

SIGHTING THE OTTOMANS FROM THE EAST

CHINESE INTELLECTUAL TRANSITION FROM IMPERIAL TO NATIONAL  
IMAGINATION THROUGH THE OTTOMANS AT THE TURN OF THE  
TWENTIETH CENTURY

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## Thesis Abstract

Selda Altan, “Sighting the Ottomans from the East: Chinese Intellectual Transition from Imperial to National Imagination through the Ottomans at the Turn of the Twentieth Century”

This thesis examines the Chinese perception of the Ottomans within the global context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in which novel ideas and discourses of nationalism were generated, and it aims at comprehending the intellectual transition from imperial to national imagination in China through the examination of these ideas and discourses. In other words, the Chinese perception of the Ottomans at the turn of the century is utilized to understand how Chinese national space was produced at discourse level by reference to the Ottomans.

The aim of the thesis is realized through reading Chinese texts produced in the late nineteenth century to 1911. These texts include commentary works of Chinese intellectuals who tried to figure out the global world space and its relation to the national space. The common point in these articles is the utilization of the Ottoman case by Chinese intellectuals who had various ideological orientations as an example for their constitutionalist, revolutionary and nationalist causes. Through this examination, it was concluded that although the Ottoman case was utilized by Chinese intellectuals, it was not viewed in a consistent manner. From the perspective of Chinese intellectuals, the Ottomans from various social levels were isomorphic as they were victimized by the imperial West while the Ottoman Empire had imperial claims over both Chinese Muslims and the nations under its rule within the imperial competition of global politics. Hence, the vague perception of the Ottoman Empire and fragmented viewing of the Ottomans had a minor but noteworthy place in the production of Chinese nationalist discourses.

## Tez Özeti

Selda Altan, “Osmanlı’ya Doğudan Bakmak: Yirminci Yüzyıl Dönümünde Çin Entellektüel Dünyasının Emperyal Tahayyülden Milliyetçi Tahayyüle Geçişi ve Osmanlılar”

Bu tez, milliyetçi düşünce ve söylemlerin üretildiği dönem olan ondokuzuncu yüzyıl sonu ve yirminci yüzyıl başında Çin aydınlarının küresel bağlamda Osmanlıları nasıl algıladığını inceleyerek bu dönem söylem ve düşüncelerinin bir analizi ile Çin’de emperyal tahayyülden milliyetçi tahayyüle geçişi anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Başka bir deyişle, yirminci yüzyıl dönümünde Çin aydınlarının Osmanlı algısının bir incelemesiyle Çin’de ulusal uzamın söylem düzeyinde Osmanlılar üzerinden nasıl üretildiği ele alınmıştır.

Bu amaç Çin’de ondokuzuncu yüzyıl sonundan 1911’e kadar yazılmış metinlerin okunması ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Tezde kullanılan metinler, küresel dünya uzamını ve bu uzamın ulusal uzamla olan ilişkisini kavramaya çalışan Çin aydınlarının yorum içeren çalışmalarıdır. Makalelerin ortak noktası farklı ideolojik yönelimli Çin aydınlarının kendi meşrutiyetçi, devrimci ve milliyetçi hedefleri için Osmanlı örneğine başvurmalarıdır. İnceleme sonunda Çin aydınlarının Osmanlı örneğinden faydalandığı görülmekle birlikte Osmanlılara bakışın tutarlı ve bütünsel olduğu iddia edilemez. Yüzyıl dönümü Çin aydınlarının bakış açısından, farklı sosyal kesimleriyle Osmanlılar emperyal Batı karşısındaki mağduriyetleri dolayısıyla Çin’e benzer bir örnek teşkil ederken, Osmanlı Devleti ise küresel siyasetin emperyal yarışı içinde hem Çin Müslümanları, hem de kendi egemenliği altındaki farklı milletler üzerinde emperyal iddialar taşımaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Osmanlı Devleti’nin muğlak, Osmanlılarınsa parçalı algılanışı Çin milliyetçi söylemlerinin üretilmesinde küçük ama dikkate değer bir yer tutmaktadır.

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GLOSSARY FOR CHINESE NAMES AND TERMS

CHINESE	PINYIN	WADE-GILES	EXPLANATION
孙中山	Sun Zhongshan	Sun Yat-sen	
康有为	Kang Youwei	K'ang Yu-wei	
梁启超	Liang Qichao	Liang Ch'i-ch'ao	
张之洞	Zhang Zhidong	Zhang Zhi-dong	
林则徐	Lin Zexu	Lin Tse-hsü	
李鸿章	Li Hongzhang	Li Hung-chang	
左宗棠	Zuo Zongtang	Tso Tsung-t'ang	
章太炎/章炳麟	Zhang Taiyan/Zhang Binglin		
鸿飞/张中东	Hong Fei/Zhang Zhongdong		
王韬	Wang Tao		
魏源	Wei Yuan		Scholar
徐继畲	Xu Jiyu	Tsu Chih-yu	Scholar
胡汉民	Hu Hanmin		Writer
民意	Min Yi		Pseudonym of an author
雍正	Yong Zheng		emperor
道光	Dao Guang		emperor
光绪	Guangxu		emperor
郑和	Zheng He	Cheng Ho	Admiral
菲菲高	Fei Feigao		Pseudonym of an author
马绍良	Ma Shaoliang		Writer
高保真	Gao Baozhen		Writer
留守镇	Liu Shouzhen		Writer
清	Qing	Ch'ing	The name of the last dynasty
广东	Guangdong	Kwangtung	Southern province of China, Canton
大同书	Datong shu	Ta-t'ung shu	<i>The Book of Great Unity</i>
海国图志	Haiguo tuzhi		<i>Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms</i>
瀛环志略	Yinghuan zhilue		<i>A Short Account of Maritime Circuits</i>
同盟会	Tongmenghui	T'ung-meng Hui	The Chinese Revolutionary Alliance
同种	Tong zhong		Same race/kind
同类	Tong lei		Same kind
亡国	Wang guo		Loss of country

### **Note on Transcription**

Throughout the text, all transcriptions of Chinese are in pinyin, except for cases in which another system of romanization was used in the quoted text or the term is commonly used in another romanization system. I put my own translations in square brackets while the translations already done by others were put in parenthesis.

## PREFACE

The past can only be told as it truly is, not was.

Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*<sup>1</sup>

Before my departure from Turkey in 2007, conducting a comprehensive research on Sino-Ottoman interactions was a dire necessity under the circumstances. Contact between China and Turkey was gradually getting more and more intense. However, when I started to work on this thesis in 2007, I foresaw none of the circumstances which put my work in an extremely relevant context of the current global politics. I was in Nanjing when the Tibet revolt of March 2008 broke out and traveling in the interior of China when the Olympic Games with the motto “one world, one dream” were being followed with the great excitement by the Chinese in the summer of 2008. When I went to Beijing to bravely do archival research, I disappointedly learnt that the collections on foreign relations of the Qing Empire were not ready for research. At the moment that I lost my hope in making an archival research on Sino-Ottoman relations in the late nineteenth century, I discovered the newspaper collections of Beijing National Library and Shanghai Library. As I scanned the dusty pages of newspapers or their microfilms, I came across an Ottoman image in the Chinese public press at the turn of the twentieth century. When combined with our previous findings in Turkey, all the articles and reports on Turkey from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century told a lot about national transformation in China and the role played by the Ottoman case in the process.

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<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), *European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 9.

The very same period of my research witnessed myriad events in Turkey within the highly globalized sphere of political interactions. After coming back to Turkey at the beginning of 2009, I found my friends amid discussions of neo-Ottomanism and Islamic revival in Turkey. Finally, I was about to finish the project when the Uyghur insurrection in Xinjiang broke out in June 2009. What amused me most in these occasions was that even though they took place at well defined locales, their claims and recognition were ironically global so far as to attract the attention of the entire human community all at once. Moreover, they denoted the claims of a trans-national space located within a global space of inter-national interactions.

It is so obvious that the world has long been immersed into great transformations in terms of its social and political configurations. The nation state is either leaving the world stage or renewing itself in order to adapt to the transnational requirements of the globalized world order while nationalism as its ideology reveals itself under different masks at most unexpected moments. At this liminal moment, it is indispensable to look back again to find the origins of the current developments, be they the signs of either a transnational religious revival, or a global integration of the capitalist society. The current paper was prepared with the assumption that the contemporary world of nation state in China (and in other places as well) can only be grasped by reference to its making from the late nineteenth century forward not only within an East-West dyad but within a web of multi-directional interactions among which the Ottomans occupied a minor but noteworthy space.

## CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the Chinese perception of the Ottomans within the global context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The indisputable fact that the period under question was characterized by the imperialist undertakings of Europe, America and Japan directed the attention of historians to the unequal interactions between East and West, resulting in the narrowing of the field to Eurocentric perspectives. For this reason, particularly in the Euro-American studies of non-Western societies of the last century, these societies were thought to be understood by reference or comparison to Euro-America as if non-Western societies did not have any native potentiality for change or Euro-America was the standard of measure to evaluate other societies. As a critique of this perspective, this study aims at decentering the focus of historical inquiry from the East-West dichotomy to a wider perspective in which modernity is identified as a global phenomenon while Eastern and Western societies are defined as its equal composers, provided that the agents of the oppressed and oppressive countries did not have the same experience.<sup>2</sup> I venture to realize this aim by tracing the hitherto ignored interactions between the Ottoman and Qing empires from the late nineteenth century on, mostly from the Chinese perspective. At the time that novel ideas and discourses of nationalism were generated, taking these interactions and perceptions into account will contribute to the comprehension of the intellectual transition from empire to the nation state in China. In this sense, the Chinese perception of the Ottomans at the turn of the

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<sup>2</sup> I would like to quote Arif Dirlik here as a reminder: “No matter how hard we try to de-center, recenter or ‘ex-center’ history, Eurocentricism persists as a frame of reference.” Arif Dirlik, “History without a Center? Reflections on Eurocentricism,” in *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 250.

century is utilized to understand how the Chinese national space was produced at discourse level by reference to the Ottomans.

On the basis of this theoretical background, the work historically traces the development of Chinese nationalism through reading texts produced from the late nineteenth century to 1911. These texts include Chinese geographical works as they expose the production of global and national space and the commentary works of Chinese intellectuals who tried to figure out the global world space and its relation to the national space with reference to the Ottoman Empire of the time.

As it is understood from the methodology, this work is a study of intellectual history in every sense of the word. At first sight, writing about intellectuals and presuming that the ideas of prominent figures lead the social transformations seems dangerous since such an attempt underestimates the substructural dynamics of social change. None of the intellectual trends of the time could be parted from economic concerns as none of the political formations could be materialized without the involvement of the public masses and material dynamics. More explicitly, writing a history of transition to modernity only as a journey of ideas without considering the development of the modern world capitalism and nation state as its political associate will be to subvert and corrupt the historical inquiry. Therefore, although the scope of the paper does not allow extensive deliberations on substructural forces and economic change in China, the tangible and dialectical link between the material forces and ideas has been kept on the background from the beginning to the end.

A relevant and specific question for the beginning will be to ask why the Chinese looked at the Ottoman case when it was so far geographically. Definitely, the Ottoman was only one example to observe, yet it was a special case in the sense that among others, it was the country which was considered by the nineteenth

century intellectuals to be the most similar to the Chinese. For instance, Zhang Zhongduan (penname Hong Fei) started his article in *Henan* magazine by saying that among others the Chinese and Ottoman countries were the closest cases as they had not been fully colonized by the imperial states yet.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, moderate reformist politician Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) identified being like Turkey as a shame among his five lessons because in Turkey other countries held her power and made reforms on her behalf while Japan chose to reform itself.<sup>4</sup> Because of its close location to Europe, the Ottoman Empire was the first stop for the imperial Europeans to test their methods so that the Chinese must have realized that what the Europeans experienced on Ottoman lands might have come to China or vice versa; i.e. a peculiar similarity between the Balta Limanı (1848) and Nanjing (1842) treaties could be observed at the mid-nineteenth century.

If similarities were one level of the Chinese perception, at another level an Ottoman endeavor in Asia, namely the policy of Pan-Islam, caused great confusion in Chinese minds. At the first level, the Ottoman was an isomorphic case as it was victimized by the imperial West; yet, at the second level it had also imperial claims on Chinese territory attributable to the invention of “Xinjiang” (Chinese Turkestan) within the Ottoman transnationalist discourse. At a later period, we will see that the Ottoman imperial domination over various ethnic identities inside its borders (i.e. Greeks, Egyptians) constituted the foundational problem for the nationalist revolutionary Chinese. What we can conclude from this scene is that from the Chinese perspective the Ottoman Empire was an ambivalent spot which made a unitary viewpoint impossible for Chinese intellectuals to interpret Ottoman experience consistently. Thus, the complex nature of the Chinese perceptions of the

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<sup>3</sup> Hong Fei, “Tuerqi lixian shuo (On the Turkish Constitution),” *Henan* 7 (August 1908), p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Earl Swisher, “Chinese Intellectuals and the Western Impact, 1838-1900,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1 (October 1958), pp. 26-37.

Ottoman world makes it possible to trace the various locatings of the Ottoman case in Chinese imperial, regionalist and nationalist discourses. However, it must be noted that, the object of sighting was not the Ottoman Empire in its totality but its fragments such as constitutionalists, pan-Islamists, military men, women, and so forth. In this sense, the act of sighting was not essentially pro-statist or confined to the sphere of politics but covered both cultural and material spheres of life.

From another angle, this study tries to make a historical and thematic introduction to the study of Sino-Turkish relations for the modern period. Unfortunately, there are only a few works produced so far to shed light on the modern period of these relations while it is easier to find works on earlier periods of Chinese history because early Chinese sources have been used to uncover information on early Turkish history. For the modern period, in 1990, well-known China historian Arif Dirlik wrote an article in which he compared the ideas of Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) and Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925) within the problematic of Third World identification and modernization.<sup>5</sup> The first archival research on Sino-Ottoman interactions for the modern period was done by İhsan Süreyya Sırma based on the documents he found in the Ottoman and French archives. His work alongside with some others placed Sino-Ottoman relations in the modern period into the frame of pan-Islam.<sup>6</sup> Based on Sırma's findings, Barış Adıbelli wrote the first book on

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<sup>5</sup> Arif Dirlik, "Third World Identification: Atatürk, Sun Yat-sen and the Problem of Modernity," presented at the International Conference on The Modernization in China, 1860-1949, Taipei, 16-18 August 1990. It is hard to find this article since it was a presentation in an international conference in China. Yet, the paper is one of the rare theoretical treatments in the field of Sino-Ottoman studies. Dirlik still writes about the issue of Third World identification and its conceptual value for social studies. A recent comparative study on Sun Yat-sen and Atatürk was made by Z. Hale Eroglu as MA thesis. See Zeyneb Hale Eroglu, "Nation-building in China and Turkey: an Analysis of the Thought of Sun Yat-sen and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Comparative Perspective," Boğaziçi University, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> İhsan Süreyya Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslam Birliği Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1990); İhsan Süreyya Sırma, "Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Uzak Doğu'ya Gönderdiği Ajana Dair [On the Agent who was Sent to the Far East by Sultan Abdulhamid]," in *Birinci Milli Türkoloji Kongresi, İstanbul 6-9 Şubat 1978* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1980); İhsan Süreyya Sırma, "Pekin Hamidiyye Üniversitesi [Peking Hamidiyye University]," in *Ankara Üniversitesi İslami İlimler Fakültesi Prof. M. Tayyib Okiç Armağanı* (Ankara, 1978), pp. 159-170; Vahdettin Engin, *II. Abdülhamid ve Dış Politika*

Sino-Turkish relations which covers the period from mid-nineteenth century to the present.<sup>7</sup> Although not counted within the same frame as the aforementioned works, recent studies of Huri İslamoğlu who proposes to deal with the history of the Eastern societies within a comparative perspective are worthy of attention. İslamoğlu suggests studying the history of Eastern countries not by comparing them to their Western contemporaries but to their Eastern counterparts so that it would be possible to avoid falling into the trap of Eurocentricism.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the lack of comprehensive studies on Sino-Ottoman relations, we have little information about how the Chinese and Ottomans knew each other. Basically, although there was not a direct diplomatic contact between the two countries, their ambassadors in European countries had the chance to meet frequently and shared the information about their social and political affairs. Sometimes they sent reports to their own countries as the Ottoman archive has many documents on China coming from her European embassies. The diaries of Chinese diplomats in Europe also have accounts on their meetings with the Ottoman ambassadors.<sup>9</sup>

The most important connection between the two empires was the Muslim one: Chinese Muslims who made up a remarkable part of the Chinese population became more attentive to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century particularly after the Kashgar Rebellion of Yaquub Beg (1864-1877) and due to the employment of Caliphate status of the Sultan Abdulhamid within his pan-Islamic

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(İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), p. 264; Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği: Osmanlı Devleti'nin İslam Siyaseti, 1856-1908* (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 379-386.

<sup>7</sup> Barış Adıbelli, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2007), pp. 20-117.

<sup>8</sup> See the articles in *Journal of Early Modern History* 5 (2001); also see Huri Islamoglu (editor), *Constituting Modernity: Private Property in the East and West* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004); Huri Islamoglu and Peter Perdue (editors), *Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India and the Ottoman Empire*: Routledge India, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> I was informed about this by Professor Wang Licheng from the history department of Fudan University but unfortunately I did not have enough time to go over the diaries of Chinese ambassadors abroad.

pursuits. When they came to Mecca for pilgrimage, they also visited Istanbul and there are plenty of documents in the Ottoman archive related to their visits.<sup>10</sup> Even some of the pilgrims were welcomed by the Sultan in the palace and in the houses of prominent Ottoman figures.<sup>11</sup>

The Muslims in China had a long history but there was no consistent term in Chinese referring to them until the thirteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The Chinese Muslims came from both Han<sup>13</sup> and other ethnic origins but they are mostly accepted as the descendants of “Persian, Arab, Mongolian, and Turkish Muslim merchants, soldiers, officials who settled in China from the seventeenth to fourteenth centuries and intermarried with local non-Muslim women”.<sup>14</sup> Despite the fact that their identity is recognized based on their religion, today, the Chinese state identifies its citizens according to their ethnic origins so that the Muslims who speak Chinese are called *Hui* (Chinese Muslims) while other Muslim groups such as the Uyghur are called with reference to their national identity.<sup>15</sup> Dru Gladney argues that such a classification is misleading because there are large *Hui* communities who speak the non-Chinese languages and all Muslims living in China are “Chinese” by citizenship. For our study as well using the term *Hui* for all the Muslims in China is reasonable since in the texts we examine, *Hui* was used to refer to the entire Muslim population of China.

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<sup>10</sup> My fellow class-mate Ulug Kuzuoglu has prepared a paper on the issue based on the Ottoman materials, he is still working on his graduate project on Chinese Muslims.

<sup>11</sup> Ali Budak, *Batılulaşma Sürecinde Çok Yönlü bir Osmanlı Aydını Münif Paşa* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2004), pp. 91-92. Münif Paşa was one of the Ottoman intellectuals who welcomed the Chinese in his house and he wrote an article titled “Çin’de Bulunan Ehl-i İslam” [The Muslim Population in China] in 1863.

<sup>12</sup> Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic* (Cambridge and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> Today, it is accepted that almost the ninety percent of the Chinese population is the Han Chinese who identify themselves as the descendants of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

<sup>14</sup> Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, p. 96.

<sup>15</sup> Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?,” in *Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Michael Feener (Santa Barbara, California: ABC CLIO, 2004), p. 164.

Among the Turkic peoples in northwest China, the biggest group is the Uyghur. In the eighth century, the Uyghur were a collection of nine nomadic, Turkic-speaking tribes and they had intense relations with the Tang dynasty (618-907) until the dynasty retreated from the region due to the outbreak of the An Lushan Rebellion in China (755-763). In 840, the Uyghur tribes scattered by a massive attack by the Kyrgyz. In the twelfth century, they submitted to the Mongol rule but from the fourteenth to seventeenth century, the rule of the Chaghataids was not centralized so that the Uyghurs improved their trade contacts with the Ming dynasty as the Islamization of the region went on.<sup>16</sup> The Uyghur territory was integrated into China in 1760 when the Manchu Qing dynasty exerted full domination over the region.<sup>17</sup> However, Xinjiang today includes eight main nationalities (both Muslim and non-Muslim) including the Uyghur, Han, Kazak, Tungan, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Uzbek and Russian.<sup>18</sup> The people who came into contact with the Ottomans were mostly the Uyghur (as they could communicate in Turkish) but also included other Muslims of China.

From a general survey of the Chinese newspapers after mid-nineteenth century, we have a glimpse of the flow of information between China and the Ottoman Empire, albeit the news on the Ottoman Empire was not comparable in number to the news on European countries or Japan. Many of them were on the foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire, but of course, there were news and articles evaluating the domestic affairs of Turkey such as the declaration of the Tanzimat, the Young Turk revolution, and nationalist separatist movements, railway construction

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<sup>16</sup> James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2004), pp. 37-47.

<sup>17</sup> Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 173.

<sup>18</sup> Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 22. The book offers very interesting statistical information on Uyghur self-identification.

projects and even earthquakes. The earliest information came from European countries through the periodicals edited by the Westerners or more specifically missionaries and then Japanese newspapers seem to be the other important source for the Ottoman news. In various newspapers, it is possible to encounter translated articles or news from European or Tokyo newspapers. As a result of this indirect flow of information, Chinese intellectuals could not draw a precise picture of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in many cases they accepted that they did not have enough information to make comprehensive evaluations about Ottoman social and political life. Despite this, the Ottoman experience was very much utilized by Chinese intellectuals to generate their own reformist, anti-dynastic and eventually nationalistic discourses.

On this historical, methodological and theoretical basis, the remainder of this introduction briefly identifies the historical setting in which China experienced the global transformation of the nineteenth century. Then it establishes the theoretical framework through which the Chinese sighting of the Ottomans gained significance in the production of Chinese national space.

In the second chapter of the thesis, I will offer the details for one of the global interactions, namely the interactions of the Qing and Ottoman empires from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. This descriptive chapter will hopefully give us the chance to decenter the focus of historical inquiry from East-West binarism to the multidirectional character of global interactions. The content of these interactions is also crucial to create an informative background for tracing the non-sequential secular, culturalist, imperial, regionalist and nationalist phases of Chinese imagination through the Ottoman case. In the third chapter, I will plunge into the discrete background of global imagination by reference to the integration of the

world through global trade and geographical knowledge. By tracing the origins of global imagination in the sixteenth century transformations, I will try to elucidate the transformations in Chinese self-locating throughout the nineteenth century as it revealed itself especially in the encounters with the West. The ideas of Kang Youwei will receive a special treatment in the second part of the chapter for Kang's being an exemplary case of imperial imagination. I will examine his Universalist thinking within the context of global imagination while I will use his observations on Turkey to grasp the Chinese changing perception of the Ottomans in the global context. As a coeval occurrence to the production of global space, the production of Asia as the site of deterritorialized politics will be the focus of the fourth chapter. In this chapter, I argue that Asia was re-invented at the turn of the century by various actors of global politics to realize either their imperial or ironically anti-imperial cravings. For a better understanding, the Ottoman, Japanese and Chinese Asianist visions will be examined in comparative perspective. This comparative approach will also help us to see the vagueness of Chinese perception of the Ottomans. In the last chapter, I will specify my focus to the production of nation in China which was partly accomplished by generating nationalist discourses through sighting the Ottoman other.

### **The Historical Setting: China at the Turn of the Twentieth Century**

Though it constitutes itself on the background of previous centuries, this thesis mainly covers the period between 1875 and 1911 for the reason that the period globally refers to the imperial phase of world capitalism, on the one hand, and a time of instability, fluidity and fertility in terms of constructing the modern ways and concepts of global modernity in the Ottoman and Qing Empires, on the other. More specifically, the time refers to a historical moment at which Chinese intellectuals like

their contemporaries in other parts of the world experienced the transition from imperial to national imagination through which they created their national space within their nationalist discourses.

From a general perspective, the nineteenth century was the era when the production of global world space gained more relevance in the emergence of the narrower configurations of various societies. Indeed, the emergent global space had its roots in geographical discoveries which made the globe a comprehensible place, hence pushed forward geographical widening of the world market, colonial territorial expansion, the establishment of communication and infrastructural technologies and the consolidation of an inter-state system.<sup>19</sup> Linked to this global picture, the century refers to economic decline, Western penetration and enormous social upheavals in China. The first significant indicator of Western penetration was the defeat in the Opium War (1838-1842) after which China had to sign the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) to give its first concessions to European countries.

Indeed, opium smoking had become widespread among the Chinese at the beginning of the eighteenth century but when the Emperor Yongzheng (1723-1735) realized that it was a threat to the moral order of the “celestial dynasty”, he proclaimed an edict in 1729 to suppress the usage of opium, but despite his proclamation, the import of opium increased constantly, making the Qing rulers totally ban it in 1780 except for medical use.<sup>20</sup> In addition to its harmful effects on human health, the opium also altered the trade balance between China and Europe causing a great outflow of the Chinese silver. In late 1838, Lin Zexu (1785-1850)

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<sup>19</sup> Manu Goswami, “From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870-1907,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40 (October 1998), p. 613.

<sup>20</sup> Yongming Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 13.

was appointed as the imperial commissioner in Guangdong by the emperor Daoguang (1782-1850) to cease the illegal importation of opium by the British. He arrested more than 1,700 Chinese opium dealers and confiscated over 70,000 opium pipes. Seeing that it was impossible to stop the trade by way of negotiation, he took the radical step and destroyed 1.2 million kilograms of opium by mixing it with lime and salt and finally throwing it into the ocean. This event is considered to be the stimulant of the First Opium War in 1839 which ended with the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. With the signing of this treaty, European traders could open the port cities of China to Western trade while they appropriated the right to reside in these treaty ports with their families. Despite their evident success over China, the British could not force the Qing rulers to legalize opium trade until the Second Opium War which resulted in more concessions given to the Westerners by the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858.<sup>21</sup>

The Qing dynasty's quick surrender in the Second Opium War was due to an internal upheaval called the Taiping Rebellion which had Christian inspirations but was mostly a reaction to the deteriorating economic, social and political situation of the country. The revolt lasted from 1850 to 1864, a period characterized by the establishment of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom which was an attempt to build an egalitarian society based on a Christianity-inspired morality. The movement became so widespread that it could only be suppressed by a joint force of the Qing, British and French armies. Although a short period of stability could be maintained after the

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<sup>21</sup> For detailed account of the First Opium War, see Peter Ward Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); for the Second Opium War (Arrow War), see J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War, 1856-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); for the role played by opium trade in the formation of world capitalism, see Carl A. Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750-1950* (London: Routledge, 1999).

Taiping Rebellion<sup>22</sup> China experienced a shocking defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1895.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan had modernized itself through a chain of reform movements called the Meiji Restoration. Indeed, it was a movement to restore the imperial rule in place of Tokugawa feudal regime and it became successful with the resignation of the 15th Tokugawa Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu in November 1867. The word “Meiji” means “enlightened rule” and the goal was to combine “western advancements” with the traditional “eastern values”. Meiji restoration created a militarily and economically strengthened industrial country. In 1876, Japan could force Korea to open its trade to foreigners and to proclaim its independence from China in its foreign relations. In 1882, an uprising in Korea after an economic crisis became the pretext for Japan to send troops to the country, but China also sent troops to counter the Japanese. Later, the troops of two countries came face to face again when the Korean emperor demanded help from the Qing court during the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894. However, the Japanese, taking it as a violation of the agreement between the countries, sent their own troops and forcefully replaced the existing government with pro-Japanese factions. By this victory, Japan ousted China from the Korean peninsula and possessed Taiwan as its colony. The indemnity gained by Japan in the Treaty of Shimoneseiki in 1895 was further used to enhance the military power of Japan.<sup>23</sup>

After the unexpected defeat, Qing rulers, like many Chinese intellectuals of the time, were convinced that the key of the Japanese success was its modernization

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<sup>22</sup> Jonathan Spence, *God's Chinese Son: the Chinese Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (London: Flamingo, 1997).

<sup>23</sup> S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 6, 293.

in the Western way so that the young emperor Guangxu (1871-1908) initiated the Hundred Days' Reform under the guidance of eminent scholar Kang Youwei (1858-1927)<sup>24</sup> to modernize the country, yet the movement was ended in 1898 by the conservative *coup d'état* led by the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908). After this incident, most of the reformist intellectuals and bureaucrats had to flee abroad but this overseas experience only contributed to the cultivation of stronger reformist or revolutionary sentiments among the Chinese abroad.

The turn of the century, however, saw one of the most critical events in Chinese history. The failure of the ruling dynasty both in foreign affairs and reform movements caused great discontent among the Chinese population. As missionary activities became more manifest after the Treaties, the Chinese, before their discovery of the "wickedness" of the Manchu race, held the Christian missionaries (or foreigners in general) responsible for their troubles and reacted with an anti-foreign revolt in 1899, known as the Boxer Rebellion.<sup>25</sup> Accusing the Qing government of the widespread violence of the Boxers against the foreigners, European countries sent their troops to China to suppress the rebellion themselves. The rebellion turned the dynasty into a hollow authority in the eyes of both foreigners and the Chinese themselves to the extent that anti-dynastic movements quickly spread all over the country from then on. All the incidents discussed above were components of a juncture which resulted in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911 by a nationalist revolutionary movement.

