, 1981), 19-25, 114-162.

⁵¹ It would be certainly inaccurate to claim that a clear ideological model was followed by all Hellenes or Greeks. The mainstream patterns described in this chapter, therefore, are used only as an example of the most common practices. See Skopetea, *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 50-74.

administrative offices with the Rums? Did the Rums recognize Greek superiority over their struggles? Were they ready to accept the Kingdom as their route to progress? Although an absolute answer cannot be given to the above questions, it is important to mention that the first encounters between the two worlds did not appear all that promising.

In Crete, for instance, although most Christians seemed to expect help from Greece, on numerous occasions they addressed different foreign powers when asking for protection. At the same time, while Cretans and other Rums were not particularly welcome to the Greek Kingdom, the *Tanzimat* created new opportunities—or at least an illusion of them—within the Empire.⁵² Despite the previously mentioned Ottoman attempts to centralize and modernize the Imperial apparatus, old traditions were cast in a new light instead of ceasing to exist.⁵³ One powerful such tradition, which was not unique to Crete, was that of the Christian Pious Foundations. Under the new conditions, in other words, the individual access the Christians gained to global economic activity was combined with their right to administer the communal properties of their religious foundations.⁵⁴ Yet the universe of new investments opened up to Christian Ottomans

⁵² David M. Williams, “Trading Links: Patterns of Information and Communication: The Steamship and the Modernization of East-West Commerce,” in *East Meets West- Banking, Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. P. L. Cottrell. Aldershot (England ; Burlington, VT., 2008), 25-40, 59-96; Philip L Cottrel, “A Survey of European Investment in Turkey, 1854-1914: Banks and the Finance of the State and Railway Construction,” in *East Meets West- Banking, Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by P. L. Cottrell (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT, 2008), 25-40, 59-96.

⁵³ For a broader theoretical discussion on this issue that challenges the fundamental divide between “the occidental and oriental, or archaic and modern,” see Engin F. Isin, and Alexandre Lefebvre, “Gift of Law: Greek Euergetism and Ottoman Waqf,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 8, no 1 (2005):5-23.

⁵⁴ Evidently, the difference between Ottomans and Greeks had more to do with the actual different issues the two states were faced with. Thus trying to explain the dynamics in question by reference to inherited Ottoman tolerance, or inherited Greek fanaticism is a problematic approach. For instance, it is worth noting here that when the Greek annexation of Crete became from an abstract idea a political reality, and for the brief period it seemed that the Greek Great Idea could be realized, the Greek strategies towards

was not only profitable but also risky, as the Ottoman authorities often acted in arbitrary or unpredictable ways, and economic activity was not secured by a stable institutional framework.⁵⁵

Religious Conflicts, European Antagonisms, and the Manifold “Great Ideas”

In the preceding sections I have briefly referred to the central place religion occupied in the context of Greek nationalism, without further reference to the particularities of the Greek Church and Helleno-Orthodox religion. It is necessary to provide some more information on the issue, in order to better illustrate the religious conflicts that occurred in the second half of the century between Rums and Greeks, both in Crete and in

Islam changed. In other words, in order to claim the right to govern territories where vast Muslim populations lived in, the Greeks adopted slogans in favor of protecting “the other.” In brief, if fanaticism colored indeed the strategies of the Greek state, a polity born through revolution, the Greeks did not hesitate to adopt slogans of “tolerance” very similar to the Ottoman patterns of control whenever they believed that their state could be transformed to an Empire.

⁵⁵ The discussion of the legal corporate status of Ottoman Helleno-Orthodox communities in the second half of the nineteenth century constitutes a very difficult task mainly for two reasons: first, because parallel to the ambiguities of central regulations one has always to take into account local particularities. And second, because as the legal framework of the Empire was transforming in the name both of reform and of tradition, a variety of hybrid structures had emerged and become the bridge between these two different aspects of modernity. My suggestion is that despite, or due to, the fact that there was no institutional stability in the late nineteenth century Eastern Mediterranean, communal capitalist networks developed side by side with the institutionalization of older legacies, such as *vakf* or monastic properties. A telling example of this was the compensation for the monastic lands confiscated by the government of A. Kouza, paid to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul, through a loan issued by the powerful Istanbul bankers Zarifi, Zografo and Alverti, see Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση, Προς μια Ανασύνθεση της Ιστορίας του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα: Reform and Secularization, The Reconstructions of the Nineteenth Century History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate* (Athina: Aleksandria, 2003), 266-270.

For the difference between Monastic rural properties and Orthodox urban properties see Ayse Ozil, *Question of Legal Corporate status for the Orthodox Christian Communities in the late Ottoman Empire* (Birkbeck College, University of London [unpublished paper]).

For a methodological discussion of “financial networking,” economical and social spaces, and of the way social and economic linkages select and exclude access to differential positions see Lilyan A. Brudner and Douglas R. White, “Class, Property, and Structural Endogamy: Visualizing Networked Histories,” *Theory and Society* 26 (Apr-Jun., 1997):161-208.

general. Furthermore, it is useful to refer with greater detail to the ramified sociopolitical and religious connotations of the "Great Idea."

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, despite the fact that 19th century Crete was an Ottoman province, the influence of Greek nationalism on the island was too important to be overlooked. It would be equally inaccurate, however, to suggest that Cretans and Greeks shared a stable, homogenous ideology, or common interests, that inspired solidarity among them and ill will towards the Muslims. The same way Cretan dynamics were influenced both by conflict and cooperation between Muslims and Christians, national dynamics were influenced by a matrix of conflicting interpretations and interests among Christian Cretans and Greeks.

Although the striking majority of nineteenth century Rums and Greeks identified with the Christian religion, their loyalties were divided among different religious centers. Influenced by the activities of western missionaries, for example, a few of them had converted to Protestantism or Catholicism.⁵⁶ At the same time, the antagonism between the Ottoman Helleno-Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul and the Autocephalus Church of the Kingdom of Greece, which had seceded from the Patriarchate in November 1833, was a major source of conflict among Rums and Greeks.⁵⁷ The

⁵⁶ By and large, in the second half of the century, American philanthropic and educative organizations took lead of missionary activity in the state of Greece. One should not forget the important difference between America and "old Europe" in this respect. The very foundation of the Greek Church was viewed as serving well British and French interests, as it brought the Greeks closer to western Christianity Orthodox East. The polity of the United States of America, on the other hand, as a newly established state and as a rising military, economic, and political power, could not afford supporting the diplomacy of the "old Great Powers of Europe." Thus Americans made their first steps in the context of eastern Mediterranean politics through philanthropy, preaching, and education. See Sofi Papageorgiou, *Αμερικανοί ιεραπόστολοι στην Ελλάδα, 1820-1850: American missionaries in Greece, 1820-1850* (Athina: Dodoni, 2003). See also, Varouhakis, *The Idea of Europe*, 24-25.

⁵⁷ Frazee, *The Orthodox Church*.

symbolic year of the secession, in other words, marked the development of two different movements within Greek Orthodoxy. The first one continued to support the Imperial legacy of the Patriarchate that was tied to the Ottoman and Byzantine traditions. The second one was rejecting any association with the Ottoman institutions suggesting that, both spiritually and administratively, the Greek Church should represent the values of the Western Christianity and modern Europe.⁵⁸

In this respect, the same way late nineteenth century Crete stood somewhere between the empire and the nation-state, the See of Crete stood somewhere between the National Church and the Imperial Patriarchate, representing a distinct reality that both centers claimed. In fact, the local See remained directly attached to the Patriarchate until 1897, in the same way the island remained under direct Ottoman rule. The jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, however, was constantly questioned by Greek nationalism, missionary activities, and local interests. The administrative relationship between the capital-city and the province, therefore, was defined more than anything by constant conflict.⁵⁹

During the nineteenth century, at the same time, at least three different versions of the “Great Idea” had been developed in Greece. The first was associated with the Empire of Russia and aimed at a future triumph of Orthodoxy over Islam. The second was based on the assumption that the Kingdom was a model modern-state, founded

⁵⁸ Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία*, 45-82.

⁵⁹ Nikolaos Tomadakis, "Έλεγχος των εν Κρήτη Αρχιερατευσάντων επί Τουρκοκρατίας (1645 - 1898): Examination of the Cretan Archpriests under the Turkish Yoke (1645-1898)," *Epetiris Eterias Kritikon Spoudon* 3 (1940):114-155; Andreas Nanakis, *Το Επισκοπικό Ζήτημα 1880 - 1882 και η Εκκλησία της Κρήτης: The Episcopal Question 1880-1882 and the Church of Crete* (Katerini: Tertios, 1992); Andreas Nanakis, *Το Μητροπολιτικό Ζήτημα και η Εκκλησιαστική Οργάνωση της Κρήτης, 1897-1900: The Metropolitan Question and the Ecclesiastical Organization of Crete, 1897-1900* (Katerini: Epektasi, 1995).

upon the mission to liberate the Orient from its medieval despots, promoting Christianity—thought not necessarily Orthodoxy—in eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia. The main supporters of this view were ideologically identified with Great Britain and France. Last but not least, according to the third version of the Idea, the Greek Church should join forces with the Patriarchate of Istanbul to culturally liberate the Orient, but without violently overthrowing the Ottoman regime—for the time being, at least.⁶⁰

This last approach became gradually consistent with British foreign policy in the East. In fact, in the first half of the century, British diplomacy had promoted the foundation of an independent Greek Archdiocese against Ottoman interests. After the Crimean war (1853-1856), however, when old rivals France and Great Britain, found themselves forced to collaborate in defending the Ottomans in order to stop the expansion of Russia, British policies were modified. The Crimean war was interpreted by the two European powers as one more battle between the West and the Orient. Only this time, the backward, dynastic Orient was represented by the Orthodox Empire rather than Muslim Ottomans. To put it differently, from 1821 to 1856, the discourses and imagined enemies of the West had changed.⁶¹ Nevertheless, when the Christian forces of Britain and France—self-identified with progressive West—had marched against the

⁶⁰ In the context of the present study it has appeared more meaningful to me to examine the transformation of the Greek Great Idea parallel to the changing strategies of the Great Powers. Yet, one has to remember that this is only one of the several ways this topic can be addressed. See also, Skopetea, *Το πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 269.

⁶¹ The slogan of “battle against the East” was used in order to legitimize both external and internal policies in France and Great Britain. On the ways the new communication technologies (namely the printed press) had influenced decision making with regard to Victorian Britain's foreign policy see Stefanie Markovits, *The Crimean War in the British Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Russian army to protect an Islamic regime, it caused turmoil and great confusion among the Greeks.

The Crimean War and the Revolution of 1821 in the Context of Greek Historiography

Almost from the foundation of the Kingdom onwards, the Greek public had been divided between those who considered Russia the only force that could liberate Orthodox Rums from the Ottomans, and those who interpreted Russian protection as a different kind of occupation. According to the latter, not only was the Tsar yet another Oriental despot, but he was also openly challenging the primacy of Orthodox Rums in the East. Under the shadow of the Crimean war, however, the Russian attack against Ottoman sovereignty was viewed with enthusiasm by the majority of Greek intellectuals. The protection offered to the Ottomans by Britain and France, on the contrary, caused popular frustration and great dissatisfaction in Greece, despite the fact that most opponents of the “Russophiles” stood firm in their belief that the Kingdom’s future belonged with the West.⁶²

At the same time, the supporters of Russia tried to avoid challenging openly the other two Powers, and prominent Greek intellectuals elaborated on closing the gap between the rivals by attempting to convince the West about Russian virtue. In their drive to defend the Tsars, Greek historians, writers, and thinkers struggled to persuade the European public that the history of Greek independence was interwoven with

⁶² Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία*, 118-119.

Russian support. The same circles argued that, by favoring the Russians, the Greeks did not betray the West. Quite to the contrary, an alliance between the westernizing Greek Kingdom and the Orthodox Empire could function, according to them, as a bridge between the two worlds, bringing the light of the West to the Christian Orient. During and after the Crimean war, therefore, the Greeks produced a number of publications in English and French devoted to the above described task.⁶³

In this context, the Greek War of Independence was presented as an example of Christian unity, reminding European readers of the great victories Christianity could achieve when united. In the light of the 'teachings' of the past, the ritual of history was employed by the Greeks to reassert the Kingdom's important place between the East and the West.⁶⁴ A telling example of such joint efforts was the historical work by S. Trikoupi published in London in the Greek language between 1853-1857 with the title *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* (History of the Greek Revolution).⁶⁵ The work

⁶³ Anastasios Goudas, *Ανατολή και Δύσις: Orient and West* (Athens, 1867).

⁶⁴ For instance, see a pamphlet published in 1861 as an answer to Comte Hamel, who was in favor of an Austrian administration of Crete, claiming that such a solution would have been beneficial for both parts. For, in this way, the island would be purified from its oriental past; and Austria would become a "Mediterranean Empire." Quoting Aristotle, the Comte claimed that Crete lied between the East and the West and that by controlling the island thus Austria could become the bridge between the two worlds. To this argument, the anonymous author of the pamphlet answered that the only Empire destined to unite the West with the East was a future Greek Empire, and that the island of Crete belonged with eastern Mediterranean and Greece. Furthermore, he underlined that Aristotle's argument was as follows: Asian populations were more intelligent than Europeans, but lacked courage. European populations, on the other hand, were very brave but lacked wisdom. Only the Greek races mastered both qualities. As written in the pamphlet: "...habitant un pays situé entre l'Asie et l'Europe, elle réunit à la fois les qualités des deux races; elle possède à la fois l'intelligence et le courage. Elle sait en même temps garder son indépendance et former des bons gouvernements capable, si elle était réunie en un seul État, de marcher à la tête de l'humanité..." See Anonymous, *L' Autriche et l'île de Candie, réponse a M. le Comte du Hamel: Austria and the island of Crete, reply to Mr. the Comte of Hamel* (Paris: Ledoyen Libraire-Editeur, 1861).

⁶⁵ Spiridon Trikoupi was then Greek ambassador in London. The first edition of his work was followed by a second, corrected one, after the Crimean war, in 1860. The work of Trikoupi and the way it was received in Great Britain reflect the complexity both of Greek nationalism and of British politics. To be more specific, Trikoupi appeared to be very critical of the endless civil conflicts among the Greeks, whereas his notion of patriotism was obviously interwoven with the Orthodox religious tradition, see

was very well received in Greece and supported by the majority of political actors. The reason for this was that, although the writer was affiliated with the British Party, his interpretation of history reminded the readers that in 1821, the forces of Christianity were united in support of the Greeks. Moreover, the fact that the author specifically underlined the enormous contribution of Russian philhellenes to the War of Independence, was enough for the friends of Russia in Greece to welcome his study and to support it.⁶⁶

If the contribution of Russian agents to the revolution of 1821 was beyond doubt, the same could be said for the numerous conflicts that had occurred between them and the local insurgents. After the Crimean war, the Greek supporters of Russia tried to

Spiridon Trikoupis, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως: History of the Greek Revolution* (En Londino: Tip. Tailorou ke Fragiskou (en ti avli tou Erithrou Leodos), 1860-1862), vol. 1-4.

It is furthermore interesting to mention here that this approach to the issue was very well received by the British public, or at least by these British actors who strongly disagreed with the support provided by the British government to the Ottomans in the second half of the century. For instance, the leader of the Liberals W.E. Gladstone, writing his thoughts *vis-a-vis* Christianity in 1865 claimed that, important as it may have been, the contribution of antiquity to the formation of western civilization was less important than the contribution of eastern Christianity. Therefore, western Christianity should “liberate” the Holy lands from the Muslims instead of supporting the Ottomans: “For the exercises of strength and skill, for the achievements and for the enchantments of wit, of eloquence, of art, of genius, for the imperial games of politics and war, let us seek them on the shores of Greece. But if the first among the problems of life be how to establish the peace and restore the balance of our inner being; if the highest of all conditions in the existence of the creature be his aspect towards the God to whom he owes his being, and in whose great hand he stands; then let us make our search elsewhere. All the wonders of the Greek civilization heaped together are less wonderful than is the single Book of Psalms...” see W. E. Gladstone, *Address on the Place of Ancient Greece in the Providential Order of the World: delivered before the University of Edinburgh, on the third of November, 1865 by the right Hon. , M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Foreign Associate of the Institute of France* (London; Edinburgh: John Murray; Albemarle Street Oliver and Boyd, 1865), 56-57.

⁶⁶ See, for instance, the very flattering review signed by the prominent historian K. Paparrigopoulos, which appeared in the *Spectateur d'Orient*, a revue that was published in 1853 in French by a group of Greek intellectuals (among whom we find Paparrigopoulos, Ragavis and Renieris), in order to explain to western Christianity the importance of Orthodox tradition and of Russian support with regard to Greek nationalism. See M. Paparrigopoulos, *Le Spectateur d' Orient* VI (1855), 255-256. Quoted in G.-G. Gervinus, *Insurrection et régénération de la Grèce: Insurrection and Greek regeneration* (Paris: A. Durand, 1863).

In the same line of thought see a review-article published in the Greek journal *Πανδώρα* in 1853: Anonymous, “Βιβλιογραφία: Σπυρίδωνος Τρικούπη Ιστορία της ελληνικής επανάστασεως: Bibliography: History of the Greek Revolution by Spiridonos Trikoupi,” in *Pandora* 4 (86):361-362.

retrospectively justify this anomaly by blaming all rivalries not to the agents of the Tsar, but to the Greek insurgents. A good example of relevant narratives is another historical study about the 1821 revolution and “Greek regeneration,” which was translated into French and published in Paris in 1863 under the title *Insurrection et Régénération de la Grèce*. Both the author of the above study, G. Gervinus, and the translators, J. F. Minssen and L. Sgoutas, openly criticized some of the Greek fighters of 1821 for their lack of harmonious cooperation with foreign actors.⁶⁷

Crete occupied an important place in the context of the above study, as a negative example of relevant dynamics. The same locals who had on different occasions been presented as the island's warrior heroes were now judged in a negative light when nested within narratives in favor of Russia. The Sfakian Cretans, for instance, were heavily criticized by Gervinus—practically accused of treason—for their failure to cooperate with Commander Dimitrios Ipsilantis’s emissary to Crete, Michail Afentoulis.⁶⁸ One should not forget that shortly before the revolution both Ipsilantis and Afentoulis had been serving as secret agents of the Russian Empire. The historical fact that some of the Cretan insurgents, therefore, had refused to cooperate with them during the War of Independence undermined the argument of a universal Christian battle against the Ottomans. In this respect, Gervinus heavily criticized the Christian Sfakians, accusing them of egoism. According to him, all the Sfakians cared about was to assume the leadership in Crete, failing to comprehend the great ideals of joint struggle and national revolution. As a result, the malignity of the local leaders, who were jealous of the

⁶⁷ Gervinus, *Insurrection et régénération*.

⁶⁸ Periklis D. Rodakis, *Ο Αλέξανδρος Υψηλάντης και η Φιλική: Aleksandros Ipsiladis and the "Filiki,"* (Athina: Gordios, 1996).

supreme military and administrative skills of Afentoulis was, according to Gervinus, the reason national enterprises had failed in 1821-1829 on the island of Crete.⁶⁹

British 'Pacifism', Russian 'Panslavism' and the *Rapprochement* Between Ottomans and Greeks

The popularity Russia had gained in the Kingdom after the Crimean war did not last long, due both to internal and external developments. In 1862, king Otto and his cabinet, who during the Crimean war had appeared to be closer to Russia than to any other power, were dethroned. Following this, British diplomacy promoted the further democratization of Greece in order to gain the support of the local sociopolitical elites, who used the parliamentary system to serve their own interests. While the delegates of the Powers met under British leadership to find the new Greek king, therefore, the Greek parliament met to decree a new constitution. Eventually, after long debates and new civil conflicts,⁷⁰ Danish prince William-George Gluckhous was selected new King of the

⁶⁹ Gervinus, *Insurrection et Régénération*, translator's introduction and 39-47.

⁷⁰ Despite the rise of Greek enthusiasm in favor of British protection and of Philhellenism in Great Britain, a part of the British public remained quite suspicious towards Greece. Henry Arthur Tilly, for example, who was visiting Greece at that time, was not thrilled with the political situation in Greece or with the ways Greeks expressed to him their liking of Her Majesty's family: "Athens is the dullest town in Europe for a long stay. Once having examined the ruins, a visitor soon gets tired of the place. It is impossible to be always in ecstasies before mutilated marbles, even though a "Victory without wings" be among them. Beyond these, Athens contains little that is interesting. Greek society is not very pleasant for strangers. The men are always up to their ears in politics, practicing eloquence in the discussion of ideas for the good of their little country. The women, still retaining in some degree the exclusiveness of all Eastern countries, only come forth in the splendor of satin, jewels, and paint. Even then, they have little to say for themselves; and this is perhaps their least fault..."

"The occasion (the appointment of a new King for Greece) soon produced artists, and Prince Alfred was portrayed to the Greeks as an interesting sailor boy, about ten years old, leaning on a cannon and looking very miserable. But in matters political, as in matters religious, it was necessary to speak to the mass pictorially...."

"-We'll set all Europe in flames, if the Great Powers don't let us have what we want." supported the

Greeks (October 1863), and the system of government was changed, affording the parliament new authorities.⁷¹

The above political reform was also followed by territorial expansion. In 1864, the Ionian Islands (*Επτάνησα*) were triumphantly integrated into the Kingdom, sealing the newly established diplomatic 'understanding' between British and Greek political forces.⁷² Great Britain made it clear that the enemy of the Greek state was not the Ottoman Empire but internal underdevelopment. As a result, only by accepting British protection could the Greeks hope to realize their Great Idea, since the Kingdom was clearly incapable of fighting the Ottomans without foreign support. Greece, in other words, was viewed by the British as a 'child' that needed to be protected and patronized; a child incapable of independent action that had better follow Great Britain's directions—the latter presented as a caring parent—in order some day to mature. The didactic tone of such approaches is best illustrated in contemporary texts such as follows:

The Greeks complain that their country is too small for them. It is not easy to see how, if a small house or a small state cannot be well administered, a larger one would be better. If the governing classes in Greece have not been able to maintain order, and regulate their money matters in so small a

Greeks...The private feelings of Queen of England, the political dispositions of the English Government, never entered their minds...So exclusively were the Greeks taken up with their idea of Alfred that they quite forgot that there were two other Powers besides England to which the country had been under some obligation. After a time, however, they remembered the fact..." Henry Arthur Tilley, *Eastern Europe and Western Asia; Political and Social Sketches on Russia, Greece and Syria* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1864):253-254, 262-285.

⁷¹ George Tridimas, "Referendum and the Choice between Monarchy and Republic in Greece," *Constitutional Political Economy* (April 9, 2009).

⁷² See Nikos Svoronos, *Histoire de la Grèce moderne* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1953), 96-97.

territory, would they manage better if they had half of European Turkey to govern in addition? We have not to look far for the reason why the rule of the Sultan in Europe is so up held by foreign Powers. If the Slavs of the north are not more advanced in political and popular education than their brethren in the south, the downfall of the Crescent is yet far distant. Were either of the two states in the Eastern peninsula in the position of the Piedmont, the Turks would not remain a year in Europe. The break up must come sooner or later, in the natural course of things, is evident. The Mahomedan rule in Europe would fall at once if the support of the foreign Powers were withdrawn. Its glory is with the past, and its revival seems almost an impossibility. The course to be followed by the Greeks is plain enough. Their wisdom is to remain quiet, and employ all their talent and energies in improving their country, in organizing its society on a firm basis, and calmly to await the issue. The heritage is theirs.⁷³

Nevertheless, when uprisings broke out in Crete in 1866, the pro-British enthusiasm of the preceding years rapidly faded away. The Cretan events provided the Russian party in Greece with new grounds to attack the antiwar strategies of Britain, as Russia was the only Great Power that favored revolution against the Ottomans. British diplomacy, in contrast, promoted economic liberalism and political cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece, in favor of the Greeks. One should not forget that, from an Ottoman perspective, the Crimean War and the Peace of Paris (1856) that had ended it, was a defeat rather than a victory, despite the fact that the Russian army was eventually stopped by the other European powers. The Ottomans were thus encouraged to prove their gratitude to the Christian West by introducing a new program of reforms. In this way the Rums, who were still the privileged elite of the Orthodox millet, were afforded new rights and authorities.

At the same time, although for the time being Britain appeared to be Europe's strongest military power, Russia was still a very powerful rival. As long as Russia

⁷³ Tilley, *Eastern Europe and Western Asia*, 337.

favored revolution, therefore, the moderate strategies of Britain failed to satisfy Greek expectations, despite the generous gestures of the Powers in favor of the Greeks. As a result, parallel to their moderate efforts to form a bridge between Russia and the West, Greek intellectuals continued to carve out irredentist projects, always including Crete among the Hellenic lands that should be liberated. Western Europe's efforts to pacify eastern Mediterranean were thus obviously disdained by the Greeks.⁷⁴ In this respect, Greek folk-poetry became the counterpart of official historiography. While the latter continued, to a great extent, to flatter Christian Europe for its support of the Greek struggles against the Ottomans, folk-poetry adopted an offensive style, attacking western 'hypocrisy' and 'betrayal.'

The violent Cretan events of 1866-1869 arose, in this context, as a popular symbolic theme. The island was used by the Greeks, mainly by the Greek supporters of Russia, to criticize the pro-Ottoman policy of the victors of the Crimean war. At a superficial level, the events of 1866-1869 were reconstructed in prose narrative to praise Cretan heroism.⁷⁵ Yet it does not escape attention that the repetitive pattern in these

⁷⁴ Constantin Saravas, *La Démocratie Hellénique et les affaires de Crète, Appel à la France* (Paris: Gustave Retaux, 1867); M.A. , *L'insurrection de Crète* (Paris: L'imprimerie d'etat, 1868).

⁷⁵ “The Sultan thinks that England is going to protect him for ever! / Yet, my dear Sultan, you have to realize that another King is going to take over your glorious palaces now/ King George is to rule and to govern/ He is to sit in on the Throne of Constantinople/ He is to be crowned with the golden wreath of victory/ He is to liberate all countries up to the “Red Apple Tree”/And you shall go back thus, Sultan; back were you belong/ Back to your barbarian, Anatolian homeland.” In Anonymous, *Ποίημα μιας Τουρκοπούλας εξ Ηρακλείου: Poem by a Cretan Girl from Herakleio* (Ermoupoli Sirou, 1867).

“...and the priest (goumenos) had called the Cretans to rise up in arms/ But the brave Manousogiannakis had answered that there is no difference between the Sultan and the *Fragia*,” see Anonymous, *Τα Κρητικά. Ποίημα αφιερωμένον εις τους εν Κρήτη Αγωνιζόμενους: Cretan affairs. Poem in the name of the fighters of Crete* (Εν Αθήναις: Εκ του τυπογραφείου Ιω. Αγγελόπουλου, 1867)

Within this context, Crete was often pictured as an innocent, virgin, girl who only hoped to be rejoined with her mother Greece. Yet she was abused by her suitors (both Anatolians and Europeans), who did nothing to help her when she fought for her freedom, hurting herself, suffering, and bleeding: “They claim to be Christian; but Christ is crucified through their actions again, and again.../Oh! Mother Mary, sweet Mary, hope giving Mary! We ask for nothing but for freedom, in the name of our sweet homeland/ Only

lyrics was the accusation that Western Christianity, *Fragia* (Φραγκιά), was shamefully supporting the Ottomans, *Tourkia* (Τουρκιά), against Christian Cretans. The massacres of Crete were presented thus as the result of western conspiracies and diplomatic games. The western answer to such accusations was, in fact, that Russia was the only power to be blamed for the violent events in Crete, since its agents encouraged the Christians to revolt in order to serve the Tsar's interests. The publications under scrutiny, however, characterized such arguments as shameful excuses of the West, oriented against the only Christian power that still supported Greece:

Christian Europe, shame on you!
 Instead of carrying the Christ's Cross with a Knight's honor
 Subordinated you are—indeed—by the Turkish horror.⁷⁶

For a short period, therefore, public opinion in Greece appeared to turn once again in favor of Russia. Nevertheless, future Greek-Russian cooperation was seriously

You know --Oh! Holy Mary--, the Cretan pain/ And if we did something wrong, please forgive us! Amen!"see Ioannou Konstadinidou, *Η εκστρατεία Ομέρ Πασά κατά του Λασιθίου: Omer Pasa's campaign against Lasithi*. (En Ermoupoli: M.P. Peridou, 1868).

Aside from the above presented Greek lyrics about Crete, it appears that there were also numerous western Europeans that felt inspired by the Cretan struggle (for all kinds of different reasons) and who had declared also in prose their love for Crete and Greece. In this context, Crete always appeared to be a powerless female (a pregnant woman or a virgin girl), who had to be liberated by powerful Christian Europe, in the name of the "manly" glory of ancient Greece. See for instance the following poems:

"From the womb of peace,/ A womb that yearns for birth,/As a man-child should deliverance come to Greece,/As a savior should the child be born on earth./...O love, O light, O flame,/ By thin own Grecian name,/We call thee and we charge thee that all these be free...

"Greece, where only men whose manhood was as godhead/ ever trod,/ Bears the blind world witness yet of light wherewith her feet are shod:/ Freedom, armed of Greece, was always very man and very God," A. C. Swinburne, "Ode on the Insurrection in Candia," *The Fortnightly Review* (1867): 284-290.

⁷⁶ «Δεν ντρέπονται οι Ευρωπαίοι; Αντί να φέρουν το σταυρό σαν ιππότες, είναι του Τούρκου υποτελείς δεσμώτες,» see K.G. Verkos, *Εν Δάκρυ επί των εν Κρήτη της τουρκικής θηριωδίας θυμάτων και μια λέξις προς την πεπολιτισμένην Ευρώπην: A tear for the victims of Turkish atrocities in Crete and a word towards civilized Europe* (En Wiourgervo: Klinis Epitropi, 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 1866).

undermined by simultaneous developments in the Ottoman Empire, where the privileged status of the Greek-Orthodox Church, which was further favored by the last administrative reforms, had generated growing resentment among Orthodox populations in the Ottoman provinces. A few years after the issue of the Reform Edict (1856), Slavic-speaking Christians rose up in arms, demanding administrative and cultural independence and refusing subordination to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul.⁷⁷

According to some scholars, the above demands were in perfect harmony with the mood of Pan-Slavism, which became quite popular in Russia after the Crimean defeat.⁷⁸ Yet it seems that the concept of Pan-Slavism was employed more by the diverse enemies of Tsarist Russia than by the regime of the Tsars. Pan-Slavism, in other words, became popular in western Europe, where it was used to convince the public of the seriousness of the Slavic threat. According to such approaches, the Russian conspiracy to conquer

⁷⁷ For a characteristic example of the ways the Bulgarian claims were received by the Hellenic-Orthodox community of Istanbul see *Εκθέσεις της Επιτροπής, της Διορισθείσης υπό της Γενικής Συνελεύσεως της 21 Φεβρουαρίου 1864 προς Διαφώτισιν του Βουλγαρικού Ζητήματος: Report by the Committee appointed by the General Assembly on 21th February 1864 to Provide Information on the Bulgarian Question* (En Kostadinoupoli, 1864).

On the construction of memory and identity in the Balkans from late nineteenth century onwards see Maria Todorova, ed., *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (Washington Square, N.Y: New York University Press, 2004), introduction.

On the image of Bulgaria in the context of Greek historical writing see Dimitris Livianos, "Christians, Heroes and Barbarians: Serbs and Bulgarians in the Modern Greek Historical Imagination (1602-1950)," in *Greece and the Balkans; Identities, Perceptions and the Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, ed. D. Tziouvas (Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd., 2003), 68-83.

It is interesting to mention here that the gradual transformation of Greek nationalism was influenced not only by developments in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and Greece, but also by developments in the "backyard" of the Greek Kingdom, namely the Balkans. In other words, it seems that since the middle-century rise of aggressive Slav nationalism in the Balkans, language had replaced religion as the main ideological vehicle of Greek nationalism.

⁷⁸ See Astrid S. Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy* Lanham (MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

the Balkan Peninsula should be stopped by any means, no matter the cost.⁷⁹ True, Pan-Slavic ideals may have colored the views of some prominent Russian intellectuals, such as *Dostoevski*.⁸⁰ Yet it appears that similar discourses gained popularity in Russia quite later. During the period in question, intellectuals had extremely limited political influence, and certainly were in no position to decide Russia's foreign policy.⁸¹

It is beyond doubt that after the Crimean War eastern Slavs monopolized Russian attention, against the interests of Rums and Greeks. Rather than some vague Pan-Slavic ideal, however, the reason for this outcome could have been rooted in the actual situation in eastern Mediterranean and Europe. In Greece, for instance, it was obvious enough that even at the peak of popular excitement in favor of Russia, local loyalties remained divided. The Greek Kingdom was dependent on the patronage of Great Britain and France, which was further legitimized through references to antiquity. Western Slavs, at the same time, were under multiple ideological influences. Older Empires (such as Austria), still claimed the right to govern and protect them; and newly established nation-states (such as Italy and Germany) claimed the right to liberate them in the name of national reunification.⁸² Only the Eastern Slavs were thus in lack of

⁷⁹ See for instance Karl Marx, Paul W. Blackstock, and Berthold Frank Hoselitz, *The Russian Menace to Europe: a Collection of Articles, Speeches, Letters, and News Dispatches* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952); Anonymous, "The Slavonic menace to Europe," *Quarterly review* 149 (1880), 518-548.

⁸⁰ Tania Leshinsky, "Dostoevski-Revolutionary or Reactionary," *American Slavic and East European Review* 4, no 3/4 (Dec., 1945.): 98-106.

⁸¹ On Pan-Slavism see the classic work by Hans Kohn, *Panslavism, Its History And Ideology* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).

⁸² See for instance the ways history of Serbia was presented in the context of German narratives. Leopold von Ranke, *Die Serbische Revolution. Aus Serbischen Papieren und Mittheilungen* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1829a); Joseph M. Kirschbaum, ed., *Slovakia in the nineteenth and 20th Centuries: Proceedings of the Conference on Slovakia Held during the General Meeting of the Slovak World Congress on June 17-18, 1971, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada* (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973); Barbara Jelavich,

powerful potential patrons when Russian circles decided to undertake their protection.

Tsarist Russia indeed mobilized the argument of common religion and racial origins to justify further intervention in the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the century. Moreover, it asserted the mission to redeem Slavs from the dual 'yoke' of the Ottoman Sultanate and the Hellenized Patriarchate. Such claims concerned mainly the Bulgarian-speaking populations living on Ottoman lands that were to be 'protected' by the Tsar not only against the Greeks, but also against neighboring Slavs. One way or another, these developments led to a growing polarization of Greeks and Christian Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula. Crete, on the contrary, was only remotely influenced by Orthodoxy's civil conflicts, as the only obvious cultural rival of the Christians on the island was Islam.

Eventually, the Ottomans were forced to accept the foundation of an Autonomous Bulgarian Church. The Bulgarian Exarchate officially seceded from the Patriarchate's jurisdiction in 1868,⁸³ a year before the Cretan uprisings reached their unfortunate ending. From a Greek perspective, the above developments created a sea of new 'martyrs' and redefined the Kingdom's enemies. The Russian failure to defend the Christians against the Ottoman forces, and their unwillingness to support Greek demands, were interpreted in Greece as arrogant indifference towards Christian grief.⁸⁴

Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁸³ Anastas Ischirkoff, *La Macédoine et la Constitution de l'Exarchat Bulgare (1830-1897) avec une Carte hors Texte* (Lausanne: Librairie centrale des nationalités, 1918).

⁸⁴ Despite the sympathy expressed towards Christian Cretans by the Russian journalistic press and society and despite the stand General Ignatyev had taken in favor of union of Crete with Greece, the Tsar's cabinet did not appear willing to risk challenging western Europe in favor of Greece. Thus, when the Powers met in 1867, nothing of positive importance for the Greeks was decided. As a result, despite the fact that the marriage of the Tsar's niece, Grand Duchess Olga, to George I of Greece had convinced numerous Greeks that Russia would support their claims, their expectations failed materialize. See B. H. Summer, "Ignatyev

Thus, the Russian party lost its popularity in the Kingdom, while the British project of Helleno-Ottoman cooperation against Russia gained growing support. True, in the following decades the Cretan massacres of 1866-1869 were gradually incorporated into the nation's grand narrative as one more proof of Turkish brutality and terror. Yet immediately after the end of the war, the tragedy was interpreted by the Greeks somewhat differently. The anti-Russian circles in the Kingdom used Crete as one more symbol of Russian betrayal, trying to convince the public, once and for all, that the future of Greece belonged with the Christian West and not with the Christian East.⁸⁵

The Cretan War of 1866: "The Greek Press is Selling us for Flying Pigs"

Despite the various morality tales that have developed with regard to the Cretan disasters of 1866, this author believes that, from a historical perspective, a moral description of the events is neither possible nor desirable. The prolongation of fighting and terror could be blamed on the implacable attitude displayed by the Ottoman authorities; the jealousies of the Christian chiefs; the merciless practices of the Muslim commanders; European demagogic policies; or personal rivalries. Yet no direct source can be used to support such arguments in an absolute way, since the accounts and comments of eye-witnesses, diplomats, reporters, and insurgents were colored both by their ideological background and by their personal preferences and dislikes. See, for instance, what the American Consul on the island wrote with regard to the

at Constantinople," *Slavonic and East European Review* (1932-33), no. xi:346-349.

⁸⁵ Skopetea, *To Πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 334.

representatives of the other European powers:

The French consul, M. Derché "(a Levantine of the lowest order, a bastard of one of the DE Lesspes [*sic*] family by a Jewish adventuress, and an intense hater of the Greeks ever since the society of Syra, where he was once Chancelier de Consulat, refused to recognize his mistress, a retired saltimbanque from a cafe chantant of the Champs Elysées) supported the Pasha in everything, and even urged him to greater arbitrariness. The English consul, Mr. Dickson, a man of the most humane character and entire honesty, had an unfortunate weakness before constituted authorities, and the greatest possible respect for the Turks, coupled with an Englishman's innate dislike for a Greek..."⁸⁶

The same Consul, who openly supported the Greeks, did not hesitate however to provide the following information about the initial outbreak of violence:

...the first blood shed was of Christian by Christian and furnishes as good an illustration of Cretan manners that it seems worth detailing. During the exchange of words which had taken place between the Pasha and the Assembly, a messenger of the former, a Cretan Christian, was insulted by one of the committee's people, spit on, and bitterly reproached for his unpatriotic subservience. His son shortly after assassinated the insulter. Both were Sphakiotes, a race with whom blood-vengeance is a religious obligation..."⁸⁷

Regardless of how the physical assaults had started and who was responsible for their long prolongation, the only thing beyond doubt was that the battles raged on for three years ending only after Crete was left in ruins.⁸⁸ The brutality of the hostilities

⁸⁶ Stillman, *The Cretan Insurrection*, 44.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 50-52.

⁸⁸ Among the different published accounts of eye-witnesses about the war, that of Stillman is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, because it constitutes a very characteristic example of broader dynamics. And second, because the rhetoric of the author corresponds to the debut of the United States as a "global" power in eastern Mediterranean. At the time in question, in other words, the representatives of the United States struggled to differentiate themselves from the agents of the European states, claiming that they stood for something new; for a nation with a powerful moral influence that could help the Hellenes against

seemed to have socked most of the direct observers. For, the confrontation of the Imperial army with poorly armed insurgents resulted predominantly in Christian casualties and massacres of women and children, reinforcing European stereotypes against all kinds of Muslims.⁸⁹ Opinions were divided as to whether or not the

foreigner intervention:

"I feel that the Hellenes are less responsible for the vices of their body politic than their guardian powers, who interfere to misguide, control to pervert, and protect to enfeeble, every good impulse and quality of the race, while they foster the spirit of intrigue, themselves enter into the domestic politics of Greece in order to be able to control her foreign, and each in turn, lest Greece should some day be an aid to some other of the contestants about the bed of the sick man, does all it can to prevent her from being able to help herself. No just and right-thinking man can take responsible for its sins or misfortunes, a people which is denied the right to shape its own institutions without a studied reference to the prejudices of its protectors; to manage its own affairs without the meddling of foreign ministers, who dictate who shall be its administrators; to protect even its own constitution against the violence and usurpation of an irresponsible and incapable head, without the secret but efficacious intervention of some foreign Power. A witness of every step of the late diplomatic intervention in Greek foreign affairs, I saw that in all the corps diplomatique [sic] at Athens Greece had not one friend- every one helped to push her into the abyss; not one world of real sympathy of friendly counsel did she find from any foreign representative...The Hellenes must learn that they have no friends dove in the unprejudiced and charitable individuals who know them well enough to be able to overlook their foibles and petty vices, in view of the solid and genuine claims which they have to our liking and the support of Christendom. As one of those, I await the day when Greece shall have been mistress of herself long enough to prove whether or not she can govern herself wisely, before I lend my voice to her blame for her failures or her offenses.." In Stillman, *The Cretan Insurrection*, 1-16.

⁸⁹ The French Consul *Tricou* reported to his government from Hania (Canea) on 21 July 1867 as follows: "The situation grows daily worse. I have had the honor of notifying to you the deplorable excesses which have been committed in the district of Kissamos; today I learn that massacres have broken out in the eastern part of the country. For the last month, isolated murders took place daily in the neighborhood of the town of Candia; the native Mussulmans overran the country and abandoned themselves to the saddest iniquities in the Christian villages. These barbarous expeditions over, they would return to the town, and the gates opened before them to give passage to their bloody trophies. I had made strong complaints to the local authorities, but all my representations had remained without effect. Emboldened by impunity, the bashi-bazouks on the 12th and 13th of this month spread themselves over the district of Rhizo and massacred women and children. To revenge themselves, the insurgents carried off a young Turkish girl and killed her father. The Candian Government, which has for a long time forbidden Christians to enter the town, doubtless counted upon these atrocities remaining buried in silence. They let them go on, and the irregulars could glut their ferocity entirely as they pleased...From all parts of the island the most sinister reports reach us. Women and children wander along the shore, dying of hunger and exposed to the most horrible treatment. I am in a position to inform you, M. le Charge d' Affaires, that three young Turkish officers, witnesses of the barbarities which have taken place at Kissamos, have give in their resignation, to avoid presiding over such butcheries."

In Great Britain, at the same time, despite the fact that the Cabinets of both Houses defended the Ottomans, one cannot overlook the fervent debates and reports airing the issue "of Turkish brutality" in June 1867, shortly before the expected visit of Sultan Abd-ül Aziz to England. Christian Cretans reported to the Consuls the deeds of Omar Pasha, who was blamed of burning villages, destroying churches and crops, setting trees on fire, burning women and children alive. Thus, although the British cabinet continued to argue that "the Cretans had a reputation as great liars for two thousand years" the Opposition used very effectively the public anxiety to attack the British government in the name of Crete. See

massacres had been ordered by the Ottoman authorities. On some occasions, it seems that the insurgents themselves had welcomed the sacrifice of innocent Christians, since the death of Christian women and children was the most effective weapon against the Ottomans:

(At Arkadi Monastery) The struggle of extermination was fought out, until one of the priests who had previously expressed to his companions the determination to blow up the magazine if the convent were entered, finding death inevitable, fulfilled his threat, and changed what was before but a profitless butchery into a deed of heroism, which again saved the insurrection from the jaws of failure...⁹⁰

On other occasions, the orders of the Ottoman authorities seemed destined to provoke Christian slaughters:

Unable to provoke a direct collision with the committee [the Boutzounaria Christian Committee], the Pasha had recourse to another expedient: he called in the entire Musulman population of the island to the walled cities. Totally unprepared for this unnecessary step, the unfortunate Mohammedans broke up their establishments of all kinds, and repaired to the fortresses in a state of the greatest irritation at the sacrifice they had made and the privations they had to endure...The cities were speedily filled to overflowing by an exasperated mob of fanatics, whose menaces against the Christian population were neither measured nor secret...A Dervish spread his carpet on the marina in front of the custom-house, and, after his prayer began to preach the holy war and the extermination of Christianity, declaring that "the cross must no longer stand but be put in the dust..."⁹¹

Correspondence respecting the disturbances in Crete, 1866-67 (London: Harrison, 1867-1868); *Correspondence respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece, 1868-69* (London: Harrison, 1869).

⁹⁰ Stillman, *The Cretan Insurrection*, 86.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 86-87.

It has to be mentioned here that when the riots first broke out, the Greek state acted with restraint. Yet the Kingdom eventually played a critical role in the prolongation of the battles.⁹² In fact, Greek parties and the press turned Crete into a campaign-flag for their own internal reasons.⁹³ After a point, however, the islanders began objecting to the patronizing efforts of the Greeks, which were not accompanied by any substantial material support. True, the Greek public expressed lavishly its enthusiasm in favor of the Cretans. Yet the actual war was carried off by dint of much less lavish expenditure on the part of the Kingdom in ammunition, men, and supplies. Moreover, while every Cretan victory was celebrated by the Greeks as proof of the Cretan 'superior nature,' every sign of human exhaustion was condemned as a betrayal.

The gap between local guerrillas and their Greek 'patrons' was not bridged as the battles continued in Crete. The Cretans accused the Athenians of being inexpedient and ignorant of the real condition on the island, in particular, and in the Ottoman Empire, in general. The answer of Athens to such accusations was that Cretan bitterness in personal rivalry was the cause of every disaster.⁹⁴ It could be mentioned in defense of the Greek committees that, despite the urban profile of their members, which prevented them from literally fighting the battles, they seemed to appreciate the particularities of Cretan

⁹² In the beginning of the war, King George had submitted to the three guardian Powers a memorandum asking for their protection. Yet the Powers had answered that it was better for everyone not to get involved to a new war. Upon this, the new king of the Greeks hustled to prove his national patriotism, answering the Powers that since they had been failing to solve the problem for more than 45 years, European reluctance left Cretans no option but to fight for their freedom by themselves. Thus, Europe should at least support them. See Administration, of Hellenic Independence, ed., *Documents relatifs à l'insurrection de Crète publiés par l'administration de l' "Indépendance Hellénique"* (Athènes: Imprimerie de L. D. Villara, 1867), 1-11.

⁹³ Mayer, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, I:117-118.

⁹⁴ Skopetea, *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 296-304.

geography. Thus, they reinforced Cretan fighters with volunteers truly experienced in mountain-guerrilla warfare. To be more specific, the Kingdom's outlaws were recruited by the Greeks in order to fight in Crete, and offered in return amnesty and generous wages.

Recruiting bandits from the Greek mountains may have been quite an imaginative idea. Nevertheless, it eventually served the short-term interests of the Kingdom rather than the long-term progress of the Cretan revolt. At first glance, the project had indeed twofold advantages. It offered Greek authorities a great opportunity to negotiate with the chiefs of the local gangs, offering a potential solution to the chronic plague of banditry. As mentioned above, furthermore, the bandits constituted the Kingdom's only well-trained guerillas capable of fighting in the Cretan mountains, proving the devotion of Greek urban groups to the Cretan national cause. The actual outcome of the project, however, was disappointing. According to eye-witnesses, the bandits were more interested in looting than in fighting, and the local chiefs did not welcome the greediness of the new-comers. In a manner of speaking, some would argue that instead of supporting the revolution, Athens had transformed Crete from a 'liberation front' into a glorified 'penal colony'.⁹⁵

By 1868, latent tension had escalated into an open conflict among mixed groups of Cretans and Greeks, reflected in the growing disagreements between the Eastern and Western provinces of Crete. After two years of fighting, numerous Cretan insurgents and refugees complained of being reduced to destitution. Letters from every part of the island were sent to the Central Committee of Athens, calling upon its members to take

⁹⁵ Ioannis S. Koliopoulos, *Περί Αύχων Αφάς*, 212.

responsibility for their actions and to support the Cretans. It appeared, however, that the Greeks had by then exhausted both their enthusiasm and material means, thus were unable to provide significant help. As a result, the representatives of the Cretan Western provinces, who claimed that the island was on the edge of ultimate misery because of the irresponsible behavior of the Greek Committees, decided to address Great Britain, asking for support. Two petitions prepared in Athens by the Zimvakakides brothers—Cretans by origin—were thus submitted to the British authorities, bypassing the Greek ones.⁹⁶

The representatives of the Cretan Eastern provinces did not agree with the above initiative. While some of them remained loyal to Greece and to the slogan of the revolution, "Union or Death" ("Ένωση ή Θάνατος"), others appeared to regret their cooperation with the Greek Committees. In this respect, the first ones joined forces with the Greek Kingdom, accusing the representatives of the Western provinces of treason. The second ones, at the same time, regretted the fact that they had not reach a compromise with the Ottoman authorities before the massacres started, and when negotiations were still in favor of the Christians. The tense relationship between the island and the Kingdom was further complicated by the rumor that the Greek government of Zaimis had decided to remove from the national budget some of the war-pensions granted to Cretan fighters, stating that "the Greek nation could not afford cherishing refugees anymore."⁹⁷

Although the government denied the rumor, and despite the fact that some of the

⁹⁶ Stilianos Stavroudis, *Απάντησις προς το Υπουργείο Ζαΐμη και τους Εκμεταλευντάς της Μεγάλης Ιδέας: Answer to the Zaimi Ministry and to those that Take Advantage of the Great Idea* (Athinisi, 1869), 64-73.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 2-3.

Cretan refugees hustled to defend the Greeks, it was beyond doubt that the disasters caused in Crete by the uprisings had undermined any sense of national solidarity that may initially have existed between the island and Greece. In the same vein, the motives of the revolutionary Committees at Athens and at the island of Syra, both of which politically identified with the Greek Opposition, were brought into question. Indeed, when the first riots had started in Crete, the conciliatory efforts of the Greek throne and government were heavily criticized by the Opposition, forcing them to embrace the public enthusiasm for revolution. Two years later, however, things had changed. The exhausted Greek finances provoked feelings of dislike, or even racism, against the Cretan refugees, who continued to arrive to the Kingdom by the thousands. Drawing upon all this, one of the Cretan fighters furiously wrote in 1869:

The Greek press is selling us off for “flying pigs” [για πράσινο χαβιάρι; things impossible to happen], in a short of speak. When we tried to do the best for our homeland in order to avoid suffering what we now suffer, and what the nation suffers under the current conditions, the press was against us and every single Greek newspaper was by then publishing abusive articles and libels that insulted us, and today, when we have just arrived [to Greece], hoping to get rested for a while, after three years of struggling and enduring, the same newspapers order us to go, considering the Cretans not humans but beasts...May I ask you then, oh! celebrated members of the grandiose Central Committee [ω μεγαλόσχημος κεντρική επιτροπή], why did not you allow us to comprise and to save our homeland from disasters, and why did you also force the Greek governments to war, convincing them to reject any possible settlement of the issue...?⁹⁸

Philanthropy and Revolution

Similar tensions and disagreements occurred among the diverse philanthropic

⁹⁸ Ibid., 54-55, 61, 65-65.

organizations established by Greeks and foreigner philhellenes to support insurgents and Christian refugees. A characteristic example was that of the Committee organized in England in 1866 with the Archbishop of Canterbury as Chairman. The Committee was engaged in philanthropic activities in favor of Crete, collecting funds, clothes, and provisions for Cretan refugees in Greece. For this purpose, a division of the Committee was organized in Athens, with General K.R. Church as Chairman, under the title “English-Greek Committee.”

The task of the Athenian division was to manage the relief funds and to distribute the provisions. In 1866, the Committee had undertaken with passion the relief of 4,200 Cretan refugees, providing them with shelter, clothing, and alimony. In 1868, however, problems arose between the Committee and the Greek government when the latter started questioning the management of the funds. The members of the Committee answered the accusations with anger. According to them, not only they had not 'mismanaged' the collected relief-money, but they had agreed to personally guarantee the repayment of a relief loan (in the amount of 20,000 drachmas) issued by the National Bank of Greece to cover the needs of the refugees that far exceeded the funds collected up until that point. Despite the above arguments, the Ministry of D. Voulgari (Ministry of Internal Affairs) eventually accepted the resignation and replacement of the Committee's offended members, who were political enemies of his government.⁹⁹

Another interesting example was that of “*Φιλοδραματική Εταιρεία Κεφαλληνίας*

⁹⁹ Most of the founding members of the committee, who resigned on 29 February 1868, were wealthy and prominent Greek intellectuals and businessmen: Chairman R. Church, vice-Chairman S. Adoniadis, Secretary A. Negriz, Accountant A. Margiolakis and the members, G. Nikolaidis, E. Tobazis, A. Theodoridis, Aleks. A. Soutsos, S. D. Krinos, Ioann. G. Papadakis, M. D. Kalapothakis. Emm. Papadakis. See *Έκθεσις της Πρώην επί της Περιθάλψεως των Προσφύγων Κρητών Επιτροπής: Report of the Committee for the Relief of the Cretan Refugees* (Athina, Epitropi epi tis perithalipseos ton prosfigon Kriton, 10 Mart 1868).

(Theatrical Club of Kefalonia island)”¹⁰⁰ In 1866, the troop decided to perform a play in order to collect money for the fighting Cretans. Yet it seems that not everybody in Kefalonia was excited about the idea. Despite the pleas of the organizers towards the locals, some municipalities openly refused to contribute to the Club’s fund raiser. Moreover, a number of mayors accused the organizers of using the occasion to promote the political interests of the “Democrats.” The Democrats were at the time the parliamentary opposition in Greece and were supported by the members of the Athenian Relief Committee mentioned above. The Theatrical Club denied that its motives were political. Numerous municipalities, however, were not convinced of the Club's proclaimed impartiality and higher ideals. Upon such accusations, the collected money was sent to the relief-committee of Syra instead of Athens.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the Club's members decided to publish a pamphlet in favor of Crete hoping, in this way, to embarrass their political rivals. As written in the introduction of the pamphlet:

“The Cretans are humans; they are Greeks; they are brothers; and they now fight, they now struggle against barbarian, merciless enemies: the Turks, the enemies of the Christ [μισόχριστους Τούρκους]; against the “whippings” by hunger and thirst; against the massacres of women and children; against shameful diplomatic deeds. They fight only in the name of the Goddess

¹⁰⁰ Kefalonia is the largest of the Ionian islands (*Επάνησα*) in western Greece, which were united with the Kingdom in 1864. On theatrical activities before the time in question in Kefalonia see Aggelos-Dionisios Debonos, 1837 - 1856. *Είκοσι Χρόνια Θεατρική Ζωή στην Κεφαλονιά: 1837-1856. 20 Years of Theatrical Life in Kefalonia* (1984).

¹⁰¹ The Constitution of 1864 was drafted to promote the modernization of the Kingdom’s political life and had led indeed to the dissolution of the old political parties. Yet, until the end of the century (and even after) the new Greek parties were organized again around the personality of their leaders rather than a given political ideology. During the relevant period the leading party was the National Party of Aleksandros Koumoundouros (*Κόμμα Εθνικοφρόνων*) that was yet heavily criticized by the growing group of political actors that were against the throne of Greece. These early ideological conflicts led Greece to a severe civil crisis, particularly after the rise of E. Venizelos to power in Greece. See Sefis Anastasakos, *Ο Πλαστήρας και η εποχή του: Plastiras and his times* (Athina: Epikerotita, 2007).

whom they call "Freedom"...¹⁰²

The salient feature of the language used by the text in question is its emotional expressiveness, in perfect harmony with the broader rhetoric patterns that had emerged on the occasion of the Cretan war, both in the Kingdom and abroad.¹⁰³ It has to be mentioned here that philanthropy, volunteer relief work, and the support of Cretan insurgents crept into the rhetoric not only of local nationalism but also of much broader ideologies, which challenged the survival of 'European old regimes.' In the broader context of social turmoil that characterized Europe in the second half of the century, in other words, Crete had become a symbol of international resistance and political change. Although the reasons leading up to the Cretan war had nothing to do with most of these

¹⁰² “Οι Κρήτες είναι άνθρωποι, Έλληνες, αδελφοί, καθ’ όσον αγωνίζονται, πολεμούν, μάχονται, προς βάρβαρους εχθρούς και σκληρούς πολεμίους, προς μισόχριστους Τούρκους, προς μαστιγώσεις πείνης και δεινής, προς σφαγιάσεις γυναικών και τέκνων, προς αισχροκερδή διπλωματίαν; καθ’ όσον αγωνίζονται ηρωϊκός υπέρ της θεάς εκείνης την οποία ονομάζουν Ελευθερίαν...” See “Προς τους αγωνιζόμενους Κρήτας; Λογοδοσία του Γραμματέως της Φιλοδραματικής Εταιρείας Κεφαλληνία; Περί της υπέρ αυτών παραστάσεως της ιδίας: *To the struggling Cretans; Report of the Secretary of Kefalonia's Theatrical Club; Relevant to the show organized by the Club* (En Kefallinia, 1866); See also *Έκθεσις της Επιτροπής περί των προς συντήρησιν των εδώ προσφύγων: Report of the Refugees' Relief Committee* (En Κεφαλληνία: Τυπογραφείον Η Κεφαλληνία, 1868).

¹⁰³ Aside from the numerous pamphlets, booklets, and brochures published in Greece with regard to Crete, in numerous public speeches and lectures realized under the pretext of different occasions, a very similar rhetoric was used by the speakers. See, for instance, the funeral of Ioannis Dimakopoulos realized in Athens in 1867. The late was a volunteer from Peloponnesus (Morea) who had fought and died in Crete. Thus, the ceremony organized in his memory was easily transformed through the rhetoric of passionate speakers to a symbol of national martyrdom. *Λόγος Εκφωνηθείς υπό του Ν. Πανταλέοντος Δικηγόρου εν τω ναω της Μητροπόλεως Αθηνών, την 12 Φεβρ. 1867 καθ'ην Εκτελέσθη το Μνημόσυνον του Ιωάννου Δημακόπουλου Πεσόντος εν Αρκάδιω της Κρήτης την 11 Νοεμβρίου 1866: Funeral Speech Spoken by the Lawyer N. Pandaleodos in the Cathedral of Athens, on 12 February 1867, during the ceremony in Memory of Ioannis Dimakopoulos Lost in Arkadi, Crete, on 11 November 1866* (Athens: 12 February, 1867). See also *Λόγος Επιτάφιος; Εκφωνηθείς κατά το υπό της Κεντρικής Επιτροπής Τελεσθέν Μνημόσυνον των εν Κρήτη Πεσόντων: Funeral Speech; In Memory of the Cretan Victims* (13 October 1868); V. Psillakis, *Λόγος των υπέρ του Πολιτισμού, της Θρησκείας, της Πατρίδος τε και Πίστεως Μαρτυρησάντων τε και Αθλησάντων; εκφωνηθείς εν τω ναω του Αγίου Νικολάου; επί τη Πανηγύρει των Αγίων Δέκα της Κρήτης Μαρτύρων και τοις Μνημοσύνοις των εν τω Κρητικό Αγώνι Πεσόντων, υπό Β. Ψυλλάκη, καθηγητού: Speech to honor those who had martyred to defend Civilization, Religion, Homeland and Faith; Spoken in the Agios Nikolaos Church; During the Ceremony in Memory of the Ten Saints Cretan Martyrs* (En Ermoupoli, 1867).

ideals, the talent of foreign intellectuals, who used Crete as an example of sacrifice in order to serve their own cause, afforded the island thousands of foreign supporters. See, for instance, the emotionally powerful words used by Victor Hugo in 1866, in his *parole* on Crete:

I hear a cry, a cry from Athens;
In the city of Phidias and Aeschylus, somebody is calling me, voices
pronounce my name.
Who am I-to merit such an honor? Nothing. A man vanquished.
And who are they whom they aimed at me? Victors.
Yes, heroic Candiotes [Cretans], the repressed of today, you shall be the
victors of the future. Preserve. Even prostrate you are victorious.
The protest is the agony of a force. It is a prayer to God that
smashes...what? the kings.
All these forces mobilized against you, all these coalitions of sightless forces
and of persistent prejudgment; the remarkable attribute that these ancient
armed tyrannies share, is the remarkable conveniences of a wrack [polity].
The Tiara on the poop-deck, the Turban on its head, the old monarchic ship
staves in its hull. It is sinking, right now, in Mexico, in Austria, in Spain, in
Saxony, in Rome and elsewhere. Preserve...
"Unified Greece, unified Italy, Athens as the capital of the first one, Rome as
the capital of the other; this is what we, France, we owe to our two mothers.
It is our debt. France shall redeem it. It is our duty. France shall carry it out.
But when?
Preserve."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Un cri m'arrive d'Athènes. // Dans la ville de Phidias et d'Eschyle un appel m'est fait, des voix
prononcent mon nom. // Qui suis-je pour mériter un tel honneur ? Rien. Un vaincu. // Et qui est-ce qui
s'adresse à moi ? Des vainqueurs. // Oui, candiotes héroïques, opprimés d'aujourd'hui, vous êtes les
vainqueurs // de l'avenir. Persévérez. Même étouffés, vous triompherez. // La protestation de l'agonie est une
force. C'est l'appel devant Dieu, qui // casse ... quoi ? les rois. // Ces toutes-puissances que vous avez contre
vous, ces coalitions de forces // aveugles et de préjugés tenaces, ces antiques tyrannies armées, ont
pour // principal attribut une remarquable facilité de naufrage. La tiare en poupe, // le turban en proue, le
vieux navire monarchique fait eau. Il sombre à cette // heure au Mexique, en Autriche, en Espagne, en
Hanovre, en Saxe, à Rome, et ailleurs. // Persévérez... // La Grèce complète, l'Italie complète, Athènes au
sommet de l'une, Rome // au sommet de l'autre ; voilà ce que nous, France, nous devons à nos deux
mères. // C'est une dette, la France l'acquittera. C'est un devoir, la France le // remplira. // Quand ? //
Persévérez., see Victor Hugo, "La Crète," in *Actes et Paroles. Collection Documents* (2 Decembre 1866)
<http://www.inlibroveritas.net>, 265-267.

One should not forget that Victor Hugo was writing the above lines in exile, where he stayed until the
Commune of 1870. When Emperor Louis-Napoleon (III) had seized complete power in 1851, Victor Hugo
had openly declared him a traitor of the French people. Upon this, Hugo was forced to leave Paris. While
in exile he participated in a network of republican intellectuals against the Empire and heartily supported

In another essay, devoted to his friend Gustave Flourens¹⁰⁵ who, though hounded and imprisoned by both French and Greek authorities, had managed to reach Crete as a volunteer-fighter, Victor Hugo remarked that the war for Crete was fought in the name of France. By France, however, he meant 'the spirit' of France, which he identified as the spirit of revolution and democracy. He was furthermore noting that this spiritual essence of France was foreign to his contemporary French regime of Napoleon III. According to Hugo, therefore, the war for Crete should be fought and won by true French patriots, not only to liberate Greece, but also to liberate France from the Emperor's despotic regime.¹⁰⁶

Very similar were the ideals of the followers of Garibaldi and supporters of Italian *Risorgimento* (Unification of Italy). A significant number of young Italian *Garibaldinis* had joined the local Christians in Crete, fighting for what their own imagined Italy stood for; the same way G. Flourens was fighting for his own imagined France.¹⁰⁷ Similar to

the war in Crete condemning the official diplomacy of France, see Jean Marc Hovasse, *Victor Hugo* (Paris: Fayard, 2001).

¹⁰⁵ Leonidas Kallivretakis, *Η Ζωή και ο Θάνατος του Γουσταύου Φλουράνς: Life and Death of Gustave Flourens*, trans. A. Vougiouka (Athina: Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapezis, 1998).

¹⁰⁶ Hugo, *Actes et Paroles*, 252-254.

¹⁰⁷ *Lettere di Volontari Garibaldini sull'insurrezione di Candia* (Firenze: Tipografia del Giornale La Riforma, 1867) See also Adonis Liakos, "Garibaldi e Garibaldini verso Creta nel 1866-1869," *Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento Italiano* 80, no 3, (1993): 316-343.

In fact, the ideas of Mazzini rather than those of Garibaldi became instrumental in the construction of the Greek Great Idea. Yet the followers of Garibaldi were among the first to join the Greek volunteers in Crete, both in 1866 and in 1897. On the Greek supporters of Mazzini and of the *Risorgimento* see the case of Andreas Rigopoulos in Varouhakis, *The idea of Europe*, 30.

On Mazzini and Garibaldi see Giuliana Limiti, "Garibaldi and Mazzini: Thought and Action," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 13, no 4 (December 2008): 492-502.

the experiences of G. Flourens, furthermore, the experiences of the Italian volunteers inspired groups of intellectuals and artists, who attracted a broad audience by celebrating Crete as a symbol of national emancipation. For instance, in his melodrama *Arkadi*¹⁰⁸ performed during the 1870's in Athens, Rafaele Parisini presented Italy and Greece as two sisters, fighting against their oppressors, Austria and Turkey. In this way, the adventurous voyages of the ship "Arkadi," which had been transporting volunteers (Italians among others) and ammunition to Crete during the insurrection, were magnified by imagination and Parisini's music, transformed thus from an actual fact into a myth;¹⁰⁹ the same way, one could argue, that the adventures of G. Flourens were magnified by Hugo's writing talent. Hugo and Parisini, in other words, mastered what I have described in the beginning of this chapter as the art of the 'storyteller.' Through references to a glorified past, they managed to afford their own political ideals with an undeniable emotional charm; raising to diachronic glory their symbolic 'heroes' and 'martyrs,' and condemning to silence their symbolic 'old regimes.'

One final example of the extremely broad coalition of ideological tendencies realized under the pretext of the Cretan uprisings, was the case of the American Committee organized at Athens in 1867 with Dr. S. G. Howe as Chairman. The Committee of Athens was in direct communication with the Greek-relief Committees of Boston and New York, which had gained by then the support of the American people.

¹⁰⁸ The boat *Arkadi* was bought by the Hellenic community of London to join *Panhellenikon* a little steamer that ran the Ottoman blockade of the island with a constant supply of munitions and men. *Arkadi* was named after the massacre at the homonymous Monastery, which used to function as the headquarters of general Koronaios. See Maureen M. Robson, "Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question, 1868-9," *The Historical Journal* 3, no 1 (1960):38-55, 41.

¹⁰⁹ Ekaterini Romanou, "Italian Musicians in Greece During the nineteenth Century," in *Programme and Abstracts of the 17th Congress of the International Music Society* (Leuven: Alamire Foundation, 2003).

The financially more powerful American Committee of Athens was initially organized to support the three Greek ones, already operating in the Greek capital before it. The Central Committee, mentioned in the previous section, confined its efforts to the support of the revolution and of the Cretan combatants. The other two provided the refugees with food and shelter. The American organization supported the relief-committees, trying furthermore to engage the refugees in every-day activities, instead of remaining jobless and idle. It established schools for the children and tried to find occupations for the women. Yet why were the Americans elaborating on behalf of Crete? In the words of the Committee's Chairman:

It is with great joy we hail the renewed interest of the American public in behalf of the suffering Cretans. During last winter one ship after another conveyed to Athens, multitudes of women and children in the most wretched state; these, for more than a year, were wandering from cave to mountain top, then along the seacoast watching for the friendly vessels which might deliver them from hunger and the cruelty of their pursuers. Thus, the 12,000 refugees have increased to 70,000. Poor people! They stretched their hands to Christian Europe, but she is not yet satiated by this work of destruction. "Go on ye Cretan martyrs," she replies, "be butchered in cold blood, or starve upon the mountains, weep and wail, ye Cretan mothers, in a strange land, for your warriors; wait till your little ones starve and you perish from cold and nakedness; till not a dwelling shall remain upon the island underfed..."¹¹⁰

The above remarks offer some insight into why American associations and committees tried to undertake the protection of Cretan refugees. It seems abundantly

¹¹⁰ *Εκθεσις Της Αμερικανοελληνικής Επιτροπής Και Του Δόκτορος Σαμουήλ Γ. Χάου Περί Των Ενεργειών Αυτών Υπέρ Των Εν Ελλάδι Προσφύγων Και Των Εν Κρήτη Γυναικοπαίδων : Report of the American-Greek Committee and of Dr. S. G. Howe Relevant to the Committee's Action in Favor of the Cretan Refugees in Greece and of the Women and Children in Crete* (Athens, 1868), 8.

clear that rivalry with 'old' Europe was an integral element in American discourses on Crete. One should not forget that the American civil war had just ended (1861-1865) giving birth to a united, potential superpower.¹¹¹ Hence, in their debut in the international arena as a rising 'Great Power,' American diplomats, intellectuals, and philanthropists found reason in describing their country as the democratic answer to the old empires of Europe, blaming the massacres in Crete on European imperialism and diplomatic games. Moreover, it seems that in America—as in Europe—the Cretan uprisings were perceived by the public as socially loaded symbols that stood for freedom, democracy, and equality, within a larger context of internal turmoil. Even if, in most cases, the people who supported with passion the Cretan cause had a very superficial (if any) understanding of the island and of the Ottoman Empire, they clearly identified Christian Cretans with models of past slavery and future emancipation, that derived from their direct American background and history, and that served their own political agendas:

Let America begin now when others are exhausted; let her eagerly embrace the present opportunity to make herself beloved not only by Greece, but by freedom-loving people every where. Let the black man hear of the Cretan struggle that he may have a chance to contribute his mite [*sic*]. Let the students in the learned institutions be organized. Let literary men and women remember their indebtedness to Greece and all Christians aid these heroic sufferers before it is too late.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Edmund Wilson, *Patriotic Gore : Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War* (New York: Norton, 1994), Eric Foner, *Slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C: American Historical Association, 1997), John M. Hart, *Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), introduction.

¹¹² *Εκθεσις της Αμερικανοελληνικής Επιτροπής*, 9.

As suggested by the above examples, the various symbolic meanings embedded in the Cretan insurrection of 1866 went far beyond the actual events. In a way, the battles were indeed interpreted as a confrontation between the East and the West. Only that, aside from the Ottoman Empire and Islam, the East was identified also with a number of European 'ancient regimes,' including the Throne of Greece—though the latter was not yet 30 years old. Within this context, revolution became the slogan of a rising, urban, dynamic, public sphere. For instance, the Athens-based Central Committee on Behalf of the Cretans, which was the main Greek instrument of the revolution, consisted mainly of doctors, lawyers, and businessmen.¹¹³ The self-identification of urban Greeks with bravery and dynamism, however, was purely theoretical since the actual battles were fought by mountaineer Cretan populations, the military skills of whom were forged through the area's rigid patriarchal structures.

Indeed, it is exceedingly difficult to say what the situation in Crete might have been without the interference of external forces. There is little doubt that both conflicting interests and conflicting ideologies were alive on and around the island, and that confrontations were not limited to issues of nationalism. It was equally obvious that the Cretans were unable to find common solutions to their issues. Despite the fact that there

¹¹³ Skopetea, *To πρότυπο Βασίλειο*, 296.

