EXPLORING SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF MITIGATION POLICIES: POSITIONS OF CLIMATE ACTION ADVOCATES IN TURKEY

GÖKÇE YENİEV

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

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EXPLORING SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF MITIGATION POLICIES: POSITIONS OF CLIMATE ACTION ADVOCATES IN TURKEY

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Gökçe Yeniev

Boğaziçi University

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Gökçe Yeniev, certify that

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ABSTRACT

Studies show that in the absence of corrective complementary social policies, environmental mitigation policies are very likely to fail to provide overall positive societal results. Although the challenges should be addressed to ensure a sustainable and equitable transition, so far scant attention has been directed to rebuilding the economy in a low-carbon and at the same time in a just manner, especially in the context of developing countries. Based on 21 in-depth interviews conducted with climate advocates in Turkey, the ways they address the impacts of mitigation policies on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion, as well as social policies they suggest offsetting the potentially-detrimental effects of mitigation policies are investigated. After reviewing briefly utilitarian, distributive, participatory, and capabilities approaches to environmental justice in the context of mitigation policies, the study proposes an analytical tool—by proposing a quadrant of justice—to map the corresponding justice approaches of various social measures recommended by climate advocates. The results of the study are as follows: a) Climate advocates consider the social impacts of low-carbon investments as relatively positive, while assessing the social risks of the policies that will impose sanctions on carbon-intensive industries as high; b) for the complementary social policies, climate advocates challenge the existing socio-economic structure when it comes to adopting a combination of different justice typologies; c) although the academic research on the social impacts of mitigation policies have increased quantitatively and qualitatively recently, the issue is not by and large on the agenda of climate advocates in Turkey.

ÖZET

Çalışmalar, düzenleyici tamamlayıcı sosyal politikaların yokluğunda, çevresel azaltım politikalarının olumlu toplumsal sonuçlar vermediğini göstermektedir. Sürdürülebilir ve adil bir geçiş sağlamak için karşılaşılan engellerin literatürde şimdiye kadar ele alınmış olması beklenirken, şimdiye kadar özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkeler bağlamında düşük karbonlu ve adil ekonomilerin yeniden inşasına çok az dikkat çekildiği görülmektedir. Türkiye'deki iklim savunucularıyla yapılan 21 derinlemesine görüşmeye dayanarak, azaltım politikalarının alım gücü, istihdam, eşitlik ve sosyal uyum üzerindeki etkilerini ele alma biçimleri ve bu politikaların potansiyel olumsuz etkilerini dengelemek için önerdikleri sosyal politikalar incelendi. Azaltım politikaları bağlamında adalet konusunda faydacı, dağıtıcı, katılımcı ve yapabilirlikler yaklaşımlarını kısaca gözden geçirdikten sonra; çalışma, iklim savunucuları tarafından önerilen sosyal önlemlere karşılık gelen adalet yaklaşımlarını haritalamak için analitik bir araç önermektedir. Çalışmanın sonuçları şu şekilde sıralanabilir: a) İklim savunucuları, karbon yoğun sektörlere yaptırımlar getirecek politikaların sosyal risklerini yüksek görürken, düşük karbonlu yatırımların sosyal etkilerini nispeten olumlu bulmaktadır; b) tamamlayıcı sosyal politikalar için, farklı adalet tipolojilerini bir arada benimsediklerinde mevcut sosyo-ekonomik yapıya daha radikal bir pozisyon almaktadırlar; c) son yıllarda azaltım politikalarının sosyal etkilerine yönelik projeler niceliksel ve niteliksel olarak artmasına rağmen, bu konu, Türkiye'deki iklim savunucularının gündemini işgal etmemektedir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CO2	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of Parties
DIEM	Democracy in Europe Movement
EJ	Environmental Justice
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GND	Green New Deal
IEA	International Energy Agency
ILO	International Labor Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
RCP	Representative Concentration Pathway
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SEFİA	Sürdürülebilir Ekonomi ve Finans Araştırmaları Derneği
TEİAŞ	Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation
The US	United States
TNI	Transnational Institute
TUED	Trade Unions for Energy Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United National Environment Program

UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION[1]

Although the *Stern Review* rang the alarm almost 15 years ago that the climate crisis would pose "global, long-term, persistent, and uncertain" risks for the Planet Earth (Stern, 2008: 25), the response so far has been inadequate. The globally hegemonic neoliberal ideology has been either resistant to incorporating ecological crises (e.g., Madra & Adaman, 2014), or the way it faces these crises has been through the submission of nature to capital (Arsel & Büscher, 2012). And we should also underline that, like many other ecological issues, the costs of the climate crisis *as well as* the costs and benefits of policies addressing the climate crisis have been (and will be) distributed unevenly among and within nation-states—further complicating the problem (e.g., Schlosberg, 2007).

Nevertheless, last years have witnessed increased political engagement with the climate crisis, as perhaps its impacts on our daily lives have been sensed by many of us in a rather explicit manner. The UN 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement in 2015, and lately, the 2021 Glasgow Summit are examples of international initiatives (UNFCCC, 2021). The European Green Deal and the Green New Deal in the US are, on the other hand, examples of governmental policies that aim for "a fair and equitable process of moving towards a post-carbon economy" (McCauley & Heffron, 2018: 2). We have also been witnessing increasing literature on inequalities and injustices in the context of the impacts of climate change as well as of climate policies (e.g., McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Martinez-Alier, Temper, del Bene &

[1] Some of the ideas in the introduction have been discussed in the proposal of this thesis, which has been submitted as the term paper of SPL 503 Research Methods in Social Policy, given by Volkan Yılmaz in Spring 2021.

Schneidel, 2016; Schlosberg, 2013). The main message of this literature comes out as that there is an urgent need for strong and coherent social policies to tackle environment-related inequalities and injustices. The motivation behind this engagement is that attention to equality and justice would help not only to prevent adding a new layer to the climate injustice by tackling unjust measures and outcomes but also for the acceptability[2] of such policies by the most affected populations (e.g., Klinsky et al., 2017; Williams & Doyon, 2019).

Although the link between social policy and the environment has not been adequately problematized, the concern for the environment has indirectly been addressed in the subfields of social policy, from housing to health, from labor conditions to pensions (Fitzpatrick, 2014). For example, Love Canal, New York (1978) and Warren County, North Carolina (1982) were very prominent and widely investigated environmental justice mobilizations in the US, which highlighted the negative health impacts of contaminating facilities in which poor and minority residents, as well as the families of workers, tended to suffer more (Martinez-Alier, 2014; Schlosberg, 2007). The housing crisis due to people being displaced by large-scale development projects, such as dam reservoirs, mining sites, plantations, recreation areas, and airport infrastructures, typically goes parallel to social and environmental policies (see e.g. Temper, Demaria, Scheidel, del Bene & Martinez-Alier, 2018; Temper, del Bene & Martinez-Alier, 2015).

Besides, historically, both climate change and social policy are the products of the industrial revolution. The measurements of greenhouse gas emissions extend back to the eighteenth century when the detrimental transformational influence of the industrial system on nature reached a threshold. Furthermore, the eighteenth century

[2] The term acceptability is used as voluntary acceptance, not acceptance by coercion.

represents a time when complex societal transformations started to occur especially in terms of health and the labor market, necessitating the emergence of the social policy field. To put it another way, from Polanyi's lens, the economy was disembedded from society, in which both production factors of the capital, labor, and nature, became out of social control (Polanyi, 1944/2001).