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<sup>24</sup> A comprehensive treatment of Kang's life and ideas can be found on pages 61-69.

<sup>25</sup> For a classical and detailed account of the Boxer Rebellion, see Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); for a visual interpretation of the events, see Jane E. Elliott, *Some Did It for Civilization; Some Did It for Their Country: A Revised View of the Boxer War* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002), the book explores the perception of the Boxers in China and in Europe through a study of visual materials such as cartoons and newspaper illustrations; for the reconstructed character of the rebellion in Chinese Marxist historiography, see Alvin P. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

## **Is it Possible to Write a History of Modern China without the Nation, the West and Imperialism?**

The Chinese have a long history of history writing while the West started to write systematic Chinese histories only in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>26</sup> This, of course, does not mean that the Westerners in Asia and Europe or America started to learn about China so late. On the contrary, the missionaries, traders and travelers all maintained knowledge on China mostly as personal travel accounts from the very early ages on, although these personal accounts became the basis for discourses which put China into an inferior position particularly after the mid-eighteenth century. The systematic treatment of China became possible from the 1930s onward due to the committed efforts of Western scholars in studying the Chinese language and using Chinese sources. By combining their first-hand research with the prejudices of the received accumulation, imperial China was depicted as a static, traditional, Oriental empire in these preliminary works. What characterized the succeeding studies of this early stage was the earlier works in which China was not the subject but “the other” to make more comprehensive explanations for European socio-economic and political formations through a comparison between European and Asian cases.<sup>27</sup> Marx’s *Asiatic Mode of Production*, Weber’s dealing with Chinese bureaucracy or Wittfogel’s *Oriental Despotism* can be counted as examples of these works. When the scheme was settled as the difference between East and West (either-or binary discursive structure)<sup>28</sup>, then the focus turned out to be the reasons of China’s failure in modernization. While Western scholars found answers

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<sup>26</sup> For an English account of Chinese (native) historiography in the first half of the twentieth century, see S. Y. Teng, “Chinese History in the Last Fifty Years,” *Far Eastern Quarterly* 8 (February 1949), pp. 131-156. Otto Franke (1863-1946) from Germany and Edouard Chavannes (1865-1918) from France are accepted as the first Europeans who began to use Chinese sources systematically to understand Chinese realities at the beginning of the twentieth century.

<sup>27</sup> Philip C. C. Huang, “Theory and the Study of Modern Chinese History: Four Traps and a Question,” *Modern China* 24 (April 1998), p. 189.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

by orientalizing China more extensively within a culturalist framework, nationalist and Marxist historians of China produced myriad works to prove that China was also developing in the same direction as Europe but its development was unluckily interrupted by Western imperialism.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the masters of the field realized the transformations experienced by the Chinese in the nineteenth century. Yet in many of the China studies, these changes were attributed to the Western influence so far as to confine China's modern experience to the frame of "China's response to the West".<sup>29</sup>

China studies like other Oriental studies came into a crossroad in the late 1970s with the questioning of American imperialism after the Vietnam War<sup>30</sup> and Edward Said's discussion on *Orientalism* which linked Euro-American scholarship directly to the imperialist disposition of the West. After a short while, Paul Cohen wrote the most systematic critique of American historical writing of China's past.

In his canonical work, Cohen criticized the approach as based on "China's response to the West" by reminding us that the interactions of the nineteenth century was not one-sided but reciprocal since the West, like the East, also took shape in the course of these interactions. Western ideas were translated and communicated in the Chinese language and thought patterns; that is, they were filtered through the Chinese so as to create the outcome which was not purely Western. For Cohen, using the concepts of East and West as things-in-and-of-themselves without seeing their relational character would at best lead to a homogenized perception of historical

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<sup>29</sup> John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923* (New York: Atheneum, 1965). The book is a collection of articles by prominent China scholars based on the archival documents. In this sense, they are informative and precious, but the scheme they drew for modern Chinese history, after dominating the field for a length of time, became the focus of scholarly criticism.

<sup>30</sup> Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 7.

reality.<sup>31</sup> By the same token, looking at Chinese history from the perspective of “China and the West” would result in ignorance of the events that were unrelated to the Western presence. Instead of totalizing the history of nineteenth century China, Cohen proposed to identify different zones distinctly arranged from “highly influenced by the West” to “the pure Chinese” but this suggestion was still inside the confines of the “influenced-pure” dichotomy and underestimated the dialogical and fluid interactions between the native and foreign dynamics. Today, an approach which exposes the production of modern China (or of Asia, East, India, etc.) as an outcome of interactions in “contact zones” where the Chinese were also active participants through challenging the European modernity by alternative modernities<sup>32</sup> will be much more accurate.

Cohen also problematized the imprisonment of Chinese history to the tradition and modernity dichotomy during the 50s and 60s by China’s picturing as an unchanging and enduring civilization with a long-lasting Confucian tradition which obscured China’s adaptation to the modern world.<sup>33</sup> In this scheme, modernity was something desirable which helped the Chinese to escape from the prison of tradition. Cohen challenged this approach by identifying modernity not as an opponent to tradition but as a fulfillment of it. For him, as in the case of East-West dichotomy, taking bipolar conceptualizations as the vantage point will result in reductionism at its best while leaving no room for human experiences that are out of modern or traditional identifications. Moreover, modernity is a closed concept for being tightly unilinear, highly teleological and ethnocentric (Eurocentric) in nature.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> Arif Dirlik, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” *History and Theory* 35 (December 1996), p. 112.

<sup>33</sup> Cohen, *Discovering History in China*, p. 79.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 94-95.

As the third spot of criticism, Cohen elaborated on the issue of imperialism which was conceptualized as the Western impositions to the non-West. He found this approach problematic since it treated the West as the dominant maker of history and gave priority to economic imperialism against other fields of domination in a unitary fashion without leaving space for variations within Asia or imperialism itself.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, imperialism, for Cohen, can only be a factor among several others to explain the nineteenth century of China.

At the end of his book, Cohen proposed to write China-centered histories whereby the relevance and importance of issues were determined by Chinese measures regardless of their being generated or influenced by the West. Additionally, this approach required de-constituting the unity of China and its past through producing more province-centered histories which would allow studying the lower levels of society within an interdisciplinary way.

The 80s signifies a “paradigm shift” in historical studies because of the insistent re-questioning of Eurocentric narratives in every field of scholarly activity. Among others, postcolonial studies deserve a particular attention with their shortcomings.

To exemplify two of them, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Prasenjit Duara shared the common point that the historical time was one of the sources of Western domination. Hence, reshaping the world within a new understanding of temporality will help us to transcend the limits of Eurocentricism. As an alternative to European “universal history”, Chakrabarty suggested “provincializing Europe,” while Duara offered “bifurcating linear histories” in India and China. Their arguments based on

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 141-147.

the assumption that European domination was working not only at political level but also at cognitive level. Non-Europeans started to imagine themselves in the nineteenth century in a progressive time frame and in a limited geographical area. They passed from cyclical imagination of the empire to the linear imagination of the nation on a bounded space. At that moment, they chose or were forced to choose locating themselves into this frame in order to become the contemporary of European civilization.

As an open critique of postcolonial studies, Arif Dirlik condemns them for “minimizing issues of structural oppression and exploitation implicit in such concepts as capital and class” with an overemphasis on culture.<sup>36</sup> Although he shares the idea that Eurocentricism is the informing principle in the spatial and temporal assumptions of dominant historiographies worldwide, Dirlik argues that Eurocentricism is the formative moment of modernity, hence that its critique “must rest on a radical critique of the whole project of modernity understood in terms of the life world that is cultural and material at once”.<sup>37</sup> More explicitly, Dirlik discusses that Eurocentricism cannot be grasped without reference to the power structures produced by Euro-America in the last five centuries including economic, political, social and cultural formations such as capitalism, property relations, imperialism, nationalism, nation form, classes, genders, races, religious forms, new conceptions of time and space, etc.<sup>38</sup> In other words, Eurocentricism is inconceivable without capitalism, imperialism and cultural domination from which it derived its dynamism

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<sup>36</sup> Arif Dirlik and Vinay Bahl, “Introduction,” in *History after the Three Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Arif Dirlik, “Is There History after Eurocentricism? Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the Disavowal of History,” *Cultural Critique* 42 (1999), p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Dirlik, “Is There History after Eurocentricism?,” p. 8.

for universalization and globalization.<sup>39</sup> It is these dynamics which differentiate Eurocentricism from other ethnocentricisms.

Although Dirlik argues for a global history which evaluates things within their global context, he claims that the current works of global history do not abolish the centers but crowd them by proliferating both claims to center and the number of centers inside the global totality. Moreover, by this proliferation, their task incorporates the hitherto excluded entities into the Eurocentric model (it is called “the disappearance of the outside by bringing the world within Europe” by Dirlik) when they claim to challenge Eurocentricism.<sup>40</sup> There he states that what distinguishes Eurocentricism is not its exclusiveness but its inclusiveness<sup>41</sup> in the way it is mentioned above.

On the other hand, “history is ultimately the most fundamental location of Eurocentricism” because history, in its systematized linear time frame in the nineteenth century, offered the chance to organize the knowledge of the world into a systematic whole, hence provided for Euro-America a new mastery over the world.<sup>42</sup> To Dirlik, the second fundamental location of Eurocentricism is “the nation form” which is in direct conflict with the universalistic claims of Eurocentricism by referring fragmentation and variations within the European center.<sup>43</sup> From all these points, Dirlik concludes that rather than abolishing Eurocentricism, there is a dire necessity to make it more precise because Eurocentricism in its internalization of history, of its spatial and temporal assumptions, and its categories is internal to

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> Dirlik, “History without a Center?,” p. 255.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 252.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 258.

societies worldwide. Only through comprehending Eurocentricism could the spatialities and temporalities of modernity be grasped.<sup>44</sup>

After reading the arguments of Arif Dirlik, we can reconsider the question in the title and replace it by another one: is it *necessary* to write a history of modern China without the nation, the West and imperialism? Although we will seek for an answer to this question throughout the discussions in the thesis, for this moment, it should be hinted that modernity was a Western-oriented project realized by the participation of world communities within an imperialist world situation and its main fruit was the nation state. China, although suffered a lot, was not colonized as India but Indian example with many others was there, just next to it, for sighting. Under these circumstances, is it really necessary to erase imperialism from Chinese history for the sake of granting a role to the non-Western subject?

### **Space as a Paradigm in History**

Today, more than ever, we discuss “space” as a human construct which avails to locating all the flows of human interactions into an imagined locus. Indeed, the attempt to problematize space and the spatial concepts which had formerly been taken for granted owes its roots to the debate on the suspicious innocence of the concepts of the *East* and the *West*, the *Orient* and the *Occident*, *Europe* and *Asia*, and so forth. With the discovery that the concepts and discourses we employ are indeed embedded components and reflections of a hegemonic condition, it has become commonplace to discuss and delve into every sort of spatial conceptualization within the geopolitical vocabulary of capitalism.<sup>45</sup> The relevance of the approach to the contemporary world does not impede us from utilizing it for the historical study.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 259-260.

<sup>45</sup> For a recent exemplary debate, see Arif Dirlik, *What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

Therefore, throughout the paper, the reader will find the hints of an imagined space or the spatial locatings of the self and other sometimes explicitly and sometimes between the lines.

In this study, the late nineteenth century primarily refers to the *globalization of historical agency*. That is, after discovering the outside world through various mechanisms, historical actors started to think in global terms, conceived the world as an integrated totality, and located themselves inside this global imagination as its composer. In a sense, on the basis of their geographical knowledge -but not only on this basis- they were creating a global world space in accordance with their regional and national imagination which also took shape at the same historical moment. So far as these imaginings were shaped primarily by geographical knowledge and eventually characterized by politics, cultural geography as the antecedent and source of spatial worldview will be mentioned briefly. Then, I suggest applying a dialectical view of space as it is exemplified by Henri Lefebvre in his eminent work *The Production of Space*<sup>46</sup> which helps us come closer to the idea of space as conceived by various individuals in the relevant example of the Chinese at the turn of the twentieth century.

In his discussion, Lefebvre uses space as a broader term while by place he refers to the local. All human experiences are lived in a place but this place interrelates to a broader space in a dialectical way. Thus, through the study of everyday practices in place (local) he extracts the socio-spatial reality which also intervenes in the processes of local practices. This approach turns space from an abstract entity into an animate reality with tangible connections to the local or everyday. Within the term *space*, which is his focus, he reconnects once separated

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<sup>46</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991).

categories of “*physical* space (nature), *mental* space (formal abstractions about space) and *social* space (the space occupied by ‘sensory phenomena, including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols and utopias’).”<sup>47</sup> The interaction of these three elements produces the space; and the outcome, that is the produced social space, is “a moment absorbed in a complex dynamic process which ‘embraces a multitude of intersections’.”<sup>48</sup> To make this interaction intelligible, Lefebvre uses a *conceptual triad* which will also be utilized in this study. In this triad, *representations of space* refer to the socially constructed space with its *conceived* and *abstract* character, usually trapped by ideology, power and knowledge within its representation.<sup>49</sup> It is the conceptualized space of scientists, planners, technocrats, etc. which dominates every society.<sup>50</sup> *Representational space* is the lived space of everyday life as it is passively experienced by inhabitants or users. In this sense, it is the dominated space “which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate”.<sup>51</sup> It needs not to be consistent or cohesive “because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic” partly due to its domination by the hegemonic space and partly because of its conceived and ordered character.<sup>52</sup> The third element in the triad is *spatial practices* which produces society’s space in a dialectical interaction. They have close affinities to the perceived space, to people’s perceptions of the world. It mediates between the conceived and the lived space.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Andrew Merrifield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18 (1993), pp. 516-531

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 516-531.

<sup>49</sup> Andrew Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (New York & London: Routledge, 2006), p. 109.

<sup>50</sup> Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p. 39.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>53</sup> Merrifield, *Henri Lefebvre*, pp. 110-111.

By seeing space as a paradigm in history and culture rather than just a material background to interpretation<sup>54</sup>, this approach draws our attention to the cognitive organization of the world space and the changing value attached to certain spatial divisions of this organization whose indicators can be found in the interaction of the global (space) and the local (place). Yet, this binary conceptualization of space and place is also intermediated by human actions or everyday practices in Lefebvre to complete his dialectical approach with a third element. Modern man imagines the existence of solid, distinct domains that he can categorize although all these domains have always been tangled together in a set of networks hidden from the human sight within their entirety. What Lefebvre suggests is a new ontology of flows and connections which politicizes the divisions between things by asking how they come into being as opposed to a modern ontology of form and essence which by taking divisions as a starting point tries to understand how distinct things interact.<sup>55</sup> In this study the entities of East and West, China and the world, global and local (national) will be handled in this frame. Moreover, the reader is invited to think global and local (national space) within the concepts identified by Lefebvre. Chinese intellectuals of the time were producing *representations* of a national space in a global one through their *spatial practices* which eventually created a *representational space* of everyday.

### **The Context in Perspective**

Within the historical context and conceptual frame summarized above, this paper is about the production of national space in China which is explicated through a

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<sup>54</sup> Nuala C. Johnson, "Public Memory," in *A Companion to Cultural Geography*, ed. by James S. Duncan, Nuala C. Johnson and Richard H. Schein (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 316-327.

<sup>55</sup> Inspired by the debate on *a non-modern ontology* in the field of cultural geography. See Bruce Braun, "Nature and Culture: On the Career of a False Problem," in *A Companion to Cultural Geography*, pp. 151-179.

conceptual framework mainly inspired by the work of Manu Goswami who explored the production of India as a bounded national space and economy from a historical, geographical and global perspective.<sup>56</sup> My partial use of her framework will definitely be limited to the production of national space, will not cover the production of national economy<sup>57</sup> because of the restricted scope of the paper and the difficulty in combining intellectual transformations with material, political-economic dynamics despite my persuasion that only a dialectical relation between the two can offer a comprehensive elucidation which was accomplished by Goswami.

Goswami weaves her arguments around the hypothesis that the nation form is in no sense natural despite the supposedly convincing counter arguments of the nationalist discourse after the 1870s and that “the reconfiguration of colonial space [in India] as national space in the late nineteenth century represented a radical socioepistemological break from received conceptions of historicity, space, political subjectivity, and sovereignty”<sup>58</sup>. The colonial state space had founded through the establishment of a massive web of transportation and irrigation structures that integrated colonial India as an administrative unit while colonial economy had emerged through official representations such as the issuing of paper money, consolidation of monetary institutions and reconfiguration of financial instruments, etc.<sup>59</sup> The colonial state of the post-1858 period was actually a “progressive territorial ‘encaging’ of social relations” which was in an open conflict with “the deterritorializing dynamic of the world market”.<sup>60</sup> In other words, the practices that homogenized social relations also produced new forms of differentiation while

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<sup>56</sup> Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> For seeing how Goswami established the connection between political economy and nation, see Goswami, “From Swadeshi to Swaraj,” pp. 609-636.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>60</sup> Goswami, “From Swadeshi to Swaraj,” pp. 612-613.

deepening socioeconomic and cultural unevenness.<sup>61</sup> This contradiction was solved at least at the level of discourse, through the generation of a line that Goswami calls “territorial nativism”. As she identifies it, territorial nativism was a movement which territorialized history and delimited imagined core nationals from the standpoint of territory while it also supposed a fictive unity between the past and the present. Within the borders of this scheme, upper-caste Hindu elites were conceived as the core nationals while Muslims were thought to be either a problematic particularity or a foreign body within the internal space of nation.<sup>62</sup>

For the Chinese case at the turn of the century, we have already stated that even though it was not a complete substitute for direct colonial rule, a different operation of colonialism was at work in so far as to constitute a colonial state space which was ostensibly governed by the Qing dynasty but directed under the colonial conditioning of the imperialist forces. In this sense, a colonial economy and space, like in India, had already been instituted by the late nineteenth century through the construction of railroads and communication mechanisms, foreign-led custom and tariff policies, centralized monetary operations and trade regulations, etc. However, particularly the colonial space constituted through forceful or compromising ways was challenged throughout the late nineteenth century by various social upheavals such as the Boxer rebellion based on the heritage of long-lasting Chinese territorial imagination. Without doubt, until the arrival of the imperialist threat, this imagination was imperial and became national in the context of dialogical interactions of the global world. Territorially defined, simultaneously colonial and imperial space of China was not compatible with the global demands of the capital anymore. Therefore, Chinese territorial nativism, I assume, could become much

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<sup>61</sup> Goswami, *Producing India*, p. 9.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

stronger on this background as it had more enduring, well-rooted and influential arguments on territorialized history and core nationals as Han Chinese deriving from the uninterrupted unity of the Chinese past and present.

### **On the Text**

The text offered in this thesis is neither unique nor completely accurate but only a moderate attempt to figure out how Chinese nationalist discourses were generated in the special context of an uneven yet contested world order of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In this sense, the work uses the journal articles of the period as its primary source. While making inquiries about the imperial, regional and nationalist discourses of the Chinese intellectuals, I tried to offer the original texts in their translated form for making it possible for the prospective students of the field to elaborate on these texts again and again. However, my translations are in no sense perfect as neither Chinese nor English is my native language and my proficiency at these languages is not more than fair. Thus, I basically cited what I understood from these texts.

For the chapter on Sino-Ottoman interactions, I scanned the documents in the Ottoman archive personally; however, because they have already been used by the scholars I cite in the text, I do not give the archive materials in footnotes or in bibliography. Also in the appendix, I compiled my research experience in China to offer it to the usage of future studies. I wish the details that are sometimes recounted tediously will be to the benefit of the China wonderers in Turkey.

## CHAPTER II. SINO-OTTOMAN INTERACTIONS AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

This chapter was prepared to offer an informative background for the discussions in the thesis. As the interactions between the Ottoman and Qing empires are under question, ignoring the visible contacts between these countries would evacuate the arguments on these interactions. However, when looking at the visible contacts, it is also crucial to locate these interactions into their proper place within the Chinese and Ottoman foreign policy practices. Thus, in the first part of the chapter, the changes in Chinese foreign policy will be handled and then the key moments in the interactions between the Ottoman Empire and China will be summarized based on the archive-based secondary sources in Turkey and my findings from the Chinese sources.

### **Transformation of Chinese Foreign Relations: The Nineteenth Century Phase**

Well-known for its deeply rooted bureaucratic tradition, the Chinese have always renovated their institutional state structure according to the needs of the time to maintain maximum efficiency in any field. In terms of foreign relations, the nineteenth century is significant because this century refers to essential changes with many others in the organization and handling of foreign affairs apparently to adjust to the pressure of the Western powers.

Before the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese foreign relations were handled within the tributary system<sup>63</sup> in which states that acknowledged the Manchu emperor offered regular tribute and had their rulers' authority endorsed by the emperor in return<sup>64</sup> while the place of each people was determined by the degree to which it was

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<sup>63</sup> For a detailed account of the tributary system see John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6 (June 1941), pp. 135-246.

<sup>64</sup> Joseph W. Esherick, "How the Qing Became China," in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 240.

permeated and transformed by the Confucian doctrine.<sup>65</sup> The center of this Confucian world order was China and all other countries were thought to be influenced by the superior Chinese culture. In this system, there was no special government body merely established to deal with foreign affairs, but the Board of Rites had responsibilities for regulating relations with tributary states and the Li-fan Yuan (Mongolian Superintendency) and various other agencies were working at least after 1638 to deal with Russian and Central Asian affairs<sup>66</sup> since these border areas constituted the empire's infirmity. However, the character and context of the relations in the nineteenth century required a different institutional schema compatible with the modern world order which initiated the establishment of *Zongli yamen* in 1860 as a special government institution for foreign affairs.<sup>67</sup> Although nominated exclusively for foreign affairs, this office was not the unique responsible body for the task as the Grand Council, provincial officials and special commissioners also dealt with the foreign issues when required.<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, the institution and its background were consequential in the formation of Chinese foreign policy at the time, hence require attention.

In the Chinese worldview, pre-nineteenth century China was conceived as the center of the region within a tributary state system, and it was culturally superior because of its cultural and scientific advancement so as to maintain its hegemony over others in the region. In this schema, China was not equal to any other state while all others were equal among each other and this perception characterized Chinese foreign policy even until the mid-nineteenth century despite the insistent

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<sup>65</sup> Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 222.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>67</sup> Indeed, the institution was the outcome of the encounter with the West. As the new system was established for the new contacts, the old tributary system was revived and continued to be used for dealing with Asian relations. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism*, p. 223.

<sup>68</sup> Jonathan Porter, "Foreign Affairs (Yang-wu) Expertise in the Late Ch'ing: The Career of Chao Lieh-wen," *Modern Asian Studies* 13 (1979), pp. 459-483.

attempts of the Western countries to integrate China into the world of “equal” states”. The only exception to this might be the case of Russia whose emperor was referred as “equal by the emperor Kangxi (1654-1722) in the Treaty of Nerchinsk and the first Chinese ambassadors were sent to Moscow in 1731 and 1732.<sup>69</sup> However, for the time being, despite having caused new conditions in the practice of Chinese foreign policy, this recognition of equal status did not significantly affect the Chinese self-perception up until the late nineteenth century. Another exception was the establishment of the Canton system in 1760 to regulate business with Europeans. With this regulation the number of ports in which Europeans could do business was limited and Chinese merchants were forbidden to be involved in direct trading with Europeans. Although at first sight it seems against the advantage of both European and Chinese merchants, founding the Canton system was the outcome of Chinese awareness that in order to continue lucrative trade with Europeans, it was required to see all nations as equal members of one family.<sup>70</sup> Yet, this was mostly a practical concern and as Canton was away from the imperial center, it was not considered to be noteworthy. Chinese self-perception became subject to essential change only due to the apparent signs of decline, particularly after the failures against foreigners through the intertwined conflicts over trade and politics after mid-nineteenth century. The main turning points were the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) after the First Opium War (1839-1842); and the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) during the turmoil years of Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). With these treaties, China allowed foreign ambassadors to reside in the capital and promised toleration for Christian missionaries and converts. Here it is timely to define the diplomatic meaning of this

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<sup>69</sup> Harry G. Gelber, *the Dragon and the Foreign Devils: China and the World, 1100 BC to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p. 143. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed between Russia and China to determine their borders. With this treaty, although its expansion to the Far Eastern markets was blocked by China, Russia gained the recognition of a state of equal status.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

transformation. Normally, as in the case of Russia, China could grant *extritoriality* to the countries she wished which meant the privileged condition of foreign ambassadors and their suites.<sup>71</sup> In the nineteenth century, foreigners realized that it was hard for them to do business on Chinese land according to the Chinese laws, which were indeed mostly regional and arbitrary regulations more than rational laws necessitated by modern commercial endeavors. Hence, Westerners, particularly the British, found no way but to integrate China into its modern-rational jurisdictional schema and this attempt became one of the reasons of the First Opium War. With the treaties mentioned before, they could transform their status from *extritoriality* to *extraterritoriality* which meant the establishment of consular jurisdiction.<sup>72</sup> Originating from the Capitulations' Treaty of the Ottoman Empire<sup>73</sup>, this status in China was enjoyed by seventeen countries in total which equipped the foreign consuls in China with more authority and responsibility such as regulating the trade activities, working as judges in controversies and protecting the rights of their subjects. However, in the late nineteenth century, as foreign states got more privileges, the term *extritoriality* was used more commonly to refer to both statuses.

In parallel to this transformation, a change was also taking place in the perception of foreign minds as Western accounts of China filled with admiration were replaced by more critical approaches to the Chinese state structure.<sup>74</sup> European intellectuals inspired by the development of their modern, rational political system, had already began blaming the Chinese system for being based on “fear” rather than

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<sup>71</sup> H. B. Morse, *The Trade and Administration of China* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913), p. 176.

<sup>72</sup> *Extritoriality* is a term of international law which is used to denominate certain immunities from the application of a country's rule that every person in that country is subject to its local laws. The content of this term is limited while in the case of *extraterritoriality*, an accredited diplomatic agent of a country has the right to reside in another country with juridical power.

<sup>73</sup> Morse, *The Trade and Administration of China*, p. 178.

<sup>74</sup> For a detailed account of Chinese image in Europe see Jonathan Spence, *The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western Minds* (London: Penguin Books, 1998).

rational laws of reason.<sup>75</sup> Later, with the boosting of Social Darwinism, these preliminary remarks became the basis for the production of Orientalist discourses on China (and on others).

It is clear in this picture that a transformation was occurring in the Chinese image both in and outside China to affect foreign relations of the empire in a radical way. For declining China, there was no way to go on with its own methods but to study Western rules of the game so as to cope with these “foreign devils” with their own tools. The establishment of *Zongli yamen* was part of this project, which initiated the foreign affairs expertise on modern theoretical and practical grounds. Without doubt, the establishment of the institution did not alter the character of foreign policy all of a sudden; rather, for a certain period of time, there was a conflict over the defense priorities of the empire, a discussion which was totally related to the personal worldviews of officials holding similar posts at different parts of the country.<sup>76</sup> One group of officials represented by Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) whom we can categorize as those who were conservative in their foreign policy evaluations supported the priority of territorial borders especially in Xinjiang against the Russians while another group represented by Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) preferred to use their foresight for potential future threats to the empire, thus proposing a new policy formation against foreigners, especially against Japan by strengthening the economy and navy through the adoption of Western techniques. The members of the second group, who can be called the reformists, are worth attention because their self-strengthening project not only included technology transfer but also the training

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<sup>75</sup> French thinker Montesquieu (1689-1755) stated that “I do not know how one can speak of honor among peoples who can be made to do nothing without beatings.” He also identified China as the “cruellest tyranny” and “and a despotic state whose principle is fear”. German philosopher Herder (1744-1803) also commented that Chinese nation was like “an embalmed mummy, wrapped in silk, and painted with hieroglyphics,” governed by “unalterably childish institutions.”

<sup>76</sup> Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, “The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs. Frontier Defense,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 25 (1964-1965), pp. 212-228.

of students in foreign languages so as to maintain technical staff for the renovated institutions.<sup>77</sup> If not immediately after this desire to change was acknowledged, in a short period of time many students and officials were sent to Japan and Europe to study their military, political and legal systems which resulted in increased knowledge on others. This process was consequential as it contributed to the creation of the Chinese modernization path through turning bureaucrats into global actors of the modern world. Officially sending students abroad was not the only means to widen knowledge on others; the Chinese were coming into contact with foreigners in many ways, sometimes through missionaries, sometimes through exile or emigration, etc. Although these reform attempts which were organized mainly by *Zongli yamen* is thought to have failed as it was clearly seen with the defeat against Japan in 1895 and even though the Qing rulers remained conservative after the failure of 1898 reforms, reformist bureaucrats could unofficially inspire the idea that change, especially change in attitudes, assumptions and ways (*bianfa*), was inevitable if China was to survive. This belief in constant change was the criterion turning various groups of people into *global actors of history*: bureaucrats through their internationalized institutions and intellectuals through their globalized worldviews. This point will be explained in detail when we discuss the production of global world space by Chinese intellectuals; for this moment, suffice it to say that this transformation in the Chinese worldview and self-perception was very much influential in the intellectual debates and the policy formation of the late nineteenth century.

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<sup>77</sup> Kwang-Ching Liu, "Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875," in *Approaches to Modern Chinese History* (Berkeley and California: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 68-104.