True, philanthropic activities in favor of the Christian Cretans were supported both by the rising urban groups and by the throne of Greece. In both cases, however, it was hard to say to what extent such activities served the personal interests of the Greeks rather than the Cretans in question. For instance, in 1868, an editor named S. Apostolides tried to publish "Our Lord's prayer" for the benefit of the Cretan refugees, dedicating his book to their majesties King and Queen of the Hellenes. The proceeds of the edition were supposed to be devoted entirely to the relief of the refugees. Nevertheless, it seems that the author's effort to obtain subscribers to his work had not met with great success. Apparently, since the insurrection was over, most Greeks believed that the Cretan refugees should return home, and that there was no reason to collect funds for their relief anymore. Moreover, it seems that the Greek throne was not as successful in exciting the interest of the Greek public as the revolutionary committees organized the rising urban classes. See S. Apostolides, ed., *Our Lord's Prayer in One Hundred Different Languages, published for the benefit of the poor Cretan refugees, now in Greece*, London: W. M. Watts (1868).

have been some efforts towards mutual action between Muslims and Christians, each time negotiations failed the locals seemed to have little hesitation in adopting aggressive nationalism, or religious fanaticism, against one another.

In May 1866, for example, the Central Cretan Commission was still calling the Cretans (Muslims and Christians alike) to unite their forces in peaceful collaboration, and to protest against the authorities in order to defend their rights. According to the authors of the relevant declaration, Muslims and Christians were brothers, created by the same God, and sharing a common enemy: poverty.

The period when Christians and Muslims were fighting each other had passed never to return. We live in times of justice, humanity, benevolence, friendly relationships. We are both the children of the same homeland, we all speak the same language, we have the same morals and the same interests, we all obey to the same Prince, we should consult each other and we should try to decide together what's best for our common interests...

“The present manifestation, of which the Christians have taken the lead only in order to provide for their Muslim compatriots, creating an opportunity for them to participate into a patriotic and peaceful deliberation with regard to the following issues, this manifestation is above everything seeking rapprochement...”¹¹⁴

And yet, a few months later, in the revolutionary manifesto sent to the Consuls of the Christian powers in Crete, the Christian members of the Cretan General Assembly stated the following:

Your Excellences, the European Consuls...We are Rums by origin and by language, comrade-in-arms of our Greek compatriots with whom we shared the perils of the 9 years war in 1821, to conquer national independence...”¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Administration of Hellenic Independence, *Proclamation de la Commissionne Centrale de la Crète, Compatriotes Crétois Musulmans et Chrétiens* (1867), 13.

¹¹⁵ Administration of Hellenic Independence, *Manifeste insurrectionnel des Crétois a MM. les*

In summary, this chapter has dedicated a significant proportion of its pages to developments regarding the uprisings of 1866, due to the variety and diversity of the relevant sources, which are very useful both as sources of information and as symbols. The example of 1866, in other words, illustrates the growing international visibility Crete had gained in the second half of the century in the context of broader social turmoil, and by means of the modern information technologies (mainly the printed press). In brief, the memory of the Cretan massacres was kept alive via thousand of pages and hundreds of articles, essays, and novels. As time passed the stereotype that there was no place for Islam in the West became even stronger. By 1897, despite the profound diversity among different European social forces and states, the view that Muslims were parochial, backward, and oppressive had become very popular in Europe. Differing opinions were very much in the minority.¹¹⁶ As a result, each time the Ottoman regimes went against their proclaimed pacifist intentions using violence against the Christians, the new 'crimes' were added by the European observers to the list of past

Représentants des Augustes Puissances Chrétiens (1868), 99-105.

¹¹⁶ E. Bennet, one of the very few supporters of the Ottomans during the 1897 insurrection in Crete, was writing in 1913 with regard to Great Britain as follows: "In the case of the other great conflicts which have disturbed the peace of the world, public feeling in this country has usually been more or less keenly aroused, even when our own national and imperial interests were not appreciably involved...But the opinions expressed by the various English newspapers in these several periods were by no means unanimous, nor in any instance was either belligerent condemned by default through the absence of any adequate statement on this case. In the case, however, of the present struggle in the Nearer East one of the combatants has been practically undefended at the bar of public opinion in England. Not a single newspaper in Great Britain has expressed sympathy with the Ottoman cause or even endeavored to place before its readers any definite statement of the Turkish point of view...All Muslims and many of the sultan's Christian subjects are convinced that the Turks are the victims of a gigantic European conspiracy to rob them of their territory by fair means or foul. They maintain that successive attempts to establish good government in Macedonia have been deliberately frustrated by Russian and the Balkan States and that a well-governed and tranquil Turkey was the very last thing really desired by the Powers...." See E. Bennett, "The Turkish Point of View," *The Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal* 217 (January, 1913-April, 1913), 278-296.

grievances, infuriating Christianity with stories of Muslim terror.

Greece as a Two-Party State and the Rums: *Aftohthones* and *Eterohthones*

While the Ottomans struggled with internal disorder and growing foreign criticism leveled at them, the Kingdom of Greece was haunted by its failure to maintain order and to regulate its finances. In addition to this, nationalism was rapidly gaining momentum in the Balkans, challenging the Greek claim that all Ottoman Christians were Rums, thereby attacking the Great Idea at its very core. In this framework, the Greek ruling elites decided to accept the patronizing advices of Conservative Great Britain and Imperial France to aim for reform rather than revolution. The Great Idea thus survived as the synonym of internal re-organizing, economic development, and improvement of the urban structures. Road and railway constructions were eventually carried out, while large expenditures were made for military preparations and the modernization of the army.

For the first time after a long period, the majority in the Kingdom seemed to believe that before addressing the issues of the Rums, Greece had first to solve the problems of the Greeks.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, political partisanship undermined any attempt to maintain a moderate foreign policy. From the 1870's on, the repetitive pattern in the Kingdom was that any time the successive governments tried to avoid expansionist

¹¹⁷ The governments of Harilaos Trikoupi, in particular, actively promoted the modernization of the Kingdom's structures, despite being faced with considerable difficulties. See Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, *Charilaos Trikoupi and the modernization of Greece, 1874-1894* (New York; Tricha, Lydia, 1977); Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, *Ο Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης και τα δημόσια έργα : Harilaos Trikoupi et les travaux publics: Harilaos Trikoupi and public works* (Athina: Kapon, 2001)

projects, their political rivals were offered an excuse to attack them. In this way, the numerous 'patriotic organizations' that remained active in the Kingdom cooperated with the political parties in a very direct way.

During the period under scrutiny, Greek political life was dominated by two parties: the “Modernist” party (*Νεωτεριστικόν κόμμα*) under the leadership of Harilaos Trikoupis, and the “National” party (*Εθνικόν κόμμα*), led by Alexandros Kommoundouros, and later on by Theodoros Deligiannis.¹¹⁸ The first party was clearly under British influence, promoting economic liberalism and the rapid modernization of the Greek economic-political apparatus and infrastructure. The second one became abstractly identified with the French Third Republic and claimed to represent the people—Rums and Greeks—against the unpatriotic plans of foreign and local elites.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, although in the second half of the century Greece had turned indeed into a two-party state, both parties proved unable to garner and maintain significant public support. Until the 1880’s, various Greek governments turned over in rapid succession, causing great instability. Developmental projects were constantly delayed, and the huge expenditures involved provoked constant public turmoil. Constant public turmoil, in turn, increased the difficulty of realizing such developmental projects. As a result, political instability restrained foreign investment and weighted down the national

¹¹⁸ Periklis I. Mazarakis, *Πολιτικά φαινογνώμια : Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης, Αλέξ. Κουμουνδούρος: Political Personalities: Harilaos Trikoupis, Alex. Koundouros* (Athine: Dimitrakos, 1946).

¹¹⁹ One should not forget that Deligiannis had been one of the most prominent students of Theofilos Kairis, one of the first scholars who tried to introduce the ideals of western Europe and French enlightenment to Greece. Deligiannis appeared to have been influenced by his tutor's ideals indeed. Yet, one could argue that his use of the values of the French Revolution against the government of Trikoupis was demagogic rather than ideological, see E. Theodossiou, Th. Grammenos, and V. N. Manimanis, "Theofilos Kairis: The Creator and Initiator of Theosebism in Greece," *The European Legacy* 9, no 6 (2004):783–797. See also (D. H. G) Anonymous, *Σάτυρα κατά του Τρικούπη, ή, Τα βάσανα του Στρατιώτου: Satyric Attack against Trikoupis, or, the Soldier's Disasters* (En Athines: 1884).

economy.

The above phenomenon was related both to the lack of internal order and to the particularities of Greek legislation. In other words, the private sector could participate in the implementation of developmental projects only under the state's management. In the absence of local resources, at the same time, economic development relied almost entirely on the inflow of foreign capital. Thus, the only way to bolster the national economy was through a series of foreign investments that could not yet be realized due to the theoretical monopoly of the public sector, which contradicted the actual reality of governmental inability and corruption. Within this vicious circle the third and fourth term in office of Prime Minister Harilaos Trikoupi is often celebrated in the literature as a period of relative stability. True, under Trikoupi, the private sector was effectively promoted by the state for the first time, and some of the most important nineteenth century construction projects were successfully realized. Nevertheless, the Kingdom's endemic problems, namely corruption and disorder, continued to defy solution.¹²⁰

Meanwhile, Hellenic enterprises were flourishing in Ottoman urban centers, such as Istanbul, Izmir, or Alexandria, as the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was still a land of opportunity for Christians.¹²¹ As a result, following developments in industry

¹²⁰ See Denis Moschopoulos, "Corruption in the Central Administration of the Greek State: A Historical Approach," in *The history of Corruption in Central Government; L'histoire de la Corruption au Niveau du Pouvoir Central*, ed. Seppo Tiihonen (Amsterdam; Berlin; Oxford; Tokyo; Washington, DC: Ios Press, 2003). According to this article, projects of development and modernization did not manage to stop state corruption. On the contrary, corruption was intensified under governments that pushed forward activities involving the building of modern infrastructure and the growth of the private sector, since the above projects could be realized only through the intervention of state offices. The author of the article, therefore, refers to the government of Harilaos Trikoupi (1882-1885, 1887-1890) as a typical example of the above.

¹²¹ The validity of arguments made by scholars professing economic history cannot really be discussed in this study. From the perspective of social history, this author agrees with the argument of S. Pamuk that the political and economical "peripheralization" of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century

and trade after the mid-century, large Greek and Ottoman populations started moving towards Ottoman port cities and urban centers.¹²² This kind of circulatory immigration resulted in multiple crossings of local identities between the two shores of the Aegean.¹²³ Plenty of Muslim and Christian Cretans, for instance, emigrated from Crete to places such as western Anatolia and Egypt.¹²⁴ In this way, physical mobility became a transformation force and new localities were formed in a dynamic relationship with the old ones. Each individual who traveled from Crete had a different story to narrate, a

(especially in its latest decades) was marked by expansion in the volume and a shift in the composition of trade. The creation of complex networks between the European industrial centers and diverse social classes in the Ottoman world helped the Empire to be integrated into the world economy. In this context, it is beyond doubt that Greeks and Rums participated very actively into the process of Ottoman economic transformation. As to the debate concerning whether the non-Muslims were or not the “comprador” bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire, it seems to me that such generalizations are very problematic. On these issues see Sevkett Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Resat Kasaba, “The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 111, no 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1991):163-165; Gocek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*.

¹²² One of the most typical cases was that of ‘Asia Minor’/ western Anatolia. Contrary to the popular lore on the subject suggesting that the ‘Rums’ had had a continuous, uninterrupted presence in western Anatolia, academic literature suggests that the impressive rise of the Greek population in the late nineteenth century was due to massive immigration from the Aegean islands, continental Greece, and Crete. See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no 1 (Jan.,1990): 3-17.

¹²³ See as an example the case of Izmir in Sibel Zandi-Sayek, “Struggles Over the Shore: building the quay of Izmir, 1867–1875,” *City & Society* 12, no 1 (2000): 55-78.

¹²⁴ In the case of Crete the evident reason for the massive immigration of both Christians and Muslims was the constant military and political turmoil. At the same time, one of the direct results of turmoil was the ruined economy of the island. Therefore, it seems that reasons both of political and of economic nature were forcing the locals to look for different alternatives. Furthermore, although it appears that most Muslims left never to return, the great wave of immigration between Crete, Greece, and Asia Minor was of a rather cyclical nature. On the Muslim immigration see Kiper, *Resettlement of immigrants*, 120-124. On some examples of Christian (and more specifically Cretan) villages in Asia Minor (western Anatolia) see the very characteristic case of Vourla. Nikos E.Milioris, “Τα ελληνικά χωριά της περιοχής των Βουρλών Μ. Ασίας: The Greek villages of Vourla in Asia Minor.” *Mikrasiatika Hronika* 14 (1970):177-225.

As to the activities in which the immigrants were engaged, that could be anything, from farming to smuggling. At the beginning of the 20th century, for instance, it appears that there was a very powerful syndicate of hashish smugglers that was in collusion with customs and police officers in Egyptian ports. That “mysterious organization” that had officers in Alexandria and Cairo, appeared to be made up by Cretans, Egyptians and Greeks, who operated in the above mentioned cities, see the chapter “Hashish and Drug Abuse in Egypt during the nineteenth and 20th centuries” in Gabriel G.Nahas, *The Escape of the Genie. A History of Hashish Throughout the Ages* (New York; Raven, 1984): 431-433.

different perception of the Cretan locality to present, and a different identity to defend. At the same time, Cretan émigrés were faced with other 'traveling' identities that dynamically influenced their own understanding of the past and ideas about the future.

Within this matrix, each Hellenic community constituted a unique case. Among other things, each community developed a different relationship with Greek nationalism, according to the demographic and territorial profile of its members. As to the bounds of these communities to the Ottoman Empire it seems that in most cases the Rums did not identify themselves with the Ottoman center for the most part.¹²⁵ Although Hellenic networks of businessmen, professionals, and entrepreneurs were built in dynamic interaction with the Imperial world, it is quite difficult to say what "the Empire" meant to them, since each province's particularities launched a different challenge to the center's political esteem.

The capital-city, at the same time, constituted a different case. Istanbul became the cradle of nineteenth century "Ottomanism." Nevertheless, since the capital's populations were far from being homogenous, different versions of Ottomanism developed, as we have already seen, to serve different needs. In this context, "Helleno-Ottomanism" became the main vehicle for the incorporation of elite-Rums into the political apparatus of the regime. In a similar way, the appointment of well-known Helleno-Ottomans as governors of provinces with predominantly Christian populations could be seen as the regime's last attempt to inspire in these populations some sense of loyalty to the state. The Christian governors of Crete were a very characteristic example of relevant

¹²⁵ For a very good example of this see Vangelis Kechriotis, "A non-Muslim Ottoman Community: Between Autonomy and Patriotism; The Greeks of Izmir at the End of the Empire," Phd thesis, University of Leiden, 2005).

dynamics, inasmuch as their appointment and the nature of their failures reflected the deep gap between central elite-discourses and provincial considerations.¹²⁶

Aside from trying to communicate between the Imperial center and the provinces, Helleno-Ottomans were also stood between the Empire and the Greek nation-state. Despite serving the Ottoman regime as officials of the highest rank, they were not rivals of Greek nationalism. Most of them participated in mixed networks of Rums and Greeks that, on most occasions, promoted passive cultural nationalism instead of aggressive irredentist strategies.¹²⁷ In this respect, the Hellenic community of Istanbul was not in need of Greek patronage. The Kingdom, financially and politically weakened after the Crimean and Cretan wars, on the contrary, was forced to welcome the financial capital and support of their fellow Greeks. The Hellenic community of Istanbul, in particular, which was embodied with clusters of historical meaning from Byzantium and which flourished intellectually and culturally, appeared ready to take the lead both in the Empire and in the Kingdom. For a moment, in other words, nobody reacted to the fact that 'Constantinople' seemed to abide Athens. Yet this moment of harmony was brief. Between 1870 and '75, the indigenous Greek elite began to react violently to the abolition of its monopoly of power. Thus, the popularity of Ottoman-Rums was not to

¹²⁶ A number of scholars have suggested that the Christian Pashas of Ottoman Crete were appointed to the island only after the intervention of the Great Powers. In the same vein, it is often suggested that the Sultan secretly encouraged the most radical leaders of the Muslims to resist the measures his governments tried to carry out. See Sir Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid* (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1917): 205-210. The present author certainly does not agree with similar monolithic approaches. To be more specific, although there is no doubt that some of the local Muslims were in secret communication with radical circles in Istanbul, one should not forget that local Christians rather than the Muslims appeared to take the lead of most uprisings against the central authorities.

¹²⁷ See for instance Haris Exertzoglou, *Εθνική ταυτότητα στην Κωνσταντινούπολη τον 19ο αιώνα: ο Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως 1861-1912: National identity in Constantinople in nineteenth century: The Hellenic Syllogos of Constantinople 1861-1912* (Athina: Nefeli, 1996).

last.¹²⁸

Greek negative feelings towards the Rums were directly linked to two conflicting situations. On the one hand, there was the extreme poverty of the thousands of refugees that arrived to the Kingdom from places such as Crete. On the other hand, there was the excessive economic power of a small group of Rums that arrived to the Kingdom from the Empire's urban centers. In the last decades of the century, the Hellenic financial capital aggressively broke through the traditional matrix of Greek society and a small group of fellow Greeks took lead of the Kingdom's economic life. They undertook numerous public works, founded banks, and introduced financial capitalism to the newly established (in 1876) stock-market at Athens. In this way, the Rums threatened to overthrow the preexisting elite-families (τζίδια) of Greece.¹²⁹ The indigenous families of worthies, however, had by then cemented their political power in the Greek parliament, which they used as a rampart for the defense of their own interests. As a result, in 1878, parallel to a new war that broke out between the Kingdom and the Empire leading to the annexation of Thessaly and new riots in Crete, tension developed rapidly within the Kingdom between 'native' Greeks and Rums (αυτόχθονες και ετερόχθονες).¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Haris Exertzoglou, *Προσαρμοστικότητα και πολιτική ομογενειακών κεφαλαίων: έλληνες τραπεζίτες στην Κων/πολη : το κατάστημα "Ζαρίφης Ζαφειρόπουλος", 1871 - 1881: Adaptability and policies of the hellenic capitals: Greek bankers in Constantinople: the office "Zarifis Zafiropoulos"* (Athina: Emporiki Trapeza tis Ellados. Idrima Erevnas kai Pedias, 1989).

¹²⁹ Giorgos Dertilis, *Το ζήτημα των τραπεζών (1871 - 1873) : οικονομική και πολιτική διαμάχη στην Ελλάδα του 19ου αι.: The banking issue (1871-1873): economic and political conflict in nineteenth century Greece* (Athina: Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapezis, 1980).

¹³⁰ Tsoukalas, *Κοινωνική ανάπτυξη και κράτος*, 236-237, 282-293. As accurately argued by E. Skopetea, one of the main reasons of tension between Rums and Greeks was that “from the 70’s on the Rums, who had been so unsparingly providing for the Greek state since its very foundation, where now coming back to ask for what was owed to them,” Thus three stereotypes emerged with regard to them in Greece: “the

The most common reasons of conflict were the attempts of the Rums to gain representation at the institutions and public offices of the Kingdom. A very characteristic example of the above was a controversy between Cretan refugees and the Greek parliament that had started before the elections of 1878. The refugees in question had in fact founded a new settlement at the end of the port of Adamas, on the island of Milos (Kiklades islands), which was characterized as a "refugee municipality." According to the Greek regulation, relevant municipalities inhabited by a homogenous refugee population should have the right to elect their own deputy to the Greek parliament. The reason for controversy, therefore, was that the Cretans wanted to vote for their own representative separately, while the Greek political groups forced them to vote for one of the 'natives.' Upon hearing this, the Cretans addressed their complains to the Greek parliament, remarking characteristically that they deserved special treatment because their homeland was in ruins thanks to the Great Idea of tiny Greece.¹³¹

The Last Phase of the Nineteenth Century Greek Great Idea

During the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war, the Greek government was literally dragged into battle by the Opposition's demands to liberate Thessalia, Macedonia, Hepeiros, and Crete. Under these circumstances, Thessalia was united with Greece (1881). As to the

benefactor," "the foreigner," "the profiteer," see Skopetea, *To πρότυπο βασίλειο*, 74, 65-73.

¹³¹ *Η Κρήτη εν τη Βουλή της Ελλάδος; Δικαζόμενη κατά την εξέλιξη της εκλογής της Επαρχίας Μήλου: Crete on trial at the Greek Parliament during the elections at Eparchy of Milou* (Athinisin: En tou tipografiou Ermou, 1879).

rest of the claimed territories, they continued to lie at the core of the national debate.¹³²

After the war, the Kingdom kept claiming Macedonia and Crete not by military means, but via historical, ethnographic, and folkloric studies, published in numerous Greek magazines and journals.¹³³ All Greek political forces agreed on the Hellenic character of the contested territories. Yet while the government of Harilaos Trikoupi was against any kind of military involvement with regard to Crete, the Opposition aggressively demanded that the Kingdom liberate the unredeemed island.¹³⁴

The Modernist party in power, in other words, insisted that the last war had run the

¹³² Within this context different actors were to be blamed for the non integration of Crete to Greece. For instance, a poem published in *Parthenon* in 1879 accused (once again) Great Britain for the lose of Crete: "...Σιγά η Ευρώπη ω τάλανα Κρήτη, // Και δούλην κηρρύτει// Την μάρτυρα σε. //- Ο Άγγλος το θέλει!-σε δούλην και πάλι// Σε ρίπτει η Ευρώπη εις σκότους αγιάλην, // Ανδρείας πυρσέ!..." see Kleanthis Papazoglis, "Αγγλία και Κρήτη: England and Crete," *Parthenon* 13 (1879).

¹³³ See for instance: "Η νήσος Κρήτη," *Ethniko Imerologio Vretou* (1863), 81-82; "Εθιμα και λέξεις εν Κρήτη: Customs and words in Crete," *Pandora* (1866), 330-331; Anonymous, "Συλλογή λέξεων εν χρήσει εν τε Αιγύλη και Κρήτη: Collection of words used in Egili and Crete," *Pandora* (1869), 340; S. Zabelios, "Βασανιστήρια εν Κρήτη επί Ενετών: Torturing under the Enetians in Crete," *Estia* (1876) 491-494; P. Labros, "Ανέκδοτα νομίσματα της εν Κρήτη πόλεως Βιέννου: Unpublished coin depictions from Viennou in Crete," *Parnassos* (1879), 516-518; Spiridon Panagelis, "Κρήτη και Κρήτες: Crete and Cretans," *Estia* (1887), 690-692; Iosif Hatzidakis, "Εὐλειθίας Σπήλαιον εν Κρήτη: Ilithia's Cave in Crete," *Parnassos* (1887), 339-342; K. Paparrigopoulos, "Γέροντας, Χίος, Μιτυλήνη, Κρήτη, 24 Αυγούστου-1 Νοεμβρίου 1824: Gerodas, Hios, Mitilini, Crete, 24 August-1 November 1824," *Estia* (1889), 362-364; G. Iak. Kalaisakis, "Περὶ της εν Κρήτη Λάππας ή Αργυρουπόλεως: With regard to Lappa or Argiroupoleos of Crete," *Parnassos* (1893), 616-621; Spiridon de Viazis, "Μέγας εν Κρήτη Σεισμός κατά το 1629: The great earthquake in Crete in 1629," *Parnassos* (1893), 218-221; V. Psilakis, "Αι Αρχαί της Τέχνης εν Κρήτη: The beginning of Art in Crete," *Estia* (1894), 353-358.

¹³⁴ In 1889, for instance, Souris, one of the most well known satirical columnists of Athens and supporter of the National party, was writing that Crete was betrayed by prime minister Trikoupi, the last one acting as the Sultan's "boy," and in perfect harmony with the interests of Sakir Pasha: "Η Κρήτη! επροδόθη...να! τα αίματα!...//είνε σωστή αλήθεια κι'όχι ψέμματα ...//ο σιρ Τρικούπης, του Χαμίτ κοπέλι,// με τον Σακήρ τα έχει γάλα-μέλι." See G. Souris, "Κρήτη: Crete," *Asti* 7 (1889).

Yet, in the same magazine, the same year, an anonymous writer (under the nickname of "Irodis o Attikos (*Ηρώδης ο Αττικός*) was celebrating Cevdet Pasas's appointment to Crete, writing that he was one of the best Ottoman statesmen; that he had managed to gain control of the island's citadels disarming the fanatic Muslim gangs that were the main cause of trouble; and that he had a committee sent to Istanbul in order to negotiate over the rights and demands of the Cretan people. Therefore, there was no need to promote warlike behaviors in Greece, humiliating the Kingdom and putting it into a vulnerable position with regard to the Ottoman Empire and Europe. Moreover, the author was characteristically writing that, although the Greek public naturally sympathized with the drama of the heroic island, even the leader of the National party (Deligiannis) was by then forced to accept that "Greece can do nothing with regard to Crete but wait," see Irodis o Attikos, "Κρήτη: Crete," *Asti* 2-3 (1889).

state down and that Greece could not afford a new collision with the Ottomans, either from a financial or from a diplomatic perspective. The warlike rhetoric of the National party, on the other hand, was theoretically supported by numerous groups of Greek militants.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, the difference between theory and practice became obvious in 1885, when Greece tried to protest the territorial enlargement of Bulgaria and annexation of Eastern Rumelia, which was also claimed by the Kingdom. With a spontaneous appeal to arms, the Greeks tried to force the Ottomans to compensate the Kingdom for the loss of Orthodox territories that used to fall under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate.¹³⁶ The humiliating blocking of the port of Piraeus (in Athens) by the naval forces of the Great Powers, however, reminded Greeks that they were hardly in a position to raise such claims without the support of the Powers.¹³⁷

In addition, in 1893, the same year Greeks celebrated the momentous opening of the Corinth Canal, Prime Minister Trikoupis was forced to make the—equally momentous—statement, “Regretfully, we are bankrupt,” thus admitting his government's failure to realize their ambitious program of improving Greek finances.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ It has to be mentioned here that the opposition-press criticized Trikoupis's government both for its unwillingness to undertake a war, and for its efforts to create a strong army and fleet. In 1886, for instance, *Asti* magazine was ironically commenting on the military exercises realized in Athens, claiming that old women and children were running to hide, terrified at the idea of such unpracticed and unskilled troops using real arms and real bullets, see Krak, "Τα γυμνάσια του πυλοβολικού: Ordance's military exercises," *Asti* 7 (1886).

¹³⁶ Spiridon Sfetas, "Aspects of Greek-Bulgarian political relations after the Congress of Berlin - the failure of the Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement 1878-1900," *Balkan Studies*, no 4 (2005): 41-52.

¹³⁷ Διπλωματικά έγγραφα κατατεθέντα εις την Βουλήν υπό του επί των Εξωτερικών Υπουργού <Αποκλεισμός>: *Diplomatic Documents deposited at the Parliament by the Minister of Foreign affairs (blocking)* (En Athines: Kostadinidis, Anestis P, 1886).

¹³⁸ Despite the unfortunate result of bankruptcy, Trikoupis's administration had succeeded indeed to introduce economic considerations into Greek political discourses. Yet the question remains: was this development Trikoupis's personal 'accomplishment,' or was it a sign of a new era? On these issues and on the role played by economists in the second half of the nineteenth century see Michalis Psalidopoulos and

Shortly thereafter, the National party came to power under the leadership of Deligiannis, with the promise to uplift the nation's morales. In 1895, one more secret association was founded in the Kingdom, under the name “National Society (*Εθνική Εταιρεία*),” with the mission to redeem Macedonia and Crete.¹³⁹ In 1896, at the same time, the ancient Olympic Games were revived for the first time in modern Athens. Despite the fact that the Kingdom lacked the necessary infrastructure to host the Games and was thus faced with serious financial problems,¹⁴⁰ the Olympic spirit reaffirmed the central importance of antiquity in the intellectual shaping of the modern world, raising the Kingdom to glory.¹⁴¹ Even as the West effectively admitted that it owed its intellectual origins to ancient Greece, modern Greece remained in actual debt to Western capitalists—mainly to the finance houses of London.¹⁴²

Adamantios Syrmaloglou, "Economists in the Greek Parliament (1862-1910): The Men and Their Views on Fiscal and Monetary Policy," in *Economist in Parliament in the Liberal Age (1848-1920): (1848-1920)*, edit. M. M. Augello and M. E. L. Guidi (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2005).

¹³⁹ Theodoros P. Deligiannis, *Η Εθνική Εταιρεία και αι ευθύναι του πολέμου : λόγοι: Ethniki Eteria and the blame for the war: speeches* (En Athines: Dionisios G. Efstratiou, 1902); Georgios Th. Lirithzis, *Η Εθνική Εταιρεία και η δράσις αυτής: Ethniki Eteria and its activities* (Kozani: H.Galanidis, 1970).

¹⁴⁰ In January 1895 Harilaos Trikoupi, who was very skeptical about the realization of the Games, tended his resignation and Theodoros Deligiannis became the new Prime Minister of Greece. Deligiannis was in favor of the event and thus got directly engaged in the chase of funds. Eventually, the Games were realized after the collection of the following funds: the National Bank of Greece had granted to the state a loan of 400,000 drachmas; some money was collected through the organization of a national lottery and through the sale of Olympic stamps. Last but not least, one should not forget the very significant contribution of the fellow Greeks. For instance, Georgios Averoff (originally from Metsovo, but settled in Alexandria of Egypt), had donated almost 1,000,000 drachmas for the restoration of the ancient Panathenian stadium in Athens (*Παναθηναϊκό στάδιο*), see John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, *Encyclopedia of the modern Olympic movement* Westport (Conn: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

¹⁴¹ D.C. Young, *The Modern Olympics. A Struggle for Revival* (Baltimore;London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

¹⁴² It seems that agriculture (one of the main sources of revenue in the Kingdom) revived after the incorporation of Thessaly in 1881, a development that increased the Greek territory by 28%. Yet, the new lands were mainly appropriated by a small group of capital-holders, and mainly by the economic elite of fellow-Greeks. At the same time, commerce was stimulated by the new tariff system of 1884. But despite all these, in the last decade of the nineteenth century the Greek state was faced with the results of global

As a result, when the Greeks were plunged into a new war in 1897, it was not clear whether that happened despite the depressing economic condition in the Kingdom or due to it. In the same vein, it was not clear if the Kingdom marched into war despite or due to the humiliating international blockade of Cretan ports, which infuriated the Greek public. At any events, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the riots that broke out in Crete were followed by a full-scale war between the Empire and the Kingdom. In this context, the leader of the National party, Theodoros Deligiannis, who had passionately attacked the moderate policy of the Modernists when he was in the opposition, was now faced with very similar problems. On the one hand, he was reassuring the Powers, in cooperation with the king, that his government was against the war. On the other hand, he was pushed by the Greek public, which was overwhelmed by internal problems and overcome with pro-war sentiments, to take action or to retreat from power.¹⁴³ Eventually, both government and king were forced into war against the commands of European diplomacy. From a Greek perspective, it was the last battle of the century fought in the name of Crete, amidst significant internal problems and great expectations. In this respect, the war of 1897 was as typical a manifestation of the Greek Great Idea as any.

depression, huge loan repayments, an agricultural crisis, constant public turmoil, and huge military expenditures. The result of all these was the bankruptcy of 1893, the imposition of International Financial Control over Greek finances, in 1898, and large scale emigration, see John A. Levandis, *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); Tsoukalas, *Κοινωνική ανάπτυξη και κράτος*, 236-237; Kostas Kostis and Sokratis Petmezas, eds., *Η ανάπτυξη της ελληνικής οικονομίας κατά τον 19ο αιώνα (1830-1914): The development of Greek economy during the nineteenth century (1830-1914)* (Athina: Alexandria, 2006).

¹⁴³ See for instance Doc no 44, D. no 45 and Doc no 35 in Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871-1914), vol. XII.

Joachim III and the Cretan Ecclesiastical Question

Simultaneously to the developments described in the above section, mixed groups of Rums and Greeks were in conflict with regard to the issues of the Patriarchate. The multitude of alliances formed against each other, the individual choices and networks, and the constantly changing ideological commitments of the protagonists in question, do not allow for an analysis of bipolar conflict between well-defined rivals. The only thing that can be mentioned here, therefore, is that the debates under scrutiny consisted mainly of two sets of forces: Secular versus Clerical; and Imperial versus National.¹⁴⁴

To put it differently, in the second half of the century, the Helleno-Orthodox community was troubled by two primary concerns. The first one was related to the new constitutional framework created by the Ottoman reforms that provided secular circles with the right to administer the community's pious foundations. The second one, which became known as the “Bulgarian Question,” regarded the threat posed to the Patriarchate by the secessionist tendencies of Slav Orthodox populations. As far as the issues at stake were concerned, two networks were formed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The first network consisted of Rums and Greeks identified with the nation-state. These groups had a fixed commitment to the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate, but did not recognize the political authority of the Empire. Thus, they considered any matter regarding the Patriarchate a religious matter, which should be addressed by the Church in cooperation with the Greek state, and not with the Ottomans.

¹⁴⁴ Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση*, 229-349.

In their view, therefore, the Kingdom was the only political authority that could legitimately represent the Hellenic nation.¹⁴⁵

The second network consisted mainly of Ottoman-Rums holding important offices in the Empire, who maintained that the Patriarchate could prevail against its rivals only in cooperation with the Ottoman authorities. According to this approach, the Patriarchate needed an official state-status as Orthodoxy's supreme authority on Ottoman lands in order to fight rival national movements in the Balkans. From this point of view, any attempt to challenge Ottoman legitimacy was viewed as a challenge against the Patriarchate itself, since the institution's spiritual primacy had actual political significance only in the context of the Ottoman millet-system.¹⁴⁶ Last but not least, these kinds of debates were further complicated by the constant intervention of the Russian Embassy, which was busy maintaining its own networks in the Ottoman capital.

The complexity of the above debates reflected the ambiguity and fluidity of the Ottoman reforms. Instead of having a well-defined legal presence, the status of the Patriarchate was open to different interpretations and ramified negotiations. At the same time, it was clear enough that Hellenic loyalty to the Ottoman state was based mainly on interests—individual or communal—and could thus be easily diverted. In the same vein, individual interests that did not correspond to ideological loyalties influenced the

¹⁴⁵ *Neologos tis Anatolis (and later on Neologos)* that was published in Istanbul by Stavro I. Voutira from 1866 until 1897, when the last one was deported from the Ottoman capital, constituted the most representative source of Athenian discourses as expressed in the Ottoman capital. True, any differentiating between "Athenian" and "Ottoman" networks is quite problematic when used in an absolute way. In fact, in the context of the present study, I have often overlooked individual choices while trying to describe general patterns. One should not forget, however, that different ideas and personal preferences resulted in the formation of conflicting networks even within families. The dynamics described in this chapter, therefore, correspond to a simplified interpretation of the matter as it is not my primary concern to present a more nuanced examination of the issue but to connect it to the island of Crete.

¹⁴⁶ Λόγος Εκφνηθείς υπό του Κ. Αλεξάνδρου Καραθεοδωρή.

formation of networks even within the community at stake. The best illustration of the above was the turmoil that occurred in almost every Helleno-Orthodox community—both in the Empire and in the Kingdom—with the rise to the Patriarchal throne of Joachim III.¹⁴⁷ Joachim came to power with the support of both secular and clerical forces almost simultaneously to Abdül Hamid II's rise to the Imperial throne. Parallel to the Sultan's efforts to reintroduce the title of the Caliph, the Patriarch tried to establish himself as the *Ethnarch* of the Rums (*Eθνάρχης*), thus the nation's supreme spiritual and political authority. In this respect, he was supported by Rums well accommodated in the Empire under the new regime, against the interests of the Kingdom. Consequently, the Patriarch was soon drawn into open conflict with the government of Harilaos Trikoupi in Greece, and with groups of businessmen and entrepreneurs that did not enjoy the Sultan's favor.¹⁴⁸

Crete was not an exemption to the above described tension. When the Cretan Metropolitan Timotheos Kastrinogiannakis died in 1897, the island was in a state of insurrection and the locals could not agree upon which authority was eligible to appoint his successor. The dispute continued among coalitions that were constantly changing, even after the proclamation of autonomy. The issue in question was twofold. Some of the locals refused in general to recognize the authority of the Patriarchate over the island. Others did not recognize the authority of the faction against Joachim III, which was then in power in the Ottoman capital. At the same time, the Greek government of

¹⁴⁷ Siehe E. Kofos, "Patriarch, Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State " *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* IV, no. 2 (1986): 107-20.

¹⁴⁸ Yura Konstantinova, "The Greek-Bulgarian Schism and the Conflict between Harilaos Tricoupis and Joachim III.," *Balkan Studies*, no. 1 (2006):101-123.

Zaimis, and the High Commissioner of Crete, Prince George, were obliged to accept that the provincial See still fell under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, since autonomous Crete was still under Ottoman suzerainty. In 1898, as a result, the official authorities in Istanbul and Greece agreed on the issue of an Ottoman *berat* (royal decree) that allowed for the Bishop of Sfakia and Lampis, Evmenios Xirouhakis, to ascend to the Metropolitan Throne of Crete.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, some of the Cretans under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos, who was then appointed member of the High Commissioner's Executive Council, strongly opposed this development. Venizelos argued that ecclesiastical autonomy should accompany political autonomy, and that neither the Patriarchate had the right to decide who the new Metropolitan would be, nor the Ottoman Sultan had the right to issue a *berat* for the Metropolitan's appointment. It is interesting to mention here that in 1898 Venizelos was still on good terms with the Prince and thus convinced him to take stand against Evmenios. The ecclesiastical issue was eventually solved in 1900 when the Patriarchate (*Μεγάλη του Χριστού Εκκλησία*) and Autonomous Crete (*Κρητική Πολιτεία*) agreed to sign the Constitutional Charter of the Cretan Church, which was the product of a mutual compromise. Yet personal rivalries did not fade away. Thus a few years later, when Venizelos came into violent collision with the Prince, Metropolitan Evmenios became the Prince's earnest supporter.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ See Paraskevas Konortas, "Η Εξέλιξη των "Εκκλησιαστικών" Βερατίων και το "Προνομιακό ζήτημα": the "Ecclesiastical" Berats and the "Privileges Issue," *Ta Istorika E*, no 9 (1988): 259-286.

¹⁵⁰ The relevant convention was signed on 4 August 1900. According to it, on the occasion of vacancy in the Cretan Metropolitan Throne, the island's High Commissioner was to be the authority to nominate three of the Cretan Bishops as candidates for the position of the Metropolitan. The Metropolitan was to be selected among them by the Patriarchal Synod. The appointment of the new Metropolitan was to be realized with the issue of a relevant decree by the High Commissioner of Crete. Cretan Metropolitans were to maintain their seat in the Holy Synod, see Nanakis, *To Μητροπολιτικό Ζήτημα*, 31, 91, 99, 119, 135-138.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on Greek nationalism, presenting it as a manifold force that influenced the shaping of nineteenth century Crete both as an actual locality and as a symbolic landscape. It has to be underlined, however, that this author strongly disagrees with the argument that Greek national and nationalistic ideals constituted a homogenous space, which critically undermined the preexisting structures on the island. As outlined in the previous chapter, pre-nineteenth century Cretan structures were not stable, but constantly changing. Moreover, other forces—such as the Ottoman reforms—were interacting with nationalism in a dynamic way. Last but not least, Greek irredentist ideals constituted a particularly vague force that was more relevant to the Kingdom's internal problems than to an uncontested solidarity between Rums and Greeks.

Plausible as it might be, this part of the argument is rarely addressed by the literature on Crete. Due to this reality, in this chapter I have tried to analyze the issue in some detail. Information about the Kingdom has been provided in chronological order, to better illustrate the multiple ramifications and inconsistencies of the Greek Great Idea with regard to Crete. This approach was certainly not easy and its value is unfortunately limited, as the analysis touches upon so many topics that it is impossible to adequately cover all of their aspects. As a result, some very important themes of Ottoman and Greek history have been ignored.

At the same time, my analysis of Greek nationalism has been constantly interwoven with references to Europe and the idea of the West. This author is convinced that neither

Greek nor Ottoman modernity can be discussed without reference to nineteenth century ideological patterns of interconnectedness—harmonious or not—between eastern Mediterranean and western Europe. Yet this aspect of the issue needs more clarity. True, it is impossible to discuss in detail the particularities of each one of the powers involved in the making of nineteenth century Cretan history. As a result, when addressing foreign dynamics I tend to use broader generalizations. Nevertheless, the complex character of forces representing the West has to be underlined. In the following chapter, therefore, I shall try to use as a case-study one of the most obvious examples: the case of a British archaeologist, Arthur Evans, who gained international recognition as the excavator of Knossos palace and intellectual creator of Minoan Crete.

CHAPTER IV

THROUGH THE EYES OF ARCHAEOLOGISTS: GREAT BRITAIN IN CRETE AND CRETE IN GREAT BRITAIN

Archeological Considerations in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The present chapter is an attempt to cut a vertical shaft into the mass of material on the late nineteenth century West, referring mainly to the case of Great Britain with regard to Crete. Special focus is placed on politics and archaeology, illustrated via the case-study of Arthur Evans. My aim is to examine in this manner an example of the diverse ways in which Western Europe was linked to Crete. Archaeological patterns, in particular, shall be discussed here to suggest that the gradual Hellenization of Crete, which had led to the eventual fall of the Ottoman regime on the island, was a complex process in which the agents of the West participated directly.

As already argued in the preceding chapters, until the middle of the century the Ottoman Empire was considered a legitimate ruler by the Great Powers of Europe, despite its obvious lack of popularity. After the Crimean War, however, the situation had changed. The fall of the Empire in France, the unification of Germany and of Italy, and the rise of the Liberals in Great Britain marked the gradual emancipation of 'the people' at the expense of dynasties. In this way, European archaeology, which was initially associated with dynastic practices and personal collections, became linked to the history both of the West and of the Nation. In the second half of the century, in other words,

Europe was no longer perceived only as a network of dynastic alliances, but also as a community of people.¹ Through the spectrum of relevant developments, narratives about the past changed direction. Sociopolitical transformations allowed for the rising communities of people to legitimize their demands for democracy and liberalism through references to a glorified antiquity. In an ironic way, therefore, the ideals of antiquity, which had previously attracted the admiration of dynastic Europe, became an inspiration for movements that summoned political change and revolution.

In this chapter I shall try to argue that, contrary to the above developments, the limited Muslim-Ottoman interest in antiquity had little to do with perceiving their ancient past as the linear history of the Ottoman 'people,' inasmuch as the Ottomans were one of the last European regimes struggling to survive as a dynasty. In the same vein, it is rather safe to argue that nineteenth century Muslim-Ottomans tried to create linear narratives about their origins, mainly by reference to the House of Osman and to Islam. Western thought, at the same time, aggressively claimed the ancient civilizations of eastern Mediterranean in the name of the abstract history of European people. As a result, archaeology became one of the main conceptual boundaries between the Ottomans and the West. In support of the above argument, this chapter is an attempt to see how the origins of Cretan civilization were appropriated by western intellectuals, who proclaimed Crete to have been 'European' since the Bronze Age. Moreover, it deals with the ways in which the Ottomans responded to relevant challenges when the island was still one of their territories. Before answering the above specific questions, therefore, a brief examination of Ottoman archaeological strategies is in order.

¹ Julian Thomas, *Archaeology and Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

Ottoman archeological strategies had two main characteristics. First, they developed quite late. Second, their orientations remained strictly dynastic. The first Ottoman antiquities-laws were drafted in the second half of the nineteenth century (in 1869, 1874 and 1884),² almost simultaneously to the foundation of the first Imperial Ottoman Museum in Istanbul in 1869.³ By that time, however, a number of important antiquities found in the Ottoman lands had already been moved out of the Empire by foreign archeologists, or had become the symbols of national movements rival to the Ottomans. In the broader scheme of things, the interest Istanbul expressed in antiquities appeared to be a delayed reflex in response to foreign challenges. Moreover, drafting the regulations and efficiently enforcing them in the provinces proved to be two completely different tasks.⁴

In Crete, for example, the local Christians were much more competitive in claiming antiquities than were the Imperial regime. Although the island was still largely

² Grigorios N. Aristarchi, "Règlement sur les Objets Antiques (Mars 1869)- Règlement sur les Antiquités (Le 20 Sefer 1291- 24 Mars 1874)," in *Législation Ottomane, ou Recueil des Lois, Règlements, Ordonnances, Traités, Capitulations et autres Documents Officiels de l'Empire Ottoman* (Constantinople: Imp. Nicolaidès Frères Bureau du journal Thraky, 1873-1881).

³ E. Goold, *Catalogue Explicatif, Historique et Scientifique d'un Certain Nombre d' Objets Contenus dans le Musée Imperial de Constantinople fondé en 1869 sous le Grand Vezirat de son Altesse A 'Ali Pacha* (Constantinople, 1871).

⁴ As it has been argued by a variety of scholars, both archaeology and history constitute ideologically loaded disciplines that have been developed in direct communication with specific political and ideological agendas. Therefore, any reference to the above disciplines without parallel reference to the socio-political context of their creation and gradual development would be very problematic. In the second half of the nineteenth century, for instance, despite the fact that French and British archaeological missions continued to represent the interests of the respective regimes in Crete, the active involvement of archaeologists in local politics becomes more comprehensible when viewed in the light of the rise of liberalism in central-western Europe during that era. Consequently, contrary to Ottoman archaeology, which started developing at the turn of the century on a dynastic basis, western archaeology was by then identified with "freedom," "independence," "nationalism," and "progress". In the following pages we will try to further elaborate on this issue by focusing on the case of Arthur Evans. For a general discussion of the issue see Margarita Díaz-Andreu, *A world history of nineteenth-century archaeology: nationalism, colonialism, and the past* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

recognized by European diplomacy as part of the Ottoman territories, the Ottomans were included in European popular narratives about Crete as culturally foreign occupiers of ancient Hellenic lands.⁵ In this context, the Christians were identified with the 'people,' while Muslims represented the 'regime.' Even at the turn of the century, after the Imperial army had retreated from Crete leaving behind only Muslim civilians and after the Muslim administrative elite was replaced by the Greeks, history continued to overshadow the present. In other words, it seemed to be commonly accepted that only the Christian Cretans were truly of a local origin and had descended from the ancient Cretans. The Muslims were viewed as a case of cultural minority-ness, having no continuity in time before the Ottoman conquest of Crete.

As a result, despite the fact that the Muslims were recognized as members of the local community whose life and property should be protected, no right to claim archaeological findings was ascribed to them. More importantly, Cretan Muslims never considered asserting such a right.⁶ The Christians, on the contrary, dynamically claimed even the pre-Hellenic past of the island. For instance, at the turn of the century, archaeologists excavated the remains of the impressive Bronze-Age palace of Knossos, which was associated with the mythical pre-Hellenic Cretan king, Minoas. This

⁵ The ideological connections between Greece, Rums, and the West has been explained in the previous chapter. In this chapter I shall further elaborate on similar connections by focusing on the particular relationship between European archaeologists and Greece with regard to Crete, and on the way “in which Western colonial powers have valued Greek (Greek-Cretan) culture as their own,” see J. Papadopoulos, *Inventing the Minoans: Archaeology, Modernity and the Quest for European identity*. *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 18, no 1 (2005): 87-149, 4.

⁶As we shall see later on, the limited attempts of Ottoman officials to have Cretan antiquities transferred from the island to Istanbul did not seem to enjoy the support of Muslim locals. At the same time, while we have information for a number of Christian associations and individual collections to be found on the island at that time, I failed to find any indication to similar archaeological activities realized by the local Muslims.

discovery was celebrated as the most important archeological undertaking in Crete, because the civilization in question, which became known as Minoan, was of immense historical interest.

In fact, the Minoans were treated even in the scholarly literature of the time as a pre-Hellenic, Cretan population, linguistically and culturally foreign to the Hellenes. One should not forget that, in the Greek mythology, King Minos was referred to as the great rival of ancient Athens. Moreover, numerous scholars suggested that Minoan civilization had been influenced by “Libya,” “Egypt,” “Arabia,” and “neighboring Oriental lands.”⁷ Nevertheless, the above characteristics of the Minoans did not stop anyone from incorporating them into the linear history of the Greek nation and, in turn, of Europe. In European narratives, the Minoans replaced the Athenians as the most ancient "cradle" of western civilization. At the same time, Cretan Christians honored them as their oldest ancestors. In this way, the Cretan past was romanticized via an imaginary reconstruction of Hellenic-Mediterranean glory. Moreover, the historical process was imbued with a metaphysical essence, leading to the conclusion that the Ottomans and the Muslims were destined to collapse.

Nevertheless, as already alluded to, the above political approach to the history of the island had little to do with the actual results of the excavation. One cannot help but wonder, therefore, why the Muslim-Ottomans did not themselves try to identify with the

⁷ Janet Case, "Cretan Excavations," in *The Classical Review* 22, no 3(May, 1908): 74-79; Levi, Doro. Jul. - Sep., 1945. "Gleanings from Crete" *American Journal of Archaeology* 49 (3): 270-329; A. J. Windekens, *Le Pélasgique. Essai sur une Langue Indo-Européenne Préhellénique* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1952); Sterling Dow, "Minoan Writing," *American Journal of Archaeology* 58, no 2 (Apr., 1954):77-129. Even in the context of our contemporary Greek primary education, Minoan civilization is still presented as an indisputable part of the history of the nation, although it is certainly less loaded with nationalistic meanings than Classical Greece, see Anna Simandiraki, "Μινωπαιδιές:* the Minoan Civilization in Greek Primary Education," *World Archaeology* 36, no 2 (Apr., 1954.): 177-188.

Minoans. In order to answer this question, one should first see how the Ottoman-Muslim world responded to the two major nineteenth-century discourses on identity: popular nationalism and elitist cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitan West

Nationalism has already been discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. By cosmopolitanism, I mean a product of western thought that is used here not in spite of, but due to the fact that it has very vague and conceptually problematic connotations. Notwithstanding its ambiguity, cosmopolitanism is still a major point of reference regarding eighteenth/nineteenth-century European political philosophy and cultural-intellectual history. From a mainstream point of view, cosmopolitanism represents a cultural model deriving from the study of Greek antiquity, which consists of a series of timeless practices and traits, such as tolerant inter-culturalism, transformation, liberality, spontaneity of consciousness, and communication. In this respect, academic and popular literature casts cosmopolitanism as the idealized counterpart of parochial radicalism, racism, fanaticism, and cultural exclusion.⁸

This interpretation, along with its profound moral connotations, is usually

⁸ See for instance Vito Volterra, "Cosmopolitan Ideals and Nationality in the Italian Scientific Community between the Belle époque and the First World War," *Minerva* 31, no 1 (March 1993): 21-37; Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Julia Prewitt Brown, *Cosmopolitan Criticism: Oscar Wilde's Philosophy of Art* (Virginia (US): University of Virginia Press, 1999); Pauline Kleingeld, "Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no 3 (Jul., 1999): 505-524; Benedetto Fontana, "Logos and Kratos: Gramsci and the Ancients on Hegemony," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, no 2 (Apr., 2000): 305-326; Robert Fine, "Kant's Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel's Critique," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 29, no 6 (2003): 609-630; Glenn Most, "Philhellenism, Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism," in *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, ed. K. Zacharia (UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2008).

attributed to European Enlightenment. Nevertheless, due to the evident Eurocentric character of such oversimplified humanitarian concepts, most intellectuals of cosmopolitanism contradicted their own ideals. It is not a surprise, therefore, that a number of contemporary scholars are now questioning the traditional approach to cosmopolitanism, suggesting that if the term means plurality then scholars should stop associating it exclusively with the West.⁹ The aim of this study is not, however, to solve conceptual and philosophical problems concerning the essence of cosmopolitanism, but to put it into the late nineteenth century historical context as a political process. The focused analysis of the late nineteenth century eastern Mediterranean indicates that cosmopolitanism constituted indeed the main cultural expression and ideological justification of liberal capitalism and western imperialism.¹⁰ In this respect, from a western perspective, Ottoman lands were viewed as part of 'oriental' territories that needed to become civilized through exposure to western (or westernized) bourgeoisie. The Ottomans, at the same time, occasionally adopted similar civilizing missions when addressing what they perceived as their own, intimate 'Orient.' Nevertheless, the Empire never became the driving force of cosmopolitan or capitalistic practices in the area.¹¹

⁹ See, for instance, the program of the following Summer Academy: "Living Together: Plurality and Cosmopolitanism in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," September 21 – 28, 2008 at Ottoman Bank Museum in Istanbul.

As very accurately put by Will Hanley, scholars have still to “confront the anti-nationalist teleology and secularizing, bourgeois fantasy at the heart of cosmopolitanism as it is currently used if they are to produce more accurate accounts of diversity in Middle East societies past and present,” in Will Hanley, "Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies," *History Compass* 6, no 5 (2008): 1346–1367, 1346.

¹⁰ For a general discussion of the issue see Malte Fuhrmann, "Cosmopolitan Imperialists and the Ottoman Port Cities: Conflicting Logics in the Urban Social Fabric," in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* (2003), <http://cdlm.revues.org/document128.html>.

¹¹ For a very interesting discussion on Ottoman orientalism see the classic study by Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism*.

Loaded as they might be, these terms cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, I should clarify here what I am not saying. I am not trying to make a qualitative comment on imperialist colonists and victimized localities. At the same time, I am definitely not trying to question the originality, complexity, and uniqueness of late nineteenth century Ottoman experiences. The only thing I am suggesting is that cosmopolitanism was the intellectual product of European Enlightenment and that it was closely related to movements rival to the Empire—such as western imperialism and Greek nationalism. From a methodological point of view, therefore, it is rather better not to confound Ottoman diversity, plurality, and the few isolated attempts to adopt the cultural codes of the West, with European cosmopolitanism.¹²

¹² In order to illustrate the above argument it is useful to examine two important articles on the profile of late nineteenth century Ottoman elites. The first one is written by Selim Delingil and focuses on the cases of Osman Nuri Paşa (general of the Ottoman army in the Crimean War and War Minister under Abdül Hamid II) and Osman Hamdi Bey (the celebrated pioneer of archaeology and museology in the Ottoman Empire). By and large, the author suggests that the two men shared a more or less common vision of Ottomanism despite their different profiles. In other words, his argument is that models of western political thought were well-integrated into the thought of elite Muslim-Ottomans, and that the mixed ideology resulting from this integration was shared by administrative and bourgeois elites, being perceived above everything as an Ottoman ideology. For instance, the views of the above individuals with regard to the Arab populations reflected a romanitized, 'cosmopolitan' understanding of the other as the 'noble savage,' which coexisted with a 'proto-national' understanding of the Empire as being 'Turkish.' Yet instead of creating an identity shared by all social groups, this interpretation of Muslim-Ottoman culture heightened not only the sense of similarity but also the sense of difference between the Ottoman elite and everybody else. See Selim Deringil, "Son Dönem Osmanlı Aydın Bürokratinin Dünya Görüşü Üzerine bir Deneme: A case-study with regard to the world-view of the enlightened bureaucracy of the late Ottoman Empire," in *Osman Hamdi Bey ve Dönemi. Sempozyum 17-18 Aralık 1992 : Osman Hamdi Bey and his Time. Symposium 17-18 December 1992*, ed. Z. Rona (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993).

The author of the second article under scrutiny, Edhem Eldem, suggests that the integration of the Empire into nineteenth century western networks of economic activity had transformed the Imperial institutions into venues of cosmopolitanism via a twofold process: first, through a synthesis of Muslim and non-Muslim bourgeois characteristics deriving from indigenous Ottoman experiences; and second, through the integration of western cultural elements to those of the indigenous ottoman communities. See Edhem Eldem, "Batılılaşma, Modernleşme ve Kozmopolitizm: 19. Yüzyıl Sonu ve 20. Yüzyıl Başında İstanbul: Westernization, Modernization and Cosmopolitanism: Late nineteenth-Early 20th century İstanbul," in *Osman Hamdi Bey ve Dönemi. Sempozyum 17-18 Aralık 1992 : Osman Hamdi Bey and his Time. Symposium 17-18 December 1992*, ed. Z. Rona (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993).

The present author agrees with both of the above arguments, adopting however a slightly different approach to the issue. The way cosmopolitanism is used by the above studies as an analytical tool results in very interesting arguments. At the same time, in the context of the present chapter, due to the particularities of my specific case-study (Cretan archaeology), I have preferred to refer to cosmopolitanism as a specific politico-historical process, the analysis of which describes the conceptual

The important difference between the two was that, while cosmopolitanism became the intellectual vehicle of European expansion into the lands of an imagined Western Empire, the Ottomans were preoccupied with trying to control only the provinces laying within their own political borders. To my knowledge, they never used antiquity or capitalism to legitimize their presence in a foreign country. The obvious problem with the above argument is that 'foreign' and the 'local' are not objective categories themselves. As we have seen, the Ottomans were considered 'foreign' occupiers in some of their own provinces, such as Crete. Nevertheless, instead of keeping a convenient distance from the locals, nineteenth century Ottomans struggled to inspire in them a sense of ideological solidarity with their regime. This mere fact suggests that western imperialism and expansive cosmopolitanism was a historical situation different from theirs.

To better explain the above argument, it is useful to clarify the terms used here with regard to nineteenth century Crete. By Ottomans I mean the Imperial center, which attempted to establish effective control over its territories. Such efforts could be interpreted as 'imperialistic,' since the Christian Cretans (and also at least some of the Muslims) refused to identify with the Ottoman regime. Nevertheless, they could also be interpreted as 'proto-national,' inasmuch as the intended control of the province was accompanied, in theory, by discourses of common belonging. Regardless of whether or not the Cretans felt any solidarity with the Ottomans, the fact that the latter experimented with similar concepts suggests that 'Ottoman imperialism' engendered

barriers created in the late nineteenth century between most Muslim Ottomans and the West, rather than what the Ottoman elites stood for.

patterns of nationalism.¹³

By Greeks, on the other hand, I mean the homonymous nineteenth century nation state, which employed imperialistic strategies through its manifold Great Ideas. As shown in the previous chapter, Greek irredentist projects always included Crete, which was considered undoubtedly Hellenic. At first glance, Greek claims appeared more nationalistic than imperialistic, since they were legitimized by means of an alleged common origin (antiquity) and religion (Christianity) with the Cretans. One should not forget, however, that the non-Christian locals living on the island did not welcome union with Greece. From this point of view, the line between Greek nationalism and imperialism appeared to be very fine indeed.¹⁴

Last but not least, by cosmopolitan West I mean a variety of different states and individuals that became involved in Cretan affairs under the pretext of modernity and

¹³ As demonstrated by Makdisi in his article on Ottoman Orientalism, nineteenth century Ottoman discourses on imperial sovereignty resembled the rhetoric of their contemporary imperial nation-states rather than to pre-modern paradigms. In other words, modernization and progress together with the dynasty provided the “advanced imperial center” with the right to “reform and discipline backward peripheries of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire,” see Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism*, 768-769.

¹⁴ By and large, Greek cosmopolitanism was broadly associated with western Enlightenment and gradually became a synonym of western support towards Greek nationalism. From this point of view, cosmopolitanism was interpreted as devotion to the liberation of the individual through the liberation of the nation, by means not only of arms but also of the instruction of Greek history. At the same time, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the mobility of bourgeois Rums made them part of the broader “cosmopolitan world” to be found in port-towns such as Alexandria and Izmir. Yet, although these groups understood “cosmopolitanism” as a synonym of “patriotism,” on different occasions, for instance in urban centers where the Greek presence was threatened by the “cosmopolitanism” of others (such as the case of Jews in Thessalonica) “the cosmopolitan” could be also identified with foreign “enemies” that threatened the nation. See Catherine Coumarianou, “Cosmopolitisme et Hellénisme dans le *Mercur* Savant, première revue grecque, 1811-1821: Cosmopolitanism and Hellenism in Sage Mercury, the first Greek periodical,” in *Proceedings of the IVth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association* (The Hague-Paris: Mouton & Co, 1966); Gilles Veinstein, ed., *Salonique, 1850-1918 : la “ville des Juifs” et le réveil des Balkans* (Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992); Loukia Droulia, “Towards Modern Greek Consciousness,” *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 1 (2004):51-67; Robert Ilbert, *Alexandria 1860-1960. The brief life of a cosmopolitan community* (Egypt: Harpocrates Publishing, 1997); Ioanna Papageorgiou, “Adelaide Ristori’s Tour of the East Mediterranean (1864–1865) and the Discourse on the Formation of Modern Greek Theatre,” *Theater Research International* 33 (2008):161-175.

antiquity. The above actors constituted a clearly heterogeneous group. Their common characteristic was that, contrary to Ottomans and Greeks, none of them tried to establish a direct national—or even proto-national—bond with the natives. Their declared cultural affiliation with the island consisted of vague references to Christianity and antiquity. In a way, the West appeared more interested in claiming the Cretan past than its present. One should not forget that the paradigm of Minoan civilization, which was often characterized as “cosmopolitan,” was a quite convenient historical point of reference for the bourgeois groups of modern cosmopolitans, which expanded over eastern Mediterranean during the period under scrutiny.¹⁵ As a result, since the territories in question were likewise integrated into global capitalist economic networks, the above patterns of expansion could easily be characterized as imperialistic. Yet one should not forget that nineteenth century imperialism had clear national connotations and that economic expansion was directly linked to political competition, both among and within the leading imperial powers of Europe—and, later on, North America.¹⁶

In brief it could be argued that, from the Great Powers of Europe to the Ottomans and the tiny Kingdom of Greece, imperialism and nationalism developed almost simultaneously. Yet the Great Powers were definitely imperialism's leading

¹⁵ The first and the second generations of foreign archaeologists in Crete appeared to claim for themselves a “cosmopolitan” profile. In the same vein, they were eager to identify Bronze Age Crete with the cradle of European liberalism and cosmopolitanism. For an example of the period’s discourses see G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race: A Study of the Origin of European Peoples*, ed. H. Ellis (London: Walter Scott, Paternoster Square, 1901); Arthur Evans, “New Archeological lights on the origins of civilization in Europe,” *Science* 44, no 1134 (22 September 1916):399-409.

On the integration of similar approaches with the literature on archaeology and Crete see Edward H. Carter, ed., *New Past, and Other Essays on the Development of Civilization* (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968); Donald Preziosi and Louise Hitchcock, *Aegean art and architecture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 13-15.

¹⁶ See Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); For a general discussion of different approaches on nations and urban societies see, Patrick Jocy, *The Rule of Freedom. Liberalism and the Modern City* (London: Verso, 2002).

force.¹⁷ In this respect, aside from being part of the actual Ottoman Empire and the imagined Greek Empire, nineteenth-century Crete was also part of a Mediterranean, cosmopolitan space that stood for stability, development of industry, growth of commerce, and western civilization. This space was shaped through a network of urban elites, who communicated via common cultural codes more relevant to socioeconomic status than to the territorial particularities of their place of residence. Furthermore, by maintaining or acquiring a foreign citizenship and *modi vivendi*, these groups tended to differentiate themselves from the natives. From this point of view, cosmopolitanism aimed towards elitist uniformity. In practice, however, it resulted in a variety of conflicting interests and hybrid practices.¹⁸ One should not forget that the European social elites residing in the urban centers of the Eastern Mediterranean represented a variety of different states, each of which had its own imperialistic interests. At the same time, although most of them tried to avoid frequent interaction with the locals, their

¹⁷ This chapter focuses mainly on politics and archeology. By Great Powers, therefore, I mean the western powers of Europe, mainly Great Britain and France, and not Russia. Although Russia continued to be involved in the Cretan affairs after 1866, the influence of the Tsar on the island was significantly limited. Moreover, to my knowledge, similarly to the Ottomans, Russian discourses on identity had very little to do with antiquity and archaeology. Last but not least, nineteenth century Russian sources cannot be used here since this author does not know the necessary language and has a very limited knowledge of the subject.

¹⁸ On this issues see the very interesting following article: Athanasios Gekas, "Compradors to Cosmopolitans? The Historiographical Fortunes of Merchants in Eastern Mediterranean Ports," *European University Institute Max Weber Programme*, EUI Working Paper MWP (2008/2009), 1-22.

Gekas suggests that the history of eastern Mediterranean can be re-considered by re-employing class as a category together with the concept of cosmopolitanism. By suggesting rightfully that Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans participated together in the networks of Mediterranean trade, Gekas focuses on the "commercial intermediate" between merchants and government in the ottoman port-cities, namely Merchant Societies and Chambers of Commerce, by arguing that in this way the Ottoman state participated into the Mediterranean "cosmopolitan space." At the same time, he argues that, as far as our contemporary methodological questions are concerned, Mediterranean cities need to be emancipated from euro-centric concepts and worth to be studied in their own terms. This argument is relevant with what I have tried to suggest in the present study. In other words, the question of whether ottoman Mediterranean cities were cosmopolitan or not (meaning whether they were multicultural or not), does not seem significantly important to me. At the same time, it is interesting to see if and how cosmopolitanism as a historical process serving the interests of particular groups was used in order to ideologically legitimize political and economical practices of expansion.

physical presence in territories previously inhabited by others drew them into local networks and conflicts.¹⁹

Crete initially participated in the above described cosmopolitan matrix only as a symbol. As shown in the previous chapter, despite the growing popularity that Cretan revolts gained in Europe, until the end of the century the Ottomans were allowed to handle the local conflicts by using their own army and means of negotiation. Moreover, from an economic and strategic perspective, the Cretan ports appeared to be much less attractive to *bourgeois* forces than those of northern Egypt and western Anatolia. In 1897, however, western imperialism reached its peak with regard to Crete, replacing youthful volunteers and rebellious 'story-tellers' with official diplomacy and military forces.

The foreign intervention of 1897, the island's blockade by European navies, the landing of foreign troops, along with the maintenance of the hybrid polity established after the war under international custody, brought the locals for the first time in direct sight of the superior military power of the West. At the same time, this development brought to Crete a new regime and a mosaic of different languages, uniforms, habits, and ideas. Moreover, the united powers of the West—and of Russia—took hold of the island's ports, turning the most strategically important one (Suda bay) into their joint naval base. Under the protection of the Admirals, therefore, European archaeologists found new grounds to explore the island, celebrating the exemption of Crete from

¹⁹ Haris Exertzoglou, "The Cultural uses of Consumption: Negotiating Class, Gender, and Nation in the Ottoman Urban Centers during the Nineteenth century," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (1):77-10, 77, 78, 79.

For the creation of 'moral' urban identities see as an example the case of Beirut, Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 191-264. For the Greeks in Izmir see Kechriotis, *A non-Muslim Ottoman Community*. For an analysis of cultural hybridity similar to the points made in this study see the case of Aleppo, and Cairo, in Alsayyad, *Being Modern in the Middle East and Whose Cairo*.

Ottoman Antiquities Laws after the proclamation of Autonomy. This peculiar venue of cosmopolitanism reshaped the island society once again, decreasing the distance between the Cretans and the world around them.²⁰

In the same vein, under the supervision of the European Admirals, the new local regime was invited to modernize administrative and economic structures, without the mediation of the central Ottoman state. One could argue, therefore, that late nineteenth century Cretan modernization became indeed synonymous with westernization. Nevertheless, the use of westernization as a paradigm is highly problematic, mainly for three reasons. The first one is based on an argument well known to the contemporary social scholar, that of *multiple modernities*. According to this approach, modernity consisted of a variety of different experiences, all of which were unique, and all equally important.²¹ The second reason is based on the idea that the West rested in a relative argument rather than in any specific geography. It could be transplanted to Paris, Athens, Istanbul, or the port cities of Crete. Furthermore, its elastic boundaries allowed for accepting newcomers under the umbrella-culture of a civilizing mission.²² The third reason preventing this author from coming to grips with the theory of one-way, hegemonic westernization of the East, is the difference between power and culture. In

²⁰ In short, Crete as a locality shaped by mobility, an actual province of the Ottoman Empire, and an imaginary province of the Greek nation and Western community, was integrated into different narrative utopias about the past and the future. See Phillip E. Wegner, *Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press (2002).

²¹ Within this context, our discussion of Cretan modernity agrees with the argument that the multiple Cretan realities refuted the hegemonic assumptions of western programs of modernity that derived from exclusive cultural dichotomies. For a theoretical discussion of the issue see S. N. Winter Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, no 1 (2000): 1-29.

²² For a comparative analysis of the Ottoman case and the broader context see Selim Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery": The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no 2 (2003): 311-342.

other words, even if we accept that the growing economic-political dominance and advanced technology of western Europe and north America became indeed the driving forces of Cretan modernity, the latter constituted a dynamic process in terms of culture.

By and large, if the Western Modernity, as an abstraction, lends itself equally to progress (*i.e.*, control of the future) and history (*i.e.*, control of the past), then we must address the question of how the second part of the process was realized. If it's true, for instance, that the nineteenth century East modernized through a process of westernization, then it is also true that the West was historically contextualized by itself, through a process of 'easternization.' One should not forget that in the period under scrutiny, sciences and arts in Europe were profoundly influenced by the manifold legacies of 'old Mediterranean,' namely antiquity, democracy, cosmopolitanism, the Roman Empire, Christianity, and Byzantium. Hence, the nineteenth century West as we know it may have never existed without its self-identification with the inheritance of the East.²³

In my view, the argument that culture is fluid does not result, as it is often argued, in generalizations that obscure the actual material determinants of cultural and

²³ Questions on identity and culture constitute a central topic in contemporary social history focusing on the eastern Mediterranean geography. Within this context, my arguments about Crete agree to a large extent with Stuart Hall's explanation of culture as "a working language." In other words, my suggestion is that the West was conceptualized through its discourses rather than through actual practices. I agree with the argument that culture is rather a process (a set of practices) than an essence (a set of things); it is a giving and taking of meaning; it is a shared meaning, or to put it differently, the communication of diverse shared meanings. Thus, it is impossible to identify separate and mutually exclusive cultural communities. At the same time, it is impossible to make history without differentiating between diverse subjects. Thus, as Halls suggests "the discursive perspective has required us to think about reintroducing, reintegrating the subjective dimension in a non-holistic, non-unitary way." See "On Postmodernism and Articulation: an Interview with Stuart Hall," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. L. Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), 145. See also, Frank Furedi, *Mythical Past, Elusive Future : History and Society in an Anxious Age* (London: Pluto Press, 1992); Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: SAGE, 1997); Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context*, edit. P. Essed and D. T. Goldberg (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002).

social history.²⁴ Quite to the contrary, by questioning the fixed character of any culture one can still derive very specific and methodologically useful conclusions. For instance, my discussion of culture as a shared phenomenon does not suggest that there were no cultural differences between the late nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and the West; it only suggests that these differences were neither absolute nor diachronic. For this reason, by using the term 'easternizing' I want to underline the following: if we accept that the evident influence of eastern Mediterranean's past on the construction of the cultural identity of the West in the nineteenth century is beyond doubt, although the agents of these legendary past "cultures" had never identify themselves with "European West," then considering Eastern Mediterranean the "cradle of western culture" has been just an arbitrary modern choice based on nothing but discursive meanings.