A glance at the literature on the social aspects of the climate crisis would make us notice the accumulated pile of research: impacts of climate change on inequalities across countries (e.g., Padilla & Serrano, 2006), consequences of climate change on poverty and food security (e.g., Wheeler & Von Braun, 2013), to name a few. Likewise, the burgeoning literature on de-growth (e.g., Hickel & Kallis, 2019; O'Neill, Fanning, Lamb & Steinberger, 2018) not only highlights the incompatibility of climate sustainability with economic growth—even if it is green—but also claims that the equality dimension needs to be placed at the center. Although NGOs, think tanks, and the bureaucracy talk about the social dimensions of climate policies, they have also not comprehensively built the connection between social policy and climate change. Furthermore, the bulk of policymakers have narrowly led the climate discussion on the feasibility and desirability of green growth, almost exclusively based on models on decarbonization, and as such, ignored the politics of social solidarity that will be needed to carry out these policies (Baldwin, 1992). Besides, until very recent efforts, the social policy literature has scarcely addressed the challenges and risks of climate change. Although very important questions have hitherto been raised with regard to the social implications of climate change, quantitatively speaking, very few have evaluated social and climate policies together in an explicit manner (Bailey, 2015; Koch & Fritz, 2014; Gough, 2013a; Murphy,

2012; Büchs, Bardsley & Duwe, 2011; Gough & Meadowcroft, 2011; Gough et al., 2008).

Ian Gough and his colleagues might be considered the pioneers of this new body of work on the integration of social and environmental policies. Gough et al. (2008, p. 325), in their groundbreaking work on climate change and social policy, classify the effects of climate change on social policy into four categories: direct (rising water stress, drought, heatwaves, floods, storms, and other extreme weather events) and indirect impacts (climate migration, food insecurity, increase in poverty rates, etc.) of climate change, adaptation policies and mitigation policies (see figure 1).

Table 1 Mapping the impacts of climate change in Europe

	Predicted effects: examples	*Social policy implications: examples*
1. Direct impact of forecast climate change up to 2050	Modest direct impact: more adverse in coastal areas and Mediterranean regions	Precautionary policies on housing and settlements, new insurance costs, health demands of extreme climate events
2. Indirect impact of forecast climate change up to 2050	Climate migration from developing world	New demands for housing, jobs, education, health, services and social protection (but offsetting benefits from younger age groups?) Challenges to social integration
3. Impact of likely climate change *adaptation* policies	Opportunity costs of making settlements and buildings more resilient to climate change	Fiscal competition between welfare state and environmental state, unless synergies are exploited
4. Impact of potential climate change *mitigation* policies	Higher energy costs in production, electricity, travel, housing	Regressive effects of carbon taxes and pricing and new energy policies: implications for social protection. New social investment demands to reduce carbon emissions of housing, transport and employment.
	Restrictions on consumption patterns	Numerous policies to change consumption behaviour

Figure 1. The categorization of the social impacts of climate change and their social policy implications (Gough et al., 2008)

Considering both the reasons for its emergence as well as its social effects and recalling Esping-Andersen's (1999) definition of social policy as public management of social risks, the climate policy can indeed take advantage of the deep-rooted corpus of social policy to manage a just transformation to a green economy (Gough et al., 2008).

While the immediate and indirect effects of climate change on vulnerable and impoverished people have received much attention, the justice dimension of climate policies has been neglected. Ambitious governmental plans for climate policy are on the way in the above-mentioned global North countries, and these plans will be the push factor to become a carbon-neutral economy not just within their borders but also, through trade, finance, and further political relationships, in other countries. In that manner, reinforcing the hitherto weak academic link between the social policy literature and the climate policy literature would help specify which policy tools can address a just transition in both developed and developing country contexts.

Recently, there has been a growing appreciation of the importance of social outcomes of climate policies; however, the scarce literature on the social implications of mitigation policies has narrowly focused on developed countries. Besides, this literature, by and large, alludes to specific policy measures exclusively (e.g., coal phase-out, retrofit subsidies) of a more extensive issue and focus on specific social effects (e.g., employment, household income) along a particular distributive axis (e.g., regional distribution) (Lamb et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019). While it is common to focus on specific effects to answer a research question adequately, it is also crucial to recognize that there is a larger spectrum of social repercussions that may entail tensions and trade-offs when adopting them (Heyen, 2021).

In the light of these arguments, this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing research on the potential distributive consequences of different climate mitigation policies, such as poverty, access to and affordability of energy services, employment, social cohesion, and conflict among different socio-economic groups in a developing country context. To understand these potential impacts, it focuses on the perspectives

of leading climate advocates from academia, civil society, and municipalities in Turkey.

Despite the fact that Turkey has a well-developed environmental legislation and a strong administrative capability (Adaman &Arsel, 2016), there is indeed a big disparity between these laws and their implementation. NGOs, activists, academics, and local governments are all important actors in pressing for the implementation of environmental legislation to close this gap. The same actors also oppose the government's inaction on climate change. When we look at Şahin's (2014) study on the actor mapping of climate change in Turkey, we can see that civil society actors, academics, and, more recently, municipalities are essential movers in defining the political agenda and that they work collaboratively for climate action.

In this context, the main research questions of the thesis are to what extent and how leading climate advocates from academics, civil society, and municipalities in Turkey take distributional consequences of mitigation policies into account both hypothetically and in practice, and how they address the equity and justice outcomes of different mitigation policies, the distribution of costs and burden among social groups in their framing and advocacy of climate action; and if so, how pro-poor and fair mitigation policies are or would be planned and implemented.

This research question is significant in the sense that it addresses policy measures or complementary policies to increase vulnerable people's benefits and/or minimize the negative effects on the population that can be directly and seriously affected by these policies in Turkey. At this point, it is important to note that the participants were asked to answer the questions on different mitigation policies hypothetically. In Turkey, the challenges of the socio-economic and political atmosphere, i.e., social rights not defined as citizenship rights, low per capita

income, severe income and wealth inequality, high accumulation of foreign debt, limited technological capacity, an authoritarian governance structure, a huge informality in economic life as well as the economic depression that has been deepening since 2016, are often raised as an impediment to the implementation of any kind of mitigation policy, which then feeds into an unwillingness to reflect on justice outcomes. Thus, the participants were asked to bypass these challenges to focus on the possible justice outcomes of mitigation policies as if they were properly implemented.

1.1 Methods

1.1.1 Data collection procedure and participants

The thesis draws mainly on in-depth interviews. To answer my research questions, I adopted a purposeful sampling method in choosing my participants. I conducted 21 semi-structured qualitative interviews with a) representatives of NGOs who were actively engaged in the topic of climate change and had policy recommendations on that topic, b) academics focusing on climate change, especially the social dimensions of climate change rather than modeling, and c) local governments that act together with civil society and have taken climate action into account so far. Beyond that, although I had no intention of meeting with officials from the ministries at first, I added them to my sample since the government started to be active in climate action recently with the ratification of the Paris agreement. However, it is important to note that, I have primarily focused on the first three stakeholders, rather than the consultants from the ministries since the incumbent government has so far shown no proper interest in addressing the climate crisis. First, I prepared a list of possible interviewees for each party. Then I chose the representatives according to two

criteria: a) their public visibility and active involvement in climate campaigns, and b) capturing the diversity, based on my previous knowledge of these associations and from the information on their websites, news, etc. For the academics, I looked at their publications and involvements in webinars and conferences related to climate change and chose from the ones who have engaged in the social aspects of climate change. Also, the criteria for municipality selection are a) cooperation with civil society, and b) having climate departments or plans. For the consultants of ministries, I have been interviewed with the ones working related to energy transformation and climate change. To complete my list of interviewees, I held preliminary meetings and went over the list with the people who are the pioneers of the climate change literature and/or activism in Turkey.

The main purpose of the interviews was to understand their perspectives on the idea of climate justice, on the possible distributive impacts of climate mitigation policies (carbon pricing, taxes and charges on energy and fuel, subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency, public and private investment in renewable energy, and low carbon technologies and infrastructures, subsidy reform for fossil fuels, strengthening the public transport network) on various issues (poverty and livelihoods, access to and affordability of energy services, distributional impacts by gender and geography, employment, social cohesion, and conflict). I used a matrix to understand their evaluation of the impacts of different mitigation policies on the above-mentioned issues (see Table 1 below).

Besides, I asked them about the measures to be taken to minimize the negative impacts of the mitigation policies at different levels, i.e., the process of policy design, the implementation of the policy, and complementary policies (see

Appendix B for the in-depth interview questions in Turkish and Appendix C for the English version).