### Locating the Sino-Ottoman Interactions: 1875-1911

Tracing the beginning of Sino-Ottoman contacts would be a superfluous attempt especially if these contacts are both official and unofficial. Yet, we can start with the assumption that there have always been people and goods travelling between the Ottoman and Chinese territories as they were located on the historical Silk Road. For the current study, these contacts gain significance when they appear as figurative networks so as to shape modern politics of the global world particularly in the late nineteenth century. As it is widely accepted, this century refers to the disintegration of the Ottoman and Chinese empires while Western and Japanese imperial claims become more prevalent and oppressive in different parts of Asia. This global picture also characterized and was characterized by the interactions of these two empires. However, before coming to these interactions, it is better to make a brief introduction to the naming of Turkish people, Turkey and the Ottoman in the Chinese publications and documents in the late nineteenth century simply because it offers us the insights to figure out the Chinese perception of the Ottomans.<sup>78</sup>

Interestingly enough, in none of the Chinese historical documents of the period can we see the usage of “Ottoman” as a name for the population or the government of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>79</sup> The Chinese have started to use “Ottoman” for pre-Republican Turkish history in their history books to make the differentiation between the empire and the nation-state. Before the nineteenth century, when they

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<sup>78</sup> Unfortunately no historical study has been done so far to trace the naming of the Ottoman land or people in Chinese sources; hence the dates I offer here for the usage of the terms are not adequate and my comments will only be preliminary remarks on the issue.

<sup>79</sup> Only in one article from 1908, I encountered the usage of the Ottoman Empire. It is an article on the journal *St. John's Echo*, bimonthly publication of St. John's University and China's first university journal. The university was established in 1879 as an Anglican university in Shanghai. In the article, the author informs the reader that Turkey is a county located in three continents and it is called *Ademan diguo* (阿德曼帝国) which seems as the pronunciation of European saying of the Ottoman Empire. Ma Shaoliang, “Lun tuerqi lixian [On the Turkish Constitution],” *Yuehan sheng* (November 1908), 4-6. Today the Chinese use *Aosiman diguo* (奥斯曼帝国) or *Aotuoman diguo* (奥托曼帝国) for the Ottoman Empire.

talked about something from the region, they used the word *lumu* (鲁木) which is the Chinese pronunciation of *Rum*.<sup>80</sup> In the late nineteenth century, when they wanted to refer to the people on the Ottoman lands, they used two words interchangeably: *Tuerqiren* (土耳其人) or shortly *Turen* (土人) and *Tujue* (突厥).<sup>81</sup> The former means “the people of Turkey” while the latter means “Turkic”, having more ethnic connotations with reference to the nomadic people of northern China particularly during the Tang period.<sup>82</sup> This usage with ethnic connotations became apparent only in the writings of Kang Youwei in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In regard to Turkey, he wrote two treatises titled “Journey to Tujue” (突厥游记) and “The Imperial Review on History of the Weakening of Tujue” (进呈突厥削弱记). Dai Dongyang claims that when Kang was using Tujue for Turkey, his main source was the book called *Taixi xinshi lanyao* (The Nineteenth Century: A History) in which it was stated that Turkey was the country which had been called *Tujue* in *Tangshu* (Official History of the Tang Dynasty) but later mistranslated by the

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<sup>80</sup> In the list of tributary states, we cannot see a country name like *Turkey* or a similar pronunciation, but *Rum* was used to refer to Asia Minor. For the list, see John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” 135-246. Also in the sixteenth century, Ottoman traders were engaged in porcelain trade in Indian city, Gogola and in 1508, the city was known as *Lumicheng* (city of Rumi) because of its crowded Ottoman population. It is probable that the Chinese learnt this name through these trade contacts. Wenkuan Ma, “Zhongguo ciqi yu Tuerqi taoqide xianghu yingxiang [The Influence of Chinese Porcelain and Turkish Pottery on Each Other],” *Gugong bowuyuan yuankan* 5 (2004), pp. 78-96.

<sup>81</sup> In some of the pre-twentieth century publications, I encountered with various versions of *Turkey* written with different Chinese characters but pronounced almost the same way. The variations I came across in which the first character was always unchanged were 土耳其, 土尔其, 土耳其. Some of these publications had foreign origins but whether foreign or native, the usage of different characters to produce the same pronunciation implies that the term was used without any meaning as trying to catch the most similar pronunciation of the original word is done for most of the foreign-originated words today. Still, the first character always referred to “the land”.

<sup>82</sup> Turkish Historical Society has recently published a translation of the parts on *Tujue* in *Tangshu*, the official history of the Tang dynasty written in 941-945 as 200 volumes. The preference of the translation committee shows the general agreement that *Tujue* in Chinese sources refers to the Turkish people who migrated from the Central Asia to Anatolia. İsenbike Togan, Gülnar Kara, and Cahide Baysal, *Çin Kaynaklarında Türkler: Eski T’ang Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006).

Chinese as *Tuerqi*. Therefore, in 1896 Kang started to use *Tujue* and gradually stopped using *Tuerqi*.<sup>83</sup>

In his travel accounts, Kang talks about his visit to a museum in Turkey and there he sees the traditional costumes of the Turkish people which he finds very similar to the costumes worn by the tribes on the northern border of China. He predicts that during the beginning years of the Ming dynasty, *Tujue* people captured the Roman capital and they only started to wear Western clothes in 1894. Also the statues in the museum replicates certain figures from their history and their postures were very similar to Manchu or Mongolian people. The statues of servants in a kneeling position as was commonly seen in the northern China indicated a relation between these remote regions.<sup>84</sup>

For the usage of *Tuerqi*, we can also speculate that the Chinese were using a translation from foreign sources, most probably from Japanese and Western ones, yet Western sources were frequently using the term “Ottoman” in addition to “Turkish”. We may assume that they used *Tujue* as they had the knowledge from their own history books that some of the tribes of the northern steppes went westward at some point and mixed with the population of Central Asia, Arabic countries and Anatolia. The Chinese first characters for these two words are not the same, which can be noted as a supportive fact for our guess, that is the two names are not referring to exactly the same thing in Chinese minds: *Tujue* having more ethnic connotations while *Tuerqi* was supposedly referring to the land. The basic translation of the word *Tuerqi* is “the ear of the land” from which we may understand “the ear of Asia”

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<sup>83</sup> Dai Dongyang, “Kang Youwei ‘Tujue youji’ gaokanben de chayi liqi chengyin (The Differences between the Manuscript and Published Forms of Kang Youwei’s Travels in Turkey),” *Jindaishi yanjiu* 2 (2000), pp. 223-236.

<sup>84</sup> Kang Youwei, “Tujue youji,” in *Kang Youwei Quanji* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007), pp. 444-445.

because of the shape of Turkey's land on the map.<sup>85</sup> During the nineteenth century, while we see the frequent usage of *Tuerqi* referring to the Turks as a nation which in Chinese conceptualization did not have direct lineage to the *Tujue* of the northern China, at the turn of the twentieth century, we can see that both names were used. Ethnic categorizations of the Chinese or the Turkish are not the real focus of this study, yet historical usage of names helps to comprehend the transformations of the late nineteenth century, revealing the gradual transition to thinking in ethnic/racial categories with reference to the history of societies.

From the archival documents and other historical sources such as diaries and newspapers, we know that the Ottoman and Chinese empires did not have direct diplomatic contact. In the absence of such diplomatic contact, their relations were carried out by the intermediary of other countries which had direct relations with them. Their knowledge of each other was also maintained through this intermediacy; the Japanese, British and French being the main sources for the nineteenth century while in the early twentieth century we see a remarkable promotion in the role of Germany. Definitely, the people traveling between these countries either for commercial reasons or for religious trips were also providing information on these countries as well as foreign ambassadors in European countries.

From the secondary sources we have the knowledge that before 1908, the Ottoman subjects in China, though their number was not significant, were under the French protectorate based on the Capitulations' Treaties of 1515 and 1740 between the Ottoman and French governments. One of the articles of the Treaty stated that the Ottomans abroad were under the French protectorate and this protection covered in China "a certain number of Turks engaged for the most part in the cigarette trade,

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<sup>85</sup> The comment fully belongs to me if I did not hear it somewhere unconsciously. When the term was started to be used in China, the Ottoman Empire was not in the shape as Turkey is today, hence they might have used to term to denote Anatolia or Asia Minor.

Syrian Jews, Armenians and Greeks born in Turkey”. There seems also “a considerable number of subjects employed on the Yun-nan and other railways” whose passports were issued through the French consulates.<sup>86</sup> This implies that most of the Ottomans in China were residing there due to economic reasons and the French protection provided them with the secure and fair environment as their government did not have any diplomatic treaties with China concerning their status. However, this does not mean that the Ottoman government left the whole issue to the French consulate; rather it made several attempts to establish diplomatic relations with China so that it could have become able to found its own embassy on the Chinese land.

### **The Kashgar Rebellion as a Turning Point in Sino-Ottoman Relations**

One of the attempts to establish an Ottoman embassy in China was recorded in 1875 as we know from the Western and Chinese media. Chinese newspapers reported in September that the Turkish minister would come to China<sup>87</sup> in parallel to the English *North-China Daily News*'s report that “the (Turkish) government will dispatch a special embassy to Peking.”<sup>88</sup> It is probable that during this visit, the Ottoman envoy discussed the status of the Ottoman subjects in China but this contact could not become significant. On the basis of the news from the same English newspaper, we can speculate that this interaction could not bear fruit for prospective ties due to the outbreak of a Muslim rebellion in northwest China in 1864, to last until 1877.<sup>89</sup> This revolt led to the establishment of an independent Muslim state governed by Yaqub

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<sup>86</sup> London Times Intelligence File, China, vol. 10, 1 March 1907-23 April 1910.

<sup>87</sup> Wanguo gongbao, “Tuguo gongshijiang zhihua” [Minister of the Turkish Country Comes to China], 11 September 1875.

<sup>88</sup> The North-China Daily News, 02 September 1875, p. 219.

<sup>89</sup> For a detailed account of the uprising, see Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Beg and from the Ottoman archival documents we can confirm that the reigning sultan of the Ottoman state, Abdulaziz, paid special attention to the uprising to the extent that he sent military instructors and armament to the region and established diplomatic relations with Yaqub Beg and his emissary. His emissary Seyyid Yaqub came to Istanbul in 1873 and 1875 to get the support of the Ottoman state by declaring their loyalty to the Sublime Porte.<sup>90</sup> In regard to the Ottoman support to the new state, Mehmet Saray asserts that the British were trying to create a buffer zone to block the Russian expansion into India. Thus at the beginning they were supporting the independence of the Kashgar government so far as to encourage the Porte to support the government of Yaqub Beg.<sup>91</sup> Having signed an agreement with Russia,<sup>92</sup> Yaqub Beg was also trying to get British support and for this purpose his emissary started negotiations with the British officials in 1873 to sign an agreement between the parties.<sup>93</sup> This reveals that Britain was informed about the issue through her Indian officials and it is most likely that she had extensive knowledge on the Ottoman connections. In the British media, it was stated that “If all our Indian contemporaries state regarding Kasghar be true, China have very reasonable cause for anxiety, and the policy of treating the Turkish embassy, which is coming to demonstrate respecting the treatment of Mahomedans, *de haut en bas* may be open to question.”<sup>94</sup> We can also speculate that at the time, the Ottoman Empire was also on the way to becoming the “sick man” of Europe and its prestige was obviously

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<sup>90</sup> Mehmet Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese, and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan: Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2003), pp. 160-161.

<sup>91</sup> Mehmet Saray, *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler* (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), p. 103.

<sup>92</sup> Ahmet Rıza Bekin, “Yakub Beğ Zamanında Doğu Türkistan’ın Dış İlişkileri,” *Ankara Üniversitesi, Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Doğu Dilleri* 2 (1972), pp. 34-38. For the English version of the agreements with Russia and Britain, see Kim Hodong, pp. 187-193.

<sup>93</sup> Bekin, “Yakub Beğ Zamanında Doğu Türkistan’ın Dış İlişkileri,” pp. 38-42.

<sup>94</sup> The North-China Daily News, 15 October 1875, p. 367.

lowering. For example, the Chinese periodical *Wanguo gongbao*<sup>95</sup> ceased using the title *da* (which means great) for the Ottoman Empire in the same year and just used the word *Tuerji* (Turkey) instead of *Datuerji* (Great Turkey).<sup>96</sup> Additionally, the date was just before the approaching Russian war of 1877-1878 which might have prevented the Ottoman state from pursuing the matter. The tension between the Ottoman and Russian states also explains the Ottoman interest in Xinjiang. Until the ascendancy of Abdulhamid to the throne, the Ottoman policy towards Chinese land was molded mainly against Russia and its scope was limited to Xinjiang while during the reign of Abdulhamid the policy mostly aimed at the British expansion through the inclusion of a wider population, the entire Muslim population of China.<sup>97</sup>

### **An Ottoman Visit to China in 1901**

After this late nineteenth century attempt to establish an embassy in Beijing, we have another visible and this time more significant contact in 1901 although we can say that in the meantime, the Ottoman government kept contact with the Muslim population of China through sending religious instructors or receiving guests from among Chinese Muslims as they came to visit Mecca on pilgrimage. The turn of the century witnessed the critical social turmoil of Chinese history as the Boxers in different parts of the country declared an open fight against foreigners, Christian missionaries and most importantly Christian converts inside Chinese borders. The spectacular incident of the turmoil years was the murder of German minister Kettler in 1900 and the events could be suppressed thanks to the intervention of a foreign

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<sup>95</sup> *A Review of the Times* was an influential, foreign-edited monthly. Its influence can be understood from the words of Kang Youwei: "I owe my conversion to reform chiefly on the writings of two missionaries, the Rev. Timothy Richard and the Rev. Dr. Young J. Allen."

<sup>96</sup> On and before 16.01.1875 the newspaper used the title *datuerjiguo shi* (Affairs of the Great Turkish Country) while it started to use the title *tuerji shi* [the Turkish Affairs] on 17.04.1875. Yet, it must be reminded that this was a newspaper published by American Methodist missionary Young John Allen so this change refers to a change in Western minds first and in Chinese minds next.

<sup>97</sup> Barış Adıbelli, *Doğu Türkistan* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008), p. 76.

allied force. Under this huge assault, the German government even applied for help to the Sultan, making him send a mission to China to pacify the north western Chinese Muslims. Headed by Enver Pasha<sup>98</sup> (accompanied by his wife, two imams, Mustafa Şükrü Efendi and Tahir Efendi, Captain Nazini bey and two soldiers), the mission arrived in Shanghai in 1901 and was hosted by the German Consulate in *Hotel des Colonies*. Before their arrival, a series of rumors spread across China and Europe concerning the object of the mission because foreigners were worried about more aggression from the Muslim population as the mid-nineteenth century witnessed two Muslim uprisings in China<sup>99</sup> and they did not trust the sincerity of the Ottoman Sultan. The representative of *North China Daily Newspaper*<sup>100</sup> could have an interview with Enver Pasha, whom he defined as “affable and courteous, of striking appearance and marked personality”. To journalist’s questions about those rumors, Enver Pasha’s reply was that “We are looked at with suspicion by several missionaries who were our fellow passengers on board the ship which brought us over (‘because they evidently believed in the dark rumours circulated in the newspapers as to the object of the mission’ said the journalist).” After confirming the journalist’s remark, Enver Pasha commented that “Those rumours were very funny indeed, very funny, and some people put faith in them, and sincerely thought that we were going to stir up more unrest in China.” Then he stated that they came to China

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<sup>98</sup> Enver Pasha came from a Polish family and he is the grandfather of the exiled communist poet Nazım Hikmet Ran. His proficiency in French must have been influential in his appointment to this position. The other member of the envoy, Imam Mustafa Şükrü Efendi was also the grandfather of Turkish ex-prime minister, Bülent Ecevit. Adbelli, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri*, p. 110.

<sup>99</sup> For the correspondence between French consulates in Paris and Beijing, see Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslam Birliği Siyaseti*, pp. 67-70. We have already cited the Muslim rebellion in Kashgar but before that, in 1854, another Muslim uprising around Yunnan area had taken place. See David G. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005).

<sup>100</sup> *The North China Daily News* was first published in 1850 as weekly *North China Herald* by British auctioneer Henry Shearman under the editorship of Frederic H. Balfour. In 1856, it became a daily newspaper, and in 1901, it was bought by a British Catholic real estate developer of Jewish descent, Henry E. Morris. It ceased publication in 1941 during the Pacific War.

with the “consent and approval of all the European powers”, therefore it was an international mission, albeit it had only Turkish Mohamedans. The journalist derived from Enver Pasha’s account that “The people of Turkey are not interested in it [the Boxer Rebellion], and the Sultan was first approached by the Powers with a view to gaining his consent to its formation and dispatch.” Then Enver Pasha stated his pleasure at being in Shanghai, “the finest city in the Far East and a most desirable place of residence”. He said if there was no necessity, they would not proceed to Peking and rather stay in Shanghai for some time.<sup>101</sup> Obviously, this was an expected and usual interview from an official of an internationally recognized government. From personal accounts, we can derive different conclusions. Indeed, as they arrived in Shanghai, the uprising had already been suppressed and the need for them was not existent anymore. When he was in Shanghai Enver Pasha took the initiative to solve a cemetery problem between the Shanghai Muslims and France. During the Boxer Rebellion, France had illegally occupied the area of a Muslim cemetery on the pretext of Muslim participation in the Rebellion. Enver Pasha held an interview with the French consulate about the treatment of Muslims and solved the problem peacefully.<sup>102</sup> Except for the friendly negotiations made with the French, Russian, Austrian and British consulates in Shanghai and with some Ottoman Jewish residents of the city, the visit to China was in vain as it was also publicized by the Chinese (British) media in a provocative manner after their departure. “The somewhat sudden departure on Saturday last of Enver Pasha and his suite to Turkey via Nagasaki, Vladivostock, ends as far as China is concerned what can only be called a fiasco.” Under the fear of a possible Muslim uprising in the northwest China,

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<sup>101</sup> The North China Daily News, 4 June 1901, p. 3.

<sup>102</sup> Hee-Soo Lee, *The Advent of Islam in Korea: A Historical Account* (Istanbul: Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), 1997), p. 142.

The idea was an excellent one if it were only certain that Mahomedans in China recognise the Sultan of Turkey as the head of their religion; and there may be Mahomedans in China, possibly even in the north-west, who do so recognise the Sultan; but majority of them, 9,999 in 10,000 or more probably 99,999 in 100,000 never heard of the Sultan of Turkey, and their whole idea of Mahomedanism is that it is a religion which prohibits the eating of pork.

According to the newspaper, “When Enver Pasha arrived here; he found that in the first place there were no Mahomedans handy to be pacified, and in the second place that the name of the Sultan was not a name to conjure with China.” The editor of the newspaper stated that it was a wrong way to enter China from Shanghai if they were to pacify northwest Muslims but he also did not believe that their presence in the area would create any effect. He criticized the mission for not collecting enough information before coming to China as it was the reason for their disappointment. For him, they could have asked the British consul in Constantinople who must have had reliable information on the situation in China.<sup>103</sup>

Indeed, it is easy to see from this account that the British journalist behaved as if they did not know about the Ottoman engagements in the northwest at the time and they were not pleased with an independent or German-connected Ottoman visit to China. Interestingly, this provocative news did not remain without response and a person who named himself “a Mahomedan” sent a telegram to the newspaper to inform its readers about the falseness of the news. Referring to the information about the unrecognition of the Sultan by the Chinese Muslims, he wrote that “The Sultan of Turkey, as is the case in most of the Mahomedan countries, is recognized as the head of Islam by the Chinese Mahomedans. Every Friday in all the mosques in China, prayers are read for his (the Sultan’s) welfare, and to say that the majority of them never heard of the Sultan is simply ridiculous.” He corrected the news by stating that the Chinese Muslims had enough knowledge on their religion and they “turned out in

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<sup>103</sup> The North China Daily News, 25 June 1901, p. 3.

considerable numbers to bid farewell to H. E. Enver Pasha on Saturday last as he left by the Saikio Maru, and that alone is a sufficient demonstration that the Mahomedans of China regard the Sultan in the same light as their co-religionists in different parts of the world.” A brief answer to this correspondence from the editor was that “We do not doubt for a moment that the leading Shanghai Mahomedans have heard of the Sultan of Turkey; we referred to the Mahomedans in the interior, whom Enver Pasha came to pacify. They may pray for the Khalif every Friday, but the most distant Sultan of whom they have heard is the Sultan of Bokhara.”<sup>104</sup>

As it is seen, it was a debate between the British and Muslims of China; unfortunately we do not know the identity of the correspondent, also Chinese newspapers of the time do not offer noteworthy comments. However, at the time, the members of the Committee of Unity and Progress published a declaration which condemned the attitude of the Sultan who, by sending the mission, behaved in the interest of the Western imperialism.<sup>105</sup>

After this date, we do not have any visible contact between the Chinese and the Ottomans until 1908, however, we have enough information that Chinese Muslims and the Ottomans were in contact during this period. For instance, Abdulhamid’s private agent, Muhammed Ali arrived in Beijing in 1902 and was welcomed by a Chinese imam, Wang Kuan in his house.<sup>106</sup> After this close contact this imam was invited to Istanbul and during his stay in Istanbul in 1906 he demanded Islamic instructors to educate Chinese Muslims. Based on this demand, an Ottoman ministry, Ali Rıza Bey with Hafız Hasan Efendi was sent to Beijing in 1908, this time to organize a school for Chinese Muslims, which is known as the *Hamidiye*

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<sup>104</sup> The North China Daily News, 1 July 1901, p. 4.

<sup>105</sup> Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslam Birliği Siyaseti*, pp. 87-88.

<sup>106</sup> For a French report on Muhammed Ali’s coming to China, see Sırma, “Sultan II. Abdülhamid’in Uzak Doğu’ya Gönderdiği Ajana Dair [On the Agent who was Sent to the Far East by Sultan Abdulhamid],” pp. 323-325.

*Medresesi* in Turkey.<sup>107</sup> The visit of Ali Rıza Bey can also be confirmed from the news on *Shuntian shibao*, a Tianjin newspaper, which reported that “Turkish ambassador goes back to his country. After receiving the telegraphic order from his country, Turkish ambassador Ali Junyin went back to his country by taking the Siberia train a few days ago.”<sup>108</sup> However, most probably the newspaper mixed the names because according to the Ottoman sources, Hafız Hasan left Beijing in 1908 but Ali Rıza spent four more years in Hangzhou.<sup>109</sup> Unfortunately, for the *Hamidiye Medresesi* we do not have much information, we just know that Ali Rıza Bey was traveling in China with the passport he was issued by the French consulate due to its protection rights of Ottoman subjects. However, two years later, in the summer of 1908, the Ottoman and German governments took a radical step and transferred this protectorate to the German consulate in China.

### **The Protection of the Ottoman Subjects in China and Imperial Politics**

On July 18, 1908, the *London Times* reported that “The Chinese Foreign Office has been notified by the German government that Turkish subjects in China will in future be under German protection.”<sup>110</sup> After this news, a short but hot discussion started in political circles as to the reality of these rumors. A week later, the details of the news became available from Beijing confirming that “On July 6 the *doyen* of the Diplomatic body communicated to all his colleagues a Note from the German Legation dated July 2 wherein Count Rex intimated that ‘at the request of the

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<sup>107</sup> Lee, *The Advent of Islam in Korea*, 152. For the news on the school published in the journal *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, see Sırma, “Pekin Hamidiyye Üniversitesi [Peking Hamidiyye University],” pp. 159-170.

<sup>108</sup> Shuntian Shibao, 20 November 1908 . Jacob M. Landau also shares this claim on the basis of secondary sources, Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, p. 44.

<sup>109</sup> Lee, *The Advent of Islam in Korea*, p. 155.

<sup>110</sup> London Times Intelligence File, China, vol. 10, 1 March 1907-23 April 1910, reported on 12 July. The information is confirmed by Landau based on the documents from the German archive, Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, p. 48.

Turkish Government my Government authorizes me to represent until further orders the interests of Turkey in China.’ At the same time, Count Rex communicated a similar Note to the Chinese Government.”<sup>111</sup> The incident is remarkable in two ways. First, no communication by the Ottoman government was transmitted to China or France about the decision; but it was done by Germany to inform only the Chinese authorities. This attitude was considered to be against the practice of international courtesy. Second, although the change was not seen as significant at that time because of the insignificant number of Ottoman subjects in China (so far as the European newspapers were accused of exaggerating the incident), when considered within the German imperial endeavors in Asia against Britain (and against Allies during the World War I), this change seems worthy of attention.

Germany’s changing face in the world politics of the time was not unknown, yet its Ottoman connection in China was not so obvious at least in the literature of China or Ottoman studies. If we remember that the Ottoman mission to China during the Boxer uprising was also sent on behalf of a German request, we can say that indeed Germany’s plans for China had been in gradual operation for a considerable length of time and the Ottoman government, because of its connections to the Muslim population of China, had always been considered a potential ally inside this plan against Britain. The reporters of the time also warned about the issue by saying that China had 80 million Muslims and the Ottoman sultan had also been engaging in pan-Islamic activities around the Muslim areas of China so far as to organize a school in Beijing for the Muslim inhabitants in March of 1906. According to British sources, this endeavor also proceeded in relation to the German Legation at Beijing.

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<sup>111</sup> London Times Intelligence File, China, vol. 10, 1 March 1907-23 April 1910, reported on 16 July.

From the British perspective, this incident indicated that the Ottoman-German cooperation in the World War I was giving its early signs in the Far East. A report from the same newspaper in 1915 is another proof of this:

The sinister character of the efforts of the German in China to precipitate rebellion in India is further attested by the discovery of a practice which has been vogue for some time of forwarding to India from Shanghai proclamations calling upon a Holy War against Great Britain and her Allies. The proclamations are written in Arabic and signed by the Sultan of Turkey, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the heir to the throne, and Enver Pasha, and are generally conveyed to different centers in India in trunks with false bottoms.<sup>112</sup>

As to this transfer of protection rights, the Chinese held also similar opinions like the British. Zhang Taiyan (1868-1936) wrote in the revolutionary periodical *Minbao* that the German king seemed to protect the rights of Muslims in China; however, his actual intention was to control the Chinese Muslim areas just like the British colonized India without recognizing Indian sovereignty. In this short article, he stated that Chinese Muslims might have had religious brotherhood with the Turkish country, yet taking religion as a distinguishing factor was wrong and following the Turkish path would only result in German domination.<sup>113</sup> Another article in the same year from *Dongfang zazhi* (Eastern Miscellany) also criticized the Ottoman attitude about the issue. Interestingly, this article talks about an Ottoman official who was visiting China at the time. The author informs us that after the establishment of Constitutional rule in Turkey, an Ottoman envoy came to China to discuss affairs between China and Turkey, some political and some religious. He says that the German king declared he was the protector of all Muslims in the world but the author cannot understand how an official envoy of an internationally recognized country had any kind of benefit from discussing the religious affairs of China given that Turkey had never carried out a missionary activity, as the Western countries did, and

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<sup>112</sup> London Times Intelligence File, newspaper dated 24 November 1915, reported on 19 November.

<sup>113</sup> Zhang Taiyan, "Dehuang baohu huijiaoshi [German King's Interest in the Muslim Affairs]," *Minbao*, 1908, 7-8.

there had never been Turkish people in China. For the author, the Turkish attitude to mix religious and political affairs was a mistake but the attitude of Chinese Muslims to make special preparations to welcome this envoy was a worse mistake.<sup>114</sup>

Another intriguing point is that after this event, the Chinese government re-evaluated the status of all foreign subjects in China. Concerning this change of the protection of the Ottomans in China, the officials stated that China would not relinquish the protection rights of “a Power which has no treaty with China”. Additionally, in the future, China would not issue passports or grant ex-territorial rights to “the subjects of a Power like Turkey, within whose borders, the subjects of other nations retain, as in China, ex-territorial privileges”.<sup>115</sup> This signifies that in terms of diplomatic standards, China and the Ottoman Empire were of the same status, both granting extra-territorial privileges to other “sovereign” countries. As missionary activities (which are thought to be political more than religious) and foreign engagements became prevalent on Chinese land, the government tried to restrict them by declining to issue passports to the subjects of countries which might be threatening for Chinese interests. This fear explicitly included Roman Catholics, Japanese researchers and pan-Islamic Muslims.<sup>116</sup>

This discussion takes us to another point, to the Ottomans in China, which might be useful to locate Sino-Ottoman interactions into their proper context. As we stated before, there was a considerable number of Ottoman subjects in China included Turks, Jews, Greeks and Armenians. Unfortunately, to get some

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<sup>114</sup> “Tuerqishi daoqing [The Visit of Turkish Envoy to Beijing],” *Dongfang zazhi*, May 1908, p. 37.

<sup>115</sup> “Foreign Subjects in China: New Passport Regulations,” *London Times*, 20 July 1908, cited from London Times Intelligence File, p. 145.