In this context, nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was subjected to hegemonic, euro-centric interpretations of the past only because none of its agents demonstrated the power (or the will) to embody "the ancient" and the "pre-historic" with a meaning challenging the dominant rhetoric of the West. In pursuing this last line of thought, this study suggests that the concept of nineteenth century westernization, and more particularly that of Cretan westernization, is valid in terms of power but not in terms of culture. In a figurative way, 'Power' resembles a labyrinth of interconnecting halls built around a well-defined core. From this point of view, it is possible to differentiate between central and marginal forces. 'Culture,' on the contrary, is a shared experience circulating in time and space the same way air circulates in the labyrinth's halls. Hence,

²⁴ For instance, the main criticism that Hall's discussion of culture has drawn is that a focus only on culture's fluidity results in generalizations that obscure consideration of the actual material, social, and economical determinants of culture, see Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, eds., *Cultural Studies in Question* (London: Sage, 1997), introduction.

any attempt to diachronically differentiate between dominant and marginal cultures is not only discriminative against certain civilizations, but also incorrect.

Minoan archaeology can be seen as the best illustration of the above. The great contribution of western archaeologists in the discovery of Minoan sites is beyond doubt. In this way, foreign archaeologists shared with the locals their modern understanding of the past and helped them to familiarize with modern techniques of excavation and the treatment of archaeological sites. At the same time, Cretan archaeological sites bestowed their legacy in the making of the modern West. In this way, western Europe was afforded a prehistoric past absent from its actual territories. One could argue that the development of Minoan archaeology westernized the East, and easternized the West.

Minoan Archaeology and Arthur Evans, The Act of Observation

“The Minoans” is a term inspired by the mythical king of Crete, Minos, that was created by the British archeologist Arthur Evans in the late nineteenth century to describe Bronze Age Crete. The restored palace of this pre-Hellenic civilization and the famous “labyrinth,” are today among the most visited archaeological sites in the world, and maintain a glorified place in the context of Greek national narratives.²⁵ From this point of view, it seems to be of little—if any—importance that these sites were excavated

²⁵ As suggested by Alexandre Farnoux, the active involvement of British archaeologists in the first excavations in Crete associated Great Britain with Minoan Crete both in theory and practice. Thus, by asking the question “pax minoica...ou pax britannica?” Farnoux clearly implies that the conceptualization of the Cretan past by British archaeological imagination was serving the British need for ancient symbols rather than objective scholarly research. See Alexandre Farnoux, *Cnossos, l'archéologie d'un rêve: Knossos, archaeology of a dream* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

One has also to keep in mind that, as noted by Papadopoulos, the re-conceptualization of Minoan society by Arthur Evans is still dominant in British, French, Italian, German, American or Greek scholarly discourses, see Papadopoulos, *Inventing the Minoans*, 4-5.

while Crete was still part of the Ottoman Empire, since excavations on the island were lead by foreign archeologists with the support of the local Christians. The Ottomans were rarely engaged in affairs of that nature, although until 1897 Ottoman officials were the only authority empowered to allow, or to forbid, such undertakings.²⁶

At any event, a number of European and American archaeologists appeared to have taken interest in the Cretan sites prior to 1897. At the turn of the century, Cretan archaeology was already a generation old. In this way, the written documents produced by archaeologists interested in the history of the island became historical sources themselves. One should not forget that most archaeologists had visited Crete during the turbulent years of constant uprisings and local conflicts. Thus, they were expected by their compatriots to reflect on issues both of archaeological and of political interest, since they were simultaneously scholars of ancient civilizations and eye-witnesses to developments in their contemporary Crete. In this respect, archaeologists participated in the hegemonic observation of an exoticized 'Orient.'

The observers, however, were also observed. The Eastern Mediterranean was watching them; and it was creating the West by admitting its existence. In this way, the paternalistic approaches adopted by foreigners matched the manipulative strategies of the locals. In Crete, for example, the locals seemed to realize and accept the superiority of the Great Powers in terms of diplomacy, economic growth, military strength, and knowledge of archaeology. Yet, this realization was not always accompanied by true admiration or acceptance of the West's moralistic qualities. Moreover, the same way westerners reduced Crete to overly simplified stereotypes, Cretans treated westerners as

²⁶ Y. Hamilakis, *Labyrinth revisited: Rethinking "Minoan" Archaeology* (Oxford: Oxford Books, 2002).

a homogenous group, occasionally taking advantage of the simplistic foreign understandings of the local reality to serve their own interests.

Similar interactions, which were both physical and dialectical, resulted in stereotypical descriptions of the 'Other,' based either on individual interpretations or on second-hand—and often wrong—information.²⁷ Mere opinions, in fact, were as likely to govern people's actions as were neat strategies or hard evidence. The combination of all these resulted in patterns that were not subjected to sudden reversals. The act of observation, in other words, accounted for the considerable expansion of stereotypical discourses, affording the subjective space of popular rhetoric artificial objectivity. In this way, a complex matrix of local and foreign, individual and collective, influential or marginal, interpretations was formed with regard to Crete, influencing developments on the island in unpredictable ways.²⁸

Thus, the most important question to be asked here is the following: how can a researcher decide what is of primary importance regarding the history of Crete, without disrupting the essential unity of history itself? Which individual stories matter more? Which general patterns are more striking? Those that appear to be particular and unique? Or, those that could help us understand how Crete related to the Universal? In fact, this has been one of the greatest difficulties in this study. Yet the nature of this difficulty is the only way to answer the question itself. In other words, although it is impossible to go fully into the history of each state, society, or individual that had something to do with nineteenth century Crete, it has to be underlined that the obvious interaction between

²⁷ For a similar discussion of stereotypes concerning the "Balkans" see Mazower, *The Balkans* and Skopetea, *The Balkans between the East and the West*.

²⁸ Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 9.

Crete on the one hand and Ottomans-Greeks on the other was also profoundly influenced by less obvious actors.

The existence of interconnectedness between individual-local histories and global developments is certainly not a novel suggestion. Social scholars have started pointing in this direction long ago.²⁹ Examining the case of Crete from such a perspective, therefore, offers us not a novel idea but one specific example that supports the argument. The previous chapter has already refereed briefly to the ideological bounds between the locality in question and the world around it. In what follows, I shall try to clarify this general point, focusing in detail on one isolated case study: the background of an archeologist that became quite influential in the reconstruction of Minoan Crete. In other words, I shall try to address the question of who was Arthur Evans and where he was coming from.

Arthur Evans, the British archaeologist who gained international recognition as the inventor of the Minoans and excavator of their palace in Knossos, visited Crete for the first time in 1894. His first short visit was followed by long exploratory excursions of the island in 1895, 1896, 1898 and 1899.³⁰ As a result, Evans happened to be present at, and became directly involved in, the making of Autonomous Crete. The archaeologist, who was also a journalist with a liberal political agenda, took an active stand towards his contemporary reality, writing about Crete both as a scholar and as a reporter. In retrospect, the variety of sources he left behind provide him, as a historical actor, with significant visibility. The records he kept on his visits, his personal

²⁹ Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*.

³⁰ Ann Brown and Keith Bennet, eds., *Arthur Evans's Travels in Crete*, *BAR International Series 1000* (Oxford: The University of Oxford, Ashmoleum Museum, 2001), introduction.

correspondence with the Ashmolean Museum and the British Archeological Mission at Athens, his journalistic reportage, and his scientific publications in learned journals constitute an important source of information about the issues addressed by this chapter.³¹ The above material will be used thus to elaborate on the links between Crete and Victorian England. Yet before doing so, an explanation of what this author means by Victorian England is in order.

Political Conflicts in Victorian England

It is commonly accepted that, by the late nineteenth century, Victorian England—also known as the core of the United Kingdom and Great Britain—symbolized economic prosperity, social progress, and political stability. The prestige of the Throne, the longevity of the Queen, the rapid industrialization of the country, the long parliamentary tradition, and the commercial and political expansion of British influence over a variety of foreign lands, contributed to the rise of Victorian England into a global super-power. It is also accepted, however, that even as the United Kingdom represented one of the wealthiest elites of the world, the majority of its inhabitants continued to live in poverty.³² Furthermore, during the first stages of industrialization, wealth and political power were concentrated in the hands of a small minority, whereas misery and lack of

³¹ Some relevant examples are discussed in the following pages.

³² Stephen J. Nicholas, Nicholas and Jacqueline M. Summer, "Male Literacy, "Deskilling," and the Industrial Revolution," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23, no 1 (1992): 1-18; Ginger Suzanne Frost, *Promises broken : courtship, class, and gender in Victorian England* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), introduction; Rachel Ginnis Fuchs, *Gender and Poverty in Nineteenth-century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

political representation prevailed among the masses. Thus, the middle century lead Victorian England had obtained in manufacturing, commerce, and banking had also led to a paradoxical growth of the gap between privileged minorities and deprived majorities, both at home and abroad.³³

In the United Kingdom, inequality had both rural and urban dimensions, as it originated both from the uneven distribution of recently accumulated capital and from traditional inequalities based on social and ethnic origin. State and society became arenas of social conflict expressed among different actors: the landholding aristocracy—which was also engaged in industry, commerce, and banking—the rising middle class, the landless agricultural laborers, and the urban workers. At the same time, inasmuch as the accumulation of capital at home was related to investments abroad, domestic turmoil was linked also to the imperialistic projects of the United Kingdom, viewed here as the core of the British Naval Empire. To put it differently, the constant battle for the diffusion of wealth and power had two major dimensions: first, the social collisions at home; and second, the constant tension between the Kingdom and its direct or indirect colonies abroad.³⁴

³³ The arguments presented in this chapter are based on mainstream generalizations according to which industrialization in Britain developed parallel to urbanization, the rise of the masses, and the consequent development of mass-politics. In this context, the particularities of local histories and experiences are overlooked. The present study is not concerned with providing a thorough analysis of the phenomenon but with demonstrating how the above general developments were connected to British politics towards Crete, see Hobsbawn, *The Age of Capital*.

For a discussion of the industrial revolution and urbanization as phenomena much more complex and ramified than a cumulative, progressive, and linear process see Edward Anthony Wrigley *Continuity, Chance and Change: the Character of the Industrial Revolution in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jon. Stobart, "In Search of Causality: A Regional Approach to Urban Growth in Eighteenth-Century England," *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 82, no 3(2000): 149-163.

³⁴ See Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe; A Century of Predominantly Industrial Society since 1830* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1939), 2: 326-379.

The networks and ideological platforms that resulted from the intersection of such diverse factors were variable and complex. In this respect, this author is convinced that British ideas and interests were neither timeless and stable, nor monolithic. If we accept, instead, that individual agendas and cognitive dispositions towards the world are, by and large, influenced by one's direct background, then it is plausible to suggest that the way British actors responded to Cretan realities was more relevant to British particularities than to Cretan ones. In this respect, it could be argued that the Cretan issue gained considerable publicity within the United Kingdom in the last decades of the century by means of the growing power of the press and due to two internal developments: the rise of the masses and the association of British patriotism with imperialism.

Late nineteenth century British political reforms are often treated by the relevant literature as the direct result of progressive industrialization and urbanization.³⁵ From such a perspective, growing demand for massive production led to growing demand for a massive work force. Consequently, the concentration of great numbers of workers in industrial centers gave birth to a force that radically influenced the character of political

³⁵ The popular movement for universal male suffrage, which was spreading in British urban centers from the late 1830's (when the People's Charter was published) onwards became the first movement in the world to be represented by an organized political party (The National Charter Association, 1840). Moreover, the Reform Act of 1867 had doubled the electorate and practically enfranchised the working classes in the industrial cities, although voting remained limited by property qualifications. In 1872, the secret ballot was prescribed for all municipal and parliamentary elections and in 1884, the electorate was increased by 40 per cent, through the regulation that made suffrage qualifications in the counties identical with those in the boroughs. Moreover, although the right to vote remained a male privilege, the dynamic suffrage movement suggests that even working women were gradually becoming visible in the context of British mass politics. For an analysis of institutional changes in nineteenth century political history of Britain see Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On women's movement see Sandra Stanley Holton, *Feminism and Democracy: Women's Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

discourse: the urban workingmen. In fact, the multitude of individuals that formed the urban masses often had very little in common with each other. They came from different backgrounds and had had different experiences.³⁶ Yet, since they all had to work exhausting hours for wages that kept them on the verge of starvation—under the most uncomfortable and unsanitary of conditions,—they all shared similar experiences of cultural and material deprivation.

According to some scholars, the individual characteristics of urban workers were assimilated through this process within “numerous, ignorant and dangerous”³⁷ masses that feared not to riot or revolt. According to others, however, the workers’ movements were ramified according to territorial particularities and did not represent an ideologically homogenized mass. In the same vein, their demands appeared to have been the product of “material realities of local social and economic differentiation” and not of a strong class consciousness.³⁸ Whatever the reason may have been, the fact was that from the middle century onwards, the urban masses of Britain were politically mobilized

³⁶ The growing interest of late nineteenth century scholars in studying “mob psychology,” is an indication of the orientations of politics and political discourses in countries such as Victorian Britain and Republican France. For instance, see the influential publication of Gustave Le Bon on “crowds” in 1895, which was shortly after (in 1897) translated into English. Despite the association of this work with racism, and later on with fascism, the attempt of the author to understand “the unusual mentality of the crowd” reflected the characteristics of the period under scrutiny in a very profound way. See Gustave Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules: The psychology of the crowds* (1895), www.gutenberg.org/etext/24007. See also N. F. R. Crafts, “Industrial Revolution in England and France: Some Thoughts on the Question, ‘Why was England First?’” *The Economic History Review* 30, no 3 (Aug., 1977): 429-441; Ronald Aminzade, “Capitalist Industrialization and Patterns of Industrial Protest: a Comparative Urban Study of Nineteenth-Century France,” *American Sociological Review* 49, no 4 (Aug., 1984): 437-453.

³⁷ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, 98. See also EP. Thompson and H Sunderland, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Penguin books, 1968).

³⁸ E. H. Hunt, “Industrialization and Regional Inequality: Wages in Britain, 1760-1914,” *The Journal of Economic History* 46, no 4 (Dec., 1986): 935-966; Philip. Jun. Howell, “The Local Background of Chartism Revisited: A Note on the Geography of Popular Politics in Early Victorian Britain,” *Area* 28, no 2 (1996): 150-159.

and gradually enfranchised.³⁹

British parliamentary structures adapted to mass politics with the rise of two parties: the Liberals and the Conservatives.⁴⁰ Within this context, the Liberal party was the first to address the “interests of the people.” While the Conservatives initially represented the British landed elite, the Crown, and the Anglican Church, the Liberals were the first to address the masses in the name of overriding issues, relevant both to internal and to external politics.⁴¹ The notorious populist campaigns of the Liberal leader William Gladstone, in particular, appeared to hold great appeal to the people. In this respect, Liberal popularity was quite damaging to the traditional profile of the Imperial regime. Nevertheless, the British ‘old regime’ responded to the challenge surely enough. From the middle nineteenth century on, the Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli did much to convince his voters that the people should be loyal above all else to the nation, and that the British nation lied at the very core of the British empire. In this way, Disraeli’s rhetoric bridged the conceptual paradox between the parliamentary system and the royal family, making patriotism the slogan of the Conservative party, and

³⁹ With regard to the question of why the elite establishment agreed on diluting its political power by extending the voting franchise, the following study offers an interesting perspective, although I would suggest that human realities are always much more complex than mathematic equations. See William Jack and Roger Lagunoff, “Dynamic enfranchisement,” *Journal of Public Economics* 90, no 4-5 (2006): 551-572.

⁴⁰ Stephen J. Lee, *Gladstone and Disraeli* (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁴¹ As suggested by Hammer in his classic study of Gladstonian politics, in the second half of the nineteenth century the main drawback of the Liberal party was lack of unity. Hence, while some suggested that a comprehensive reform program should become the unifying instrument for the party, others – including Gladstone—preferred promoting isolated issues as the touch stone of Liberalism in Britain. In this context, it seems that agendas such as “Home Rule for Ireland” or the “Eastern Question,” a parameter of which was evidently the “Cretan Question,” were promoted explicitly by Gladstone in his search for Liberal unity and public popularity, see D.A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1972).

establishing the Crown as the most outstanding symbol of the British nation.⁴²

If the Liberals initially put, at least in theory, the common interests of the people above national and dynastic affiliations, the Conservatives made it clear that British politicians should care more about British people. They maintained, therefore, that the United Kingdom should remain strong and competitive in the global scene, so that British people might enjoy peace and prosperity. In this respect, the welfare of the nation was bounded to the welfare of the Empire. Moreover, the welfare of the Empire was linked to the common-wellbeing, since British administration was presented as a real salvation for people incapable of self-government, such as Indians, Africans, Cretans and Greeks. As to internal issues, Disraelian Conservatism was initially promoting the interests of British aristocracy and of the old sociopolitical elite. This approach was not particularly popular among the rising urban classes. Under the leadership of Salisbury, therefore, British Conservatives began suggesting that imperialistic strategies abroad should serve not only the interests of the ruling groups but the establishment of a strong social-state at home.⁴³ Due to this development, a group of Liberals called Unionists decided to cooperate with the Conservatives and seceded from the Liberal party of Gladstone in the 1880's, maintaining that by failing to embrace the "historic imperial mission" and "national greatness of the English people," Gladstone could not hope to

⁴² See "Conservatism with imagination: Disraeli and Newman" in Russel Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2001 [1953], 266-279.

⁴³ On the collaboration between the Whig patrician Lord Hartington and Joseph Chamberlain, who represented the Unionist alliance that had seceded from the Liberals in 1886 to take office in the Conservative government formed by Lord Salisbury in 1896, see T. A. Jenkins, "Hartington, Chamberlain and the Unionist Alliance, 1886-1895," *Parliamentary History* 11, no 1 (1992), 108-138.

realize efficient social reform at home.⁴⁴

One should not forget that in the last decades of the century, Victorian economic and diplomatic might seemed to be seriously challenged by the global economic crisis and by the rising stars of American, Russian, and German competitors.⁴⁵ Within this context, contrary to earlier radical versions of sentimental patriotism promoted by the Liberals, the Conservatives espoused Protestant 'common sense,' presenting it as the national symbol of Great Britain. In this respect, they characterized the abstract ideals of the Liberals—such as democracy, socialism, fraternity, and international peace—to be little more than sentimental theorizing, totally foreign to the British national quality of objective rationality. Furthermore, since the above ideals were associated with the French Revolution, the Conservatives used them against the Liberals by stirring up the well-known British francophobia.⁴⁶

The aforementioned Conservative approach gained growing popularity among the British in the last decades of the century, since the abstract ideals of the Liberals did not seem to offer an answer to the actual challenges Great Britain was faced with. The Liberals, therefore, may have decided to change their political platform regarding foreign policy, in response to the decreasing popularity of their party. In any event, from

⁴⁴ For instance, for the change in Chamberlain's perspective from a concept of nationalism rooted in Liberal radicalism to an approach of patriotism firmly associated with the Tory tradition, see James Loughlin, "Joseph Chamberlain, English Nationalism and the Ulster Question," *History* 77, no 250 (June 1992), 202-221.

⁴⁵ Fulvio Cammarano, *To Save England from Decline. The National Party of Common Sense: British Conservatism and the Challenge of Democracy (1885-1892)* (NY: Univerity Press of America, April 2001).

⁴⁶ See Loughlin, *Joseph Chamberlain*, 205-207. See also Paul. Jan. Readman, "The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the General Election of 1900," *The Journal of British Studies* 40, no 1 (2001): 107-145.

the 1870's onwards, the Liberals abandoned their vague, universal ideal of international conciliation in favor of a seemingly more 'patriotic' agenda. Instead of claiming the right to represent the 'people,' they decided to defend only the Christian people; more specifically, those Christian people living under the Ottoman regime.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, after the Crimean War, the British Conservatives in power tried by all means to defend the Ottoman regime against Russia. The Liberals then found grounds to attack them in the name of Christianity, an issue undoubtedly popular among voters identifying with British patriotism. One should not forget that the Liberal leader Gladstone used to be a churchman, who had migrated to the Liberals from conservative circles.⁴⁷ Under his leadership, therefore, high churchmen, Irish Catholics, and Irish home-rulers were attracted to the Liberals in the name of religion rather than of secular democracy, despite the radical opposition of academics, non-conformists, and positivists within the party.⁴⁸

The Cretan Issue and British Internal Politics

British discourses on the Cretan riots of 1897-1898 show that in Great Britain, as elsewhere, elaborated theory was certainly less influential on the formulation of foreign policy than personal considerations, short term dynamics, and ideological ambiguities

⁴⁷ Jonathan Philip Parry, *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Agatha Ramm, *William Ewart Gladstone* (Cardiff: GPC Books, 1989).

⁴⁸ On this see the thorough study of J.P Parry. As noted by the author in his introduction, one should not forget that the Victorian Age was to a large extent a 'moral age.' Hence, "politics in the 1860s-1870s, cannot be understood if it is treated merely as a secular activity, see Jonathan Philip Parry, *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Introduction, 150-159.

deriving from individual interests and beliefs. The most striking example of this was the shift in the discourses of the two parties from the first to the second half of the century with regard to the Ottomans. Until the middle of the century, when the Liberals were under the leadership of Palmerston, they maintained that the Ottoman Empire was rapidly reforming and was soon to become a modern state. As one of the Liberals enthusiastically declared in a meeting held in Manchester in 1853, "The Turk is not a Moslem. He is Unitarian."⁴⁹ Conservative circles, on the other hand, seemed quite uneasy with the fact that the realm was supporting a Muslim regime.

After the Crimean War, however, the Conservatives adopted an openly pro-Ottoman policy in favor of stability and peace. Gladstonian Liberals, on the contrary, arose as the greatest enemies of the Ottoman rule in Victorian England. In this context, from the 1870's onward, the massacres of Christians in Bulgaria and Crete became the emblem of Liberal opposition against British Conservatives. Nevertheless, when the Liberals came to government (1892-1895), their short term in power proved enough to split their own party. The main reason for this development was that some of them did not approve of Gladstone's strategies concerning the Eastern Mediterranean and Ireland.⁵⁰

The terms of the British debate on the Cretan issue were thus set in the above context. The Conservatives, who had come back to power in 1895, tried to take a neutral stand. They maintained that the government should secure Ottoman control over Crete to

⁴⁹ See *Manchester United*, 17 December 1853, quoted in Ann Pottinger Saab, "The Doctors' Dilemma: Britain and the Cretan Crisis 1866-69," *The Journal of Modern History*, 49, no 4 (Dec., 1977), D1383-D1407.

⁵⁰ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question* (London: Frank Cass, 1962).

protect stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Governmental strategies, however, were seriously undermined by the popular outcry against the Ottomans stirred up by the Liberals. Gladstonian Liberals missed no opportunity to lambaste the government for not taking an active stand to stop 'Turkish atrocities' against the Christians.⁵¹

A typical example of these dynamics was the publication of a letter by J. Gennadius in the *Times*, in February 1897. According to the author, the aim of the article was to explain to the British public the Greek point of view; and it did so by enumerating the revolts of 1831, 1841, 1858, 1866-8, 1877-8, 1889 and 1896-7 as national revolutions that proved Cretan devotion to Greece. Gennadius was obviously enough trying to challenge in this manner the stereotypical view taken by the British government that the majority of Cretans were against union with Greece. Moreover, the author was openly addressing the issue of religion, kindly pleading Christian Britain to embrace her patriotic duty and to support her fellow Christian Cretans.⁵² Although the letter was published in the last pages of the rather moderate *Times* in the "letters to the editor" column, it enjoyed the special attention of Gladstone himself and of his

⁵¹ M. de Councel, French Ambassador in London in 1897, was reporting to his government that the recent fashion of Philhellenism was manifested even in Great Britain, which was the least prosperous country for such movements. More specifically, in February 1897, the Ambassador reported that relevant committees had started to demonstrate an extraordinary activity even in London, see Doc No 106. M. de Councel à M. Hanotaux, 13 Février 1897, in Documents Diplomatiques Français (16 Octobre 1896- 31 Decembre 1897).

⁵² "The Cretan revolts of 1831, 1841, 1858, 1866 to 1868, 1877 to 1878, 1889, and that of last summer entailed upon the neighboring kingdom not only continual unrest, as inevitable as it proved pernicious, but enormous financial sacrifices for the maintenance of the terms of thousands of refugees whom, even if they have not been our own flesh and blood, we were bound to support as mere human beings... It has been averred that these troubles were fomented in Greece. The whole course of human history will not offer an example of people ready to undergo, periodically at intervals of ten years, pillage, massacre, and untold misery at the bidding of outsiders. If, however, such an extraordinary power of persuasion over the Cretans be admitted in us, we are ipso facto recognized as virtual masters of an island which its masters cannot restrain from this mad love of self-immolation for our sake. The truth lies in the fact that it is impossible to draw between the Greeks in the kingdom and the Greeks in Crete even that faint distinction which is observable between Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen." See J. Gennadius, "Crete and Greece," *The Times* (London), 15 February 1897.

supporters. Gennadius was thus conveniently quoted by the Liberals to attack the 'unpatriotic' policies of the government; a challenge that could not be easily answered.⁵³

While atrocities and battles continued on the island, the British government's failure, or lack of will, to stop Christian bloodshed in Armenia and Crete caused growing public dissatisfaction in Great Britain. Nevertheless, the real irony of Conservative foreign policy was that the government was eventually forced to abandon its strategy of 'wise mediation' when, during the outbreaks of 1898 in the town of Iraklio (Candia), Muslim *Bashi-Bazouks* had murdered eighteen British soldiers. Such an insult to the British flag could not easily be excused. The British public was enraged. Thus, serious steps of a punitive character were taken by the Admirals of the Powers on the island, and seven Muslims, who were tried and convicted for their participation in these events, were hanged.⁵⁴ The gallows was erected on a hill that could be seen from the whole sound, and their bodies were left hanging as a lesson to the locals.⁵⁵ Despite the brutality of the punishment, however, the outbreaks continued and the Muslim radicals appeared to be out of control. Thus, the British government eventually agreed on the forcible ejection of the Ottoman troops from the island, and on the suggestion of Russia to

⁵³ Gladstone asked the British cabinet and people not to ignore Gennadius's plea. Moreover, when the six Great powers of Europe informed Greece, via a collective note, that Crete would not be annexed to the Hellenic Kingdom, Gladstone melodramatically characterized Crete as "a David facing six Goliaths." Last but not least, shortly before his death, Gladstone sent to the duke of Westminster a letter on the issue, which was meant to be one of his last public pronouncements. As a result, the letter in question acquired extra publicity among Gladstone's supporters, and became known as the last manifesto of Gladstonian Liberalism: "By the testimony alike of lining authority and of facts, Turkish rule in Crete exists only as a shadow of the past, and has no place in the future; that there is no organ upon earth (subject to independent provisions on behalf of the minority) so competent or so well entitled to define a prospective position for the people, as the people itself," see Gladstone, *The Eastern crisis*, 15.

⁵⁴ Regarding the intense debates realized in the House of Commons about the issue of Crete see *Hansard 1803-2005 ; Commons Sitting* (15 July 1897).

⁵⁵ *The New York Times* (19 October 1898).

appoint Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner of the four guardian Powers (France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia).⁵⁶

It must be mentioned that, despite their reaction to the events of 1898, the British remained among the least enthusiastic Europeans towards the 'Greek cause.'⁵⁷ In fact, after Gladstone's withdrawal from politics, the leading circles of the Liberals appeared willing to support the government's guarded diplomacy.⁵⁸ Yet, it should be underlined that the British government was defending the Ottomans only for the benefit of 'peace and stability.' When it became clear that the regime of Istanbul could control neither Christians nor Muslims in Crete, British support waivered. In the same vein, after the murder of the British soldiers, leading Liberals that had supported governmental strategies were heavily criticized by their own party.

Under the pretext of Crete and other foreign issues, therefore, the Liberals were once again divided. Left-wing Liberal newspapers, which did not agree with the choices of the party's leadership, did not cease to suggest that the ideological differences between the two parties could not be bridged. Thus, cooperation with the Conservatives, on any occasion, should be out of the question. Liberalism should remain a force of criticism and opposition against all kinds of dynasties and regimes, and especially against the Ottoman regime. According to the radicals, the fact that Liberal leadership

⁵⁶ Theodore P. Ion, "The Cretan Question," *The American Journal of International Law* 4 (2): 276-284: 179-280.

⁵⁷ Bojidar Samardjiev, « L'Angleterre, les puissances Européennes et les reformes en Crète à la fin du XIXe siècle, » *Balkan Studies*, no 1 and 2(1998): 66-92.

⁵⁸ The successor of Gladstone, Lord Rosebery, appeared to be much less fervent in criticizing the government than his predecessor. Despite the fact that he was asked by other Liberals to urge the government to take action regarding the massacres in Crete, he seemed unwilling to do so, asserting that his lack of knowledge about the Cretan affairs prevented him from taking any responsibility, see Lord Rosebery, "And The Massacres In Crete," *The London Times* (Aug 20, 1896).

did not follow the above dogma in the case of Crete was a sure sign that it was time not only for the union of Crete with Greece, but also for the British Liberals to find new leaders.

A typical example of the above was the newspaper *Daily Chronicle* which, during the Cretan crisis, adopted an agitated rhetoric against the Ottomans and the moderate efforts of the British government.⁵⁹ According to some researchers, the attitude of the *Chronicle* caused more damage than good to the Greeks, since the articles of the paper in question were poorly written, full of exaggerations, and often provided incorrect information. In fact, the newspaper's own reputation was also heavily injured by the way it handled issues of foreign interest.⁶⁰ Regardless of who was considered to be right or wrong, the example of the *Chronicle* suggests that British debates on Crete were clearly colored by internal considerations.

This conclusion affords some clarity about the reasons British newspapers and periodicals were flooded with speeches, articles, telegraphic information, and correspondence in connection with the Cretan crisis of 1897-1898. Eventually, it seems that the British government, which was initially unwilling to take any initiative with regard to Crete, was forced to become actively involved by the gradual culmination of violence, the initiatives of the other Powers, and public criticism at home. However, British diplomacy continued to firmly oppose the island's annexation to Greece, which would offend the dogma of Ottoman integrity, destabilizing the Balkans once again, and

⁵⁹ See the *Daily Chronicle* (London), 1896-1900.

⁶⁰ Alfred F. Havighurst, *Radical journalist: H. W. Massingham (1860-1924)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 94-110.
See also Angela V. John, *War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century: the Life and Times of Henry W. Nevinnson* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 17-27.

putting the entire region at risk.

In this framework, the legendary leader of the Liberals, W. Gladstone, who had by then withdrawn from active politics to his country estate, burst back into the public limelight for the last time. Shortly before his death in 1898, Gladstone addressed a clarion call to Britain to help the Christians against the Turks, and to liberate Crete.⁶¹ In a figurative way, the death of the “Grand Old Man” of nineteenth century British Liberalism marked the end of an era. The young generation brought to the fore was far more concerned with social reform at home than with what was happening abroad. Yet Gladstone's legacy remained alive. One should not forget that the legendary politician had been celebrated more for his passionate rhetoric than for his actual political successes. Thus, his abstract theories and insights were generally respected by young Liberals, despite the fact that nobody actually followed them.

In addition, Gladstone had been the most prolific Victorian commentator on the Homeric corpus, and had published a number of papers in Bronze Age studies. Thus, his idealization of Christianity, his admiration of antiquity, and his abstract understanding of universal political liberalism, influenced British politics more than the actual reforms he initiated during his brief terms in power. In the same vein, he had encouraged young liberal archaeologists to combine their political ideals to the quest for lost civilizations.⁶² The anti-Ottoman campaign he served with his last breath, therefore, must have had a

⁶¹ Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History*, 335-340.

⁶² In fact, Gladstone's devotion to lost civilization appeared to be a bit extreme. For instance, during his term as Prime Minister in 1882, he proposed to his cabinet to send a naval expedition in eastern Mediterranean, in order to find the “lost continent” of Atlantis described by Plato. As noted by William A. Koelsch, fortunately for the defense of the prestige of the realm and the British ratepayer (if not for Gladstone himself!) the expedition never got under weight. See A. Koelsch William, "W. E. Gladstone and the reconstruction of bronze age geography," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 12, no 3 (December, 2006): 329-345.

great emotional impact on a generation of Liberals that politically matured under his shadow. This is what one concludes, at least, when examining the case of Arthur Evans, excavator of Knossos palace in Crete, and a well-known Gladstonian Liberal.⁶³

As we shall see later on, before becoming internationally known for his archeological discoveries in Crete, Arthur Evans had become famous in Britain for his political reportage. In the 1870's, Arthur Evans was hired by the *Manchester Guardian* and sent to the Balkans. The walking tour of the young reporter coincided with the Bosnian uprising of 1875 and the massacres that followed it. Being thus one of the few British eye-witnesses when the riots broke, Evans became almost overnight an authority on the issue. His writings were quoted by Gladstone and his supporters in their public denouncement of Turkish atrocities as objective descriptions of Muslim oppression against the Christians. Moreover, since Evans's descriptions contradicted those of the British Foreign Office, the Liberals found grounds to accuse the Conservatives in power of preventing objective information from reaching the British public.

In brief, Evans made a critical contribution to the Liberal press-campaign against the Ottomans—and against the government—that swept Great Britain in the 1870's. As a result, his visits to the insurgents' quarters brought him in conflict with the British

⁶³ See R. W. Seton-Watson, "Arthur Evans," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 24, no 63 (Jan., 1946): 47-55; Alexander J. MacGillivray, *Minotaur: Sir Arthur Evans and the Archaeology of the Minoan Myth* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000).

Evans own publications, which from his various trips, demonstrate very characteristically how his interest in archaeological sites was combined to his curiosity for local customs and to his growing political awareness and antipathy for the Ottomans. See Arthur Sir Evans, *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September 1875 with an Historical Review of Bosnia, and a Glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the Ancient Republic of Ragusa* (London: Longmans, Green and CO, 1876); Arthur J. Evans, *Illyrian Letters. A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the 'Manchester Guardian' during the Year 1877* (London: Longmans, Green and CO, 1878); Arthur Evans and John Evans Arthur, *Anitquarian Researches in Illyricum* (1883).

Foreign Office. On a similar occasion, during the uprisings in Herzegovina in early 1882, Arthur Evans was arrested in Ragusa and imprisoned by the Austrian authorities, due to his activities in favor of the insurgents.⁶⁴ Since the following sections refer to the individual background and experiences of the archaeologist in greater detail, the only thing to be underlined here is that the active support Evans provided to the Christian insurgents of Crete in 1897, both as an archaeologist and as a journalist, was born out of a very long tradition. This aspect of his background is emphasized to suggest that each individual who went to Crete during the period in question formed a bridge between two different, subjective worlds that interacted in complex ways.

Thus, each time a researcher uses the records of foreign eye-witnesses to the events in Crete, it is impossible but to wonder from where their interests in the island derived. Moreover, how did their filter influence mass-opinion and behavior at home; and how did domestic developments in their countries influence their opinions about geographies foreign to them?⁶⁵ Though such questions can never be answered adequately, it is important at least to address them. Nevertheless, to this author's knowledge, the literature on late nineteenth century Crete ignores this perspective. True, Greek scholars often refer to contemporary foreign publications on the island, suggesting that the Greek cause enjoyed vast European support and, at the same time, blaming any support provided to the Ottomans to “diplomatic games.”⁶⁶ This

⁶⁴ Arthur Evans and J.J. Wilkes, *Ancient Illyria: an Archaeological Exploration* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006): introduction.

⁶⁵ Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, "The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics," *American Political Science Association* 2, no 1 (Mar., 2004): 55-73.

⁶⁶ Διατριβή Γλαδστώνος "Το Ελληνικό Στοιχείον εν Τω Ανατολικώ Ζητήματι" Εκτυπωθείσα Ιδία ες

perspective, however, often reduces the issue to simplifications useful to national narratives rather than historical research. Studies that focus on internal European debates, at the same time, refer to Crete only marginally. In order to cover this gap, the following section focuses in detail on two British publications about Crete and contextualizes the issue with respect to British internal debates.

British Publications on the Cretan Issue

This section is not an exhaustive account of the overall thought of British intellectuals, statesmen, publicists, and journalists with respect to the Cretan events of 1897. The two specific examples presented here have been selected to illustrate only mainstream Conservative and Liberal approaches to the issue at stake. The first one is a booklet published in 1897, entitled *The Greek, the Cretan and the Turk; A short and concise history of the three nationalities*. At first glance, the publication appeared to be an innocent book of travel. In his preface, the author informed the reader that he hoped the best for each one of the countries reviewed, and wished him a pleasant trip to the Aegean and Bosphorus.⁶⁷ A more careful examination of the publication, however, suggests that a potential traveler could profit very little from its pages. First, because it was rather

Τεκμήριον Εθνικής Ευγνωμοσύνης και ως Αφειρηρία Σύλλογής Εκουσίων Εράνων υπέρ του Εθνικού Στόλου: Gladstone's Thesis "The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem" Published Both as a Symbol of National Gratitude and as a Motivation for Voluntary Fund Raisers in Favor of the National Navy (Ek tou tipografiou Perikleos Pestemaltzioglou, December 1876); Niki Maroniti and Ada Dialla, "Κρητικό Ζήτημα και Ευρωπαϊκός Τύπος: Μια Παράλληλη Ανάγνωση των Βρετανικών και Ρωσικών Δημοσιευμάτων: The Cretan Issue and European Press: A Comparative Reading of British and Russian Publications, " in *Η Τελευταία Φάση Του Κρητικού Ζητήματος: The Last Phase of the Cretan Question*, ed. Th. Detorakis and A. Kalokerinos (Iraklio Eteria Kritikon Istorikon Meleton, 2001).

⁶⁷ Ogilvie Mitchell, *The Greek, the Cretan and the Turk; A short and concise history of the three nationalities* (London: Aldine Publishing Company, LTD, 1897)

unlikely that English-speaking readers would travel to Crete for “pleasure and refreshment” on the eve of the war; and second, because the three chapters that were respectively entitled, “The Modern Greek; His history,” “The Cretan” and “The Modern Turk; His history,” had very little to do with the territories and populations the author claimed to have reviewed. Far from being a description of the relevant groups of people, the book was a summary of stereotypical and loose generalizations. Moreover, since the author openly praised the political leader Gladstone, his account is quite interesting when seen as a somewhat simplified version of his contemporary Gladstonian rhetoric.⁶⁸

The main argument in the book was that there was an obvious clash of civilizations between Turks and Greeks. Its main stylistic characteristic, at the same time, was that the arguments were based upon assumptions presented to the readers as hard-core data:

The national character of the Turk is exceedingly complex. Like most Orientals he is slothful and indolent, and from time immemorial he has been taught to despise commerce and everything pertaining thereto. The sole duty of the Ottoman is comprised in military service, and it must be said of him that he makes an excellent soldier. He has little taste for art, though his architecture exhibits a grace that is very pleasing in his mosques and palaces. Everything is, however, subservient to the military idea, and, mainly from that cause, agriculture is entirely neglected by the Turk, and handed over to the Greek community in his dominions....⁶⁹

In short the Turks, who were identified in the text with the ruling Ottoman elite,

⁶⁸ Ibid., 40-41.

⁶⁹ “The peasantry of Turkey are to a great extent Greek, and are universally known as East Romans, or Romans. The language of these people is modern Greek, and they represent the people of the later Greek Empire...If the Turks were driven into Asia, the Constantinople country, the European side of the Dardanelles, and all the peninsula between the Aegean and the Black Sea from the base of Adrianople, would be a Greek country.” Ibid., 84-85.

were almost monotonously presented as Oriental, barbarian, and backward. Their deficiencies were associated with their Asiatic origin, and the disorders within their state were attributed to their Muslim religion. In this way, the book under scrutiny agreed with numerous contemporary Liberal writings that dealt with “Turkish history and civilization,” reaching almost always the same conclusion: that Turks belonged with Asia and not with Europe; and that they were tyrannical though slothful, violent and yet indolent. In this context, the only skills of the Turks—if they were recognized to have any skills at all—were their military ones. Their only interesting cultural particularity—if they were recognized to have any culture at all—was the institution of the harem. As to the Muslim Cretans, in particular, the Liberal literature commonly presented them as nothing but irregulars or soldiers, identified with massacres, casualties, and terror against the Cretan natives—who were none other than the Christians.⁷⁰

The profile of the Christian-Greek-Cretan, at the same time, was laid out in absolute opposition to that of the “Terrible Turk.” In this respect, the book in question informed its reader that the Cretans are Greeks, therefore born to be businessmen, hard-working peasants, and first-rate intellectuals:

How stands the case of Crete in relation to Greece? Do what you will by the might of brute power, **"a man's a man for a'that,"** [*sic*] and, in respect of everything that makes a man to be a man, every Cretan is a Greek. The Ottoman rule in Crete is a thing of yesterday; but Crete was part of Greece, the Cretan people of the Greek people, at least three thousand years ago, nor have the moral and human ties between them ever been either broken or relaxed. And, in the long years and centuries to come, when this bad dream of Ottoman dominion shall have passed away from Europe, that union will still subsist, and cannot but prevail as long as the human heart beats in the

⁷⁰ On the relevant diplomatic rhetoric see G. S. Papadopoulos, *England and the Near East: 1896-1898* (Thessaloniki: Eteria Makedonikon Spoudon, 1969).

human bosom.⁷¹

In pursuing this line of thought, the entire Greek nation was presented by the author as blessed with great avidity for instruction, physical strength, and quickness of intellect; an approach that was, once again, quite popular among Liberal writers of the time. Even if Gladstone himself was, in fact, forced to recognize that the fall of the Greek race from so great an ancient high to such a depth of modern misery was “without parallel in history,” that was an outcome always blamed to the foreign yoke:

When still the exclusive mistress of the most refined learning of the world, she (Greece) was called to bear, in common with other not yet patrician races, the fearful weight of the Ottoman yoke. By the far sighted cruelty of Mohammed the II, the aristocracy of the Greek lands was completely swept away...the repetition of this infamy on a smaller scale in Crete took place at a much later period. Greeks were not only deprived of their natural leaders; they were assailed at every point, and in the very citadel of the family life, by the terrible exaction of the children-tribute.⁷²

From the author's point of view, furthermore, the unfortunate fertility of the Cretan lands, the celebrated beauty of the Cretan women, and the well-known skills of the Cretan men, had attracted Turkish greed, resulting in the island's enslavement. The author particularly insisted on quoting stories of beautiful Cretan girls who had been

⁷¹ Mitchell, *The Greek, the Cretan and the Turk*, 40-41.

⁷² "Not only was the system indicated by that phrase a most cruel and wicked one on the part of the conquerors who invented it, but it varied with it an amount of degradation to the sufferers who bore it such, perhaps, as never was inflicted even on African slaves. Endured at first in the stupidity of terror, it laid wide and deep, during the two centuries for which it lasted, the foundations of baseness, and it is probably not too much to say that two centuries since its cessation have not yet everywhere effaced its effects. Nor is effeminacy, especially where thus engendered, a guarantee for humanity. The fathers who gave over the bodies and souls of their children to the tyrant were, thus far, sunk into the region of the brutes, and acquired of necessity something of that habit of mind which is as ready upon occasion to enforce the law of violence as to cringe before it." Gladstone, *The Hellenic Factor*, 4.

ravished by Turkish *Beys*, and whose Greek-Cretan husbands, lovers, fathers, brothers, and cousins had been killed with brutality by the corrupted 'tyrants':

The Ottomans brought in Crete a new form of slavery: the Harem. Crete has always been celebrated for the beauty of its women...In all European nations the first object of government is the good of the people. It is not so, however, with the Oriental...Horrible, is it not? Can we wonder now at the ingrained hatred of the Cretan for the barbarian who perpetrated such enormities? Yet we Christians are at this moment supporting the Turk against this long-suffering people.⁷³

The obvious conclusion of the book was that supporting the Ottoman Empire against the Greeks was a disgrace to the British government. It is interesting to note that the religious links between the island and the United Kingdom were constantly underlined in the text, overlooking any dogmatic particularities. In harmony with Gladstonian Liberalism, therefore, the author of the book accused the Conservatives of, by supporting the Ottomans, betraying Christianity and the English Church. One should not forget however that, with regard to the realm's foreign interests, Gladstonian rhetoric appeared to be inspired more by "real politics" than by religion. In this respect, the Liberals contradicted their devotion to Christianity, declaring Russia the greatest enemy of Great Britain. On this matter they agreed with the Conservatives. Yet they argued that, instead of supporting the Ottomans, their government should favor the creation of an enlarged and stronger Greece, which could then function as a buffer-state between western Europe and Asia.⁷⁴

⁷³ Mitchell, *The Greek, the Cretan, and the Turk*, 47-50.

⁷⁴ "...there are in the Levent we may safely say four millions, on whose affections we may take a standing hold, by giving a little friendly care at this juncture to the case of the Hellenic provinces. They want no Russian institutions, but such a freedom as we enjoy. They want for their cause an advocate who is not

Russia is the prime mover behind the scenes of this matter. It is to her interest that Greece should be made as weak as a State can be. With a strong and united Hellenic nation there might be opposition to Russia's ultimate designs on the Bosphorus, for there is little secrecy about the fact that the Northern Power intends, sooner or later, to command the entrance to the Euxine.⁷⁵

Contrary to the sentimental character of Liberal publications, such as the above, Conservative rhetoric and literature claimed to discuss Cretan affairs with impartiality and moderation. Yet at the core of British “common sense,” which was rampant among late nineteenth century Conservative publications, laid stereotypical patterns of Orientalism. In other words, the Conservatives asserted that it was the realm’s moral duty to protect and guard weaker, irrational populations, the same way a rational and responsible adult should prevent irresponsible children from hurting themselves. In this respect, they insisted on opposing the island’s Greek annexation, openly questioning the ability of the Greeks to self-govern. While Crete was referred to as a constant source of anxiety and expenditure, Greek governments were accused of complete fiscal irresponsibility that resulted in their constant state of bankruptcy. From this point of view, a future union was considered sure to ruin both the island and the nation. It was suggested, therefore, that the Greeks should better limit their territorial ambitions and try to put their own house in order before making any new additions.

To some extent, this rhetoric was more reasonable than liberal generalizations,

likely to turn into an adversary; one whose temptations lie in other quarters; who cannot (as they fondly trust) ask anything from them, or in any possible contingency, through durable opposition of sympathies or interest, inflict anything upon them.”Gladstone, *The Hellenic Factor*; 26-27.

⁷⁵ Mitchell, *The Greek, the Cretan and the Turk*, 63-64.

and yet equally monolithic (if not culturally racist). Furthermore, it perfectly agreed with broader upper middle-class stereotypes, as they had developed from middle nineteenth century onwards. The realm's pragmatic foreign interests, in other words, which were identified with the principle of Ottoman integrity, were combined with an admiration of 'Turkish exoticism,' particularly popular among the British upper middle-class.⁷⁶ In the minds of a number of Britons, the Orient appeared to be an imaginary, timeless, and stereotypical synthesis of harems, sultans, luxurious pleasures, and oriental sensuality. As a result, their admiration for this 'essentialized' Orient may have derived from their need to intellectually create an exotic refuge from the industrialization, modern rationality,⁷⁷ and rigid morality of Victorian social life.⁷⁸

One should not forget that, as the nineteenth century approached its end, technological change made traveling easier than ever before. Railways and steamships bridged the Orient with the West, and a number of upper middle-class Britons, male and female, were offered the opportunity to visit the Ottoman Empire for the first time.⁷⁹ At the same time, faster circulation of written information created a shared space of exoticism between actual travelers and the readers of their experiences, which were

⁷⁶ Saab, *The Doctor's Dilemma*, 1400-1401.

⁷⁷ Stephen Arata, *Fictions of Loss in the Victorian Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁷⁸ As suggested by the relevant literature, the destabilization of dominant masculine models and the parallel establishment of puritan feminine ones by the social practices and intellectual production of the Victorian era had led middle-class masculinities and feminine identities into crisis. This transformation was directly connected to the rising popularity of oriental essentialism. See Marthaed Vicinus, *Widening Sphere: Changing Roles of Victorian Women* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977); Andrew Smith, *Victorian Demons: Medicine, Masculinity and the Gothic at the Fin-de-Siècle* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

⁷⁹ Philip Ernest Schoenberg, "The Evolution of Transport in Turkey (Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor) under Ottoman Rule, 1856-1918," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no 3 (Oct., 1977): 359-372.

often published in public travelogues. As a result, even those without the means to actually visit the Orient were afforded the chance to get a taste for it, in a manner to which they were not accustomed, via numerous publications.⁸⁰ Conservative voters came mainly from the above described social group. It could be argued, therefore, that both the popularity of the imagined Orient and the public sentiment in favor of the Ottomans among British Conservatives were the products of a dynamic interaction between conscious strategies of editors and politicians, and the unconscious fantasies of their audience and voters.

Conservative narratives regarding Greece were also subjected to mainstream patterns of Orientalism. The Greeks were considered to be a certainly eloquent— though not yet strong—race that needed to be protected from its own vices. It was, thus, the “white man’s burden” to accept the peculiar mission of patronizing Greeks and Cretans, even against their own will. It was out of love for Cretan beauty and respect for Greek antiquity that Great Britain ought not to hand over the island to Greece, even if this decision resulted in hatred against the realm. As put by the bard of British colonialism, R. Kipling himself, it was the White man’s old reward “to receive the blame of those ye better, and the hate of those ye guard.”⁸¹

⁸⁰ Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama: British Travellers in Nineteenth Century Turkey* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999); Edward Ziter, *The Orient on the Victorian Stage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Reina Lewis, *Rethinking Orientalism : Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem* (London: Tauris, 2004); Mary Roberts, *Intimate Outsiders : the Harem in Ottoman and Orientalist Art and Travel Literature* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Efterpi Mitsi, "Private Rituals and Public Selves: The Turkish Bath in Women's Travel Writing," in *Inside out : Women Negotiating, Subverting, Appropriating Public and Private Space*, ed. T. G. Reus and A. Usandizaga (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008).

⁸¹ “Go, make them with your living// And mark them with your dead.// Take up the White Man's burden,// And reap his old reward--// The blame of those ye better//The hate of those ye guard” see *Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition* (New York: Doubleday,1940).

The British poet Rudyard Kipling wrote the above classic poem in 1899, as a warning about the responsibilities of the Empire. The poem was addressed not to London but to newly founded United

An essay on Cretan affairs produced by Ernest N. Bennett, in 1897, is quite characteristic of this approach. The text carried the title *Side-Lights on the Cretan Insurrection* and claimed to be an eye-witness's contribution to objective analysis.⁸² Nevertheless, the work was a perfect justification of governmental policies, rather than a critical report. It was in perfect harmony with Conservative rhetoric as described above:

The best endeavours of the representatives of the Powers to restore order in Crete were continually hindered by telegrams which were a mélange of falsehood and exaggeration. A perusal of Greek newspapers, and still more of the Athenian telegrams which are sold broadcast in Greece for five **lepta** [*sic*] each, will convince anyone of the truth of this assertion. Our excellent Consul at Canea, Sir Alfred Biliotti, who has acted throughout the struggle with perfect justice to Turks and insurgents alike, is, because of this very impartiality, accused by every Greek one meets in the interior of the island, from Colonel Vasos downwards, of deliberately sending false reports to the British Government and being in the pay of Turkey!⁸³

The essay in question was thus an attempt to challenge the Liberal literature on Crete, arguing that the British public was misinformed by publications far too exaggerated, which discriminated against the Ottomans and twisted the truth about the island.⁸⁴ True, most European eye-witnesses on the island blamed the Ottomans for devastation and massacres against the Christians. Nevertheless, argued Bennett, such reports lacked accuracy and were inspired more by pre-existing stereotypes in their authors' mind than by actual observation. On the contrary, according to him, it was the

States. Kipling wrote the poem shortly after the USA occupied Philippines. The poem is typically described as a hymn to imperialism, since it invited Washington to learn from the "superior" and older experiences of Great Britain. See also H. L. Varley, "Imperialism and Rudyard Kipling," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14, no 1 (Jan., 1953): 124-135.

⁸² Ernest N. Bennett, *Side-Lights on the Cretan Insurrection* (1897).

⁸³ Ibid., 687-688.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 690.

Muslim Cretans that suffered the brutality of the insurgents and not the other way round:

In the House of Commons, the Bashibazouks who, by the way are continually confounded with the Turkish regulars, are represented by Mr. Dillon and others as blood-thirsty ruffians who are perpetually sallying out from the towns for loot and massacre. But, as a matter of fact, there is in the space between the Turkish outposts and the lines of the insurgents practically nothing to loot and certainly nobody to massacre. It is quite true that these Turkish irregulars do sometimes burn an olive tree belonging to a Christian in the outskirts of the town, and sometimes cut one down for firewood; but this is quite exceptional...and we must not forget that the vineyards and crops of the vast majority of the Moslem population are at present in the possession of their enemies. As far as shooting is concerned, the aggression comes almost entirely from the Christians. They are perpetually firing at the Turks, who rarely reply, partly because the powers have requested them to abstain from this as much as possible, partly because it is almost impossible to hit a Cretan, who lies well concealed behind a rock and takes pot-shots at any Turk he can see.⁸⁵

According to Bennett, therefore, the House of Commons was systematically misinformed about the actual situation in Crete, since most European correspondents had no direct knowledge of the issue, and never attempted to leave their guarded castles to explore the hinterland, where the real battles took place. Thus, their reportage relied on the exaggerated propaganda of the Greeks. The above argument was the traditional answer provided by the Conservatives in London to the accusations of the Liberals, who blamed the government for being in denial of the reported Christian massacres. Yet, regardless of whether or not the Liberal reports were the product of imagination and propaganda, the alleged 'impartiality' of the Conservatives was also colored by internal considerations rather than by actual knowledge of the situation in Crete. Similarly to the author of the essay under scrutiny, who was self-identified as the only objective expert

⁸⁵ Ibid., 91.

on the issue, Conservative writers failed to enlighten their readers on the exact nature of their sources. Moreover, their interpretation of the events often did not agree with the direct accounts of the Cretans themselves.

For instance, when Lord Salisbury and Mr. Curzon appeared in the House of Commons claiming that, contrary to broader perception, Christian Cretans were in fact opposed to union with Greece, the Christians in question hastened to inform the British parliament that Mr. Curzon was misinformed. A declaration signed by the majority of Christian deputies was sent from the island to the House of Commons, contradicting the opinion of Mr. Curzon that “Autonomy is all that the Cretan people have desired for a whole century,” and claiming that what the Cretans have actually desired for a whole century was union with Greece.⁸⁶

It has to be underlined here that by Cretan autonomy the Conservatives meant, clearly, Cretan dependence on Great Britain or, at least, on the Powers. In the words of Mr. Bennett “a people less capable of self-government it would be difficult to find.” As argued by him, therefore, the only hope for Crete was one of the Great Powers to annex it. Moreover, the above suggestion was claimed to derive from love for Crete. In perfect harmony with British colonial orientalism, therefore, the author expressed his paternalistic feelings towards Greece and Crete, regretting the fact that decades ago (after the Crimean war), the British had undertaken the 'protection' of Cyprus instead of Crete. As a result, melodramatically concluding his essay, which had started as a cold-blood account based on 'common logic,' Mr. Bennett wrote as follows:

⁸⁶ *The Desire of the Cretan People* (Athens: P. D. Sakelarios, March 1897).

An aged priest who was talking to me of the many calamities of his country quoted pathetically enough the complaint of the Psalmist:

Thou hast shown Thy people heavy things,

Thou hast made us to drink the wine of staggering...

How heartily one sympathized with his prayer that the reign of bloodshed and anarchy would speedily cease and the sun of righteousness at length arise upon this unhappy island with healing in his wings.⁸⁷

In short, one realizes that by reading side-by-side publications well-disposed towards the Conservative government of the time and publications critical of British strategies with regard to Crete, we learn much more about the stereotypical patterns of political articulation within British debates than about the island. Moreover, since both parts tended to quote eye-witnesses that provided accounts absolutely incompatible with each-other, no British account on the matter was particularly convincing. Were the Christian Cretans brave, spirited, proud, and long suffering? Or, were they crafty, cautious, shifty, and cruel? Were the Muslim locals the victimizers of the Christians? Or, were they the actual victims? Were the European Admirals “as bundling and incompetent as old women?” Or, were they capable officers who, in a position of exceptional difficulty, have acted throughout with “the outmost moderation?”⁸⁸

Similar subjectivity characterized British journalistic reports about the war of

⁸⁷ Bennett, *Sidelights*, 698.

⁸⁸ A British journal article that attempted to discuss with impartiality both sides constitutes one more telling example of the above. The article consisted of quotations from two other articles which had appeared in British magazines on the Cretan affairs, in April 1897: The first one in the *Fortnightly*, signed by Dr. E. J. Dillon; the other in the *Nineteenth Century*, signed by Mr. E. N. Bennet. It appears that both of the above authors have been eye-witnesses of the Cretan events. Despite this, they had drawn amazingly discrepant conclusions as to who was to be blamed for the atrocities; the first one defended the Christians and accused Admirals and Muslims; the second one took the opposite standing and blamed chaos to the Christians. As to the author of the main article, the columnist of the Liberal *Westminster Gazette*, although he tried to remain neutral and to present both sides, he concluded his analysis by noting with satisfaction that, one way or another, it was obvious to everyone that “the Turk had better go,” from Crete. See “What is Truth?” April 30, 1897, *The Westminster Gazette* 11 (April 30, 1897).

1897. Aside from serving different ideological agendas, each account of the events was profoundly influenced by the personal narrative style of each war-correspondent. Objectivity was often sacrificed in the name of 'comfort,' since reporters that avoided the actual battles used their own imagination and writing talent to report events they had never witnessed. Retrospectively, the inaccuracy of similar writings proves that their author preferred to stay as far away from the battlefield as possible. Some other reporters, on the contrary, seemed to sacrifice objectivity in the name of 'color,' and were dragged away from the actual events in a quest of abstract ideals. Thus, their war-correspondence ended up being a lyric text in praise of super-human heroes, or in condemnation of monsters in human form, rather than being a description of the actual conflicts.

On some occasions, the gap between any understanding of reality and journalistic publications was accidentally unveiled, resulting in tragicomic situations. When, for instance, the editors of New York's *Evening Sun* took literally an imaginative parody, according to which R. Kipling was working as a reporter in Crete, they decided to publish in the form of an actual reportage the above text, which was actually a pure product of imagination, a satirical parody that made fun of Kipling's exaggerated style of writing. Thus, R. Kipling was quoted by the newspaper as being in Crete at the front, while he was actually in his house in America, not knowing he was supposed to be reporting "actual facts" from the battlefield! In the words of a contemporary columnist, the bad break *Evening Sun* had made forces us to wonder if the above incident was an isolated case or "if this is how history is usually made."⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Charles Battell Loomis commented exactly on this issue in the form of three parodies, published in the *Critic*, and focusing on the ways the 1897 war was reported in British newspapers. The parodies pointed

British and Ottoman Empires: A Comparison

The previous section has been an attempt to demonstrate how British publications about late nineteenth century Crete were colored by each author's background and personal style. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of this analysis is not to suggest that the publications under scrutiny contradicted 'objective' reality. Quite to the contrary, this author is convinced that the matrix of conflicting, subjective interpretations constitutes in fact the only traceable reality. In the context both of short-term journalistic reportage and long-term historical research, events take their meaning by the language used to depict them. From a researcher's retrospective point of view, therefore, past interpretations of past events constitute, after all, an objective point of reference when used in a comparative way.⁹⁰ In this respect, since the previous section has focused on political conflicts at the core of the United Kingdom, this section shall elaborate on the broader problems that the British Empire was faced with. One should not forget that, almost simultaneously to the Cretan riots of 1897-1898, the growing turmoil in India, Ireland, and Sudan, challenged the interests of the British realm more directly than

up the aspects of the various styles of three writers: Stephen Crane, representing the New York's *Journal* and the London *Westminster Gazette*; Richard Hardin Davis, representing the London *Times*, and Rudyard Kipling. The last parody concerned the quite entertaining example I have referred to above. Kipling was only rumored to have been offered a position as a correspondent shortly before the war, but had eventually never gone to Crete or Greece at all. See E. R. Hagemann, "Correspondents Three" in the Graeco-Turkish War: Some Parodies," *American Literature* 30, no 3 (Nov., 1958): 339-344.

For an example of the artistic, though exaggerated, fascination of S. Crane with the war and with reporting crude events and tragedies, see Richard M. Weatherford, ed., *Stephen Crane. The Critical Heritage* (London, New York: Routledge, 1997).

For the personal rivalry between Carnes and Davis see, Scott C. Osborn, The "Rivalry-Chivalry" of Richard Harding Davis and Stephen Crane, *American Literature* 28, no 1 (Mar., 1956): 50-61.

⁹⁰ Murray Edelman, "Political Language and Political Reality," *American Political Science Association* 18, no 1(Winter, 1985):10-19.

developments in Crete. Yet all of the above issues were, to a certain extent, connected.

While the Liberals made a political issue of the bloodbaths in the Balkans, Armenia, and Crete, stability and union within the United Kingdom was threatened by sectarian tendencies in some of the provinces. Moreover, the rebels were occasionally supported by a growing number of British socialists. This parameter of the Kingdom's internal politics has to be underlined here, as it is usually ignored by the broader literature regarding Crete. In other words, the dynamic relationship between the different worlds in question is often presented by our contemporary scholarship as a monolithic process leading, always, to the same conclusion; that there was an obvious civilization clash between the 'progressed' and the 'backward,' in other words, between the West and the Rest. Even when this argument is not openly supported by contemporary scholars, the latter often adopt the view that the West was interfering with the parochial conflicts among Ottomans, Cretans, and Greeks, only in patronizing ways. This argument is to a certain extent correct and has already been referred to in this study. Yet, despite the obvious differences between the two worlds, is it impossible to suggest that in its civilizing mission the West plastered over its own ambiguities, or even fears? How different were the conflicts in the Ottoman Empire from conflicts in the British one? How united indeed was the United Kingdom? And have the above questions any methodological value for the present study? With respect to the third question, this author thinks that the answer is in the affirmative.

A century after Ireland had become an integral part of the United Kingdom (1801), for instance, the "Irish question" continued to cause trouble for the British regime. Sectarian conflicts, religious fanaticism between Catholics and Protestants, discrimination, poverty, and famine, were common themes in nineteenth century Irish

debates. Thus, although the socioeconomic aspects of Irish sectarianism cannot be discussed here in greater detail, it can be remarked that in terms of massacres, bloody rebellions, and constant political turmoil, Irish experiences were certainly comparable to their contemporary Cretan ones. In 1897-1898, for instance, while the Powers were debating over the future of Crete, Irish nationalists were revisiting their battle for “Home Rule,” supported by strong groups of British Liberals against a minority of Irish Unionists, who still favored union with Great Britain.⁹¹

Scotland and Wales, at the same time, had by then been more successfully—though no less violently—integrated into the United Kingdom.⁹² As a result, in the second half of the nineteenth century, earlier strategies of forced assimilation were no longer needed. Economic growth, the gradual industrialization of these territories, and the realization of land reforms, condemned aggressive sectarianism to oblivion. Thus, it could be argued that in the second half of the nineteenth century, Scottish-Welsh understanding of the locality laid less with violent uprisings and more with a sort of

⁹¹ D.W. Miller, *Church State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1912* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1973); Oliver MacDonagh, W.F. Mandle, and Pauric Travers, eds., *Irish Culture and Nationalism 1750-1950* (London: Macmillan, 1983); J. Loughlin, *Gladstone, Home Rule and the Ulster Question 1882-93* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan Ltd, 1986); David Cairns, and Shaun Richards, *Writing Ireland: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Culture* (Manchester [England]; New York: Manchester University Press, 1988); Thomas A. Boylan and Timothy P. Foley, *Political Economy and Colonial Ireland [electronic resource] : the Propagation and Ideological Function of Economic Discourse in the Nineteenth Century* (London [England]; New York: Routledge, 1992); Robert James Scally, *The End of Hidden Ireland: Rebellion, Famine, and Emigration*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Edward G. Lengel, *The Irish through British Eyes: Perceptions of Ireland in the Famine Era* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002).

⁹² Scotland was united with Great Britain in 1707. Yet the clan-based culture of Scottish Highlands continued to challenge the central regime, often leading to armed-revolutions that each time received different political connotations. The eighteenth century effort of the central regime to bring Scotland under control, namely the violent elimination of cultural differences that caused sectarian tendencies became known as the “Highland Clearances.” See Eric Richards, *A History of the Highland Clearances. Agrarian Transformation and the Evictions, 1746-1886* (London; Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), 1; BP. Levack, *The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union, 1603-1707* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1987); Callum G. Brown, *Religion and Society in Scotland since 1707* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1997).

romantic melancholy for the past.

In Scotland, folkloric local pride was expressed via the intellectual production of the region⁹³ and via the establishment of collective, traditional rituals.⁹⁴ As for the Welsh, despite the dominance of English culture on their territories, they had managed to maintain a linguistic particularity conceptualized as the region's trademark and an abstract collective memory of a prehistoric past. Despite the fact that rapid nineteenth century industrialization of the Wales led to a growing social gap between local workers and English capital-owners, the uprisings resulting from this situation never developed into nationalist, sectarian movements. Quite to the contrary, it seems that numerous Welsh families managed to become part of the Kingdom's *petite-bourgeoisie*, consequently acquiring a sense of solidarity with the regime.⁹⁵

In brief, the cultural particularity of Scotland and the Wales was considered legitimate as an integral part of the United Kingdom's folklore. My interest in this issue

⁹³ In this context, the famous writer Sir Walter Scott constitutes a very telling example with regard to our discussion. Modern Scottish nationalists dismiss his work by condemning the writer for having being "Anglophile," and "bourgeois," characterizing his use of the English language as a betrayal to "his own race." In the nineteenth century, however, Scott was considered to be the leading Scottish writer, and his work was well-known both at home and abroad. From this point of view, it seems to me that the rise of Sir Walter Scott to glory constitutes a perfect example of the negotiation-patterns between the central English regime and the Scottish locality. See John Henry Raleigh, "What Scott Meant to the Victorians," *Victorian Studies* 7, no 1 (Sep., 1963):7-34.

Furthermore, a comparative examination of Scott's political identity and aesthetics of writing illustrates very well what I have tried to describe as 'Orientalism.' To be more specific, Scott, who was a well-known Unionist, followed in his writing the aesthetics of gentlemanly travel narrative, describing the Highlands through metaphors of a mysterious, exotic Orient. As an example, see his description of Grampian range in his *Lady of the Lake* as fantastically set with minarets, or as mosques of eastern architecture. See Susan Oliver, "Crossing "Dark Barriers": Intertextuality and Dialogue Between Lord Byron and Sir Walter Scott," in *Studies in Romanticism* (22-Mar-2008), <http://goliath.ecnext.com>.

⁹⁴ Susan J. Smith, "Bounding the Borders: Claiming Space and Making Place in Rural Scotland," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18, no 3 (1993): 291-308.

⁹⁵ C. M. Law, "The Growth of Urban Population in England and Wales, 1801-1911," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 41 (Jun., 1967): 125-143; Ieuan Gwynedd Jones, *Mid-Victorian Wales. The Observers and the Observed* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992); Geraint H. Jenkins, ed. *The Welsh Language and its Social Domains 1801-1911* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000).

derives from the fact that the Ottomans attempted to do something similar with respect to Crete, including Cretan folklore and history in Imperial traditions and customs. It could be argued, therefore, that nineteenth century Ottoman reforms aimed at having Crete culturally integrated with the Empire by treating the island as an “Ottoman Scotland.”⁹⁶ In this respect, regardless of the result, there was some similarity between British and Ottoman strategies. From a British perspective, at the same time, the similarities may have been quite disturbing, as the Cretan rebellions resembled to a great degree the violent riots in Ireland.

True, the above arguments derive exclusively from this author's speculations. Yet, these speculations are inspired by the fact that Ottoman strategies to maintain union between Crete and the Ottoman Empire, are strongly reminiscent of the United Kingdom and the British model. Moreover, this comparison may be even more useful for our discussion, since one of the Welsh families well-accommodated in the Kingdom was that of the archeologist Arthur Evans. In his sister's words, the Evans family was of the Welshmen that usually had "a long and narrow roll of parchment, inscribed in the seventeenth century by some wandering herald with a family tree that went back either to a King of Troy or to Adam who was the son of God."⁹⁷ The family, in other words,

⁹⁶ In fact, the Greek attempts to appropriate the Cretan folklore were much more aggressive than the Ottoman ones. See for instance the Greek participation in the Great Exhibition of 1853. Artemis Yagou, *Facing the West*. See also Risto Pekka Pennanen, "The Nationalization of Ottoman Popular Music in Greece," *Ethnomusicology* 48, no 1 (Winter, 2004):1-25.

At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that the Ottomans were simultaneously trying to incorporate in the Ottoman culture Cretan costumes, antiquities, architecture, and music. Yet these efforts were rather unsuccessful, especially when compared to those of the Greeks. See Deringil, *Son Dönem Osmanlı*; Ahmet Ersoy, "A Sactorial Tribute to Late Tanzimat Ottomanism: the Elbise-i 'Osmaniyye Album," *Muqarnas* 20:187-207; Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann., eds. *Ottoman Costume: from Textile to Identity* (Istanbul: Eren Yayincilik, 2004).

⁹⁷ Joan Evans, *Time and Change ; The story of Arthur Evans and his Forebears* (London;New York;Toronto: Longmans, 1943), 1.

maintained a peaceful local pride, in perfect harmony with the interests of the British regime and the platform of the Conservative party. Yet, in the Liberal mind of Arthur Evans, the family's 'revolutionary' son, it seems that the abstract memory of independent Wales was romanticized and connected to the contemporary uprisings from Crete to the Balkans. As we shall see later on, this is what the writings of the archaeologist himself in his youth suggested.