Table 1. The Matrix Indicating Social Impacts of Mitigation Policies

Policy Measures	Potential Social Impacts				
	Poverty and livelihoods	Energy poverty	Gender and geographical equality	Employment	Social Cohesion
Emission Trading Scheme					
Carbon Tax					
Tax on energy and fossil fuels					
Energy efficiency-retrofit					
Renewable energy investment					
Removal of subsidies from fossil fuels					
Investment in public transportation					

The study was approved by the Committee on Ethical Conduct in Extramural Academic Relations at Boğaziçi University in November 2021 (see Appendix E for ethics committee approval in Turkish). The interviews were carried out between November 2021-April 2022 (see Appendix F for the consent form). During the interviews, participants were informed that the anonymity was voluntary, and they did not object to the mention of their names due to the fact that they have already shared their ideas in public. However, in the analysis, the names of the organizations

and people have not been used. For the transcriptions, the voice recorder was used with the permission of the participants (see Appendix D, for the list of interviews)

1.1.2 Structure of data analysis

The interviews were subjected to different analysis methods. For the social impacts of mitigation policies, the interviews were subjected to content analysis. First, the participants were asked to evaluate the possible distributive impacts of climate mitigation policies (carbon pricing, taxes and charges on energy and fuel, subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency, public and private investment in renewable energy, and low carbon technologies and infrastructures, subsidy reform for fossil fuels, strengthening the public transport network) on various issues (poverty and livelihoods, access to and affordability of energy services, distributional impacts by gender and geography, employment, social cohesion, and conflict) and whether their short-term and long-term impacts were positive, negative, or neutral. In that part, I analyzed the transcriptions according to the impacts they have counted on. After that, I have adopted the thematic analysis to see whether there were any variances or similarities in how these actors approached climate justice, mitigation policies, and complementary social policies. While doing the thematic analysis, I have focused on three different layers: a) how the participants define climate justice; b) their perspectives on differentiated impacts of different mitigation policies on society, and "why" of inequity; and c) their approach to the social policies for eliminating the potential negative impacts of mitigation policies. In the analysis, inspired by Stevis and Felli (2015), the categorization of "varieties of environmental justice", I evaluated the positions of participants across two dimensions: whether they take justice as distribution (Rawlsian justice) vs. justice beyond distribution

(political process, recognition, participation, functioning, the role of institutions of power) and whether they adopt an ecocentrist approach or evaluates social and ecological justice together.

1.2 Significance of study

The significance of the research is that it covers a hitherto unexplored topic: the viewpoints of climate change actors on poverty, inequality, and justice in the context of climate mitigation policies. Given the importance of multiscale, pro-poor climate policy, the study seeks to determine whether these actors advocate just for climate action or also consider the policies' distributive effects and potential poverty implications in a developing country context. The social justice dimensions of mitigation policies are relatively more discussed in the context of developed countries; however, because of the fact that countries like Turkey are very late for taking steps on implementing climate policies, climate advocates spend a lot of time and energy to have these policies in place, and thus, they tend to think less about how the policy is designed and what impact it will have on whom. The challenge of achieving social equity and environmental sustainability needs to be addressed by the avant-garde and essential actors in determining the political agenda, and this study aims to accelerate the discussion of this challenge and to contribute to the groups that support climate action to gain a deeper reflection on the justice dimension of climate mitigation policies.

In this context, the thesis seeks a) to contribute to the literature on the political economy of the environment in Turkey, which mainly focuses on environmental conflicts that intersect with the axes of race, gender, and class, b) to make the bridge between social and climate policies more visible academically and

politically, and c) to see the potential in Turkey to popularize climate mitigation policies for different socio-economic groups.

1.3 Outline of chapters

This thesis consists of five chapters. Following the introductory chapter, which includes an overview of the main directions around the main research question of the thesis, the methodology, and the significance of the study, chapter 2 introduces a literature review on mapping the concepts and theories of justice since the thesis anchors different conceptualizations of justice related to ecological and social concerns as well as the interaction between them in the analysis of the interviews. Chapter 3 reviews the contemporary policy frameworks of mitigation policies. Three consecutive subsections offer insights into a) policy alternatives for mitigation policies, b) their potential social outcomes and social effects along with various axes of justice, and c) the current situation in terms of mitigation policies in Turkey. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the perspectives of leading climate advocates from academics, civil society, and municipalities. The findings of the research are discussed under three layers: how these actors see the effects of different mitigation policies on different dimensions, how they approach ecological and social policies in policy design, implementation, and complementary social policies and how these actors approach climate justice. Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the findings of this study with reference to the existing literature.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: HOW IT RELATES TO CLIMATE POLICIES

2.1 Introduction

Justice is a highly loaded term. What we mean by justice and how it manifests itself in societies are not easy questions to answer; however, they require deep philosophical and political thinking. There are different conceptualizations of justice at the societal and the individual level since justice has no objective meaning. Although these conceptualizations might be diametrically opposite, they are expressed by the same word and thus increasingly contested. For example, before the civil rights movement, while gaining equal rights was the central struggle of blacks to correct existing injustices, for a white person in the US, being equal to a black person was unjust controversially. For libertarians, the state's taxation of the inheritance and the redistribution of income and wealth are causes of injustice; some see the non-appropriation as unjust because they do not see wealth accumulation as independent from the exploitation of nature and labor. To accurately understand how justice is framed, there is a need to unpack different perceptions and understandings of the term in academia, society, various contexts, and theoretical backgrounds, with the acceptance that they are not free from power relations.

The environment has started to be a subject of justice since the 1980s (Anguelovski, 2015; Schlosberg, 2013; Martinez-Alier, 2002; Martinez-Alier, 1995). Since the environmental bads and risks such as pollution, contamination, resource extraction, and uneven spatial developments have had more harmful impacts on historically marginalized groups, environmental justice has become something that people have been fighting for to defend their territories (Scheidel et al., 2020;

Anguelovski & Martinez-Alier, 2014; Mohai, Pellow & Roberts., 2009; Bullard, 1990). Since the beginning of the 2000s, when the effects of climate change have begun to be more noticeable, i.e., a tremendous increase in the frequency and impact of extreme weather events such as drought, floods, severe hurricanes, increase in ocean and seawater levels, increase in the acidity of the oceans, melting of glaciers, etc. (IPCC, 2014; 2021), the notion of justice has expanded spatially and temporally and began to be addressed across different social groups, localities, and time (Tokar, 2018; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Bullard & Wright, 2009; Smith, 2006). The debates on the meaning of justice in the context of environment and climate have also diversified and enriched across the nexus of social and ecological dimensions and in terms of which mechanisms lead to justice.

I will unpack the notion of justice in this chapter. First, recent theories of justice are reviewed, from the utilitarian approach to justice to Rawlsian justice, and then the justice beyond distribution, i.e., recognition, participation, and capabilities. Then, in the second part, the notions of environmental justice, ecological justice, and climate justice are explored. The chapter is concluded with a summary of the literature review in the fourth section.

2.2 Recent theories of justice

In this section, I will first examine John Rawls's theory of justice by putting it into perspective. After drawing attention to the differences between utilitarianism and justice as fairness, Rawls's (2001, 1999) theory of distributive justice will be outlined. Then, justice beyond distribution, the approaches that evaluate and criticize distributive justice, will be scrutinized. Justice as recognition, raised by Young (2008; 2006; 2000; 1990) and Fraser (2007, 2000, 1998, 1997; Dahl, Stoltz &

Willig., 2004), will initially be explored in this set. They find distributive justice restrictive and argue that the scope of justice should be expanded to emphasize the processes that create distributional inequalities rather than solely focus on the outcomes. For justice as recognition and participation, injustices occur since the political existence of groups and individuals is not recognized at the institutional level. Also, I will look into Sen's (1999, 1992, 1985) and Nussbaum's (2003, 2000, 1999) capabilities approach that focuses on people's agency, functioning, and well-being.

2.2.1 Rawls' theory of justice

2.2.1.1 Utilitarianism

To understand Rawls's theory of justice, it is first necessary to briefly define utilitarianism and look at how Rawls challenges the epistemological postulates of this doctrine and understand how his principles are superior to that of utilitarianism (Sen, 1974; Rawls, 1999; Lyons, 1972).