<sup>116</sup> Christian missionary activities were well known in China for a length of time and the government was taking precautions to prevent conversion of the Chinese to Christianity as any influence from the West was thought to be anti-dynastic and colonial. Japanese researchers were also making researches especially around Manchuria and the Chinese government was cautious against Japan especially after their defeat in the war in 1895. As to the Muslims, the Muslim rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century proved that taking measures to control the foreign activities in the Muslim regions was indispensable to avoid any discontent.

information about their dealings in China we still need some time to conduct further research in the local archives and use the business records of the time. As a first step, I tried to search for published trade records. Unfortunately these records were organized in a way that they list the business records of treaty countries in a detailed way, but they list the other countries altogether as a category of “non-treaty powers”. Still, it is possible that certain information could be obtained from the Customs Archive which is located inside the Second Historical Archive (Nanjing), as we have the information that certain businessmen from the Ottoman lands resided in China from the early nineteenth century onwards although they did not identify themselves Ottomans. That is for sure that the traders of the treaty countries benefited more from business than the traders of non-treaty powers. Therefore, if they had the chance, they changed their citizenship to a privileged country, as did the Sassoons, Harpoons and Kedouries of Ottoman Baghdad.<sup>117</sup> After acquiring British protection, these Middle Eastern Jewish families became the richest families of Shanghai and influenced the local undertakings up until the Japanese occupation.

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<sup>117</sup> The Ottoman population in China might be an interesting topic for future studies. Up to now, we only have information on the Jews in Shanghai from the secondary sources but I believe it is likely that some documents from the Shanghai Municipal Archive can be appropriated. For a brief outlook of (Ottoman) Jewish residents of Shanghai, see Betty Peh-T’i Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 104-254; Chiara Betta, “From Orientals to Imagined Britons: Baghdadi Jews in Shanghai,” *Modern Asian Studies* 37 (2003), pp. 999-102.

### CHAPTER III. PRODUCING THE GLOBAL WORLD SPACE

Our mind shall we nurture;  
Our people from ignorance shall we deliver.  
To its utter limits our insight shall we enlarge  
A universe infinite and boundless to behold:  
How can the earth, a small thing,  
Into West and East divide?  
But to begin: love our own kind;  
Our fatherland shall we not neglect.  
Kang Youwei<sup>118</sup>

The Sino-Ottoman interactions mentioned in the previous chapter were the outcome of the globalizing world space and historical agency in the Ottoman and Qing cases. Previously being hegemonic powers of their region, both empires went through a process of challenge originating from the imperialist claims of Euro-America and Japan. By way of a critical dialogue between the imperial imagination of the Asian countries and modern/imperialist thinking of the West, the Ottoman and Qing intellectuals redefined their location within the global political geography of the world to generate a shared modernity of different locales. The modernization of Asian countries has so far been elaborated as the outcome of a unidirectional relation between East and West. I argue, however, that by focusing on the interactions in a globally conceived space, we can come closer to a more complete picture since only this way we can escape ourselves from the locking of binary polarizations.

In the first part of the chapter, I will focus on Chinese self-locating before and during the nineteenth century with reference to widening geographical knowledge

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<sup>118</sup> Kung-Chuan Hsiao, *A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 195.

and development of world capitalism with Europe at its center. In the second part, I explore the ideas of Kang Youwei as a universalist who was to me still inside the borders of imperial imagination at the turn of the twentieth century but within a global frame. The journey of his ideas on Turkey also illustrates the unsettled character of Chinese perception of the Ottomans.

### **Chinese Spatial Self-Locating Before the Nineteenth Century**

Evidently, the sixteenth century is the period in which great transformations in spatial imaginings occurred all around the world due to two remarkable and intertwined incidents: the geographical discoveries which speeded up the process of maritime integration and a profound change in the nature and volume of human knowledge. Here I do not propose that the global imagination started in the sixteenth century. On the contrary, imaginings have always been global. Yet, until that time the globe was not known within its entirety as it is today. This comprehensive recognition became possible only with the developments of the century. The development of this recognition will be exposed with reference to the pre-nineteenth century situation and its aftermath both in Asia and Europe.

Indeed, Europe has always been a collection of maritime states in contrast to the land-based states of Asia, albeit all these societies were somehow engaged in both land and sea trade. This geographical fact, even though not determinant, helps to expose the transformations of the sixteenth century world. Both the Ottoman and Chinese empires (in Ming and Qing dynasties) had benefited from their unique location at the two ends of the continental and maritime trade routes particularly throughout their consolidation periods. However, for these continental empires, the land trade was profitable partly because the goods traded at that time were light

enough to be carried on land; partly because of the inadequate maritime technology. Until the end of Pax Mongolica period, the trade on the historic Silk Road was very vivid thanks to the stability maintained through the unitary rule of Mongol emperors.<sup>119</sup> As Abu-Lughod discusses, only the trade networks established during this period could prepare the ground for the sixteenth century development of world capitalism which arguably centered on Europe, “an upstart peripheral to an ongoing operation”.<sup>120</sup> This vivid economic and cultural exchange widened the spatial visions of early modern societies of Asia as they started to move freely in a broader and relatively stable area which brought them into contact with people from less known regions of the world. *Travels of Marco Polo* was the product of this period which indicated increased European knowledge on Far Eastern states and societies. Mongol unification increased the broader outer space awareness of the Chinese and Indian on the one hand, and disturbed their self-centered perceptions on the other as they were turned into peripheral areas of a foreign world order. Nonetheless, after the breakup of Pax Mongolica, they resumed their previous spatial positioning to last until the new geographical organization of the world with the Western geographical discoveries in the sixteenth century. Up to that point, China had been the cultural, economical and political center of the region if not of the globe although some world system theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank generously argued that until the nineteenth century China was also the center of the entire world system thanks to its self-sufficient and export-oriented economy.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> For the Chinese trade policies during the Mongol rule, see İsenbike Togan, “Moğollar Devrinde Çin’de Ticaret ve “Ortak” Tüccarları (The Mongols’ Trade Partners: A Study of Chinese Trade under Mongol Rule),” *Toplum ve Bilim* 25/26 (Bahar-Yaz 1984), pp. 71-90.

<sup>120</sup> Janet L. Abu Lughod, *Before European Hegemony* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 12.

<sup>121</sup> Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 108-117.

When Mongol rule came to an end in the sixteenth century, and due to the rising tension between the Ottoman and Safavid empires in the Middle East, the land and sea route between Europe and China became insecure, obstructing the trade contacts through the region although it could not stop continental trade completely. Concurrently, Vasco da Gama accidentally discovered the Cape of Good Hope as an outcome of European entrepreneurship which unexpectedly created an alternative route to continue trade without the intermediary of Mediterranean figures. This discovery dramatically shifted the central role of the Mediterranean within the commercial network by replacing it with Atlantic Europe. The sixteenth century geographical discoveries and new spatial divisions stemmed also from some other sources such that travel accounts of both Europeans and Asians raised a significant attention for and in different parts of the world. A curious attempt to find new sources which would nourish imperial political centers emerged all around the world. The European drive to discover was whipped also by the transfer of Constantinople to Islam which obstructed the Christian entrepreneurship of Europe.<sup>122</sup> Cartographic works and knowledge production on outer peoples unprecedentedly proliferated so far as to declare Europeans dominant over nature. Starting from this century, this explicit control over nature overlapped with the broader space demand of the capital flowing from the New World. World space needed new divisions operating in the service of capital and its political invitees, which gradually and forcefully pushed old actors of global trade to an inferior position in its nineteenth century phase. It was this challenge which threatened the prior self-perception of Asian empires and this transformation which shaped the production of world space in contrast to regional positioning of the previous age, a process which can also be read as the clash of

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<sup>122</sup> Nayan Chanda, *Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 159.

*representations of space* which eventually resolved into a concordant global-national imagination.

After the unification of China (“China proper” as it is called today) under the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C., the geographical unification of the Chinese land was idealized in a way that regional geographic research was extended, cartographic theories and techniques were developed, and more attention was paid to the study of other lands and peoples to maintain that unity. The oldest printed Chinese historical atlas appeared in the twelfth century, during the Song period, but most probably had been prepared before that time while in Europe the first modern atlas was printed in 1570.<sup>123</sup> This first Chinese atlas was special because it drew what had previously been the Chinese to point the ideal spatial positioning of the country in which the Great Wall was also seen as part of this “natural borders” project.<sup>124</sup> Such kind of engagement refers to an ability to visualize spatial imagination on the one hand and a spatial rather than a cosmographic or ethnic identification of the people on the other.

The first known westward travel account of China, *Travels of Emperor Mu* from the third century BC, reflected certain knowledge on peoples of Central Asia.<sup>125</sup> Archeological works in different parts of Europe and Asia have also unearthed material remnants (goods and coins) of a highly developed trade contact between these remote areas.<sup>126</sup> Additionally, the travels of Zhang Qian in the second century BC and of Zheng He (1371–1433) in the fourteenth century are worth attention for their contribution to the spatial imagination of the Chinese. It is interesting to note

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<sup>123</sup> Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator (1512-1594) encouraged Abraham Ortelius (1527-1598) to compile the first modern world atlas, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, in 1570. He produced his own atlases later on.

<sup>124</sup> Jeremy Black, *Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 2-4. The Great Wall was integrated into this ideal of unity to the extent that it was even illustrated in the maps showing the previous times that the Wall did not exist at all. Richard J. Smith, *Chinese Maps* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 2.

<sup>125</sup> Irene M. Franck and David M. Brownstone, *the Silk Road: A History* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986), p. 33.

<sup>126</sup> Li Qingxin, *Maritime Silk Road* (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2006), 18-32.

that Zheng He had appeared on the African coast long before the Spanish expeditions. He also traveled around the Arabic peninsula with the well known official Ma Huan whose travel accounts incredibly added to the Chinese knowledge on Indian Ocean area.<sup>127</sup> Although these expeditionary activities were given up soon for being too costly without expected returns,<sup>128</sup> it is undeniable that spatial positioning of other societies within the Chinese knowledge of the world possessed a certain value for the Chinese like for the other societies of the age.

Empires were worried about their territories mostly because they wanted a larger area of action, wealth, and power. This idealized economic and spatial vision came out to be the unification of an imagined totality and stabilization inside its defined borders in China. Until recently the Chinese preferred to use *Tianxia* for *world* which means “all under heaven”. This spatial imagination was very much operative for the Chinese land which was under permanent foreign threat from the north because of which the Chinese had to develop a more cultural and spatial self-identification, not an ethnic Han identity at least until their meeting with nationalism as a modern paradigm. Being incapable of defeating northern conquerors by military means<sup>129</sup>, Chinese self-identity was enhanced through idealizing a culturally superior and territorially unified entity. Hucker construes this fact differently by claiming that because the people of the area were all coming from Mongoloid origin, they did not come into contact with ethnically (i.e. physically) dissimilar people, a fact which caused them not to develop ethnic identity through differentiating the self from the

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<sup>127</sup> Chanda, *Bound Together*, pp. 152-153.

<sup>128</sup> Wallerstein uses the argument made by Chaunu that Europe needed space because of its limited land while China preferred to expand internally to increase its rice production. *The Modern World System*, p. 57.

<sup>129</sup> Q. Edward Wang, “History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview,” *Journal of World History* 10.2 (1999), p. 285-305.

other.<sup>130</sup> Thanks to this non-ethnic self-perception, non-Han people could also reign on the Chinese land so far as to transform the term *Chinese* into a culture-denoting construction (as it is accepted in Sinicization debates) rather than a name for an ethnic group. However, with the emergence of nationalism on the world stage, the term gained ethnic connotations as a reaction to “unsuccessful” Manchu rulers.

### **Transformations in the Nineteenth Century**

Although it resides on the heritage of previous centuries, the nineteenth century has its own characteristics. First of all, it was the time of a globally but unevenly integrated world which was contested by the geographical and political claims of various actors. Moreover, it was the imperial world order of modern global capitalism which in the meantime had experienced the French revolution and transformed itself from the commercial to the industrial phase. The French Revolution caused two fundamental changes: first, “it made change, political change, into a ‘normal’ phenomenon, something inherent in the nature of things and in fact desirable”; second, it “reoriented the concept of sovereignty, from the monarch or the legislature to the people”.<sup>131</sup> As the different parts of the world came into contact in the global world space, these West-oriented intellectual trends met with their non-Western counterparts. The second development, the dramatic increase in industrial production, raised the importance of global markets as well as goods to sell, forced their production at minimum costs by means of cheap raw materials and labor force in a competitive capitalist world market. This meant the colonization of available countries by the powerful states not only in a specified locale such as Asia, but at

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<sup>130</sup> Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past: an Introduction to Chinese History and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 5.

<sup>131</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 51.

different parts of the globe. Though carried mostly by European states, imperial competition also included Japan as an Asian actor and the United States as a relatively late comer. This quick process of colonization or semi-colonization owes to the fact that the process overlaps with the disintegration of the early modern states in different parts of the world due to their internal shortcomings and coeval global transformations. Their internal weakness made them available and unresisting to imperial assaults while the latter concurrently caused more internal problems. On this background, exposing the transformations including reform movements and attempts to modernize in China as a reaction to these imperial assaults would be an easy and unfair approach to the complexity of the issue as the attitudes of the Chinese cannot be imprisoned into the cage of “reaction” or “response”. To me, the process can better be defined as “a critical dialog with European ideas”.<sup>132</sup> This thesis claims that although they had inseparable connections and both of them were the participants of the same global modernity, the agents of oppressive and oppressed states did not have the same particular experience; rather, they had their unique perceptions and world views which took shape in the context of a dialogical network of multidirectional interactions. The focus of this study is only one branch of this network; that is, the Chinese perception of the Ottoman case at the turn of the twentieth century.

### **Kang Youwei as a Universalist**

Many Chinese intellectuals of the turn of the twentieth century can be examined for their global perception and thinking, such as Lin Zexu or Zhang Zhidong but the controversial figure of Kang Youwei, the prominent constitutional monarchist and

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<sup>132</sup> Andreas Eckert, “Historiography on a “Continent without History”: Anglophone West Africa, 1880s-1940s,” in *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 99-118.

reformist invites our attention here as he was particularly noteworthy for his comments on the people and the condition of the Ottoman Empire.

Kang Youwei (1858-1927) was a significant figure in Chinese modern history due to his political engagements and intellectual prominence. He was born in Guangdong and prepared for Imperial Examination from his early years on. Under the hardships of preparing for the exam, he started to engage in Buddhist meditation. However, he was a devoted Confucian throughout his life although he supported a renovated version of it. Kang, with his well-known student Liang Qichao (1873-1929) became the monitor of the Hundred Days' Reform by persuading the Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908), but his reform movement was suppressed by the Dowager Cixi. Then he had to flee abroad only to come back toward the end of the dynasty.

At a very early age, Kang had started reading on foreign lands and people as he had the chance to travel for various reasons so that he could combine what he read with what he saw during his visits to various parts of China and the world. Different from his contemporaries who could also pay visits to the outside world, one of the most remarkable points in Kang's writing was his awareness of the global space and his locating of China in it. To offer a case of comparison, we can briefly look at the ideas of Wang Tao (1828-1897) who was an eminent newspaper man of the late nineteenth century with significant inspirations from the Western world. Although he knew much about the Western world, he still could not fully grasp the transformations in the nineteenth century world and thought in traditional Chinese terms insofar as to hope that one day China would gain its prior superiority over the West as the Western intrusion in China for the time was similar to previous "barbarian" assaults.<sup>133</sup> While being member of a country which named itself as "the

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<sup>133</sup> Paul A. Cohen, "Wang Tao's Perspective on a Changing World," in *Approaches to Modern Chinese History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 133-162.

central country”, Kang, on the other hand, wrote “The ancients considered the China and the four barbarian [territories] of which they had heard to be the whole world. Today the globe is completely known, and when we look at that which was called ‘The Central Nation’ (i.e. China) and the four barbarian [territories], [we see that they] are then just one corner of Asia, and only one-eighth part of the world.”<sup>134</sup> Based on his Confucian background to be fulfilled with this awareness, he reflected upon the problems of entire human community alongside with his own country so that he initiated the 1898 Reforms and organized the first Anti-Foot binding Society in China to reform his country to make it compatible with the modern world order which he critically embraced without a reactionary or nostalgic repudiation. His Confucianism became a controversial issue in China studies but now based on the writings of his political ally and disciple Liang Qichao, it is mostly accepted that Kang was a revisionist Confucian if not a conventional one.<sup>135</sup> Particularly after the establishment of the Republic his efforts to promote Confucian studies reveal his attachment to Confucianism. Kang has so far been understood mostly in relation to his proposals during the reform movement of 1898 as a result of which his way of thinking in its entirety has not yet been comprehensively analyzed. As the focus of this chapter is the production of the global world space, rather than only focusing on his opinions on Turkey, his eminent but less known book *Datong shu* (completed in India in 1902) will be examined here as it offers the main clues of a pioneer Chinese intellectual who started to think in global terms at the turn of the twentieth century. Secondarily, I will also try to highlight the main points I got from his writings on Turkey.

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<sup>134</sup> Laurence G. Thompson, *Ta Tung Shu: The One World Philosophy of Kang Yu-wei* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 80.

<sup>135</sup> Hsiao, *A Modern China and a New World*, pp. 42-45.

Kang starts *Datong shu* by claiming that he has already tasted the wisdoms of the East and the West and become aware of the entire world. Remarkably, what forces him to think and write is his awareness of the human suffering in the world which might reflect the perception and psychology of an aggrieved agent whose country was subordinated by imperialist foreigners. In this sense, he experienced the pains of transition to modernity as did Marx, Nietzsche and others in the West causing him to evaluate things within a humanitarian perspective.<sup>136</sup> However, the most notable thing in Kang's writing is the nuanced way through which he was integrating the world into his own (Chinese) worldview. Kang had always aimed at universal harmony when he was defending the idea of abolishing borders and establishing a world government. The source of his universalism was Confucian ethics based on filial piety which made him conceive human society as a big family including animate and inanimate beings of the world. In other words, as opposed to the argument that the modernist Chinese intellectual world of the late nineteenth century was merely influenced and shaped by the Western categories, Kang was exposing and construing the modern world within his own categories under the light of their unequal treatment by the powerful states. Nonetheless, his integration of the world into his Confucian worldview was not fundamentally challenging Western dominance because Kang never discovered and problematized capitalism as the source of Western hegemony. Like Kang, for later East Asian Confucian scholars it became possible to revive Confucianism since it meant not to offer alternative values

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<sup>136</sup> For a brilliant account of European experience of modernity in the nineteenth century, see Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: the Experience of Modernity* (New York: Verso, 1997), pp. 15-36.

to those of Euro-American origin, but “its articulation of native culture into a capitalist narrative”.<sup>137</sup>

From Kang’s Confucian perspective, among other things, what had caused China suffer for so many years, namely the separation and power struggle between different states, was also the reason of the human suffering in the world. It is clear in this scheme that national boundaries were not something desirable. Rather, by creating unnatural boundaries between societies they became the main obstacle for the creation of one, united human community. In 1907, he wrote a long petition to the Qing court in which he demanded that the distinction between Manchu and Chinese be abolished and that China be known as “Zhonghua guo” (Chinese country, cultural identity emphasized) instead of “Qing guo” (Qing country).<sup>138</sup> This perspective can also be interpreted as a remnant of imperial imagination which always aims at a wider action space and a cosmopolitan community to rule over and when considered within the frame of reformism in Kang’s career and his insistent support for a constitutional monarchy<sup>139</sup>, identifying his imagination as imperial fed by universal resonance seems more reasonable.

As he longed for a public government for all the people in the world without private property, class boundaries and individual states, Kang’s attitude also comes closer to communism; yet, in no part of the book he does problematize capitalism as

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<sup>137</sup> Arif Dirlik, “The Global in the Local,” in *Global & Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 21-45. Dirlik argues that the Confucian revival in the 1980s in China studies is an attempt within postcolonial discourse to create a native past which confronts the discourses of global capitalism and Orientalism while it tries to challenge them. See Arif Dirlik, “Confucius in the Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of Confucianism,” *Boundary 2* 22 (1995), pp. 229-273.

<sup>138</sup> Hsiao, *A Modern China and a New World*, p. 243.

<sup>139</sup> In 1899, Kang had already founded *Baohuang hui* (Emperor Protection Society). When the Republic was established in 1912, having seen that his proposals to make the Republic more viable were in vain, Kang joined the counterrevolutionary movement in 1917. He saw Yuan Shikai’s monarchial schema as clear evidence that republicanism in China was impossible. While working hard against Yuan Shikai, differently from the Republicans, his aim was to revive the fallen Manchu dynasty. As a result, he was arrested by the Republican government and granted asylum in the American Legation.

a political and economic formation to give us the clues about his awareness of Marxism as the theory of communism. Contrary to his universal and egalitarian longings, his ideal socio-political model seems to be American democracy based on individualism and liberalism. When he discusses the problem of inequality, he exposes the superior social system of China (in comparison to India and Europe in the past) with the Confucian organization of the state and society. For him, only due to the ideological dominance of Confucianism over Chinese rulers could China be away from caste system, slavery, hereditary nobility, etc. However, Kang observes, this does not mean that China fully realized an egalitarian society since slaves were used in royal houses, women were deprived of their rights and many people were pushed into inferior social status. From the people he problematizes, we understand that what he discusses as “class” in his book is not the class we know from the Marxist theory which is distinguished through the ownership of means of production, rather seems closer to a Weberian identification as a social group based on status.<sup>140</sup>

When it comes to racism, the work of Kang reveals inconsistencies more explicitly. Having heard the principle of the survival of the fittest, he adopts the common attitude of the Americans (his ideal model) and confesses that because of their appearance, there is no way for the black people to be equal with the white and yellow race. Nonetheless, if it is accepted that races come into being by adapting to the environment and climate, then by changing the locale of the people, there is the possibility to change the appearance of various races. What is interesting here is that first, Kang does not expose racial differences with genetics; second, he does not tolerate racial differences but instead searches for ways to extinguish them.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 180-195.

<sup>141</sup> Thompson, *Ta Tung Shu*, pp. 140-148.

As to the ideal political system, from his life story we can see that his ideal was a republican democracy but for societies like China passing to democracy directly was not a proper way, hence constitutional monarchy would serve as a transition from autocracy to democracy. When considered within his opposition to the establishment of the Republic in 1912, he seems as a reactionary but indeed Kang was supporting a gradual transition toward perfection and a state based on people's authority, and not on the autocrat.<sup>142</sup> His sober approach to prompt changes can also be ascertained from his writings on Turkish constitutional monarchy. In his travel accounts, he discusses that even though the people of Turkey declared constitutional rule in 1908 in which everyone was equal and free, they should have kept in mind that freedom had also limits and such kinds of over-night changes would result in peril. A constitution might have been a proper mechanism for France but it was not for Turkey. One part of his explanation for this is that Turkey had two types of law, one secular and the other religious, and it was hard for Turkey to merge all these traditional, religious and Western laws in the same melting pot.<sup>143</sup>

Beyond his advanced and systematic deliberations of ideal society, Kang was one of the rare modernizers of China who made deliberate observations on Turkey to reach better solutions for the problems of his own country. Particularly in his "The Imperial Review on History of the Weakening of Tujue", it is easy to realize that Turkey was an exemplary case from whose weakness China should have learnt. He submitted the book to the Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908) during the 1898 reforms. The case of Turkey was special because of all the countries in the world Turkey had the most similar internal structure to China for being an old-style empire, even of the same kind. It was once a powerful state which threatened European countries but it

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<sup>142</sup> Hsiao, *A Modern China and a New World*, pp. 193-200.

<sup>143</sup> Kang Youwei, "Tujue youji," p. 455.

had been in decline for a long time because it became conservative and fell behind. To Kang, if Turkey could not rescue itself from this weakness, it would either be colonized or led to destruction.<sup>144</sup> In this way, even though he identified Turkey as a country located in Europe because of its geographical closeness to European countries,<sup>145</sup> Kang, before his departure from China in 1898, was constructing the connections between Turkey and China through the idea of a shared “sickness” before the imperial West. Although not in the subsequent writings of Kang, this connection gradually turned into the idea of imagined closeness in an imagined Asian geography.

Kang stayed in Turkey from June 1908 until April 1909 as part of his journey to the Western countries after his departure from China in 1898 as a political exile. Unfortunately, we do not know with whom he traveled in Turkey, but he made detailed observations in Constantinople. The interesting thing is that his travel accounts were published only in 1913 in the journal *Buren* as a series in three parts.<sup>146</sup> However, the published version was not the same as the original texts; slight changes were made by Kang Youwei himself particularly about the Turkish constitutional rule because of his ideological concerns.

One of the main things that drew our attention was his emphasis on the common historical background of Turkey and China. Despite the fact that Turkey had been closer to European countries, culturally it was not influenced by them and it was easy to observe from the people and their way of life that they had some sort of

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<sup>144</sup> Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 39-40.

<sup>145</sup> Kang Youwei, “Tujue youji,” 438. This edition indicates the differences between the original text and its published version.

<sup>146</sup> Dai, “Kang Youwei ‘Tujue youji’ gaokanben de chayi liqi chengyin [The Differences between the Manuscript and Published Forms of Kang Youwei’s Travels in Turkey],” p. 223.

relation to the ancient people of north China.<sup>147</sup> Secondly, in the original text, he encouraged the Chinese for taking Turkey as a model because the Young Turks established the constitutional rule. However, after his every praiseful sentence came a wary one, which negated the Young Turk's way of establishing the constitutional rule. In the published version, the revolutionary method of the Young Turks was even censored.<sup>148</sup> He criticized the Turkish revolution for being smattering and he himself argued that the changes on the surface must turn into real political changes. Additionally, political changes must accompany structural and material changes.<sup>149</sup> During his visit to Turkey, he observed that Ottoman Turkey was very much influenced by French culture and political ideas.<sup>150</sup> Nevertheless, French was not a proper example for Turkey and the Young Turk imitation of the French model was the source of all domestic discontent and of the weakness of the country in foreign relations. One of the main distinguishing dynamic of Turkey was its religion and Islam contributed a lot to the unity of the Ottoman territory.<sup>151</sup>

To sum up, Kang Youwei was one of the most controversial figures of Chinese modernization history in every period of his life time and even after his death, his opinions and attitudes have continued to be discussed. Before the foundation of the Republic in 1912, he was the man who was searching for modern ways to save his country and people and in his plan the dynasty was only a means to achieve this goal. The ethnic origin of the dynasty might be a partial explanation for his disregard of the dynasty, yet as he was supported by the monarch, he preferred to use it to his own ends. He was a gradualist in every sense of the word and

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<sup>147</sup> Kang Youwei, "Tujue youji," p. 437, 444.

<sup>148</sup> Dai, "Kang Youwei "Tujue youji" gaokanben de chayi liqi chengyin [The Differences between the Manuscript and Published Forms of Kang Youwei's Travels in Turkey]," pp. 225-226.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>150</sup> Kang Youwei, "Tujue youji," p. 454.

<sup>151</sup> Dai, "Kang Youwei "Tujue youji" gaokanben de chayi liqi chengyin [The Differences between the Manuscript and Published Forms of Kang Youwei's Travels in Turkey]," p. 225.

consistently opposed every revolutionary attempt which meant a prompt change. His opposition to the Republic was also originating from this concern but when he was proposing to save the national essence during the Republican years, he was accused of being a pure reactionary; ironically he had been accused of being too modern during the 1898 reform movement. Indeed, he was a man who timely grasped the global transformations of the age and in accordance with this awareness he tried to locate China in the global world space without losing any of its peculiarities. To him, the main characteristics that made China a unique civilization was neither its racial superiority nor its geopolitical position on the world stage but a revised Confucian morality which, contrary to the Western/modern way of thinking in binary polarizations, served to the unity of humankind in an egalitarian, cosmopolitan, and universal environment by abolishing the divisions between people and regions. In this sense, he was neither a regionalist nor nationalist but a pure Universalist.

## CHAPTER IV. PRODUCING ASIA

No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldwide does not abolish the local.  
Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*

The idea of “Asia” has never been perennial; rather it was produced and reproduced at certain historical moments by various actors. In the pre-nineteenth century works, it was hardly possible to come across the discourse of Asia as it was applied in the late nineteenth century by the Chinese, Japanese, Ottoman, or European intellectuals as one of the five continents. What made the nineteenth century production of Asianist discourse possible was the Western imperial and racist treatment of the countries that were not the main actors of the colonial competition which characterized the modern experience of non-European societies. On the way to create their own modernity, various individuals from different layers of society imagined their own Asia as a critical place within the global world space and acted accordingly to realize their images. Regardless of their success in realization, the vividness and multiplicity of these imaginings show us how a region became the locale of contesting political claims on the uneven global world stage. To offer a tangible background to the production of discourse, in the first part of this chapter I will try to summarize the historical change in the perception of Asia as a geography while trying to understand how Chinese and Japanese geographers categorized Turkey in the spatial organization of the world. In the second part, we will see how Asia was produced as the space of deterritorialized politics during the transition to national modernity within global socio-political discourses of capitalism. The cases to be examined will be the Japanese pan-Asianism and Ottoman pan-Islamism in comparison to state-centered and non-state-centered pan-Asianist visions of China.

In the end, I will try to identify the relatively minor and more importantly ambiguous place occupied by the Ottomans inside the Chinese Asianist imagination.

### Asia as Geography

Etymologically, the word ‘Asia’ is claimed to derive from a Babylonian term referring to the rising of the sun (‘asu’: to rise).<sup>152</sup> Anatolia had been used by Herodotus to differentiate it from Greece and Egypt. When Herodotus talked about the war of Troy, he stated that “the Greeks ... invaded the Asia and destroyed the empire of Priam [the king of Troy]”.<sup>153</sup> In one part of his work, Herodotus recounted the origin of the name, based on the sayings that Asia had been named after the wife of Prometheus according to the Greeks; and after Asies, the son of Cotys and grandson of Manes according to the Lydians.<sup>154</sup> Throughout his book he situated everything from the West Anatolia all the way to India as Asia (or Asia major) including Sychtians, Persians, Medes, Assyrians.