The Family of Arthur Evans

In retrospect, the multifarious activities of Arthur Evans as a researcher, an activist, and a writer; a citizen of Victorian England and a Liberal; a Welshman by origin and a Philhellene by choice, stand revealed as integral parts of a remarkably ramified and yet consistent whole. From such a perspective, the visit of the archaeologist to the island constituted one of the many nineteenth century Cretan crossings between the manifold, intimate manifestations of the Orient and the West. One should not forget that the treasures of the remote past, which remained hidden underneath Cretan soil, conflated nineteenth century riots with past glory. In this way, foreign archaeologists and other visitors may have found great interest in Crete for the simple fact that the island's past and present provided them with interesting parallels to their own individual, hybrid stories that still defined them in unknown ways.

Arthur Evans, in particular, was already in his forties when he visited Crete for the first time, after having traveled extensively in Central Europe and the Balkans. According to his biographers, the first person with whom Evans had shared his interests

in archaeology and traveling was his father, Sir John Evans, a successful paper-manufacturer from Wales, amateur-archaeologist, and collector.⁹⁸ In addition, his father's support was the main reason Arthur was able to afford such a professional orientation, providing his son with the financial means "to travel and to explore." While still a young researcher, Arthur was offered a comfortable home and an impressive allowance of 250 pounds a year, without question or condition.⁹⁹ And yet, the somewhat indirect antagonism that gradually developed between father and son led the archaeologist to follow different ideological paths, becoming a great enemy of Sir Evans' conservatism and ardent supporter of Gladstonian Liberals. In his sister's words:

For John Evans, politics were a simple and practical matter. He had inherited his father's natural bent towards conservatism, and for the rest of his political creed might have been summed up in the trade toast "Peace, Prosperity and Papermaking". For Arthur, politics were a matter of ideas and ideals; if they bore any reference to real life, it was to some isolated and individual case. He never saw the state as an economic unit of unity; questions of finance and trade never obtruded into his political thinking. It was therefore easy for him to break away from the family conservatism and become an ardent Liberal. John Evans distrusted all politicians and most especially that Grand Old Man who kept him uncertain whether he were more fool or more knave; Arthur Evans sat devoutly at the feet of Gladstone and saw in him the only hope of salvation for the oppressed minorities in Europe...It was the oppressed minorities of Europe that linked Arthur's political opinions with his

⁹⁸ For some more biographical information see Donald B. Harden, *Sir Arthur Evans, 1851-1914, a Memoir* (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1983); A.C.Brown, *Before Knossos...: Arthur Evans' Travels in the Balkans and Crete* (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1 Jan 1993); Brown, *Arthur Evan's Travels*, introduction.

⁹⁹ "There were immense advantages for Arthur in belonging of right to the world of learning and the lesser world of archaeology; in having and instinctive judgment of date and style and use, acquired by living among the collections at Nash Mills...There were solid advantages too -though these Arthur took very much for granted- in being the son of a man who provided a comfortable home and an allowance of 250 pounds a year without question or condition, and would always help in a financial emergency; for Arthur had inherited his grandfather's innocent extravagance, and had infinitely more opportunities for exercising it." Joan Evans, *Time and Change*, 160.

opportunities of travel.¹⁰⁰

As the above quotation indicates, the Evans family was a typical microcosm within the broader framework of the United Kingdom's sociopolitical realities and debates. The father being a fervent Conservative, the son became an ardent Liberal. The family admiring the exotic, imaginary, Muslim East, Arthur became a supporter of Christian rebels and insurgents, who constantly revolted against the Ottoman regime. In brief, Arthur's intellectual and actual engagement with the Balkans and Greece was in perfect harmony with his Liberal profile, as the above territories symbolized the struggle of the people against dynasties. His family's appreciation of the Turkish Orient, at the same time, served nicely Conservative paradigms of imperial civilizing missions. Although these two approaches were characterized by profound differences, they shared a similar patronizing character, claiming the right either to 'liberate' the Orient, or to 'reform' it.¹⁰¹

It was to his father's dissatisfaction that Arthur Evans, immediately after having graduated from Oxford University in 1874, accepted the post of Balkan correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*.¹⁰² Moreover, the elder Evans expressed his great discontentment when the enthusiastic, “anti-Turkish,” journalistic work of his son

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 163-164.

¹⁰¹ For a comparative discussion of some similarities and dissimilarities between *Oriental-ism* and *Balkan-ism* see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); K. E. Fleming, "Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography," *The American Historical Review* 105, no 4 (Oct., 2000): 1218-1233.

¹⁰² Brown, *Before Knossos*.

caused him to enter into a number of feuds with local authorities and British diplomats.¹⁰³ At the same time, the Montenegrin highlands, full of adventures and insurgents, appeared to be fascinating to a young Welshman of his age who was trying to break away from home. In his more private moments, however, Arthur Evans would still write as follows:

Nature's gentlemen the Bosniacs (Christians) certainly are not!...[They] show themselves grossly familiar when not cowed into bearish reverse;...In these Illyrian lands I have often been addressed as brat, or brother, and the Bosniacs are known to call the stranger shija, neighbor. I...happen individually not to appreciate this égalitaire spirit. I don't choose to be told by every barbarian I meet that he is a man and a brother. I believe in the existence of inferior races, and would like to see them exterminated. But these are personal mislikings, and it is easy to see how valuable such a spirit of democracy may be amongst a people whose self-respect has been degraded by centuries of oppression...Yes, that old tyrannous dominant caste (the Muslims) had its fine side too...but regret ceases as the eye wanders across that rich campaign so bare of cultivation...how rich this land might become, when no longer trodden down with Turkish hoof-prints.¹⁰⁴

The same Arthur Evans, who during his first years in the Balkans appeared to be—when perfectly honest with himself—in a state of complete ideological confusion, had gradually become more stable and ideologically settled, especially after he met the historian E. A. Freeman. Freeman was a noted Gladstonian Liberal, profoundly interested in religious matters, pioneer of Byzantine history in Europe, staunch Philhellene, and fervent Christian, denoted enemy of “the Turk,” and devoted partisan of

¹⁰³ A telling example was the notorious feud between Evans and Mr. W. R. Holmes, British Consul at Serajevo, who strongly dispraised Evans reports of massacres in 1877. Mr. W. R. Holmes claimed he had heard nothing of murders and outrages in North Bosnia. See Joan Evans, *Time and Change*, 189.

¹⁰⁴ Evans, *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina*, 308.

the “Greek cause.”¹⁰⁵ It seems that Arthur Evans was charmed, both by Freeman and by his daughter Margaret, whom he married in 1878. Thus, his political thought continued to develop in perfect harmony with the Gladstonian rhetoric, making his parental family extremely uncomfortable.¹⁰⁶ Within this context, Arthur’s preferences, and his family’s reactions to them, constitute typical expressions of the two related—though diversified—versions of British Orientalism as discussed above.

One way or another, in 1884, Arthur Evans decided to settle down and was appointed Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum of Oxford.¹⁰⁷ Ten years later he lost his

¹⁰⁵ The following passage is a quotation from Freeman’s academic lectures in the 1880’s. I consider it a very telling sample both of Freeman’s own theories and ideas, and of Liberal British Imperialism as a whole: “Not very far removed, so some have thought, from the Greeks in blood, in any case belonging to the same great branch of the human family, the nations of the extreme south of Italy, like their neighbors of Sicily, had a special power of adapting themselves to Greek ways, of adopting Greek culture, of making themselves in short Greeks by adoption. They did not die out before the new settlers, like the savages of America or Australia... This is one of the most marked differences between the old Greek settlements and the settlements of modern Europeans. The settlements of different European nations have taken different courses, but there has been nothing exactly answering to the process by which so large a part of the barbarian neighbors of the old Greek colonies became adopted Hellènes. In the case of our own settlements, the spread of British settlement or dominion has meant either the gradual dying out of the native races, as in America or Australia, or else, in India, their survival as a distinct and subject people... In the Greek and in the English case, it has been the higher civilization of the time that has been extended, and that by milder means in the Greek case than in the English... Egypt did in the end become in some sort part of the Greek world; but it was not by settlement from free Greece, but by the conquest of the Macedonian kings. Egypt under the Ptolemics was like India now, a land conquered but not, strictly speaking, colonized, a land in which the older nation kept on its own older life alongside of the intruding life of the younger settlers.” See Edward A. Freeman, *Greater Greece and Greater Britain; and George Washington, The Expander of England. Two Lectures with an Appendix* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1886), 8-12. See also Edward A. Freeman, *The Eastern Question in its Historical Bearings. Delivered in Manchester, November 15, 1876* (Manchester: National Reform Union, 1876); Edward A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe: Its Nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline* (London: Macmillan, 1877); Edward A. Freeman, *General Sketch of European History* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1880); J.W. Burrow, *A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); C. J. W. Parker, “The Failure of Liberal Racialism: The Racial Ideas of E. A. Freeman,” *The Historical Journal* 24, no 4 (Dec., 1981): 825-846; Arnaldo Momigliano, “Two Types of Universal History: The Cases of E. A. Freeman and Max Weber,” *The Journal of Modern History* 58, no 1 (Mar., 1986): 235-246; Paul Stephenson, “E. A. Freeman (1823-1892), a Neglected Commentator on Byzantium and Modern Greece,” *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 4 (2007): 119-157.

¹⁰⁶ Joan Evans, *Time and Change*, 201-203.

¹⁰⁷ Founded in 1683, the Ashmolean Museum of the University of Oxford is known to have been the first “public museum” in Great Britain. See R.G.W. Anderson, “Is Charging Economic?,” *Journal of Cultural Economics* 22, no 2-3 (June, 1998): 179-187.

wife and, shortly after, he departed for Rome, Sicily, Greece, and Crete, in search of antiquities for the Museum. During his visits to Crete, Arthur Evans kept a journal that is particularly interesting for the present discussion.¹⁰⁸ The archaeologist's own writings illustrate his individual transformation and the ways his ramified background was reflected in his thoughts about Crete. The first thing to note, in this respect, is that his Cretan writings offer a contrast to his early writings on the Balkans. Unlike the enthusiastic days of his youth, Arthur Evans went to Crete more as an archaeologist and a businessman serving the interests of Ashmolean Museum, and less as an activist interested in protecting the 'weak and the oppressed.' Thus, his Cretan writings reflected his business considerations, individual antagonisms, and personal dislikes, rather than abstract, liberal ideals.

Archaeological Encounters in Crete: Arthur Evans, Osman Hamdi Bey,
and the Others

The first lines Evans wrote after having reached the island in March 1893 following a terrible voyage did not resemble at all his enchanted description of the Balkans.

Annoyed by his French antagonists and not exactly thrilled by the general conditions on the island, Evans did not stop spelling out the difficulties of working in Crete. In

On the European transition from private collections to public museums see David Murray, *Museums. Their History and their Use. With a Bibliography and List of Museums in the United Kingdom* (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1904), vol. II; Paula Findlen, "The Museum: Its Classical Etymology and Renaissance Genealogy," *Journal of the History of Collections* 1, no 1 (1989): 59-78. One should not forget that Arthur Evans had contributed significantly to the creation of the Cretan collection of the above museum. See John Boardman, *The Cretan Collection in Oxford - The Dictaeon Cave and Iron Age Crete* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

¹⁰⁸ Evans's journal was published, with a commentary and selected bibliography by Ann Brown in 2001.

addition, he was very worried by the widespread rumors that the Ottoman archaeologist Osman Hamdi Bey was planning to excavate the already famous site of Knossos.¹⁰⁹ Eventually, Evans's fears did not materialize and Osman Hamdi Bey directed his interests elsewhere. Yet, this particular instant of archaeological rivalry deserves some consideration. The indirect antagonism between the Ottoman capital and Ashmolean Museum over the legendary bronze-age palace of Crete constitutes a telling metaphor for the issues discussed in this chapter.

Arthur Evans, representing an institution almost three centuries old, was standing on the one side of the debate and Osman Hamdi Bey, representing the Ottoman regime, on the other.¹¹⁰ The former was one of the numerous British archaeologists traveling the

¹⁰⁹ It was rumored that the French archaeologist A. Joudin was negotiating with the proprietors of Knossos fields and had managed to come to an agreement with one of them. Joudin cooperated with Osman Hamdi Bey for the creation of the imperial collection in Istanbul. Therefore, it was widely believed that the French mission was preparing the field for the representative of the Ottoman capital to undertake action. Nevertheless, as Evans was noting characteristically in his journal "Greeks here are much averse to Joubain having any finger in the pie now he has become Turkish employé and an underling of Hamdi Bey" see Evans (1894), 3,37 in Brown, *Arthur Evans's Travels*.

The French école d' Athènes, founded in 1846, was one of the first institutions to become engaged in archaeological excavations in Anatolia, or "Grèce de l'Est" as the French called it. Although initially staffed with the partisans of the anti-Turkish French party of Athens, the institution was interested in exploring Anatolia, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. During the Crimean War, therefore, some of the administrative members suggested that the institution should be transferred from Athens to "Constantinople." Eventually, the liaison between Athens and Istanbul was realized when Osman Hamdi Bey became Director of the Ottoman Imperial Museums (1881-1910). Yet, most of his European colleagues treated him as a unique *savant Turk* (wise Turk), and insisted in differentiating him from the rest of 'Muslim Ottomans.' In this respect, the fact that they cooperated with him did not mean necessarily that they approved of the Ottoman Empire: "(Osman Hamdi Bey) Véritable Européen, francophile et francophone, il s'entoura d'Athéniens au musée d'Istanbul (Salmon Reinach, André Joubin, Gustave Mendel) et accorda libéralement aux membres de l'Ecole des autorisations de publication." See Christian Le Roy, "L'École française d'Athènes et l'Asie Mineure: The French School of Athens and Asia Minor," *Persée* 120, no 1 (Année 1996): 373 – 387, 375.

On the cooperation between A. Joubin and Osman Hamdi Bey at the museum of Istanbul, see Brigitte Pitarakis and Pinar Bursa, "A Group of Bronze Jugs in the Istanbul Archaeological Museums and the Issue of their Cypriot Origin," *Antiquité Tardive* 13, no 13(October 01, 2008): 29-36. See also Andre Joubin, *Musée Impérial Ottoman (The New Museum). Catalogue des Sculptures Grecques, Romaines, Byzantines et Franques* (Constantinople, 1893).

¹¹⁰ The personal profile of Osman Handi Bey *per se* constituted a very indicative example of the constraints regarding late nineteenth century Ottoman archaeology.

Eastern Mediterranean by that time, carrying off thousands of antiquities to the United Kingdom's collections in the name of the British public and the British realm. The latter was one of the few—and perhaps the only well-known—Ottoman archaeologists that, as late as in the second half of the nineteenth century, had begun to elaborate a “defensive archaeology,”¹¹¹ trying to prevent the various representatives of European institutions (such as that of Evans himself) from plundering the Empire's antiquities.¹¹² Moreover, Osman Hamdi was the first Muslim Ottoman to hold the position of director of the Istanbul Imperial Museum after the death of Anton Déthier, in 1881; an appointment that was in perfect harmony with the orientations of the Hamidian regime as discussed in the previous chapters.¹¹³

The ironic difference between the two with regard to Crete was that while Arthur Evans, together with other European archaeologists, was very much supported by the locals (the Christians at least), the representative of the Ottoman capital was considered a foreign force, trying to exploit the island's treasures.¹¹⁴ The state of archaeology in late

¹¹¹ Irene Maffi, "The Emergence of Cultural Heritage in Jordan: The Itinerary of a Colonial Invention. *Journal of Social Archaeology* 9, no 5 (2009): 5-35.

¹¹² On the interest in archaeology the Ottoman elite had started to demonstrate since the last decades of the nineteenth century, see Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*; D.T. Potts, "The Gulf Arab States and their Archaeology," in *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, edit. L. Meskell (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); For a more focused, thorough discussion of antiquities legislation and museums see Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 31-131.

¹¹³ On Osman Hamdi Bey see Mustafa Cezar, *Müzeci ve Ressam Osman Hamdi Bey: Musiologist and Painter Osman Hamdi Bey* (Istanbul: Turk Kulturune Hizmet Vakfi, 1987); Mustafa Cezar, *Sanatta Batıya Açılış ve Osman Hamdi I: The Western Opening in Arts and Osman Hamdi Bey* (Istanbul: Erol Kerim Aksoy Kultur ve Egitim, Spor, ve Saglik Vakfi Yayini, 1995); Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 90-108.

¹¹⁴ When the Italian Vittorio Simonelli visited the Museum of Candia in 1893, for example, he asked the local curator about the progress of the exhibition. Upon this question, the curator answered him that the locals preferred to leave Cretan antiquities underneath Cretan soil rather than to excavate them and have them exposed in Istanbul's archaeological museum. See V. Simonelli, *Candia: Ricordi di Escursione (Illustrati Con fotografie e Disegni dell'autore)* (Parma, 1897).

nineteenth century Crete, therefore, indicated that despite its efforts, the Ottoman regime was *de facto* denied its sovereignty rights. Furthermore, the personal portrait of Osman Hamdi *per se* mirrored the problems that prevented Ottoman archaeology from developing. Some biographical information can be used to further elucidate this argument.

Osman Hamdi was the son of Edhem Pasha, a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat and one of the most western-oriented officials in the empire. When still a young boy, Osman Hamdi was sent to study law in Paris where, despite his mediocre performance as a student, he managed to perfect his knowledge of French, marry a Frenchwoman, and develop a creative interest in conjectural arts. Though enchanted by Paris and the French way of life, Osman Hamdi returned to Istanbul in 1869, a decision that may have been the result of Edhem Pasha's persuasion rather than Osman's own will. In any event, Osman Hamdi was able to conflate very successfully his newly acquired background-knowledge on European arts with his father's high-level administrative positions and acquaintances. In other words, he was soon to establish himself as the Empire's most well-known painter, museum administrator, modernist artist, respected intellectual, active archaeologist, trainer of the younger generation of archaeologists, legislator in matters of antiquities, and director of the Imperial Museums. Osman Hamdi Bey became, in this manner, the link between the Ottomans and Europe; his religious identity and social profile being the most celebrated impersonation of the broader Ottoman attempt to transform the Empire into a modern Muslim-European state. Nevertheless, the fact that the whole Imperial archaeological project appeared to be 'one man's story' was

the perfect illustration of the many drawbacks to such an undertaking.¹¹⁵

The case of Crete, for instance, indicated that, despite the development of a well-reasoned Ottoman legislation on antiquities and archaeological sites, the gap between theory and reality could not easily be bridged. The delayed enforcement of relevant regulations in the late nineteenth century contradicted already established practices in the provinces. As a result, the new regulations caused series of European and provincial reactions, forcing the regime to abandon its rights on numerous occasions. In the same vein, the absence of any kind of enforcement authority along with the inability of the central administration to oversee actual practices in the provinces, rendered it trivial for foreign archaeologists to 'overlook' Ottoman regulations. Last but not least, it was quite difficult for the Ottomans to claim, appropriate, and protect, antiquities found on Imperial lands due to an obvious lack of a narrative that would allow for the regime to relate to the findings at stake and to declare them part of a common Ottoman history.¹¹⁶

One should not forget that, in the second half of the century, the visits of foreign explorers and scholars to Crete had become quite frequent. To be more specific, after the amateur digging attempts of Minos Kalokairinos had brought to light the first ancient

¹¹⁵ In 1881, it appears that the Ministry of Education was negotiating with the Germans for finding a new European director for the Museum. One cannot help wondering, therefore, what the state of Ottoman archaeology would have been, if Edhem Pasha would not have sent his son to study in Paris. According to the very interesting --and well supported by primary sources-- arguments of Edhem Eldem, it was in Paris that Osman Hamdi learned willingly to appreciate European arts and culture and (rather less willingly) that it was his patriotic duty as a Muslim and a Turk to serve the Ottoman Empire. See Edhem Eldem, "An Ottoman Archaeologist Caught between two worlds Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910)," in *Archaeology, Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia. the Life and Times of F.W. Hasluck, 1878-1920*, ed. D. Shankland (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004). See also Edhem Eldem, "Quelques Lettres d'Osman Hamdi Bey à son Père lors de son Séjour en Irak (1869-1870)," *Anatolia Moderna: Yeni Anadolu* 1, no 1 (1991): 115-136.

¹¹⁶ In this respect, the case of Iraq offers an interesting comparison to Cretan realities. See Magnus Thorkell Bernhardsson, *Reclaiming a Plundered Past Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005): 86, 125.

artifacts at the site of Knossos, the impression that great opportunities for excavating and plundering were offered in Crete became even stronger, attracting European pioneers from different countries.¹¹⁷ As a result, while Minos Kalokairinos himself was left in the shadows, his discoveries and direct assistance to European archaeologists contributed to some academic celebrities being drawn to the island. The excavations and publications of the latter brought the Cretan past to the attention of a growing European audience.

In brief, the first impressive outcome of pioneering foreign excavations was the discovery of a marble slab, inscribed *voustrofidon* (*βουστροφηδόν*: in alternate lines read in opposite directions), found in the wall of a mill on the site of ancient Gortyne (the village Agii Deka) by Messrs, G. Perrot and L. Thénon.¹¹⁸ The discovery was the result of the island's theoretical integration into the academic missions of the Athenian *Ecole*.¹¹⁹ The findings were thus soon to be exposed in the National Museum of Louvre, the same way a tall *pithos*, (*πίθος*: earthen-ware storage jar) discovered by M. Kalokairinos in 1878 was given as a gift by its finder to the British Museum.¹²⁰ The above discoveries were followed by M. Haousoullier,¹²¹ in 1879, who noticed and

¹¹⁷ For Minos Kalokairinos see the following section.

¹¹⁸ See Georges Perrot, *L'Ile de Crète. Souvenirs de Voyage* (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie, 1867), 11,96,98,99,106,120; Michel Breal, "Un Ancien Texte de loi de la Crète," *Revue Archéologique ou Recueil de Documents et de Mémoires Relatifs à l'étude des Monuments, à la Numismatique et la Philologie de l'Antiquité et du Moyen Âge* (December, 1878); E.S. Roberts, "Archaic Inscriptions from Crete," *The Classical Review*, 2, no 1/2 (Feb., 1888): 9-12.

¹¹⁹ Kalliopi Christofi, "Les Français en Crète. De la Huitième Question de l'Académie à la Concession de Zouroképhalo," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 120, no 1 (1996): 357-371; Rene Treuil, L'École Française d'Athènes et la Préhistoire/Protohistoire du Monde égéen," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 120, no 1 (1996): 407-439.

¹²⁰ Edmond Pottier, "Les Vases archaïques à reliefs dans les pays grecs: Archaic Vases and Reliefs in the Greek Lands," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 12, no 12 (1888): 491-509.

¹²¹ Bernard Haussoullier, "Inscriptions Archaïques de Gortyne (Crète): Archaic Inscriptions from

copied a similar fragment of the Gortyne marble slab in a house near the mill. The same scholar, furthermore, published some of Kalokairinos's own discoveries. A few years later, in 1884, the representatives of the Italian-German mission, Federico Halbherr and Dr. Fabricius,¹²² realized an even more successful excavation, which led them to a circular wall of grayish limestone, covered by a monster inscription in archaic Greek fully 12 columns and nearly 660 lines long.¹²³

The product of this last excavation was quite impressive. The discovery was thus directly communicated to the German Institute at Athens and to the Italian government, which quickly mobilized to receive permission for the continuation of the excavation. On this occasion, the permission was easily gained as the excavators were very well received by the Ottoman Governor, Fotiadis Pasha. Nevertheless, almost 10 years later, while Halbherr was still working on the great inscription, the Ottoman Governor Mehmet Pasha abruptly refused to allow him to continue. This incident was the main

Gortyne," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*. 4, no 4 (1880): 460-471.

¹²² It is interesting to note here that F. Halbherr was sent to Crete by his professor of Classical Studies at the University of Florence, Domenico Comparetti, to find a lost inscription that has been copied by the Venetian Barozzi in 1557. One should not forget that the Italian cities were the first to demonstrate a proto-archaeological interest, while Crete was still under Venetian administration. For instance, as early as in 1417, the Catholic monk Buondelmonti had included in his *Descriptio Insulae Cretae* the copies of 4 Cretan archeological sites. At the same time, the discoveries at the site of Gortyna and those that followed (Phaistos Palace etc) created strong ideological links between the Italian archaeological missions, Greece, and Crete. Moreover, in 1909, F. Halbherr had achieved the assent of the Italian government for the establishment of an Italian Archaeological School at Athens, and in 1910 he settled down on Crete. See Dimos Irakliou and Scuola Archeologica Italiana di Atene, ed., *Timi stin Kriti 1884-1984-Homage to Crete 1884-1984* (Iraklio Kritis, 1984); Sally McKee, "Speaking for Others: Imposing Solidarities on the Past. The case of Venetian Crete," in *Medieval Cultures in Contact*, edit. R. F. Gyug (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003): 39-58; Morfotiko Idrima Ethnikis Trapezis, ed., *Candia/ Creta/ Kriti* (Athens: Arhio Hartografias tou Ellinikou Horou, 2005).

¹²³ The inscription on the wall constitutes a fact a code of law that had formed part with a small ancient theater contained provisions of private law. The inscription of Gortyna has been, by far, the longest discovered archaic inscription. The text is known in Greek as *Οι Νόμοι της Γορτύνας* (Gortyna Laws), see I. A. Tipaldou, *Ερμηνεία της εν Γορτύνι της Κρήτης τω 1884 Ανακαλυφθείσης Επιγραφής: Translation of the Inscription Found in Gortini, Crete, in 1884* (Athens: Ek tou Tipografiou tis Enoseos, 1887).

reason foreign archaeologists started circulating rumors about Osman Hamdi Bey and his alleged plans to excavate in Crete. Regardless of whether these rumors were accurate, the most interesting aspect of the story was that the alleged intention of the Ottoman regime to exercise its legitimate rights over Crete was perceived by foreign archaeologists as a conspiracy, and as a violation of their own self-acquired rights. In addition, similar were the views of the local Christians who, although trying to help almost every other archaeologist on the island, were obviously very negative towards a future involvement of Osman Hamdi Bey in local excavations. The Muslim locals, at the same time, did not express any interest at all for relevant issues and debates.¹²⁴

It is important to mention also that it was not really clear whether the Ottoman authorities had stopped the Italian mission from excavating due to archaeological considerations or to political ones. True, the enthusiastic support provided by Italians to the irredentist projects of Greece could not be overlooked. In the same vein, the Ottoman authorities may have started, after a point, to realize that, in the middle of uprisings and all kinds of conflicts, excavations that brought to light ruins from the island's archaic, Hellenophonic past were not favorable to the interests of the regime. Thanks to Federico Halbherr, for instance, Gortyna had received considerable international attention legitimizing, in a way, Greek-European claims over Crete.

To be more specific, the inscription of Gortyna, a Greek legal text of immense archaeological importance, has been integrated in the literature on the island as proof of ancient assertions. According to Plato, the ancient Greek world had received its best laws from Crete. According to Homer, the kings of Crete, Minos and Radamanthos (sons

¹²⁴ Evans (April, 1894), 183, 63 in Brown, *Arthur Evans's Travels in Crete*.

of Zeus themselves) had conversed with their Olympian sire to make laws for their cities according to His will. These laws were inscribed on stone, later on influencing the Greco-Roman legal tradition of 'right reason,' which after centuries became one of the cornerstones of Enlightenment. In this context, the combination of mythological Minoan kings, Hellenic conquerors of Crete, Zeus, Christian God, and legalistic rationality was used by western scholarship in order to suggest that the Cretan past belonged clearly to the realm of the modern West.¹²⁵

The publication of the discoveries of Gortyna had attracted to Crete, among many others, the famous archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann. Schliemann had developed a formidable reputation after his finds at Mycenae in Greece and at the site he took to be the Homeric city of Troy (at the site of Hisarlık, overlooking Çanakale, in modern Turkey). His alleged discovery of mythological Troy, in particular, was celebrated by Schliemann himself and those thinking like him, as evidence that Homeric narratives were not merely myths, but had historical validity. In fact, Schliemann's analysis was heavily attacked by a number of his contemporary scholars, since there was no indication the ruins he excavated had anything to do with Troy. Nevertheless, inasmuch as late nineteenth century archaeological issues were undoubtedly politically colored, Schliemann was ardently supported by Liberal archaeologists and scholars throughout Europe. The latter believed with passion in the prehistoric roots of an eternal clash of civilizations between Europe and Asia, and considered Schliemann's excavations the proof of this. One of Schliemann's greater supporters, for instance, was the British politician W. E. Gladstone, who found reason in

¹²⁵ Augustus C. Merriam, "Law Code of the Kretan Gortyna (I)," *The American Journal of Archaeology and of the History of the Fine Arts* 1, no 4 (Oct., 1885): 324-350.

interpreting the Trojan Wars as the ultimate collision between “masculine” Greeks and “feeble” Trojans.¹²⁶

The visit Schliemann paid to Crete in 1886, therefore, was very important when viewed as a sign of the island’s integration into a much broader archaeological debate, one with profound political connotations.¹²⁷ Schliemann's intention to excavate at the Knossos site was thwarted, however, not by the Ottoman authorities, but by the same powerful force that had created obstacles to the efforts of Italian, German, French, and British missions: the financial demands of the owners of the Knossos lands, which were characterized by all interested parties as excessive. Similarly to previous attempts, therefore, Schliemann's project to excavate Knossos was abandoned. Once again, the Minoan palace remained hidden in the Cretan soil, to Arthur Evans's greatest chagrin. Thus, after almost twenty years had passed from the first excavations realized by Minos Kalokairinos in the seventies, Arthur Evans arrived to Crete when the conditions were finally mature for him to succeed where everybody else had failed.

The Cretan Journals of Arthur Evans

With the support of the local Christians, Arthur Evans managed to buy the site of

¹²⁶ In the exact words of Gladstone himself, the weakness of Trojans was physical, moral, and political, since they presented a much less developed capacity for political organization than the Greeks. See W.E. Gladstone, *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age, in three volumes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1858), III: 206, 245-246. For a general discussion of Victorian discourses on Troy see Cornelia D. J. Pearsall, *Tennyson's Rapture : Transformation in the Victorian Dramatic Monologue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also H. Schliemann, *Mycenæ: a Narrative of Researches and Discoveries at Mycenæ and Tiryns* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1880), introduction.

¹²⁷ Rodney Castleden, *The Knossos Labyrinth: A New View of the 'Palace of Minos' at Knossos* (London;New York: Routledge: 23-40), 1990.

Knossos after long negotiations with its Muslim landowners. As a result, despite the positive outcome, the attitude of the Muslims enforced his already existing repulsion against Islam.¹²⁸ This becomes evident in the archaeologist's diaries which, though brief and businesslike, demonstrate clearly enough that Arthur Evans experienced Crete through the filter of his own background. Naturally, all archaeologists who went to Crete in late nineteenth century formed different opinions about the island according to their individual experiences and prejudices. Plausible as it might be, this argument deserves to be underlined, as the interpretations and theories of these pioneering scholars are loaded with meaning when one considers what they were really looking for in the Cretan soil. Were the Liberals digging for their ideals? Women archaeologists for equality with men?¹²⁹ French archaeologists for the Republic? British archaeologists for the Victorian realm? With regard to Evans, in particular, a number of contemporary scholars suggest that his reading of the Cretan past was inspired more by Victorian realities and personal

¹²⁸ I. Hatzidakis, "Αρχαιολογικά έρευναι εν Κρήτη: Archaeological excavations in Crete," *Αρμυρία*: (1900), 529-538.

¹²⁹ Although this chapter cannot discuss in greater detail the background stories of women archaeologists digging in late nineteenth century Crete, such a case-study would be of particular interest. The case of Harriet Boyet, who excavated in Eastern Crete at the turn of the century, offers a very telling example in this respect. Similarly to Arthur Evans, Boyet became quite influential both as an archaeologist and as an activist. For instance, during the war of 1897 she had served as a nurse for the Greeks and, the same year, she participated into the foundation of an organization called the American Excavation Society, the president, secretary, and driving forces of which were American, well-educated women. In 1900, Boyer and her friend Jean Patten, a botanist interested in Cretan botanical specimens, were permitted to excavate in Crete, representing the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. It appears that the main reasons these two women traveled to Crete were two: to be the first women directing the excavation of an archaeological site; and to divide finds between the local museum and the foreign institutions they represented, see Philippa Levine, *The Amateur and the Professional. Antiquarians, Historians and Archaeologists in Victorian England, 1838-1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Mary Allsebrook, ed., *Born to Rebel. The Life of Harriet Boyd Hawes* (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1992); Diane L. Bolger, "Ladies of the Expedition: Harriet Boyd Hawes and Edith Hall at Work in Mediterranean Archaeology," in *Women in Archaeology*, edit. C. Claassen (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Marshall Joseph Becker, Philip P. Betancourt, and Richard B. Seager, *Richard Berry Seager: pioneer archaeologist and proper gentleman* (Pennsylvania: UPenn Museum of Archaeology, 1997), 11-25.

needs than by the results of actual excavations.¹³⁰

In order to illustrate the above argument, the following examples can be taken into consideration: Evans's persistence to describe, with very little evidence, Bronze Age Crete as the center of the liberal, cosmopolitan Empire of Minos, King of the Cretans and Master of the Seas; his obsession with a hypothetical cult of the Female Mother Goddess; his Victorian idealization of motherhood; his suggestion that the Minoan pre-Hellenic culture survived the occupation of the Greek tribes, and that the Eteo-Cretans represented the Minoans in a world dominated by the Ancient Greeks; the same way, some researchers would say, that Welshmen tried to culturally survive in a world dominated by the British.¹³¹

This author regards similar considerations quite insightful, despite the fact that no one can actually know what was happening in Evans's mind. True, the above parallels between the archaeologist's theories and Victorian dynamics are based on subjective interpretations that defy scientific proof. Nevertheless, the point remains to be made that Evans's mind was unlikely to have been *tabulla rasa* when he visited Crete; neither was the mind of any other foreign archaeologist, correspondent, diplomat, revolutionary fighter, or simple visitor. Thus, as demonstrated by a number of different examples in the context of the present study, trying to understand how foreign actors thought about and interacted with Cretan society is an important task, even if such

¹³⁰ R. A. McNeal, The Legacy of Arthur Evans. *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 6, 205-220.

¹³¹ P. M. Day, and M. Relaki, "Past Factions and Present Fictions: Palaces in the Study of Minoan Crete," in *Monuments of Minos: Rethinking the Minoan Palaces*, edit. J. Driessen, I. Schoep and R. Laffineur (Liège/Austin, 2002), 217-234; Yannis Hamilakis, Momigliano, "Archaeology and European Modernity," in edit. N. M. Yannis Hamilakis and Nicoletta Momigliano, *Archaeology and European Modernity, Producing and consuming the "Minoans,"* (Creta Antica Padova: Bottega d' Erasmo, 2006).

questions can never be adequately answered.

The detailed journals that Evans kept during his visits to Crete in 1893, 1894 and 1896 are quite telling in this respect, since the archaeologist became actively involved in local politics in favor of the Greeks. In fact, Evans may have tried to be as objective as possible towards Muslim and Christian Cretans. When reading his journals, however, one cannot overlook the fact that his local contacts, colleagues, and guides were almost invariably Christian. In other words, as the archaeologist's narrative continues, the reader follows him traveling all over Crete and witnesses him being informed about the island's archaeological sites and local politics only by the Christians.¹³²

On his way to famous historical sites, for instance, Evans had passed by lots of destroyed monasteries, churches, mosques, and ruined villages—both Muslim and Christian. Yet, the introversion of the Muslim communities, together with an obvious language-barrier, did not allow him to have any significant discussions with the Muslims. The fact that plenty of Turkish villages consisted of mere shells of ruined houses was noted by Evans's in his writings with no comments beyond his abhorrence of Muslim backwardness.¹³³ Similarly, any encounter he had with the Muslims, appeared to uncritically feed already stimulated prejudices against Islam:

1896. Friday, May 8.

At Ligortino found the Daskalos Ahmet Effendi Mostaixakis of the purely Mahometan village whom I knew to have dug up two Myc Tholoi. At his

¹³² It seems that most foreigners interested in archaeologies and historical sites who visited the island in the second half of the nineteenth century, had followed more or less the same pattern. See for instance C. Edwardes's touring of Crete with a group of Orthodox monks and priests in 1886, Charles Edwardes, *Letters from Crete* (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1887).

¹³³ Evans (1894), 71, 63 in Brown, *Arthur Evans's Travels*.

house saw some of the contents of No1....the three larnakes from here I afterwards saw in a kind of barn....For the antiquities at Heraklion he asks 100 liras!...- lie upon lie. It being a Turkish village they could not receive infidels into their houses but offered me the barn. I accordingly said I would rest there and succeeded in sketching the larnax: finally we put up in the καφενεῖον (coffeehouse). The Daskalos (schoolteacher) also showed me a spot near where had been apparently a destroyed grave, several small cups...Arranged for 10 men to dig in the hope of striking a dromos (path.)...
 “1896. Saturday, May 9.

At 6.30 informed by Alevisos that the fellow had broken his promise and would not allow digging. More equivocations. At 7. I send an ultimatum. Unless an answer is returned within 15 minutes will have no more dealings with ἀπιστοι (infidels) - and not look at the things at Heraklion. At 7.10 am brought a bunch of roses and the reply that the digging will begin immediately...Hagios Georgios a large Monastery with gardens and a Campos of its own in a fine air under the hills. Hegoumen (the abbot) an excellent man, tells me that the Ligortino Turks are the worst fanatics about ἄνδρες δολοφόνοι (men who are murderers)- If a Christian appears alone in the village he is turned out with cries of ἔξω Ρωμιός (get out greek). Their women are simply prisoners for life.¹³⁴

On the contrary, Evans had both the chance and the will to contact a number of local Christians and educated Greeks. He was consequently informed about, and did not hesitate to share, their feelings of despair about the disasters of Crete. Moreover, since it was a common habit of the Christians to guide interested visitors around the island's monuments, always showing them the evidences of “Muslim brutality” towards them, Evans was offered numerous opportunities to witness the results of Muslim vandalism in Crete.¹³⁵ In his writings, he missed no opportunity to underline the disastrous results the Turkish 'yoke' had held for Crete:

1894. Wednesday, March 28. Amary (Asomatos Monastery).
 In Venetian times no Greek bishoprics were allowed except one in very latest

¹³⁴ Evans (1896), 237 in *ibid*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

period at Kissamo-only Greek archpriests. Cretans however studied in Italy and the "yoke" (ζυγός) though not light was not like the Turkish. Muzurus Cretan family. The Turks of Amari 20 years ago in a majority now in minority. Very fanatical. No real friendship with them possible. Would like to exterminate all Christians according to the bishop...¹³⁶

1894. Tuesday, April 3. Viano.

I was kindly taken in by the Greek army doctor here- a young man who lives alone with his mother in a two roomed hovel (Georgios M. Piskopakis) and turned his sitting room into a bedroom. His father and five uncles had fallen in one or other of the Cretan insurrections. He had studied at Athens where he lived 14 years and spoke French very fairly. Though a native of a village near Retimo he was disgusted with the Cretans. He said except Sphakia and the Retimo district the people were not good for much. The inhabitants of Mesara and the East of Crete generally were a spiritless lot, and dishonest to boot. As to Cretan politics he was disillusioned. The Greeks and the Mahometans are always ready to fly at each others' throats and each has only one idea, Greece or the Sultan-as to "Cretan Patriotism" the Mahometans had not a notion of it...I explored the height to North West of Viano known as Korakovigle....the remains extended to the valley bellow. Here on a knoll with an alonion or threshing floor I was shown a recently discovered grave-the Turk who took me there said only bones were discovered but as Alevisios [Evan's Christian guide] remarked "they are all liars..."¹³⁷

Despite the obvious sympathy of the archaeologist for Christian Cretans, however, he had a number of bad experiences with them. For instance, when his intention to buy archaeological findings of any kind became known to the locals, lots of Christians and Muslims alike had tried to deceive him. By and large, activities such as overpricing items found in Cretan fields, producing fake antiquities to satisfy the European market, and smuggling findings from the excavations sites, appeared to have

¹³⁶ Ibid., 63.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 87.

no color and knew no religion.¹³⁸ Arthur Evans was one of the many foreigners who had fraud perpetrated against them, and appeared to be literally infuriated upon being constantly manipulated by the locals. At the same time, it was only with the help of the local Christians, who had handled long legal procedures for him, that Evans managed to buy the land at the Kephala site (Knossos) and turn it to an excavation site.¹³⁹

Archaeology and the Rise of the Greek Urban Elite in Crete

In fact, preoccupied with Islam as he might have been, Evans was rather right to believe that the local Muslims had little sense of archaeological awareness. Their indifference for antiquity, furthermore, was in stark contrast to the active engagement of local Christians with archeological activities. It has to be mentioned here that in the seventies, parallel to the pioneering-excavations realized on the island by Minos Kalokairinos, a number of educated Greeks had started to demonstrate a growing interest in the island's

¹³⁸ E. J. Forsdyke, "A Stag-Horn Head from Crete," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 40, no 2 (1920):174-179; Reynold Higgins, *The Archaeology of Minoan Crete* (New York: Henry Z. Walck, 1973); Kevin Butcher and David W. J. Gill, "The Director, the Dealer, the Goddess, and Her Champions: The Acquisition of the Fitzwilliam Goddess," *American Journal of Archaeology* (97 Jul., 1993), 383-401; K. Lapatin, *Mysteries of the Snake Goddess. Art, Desire, and the Forging of History* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002); David Lowenthal, "Mediterranean heritage: ancient marvel, modern millstone," *Nations and Nationalism*, 14, no 2 (10 Apr 2008): 369 - 392.

¹³⁹ The property that Evans was trying to buy at Kefala site belonged to different proprietors. The proprietor willing to sell was Zehra Ulfet Hanim, who owned a quarter and was represented by her brother Hasan Bey. The proprietors of the other three quarters, the heirs of Sami Bey Latifzade –or to be more specific their guardian Said Bey Tsalikakis—were asking for an amount of money that the archaeologist could not afford paying. Finally, after the formation of the Cretan exploration fund in 1899 (a joint venture between Arthur Evans and the British School at Athens) and with the cooperation and great support provided to the archaeologist by Hatzidakis, Evans had managed to secure the site to the British mission. See Arthur J. Evans, "The Neolithic Settlement at Knossos and its Place in the History of Early Aegean Culture," *Man* 1:184-186; J.D.S Pendlebury and Arthur Evans, *Handbook to the Palace of Minos at Knossos with Its Dependencies* (Belle Fourche, S.D.: Kessinger Publishing, 2003 (1933), 10-20; Brown, *Arthur Evans's Travels*, 37.

past.¹⁴⁰ Based on individual efforts, the Greeks created private collections, stimulating a sense of local understanding of the past that resulted in the protection of antiquities. In 1878, for example, the local Greeks founded in Candia the Society for the Promotion of Learning (*Φιλεκπαιδευτικός Σύλλογος Ηρακλείου*) in order to spread Greek education and archaeology. Among its other activities, the Society established a small Museum in the town of Iraklio (Candia), to display antiquities collected from different parts of the island.¹⁴¹

On a cultural level, therefore, the members of the Society clearly identified with Greece. In terms of financing, however, they were willing to remain loyal to the Ottoman Empire, hoping to acquire some extra funding. In fact, the Society was in close contact with the Archaeological Society of Athens (*Αρχαιολογική Υπηρεσία των Αθηνών*), which provided funds for the purchase of local antiquities. Nevertheless, the members were trying to hide their affiliation with Athens from the authorities, since the Society was simultaneously recognized as an Ottoman foundation, which could receive funds from the local Assembly only after the necessary approval of the Ottoman Governor. In 1886, for instance, when Athens had approved a budget of 4,000 golden drachmas (4,000 francs) to fund the Society, the members of the latter expressed their gratitude together with the wish to keep the decision secret. The reason for this was that, in the very same year, the Ottoman Governor Savva Pasha had also approved the local Assembly's decision to fund the Society with 25,000 *kuruş* (5,000 francs). The fact that

¹⁴⁰ With regard to late nineteenth century Crete I find reason in calling the local Christians, and particularly those involved in similar activities, Greeks since they openly identified themselves with the Greek identity and culture.

¹⁴¹ Iosif Hatzidakis, *Ιστορία του Κρητικού Μουσείου και των Αρχαιολογικών Ερευνών εν Κρήτη: History of the Cretan Museum and Archaeological excavations* (Athina: Estia, 1931).

a foundation loaded with the political mission to protect Greek identity, education, and past, was financed both by the Kingdom of Greece, which was rival to the Empire, and by the Ottoman authorities, was a very indicative example of archaeological realities in late nineteenth century Crete.¹⁴²

Until 1897, Athens and Istanbul were still claiming the island in very similar ways. From this point of view, the act of protecting antiquities was interwoven with the desire of both administrative centers to act as 'modern.' Nevertheless, the difference between the two was that only in the case of Greece did the antiquities in question carry a political meaning related to the linear history of the Greek people. Ottoman archaeological patterns were characterized by profound ideological confusion. Archaeology was linked to the regime's attempts to modernize the state, but was never infused with the secret meaning of the continuity in time and of the eternal survival of a nation. It is not a surprise, therefore, that archaeological activities had minimal ideological impact on the Muslim Cretans.

In the same way, archaeology was correlated with the rise of an elite of Christian doctors, lawyers, merchants, and manufacturers in the urban centers of Crete. These groups were in close contact with Athens. Minos Kalokairinos, for instance, was a wealthy merchant from Iraklio and had spent time in Athens as a law student.¹⁴³ Joseph

¹⁴² Giannis Sakellarakis, *Αρχαιολογικές Αγωνίες στην Κρήτη του 19ου αιώνα; 51 έγγραφα για τις κρητικές αρχαιότητες (1883-1898): Caring about Archaeology in nineteenth century Crete; fifty-one documents on Cretan Antiquities (1883-1898), Simvoles stis Epistimes tou Anthropou* (Iraklio: Panepistimiakes Ekdosis Kritis, 1998), 132-134.

¹⁴³ In 1906 Minos Kalokairinos started publishing in Iraklio the *Κρητική Αρχαιολογική Εφημερίδα* (Cretan Archaeological Journal) in the first papers of which he tried to explain in great detail his interest in archaeology and to describe his first amateur, archaeological experiences in Crete. His journal is thus of particular interest as it constitutes an articulated example of the ideological link between Greek education and Crete realized via the path of archaeology.

Hatzidakis, the appointed president of the Society in 1883, was a medical doctor (gynecologist) of Cretan origin, born and educated in Greece.¹⁴⁴ Stefanos Xanthoudidis, who became the first curator of antiquities representing Hania (*Canea*) in Autonomous Crete, and Director of the Archaeological Museum at Irakleio,¹⁴⁵ was from Cretan Avdos but had lived for years and studied Philology in Athens.¹⁴⁶

Despite the fact that none of these men was a professional archaeologist, they were the first locals to get actively involved in excavations and had played an important role in the improvement of the legal and actual state of Cretan archaeology after the proclamation of Cretan Autonomy. In this respect, the family story of each of them is very interesting because none of them is unique. Joseph Hatzidakis was born on the island of Milos, where his family had taken refuge from the middle-century Cretan bloodshed. When he decided to resettle in Crete, he was already 34 years old, had already studied at the Universities of Athens, Munich, Berlin, and Paris, and had practiced medicine on the island of Syros for quite a few years. The family of

¹⁴⁴ His travel memoirs from his visit to Crete in 1881 constitute a very telling example of the ways Hatzidakis experienced the island half as a local and half a foreigner, see Iosif Hatzidakis, 1881. *Περιήγησις εις Κρήτην- Tour of Crete* (En Ermoupoli: Nikolaos Varvaresos, 1881).

¹⁴⁵ S. A. Xanthoudidou, *Ο Κρητικός Πολιτισμός, ήτοι τα εξαγόμενα των εν κρήτη ανασκαφών- The Cretan civilization, the products of the archaeological excavations in Crete, Σύγραμμα περιοδικόν της εν Αθήναις Επιστημονικής Εταιρείας: Scientific journal of the Athenian Scientific Association* (En Athines: Ek tou tipografiou tou P.D. Sakellariou, 1904).

¹⁴⁶ Manousos I. Manousakas, "Στέφανος Ξανθοῦδιδης (1864-1928): Stefanos Xanthoudidis (1864-1928), *Nea Estia* 54, no 634 (1954): 1766-1768. Stefanos Xanthoudidis had also published a variety of studies focusing on Cretan Christian antiquities, in particular, and the island's history, in general. The following publications are quite telling examples of the ways he interpreted Cretan history as a continuation of Greek-Christian civilization, see Stefanou A. Xanthoudidou, *Χριστιανικά ἀρχαῖότητες ἐκ Κρήτης: Christian antiquities from Crete, Διεθνὴς Εφημερίς της Νομισματικῆς Αρχαιολογίας: International Journal of Numismatics* (Athens: Beck-Barth, 1903); Stefanou A. Xanthoudidou, *Επίτομος ιστορία της Κρήτης: ἀπὸ των ἀρχαιοτάτων χρόνων μέχρι των καθ' ἡμᾶς. Μετὰ 30 εἰκόνων ἐντὸς του κειμένου και ἐνὸς χάρτου της Κρήτης: An abridged history of Crete: from antiquity to our day. Including 30 pictures and a map of Crete* (En Athines: Elliniki Ekdotiki Eteria, 1909).

Xanthoudidis, at the same time, had taken refuge in Athens after the uprisings of 1878, where Stefanos had studied and developed an interest for archaeology. In the nineties, he returned to work as a high-school professor in Crete and became actively involved in archaeological activities.¹⁴⁷ These men were thus among the numerous descendants of Christian families who had escaped the island in the past because of riots and massacres and who, after having studied abroad, started to return. In this way, they belonged to a generation of expatriated Cretans, the identity of whom had been shaped off the island, through education and mobility.

Immigration back and forth stimulated the Greek identity of numerous Christian Cretans. Despite the bad experiences Cretan refugees had lived through in the Kingdom of Greece, lots of young Cretans were offered the opportunity to study in Greek schools and to master the Greek language. As the nineteenth-century wore on, therefore, young, educated Greeks who were by origin Cretans started resettling on the island, in a sense reclaiming the urban centers from the Ottomans. In this context, archaeology and history carried significant meaning for the Greeks. First, because the sites of Crete proved that Hellenic civilization had continuity in time. Second, because the Greeks were the only locals that really cared about such issues. From a Greek-Western point of view, therefore, the Muslim indifference for the past was a proof that Muslims had no place in the island's future.

It has to be mentioned at this point that the Muslim population of the island was rapidly declining in numbers. In most cases, the local Muslims who escaped the island simultaneously with the Christians due to riots and massacres left never to return. At the

¹⁴⁷ Manousakas, *Στέφανος Ξανθοδίδης*, 1766.

same time, the Muslims who stayed in Crete after the proclamation of Autonomy did not try to challenge in any respect the already stimulated hegemonic historical narrative of the Greeks. As a matter of fact, they continued to avoid similar issues as a whole. To my knowledge, the only exception of a local Muslim who expressed a taste for local excavations and history was the famous photographer Rahmizâde Bâhâeddin from Hania (Canea). Although he never got actively involved in archaeological activities, Bâhâeddin captured through his camera the transition of Ottoman Crete into a world of nation states by taking pictures of excavations, modern technologies, European admirals, and a standardized local folklore.¹⁴⁸

The fact that local Greeks were interested in antiquities did not mean that they shared common views regarding what should be done with the antiquities at stake. The president of the Society, J. Hatzidakis, and those thinking like him, for example, eagerly cooperated with foreign archaeologists in order to present a common front against the Ottomans. Others reacted to the privileged treatment of foreigners such as Arthur Evans. Some of Hatzidakis opponents at the Society did not hesitate to remark that the president should reconsider the notion of “national duty.”¹⁴⁹ Similarly to Hatzidakis, M. Kalokairinos and a few other wealthy collectors were munificently beneficent to British, French, Italian, and Greek foundations alike. Cretan antiquities were generously donated by them to almost anybody but the Ottoman authorities. Others would refuse to donate

¹⁴⁸ Seyit Ali Ak, *Girit'ten İstanbul'a Bahaettin Rahmi Bediz: From Crete to Istanbul Bahaettin Rahmi Bediz* (Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2004).

¹⁴⁹ See for instance the case of Ioannis Perdikaris, a professor that after the proclamation of the Autonomy was appointed General Inspector of Higher Education in Crete. Ioannis Perdikaris 1901. *Το εκπαιδευτικόν συνέδριον και αι επιτηρίδες των γυμνασίων κατά το σχολικόν έτος 1899-1900: The educational conference and the yearbooks of highschoools during the school-year 1899-1900* (En Haniis: Ek tou Kivernitikou Tipografiou, 1901).

antiquities even to Greece. For instance, when the National Museum at Athens expressed interest in buying antiquities from the private collections of the Mitsotakis family, the widow of Ioannis Mitsotakis, Terpsihoi, pursued tough negotiations over the price. Despite the fact that the transaction was described by the widow as her "national duty," she did not consider it her duty to lower the price (let alone to provide the antiquities for free).¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, until 1897-1898, Crete was still under direct Ottoman control. In theory, according to the first Article of the Ottoman Regulation on Antiquities, artifacts of historical value found in Ottoman soil belonged by law to nobody but the Ottoman state. In practice, however, it was commonly accepted that antiquities belonged to the first one to find them—or plunder them, or buy them—even with regard to archeological pieces found within the vast fields of the Ottoman *vakfs*.¹⁵¹ As to foreign archaeologists, as long as they were profiting from the chaotic situation in Crete they did not seem to object. Quite to the contrary, in cooperation with the Greeks, some of them considered stopping Ottoman authorities from moving Cretan antiquities to Istanbul a truly legitimate duty.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ For the relevant correspondence between professor *Ιωάννης Περδικάρης* (Ioannis Perdikaris), who was the secretary of the Society, and Hatzidakis, or for the correspondence between *Τερψιχόρη Μητσotάκη* (Terpsihori Mitsotaki) and the Archaeological Society of Athens see Sakellarakis, *Αρχαιολογικές Αγωνίες*, 44, 99-105.

¹⁵¹ See for instance the relevant article published in 1888 by Ioannis Perdikaris about an inscription found within the fields of Han-Ali *tekke* (lodge) very close to Knossos, Ioannis Perdikaris, "Επιτύμβιος Επγραφή εκ Κνώσου Κρήτης: Funeral inscription from Knossos of Crete," *Deltion tis Estias* 12, no 591 (1888).

¹⁵² For these issues and on the role played by the Greek Cretans, or the "Cretan gentlemen" as the writer calls them, see the following very interesting article by Philip Carabott, "A country in a "state of distitution" labouring under an "unfortunate regime": Crete at the turn of the 20th century (1898-1906), in *archaeology and European Modernity, Producing and consuming the "Minoans*," edit. H. Yannis and M. Nicoletta (Padova: Bottega d' Erasmo, 2006).

Arthur Evans, for example, publicly ridiculed the Ottoman “legitimate heirs” axiom, characterizing the Ottomans not a legitimate authority but an occupation force.¹⁵³ True, not everybody was so radical. For instance, the director of the British School of Archaeology at Athens, D. G. Hogarth, was somewhat annoyed by such extreme opinions against an Empire’s sovereignty rights.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, when Evans’s radical liberalism in favor of the Greeks was generously rewarded after the proclamation of Autonomy—a little too generously perhaps—Conservatives and Liberals alike in Great Britain called Arthur Evans a genius. In 1899, for example, J. Hatzidakis received permission from Prince George to secure certain archaeological sites only for British archaeological exploration, including the by then legendary site of Knossos. Upon hearing this, D. G. Hogarth forgot about his past doubts and wrote with pride as follows:

In the spring of 1899 I accompanied the future explorer of Cnossus on my fourth visit to Crete. Arthur Evans had long laid his plans, and, with the forethought of genius, cast his bread on troubled waters by buying a Bey’s part share of the site of the Palace of Minos. He seemed to waste labour and money; for under the Ottoman law his title could not be made secure, and in the end his partnership lapsed to a partner. But when others, who coveted Cnossos, put forward moral rights, he alone could argue the convincing claim of sacrifice, and the Cretans, for whom he had done much in their hour

¹⁵³ Momigliano, *Federico Halbherr and Arthur Evans*, 284-285.

¹⁵⁴ Although Hogarth appeared to be very pleased with Evans’s accomplishment as an archeologist working for the British Institute, he strongly disagreed with his political views and opinions about the actual situation on the island. In fact, he appeared to be as negative towards the “Greeks” as Evans was towards the “Turks”: “The Admirals should have known Greeks better than to trust them on such vicarious parole as was given by caps and black hats, whether on the heads of chiefs or no. No Greek may answer surely for any other Greek, since individualism and intolerance of discipline are in the blood of the race. In the stormy history of Levantine religious warfare you may note one unvaried law of consequence. Where the Moslem have prevailed, the votaries of the two creed have resumed peaceful life as of old, the Christian knowing that Moslems act under the orders as one man, and that when Islam is triumphant its Gibeonites are secure of their lives. But if Christians gain their freedom, the Moslem leaves the land of his birth. For whatever pledges the new authorities may give, he knows for his part that, since Eastern Christianity supplies no social discipline, each Christian will act on occasion as seems best in his own eyes.” See Hogarth, *Accidents of an Antiquary’s life*, 25.

of danger, upheld his cause in their hour of freedom...¹⁵⁵

The Massacres of 1898

One of the main differences between scholarly history and positive sciences is that historical research can prove nothing in a definitive way.¹⁵⁶ Another important difference is that history has a greater emotional impact on people than science. Thus, similarly to individual memories, historical narratives tend to be interwoven with 'sentimental' aspects of our identity, as subjects of history, researchers, and readers of it. As already argued previously, with regard to the events of 1866, massacres and violent conflicts are often comprehended by the human mind only when legitimized via a sacred meaning. From such a perspective, it is understandable why the numerous recorded massacres against Christians in Crete led to the eventual stimulation of an aggressive Greek national narrative, which turned the victims into martyrs to legitimize the Cretan disasters.

Nevertheless, one should not forget that historical records are always drawn from subjective memory: the short-term memory of their producer and the long-term memory of their interpreters. Hence, for a variety of reasons, some massacres gain more publicity than others. For instance, although the massacre of hundreds (or thousands) of Christians in the town of Iraklio during the riots of 1898 is a common point of reference in the popular and academic literature on Crete, the massacre of hundreds (or thousands) of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 64.

¹⁵⁶ From the very rich literature that has been produced over the past two decades on memory, tradition, invention, and the human space, one can see selectively the following very interesting article Edward Said, W. Winter, "Invention, Memory, and Place," *Critical Inquiry* 26, no 2 (2000):175-192.

Muslims during the spring and early summer of the same year remains generally in the shadows. Nevertheless, the brutality of the event was of such immense proportions that the contemporary foreign eye-witnesses on the island were shocked. Moreover, since some of the Christians felt really proud about their victory and boasted about the ultimate extermination of thousands of Muslims, the matter could not be covered up. As a result, even well known supporters of the Greeks, such as Arthur Evans himself, were forced to report to their compatriots that in some of the villages of eastern Crete "not a Muslim soul had escaped." Evans's account of the events was published in the *Manchester Guardian* as follows:

...The orders now given by the responsible leaders were that all Moslems who laid down their arms should be allowed to leave for the port town. In the case of many villagers this order was faithfully executed, but a frenzy had seized on part of the Christian bands, and in several places they gave way to wholesale massacre, sparing neither age nor sex. One or two villages were entirely wiped out. At Sykia, through whose blackened ruins I recently made my way, not a single Mahometan escaped... At Zyro, another mixed village, the mosque, where a great part of the Moslem inhabitants were defending themselves, was blown up by dynamite, and about eighty perished. At Daphne, a purely Mahometan village, taken by assault in a night attack, the number slaughtered is estimated at about 320... But the most deliberate act of extermination was the perpetrated at Etea. In this small village, too, the Moslem inhabitants, including the women and children, had taken refuge in the mosque, which the men defended for a while. The building itself is a solid structure, but the door of the small walled enclosure before it was finally blown in, and the defenders laid down their arms, understanding it would appear, that their lives were to be spared. Men, women, and children, they were all led forth to the church of St. Sophia, which lies on a hill about half an hour above the village, and then and there dispatched- the men cut to pieces, the women and children shot. A young girl who had fainted, and was left for dead, alone lived to tell the tale. She was taken care of by the neighboring villagers of Armenous, where she is now living. A Christian inhabitant of Etea, who owned to having taken part in these atrocious acts, informed me that a Turkish man also succeeded, after leaving the mosque, in escaping over the mountains to Girapetra, but he has since died. Otherwise not a soul escaped... The Mahometan houses of the village have, as in all other cases, been reduced to heaps of ruins, but the olives and vines at Etea

have been spared, since no Muslim was left to claim them. Except for its ruined minaret, the mosque, too, contrary to the usual practice, has been left untouched...

Despite his honest attempt to describe the given horror of the above atrocities, however, Arthur Evans concluded his article by blaming Christian and Muslim massacres alike on the Ottoman sultan. Thus, his account of the events has a twofold importance. On the one hand, it is a rare description of the Muslim tragedies in Crete by an eye-witness who was certainly not biased in favor of the Muslims. On the other hand, it illustrates in a tragic way the difference between Christian and Muslim victims. In the mind of Greeks and the majority of Europeans, the former had gained the crown of a martyr while the latter were considered justly punished for the previous atrocities of the Ottoman regime. For instance, in an attempt to defend the brutality of the Christians, which he had directly witnessed, Arthur Evans referred with passion to previous massacres against the Christian which, contrary to the massacre of the Muslims that was beyond doubt, he had actually not witnessed directly but only heard of. Yet his lack of personal knowledge did not stop him from very vividly describing how women had been violated and how men were thrown alive into public ovens and slowly roasted to death by the Turks, to conclude in a half-compassionate, half-threatening tone that the Muslims of Crete had paid for the massacres of Armenia:

...These ferocious deeds, which were in fact a direct consequence of the hundredfold greater slaughter of Armenia, show that Ottoman rule is capable of engendering among its subject Christian populations a barbarism almost equal to its own...the whole country-side where Mahometan villagers once lived in a scene of desolation; the paths are almost impassable on account of the scattered debris of ruined walls and the torn limbs of fruit-bearing trees; dead animals have been thrown into the cisterns; the minarets in some cases

have afforded crematories for the dead. The survivors are now, to the number of 8,000 mostly refugees in Candia. How shall they ever return? Once more- **it is the nemesis of Armenia!** [*sic*]¹⁵⁷

From the point of view of the Ottomans, at the same time, the Muslims of Crete were the victims of aggressive Greek nationalism. The examination of newspaper *İkdâm* from 1897 to 1898, for instance, offers the reader the opposite narrative to the one above. Until the end of the military clashes, the newspaper was reporting from the island, retaining information from Europe, giving publicity to the philanthropic activities in favor of the Cretan Muslims, praising the Ottoman army, and blaming all disasters on the Greek state. Moreover, together with other newspapers and periodicals, *İkdâm* participated very actively in the fund-raising campaign for war orphans and the families of wounded soldiers (*Evlâd-i Şüheda ve Malulîn-i Güzzat-ı Şahane i 'ânesi*) and for the indigent and pitiable Muslims of Crete (*Girid muhtâcin-i islâmiyesine*). The campaigns' registers were published on a daily basis, making the donors' names public, and reminding to the readers that their religious brothers (*akhvân-i diniye*), the poor Cretan people of Islam (*Girit ahâlî-i islâmiyesi*), needed their help.

Even more interesting was the book campaign. The Ottoman Ministry of Education had established a special aid commission, responsible for selecting and of marking books, essays, and stories that could be sold for charity purposes. These books were sold by different bookstores and the money raised from the sales was used, once

¹⁵⁷ See Arthur J. Evans, *Letters from Crete* (Oxford: Printed for Private Circulation by Horage Hart, Printer to the University, 1898), 12-22. [Reprinted from the "Manchester Guardian" of May 24, 25, and June 13, with Notes on some Official Replies to Questions asked with reference to the above in the House of Commons]

again, to support the Muslims of Crete. *İkdâm* was promoting the campaign by publishing, on a daily basis, the total sales registers.¹⁵⁸ There is no doubt that the sale of the charity books often took on an obligatory character. The registers show that, most of the time, the buyers were not isolated individuals. The books were sold in large numbers to members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, employees of several foundations, and students or instructors of various schools. Therefore, it seems that the acquisition of a book and the contribution to the campaign was rarely a matter of personal choice and conscious decision.

In this context, the difference between Ottoman publications and European, or Greek, narratives about Crete was that only the latter tended to overly emphasize tragedies and disasters. The Ottoman regime, on the contrary, still made an effort to appear as a powerful sovereign that protected Muslim Cretans and had everything under control. In this context, riots, massacres and catastrophes were consistently either ignored or underestimated. For instance, aside from the vague appeals made by the editors of *İkdâm* to support their Muslim brothers in Crete, no further reference was made to the actual dimensions of the crisis. In the same vein, the book campaign appeared designed to sketch the profile of an ideal Ottoman public, consisting of literate and sensitive citizens, rather than to provide Cretan riots with visibility.

Neither the Ottoman point of view nor the later-developed aggressive ideas of the

¹⁵⁸ Most of the times the newspaper was publishing the relevant registers on the front page. See, for instance, the lists published under the title “Girid muhtâcin-i islâmiyesine” or “Girid âhâli-i islâmiyesi muhtâcinine i‘âne” (To the dear poor Cretan Muslims) in *İkdâm* (Istanbul), 28 Şevval 1314: 1 April 1897, 29 Şevval 1314: 2 April 1897, 1 Zilkade 1314: 3 April 1897, 2 Zilkade 1314: 4 April 1897, 3 Zilkade 1314: 5 April 1897, 4 Zilkade 1314: 6 April 1897, 5 Zilkade 1314: 7 April 1897, 6 Zilkade 1314: 8 April 1897, 7 Zilkade 1314: 9 April 1897, 8 Zilkade 1314: 10 April 1897, 9 Zilkade 1314: 11 April 1897, 10 Zilkade 1314: 12 April 1897, 11 Zilkade 1314: 13 April 1897, 12 Zilkade 1314: 14 April 1897, 13 Zilkade 1314: 15 April 1897, 14 Zilkade 1314: 16 April 1897, 15 Zilkade 1314: 17 April 1897, 16 Zilkade 1314: 18 April 1897, 17 Zilkade 1314: 19 April 1897, 18 Zilkade 1314: 20 April 1897, 19 Zilkade 1314: 21 April 1897, 20 Zilkade 1314: 22 April 1897.

Young Turks with regard to Crete had ever gained the same popularity as the Greek cause in Europe. Quite to the contrary, despite their efforts, the Ottomans were gradually isolated from Europe and the West. Similarly, the nationalistic ideas presented by our contemporary Turkish literature on the issue appear to be quite marginal outside of Turkey, or even outside of some of the best academic institutions in Turkey.¹⁵⁹ This study, therefore, considered it more important to address European and Greek stereotypes, due to their significant popularity, both past and present. To sum up, the sources used in this chapter suggest that the Ottomans were indeed discriminated against and isolated from late nineteenth-century western Europe for two main reasons. First, they did not keep up with international developments in the sphere of popular, sociopolitical representation. Second, they were referred to as Muslims. Stereotypical as it might be, this point cannot be avoided, since it seems to be beyond doubt that for the majority of nineteenth-century Europeans, religion had become an issue of significant importance and divisiveness; a development that was not necessarily in harmony with older realities. In this respect, it seems that religious radicalism developed hand in hand with aggressive nationalism, as an answer to modernity's cry for 'fixed identities.'

Conclusion

To summarize, the present chapter has focused on Arthur Evans and late nineteenth century Great Britain to suggest that, aside from the Ottoman Empire and Greece, all individuals, states, political groups, and social forces having any kind of impact on late

¹⁵⁹ See the introduction and first chapter.

nineteenth century Crete deserve to be studied in their own right. It would have been equally interesting, for instance, to focus on French, American, or Italian archaeologists, and on the ways internal dynamics in their place of origin influenced their relationship with Crete. My choice of Arthur Evans had to do with the variety of available sources about him and with the leading role Great Britain played in eastern Mediterranean of the time.

In brief, as mentioned in the introduction of this study, developments in the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Kingdom, and the world around them have been discussed here in order to illustrate the long and ramified process through which Cretan majorities and minorities have been shaped. From a methodological perspective, this approach has certainly been risky. The first three chapters of this study have discussed the broader context in which Cretan Muslims became a minority, without focusing in greater detail on the Muslims *per se*. The point I have tried to make is that only by reference to the complex transformations in the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Kingdom, the island in question, and Europe can one appreciate how Crete became—and was considered to have always been—Greek. When addressing the issue of whether the Muslim Cretans were or were not a minority, the historical context is of crucial importance. In the same way, one could argue that in territories that ended up being "Turkish" in the twentieth century, the 'minority' status attributed to non-Muslims was not necessarily in harmony with previous Ottoman realities.

The period of Cretan Autonomy, which will be discussed in the following chapter, and the persistent presence of a Muslim community on the island against all odds is how this study shall conclude, linking the Muslims of Crete to the issues discussed in the previous chapters. Moreover, the majority of unpublished material used

in this study shall be presented in what follows. As to the sources examined in this chapter, most of them are published, mainstream, and quite well-known. This has been a conscious decision leading to the suggestion that nineteenth century Cretan history needs to be revisited, by carefully rereading once again some old and easily accessible relevant sources.

CHAPTER V

THE MUSLIM MILLET (1897-1912)

Minorities and *Millets*

The previous chapters have discussed broader internal and external dynamics in the Ottoman Empire, Europe, and Greece as related to the proclamation of Cretan autonomy. The present chapter's scope of focus is rather limited in comparison. It discusses only particular aspects of Muslim participation in the making of Autonomous Crete, by use of the following sources: first, the Constitution and fourteen volumes of the Cretan State Gazette, including regulations, edicts, court-actions, state-auctions and notifications, appointments and paycheck of state-employs, and anything else published in it from 1899 to 1908;¹ second, the proceedings of the Cretan Parliament, together with published regulations on archaeology, education, religion, commerce, and justice;² and

¹ *Επίσημος Εφημερίς της Κρητικής Πολιτείας: State Gazette of Autonomous Crete* (En Haniis: Ek tou Tipografiou tis Kritikis Politias, 1898-1908) and *Παράρτημα της Εφημερίδος της Κυβερνήσεως εν Κρήτη: Cretan Appendix to the State Gazette* (En Haniis: Ek tou Tipografiou tis Kritikis Politias, 1908-1915).