Utilitarianism is a doctrine put forward by the late 18th- and 19th-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and has established its hegemony throughout the years, especially within the disciplines of politics and economics. According to utilitarianism, actions are decided by computing their ultimate pleasures and pains for an individual, and thus it is a consequentialist and individualistic moral theory (Sen, 1979; Rawls, 1999). If an effort has unpleasant or painful consequences, this doctrine does not support that behavior. Conversely, if it leads to pleasure and happiness, the person should orient himself/herself to that action. Here, pleasure and happiness commonly indicate utility. In the words of Bentham (1789/2007, p.2):

> By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

Utilitarians see community as a fictitious body. Society is seen as consisting of members who make up that society; although there are indeed various forms of utilitarianism, they all start with the same premise: the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people.[3] Here, the emphasis on the sum is essential because the utilitarian welfare function favors whatever "the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it" (Bentham, 1789/2007, p.3) yields more.

In the light of this information, what utilitarians understand by justice has been a much-debated issue. At first sight, distribution through the utilitarian rule, i.e., utility maximization, seems egalitarian. Basically, the attempt is to maximize the size of the cake for society. Assuming everyone's preferences are the same, the law of diminishing marginal utility implies that the marginal satisfaction of individuals decreases with additional slices of cake, the first piece mattering much more than those that follow, and people are expected to be satiated eventually. This calls for redistribution from those who have more (with less marginal utility for the piece transferred from them) to those who have less (with more marginal utility for the piece transferred to them). Thus, the principle of utility maximization will imply a completely egalitarian distribution as the best solution for society. However, as the utilitarian philosophy of justice is based on an aggregation of individual satisfaction rather than on a distributive principle, if the total pleasure of one part of society exceeds the pain of another part, and if the occurrence of this pleasure and pain is

[3] Driver, J. (2009). The history of utilitarianism. https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/utilitarianism-history/

relational, then the other part could be expended for the total pleasure of the society.[4] The thought experiment of Robert Nozick (1974), i.e., utility monster, clearly reveals this gap in the utilitarian approach. For the utility monster, a resource leads to, let's say, 100 times more utility than an ordinary person, thus contributing the society's total utility more than others. Therefore, to maximize the utility for society, the logical way is to give the resources to the utility monster. This experiment challenges the assumption that the societies under utilitarian rule are profoundly egalitarian. Likewise, while utilitarians advocate liberty and political rights (Mill, 1859), they really aren't opposed to curbing liberty or political rights if it leads to greater well-being (Romano, 2014). In that sense, according to the utilitarian principle, distributive justice has no intrinsic value, but it is only beneficial if it increases utility, not if it decreases it (Rawls, 1971).

2.2.1.2 Rawls

Thinking of theories on justice, the most famous proponent is the American philosopher John Rawls since his theory was a great contribution to the theory of political justice and political science. Accepting that there will be different understandings of justice in a society where pluralism is given, Rawls developed a theory of justice on how an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness can be established in society. As one of the prominent thinkers of the liberal school of thought, in which the idea is equal freedom for all, Rawls also constructs his theory based on all people being equally free.

[4] Here, displacements during dam constructions can be given as an example. It can be said that it is a utilitarian argument that while the dams are being built, the entire society will prosper. Therefore, the evacuation of the villages that were flooded during the construction of the dam should not be problematized.

Initially, it is important to discuss how utilitarianism, which has been the dominant ideology in modernity, differs from Rawls's justice as fairness in order to establish a historical connection and to understand justice as fairness better. As mentioned above, the moral principle of utilitarianism is to maximize utility at all levels, be it individual, societal, institutional, or global. However, for Rawls, there is no moral principle that would work the same at all these levels. In the Rawlsian approach, the essential point is that the subject of justice is the basic structure, "or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." (Rawls, 1971, p.6) Social institutions, such as family, market, and/or political institutions, as the relatively persistent controlling mechanisms, establish rules about how a society would function; thus, they indicate something other than individual interaction (Young, 2006). The starting point of Rawlsian justice is about how the advantages obtained at the end of social cooperation are distributed as well as interests, duties, and responsibilities, therefore the concern here is beyond seeking pleasure. In that sense, contrary to utilitarianism, the meaning of social welfare is not just about the balance of individual pain and pleasure, but it is about just institutions in which "the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens" (Rawls, 1999, p.4) takes place.

The discussion of justice as fairness happens in a modern constitutional democracy. In Rawls's words, "the main institutions of this structure are those of a constitutional democracy." (Rawls, 1999, p.171). That is, while he was forming his theory, Rawls had in mind not an authoritarian or religious regime but a modern democratic society in which a wide variety of spiritual, moral, and philosophical views could coexist together. In this respect, Rawls' theory of justice is said to be

ideal/transcendental (Arneson, 2013; Sen, 2009). This approach also constitutes the first of Rawls's principle of justice, i.e., "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others." (Rawls, 1999, p.53) The realization of the second principle, which will be conveyed shortly in the following paragraphs, depends on whether the first principle is satisfied or not.

Understanding Rawls's line of thinking on human nature has significant power in explaining his theory. In this plurality and liberty, he sees people as reasonable creatures who can show tolerance and respect for the social differences between them. Rawls's understanding of human nature has worked out and improved upon Kant's ethical theory. According to the ideas of Kant, humans are free, rational, autonomous, and equal and have the capability to give an order and create the law for themselves. Rawls, as a great admirer of Kant's ethical theory and a proponent of the social contract theory, is of the opinion that the implementation of a specific set of basic laws that are aligned with the agreed-upon values and standards will be acceptable to reasonable citizens (Levine, 1974, Rawls, 1999). That is, rational people need to be equal and free to judge a question of justice impartially; otherwise, such evaluation would not be possible (the first principle of equality). When this is achieved, people are expected to act reasonably in social and ethical principles for their own and society's well-being; otherwise, they can be considered sociopaths, so to speak. At this point, it should be noted that there is a private/public divide in the making and implementation of these rules and regulations. People are free to live their private lives on their own terms, but in a public setting, they must act in accordance with the institutions (Kearns, 1983).

Rawls's thought experiment shows why people would be reasonable individuals to solve a fairness issue. In his opinion, one could decide and identify what might be unfair and how to fix this unfairness. Basically, he recommends the following experiment: imagining oneself under someone else's hat; what he calls this device is the original position behind the veil of ignorance. By keeping the question of what it would have been like to be born as someone else and live another's life (with different parents, being of another gender and race, in a different neighborhood, relatively poor or rich, with vulnerabilities, sicknesses, etc.) in mind, how that person might feel safe to be in any position in society if they were appointed to that position without a choice, according to Rawls, such abstraction of oneself could lead to an objective setting to determine which conditions lead to fairness in a society. Such abstraction creates the basis for deciding the criteria for sharing advantages and burdens of social cooperation (Rawls, 2001).

The anxiety of not knowing in which position one continues to live forms the basis of the second principle of justice, i.e., the principle of difference, in other words, the maximin rule. This anxiety behind the veil of ignorance pushes people to take care of the least advantaged and the most vulnerable people and make them try to maximize their welfare. According to the second principle of justice, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all." (Rawls, 1999, p. 53)

The principle of difference manages economic and social inequalities and redistributive social justice. It tells how to divide social cooperation's burden, risks, and benefits. According to the second principle of Rawls, benefits and burdens should be distributed in a way that maximizes the benefit of the least advantageous

or reduces their burden most. This principle does not quite contradict strict equality, but if the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens is for the interest of the least advantageous, then it can admit some degree of inequality (Rawls, 2001).

2.2.2 Critiques of Rawls's theory of justice

John Rawls offers a line of thinking that provides a framework which implies that the distribution of the resources of social cooperation should focus on maximizing the resources of the least advantaged. There have been criticisms of Rawls's theory of justice. As one might remember, Rawls's first principle is prioritized over the principle of difference. This means that Rawls's theory of justice is valid in pluralistic societies of democratic systems, where everyone is equal. Rawls's theoretical approach has been criticized for being ideal, transcendental, and one-shot, and thus not addressing the actual conditions of injustices in the world as well as how injustices are experienced. Besides, it does not address the concerns, claims, and struggles of those in the justice movements, be it environmental, racial, or gender-based. In this section, I will review the contributions of four intellectuals, Young, Fraser, Nussbaum, and Sen, who have recognized Rawls as having laid the foundations of a theory of justice, but, have noted that improving the conditions of a just society requires a diagnosis of various injustices.