The introduction of Asia to China as *yaxiya* is mostly linked to the Italian missionary Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) who was a Jesuit missionary in seventeenth century China. Yet, despite his usage of the word, because Ricci was a real admirer of the East, it seems less probable that he used a term which composed of three Chinese characters (*ya-xi-ya*) meaning Inferior-Trifling-Inferior.<sup>155</sup> Contrary to the claims that *yaxiya* was introduced to China by Europeans<sup>156</sup>, according to Alastair Bonnett, indeed, “Asia was considered to be a marginal place, an area that

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<sup>152</sup> Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 102.

<sup>153</sup> Herodotus, *The Histories* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 4.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 230.

<sup>155</sup> Bonnett, *The Idea of the West*, 102. Today, the word *yazhou* (亚洲) is used in China which means the Asian continent among other continents. *Ya* is the same as in *yaxiya* (亚细亚) which means “inferior” on its own, then it becomes “inferior continent” when it is *yazhou*.

<sup>156</sup> Hiroshi Mitani, “The Concept of Asia: From Geography to Ideology,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 35 (2006), p. 26.

surrounded but did not include China”<sup>157</sup> which means the Chinese *themselves chose* the term –not the West- four centuries ago for their neighbors. In the nineteenth century, the Chinese also became part of this Asian geography not only because of the change in the geographic knowledge but also of geopolitical changes in the global world. More explicitly, the Chinese self-identification and self-locating in the late nineteenth century made it possible for the Chinese to put themselves into the solidarity network of Asian countries through the novel idea of *tongzhong* (same kind) before Europe. *Tongzhong* had previously been used to denote the people who had supposedly shared the same cultural features, Japanese being the best fit for China. In the late nineteenth century, however, a new meaning accompanied the former that people who shared the same political condition of inferiority before Europe were included within the confines of the word.

In the previous chapter, we stated that the Chinese had a long tradition of geographical studies and until the mid-nineteenth century most of this work was on inner Asia since this region was considered to be crucial for the security of the empire’s borders for the time being. In terms of the maritime world, the Chinese had accurate knowledge as well yet this knowledge gained significance when they felt the danger coming from their coastal regions. Despite their cartographic tradition and Admiral Zheng He’s (1371-1433) seven ocean voyages to the West with the purpose of expanding tribute contacts in the fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty’s record of maritime engagements was not so bright because of their state-monopolized overseas trade. A strict ban was enforced by the Ming rulers with an open policy of tribute commerce which meant as long as goods were presented as tribute free trade could be realized.<sup>158</sup> Due to this limited vision toward the maritime world, the knowledge

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<sup>157</sup> Bonnett, *The Idea of the West*, p. 102.

<sup>158</sup> Li Qingxin, *Maritime Silk Road*, p. 111.

of the maritime world during the Ming dynasty was narrow to the extent that Europe and maritime Asia were not distinguished. Thus many European states were thought to be located in *Nan-yang* (maritime Asia); island kingdoms in the *Nan-yang* were confused with mainland states; and no geopolitical grouping was used for different states.<sup>159</sup> However, in the nineteenth century, encountered with the Western challenge on their border areas, many Chinese scholar officials realized that knowing about the non-Chinese world is indispensable if China was to deal with European expansion in Asia.

With this awareness in mind, one of the main geographical works of this period, *Haiguo tuzhi* (Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms), was written by the scholar-official Wei Yuan (1794-1856) around 1844 based on the Chinese works of the previous decades and newly-familiarized European sources.<sup>160</sup> J. K. Leonard emphasizes that although the work used European sources and talked about Western geography, it was a book mainly on maritime Asia with traditional inspirations in the sense that the author did not replace traditional ideas and conceptualizations with Western geographical and geopolitical concepts.<sup>161</sup> Indeed, even though it was fed by the previous Western accounts of the world geography, the work was largely based on the knowledge gathered by the Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu (1785-1850) during his encounter with the Westerners before and during the First Opium War. This clash demonstrated the naval power of Europe making the Chinese think more about the change in the Southern seas and sources of European maritime expansion. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that Wei Yuan wrote his book for practical

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<sup>159</sup> Jane Kate Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 100-101.

<sup>160</sup> For the European and Chinese sources of the work, see Suzanne Wilson Barnett, "Wei Yuan and Westerners: Notes on the Sources of the Hai-Kuo T'u-Chih," *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* 2 (November 1970), pp. 1-20.

<sup>161</sup> Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*, p. 93, 144.

concerns of coastal security particularly after the First Opium War, he did not limit it to the knowledge on Chinese seas or British geography but tried to include a wider content as he was well aware that the maritime expansion of Europe was a global phenomenon. Hence, the main part of the book covered world geography which consisted of forty-two chapters out of sixty.<sup>162</sup> Whether it was a mistake or a conscious preference, in his work, the Middle East was called “western India” or parts of Central Asia were called “northern India”.

Before the nineteenth century, the common way of imagining East Asia consisted of a single center and its peripheries.<sup>163</sup> In other words, the world was made up of concentric circles whose core was occupied by civilized people while in the peripheries lived the less civilized. Parallel to this categorization, Wei also pictured the world as the ensemble of concentric circuits. Contrary to the European usage of continental divisions, Wei Yuan organized his world geography in terms of ocean regions of the maritime world. His usage of *yang* (ocean) referred to a major land area and its contiguous body of water as it had been used in traditional Chinese geography texts. He identified six ocean-regions beginning with its closest tributary neighbors in Southeast Asia to conclude with the Americas. Conforming to the traditional Chinese conceptualization (as we recounted in the first chapter for the Chinese self-locating before the nineteenth century), in Wei’s schema, for each region a self-contained tributary hierarchy with a dominant state (it was China for East Asia) at the center was identified to formalize political relations between the constituent states for stability. Also, a legitimate dynastic rule was critical in the establishment of regional order as well as in the peaceful managing of inter-regional relations. These inter-regional relations required solidarity among neighboring

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<sup>162</sup> Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World*, p. 105.

<sup>163</sup> Mitani, “The Concept of Asia,” pp. 21-35.

regions particularly against the aggressive intervention of foreign powers as any intervention of this kind would threaten the security of all neighboring regions. Particularly in terms of trade relations within the tributary system in Asia, Wei claimed that traditional order had been one of mutual benefit and reciprocity while the Western intrusion supported by naval power was coercive and thus destructive for the region. Even though Asia in this work was not systematically identified as a unified space of anti-imperialist struggle as it was done in succeeding studies, Wei was utilizing an “Asia-Europe” dichotomy which can be noted as the first hints of a regionalist/Asianist agenda. For Wei, Europe was expanding because of its lack of virtue and sound political values.

Although organized differently from the *Haiguo Tuzhi* but parallel to it in terms of its content and political intentions, Xu Jiyu’s (1795-1873), *Yinghuan zhilue* (A Short Account of Maritime Circuits), was another work which illustrated a global view of the world with the awareness that China’s old perspective was unrealistic. As it was described in *Yinghuan zhilue* in 1848, the new global world order was an inter-state system which “looked not to morality or virtue for legitimacy, but rather to industrial and military power”.<sup>164</sup> With this emphasis, the work of Xu differed from Wei’s which still attached importance to spiritual superiority of China. Interestingly, in the book, Asian states were categorized together excluding the Turkish Empire.<sup>165</sup> In the preface, the author stated that “Asia is the name for what, in ancient times, was called Turkey Minor. Westerners call everything east of this Asia”<sup>166</sup> from which we understand that the Asian continent was in the process of creation with reference to European sources. In an eighteenth century Japanese work of geography (Hakuseki

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<sup>164</sup> Fred W. Drake, “A Mid-nineteenth Century Discovery of the Non-Chinese World,” *Modern Asian Studies* 6 (1972), pp. 205-224.

<sup>165</sup> Drake, “A Mid-nineteenth Century Discovery of the Non-Chinese World,” pp. 205-224.

<sup>166</sup> Rebecca E. Karl, “Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” *American Historical Review* 103 (October 1998), p. 1100.

Arai's A Collection of Foreigners' Words Representing the World) Turkey had been categorized as an African country and in the early nineteenth century, it was corrected by Yamamura Saisuke (1770-1807) that Turkey belonged to Asia not to Africa but he also classified Turkey in Europe when naming the three great emperors of Europe.<sup>167</sup> This explicitly supports our argument that before the nineteenth century, Turkey had not been identified as a clear-cut location and it was not even after its political affinity to the colonized Asia became manifest.

Rather than supporting the traditional locating of China at the center of a tributary system, Xu tried to find the proper location of China in the new order of states. This change in attitude has been shown in the chapter we exposed the transformation of Chinese foreign policy linked to her new location inside the global world space as an ordinary part of it. Xu was aware that the world was changing out of their control and Western hegemony was about to shape the global order in its own terms not only because of European military power but also of forms of governmental organization (which gives priority to the people's commitment to the protection of their state) alongside with practical and theoretical learning. China's main shortcoming was her inability to see the transformations from the sixteenth century on in a global perspective and not to support trade officially in order to challenge Western capitalism with Chinese capitalism.<sup>168</sup> Obviously, this evaluation was much more sophisticated than Wei's and consistent with Western conceptualization of the new world order. After this work, we see the term *yazhou* (Asian continent) more often than *yaxiya* (Asia as it was pronounced in European languages) with the implication that *yazhou* was a region which was part of a multi-continental globe.

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<sup>167</sup> Mitani, "The Concept of Asia," p. 27.

<sup>168</sup> Drake, "A Mid-nineteenth Century Discovery of the Non-Chinese World," pp. 205-224.

### **Asia as the Site of Deterritorialized Politics**

Asia as the site of deterritorialized politics was created in the late nineteenth century. It was a deterritorialized space because when compared to the imperial and national form, the claims over the continent did not require political unity within a defined territory but called for an imagined unity beyond official territories among the suppressed societies of the East. Nonetheless, this imagined unity was invited within the frame of pan- movements of various kinds.

Commonly studied by scholars because of their relevance to the current politics, pan- movements contributed to the anti-imperialist struggles of colonial societies after the late nineteenth century while they controversially left a long-lasting legacy that influenced the development of expansionist/nationalist thought in countries that could develop earlier than the others. Within the extra-political frame of the nineteenth century context, pan-Asian and pan-Islamist movements are either condemned for being essentially and simply anti-Western or understood as a precursor of nationalist movements in the context of anti-imperialist struggles of the suppressed countries. However, the historical development of the pan- movements reveals that the issue is much more sophisticated. Hence it cannot be restricted to such oversimplifications. In his treatment of Pan-Islam and Pan-Asianism as anti-Western movements, Cemil Aydın argues that pan-Asianism and pan-Islam are the products of a special conjuncture in which intellectual justifications of a single, globalized, international system, namely imperialism of the late nineteenth century, was countered by alternative visions of the global world order.<sup>169</sup> Though it is reasonable to problematize pan- movements as contesting visions of the global world order, I, on the other hand, argue, first, that pan-Islam and pan-Asianism were not

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<sup>169</sup> Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 6.

necessarily anti-Western, anti-imperial or anti-colonial in every case if their cooperation with the European powers (Japan's with Britain and later Germany and the Ottoman Empire's with Germany) was remembered; and second, that they did not merely emerge as a reaction to the Western imperial assaults but also as attempts to generate alternative paths of modernity albeit within the limits of European hegemony particularly when they became state-centered imaginations.

While the geographical re-definition of Asia in the late nineteenth century was taking place, a new geopolitical configuration was also in process for various actors who somehow identified themselves with the Asian continent. Definitely, being "Asian" before the imperial West embraced anti-imperial and anti-Western resonances for the threatened subject but defining Asianism essentially and primarily anti-Western will lead us to a wrong generalization which treats Asia as a homogenous totality without any variation. An interesting example is the case of Gadhadhar Singh, an Indian soldier who was part of the international expedition of eight nations that lifted the siege of Beijing<sup>170</sup> during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Singh was very much in favor of the British rule because of his admiration of Western military advancement although he was seeing the troubles of the Chinese people caused mainly by the Westerners. In his accounts published in India in 1902, he stated that although China and India were the oldest civilizations of the world with a long Buddhist tradition, the West could suppress them thanks to its

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<sup>170</sup> In June 1900, anti-foreign and anti-Christian Boxer fighters gathered in Beijing to besiege the foreign embassies. Soon after this gathering, the conservative faction of the Imperial Court induced the Empress Dowager, who ruled in the emperor's name, to declare war on the foreign powers that had diplomatic representation in Beijing. Diplomats, foreign civilians, soldiers and some Chinese Christians retreated to the Legation Quarter where they withstood for fifty-five days. The siege was lifted by the troops of Eight-Nation Alliance. For a literary and primary source based account of the foreign experience during the time, see Diana Preston, *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900* (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). Also the diary of Lancelot Giles, who wrote the Chinese-English Dictionary whose romanization system was used for a long time in China studies, is interesting for being the personal observations on the siege. Lancelot Giles, *The Siege of the Peking Legations* (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1970).

commercial and military superiority. Thus, he wished China to become a British colony which had made them [Indians] ‘attain the sleep of happiness and carefreeness’. What he meant by this statement was that under the British rule, Indians did not need to bother themselves with the complex affairs of modern administration. If they united as a “Hindu-Chinese” country under the British flag, they could reach great happiness in Asia.<sup>171</sup> Obviously, this is a very simple and unique case of a colonial personality which tells little about the controversial character of Asianist thinking. But, the cases of Japanese pan-Asianism and Ottoman pan-Islamism were quite controversial as will be discussed below in comparison to the Chinese Asianist vision.

European narratives of the early nineteenth century could persuade the world population that the European race was superior to every other in the world with the proof of Western expansion all around the world that was backed by a scientific and industrial advancement. Convinced by the universal civilization discourse of the West, many non-Western states like Ottoman Turkey, China and Japan began to search for mechanisms to adapt themselves to the Western ways of the global game despite the frequent and widespread discontent in their societies. In addition to their appreciation of the Western mechanisms of politics and economics particularly around the mid-nineteenth century, they were convinced that only through modernization could China, Japan or Ottoman Turkey rescue themselves from sharing the fate of India. Towards the end of the century, however, the enthusiastic visioning of the West became subject to change as its imperial tendencies became more prevalent.

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<sup>171</sup> Anand A. Yang, “(A) Subaltern (’s) Boxers: An Indian Soldier’s Account of China and the World in 1900-1901,” in *The Boxers, China and the World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 43-64.

In her evaluation of the Central and East European pan- movements, Hannah Arendt discusses that lacking colonial possession and hope for overseas expansion, these nations were convinced that if expansion was the legitimate rule of international politics, they had the right to expand inside Europe. Even though their intent was imperial in essence, pan- movements lacked the capitalist support which was the major force behind imperialism.<sup>172</sup> Because of this lack, pan- movements in marginalized countries were mostly initiated by students and intellectuals while in the case of imperialism, the initiative lay mostly with the representatives of capital.<sup>173</sup> The distinction made by Arendt between imperialism and pan- movements makes sense for the Japanese and Ottoman cases: Japan with a backing of industrial capitalism envisioned an imperial pan-Asianism while the Ottoman pan-Islam remained inside the limits of pan- movements despite its imperial cravings. Because its empire building in Asia could be accepted as the first sign of the emergence of a broad ideology of “Asianism”<sup>174</sup>, Japanese pan-Asianism will be our starting point.

In 1880, *Koakai* (Raise Asia Society) was founded in Japan and attracted many reformists from China and Korea. Through this society, the idea of Asian solidarity against Western imperialism or the Russian threat was diffused alongside with the idea of Asian solidarity with India. In 1885, Tarui Tokichi wrote the book *Daito Gapporon* (Theory of Uniting the Great Asia) in which he proposed cooperation between the Japanese and Korean reform movements as a step towards Asian solidarity. In 1893, he published a re-written version of the book in classical Chinese in order to reach a wider readership. His book revealed a consciousness of

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<sup>172</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Imperialism: Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), p. 104.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

<sup>174</sup> Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, “Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era,” in *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945*, ed. Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 16-17.

belonging to a shared Chinese cultural zone, defined by Confucianism and a common writing style.<sup>175</sup> The Sino-Japanese war of 1895 became the turning point for the development of Japanese Asianist discourses because after the recognition of the Japanese threat to the Western colonial interests in East Asia, the racist discourse of the “yellow peril” became widely used by European statesmen to entail the Japanese antipathy towards the West. The rising awareness of the conflict of interests between the white and yellow races in the colonial competition made the Japanese direct their attention to an expansionist policy in Asia at the turn of the twentieth century given that China was no longer a hegemonic power in the region. This Japan-centered Asianist tendency was ironically confirmed and fostered by the non-Japanese Asian intellectuals during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905<sup>176</sup> as a symbol of Asian challenge to the Western domination or of “the awakening of the East”. Indeed, seemingly anti-Western attempts of Japan in Asia did not take its strength from her foundational challenge to Western ways of governance, economics and thinking but contrarily stemmed from her success in modernizing in the Western way. Lacking a real alternative vision of a global order, Japanese state-led attempts were only the constituents of a geopolitical power struggle inside the boundaries of a Western-defined global world order. However, its content was not comprehended by the Asian subject in the historical context which did not allow making evaluations beyond the dichotomy of tradition-modernity, spiritual East-material West, and yellow race-white race. For the colonized or suppressed Asian subject, the Japanese state-centered model was much more instructive as it exemplified a relatively late but

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<sup>175</sup> Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, pp. 43-46.

<sup>176</sup> The war was the outcome of a conflict that grew out of the rival imperialist ambitions of the Russian Empire and Japan over Manchuria and Korea. Japan’s unexpected victory resulted in a reassessment of Japan’s recent entry onto the world stage while the dissatisfaction of the Russians with the inefficient and corrupt Tsarist government proved a major cause of the Russian Revolution of 1905.

rapid integration of the modern ways into a non-Western country without converting to Christianity or losing its native essence and tradition. Seeing the rising influence of Japan in Asia, many Ottoman intellectuals such as Mehmet Akif and Abdullah Cevdet also praised the harmonious melting of traditional and modern values by the Japanese state to the extent that a clandestine cooperation between the Ottoman pan-Islamist and Japanese pan-Asianist figures gradually became rational, operational and noteworthy at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>177</sup>

As in the case of Japan, pan- movements in the Ottoman Empire were also the products of an asymmetrical encounter with Western imperialism. Although it is possible to trace the origins of pan-Islam to the Ottoman-Russian treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) in which a clause was inserted asserting the sultan's spiritual jurisdiction over Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire<sup>178</sup> we can easily claim that it could make its appearance only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Namik Kemal was one of the first Ottoman intellectuals who used the term "Muslim unity" (ittihad-i Islam) in 1872.<sup>179</sup> In 1881, a manuscript written by Suleyman Hasbi titled "A Treatise about Union for the Happiness of the Islamic Millet" was presented to the Sultan Abdulhamid.<sup>180</sup> We have already mentioned the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman undertakings in Xinjiang especially during the Muslim rebellion of Yaqub Beg, although the Ottoman involvement for that time cannot be interpreted as the marker of an organized pan-Islamic movement. However, at the turn of the century, these attempts gained a new momentum when the Ottoman Porte realized the potential of using the influence of Islam for the Muslim population of the entire world against the Western imperial expansion. Thus, through the establishment of a

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<sup>177</sup> Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945," *The American Historical Review* 109 (October 2004), pp. 1140-1170.

<sup>178</sup> Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, p. 10.

<sup>179</sup> Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, p. 36.

<sup>180</sup> Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, p. 24.

clandestine network of pan-Islamist activists, the Sultan initiated the propaganda that he was the Caliph of all the Muslims in the world. For this purpose, special envoys and agents were sent to different parts of Asia and Africa, the attempts to establish consulates in Japan, North Africa, India were intensified, and every opportunity to promote Islamic sentiments was used by the Sultan or the carriers of the project. One of these agents, Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857-1944) deserves a special attention here as the unsupported intersection of pan-Asianist and pan-Islamist movements.

Abdürreşid İbrahim was a Russian Tatar activist who observed the maltreatment of Russian Muslims during the late nineteenth century and contributed to the transformation of Tatar *jadidism*<sup>181</sup> into a political framework with a strong pan-Islamic emphasis. His antagonistic sentiments against Russia pushed him towards Ottoman pan-Islamist and Japanese pan-Asianist circles especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. He traveled in a wide geography from Ottoman Turkey to Japan merely to establish a pan-Islamist and pan-Asianist network under the leadership of the Ottoman or Japanese government if Japan would have accepted Islam as its national religion.

In 1909, Abdürreşid İbrahim also visited China towards which was not pleasantly impressed. It is likely that he went there to see the conditions of Chinese Muslims on the one hand and establish a Muslim network on the other. However, from his accounts, it is understood that although he made certain contacts, his visit was not significant in any sense.<sup>182</sup> First of all, he was not satisfied with the

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<sup>181</sup> Jadidism is the program of Muslim reformers in Russia in the late nineteenth century which initiated the application of “the new method” for the teaching at schools. Although at first sight, the program seems naïve as an educational reform, it was treated with suspicion by the Russian government because of its supposed connection to the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic movements in Asia. See Adeeb Khalid, *The politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

<sup>182</sup> Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslâm ve Japonya'da İslâmiyet'in Yayılması: Türkistan, Sibiryâ, Moğolistan, Mançurya, Japonya, Kore, Çin, Singapur, Uzak Hind Adaları, Hindistan, Arabistan, Dâru'l-Hilâfe* (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 2003), p. 219.

daily habits of the Chinese Muslims as they did not know much about hygiene. Second, their knowledge of language was so poor that he had great difficulty in communicating with them despite his knowledge of Russian and Arabic. Third, in terms of religious knowledge, the Chinese Muslims were in such a desperate condition that sending well-informed religious instructors to the region was a dire necessity to annihilate the differences between the religious practices of the Chinese Muslims and other Muslim communities in the world. Contrary to his observations, when he was in Japan, a Japanese young man mentioned his China experience to İbrahim that the Chinese Muslims were very different from other Chinese people in terms of their cleanness and courage so that the man decided to convert into Islam in front of Abdürreşid İbrahim.<sup>183</sup> During his China visit, İbrahim stayed in Manchuria and Harbin where the Muslim Chinese lived in moderate numbers. Still, he did not have any problem related to his expenses and accommodation. In this stay, he talked to many Chinese people to whom he uttered anti-Russian, anti-Western and anti-missionary comments. In one of these conversations, he proposed brotherhood between the Chinese and Japanese against Russians and other European countries but his Chinese friend warned him that such kind of brotherhood was not possible since the Chinese would not accept the Japanese claims of superiority. Yet, the man stated, they could cooperate against the Westerners so that China in the meantime could have some time to develop itself.<sup>184</sup> As he recounted his China visit, he frequently applied an Asianist discourse through which he identified an Asian spiritual civilization of hospitality, honesty and bravery based on Islamic culture and ethics. Also, in many of the episodes, the conversion of the Chinese into Christianity was illustrated as forced because the Chinese people in essence were very much loyal to

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., pp. 536-541.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., pp. 235-236.

their tradition as it could be understood from their passionate keeping of their queues.<sup>185</sup>

Despite his insistent attempts to establish an Asianist and Islamic network, his combined approach to pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism was welcomed neither by the Ottoman Sultan nor by the succeeding Young Turk government maybe because of his overemphasis that Japan would one day be the true savior of Islam.<sup>186</sup> Deprived of the Ottoman support he expected through his pan-Islamist currents, he made a mild transition to pan-Turkism which can also be seen as an example of the transition from global/religious/regionalist to nationalist thinking in parallel to the rising influence of nationalist sentiments of the time. Interestingly, after the Ottoman surrender together with Germany in World War I, Ibrahim once more subscribed to Asianism in the late 1930s and 1940s during his stay in Japan.<sup>187</sup>

It is interesting to note that contrary to the multiplicity of studies on the Japanese Asianist vision, there are very few works which focus on the Chinese Asianist imagination particularly for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the previous chapters, we stated that from its unification in the third century BC, China had always been considered by the Chinese as the center of a tributary system in which neighboring countries fed themselves with the superior Chinese culture in recognition of its regional hegemony. However, the Chinese superiority was challenged first by the Westerner in the early nineteenth century and later by the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. When they combined the deteriorating situation of the country with the Japanese promotion in the region, the Chinese intellectuals took different positions concerning the position of China in the global

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid., pp. 236-237, 245-246.

<sup>186</sup> Nadir Özbek, "From Asianism to Pan-Turkism: The Activities of Abdürreşid İbrahim in the Young Turk Era and Japan," in *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent: New Perspectives on the History of Japanese Turkish Relations* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2003), pp. 86-104.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 100.

world and in Asia. By the early twentieth century, they had already realized that China was only a small portion of a broader world space, not the central country as they had conceived before. Under the pressure of Western imperialism and the influence of the Japanese model, as the subjects of a weak nation, many of the intellectuals found their way in nationalism which, in accordance with the traditional bounded spatial imagination of China, advised a defensive strengthening movement.<sup>188</sup> Some others, on the other hand, even though under the same circumstances, followed a way which anticipated a regional unity under the leadership of Japan. For instance, Zhang Binglin (1869-1936)<sup>189</sup> wrote an article in 1897 titled “A Treatise on How Asia Should Unite” in which he argued for a Japan-led unification in Asia against Russia and other Western countries because he was worried about the white race’s oppression of the yellow race and China’s partition by the West.<sup>190</sup> As such, the leader of the 1911 Revolution Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) appreciated the Japanese model but instead of Japanese leadership, he proposed cooperation between China and Japan and he was successful to some extent at least in the course of his anti-dynastic struggle.<sup>191</sup> A third group of intellectuals mostly educated in Japan after 1905 could also generate an awareness of cultural and racial affinity with Japan but the scope of a Sino-Japan alliance against Western imperialism has always remained limited.<sup>192</sup>

In the spring of 1907, Indian students in Tokyo organized a meeting to commemorate a seventeenth-century rebel, Shivaji who became the leader of an uprising to overthrow the Mughal Empire. Soon after this meeting, Chinese and

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<sup>188</sup> Lu Yan, *Re-Understanding Japan: Chinese Perspectives, 1895-1945* (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004), p. 31.

<sup>189</sup> Zhang Binglin is one of the significant figures in this study, hence a detailed account of his ideas can be found on pages 96-97.

<sup>190</sup> Kauko Latinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist* (London: Curzon Press, 1990), p. 60.

<sup>191</sup> Lu Yan, *Re-Understanding Japan*, p. 68.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

Indian activists in Tokyo established an organization called “the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood” which is known as the Asian Solidarity Society in recent studies. The aim of the organization was to construct solidarity among all the peoples in Asia engaged in anti-imperial struggles. The main criteria for joining the Society were opposition to imperialism and commitment to protect solidarity.<sup>193</sup> Even though it could only be a short-lived organization of a period of eighteen-months, the Society’s composition and alternative approach to Asianist thinking deserve special treatment with its background in terms of its non-state-centered, local as well as global anti-imperial interpretation of Asianist struggle.

The society’s composition was based on the Chinese as well as Japanese and Indian debates of the previous years. In his proposals for a new periodization for Chinese history, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) had already identified the Chinese medieval period as “China of Asia” because of vivid contacts between China and the various countries of Asia while the Chinese modern period was characterized by its uniting with all the Asian peoples against the West. During the period between 1895 and 1911, Chinese intellectuals both in and outside China could have the chance to observe the experience of other peoples and discover that China was not alone in its maltreatment by the imperial West. It was during this period that the Chinese began to use the discourse of *tongzhong* (same kind) frequently. Previously, the term had been used to indicate the similarities between the Japanese and Chinese cultures but in time its ethno-cultural connotations left their place to a more political meaning when the countries that experienced or on the eve of experiencing *wangguo* (lost state/country)<sup>194</sup> were included within the new broader meaning of the term. Within its new context, the term indicated a shared global condition which was activated

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<sup>193</sup> Karl, “Creating Asia,” pp. 1111-1113.

<sup>194</sup> The term originally referred to the overthrow of a dynasty in classical Chinese texts but in the late nineteenth century it was used to denote the loss of country at the hands of colonial powers.

within the same conceptual and practical space of Asia. In this Asian space Indians represented the worst case as they were thought to be “no more than slaves”<sup>195</sup>. Until the collapse of the Philippines’ effort and its colonization by the United States in 1903, the Philippines struggle was on the other hand, a role model and many Chinese intellectuals hoped the Philippines to be a second Japan in Asia.<sup>196</sup> As they inquired the reasons of the Philippines’ failure, they found out that an essential component of the European success at colonization was its success in writing the histories of the colonized people on their behalf. Through the usage of historical (mis)information, Western countries legitimized their dominance over the colonial people which revealed the importance of writing independent histories of their own.<sup>197</sup> In this attempt to write their own histories, Chinese and Indian Asianists developed a strikingly similar approach by blending the local and global histories together. That is, rather than the British conquest, the turning point for the loss of India was the Mughal takeover in the sixteenth century while for China it was represented by the Manchu overthrow of the Ming dynasty in the seventeenth century. Both of them were alien races to the native population. This seemingly racial interpretation of their history implied a shared experience of *wangguo* as an internal event that predated the arrival of the West. By way of such conceptualization, Chinese and Indian commonality was constituted on both external (Western) and internal (non-native) state suppression. The state-critical approach of the Society definitely originated from the participation of socialist and anarchist personalities in the circle such as Liu

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<sup>195</sup> The expression was taken from a story published in the Chinese journal *Jiangsu* in 1904. Quoted from Karl, “Creating Asia,” pp. 1109-1110.