² See selectively *Σύνταγμα της Κρητικής Πολιτείας: Constitution of Autonomous Crete* (En Haniis: Ek tou Tipografiou tis Kritikis Politias, 1899); *Διάταγμα περί Ειδικού Νόμου της Μουσουλμανικής Κοινότητας: Special Regulation Concerning the Muslim Community* (Hania: 1900); *Στενογραφημένα Πρακτικά της Συντακτικής Συνελεύσεως των Κρητών: Shorthand Proceedings of the Constitutional Meeting of Cretan Assembly* (En Haniis: Ek tou Kivernitikou Tipografiou, 1902); *Διάταγμα περί Ωρολογίου Προγράμματος των Μουσουλμανικών Δημοτικών Σχολείων και Παρθεναγωγείων: Princely Edict on the Course Timetable of Muslim Primary Schools and Girls' Schools* (Hania: 1902); *Σύνταγμα της Κρητικής Πολιτείας: Constitution of Autonomous Crete* (En Haniis: Ek tou Tipografiou tis Kritikis Politias, 1907); *Επίσημα Πρακτικά της Β' Συντακτικής Συνελεύσεως των Κρητών: Official Proceedings of the Cretan Assembly's Second Constitutional Meeting* (Hania: Ek tou Kivernitikou Tipografiou, 1907).

third, the Cretan archival collection of the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Center of Istanbul.³ The introductory paragraphs of this chapter have directly referred to the used sources, as the material in question constitutes a very good illustration of the chapter's methodological aims. The Gazette, for instance, is used here to examine Muslim participation in the island's administration. In other words, it provides adequate information on public posts occupied by Muslim citizens in Autonomous Crete. The parliamentary proceedings, at the same time, provide detailed examples of debates, mainstream discourses, and issues of public concern. As for the archive of the Ottoman Bank, it is of particular interest to this author, both due to its content and to its own history.

The Ottoman Bank archive constitutes a rich collection of handwritten documents in Greek and Ottoman script concerning Muslim communal issues and pious foundations from the last decades of the nineteenth-century through the 1930's. This collection was somehow brought to Istanbul by the last generation of Cretan Muslims, when exchanged with the Christians of Ottoman Anatolia according to the terms of the Lausanne Treaty. Yet, the archive remained lost for over eighty years, until it was accidentally found a few years ago. The timing of this discovery is interesting indeed. Over the last few years, scholars have rediscovered the Muslims of Autonomous Crete, who had remained for decades almost hidden from historical view, as though they had never existed.⁴

³ Ottoman Bank Archives, Istanbul, *Cretan Collection*: Dossier 1-56.

⁴ For example, in the collective volume on Autonomous Crete published in 2001 by *Εταιρεία Κρητικών Μελετών* (Society of Cretan Historical Studies), two chapters on Muslim Cretans were included in the publication. Although I do not necessarily agree with the perspective of the authors in question, their articles have introduced the Muslims to the discussion bringing to light interesting archival data with

The period of Cretan autonomy, in other words, was traditionally perceived, mainly by Greek historians, as the last step before the island's ultimate liberation. In this respect, Muslims were either ignored or treated as a historical paradox, an anomaly, or a leftover from the island's enslaved past. Nevertheless, this approach has lately started to change. I hope the present chapter will contribute to the broader discussion of the issue since, to my knowledge at least, it is the first scholarly attempt to focus on the community in question during the period of autonomy. The archive of the Cretan Muslim Pious Foundations, in particular, which had once traveled to Istanbul from Crete, may become my "Ariadne's ball of thread" leading me back to the island. Even if it turns out to be impossible to find the exit of the "labyrinth" formed by historiography on Crete, I shall try at the very least to follow a somewhat different rendition of the journey.⁵

It is necessary to explain here what I mean by the terms "Muslim community" of Autonomous Crete and whether I consider it to be a minority or not. From a sociological point of view this question is impossible to be answered adequately, as the notion of the

regard to the island's bi-communal dynamics. See Manolis G. Peponakis, "Η Τουρκοκρητική Μετανάστευση του 1897/1899: The Immigration of Turkish Cretans in 1897-1899" and Emmanouil G. Drakakis, "Τουρκοκρήτες και Χριστιανοί: Οι Σχέσεις των 2 Κοινοτήτων μέσα από Δικαιοπρακτικά Έγγραφα (1898-1900): Turkish Cretans and Christians: the Relations Between the two Communities Through Court Proceedings (1898-1900)," in *Η Τελευταία Φάση του Κρητικού Ζητήματος: The Last Phase of the Cretan Question*, ed. T. Detorakis and A. Kalokairinos (Iraklio: Tipokreta Kazanakis ABEE, 2001), 127-146, 147-158. See also Lena Tzedaki-Apostolaki, "Τουρκοκρητικοί: Αναζήτηση μιας Ταυτότητας: Turkish Cretans: in Quest of an Identity," *Istorika*, no. 18 (2001), 147-166; Nikos Andriotis, "Χριστιανοί και Μουσουλμάνοι στην Κρήτη 1821-1924. Ένας Αιώνας Συνεχούς Αναμέτρησης Εντός και Εκτός Πεδίου της Μάχης: Christians and Muslims in Crete 1821-1924. A Century of Continuous Competition at, and Outside of, the Battlefield," *MNIMON*, no. 26 (2004), 63-94. At the same time, the contribution of a few Turkish scholars in publishing and analyzing ottoman sources with regard to late nineteenth century Crete is equally important. See for instance Melike Kara, *Girit Kandiye'de Müslüman Cemaati / 1913 - 1923: The Muslim Community of Cretan Candiae/ 1913-1923* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi, 2008). Although I don't necessarily agree with the perspective of the authors at stake, the important think to be underlined here is that they introduce the Muslims into the discussion bringing to light interesting archival data with regard to the island's bi-communal dynamics.

⁵ T. B. L. Webster, "The Myth of Ariadne from Homer to Catullus," *Greece & Rome* 13, no. 1 (Apr., 1966), 22-31.

“minority” is even more problematic than the notion of the “nation.” If being member of a nation means participation in an “imagined community,” then being member of a minority means participation in a smaller imagined group within the larger one.⁶ Moreover, since the institutional creation of minorities is the result of a variety of dynamics, both localized and global, any analysis of minority issues that does not include reference to their historical context is quite problematic.

From a historical perspective, one could argue that minorities could not exist in legal and administrative terms without an organized global system of effectively governed modern states.⁷ Hence, the term “minority,” as legally applied to a cultural group, is *per se* a creation of late-modernity. The term was included for the first time in international diplomatic practice in the context of the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference.⁸ Before then, the concept had been used by different communities without yet elaborating a coherent, universalized, legislative morality.⁹ Similarly, minority rituals, applied to establish unity of mind among a community's members, are as old as minority practices

⁶Due to the fact that both phenomena, whether despicable or deplorable, are real, dangerous, interesting and important, they call for closer consideration. See Anthony de Jasay, “Is National Rational?,” *The Independent Review* III, no. 1(Summer 1998),77–89.

⁷ Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 19-21.

⁸ See the Peace Treaties signed among the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Prussian Kingdom, where reference was made to “persons who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities.” The original texts published by Jennifer Jackson, and Preece, *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 15.

⁹ On Muslim minority-issues within the state of Greece, see Triandafyllidou - Paraskevopoulou, "When Is the Greek Nation? The Role of Enemies and Minorities," *Geopolitics* 7, no. 2 (2002); Ronald Meinardus, "Muslims: Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies," in *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2002); Sally McKee, "Speaking for Others: Imposing Solidarities on the Past. The Case of Venetian Crete," in *Medieval Cultures in Contact*, ed. Richard Francis Gyug (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "Citizenship in Greece: Present Challenges for Future Changes," in *Multiple Citizenship as a Challenge to European Nation-States* ed. D. Kalekin-Fishman and P. Pitkanen (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2006).

of discrimination against the 'other.' However, the creation of standardized minority institutions and the development of an international common understanding of minority rights are different phenomena than those described above. Hence, whenever discussing relevant issues, it is necessary to differentiate between the vague sociological concept of a minority—that may describe almost anything—and the specific historical reality of its establishment as a socio-legal category of global dimensions.¹⁰

In keeping with our discussion of time and place, one could argue that the case of Cretan Muslims constituted a very interesting experiment in communal organization, which was in harmony with the broader local and Imperial administrative practices of the time. Nevertheless, I think the term minority should be avoided. First, because the term did not have, at that time, a specific meaning; and second, because it has very specific political meanings nowadays. The term is currently associated often with communities 'foreign' to the 'natives' of a given territory, affording the latter an artificial continuity in time. Yet as we have seen in Crete, as elsewhere, 'majorities' and 'minorities' were not objective and monolithic categories, but constantly changing groups that interacted with each other. Similarly, the state of political affairs, both locally and empire-wide, was not static but constantly rectified by a variety of factors. Consequently, the status of Muslims in Autonomous Crete continually changed.

¹⁰ On the formation of political societies through the interaction between imaginary majorities and imaginary minorities, see Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 1-40. The central thesis of this book is that the modern state is defined by two main dynamics: national theory and the creation of a homogenous civil space; governmentality and constant negotiation between the state and the actually heterogeneous civil space. As argued by the author, "People can only imagine themselves in empty homogenous time; they don't live in it." Therefore, although in theory modern states function in cooperation with a civil society, consisting of citizens each of whom has an individual, legal place in society, in practice—even nowadays—governance often rests on population categories, recognizing variables such as religion, language, and ethnicity. When viewed from such a perspective the Ottoman and Cretan examples seem to agree with rather than challenging the paradigm of the modern state.

In terms of historical content, the term minority is highly problematic not only with regard to Crete, but also in general. Even if we agree to define as minorities those communities that were different from the ‘majorities’ with regard to language, religion, ethnicity, or cultural identity in a given time and space, we have still to accept that ‘identity’ is an extremely fluid concept. One should not forget that majorities have also identities neither totally secure, nor unambiguous.¹¹ In this respect, any homogenous historical identity of individuals or groups appears to be retrospectively formed. As a result, one of the common historical paradoxes concerning identities—whether defined in terms of national, social, class or, gender—is that their homogeneity is often taken for granted, despite their patent heterogeneity. For example, researchers tend to refer to Greeks, Turks, Christians, Muslims, or Cretans as a whole, despite the fact that all members of each group were certainly not the same. True, from a methodological point of view, the utility of generalization techniques is significant. But, it is important to keep in mind that human identities are, by and large, hybrids; that is, they possess a quality that allows for human history to exist, promoting conflict, collaboration, and constant transformation.¹²

Within this context, the Muslim community of Crete is seen here as a hybrid cell in a generally hybrid world. This is the only way to explain first its heterogeneity, and second its endless transformations. The Muslims of Crete were not all the same. They

¹¹ For issues concerning locality and national identity see David Hooson, ed., *Geography and National Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell; Lovell: Nadia, 1998) and *Locality and Belonging* (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹² Although numerous scholars have treated modernity as an ideological challenge to human heterogeneity—that was soon to be questioned by post-modern thought—historical research suggests that, in practice, modernity itself produced new forms of social heterogeneity: See Jennifer Cole, "Memory and Modernity," in *A Companion to Psychological Anthropology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 26 Nov 2007).

presented sound differences of social, educational, linguistic, and financial status; cultural and ideological practices; and patterns of self-identification. For example, the structural and ideological boundaries between Muslim and Christian Cretans had forced some Muslims to leave the island. At the same time, the structural and ideological boundaries between Crete and the world around it had forced some others to remain. For this reason, I would suggest that not only the term “Muslim minority,” but also the term “Muslim community” is problematic when used in an absolute way. By separating the Muslims from the Christians, we make an arbitrary choice to mark out a group according only to its religion, disregarding other important aspects of its self-identity with respect to language, social status, education, gender, age, and personal choice to emigrate from, or to remain in a given geographical locality.

It would be equally problematic to disregard communal feelings of belonging deriving from religion, since communal solidarity is as real as communal heterogeneity. In Autonomous Crete, in particular, the community of sentiments, rights, and responsibilities among the Muslims was further strengthened by administrative practices. In the Cretan constitution, for instance, freedom of religion was protected individually, through citizenship,¹³ and communally, through the preservation of religious institutions, despite the fact that constitutional attempts to prevent practices of

¹³According to the Article 6 of the *Cretan Constitution* (1899) Cretan citizenship (*ιθαγένεια*) was granted to: a) Those settled on the island before January 1897, if at least one of their parents was of “a Cretan origin” b) Descendants of “Cretan-Ottoman subjects,” regardless of their present residence c) Those born in Crete by unknown parents.

discrimination¹⁴ were characterized by profound ideological confusion.¹⁵ If the term minority is considered improper, therefore, how can this given administrative reality be described? This author's suggestion is that, due to the particularities of the case, it makes more sense to describe Cretan Muslims as a *millet*.

Of course, the Muslims of Crete historically were never referred to as a *millet*. My use of the term is certainly a neologism that does not correspond to any historical data. Nevertheless, the concept of *millet* captures the particularity of the issue, both in terms of focused analysis and by way of comparison with the broader Ottoman world. Contrary to minorities, which belong with a world of well-defined nation states, nineteenth century Ottoman *millets* were the product of an anguished negotiation between society and state, corresponding to a variety of fluid, crossing 'identities.' Thus, the same way Ottoman *millets* constituted not minorities, but a central part of the Ottoman world, the "Muslim *millet*" of Autonomous Crete was not a community foreign to the natives, but a part of them. In this respect, the status Muslim Cretans had gained in Autonomous Crete offers a very telling reversed illustration of the status of non-Muslims

¹⁴ See Article 7: "All Cretans are equal before the law and have the same rights, regardless of religion." Article 8: "Public posts are open to all Cretans, regardless of religion, according to their skills and qualifications." Article 10: "Freedom of religion is protected and proselytism is prohibited though not against the personal will of citizens who have henceforth the right to publicly declare their religious beliefs. Religious differences, or change of religion, have nothing to do with property rights, real rights, and legal obligations." Article 11: "Public worship of all officially recognized religions is free and protected by the government (Πολιτεία) as long as it is not against the law and police regulations." Article 21: "Education is free, but it has to be provided by individuals scientifically and morally (χρηστότητα) qualified according to the criteria established by law, and under the supervision of the relevant authority, with regard to morality, public order, and respect of governmental law. Primary education is compulsory and free," in *Cretan Constitution* (1899).

¹⁵ See Article 6, in *Constitution* (1899) on privileged relinquishment of Cretan citizenship to "those who participated into the liberation wars of Crete (Εἰς τοὺς μετασχόντας τῶν ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας αγῶνων τῆς Κρήτης)." The contradiction in ideological terms becomes evident if one considers the fact that Autonomous Crete was still under Ottoman suzerainty, and that the new Cretan government was committed to treat Muslims as equal with the Christians and to protect their freedom of religion. Yet, at least some of the Muslims were openly rival to any kind of "Greek liberation" from the "Ottoman Empire" or "Islam." See also Proceedings No 9, SGAC, 23 February 1899.

in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the century.

Early Autonomous Crete: The Experiment of Peaceful Coexistence

A focused analysis of the specific status of Muslims in post-1897 Crete constitutes the best illustration of the general arguments made in the previous section. Aside from having equal rights as local Christians to individual citizenship and religious practices,¹⁶ they constituted the only actual link between Muslim Istanbul and the island.¹⁷ Under this pretext, at least until the political change of 1906, Istanbul had the opportunity to question Cretan autonomy, in case Muslim rights were violated. One should not forget that autonomy was granted to Cretans as a temporary experiment, one of the most important preconditions for which was the cooperation of both communities with the new regime; and a number of local Muslims indeed cooperated actively with the new authorities, occupying some of the most prestigious administrative offices.

As early as 1898, the High Commissioner, Prince George, appointed four Muslims (Mehmed Petinakis, Nesim Farfourakis, Ali Veisakis, Hasan Skilianakis) to the constitutional commission (consisting of fifteen total members) that would prepare the

¹⁶See for instance the Provisional Regulations on Muslim pious foundations, according to which the Central Administration of Muslim Pious Foundations was recognized as a legal individual with the right to hold religious communal property: “vakf real estate (κτήματα) belonging to the Evkaf or to their managers, regardless of their specific status, and vakf fields belonging to Muslim pious foundations and administered by appointed managers (remain communal property). But in case of a selling transaction, realized by the Evkaf according to the relevant special regulation approved by the Assembly, the concerned fields are going to be sold as private property.” Article 107 in *Cretan Constitution* (1899).

¹⁷ See for instance the articles concerning the appointments of Cretan *kadılar* and *müftüler* : “(The High Commissioner) is the only authority to appoint and to discharge public servants, to offices indicated by the law, including Muslim judges (καδῆδων) and interpreters of Islamic Law (μούφτηδων), who are to be selected only among those licensed by the Supreme Religious Authority of Ottoman Empire (Σειχουλislamῆ),” Article 31 in *Cretan Constitution* (1899).

first legislative bills for parliamentary debate and eventual enactment. Furthermore, Hasan Skilianakis was appointed Counselor of Transportation and Public Security.¹⁸ Similarly, after the territorial organization of local municipalities, Mehmed Hamitveizades, Yusuf Aliaitsidakis, and Mustafa Deliahmetakis were appointed mayors of the island's major towns—Hania, Rethimno, and Iraklio respectively—where the Muslims were still the majority in numbers.¹⁹ Last but not least, fully one-third of the parliamentary representatives from 1899 to 1906 were Muslim. The names of those that were elected to participate to the first constitutional assembly in 1899 (50 of the 188), for instance, are presented in the relevant table.²⁰

In the same vein, it was also agreed that Muslims should be represented on the parliament's presiding board. In the first meeting of parliament, Hasan Skilianakis was elected third vice-president (109 of 151 votes), and Ekmel Softadakis third secretary (94 of 151 votes). It is interesting to note that during the same voting process Eleftherios Venizelos, the future prime minister of Greece, received only 3 votes for the secretary's

¹⁸ When Hasan Skilianakis resigned from his position, in May 1899, he was replaced by Hüseyin Yenitsarakis. See Princely Edict, SGAC (33), 10 May 1899.

¹⁹ In 1900, the island was divided into 86 Municipalities. According to Chapter III of the relevant Law, mayors were to be appointed by the High Commissioner. Only the members of the municipal council were elective. See Municipal Law No 120, SGAC, 8 February 1900. For the appointment of the Muslim mayors, see Princely Edict No 15, SGAC, 16 March 1900.

²⁰ In 1899, Muslim parliamentary representatives were elected by Muslim electors, elected by the Muslim population of each municipality in 1895. See Princely Edict, SGAC (3), 9 January 1899. For the names of Christian and Muslim representatives see the list published by the relevant committee, under the presidency of Mehmed Petinakis, SGAC (6), 2 February 1899. The first direct election of the island's parliamentary representatives was realized after the issue of the new Cretan Elections Law in 1901. Male suffrage was not universal but limited to literate Cretan citizens, older than 30 years old, Elections Law No 283, SGAC, 22 January 1901.

position.²¹ The above examples show that, at least during the first years of autonomy, Cretan Muslims maintained high-status and were represented adequately in local institutions. This development was the result of two important factors: first, of the necessity to protect Muslim communal rights; and second, of the reality that Muslims participated in mixed political networks that promoted them as individuals.²²

Aside from the new political opportunities offered to them, some Muslims tried to profit also from the business opportunities that occurred on the island after the regime change. For example, when the newly founded Bank of Crete started to sell stock shares, a number of Muslims hastened to buy them.²³ Others participated in auctions of governmental work contracts, undertaking profitable projects. For instance, the production of specialized uniforms for the newly established gendarmerie was contracted to the company Ali Klimatsakis and Associates (*Αλή Κλιματσάκης και Σας*) in Hania.²⁴ The lighting of the town of Rethimno was entrusted to Hacı Aziz Noumanakis by the mayor of the town, Yusuf Aliyayitzidakis.²⁵ A number of other Muslims

²¹ Similarly, the following Muslim representatives received also a number of votes: for the position of the vice-president, Mehmed Karaslanakis (2 of 151 votes), Bexhet Pasa Agazades (1 of 151), İbrahim Hiadis (1 of 151). For the position of the secretary, Bexher Agazades (16 of 151), see Proceedings No 4, SGAC, 10 February 1899.

²² The other members were Eleftherios Venizelos, Konst. Foumis, Minos Isihakakis, Har. Pologeorgis, Frantzi Frantzeskakis, Man. Koundouros, Emm. Zaharakis, Stil. Fotakis, David Ksanthoudidis, and Nikol. Yamalakakis, see Princely princely edict, SGAC (1), 25 December 1898.

²³ Prefecture of Hania: Nesib Sefikefedizades (3), Lebib Sefikefedizades (3), Cemal Sadikakis (3), Ali Sourouzades (4), Süleyman Ombasakis (4), Süleyman Dzezaerlakis (4). Refecture of Iraklio: Hasan Skillianakis (10), İbrahim Skillianakis (10), Emin Skillianakis (10), see the relevant Announcement No 1906/2379, SGAC, 29 December 1899.

²⁴ Announcement of Underbid Auction 1024/403, SGAC, 2 November 1899.

²⁵ The project was initially entrusted to Hacı Aziz Noumanakis but the auction was repeated after Hasan Tzitzevrakis had offered a price 5% lower. See Announcement No 587/ 326, SGAC, 21 March 1905.

participated in auctions for the leasing of public taxes.²⁶ This particular system, according to which the successful bidder would take on the responsibility of paying the state a gratuity sum, receiving in reverse the right to collect the island's annual tax levies, was maintained in Autonomous Crete as a local *iltizam* (tax-farming).

At the same time, acts of violence continued to destabilize life in the hinterland; the exodus of hundreds of terrified Cretan Muslims from their country-houses was prolonged, jeopardizing the whole project of “coexistence.” The authorities, for their part, strongly disapproved of violence, separatism, and discord, publicly condemning such behaviors and having some of those responsible punished. In 1900, for example, when a freighter owned by Hüseyin Risvanakis from Iraklio had an accident while trying to enter the port of Ierapetra (at the eastern part of the island), significant tension was caused by the events that followed the accident. Although the harbor-master invited I. Dogrammatzakis, the Christian owner of a small tugboat, to tow the ship to the coast, the latter refused to do so, putting the life of the crew in danger. He was thus forced to pay a fine and was sentenced to a symbolic imprisonment.²⁷ Similarly, Ayşe Hatzivramaki was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment for having publicly disdained and insulted the High Commissioner. Yet, in her case, the latter decided to offer her reprieve as a sign of

²⁶ See for instance, Announcement of Repeating Auction No 1920/1136, SGAC, 16 March 1900; Announcement of Repeating Auction-Dry Goods/Iraklio, No 7047/4185, SGAC, 1 October 1900; Announcement of Repeating Auction-Fishery/ Iraklio, No 3155/1622, 20 August 1901; Announcement of Repeating Auction –Municipal Abattoir/ Hania, No 4662/ 2835, SGAC, 17 August 1902; Municipal abattoir/ Rethimno-Final auction, No 1715/932, 31 August 1902; Announcement of Final Auction-Fishery/ Iraklio, 3 October 1902; Announcement of Final auction-Fishery, No 2190/1100, SGAC, 4 August 1904; Announcement of Final auction-Fishery, No 2291/1562, SGAC, 3 July 1908; Announcement of Final Auction-vegetables/ Hania, Sfakia, Rethimno, Iraklio, Neapoli, No 2289/1560, SGAC, 1 July 1908; Announcement of Final auction-municipal taxes, No 526/ 354, SGAC, 10 August 1908.

²⁷ See Ierapetra Minor Civil Court No 155/157, SGAC, 15 July 1900.

good will on his part.²⁸ From 1899 onwards, High Commissioner, Prince George, had addressed many calls to the Christian Cretans, encouraging them to demonstrate their 'love' towards their Muslim compatriots.²⁹

Despite the punishment of aggressive behaviors by the regime, ideological rivalries continued to color trans-communal interaction. Hence, the massive Muslim emigration from the island continued, paralyzing the local economy, particularly agriculture. In this state of affairs, a number of provisional regulations was approved by the parliament, with the aim to financially support the deprived agrarian population. A low-interest loan program was established by the Bank of Crete. Confiscations or detentions on the orders of any government or public authority were postponed. In theory, such arrangements were addressed to all locals, the properties of whom had been hit hard during the uprisings. In practice, the locals who had abandoned their properties during the riots were, by law, excluded.³⁰

Thus, although both communities were offered the right to apply for similar aid programs, Muslims benefited actually much less, as entire villages had been abandoned in the hinterland and most of the Muslim inhabitants had left never to return. On the contrary, it seems that plenty of Christians who had escaped during the riots returned

²⁸ Princely Edict No 91, SGAC, 1 November 1900.

²⁹ Princely Proclamation, SGAC (36), 12 May 1899.

³⁰ The first Assemblies took into consideration Muslim petitions, concerning burned trees and destroyed harvests. See for instance the case of Süleyman Tzorbatzakis, representing the Muslim residents of villages Armenon, Abelakion, Orous, Karon, and Seli, eparchy of Rethimno, Proceedings No 9, SGAC, 13 February 1899. On the committee formed in 1902 in order to decide who was entitled to a compensation for losses from the 1896 uprisings, see Princely Edict No 54, SGAC, 30 March 1902. See also Office of the Central Committee of Compensations, SGAC, 22 March 1905. On the low-interest loan issued by the Bank of Crete to support Muslim and Christians, the fields of whom had been burned during the uprisings, see Law No 131 and Princely Edict on Article No 11, SGAC, 10 May 1899. On special provisions for expired debts, see Princely Edict No 121, SGAC, 9 February 1900. For the long parliamentary debates concerning the above issues see *the Proceedings of the Cretan Parliament*, 1901-1902.

immediately after the proclamation of autonomy. Despite the fact that Muslim deputies had repeatedly brought this aspect of the issue up for discussion in the parliament, suggesting that the Muslims should be encouraged to return, nothing really changed. The Muslim parliamentary representatives tried to arrange a deadline extension for any Muslim refugees still interested in coming back. Nevertheless, their request was not approved by the parliament. Evidently, most Christian deputies were not in favor of a large-scale Muslim return, although convincing the last of the Cretan Muslims to stay, and securing their rights, appeared to be among the new regime's top priorities. At the same time, Muslims were not the only ones dissatisfied with the new measures, which resulted in the delay of loan-refunding and confiscations. One should not forget that, in both communities, those who had interest in receiving refunds were almost as numerous as those who had interest in not paying. As a result, relevant issues became the source of endless political conflicts and parliamentary debates, enforcing networks that were relevant not only to religion, but also to social status.

At the same time, one should not forget that the Greeks were making an effort to respect Muslim rights often against their will, since autonomy was granted to Cretans under the custody of the Four Powers (France, Great Britain, Russian Empire, and Italy) in spite of the humiliating defeat of Greece in 1897. When the Ottoman army withdrew from the island, therefore, local Greeks were forced by Europe to guarantee the protection of Muslims and to cooperate with them for the restoration of peace and prosperity. The Powers were, in fact, the only force with enough military prestige and financial power to undertake such a task, and were thus in a position to keep the new regime under direct supervision. In exchange, they provided their political 'mediation,'

together with a significant loan for the resurgence of the local economy.³¹ Nevertheless, if the experiment of peaceful coexistence failed, anything was possible in the future.³²

Eventually, early twentieth century developments (*e.g.*, internal turmoil in the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan Wars, and the First World War) caused as we know the downfall of the Ottomans. Yet this was not already known in 1897-1898. One could argue, therefore, that if the Christians violated Muslim rights, if the Empire survived, and if the Powers of Europe (whichever these would turn out to be) agreed (for whatever possible reason) to protect the Ottomans, then nothing indicated that Crete could not return one day under the capital's direct control. In brief, despite mainstream historical approaches treating autonomy as an administrative step-phase destined to lead to union with Greece, this author finds perfect logic in suggesting the opposite. In 1898, it was not at all certain what the future of Crete would be.

One way or another, any discussion of Cretan Autonomy without reference to Muslim Cretans is as misleading as would be the exclusion of non-Muslim Ottomans from the history of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, it is equally inaccurate to consider Cretan Muslims nothing but a victimized community that had suffered human-rights violations and a traumatic loss of status. In fact, some Cretan Muslims gained advantages and benefited quite a lot from the proclamation of autonomy, even if only for a short period. In other words, it is easy to explain how violence, fanaticism, and the gradual marginalization of Muslim-Ottoman culture might have triggered the emigration

³¹ See Law No 364, SGAC, 12 June 1901.

³² Upon which, the first Assembly of Autonomous Crete, decided to officially express its gratitude to the four Great Powers, granting general amnesty to both Christians and Muslims for every crime committed between 16 September 1896 and 9 December 1898. See Proceedings No 22, SGAC (23), 9 March 1899. See also the introduction in Encyclical on Agriculture No 426/328, SGAC, 12 July 1899.

of an important number of Cretan Muslims. Why did a significant number of them stay? In order to address this issue, I would argue for a shift of perspective and suggest that, from the point of view of some of its members, the Muslim community was growing.

This interpretation of growth is evidently a relative one. In economic terms, it is based on a classic short-term model, implying that the level of *per capita* income is determined by two variables: savings and population growth; the higher the rate of savings, the richer the community; the higher the rate of population growth, the poorer the community.³³ Hence, it is possible to suggest that, as the population of Cretan Muslims decreased at a higher rate than did Muslim real estate, the potential income of those who stayed was increased. In fact, this impression derives from the reading of archival sources rather than a tested economic model. Yet, as far as actual humans are concerned, impressions—and false impressions—influence decisions more powerfully than proven, long-term, economic scales. This has the potential to explain why, when personal interests are taken into account, becoming a minority in numbers is not necessarily a negative.

As for social terms, personal interests may be correlated with social visibility, the right to represent and to participate. Population decrease, in other words, leads to increasing direct participation into communal administration. Furthermore, it shapes more concrete group identities, further facilitating group strategies. From this point of view, autonomy had provided Cretan Muslims with opportunities for community building, based on two parallel aspects of their local identity: Cretan autonomy within the Empire; and religious particularity within the locality. Hence, my argument is that

³³ Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* LXX (1956), 65-94.

the delicacy of the situation afforded Muslim Cretans, who were not necessarily qualified to hold similar posts, a newfound special administrative status. In other words, the religious and political leaders of the community were not selected anymore among the Empire's officials but among the locals.³⁴ In order to illustrate this, a general description of the community's administrative status would be useful.

Judicial Change after 1899 and Muslim Education

One of the most important administrative changes in post-1897 Crete was the definitive abolition of the *kadı* system. In fact, as has been already mentioned, important judicial reforms on both local and central levels were realized by the Ottoman state in the second half of the nineteenth century under the pretext of imperial modernization. Through the enactment of new imperial laws, the *kadı* court system was replaced by a system of *nizamiye* courts (regular courts).³⁵ Nevertheless, there was an important difference between broader Imperial and Cretan judicial changes after 1897. The first was the result of the state's effort to protect the Ottoman legacy by modernizing imperial mechanisms.³⁶ The second *de facto* separated Crete from the imperial center's

³⁴ For a similar discussion concerning a very different context see L. D. Jenkins, "Becoming Backward: Preferential Policies and Religious Minorities in India," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 39, no. 2 (2001), 32-50.

³⁵ J. Akiba, "From Kadi to Naib: Reorganization of the Ottoman Sharia Judiciary in the Tanzimat Period," in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, edited by C. Imber and K. Kiyotaki (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 43-60; H. S. Feyzioglu, and S. Kilic, "Tanzimat Arifesinde Kadılık-Naiplik Kurumu: The Institution of Kadi-Naip in the Eve of the Tanzimat Period," *Tarih Arastirmalari Dergisi* 24, no. 38 (2005), 31-53.

³⁶ For an interesting discussion of this issue see H. Islamoglu, *Ottoman History as World History* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007).

jurisdiction. Moreover, most of the new Cretan laws and regulations were inspired by Greek law. At the same time, the post of the *kadı* was maintained in Crete, but only as a religious office. In other words, the title of the Ottoman judge, which long symbolized the Imperial universality of Ottoman law, was converted to a symbol of local-religious particularity.

In short, in 1899, three religious courts were organized at the island's major towns, Hania (Hania and Sfakia prefecture), Rethimno (Rethimnis prefecture), and Iraklio (Iraklio and Lasithi prefecture).³⁷ The last one was divided in 1901 after the foundation of an independent court at Ierapetra.³⁸ Yet, the Muslim judge had no executive power. Moreover, issues falling under his jurisdiction had limited importance and were of purely religious nature, concerning marriages, palimony, guardianship, and inheritances. At the same time, cases concerning properties granted to religious endowments were decided by the Muslim judge only when all concerned parties agreed with his decisions; if not, they were decided by the island's regular courts.³⁹

The terms *kadı* and *müftü* (ιεποδίκης) were thus maintained in Autonomous Crete

³⁷ Princely Edict No 145, SGAC, 23 March 1900. The first appointed Muslim Judges of Autonomous Crete were the following: Mehmed Neim, *Kadı* of Rethimno; Mehmed Sedidoudis, *Müftü* of Rethimo; Ali Soukiouris, *Müftü* of Iraklio. See Princely Edict No 29, 7 April 1900. Mehmed Cemil, *Kadı* of Hania; İbrahim Hierif *Müftü* of Hania. See Princely Edict No 28, 21 April 1900. Mehmed Arif, *Kadı* of Iraklio (appointment after the resignation of El Seyd İbrahim). See Princely Edict No 22, SGAC, 24 March 1900.

³⁸ Princely Law/Muslim Community's Special Regulation No 434, SGAC, 30 August 1901. Mustafa Rahit was appointed *müftü* at Ierapetra in 1901, Princely Edict No 115, SGAC, 1 November 1901.

³⁹ On the Muslim Courts, see Proceedings No 17, SGAC (21), 10 March 1899. On the establishment of Minor Civil Courts, see Princely Edict, SGAC (43), 22 May 1899. See also *Οργανισμός των Δικαστηρίων: Court System* (En Haniis: Tip. tis Kritikis Politias, 1899).

initially as two distinct offices and, after a point, in the form of a single position.⁴⁰ The difference between a *kadı* and a *müftü*, in fact, did not appear to matter much. At least until 1908, both Muslims and Christians agreed on selecting Muslim judges among the locals, even if most of them were not qualified for the post of a *kadı*.⁴¹ Since their main responsibility was to interpret Islamic law and to keep records of marriages, divorces, and inheritances, Muslim judges were in fact acting more as *müftüs* than as *kadıs*. Yet they received double-salaries, without the supreme authorities initially realizing that, in most cases, *müftü* and *kadı* were actually the same person. After the constitutional change of 1906, the reality of double-salaries became a debated issue. In 1907, for example, friction occurred between the judge Mustafa Rahit and the prefect of Lasithi, when the latter refused to pay the former the salary of a *kadı*, arguing that he was actually just a *müftü*.⁴² A similar argument was used by the prefect of Rethimno in 1910

⁴⁰ For some examples see: Administration of Iraklio: OBA, Doc 28, Dossier No 37, 1 August 1900/ OBA, Doc 63, Dossier No 24, 1 July 1910/ OBA, Doc 146, Dossier No 48, 6 March 1917/ OBA, Doc 49, Dossier No 52, 26 November 1922/OBA, Doc 52, Dossier No 52, 9 January 1923/ OBA, Doc 45, Dossier No 52, 9 January 1923/OBA, Doc 49, Dossier No 52, 9 January 1923.

Administration of Rethimno: OBA, Doc 120, Dossier No 45, 22 August 1900/OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 24, 31 October 1907/OBA, Doc 24, Dossier No 51, 30 March 1908/ OBA, Doc 29, Dossier No 51, 30 July 1908/ OBA, Doc 53, Dossier No 51, 26 June 1910/ OBA, Doc 69, Dossier No 51, 31 October 1911/ OBA, Doc No 70, Dossier No 51, 1 July 1912/ OBA, Doc 92, Dossier No 50, 25 April 1917.

Administration of Hania: OBA, Doc 12, Dossier No 49, 16 May 1911/ OBA, Doc 107, Dossier No 41, 8 May 1919/ OBA, Doc 11, Dossier No 36, 21 February 1919.

Administration of Lasithi/ Ierapetra: OBA, Doc 106, Dossier No 51, 10 February 1904/ OBA, Doc 102, Dossier No 51, 1 February 1905/ OBA, Doc 42, Dossier No 45, 28 July 1905/OBA, Doc 170, Dossier No 51, 1 February 1907/ OBA, Doc 65, Dossier No 36, 5 November 1907/ OBA, Doc 17, Dossier No 44, 13 December 1907/ OBA, Doc 101, Dossier No 51, 4 March 1908/ OBA, Doc 132, Dossier No 51, 7 April 1908/ OBA, Doc 58, Dossier No 45, 30 August 1910/ OBA, Doc 7, Dossier No 36, 10 January 1911/OBA, Doc 15, Dossier No 7, 28 April 1911/OBA, Doc 131, Dossier No 48, 16 March 1916.

⁴¹ Since developments after 1908 are not included in my discussion but in terms of comparison I cannot refer in greater detail to the clashes between the two communities after 1908. Yet, I have to mention that the issue of the appointment of the Muslim judges became gradually one of the most important causes of friction. See the events of 1911 in Nikos Andriotis, “Χριστιανοί και Μουσουλμάνοι στην Κρήτη,” 63-94.

⁴² OBA, Doc 65, Dossier No 36, 5 November 1907.

against the town's Muslim judge.⁴³ In any event, it seems that the rights of the community were maintained even after the integration of the island to Greece. Thus, Muslim judges continued to appear in relevant lists as holding double positions and receiving double salaries.

Aside from the above mentioned administrative and religious responsibilities, the Cretan Muslim judge also had educative authorities, which rested on the necessity to protect the cultural particularity of the Muslim community; namely, its language and religion. The *kadı* was authorized to supervise the local instruction of the Turkish (Ottoman) language, together with the classes on calligraphy and religion, as well as presenting to the relevant Council of Education any comments, suggestions, and complains that might ensue. The Council was indeed the only authority empowered to approve the curriculum. Yet, inspectors could not attend Muslim classes without being accompanied by the judge. Such privileges of the Muslim community were, in fact, gradually waved. In this respect, developments in education mirrored the general conditions.

In 1899, five-grade Muslim grammar schools (*mekteb-i iptidai*), and eight-grade Muslim girls' schools were established at each one of the island's major towns (Hania, Rethimno, Iraklio).⁴⁴ In following years, a number of public Muslim schools were

⁴³ OBA, Doc 53, Dossier No 51, 26 June 1910.

⁴⁴ In 1903, it was decided that Muslim primary schools should consists of six grades, to include more classes of Turkish and Islam. Furthermore, a 7th grade was added to Muslim schools in Hania, Rethimno, and Iraklio that had at least 10 students each. In addition, an inspectorate consisting of the President of the Muslim Elders and two Muslim university graduates, or in lack of them, of high school, or primary school graduates, was responsible for supervising Muslim instructors and teachers, see Princely Law No 496, SGAC, 1 July 1903, and Princely Law on Public Education No 485, SGAC, 11 July 1903.

founded in smaller towns and villages.⁴⁵ In addition, private schools were founded by Muslims, after receiving governmental authorization.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, after a few years, the above process was reversed. As the numbers of students were falling, Muslim schools started to become deserted.⁴⁷ After the integration of the island to Greece, public Muslim schools were forced to adopt to the Greek curriculum. As for private Muslim schools, they were shut down completely.⁴⁸ Any remaining Muslim students were gradually enrolled to Greek schools, where they faced great difficulty in maintaining a sense of religious-linguistic particularity.⁴⁹ With regard to the remaining Muslim teachers, they were so few that they could barely cover the community's needs. Even at

⁴⁵ On the foundation of new schools see Princely Edict No 12, SGAC, 7 March 1900; Princely Edict No 87, SGAC, 14 November 1900; Princely Edict No 103, SGAC, 30 August 1901; Princely Edict No 41, SGAC, 23 July 1903. See also some of the elders' reports about the rising numbers of the students –in Iraklio and Hania, at least— until 1912: OBA, Doc 5, Dossier No 52(file 2), 7 November 1907/OBA, Doc 71, Dossier No 53, 11 December 1907; OBA, Doc 158, Dossier No 25, 16 March 1909/ OBA, Doc 178, Dossier No 10, 29 August 1911.

⁴⁶ See, for instance, the following examples: Muslim Girls' Grammar School (*μουσουλμανικό γυμνασιοδιδασκαλείο*) founded by Adille Kavromadakaina, in Rethimno town, Princely Edict No 16, SGAC, 7 March 1900; Muslim Private Grammar School in Varousi Kidonias (Hania) (*μουσουλμανικό γυμνασιοδιδασκαλείο Βαρουσίου Κυδωνίας*), Princely Edict No 63, SGAC, 4 May 1901; Muslim middle-school "Roustiye (*mekteb-i rüstiye*)" in Hania, founded by İbrahim Bourlakis. See Princely Edict No 256, 9 August 1906. The classes to be taught in the last one included 5 hours of Greek, per year, 6 hours of Turkish, Persian and Arabic, and 3 hours of French, see the relevant Curriculum, SGAC, 2 August 1906.

⁴⁷ For instance, the Muslim three-class primary school at Spina Longa, and the Muslim Girls' School at Sternes Kidonias were closed down in 1904, see Princely Edict No 80, SGAC, 1 December 1904; The Muslim schools at Halepa and Daratson of Kidonia, Perivolía and Hromonostari of Rethimnis, Fortetsa of Iraklio, Limena Sitias, were closed down in 1905. See Princely Edict No 122, SGAC, 4 September 1905.

⁴⁸ OBA, Doc 17, Dossier No 29, 16 November 1913/OBA, Doc 17, Dossier No 29, 16 November 1913/OBA, Doc 174, Dossier No 41, 29 July 1915/OBA, Doc 145, Dossier No 41, 22 August 1915.

⁴⁹ It seems that the special rights exercised by the community during the period of Autonomy, such as exemption of religious officers from the army, or instruction of Turkish and the Arabic letters at Muslim schools, started to be challenged after 1912, especially during the First World War. See OBA, Doc 180, Dossier No 41, 11 March 1915/ OBA, Doc 184, Dossier No 41, 5 November 1915/OBA, Doc 151, Dossier No 7, 4 July 1919/OBA, Doc 218, Dossier No 38, 2 December 1919/OBA, Doc 33, Dossier No 52, 16 January 1923/ OBA, Doc 39, Dossier No 41, 16 January 1923. It appears, furthermore that, at this time, it was difficult to find anybody who could teach Turkish classes in Crete. For instance, when the teacher of the village of Tefeli Monofatsiou, was recruited to the army in 1922, it was almost impossible to find somebody to replace him, OBA, Doc 86-87, Dossier No 41, 2 December 1921. For similar problems in the town of Iraklio see, OBA, Doc 217, Dossier No 38, 2 January 1919.

Muslim schools, almost all classes were eventually taught by Christians, and even the instruction of the Ottoman language was ultimately replaced by Greek lessons.⁵⁰

How did Muslims respond to this situation? It seems that, at least for a short period, they tried to avoid mixed public schools. Lots of them preferred to send their children to unauthorized Muslim schools instead of authorized Christian ones, provoking the dissatisfaction of the local authorities. According to the inspectors of the autonomous regime, the Muslim teachers were unqualified and indifferent, the boys often leaving classrooms to hang around “indecent places,” and the girls commonly forced to join classes with the boys.⁵¹ Mixed groups of students frequented the markets asking for money. Thus, according to the relevant reports, the behavior of Muslim schoolchildren was construed as a moral threat to both communities. The same Christian inspectors additionally remarked that a lack of discipline characterized local Muslims both at school and at home. Hence, they suggested that Muslim girls would do better to stay home instead of hanging around with boys under the pretext of education and that Muslim children demonstrating “inappropriate behavior” should be arrested by the local gendarmerie for their own good.⁵²

Similar complains were voiced after the educational reforms that followed Greek annexation. Only, this time, it was the Muslims doing the complaining. As argued in the 1915 report of a Muslim school director from Iraklio, for example, the moral values of Muslim boys were endangered by the cultural differences between the two communities.

⁵⁰ OBA, Doc 181, Dossier No 41, 8 March 1915.

⁵¹ OBA, Doc No 8, Dossier No 50, 28 April 1902.

⁵² OBA, Doc No 12, Dossier No 34, 18 December 1900.

Due to the fact that the majority of teachers were Christians, the students were missing lots of classes on the endless Christian feast-days. Moreover, Muslim parents were not even aware of these holidays. Their sons, therefore, had developed the habit of frequenting the “indecent places” alluded to earlier, during school hours and church ceremonies, embarrassing both themselves and the community.⁵³

Problems of a different nature arose with regard to Muslim female students. One of the greatest sources of friction at schools, for instance, was the issue of the headscarf. Christian teachers complained that they could not tell one student from the other and that Muslim girls were using their headscarves as means of cheating during exams. Muslim authorities replied that it was their right to defend their cultural particularity. Within this context, a series of unpleasant events had occurred in 1903, when the Christian director of a school at Iraklio started to violently take his students’ headscarves off, provoking the reaction of their parents.⁵⁴ Similar incidents continued to occur after the integration of the island to Greece, despite the fact that the right of Muslim women to freely veil their faces and heads was upheld.⁵⁵ In 1916, for example, the *müftü* of Rethimno protested the fact that Muslim students had been asked to appear without their headscarves in front of their instructors in order to be identified before the exams. According to the *müftü*, such acts injured the girls’ honor, especially in the case of the older ones, offending the community’s sense of morality. According to the Christian instructors, on the other hand, Muslims should expect to be treated as the rest of the

⁵³ OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 22, 11 January 1915.

⁵⁴ OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 53, 13 October 1903.

⁵⁵ OBA, Doc 49, Dossier No 38, 9 April 1916.

students and had no right to request privileged exemption.⁵⁶

It becomes clear from the above examples that Muslim and Christian Cretans engaged in modes of moral reasoning different in form, yet similar in content, with regard to education and communal identification. In both cases the logic behind positions on “moral behavior” was based on communal understandings of tradition and modernity. Furthermore, in both cases, moral arguments were used to strengthen the legitimate status of the concerned authorities *vis-à-vis* the administrative 'center,' whether Imperial or local. The Christians underlined the moral virtues of autonomous administration. The Muslims, from their part, emphasized the necessity to protect Muslim communal particularity. In any case, such negotiations did not directly challenge the principles of coexistence, though the line between cultural particularity and ideological exclusiveness was very fine indeed.

In order to further analyze the fragile balance between ideological conflict and cooperation, one can examine some more aspects of the local Muslim educational system. The Muslim curriculum was almost the same as the Christian one, but with additional classes on Ottoman language. At the same time, classes on Christianity were replaced by classes on Islamic religion, and history classes were limited to important themes of world history, avoiding sensitive local or national topics. In other words, language and religion were considered the main pillars of communal particularity and were given special importance. For example, at the first qualification exam, held in order to provide Muslim teachers with a license to work in Crete, the examinees were tested in

⁵⁶ OBA, Doc 88, Dossier No 22, 30 April 1916.

two subjects: Ottoman skills, and general skills.⁵⁷ Furthermore, it was underlined that Muslim school-directors should preferably be graduates of Ottoman *mekteb-i rüştiye* (middle schools), in order to have a good command of the Ottoman language. Nevertheless, despite the high standards maintained in the proposed regulations, the reality was that very few Cretans were qualified to be Ottoman educators.

Parallel to school education, therefore, the community considered it necessary to undertake further teaching activities. Such initiatives appeared to have a twofold character. On the one hand, they protected tradition. On the other hand, they aimed at the community's intellectual improvement. For instance, a fraternity for the promotion of Ottoman-Muslim education was founded in Iraklio ("*Φιλεκπαιδευτική Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα Ηρακλείου*") with the task of supporting Muslim students.⁵⁸ A similar Society, "The Muslim Nocturnal School (*Μουσουλμανική Νυχτερινή Σχολή*)," was founded in Hania, with the goal of promoting the moral, ethical, and religious education

⁵⁷ The candidates were graded as follow (the first grade responded to their Ottoman skills and the second one to their general skills). Hania: İbrahim Zikri Aptiagazadakis, Hania, 8/7; Ahmed Elfi Arnaoutakis, Rethimno, 4/2; Hüsnîye Violaki, Hania, 8/8; İbrahim Cevdet Emin Tsaousakis, Hania, 0/0; Abdurahman İakoupakis, Ioannina, 4/4; Kübra Koltzibasaki, Hania, 8/8; Pesede Mouezinopoula, Hania, 5/5; Hulusi Poumaktzakakis, Rethimnon, 9/9; Demir Reizogloudakis, Hania, 6/5; Hasan Zeki Sakirakis, Nerokourou, 7/6; Mustafa HatziAhmedakis, Hania, 7/7.

Iraklio,: Ali Ulvi Abadiotakis, Rethimno, 9/9; Fahrie Arapoglaki, Iraklio, 4/3; Zühtü Recep Arnaoudalakis, Iraklio, 9/9; Ali Velidakis, Iraklio, 6/4; Afeti Velidaki, Sitia, 4/3; Rizvan Gasanos, Gasi Irakliou, 5/3; Kazım Emineefedakis, Rethimno, 10/10; Yildize Emin Efedaki, Iraklio, 5/4; Remile Kalathopoula, Iraklio, 1/0; Hasan Karavanakis, Iraklio, 7/5; Nüriye Karahasanaki, Iraklio, 3/2; Fazıl Kasimakis, Iraklio, 7/6; HacıMustafa Kastrinos, Iraklio, 5/4; Hüseyin Koumaritakis, Rethimno, 8/8; Nouri Koutzizade, Iraklio, 10/10; Ahmed Rıfât Makralakis, Iraklio, 8/7; Feteyine Moulazade, Iraklio, 9/8; İbrahim Babalakis, Sitia, 3/2; Mustafa Barbousakis, Rethimno, 3/2; Nasibe Beinamazaki, Iraklio, 4/2; Zeliha Besmi Efendi, Iraklio, 9/6; Mustafa Pasalakis, Sitia, 6/5; Rızvan Selim Efedakis, Iraklio, 9/8; Nacle Selim Efendizade, Iraklio, 8/7; Sahzle Selim Agadaki, Iraklio, 5/3; Demir Sakalakis, Douli Irakliou, 7/6; Hüseyin Zaki Skederefedakis, Iraklio, 7/5; Ali Sapthakis, Rethimno, 6/6; Ali Fafoulagadakis, Rethimno, 6/6; Hüseyin Filladitakis, Rethimno, 7/5; Hüseyin Vahitakis, Iraklio, 8/8; Tefik Zihnı Hatzidervisakis, Sitia, 9/8. See the Exam Result List, SGAC, 19 August 1900.

⁵⁸ President of the Fraternity was Dr. I. P. Moulazades. The founding members were the following: Nuri Koutouzades, vice-president, T. Fazıl, Yusuf Barabaresakis, Mustafa Doubarakis, Hasan Yunusakis, stewards, M. E. Masloumzades, treasurer, İsm. H. Arhaniotakis, secretary. See the Founding Charter, 10 May 1901.

of needy Muslim Cretans, regardless of their profession.⁵⁹

With regard to higher education, it was evident the community was not capable of providing it. In order to receive high-school education, therefore, Muslim students could only register to Christian schools after passing the relevant exams. At schools with more than 30 Muslim students, however, an instructor of Ottoman language and Islamic religion could be appointed by the authorities at the community's request. On similar occasions, the Muslim judge was recognized as the only authority qualified to test the instructor's skills. Other than that, Muslim students had to follow the same classes as Christians, being exempted only from history and religion.⁶⁰ As it becomes clear from this example, the special rights granted to the community were directly related to its size. When the community started to dwindle in numbers, therefore, opportunities to receive a proper Ottoman education rapidly faded away.

As early as 1901, articles on Muslim education were included in Cretan Education Law as marginal provisions under the title “With regard to the schools of those of a different faith (*Περί Σχολείων Ετεροθρήσκων*).”⁶¹ The above categorization challenged the principle of equality, since it derived from an unofficial—and yet blatant—elevation of Christianity to the island’s state-religion. In the relevant articles, furthermore, the adjective “Ottoman” was replaced by the adjective “Turkish” when

⁵⁹ H. Zekis was President, and N. Kafalakis was vice-president of the Society. The founding members were I. Houlousis, X. Tzemaliefedakis, Arif Bitsaksakis, Aligiotakis. See the Society’s Founding Charter, Princely Edict No 90, SGAC, 2 May 1902.

⁶⁰ See Chapter K on Muslim schools, in Enactment No 86 on Public Education, SGAC (86), 30 September 1899. On the foundation of new schools see Princely Edict No 12, SGAC, 7 March 1900, Princely Edict No 87, SGAC, 14 November 1900, Princely Edict No 103, SGAC, 30 August 1901.

⁶¹ Although the exact translation of the term *Ετερόθρησκοι* or *Αλλόθρησκοι* is “those of a different faith” I believe the term “infidel” captures better the ideologically loaded character of the word, which in Greek clearly implies that the Muslims were a foreign body since they followed an ‘other’ rather than the ‘local’ religion.

referring to language. Apart from that, it was decided that if the Muslim director of a communal school lacked the necessary skills for his post (as was often the case), then a Christian vice-director should supervise the curriculum, instruction, and exams held by the school.⁶² In this way, Muslim education in Autonomous Crete was relegated to an inferior position. As to the reasons that led to this development, the most obvious one was the lack of educated Muslim tutors. As suggested before, it seems that individuals with such qualifications did not prefer to stay in Crete after 1897. At the same time, despite the vague diplomacy of Europe officially promoting bireligious local administration, it was obvious enough that Christian Cretans were ideologically claiming the island in the name of Greece. Even if Christian authorities could not openly attack Islamic culture, they seemed happy enough to let it quietly die away.

Linguistic Particularities

The developments described in the previous sections may have been the reason the majority of Cretan Muslims who came to Turkey after 1923 was fluent in Greek and ignorant of Turkish. Yet that was not necessarily the state of things before 1899; neither was that development the result of the community's conscious decision. Despite the fact that all efforts to protect the cultural particularity of Cretan Muslims proved eventually to be in vain, we cannot ignore the fact that such a culture had once existed and that the Muslims had initially tried to maintain it. By stating this, I do not mean to describe the island's religious communities as homogenous and mutually exclusive entities. Nevertheless, I consider it problematic to treat the linguistic and religious barriers

⁶² Section VIII in Education Law No 391, SGAC, 1 August 1901.

between them as unworthy of notice. Aside from religion, therefore, the less obvious and far more complex issue of linguistic particularity has also to be taken into account.

Despite the popular lore on the subject suggesting that most Cretan Muslims were native speakers of Greek, the issue deserves more attention. Indeed, most nineteenth century sources describe Cretan Muslims as a Greek-speaking population.⁶³

Yet, it is important to clarify two things with regard to such descriptions. First, Cretan

⁶³ In fact, the accuracy of such sources is in most cases debatable, since almost all foreign authors concluded in broad generalizations, by contacting only a few Cretans. Furthermore, even in the case of those travelers who knew some Turkish or Greek, one wonders if they could really understand the particularities of the Cretan dialect. Indeed, some visitors commented on the fact that large numbers of Cretans –Christian and Muslim—were speaking a language very different from Modern Greek. Still, the fact that most authors characterized the Muslim community as Greco-phone cannot be ignored. Even if similar descriptions derived from stereotypes and general confusion rather than actual research, one should not forget that even stereotypes correspond to something.

See for instance the following examples, “I soon found that the whole rural population of Crete understands only Greek. The Aghas, who live in the principal towns, also know Turkish; although, even with them, Greek is essentially the mother tongue. As to the peasant, when he has said *selam aleikum*, or replied *aleikum salam*, he has exhausted the whole stock of his Mohammedan lore. One consequence of this ignorance of Turkish is that the language of the places of religious worship is less understood, by the Cretan followers of the Prophet, than the Latin of the Catholic ritual is by the people of France or Italy. Thus also in different parts of Asia Minor, I have found Greek populations who were totally ignorant of every language except Turkish, but among whom the services were still performed, as elsewhere in ancient Greek” in Pashley, *Travels in Crete*, 8.

“Only the Sphakians, maybe, have something to do with the beautiful girls of ancient Greece, but the fact is that they speak a language incomprehensible to the Academy of Athens; furthermore, they hate Greece” in Callone, *L'insurrection Candiotte*, 20-21.

“While we were in Hania, the Ottomans (Οθωμανοί) were celebrating their Ramadan. Well, every afternoon large numbers of Muslims from all classes would gather at the coffee-shops around the square, some of them singing, some others playing tombola, others smoking leisurely in the kiosk, and others listening Bavarian and Italian female artistes, performing their songs at the relevant coffee-shops. At the same time, lots of Ottoman women, in groups of three, five, or more, accompanied by large numbers of servants that would go before them, holding large lamps, were slowly passing through the cheering crowd. And everywhere Christians and Ottomans were mingled with one another; for, we have to admit that in Hania, Christians and Ottomans get along much better than they do in Iraklio and they seem to tolerate one another. Besides, it is well known that in Crete even the Ottomans speak Greek and that most of them are of a Greek origin” in Hatzidakis, *Tour of Crete*, 98-99.

“March 24 Saturday: “The population of Retimo mostly Mahometans c.8000 to 2500 Christians-the majority of the population. In most of the Cretan towns is Mahometan. Though Greeks they are fanatical Turks and as a rule do not speak their own language and know nothing of their own history and traditions” Evans (1894) in Brown, Arthur Evans, 51.

From the part of the Ottomans, one of the most important sources on this matter is the collection of articles by Tahmisci-zâde, Mehmed Mâcîit originally published in the following newspapers “Şura-yı Ümmet” and “Tanin” between 1906 and 1912. The author refers also to Greek-speaking Muslims in order to justify the argument that the Muslim community was of a local origin. Yet his description corresponds to a later period the particularities of which deserve further consideration.

Muslims presented great social and geographic ramification. Hence, the most isolated and introvert groups, which were the most likely to use their own dialects, were the least likely to contact travelers and visiting administrators. Second, even if we accept that the Greek language was dominant in nineteenth century Crete, we still have to consider what was the exact meaning of this reality. In other words, even if the majority of locals was able of using the Greek language in every-day life, indeed, did this reality imply that Muslims and Christians had a similar linguistic profile? This author thinks not. There is a great difference between mastering a standardized language and just learning to speak a local dialect.⁶⁴ In this respect, the linguistic profile of Cretan Muslims was very different from that of the Christians. As the sources used in this chapter suggest, although many Muslims could understand and make basic use of the Greek language, educated Christians were the only ones who mastered it. If we accept that the more popular the communicative aspect of a language is, the more powerful those fluent in it become, then we can agree that the above qualitative differences had a significant importance.

After the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece, Christian Cretans started to receive university education in Athens. The educated Muslim elite, at the same time, and more particular officials and dignitaries, continued to be trained through the Ottoman

⁶⁴ The issue of language as a factor of origin is too complicated to be treated in an absolute way. In any case, one of the Cretan practices that may shed some light upon this issue is that of inter-communal marriages. On this issue see two interesting articles by Nuri Adıyeke: Nuri Adıyeke, “Girit'te Cemaatler Arası Evlilikler: Inter-Communal Marriages in Crete,” *Kebikec* 16 (2003), 17-25 and “Kadı Mahkemelerinde Yapılan Hristiyan Evlilikleri ve Girit Örneği: Christian Weddings at the Kadi's court and the Cretan example,” *Kebikec* 19 (2005), 65-72.

system.⁶⁵ Yet it appears that very few erudite Ottomans had stayed in Crete for a long period. As a result, particularly in the second half of the century, when Cretans educated in Greece had started to resettle on the island, the local elite of intellectuals was shaped in direct communication with Greek nationalism. In addition, it seems that the Cretan-Greek dialect had also become the island's subaltern *lingua franca*, since it was used by the majority of locals in their trans-communal transactions.⁶⁶ The almost simultaneous Ottoman reform projects on education did not appear to have a great impact on Crete, mainly due to constant internal turmoil.⁶⁷

By and large, one could argue that the gradual rise of Greek urban elites had led to the further propagation of the Greek language via two parallel processes. On the one hand, we have the intellectual activities of young scientists and professionals, who were fluent in standardized (Athenian) Greek and who challenged aggressively the erudite Ottoman administrative regime and bureaucracy. On the other hand, we have the establishment of a commercial business network between Crete and western Europe, in which the Greeks held a prominent position.⁶⁸ I will be the first to admit that my analysis

⁶⁵ On Ottoman education and civil culture see Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), J. Akiba, "A New School for Qadis: Education of Sharia Judges in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Turcica* 35 (2003), 125–63.

⁶⁶ One could consider for instance the use of Attic Greek, Latin, French, English, Arabic Ottoman as *linguae francae* concerning different periods and populations. The common element in all cases was the more people had to use one of these languages the more powerful became the limited elites trained in them. See Peter Ives, "'Global English': Linguistic Imperialism or Practical Lingua Franca?," *Studies in language and capitalism* 1 (2006), 121–141.

⁶⁷ This chapter does not examine in detail nineteenth century Cretan education. Furthermore, there is to my knowledge no focused study dealing with Ottoman educative reforms in the context of nineteenth century Crete. Thus, our argument is based on a retrospective analysis of the gradual marginalization of local Muslim culture and education that can be reconsidered in the future.

⁶⁸ V. Kremmidas, "Χαρακτηριστικές Όψεις Του Εξωτερικού Εμπορίου Της Κρήτης (Τέλος 18ου Και Αρχές 19ου Αιώνα): Typical Reflections of Cretan External Trade (End of 18th - Beginning of nineteenth Centuries)." *O Eranistis* 18, no. 16 (1980), 190–98.

of relevant dynamics before 1897 is broadly based on speculation. Yet, I can safely argue that the gradual disappearance of the Ottoman language from Crete after 1897 was directly influenced by the fact that the Greek language became the island's official tongue.⁶⁹ For this reason, the linguistic profile of the Muslim community after 1897 deserves separate attention.

In brief, both archival and printed sources indicate that even the most prominent Muslim officials of autonomous administration were not fluent in Greek. As a result, a special provision was included in the Cretan constitution exempting the Muslims from the language criteria for eligibility to hold public offices.⁷⁰ At the same time, it appears that even a basic knowledge of Ottoman was enough to afford Muslims a sense of communal particularity. Hence the Ottoman language had survived in Crete more in theory than in practice, elevated to a symbol of Muslim culture that should be guarded and protected. In other words, while Greek became the official language of the island, Ottoman was recognized *de facto* as the language of the community. For example, although official archives were supposed to be kept in—or at least translated into—

⁶⁹ Article 5 in *Cretan Constitution* (1899): “The Greek language is the official language of Autonomous Crete.” One has to note here the Muslim pleas to abatement with regard to the above Article that were yet not taken into consideration. See Proceeding (6), SGAC, 20 February 1899.

⁷⁰ Article 108 in *ibid.*: “For the first 8 years after the proclamation of the present Constitution, the High Commissioner has the right to decide the exceptional appointment of Muslim Cretans to public offices, when they meet the law’s criteria of morality and capability (χρηστότητα και ικανότητος), and even if they are inferior to others, with regard to their scientific background or knowledge of Greek.”

Greek, records of intra-communal transactions were kept in Ottoman.⁷¹ Furthermore, the Muslims had managed to maintain quite a dynamic Ottoman press,⁷² although there was an obvious lack of learned individuals among the editors at the helm.⁷³

Within this context, the knowledge of both languages provided for new employment opportunities, despite the fact that bilingual Muslims were often fluent neither in Greek nor in Ottoman. In this respect, translation offices (*Μεταφραστικό γραφείο*) were founded at the three Courts of First Instance (at Iraklio, Rethimno, and Lasithi) and a number of bilingual employees were hired with both long-term and short-term obligations. On the one hand, they were expected to serve as court interpreters in proceedings involving Turkish-speaking citizens and to provide translations of official Ottoman documents when needed. On the other hand, they were supposed to cooperate in the gradual translation of older *vakf* archives, land registers, property titles, family records, and court degrees from Ottoman to Greek.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, since the first

⁷¹ In the following examples, I have included translations of governmental announcements, or other official documents, from Greek to Ottoman, as well as translations of the proceedings of the elders' meetings, or the Muslim Courts' records, from Ottoman to Greek. See OBA, Doc 20, Dossier No 52(file 1), 11 September 1900/OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 1(file 2), 8 August 1901/OBA, Doc 128, Dossier No 53, 17 April 1904/OBA, Doc 70, Dossier No 34, 26 June 1904/OBA, Doc 83, Dossier No 38, 10 February 1905/OBA, Doc 153, Dossier No 10, 10 October 1911/OBA, Doc 80, Dossier No 51, 14 January 1912/OBA, Doc 75, Dossier No 51, 7 May 1912/OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 44, 27 November 1913/OBA, Doc 25, Dossier 50, 2 December 1913/OBA, Doc 76, Dossier no 37, 15 August 1916/OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 44, 27 November 1919/OBA, Doc 47, Dossier No 44, 11 March 1920/ OBA, Doc 40, Dossier No 35, 12 April 1923.

⁷² Orhan Kologlu, "Girit'te Türkçe Basın," *Tarih ve Toplum* C VIII, no. 48 (Aralık 1987), 9-12; Johann Strauss, "The Cretan Muslims and Their Struggle for Ottomanism : Some Evidence from the Periodical Press (Sada-yı Girid, İstikbal)," in *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi (21-25 Ağustos 1989 İstanbul)* XXVI, no. 4 (1990), 55-66.

⁷³ According to the relevant law, only University graduates had the right to be newspaper editors. Yet, in the case of Muslims that was impossible. Thus, it was decided that a *rüştiye* (high-school) diploma should be enough. See Princely Edict (251), SGAC, 2 December 1900.

⁷⁴ See Princely Edict No 49, SGAC, 2 August 1899 and Article 211 in Princely Edict on Justice, SGAC, 10 May 1899.

Muslim translators were not really trained for this job, their appointment was provisional.⁷⁵

Aside from their employment at translation offices, a number of Muslims were appointed at different public offices after passing the necessary exams. One should not forget that, although the island's bureaucratic machine was rapidly hellenized, the new administrative regime was obliged to integrate into the new institutional framework the island's administrative past. In this respect, Muslim cooperation was of significant importance. A number of Muslims were to be found among the island's lawyers, judges, notaries,⁷⁶ school-teachers, gendarmes, and postmen,⁷⁷ while few of them were licensed

⁷⁵ See for instance the following cases: Fuat Vedourakis, Mehmed Fafoulakis, and Hasan Kouyoumitzakis, appointed provisional translators at the Central Translation Office, Princely Edict No 127, SGAC, 9 August 1899/Princely Edict No 195, 18 December 1899/ Princely Edict No 196, 18 December 1899. Ali Metzakis, was appointed provisional translator of the relevant office at Iraklio, Princely Edict No 129, SGAC, 12 August 1899; Mustafa Moutafakis was appointed provisional assistant of the above office, Princely Edict No 163, SGAC, 24 September 1899. Hüseyin Tzelal and Mustafa Yiyourtsakis were appointed assistants at the Central Translation Office by the Court of Appeal. Mehmed Vefik was appointed assistant of the office at Iraklio, Princely Edict No 170, SGAC, 14 October 1899.

⁷⁶ For instance, in 1899, Ahmed Dolmadakis succeeded in passing the notary exam and was appointed notary of Hania. See the list of successful candidates published by the Directorate of Justice (*Ανωτέρα Διεύθυνση της Δικαιοσύνης*), SGAC, 23 September 1899, and Princely Edict, SGAC, 31 May 1899.

In addition, the following Muslims were appointed judges of Minor Civil Courts (*Ειρηνοδικεία*): Mustafa Hüseyin Efendakis, at Voukolion department; Kami Veisagadakis, at Nevs-Amariou department; Ahmed Besim Saridakis, at Kastelliou-Pediados department, Princely Edict, SGAC, 6 June 1899. Mehmed Cevdet Mavrommatakis was appointed judge at Nevs Amariou, Decree No 94, SGAC, 17 April 1900. Furthermore, Mehmed Petinakis, and Nesim Farfourakis were appointed Judges of Appeal (*Εφέτες*), and Fazil Foukounakis was appointed Recorder of Lasithi (*Πρωτοδίκης*), Decree No 1, SGAC, 19 July 1899. Ali Veisakis was appointed Recorder of Rethimno, Fazil Roukounakis Recorder of Lasithi, and Tahir H. Smailakis Recorder of Hania, Decree No 3, SGAC, 15 July 1899/ Decree No 2, SGAC, 12 July 1899/Degree No 26, 28 August 1899. In 1902, İbrahim Hiadis was appointed Recorder of Hania; Tahir H. İsmailakis Recorder of Rethimno; Ali Veisakis Recorder of Iraklio, Princely Edict No 7, SGAC, 1 February 1902.

For later appointments and postings see the relevant announcements by the Superior Directory of Education and Justice, SGAC, 8 March 1902. After 1907, however, most of the Muslim judges were dismissed and were appointed lawyers at the island's Courts of First Instance. For instance, see the appointment of Ali Veisakis, Ali Ramız Hamamtzakis, Mehmed Cevat Mavrommatakis, Vecih Hatzidakis in Directorate of Education and Justice, SGAC, 3 July 1907.

professionals or scientists that did not work as public employees.⁷⁸ Particularly high was the number of Muslims appointed as customs guards, though due to accusations of breach of duty and smuggling, depositions were very frequent.⁷⁹ As far as higher public offices were concerned, Muslim appointments had a rather symbolic character. They resulted from the regime's efforts to promote justice and equal representation, without taking into strict consideration the actual eligibility of Muslims in terms of language and education. Despite the fact that Muslims were commonly excused from qualification exams, they would often find themselves forced to resign from public posts due to their

⁷⁷ The following teachers were the first to be appointed at Muslim schools: Abdul Rahman Yakoupakis, at Tusla Kidonias; Demir Reizoglouidakis, at Halepa; Ömer Ouzounalakis, instructor of religion at Hania; İbrahim Zekri Agadakias, tutor at Kenourgia Hora Hania; Ali Ubli Abadiotakis, instructor of religion at Rethimno; Ali Spathakis, Hacı Mustafa Efendis and Ali Fafoulagadakias, tutors at Rethimno; Mehmed Moukabeletzis, Mustafa İmamezades, Zouhdi Efendis, instructors of religion at Iraklio; Kazim Emin efendakis, Director of the Muslim School of Iraklio. See Princely Edict No 29, SGAC (102), 18 November 1899.

At the same time, Nazlı Koumaritopoula was appointed tutor at the Girls' School of Rethimno, Princely Edict No 2, SGAC, 28 January 1900. For later appointments see the relevant lists of the Directorate of Education and Justice, SGAC, 24 May 1902/ 26 November 1903; Princely Edict No 43, SGAC, 8 September 1903.