2.2.2.1 Justice as recognition

In her famous book, *Justice and the politics of difference (1990),* Iris Marion Young claims that "a conception of justice should begin with the concepts of domination and oppression" (p.3) rather than solely focusing on how resources are distributed. In that sense, Young's criticisms of Rawls's theory of justice seek to broaden its

explanatory capacity beyond the distributive paradigm. In her opinion, without recognizing and analyzing the relationships of injustices with domination and oppression, it is not possible to understand and cover the issue of justice entirely. Therefore, theories of justice necessarily spotlight more on these social relations.

According to Young (2000, 1990), the idea that everyone is free and equal is indifferent to the differences in class, race, gender, or ethnicity between individuals and social groups, which brings about various problems. These problems, viz., "exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence" (Young, 1990, p.9), themselves have been setting off the main struggles of various movements against oppression and domination. Young's starting point is the social movements in favor of justice that appeared in the second decade of the 20th century in the USA that are "democratic socialist, environmentalist, Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and American Indian movements; movements against U.S. military intervention in the Third World; gay and lesbian liberation; movements of the disabled, the old, tenants, and the poor; and the feminist movement." (ibid., p.7) These movements lead her to rethink the conception of social justice and expand the notion of justice toward the leading dynamics of injustices.

In parallel with her view that there is no single theory and method that could be valid under all circumstances to produce a just outcome, Young (1990) expresses that she has not been formulating a new theory that replaces the Rawlsian theory of justice. She claims that justice is embedded in social and political practices, and thus concepts and ideas on justice are in need to be clarified within these practices. Her approach to justice as recognition relies on critical theory, which itself aims at uncovering power relations in a society with a reflective assessment.

Young (1990) argues that distributive justice should be limited to material goods. She opposes the claims in the distributive justice literature that non-material things, such as opportunities, recognition, power, or honor, can also be distributed. The existing theory of distributive justice is either blind to these issues, or taking these non-material things for granted, or thinking of them as distributable to confirm the conditions of justice. According to Young, the distribution of material goods and the institutionalized procedures of decision-making processes are different and complementary to each other. Injustices in material terms stem from a predominantly lack of voice in decision-making and participation. There is a need to eliminate institutionalized domination and oppression and promote democratic decision-making procedures since only enhanced participation can address issues of unequal material distribution and cultural misrecognition.

On the other hand, Fraser (2000, 1998, 1995) claims that with the attempt of neoliberalism to suppress the socialist ideas beginning from the 1980s, justice had changed its focus from a class-based, Marxist paradigm to culture and identity-based politics. Such a shift has downplayed the political importance of the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, and cultural misrecognition came to be treated as the primary and only basis of injustice. However, according to her, being more than just a materialist does not mean giving up the material concerns; both are needed for a just social structure. She considered the substitution of *justice as distribution* with *justice as recognition* is not possible since they are not reducible to one another; however, she has found Young's book *Justice and the politics of difference (1990)* were distinctive in the age of recognition due to the attempts of the book to integrate the perspective of political economy with the cultural recognition.

It is no coincidence for the time that she has praised and elaborated on Young's justice approach. Fraser has been criticizing the political atmosphere of that period in which the redistribution of income and wealth has moved away from the center of political claims and gave way to cultural recognition. With this concern, Fraser (1997) has built up an integrated redistribution/recognition framework. She proposed a quadrant to explain the *remedies* on the nexus of affirmative-transformative, on the one hand, and recognition-redistribution on the other. This conceptual schema is specified by whether the *remedies* introduce a structural change, or they aim at solving injustices within the existing socio-economic and/or socio-cultural order. For redistribution, liberal welfare states would represent one end of the spectrum; socialist regimes would represent the opposite end. For recognition, mainstream multiculturalism would be thought of as an example of affirmative recognition, and deconstruction as an attack on traditional cultural assumptions is an example of transformative recognition. This framework has three goals: to combine recognition and redistribution analytically; to locate the existing political claims within this schema and compare them according to one another, and to show that transformative recognition is in need of transformative redistribution, and vice versa.

Fraser (1995) has criticized Young's perspective for not directly relating her arguments with the redistributive axis of the analytical framework. Fraser (1997) put Young's approach under the category of affirmative recognition since Young's stance on multiculturalism. Young (1990) has developed an avant-garde argument for the existing political atmosphere at that time; however, Fraser has thought that such emphasis on the group differences and their celebration would not be necessarily defended, as she has supported "only those versions of difference that coherently synergize with the politics of redistribution" (Fraser, 2003, p.205). In that sense,

Fraser (2007) developed a critical theory of recognition and proposed a *non-identitarian politics of recognition*. She defines justice as a principle of participation parity, which requires social agreements for equal participation at the institutional level. Unlike Rawls, who begins with the basic structure of society, Fraser starts from the need to overcome institutional obstacles in order to overcome injustice, and by that, she meant status-based political participation rather than identity-based recognition.

2.2.2.2 Capabilities approach

As an Indian Nobel prize winner, economist, and philosopher, Amartya Sen has essential works about the idea of justice. His concerns have been different than both utilitarians and Rawls. The focus of Sen's work is the differences in capabilities between people, which are reasons for the differences in their well-being.

Like Rawls, Sen has criticized utilitarians for their moral approach (Sen, 1979). His main criticism of economics is to limit the measurement of welfare to the concept of utility. He has been a development economist, and Sen's contribution to the science of economics in general and welfare economics, in particular, is that he accepts the development of human potential as the fundamental proposition for welfare and development. According to Sen, economics should focus on the functioning and capabilities of people at the individual level. These thoughts of Sen are in sharp contrast with the traditional utilitarian view. The traditional economic view focuses on producing more goods more efficiently and ultimately maximizing the benefit; however for Sen, its consequentialist nature that does not pay attention to who gets what is inadequate to achieve a just outcome.

In the development of the capabilities approach, Sen has also criticized Rawls (Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 2006, 2004). As mentioned above, Rawls's theory of justice is a transcendental one rather than a comparative theory (Sen, 2006). In that sense, it is not historical or comparative—Rawlsian distributive justice is a thought experiment, a way of thinking about society from a distance. However, according to Sen, "identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient." (Sen, 2006, p.217). As Sen (2006, p.216) puts it:

> In his analysis of "justice as fairness," Rawls takes the principal question to be: What is a just society? Indeed, in most theories of justice in contemporary political philosophy, that question is taken to be central. This leads to what can be called a "transcendental" approach to justice, focusing—as it does—on identifying perfectly just societal arrangements. In contrast, what can be called a "comparative" approach would concentrate instead on ranking alternative societal arrangements (whether some arrangement is "less just" or "more just" than another), rather than focusing exclusively—or at all—on the identification of a fully just society.

He claims that to create a more just society, sometimes there should be no need for consensus. He gives the example of the abolition of slavery for his comparative approach to explain that the arrangements at the institutional level should be evaluated relatively rather than seeking the ultimate just society:

> When people agitated for the abolition of slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they were not laboring under the illusion that the abolition of slavery would make the world perfectly just. It was their claim, rather, that a society with slavery was totally unjust (among the authors mentioned earlier, Adam Smith, Condorcet, and Mary Wollstonecraft were quite involved in presenting this perspective). It was the diagnosis of an intolerable injustice in slavery that made abolition an overwhelming priority, and this did not require the search for a consensus on what a perfectly just society would look like. *(Sen, 2008, p.21)*

Moreover, he claims that Rawls considers justice as a one-time matter, and thus, Rawls neither reflects on the dynamics that bring about injustices in society nor goes after eliminating these dynamics. For Sen (2008), the discussion of justice is an ongoing debate that should consider the impact of society on people's capabilities.