<sup>196</sup> In 1898, Filipino revolutionary forces under the leadership of General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869-1964) proclaimed the sovereignty and independence of the Philippine Islands from the colonial rule of Spain by publicly declaring the *Act of the Declaration of Independence*. Formerly a Spanish colony, the islands were ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American War of 1898 and they wanted to use the defeat of Spain as a chance to gain their independence, however, the US did not recognize their independence until 1946.

<sup>197</sup> The evaluation belonged to Tang Tiaoding (1878-1940) when he wrote about the events in the Philippines in 1903. Recited from Karl, “Creating Asia,” p. 1108.

Shipei (1884-1919) and his wife He Zhen. Contrary to many of his contemporaries, while discussing the Asian liberation, Liu Shipei identified Japan as “part of the problem not the solution”<sup>198</sup> because of its imperial and expansionist plans in Asia.

Amid these Asianist discussions and imaginings in China, Ottoman Turkey had a minor place in comparison to India and the Philippines, but still it was the case most similar to the Chinese as illustrated by Hong Fei in his article in *Henan* magazine after the declaration of constitutional rule in Turkey.<sup>199</sup> The author made a categorization among Asian countries and pointed to Japan as the unique case in Asia to compete with the great powers of the West. The others like India, Myanmar, Vietnam and Korea had already been lost (*wangguo*) not to revive again while some others like Siam, Afghanistan and Persia were exposed to full foreign control. Yet, there was also a third category of Turkey and China which had not been lost yet but was on the edge of loss. This in-between situation had significance because the world of the twentieth century was of change, full of unexpected ups and downs and it was this instability that opened the doors of the chance to survive for Asian countries like Turkey and China. Hong’s evaluation on the Turkish constitutional rule is the focus of the next chapter so here only his emphasis on Chinese and Turkish similarities will be stated. Nonetheless, Ottoman Turkey was not found isomorphic to China by everyone at that time for the reason that although it was not on equal terms with the imperial West, the Ottoman state’s pan-Islamic pursuits constituted an impediment for the inclusion of it inside the Asian solidarity network. As such, we do not know any Ottoman personality who was in direct contact with the Chinese anti-imperialist activists at the turn of the twentieth century.

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<sup>198</sup> Karl, “Creating Asia,” p. 1116.

<sup>199</sup> Hong Fei, “Tuerqi lixian shuo (On the Turkish Constitution),” *Henan* 7 (August 1908), pp. 19-27.

One of the eminent members of the Asian Solidarity Society, Zhang Taiyan or Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) who was a well-known nationalist figure for his anti-Manchu attitudes, wrote an article in 1908 on the German interests in Muslim affairs.<sup>200</sup> In this short article, he addressed the people of Xinjiang saying that the Muslim people of the area came from Mongol and thirty-six-countries origin and “among them there were *tuferqi* people”.<sup>201</sup> The people of Gansu and Sanxi like other provinces where the Muslim people live, had Han people and they shared the same culture (*tonghua*). When the Tang dynasty was reigning over China, the daughter of the emperor got married to a Muslim. In the time of the Ming dynasty, there were many Arabs in China. At that time, the Muslim people were entitled to their own land until the invasion of Manchu rulers. Hence, the real enemy was the Manchu domination, against which the Han and the Hui people (Chinese Muslims) must fight together. It was undeniable that the Hui people had religious brotherhood with the people of Turkey but they belonged to the Chinese cultural zone because of their history. Most importantly, if the Hui people turned their faces to the other side of the Tianshan (towards Arabs), their end would have been at German hands as the German king Wilhelm II (1859-1941) tried to colonize the Xinjiang region by using the influence of the Ottoman sultan over Chinese Muslims. As such, religion could not be a distinguishing factor for being *tongzhong* in the imperial order of the world in which the only way was to conduct a struggle of independence.

The concepts Zhang used and his approach to the issue are very illuminating to see how an Asianist and a Han nationalist interpreted the Ottoman engagements in

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<sup>200</sup> Zhang Taiyan, “Dehuang baohu huijiaoshi [German King’s Interest in the Muslim Affairs],” *Minbao*, 1908, pp. 7-8.

<sup>201</sup> Even though the author talks about the antique origins, he does not use *Tujue* as a name for the Turkish people. I cannot offer the exact page numbers since I could find the article in Wang Renzhi, *Qin Hai geming qian shi nian jian shi lun xian ji* [Selected Publications From the Ten Years Before the Qin Hai Revolution]: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian, 1977), pp. 363-368.

the region. First and foremost, Zhang was using *hantu* instead of China and it meant “the land of the Han people” exemplifying his anti-Manchu stand within the course of producing the national space. Second, despite his racist categorization of Han-Manchu dichotomy, he did not emphasize any ethnic connection between the people of Xinjiang and Turkey. Rather, he stressed the historical, cultural and political commonalities of the Han and the Hui people. These people had a long history of mutual exchanges within the same cultural geography and now they once more shared the same fate before the Manchu rulers. Under the state domination of the Manchu, and against the imperial plans of the British, German, or Ottoman states, the only solution was to establish their own independent state as they did in their “glorious past”. At first, he, as a Han nationalist did not seem to have any claim to include the Muslims of the area in a Chinese state which he imagined as the state of Han people. However, he made a call to them for self determination: “We should let them stay or leave as they choose.” However, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet, though originally outside the Chinese cultural zone, at least did not belong to anyone at that historical moment which meant they could be incorporated into the new Republic if properly assimilated. According to Zhang, Muslims were clever enough to be educated by the Han colonists in Xinjiang.<sup>202</sup>

Thus, until the time Constitutional rule was declared in Ottoman Turkey in 1908, Turkish affairs were observed by the Chinese intellectuals either to draw lessons from the weakness of the Ottoman dynastic rule or in regard to the Ottoman imperial claims on the supposedly Chinese cultural zone. Whenever the Muslims of China were the issue, the Ottoman Empire was treated as a state with imperial cravings while it was called *tongzhong* (same kind) when the Western imperialism

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<sup>202</sup> Zhang’s ideas on how larger non-Chinese groups would be dealt are taken from Esherick, “How the Qing Became China,” pp. 237-238.

was problematized. This unstable locating turned into a steadier one as the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and the events aftermath were utilized by the Chinese revolutionaries or by the foreign supporters of Chinese constitutionalism to better plan their own revolutionary path. This will be the focus of the last chapter.

## CHAPTER V. PRODUCING THE NATION

Raise the Han, raise the Han,  
Raise our great Han.  
Destroy the Manchu, destroy the Manchu.  
Destroy the thieving Manchu.  
The spirit of the Yellow Emperor  
Helps us to kill the thieves.<sup>203</sup>

The events that started in the early nineteenth century caused deliberate considerations on the part of the Chinese intellectuals in order to discover the reasons of the Chinese failure in global politics. Well aware of the transformations and the character of global interactions, they mostly concerned themselves with the survival of the country as an equal and proud state on the global world stage. In the late nineteenth century, prominent Chinese scholars like Kang Youwei and his student Liang Qichao chose the way of reformism which would help them to locate China into a global world order as a constitutional monarchy. Later on, as the reformist attempts failed due to various reasons, a new perspective which proposed to locate the country into the web of an Asian solidarity network against the imperial West was adopted along with the conviction that a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the reigning dynasty was a necessity. Yet, the circumstances in Asia did not allow for such a formation as the late comers of the imperial competition, like the US or Japan, emerged with contesting claims over the region while some of the Asian countries had already been lost, destroying all hopes for a potential Asian unity against the

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<sup>203</sup> This military anthem was played during a ceremony attended by the revolutionary leaders in honor of the Yellow Emperor, in 1911. Cited from Esherick, "How the Qing Became China," p. 238.

imperial claims of the West. Squeezed between the imperial assaults of various political actors and the discontent and ignorance of their native community, the Chinese intellectuals found themselves in an identity crisis which originated from their failure to imitate the white ruler who maintained his superiority over the semi-colonial subject through a racist discourse.<sup>204</sup> The intellectual could generate two alternatives to solve this contradiction: either by xenophobically returning to a glorious native past which was concealed behind the Western brilliance of the century or by indiscriminately imitating the colonizer and rejecting all the particularities of the native culture. Nationalism, on the other hand, offered a more compromising solution which partly included both perspectives by way of erasing their extremities and integrating them into the discourse of proud nations of the world.

In this last chapter, based on the arguments made in previous chapters concerning the production of the global world space and Asia as the site of deterritorialized politics, we will more explicitly observe how the Chinese intellectuals transformed their mental world from imperial to national thinking. The process will be exposed by reference to the revolutionary and gendered discourses of emergent nationalism through the reading of Chinese journal articles on Turkey at the turn of the twentieth century.

### **Nation as Bounded Politics**

Nationalism in Asia has so far been treated as a “reaction” to Western imperialism or as “a derivative discourse” of its European antecedent<sup>205</sup> but indeed nation and

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<sup>204</sup> Harry D. Harootunian, “The Impact of Colonialism, Nationalism and Communism,” in *West and Non-West: New Perspectives* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 113.

<sup>205</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1993), pp. 1-36.

nationalism in China were produced throughout a complex set of interactions between the Western, Eastern and indigenous practices and discourses of a remote past, an unsettled present and of an unforeseen future.<sup>206</sup> The end of the Qing dynasty came as a result of the proliferating discourses of Han nationalism (against the Manchu dynasty), revolution for the rule of public masses and of the liberation of women from their traditional bonds. Through these discourses, a new space of nation was created out of the imperial space of the previous age. As we focus on the production of nationalist discourses in China through the Ottoman case, we will also see how the fragments of the emergent Turkish nation were sighted by various fragments of the emergent Chinese nation.

The introduction of the ideas of Charles Darwin to China became significant only after the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895.<sup>207</sup> As we discussed before, when the Chinese intellectuals and bureaucrats tried to find answers to their failures against Euro-America or Japan, they discovered the idea of progress which, contrary to the Chinese cyclical conception of time, necessitated an insistence on endless improvement toward a better future. For being one of the first knower of Western ideas, Kang Youwei was also the first Chinese who discovered the progressive history and could integrate this idea into his Confucian worldview.<sup>208</sup> Indeed, the racial categories and differentiations had already been in usage from the earlier times, in Chinese classics to refer to the non-Chinese societies<sup>209</sup>. Nevertheless, racism became a significant dynamic in the transformation of China

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<sup>206</sup> Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, "Introduction: Nations and Identities in Asia," in *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 9-10.

<sup>207</sup> James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1983), 5. The book is the only extensive examination of Darwinist and anti-Darwinist ideas of Yan Fu, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-27.

<sup>209</sup> Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 1-30.

only after its association with its the social Darwinist interpretation at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>210</sup> Due to the native and domestic works on world races, the Chinese developed an awareness of human races especially by reference to Japan and then to Euro-America.<sup>211</sup> However, this identification by reference to the outside world soon turned into identification against the unsuccessful Manchu dynasty particularly in the writings of the well known nationalist intellectual Zhang Binglin (1869-1936).

Indeed, after the defeat of 1895, Zhang Binglin (Zhang Taiyan as he was referred in the texts mentioned in this paper) participated in the reform movement of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao although he had doubts about the Kang's New Text interpretation because he was in favor of constitutional reform but against the promotion of Confucianism to the position of religion.<sup>212</sup> His anti-Manchu ideas became manifest when he was exiled to Taiwan with other reformers after the failure of the Hundred Days' Reforms in 1898. During his exile period, he crystallized his ideas that the Manchus were a different race (*yizhong*) while the Japanese were of the same race (*tongzhong*).<sup>213</sup> In 1901, Zhang, in his article titled "On the Correct Hatred of the Manchus" criticized Liang Qichao for defending the Manchu dynasty under the name of constitutional monarchy.<sup>214</sup> Again in a published letter to Kang Youwei who opposed revolution and anti-Manchism, he stated that the era was the time of nationalism, so that the Hans and the Manchus should have not been mixed since

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<sup>210</sup> When the Manchu emperor took the throne in 1644, Chinese bureaucrats had refused to serve the Manchu dynasty because of their loyalty to the (Han) Ming dynasty, but this attitude did not turn into an organized anti-Manchu campaign until the turn of the twentieth century.

<sup>211</sup> It was common in the nineteenth century to refer to Japan as "same culture same race" (*tongwen tongzhong*) to the extent that Liang Qichao introduces his intention to publish the journal *Qingyi bao* as to establish the friendship between China and Japan but as he realized imperial pursuits of Japan he left this discourse. Huang Zunxian (1848-1905) identified the Chinese as "yellow race against white race" when he witnessed the maltreatment of the Chinese in California. Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 85, 94.

<sup>212</sup> Latinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the late Qing Dynasty*, p. 60.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

they were historically different races.<sup>215</sup> Similar revolutionary and anti-Manchu discourses of the time will be exemplified below with reference to the revolutionary Ottomans.

### **Revolution for the Nation**

In 1908 and the succeeding years, the declaration of the Turkish constitutional rule or the Young Turk Revolution as it was mostly called by Chinese revolutionaries was one of the most popular issues in Chinese journals. Before that time, Chinese journals were publishing news and articles on Turkey but mostly to inform their readers about the problems encountered by a traditional empire in the globally transformed imperial world order. The news mostly covered information on nationalist and separatist movements of the empire such as Greece and Egypt. Beyond that, the relations of the Ottoman Empire to the European countries were also having due treatment because of their instructive character. In the revolutionary journals, while the Sultan was illustrated as the puppet of European countries for his own interests, the dissidents, reformist bureaucrats and particularly Young Turks were mostly shown as the people who were working for the real interests of the people. Even though they inquired the same issue, each article emphasized a different dimension of the events in Ottoman Turkey.

*Waijiaobao* was one of the first journals which informed the Chinese public about the Turkish constitutional rule by publishing the news just a few weeks after its declaration.<sup>216</sup> The journal reported it because for the time being it was the main issue which attracted the attention of the European countries and it is clear that the journal was using information filtered through the Western sources. Indeed, Ottoman

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., pp. 94-95.

<sup>216</sup> “Lun Tuerqi lixian [On the Turkish Constitution],” *Waijiaobao*, August 1908, pp. 16-20.

Turkey had declared its constitution in 1876 but after a short while it had been suspended by the Sultan. Thus, the journal stated, remembering the events of that time would shed light on the current transformation.

In 1876, the Ottoman Porte confronted a great danger from its borders: Serbia's cabinet changed and Bulgaria was giving the signals of a revolution. If the government did not reform itself and consolidate the country's politics, there would have been no way to tranquilize the country. Originally, Turkey had been a traditional dictatorship, but now turned into a people's rule. The first reason of this change was to strengthen the country against the pressure of the foreign powers and second, there was an eminent politician who could influence the decision of the monarch. Who was it? It was Mithat Pasha. Generally speaking, in Turkey it was hardly possible for a politician not to be resented by the monarch or squeezed out of power by the other members of the government. However, Mithat Pasha was an exception. He was endowed with great intelligence, iron-willed, and a person who could think ahead. He proved his abilities when he was a bureaucrat in Serbia and Bulgaria. He always wanted to import the European political system into his own country and when he was entitled to the generalship of the Macedonian army, he killed the Sultan because of his obstruction of the new government. Because the new Sultan Murat was not capable of ruling the country, he was overthrown again by Mithat Pasha.<sup>217</sup>

The article went on with a detailed account of the ideas and proceedings of Mithat Pasha to show how influential he was in the Ottoman political life:

Mithat Pasha was the leader of the revolutionary party and when he was appointed as the head counselor, he was also the head of the committee to prepare the constitutional draft. This draft took egalitarianism as its basis and did not make any differentiation between religions. The draft was consulted to the government and revised. When the Serbian war broke out, Murat's brother took the throne and the great change for the country started. Reshid Pasha was once more appointed as the head of the cabinet which was composed of twenty eight people and their rule was restricted by the constitution. Young Turk Party tried to find ways to free Christian criminals. Public opinion made such a noise! At that time, because Mithat Pasha did not like Reshid Pasha to whom he was superior, he did not trust him and kept power exclusively for himself. When the British demanded the Ottoman Empire to allow Slavic people to establish autonomous rule, Mithat Pasha took the advantage of the occasion to suppress his opponents. On the second day of his position, he changed the articles of the constitution so as to turn it into the frame he had wished originally. In general, the constitution was in line with European standards but its 113. Article stated that the decision about the people who worked against the interests of the country exclusively belonged to the Sultan and if he felt the need, he could banish that person. Based on this article, Mithat Pasha was exiled and 13 years later, in 1884 was

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

devastated by the order of the government, only his head could come back to the country.<sup>218</sup>

After the death of Mithat Pasha, the constitutional process erupted due to the Sultan's intervention as it was explained by the journal:

On 19 March, 1877, the parliament held its opening ceremony. The Ottoman Sultan declared to European countries that from now on the people of the country would live under the protection of the law and be treated equally. On March 27<sup>th</sup>, the parliament published a declaration to praise the Sultan's decision. In June 1877, one of the members of the parliament proposed the recruitment of the Christian subjects of the empire to the army but the proposal was not implemented. At the end of the same month, the discussion on the constitution was ended and in August the Sultan approved it. At the end of the year, the parliament gathered again and it was seen that opponents of the government were many. On 19 February 1878, the parliament was dissolved so that Ottoman Turkey once more restored its old political system to last for another 30 years.<sup>219</sup>

After these events, the Sultan increased the number of his bodyguards and the policemen, employed spies to make inspections inside the country to find out his opponents, and people were exposed to a great oppression. Then, the author explains the role played by the Macedonians in the process. Because the movement attracted the attention of the general public and became spread quickly, not only the members of the Young Turk Party but also many businessmen alongside with military men and local officials were involved in the movement.

From the time of Persian and Russian revolutions, the longing of the Turkish people for constitutional rule increased significantly. Previously, there were the cases that the Ottoman government could not pay the salaries of the soldiers but when it was protested by the soldiers, the government could solve the problem after receiving the telegraph from the army members. However, this time, the turmoil of June was much more serious; the Macedonian army threatened the government that if they did not reform the government, they would apply force to do it themselves.<sup>220</sup>

Macedonian events went on with the increasing demands from the Young Turks to result in the establishment of constitutional rule in Turkey:

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

Last year, on 27-29 December, the central meeting of all the Young Turk Party branches was held to discuss the post-revolutionary plan. Having enumerated the harsh methods of ruling such as banishment, confiscation, or cruelty against religion, they stated that there was also oppression, meddling in the education of the youth, prohibition of public press, restrictions on communication, etc. Even though the government seemed to agree with doing reforms, they did not carry it out. There is no way other than reforming politics to save the country. Thus, they discussed the abolishment of the Sultan, reforming the administration of the country, and adopting to the system of the age. In order to gather the parliament, there was the need to list the amount of armaments. They encouraged the businessmen to go on a strike, dismissed all the policemen by sending them back to their homes, did not pay taxes, and persuaded the military men. They demanded the army not harm common people or revolutionary party, so that the riot grew stronger day by day. On 13 July, an alliance originated from the Young Turks announced that 1. The purpose of the Alliance was to restore the constitution of 1876; 2. We are not the enemies of Muslim religion, every person and religion was equal; 3. Although we have military power, actually we were on legitimate defense, and in desire to use our arms to punish the enemies of freedom; 4. We would not agree any pointless war; 5. The army of the Alliance would not harm villagers, but protect them. Under the threat of the Macedonian army, and in fear of its attack on Istanbul, the Sultan declared the opening of the Parliament once again on 23 July.<sup>221</sup>

From the article, we understand that Ottoman Turkey could save itself from foreign aggression by way of a constitutional revolution which meant the freedom of speech, the protection of property and the equal treatment of people without making any differentiation between religions. Through these guarantees, various groups in society came together to form an alliance and the army forces made up its most important part to exert fear and pressure on the Sultan. Only through unity could revolutionary forces impose their demands on the monarch who was playing political games among powerful states to keep himself alive. The most realistic way to save a country was to depend on the power of the people, not of foreign countries and only this way could Ottoman Turkey change its fate of being “the sick man of the Near East”.

Three months after the publication of this article, another one under the same title was published from a relatively more Asian perspective in the journal *St. John's*

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 17-18.

*Echo* which was the bimonthly journal of St. John's College, a British university in Shanghai.<sup>222</sup> The author stated that he wrote an article on Turkey because he was interested in the affairs of countries like Turkey which was similar to China.

The author starts his discussion by reminding the British scholar Charles Darwin whose theory of the survival of the fittest was commonly adapted to the power inequalities among various states. In accordance with this rule, many countries had renovated their political system while some of them were still in the process of reform like Turkey. As its system became old and incompetent with the global world order, its internal problems became more prevalent so as to invite the intervention of foreign powers to its domestic affairs. For instance, "in 1875 Germany wanted Turkey to reform its political system. After a short while, Turkey was in war with Russia by which she was defeated. At that time, Britain was supporting Turkey against Russia and at the end of the war the Berlin Treaty was negotiated by seven countries and signed. Yet, the country kept on weakening."<sup>223</sup>

For the author, it was the constitutional demand of the Young Turks which made it possible for Turkey to survive and see the twentieth century. When the Sultan accepted to declare the constitution, Turkey was awakening but there was a rule of international relations that if a country got strong, its neighbors automatically became weak which meant as Turkey became stronger, the imperial countries that benefited from it, could not use the country anymore for their own interests. Hence, there would be people and countries which did not want the constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire, the first of which was Austria. Because she could not possess Bosnia and Herzegovina even though she was given these territories in the Berlin Treaty, to get these territories, Austria would not wish Turkey to be a strong country

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<sup>222</sup> Ma Shaoliang, "Lun Tuerqi lixian [On the Turkish Constitution]," *Yuehan sheng* (November 1908), pp. 4-6.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

so that she would even support the independence struggle of Bulgaria. According to the author, the second country which was a threat for Ottoman Turkey was Russia because of her interests on the Black Sea. Russia had also started to strengthen itself by opening the parliament and now it wanted to renegotiate the Berlin Treaty to get Tartary. Only the British seemed to support Turkish constitution but it was easy to see her interests in the Ottoman Turkey. Her main concern was her fear of Russian expansion towards India so he did not want any renegotiation. At the moment, Turkey tried to solve her problems through the British support but it was impossible to foresee what will be required next in the global game of international politics. Nevertheless, if Turkey could use her constitution, she could easily solve her problems by making required changes quickly. If she went on decaying, the outcome of the constitution was unpredictable.<sup>224</sup>

At first sight, the article was picturing the international relations of the century from the Ottoman perspective. The author was critical about the constitutional rule as its success to save the country was not guaranteed under every condition. It could be successful if it was used properly, by giving priority to the people's will to determine the faith of the country, not to the diplomatic tricks of global power games because they were not stable to base. Also in the process of strengthening, a country must have been careful as its neighbors or the countries which had interests in that country would resist any change for strengthening.

Among these, an interesting and exceptional article from the same year revealed more explicitly the reason why the Chinese would have been interested in the Ottoman experience.<sup>225</sup> After summarizing the events following the Berlin Treaty and picturing the in-between situation of Turkey, the author stated his surprise that a

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>225</sup> “Lun Tuerqi shixing lixianshi [On the Realization of the Turkish Constitution],” *Luyulunbao* 7 (1908), pp. 7-9.

constitution could so quickly solve all the religious and diplomatic contradictions of the country and then explained why he found the Ottoman case worthy of attention from a pure Chinese perspective:

When the people of Turkey experience the happiness, the people of my country have become worried. What is the reason of this fear? Because the Western countries have frequently evaluated my country and Turkey as the sick man of East Asia, they used every opportunity to invade our land. Because of its strategic location between Asia and Europe and moreover close to the Russian southern passage, and of the unsolvable Macedonian problem, the Ottoman Turkey could not get any power to benefit from our sources. The problems of Turkey have already been settled; Western countries do not have any scheme, so these countries will turn their face to us and definitely direct their forces to the Far East. Because of this, today there are many countries coming to occupy our land, how can the people of my country feel any happiness? Moreover, there are rumors that some people from Turkey are also coming alongside with these powerful countries to occupy, but Turkey still have many unsolved problems so that she does not have enough power to go and invade other countries. Today, the situation in Turkey is getting stabilized mostly thanks to the foreign intervention, thus it is likely that Turkey comes to our country soon to benefit from us. One more country which is ruled by constitution means one more enemy for us, isn't it something not to fear?

Today strengthening the country through reform is the common desire of all. However, if only the joint forces of the state and people demand independence can we guarantee the security of the country. This way, the monarch can also reach the sacred glory, and the masses can have equal and shared happiness. If a country's strength falls short of safeguarding its independence to the extent that it falls into the foreign hands, then the country can quickly declare constitution and the freedom of its people gradually lessens and eventually disappears, how can we call it an accomplished country? Japan wants to control Korea and Koreans let it to do so; but when the British want to control Turkey, Turkish people resist immediately. This shows that the weakness and strength of the eastern and western countries are not the same. We should question ourselves carefully. The imperial government does not respond to the people's demands, and in the final analysis it definitely should not adopt new politics instead of the old one. In case that we chose to do so, we can expect that what powerful European states do in Turkey now, they will do the same to us in the future. Our government does not want any change but this is also not possible. Yet, if we try to reform our country under the coercion of the great powers, what will happen to the sacred position of the emperor and to the well-being of the people? As I consider them one by one, my heart becomes full of fear.

Today, if compare Turkey and China, in Turkey yellow race and white race coexist together like Manchu and Han people coexist in our country. However, because of the religious factor, they cannot reach a harmonious

structure in Turkey. The difference between the two ethnic groups in our society is not so big. Still, because Turkey passed to the constitutional rule, they have already solved this conflict and entered into the high ranks of the world states. We, on the other hand, still have unfounded suspicions about each other so still need a long time to see the days we come together peacefully. Alas! We just give ourselves misery, let the sorrow pass by and show the effort to feel the happiness for others.<sup>226</sup>

This might be one of the most controversial interpretations at the time. Although the author saw Turkey politically in the same situation as China before the imperial West, he thought that after the establishment of the constitutional rule, all of Turkey's internal problems would be solved and the country would become so powerful that just like the great powers, she would also try to find colonial areas for herself and China would be one of the target areas. This overstated perspective must have been based on the common perception of the Turkish constitution in the Chinese public press which was largely influenced by the European and Japanese publications as we cited above. In terms of ethnic conflict, the author's perspective was also significant because he, in no sense, seems to agitate against the Manchu people; rather he claimed that ethnic segregation was one of the main obstacles to the progress of China, that is, nationalist sentiments seemed to be condemned by the author.

Like this article, another one by Zhang Zhongduan (1877-1911) was published on revolutionary *Henan* magazine in the same year this time to praise the success of the Young Turks in forcing the monarch to declare constitutional rule which was critical to save the country from loss.<sup>227</sup> Before the 1911 Revolution, many students from Henan province went to Japan to study, but during their stay there, they also established the Henan Branch of Revolutionary Alliance in Tokyo and participated in the revolutionary organization. First, they started to publish the

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-9.

<sup>227</sup> Hong Fei, "Tuerqi lixian shuo [On the Turkish Constitution]," 19-27. Taken from Wang, *Qinhai geming qian shinian jianshi lunxianji* [Selected Publications From the Ten Years Before the Qinhai Revolution], pp. 363-368.

journal *Yubao*. However, this journal could not clarify its revolutionary line because of its heterogeneous editorial staff. Therefore, the students started to publish *Henan* on a more manifest revolutionary line. First publication was done in December 1907 under the editorship of Liu Jixue (1880-1960) and management of Zhang Zhongdong. Its main themes were the revolution, opposition to the monarchical rule, saving the country and saving the people, cultural exchange between the Eastern and Western societies. Many members of the organization went back to Henan province after 1909 to participate in the Revolution.<sup>228</sup>

At the beginning of the article, the author categorized Turkey and China together as Asian countries that were still suspended between survival and loss; although Turkey, in comparison to China, seemed one step ahead as its revolutionary forces could force the Sultan to abdicate by creating a popular alliance from various groups of society. Indeed, his intension for writing this article was to discuss the importance of the constitutional rule and he found Turkey as the most proper case. In Asia, Japan's success could only be exposed in reference to its constitutional reform while Persia could not utilize its constitution to rescue itself from foreign intervention because of its internal problems. Thus, the only example to offer to the Chinese readers was Turkey.

Actually, Turkey had declared constitutional rule in 1876 but for Zhang, it was not a real attempt to implement constitutional rule; rather it was the puppet instrument of the monarch to cheat its people and foreign countries as even the best monarch in the world would not have given up his blessed power for the well-being of the people. Yet, this time it seemed that the constitutional rule would be implemented because there were the indicators: the confiscation of the Sultan's

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<sup>228</sup> [http://www.shwanfangdata.com/WFknowledgeServer\\_Mirror/D/Thesis\\_Y1122156.aspx](http://www.shwanfangdata.com/WFknowledgeServer_Mirror/D/Thesis_Y1122156.aspx).

private property and its transfer to the army; the reform in the imperial palace structure; the Islamic approval of the constitution; and the construction of the parliament building by the Sultan's property in order to gather in every November. Other indicators were the release of the Young Turks who were arrested and the abolishment of the intelligence system.