In 1903, Hulki Bey was appointed officer of the gendarmerie (*ενοματάρχης*), see Directorate of Internal Affairs, SGAC, 31 May 1903. In 1900, Hüseyin HatziAhmedakis was the only Muslim to be found among the island's apprentice postmen, Princely Edict, SGAC, 28 January 1900.

⁷⁸ The following two Muslims, for instance, had received permission to practice the medical profession in Crete: Pertev Moulazades and Ali Rasih Sabret Babazades from Iraklio. See the relevant list, SGAC, July 1903. Furthermore, in 1908, Ali Noursoures Tsousakis and Ali Smahanakis, had received a Pharmacists' license, after having passed the relevant exam, Edict No 4, SGAC, 14 January 1908.

⁷⁹ It seems that particularly widespread was the smuggling of salt. See Law Against Smuggling Salt No 129, SGAC, 25 August 1901.

For some examples of appointments and depositions see, Provisional Inspector of Hania Customs Office, SGAC, 18 December 1899; Vice Customs-officer of Spinaloga, SGAC, 21 August 1899. Dismissal of Derviş Legeorgiotakis, İsmail Laterakis and Ahmed Bereketakis, from the Customs Office of Rethimno, Princely Edict, SGAC, 11 September 1899. Disciplinary Action against the Head Customs-Officer of Hania, Hüseyin Nasiraki. See Council of Economy, No 1892/ 2354, 27 December 1899. Deposition of Hüseyin Seremetaki from the Customs Office of Iraklio. See Directorate of Economy, No 137, SGAC, 21 December 1900. Appointment of Bedrudin Bedraki manager of the Iraklio Customs Office, Princely Edict No 178, SGAC, 26 April 1901.

complete lack of Greek.⁸⁰

In the same vein, the examination of the local parliamentary proceedings suggests that Muslim representatives avoided participation in the otherwise passionate debates among Christians. The differences between Christian and Muslim deputies appeared striking. While the former used every possible opportunity to prove their oratorical skills, the latter preferred to remain silent and failed to consistently engage in the endless debates and exchange of sophistries so popular among Christians. In fact, the Muslims appeared to be more active with regard to matters that concerned the community directly, such as the issue of pious foundations.⁸¹ Yet, even on such occasions, their speeches were always brief and very poorly articulated. Their limited participation, therefore, did not seem to be the result of indifference, but of an obvious language barrier. This example is congruent with the general reasoning of this chapter that, in the late nineteenth century, standardized language and higher-education were correlated with significant political privileges. In this respect, even if we accept that the use of the local dialect by Cretan Muslims afforded them an opportunity to participate in the reshaping of their locality, we have also to admit that they did so always from a position of inferiority.

It is interesting to mention here that, prior to 1897, the issue of language was

⁸⁰ For instance, it was decided that for eight years after the proclamation of autonomy, Muslim notaries would be appointed without having to pass the relevant exam. See Princely Edict No 252, SGAC, 2 December 1900. Yet, some of them were forced to resign immediately after their appointment due to their complete lack of writing skills in Greek. For instance, Hüseyin Haspi Saranakis and Ali Klapsarakis, notaries of Rethimno, were released from their duties because, according to the relevant report, they were unable to write or to read in Greek. See Princely Edict No 79, SGAC, 13 July 1899. See also the resignation of the Muslim parliamentary representative of Iraklio Beha Rahmizade, for similar reasons, Princely Edict, SGAC (12), 20 February 1899.

⁸¹ The above brief remark derives from a careful study of the island's Parliamentary Proceedings from 1899 to 1912.

also used as a factor of social discrimination, but for the opposite reason.⁸² In other words, Muslim and Christian Cretans speaking both languages, and particularly those of them who had graduated from the Ottoman capital's educative institutions, were preferred to the graduates of Greek institutions, despite the fact that the latter were more numerous. Similar appointments, therefore, were causing considerable friction among Christians.⁸³ For this reason, after the revolution of 1897, some of the Christians argued that it was time for "Greek graduates" to take their revenge. They asked for the expulsion from public offices all Cretans that had served, or cooperated with, previous administrations, "receiving a salary from the rivals of the Greek struggle."⁸⁴

My discussion of the issue so far raises two important questions: were the linguistic skills of the few Muslim dignitaries, officials, journalists, and public employees typical or exceptional? What about the community's 'invisible' members? To put it differently, should we argue that officials and public employees were the most learned Muslims to be found in Crete? I do not think we can answer either of the above

⁸² See the inter-parliamentary friction in Greece in 1889 over the Cretan Question. The opposition attacked the government on grounds of governmental policies. Among the several complaints that were put in front of the Assembly by deputy of Attiki and Viotia, Nikolaos D. Levidis, was that of education. According to his speech, the Cretans were complaining that those speaking the Ottoman language, meaning "Greeks" and "Turks" that had studied in Constantinople, were preferred for appointment to public offices to the rest of the Cretans. See Nikolaou D. Levidou, *Αγορεύσεις εν τη Βουλή περί του Κρητικού Ζητήματος τη 31 Οκτωβρίου και τη 5 Δεκεμβρίου 1889: Parliamentary Speeches with Regard to the Cretan Issue, 31 October and 5 December 1889* (En Athines: Anestis Kostadinidis, 1890), 22. Exaggerated or not, such complaints corresponded to a given reality.

⁸³ In 1874, for instance, W. J Stillman was writing as follows with regard to the 1866 uprising: "The first blood shed was of Christian by Christian and furnishes as good an illustration of Cretan manners that it seems worth detailing. During the exchange of words which had taken place between the Pasha and the Assembly, a messenger of the former, a Cretan Christian, was insulted by one of the committee's people, spit on, and bitterly reproached for his unpatriotic subservience. His son shortly after assassinated the insulter. Both were Sphakiotes, a race with whom blood-vengeance is a religious obligation. During this state of things extreme hostilities broke out at several points of the *island*," See Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*, 52.

⁸⁴ See the proposal of Foudalidou, Drakaki and Vlahaki, Proceeding No 15, SGAC (19), 5 March 1899.

questions in an absolute way. It is plausible to suggest that if there were Muslims in Autonomous Crete that did not speak a word of Greek, it would be difficult to find them among the groups interacting with Christian locals and foreigners. Yet, since the holding of public-offices was not necessarily based on objective skills, it would be inaccurate to claim that Muslim translators or deputies were any more fluent in Greek than the rest of the Muslim population.

From complains addressed to the Superior Directorate of Education by the *müftü* of Rethimno in 1912, we learn that the latter was in conflict with the town's elders for similar reasons. The *müftü* was protesting the fact that İzzet Aiyoryanakis, the former secretary, who was trained both in Ottoman and official Greek (*επίσημη ελληνική*), was replaced by the elders with an individual (the name of whom is not provided) who was practically illiterate. According to the *müftü*, that appointment served nothing but the personal interests of the elders. The elders, however, claimed that it was Aiyoryanakis that was not qualified to be a secretary, and that the *müftü* had nothing in mind but his own interest.⁸⁵

Regardless of who was right and who was wrong, the above incident indicates that appointed public officers were not necessarily the best qualified for the positions they filled. It is important to note, however, that such dynamics were also related to the demographic profile of the community, which was rapidly changing. To be more specific, the Muslims had gradually disappeared from Crete's public offices for two interrelated reasons. First, early egalitarian principles had, after a point, faded away. Second, the community's most prominent members, most of whom were of a rather

⁸⁵ OBA, Doc 74, Dossier No 51, 12 May 1912.

advanced age in 1899, had gradually passed away.⁸⁶ Furthermore, while *Ottomanism* was confronted by a variety of ideological challenges, Greek nationalism was spreading in Crete through rather coherent channels of education. Hence, Muslim Cretans who came of age in Autonomous Crete were very different from previous generations. Although Muslim claims to a privileged status could not be justified without a sense of cultural particularity, Ottoman Muslim culture steadily became quite foreign to Cretans. At the same time, despite the fact that “the loss of Crete” would later become a symbol of Muslim revolution against the sultan, local Muslims did not seem to have been significantly influenced by such movements. As a result, gradually assimilated by local Christianity, they could not escape this vicious circle.

The Great Exhibition (1899-1900) and Bi-Religious Professional Solidarity

During the first years of autonomy, at least, the Cretans tried indeed to create a local common space by insisting on differentiating the local Muslims from the Ottoman Empire and the “Turks.” In this respect, not only local administration but also bi-communal self-representation had followed two different directions. As far as long-term, linear narratives on sovereignty were concerned, Crete was definitely identified with Greece, antiquity, and the heroic struggle against foreign occupiers. In that framework,

⁸⁶ For example, within a year after the proclamation of the new Constitution, three of the most important Muslim dignitaries had died. Mehmed Petinakis, Judge of Appeal and Member of the Superior Council of Justice, was forced to resign in 1899 due to his bad health and old age. See Princely Edict No 192, SGAC, December 1899. Hüseyin Yenitsarakis, Superior Counsellor of Public Security and Transportation, died in 1900. See Princely Edict, SGAC, 24 June 1900. The *müftü* of Rethimno Mehmed Sedidoudin died in 1900. See Appointment Edict of the new *müftü*, No 4, SGAC, 26 January 1901.

the Ottoman times were categorized as nothing but a period of foreign occupation.⁸⁷ Yet in the context of local *folklor*, Muslims constituted part of the island's public image. In order to illustrate this, let us examine as a case-study the first International Exhibition of Crete, which was realized in 1899-1900 at the Public Garden of Hania.

The event was called Exhibition of Industry-Commerce-Agriculture-Art-Hygiene-Nutrition-Education etc., and its main mission was to present local cultural and enterprising activities to an international audience. At the same time, it provided an opportunity for the introduction of foreign scientific innovations to Crete. It is interesting to note, therefore, that Muslim participation in the event was of central importance. The organizing board honored, for instance, the Muslim General Prefect of Hania, Mehmed Spathakis, in whose jurisdiction was the event realized and who took an active role in its successful realization. The prefect was specifically thanked, together with Muslim authorities representing other prefectures, for having encouraged Muslims to participate.⁸⁸ Moreover, the Muslim community was represented at the organizing board by a local landowner, Mehmed Kasimzades, and a merchant, Nesib Sefikefendizades.⁸⁹ The post of the Head Juror of Agricultural Products was also granted

⁸⁷ One of the new government's first priorities was to organize a local Archaeological Office and to found two local public museums, at Iraklio and Hania. According to the new Archaeological Law, all antiquities to be found in Cretan soil belonged to the local state, and needed a place to be exposed. Within this context, Minoan and Greek antiquities were considered "national inheritance;" Venetian buildings and sights were considered monuments of a foreign occupation that had to be preserved due to their high esthetic value. As to Ottoman sights, they were not considered to be monuments at all. Thus, they were identified with bad memories of the past that should be ignored or even demolished. See Princely Edict No 189, SGAC, 12 July 1900. See also Archaeology Law No 430, SGAC, 30 August 1901.

⁸⁸ See Diplomas of Honor, SGAC, 21 August 1900.

⁸⁹ See the relevant Announcement and Circular published in Greek and French, SGAC, 26 December 1899. For a complete list of the participants. See SGAC (19), 11 May 1900.

to a local Muslim, İbrahim Sakiragazades.⁹⁰ Last but not least, a number of Muslim Cretans received awards for the quality of their exhibits, mainly in the sections of agricultural industry, small industry, artistry, weaving industry, metallurgy and craftsmanship, and chemical-medical products.⁹¹ Particularly impressive was the participation of Muslim women, a number of whom (mainly from the town of Iraklio) were awarded prizes for their silk textiles and *χρυσοκέντητα* (textiles interwoven with gold).⁹²

In brief, the Exhibition had received considerable support by both communities as a bireligious effort at peaceful cooperation. In the same vein, bireligious interaction was promoted in Crete under the pretext of social solidarity and professional unity. Local clubs and unions were founded with the mutual cooperation of both communities. At the same time, since neither Muslims nor Christians were homogeneous, the clubs established by them presented a variety of aims and orientations. In order to clarify this, one can examine the following two examples. The first one, “Hania Athletic Club

⁹⁰ See Committee Report, SGAC, 25 June 1900.

⁹¹ Soap products: Mustafa Barouksis, town of Hania, silver medal; Fuat Bey Sourouzades, town of Iraklio, honorable praise. Halva sweets: Hacı Acem, town of Hania, copper medal. High Boots (*στιβάνια*): Mustafa Hamamitzidakis, town of Rethimno, copper medal. Drawing: M. Tzemil (a child most probably), honorable praise. Woolen rugs (*χράμια*): Hayder Hacı Vikirakis, town of Rethimno, copper medal; Woolen saddlebags (*δισάκι*): Ahmed Feizakis, town of Iraklio, honorable praise.

Textiles interwoven with gold (*χρυσοκέντητα*): Fazıl bey Faltizades, town of Iraklio, honorable praise. Brazen Bells: Mustafa Kalaitzis, town of Hania, honorable award.

Aperients medicine: Mehmed Resitis, town of Hania, honorable praise. Rosewater: Hasan Babas Oustadakis, town of Rethimno, copper medal, see the relevant List of Awards, SGAC, June 1900.

⁹² Silk textiles: Sandel Hanım Hasan Skillianaki, wife of Mustafa Mazhar bey DeliAhmedakis, town of Iraklio, silver medal; Halime Tasounaki, town of Iraklio, honorable praise; Wife of imam Nazif effendi, town of Iraklio, honorable praise.

Textiles interwoven with gold (*χρυσοκέντητα*): Sister of Bexhet efendi, town of Iraklio, copper medal; Hildize Kazım, town of Iraklio, copper medal; Zeynep Osman Tzamzade, town of Iraklio, copper medal; Wife of Fuat Sourouzade, town of Iraklio, copper medal; Fatma Abdullah, town of Hania, copper medal; Aziye Berikokaki, town of Iraklio, honorable praise; Yüter Arap Ahmedopoula, town of Iraklio, honorable praise; Nariye Risvagadopoula, town of Rethimno, honorable praise; Nazlı Yerakarianaki, town of Rethimno, honorable praise, see *ibid*.

(*Γυμναστικός Σύλλογος Χανίων*)” was founded in 1899 in Halepa (Hania). As specified in the articles of association, the club’s goal was to spread the spirit of athletics among all Cretans, regardless of their religion. For this purpose, the members planned to have a gym built in Hania and to organize excursions, sports, and games. The vice-president of the club was Ali Taalat Moulazades, and two more Muslims were among its founding members.⁹³

The second club, “Rethimno Athletic Club (*Γυμναστικός Σύλλογος Ρεθύμνης*),” founded by Emmanouil Generalis in 1899, seemed at first glance to be very similar to the first one. The proclaimed goal of the club was to promote sports and athletics among both communities, and five of its founding members were local Muslims. Yet, the founding Charter specified that the club addressed in fact not just all religions, but all classes (*τάξεις*). From this point of view, it seems that Rethimno Club was probably founded as an answer to the Club of Hania that had a rather elitist-urban character.⁹⁴ As far as the Muslims were concerned, their participation in the Club of Hania combined a regional, elite profile, that of the notorious *Αγάδες των Χανίων* (Hania notables/ Hania ağaları), to modern practices of elitist-urbanism. In the case of Rethimno Club, in contrast, it was underlined that the common wish of Christians and Muslims alike was to educate citizens of all social strata, helping them to feel engaged with a process of urbanization.⁹⁵

⁹³Mehmed Tahmisakis, Mehmed Ali Efedakis. See Charter of Hania Athletic Club, SGAC, 9 October 1899.

⁹⁴Meropi Anastassiadou, “Sports d’ Elite et Elites Sportives à Salonique au Tournant du Siècle” in *Vivre dans l’Empire Ottoman, Sociabilités et Relations Intercommunautaires (XVIIIe-XXe siècles)*, edited by F. Georgeon and P. Dumont (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997).

⁹⁵Advisors: Ali Veisakis, Vecih Hatzidakis. Members: Kami Veisagadakis, Husni Vakoglakis, Ahmed Vecih Hatzidakis. See Charter of Rethimno Athletic Club, SGAC, 24 October 1899.

Parallel to the men, Cretan women appeared to follow through energetically with similar tasks. A telling example was the foundation of the “Society of Christian and Ottoman Women (Σύνδεσμος Χριστιανών και Οθωμανίδων Κρησών)” in 1901. Among the leading aims of the Society was the promotion of local weaving activities—together with other kinds of female industry—and the professional settlement of needy Cretan women. Moreover, the Society was devoted to keeping female Cretan clothes as simple as possible and to promote, at all costs, local costumes rather than foreign ones.⁹⁶ Such discourses on female morality and identity were typical among the various Mediterranean geographies of the era.⁹⁷ What is important to underline here is that the orientation and aims of this particular group of women pointed to the existence of a local, female, weaving craft, which identified above all with gender and a bireligious folkloric tradition. In other words, contrary to contemporary opposite examples,⁹⁸ the above rhetoric on folk costumes and their weavers reflected on regional types created through cultural and economic alliances rather than national symbols.

⁹⁶ “Ἡ παντὴ σθένει καὶ πάσῃ θυσίᾳ υποστήριξης τῆς ἀπλότητος περὶ τὴν περιβολὴν καὶ τῆς ἐμμονῆς εἰς τὰ πατρία,” Charter of the Society of Christian and Ottoman Women, SGAC, 14 May 1901. Anna Yerasimidou was the first president of the society. It is interesting to mention here that more than half of the founding members were Muslim women: Adile Spathaki, Hatice Bekset Agazade, Saruhane Hamit Bey, Fatme Sefik Efendizade, Melek Softazade, Seniha Sourouzade, Mevhibe Hamit Bey.

⁹⁷ For a general discussion of the issue see Uli Linke, “Folklore, Anthropology, and the Government of Social Life,” *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 32 (1990), 117-148, Yolande Cohen and Francoise Thebaud, eds., “*Féminismes et identités nationales: Les processus d’intégration des femmes au politique: Feminisms and national identities: the process of female integration into politics* (Lyon: Programme Rhone-Alpes de Recherche en Sciences Humaines, 1998), Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hal, *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000).

For a very interesting and relevant to our discussion article see Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra, “Engendering ‘Greekness’: Women’s Emancipation and Irredentist Politics in Nineteenth-Century Greece,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 20, no. 1 (June 2005), 67-79.

⁹⁸ See for instance the Charter of “Iraklio Society of Ladies (Σύλλογος Κυρίων Ηρακλείου),” which was operating under the shield of the local Church, SGAC, 10 February 1901.

Similarly to the above examples, local unions had initially developed in Autonomous Crete more as an expression of bireligious, professional solidarity than as a divisive representation of religious communities. For instance, the “Lawyers’ Union of Rethimno (*Δικηγορικός Σύλλογος Ρεθύμνης*)” was founded in 1900 as a legal entity, the mission of which was to promote scientific research without regard to religion.⁹⁹ Hence, Ahmet Koutalakis was symbolically included among its few founding members. Similarly, the “Cretan Teachers’ Union (*Παγκρήτιος Δημοδιδασκαλικός Σύλλογος*),” which was founded in 1902 to encourage education and athletics, addressed both communities. Cretan teachers and gymnasts regardless of title, religion, or gender had the right to become regular members of the Union and to participate to its activities.¹⁰⁰ Last but not least, in 1907, the Coach-Driver Cretan Fraternity (*Αδελφότητα Αμαξηλατών*) undertook action to protect the professional rights of both communities. Whoever wanted to become a coach driver in Crete, therefore, had to pass the necessary exams administered by the fraternity's board. The board consisted of two policemen, the Fraternity's president, and two of its skilled members—one Christian and one Muslim.¹⁰¹

In brief, aside from administrative public offices, autonomy had afforded Cretan Muslims a variety of ways to interact with the Christians. Hence, if the concept of “community” arises from common characteristics, responsibilities, and interests, why should the common bounds of religion be considered more important than other social affiliations? True, especially after the Greek annexation of the island, religious

⁹⁹ See the Charter of the Cretan Lawyers' Union, SGAC, 8 March 1900.

¹⁰⁰ See Principal Edict No 113, and the Charter of the Cretan Teachers Union, SGAC, 17 May 1902.

¹⁰¹ See Police Order No 1385/518, SGAC, 28 March 1907.

particularity gradually came to be seen as the only way to differentiate between Cretan “majorities” and “minorities.” We should be careful yet not to use the random conclusion of this historical process—which is known only to us in retrospect—as an excuse for absolutely disregarding any dynamics contradicting with it. In Autonomous Crete, bireligious professional solidarity was as real as were ideological differences, discrimination practices, and animosity between Christians and Muslims. At the same time, it was possible to identify professional differences deriving from religion.

For instance, numerous boatmen and fishermen were to be found among the locals. Did Christian boatmen cooperate with the Muslims, or did they form mutually exclusive groups? In fact, although there were lots of instances of friction between Muslims and Christians, there were also moments of cooperation. It appears that even if, most of the time, unofficial networks were based on religion, that practice was not derived from systematic or absolute ideological doctrines. In other words, it seems to be true that Muslims would commonly go fishing with other Muslims and Christians with Christians. Furthermore, it seems to be true that, in case of an emergency, they would both mobilize first their co-religious fellows. It is not clear, however, if such behaviors were the result of abstract group identities rather than a reflection of random friendships deriving from common cultural codes.

A typical example of the above is an incident that took place in November 1900, when a boat filled with Russian soldiers had been driven by wild storm-clouds to the open sea. A number of Muslim boatmen from the town of Rethimno had then risked their lives rushing to the soldiers’ rescue; upon which they received an honorary diploma signed by the High Commissioner. This spontaneous reaction to danger appears very interesting. The Muslims had indeed been mobilized as a group that did not include local

Christians. Yet they did so in order to save Christian soldiers, despite the fact that most Russian circles supported most ardently the Greek claims over Crete. Hence, this symbolic rescue of eleven Russian soldiers by Muslim boatmen is an indication that, in some cases at least, Cretan group identities were guided more by everyday practices than by consistent ideologies and propaganda.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, due to the specific nature of my sources, which concern mainly local administrative policies and not businesslike activities, it is impossible to adequately discuss here the community's presence in trade, commerce, and local industry.¹⁰³ Yet, Muslim professional presence within Cretan town markets draws particular attention regarding not only economy, but also local politics. In what follows, therefore, reference will be made to some of the Muslim urban professional activities that were heavily challenged after 1899 under the pretext of hygiene. In order to do so, focus will be placed on the inspection-lists concerning Muslim shops, restaurants, hotels, and all kinds of small businesses that operated in Cretan towns between 1899 to 1908.¹⁰⁴

Cretan Politics of Hygiene

It seems that, at the turn of the century, a number of restaurants, taverns, inns, shops, and markets in every town were owned by Muslims. To give some examples, in

¹⁰² See Princely Edict, SGAC, 8 December 1900.

¹⁰³ As far as commerce is concerned, it seems that established networks were to be found between Muslims from Southern Macedonia and Thrace (mainly from Thessaloniki, Kavala, and Drama) and Cretan Muslims (mainly from Hania and Iraklio). Yet this very interesting issue deserves further and more careful consideration. See for instance Court Decree No 826/1903, SGAC, 5 January 1904.

¹⁰⁴ For the relevant tables see Appendix.

the towns of Hania, Rethimno, and Iraklio, the Muslims were famous horse breeders. The striking majority of Cretan stables and inns belonged to Muslim owners. Similarly, they appeared to monopolize dairy and ice-cream shops, as well as owning a number of high quality patisseries. Moreover, a number of them owned grocery shops, taverns, and coffee-shops of various sizes. From this point of view, it seems that Muslim professional activities in Crete were to a certain extent influenced by religious craftsmanship. At the same time, partnerships between Christians and Muslims were also possible, though quite rare. It is interesting to note that a number of Muslims and Christians that carried the same surname were working in common sectors.¹⁰⁵ Was that detail a coincidence? Or was it an indication of common origins? The issue certainly deserves further consideration. The only thing to be mentioned here is that, although the two communities of Autonomous Crete participated indeed in business networks colored by religion, it is difficult to say whether their professional orientation was influenced by their religious identity; or if what was happening was actually the opposite.

One way or another, the most common criticism against Muslim restaurateurs, cooks, bakers, and butchers was that they were not keeping up with modern standards of hygiene. From 1900 onwards, local administrations manifested growing interest in bringing order to Cretan towns, realizing frequent controls at local private facilities, and establishing specific rules about consumable provisions.¹⁰⁶ In the town of Hania, unheralded inspections were made quite often, while in Rethimno and Iraklio, hygiene

¹⁰⁵ In the Appendix of this study, I have tried to provide only full lists of Muslim Cretans with relevant activities.

¹⁰⁶ Report sent to the Prefecture of Hania No 103/98, SGAC, 24 June 1904; Report signed by the Police Doctors of Hania No 1126/93, SGAC, 12 May 1904 and No 72/74, SGAC, 14 May 1904 and No 132/98, SGAC, 13 May 1904.

and sanitation control were known to be less strict. As to Sitia and Lasithi, it seems that such controls were extremely rare in these provinces. In this respect, the inspection lists mentioned above provide us both with general information about Muslim activities and with a few specific indications as to the regional particularities of modernization projects.

During the first hygiene inspections undertaken in Autonomous Crete, many Muslims and Christians alike were faced with negative evaluations. Yet the Christian community presented greater socioeconomic diversity, thus had the means to survive the process. In other words, while the larger business establishments, hotels, restaurants, and super markets had little difficulty in modernizing their facilities, the smaller ones (such as small grocery shops, taverns, and local barbers) could not easily adapt into the new situation. As a result, the Muslim enterprises, which after 1899 appeared to be limited to the second category, were after a point faced with negative evaluations much more often than those of Christians. In a figurative way, the progressing marginalization of Muslims was reflected also in their business activities. One should not forget, furthermore, that all relevant modernizing-hygiene projects were initiated by the Greek-Cretan authorities in direct communication with the Kingdom of Greece.

Nevertheless, the above strategies of the autonomous regime constituted a continuation of modernizing-projects initially introduced to the island by the Ottomans. In this respect, Crete was one of the many provinces in which a modern institutional framework initiated by the Ottoman state was appropriated by local leaders for the

redefinition of the localities against Istanbul.¹⁰⁷ It is beyond doubt that from the late nineteenth century onwards Greek doctors, mechanics, architects, teachers, lawyers, administrators, and scientists had dynamically replaced the Ottomans in articulating modernity. In this respect, Cretan Muslims were trapped between two artificially defined clear-cut identities: Greek nationalism, which represented progress; and Ottoman “tradition,” which represented communal particularity. In the context of the era's fragile diplomatic arrangements, therefore, an intricate relationship was formed between the above dynamics.

At least with regard to issues of hygiene, local Muslims tried hard to cope with the above situation, improving their facilities and equipment according to the relevant recommendations, following heavy criticism from the inspectors. Cooks and restaurateurs, for example, were given negative evaluations for using metal vessels inappropriate for cooking, for not cleaning those vessels, and for not taking the necessary measures for safe food storage. Similarly, the inspectors' adverse reports explicitly characterized a number of Muslim inns as unsuitable for receiving guests, as basic rules of hygiene and sanitation were not followed. One of the most serious problems was that inn-keepers insisted on maintaining animals (such as chickens, cows, and goats) in the same buildings—frequently in filthy environments full of offal, which

¹⁰⁷ Due to constant turmoil in nineteenth century Crete, the earlier efforts of Ottoman administrations to follow such practices proved to be extremely unsuccessful. Yet that does not mean that they did not exist. At all events, autonomous administration proved initially much more popular, and thus much more effective, than the distant Ottoman capital. In any case, it seems that Ottoman and Greek political elites — or at least a part of them—were oriented towards very similar ideas of progress during the second half of the nineteenth century. See Eugene L. Rogan, 1999, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Meropi Anastassiadou-Dumont and all Authors / Contributors: Méropi Anastassiadou-Dumont, eds., *Médecins et Ingénieurs Ottomans à l' Âge des nationalismes* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003); Milen V. Petrov, 2004, «Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864–1868,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 4 (2004), 730-759; Angelo Georgakis, “Ottoman Salonika and Greek Nationalism before 1908,” *Balkan Studies* 1 (2005), 111-138.

were literally characterized by the inspectors as plague hotspots. In 1901, for example, it was decided that the inns owned by Mercan Tsafadakis, Ahmet Knithakis, Salı Avnakis, İbrahim Stiliarakis, Mustafa Kastrinakis, Ali Katsigarakis, Mustafa Karbilakis, Ahmet Stratalakis, and Mustafa Vedourakis should be moved out of the town of Hania for the above reasons.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, in 1903, the police-doctor of Hania had reported to the prefect that illegal Muslim barbers were practicing their profession in coffee-shops, wine-shops, inns, and restaurants, instead of in authorized barber-shops, in violation of the relevant law.¹⁰⁹ Another illegal activity persecuted by law and yet rumored to be performed in Muslim coffee-shops was the resale of stolen or smuggled goods. It is difficult to decide, however, whether stories of this nature, which were in general circulation among the locals, were true or false. In 1904, for instance, Ahmet Ali Babalakis was accused by some locals of selling smuggled valuable clocks in his coffee-shop. After investigation by the police, however, Babalakis was declared not-guilty. The police had accepted, in fact, that although smuggled clocks were indeed for sale at his coffee-shop, the owner did not know where they had come from and that accusations against him derived from personal rivalries.¹¹⁰

It seems that hygiene, sanitation, and order were used by the Greek authorities as a way to claim the island's greater towns—where the Muslims were still the majority. This process, however, was neither linear nor conscious. Thus, a delicate balance was

¹⁰⁸ Inspection Report of Hania, SGAC, 1 July 1901.

¹⁰⁹ The barbers in question were the following: Hüsnü Misirlakis, Ahmediye Alisagakis, Ali Efendi Topsibasakis, Mustafa Halikoutakis. See Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, SGAC, 3 October 1903.

¹¹⁰ Custom Office of Hania No 85, SGAC, 6 September 1904.

maintained between the two communities, at least until 1905. After that point, the intense conflicts among local Christians started to challenge aggressively both autonomy and coexistence. The Muslim community responded quite passively to relevant developments, although faced with further marginalization. To appreciate the change of status experienced by the Cretan Muslims after 1905-1906, internal political developments regarding not only the island but also the Empire have to be taken into consideration.

Autonomous Crete after the "Thesisso" Movement:

Marginalization of the Muslims

In 1905, when Eleftherios Venizelos came into open conflict with High Commissioner, Prince George, local Christians were divided between the two, and Christian-Muslim peace was once subverted. In fact, as we have already seen, the conflict among Christian fractions, which escalated into an armed uprising against the prince, had little—if anything—to do with local Muslims. Local Christian politicians were annoyed by the fact that Athenian circles, backed by the Palace, were taking over Cretan issues. As a result, when the prince undertook the mission to ask the Powers for union of Crete with Greece, the Cretans interpreted his initiative as one more violation of their right to represent local common will. In 1900, when Prince George took a diplomatic trip to European courts requesting union, a press battle ensued between the two parties. Athenian papers in favor of the royal family openly attacked Venizelos, while the Cretan papers supporting Venizelos directed their most unfavorable criticisms against the prince. Upon this, the prince decided to symbolically close down the newspapers of the

opposition.¹¹¹ In March 1901, Venizelos was dismissed from the office of Councilor of Justice¹¹² and due to his fierce complaints following the above developments, the newspaper *Κήρυξ* (*Herald*) he published was persecuted. Following this, in the summer of 1904, a Christian uprising broke out in the village Lakki (close to Hania), but was easily suppressed by the local gendarmerie, still loyal to the Prince.¹¹³ Shortly thereafter, three influential local politicians, Eleftherios Venizelos, Konstadinos Foumis, and Konstadinos Manos, traveled to Athens, where they founded the “United Opposition,” with the aim to overthrow the High Commissioner.

Thereby, when the prince made his second diplomatic trip to Europe requesting, with the support of Russia, the Greek annexation of the island, the United Opposition, supported also by a number of Christian merchants from the town of Hania,¹¹⁴ organized one more uprising against the High Commissioner that reached its peak in Mart 1905.¹¹⁵ The barracks of the rebels were established in Therisso where, in disapproval of princely administration, they presented their own political program and raised the Greek flag,

¹¹¹ For instance, in July 1900, the paper *Elefteria*, printed in Iraklio, was closed down for promoting rivalry between the Prince and his “beloved Cretans.” See Princely Edict, SGAC, 10 July 1900. See also *Elefteria*, 5 February 1900/ 24 March 1900/13 November 1900. After a short period the paper started to circulate again in 1902, under the title *Nea Elefteria*. But in July 1904 the paper, was symbolically closed again—only for a month this time. Princely Edict No 174, SGAC, 30 July 1904. See also *Elefteria* 1902-1905.

In November 1900, the paper *Anaggenisi*, printed in Rethimno, was closed down because of criticizing the local police. See Princely Edict, SGAC, 21 November 1900.

In October 1900, the paper *Kendron*, printed in Hania, was closed down, accused of attacking the authorities and of causing turmoil. See Princely Edict, SGAC, 9 October 1900.

¹¹² See SGAC, March 1901.

¹¹³ See SGAC (29/2), 4 July 1904.

¹¹⁴ Kostas Svolopoulos, “Η Κρητική Πολιτεία από το 1899: Autonomous Crete since 1899,” in *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: History of the Greek Nation*, ed. E. Athinon (Athina: Ekdotiki Athinon).

¹¹⁵ See Princely Address to the Cretans, SGAC (40), 23 August 1906.

arbitrarily declaring union with Greece. In other words, although the slogan used by the prince remained the same, the locals imbued it with a different meaning: democracy and self-administration. To make a stronger point, furthermore, they managed to take control of some of the island's customs offices and proceeded to collect taxes on imports in the name of their rebellious administration.¹¹⁶ The prince, for his part, declared martial law. The Christian governmental deputies issued a decree condemning the revolution and authorizing the prince—and only the prince—to declare union with Greece. As to the Muslim deputies, they protested the declarations of rebels and officials alike as, despite the actual factors that contributed to the outbreak of turmoil, the issues put at stake by the conflict directly concerned the status of Muslims.¹¹⁷

In fact, the armed mobilization of the rebels, which became known as the “Therisso movement,” seemed to be more symbolical than literal—especially when compared to the island's violent past. As reported, only a few soldiers of the gendarmerie and some rebels were injured during the collisions as, contrary to previous uprisings, most of those climbing the mountains in 1905 to get European attention were local politicians, doctors, and lawyers.¹¹⁸ In any case, the Great Powers decided that, violent or not, a new uprising should be avoided. Moreover, since the rebels objected to

¹¹⁶ Following these events, the prince and the general consuls were forced to inform European businessmen about the situation, specifying which customs offices were still under the control of the official authorities and which not, see the relevant announcement in French and Greek, signed by the Prince and the Consul of Great Britain Esme Howard, Consul of Russia De Bbonewsky, Consul of France L. Maurouard, and Consul of Italy Fasciotti, SGAC, see 8/21 September 1905.

¹¹⁷ See the Princely Speech-Address to the Cretan Parliament and the result of the relevant parliamentary vote, SGAC, 7 April 1905. See also the Resolution of Union, signed by the Christian deputies of the Cretan Parliament, SGAC, 15 May 1905.

¹¹⁸ See SGAC (14), 12 March 1905; SGAC(16), 16 March 1905; Proceedings of the Princely Council's Meeting No 69, SGAC, 9 December 1905.

the leading role the prince and Russia tried to play in their 'liberation,' the ambassadors of the Western powers agreed to negotiate with them, convincing Russia to follow. Union with Greece was out of the question. Yet, in exchange, they agreed on an internal political change.¹¹⁹ An international committee was sent to Crete, suggesting a program of reforms. New parliamentary and municipal elections were immediately proclaimed and it was kindly recommended to the prince that he had better grant the rebels general amnesty.¹²⁰

Within this context, a fragile tranquility was restored under the precondition of further democratization.¹²¹ The Cretans set out for new elections, which were to be held in May 1906, leading to the formation of the second constitutional parliament of Autonomous Crete.¹²² Since Cretan demographic data had meanwhile shifted once again in favor of the Christians, new electors lists had to be prepared. The relevant lists show the dramatic fall of the Muslim population in Crete that resulted in a profound decrease of their representative power. While in 1899 the Muslim deputies constituted one-third

¹¹⁹ See the answer provided by the Great Powers to the prince's request for union in SGAC, 22 March 1905. See also the answer provided by the Powers to the similar requests of the Cretan Parliament, SGAC, 29 April/12 May 1905. See also, Speech of the Consuls-Address to the Committee of Therisso, SGAC (1905); Princely Proclamation, SGAC, 2 July 1905; Cretan Parliament to the Consuls of the Powers, SGAC, 10 July 1905.

¹²⁰ Princely Edict on Parliamentary Elections, SGAC, 17 January 1905: It was decided that 64 deputies were to be elected as following: 15 from Hania, 12 from Rethimno, 6 from Sfakia, 19 from Iraklio, 12 from Lasithi. See also Princely Edict on Municipal Elections, No 238, SGAC, 28 October 1905. Princely Edict on General Amnesty, SGAC (62), 11 November 1905 and the relevant announcement signed by the General Consuls of the Powers, SGAC(33),2/15 July 1905.

¹²¹ One of the first measures taken towards this direction was the annulment of the right of the Prince to appoint 10 deputies of his preference to the local Parliament. See Princely Edict No 626, SGAC, 8 September 1905.

¹²² Princely Edict on Elections No 30, SGAC, 29 February 1906.

of the Cretan Parliament, in 1906 they were reduced to just one-tenth of it.¹²³

Furthermore, at the new Parliament's first meeting, all Christian powers agreed on voting in favor of union. In this way, the Muslims were *de facto* forced to refuse participation at the opening.¹²⁴ Although the Powers hastened to protect them again, defending religious equality (*ισοπολιτεία*), it was obvious that Muslim security had become by then an issue of secondary importance.

In fact, the Powers strongly disapproved of—but did nothing to effectively prevent—the numerous reported incidents of Christian violence against Muslims, the actual impingement of what was decided in 1899, and the increasing encroachments upon Muslim properties—communal or individual—by the Christians. True, a mixed committee was formed by local and foreign representatives to examine relevant issues in cooperation with the special military courts set up by the Powers. Furthermore, in an attempt to balance things out, the prince was invited to grant amnesty to Muslims tried for the murder of Christians in 1897-1898.¹²⁵ Yet such symbolic initiatives proved rather unsuccessful. One should not forget that parallel to the local demographic transformations mentioned above, the Ottoman regime of the time was in no position to dynamically claim Crete. As a result, it seemed that for the sake of local stability, it was

¹²³ To be more specific, the Cretan Parliament numbered 132 deputies, 114 Christians and 18 Muslims. The above percentage was decided according to the following population data referring to those having the right to vote, Prefecture of Hania: 59, 652 Christians/ 11,735 Muslims. Prefecture of Sfakion: 25,549 Christians/ 0 Muslims. Prefecture of Rethimno: 51,657 Christians/ 6,797 Muslims. Prefecture of Iraklio: 77,313 Christians/ 13,341 Muslims. Prefecture of Lasithi: 56,215 Christians/ 0 Muslims. See Decision of the Princely Council (9), SGAC, 28 January 1906.

¹²⁴ Second Constitutional Assembly of the Cretans-Voting for Union, SGAC, 30 June 1906.

¹²⁵ Princely Edict on Amnesty, SGAC (45), 22 August 1906.

urgent to pacify Christian Cretans and Greeks rather than to satisfy Muslims.¹²⁶

In order to maintain balance between local rebels and the throne of Greece, therefore, the Powers afforded the latter the right to designate the island's High Commissioner every 5 years. As to the Ottoman Sultan, he had no right to interfere with the process any longer. Furthermore, it was agreed that Greek high officers would be sent to Crete to train local forces. After the above developments, and since the personal rivalry between Eleftherios Venizelos and Prince George was also at issue, the prince agreed to announce his resignation and leave Crete.¹²⁷ His decision caused a new round of riots on the island, as the Therisso rebels did not, in fact, represent a clear local majority. Upon closer scrutiny, it seems that local alliances were changing so rapidly that it was not all that clear who was supporting what.

In this respect, one of the most characteristic moments of the 1905-1906 riots was the attack against the Russian Embassy at Halepa (Hania), in September 1906, which resulted in the fatal injury of Basilios Mathioudakis, guardian of the embassy, and the severe injury of a Russian officer. The irony of this tragic incident was that both sides accused each other of the murder, since nobody could prove what exactly had happened. To be more specific, an indignant meeting had been held on that day by the governmental party at Halepa, to protest the resignation of the Prince and the support provided to the rebels by the Great Powers. The meeting had started peacefully but ended in a spirit of riot, manifested in violent outbreaks against the embassies. The parliamentary opposition, therefore, blamed the violent outcome of the day on the

¹²⁶ See Guardian Powers' Address to the Cretans, SGAC, 10/23 July 1906.

¹²⁷ Prince George's Address to the Cretans, SGAC (45), 2 September 1906.

government. The government argued that during the meeting the supporters of the rebels had started shooting from the nearby houses into the crowd and the embassies. Moreover, the same circles argued that the Russian embassy had been deliberately attacked by the opposition, since the Russian throne had openly supported Prince George.

The supporters of the opposition thought differently. The unlucky guardian was elevated by them into a symbol of governmental violence. As a result, they hijacked the customs office of Rethimno, with the excuse that import taxes should be used in order to compensate the victim's family. Both government and prince were then forced to accept the blame, undertaking the responsibility to pay the family a financial compensation, and humbly apologizing to the Russian Emperor for the insult.¹²⁸ Eventually, Prince George left the island after having melodramatically declared his devotion to the still loyal gendarmerie, expressing further the hope that local corps would one day constitute an integral part of the Greek army.¹²⁹

Alexandros Zaimis, a moderate conservative politician supportive of the Greek throne, was appointed new High Commissioner of Crete.¹³⁰ He arrived to the island in September 1906, with the mission to pacify local spirits.¹³¹ One of his first acts was thus

¹²⁸ Announcement of the High Commissioner's Council No 878/457, SGAC, 20 September 1906.

¹²⁹ Prince George's Address to the Cretan people, SGAC (48), 11 September 1906; Prince George's Address to the Cretan Gendarmerie, SGAC (49), 11 September 1906.

¹³⁰ Prince George's Address to the Cretans, SGAC (46), 4 September 1906; G. Theotokis, President of the Ministerial Council of Greece-Address to the Cretan Parliament, SGAC (52), 16 September 1906.

¹³¹ For the main events of the period see Stilianos Panigirakis, "Η Επανάσταση του Θερίσου: The Theriso Revolution," *Hania* (1980), 8-14; Stella Aligizaki, "Θερισό 1905: *Theriso 1905* (Hania: National Research Foundation "Eleftherios K. Venizelos," 2003).

to grant general amnesty.¹³² Moreover, although he assured Cretans that the long-term wish of Powers and Kingdom alike was union of the island with Greece, he underlined the importance of peace, democracy, equality before the law, and religious tolerance.¹³³ The fact that the Cretan Parliament of 1906 had immediately presented the new constitution to the Greek government, asking for its symbolic approval, cannot be overlooked. The hope of the local Christians for union was put forward one more time, in complete denial of the will of the Muslims. It is plausible to argue, therefore, that after 1906 the Muslim community of Crete started to resemble more what we mean by 'modern minorities.' That development, however, was not yet definitive.¹³⁴

In the same year, unofficial Olympic Games were held in Athens for the second time, generating considerable global attention and galvanizing Greek requests for a permanent venue in Greece.¹³⁵ The event constituted one more great opportunity for Christian Cretans to underscore their ties with Greece by sending their athletes to the free capital of the nation. According to them, the world had to be reminded of the significant role played by Cretan antiquity to the historical development of western athletic spirit. Thus Cretan municipalities, clubs, and associations were invited by the authorities to financially and physically contribute to the preparation of the local team.

¹³² Edict on General Amnesty, SGAC (61), 6 October 1906; High Commissioner-Address to the Constitutional Assembly of the Cretans, SGAC (39), 4 October 1906.

¹³³ Alexandros Th. Zaimis's Address to the Cretan People, SGAC (53), 18 September 1906; Alexandros Th. Zaimis to the King of the Greeks, SGAC (84), 21 September 1906; Princely Councilors Ad. Katzourakis, M. R. Koundouros, E. Hourdakakis, towards the Cretan authorities SGAC (88), 24 September 1904.

¹³⁴ See Communication between the President of the Constitutional Cretan Parliament Ad. Mihelidakis and the President of the Greek Parliament N. D. Levidis No 29/28, SGAC (74), 2 December 1906.

¹³⁵ Stanley Edgar Hyman, "Myth, Ritual, and Nonsense," *The Kenyon Review* 11, no. 3 (1949), 455-475; Christina Koulouri, ed., *Athens: Olympic City, 1896-1906* (Athens: International Olympic Academy, 2004).

As to the ideological content of such invitations, references from the Persian wars to the glory of ancient Athens and Sparta were employed by those in charge, as a sort of mosaic history, which legitimized ancient and modern union of Crete with Greece in the name of Cretan athletic might. As to the Muslims, although they were not officially excluded from the process, one imagines that it would have been very difficult for them to identify with ideals inspired by Greek nationalism, Christianity, and antiquity.¹³⁶

The following year, back in Crete, the electors lists prepared for the parliamentary elections of 1907 showed that Muslim benches had been slightly reduced to 8 of 65 (while in the constitutional parliament of the previous year, the relevant numbers were 18 of 142).¹³⁷ At the same time, although for a period Muslims were not included in the High Commissioner's Councils,¹³⁸ in 1907 Mehmed Bey Hamid Beizades was symbolically appointed Councilor of Education and Justice. In 1908, furthermore, Hasan Bey Skilianakis and Nesim Farfourakis were appointed Councilors of Education.¹³⁹ In order to explain this, it has to be mentioned that the enthusiastic Cretan declarations in favor of union did not last long. Shortly after the constitutional change, friction had developed once again between Venizelos and the throne of Greece.

¹³⁶ See Circular No 674/320, SGAC, 9 February 1906; Circular No 855/321, SGAC, 9 February 1906.

¹³⁷ The population in 1907 was presented as follows: Prefecture of Hania: 59,375 Christians, 11,735 Muslims: 12 Christian and 3 Muslim deputies. Prefecture of Sfakia: 26,303 Christians, 0 Muslims: 6 Christian deputies. Prefecture of Rethimno: 52,001 Christians, 6,797 Muslims: 11 Christian and 2 Muslim deputies. Prefecture of Iraklio: 76,924 Christians, 13,431 Muslims: 16 Christian and 3 Muslim deputies. Prefecture of Lasithi: 55,446 Christians: 0 Muslims-12 Christian deputies. See High Commissioner's Edict No 29, SGAC, 7 March 1907 and No 30, SGAC, 7 March 1907. See also High Commissioner's Edict on the transaction of elections No 42, SGAC, 24 March 1907.

¹³⁸ For instance, in 1906, Manousos Koundouros was Councillor of Economy, Adonios Katzourakis was Councillor of Internal Affairs, and Emmanouil Hourdakakis was Councillor of Education and Justice. In 1907, Petros Tatarakis was appointed Councillor of Economy, Ioannis Saounatsos was Councillor of Internal Affairs, and Haralambos Fandridis was appointed Councillor of Education and Justice, see SGAC(9), 21 February 1907.

¹³⁹ See High Commissioner's Edict, SGAC, 6 March 1908.

In this respect, from 1906 onwards, autonomous administration reached its peak of hybridity. What I mean by this is that, although Christian Cretans embraced Greek nationalism, some of the local political leaders—being in conflict with the Greek regime—were open also to the idea of an autonomous Christian-Muslim administration, provided that the Muslims in question would not try to push any initiatives against the Christian will.

Nationalism and Morality

The Greek-national connotations of local education and popular culture became even more obvious after 1906. Muslim culture was placed in a position of ever lower importance. For example, as we have seen, the post of the Councilor of Education and Justice was symbolically held by a Muslim. Yet the constitutional change of 1906 brought the local legal structures in almost perfect alignment with the Greek system, *de facto* excluding most Muslim jurists from the local institutions of Justice. Moreover, the Directory of Education engaged in an enthusiastic effort to promote the ideals of antiquity and Christianity among local students. A text published by the authorities in December 1908 announcing the foundation of Sports Academy in Athens, for example, was characteristic of the official narratives of the time.

By using illustrations from Greek antiquity, the authors of the text argued that athletic spirit was necessary for the healthy moulding of Cretan youth. The text referred specifically to ancient battles from Classical Athens to Alexander the Great as an endless series of collisions between the East and the West. In this respect, it was argued, ancient sport centers had become the gates of the West, serving to ready glorious armies. Yet,

that magnificent era had been followed by the unfortunate centuries of national captivity, when broader decadence had stricken the ancient athletic spirit at its very foundations. During those dark ages, only populations such as Maniates, Souliotes, Cretans, mountaineer thieves, and bandits had managed to maintain the ancient spirit of athletics (“Η γυμναστική δια μέσου των αιώνων ακολούθησασα τας τύχας του έθνους ημών παρημελήθη καθολοκληρίαν, μόνοι δε οι Μανιάται, οι Σουλιώται, οι Κρήτες, οι αρματωλοί και οι κλέφται διετήρησαν στοιχεία τινά ταύτης.”)¹⁴⁰ Only after the Greek revolution was the nation again in position to promote athletic training. Such initiatives, however, had been delayed due to an unfortunate lack of relevant education among the first masterminds of independent Greece. In conclusion, it was suggested that the time for the nation to recuperate had come, and that young Cretans should thus start to exercise in the name of national might.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ It is interesting to mention here that in the context of Greek national narratives all of the above groups were faltering between two conflicting characterizations: traitors or heroes. By and large, all of them were identified with mountaineer populations trained in professional fighting. Thus, during the uprisings of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they occasionally fought in the service of the sultan and occasionally against him, in the service of his enemies. Yet, most of the times, they functioned as simple bandits, in the service of nobody but their own chief. One has to underline here that despite —or due to— their lack of abstract ideological devotion, such populations, that is the Albanians of Morea and Epirus and the Cretans of Sfakia and Candia (*Αρβανίτες* and *Κρήτες*), were considered to be among the best fighters of the Empire; and later on, they produced numerous “Greek national heroes.” Furthermore, issues of religion presented also similarities among such groups, since they were identified with Islam or Christianity in a very abstract way, having very little to do with official religious services as practiced by populations in urban centers. The case of Crete had already been examined in this respect. In terms of comparison see also Mihail G. Labrinidis, *Οι Αλβανοί κατά την κυρίως Ελλάδα και την Πελοπόννησον : Υδρα - Σπέτσαι: Albanians in Central Greece and the Peloponnese: Hedra and Spetses Islands* (En Athines: Estia, 1907); Kostas I. Biris, *Αρβανίτες, οι Δωριείς του Νεώτερου Ελληνισμού : Ιστορία των Ελλήνων Αρβανιτών: Arnavouts, the Dorians of Modern Greece: the History of Greek Arnavouts* (Athine: Bizoumis, G,1960); Aristidis P. Kollias, *Αρβανίτες και η Καταγωγή των Ελλήνων: Ιστορική, Λαογραφική, Πολιτιστική, Γλωσσολογική Επισκόπηση: Arnavouts and the Origins of Greeks: a Historical, Ethnographic, Cultural and Linguistic Examination* (Athina: Rallis, Evaggelos M. 1983); Maria Mihail-Dede, *Οι Έλληνες Αρβανίτες: Greek Arnavouts* (Ioannina: Idrima Vorioiprotikon Erevnon, 1987); Mihail-Dede, Maria, *Δημοτικό Τραγούδι και Ιστορία : Τουρκαλβανοί και Έλληνες Αρβανίτες: Folk-song and History: Tuskish-Albanians and Greek Arnavouts* (Ioannina: Idrima Vorioiprotikon Erevnon, 1995).

¹⁴¹ See Higher Directory of Education’s Address to Teachers and Educators No 4870/2920, SGAC, 13 December 1908.

Similar to the above was a text regarding Christianity that was sent to school teachers by the same authority. By referring to Homer, Alexander the Great, Byzantine Constantinople, and the heroes of the Greek revolution—Kanaris, Kolokotronis and Korakas—the authors were suggesting that religious piety was a particularity of the Greek nation (“το έθνος ημών επί χιλιετηρίδων όλην διεκρίθη δια την ευσέβειαν και δια τους μακρούς αγώνας αυτού ού μόνον προς εξάπλωσιν αλλά και διαφύλαξιν από των αιρέσεων της θείας υμών θρησκείας.”) This imaginative narrative, which included idolatry, paganism, medieval imperial orthodoxy, and clannishness in the same conceptual framework—falling under the abstract description of “national religion”—left out from consideration only local Islam. Yet the main point the authors were trying to make was that students' attendance in church services should be obligatory, and that teachers should keep attendance records.¹⁴²

The above examples prove that education projects in Autonomous Crete were influenced by missions specifically national, and generally moralistic, in character. Moreover, such projects did not concern only students. By and large, the autonomous regime, both before and after 1906, seemed devoted to purifying local society from the vices of the past. Physical violence, prostitution, homosexuality, feuds, and self-redress were thus to be actively persecuted and implicitly condemned. Within this context, Christians and Muslims alike were forced to adapt to what was perceived as 'proper behavior.' Local regulators accepted, for instance, that prostitution had to be tolerated, but considered it a necessity to keep such activities under state control. For instance, it does not escape attention that one of the very first bills issued in Autonomous Crete

¹⁴² See Higher Directory of Education's address to teachers and educators No 4937/2957, SGAC, 18 December 1908.

concerned dive bars (*χαμαιτυπίο*) and female street prostitution. In this respect, medical reports were presented by the relevant authorities in order to justify the top-priority given to this issue.

As it was argued by the doctors charged to explain the governmental point of view, due to the "primitive and yet noble," austere Cretan family traditions, which contradicted the "robust, strong, and full of healthy vigor" physical condition of the Cretans, moral corruption constituted a constant threat against law and order. Thus, the number of acts of violence related to sexual issues was alarming, on the one hand; and prostitution was completely out of control, on the other. The main problem was that the very same authorities charged with defending morality and order, such as the local *gendarmerie*, appeared to be the most vulnerable to the lure of such "threats" to morality. Thus, according to the doctors, the issue at stake was one of national security. It is interesting to mention, furthermore, that the relevant medical reports praised continuous revolutions and uprisings for having been a very effective solution to the problem in the past. Nevertheless, since the restoration of peace had led to a bout of immoral behaviors, prostitution had henceforth to be institutionalized and regulated by the state.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ “Εἰς ποίας ποτέ χρονικάς περιόδους ὁ Κρητικὸς λαὸς, κεκμηκῶς ἐκ τῶν πολιτικῶν παθῶν, εὐρέθη εἰς συνάφειαν μετὰ τοσούτων γυναικῶν ἐλευθερίων ἡθῶν; Τ’ ἀπλούστερα ἦθη, πρωτογεννῆ τολμῶ εἰπεῖν, εἶνε ἡ κληρονομία τοῦ Κρητικοῦ λαοῦ, καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν κατὰ συνέπεια ἡ τιμὴ τῆς οἰκογενείας ἐνυψίστη συναισθήσει μέχρι τοῦ σημείου τοῦ να καθίσταται ἀφορμὴ αἱματηρῶν ἀντεκδικήσεων. Καὶ τὰντα μὲν ὑπὸ ἠθικὴν ἔποψιν. Ὑπὸ φυσικὴν δ’ ἔποψιν αἷμα ἀγνόν, ρωμαλαῖον, ὁργανισμὸς τέλειος, ὡς κατ’ ἐπανάληψιν ἐδήλωσαν μοι οἱ στρατιωτικοὶ ἰατροί, οἱ ἐπισκεφθέντες καὶ ἐξετάσαντες τοὺς χωροφύλακας.” See the relevant medical reports in SGAC, 2 June 1900.

With regard to the specific regulation issued in this respect, the special attention paid—at least in theory—to the protection of women and hygiene is interesting. Among other things, it was specified that women working at licensed houses should see medical doctors often, and take care of their personal hygiene. It was forbidden by law to recruit girls younger than sixteen years old. It was considered a crime to force women into prostitution against their own will, or to physically injure them in any possible way. Furthermore, in case they wanted to quit such activities, women had the right to address the local police asking for protection. In case they were of a foreign origin and wanted to abandon the island, it was the responsibility of the authorities to safeguard that they would find a “descent job” in the place of their origin, or where they had relatives. See Princely Edict No 173, SGAC, 2 June 1900.

Male homosexuality, at the same time, was considered by the authorities a crime that should not be tolerated under any circumstances. In Autonomous Crete, therefore, courts were flooded with cases of homosexual activities involving both Christians and Muslims, which were often to be judged by default, upon the defendants' escape from the island. Thus, since all trials in absence of the defendants were published in the State Gazette, the above source constitutes an interesting database. In short, simultaneously to political conflicts and turmoil, it appears that numerous Muslims had abandoned Crete after 1899 due to their persecution not for political but for 'moral' reasons. Marginal or not, such cases were numerous enough to attract my attention. In the context of this study more than 300 cases of Muslim fugitives who appeared to have escaped the island to avoid punishment for their "immoral" deeds have been examined, spanning from 1899 to 1908. As to who were included into this abstract category, the most typical patterns are briefly presented in the following section.

The Emigration of the Muslim 'Marginals'

As mentioned earlier, homosexuality and male prostitution were treated as punishable acts in Autonomous Crete. It is quite striking, furthermore, that in case the 'culprits' at issue had fled the island, the indictment was published in the Gazette with a full description of their 'crime.' In this way, the reader of the Gazette is offered not only the names of mixed homosexual groups of Christians and Muslims, but also details about

the exact manner in which their 'crime' was committed.¹⁴⁴ It is hard to know if the authorities went to the lengths they did in an attempt to ridicule homosexuals and to make a negative example of them, or if the directness of similar indictments manifested only their attempt to be straight-forward about the matter. One way or another, it was clear enough that homosexuality was persecuted not only as an act but also as an orientation. Thus, anyone having anything to do with similar activities was considered a criminal by the local court-of-law, be they groups of young boys (Muslim and Christian) swimming naked, touching each other in inappropriate ways, or whomever hosted homosexual activities in his house.¹⁴⁵

Aside from homosexuality, the authorities instituted legal proceedings against the also common patterns of child-molesting, bestiality, sexual relations outside the bonds of marriage, adultery, physical violence against women and men, and obscenity (mainly against the authorities).¹⁴⁶ Hence, a number of Muslims appeared to be fugitives from justice for one of the above reasons. A particularly great number of them was prosecuted for murders and injuries that had occurred during private altercations. One has to underline here that, although in some cases physical assaults may have been colored by

¹⁴⁴ From the Gazette, we learn for instance that Mustafa Karavelakis, from the town of Iraklio, had escaped Crete after being accused of having sexually harassed three English soldiers, exposing his genitals to them in public, and trying to molest their posteriors. See Case No 873/749, SGAC, 8 September 1906. Similarly, fugitives Ahmed Hasan Katsivelakis, Ahmed M. Mehmed Tsoukakis-Mendis, and Alekos Andr. A. Mragopoulos were invited to court for the following "punishable" deeds. The first one, for having tried to commit sodomy upon the second one –although he had, eventually, failed to so due to reasons above his will; the second one, for having assented in being sodomized, removing his trousers and belt with his own free will; and the third one for allowing them to use his house for the above described activities. See Case No 4573/3129, SGAC, 13 June 1906.

One should not forget that copies of these indictments were also post on the door of the fugitives in question.

¹⁴⁵ Case No 269, SGAC, 12 September 1905.

¹⁴⁶ See for instance Case No 1214/ 996, SGAC, 26 November 1903.

national or religious hatred, it seems that such fights generally had more to do with issues of honor, domestic feuds, manorial conflicts, and abductions, which were equally frequent within and between the two communities.¹⁴⁷ In some cases, the line between disputed property rights, personal hatred, and communal ideological fanaticism was indeed fine.¹⁴⁸ Yet inter-communal acts of violence were as numerous and as vehement as those between Muslims and Christians.¹⁴⁹ In the case of Crete, therefore, one has to be very careful when trying to explain violence primarily along the lines of religious conflict.

In brief, under autonomous administration, Cretan penal courts frequently brought to trial murders committed both in sudden wrath and with deliberation,

¹⁴⁷ See for instance Case No 1214/ 996, SGAC, 26 November 1903.

¹⁴⁸ For instance, in 1903, Kaber Kambourakis from the eparchy of Monofatsiou was prosecuted for breaking into the residence of Nikolaos Aggelidakis, physically attacking him, and trying to occupy the residence by force. In fact, Nikolaos Aggelidakis used to work as a gardener for the actual owner of the residence, Dervis Halalakakis, who had died in Izmir. A sharp disagreement occurred then between the gardener and Kaber Kambourakis, since the first one occupied the disputed building, which the second claimed to be his own. See Case No 1214/ 996, SGAC, 26 November 1903.

More aggressive behaviors were equally often. For example, in 1908, Mahmud Selim Rounakis, from the eparchy of Monofatsiou, was prosecuted for having decapitated Ioannis Kokarakis in sudden wrath, by cutting off his head with a large knife, simultaneously firing his gun against his victim's face twice. See Case No 129/ 34, SGAC, 31 March 1908. Similarly, in 1907, Haridimos Stavroulakis was prosecuted for the deliberate murder of Salih Tairakis from the eparchy of Rethimno, who was stabbed to death while sleeping, by the defendant and his friends, over previous disagreements. See Case No 644/693, SGAC, 1 March 1907.

¹⁴⁹ For instance, in 1904, Niyazi Varatanakis had injured Hilmi Oustahasanakis in knife fight, after an argument he had with him in front of Arap Matzounis's coffee-shop. See Case No 101/325, SGAC, 4 October 1904.

In 1906, Ali Hacı Mustafa Yaralakakis, from Kokkino Metoxi, eparchy of Kidonias, had broken the head of Hasan Ibrahim Ladakis in sudden wrath. See Case No 1597/1490, SGAC, 30 July 1907.

The same year, Ali Mercan Lagitakis from the prefecture of Rethimno, had walloped hard two Muslim women, Nazife Kasım Mevloutaki and Elfiye wife of Yusuf Habibakis, verbally insulting the husband of the latter, calling him a "dishonest cuckold (*κερατά/kerata*)" and publicly threatening him with murder. See Case No 8775/5976, SGAC, 16 November 1906. In 1907, Halil Ali Kirkorakis, from the prefecture of Hania, was persecuted for the deliberate murder of Mustafa Youlielmakis, who was stabbed to death by the plaintiff and his father Ali Kirkorakis, over previous disagreements. See Case No 1903/2009, SGAC, 6 June 1907.

according to the local codes of "vendetta."¹⁵⁰ True, the examples used in this study concern only defendants who had left the island before their trial. Although it may have been of interest to examine the local court archives and records in greater detail, this has not been the chief concern of the present investigation. Even by reference to my restricted body of data, however, it can be safely argued that the number and character of the cases examined here point to the existence of certain patterns in Crete that contradicted the authorities' understanding of order and law. The attempts of the autonomous administration, at the same time, to prosecute any 'immorality' or 'vice' pointed to a new understanding of the *ethos* (ἦθος) directly associated with Greek nationalism. In this respect, regardless of religion, a part of the local population that could not adapt to the new situation was hounded and left with little choice but to escape.

Bills of indictment concerning Muslim fugitives, therefore, carry a double meaning. First, they illustrate the transformations experienced by the world they had left behind. Second, they are reminders that each one of the 'Muslim refugees' deserves the right to have had a unique story, instead of having been just a part of an anonymous mass. The cases examined in this study may have been quite marginal. Yet they were the most striking examples of the fact that even massive emigration concerns a variety of different individuals, each with their own (frequently untold) story. During the years of the Muslim exodus from Crete, one finds among those who departed illicit couples, charlatans profiting from chaos, men and women who wanted to abandon their family, or farmers and entrepreneurs who could not repay their debtors. Such background stories

¹⁵⁰ For a similar discussion see Stephen Wilson, *Feuding, Conflict and Banditry in Nineteenth-Century Corsica* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

are of particular interest, as they derived from diachronic human behaviors rather than specific political conflicts, though the two aspects of each story—the personal and the general—may have been related to each other in unknown ways.

For instance, it is not known whether a certain Aliye Gafouloupoula, wife of Mustafa Tourkohasanakis, perceived developments after 1897 as a gradual *Hellenization* of the island, or whether she cared not at all about such issues. What is known is that in 1905 she got pregnant by adultery and gave birth to a daughter, of whom according to the law she had to take care. Moreover, it is known that she had decided to act differently, abandoning her newborn infant in front of the Muslim cemetery at Hania and secretly escaping Crete.¹⁵¹ Similarly, the thoughts of a Christian man, Panagiotis Katzourakis, and a Muslim woman, Fatima Hasan Saridaki, from Iraklio regarding the island's political situation remain obscure to the present researcher. Yet, even the present researcher can guess what feelings towards each other they might have shared, since in 1908 they ran away from Crete together against the wishes of the girl's family.¹⁵²

Despite the fact that the reasons the above individuals escaped Crete were not, directly at least, relevant to political developments, one wonders where they went and what story they told about their emigration when they reached their new place of residence. Cretan turmoil, administrative confusion, and the massive Muslim exodus from Crete, in other words, provided such fugitives with a desirable anonymity. This aspect of the story becomes even more obvious in the case of Ali Arifakis, an imaginative charlatan who, in 1907, was prosecuted for taking advantage of naive

¹⁵¹ Case No 870/ 448, SGAC, 19 February 1905.

¹⁵² Case No 4606/ 2752, SGAC, 2 June 1908.

Muslims in the town of Iraklio. For instance, Ali Arifakis had managed to convince Rukiye (or Nakiye) Stiakopoula, wife of Ali Samantzakis, that he was a holy man of Islam, well-known among Muslims in Anatolia by the name “Hazret Ali.” Moreover, in order to swindle a large sum of money out of her, Ali deluded Rukiye with empty promises. He convinced her that she had a secret charisma and that she should thus become a female Saint. The only problem was that Saints were not supposed to have private property. Thus, for Rukiye to be purified, she had to sell a residence she owned in the town of Iraklio and grant the money to him to use for charity purposes. Rukiye had agreed to follow his advice. However, as soon as the transaction was finalized, “Hazret Ali” disappeared from the island; and his dissolution into thin air evidently had little to do with his quality as a putative Saint, as he took with him both his promises and his victim’s money.¹⁵³

Another trick that appeared to be equal in creativity to the one just mentioned was the false impersonation of Muslim women. For instance, fugitives Hüseyin Tzemalakis and Azize Lazanopoula, from Iraklio, were prosecuted for the following acts. The latter had appeared to the town’s notary, pretending she was Hüsniye Hotzopoula, and receiving in Hüsniye's name a significant sum of money (860 drachmas) from Eleftherios Krasakis. The notary was easily convinced, because Hüseyin Tzemalakis confirmed her identity as real. However, after the money had been received (the actual Hotzopoula being still ignorant of the transaction) the two partners disappeared.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, fugitives Adonios Kodokritharakis, Cemal Mehmed Abdul

¹⁵³ The value of the residence was 1000 *drachmas*, Case No 649/658, SGAC, 21 June 1907.

¹⁵⁴ Case No 114/23, SGAC, 10 August 1908.

Selimakis, and Abdul Selim Misirlakis, all from the town of Hania, were prosecuted for the following fraud. Adonios appeared to the town's notary together with an unknown Muslim woman, claiming that the latter was Aliye Rahataki, to whom he wished to lend an amount of money. After the other defendants had certified her identity, a contract was signed stipulating that Aliye Rahataki owed to Adonios Kodokritharakis an amount of 3,000 francs. The fraud was eventually uncovered. As to the three partners, they had escaped the island together with the mystery Muslim woman, who may not have been a woman at all.¹⁵⁵

Those Who Had Stayed

It could be argued that after the Therisso events, the integration of Crete to Greece seemed to be almost inevitable. Nonetheless, as I have underlined numerous times, if later developments—from the Young Turk revolution to the First World War—had evolved in differently, eastern Mediterranean political geography might have been very different today. In this context, the only thing that was certain with regard to Crete was that the population of Muslims had rapidly fallen. Even this reality, however, should not be examined only from the perspective of political conflict. In order to illustrate this argument I have tried to present some of the most “marginal” of reasons for Muslim emigration, underlying the intimate aspects of each story. In the same vein, we should not forget that the stories of the Muslims who had decided to stay in Crete were equally varied.

Opportunities for individual growth were offered to Muslims both in spite of and

¹⁵⁵ Case No 63, *SCAG*, 7 September 1908.

due to the relative marginalization of the community. For instance, some of them invested in sectors not directly influenced by political changes, such as small industry and commerce. Although most of the wealthiest members of the community, including manufacturers and traders, had sold their properties and left after 1897, some of the smaller Muslim interpreters, cooks, pastry chefs, grocers, innkeepers, and craftsmen invested in staying in Crete and modernizing their facilities. One should not forget that in an effort to improve local economy the authorities levied no customs duties for the import of foreign machinery. Thus, despite extremely unstable political conditions, some of the local Muslims appeared to profit from the government's growing interest in supporting local investments.¹⁵⁶ Yet the most important aspect of Muslim communal identity was linked not to trade or enterprising, but to the legacy of the pious foundations.

To sum up, three interconnected factors have to be taken into consideration with regard to the Muslim presence in Autonomous Crete. First, during the period from 1897 to 1906, autonomous administration was granted to Cretans by the Great Powers as an experiment in peaceful coexistence. In this respect, the representation of Muslims at administrative and political institutions was of crucial importance. Moreover, as some of

¹⁵⁶ The following cases, provide a good illustration of the first argument in context:

In 1904, Hüseyin Hüsnü Hisairakis brought in Iraklio new machinery to tool up his wool manufacturing company. See Princely Edict No 563, SGAC, 5 March 1904.

In 1905, amidst tension and local turmoil, Ali Vafi Selianakis actively engaged in modernizing his oil-mil in the town of Rethimno, importing to the island a variety of new machines and equipment. See Princely Edict No 775, SGAC, 19 September 1905; Princely Edict No 833, SGAC, 12 November 1905; Princely Edict No 891, SGAC, 23 February 1906.

In 1906, Yusuf Lamerakis had two brand-new olive-presses, with their full spare parts, imported to Rethimno, to be used in his oil-mil. See Princely Edict No 1033, SGAC, 12 December 1906.