When it comes to the principle of difference in the Rawlsian theory, Sen's capabilities approach anchors the ends rather than the means of the distribution. He argues that people's needs are differentiated according to their beings and doings, i.e., their functionings. How Sen defines functionings and capabilities is as the following:

> A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you lead. *(Sen, 1988, p.36)*

The same amount of primary goods would have different meanings for the people because of their differentiated needs. Moreover, according to Sen (1988), the liberal school of thought has been essentially prioritizing negative freedoms over positive freedoms, if not restricting itself by taking only negative liberties into account. While negative freedoms mean the opportunity to choose without the absence of external restraint, positive freedom recognizes social disadvantages preventing the participation of the person in society and helps them to enhance their capabilities. In an environment where the initial distribution of resources is unequal, a just outcome cannot be satisfied with negative freedoms. Even though the resources and income are distributed equally, due to the differentiated functionings, they do not ensure positive freedoms. Therefore, changing the focus from negative freedoms to positive freedoms is needed.

The expansion of freedoms is seen by Sen as the main goal of development. He thinks that freedoms have two functions, i.e., constitutive and instrumental. Substantive freedoms, which are the freedom to avoid hunger, malnutrition, preventable diseases, and premature death, besides the freedom to enjoy literacy, political participation, and freedom of speech, can be considered constitutive.

Instrumental freedoms, on the other hand, are concerned with the way in which different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to one's overall capacity to live more freely. For example, political freedoms, economic opportunities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security contribute to the overall capacity necessary for a person to live more freely (Sen, 1999, p. 531-533).

Additionally, Sen's concept of capability, which includes abilities/rights to develop and maintain a dignified and meaningful life and to take advantage of opportunities, is not subject to a universal and homogeneous norm. The fact that people have rights does not mean that they have the opportunity to exercise those rights. In this way, he carries the concept of primary goods developed by Rawls to his own capacity approach, emphasizing the differences between people (Sen, 1979). To put in Sen's words:

> A corresponding remark can be made about the Rawlsian Difference Principle. If people were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods might be quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and clothing requirements). So what is involved is not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but overlooking very widespread and real differences. (pp. 215-216).

His focus is on capabilities and freedoms; however, he has not done the mapping of capabilities and functionings. Unlike Sen, Nussbaum has offered a list of Central Human Capabilities. These capabilities are "Life, Bodily Health, Bodily Integrity, the Development and Expression of Senses, Imagination, and Thought, Emotional Health, Practical Reason, Affiliation (both personal and political), Relationships with Other Species and the World of Nature, Play, and Control over One's Environment (both material and social) (Nussbaum 1999, p. 41-42; 2000; 2006; 2011).

Nussbaum has created the list of capabilities to assign some of the *beings and doings* more central importance. Based on basic human rights to ensure the minimum conditions of a decent life, she has embodied the capabilities approach to make it useful in policy-making processes beyond the assessment of the current capabilities of a specific group. She claims that this is a list that needs to be fulfilled to live what cultural differences allow, rather than the imposition of a cultural norm so there is no paternalistic intention to define the needs of people from the top-down (Nussbaum, 2003).

2.3 Integration of justice as distribution, recognition, and capabilities with a focus of environment

At this point, it is important to highlight that the typology of distributive justice, justice as recognition and participation, and justice as capabilities, both integrated and separately, have been making use of different weights in relation to the environment to frame uneven political-ecological contexts.

Environmental justice, ecological justice, climate justice, energy justice, and just transition, all have become voluminous literature by themselves so far which have been using different justice approaches. Schlosberg (2007) is the academic who offers a theory of environmental justice, based on, and fed by existing justice theories and approaches.[5]

He synthesizes the central questions and routes of justice within environmental and climatic events, and delve into the question of "What, exactly, is

[5] For a more in-depth account of the theoretical approach to environmental justice, see his *Defining environmental justice: Theories, movements, and nature* (2007).

the ‘justice’ of environmental justice?”. He has analyzed environmental justice movements and their demands by benefitting from recent theories of justice, viz., distributive concerns, power relations, participation in decision-making processes, and justice as capabilities. Also, he has explained environmental change and the complex relationship between nature and society with a specific focus on the justice dimension to develop the theory of ecological justice, i.e., doing justice to non-human nature. Besides, Martinez-Alier (2002) has conceptualized environmental justice as environmentalism of the poor by comparing and revealing the differences from other currents of environmentalism, viz. conservationism and eco-efficiency, which will be shortly presented under the head of environmental justice below.

Moreover, Schlosberg & Collins (2014) has tried to conceptualize climate justice out of the effort to theorize justice in environmental justice, again by looking at the framings of grassroots climate justice movements. It can be said that climate justice has also created two different new justice issues from within itself. The first of these is energy justice. Energy justice is defined as equal, affordable access to energy systems by ensuring of overcoming of historical injustices and revealing and reducing possible future injustices through political involvement and equitable distribution. Energy justice has been conceptualized separately from environmental and climate justice by different scholars, and it has been argued that dealing specifically with energy justice can bring specific policy-oriented solutions to poverty and inequality. In addition, energy policy and energy transformation in the context of climate change have been addressed from the viewpoint of workers, and the concept of just transition was born especially from the perspectives of the union activities of the workers.

As the concept of justice is quite central to environmental issues, in the next subsection, I will explain the terms environmental justice, ecological justice, climate justice, energy justice, and just transition one by one with their historical backgrounds, and their relations to different theories and approaches to justice, and then will offer a matrix helping to classify different understandings of justice. This will later help me to understand the positions of different stakeholders in relation to the mitigation policies of Turkey, the main purpose of the thesis, which will be presented and discussed in the third chapter.

2.3.1 Environmental justice

Ecological distribution conflicts (EDCs) have accelerated with the rapid environmental change with the neoliberal turn since the beginning of the 1980's (Martinez-Alier & O'Conner, 1996). This has led to environmental justice movements in the global North and environmentalism of the poor in the Global South. From contamination, poor waste management, natural resource extraction, revitalization projects, to green gentrification, persistent poor housing conditions, abandonment, decay, and the restriction to enjoy green areas, these phenomena have resulted in socio-environmental conflicts (Temper, del Bene & Martinez-Alier, 2015; Martínez-Alier et al., 2016; Scheidel et al., 2018; see the Environmental Justice Atlas, www.ejatlas.org). Taking the environment as a historically produced nature (Swyngedouw, 2009; Harvey, 1996), the position of where one is situated economically, socially, and geographically has been shaping who benefits and who loses from that change, i.e., the distribution of amenities and burdens.

Environmentalism of the poor is generally utilized to indicate the struggles in the Global South due to extractive and infrastructure projects. In the global North,

Environmental justice (EJ) movements initially emerged in the US during the late 70s. Although these conflicts have been accelerated since the 1980s, environment-related conflicts in both the global north and global south have been common before that, however, since the movements had not been using "environment" in their language, or as their central concern, the Mantra of Environmental Justice has entered the political and academic discourse only after the 90s (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Love Canal, New York (1978), and Warren County, North Carolina (1982) can be considered the milestones of the urban environmental justice movement. The anti-racist environmentalism of these movements has helped to link the social and ecological aspects of the justice issues to one another directly (Anguelovski, 2015; Anguelovski & Martinez-Alier, 2014; Martinez-Alier, 2002). Historically marginalized, low-income and minority communities had mobilized against the fatal health impacts since the industry was using and disposing of the toxic chemicals where they live in both locations. Since then, almost 3000 environmental justice movements and/or the cases of environmentalism of the poor have been entered in Environmental Justice Atlas all around the world (Schneidel et al., 2020).

The Mantra of Environmental Justice has been introduced by Martinez-Alier (2002) as a category of environmentalism, different from the other apolitical currents of environmentalism, viz. The Cult of Wilderness and the Gospel of Eco-efficiency (also see Robbins, 2011). The aim of the former is "to preserve the remnants of pristine natural spaces outside the market. It arises from the love of beautiful landscapes and from deeply held values, not from material interests." (Martinez-Alier, 2002, p.3; Martinez-Alier, 1995; see also Inglehart, 1971; 1977). The latter is a management strategy of resources, targeting to achieve the same size of the economy

with less resources through reducing resource use and carbon emissions with technological improvements (Martinez-Alier, 2002).