To Zhang, discussing the current establishment of the constitution as an outcome of the Sultan's consent would be misleading because it became only possible as a result of the persistent efforts of the Young Turks alongside the support they got from the army, laborers and women. As in the case of every other country, whether eastern or western, unity of the people to struggle for a political change was the only way to establish constitutional rule. Turkish people could come together under the leadership of the Young Turks so that they could oblige the Sultan to declare the constitution. Chinese people on the other hand, were not as capable as their Turkish contemporaries in terms of their mobility, belief in their cause, uprightness of the military men and the activism of women and laborers. Still, the shortcomings of the Chinese people were not perpetual and one could hope that one day they would change in the same direction as the Turkish did. There were still some people in China who wrote extensively in the magazines demanding the reform from the government. However, for Zhang, they were only interested in their own benefits not in the real interests of the people or the country. Thus, expecting a change from above was useless without creating a popular pressure on the imperial rule. In this sense, Turkey was the most proper case as it exemplified the revolution of the public masses.

One year after the declaration of the constitutional rule in Turkey, the Turkish Revolution was still the focus of Chinese revolutionary journals because of its

instructive character. On the edge of their republican revolution, Chinese activists were examining the various aspects of the Turkish case to better organize their own revolution. One example of them which focus on the revolutionary action was written by Hu Hanmin (1879-1936) in 1910.<sup>229</sup> In his article Hu Hanmin made a comparative study of the Russian and Ottoman revolutions both of which had the aim of changing the relation between the state and people. Both revolutions could be successful thanks to the support of a military force: the Macedonian army in the Ottoman case and the army gathered from those captured in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 in the Russian case. If compared, the Ottoman revolution was easier because it had the explicit support of the army while in Russia the revolutionaries had to suffer in prisons until their victory. The Young Turks must have punished the Sultan, “the enemy of the people”, in their first attempt which unduly cost them pursuing a second struggle. There were two alternatives for the revolution: assassins and armies. Assassins caused great excitement by their quick success but they could only kill few people whose fellows would pursue their revenge immediately. Armies, on the other hand, by spreading fear created foundational changes. In order for revolutionaries to have contact with the army, there were also two methods. First, the revolutionaries could organize their own army but it was the difficult way. The second was much more effective because in this way, the revolutionaries agitated the already educated and organized army members who had been loyal to their government. By gaining their support, the revolutionaries did not have to spend any money for armaments. The army maintained its survival based on the taxes coming from the people. Thus, their first and most important task was to protect the people from foreign threats and the state’s pressure. Also, in China it was easier to succeed in convincing the Han

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<sup>229</sup> Hu Hanmin, “Jiu Tuerqi geming gaosu woguo junren (On What the Turkish Revolution Can Tell Our Military),” *Minbao* 25 (January 1910), pp. 1-25.

(Green) Banners since there was conflict between the Han soldiers and Manchu Banners and Manchu rulers from which it was understood that the Han soldiers must have chosen to defend the rights of their co-ethnics for Hu Hanmin.

Before passing to another article from the same journal, it will be illuminating to introduce the journal *Minbao* (People's Journal). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese revolutionaries desired to organize a centralized revolutionary movement and their longing was realized when Sun-Yatsen's went to Tokyo from Europe in 1905. In the same year, he led the establishment of *Tongmeng hui* (the Revolutionary Alliance) in Japan with the purpose of uniting the small revolutionary groups for a centralized struggle. The organization accepted the journal *Ershi shiji zhizhina* (Twentieth-Century China) as their official publication but when the Japanese government became uncomfortable because of an article in the journal, the revolutionaries published the first issue of the journal *Minbao* on November 26, 1905 under the editorship of Hu Hanmin. Sun Yat-sen was also dealing with the journal by suggesting the topics to be published, offering his ideas and sometimes writing articles under pseudonyms. He mentioned his three principles for the first time in this journal. From its seventh issue, Zhang Taiyan became its editor but under his editorship the journal, in addition to his anti-Manchu emphasis, became mostly engaged in religious affairs, particularly Buddhism, for Zhang believed that people could unite only with the help of a sentimental, religious element. The writers of the journal suffered from the oppression of the Qing and Japanese governments as they also had internal ideological fragmentations.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Chen Yushen, *Wanqing baoyeshi* [The History of Journalism in the Late Qing Period] (Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, 2003), pp. 216-224.

One of the prominent figures of the journal, an article on the Turkish constitution with an ethnic emphasis was published under the name Min Yi.<sup>231</sup> The article indicated a sharp passage from discovering similarities between Turkey and China against the imperial assaults of the great Western powers to perceiving the Ottoman Empire as an oppressive state that obstructed but could not block national salvation for various ethnic groups under its rule. The first and less significant argument of the article was that a revolutionary movement must have definite goals as an indulgent attitude would result in failure and require repetitive actions for the realization of revolutionary goals. The Young Turk movement was the best example as the Young Turks once fell into the trap of the Sultan and expected to use his influence to realize their own ends. As expected, their intentions were in vain because it was easy for the Sultan to use their indecisive stand. However, in their second attempt, they were more careful and punished the Sultan severely so that they could accomplish their goal.

Although it tried to draw lessons from the Turkish example, the article clearly stated that the situation in Turkey and China were completely different for the reason that ethnic conflicts in Turkey were solved while in China the Han-Manchu conflict seemed to remain unsolved for a length of time. The declaration of the constitution in Turkey became possible only with the resolution of the ethnic conflict (through homogenization of the society to the advantage of Turks [*Tujue*], while in China the ethnic conflict obstructed constitutionalism. The author remarkably stated that:

Those who hold monarchial power are Manchus, and those who seek a constitution are Han [Chinese], not Manchus. This differs greatly from the revolutionary obtainment of a constitution in Turkey, because the main revolutionary motivation in Turkey is from Turks, supported by Macedonians, whose intension is merely to be a minority people supporting a majority people in order to secure their own survival. How could the [majority] Han

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<sup>231</sup> Min Yi, "Tuerqi geming (The Turkish Revolution)," *Minbao* 25 (January 1910), pp. 1-7.

even dream of supporting the [minority] Manchus so as to ensure their own survival?!

If one calculates the position of the Han [in China], it is similar to the Greeks' plotting for independence [from the Ottoman Empire]... The Greeks were a civilized people who were compelled into submission to Turkey, just as the Han were compelled into submission to Manchus. During the period when Greeks were subjected to the oppressive rule of Turkey, they knew to plot for independence and not to rest their hopes on a Turkish constitution. It is only because the [Greek] people had such intensions that they finally achieved independence. This is really exactly the same as the intensions of contemporary China's Revolutionary Party...

[In Turkey] it was not just the Greeks, however. Bulgarians, Slovenians, Romanians, Montenegrins: all were peoples [minzu] subject to Turkey's rule and all reacted in exactly the same way as the Greeks...

How can the Han ignore this and follow the lead of the Macedonians?!<sup>232</sup>

There cannot be a more explicit example that shows the transition to nationalist thinking in China. Only a few years ago, Turkey had been an isomorphic case owing to its victimization before the imperial West but now China was imagined closer to the nations like Greece which in addition to a glorious and civilized past, bravely fought for its independence from an ethnically foreign dynasty.

A year later, an article written by Fei Feigao also described the events in Turkey to draw lessons for Chinese revolutionaries, but this time the focus comes to the propaganda process from the armed revolutionary process.<sup>233</sup> At the beginning of his article, the author clearly stated that although the Italian revolutionaries had been the main example for the Chinese in the last ten years, now the Young Turks also seemed instructive. He informed the reader that he learnt about the organization of the Young Turk Party from the certain British writer Nike from whose account it was

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<sup>232</sup> Translation quoted from Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 187.

<sup>233</sup> Feigao Fei, "Shaonian Tuerqizhi zuzhi [The Organization of the Young Turks]," *Nanfeng bao* (July 1911), pp. 38-42. *Nanfeng bao* was the official newspaper of the Guangxi branch of the Revolutionary Alliance after *Nanbao* (Southern Journal). It was first published in Guilin, February 1911 and lasted for 38 volumes. The first issue of the journal's cover had a picture in which a bird under a green bamboo sang and on a leave four Chinese characters were written, meaning "nationalism". The journal also introduced its readers the revolutionary struggle of Sun Yat-sen in USA. Chen Yushen, *Wanqing baoyeshi* [The History of Journalism in the Late Qing Period], p. 275.

easily seen that what the Young Turks did was appreciable under the oppression of the Ottoman Sultan. The members of the Young Turk Party had very well organized intelligence to discover the most suitable individuals for their cause. They visited him in his house and then talked to him about the troubles of the country caused by the uncompetitive state structure and the dictatorial rule of the Sultan. If the host seemed in agreement with the Young Turk (who was unknown of course to the host with his political identity), then he was taken to a far and hidden place. When his eyes were covered with a piece of paper, he was told to take the revolutionary oath in the name of Mohammed (or in another way according to the religious identity of the person) and if he was a real patriot he would promise to liberate the people from the oppression of the government and contribute to the well-being of the society. Then, he was allowed to open his eyes to see the other members of the party among whom a sentimental interaction occurred in most cases.<sup>234</sup>

Although the author does not explicitly states his purpose in writing this article, it is clear that he was offering a method to Chinese revolutionaries. Under the conditions of high pressure, following an underground way and finding the most proper activist seemed to be the key points for a well-organized revolutionary movement. Also, the date of the article is just two months before the Xinhai Revolution which began with the Wuchang Uprising on 10 October 1911 which means the revolution was on its way but still had some organizational issues to the extent that intellectuals were still searching for proper ways to realize the cause. Obviously, we cannot claim that in such a short period of time, the Young Turk model contributed to the line of Chinese revolutionaries.

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

## Women of the Nation

In the course of emergent Chinese revolutionary nationalism, the idea of “the new woman” like “the new citizen” of China constituted a crucial part in the clash between the tradition and modernity; hence, it was formulated as “a question of coping with change”.<sup>235</sup> Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese revolutionary nationalists wrote extensively on the new woman as part of their nationalist discourse within which they reconfigured the image and role of the Chinese woman. As it was relevant to the foundation of a new society, the main question they were trying to answer was “how must women behave in these changing times?”<sup>236</sup>

It is interesting to note that the condition of women in Asian countries was an essential part of the Orientalist discourse and it was accepted by many Chinese intellectuals without further questioning. In this scheme, the Western woman was perceived as a role model for the backward Chinese woman, while it also constituted a reference of difference through which Chinese women discovered their gendered identity. That is, through the exemplification of foreign others, a space of self-search was opened for the Chinese woman in order for her to imagine a new self in accordance with the modern values of the global world order which eventually turned into another moment of closure by the creation of “a new patriarchy”<sup>237</sup>.

The best example of such an approach might be found in the writings of Liang Qichao who wrote a biography of “the first woman doctor of China” in 1897.<sup>238</sup> Kang Aide (1873-1930) was a woman who had been adopted by a

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<sup>235</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 135.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>238</sup> Ying Hu, *Tales of Translation: Composing the New Woman in China, 1899-1918* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 3.

missionary to be educated in America. For Liang, Kang Aide represented an ideal Chinese woman full of practical knowledge which saved her from the ignorance of ordinary Chinese women. In his *General Discussions of Reform*, he focused on the education of women by distinguishing the real education from the traditional one. In this text, he condemned educated elite women of the past who were engaged in writing literary works of no practical use for at the time the most urgent necessity was the popular education of mother citizens for the building of the modern Chinese nation.<sup>239</sup> During the revolutionary period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many works were created to feed the Chinese woman with the experience of the foreign others among whom the Ottoman women also constituted a special case because of their appreciable adaptation to the times despite their backward religious background. From another angle, we have so far tried to figure out how the (male) Ottomans were utilized to imagine the Chinese self through a foreign other. In this last part of the paper, we will go through two examples that revealed the Chinese perception of Ottoman women in order to have a glimpse of how the Chinese (female) self was imagined through the engendered other.

The first article I would like to mention was published in the journal *Datongbao*<sup>240</sup> in 1909 by the British missionary William Arthur Cornaby (1861-1921)<sup>241</sup> under his Chinese name Gao Baozhen. *Datongbao* (Great Harmony Journal) was founded in June 1907 as a Tokyo based periodical. Unlike many of the Tokyo based journals of the time, it was published by the Manchus to contribute to the discussion of the “Manchu-Han question”. The journal argued that the main problem

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>240</sup> Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 114-116.

<sup>241</sup> William Arthur Cornaby was sent to Wuhan in 1885 as a missionary with the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society after his education at Richmond College. In 1905, he was appointed to take up literary work in Shanghai with the Christian Literature Society under the direction of Timothy Richard and it was during this time that he edited *Datongbao* which targeted at Chinese officials and scholars.

in China was the despotic rule which deprived the people of any sense of responsibility. The only solution was the establishment of a constitutional system in which a parliament was opened to maintain people's representation, the equality between the Han and Manchu people was secured and Manchu, Han, Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan people were united under the flag of one country. In his article, Cornaby summarized the historical change in the condition of Turkish women through an episode that had been conveyed by his German journalist friend.<sup>242</sup>

Once the German journalist went to Turkey to travel and came across a meeting of around three hundred women on a hillside area. These women attracted his attention because unlike the majority of the women in Ottoman Turkey, they looked like European women as they wore modern style clothes, chatted cheerfully, laughing loudly, and did not use the cloth to cover their face and hair. As some of them stood and some of them sat, the group leader started to explain that from now on, the country had entered into a period of enlightenment after the nights of darkness. She went on:

The Enlightenment treats males and females in the same way without any differentiation. When men demand power, how can the women remain silent? From now on, the country is on the way of development through the people of new ideas. In the past, we were expected to be useful inside our houses but now lots of poor people need our help, especially the help of women for old and young. If we can be successful at charity activities, then in the future we will also have power like men and become like the women in European countries. This way, we can develop our own morality not to allow other people suspect from us. Just don't let them chain us again like the criminals in prison, or make us their slaves and call us to bow our head not to reach the day of freedom.<sup>243</sup>

What the author tried to convey to his readers, at first sight, was that Turkey was once a country where women lived in the condition of slaves without any right or freedom. However, the constitutional revolution made it possible for the women of

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<sup>242</sup> Gao Baozhen, "Tuerqi funü zhi ziyou sixiang [Turkish Women's Idea of Freedom]," *Datongbao*, November 1909, pp. 9-10.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

such a traditional country to get the awareness that they were also an indispensable part of the social life and their participation in social life would justify their demand of right to power. Change was possible even in the most extreme cases but needed taking initiative. From a broader perspective, on the other hand, the text can be evaluated differently. First, the article was written by a European with high emphasis on the backwardness of the non-European countries, Turkey and China being the most relevant examples. By way of inviting them to be the creators of a modern nation, Chinese and Ottoman women were being integrated into a discourse which put the Eastern culture into an inferior position. Second, the women's demand to go out and participate in social life was stressed as the main indicator of change. However, for the time being, this participation was only at the level of charity without any political connotation. Indeed, as charity activities were commonly referred, the space they assigned for themselves was still an inner space which was conceived in opposition to the outer space of the nation. Moreover, in the nationalist discourse of the cultural domain, the inner space (home) was equalized with spirituality while the outer space (world) was denoted by materiality in non-Western discourses of modernity<sup>244</sup> so that the women were excluded from the material dirtiness of the modern world. Yet, because the article was written by a European, we cannot come across such an approach in this article.

The second article was published in *Funü shibao*<sup>245</sup> in 1911 by a person called Liu Shouzhen.<sup>246</sup> Like the aforementioned article, this article also talked about the harshness of the Ottoman tradition towards women, as on the streets of

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<sup>244</sup> Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, pp. 119-120.

<sup>245</sup> *Funü Shibao* [Women Times] was first published on November, 6, 1911 under the editorship of Bao Tianxiao, a well known (male) figure in the publishing world. It was one of the various women's magazines that proliferated due to the spreading revolutionary sentiments at the beginning of the twentieth century.

<sup>246</sup> Liu Shouzhen, "Lun tuerqi nuzi [On the Turkish Women]," *Funü shibao*, 1911, pp. 54-56.

Constantinople, it was very common to run into women in the shape of “a mummy”.<sup>247</sup>

The author mostly mentioned about the Ottoman traditions in detail such as polygamic marriage, girls’ prohibition of going out and seeing males except for their fathers and brothers, the arranged marriages at very early ages and so forth. He illustrated an ordinary day of an Ottoman woman who was the wife of a Moroccan bureaucrat. After that, he mentioned the life of American women who had a soulless life in their houses. In the end, he concluded that although they seemed free at first sight, indeed these women were also not different from slaves as their lives were just like the lives of those who were already dead. They were depressed like slaves both at home and in the workplace. Indeed, not only the Ottoman women but also many women in the world lived under these circumstances and if they did not do something to change this, the women would never be able to embrace the cultural level of the civilization.

Interestingly, contrary to its contemporaries, in this article we see no mention of the constitutional rule or the transformations that the Turkish women experienced after the 1908 revolution. Additionally, maybe for the first time, we see a comparison between the Ottoman and American women to emphasize similarities rather than the superiority of the latter over the former. This critique of Western women corresponds to the non-Western attitude we mentioned above. Western women were deprived of the tastes of spiritual life in the material life of modernity. Despite their relatively liberal appearance, they had also problems of oppression even if they were not the same as their Eastern contemporaries. The author’s emphasis on the suppression in the workplace is interesting because it most probably referred to the inhumane

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

working conditions of the industrial capitalism. This material life made women's lives tasteless, creating a different kind of stress. Then, in this frame, women were under the pressure of both tradition and capitalist modernity.

From the articles, it is seen that Chinese intellectuals knew much about Ottoman Turkey although their knowledge was wrong sometimes and inadequate most of the times. More reasonably, we can claim that they manipulated what they knew for their own revolutionary cause. It is also clear that they did not have direct contact to obtain information so they based their facts on what they read from the foreign press. The declaration of the Constitutional rule was followed and the participants of the revolutionary process, namely the people, within their fragments were examined and exemplified by comparison to other cases in the world. At an earlier stage of the revolutionary process, the Ottoman case was important because it was an example of a constitutional revolution but on the eve of the revolution, a nationalist discourse became manifest and the Ottoman Empire was exemplified as the country of national liberation stories.

## CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to cover a wide scope of events and ideas all at once although it is one of the first works in the field of Sino-Ottoman studies. Throughout the pages, I traced the hints of the interaction between the two oriental empires in a global context for the period between 1875 and 1911. By doing this, my main purpose was to explicate the production of national space in China at the level of discourse through sighting the Ottoman fragments: military men, revolutionaries, constitutionalists, women and so forth. My main argument was that through this sighting, Chinese intellectuals experienced the transition from imperial to national imagination as they generated the discourses of this national imagination. However, the production of the national space occurred at the same moment when the global world space and Asian continent as a regional space were also produced as the sites of deterritorialized politics. These global, regionalist and nationalist worldviews intersected at the special conjuncture of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century before fixed conceptualizations of race and nation-state dominated the world stage.

Locating Sino-Ottoman interactions from the late nineteenth century into their proper context was important to comprehend the Chinese perception of the Ottomans since these interactions maintained and shaped the Chinese knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. From the Ottoman archival materials and the secondary sources written on the basis of these documents, we saw that the Ottoman attempts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to establish diplomatic contacts with China were mostly motivated by its pan-Islamic pursuits although the commercial concerns cannot be denied because of the activities of Ottoman subjects in China. I am sure

that further research on the Ottoman subjects in China will be more helpful to comprehend the character of these interactions.

On the eve of the World War I, the interactions between the two empires were mostly characterized by the imperialist undertakings of Euro-America and Japan as the Qing and Ottoman governments lost control of events. This dependent and imperialism-involved character of the interactions left its legacy even on the late establishment of the relations between Turkey and China. In this sense, understanding the global context of these interactions constituted one of the main concerns of the thesis. I focused on the production of global world space particularly after the geographical discoveries of the sixteenth century which integrated the world into a unified whole. However, in its nineteenth century phase, this integrated world turned into the uneven space of contested claims of various imperial actors which caused transformations in the Chinese self-locating. The most manifest instance of this transformation in thinking was the reformist intellectual Kang Youwei who timely grasped the global transformations of the age and incorporated them into his own Confucian worldview. Kang's ideas were also worthy of attention because he was one of the rare modernizers of China who made deliberate observations on Turkey before and after his visit to Turkey in 1908. Confirming his reformist and anti-revolutionary tendencies, Kang praised Turkey for its success in the establishment of constitutional rule while in his later writings he criticized the Turkish example because of its revolutionary undertakings.

At the same critical moment, Chinese intellectuals with their contemporaries in other parts of the world began to imagine Asia as a continent on which global politics could be experienced within a network of solidarity and independence struggle. Keeping the idea in mind that the idea of Asia has never been perennial,

alongside with its discovery as a geographical totality, Asia was also discovered as a new geopolitical entity in which countries like China, India and Ottoman Turkey were conceived together within a shared sickness. Pan-Asianism as deterritorialized politics was dealt from the perspective of the Japanese, Ottoman and the Chinese. Japanese imperial undertakings in Asia and the Ottoman policy of Pan-Islam prevented the Chinese from conceiving Asia as the site of a shared struggle of these countries. However, this did not impede the production of Asia as a site of global politics in which the Ottomans occupied an ambiguous place.

The main arguments of the thesis were supported by the material used in the discussion of the production of nation. The journal articles from the early twentieth century illuminated how Chinese intellectuals passed from imperial or regional imagination to the national imagination parallel to their counterparts in Turkey or other countries. Contrary to the previous imperial thinking, national imagination required conceiving the nation in a bounded space and it was possible only through the global consensus of all the nations in the world. World communities were convinced for that fact throughout the painful wars of global scale. Chinese intellectuals convinced their own people by generating their own nationalist discourses.

The intellectuals of the time were not homogenous and they included reformists, revolutionaries, anti-Manchu, etc. These intellectuals with various ideological orientations incorporated their observations on Turkey into their own revolutionary, nationalist and gendered discourses. In constitutional articles, Turkey after 1908 was defined as a country which solved its problems by way of constitution; in revolutionary articles the methods of the Young Turks were exemplified for the Chinese revolutionaries; the transformation of Ottoman women were presented to

show that change was possible even in most oppressive countries. Contrary to these positive evaluations, the Ottoman state was illustrated as an oppressive power which dominated different nations under its rule and blocked their self-realization. This modern/nationalist/nation-state-centered perspective frequently went hand in hand with an inadequate, wrong or inconsistent understanding of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the Chinese perception of the Ottoman Empire was vague while it was fragmented for the Ottomans as individuals from various levels of society. This showed us that only such an ambiguous case like the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans could be utilized to generate most needed discourses of the time.

The thesis is also based on a theoretical argument which was presented in the introductory chapter. The opening question of the argument was whether it was possible to write a history of modern China without the nation, the West and imperialism. At the beginning I tried to describe the scholarly attempts which questioned existent narratives of Chinese (or Indian) history to offer alternatives to its Eurocentric dealings. Contrary to their arguments which try to transcend Eurocentricism, Arif Dirlik's argument that Eurocentricism cannot be erased out of the historical inquiry because it is integral to everywhere and everything proved itself most applicable throughout this thesis. As I looked at my research in its final form, I saw that however I tried to look at the issue from a global perspective, it was clear that the Western imperial and hegemonic intrusion to China, to other colonized countries as well, created a condition in which Eurocentric assumptions and thinking underwrote everything in these countries even the ones which seemed to be the most authentic. Moreover, any attempt which tried to avoid Eurocentricism as I tried to do through a global perspective, had the danger of cleaning history from its most explanatory categories of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. Based on Dirlik's

arguments, during my writing period I saw that what has to be asked is not the possibility of writing a modern history without the nation, West and imperialism, but rather how we can re-shape these categories into our research themes by questioning their very existence to create alternative spaces outside them. In this sense, a modern history without the nation, West and imperialism will not be a challenge to Eurocentric assumptions; on the contrary, it will be the corruption of historical inquiry to reaffirm Eurocentric conceptualizations of past, present and future.

## APPENDICES: GUIDE FOR RESEARCH IN CHINA

### APPENDIX A: An Historical Survey of Qing Archival Studies

Doing archival research requires certain awareness not only of documents but also their changing usages in time due to the involvement of various researchers. Every researcher reads and uses documents in a unique way though every usage leaves its footprints on subsequent interpretations. In this sense, it becomes critical to know the accumulation on which a new study constitutes itself.

Since the gradual opening of Qing archives first to scholars and then to the general public in the Republican period, an enormous number of scholarly work has been produced in different parts of the world. As in many other fields of humanities, U.S. and British scholars among others took the lead due to numerous reasons which have already been debated by global intellectual community.<sup>248</sup> Today only in the U.S., there are more than 2000 institutions doing or sponsoring research on China. Starting in the 1920s, with the support of prominent Chinese scholars they have conducted many archival researches in China which resulted in the production of precious knowledge on a series of issues ranging from Chinese political institutions to social life; from intellectual currents to local operations of every sort. Regarding their exemplary character for an infant field, namely the Sino-Ottoman studies, it seems indispensable to present a brief account of the early works and debates in English-speaking world.

From a general survey of hitherto produced articles, reviews and commentaries, we can summarize the debated topics as the operation of Qing

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<sup>248</sup> I am referring to the debate started with Edward Said's outstanding work of comparative literature, *Orientalism*. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 1-28.

memorial system; the role of Grand Council in imperial administration; the publication of historical documents and periodization. Though at many points they tangle in an explicit manner, I will describe these titles separately. My explanation will follow the works of scholars in the field and will also be a survey of archival China studies.

#### Appendix A. i: The Operation of the Qing Memorial System

The confidential memorial system of the Qing dynasty is of key value for a better understanding of central imperial operations simply because it kept most of the concealed political information of the empire. Being one of the key power-sustaining apparatus of the emperor, the memorial system refers to the mechanism of communication between the bureaucracy and the emperor, i.e. the records of commands, edicts, orders, petitions, reports, etc. These records were processed and preserved in a particular way to create a complex system of record keeping for different dynasties. The Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council were the highest imperial institutions in Qing period that processed these documents to make and carry out critical decisions. Grand Secretariat, an institution inherited from Ming dynasty was the highest administrative body, but in 1729 emperor Yong Cheng established the Grand Council because the Grand Secretariat with its large and cumbersome structure became inefficient to take important and quick decisions. Thus, Grand Council which was composed of less but more exclusive bureaucrats became the highest bureau with a more confidential operation.

In 1932, Cyrus H. Peake from Columbia University, by stating the opening of Qing archives after the Republican revolution, made an early call to use these

documents to understand the modern period of China from c. 1620 to 1911.<sup>249</sup> He recounted the information he got from the archival and academic institutions that the documents of the Grand Council were in better state than the documents of the Grand Secretariat which had been damaged during the turmoil years of China. Then, he gave an account of the current situation of archival cataloging and publishing projects. The time he wrote corresponded to the date documents on the Foreign Relations of Qing Dynasty were about to be printed as various collections in 1930s. More importantly, it corresponds to the period when Chinese historians were involved in source criticism under the influence of German historicism based on Rankean hermeneutics.<sup>250</sup>

Shortly after the call of Peake, towards the end of 1930s, we see the appearance of widely known preliminary co-written works of John King Fairbank and S. Y. Teng. Their first work confirmed the abundance of Chinese historical material; but at the same time criticized the lack of information on their creation.<sup>251</sup> Believing in the importance of record keeping processes for deciphering their meanings, they presented a detailed account of the transmission of documents, namely postal arrangements, which they believed was critical to evaluate the decision making processes particularly related to the foreign affairs in the mid-nineteenth century. Another important note was that these documents passed through the Grand Council, not the Grand Secretariat because it had already lost its previous status to the former; so that their study focused on the dealings of the Grand Council. The work elaborately displayed the transmission of documents from local

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<sup>249</sup> Cyrus H. Peake, "Documents Available for Research on the Modern History of China," *The American Historical Review* 38 (October 1932), pp. 61-70.

<sup>250</sup> Q. Edward Wang, "German Historicism and Scientific History in China, 1900-1940," in *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 141-161.

<sup>251</sup> John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Transmission of Ch'ing Documents," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 4 (May 1939), pp. 12-46.

administration to the center and the other way around under the light of archival documents, exemplifying a possible usage of Qing archival collections. Their second work, again aiming at equipping the archival researcher with a crucial technical knowledge, more directly focused on the types and uses of documents, but this time including a broader scope of both Grand Council and Grand Secretariat documents.<sup>252</sup> After summarizing their inner operation, they presented a catalog of types of documents in which the English translations of document names were provided in addition to their uses. In this work, a selected bibliography for available collections was also presented which was later to be extended by Fairbank in his recently out-of-print syllabus.<sup>253</sup>

In the 1960s, we see an increase in the number of archival studies by overseas scholars in parallel to the augmenting publications of archival documents particularly in Taiwan while academic studies in China came to a standstill due to the political atmosphere of the country. The most significant English works of this period were written by Silas Hsiu-Liang Wu and Jonathan Spence. In a journal article, Wu improved the account on Qing memorial system provided by aforementioned studies of Fairbank and Teng.<sup>254</sup> To comprehend the functioning and evolution of the memorial system in addition to document types and uses, this work can still be regarded as one of a landmark alongside with his eminent book *Communication and Imperial Control in China*.<sup>255</sup> From these sources, we learn that Manchu rulers constantly reformed their administrative structure by passing from the routine memorial system of the Ming dynasty to their palace memorial system to create a

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<sup>252</sup> John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Types and Uses of Ch'ing Documents," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 5 (January 1940), pp. 1-71.