In 1906, Hüseyin Kefalakis, a blacksmith from Hania, and his partner Thomas Nikakis, bought new equipment for their workshop, and Hacı Adem Pizrenli, a pastry-cook from Hania, bought for his patisserie a brand new almond peeling machine. See High Commissioner's Edict No 1006, SGAC, 10 October 1906 and Princely Edict No 921, SGAC, 29 May 1906.

the most prominent Muslims had already abandoned the island by then, those left behind were offered the opportunity to occupy posts for which they were not qualified. This fragile balance, however, was disrupted by Greek nationalism and Muslim emigration. Eventually, therefore, the Muslims were excluded from local administration. The second factor that may have kept Muslims in Crete was their engagement in local commerce, industry, trade, farming, fishing, and a variety of other economic activities. Nevertheless, one's professional background—whether owning a massive factory or a modest tavern—can explain only individual choices. It does not explain how the communal identity of Cretan Muslims was shaped in relation to the island's particular material realities.

In this respect, I would argue that the third factor under scrutiny—that is, Muslim pious foundations—became the actual venue for the final community-stimulation of Cretan Muslims. From this point of view, it is impossible to explain the survival of Cretan Islam for almost thirty years after 1897 without reference to the local institution of the *vakf*. In fact, the analysis that follows focuses only on developments up until 1908. Later dynamics cannot really be examined without reference to the upheaval caused throughout the Ottoman Empire following the fall of Abdülhamid II. Nevertheless, in an attempt to show how the primary sources used here directly correspond with the resulting theory, I have included in my analysis some later examples. On the following pages, therefore, the discussion contemplates a twofold task. First, a presentation of some examples concerning the archival material used here; and second, an attempt at more general projections made from the specific body of data regarding the pious foundations.

The Cretan *Vakfs*

In Crete, the story of the Ottoman *vakf* starts in late seventeenth century when the Ottomans got hold of the island after much effort, ending the previous rule of Venice. In line with Ottoman patterns of the era, numerous endowments were founded on Cretan lands after the conquest: by members of the imperial family, high or low-ranking Ottoman officials, and persons of more modest means—women as well as men. Moreover, since the island was brought under Ottoman control at a time when Orthodox Islam was faced with important challenges, Crete was furnished with *tekkes* and *tarikats* of mystical Islam, both orthodox and heterodox.¹⁵⁷ In this respect, the practice of endowing continued for centuries as a means of negotiating land, status, and power between the capital city and the province, the imperial treasury and individual properties, orthodox and heterodox Islam, Christian communities and Muslims. The result of this process was that numerous Cretan villages, valleys, urban quarters, and arable fields ended up being attached to the island's *vakfs*.

The complex theme of private ownership on conquered Cretan lands is not going to be addressed here. Moreover, this study cannot answer the question of whether the administration of Ottoman pious foundations had ever been centralized and, if so, when decentralization started to occur. The only thing to be mentioned here with regard to such issues is that in the eighteenth century, most of the Cretan Muslim endowments were outside of Istanbul's direct reach. As noted in previous chapters, furthermore, the above situation started to radically change from the reign of Sultan Mahmud II onwards

¹⁵⁷ For the conversion of old Christian religious places to Muslim ones, as well as for the establishment of new Muslim *vakfs* see Bayraktar, *Ottoman Religious Policies*, 58-65, 66-74.

(or even shortly before). In other words, it was around that era the imperial center attempted for the first time to violently deal, once and for all, with the main poles of decentralization in Crete: *ayans*, *yeniçeris*, *tarikats*, and *vakfs*.¹⁵⁸

Similar enterprises were undertaken by the Empire's bureaucrats during the period of the *Tanzimat* in the name of broader reform. Yet due to the fact that the *Tanzimat* regime was simultaneously faced with multiple obstacles, one of which was the development of national movements in some of the provinces, the process remained incomplete. Thus, as soon as Crete became autonomous, the new authorities realized that local *vakf* real-estate was of overwhelming proportions, and largely out of bureaucratic control. Yet, the position of the new regime *vis-à-vis* the issue was delicate. On the one hand, the island's Islamic past and the communal rights of the Muslims should be respected. On the other hand, Muslim foundations needed to be placed under efficient administrative control, since their status directly concerned both Christians and Muslims. In order to explain what is meant by this, one has to take into consideration what the endowments in question consisted of.

The pious foundations of Crete were made up of religious and charitable institutions, such as mosques, dervish convents, khans, fountains, and soup kitchens, the source of revenue for the construction and maintenance of which was provided by endowments dedicated to the foundations by the faithful. Therefore, real estate property, such as building plots, arable lands, trees, residences, and shops, as well as cash *vakfs*, such as the Orphan Banks, were to be found in late nineteenth century Crete under the management of the local *Evakfs* (Administration of Pious Foundations). Moreover,

¹⁵⁸ Barnes, *Introduction*, 67-86; M. Ipsirli, "II Mahmut Döneminde Vakıfların İdaresi: The Administration of Religious Foundations During Mahmud II's Reign," in *Sultan II Mahmut Ve Reformları Semineri, Bildiriler* (Istanbul: 1990).

although this study is not an exhaustive account of the different endowments to be found on the island, it is safe to say that Cretan land *vakfs* were *gayr-ı sahih* (non-sound), since they constituted *mîrî* (public) lands, alienated from the treasury for pious reasons.¹⁵⁹ As to the tenure characteristics that such properties appeared to have in the years before and after 1897, lands and buildings were officially divided into two main categories: leased by single rent, on a short term lease (*μονοτελή/ icâre-i vahide*), and leased by double rent, on life-tenancy (*διτελή/ icâreteyn*).

In the first instance, the lands were given to rent either by the central administrations or by individual managers for a short period of time. In the second instance, however, a different kind of agreement was made between the two. The renters had to pay a double rent. The first one was paid in the form of down-payment to the managers or to the *Evkaf* (*icâre-i muaccele*), for which the renter received a title-deed acknowledging him life-tenancy rights on the property (*tapu*). The second one was paid in the form of a yearly rent (*icâre-i müeccele*), which safeguarded that only the *tapu* of the property (and not the right of possession) belonged to the renters, and could thus be inherited or sold by them. Theoretically speaking, the above system was legitimate, in case the leased properties were in bad condition and the *Evkaf* needed liquidity in order to cover their repair. It is hard to say, however, whether this was how the system worked in practice. In other words, it was not really clear if local networks operated more in favor of the pious foundations, or of individual interests.¹⁶⁰ One way or the other, the

¹⁵⁹ For the relevant terms see, Ali Himmet Berki, *Vakfa Dair Yazılan Eserlerle Vakfiye Ve Benzeri Vesikalarda Geçen İstilah Ve Tabirler: Terms and Expressions That Appear in Written Sources, Vakfiyes and Similar Documents with Regard to Pious Foundations* (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel Mudurlugu Yayinlari 1966), 27-28.

¹⁶⁰ For the system of *icâreteyn* see Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations*, 50-59; Seyit Ali

above practice was quite widespread in Crete. Moreover, at the end of the century, lots of the relevant title-deeds appeared to have been either lost or destroyed. On numerous occasions, therefore, it was impossible to prove what was leased to whom, and on what basis. In this respect, since in the following pages reference is made to the land reforms realized in Autonomous Crete, it is useful to keep in mind that the sorry state of the foundations' archives constituted a major source of confusion.

The Administrations of Muslim Pious Foundations,

Cash *Vakfs* and Orphan Banks

Contrary to mainstream literature, which treats the period of autonomy as nothing less than the downfall of the Muslim community, my argument is that new circumstances after 1897 offered Muslims a variety of individual opportunities. The above opportunities, however, cannot by themselves adequately explain the fact that a recognizable Muslim communal identity was maintained in Crete. In order to address Cretan Muslims as a group we need to define what their local common point of reference was. The easiest answer to the above question would be that they were all described as Muslim-Ottoman Cretans. Yet what exactly did this description mean during the period under scrutiny? Did ideological awareness derive from an abstract sense of loyalty to Istanbul? Was Cretan Islam a homogenous structure relating to Islamic Orthodoxy as defined by the Ottoman Capital? Or, was it a ramified, local socio-ideological construction with clear material connotations pertaining to local *tarikats*,

Kahraman, *Evkâf-ı Hümâyûn Nezâreti: The Ministry of the Imperial Directory of the Muslim Pious Foundations* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2006), 70-75.

mosques, and Muslim real-estate?

One should not forget that, particularly during the period under scrutiny, the essence and practices of Ottoman Islam constituted contested space not only in Crete, but everywhere around the Empire. At the same time, human identities in general are ideological constructs that correspond—almost without exception—with given material situations. In order to explain why the Muslim community continued to exist in Crete, therefore, one needs something more substantial than some abstract reference to Islam. In this respect, this author suggests that the Cretan *vakf* has to be taken into consideration as a material reality with loaded ideological meaning. In other words, my argument is that the institution of the *vakf* had direct material and ideological connotations strong enough to cover both tangible aspects of the Muslim way of life and individual interests. Furthermore, it was flexible enough to be integrated—or at least tolerated—within national structures rival to the Ottomans. The transformation and survival of the *vakf*, in other words, became one of the most important reasons the community was able to transform and to survive until 1923. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the diplomatic delicacy of the situation after 1897 prevented the new authorities from openly violating Muslim communal rights.

Specific reference to administrative issues may help to clarify the above abstract arguments. In Autonomous Crete, the old *Evkafs*¹⁶¹ were replaced by three (and later on, with the foundation of one more Muslim court at Lasithi, four) Administrations of Muslim Pious Foundations, each of which was founded at the seat of the relevant religious court. Each Administration was managed by an eight-member council of Muslim elders (*Δημογεροντία*) and a director elected by the council. The religious judge

¹⁶¹ Senisik, *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete*, 102-110.

of the town was the president of the administration. The members were unsalaried and elected. After the election, their appointment was validated by the High Commissioner, unless there was any kind of legal objection or impediment.¹⁶² As to the electoral body, it consisted of the prefecture's Muslim parliamentary representatives, mayors, and members of prefectural and municipal councils.

It is obvious, therefore, that the management of the Muslim foundations was granted to a small group of Muslim dignitaries, holding key-positions on every level of local Muslim representation. In this respect, the alleged knowledge these families had of administering pious foundations afforded them significant power. Especially during the first years of autonomy, when the Christian authorities lacked both the knowledge to deal with the issue and the power to radically offend Muslim rights, Muslim participation in the parliament and local administration could have been justified even for the simple reason that they represented the Muslim foundations. True, Christian authorities started to claim Muslim communal properties as early as 1899. Yet, at least until 1906, internal conditions allowed for the parallel growth of a local Muslim elite, which continued to negotiate with the Christians over property and status. This process is illustrated very well by the ways the ideological and functional uses of the old *Evkafs* changed after 1899.

One of the first things to be mentioned here is that the salaries of the employees of the Muslim foundations—whether religious, educational, or charity institutions—used to be paid from the Muslim communal treasury. This practice was at first considered the cornerstone of the maintenance of *vakf* legacy in Autonomous Crete. Nevertheless,

¹⁶² See Religious Foundations, Chapter B, in Princely Edict No 145 “Special Regulation on the Muslim Community,” SGAC, 23 March 1900.

shortly after the proclamation of Autonomy, the local authorities started to challenge the established system, gradually taking upon the common public treasury some of the *Evkafs'* responsibilities and authorities. For example, the government undertook the obligation to pay the salaries of Muslim teachers¹⁶³ and Muslim spiritual leaders (the *kadi*, *müftü* and secretaries of the religious courts).¹⁶⁴ In this respect, the institutionalization of compulsory primary education and the recognition of Muslim religious offices as public offices constituted serious threats to older pious practices and rights. The threat, however, was initially only theoretical. In practice, the government was unable to immediately take up the burden of restoring school buildings, covering expenses, and providing the necessary infrastructure for modern education. In addition to such constraints, the new administration was also faced with significant debts created by the former authorities. For instance, due to the constant turmoil before 1899, some public employees had not been paid their salaries for months or even years.¹⁶⁵

In the first years after 1899, therefore, Christian and Muslim communities were invited to get their treasuries in order, and to continue financing education through their traditional means, up to the point in which local authorities would be able to take over the relevant expenses. In fact, the prolongation of old practices did not last long. In March 1902, for example, the government informed the Administrations' directors about

¹⁶³ See, for instance, Princely Edict No 473, SGAC (84), 15 December 1907. For an example of how such payments were realized see the case of Ali Fafoulagadaki, Muslim teacher, appointed at the Muslim primary school of Hania, Princely Edict 475, SGAC (84), 15 December 1907.

¹⁶⁴ In the 1899-1900 budget of the Directory of Public Education and Religions, for instance, the following salaries were included: judge of the Muslim religious court (*ιεροδίκης*), representative of the judge of religious court, interpreter of the Islamic law (*μούφτης*), secretaries and ushers of the court. The salary of the Head Judge (that is the Muslim judge of Hania) was 600 *dr*. In comparison, the salary of the Christian Metropolitan was 700 *dr*. See Budget of Expenses 1899-1900, SGAC (1899). See also Budget of Expenses 1905-1905, SGAC (1905).

¹⁶⁵ Princely Law No 436, SGAC, 22 February 1901.

the issue of a new Regulation (No 434) concerning Muslim communal properties. According to it, after the death of a dedicator, the *beit-ül mal* (public treasury/property) property of Islamic foundations, that is property devoted by him or her to finance the operation of Muslim educational institutions, would become the public property of Autonomous Crete. Until this date, after the death of a dedicator, *beit-ül mal* endowments were automatically attached to the institution to which they were originally devoted. In 1902, however, the government decided that there was no longer any reason for the Muslim community to have this right, since public education would henceforth be financed by the treasury of Autonomous Crete.¹⁶⁶

The same year, the directors of pious foundations were asked to provide the authorities with accurate registers of the *vakf* properties administered by the Cretan Ottoman Orphan Banks, which belonged also to the same category (*beit-ül mal*). In other words, the directors had to provide the Cretan state with detailed information on *beit-ül mal* endowments, offered to each *Evkaf* in favor of the Orphans.¹⁶⁷ The relevant treasury, that is the Orphan Bank, used to consist of two kinds of *vakf* capitals: incomes from endowments devoted to the *Evkaf* (*beit-ül mal*); and incomes from inherited private

¹⁶⁶ See the relevant announcement addressed by the Superior Directory of Public Education and Religions towards Muslim and Christian mayors and the elders' councils, No 498/104, SGAC, August 1899.

¹⁶⁷ On the broader issue of cash-*vakfs* and *eytam sandıkları* (funds for the orphans) in the Islamic world and, more particular, in the Ottoman Empire, see Jon E. Mandeville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 10 (1979), 298-308; O. L. Barkan and E. Mericli, *Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yönleriyle Vakıflar: The Socio-Economic Aspects of Pious Foundations, Hudavendigar Livası Tahrir Defteri I.* (Ankara: TTK. Basimevi, 1988); Murat Cizakca, "Cash Awqaf of Bursa, 1555-1823," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38 (3 August 1995), 3-14; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Making a Living or Making a Fortune in Ottoman Syria," in *Money, Land and Trade*, ed. N. Hanna (London: I.B.Tauris, 2002); Ahmad Dallal, "The Islamic Institution of the Waqf: A Historical Overview," in *Islam and Social Policy*, ed. S. P. Heyneman (Vanderbilt University Press, 2004); Amy Singer, "Serving Up Charity: The Ottoman Public Kitchen," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 3 (Winter 2005), 481-500.

properties, put under the control of the *Evkaf* until the adulthood of the orphan to whom they belonged. In such cases, the *Evkaf* administration had the right to keep and manage the property, with the responsibility to secure it for the day the child would come of age. Until then, the property could be invested, leased, used as collateral for loans, and generally exploited for different kinds of transactions. Apart from this, the Bank was receiving an interest for the financing of its operation. In case of the orphan's death, if no family member was present to claim the property, it was left to the Bank.¹⁶⁸ Given the fact that constant uprisings resulted in lots of deaths, abandoned properties, and unguarded orphans, the Cretan Orphan Banks managed considerable cash *vakfs* in the second half of the nineteenth-century, thus functioning as significant local magnets of capital.

Nevertheless, after 1899, the local authorities decided to close such activities, replacing Orphan Banks with family councils and orphans' supervisors.¹⁶⁹ Starting in 1900, the general supervision of Muslim orphan properties was delegated to public supervisors, appointed by the High Commissioner by each council of Muslim elders. As a result, the Muslim institution of the Orphan Banks was officially abolished. Moreover, the specific act of guarding and protecting Muslim children was entrusted to their legal guardians, under the direct supervision of the council of the Muslim elders. More particularly, in case the children were orphans by mother, their father was automatically appointed as their guardian, unless he was mentally ill, indigent, or considered—for whatever reason—unable to handle the children's financial affairs. In case the children

¹⁶⁸ OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 52, 16 March 1902; OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 52, 2 May 1902.

¹⁶⁹ See Guardianship and Custody, Chapter A-G, in Princely Edict No 145 "Special Regulation of the Muslim Community," SGAC, 23 March 1900.

were orphans by father, their mother could be appointed their guardian only if she remained unmarried and if the family council approved of her.

The family council consisted of four or six male relatives of the parents (half of them from each side) living in or close to the place of residence of the family. The president of the council was the area's supervisor of orphans. In case both parents were dead, the council had the right to appoint a male relative or, in lack of him, a male friend of the family as guardian of the orphans. No female relative but the mother could undertake such a duty. In this respect, it is obvious that the rights of Muslim women were very limited when compared to those of men with regard to their children. However, the fact that numerous Muslim mothers were actually appointed guardians of their orphans despite such restrictions appears to have had something to do with the judicial emancipation, so to speak, of Muslim women in Autonomous Crete.

In September 1900, it was decided that Muslim women would henceforth have the right to appear in courts of law and to enter into solemn bonds and contracts without first securing the permission of their male relatives, nor having to be accompanied by one of them.¹⁷⁰ Each guardian, woman and man alike, was authorized to oversee, secure, and manage properties inherited by the orphans, a task that included also the orphans legal representation. Each guardian had the responsibility to clear debts inherited along with the property or, to receive the children's share of money from loans or investments. Yet major transactions concerning the properties of each orphan could not be realized by the guardian without the prior authorization of the family council.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ See Princely Edict no 209, SGAC, 9 September 1900.

¹⁷¹ For some examples see the following acts involving transactions and documentation in both Greek and Ottoman: In July 1900, the Council of the Muslim Elders of Rethimno (Resmo), consisting of Mehmed

It should be noted here that Cretan regulations concerning Muslim orphans were not very different from practices in other late nineteenth-century Ottoman territories.¹⁷² The only Cretan particularity of interest was that, after 1900, the supervision of such practices was assigned to a local official that was either Christian or Muslim, instead of being placed under the *Evkaf*.¹⁷³ In the same vein, the amounts of money belonging to orphan children, which used to be deposited at the Ottoman Orphan Banks, were henceforth deposited at the Bank of Crete. An exemption was made only in case the guardian had the family council's special permission to invest the money elsewhere. In this way, the new administration appropriated the cash *vakfs* previously devoted to the

Sededoudin, müftü-kadı and president of the council, and the members Hasan Lahouridaki, Mehmed Elfanaki, Hasan Arifagadaki, Ali Kazazalidaki and Hasan Vakoglaki, approved the decision of the family council of the orphans Hasan and Yildize, children of the late Mustafa Karamousalaki, to appoint Hüseyin Karamousalaki guardian of the children, OBA, Doc 29, Dossier 52, 26 July 1900; In November 1901, the Council of the Muslim Elders of Rethimno, consisting of Fahrudin Hotzaki, president, and the members Sefki Tsitsekaki, Hacı Ali Sinamekaki, and Musa Lahouridaki, approved the decision of the family council of the orphans Ali and Derviş, children of the late Mehmed Kiatipaki, to authorize Sadiye Kiatipopoula to litigate the owed money out of several individuals indebted to the children's late father, OBA, Doc 44, Dossier No 52, 27 November 1901; In May 1905, Nuriye Halepopoula was appointed guardian of her, orphan by father, children and was authorized to sell some property assets to provide for them, OBA, Doc 26, Dossier No 53, 4 May 1905/ OBA, Dossier No 52, 30 November 1902; In November 1904, the Council of the Muslim Elders of Rethimno, consisting of Fahrudin Hojaki, president, and the members Sefki Tsitsekaki, Kami Veisagadaki, and Musa Lahouridaki, approved the decision of the family council of the orphan Zeynel, daughter of the late Umi Mouladopoula, to authorize the father and guardian of the child to sell some of the properties devised to the child by the child's mother, under the condition that he would use the money for the child's benefit, OBA, Doc 25, Dossier No 52, 14 November 1902; The same day, the above council (with the participation also of Mercan Omeraki) approved the decision made by the family council of the orphan children of the late Mehmed Lafasaki, to appoint Hüseyin Pervanaki guardian of the children, OBA, Doc 26, Dossier No 52, 14 November 1904; In May 1908, the Council of the Muslim Elders of Rethimno, consisting of Mercan Omerakis, Mustafa Detoglakis, Mustafa Namı Karatsedakis, and Ali Bedriagadaki, approved the decision of the family council of the orphan Mehmed Ali of late Toundsarapakis, to authorize the guardian to sell arable lands left to the child in the name of the company "Toundsarapakis brothers," OBA, Doc 51, Dossier No 48, 8 May 1908.

¹⁷² M. Canli, *Eytam İdaresi ve Sandıkları (1851-1926): Administration and Treasury of the Orphans (1851-1926)*, Vol. XIV, *Türkler* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002); Haldun Eroglu, "On dokuzuncu yüzyılda yetim çocuklara vasi tayini: Antalya örneği: The appointment of orphans' guardians in nineteenth century Ottoman Empire: the example of Antalya," *Çocuk Sağlığı ve Hastalıkları Dergisi* 50, 285-288.

¹⁷³ See for instance the example of the orphan children of late Hasan Taksim Hilmiye Kubra, who in 1904 wer represented in court by the supervisor of orphan properties of Lasithi, Hüseyin Kahramanakis, OBA, Doc 2, Dossier 53, 3 February 1904.

Muslim commonwealth. Furthermore, this change was clearly realized in favor of the common public treasury and the Bank of Crete, a department of the National Bank of Greece.¹⁷⁴ At the same time, the new conditions provided Muslim elites—namely, elders, supervisors, and former administrations of the Orphan Banks—with new powers and opportunities for profit.

In fact, it is impossible to judge by archival appearances who was really benefiting from the hundreds of transactions concerning orphan properties authorized in those days by different family councils in different regions of Crete. Yet it is beyond doubt that the management of such estates offered numerous opportunities for profit, which were not necessarily synonymous with the interests of the children. At the same time, although the Ottoman Banks were supposed to start re-liquefying their balance sheets in 1900, returning the relevant assets to the orphans' guardians, this enterprise proved to be of unwieldy proportions and eventually lasted for decades. Meanwhile, some of the eligible proprietors had abandoned the island, died, or simply disappeared, losing their rights in the process. On the contrary, Christians and Muslims who remained on the island continued to profit in various ways from the administrative chaos. To put it differently, the future of the properties previously belonging to the Orphan Banks dissolved in 1900, continued to be an issue of central legal interest for years to come. For, the properties at stake were vast. Thus, lawyers, guardians, and supervisors continued for years to profit from the liquefaction of the Orphan Banks, forming mixed bireligious networks.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴See the Memorandum of the Bank of Crete, Princely Edict No 81, SGAC, 30 September 1899.

¹⁷⁵For example, as late as 1916, the supervisor of the Muslim orphans of Iraklio informed the prefect of the matter, underlying that the guardians were not to be always trusted, since numerous incidents of

Immediate liquefaction was actually impossible due to the fact that the orphans' personal assets did not consist of “stopped and still” real estate, but of revenue-generating properties and invested money. The situation was less complicated in the case of the Orphan Banks of Rethimno and Hania. In these towns, Muslim foundations kept different accounts for each child. Thus the imposed interest charges corresponded to different shares that could readily be calculated (*κατά μερίδας εκτοκισμός*). On the contrary, the Orphan Bank of Iraklio followed a different system, receiving interest by using the deposited capital for different investments (*κατά κοινωνιά εκτοκισμός*). Therefore, withdrawing individual shares from collective investments would trigger losses. Aside from this, it was very difficult to calculate how much exactly should be allocated to whom.

According to the first unrealistic decisions of local administration in 1900, the Banks of Hania and Rethimno had to settle their accounts within six months. The Bank of Iraklio and Lasithi were given one year to do the same. Meanwhile, it was decided that extra profit from relevant investments should henceforth be attributed to the orphans' guardians. As to the salaries of the Banks' employees, they were to be covered from previous gains.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, as we have already argued, archival evidence shows that—in all cases—it actually took years for the above project to be realized.¹⁷⁷

prodigal administration had been noticed in the past. See OBA, Doc 60, Dossier No 34, 17 March 1916. Similarly, as late as 1922, lawyer Athanasios Bloum Pashalis had still open accounts with the Orphan Bank of Hania. See OBA, Doc 201, Dossier No 34, 26 May 1922.

¹⁷⁶ On the dissolution of Ottoman Orphan Banks see Princely Edict No 145 “Special Regulation on the Muslim Community,” SGAC, 23 March 1900.

¹⁷⁷ In fact, it seems that some Muslims were rather not immediately convinced that the Banks would be dissolved. Even in 1903, for instance, the Foundations' Director of Iraklio, Ahmed Besim Saridakis, was asking Mr. Hronidis, the residence of whom was next to the building of the Bank, to repair a wall standing between the two buildings, OBA, Doc 31, Dossier No 53, 4 June 1903. In other words aside from the

The process involved long court trials, actions against the Banks' debtors, auctions, and confiscations.¹⁷⁸ The linguistic constraints of the project further complicated matters.

Older accounts were kept in Ottoman. Acts to be realized called for recourse to Greek speaking courts. Last but not least, different languages corresponded also to very different understandings of the concept of law.¹⁷⁹

endless trials with regard to this process even informing the holders of the new development had lasted for years. See for instance: Doc 15, Dossier No 49, 22 February 1901; Doc 12, Dossier No 52, 31 March 1902; Doc 21, Dossier No 52, 30 December 1902; Doc 22, Dossier No 52, 7 January 1903.

¹⁷⁸For this reason, after 1906, the administration decided to appoint mixed committees of inspectors, in order to supervise the activities of the banks that were still trying to liquefy their properties. For instance, Niko Palidis and Mercan Demourcakis were appointed inspectors of the Bank of Hania, see OBA, Doc 33, Dossier No 55, 10 July 1906. See also the different court acts concerning the dissolved Orphan Banks in almost every part of Crete:

Iraklio: OBA, Doc 147 and 148, Dossier No 51, 1 November 1904; OBA, Doc 150, Dossier No 51, 5 November 1904; OBA, Doc 7, Dossier No 22, 28 April 1904; OBA, Doc 156, Dossier No 51, 18 January 1905; OBA, Doc 112, Dossier No 53, 27 January 1905; OBA, Doc 149, Dossier No 51, 18 January 1905; OBA, Doc 52, Dossier No 34, 17 May 1905; OBA, Doc 24, Dossier No 23, 25 January 1906; OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 13(2), 16 October 1907; OBA, Doc 57, Dossier No 53, 12 December 1907; OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 20, 28 January 1908; OBA, Doc 148, Dossier No 48, 14 February 1908; OBA, Doc 13, Dossier No 22(file 1), 12 January 1909; OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 22(file 1), 6 June 1909; OBA, Doc 168, Dossier No 38, 5 February 1911; OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 25, 14 October 1912; OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 37 (file 9), 4 February 1914; OBA, Doc 1, Dossier 21, 5 June 1914; OBA, Doc 7, Dossier No 21(7), 25 April 1915; OBA, Doc 85, Dossier No 10, 21 August 1921; OBA, Doc 86, Dossier No 10, 23 September 1921.

Rethimno: OBA, Doc 109, Dossier No 53, 15 November 1900; OBA, Doc 140, Dossier No 34, 8 May 1902; OBA, Doc 87, Dossier No 34, 31 May 1902; OBA, Doc No 203, Dossier No 7, 10 June 1902; OBA, Doc 173, Dossier No 38, 12 June 1906; OBA, Doc 148, Dossier No 34, 8 April 1909; OBA, Doc 150, Dossier No 34, 4 November 1910.

Hania: OBA, Doc 195, Dossier No 15, 27 January 1901; OBA, Doc 65, Dossier No 12, 16 May 1901; OBA, Doc 113, Dossier No 25, 12 August 1901; OBA, Doc 25, Dossier No 17, 20 January 1903; OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 33, 3 August 1906; OBA, Doc 137, Dossier No 51, 28 August 1906; OBA, Doc 47, Dossier No 22, 13 June 1915.

Lasithi/Ierapetra: OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 22(file 1), 7 September 1902; OBA, Doc 54, Dossier No 12, 22 November 1902; OBA, Doc 89, Dossier No 30, 1 June 1903; OBA, Doc 168, Dossier No 15, 14 September 1904; OBA, Doc 16, Dossier No 45, 9 October 1904; OBA, Doc 42, Dossier No 20, 20 December 1904; OBA, Doc 131, Dossier No 15, 29 December 1904; OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 3, 28 October 1904; OBA, Doc 127, Dossier No 15, 14 January 1905; OBA, Doc 58, Dossier No 37, 13 May 1905; OBA, Doc 75, Dossier No 25, 23 September 1907; OBA, Doc 17, Dossier No 45, 21 July 1908; OBA, Doc 1, Dossier 1 (file 3), 18 February 1908/OBA, Doc 3, 2 January 1907.

¹⁷⁹ A translation office was established to initially serve the needs of the Court of Appeal, while the relevant needs of the Courts of First Instance and Minor Courts of First Instance were served by the offices of "special secretaries." See Article 211 in Princely Edict on Justice, SGAC, 10 May 1899. Yet this solution was, at least during the first years of autonomy, solving the problem only in theory rather than in practice.

In addition, although after 1899 all Administrations were, in theory, forced to keep their books in Greek, archival sources show that they often failed to do so. In 1908, for example, the prefect of Lasithi complained to his superiors that the regional Muslim Administration, which represented Muslim Foundations and the (dissolved) Ottoman Orphan Bank, was still keeping its books in Turkish, making it very difficult for him to control its budgets and accounts before approving them. His report, however, did not appear to particularly trouble him or the authorities. The prefect was proud to announce that, due to his knowledge of the Ottoman numbers, he was able to control and approve the Administration's budget. Thus the incident was easily resolved.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, this minor example of Cretan administrative practices is indicative of the ways transactions regarding Muslim properties were realized in Autonomous Crete.

By and large, it is impossible to follow exactly how these series of actions directed to some end. Taking into consideration the known constraints of the projects and the simultaneous internal turmoil, one becomes suspicious of how systematic the local reorganization really was. Was it possible to efficiently supervise it; and, if not, who actually profited the most from it? The only thing to be said with certainty is that even after the integration of Crete to Greece, the Administrations of Muslim Foundations continued to appear in Greek courts claiming shares and money owed to the dissolved Orphan Banks. In this course of things, in 1915, the council of the Muslim elders of Iraklio, addressed a desperate petition to the Greek government asking for the cancellation of every court action and decision concerning the properties of the Banks. The reason was that, while account holders were rightfully asking for and receiving their

¹⁸⁰ OBA, Doc 78, Dossier No 48, 8 March 1908. For similar cases of "lost in translation" property deeds see, OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 23(file 3), 2 March 1906.

money from the Administrations, those indebted to the Bank (Muslims and Christians alike) almost invariably refused to pay. According to the elders, therefore, the result of this process, which had been going on for years, would be the eventual bankruptcy of Muslim foundations unless countermeasures were taken immediately.¹⁸¹

The Expropriation of Muslim Communal Properties

By and large, administrative changes in Autonomous Crete had activated a bireligious network of locals, who profited from the widespread administrative chaos at the expense of the long-term interests of the Muslim foundations. Within this context, the most important agreements were realized between Greek lawyers, wealthy Muslim landlords, and Muslim directors. Lawyers participated in the expropriation of foundations and individuals from their real-estate and cash properties in two ways: first, through confiscations and auctions in the name of Muslim and Christian creditors against mostly Muslim, but also Christian debtors;¹⁸² and second, through profitable agreements. For

¹⁸¹ OBA, Doc 195, Dossier No 41, 2 January 1915/OBA, Doc 188, Dossier No 41, 3 February 1915/OBA, Doc 190, Dossier No 41, 3 February 1915/OBA, Doc 195, Dossier No 41, 2 January 1915.

¹⁸² See for example the following cases: Auction by the Administration of Lasithi, represented by the lawyer Themistokli Kallergi, against the debtor Emmanouil K. Paterakis, OBA, Doc 46, Dossier No 37, 14 June 1900; Auction by the heirs of late Mehmed Yafdisfakis, all of them residents of Istanbul, against the Orphan Bank of Iraklio and the heirs of late debtor Osman Agagakis, residents of Izmir (Asia Minor/Anatolia), OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 36(1), 18 October 1900; Auction against the heirs of late İsmail H. Yenousakis, by Emmanouil N. Bamniedakis, who had bought back their debts, OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 13(file 29), 10 January 1901; Auction by Maria, former Cemile of Ömer Diyenakis and present wife of P. Dourakakis, against the heirs of late Mustafa Vrodakis, OBA, Doc 139, Dossier No 51, 2 July 1901; Auction by the Administration of Lasithi/Ierapetra, against Zarife Mustafa Arnaoutaki, resident of Asia Minor, OBA, Doc 15, Dossier No 44, 1902; Auction by Mehmed Celebi Valcakis and Ali Omergadakis, against the Supervisor of the Muslim Orphans of Hania, OBA, Doc 215, Dossier No 41, 10 April 1903; Auction by Dimitrios I. Kromidakis against the Foundations of Hania, OBA, Doc 211, Dossier No 51, 7 July 1903; Auction by Ali Karapartalakis against the Administration of Lasithi, OBA, Doc 19, Dossier No 45(file 1), 16 November 1903; Auction by the Administration of Lasithi against Georgios Avganis, OBA, Doc 120, Dossier No 53, 13 February 1904; Action by the Administration of Iraklio against the heirs of

instance, in 1914, the lawyer Mihail Trapezanakis agreed to the following arrangement with Ahmet Velijoudin Hacir Efendakis, imam of Lasithi, director of the Muslim Foundations, supervisor of the Muslim Orphan Properties, and authorized delegate of the dissolved Ottoman Bank. The former agreed to represent the Administration in numerous trials concerning money owed to different foundations, accepting in payment of his services the right to receive a significant part of the owed money. This particular kind of agreement was typical. It is obvious, therefore, that cooperation with Muslim administrations offered the lawyers in question significant long-term income, despite the disputes that occasionally occurred between the two.¹⁸³

In fact, cooperation and rivalries between Greek lawyers and the *Evkaf* had been quite frequent even before 1899. It is interesting to note, furthermore, that among the first Greek lawyers who represented Muslims, one finds the names of men who were—

late outlaw Hüsni Marcadakis; Sale through auction of the estate and properties of late Celep Otouzbarakis, in the name of the lender Nesip (?) Sefikefendizades, OBA, Doc 128, Dossier No 51, 4 January 1905; Sale through auction of the estate of Mustafa Vrodakis or Alibegakis, in the names of his lenders, OBA, Doc 126, Dossier No 51, 4 March 1906; Auction by the Administration of Rethimno, represented by lawyer I. Tsouderos, against Hasan Harokopakis, OBA, Doc 38, Dossier No 52(file 1), 25 May 1906; Sale through auction of the properties of Cemal Mouladakis, in the name of his debtors – including the Administration of Rethimno, OBA, Doc 86, Dossier No 50, 1 May 1907; Sale through auction of the estate of the debtor Emmanouil G. Andralidakis, in the name of the Administration of Rethimnis, OBA, Doc 12, Dossier No 44(file 1), 20 December 1907; Auction by the Administration of Lasithi, represented by lawyer Mihail Kothri, against the debtor G. Silanos, OBA, Doc 108, Dossier No 37, 5 September 1908; Auction by the Administration of Rethimno against the heirs of late debtors Dimitrios Tzanakis, Mihail Papadakis, Ioannis Fanourakis, OBA, Doc 35, Dossier No 25, 15 January 1909; Auction by H. Mustafa Kaourakis, merchant, resident of Hania, represented by the lawyer A. N. Anthousis, against the heirs of late Ismail Tselepakis, OBA, Doc 217, Dossier No 7, 4 March 1910; Auction by the Administration of Rethimno against the debtor Mehmed Katsaledakis, OBA, Doc 151, Dossier No 45, 10 April 1910; Auction by the Administration of Rethimno, represented by the lawyer Nik. A. Koronakis, against Emtullah Pastelopoulas, OBA, Doc 64, Dossier No 33, 14 June 1912; Auction by Hamca Bey ArapAhmedakis, represented by lawyer N. G. Papadakis, against Ahmed Moutevalakis and Sami Kotsifalakis, OBA, Doc 49, Dossier No 50, 26 June 1915; Sale through auction of the estate of İbrahim Aszarakis, at the periphery of Plouti Kenouriou Village, in the name of his lenders, OBA, Doc 135, Dossier No 53, 6 March 1916; Lawyer I. Melissidis representing numerous Muslims, OBA, Doc 10, Dossier No 53, 10 October 1918.

¹⁸³ OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 55, 20 February 1914.

or were to become—prominent political actors, such as Konstadinos Mitsotakis and Eleftherios Venizelos. In 1886, for example, K. Mitsotakis represented numerous Muslim defendants against the Ottoman Orphan Bank of Hania, on behalf of which acted attorney M. G. N. Stratigakis.¹⁸⁴ Similarly, in 1888, Eleftherios Venizelos represented numerous Muslims against the *tekke* of Yusuf Paşa of Hania, on behalf of which acted again lawyer Stratigakis.¹⁸⁵ It does not escape attention that both of the above lawyers, who had a well-known liberal political agenda, represented the individuals against the foundations. It is plausible to suggest, therefore, that such legal alliances had something to do with the political profile of those involved, although such a hypothesis cannot really be proven in the span of the present study.

In any event, court cases before 1899 cannot reasonably be compared to the series of legal procedures undertaken by Greek lawyers after that date, in the context of the chaotic circumstances created by continuous reorganization and reform. In this respect, the reasons why significant property rights were assigned by Muslims to Greek lawyers in exchange for their legal assistance can be easily understood. Aside from constitutional and administrative changes, turmoil and political uncertainty provided for constant violations of the Muslim foundations' property rights, resulting in an endless stream of complicated and costly trials. In this respect, vast as they may have been, Muslim pious properties were of practically no value in the absence of proper legal representation. Thus, Muslim Administrations often agreed to waive their rights in favor

¹⁸⁴ OBA, Doc 13, Dossier No 52, 8 March 1886. See also the following cases, Lawyer M.G.N. Stratigakis representing the Ottoman Orphan Bank against its numerous Muslim debtors, OBA, Doc 9, Dossier No 52, 8 February 1886/ Doc 15, Dossier No 52, 1 May 1886/Doc 11, Dossier No 52, 2 December 1886.

¹⁸⁵ OBA, Doc 58, Dossier No 20, 18 February 1888.

of Greek lawyers, in order not to loose everything to usurpers and absentee debtors.¹⁸⁶

At the same time, some Muslim peasants seemed to hope they could also profit from the above-described situation in a similar way. That was the case for Emin Semerakis, a farmer from Hania, and his sister Fatma, a housewife. In 1900, the latter had bought back debts, whose repayments were doubtful, by the Ottoman Orphan Bank of Hania (represented by the director Arif Ef. Bitsaxakis).¹⁸⁷ This transaction may not have been of significant proportions. Yet it is of particular interest because it was not unique. A number of Muslims of rather modest means invested their money in similar ways. Nevertheless, if it is easy to understand why Greek lawyers had an advantage over Muslim Administrations with regard to legal procedures, it is not clear how exactly the Semerakis family planned to deal with relevant issues. Did they have personal contacts with the debtors, which the central Administration lacked? Had they previously reached an agreement that was beneficial to all parties? Or, was the deal so profitable to them

¹⁸⁶ See also the following cases: Lawyer Georgios Dokoumejakis (or Dokoumejidou), representing the Director Hüseyin Bexet Astsakis in claiming the rights of the dissolved Orphan Bank of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 92, Dossier 25, 19 October 1904/OBA, Doc 112, Dossier No 53, 27 January 1905 /OBA, Doc 90, Dossier No 48, 24 March 1905/OBA, Doc 26, Dossier No 55, 1906/OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 22(file 1), 9 May 1909. The same Director was also represented by lawyer Nikolaos G. Stavrakis, OBA, Doc 117-121, Dossier no 48, 17 June 1902; and lawyer Nikolaos E. Mitsotakis, OBA, Doc 4-5, Dossier No 21(file 5), 6 May 1914. See also: Lawyer Konstadinos Stamatakis, OBA, Doc 34, Dossier No 37, 22 August 1906; Lawyer Frajis Frajaskakis, OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 36, 18 December 1906; Lawyer Mihail N. Trapezanakis (or Trapezanou), asking to be paid, in 1913, by the Ottoman Orphan Bank of Lasithi, OBA, Doc 189, Dossier No 51, 15 February 1913; Doc 58, Dossier No 37, 13 May 1905; Lawyer M. Kothri, representing in numerous cases the Administration of Lasithi and dissolved Ottoman Bank, OBA, Doc 82, Dossier No 50, 24 September 1900/ OBA, Doc 116, Dossier No 25, 22 March 1908; Lawyer Athanasios Bloum Pashalis, representing in many cases the Administration of Hania and dissolved Ottoman Bank, OBA, Doc 8, Dossier No 41, 9 November 1902; Lawyer Ioannis Stefanidis, representing in many cases the Administration of Hania an dissolved Ottoman Bank, OBA, Doc 186, Dossier No 41, 26 February 1915; Lawyer Stilianos Kodogiannis, asking to be paid for his services offered to the Administration of the Muslim Foundations of Rethimnis and dissolved Orphan Bank, Doc 172, Dossier No 34,3 February 1906; Lawyer Themistoklis Papadakis, representing the Orphan Bank of Rethimno, Doc 204, Dossier No 34, 3 December 1905; Lawyer Emm. Hourdakis, representing the Muslim Foundations of Iraklio, Doc 14, Dossier No 21(file 7), 10 May 1912.

¹⁸⁷ OBA, Doc 56, Dossier No 47,22 October 1900.

that they decided to take their chances in good faith that the debtors would pay?

To find an exact answer to the above question is not really necessary. Regardless of the specific details, the Semerakis example provides a very good illustration of the ways in which Muslims were still investing in and planning their future in Autonomous Crete.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, it is one of the numerous instances clearly showing that, on numerous occasions, the interests of the Muslim foundations were not the same as the interests of individual Muslims. In the same way, as suggested by all of the above examples, Muslims often cooperated with Christians, forming all kinds of mixed networks. Moreover, numerous agreements were made between those who had left, abandoning everything, and those who remained in Crete, and could thus reclaim some of their lost properties.¹⁸⁹

In brief, Muslim foundations and citizens very often found themselves adversaries in courts of law for all kinds of reasons. In the same vein, central Administrations and separate foundations often appeared against each other as plaintiffs and defendants in legal proceedings, with a number of comical outcomes. For instance, in 1903, Ahmet Zeki Agagakis, director of the Muslim Foundations of Lasithi and delegate of the central Administration, was forced to appear in court against himself due

¹⁸⁸ The Semerakis family was not the only to decide a similar investment. In 1902, two blacksmiths from the town of Rethimno, bought back the debt owed to the dissolved Orphan Bank by a few Muslim farmers, OBA, Doc 187, Dossier No 25, 18 March 1902. The above examples are typical of a variety of similar cases.

¹⁸⁹ For instance, in 1911, lawyer Adonios Hajidakis from Iraklio was acting against the dissolved Ottoman Bank on behalf of the heir to late Orhan Ali Kadimaki fortune, who was at that time a resident of Izmir, OBA Doc 46, Dossier No 52, 28 June 1911; Lawyer Georgios I. Papadopoulos was asking in 1911 to be paid by the heirs of late Mehmed Vedourakis for his services provided to the late, OBA, Doc 122, Dossier No 48, 29 July 1911.

to the fact that he acted also on behalf of the dissolved Ottoman Bank of Lasithi.¹⁹⁰ In order to avoid a similarly absurd situation, in 1912, the Administration of the Muslim foundations of Iraklio had followed a different strategy. Whenever the dissolved Bank was called to court against Muslim orphans, who were under the director's supervision, then the institution was represented by its secretary, while the director acted on behalf of the orphans.¹⁹¹

The above practice appeared to be more solid, at least from a judicial point of view. The actual outcome, however, was still the same. On numerous occasions the Administrations were simultaneously both plaintiffs and defendants. One has to keep in mind that a number of the accounts previously belonging to Muslim orphans had never been actually put in order, due to the fact that their holders had left, died, or simply disappeared. As a result, the dissolved Banks continued to be called in trial for years, sometimes against orphans the late parents of whom used to owe money to the central Administration; and sometimes on behalf of orphans, present or absentee, who had legitimate financial demands against the Administrations, or a separate Muslim foundation. One wonders, therefore, how exactly did directors deal with such a perplexing state of affairs, and whose interests were indeed at stake. In fact, a number of incidents were recorded, concerning impingement of the orphans' rights, conversion of funds, and similar behaviors that had literally seen the light of justice.¹⁹² Yet in most

¹⁹⁰ OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 53, 7 April 1903.

¹⁹¹ When Mihri Koutsizades, for instance, Director of the Administration of Iraklio and guardian of the Ajaraki Orphans, had to appear in court representing the one against the other, the Secretary of the Administration undertook the duty to replace him in representing the Foundations, see OBA, Doc 13, Dossier No 21(7), 10 May 1912.

¹⁹² For some more examples of smaller and bigger frauds, see the following cases: In 1900, Hasan Yetimakis was accused of occupying arable lands belonging to the orphan children of late Edehem

cases, specific evidence was scarce. Nevertheless, this state of affairs lends support to rather than challenges my impression that the whole project of legislative and judicial reformation allowed for huge profiteering from the exploitation of the pious foundations, since it was monitored by the authorities only in theory.

The case of Hacı Hojakalakis, for example, illustrates very well the above-described state of affairs. Hojakalakis had been for three years (from 1897 to 1900) accountant of the *Evkaf* of Lasithi and director of the Ottoman Orphan Bank. Thus, he used his position to make a fortune by writing pious properties to the name of his father Ali. Eventually, his behavior was reported to the authorities and the perpetrator was imprisoned. Yet, before his arrest, he had managed to hide the logistic books of the area's Muslim foundations, creating considerable confusion. As a result, when the director of

Hamitakis. See OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 41(2), 21 August 1900; The same year, the Administration of Iraklio, appeared in court against numerous usurpers of land plots, by the beach, at Hersonisos Padiados village (Kastri location) and olive fields at Hrisi Elia location, belonging to the Foundations. Numerous Christians were accused of having arbitrary occupied the land plots, having shops built on them. At the same time, numerous Muslims were accused of selling to the Christians the deeds to land plots that did not actually own. Although the Administration won the case, it was forced to reach an agreement with the new owners, who agreed to pay the Foundations a compensation and buy the property. See OBA, Doc 21a, Dossier No 37, 9 August 1900/ OBA, Doc 48, Dossier No 37, 10 May 1900/ OBA, Doc 50, Dossier No 37, 13 May 1900.

In 1901, Emine Ismailopoula, mother and guardian of the orphans of late Ahmed Rehitakis, hired a lawyer to defend the real estate of the children against numerous usurpers. See OBA, Doc 14, Dossier No 49, 28 July 1901.

In 1902, Ahmed Zeki Avizakis, Director of the Administration of Ierapetra, accused Erginusi Bekleri of having arbitrary impinged the old ottoman cemetery at the periphery of Pradianon village, destroying the tomb stones, and cultivating the land of the graves. See OBA, Doc 30, Dossier 47, 13 July 1902.

In 1902, a number of contracts was signed by unauthorized parts in the name of the orphan child Sait Hacı İbrahim Roukounakis. See BOA, Doc 112, Dossier No 41, 5 January 1902.

In 1908, the elder's council of Rethimno, decided to sell vast plots of arable *vakf* lands at the periphery of Prinou village (known as *Lanjimas* lands) that had once been devoted by the son of Kara Musa Paşa, Ahmed Paşa, to the Foundations. The claimed reason for this decision was that the occupants of the lands refused to pay the Administration and that numerous, arbitrary land impingements that couldn't be stopped were realized against the Administration's interests. OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 52(file 1), 10 March 1908.

In 1909, Ahmed Karavakis, the older one of the orphan children of İsmail Karavanakis (and the only one of age) was accused of selling properties that belonged not to him to his brothers and sisters. OBA, Doc 146, Dossier No 51, 21 March 1909.

In 1910, Mehmed Raftianakis complained that the properties inherited to his daughters by their late mother Ayşe Sitika Vezirpoula were impinged by numerous usurpers, OBA, Doc 25, Dossier No 25, 7 July 1911.

the same Administration reported in 1904 tremendous property losses, nobody could prove to what extent the damage, which became obvious in 1904, was recent, and to what extent it was old. In this respect, the only point to be made with regard to the state of affairs in Autonomous Crete is that archives and pious properties disappeared among networks of Muslim and Christian locals, without anybody's systematically keeping track of the transformation.¹⁹³

Administrative abuses were especially common during moments of crisis, such as 1897-1899, 1906, 1908, 1912-1913 and the like. Internal conflicts not only paralyzed the local authorities, but also subverted the egalitarian ideals of autonomous administration, leading *de facto* the Muslim pious foundations to a vacuum of legitimacy. In 1908, for example, it appears that the broader political developments in the Ottoman Empire encouraged an unfavorable administrative attitude towards Muslim foundations in Crete. In the same vein, lots of individual usurpers (mostly Christians, but also Muslims) were encouraged to impinge on pious lands. Others who, in theory, leased such lands refused to pay rent.¹⁹⁴ As a response to this situation, the director of the Administration of Rethimno, Kiami Veisagadakis, had tried to lay legal claim to abandoned mosques, cemeteries, residences, and arable pious lands, which had become vacant and were arbitrarily occupied by squatters.¹⁹⁵ Two years later, Mustafa Rahmi Tatarakis, director of the Administration of Iraklio, openly accused the Greek state of sending its agents to occupy abandoned Muslim cemeteries and pious lands. Despite the

¹⁹³ OBA, Doc 118, Dossier No 15, 15 March 1904.

¹⁹⁴ OBA, Doc 76, Dossier No 34, 22 September 1906.

¹⁹⁵ OBA, Doc 62, Dossier No 48, 21 June 1908. Furthermore, it appears that similar had been the situation in Rethimno in 1906, OBA, Doc 66, Dossier No 48, 19 October 1906.

fact that lots of the disputed properties obviously used to be Muslim cemeteries or mosques, the Administration could not actually prove its legitimate ownership over them, since the relevant deeds had been lost.¹⁹⁶

At the same time, a less violent way of expropriation was the issue of loans to all kinds of managers of Muslim properties by the Bank of Crete. For example, a number of guardians of Muslim orphans had borrowed money from the Bank of Crete, mortgaging the orphans' properties. Moreover, managers of specific pious foundations appeared to proceed with similar financial decisions, mortgaging pious properties that they did not own. In this context, the numerous uprisings, which had significantly injured the local economy—particularly agriculture—were used as an excuse for recourse to loans. Yet, the damage made to each foundation could never be estimated with accuracy. Hence, each time a manager might take a loan, there was no way to prove if that decision served better the interests of the foundation or himself.¹⁹⁷

The Land Reform of 1899

The Cretan constitution of 1899 recognized Muslim communal properties as a legal entity under the name “Anonymous Pious Foundations (*Ανώνυμα Αφιερώματα*).” Yet

¹⁹⁶OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 50, 15 December 1910.

¹⁹⁷ For example, in 1900, the manager of the *mastaba tekke* (Iraklio) addressed a desperate petition to the town's elders, trying to convince them that only a loan could save the *tekke* from final expropriation. According to his claims, during the previous ten years he had borrowed important amounts of money in order to have the building of the foundation repaired. Yet, since due to the local turmoil of 1897-1899, the *tekke* had been receiving no incomes from its leased agricultural plots and buildings, for two years, the debtors were threatening him with confiscation and sale through auction. Thus, according to his view, the only solution to the problem would be the issue of a loan by the Bank of Crete. See OBA, Doc 136, Dossier No 10, 12 August 1900.

only properties that had previously been under the direct management of the *Evkafs*, without being attached to a specific foundation, fell under this category and were thus placed under the direct management of each Administration.¹⁹⁸ Separate pious foundations, mosques, dervish lodges, and fountains, for example, were recognized as separate legal entities with the right to possess private property. Hence, endowments for the benefit of such foundations, including shops, water cisterns, mansions, residences in the towns, and trees or arable fields in the hinterland, were not considered part of each Administration's properties, but were nevertheless under each Administration's supervision.¹⁹⁹

The legal status afforded by the constitution to local Muslim foundations was of particular importance. Although administrative and legislative changes have been so far presented by this author mainly as venues of easy, illegal profit, one should not forget that the matter had also different connotations. The organization of a well-governed civil space in Autonomous Crete, with transparent and respected property rights, could not be realized without addressing dynamically the issue of pious foundations. Yet the more local authorities tried to put under control the religious endowments of Islam, the more obvious it became that these properties were in fact both chaotic and massive. In a figurative way, therefore, one could claim that the upheavals caused by the gradual fall of the *vakf* legacy in Autonomous Crete resulted in a full-scale transformation of the island's structures, with significant socio-economic aspects.

In order to deal with the chaotic networks of pious foundations in the hinterland,

¹⁹⁸ Princely Edict No 234, SGAC, 11 November 1900.

¹⁹⁹ See Religious Foundations, Chapter B, in Princely Edict No 145 "Special Regulation on the Muslim Community," SGAC, 23 March 1900.

the Cretan parliament of 1899 had definitely decided that the quasi-legality of agricultural land-holding had to be immediately subjected to review. The same year, therefore, a regulation was issued in order to accord *vakf* arable fields of every category the status of private ownership, regardless of whether the fields in question were held (*κατεχόμενα*) by individuals or legal persons, or whether they had the character of a freehold. Within this context, the rights of proprietorship over fields dedicated directly to the *Evkaf*, or fields dedicated to a specific *vakf* whose supervision was entrusted to an employee of the *Evkaf* (*nâzır*), were given to the Administrations. On the contrary, *vakf* estates belonging to a family of managers (*mütevelli*) were to be given as perfect private property to their users. The same was decided with regard to pious estates that had been divided again and again—through inheritance and leasing—over the centuries into smaller shares, resulting in small agricultural plots cultivated by families, individuals, or institutions that had nothing to do with the original dedicator.²⁰⁰

At the same time, Administrations and individuals having any kind of rights over such fields were entitled to receive only gratuity compensation by the new owners.²⁰¹ It is interesting to note here that a great number of those newly recognized owners were Christians. A few years later, the government decided to officially provide owners of arbitrary constructions built on *vakf* lands between 1 January 1897 and 9 December 1898 with official property rights over the plots. As to the actual owners of

²⁰⁰ See Article 103 in Proceedings (18), SGAC, 4 March 1899.

²⁰¹ Princely Edict No 84, SGAC, 14 October 1899. The *Evkaf* had the right to receive for each island of property a total of money 20 times the yearly leasing money (*icare*) paid by the occupants of the property. For instance, if the yearly money paid was 10 *kuruş* then the new owner had to pay the *Evkaf* a compensation of 200 *kuruş*. See the relevant instructions send by Justice Councilor Eleftherios Venizelos to the frustrated and confused judicial authorities of the island, No 3384/1552, SGAC, 18 November 1899. For amounts bigger than 100 dr. an usance of three years was provided, Princely Edict No 123, SGAC, 9 February 1900.

the land at issue, namely the *Evkaf*, the manager (*mütevelli*), and numerous annuitants dependent upon such incomes, they were compensated for the forced loss of their property, to which they could not object.²⁰²

Aside from the question of legitimacy of such arrangements, it has to be also mentioned here that the project was a rather poorly conceived one since, on a number of occasions, numerous parties were provided with property rights over the same fields. After having worked for two more years, therefore, the committees appointed by the parliament for this purpose, agreed on dividing contested fields into four different categories: (1) private fields, the deeds to which had been inherited before the proclamation of the constitution (1899); (2) private fields, the deeds to which had not been inherited before the proclamation of the constitution; (3) fields administered by a manager, to the revenue of which the Muslim foundations hold a share; and, (4) fields dedicated to the *Evkaf*, or a separate foundation, and administered by appointed supervisors.²⁰³

The ultimate result of the process appeared to be that whoever happened to occupy *vakf* arable lands in Crete in 1899 was recognized as their rightful owner, regardless of the nature of tenure prior to that time. Apart from that, it seems really difficult to find consistent legislative reasoning in the mass of contradictions in the new regulations. Even if the main logic of the reform was to turn *mütevellis* (managers) into rightful owners, that was not what eventually happened. In fact, the consistent

²⁰² See Law No 536, SGAC, 27 June 1903.

²⁰³ Princely Law No 422, SGAC, 25 August 1901.

implementation of the regulations was actually impossible.²⁰⁴ Moreover, due to the great number of abandoned fields and deserted buildings that used to be Muslim property, it was not that easy for the authorities to stop Christians from arbitrary occupying them. Quite to the contrary, the interests of the Christians were usually promoted against the rights of the Muslim foundations. Especially after 1906, Muslim property rights started to be violated quite openly both by individuals and by the authorities.²⁰⁵

It is evident, therefore, that long-term developments were not beneficial to the Muslim community. In the short term, however, even the 1899 land reform discussed above created new opportunities for those Muslims directly involved in the project. In other words, similarly to what had happened with cash *vakfs* and Orphan Banks, the effort to put in order the chaotic land registers of the pious foundations and to clearly delineate levels of property rights lasted for years. As already mentioned above, most

²⁰⁴ The example of Polidoros Saounatsos, a trader from Rethimno, is very telling in this respect. In 1904, Saounatsos was called in court of law, accused of having impinged lands dedicated to the mosque of *Kara Musa Paşa*. The plaintiffs, Hatem Selimvegopoulos, manager of the mosque, and Hüsnü Selimefendakis, director of the Central Administration, claimed that the defendant was just supervising the disputed fields, the management of which belonged to the plaintiff's family. However, since none of the interested parts could provide detailed deeds to the lands, the Court had decided in favor of the defendant. See OBA, Doc 237, Dossier No 15, 21 July 1904.

²⁰⁵ In 1906, for example, the elders of Lasithi addressed to High Commissioner Alexandros Zaimis, the following complain. The new councilor of education refused to approve the appointment of the Administration's director, causing the Foundations significant damage. Since the director was the only one authorized to represent the Foundations in court-of-law, the numerous cases tried at that time, and concerning vast pious properties, had ended in expropriations by default judgments that were soon to become final. Furthermore, the Director was responsible of paying Muslim employees their salaries. Consequently, without him neither Muslim schools nor mosques could operate. In brief, the elders supported that the damage made against the community, as a result of the delay, was immense. Aside from the content of the argumentation, such complains appear really interesting to me also due to their particular stylistic form. To be more specific, the Muslims of Lasithi were starting their petition by affirming their loyalty to the new authorities and by reminding them of the community's devotion to peace, demonstration of responsible tax-behavior, and hope for the progress and prosperity of the High Commissioner. In addition, they made sure to support their arguments by mentioning that former privileges had been respected by all previous authorities in Autonomous Crete—despite the fact that the time span they could refer to was really short. From this point of view, the stylistic models used by Cretan Muslims in addressing the High Commissioner, strongly reminded of previous petition-techniques used between ottoman *millets* and the Ottoman regime. See OBA, Doc No 67, Dossier No 25, 9 October 1906.

endowments were used both by the foundations and by the broader local community through an impressively complicated network. Thus, with regard to relevant arable fields, it was often unrealistic to try to find who the original dedicator was, who had beneficial interests, who was just leasing the lands of those having beneficial interests, who was a *nâzir* appointed by the *Evkaf*, and who was a *mütevelli* with hereditary rights descending from the family of the dedicator. Consequently, all of the above were often treated as having an equal status.

Within this context, the participation of the Muslim elite to the process was of crucial importance, inasmuch as most Christian authorities were completely ignorant of relevant issues. Even if their opinion was not always taken into consideration, Muslim dignitaries were always consulted. Moreover, upon being deposed from significant estates, the community was at least to be compensated. In this way, those Muslims who happened to manage administrations and foundations during the period when the vast Muslim real-estate changed hands, received important amounts of money. Even if compensations did not correspond to the actual value of the lost property, they could still be seen as a fast and desirable liquefaction of poorly remunerative estates. For all of the above reasons, I have argued that, from the point of view of some of the Muslims, the community was economically growing. The dramatic drop in the Muslim population in the countryside left behind a massive communal real-estate consisting of abandoned cemeteries, mosques, arable fields, and residences. Despite the fact the Christians claimed very dynamically the right to occupy these properties without paying anything, throughout this process the last of the Cretan Muslims were actually given the right to negotiate over the impressive ruins of the Ottoman past that seemed to occupy a significant part of the island. True, in some cases the rights of the Administrations were

respected neither by Christians nor by Muslims. In others, however, the properties changed hands only after agreements and mutually profitable arrangements.

In this context, the role played by the local courts-of-law was of significant importance since, in most cases of disputed properties, the argumentation of the rivals was based on nothing but their word. Thus, it was up to the judge to decide who was right and who was wrong by using regulations that were already vague and confusing enough. As a result, some of the decisions appeared to be fair but not legally justified, whereas others were justified but certainly not fair. In 1889, for example, Asiye and her husband Osman Tsoutsounakis, had devoted their arable lands at the periphery of Sandali village (Sitia) to the Foundations of Lasithi, keeping for themselves the status of the *mütevelli* (μονοτελή βακούφια). According to their *vakfiye* (deed of trust), after their death, the property would become part of the Muslim *beit-ül mal*, a wish that was initially respected by the Cretan courts-of-law. Meanwhile, however, after the death of the *mütevelli* couple, their relatives had arbitrarily occupied the fields; and in 1910, the Cretan Court of Appeal decided that they rightfully did so, because they had the right to inherit.

The above decision was based on the argument that the dedicators were still alive in 1899, when according to the reform realized that year the disputed fields had turned from pious to private property. Thus, according to the relevant regulation, after the death of the proprietors, the fields should be given to the closest alive relative of the late owners, namely Rehide Hajomeropoula, wife of Hüseyin Peponaki. The problem with the above reasoning was twofold. First, it appears the concerned dedicators had no idea that after their death the fields would be given to their relatives. If they knew it, they may have decided differently. Second, the concerned relatives were not living in

Crete in 1910, but in the town of Efes (Anatolia).²⁰⁶ Therefore, one cannot help but wonder what the actual result of this development had been and whether the relatives had reached an agreement with somebody else on the island.²⁰⁷

Aside from the fact that most of the locals did not seem to be well informed about the new regulations, the most common problem created by the land reform of 1899 was the following: pious properties that used to be shared between foundations, individuals, and the Islamic commonwealth, were transformed into private property held by only one of the previous share-holders, against the interests of the others. Moreover, on lots of occasions, the final proprietor had nothing to do with the family of the dedicator. In the same vein, the right to life-tenancy was often confused with full ownership. The reasons for the confusion were that both values were transferred through inheritance, and that official records were not always kept with regard to such arrangements. Shared-holding, in other words, commonly used to derive from established practices that did not agree with official registrations. Therefore, disputes over such properties could not easily be answered by the archives. Thus, they resulted in

²⁰⁶OBA, Doc 71, Dossier No 48, 20 November 1910.

²⁰⁷In fact, similar disagreements between Muslims occurred on numerous occasions, especially with regard to the properties of specific foundations. For instance, in 1900, a clash occurred between the *mütevelli* family of *Vezir Camii* (mosque) and the *mütevelli* family of the *tekke* of *Mastaba Hüseyin Baba* concerning disputed arable lands at the town's periphery (*Mastaba* location). To be more specific, Salih, uncle and representative of the heirs of late Numan Efendi Yeniçeri Efendi, was claiming that the heirs of the *mütevelli* of the *tekke* were arbitrary occupying the lands, continuing the illegal practices of their father. According to his allegations the mosque had indeed leased the properties to the *tekke* by *icâre* (rent on *vakf* property) but the *tekke* had arbitrarily attached the properties as its own. Eventually, the Muslim court of Iraklio had appointed Tahkir Muğla inspector, with the duty to personally examine disputed fields at the periphery of the town, to consult the local estimators, and to have the properties registered accordingly. Yet the objections to his decisions were great, since the temporary right of possession—or the right of collecting the revenue—was constantly confused, consciously or not, with the substance of the land itself (*rakabe*). See OBA, Doc 37, Dossier No 37, 31 January 1900.

endless court trials, conflicting interpretations of property rights, and confusion.²⁰⁸ At the same time, while the vast majority of Muslim representatives resided in the island's major towns, the expropriation of communal properties had started from the island's hinterland. From this point of view, since the project of privatization had secured the decisive abolition of Ottoman structures in the country-side, the above process could be seen both as a negotiation between Christians and Muslims, and as the final retreat of the Muslim elite to the towns of Crete.

By and large, parallel to the Cretan government's land reforms that *de facto* ended the legacy of the pious-foundations in the hinterland, Muslim administrations started to sell one by one their property rights over arable fields, plots, and buildings belonging to the old *Evkafs* in the countryside and, later on, in the towns.²⁰⁹ The rapid

²⁰⁸ One of the most common arrangements of shared holding was the system of *galledarides*, illustrated very well by the following example. In November 1902, the Council of the Muslim Elders of Rethimno, consisting of Fahrudin Hojakis (president), Sefki Tsitsekakis, Kami Veisagadakis, Musa Lahouridakis and Mercan Omerakis, authorized the director of the Administration to sell through auction the property rights of the "Veli Pasha" *vakf*, to cover the Administration's debts. The director wanted to sell the Administration's share ($\frac{1}{4}$) over gleaning spear grass, in the fields between villages Armeni, Somatas, and Roussospiti, in the Municipality of Vrisineon. The above *vakf* area was known as "Platania or Akonia" and had been dedicated to the Veli Pasha mosque according to the system of *γαλεντάρηδες* (*galledarides*). To be more specific, the dedicator was keeping for him and for his descendants the right to receive $\frac{3}{4}$ of the profit made by the utilization of the individual *vakf* (*galle-i vâkf = vakfın gelirleri*), which in this specific case was the sale of spear grass gleaned from the above mentioned fields, dedicating to the central *vakf*, namely to the Veli Pasha mosque, $\frac{1}{4}$ of it. This system was quite widespread in late nineteenth century Crete and could be applied to different kinds of *vakf* incomes, concerning profit made mainly by leasing fields or, fruits, trees, and grass growing in the given fields that otherwise belonged to the state. See OBA, Doc 27, Dossier 52, 14 November 1902.

²⁰⁹ My aim here is certainly not to present an exhaustive list of selling auctions realized by the Muslim Administration. The following examples are thus nothing but a few indicative cases of the hundreds of selling auctions concerning Muslim Pious Foundations after 1899:

Administration of Iraklio: Islands of land at the periphery of the village of Hersonisos Pediados, OBA, Doc 132, Dossier 45, 18 December 1904/ OBA, Doc 134, Dossier No 45, 19 March 1905; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Mavrakia, OBA, Doc 7, Dossier No 13(file 8), 8 December 1905; The old mosque in the village of Anyenes Maleviziou, OBA, Doc 9, Dossier No 55, 5 September 1915; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Axendi Monofatsiou, Doc 136, Dossier No 51, 2 January 1916; The old Muslim cemetery of Vagiania Monofatsiou village, OBA, Doc 31, Dossier No 48, 2 January 1916; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Plouti Kenouriou, OBA, Doc 135, Dossier No 51, 6 March 1916; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Plousta, OBA, Doc 134, Dossier No 53, 8 March 1916; Arable lands owned by the *Kadri tekke*, known as "Paterika" fields, at the periphery of the village of

expropriation of old pious properties caused a short-term high capital flow into the treasuries of the Muslim foundations. As noted above, relevant transactions were realized by each administration's director after the approval of the elders, under the pretext that they were beneficial for the foundations. True, in some cases the sales were forced by the fact that Muslim property rights were questioned. Yet the eventual

Ano Vathias, OBA, Doc 101, Dossier No 45, 3 October 1916; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village Kalivia Kinourias, OBA, Doc 32, Dossier No 36, 28 May 1917; The former cemetery at the periphery of the village of Vali Monofatsiou, OBA, Doc 79, Dossier No 30, 28 May 1917; Arable lands, the former mosque and Muslim schools, at the periphery of the village of Dionision Monofatsiou, OBA, Doc 75, Dossier No 30, 28 May 1917; Arable lands, the former mosque, and the residence of the imam in the village of Zaran Kenouriou, OBA, Doc 114, Dossier No 25, 3 September 1917; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of Stavyies, OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 45(1), 1 October 1917; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of Apolihnou, OBA, Doc 28, Dossier No 44, 20 October 1917; The former Muslim cemetery in the periphery of the village of Yliyoria Kenouriou, OBA, Doc 110, Dossier No 34, 16 November 1917; The former Muslim cemetery in the periphery of the village of Krezi Kenouriou, OBA, Doc 111, Dossier No 34, 26 November 1917; The former Muslim cemetery in the periphery of the village of Kseniako Pediados, OBA, Doc 109, Dossier No 33(file 2), 1 April 1918; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of the village of Kseniakos Pediados, OBA, Doc 109, Dossier No 34, 1 April 1918; The former Muslim cemetery in the periphery of the village of Evaro, OBA, Doc 91, Dossier No 34, 6 May 1918; Arable lands in the Prefecture of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 100, Dossier No 41, 1 April 1918/ OBA, Doc 98, Dossier No 41, 5 August 1918/OBA, Doc 99, Dossier No 41, 19 August 1918; Arable lands in the Prefecture of Iraklio and Lasithi, OBA, Doc 193, Dossier No 38, 7 October 1919; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of Keramoutsis, OBA, Doc 106, Dossier No 33(file 2), 8 November 1920; The former Muslim cemetery in the village of Paigadouri, OBA, Doc 35, Dossier No 44, 9 November 1920; The former Muslim mosque in the village of Keramoutsis, OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 44, 10 November 1920; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of Panayia, OBA, Doc 32, Dossier No 44, 10 November 1920; A coffee-shop in the village of Elia, OBA, Doc 33, Dossier No 44, 11 November 1920; The former mosque and Muslim cemetery in the village of Pedamadi (Pedamidi), OBA, Doc 31, Dossier 44, 28 November 1920; Residences in the town of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 3b, Dossier No 34, 27 October 1919/OBA, Doc 3a, Dossier No 34, 3 November 1919.