One of the fundamental problems of these two currents is that they see nature separated from society and politics. They blame overpopulation, lack of scientific knowledge/technology, poor people's "mismanagement" of environment as the main problems of ecological degradation, rather than economic growth and the capitalist mode of production (Robbins, 2011). They do not question the expansion of commodity frontiers[6], and seek to find a reformist solution to the hazardous impacts of further commodification of labor and nature. Both are of the opinion that there is a conceptual divide between humans and nature, so nature is something to be protected from humans by either conversation for aesthetic and ecological values or by reducing the impacts of production and consumption with ecological modernization, technological innovations, and further privatization of nature.

Such aims paradoxically open the possibility of a top-down and colonial approach to nature, "underdeveloped" countries, and marginalized poor populations. For example, conservation-induced displacement has resulted in the dispossession and the loss of livelihoods for many communities (see the displacement in the Central Park in New York or Mozambique's Limpopo National Park (Fisher, 2011; Masse, 2016)). Also, some ecological services are evaluated monetarily to persuade people of their true value, which, however, leads to the highly problematic possibility that people feel they can just pay for and use these resources indiscriminately. Ecological modernization can also be problematic since it is normally framed as technologies needed to be diffused towards developing countries without questioning how such technology would impact inter and intrastate power

relations, inequality, and access. Climate-smart agriculture would be a very emblematic example of the gospel of eco-efficiency (Taylor, 2018).

The third current is the Mantra of Environmental Justice, which includes environmentalism of the poor of developing and developed countries, and urban environmental justice movements. This current directly stems from the expansion of the economy through new commodity frontiers[7], resulting in the increase in waste production, the usage of more natural resources, and the expansion and intensification of land use. Such environmental change directly attacks material interests of indigenous and poor people since it threatens their livelihoods, health, and mode of living. Beyond that, they generally do not benefit from the value-added produced by the projects that threaten their livelihood. Here, it is important to note that the emphasis on the materiality of ecological distribution conflicts does not mean that these conflicts and movements will easily quiet down with monetary compensation for their loss. In these conflicts and movements, there are various valuation languages, many of which are incommensurable, territorial rights, sacredness, livelihood values being examples (Schneidel et al., 2018, Martinez-Alier, 2008).

The ethical concern of these movements in terms of environmental protection is not the intrinsic value of nature per se, but rather their dependency on and connectivity of the sustainable management of natural resources to maintain the livelihood of related peoples. Indigenous populations maintain and preserve natural resources carefully for their livelihood and struggle to defend their environment when there is a threat. In that sense, these ecological distribution conflicts are

[7] Commodity frontiers is defined as the expansion and intensification of economic activities by incorporating new sites for extracting and using natural resources into World economy (see Conde & Walter, 2015).

evaluated as the potential forces for the struggle for sustainability (Schneidel et al., 2018).

2.3.2. Ecological justice

In his book, Schlosberg (2013) questions whether the discussion of environmental justice can be expanded to the concept of ecological justice. His argument is as follows:

> in both environmental and ecological justice, we can use a similar set of concepts, tools, and languages; indeed, the same conceptions can be applied to both environmental and ecological matters. Realizing this may help us get beyond the divide between environmental and ecological justice, and into a practice of recognition, expanding decision-making, and providing the capacities necessary for individual and community functioning to human and nonhuman alike. (p.8)

Ecological distribution conflicts problematize the burden of environmental bads that fall on groups that make negligible or zero contributions to the production of these bads. Although the actors of environmental justice lead a de facto ecologically harmonious life (such as the low ecological footprints due to the mode of living of the minorities in the cities or the low environmental impacts due to the production practices and scales of the farmers who take action against mining projects in the countryside) they may not directly and explicitly problematize ecology in their struggle (Martinez-Alier 2002).

The ecological justice concept, unlike environmental justice, explicitly includes doing justice to nature as Schlosberg (2013) states. It attributes not only an instrumental but also an intrinsic value to the environment. In this respect, it challenges the anthropocentric point of view and addresses how non-human nature is affected by human activities. In that framing, development projects such as mining projects, newly opened bridges, airports, and thermal power plants are opposed not

just for their negative social impacts such as loss of culture, gentrification, the risk of overpopulation in central neighborhoods and displacement, but also for their ecological impacts like habitat degradation, land contamination, waste generation, and water pollution. While social impacts are defacto anthropocentric, the effects of these projects on environmental transformation can be considered as either environmental or ecological justice issues. For example, the impact of water pollution on human health is rather an anthropocentric justice issue, while taking into account its effect on the migration routes of migratory birds residing on that water or ecological corridors requires a more eco-centric perspective. Biodiversity conversation, justice to species, and justice to animate and inanimate nature can be considered the subjects of ecological justice.

The two central questions here are should the ecosystem be preserved because of the functions it offers to humans or because it has value in itself; and how should nature be protected? As noted, the former is responding to the question of where the focus is anchored on the spectrum of eco-centrism or anthropocentrism. The latter distinguishes between ecological justice and the cult of wilderness. While ecological justice establishes itself based on the acceptance of equal access to environmental resources and services and protecting nature with ecologically sound practices (Schlosberg, 2013, Devine, 2004), the cult of wilderness can adopt an exclusionary approach such as leading to a forced displacement for a conversation of a national park. In that sense, these two approaches assign differential rights and values to the relationship between the human-non-human environment, which in turn have different implications for the political terrain.

2.3.3 Climate justice

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, human-induced climate change brings about unprecedented and enormous changes in the environment. Compared to the periods before the industrial revolution, the average global temperatures have risen 1.1 °C since the industrial revolution, leading to sea-level rise, changes in weather patterns like drought and flooding through decreasing precipitation and more intense and sudden rainfalls, increase in the frequency, duration, and intensity of drought, more wildfires, and stronger hurricanes as the ocean temperatures rise, etc. (IPCC, 2022, 2014).

Such climatic changes have reflections on both ecosystems and human systems. The IPCC reports (2022, 2014) indicate that climate change results in changes in ecosystem structure, timing of annual cycles of species (phenology), and above all loss of biodiversity. In the IPCC reports, the impacts of climate change on human systems are divided into three categories: the impact of climate change on water scarcity and food production, on health and wellbeing, and on cities, settlements, and infrastructure. These effects are differentiated across different social groups, different localities, and/or across time.

Climate change is the subject of justice due to this differentiation. Although it is emphasized that climate change differs from previous climatic variabilities on earth with expressions such as human-induced, and man-made, it is not that all people together cause climate change. The famous short documentary demonstrated at UN Rio+20 called *Welcome to the Anthropocene* has been criticized widely since it blames humanity—the population more specifically—for being the main reason for climate change (Barca, 2020). However, some groups and some localities have disproportionately low responsibility for causing the emissions responsible for

climate change in the first place. The richest 10% is responsible for half of total lifestyle consumption emissions, while the poorest 50% is responsible for only 10%.[8] Controversially, it is the poorest 50% who get affected by the impacts of climate change more severely in terms of the extent of the exposure to hazards, and access to resources to respond to these hazards.

In the fifth IPCC assessment report (2014, p.12) the direct risks of climate change are indicated as follows:

- Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and small island developing states and other small islands, due to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level rise.
- Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations due to inland flooding in some regions.
- Risk of mortality and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors in urban or rural areas.
- Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for poorer populations in urban and rural settings.
- Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to drinking and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity, particularly for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid regions.

Additionally, for the first time, in the sixth assessment report of IPCC (2022), colonialism is addressed as the historical driver of climate change and an ongoing threat to equity. Acknowledgement of decolonization as being central to the global response to climate change is a very important development.

Keeping these facts of injustices in mind, the concept of climate justice has been initially spoken out by social movements. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the climate justice movement has emerged as a critical voice by following the tradition of environmental justice movements throughout the world and it has drawn attention

[8] https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/confronting-carbon-inequality

to race and class-based inequalities in experiencing climate change and demand for systemic change.