<sup>253</sup> John K. Fairbank, *Ch'ing Documents: An Introductory Syllabus* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1965).

<sup>254</sup> Silas Hsiu-liang Wu, "The Memorial Systems of the Ch'ing Dynasty 1644-1911," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 27 (1967), pp. 7-75.

<sup>255</sup> Silas H. L. Wu, *Communication and Imperial Control in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System 1693-1735* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

more confidential and efficient decision making mechanism to respond to increasing (mostly military) outside contacts of the eighteenth century. As it is agreed by prominent scholars of the field, this system worked properly until the time the throne was left without the physical presence of the emperor by Dowager Cixi's *coup d'état* of 1861. However, the debate for the origins of the memorial system began around these works. Another eminent scholar, Pei Huang remarked that the nineteenth century palace memorial system was not a Manchu invention, but a modified link inside the imperial heritage inherited from the Ming dynasty.<sup>256</sup> However, this claim was not confirmed by Wu in his response to Huang's review with reference to Jonathan Spence and Huang's own statements before.<sup>257</sup> This debate still does not have a conclusion as every historian takes a personal attitude.

China scholars entered into the new decade with this discussion which can also be read as a sign of burgeoning Qing studies. The 1970s and 1980s mark the productive years of China studies in the English speaking world in parallel to eventual stabilization of relations with People's Republic of China. It is in this period that we see the publication of *The Secret Palace Memorials of the Guangxu Period* by Taiwan National Palace Museum in 1973, a major development for late Qing studies.<sup>258</sup> Soon after, a new journal, *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i*,<sup>259</sup> made its appearance with various articles to share academic experiences and news of Qing archives<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Pei Huang, review of *Communication and Imperial Control in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System 1693-1735* by Silas H. L. Wu, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 31 (1971), pp. 323-332.

<sup>257</sup> Silas Hsiu-liang Wu, "A Note on The Proper Use of Documents for Historical Studies: A Rejoinder," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 32 (1972), pp. 230-239.

<sup>258</sup> Yen-ping Hao, "The Importance of the Archival Palace Memorials of the Ch'ing Dynasty: The Secret Palace Memorials of Kuang-hsü Period, 1875-1908," *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* 3 (November 1974), pp. 71-94.

<sup>259</sup> *Qingshi wenti* (Late Imperial China) was founded in 1981 by the John Hopkins University to contribute to the Ming and Qing studies.

<sup>260</sup> Beatrice Bartlett, "An Archival Revival: The Qing Central Government Archives in Peking Today," *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* 4 (December 1981), pp. 81-110.

also to become the platform for coming debates which still influence the works produced in the field.

#### Appendix A. ii: The Grand Council

Obviously, the Grand Council is not an independent body of the Qing memorial system. Nevertheless, because of its special functioning within the system and its central role in imperial decision making procedures, it is worth special attention. This body has been known to us for many years, even from the accounts of Council secretaries themselves. After the well known book of Hsieh Pao-chao<sup>261</sup> and the aforementioned works of Fairbank and Teng, in 1952, Alfred Kuo-Liang Ho from Stanford University introduced its structure in a tidy manner and his article is still the basic reference for a brief introduction to the institution.<sup>262</sup> Like the case for the memorial system in general, controversies over the origins and functioning of the institution aroused among scholars both in and outside China.

Pei Huang relates these controversies, first, to the lack of direct reference to the institution in Qing documents; second, to concurrent entitlement of Council members with their previous appointments; and third, to the indiscriminate use of terms in documents related to the Grand Council.<sup>263</sup> Due to these reasons, some scholars define it as a Manchu invention utilized against the Manchu nobility during the Zunghar War (1717-1755); while Pei Huang himself evaluates it as a typical inner court mechanism which has been utilized by all Chinese dynasties for changing functions at specific times of need. Whatever the origins, it is obvious that the institution provided the emperor with an effective body of advice; a broad system of

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<sup>261</sup> Pao Chao Hsieh, *the Government of China 1644-1911* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1925).

<sup>262</sup> Alfred Kuo-liang Ho, "The Grand Council in the Ch'ing Dynasty," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 11 (February 1952), pp. 167-182.

<sup>263</sup> Pei Huang, "The Grand Council of the Ch'ing Dynasty," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 48 (1985), pp. 502-515.

control over provincial and central bureaucracy; and a flexible institution which could be nominated with various functions according to the requirement of a certain period.

#### Appendix A. iii: Publication of Documents and Periodization

China has always been appreciated for its systematic record keeping. Obviously not reliable in every case just because of its official character, this tradition still feeds the scholars of the field with an unlimited amount of historical material. However, during the 50s and 60s, the publication of this material, although mostly appreciated by all, is criticized for either ideological or technical reasons. Western scholars found the Marxist approach in the selection of to-be-published documents ideologically one-sided. Also because of the prefaces of these historical publications, they were accused of imposing their Marxist agenda onto the reader by simply illustrating a patterned picture of Chinese history from feudalism to Western imperial aggression and then to the Communist salvation.<sup>264</sup>

Putting these complaints aside, many years have elapsed after the opening and reform policy and as in every other sphere of life, academic bodies have also come into contact with non-Marxist approaches. Today it is possible to talk about various periodization approaches to Chinese history. Despite the fact that many Chinese historians still prefer to organize their works with feudal, capitalistic, colonial and imperial schemas, in library and archive catalogues the main periodization seems to be the ancient, modern and contemporary history which means the period before early nineteenth century refers to *gudaishi* (ancient history); the period from the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement (1840-1919) refers to

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<sup>264</sup> John K. Fairbank and Mary C. Wright, "Documentary Collections on Modern Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 17 (November 1957), pp. 55-60.

*jindaishi* (modern history); and the period after 1919 refers to *xiandaishi* (contemporary history). However, some scholars and institutions use *dangdaishi* (current history) to refer to the period after 1949. In this periodization the phrases *jiefang qian* (pre-Liberation) and *jianguo qian* (before the establishment of PRC) refer to the pre-1949 period. Besides these periodization models, individual studies, of course, resort to their own periodization according to the perspective and research aim of the author.

## **APPENDIX B: Archives and Libraries**

Obviously, the best place to do research on Qing China is the First Historical Archive which is located just next to the Imperial Palace in Beijing. Their collection is huge in scope covering the documents belonging to every institution of the Qing administration such as the Grand Council and the Grand Secretariat as well as the Imperial Household and the Imperial Lineage. One can apply this archive to get permission to use their collections for research on Qing administrative institutions, decisions concerning the foreign affairs until 1911, provincial affairs and other fields of social and economic life. However, recently the documents of foreign affairs are in the process of cataloging, and it is unknown when the collection will be open to researchers. Another thing is that Kuomintang government, after their defeat by the Communist Party, took an important portion of documents concerning foreign affairs to Taiwan, hence, their collection might be useful until the time the collection in the First Historical Archive is opened.<sup>265</sup> Archive administrations demand official introduction letters to do research in their collections.

The Second Historical Archive is the address to conduct research on the period after the Republican Revolution of 1911. The Nationalist government chose Nanjing as the capital; hence their documents are preserved in this historical city. Still, a small number of documents can also be found concerning the period covering Qing dynastic rule, mostly on domestic affairs. The Second Historical archive is also the place where the records of Chinese Customs (which was administered by the British) are kept. In this sense, the Archive might be useful for economic historians.

Shanghai is the most important port city after Canton and has its unique historical character. Opened to trade after the Nanjing Treaty, the city is widely

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<sup>265</sup> I did not have the chance to go to Taiwan, yet Professor Wang Licheng from Fudan University who is an expert of diplomatic history informed me that there is not a special collection for the documents in Taiwan related to Ottoman affairs.

accepted as the commercial center of mainland China, housing many foreigners during the course of its history. In this sense, its archive is abundant with documents both in Chinese and other western languages. The main research themes that can be extracted from its collection can be counted as missionary activities; commercial development and trade contacts with the outside world; revolutionary activities and organizations against dynastic Qing rule; foreign residents of the city; activities of international organizations such as Red Cross Society; Japanese occupation and puppet government period; the liberation, Communist Party rule and Cultural Revolution. More than official documents, the city archive is a good source of unofficial materials such as various anti-dynastic periodicals, local newspapers in various languages, the records of the foreign residence areas and prominent books which are identified with the city.

As for the libraries, the main library of the Qing researcher will be the National Library in Beijing. The library has recently been supplemented with a new building which is very modern and spacious for intense study. Yet many of the historical materials are still in the old building which is architecturally a complicated structure. And worst of all, some of the materials were in the process of moving during my research period so I could not benefit from the old newspaper collection of the library.

The second biggest library in China is the Shanghai Library which still operates in its old building, and this library is also abundant with historical material such as ancient books and newspapers. This library is extremely important for the newspaper collections of from the late eighteenth century on since many of them were published in Shanghai, yet rare books and periodicals in foreign languages are kept in a separate building, not in the main library. During my research period, the

library was uploading many of the historical material to its online system, which means in a short period of time, the materials will be available more easily.

The third biggest library of China is in Nanjing which was the capital of the Nationalist Government. The Nanjing Library has also moved into its new building but it has already settled by now. Though at some points, some confusion arise because of wrong numbering in the online catalog system, the library is very convenient to use with its huge collection especially for the after-1911 period.

In addition to these main libraries, Peking University Library is also known for its unique collection as being the biggest university library of Asia. The collection held by the library amounts to 4,610,000 items in addition to many modern documents like audio-visual material, CD-ROMs, and databases in many disciplines. Many of the universities in different parts of China also have user-friendly libraries. Most of them have a separate library in their history departments and they contain valuable sources.

## **APPENDIX C: Reference Materials**

In this part of the guide, I will refer to some reference materials ranging from journal articles to dictionaries and indices which are indispensable for the archivist. In terms of dictionaries, definitely every user will make a personal choice, but it is important to remind that whatever the dictionary, for the historical work, it must contain traditional and simplified Chinese characters together.

### **Appendix C. i: Reference Books and Guides in English**

The most comprehensive and up-to-date guide book of the field I have ever encountered is Endymion Wilkinson's *Chinese History: a Manual* which is a reference not only for Qing history but for the entire history of China. The 1998 edition that I used contains a wide range of contents from general knowledge on Chinese history, chronology, geography, people, language etc. to an annotated bibliography of primary and secondary sources for all dynasties and periods of Chinese history in addition to important dictionaries and encyclopedias. The organization of the book makes it convenient to follow the directions thanks to the cross references between different chapters which are classified according to different approaches such as sources on the basis of dynastic periodization and sources on the basis of types and historical genres. The author also uses traditional Chinese characters for sources as in the name of the original source alongside with pinyin and English translations; so that one can easily find the sources necessary for the topic under study. In addition to the detailed presentation of sources in China, author's expertise of sources in Japan, Taiwan, USA and other countries equips the researcher with foreknowledge on where to trace the sources. Even better news is that the book has a new edition in 2000 which is much more comprehensive than the

previous one.<sup>266</sup> All in all, *Chinese History: a Manual* is a must for every researcher on Chinese history with its detailed account of research tools, research locations, the history, preservation, usage and publication of primary and secondary sources, and key themes in the study of Chinese history. Another reference book of the same sort is Zurndorfer's *China Bibliography* which is also a very valuable guide for research on China.<sup>267</sup> Especially its first chapter on China studies outside China offers a precious introduction to the newcomers of the field. In the introduction, the author says that she avoids repetitions to Wilkinson's book which means many of the sources in Wilkinson cannot be found in Zurndorfer, in this sense this book can be used as a supplement to Wilkinson. Smaller in scope, Zurndorfer's book is valuable for its in-depth introductions to Chinese, English and Japanese historical sources such as bibliographies, references, biographies, dictionaries, collections, etc. The most useful parts are extensive lists of periodicals and calendar conversion explanations. These two are not the only English guides as there is also another guide written by Alvin Cohen.<sup>268</sup> Aiming at helping mostly students (both foreign and Chinese), he prepared the guide as a textbook which also includes certain exercises. Scary in its appearance, this guide can only be used as a guide-at-home or guide-in-library, yet it is not less comprehensive than the Wilkinson's.

Another guide book for archival research in China is *Directory of Chinese National Archives* which is published by National Archive Press. It gives an outlook of local and central archives in China with the general information on the documents

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<sup>266</sup> Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A Manual* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1998). After the first publication of this book, James H. Cole wrote a supplement to it (*Updating Wilkinson: An Annotated Bibliography of Reference Works on Imperial China Published Since 1973*), but the new edition of Wilkinson has already replaced that supplement. Cole's other bibliographic book (*Twentieth Century China*) covers the period after 1911.

<sup>267</sup> Harriet Thelma Zurndorfer, *China Bibliography: a Research Guide to Reference Works about China, Past and Present* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

<sup>268</sup> Alvin P. Cohen, *Introduction to Research in Chinese Source Materials* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000).

that can be found in their collections. Though not up-to-date, the contact information of archives is also of some value. However, a better and up-to-date work on Chinese archives was published by Ye Wa and J. W. Esherick in 1996.<sup>269</sup> The book neatly and briefly offers the most required knowledge on the Chinese national archives with a well-prepared introduction to the history of Chinese archives from the late Qing period to the present.

A reference book concerning the individuals for the Qing history is Arthur W. Hummel's two volume work *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* which is the first alphabetical list of around 800 Qing eminent figures mostly bureaucrats and intellectuals.<sup>270</sup> The names are given in traditional Chinese and romanized in the Wade-Giles system, and at the end of each entry a reference is offered for further reading. The book is prepared by a commission of fifty scholars; successfully illuminates the connections between individuals and their activities, but a shortcoming is that only nine women are mentioned among so many entries. Thus, researchers who are interested in female figures are encouraged to use *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women: The Qing Period, 1644-1911* as a complement.<sup>271</sup>

#### Appendix C. ii: Journal Articles and Manuscripts in English

One of the main periodicals in the field is *Late Imperial China* which started its publication in 1965. Also known with its Chinese name *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* (Qingshi wenti), the journal has become the first ground to develop archival research in China through the sharing of individual and institutional experiences. A careful

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<sup>269</sup> Wa Ye and Joseph W. Esherick, *Chinese Archives: an Introductory Guide* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California: Center for Chinese Studies, 1996).

<sup>270</sup> Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943).

<sup>271</sup> Lily Xiao Hong Lee and A. D. Stefanowska, *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women: The Qing Period, 1644-1911* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).

examination of its past issues which are currently available online is indispensable for the researcher simply because it contains today's well known China experts' first experiences in Chinese archives which have great value for the novice researcher. Two introductory articles in this journal that can be read together might be Cheng Pei-kai's "A Visit to the Ming-Ch'ing Archive in Peking," (June 1979) and Beatrice Bartlett's "An Archival Revival: The Qing Central Government Archives in Peking," (December 1981). The latter is helpful insofar as it offers a comprehensive look at the cataloging system of the First Historical Archive supplied by Chinese and English titles of document collections. From these articles we have a glimpse of the institutional operation of the First Historical Archive.

#### Appendix C. iii: Reference Books in Chinese

English materials will definitely be helpful for the beginning. Yet for further research the main materials to use are Chinese bibliographies and indices. Here I will recount some of them which I believe are critical for an efficient research.

One of the biggest issues to do research in China is the language. Until it reached its current usage, Chinese language had passed through some critical changes. At the very beginning the Chinese works were created in the style that we call classical Chinese today. It is the style main Chinese classics such as the books of Confucius, Mencius, etc. were written. Classical Chinese, albeit has considerable similarities to modern Chinese, has its own grammatical rules; does not use punctuation; and some key words that we use today in everyday life might have different meanings and usages. The researcher who is interested in the ancient period has to learn it. For the researcher who is interested in the modern period, the main challenge will be the traditional characters and the influence of classical Chinese

again. Among others, a relatively new two-volume book which is also used by many Chinese schools as the textbook for classical Chinese is *Gudai Hanyu: xiudingben* (Classical Chinese: Revised Edition). The book is useful because it uses traditional characters, so that researchers can familiarize themselves with the traditional characters.<sup>272</sup> By the same token, the classical Chinese books published in Taiwan and Hong Kong can also be recommended since they are still using traditional characters. A dictionary of classical Chinese and a small dictionary to convert traditional characters into simplified form (and vice versa) will also complement the linguistic task to deal with the historical material.<sup>273</sup>

For following the history of China in a chronological order for the late Qing period, there are plenty of sources again, such as historical encyclopedias and multi-volume books produced from dynastic histories. Among them, I can suggest *Zhongguo ershi shiji jishi benmo* which is a thematic and chronological history of twentieth century China, for the period of 100 years from 1900 to 2000.<sup>274</sup> Each volume starts with historical pictures, introduces key events of the period such as uprisings, treaties and wars, etc. It also offers background information on main publications of the time and it is very inspirational with its organization for prospective research themes.

For the ones who are supposed to work with publications, the main bibliography will be *Zhongguo jindai qikanpian mupiao quanlu*. Although it does not include every volume of each periodical, it is still an excellent source because it offers the entire content of periodicals from the earliest Chinese periodical to 1919. It uses traditional characters as they were in their original, uses the classification of the

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<sup>272</sup> Xiliang Guo et al., *Gudai Hanyu: Xiudingben* (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2008).

<sup>273</sup> There are plenty of dictionaries, but for convenience I can suggest Lansheng Jiang and Zunwu Liu, *Jianhuazi fantizi duizhao zidian* (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007).

<sup>274</sup> Zhou Hong and Zhu Hanguo, *Zhongguo ershi shiji jishi benmo*, Shandong renmin chubanshi.

original periodical (for the themes) and in footnotes it offers a little bit of information about the publication. The dates are definite and authors are given with their names on the periodical.

If the researcher is involved in the periodicals of the late Qing and Republican period, a bilingual reference book *Twentieth Century Chinese Authors and Their Pen Names* is indispensable to find out which article belonged to whom.<sup>275</sup> The book is very convenient as it is possible to make search from Real Name (capitalized) to the pen name and vice versa. Another advantage is that it uses pinyin romanization and simplified characters, gives the life span of the authors and offers a comparative conversion table for romanization systems of pinyin and Wade-Giles.

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<sup>275</sup> Zhu Baoliang, *Twentieth Century Chinese Authors and Their Pen Names* (Revised Edition), Harvard-Yenching Library Bibliographical Series IX, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2002.

## **APPENDIX D: Documents: Types and Uses**

As it is stated in many parts of this paper, the number of Chinese historical sources is incomparable to many other countries. Though there are some problems of availability of documents for earlier dynasties, for the Qing dynasty we are face to face with an incredible amount so far as it amounts to approximately fifteen million documents. In this part of the paper, I will try to summarize these documents –both published and unpublished- within the format of an annotated bibliography.

### Appendix D. i: Dynastic Histories

Chinese archival administration has long been working to make their documents available through the publication of original sources. However, in this ocean of documents confusions are inevitable about document types and their origins. For this reason, there is a need to pay attention to document types especially in terms of differentiating primary sources from the secondary ones. Definitely, we cannot identify a broad category such as Chinese primary sources since a primary source will change according to the topic of an individual study. What is meant here is that apart from our research purpose, among the published documents, we should differentiate the original documents created by official authorities from the history writings which are based on these official records.

First of all, any researcher will most likely benefit a lot from the published official histories before going into the archives. History writing has long been an officially commissioned profession in China which dates back to the times even before the Han dynasty. Yet, its formalization and standardization can be dated as Sima Qian's celebrated book *Shiji* (109-91 BC). Before this work, an official history is equal to annals that are the chronological account of events that occurred during the

reigns of various emperors. Sima Qian added monographs and memoirs to this genre which resulted in the creation of another style called *jizhuanti* (annals-biography). In this new style, monographs cover the historical evolution of certain institutions while memoirs refer to biographies of prominent individuals. This style which is known as standard history was the unique official history writing until the Song dynasty, and after the twelfth century, it became varied. In this period, we see the emergence of topically arranged history writing, but what is done by this style is only a rearrangement of the standard history in terms of key topics, which means this style does contribute to the practice not with fresh information but with a novel organizing approach. During the Tang Dynasty, the Bureau of Historiography was established and history writing became a more standardized endeavor. The dynasties then commissioned this office to write a comprehensive history of previous dynasties and the official historians accomplished this task by creating collections from previous official histories. The result is the eminent work *The 24 Histories* (until the end of Qing dynasty) which includes major historical records for each dynasty as well as some other sub-categories: for the decisions and actions of the emperor we have court diaries; for the confidential records of ministries we have the records of current government; and for chronological information we have daily calendars. Based on these three sources, veritable records were created for each emperor after his death or after he was overthrown as to recount the events took place during his reign.

From this brief introduction we can conclude that a standard history is a record of events which covers previous dynasties completed with the current dynasty and most of the time it is officially commissioned. In rare occasions, a private undertaking can also be turned into an official history.<sup>276</sup> Whatever they are, we can

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<sup>276</sup> An extensive explanation is not offered here since the topic is beyond the scope of the paper; yet, the Chinese historical genre is a complex issue which requires more clarity. For further information, in

easily claim that they are written by Confucian literati mostly to legitimize the rule of the current dynasty or to delegitimize the previous one. Besides this settled agenda, standard histories, though based on official documents, are written after a dynasty is overthrown, which means the temporal distance especially from the elementary stages of a dynasty makes their accuracy questionable. Nonetheless, this in no sense changes the fact that they are still our main sources to follow the events in a chronological order particularly in the lack of other sources for pre-Qing period. Fortunately, for the Qing period we have plenty of extant documents such as court diaries, local official records, local gazetteers, foreign documents etc. so that they can reliably be used within a cross-check method of historical inquiry. See Table 1 for history writing styles and see Table 2 for a supplementary glossary.

For all Chinese dynasties we have 26 standard histories in total which were created on the basis of previous histories in a cumulative fashion. The last standard history was written in 1914-1927 by Zhao Erxun (1844-1927).<sup>277</sup> This work is special because it is the only standard history which contains a separate monograph on foreign affairs.

#### Appendix D. ii: Archive Documents

Like the official histories, archival documents have also been published since 1911 which means some of them are available both in and outside the archive. However, in publication selections, the documents on Sino-Western relations have priority as they are thought to be more influential and explanatory for the modernization period of China. Since it is impossible to recount all of the documents here, I will just

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addition to Wilkinson and Zurndorfer, see Donald D. Leslie, Colin Mackerras, and Wang Gungwu, *Essays on the Sources for Chinese History* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973) and On-cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, *Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).

<sup>277</sup> Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, 177 volumes, Zhonghua, 1983.

mention the documents on foreign relations which are a remarkable part of the Qing memorial system. This also implies that in order to understand the documents on foreign relations, it is better to know about document types in Qing memorial system within its operation system. As ample explanation is offered at the very beginning, here I will just selectively list the document types with annotations when required.

The documents on foreign affairs are in two separate places. The first bunch is in the First Historical Archive, Beijing. They are located inside 軍機處檔案, 全宗 3 (the Grand Council archives, collection 3) which is a sub-category of 輔弼皇帝中樞機構的檔案 (archives of the central organs of the imperial government). In this collection it is also possible to find documents on the affairs of non-Han people, suppression of revolutionary movements, imperialist aggression and others.

The second bunch is kept in Taiwan. Many of the Zongli yamen (1860-1901) and Waiwubu (1901-1911) documents are there and they are critical for studying international relations of modern China.

#### Appendix D. iii: Gazetteers, Newspapers and Periodicals

For periodicals we can define two categories: gazetteers of imperial institutions and other nonofficial publications. Gazetteers are the information link between the imperial center and locals and it is only through them that the government gathered information from locals and transmitted its decisions to them for their actualization. Hence, they can be found in local or central archives or as published material and they provide profound information on regional geography, climatic events such as floods, regional infrastructure, individuals and officials. A researcher who focuses on a locale must be familiar with this genre.

The second category, non-governmental publications, constitutes a special material for modern China since their number is considerable for the late Qing period and they tell a lot for the intellectual and social transformations of the country. They are also available in the collections of various libraries, particularly in the local library that their publication took place. Because their relevance to the study was stated in the introduction, no in-depth discussion will be offered here. From the selective list below, the researcher can easily find the relevant newspaper according to the location, content or the period of interest.

**Table 1: History Writing Styles<sup>278</sup> from the History branch in *Siku* Classification<sup>279</sup>**

Traditional Chinese	Simplified Chinese	Pinyin	English
正史	正史	Zhengshi	Standard history
編年	编年	Biannian	Annals
紀事本末	纪事本末	Jishibenmo	Topically arranged histories
別史	别史	Bieshi	Unofficial histories
雜史	杂史	Zashi	Miscellaneous histories
詔令奏議	诏令奏议	Zhaoling zouyi	Edicts and memorials
傳記	传记	Zhuanji	Biographical works
史抄	史抄	Shichao	Historical excerpts
載記	载记	Zaiji	Contemporary records
時令	时令	Shilling	Regulation of time
地理	地理	Dili	Geography
職官	职官	Zhiguan	Government offices
政書	政书	Zhengshu	Government institutions
目錄	目录	Mulu	Bibliography, epigraphy
史評	史评	Shiping	Historiography

<sup>278</sup> Based on Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A Manual* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 258.

<sup>279</sup> *Sibu* is the traditional fourfold bibliographical classification which became the standard in Tang period. In 1773, as the Emperor Qianlong ordered the compilation of all the valuable works of the time, there emerged the eminent work *The Siku quanshu*, which also used this same classification system. The four branches are Classics, Histories, Philosophers and Belles-lettres. *Siku* is the name of the palace depository in which *sibu* collections were held, so the two terms are used interchangeably.

**Table 2:** Supplementary glossary for historical styles

Traditional Chinese	Simplified Chinese	Pinyin	Description
譜牒	谱牒	Pudie	Genealogy (many of them were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution)
自傳	自传	Zichuan	Autobiography
書	书	Shu	Letters or can refer books in general
日記	日记	Riji	Diaries
史傳	史传	Shichuan	Biography in official historical works
年譜	年谱	Nianpu	Chronological biographies for Ming and Qing periods
地方志	地方志	Difangzhi	Local gazetteers (have different sorts for provinces, prefectures, sub-prefectures and counties)
叢書	丛书	Congshu	Collectanea, series, collected reprints of separate books
經籍	经籍	Jingji	Dynastic bibliographies as supplements to the standard histories
禁書	禁书	Jinshu	Banned books
十通	十通	Shitong	Ten encyclopedic histories of institutions, wider than monographs
類書	类书	Leishu	Encyclopedia (various kinds)
總集	总集	Zongshu	Anthologies and collected works
筆記	笔记	Biji	Reading notes/miscellanies (can take other names)
農書	农书	Nongshu	Comprehensive agricultural treatises on all aspects of agriculture
掌故	掌故	Zhanggu	(Historical) anecdotes

**Table 3:** Main periodicals for the late Qing period (the ones which include several news or articles on the Ottoman Empire have asterisks)

Periodical		Publication		
Chinese	Pinyin	Place	Date	Description
中外新报	Zhongwai xinbao	Hong Kong	1858-1919	The first Chinese newspaper, Chinese edition of local English journal <i>Daily Press</i>
上海新报	Shanghai xinbao	Shanghai	1861-1871	The first newspaper published in China, Chinese edition of <i>North China Herald</i>
申报	Shenbao*	Shanghai	1872-1949	The most longstanding and influential newspaper of China
新闻报	Xinwenbao	Shanghai	1893	
时务报	Shiwubao	Shanghai	1896-1898	An organ of reformist <i>Qiang Xuehui</i> (Shanghai branch)
清议报	Qingyibao*	Yokohama	1898-1901	Edited by Liang Qichao
苏报	Subao	Shanghai	1896-1903	The organ of revolutionary <i>Aiguo Xueshe</i>
民报	Minbao*	Tokyo	1905-1910	The official periodical of Sun Yat Sen's <i>Tongmeng hui</i>
东方杂志	Donfang zazhi*	Shanghai	1904-1949	Published by the Commercial Press and the most enduring Chinese magazine
中国	Zhongguo jibao	Hong Kong	1899-1913	The first Chinese revolutionary daily edited by Sun Yat-sen supporters
新民宗报	Xinmin zongbao	Yokohama	1902-1907	Edited by Liang Qichao
外交报	Waijiaobao*	Shanghai	1851-1911	Diplomacy news
新世纪	Xinshiji*	Paris	1907-1910	New Century
南风报	Nanfengbao*	Guangxi	1911	Official journal of the Revolutionary Alliance (Guangxi branch)
万国公报	Wanguo gongbao*	Shanghai	1868-1907	A weekly published by an American missionary Young J. Allen.
集成报	Jichengbao*	Shanghai	1897	Selections from domestic and foreign periodicals and newspapers
中西教会报	Zhongxi jiaohuibao*	Shanghai	1891-1912	Missionary review edited by US and British missionaries
大同报	Datongbao*	Tokyo	1907	Great Harmony Journal

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