Administration of Rethimno: Arable lands in the Prefecture, OBA, Doc 84, Dossier No 10, 10 March 1903; Arable lands in the Municipality of Melidoni, OBA, Doc 117, Dossier No 25, 9 March 1904; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Prini Milopotamou, OBA, Doc 44, Dossier No 48, 30 March 1908; An old fountain in the town of Rethimno, OBA, Doc 45, Dossier No 48, 20 April 1908; Residences in the village of Episkopi, OBA, Doc 43, Dossier no 48, 20 April 1908; Land plots at the periphery of the village of Agios Andreas, OBA, Doc 117, Dossier No 51, 23 August 1915/OBA, Doc 94, Dossier No 45, 23 August 1915/OBA, Doc 118, Dossier No 51, 23 August 1915/OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 55, 13 September 1915; All of the old Muslim cemeteries in the Prefecture of Rethimno, OBA, Doc 116, Dossier No 51, 17 April 1916/ OBA, Doc 44, Dossier No 44, 24 April 1916.

Administration of Hania: Arable lands and residences, OBA, Doc 30, Dossier 8, 1901; Shops in the town of Hania, OBA, Doc 9, Dossier No 52 (file 1), 17 April 1905/ OBA, Doc 32, Dossier No 37, 27 April 1922; Numerous estates in the Prefecture of Hania, OBA, Doc 76, Dossier No 36, 24 August 1908; Arable lands, OBA, Doc 141, Dossier No 45, 8 June 1913/ OBA, Doc 172, Dossier No 15, 6 May 1915.

Administration of Lasithi: All of the Muslim abandoned mosques, schools, ottoman cemeteries, and vacant arable lands in the Eparchy of Sitia, OBA, Doc 74, Dossier No 37, 17 September 1921; The former Muslim cemetery at the periphery of the village of Kampos Mesa Merze, OBA, Doc 42, Dossier No 8, 3 October 1921.

outcome was that within years, the Muslims in charge had managed to sell off an impressive portion of Muslim property-rights, covering everything from mosques and cemeteries to spear grass. It is in this respect I have argued that the process could be seen as the final retreat of the Muslims into the towns of Crete; a retreat which provided the managers of the Foundations with auspicious opportunities for profit.

Spatial Practices of Coexistence: the Urban Space of Muslim Foundations

Despite the developments described in the previous section, Muslim administrations had yet managed to maintain the ownership of numerous mosques, arable lands, residences, water cisterns, fountains, shops, and a variety of other buildings in the Cretan towns, which were either directly used by the community or leased to others. Moreover, especially in the town of Hania, an effort was made not only to maintain, but also to restore some old communal buildings.²¹⁰ For instance, under the management of Arif Efendi Bitoxakis, director of the Administration of Hania during the very last years of Muslim presence in Crete, the community was engaged in protecting the town's new Muslim cemetery by erecting a wall around it, restoring to its original condition the abandoned mosque at Suda bay, and renovating the buildings of communal schools, residences, and shops.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Similar activities were also realized in the towns of Iraklio and Rethimno but not to the same extent. See, for instance, OBA, Doc 10, Dossier No 13 (file 8), 21 March 1905/ OBA, Doc 5, Dossier No 33, 19 October 1910/ OBA, Doc 14, Dossier No 9, 3 November 1909/ OBA, Doc 31, Dossier No 8, 22 July 1911/ OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 44, 27 November 1913/ OBA, Doc 260, Dossier No 51, 10 June 1921.

²¹¹ OBA, Doc 10, Dossier No 30, 29 August 1918/OBA, Doc 13, Dossier No 30, 11 July 1918/OBA, Doc 15, Dossier No 30, 16 August 1918/ OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 30, 13 May 1919/ OBA, Doc 1, Dossier 2 (file 4) OBA, Doc 11, Dossier No 30, 7 November 1919.

Although in the course of this study I have tried to describe broader developments and trends, overlooking for this purpose the particularity of each case, it needs to be underlined here that smaller localities existed within the wider one; it is hardly as though every part of Crete was the same. Neither did all Cretan Muslim communities necessarily resemble one another. As a result, the strategies applied with regard to communal properties by the four Administrations varied. By and large, in the prefectures of Iraklio and Rethimno, expropriations and auctions were more visible than elsewhere. The community of Hania, at the same time, continued to be the most prestigious one (but for reasons that were not limited to the use—or abuse—of Muslim properties). Last but not least, the Administration of Lasithi/Ierapetra in eastern Crete represented a territory quite distant from the local administrative capital (Hania) and the main base of the European Admirals (Suda). It is not a surprise, therefore, that the numbers of Muslims had fallen very rapidly there and that communal properties had quietly disappeared.

Despite these differences, it seems appropriate to describe Muslim foundations in Autonomous Crete as a cultural, material, and traditional Islamic complex, which was maintained for years in the island's port towns, despite its rapid disappearance from the hinterland. Muslim foundations, in other words, continued to cover a significant part of the local urban space, sustaining a number of bicomunal uses and visions. Christian and Muslim locals went on living among mosques and Ottoman fountains, leasing shops belonging to the *vakfs*, or living in one of the numerous leased residences. In light of this reality, one cannot help noticing the striking contrast between Autonomous Crete as it emerges in the context of this study and Autonomous Crete as it is generally presented by the literature. The latter tends to ignore both the existence of Muslims and the issue

of Muslim pious foundations on the island after 1897. Yet, according to this author, during the period under scrutiny, the *vakf* still lied at the core of the island's realities as space, history, cultural memory, and everyday practice.²¹²

In this context, those of the locals who were on better terms with the Muslim administrations were often offered profitable leasing or buying deals regarding the properties in question.²¹³ It should be mentioned one more time here that whenever I

²¹² See a few indicative examples of leasing auctions:

Administration of Iraklio: Shops in the town's central market, OBA, Doc 62, Dossier No 24, 16 July 1901/ OBA, Doc 25, Dossier No 24, 29 September 1901/ OBA, Doc 38, Dossier No 45, 10 July 1916/ OBA, Doc 35, Dossier No 29, 10 July 1916/ OBA, Doc 8, Dossier No 49, 28 July 1916/ OBA, Doc 56, Dossier No 36, 6 August 1916/ OBA, Doc 40, Dossier No 45, 17 August 1916; The former Muslim school in the town of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 201, Dossier No 51, 10 July 1916; Residences next to the Vezir mosque, OBA, Doc 115, Dossier No 53, 6 August 1916/ OBA, Doc 116, Dossier No 53, 11 August 1916; Arable lands belonging to the *Bektaşî tekke*, known as "Agios Vlassis" fields, OBA, Doc 40, Dossier No 50, 1 September 1921;

Administration of Rethimno: Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Agios Andreas, OBA, Doc 40, Dossier No 52(file 1), 9 July 1900; Residences in the town of Rethimno, OBA, Doc 27, Dossier No 49, 7 December 1902; Shops in the town of Rethimno, OBA, Doc No 6, Dossier No 15, 27 April 1902/ OBA, Doc 5, Dossier No 15, 19 May 1903/ OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 15, 1 May 1905/ OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 15, 24 April 1906/ OBA, Doc 15, Dossier No 52(file 1), May 1906/ OBA, Doc 6, Dossier No 44, 27 August 1906/ OBA, Doc 73, Dossier No 38, 12 August 1907/ OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 51, 10 August 1908/OBA, Doc 154, Dossier No 45, 31 August 1910/ OBA, Doc 107, Dossier No 45, 1 February 1913/OBA, Doc 110, Dossier No 45, 19 May 1914/ OBA, Doc 109, Dossier No 45, 26 May 1914; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Amnatos (Municipality of Arkadi), OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 37(file 3), 11 July 1900/OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 37(file 3), 6 July 1902/ OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 37(file 3), 18 July 1904 / OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 37(file 3), 16 July 1906; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Kare, OBA, Doc 1, Dossier No 37, 1 August 1906; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Hromonastiri, OBA, Doc 15, Dossier No 44(file 1), 1 August 1910; Arable lands at the periphery of the village of Maroula, OBA, Doc 126, Dossier No 53, 31 August 1914/ OBA, Doc 127, Dossier No 53, 8 September 1915; Arable lands and residences at the periphery of the village of Yannousi, Doc 120, Dossier No 51, 28 August 1922/ Doc 121, Dossier No 51, 28 August 1922.

Administration of Lasithi: Arable lands, OBA, Doc 185, Dossier No 34, 1 February 1902/ OBA, Doc 159, Dossier No 34, 20 August 1904; In 1904, in Administration had asked the Mayor to lease in the name of the Municipality of Lasithi a number of *vakf* arable lands, OBA, Doc 165, Dossier No 15, 17 September 1904.

Administration of Hania: Arable lands and residences, OBA, Doc 29, Dossier No 8, 1901; Arable lands, OBA, Doc 173, Dossier No 15, 7 April 1915.

²¹³ As far as individual rivalries were concerned, they commonly occurred over preemptive *vakf* lands and buildings. In fact, according to local regulations, the leasing of properties with worth more than 200 dr. should always be realized through auction. In practice, however, in the archives we find quite a few complains on the issue of unjust auctions. Moreover, Muslim complains with regard to this particular regulation appeared to have continued from 1900 to 1922. See OBA, Doc 12, Dossier No 37, 27 September 1900/ OBA, Doc 13, Dossier No 37, 11 September 1900; OBA, Doc 35, Dossier No 47, 30 November 1922.

refer to Cretan-Muslim space, I do not mean to describe it as an even tenor of communal life, occasionally disrupted by uprisings and revolutions. Quite to the contrary, the only way to locate Muslim realities within the broader Cretan geography—both before and after 1897—is by describing them as products of constant negotiation and profound heterogeneity: negotiation between 'centers' and 'peripheries', inter-communal and bireligious networks, abstract ideals and specific material needs; and heterogeneity of spatial religious structures, individual uses, and collective narratives.

After having clarified this crucial point, reference can then be made to the actual usages of Muslim space the way it was reshaped through interaction with the local authorities after 1897. In other words, we can now try to see how the central place pious properties still occupied in the major towns of Autonomous Crete was affected by the gradual marginalization of the community. In this respect, it is beyond doubt that the Christian authorities gradually expropriated Muslim foundations from a number of prestigious mansions, ruined residences, central open spaces, and communal buildings, which were henceforth to be used for the needs of the new sociopolitical elite.²¹⁴ Similar

In a number of cases individual bidders complained that some locals participated to the auctions only in order to raise the price in favor of the Administration or, to serve the interests of others. See OBA, Doc 100, Dossier No 36, 1 September 1914/ OBA, Doc 97, Dossier No 36, 25 January 1915.

²¹⁴ See for instance the following cases: Demolishment of *vakf* shops in Iraklio according to the town's new urban planning, OBA, Doc 52, Dossier No 24, 30 April 1901; Occupation of the former Muslim Orphanage by the British troops, OBA, Doc 81, Dossier No 41, 5 February 1902; Leasing of the building of the former Muslim school to the Municipality of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 88, Dossier No 25, 12 October 1902; Demolishment of the Muslim school and fountain of the foundations for the creation of a square at the port of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 52-53, Dossier No 44, 5 January 1904; Demolishment of *vakf* shops in the town of Hania, OBA, Doc 54, Dossier No 34, 12 June 1905; Occupation of some central *vakf* residences in Hania, OBA, Doc 139, Dossier No 45, 9 December 1906; Court trial concerning disputed lands between Greek public and Muslim Orphan Properties of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 20, Dossier No 44, 25 March 1909/ OBA, Doc 19, Dossier No 44, 10 February 1911/ OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 30, 5 March 1911; Demolishment of old *vakf* buildings in the town of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 77, Dossier 53, 13 December 1911/ OBA, Doc 168, Dossier No 41, 19 June 1915; Occupation of real estate properties belonging to Muslim Orphan Properties of Iraklio, for the construction of a public street, OBA, Doc 3, Dossier No 52 (file 1), 6 May 1912; Court trial concerning disputed lands between Greek public and Muslim Foundations of Iraklio,

developments were sometimes the result of mutual agreements between the community and the island's authorities; most of the time, they were not.

Cretan Muslim space was claimed by the new authorities via both direct and indirect practices. Through leasing, sales, and forced demolitions according to the towns' new urban planning, on the one hand; and through the occupation of devalued and deserted places, on the other. The instances that follow offer good illustrations of the above. In 1904, the local authorities decided to found a settlement of lepers in the deserted Muslim school of Spina Longa, occupying *de facto* the abandoned village of the Muslims and making it impossible for them to return.²¹⁵ Similarly, the authorities decided to build public urinals next to the central *vakf* bakeries in the town of Iraklio, despite the protestations of the Administration that nobody would buy bread from there any longer. True, after the construction of the urinals, the Muslim foundations experienced significant losses of income and were thus forced to abandon the buildings.²¹⁶

During the First World War, previously concealed challenges against Cretan Muslims reached their peak.²¹⁷ Mosques and Muslim schools were openly attacked by large crowds, communal buildings were occupied by the Greek army, and numerous

OBA, Doc 87, Dossier No 48, 15 February 1912/ OBA, Doc 86, Dossier No 48, May 1914; Build of a new road through the former Muslim cemetery of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 17, Dossier No 8, 19 November 1914; Turning a *vakf* building in Iraklio, and 7 small shops to Public Theater, OBA, Doc 115, Dossier No 48, 31 October 1918.

²¹⁵ OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 23(file 3), 10 August 1904.

²¹⁶ OBA, Doc 140, Dossier No 45, 13 February 1920.

²¹⁷ For previous such incidents see the following two examples: In 1903, the Administration of Hania complained that Christians were often throwing stones to the windows of Valide mosque, OBA, Doc 59, 3 June 1903; In 1907, the Administration of Lasitihi/ Ierapetra was complaining that at night Christians were attacking the Muslim cemetery, OBA, Doc 65, Dossier No 25, 17 January 1907.

initiatives were taken by Christians to offend against Islam, such as using active mosques as stables, public toilets, or garbage dumps.²¹⁸ One should not forget that wretched Christian refugees from Anatolia were by then fleeing to Cretan towns by the thousands, circulating stories of horror regarding the atrocities of Turkish forces on the mainland. Hence, at that time, Christians and Muslims alike were faced with the extremity of local collisions and with the terror of the Great War, which disrupted the balance of bireligious Cretan networks once and for all. During that period, lots of the previous experiences were instantly forgotten, lost in the din of greater catastrophes and disastrous battles. Despite the final outcome, however, it should be underlined that for a period Muslims and Christians had coexisted in Cretan towns, together with older Ottoman material legacies. The result of this coexistence had been an interesting, trans-communal spatial synthesis.

A very telling example of the above was the case of a building dedicated to the İbrahim Ağa mosque in the town of Iraklio. In 1902, a visitor would find on the second floor of the building a Muslim communal library and a reading room. The library's book collection included rare items brought to the town from the provisional mosques of the prefecture, which had by then been deserted or demolished. On the first floor of the

²¹⁸ See for instance the following incidents: Physical attacks against the Muslim girls' schools in the town of Iraklio, OBA, Doc 67, 15 May 1919; Demolishment of the minaret of Neracie mosque (in the town of Rethimno) and occupation of the mosque by the navy and Christian citizens, OBA, Doc 10, Dossier No 22, 9 July 1921; Demolishment of some *vakf* shops in the center of the town of Iraklio, Doc 43, Dossier No 52(file 1), 14 July 1921; Occupation of the Muslim schools of Rethimno by the Greek Navy, OBA, Doc 7, Dossier No 22, 22 July 1921/OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 22, 5 August 1921; Occupation of the Muslim sewing club's building in the town of Rethimno by the Greek navy, OBA, Doc 24, Dossier No 12, 9 June 1921; Demolishment of old *vakf* buildings in the town of Rethimno, OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 54, 1 June 1922; Occupation of the Muslim schools of Rethimno for the settlement of Christian refugees, OBA, Doc 57, Dossier No 38, 30 November 1922; Effort to build a stable in the yard of Vezir mosque, OBA, Doc 50, Dossier No 41, 5 January 1923; Occupation of the Muslim schools in the town of Iraklio by the Greek navy, OBA, Doc 45, Dossier No 52, 9 January 1923; Occupation of *vakf* buildings in the towns used for the settlement of Greek refugees coming from Asia Minor, OBA, Doc 4, Dossier No 38, 9 November 1922; OBA, Doc 111, Dossier No 37, 22 November 1923.

building, at the same time, one would find the “Eviv” amusement club, a coffee shop/casino owned by non-Muslims. The coexistence of a club hosting gambling activities and all kinds of 'amusements' in the same building which hosted the religious library, was certainly an interesting example of shared space. Apparently, however, the leasing of pious property for such a purpose was not favored by all Muslims. As a result, the elders' council, which had approved the leasing, was forced to explain how exactly the contract at issue served the pious purposes of the foundations. The elders answered the challenge by underlining the benefits of education, reading, and learning. According to them, education and the maintenance of the communal library were sacred and should be protected by any means necessary. Consequently, inasmuch as the leasing of the first floor was the only practical way to maintain a library on the floor above, both uses of the building had to be approved as “pious.”²¹⁹

A very different, and certainly less controversial, 'pious space' offered for trans-communal activities was that of aqueducts, fountains, and cisterns controlled by the Muslim foundations.²²⁰ In Autonomous Crete, to be more specific, Muslim fountains (*çeşmes* or *sebils*), central water reservoirs (*maksims*), both of which belonged to the Administrations, and water-mills, some of which belonged to Muslim orphans, provided

²¹⁹ The building was located in the neighborhood of “Tris Kamares,” OBA, Doc 141, Dossier No 48, 14 October 1902.

²²⁰ For a general discussion of pious urban management in other Ottoman cities see R. Deguilhemand and A. Raymond, eds., *Le waqf dans l'espace islamique outil de pouvoir sociopolitique* (Damascus: Institute Français de Damas, 1995); R.V. Leeuwen, *Waqf and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: BrillHamouche, 1999); Vincent Lemire, “Water in Jerusalem at the End of the Ottoman Period (1850-1920); Technical and Political Networks,” *Bulletin du Centre de Recherche Français de Jérusalem* 7, 136-150; Mustapha Ben, “Sustainability & Urban Management in Old Muslim Cities: The Role of Pious Foundations,” *Architecture and Planning* 19, no. 2, (2007), 27-48; Engin Isin and Ebru Ustundag, “Wills, deeds, acts: women's civic gift-giving in Ottoman İstanbul,” *Gender, Place and Culture* 15, no.5 (October 2008), 519–532; Noyan Dinckal, “Reluctant Modernization: The Cultural Dynamics of Water Supply in Istanbul, 1885–1950,” *Technology and Culture* 49, no. 3 (July 2008), 675-700.

water not only to Islamic foundations, but also to Christian cemeteries, schools, churches, and residential quarters—both Christian and Muslim. One should not forget that the older water-systems (built in the 17th and early 18th centuries) had been partly modernized during the era of Abdülhamit II, when the number of fountains grew, reservoirs were rebuilt, and earthen pipes were replaced with iron ones.²²¹ The relevant infrastructure, which was controlled by the Muslim foundations, survived until the following century. Despite the fact that autonomous administration seemed devoted to replace these water systems with new municipal ones, the project could not be realized immediately.²²² Consequently, both in Autonomous and in Greek Crete, Muslim foundations—particularly the aqueduct of Rethimno and water cisterns of Iraklio—not only continued to provide similar services, but even extended the scope of water distribution with more pipes in order to cover growing local demand.²²³

²²¹ On the water reservoir of Rethimno see Giannis Papiomitolou, “Στο Πέθυμνο του 1894: In Rethimno of 1894,” *Kritologika Grammata* 1, no. 1, (1990), 17-20.

On fountains which were built in Crete in nineteenth century, see Orhan F. Koprulu, “Usta-zâde Yunus Bey'in meçhul kalmış bir makalesi: Bektaşiliğin Girid'de intişarı: An anonymous article by Usta-zade Yunus Bey: The evolvement of Bektashish in Crete,” *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8-9 (1979-1980); Mihalis Emm. Paterakis, *Κρήνες και Κάστρα της Κρήτης: Fountains and Castles of Crete* (Iraklio: Sfakianos, 1990); Cam. Nusret, *Yunanistan'daki Türk Eserleri: Turkish Monuments in Greece* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 2000).

²²² For the auction concerning a municipal aquarium in the town of Hania, see No 29, SGAC, 1 October 1899.

²²³ Administration of Rethimno: OBA, Doc 117, Dossier No 38, 16 July 1903/ OBA, Doc 90, 22 November 1905/ OBA, Doc 66, Dossier No 48, 19 October 1906/OBA, Doc 124, Dossier No 45, 31 July 1907/ OBA, Doc 50, Dossier No 48, 6 May 1908/ OBA, Doc 58, Dossier No 48, 29 May 1908/ OBA, Doc 42, Dossier No 48, 10 April 1908/ OBA, Doc 41, Dossier No 48, 20 April 1908/ OBA, Doc 25, Dossier No 8, 1 September 1909/ OBA, Doc 49, Dossier No 22, 8 September 1908/ OBA, Doc 61, Dossier No 35, 1 December 1909/ OBA, Doc 175, Dossier No 25, 1 May 1910/ OBA, Doc 111, Dossier No 53, 1 August 1910/ OBA, Doc 6, Dossier (file 1), 1 June 1910/ OBA, Doc 20, Dossier No 38, 13 December 1911/ OBA, Doc 176, Dossier No 15, 28 March 1913/OBA, Doc 256, Dossier No 51, 18 September 1914/ OBA, Doc 11, Dossier No 18, 13 May 1915/ OBA, Doc 12, Dossier No 55, 16 June 1922/ OBA, Doc 6, Dossier No 54, 6 June 1922/ OBA, Doc 16, Dossier No 54, 13 July 1922/ OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 54, 28 July 1922/ OBA, Doc 21, Dossier No 54, 30 July 1922/ OBA, Doc 12, Dossier No 55, 16 June 1922/ OBA, Doc 22, Dossier No 54, 28 July 1922/ OBA, Doc 21, Dossier No 54, 30 July 1922/ OBA, Doc 63, Dossier No 38, 22 August 1922/ OBA, Doc 46, Dossier No 24, 30 August 1922/ OBA, Doc 59, Dossier No 38, 12

The 'Greek Empire' and the 'Muslim Millet': the Final Scene

Taking into consideration all of the dynamics discussed in previous sections, I have tried to describe the Muslim community of Autonomous Crete as a local *millet* and as part of a collective experience that contradicts the monolithic, national narratives of belonging commonly applied to the region. Though Cretan Muslims were obviously not all the same, the fact they had enjoyed collective rights and had suffered collective discrimination as a religious group is enough for me to describe them as a (non-homogenous) entity. Yet this entity was very different from our modern understanding of minorities. In this respect, despite the fact that some of the legacies of Autonomous Crete continued after the integration of the island to Greece, one should differentiate between the two periods. Contrary to national realities, autonomy was by definition legitimized on the basis of shared roles and experiences between Christians and Muslims. From this point of view, only the spatial practices of coexistence as embedded in the urban space of Muslim pious foundations, which were maintained until the forced

December 1922/ OBA, Doc 60, Dossier No 38, 14 December 1922.

Administration of Iraklio: OBA, Doc 87, Dossier No 37, 23 February 1901/ OBA, Doc 91, Dossier No 37, 1 March 1901/ OBA, Doc 89, Dossier No 37, 5 March 1901/ OBA, Doc 131, Dossier No 25, 15 September 1901/ OBA, Doc 95, Dossier No 37, 29 January 1902/ OBA, Doc 93, Dossier No 41, 14 March 1902/ OBA, Doc 88, Dossier No 37, 27 July 1902/ OBA, Doc 127, Dossier No 10, 22 June 1903/ OBA, Doc 81, Dossier No 50, 28 June 1904/ OBA, Doc 39, Dossier No 53, 25 August 1902/ OBA, Doc 2, Dossier No 13(file 8), 8 June 1905/ OBA, Doc 126, Dossier No 10, 21 June 1905/ OBA, Doc 77, Dossier No 29, 12 June 1905/ OBA, Doc 119, Dossier No 38, 17 March 1907/ OBA, Doc 72, Dossier No 53, 9 October 1907/ OBA, Doc 32, Dossier No 52, 15 May 1911/ OBA, Doc 19, Dossier No 29, 14 October 1913/ OBA, Doc 14, Dossier No 29, 26 November 1913.

Administration of Hania: OBA, Doc 105, Dossier No 53, 10 July 1901 (incomes from water and electricity supplies)/ OBA, Doc 62, Dossier No 8, 22 November 1902/ OBA, Doc 36, Dossier No 45, 22 November 1905.

Administration of Lasithi/ Ierapetra: OBA, Doc 110, Dossier No 15, 20 July 1904/ OBA, Doc 140, 30 November 1904/ OBA, Doc 124, Dossier No 15, 24 January 1905.

deportation of Muslims from Crete, had survived the transformation of the Muslim *millet* into a minority. The same way, one could say, that the pious foundations of non-Muslims in modern Turkey had survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the consequent birth of minorities out of the old *millets*.

Thus, even if the experiment of Cretan bireligious administration proved to be quite brief, Muslim legacies lasted far longer. Moreover, when Eleftherios Venizelos became leader of the Greek Liberals and Prime Minister of Greece, the experiment of coexistence was handed from the Ottoman Empire down to the Greek nation-state. During the First World War, when Greeks held Izmir and swept on into the Anatolian hinterland—dreaming of expanding even beyond the historical lands of Byzantium—Prime Minister Venizelos brought Cretan Muslims again onto center stage. It seems that, according to him, if the national project was to be realized and if Greece was indeed to rule over former Imperial lands, then the Muslims of Crete could become Greece’s own “Fanariotes” and “Dragoumans.” To be fair, the above terms were never actually used by the Greek Prime Minister. Nevertheless, his future plans for Muslims in an enlarged Greece were strongly reminiscent of late nineteenth-century Ottoman experiences. For example, in a letter sent to his friend Aristidis Stergiadis, in 1919, inviting him to become Governor of Izmir, Venizelos wrote as follows:

“Turkish Cretans (τουρκοκρητικοί) are going to help us administer Asia Minor Greece... Their Muslim devotion to the Will of God and their local patriotism, can make them priceless servants of our administration in Asia Minor... It is thus time we leave behind the prejudices tied to old, tiny Greece; it is time we move towards values that inspire and motivate peoples (λαούς) destined to govern great numbers of foreign populations...”²²⁴

²²⁴ Published in Manolis Karellis, *Ιστορικά Σημειώματα Για Την Κρήτη. Από Την Επανάσταση Του 1866 Έως Την Κατοχή. Με Ανατύπωση Της Εκθέσεως Ομοτήτων Του Καζαντζάκη, Κακρίδη, Καλιτσουνάκη: Some*

Venizelos, in other words, acted as a pragmatic champion of the “Great Idea.” His legitimization of Greek expansion was not only based on mystical claims to Byzantium’s reconstitution. According to his approach, Greek expansion over western Anatolia was as possible in practice as it was desirable in theory, not only due to past legacies, but also because the ‘progressed’ should guide and govern the ‘backward’ for the latter’s own good.²²⁵ To my understanding, therefore, Venizelos’s interpretation of territorial expansion was articulated through a matrix of discourses colored no less by imperialism than by nationalism. By and large, Liberal Greeks were then experimenting with patterns strongly reminiscent of the era of Abdülhamid II and of the British imperial model. From this point of view, the “Muslim *millet*” of Crete appeared destined to function as a bridge between non-Christian locals in Anatolia and the core of the ‘Greek-Empire-to-be,’ namely the Kingdom of Greece. Were then such hybrid orientations symptomatic of traditions that had not yet gone and of a modernity that had not yet arrived? This author’s view is that, quite to the contrary, eastern-Mediterranean modernity gave new life—albeit in quite different a shape—to the region’s ramified old practices.²²⁶

Historical Notes on Crete. From the 1866 Revolution to the Occupation. Reprinting of the Report on Brutalities by Kazantzaki, Kakridi, Kalitsounaki (Iraklio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2005).

²²⁵ Despite the ideological ‘flexibility’ Venizelos presented in time regarding his alliances, it seems that his attitude towards Cretan Muslims had not dramatically changed from the period he was a politician in Autonomous Crete until after he became Prime Minister of Greece. For some earlier examples see his letters sent to papa-Stefano Provataki in 1905, and his speeches in the Cretan Parliament, in 1907, Hrisoula Tsikritsi, ed., *Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου Επιστολές Προς τον Παπά Στέφανο Προβατάκη: The Correspondence of Eleftherios Venizelos with Papa Stefano Provataki* (Iraklio: 1965), 18-34; “Εστενογραφημένα Πρακτικά Της Βουλής Των Κρητών, Συνεδρία Ζ: Proceedings of the Cretan Parliament, Session VII,” (Hania: 14 July 1907), 130-33.

²²⁶ For a similar discussion of hybridity within a different context see Nestor Garcia Canclini, *Hybrid*

The arrival of modernity to the Eastern-Mediterranean signified the creation of a new understanding not only of progress but also of tradition.²²⁷ It reflected both new and older perspectives. In the same vein, modern national narratives were impinged upon by older religious legacies. Pious foundations, therefore, had survived in the Eastern-Mediterranean as a space considered as sacred as—if not more sacred than—the ruins of the ancient past. One should not forget that the modern quality of 'the progressed' was considered, among other things, relevant to one's attitude towards ancient monuments and different religious traditions. From this point of view, conceptual dichotomies—such as modernity versus tradition, empire versus nation, local versus universal—are problematic when used in an absolute way. At the turn of the century, for example, Crete, Great Britain, the Ottomans, and Greece constituted separate and yet interconnected realities, shaped in the light of modernity, both by their common present and by their particular past.

Conclusion

Parallel to the general, theoretical framework provided by this chapter, I have tried to underline the importance of individual experiences and strategies. Although historical research cannot intrude into intimate past realities but to limited extent, it is important to

Cultures. Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity (Minnesota: U of Minnesota Press, 2005). For an interesting discussion of Modernity and Tradition see Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity-an Incomplete Project," in *Postmodern Culture*, ed. Hal Foster, *Pluto Classic* (London: Pluto Press, 1995).

²²⁷ As suggested by L. Olivier in his very interesting discussion of archaeology, historic time is a fusion between the present and the past; a fusion stimulated more than anything, I would add by modernity's understanding of time. See Laurent Olivier, "The Past of the Present. Archaeological Memory and Time." *Archaeological Dialogues* 10, no. 2 (2004): 204-13.

keep in mind that general patterns are shaped by the lives of unique individuals motivated by deeply personal concerns. Hence, without reference to the latter the former cannot adequately be discussed. As a conclusion, therefore, let us focus on the following scene taking place in a neighborhood of Rethimno back in 1908. A number of residents, Muslim and Christian, are using the water bought in by the Muslim aqueduct. Some are watering their gardens; others are cleaning the school toilets of a Christian religious school; but most of them are using the water for their personal, trivial, domestic needs. These people may have had close or distant relatives who had been slaughtered, injured, or abused in one of the numerous uprisings and revolutions. They may have known nothing about the principles of Islamic law. They may have been indifferent towards their contemporary developments in the Empire and Greece. They certainly did not know what their future might be. And yet they had unconsciously participated in the maintenance and transformation of *vakf*-realities in the most direct way.

Hence, aside from the broader strategies and practices, which had shaped the legacy of Muslim pious foundations in Crete, one should always keep in mind that personal experiences were equally important. For this reason, the present chapter has examined broader ideological transformations, discourses, and patterns of control in parallel with individual stories. Stories that may appear to us heroic, comic, horrible, dramatic, or pragmatic. Stories that we, as researchers, try to discover in archives and other sources in an effort to shape our own story about the past. As to the story of the Cretan Muslims *per se*, it has been colored by actions, feelings, and thoughts we certainly do not own and probably do not understand.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In the conclusion of the present study I would like to summarize it and try to explain some of its main points, as well as highlight its methodological particularities and weaknesses. The discussion has started and finished with reference to the Muslims of Autonomous Crete, the mere existence of whom had most vividly captured, in my view, the anguished transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean during the age of late modernity.¹ The first three chapters, however, have touched upon a variety of issues only partly related to Cretan Muslims. True, this was not my intention at the outset of this research project. In an honest first attempt to contextualize the case of Cretan Muslims with regard to the Ottoman Empire and Greece, I initially tried to recreate an introductory chronological framework, demonstrating that the uncritical use of the term 'minority' for the community in question is misleading at best. Nevertheless, my examination of secondary literature on nineteenth century Crete has convinced me that the gap between the majority of approaches, both scholarly and popular, and my understanding of the issue was unbridgeable without a thorough reevaluation of nineteenth century developments in eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the investigation of the sources to which the existing literature refers has shown me that views different from mine do not derive from hard data, but from subjective and isolated interpretations.

Subjectivity is, naturally, an obstacle this author does not claim to have

¹ For a brilliant, broad analysis of the forces that shaped and defined the ideological, political, and economic dimensions of late modernity, focusing on the interplay between the Empire and the Nation State see Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*.

overcome. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to examine a variety of sources from western Europe, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire, converging the different and often conflicting results of this examination into a single narrative thread. The main purpose of this process was not to provide teleological answers to specific questions, but to attempt the comparative presentation of discourses and dynamics that evolved diachronically from the late eighteenth through the dawn of the twentieth century. In this way, my initial interest for the Muslims of Autonomous Crete became the terminus of a much broader narrative that has developed through the complex paths of historical and historiographical labyrinths.

My main concern has been to establish thus a framework that would liberate Autonomous Crete from historiographical provincialism, since the latter inevitably manifests itself whenever the island is examined in isolation. In this respect, this study has become a conscious attempt to combine a narrative about Crete with a structural survey of the Eastern Mediterranean, a region viewed here as a multiform, contested *chronotopos*, shaped by modernity and tradition, Islam and Christianity, empires and nation-states.² This methodological approach may appear too confusing when applied to a study of regional history such as the present one. Nevertheless, I believe that my focused study of Autonomous Crete would have been much more misleading for the reader if I had suggested that Crete was nothing but a unique, atypical case. In the same vein, I have considered it of crucial importance to demonstrate how developments concerning the island were linked to the world around it, through variable and often not all that obvious ways. Within this perspective, I have attempted to examine Crete both as an actual Ottoman province,

² Katica Kulavkova, "The Mediterranean 'Chronotopos' and Its 'Differentia Specifica'." In *Representation of The "Other/S" In the Mediterranean World and Their Impact on the Region*, edited by Nedret Kuran Burcoglu and Susan Gilson Miller (Istanbul: The Issis Press, 2005)

influenced directly by the broader developments in the Ottoman Empire, and as a symbol shaped to serve the main ideological needs of the era.

With regard to the second issue, I have tried to explain why, in the context of a variety of Greek and European narratives, the Ottomans were characterized as little more than the evil, Muslim occupiers of Christian Crete. I have tried thus to demonstrate that each one of these narratives had emerged in harmony with at least one of the following collective identities: Christianity, democracy, nationalism, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism. I explicitly have argued that the historical contextualization of Crete as having always been Greek-European, and the characterization of the Ottomans and Islam as foreign to the island's cultural elements, had nothing to do with objective sources and rational explanations. However, it certainly has not been my aim to present the Ottomans as the unfortunate targets of European conspiracies against Islam. Such an interpretation would have been unfair, above all, to the complex world for which the Ottoman Empire stood, until its own very end. In the same vein, any argument that appeals to the lack of military and financial power, or technological development, to explain why the Ottomans were excluded from Europe does not appear to be valid, especially if one takes into consideration that Greece was triumphantly included.

As a result, in an effort to understand one of the main differences between the Ottoman Empire and Greece during that period, I have decided to pay attention to Europe's "storytellers." In brief, I have tried to link social movements and the political rise of the masses to the popularity of some European narratives, which contradicted many pragmatic interpretations of the past and the present and yet (or thus) had an unmistakable emotional impact on the 'people.' In the Ottoman context, at the same time, constructing popular collective narratives was as problematic an act

as any attempt to promote the emergence of a public sphere, since the latter could exist only when directly controlled by the regime. Within this perspective, one can argue that the West (whether European, secular, or Christian) stood, among other things, for the masterful construction of collective identities that previously did not exist; a practice to which the Ottomans were certainly latecomers.

Moreover, one has to remember that in the late nineteenth century, national identities constituted only one group among a variety of newly constructed others, including collective identities based on religion, class, modern progress, or past glory. I have argued, therefore, that the Ottomans had gradually lost nineteenth-century Crete to Greece—leaving behind a group of ideologically confused local Muslims—not because of the weakness of their army, but because of their lack of inspiring narratives; a lack that may have resulted from the regime's successful censorship of potentially talented 'storytellers' and of their audiences. Ironically, therefore, the relative power of the Ottomans, the area's longest-lived dynasty, at the turn of the century had started to become one of its main weakness.

Last but not least, this being considered a topic of Ottoman studies, it has appeared very interesting to me to examine the Muslims of Crete as a reversed example of broader dynamics and negotiations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. The above 'mirror-aspect' of my representation of the Muslim community of Autonomous Crete needs to be emphasized and further explained. This study, in other words, has questioned predominantly Greek and European stereotypes about Crete, focusing much less on discourses in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. The reason for this choice has been twofold. First, it has to do with the historical and historiographical particularities of the issue under scrutiny. Second, it has to do with the particularities

of this author's background and personal story. Having been born and raised in Greece and having received a significant part of my education in that country, I felt both the need and the confidence to question, challenge, elaborate on, and try to explain the most problematic aspects of my intimate background and educational experiences. That having been said, one should not forget that both my interest in Cretan history and my reading of it is to a large extent subjective. Nevertheless, this has been a weakness I have honestly tried to limit by remaining loyal to the mainstream methodology and techniques of academic historical research—that is, by deriving my conclusions from the careful and comparative examination of primary sources.

At the same time, for reasons similar to the above, I have tried to underline the 'mirror-aspect' both of the present research and of the present researcher. A parallel examination of the Turkish and Greek literature, in other words, with regard to our contemporary religious minorities and their Ottoman past, suggests that an interesting comparison can be made between, for instance, the gradual fall and eventual deportation of Muslims from Crete and that of the Christians from western Anatolia. Moreover, one can find striking analogies concerning how the present reality influences our reading of the region's past by projecting present 'minorities' and 'majorities' to linear narratives of ethnic, regional continuity. In other words, I hope my discussion of the Muslim '*millet*' of Autonomous Crete may be useful for a further consideration of the issue, illustrating some of the essential differences between present minorities in the concerned nation-states and the area's Ottoman past.

In the same vein, a systematic attempt was made in this study to render the particularities of the region by placing it in the larger picture. Instead of treating

Cretan history as one more Greek-Turkish issue, or as a series of parochial conflicts observed by the rest of the world, I have attended to Crete's historical, mythical, and actual relations to that part of the world self-identified as the West. This relationship was underlined at different parts of each chapter and with varying emphasis. The third chapter, in particular, was from beginning to end an attempt to demonstrate how ancient and modern Crete was conceptually recreated by the West for the latter to cater to its own particular needs. By this, I have not tried to imply only the obvious bounds created by financial capitalism, globalization, and political imperialism among different parts of the world and Crete. I have also tried to touch upon issues much more complex and better hidden even to our day. My intention has been above all, perhaps, to demonstrate that the nineteenth-century West craved the discovery of the Orient, viewed not only as its contemporaneous, backward 'other,' but also as its mythical, ancient-self.

One of the central arguments of this study has been that the undoubted cultural expansion of western Europe during the period under scrutiny has been a movement largely colored by the profound—though rather unconscious—'easternization' of the West. As mentioned above, a conscious effort has been made to demonstrate how the differentiation between the historical Orient and the historical West derived from the immense importance attached by Christian Europe to similar issues, from at least the Enlightenment to our day; a differentiation, however, that has nothing to do with rational explanations and objective data. With regard to Crete, in particular, ideas about the island's present and remote past have intersected with political, ideological, and social issues of global dimensions; a process that has condemned almost to oblivion most aspects of the Cretan Muslim past. Needless to say that the above arguments do not imply the lack of any difference between the late nineteenth

century Ottoman Empire and western Europe. From the point of view of most Western forces, for instance, the Ottomans were not part of them. Yet, as suggested above, this subjective dichotomy derived more from the delayed response of Muslim Ottomans to the rise in the West of social movements, popular forces, popular stories, and their story-tellers, than from an actual long-term cultural clash of civilizations between the two. Moreover, the very ideals of the West were absent from some of the so-called 'western' territories while present, to a certain extent, in the Ottoman lands.

The above approach to the issue created the need for a balance to be redressed. Thus, the last chapter of this study has been an effort to complete the above narrative by following quite a different methodological approach. Special focus was placed on the Muslim community of Autonomous Crete, without really discussing developments in the Ottoman Empire, Greece, or Europe after 1897-1899. Moreover, a number of individual stories have been presented as intimate aspects of the island's past, involving aspects of reality that may have been tragic, comical, dramatic, realistic, imagined, personal, or collective. In this respect, despite the obvious discrimination against Muslims and the gradual decline of the community in Crete, this author strongly disagrees with any monolithic reference to 'victims' and 'victimizers.' The same way Crete as a locality was connected to the broader framework—that being Greek, Ottoman, Mediterranean, or global—via complex paths and dynamic power-networks, the Muslim community of Crete, as a smaller *topos* within the locality, was linked to the island via a matrix of variable individual experiences, views, actions, and interests.³ In order to underline this aspect of the issue I have, on numerous occasions, tried to look beyond massacres, deportations, and collective identities, focusing instead on the intimacy of individual experiences

³ Michel Foucault, *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000 [1994])

and stories.

The main danger of this approach has been the risk of creating a caricature of the island under scrutiny by referring, for instance, to sexual preferences, fraud, bribes, and irrational dreams, hopes, and fears. In fact, the main perspective of this study as a whole bears a similar danger. Nevertheless, my view is that insofar as similar behaviors have been, more or less, common in every geography and period throughout history—despite the understandable particularities that characterize each territory and era—the retrospective idealization of past communities and individuals is actually much more disrespectful to them than any honest attempt—successful or not—to understand how these individuals actually experienced the world around them. Crete, in particular, constitutes a very loaded case-study, due to its overwhelmingly violent past. Although I do not wish to underestimate the depths of human tragedies, I insist that the Cretan past is not abused when one tries to see beyond its various 'martyrs,' but rather when our by definition retrospective understanding of historical reality limits the history of Crete to a purified, idealized, and simplified version of 'monsters' and 'heroes' used by various actors of the present to legitimize contemporary interests and ideals.⁴ Thus if a caricature is sketched by this study indeed, it concerns more some of the present uses of history than history itself.

In brief, this study has been an effort to overcome obstacles, both physical and metaphysical, that stand between nineteenth century Crete and this author. In this context, it is certain that important aspects of the story have been omitted, while others have been magnified. It is probable that some of the issues discussed have

⁴ See the introduction in Maria Todorova, *Bones of Contention. The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National Hero* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2009).

been interpreted in misleading or even wrong ways. It is plausible that the narrative has been significantly colored by my own concerns, thoughts, and ideas. Thus one may well agree or disagree with the ways I have analyzed and understood the issues at stake. At the same time, I hope that some of the sources used and translated here may help a future reader to form his/her own opinions, and find answers to his/her own questions. Thus comes to a close nothing more and nothing less than my own five-year effort to understand and to contextualize, to the extent I could, the mirror-locality of Crete, through the reflections of transforming old Empires and modern nations-states; an issue as complex and as interesting to me as any other mirroring of human change.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Books selected by the community and approved by the government for the year 1901-1902:¹

	Muslim Religious Classes	Cretan Muslim Boys' Primary School	Cretan Muslim Girls' School
Ottoman Reading Skills	I Class	1) Mehmed Şemseddin, <i>Çocuklara Kılavuz: Children's guide</i> Or, <i>Elifbâ-ı Osmanî: Ottoman Alphabet</i> redacted by the Muslim teachers of Hania according to the needs of the first class students	1) <i>Elifbâ-ı Osmanî: Ottoman Alphabet</i> redacted by the Muslim teachers of Hania according to the needs of the first class students; Mehmet Hilmi, <i>Anahtar (Clue)</i>
	II Class	2) Mehmet Hilmi, <i>Anahtar (Clue)</i>	2) Mehmet Hilmi, <i>Anahtar (Clue): II</i> Hüseyin Kâmi, <i>Kelimât-ı Türkiye ve Rumiye: Turkish-Greek Vocabulary</i>
	III Class	3) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: I</i>	3) Ali Nazima, <i>Talim-i Benat: Ladies' Rules</i>

¹ See Princely Edict No 112, *SGAC*, 30 September 1901 and Princely Edict No 83, *SGAC*, 1 October 1902. As far as the rest of curriculum books are concerned see Princely Edict No 51, *SGAC*, 23 September 1903. The list of book is presented here as it appears in the original. Most books have been identified as follows: Mehmed Fuad and Ahmed Cevdet, *Kavaid-i Osmaniye* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1864); Hüseyin Kâmi, *Kelimât-ı Türkiye Ve Rumiye (Girid Stbyan Mektepleri İçin Cem'olunan): Turkish-Greek Vocabulary* (Hanya: Girid Matbaası, 1291 [1874]); Muallim Naci, *Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules* (Kandiye: Maarif matbaası, 1312 [1894]); Ali Nazima, *Oku: Read* (İstanbul: Kasbar Matbaası, 1307 [1890]); *Talim-i Benat: Ladies' Rules* (İstanbul: Kasbar matbaası, 1307 [1890]); Mehmed Şemseddin, *Çocuklara Kılavuz: Children's Guide* (İstanbul: Arakel Matbaası, 1321[1903]. See Özege, M. Seyfettin, *Eski Harflerle Basılmış Türkçe Eserler Kataloğu* (İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1973).

	III Class	4) Ali Nazima, <i>Oku: Read</i>	4) M. Naci, <i>Kıraat: Reading : I</i>
	IV Class	5) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: II</i>	5) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: II</i>
	V Class	6) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: III</i>	6) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: III</i>
	VI Class	7) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: IV</i>	7) Muallim Naci, <i>Talim-i Kıraat: Reading Rules: IV</i>
Religious Classes	I Class	8) <i>Kur'an</i> (for first-grade students)	8) <i>Kur'an</i> (for first-grade students)
	II Class	9) <i>Kur'an</i> (for second-grade students)	9) <i>Kur'an</i> (for second-grade students)
	III Class	10) Ali Nazima, <i>İ'timan: Faith/Trust: II</i> Mahmud Mesud, <i>Mebadi-i ilm-i hâl: Introduction to the methods of prayer</i>	10) <i>Kur'an</i> Ali Nazima, <i>İ'timan: Faith/Trust: II</i>
	III Class	11) Ali Nazima, <i>İ'timan: Faith/Trust: III</i> Or, Mahmud Mesud, <i>İlm-i hâl-i Muhtasar: A Brief Method of Prayer</i>	11) <i>Kur'an</i> Ali Nazima, <i>İ'timan: Faith/Trust: II</i>
	IV Class	12) Ali Nazima, <i>İ'timan: Faith/Trust: II</i> Or, Mahmud Mesud, <i>İlm-i hâl-i kebir: Superior methods of prayer</i>	
Grammar	III Class	13) Ali Nazima, <i>Sarf-ı Osmanî: Ottoman Grammar</i>	9) Ali Nazima, <i>Sarf-ı Osmanî: Ottoman Grammar</i>
	IV and V Classes	14) <i>Muallim-ı Sarf: Teacher's Grammar</i>	10) Ahmet Rasim, <i>Muhtasar Sarf-ı Türki: Turkish Grammar: I</i>

			Or, <i>Lisan-ı Osmani: The Ottoman Language</i>
	VI Class	15) Cevdet, <i>Kavaid-i Osmani: Ottoman Rules</i>	11) Ahmet Rasim, <i>Muhtasar Sarf-ı Türki: Turkish Grammar: II</i>

Table 2. Curriculum of the Muslim Schools of Autonomous Crete:²

Grade	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Religious education and reading of the Qur'an (<i>Θρησκευτικά και Κοράνιον</i>)	4	4	5	4	3	3
Instruction of the Turkish language-reading and grammar (<i>Τουρκικά-ανάγνωση και γραμματική</i>)	9	8	8	9	8	8
Turkish language –writing and calligraphy- (<i>Τουρκικά- γραφή και καλλιγραφία</i>)	2	1	1	1	1	-
Turkish Mathematics (<i>Αριθμητική Τουρκική</i>)	2	1	1	-	-	-
Greek Language (<i>Ελληνική γλώσσα</i>)	6	9	10	10	8	8
Mathematics (<i>Αριθμητική</i>)	1	2	2	3	2	2
Geometry (<i>Γεωμετρία</i>)	-	-	-	-	-	1
Geography (<i>Γεωγραφία</i>)	-	-	-	-	2	2
Physical History (<i>Φυσική Ιστορία</i>)	-	-	-	-	2	2
Writing and Calligraphy (<i>Γραφή και Καλλιγραφία</i>)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Πραγματογνωσία	1	1	-	-	-	-
Drawing (<i>Ιχνογραφία</i>)	-	-	-	-	1	1
Experimental Physics (<i>Φυσική Πειραματική</i>)	-	-	-	-	-	1
Universal History (<i>Ιστορία Παγκόσμιος</i>)	-	-	-	1	2	2
Gymnastics (<i>Γυμναστική</i>)	2	2	2	2	2	2

² For a detailed curriculum of the Muslim schools see, Princely Edict No 9, *SGAC*, 28 January 1902.

Table 3. The First Muslim Parliamentary Representatives of Autonomous Crete:

Parliamentary Representatives of Selinou, Kissamou, Kodonias, Apokoronou, and Hanion (town)	<u>36 Christians</u> <u>12 Muslims:</u> Bekset Passa Agazaden, Hüseyin Neibeyzaden, İbrahim Betri beyzaden, Ekemel Softazaden, Nesim Farfourzaden, Ahmet Dolmazaden, Mehmet Hamit beyzaden, Ali Vekilagasizaden, İbrahim Kaourzaden, Nurudin Kaourzaden, Arif Saratsizaden, Fuat Vendourzaden
Parliamentary Representatives Rethimnis (town and eparchy), Amariou, Milopotamou, and Agiou Vasileiou	<u>30 Christians</u> <u>10 Muslims:</u> Mehmet Spathakin, Ali Veisakin, Yusuf Skoubededakin, Kamı Veisakin, Kaider Hatzivekirakin, Husni Azabazaden, Hasan Imamakin, Husni Moulaselimefendakin, Derviş Mousadakin, Şefik Tsitsekin
Parliamentary representatives of the Departments of Irakliou and Lassithiou	<u>72 Christians</u> <u>28 Muslims:</u> Hasan Skilianakin, Fuat Vendourakin, Hüseyin Valtzakin, İbrahim Zeki Souroutzaden, Bekset Agazaden, Hasan Kouyoumtzakin, Talat Megounakin, Arif Davoutakin, Nuri Kaourzaden, Ali Katzoulaki, Ali Calip efendin, Gazim efendi, İbrahim Hiandin, Behamb Rahmizaden, Namin Vrazerzaden, Ali Hivtzi efendin, Rıfat Afendakin, Hilmi Arhaniotaki, Hatzi Selim efendin, Nevil efendin, Husni Koubaratzaki, Ramız efendin, Mehmet Karaslanakin, Mustafa Deliahmetakin, Alin Moustafabadakin, Cafer Yetimakin, Kadri Tzabatzakin, Hefik Hatziademakin

Table 4. Muslim small enterprises in Autonomous Crete:

Muslim Grocery Shops³

	Hania	Rethimno	Iraklio
1901	1)Mustafa Kadrakis 2)Hasan Agakakis 3)Edehem Horafakis 4)Sait Rodalakis 5)Ahmet Stampraimakis 6)İsmail Moskonakis, Süleyman Bistolakis 7)Haydar Arvanitakis and Vasilios Verganelakis 8)İbrahim Mavralakis 9)Nuri Passakakis, Muhterem Balardakis, Hasan Halimakis, Leonidas Hatzidakis, Hasan Vakakis, Hüseyin Kavatzakis, Theodoros Marinakis, Andreas Zakynthianakis 10) Osman Parvelakis 11)Ali Bektasakis 12)Ahmet Bibilakis and Mustafa Rousenis 13)Hüseyin Katsikanakis 14)İbrahim Palataitakis 15)Hasan Argirakis		1)Hüseyin Risvanakis 2)Mustafa Yidakis
1902			1)Abdullah Hemihianis 2)Hacı Salı Portakalakakis 3)Mustafa Viannitakis 4)Besim Yilianakis 5)Mustafa Houdaidakis 6)Mustafa Tzeferakis 7)İbrahim Stroubakis 8)Arap Dilaverakis 9)Ramazan Kaimaklakakis 10)Ali Vrazerakis 11)Ali Kadartzakis 12)Mehmet Mouratakis 13)Hacı Selim Yenarakis 14)Arif Tzebetzakakis 15)Kadem Halazarakis 16)İbrahim Katsoukakakis 17)Heban Karakatzakis 18)Ali Selimakis 19)Ali Papoutsalakakis 20)Arif Selimakis 21)Zeynel Palatsakis 22)Ali Mouladakakis 23)Hüseyin

³ Inspection Report on Grocery Shops of Hania, *SGAC*, 4 August 1901; Inspection Report on Hostelrys of Iraklio, *SGAC*, 17 July 1901; Report No 25/22 towards the Prefecture of Iraklio, *SGAC*, 15 June 1902; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 4 December 1903; Report No 94/89, *SGAC*, 23 August 1904; Report No 154/ 145, *SGAC*, 21 September 1904; Report No 194/173 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 3 June 1906; Report No 82/50 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 7 February 1908.

			Moustatzepakis 24)İbrahim Verikkokakis 25)İbrahim Houmanakis 26)Asan Nazifakis 27)Mehmet Kriarakis 28)Cemal Moulabrainmakis 29)Nihat Hamtzadakis 30)İbrahim Papoutsalakis 31)Sait Nispithianakis 32)Faful Sakirakis 33)Mehmet Tsibouksakis 34)Hüseyin Hotzakis 35)Mehmet Hazazalakis 36)Ali Bekirakis 37)Mehmet Biralakis 38)Mustafa Kazalakis 39)Cafer Kadartzakis
1903	1)Hasan Halimakis 2)Nuri Pasakakis 3)Ahmet Kotinakis 4)Salı Dermetakis 5)Ali Behtasakis 6)Hüseyin Argirakis 7)Mustafa Bourekakis 8)Mustafa Rousianakis 9)Ali Kotsifakis 10)İsmail Mousourakis and Tselepakis 11)Hacı Braimıs and Haral, Tsagarakis 12)Mustafa Kadrakis 13)Betri Bekrakis 14)Ali Halilakis 15)Recep Kerestetzakis 16)Hacı Braimıs 17)Mehmet Droumas 18)Ali Louloudakis		
1904	1)Hatzidakis Brothers and Makris, Savvakis, Salı Demirtzakıs, S. Kabourakis, İliakis, G. Hatzidakis 2)N. Nenedakis and L. Hatzidakis, Nuri Aga Sakkakis 3)S. Stoupakis and Savvakis, Verganilakis, Hasan Selimakis, Mustafa Mehmetalakis, İsmail Moshonakis, Sait Rodalakis 4)İbrahim Agadakis		
1906	1)Musa Dambasakis 2)Hasan Agapakis 3)Hasan Argirakis 4)Sait Rodoulakis 5)Hasan Hortatzakis		

1907			
1908	1)İsmail Panierakis 2)Nuri Pasakakis 3)Agakakis and Argirakis		

Muslim Taverns-Restaurants-Hostelries-Stables⁴

	Hania	Rethimno	Iraklio	Sitia
1900	(Taverns) 1)Ali Fragazizakis 2)Ahmet Moutsadakis 3)Mehmet Sabalakakis			
1901	(Taverns) 1)Ali Fragazizakis 2)Mehmet Sabalakakis		(Taverns) 1)Hacı Asani Mousadakis 2)Mustafa Arnaoutakis	
1902	(Hotels and Hostelries) 1)Mehmet Tousounakis 2)Mehmet Sabelakis 3)İbrahim Kabarakis 4)Hacı Ziya Tsagarakis 5)Mehmet Trodakakis	(Restaurants and Taverns) 1)Hacı Asan Mousadakis 2)Ali Dinidaki 3)Ali Semiotzakakis 4)İbrahim Skilianakis 5)İbrahim Aidilakis (Hostelries) 1)Mustafa Volionitis 2)Yusuf Limeras 3)Mehmet Parinis 4)Mehmet	(Hostelries) 1)Adem Bitsaksakis 2)Mustafa Smirniotakis 3)Hüseyin Merabeliotis	

⁴Report of the Police Doctor of Hania, *SGAC*, 5 September 1900; Inspection Report on Restaurants of Hania, *SGAC*, 20 June 1901; Inspection Report on Hostelries of Iraklio, *SGAC*, 17 July 1901; Report on Hostelries of Hania, 23 August 1901; Report of the Police Doctor of Hania on Hostelries and Restaurants No 79/37, *SGAC*, 10 Mart 1902; Report No 117/100 towards the Prefecture of Iraklio, *SGAC*, 11 September 1901; Report No 18/16 towards the Prefecture of Iraklio on Hostelries, *SGAC*, 8 June 1902, Report No 81/61 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 17 June 1902; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 30 October 1903; Report No 294/221 towards the Prefecture of Iraklio, *SGAC*, 11 November 1903; Report No 208/165 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 11 October 1903; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 3 August 1903; Report No 160/122 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 18 July 1903; Report towards the prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 3 December 1903; Report towards the Prefecture of Lasithi, *SGAC*, 5 June 1903; Report No 217/ 183, *SGAC*, 16 September 1904; Report No 57/43 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 29 September 1904; Report No 186/144 towards the Prefecture of Iraklio, 28 April 1904; Report No 144/110 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 28 April 1904; Report No 46 towards the Prefecture of Hania, 6 April 1904; Report No 81/62 towards the Prefecture of Rethimnis, 8 Mart 1904; Report No 42/37 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 15 February 1905; Report No 175/154 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 24 May 1906; Report No 158/ 127 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 28 June 1907; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 28 February 1907; Report towards the Prefecture of Rethimno No 56/47, *SGAC*, 11 February 1907; Report No 11/12 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 24 January 1908; Report No 124/81 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 22 February 1908; Report No 59/34, *SGAC*, 25 January 1908

		Skoudidrakis 5)Ali Spilianakis 6)Mehmet Vernados 7)Yusuf Harkiadakis 8)Ali Kissanakis 9)Mustafa Volionitis 10)Besim Ktistakis and Assoc. 11)Besim Ktistakis and Assoc. 12)Mehmet Memisakis 13)Mustafa Betridakis 14)Ali Bolakis 15)Nuri Dasenias		
1903	(Hostelries and Stables) 1)Mustafa Vedouraki 2)Company of Carriages: Haralabos Hatzidakis and Hüseyin Perdikis 3)Mehmet Loupakis 4)Ali Katsigaris 5)Usta Mustafa 6)Mercan Tsafanakis and Stavros Tzepapadakis 7)İbrahim Steliarakis (Taverns) 1)Mehmet Sabanakis 2)Mehmet Trodakis 3)Mehmet Voutsadakis 4)Hacı Mehmet Tzevremakis	(Stables) 1)Mehmet İrfanakis 2)mehmet Skoudidrakis 3)Ali Halkiadakis 4)Hüseyin Harkiadakis 5)Mustafa 6)Hüseyin Masloumakis 7)Mustafa Spilianakis 8)Yusuf Lamerar 9)Mehmet Perinakis 10)Mustafa Bedridakis 11)Ali Bolakis (Taverns) 1)Hasan Kadinelis 2)Ahmet Kalkatzidakis 3)Mehmet Mavragakis 4)Davut Berberakis (Hostelries) 1)Brothers Ali and Hüseyin Bilalakakis 2)Hüseyin Harkiadakis 3)Mustafa Kotsobos 4)Yusuf Spilianakis 5)Mehmet Sisidridakis 6)Ali Spilianakis 7)Mehmet Perinakis 8)Mustafa Betridakis 9)Ali Bolanis Yusuf Lamerar	(Hostelries) 1)Hacıasanaki Musadakis 2)İbrahim Adendilakis 3)Haki Dabagoutzaki 4)Demir Tsitsibafokakis 5)Mustafa Retzepakis 6)Salı Pervolarakis 7)Ali Dededakis 8)Ali Semertzakis	-

1904	(Hostelries and Stables) 1) Mehmet Loupasakis 2) Mustafa Kabelakis 3) Ali Katsigarakis 4) İbrahim Steliarakis 5) Hüseyin Perdikakis 6) Company of Carriages: Haralabos Hatzidakis and Hüseyin Perdikis (Taverns) 1) Mehmet Sabalakakis 2) Mehmet Trodakakis 3) Hacı M. Tzevremakis (Coffee Shops) 1) Nuri Babadakakis 2) Süleyman Bey Bistolakis	(Hostelries and Stables) 1) Haydar Tsaousakis 2) Hasan Kadinelis 3) Mercan Kayiannakis 4) Mehmet Skoudridakis 5) Hüseyin Harkiadakakis 6) Hasan Yeraniotakis 7) Ali Spilianakis 8) Mustafa Volionitakis 9) Mustafa Katsobos 10) Mehmet Pirinakakis 11) Yusuf Lamerakakis 12) Mustafa Volionitakis 13) Mehmet Memisakis 14) Ali Bolakis 15) Yusuf Lahouridakakis (Taverns) 1) Hasan Kadinelis 2) Ahmet Karkatsidakakis 3) Mehmet Tourkakakis	(Hostelries) 1) Ali Dededakis 2) Ali Semertzakis 3) Hacı Asan Mousadakakis 4) İbrahim Aidilakis 5) Hakkı Dabakoutzakakis 6) Hüsnü Naisaatsakis (Taverns) 1) Hüseyin Akif 2) Hacı Mehmet Tzevremakis 3) Mehmet Trodakakis 4) Mehmet Sabalakakis 5) Sait Kaberakis	
1905	(Taverns) 1) Hacı Tzevremakis 2) Mehmet Trodakakis 3) Hüseyin Akif 4) Mehmet Sabalakakis			
1906	(Hostelries and Stables) 1) Mehmet Loupakakis and Ahmet Semeritzakis, Mustafa Kabilaks, Mustafa Vedourakis 2) Ali Katsigarakis 3) İbrahim Steliarakis 4) Mustafa Tsatsaronis			
1907	(Hostelries and Stables) 1) Mehmet Loupakakis 2) Ahmet Semertzakis 3) Mustafa Vedourakis 4) Mercan Ali Katsigarakis	(Taverns) 1) Hasan Kadinelis 2) Haydar İbrahim Tsaousakis	(Restaurants) 1) Hasan Kadinelis	

	5)İbrahim Stiliarakis 6)Aziz Ksenakis 7)Hüseyin Terizakis (Taverns) 1)H. Mehmet Tzedremakis 2)Mehmet Sabalakakis 3)Mehmet Trodakakis			
1908	(Restaurants) 1)Mehmet Savvalakis 2)Hacı Mehmet Tzedremakis (Coffee Shops) 1)Osman Omerakis 2)Mustafa Tsouknakis 3)Ali Rektakis 4)Ali Manierakis 5)İbrahim Dermitzakis 6)Hasan Ellinakis 7)Ahmet Argimalakis 8)Bekir Agrimelakis Ali Kastrinakis 9)Cemal Lakoudakis 10)İbrahim Kadarakis 11)Mustafa Maniatis 12)Hasan Safran 13)Mehmet Mourinakis 14)Ramazan Zekirakis 15)Mustafa Latifakis 16)Mustafa Kotorakis 17)Emin Boxonakis 18)Hüseyin Nourakis	(Hostelries and Taverns) 1)Hasan Kadinelis		

Muslim Bakery Shops and Patisseries ⁵

⁵ Report of the Inspector of Hania Bakery-Shops No 20/14, *SGAC*, 17 September 1901; Report of the Police Doctor of Hania on Patisseries No 62/ 42, *SGAC*, 20 October 1901 and 23 June 1901; Report of the police Doctor of Rethimno on Bakery-Shops, *SGAC*, 14 September 1902; Report of the Police Doctor of Hania No 143/83, *SGAC*, 18 May 1902; Report No 81/61 towards the prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 18 June 1902; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 12 November 1903; Report towards the prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 19 April 1903; Report towards the

	Hania	Rethimno	Iraklio
1901	(Bakery Shops) 1)Halim Skounakis or Halil Skanakis 2)Mustafa Martigakis (patisseries) 1)İbrahim Ismitoglou 2)Mustafa Ntrarakı		
1902	(Bakery Shops) 1)Halim Skounakis or Halil Skanakis 2)Mustafa Martigakis	-	
1903	(Patisseries) 1)Ömer Odabasakis 2)Süleyman Hotzakis 3)Mustafa Misirlakis 4)Mustafa Trarakis 5)Moustafa or S. Kaliotzakı 6)Recep Manarakis or Behroulakis 7)Hacı Adem Pezolelis (Bakery Shops) 1)Mustafa Martigakis		
1904	(Patisseries and Workshops) 1)Mustafa Mersinaki 2)Mehmet Patalakis 3)Semi Pardalakı 4)Cemal Mourginakis 5)Mehmet Şerif Bairamakı 6)Mustafa Trarakis 7)Süleyman Hotzakis 8)İbrahim Ismitoglou	(Patisseries) 1)Ahmet Dervısakı 2)Rıza Alımadarakı 3)Ali Tsaousakı 4)Sumen Stafılakı 5)Ali Berberakı 6)Hüseyin Tselepakı	
1905	(Bakery Shops) 1)Mustafa Martigakis	(Bakery shops) 1)Süleyman Bouhayartı 2)Hasan Dervısalıdakı	
1906		(Bakery Shops) 1)Ahmet Dervısalakı 2)Hüseyin Fıelıdakı	
1907			

Prefecture of Rethimno No 240/186, *SGAC*, 13 June 1904; Report No 73/54 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 4 Mart 1904; Report No 331/258 towards the Prefecture of Hania, 14 November 1904; Report No 67 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 27 February 1905; Report No 24/21 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 7 Mart 1905; Report No 242 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 3 July 1906; Report No 165/113 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 8 Mart 1908; Report No 8/9 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 22 January 1908; Report No 58/33 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 25 January 1908; Report No 9/10 towards the Prefecture of Rethimnis, *SGAC*, 22 January 1908

1908	(Flour Shops) 1)Halim Spathourakis- Italian flour (Patisseries) 1)Mustafa Terezaki 2)Hacı Adem Pizpilari 3)Ömer Odabasaki	(Bakery Shops) - (Patisseries) 1)Sumen Stafilakis 2)Süleyman Ylistridakis	
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Muslim Dairy Shops, Ice Cream Shops and Butcher's Shops⁶

	Hania	Rethimno	Iraklio
1901	(Dairy Shops) 1)Şükrü Nadir		
1902	1)Emin Raisakis (Kalika) 2)Ahmet Hüseyin Hacı Ismailakis (Kokkino Metohi)		
1903	(Dairy Shops) 1)Hüseyin Kopritakis 2)Mustafa Aitakis 3)Mustafa Kiamilakis 4)Mehmet Agrimalakis 5)Mustafa Pistrakis 6)Hasan Eminakis 7)Halim Hacı Moustafakis 8)Musa Thribitsakis 9)Cemal Arnaoutakis (Butcher's Shops) 1)Hacı Ahmetakis		
1904	(Dairy Shops) 1)İzzet Avnakis 2)Hasan Agakakis 3)Hasan Argirakis 4)Mustafa Thribitsakis 5)İbrahim Sfakianakis 6)Ali Bolanakis (Hasan Giaourakis) 7)Ahmet Kodonakis 8)Salı Dermitzakis 9) Ali Koufakis 10)Ahmet Kotonakis (Ice Cream Shops) 1)İbrahim Kaniarakis 2)Şükür Nadir 3)Kostis Tzedakis and Georg. Kalligeris, Pavlis		1)Nuri Tzemalakis 2)Asan Nourakis 3)Hasan Mouktarianos 4)Ali Leblebtzaki

⁶ Report of the Police Doctor of Hania on Dairy-Shops No 85/59, *SGAC*, 17 November 1901; Inspection of Dairy-Shops, *SGAC*, 22 August 1900; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 30 September 1903; Report towards the Prefecture of Hania No 172/ 129, *SGAC*, 15 June 1904; Report No 217/ 183, *SGAC*, 16 September 1904; Report No 168/ 127 towards the Prefecture of Rethimnis, *SGAC*, 13 June 1904; Report No 76 towards the Prefecture of Rethimno, *SGAC*, 1 Mart 1905; Report No 125/82 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 23 February 1908; Report No 125/82 towards the Prefecture of Hania, *SGAC*, 23 February 1908

	Milogiannis, Haridimos Valis, Hüseyin Bournazakis, Georgios Papoutsakis 4)Ömer Odabasakis 5)Mehmet Mourginakis		
1905		(Dairy Shops) 1)Hacı Odabasakis 2)Süleyman Soumanagadakis 3)Mustafa Karatzedakis 4)Bedri Tsiligrakis 5)İbrahim Arnaoutakis 6)Ali Kouroudakis 7)Hacı Velis 8)Hacı Selamis 9)İbrahim Atakis 10)Ali Tsaousakis	
1906			
1907			
1908	(Dairy Shops) 1)Mehmet Kalitsounakis 2)Ali Yirmitzaki 3)Mustafa Kadrakis 4)Halil Volanakis and Mehmet Argirakis 5)Ahmet İvraimakis 6)Hasan Agakakis 7)Ali Kikidakis 8)Sait Rodolakis 9)İbrahim Sfakianakis 10)Ali Tahirakis 11)İzzet Linakis 12)Ahmet Kakoperakis 13)Salı Demirtzakis		

Muslim Barber Shops⁷

	Hania	Rethimno	Iraklio	Sitia
1901	1)Mehmet Xervakis 2)Mehmet Spahakis 3)Mehmet Hacisabanakis 4)Ahmet Behloulakis 5)Cafer Risvanakis 6)İbrahim Bedevakis 7)Huseyin Habibakis 8)Hasan Bedevakis			
1902			1)Mustafa Yetınakis 2)Çekil Tzevrefendakis	

⁷ Report of the Police Doctor of Hania on Barber Shops No 56/37,SGAC, 11 October 1901; Report No 99/86 towards Prefecture of Iraklio, SGAC,29 August 1902.

			3)Hüseyin Tsaousakis 4)Mehmet Emin Psihopedakis 5)Sali Memihraki 6)Hacı Asan Koubitaki 7)Mustafa Yatraki	
1903				1)Derviş Dourvakis
1904				
1905				
1906				
1907				
1908				

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Εσπερινή (Athens)

Εστία (Athens)

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