From the climate justice movement perspective, which has become more radical over the course of the years, the steps to be taken have been listed in the Cochabamba summit[9] (Bond, 2019, p.158):

- By 2017, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50%.
- Stabilize temperature rises to 1oC and 300 parts per million.
- Acknowledge the climate debt owed by developed countries.
- Achieve full respect for human rights and the inherent rights of indigenous people.
- Universal declaration of rights of Mother Earth to ensure harmony with nature.
- Establish an International Court of Climate Justice.
- Reject carbon markets and commodification of nature and forests through the REDD Programme.
- Promote measures that change consumption patterns in rich countries.
- End intellectual property rights for technologies useful for mitigating climate change.
- Payment of 6% of developed countries' GDP to address climate change.

As can be understood from these articles, the climate justice movement is not only concerned with the injustices created by inaction, but also with how just the steps to be taken against climate change are and will be. They have emphasized that market-based solutions are false solutions.[10] From the very beginning, the coal and oil industry, their power of lobbying against climate change, and rich countries have been identified and blamed for the climate crisis by these movements.

From Global Justice Ecology Project, Anne Paterman (2009 as cited in Bond, 2013) defines climate justice as follows:

> Climate Justice is the recognition that the historical responsibility for the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions lies with the industrialized countries of the global north. It is the understanding that peasants, indigenous peoples,

9 http://cochabamba2010.typepad.com/blog/2010/08/the-proposals-of-peoples- agreement-in-the-texts-for-united-nations-negotiation-on-climate-change.html

10 https://globaljusticeecology.org/false-solutions-to-climate-change/

> fisher-folk, women and local communities have been disproportionately affected by climate change, also by the fossil fuel industry and by false solutions to climate change, including tree plantations, genetically modified organisms like crops, large scale hydro projects and agro-fuels. These are also the people least responsible for climate change. Climate Justice recognizes that instead of market-based solutions, the sustainable practices of these peoples and communities should be seen as offering the real solutions to climate change. Climate Justice is the fundamental knowledge that climate change cannot be addressed through corporations and the market as these are the entities that caused the problem in the first place.

Within time, the claims and demands of climate justice movements have entered the agenda of the mainstream environmental NGOs and the legal discourse. They have become part of the discourse of the bargaining coalitions at the UN Conference of the Parties (COPs) negotiations. Such improvement is important for the movements since it is better than neither being seen nor heard of, on the other hand, the concept has been in danger of being co-opted by corporate actors and mainstream foundations with fundraising power whose interpretation of the term is a the direct opposite of the interpretation of climate justice movements.

Bullard (2009, as cited in Bond, 2018) has divided the climate policy agenda into three categories: a) business-as-usual; b) catastrophism, (minor and market-based solutions such as geo-engineering, nuclear and carbon markets); and c) climate justice which is supported by movements. According to Bond (2018), the international negotiations (i.e., COPs) and agreements such as Kyoto Protocol or Paris Agreement and state actions are fallen under the first two categories. In other words, these actors either have done nothing to curb their emissions or relied on techno-fixes that have not been reduced net emissions so far. However, it is important to note that recent years have witnessed a stronger political engagement with the climate crisis, as perhaps the impacts of climate change on daily lives have been increasingly felt by many in a rather direct manner. The UN 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement in 2015, and lately the 2021 Glasgow Summit are just some

examples of intensifying international initiatives (UN FCCC, 2021). The European Green Deal and the Green New Deal in the US are, on the other hand, examples of governmental policies that aim for "a fair and equitable process of moving towards a post-carbon economy" (McCauley & Heffron, 2018: 2). However, as climate justice movements argue, these initiatives only strengthen the belief that the real and just solutions will come with the demands of bottom-up movements. The studies show that there is no energy transition, but energy expansion (TNI & TUED, 2021), and policy tools to combat climate change have been undermined by short-term profit-oriented motives, preventing them from serving their purpose to reduce emissions equitably (Stuar, Gunderson & Petersen, 2019; Arsel & Büscher, 2012)

Such transformation in the economic system requires thinking about the justice dimension of climate policies. Adaptation to the expected change of climate by decreasing vulnerabilities and increasing resilience is necessary, on the one hand, and on the other hand, mitigation is required by decreasing the use of fossil fuels, investing in renewable energy sources, improving energy efficiency, optimal and sustainable solutions to urban land use and growing public transportation. Since these changes are directly related to energy systems, I will look at energy justice on the consumption side and just transition on the production side in the next subsections.

2.3.3.1 Energy Justice

The most prominent policy in the discussions of climate mitigation is energy transition since a further rise in average global temperatures cannot be kept under 1.5 °C until 2100 without it. The discussion around energy justice as a theoretical and practical concept has been accelerated along with the need for the transformation of

the energy system to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The shift of the energy mix from fossil-fuel-dependent energy production to renewables has increased the concerns around energy access, energy security, energy poverty, and development goals. This concept is to address the challenges that are put forward by neoliberal energy policies so as to replicate the old injustices during and after the transition.

On the one hand, conventional energy production from coal and oil has led to air pollution that threatens the health of people living around the settlements of the power plants, besides being responsible for 89% of global CO2 emissions (EIA, 2021a). On the other hand, fossil fuel is still the cheapest to produce energy, although this fact is expected to change soon with the decline in the costs of renewable energy technologies. Available and relatively cheap coal seems indispensable to following development objectives for now, obviously at the expense of long-term climate goals. Given that countries, mainly developing countries continue to rely on coal, the phase-out of coal and oil have always been a contested theme, especially with regard to energy security. In the last climate summit in Glasgow, India's intervention to get the term "phase-out" of coal changed to "phase-down" was the most resonant, almost the tabloid side, of the summit since it heated the discussion of how developing countries can achieve progress in the fight against poverty, malnutrition, and poorer public health and education systems without repeating the carbon-intensive development patterns of industrialized countries (Dsouza & Singhal, 2021; Farand, 2021).

In Sustainable Development Goals, which is a set of policy agendas for more equitable and sustainable future proposed by United Nations, a "dedicated and stand-alone" target, the 7th target, calls for ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all, and as such directly addresses the energy

issue from a social justice perspective. An estimated 2.7 billion people today, mostly in developing countries and rural areas, heat and cook with traditional biomass, and 1.4 billion people do not have access to grid electricity (EIA, 2021a). The lack of access to modern electricity means shorter days, efforts to pursue education by candlelight, lack of a refrigerator to cool food and medicines, and washing clothes by hand, which obviously impact the functionings of people (Sen, 1979). The central question is how would providing modern energy to 2.7 billion people goes hand in hand with the need to reduce emissions required by the climate crisis. Besides, as energy transition is expected to be expensive how would the increase in energy prices during this transition impact energy poverty.

These existing dilemmas and injustices make the concept of energy justice an "explanatory framework that is positioned as a conceptual, empirical and decision-making tool". (Jenkins, Stephens, Reames, & Hernandez, 2020, p.1.; Sovacool, Burke, Baker & Kotikalapudi & Wlokas., 2017). The studies on energy justice propose that energy justice is a useful term for academic and policy-oriented purposes. They see energy justice as a more focused concept, and thus beneficial to better address both distributive and procedural justice issues.

2.3.3.2 Just transition

As the transition to a low carbon economy requires the plans to phase out the fossil fuel industry, what would happen to workers and regional economies around this industry has appeared as a huge question. The concept has been sometimes taken under the energy justice heading but is also widely discussed as a separate concern since the actors who initiated the term were different, and it is more related to the production side of the fossil fuel industry. Starting from the 1990s, trade unions have

started to problematize the transition process, since it is likely for a net-zero economy to lead to concentrated job losses at the regional scale.

Just transition can be thought of as a new current of working-class environmentalism. Barca (2012) defines working-class environmentalism as "to defend the integrity and safety of their working environment and of the environment where their families and communities live." (p.66). Barca (2015) divides working-class environmentalism into two periods. The first current is only concerned with occupational health and safety and historically back to an earlier date, and the second current, i.e., advocating for just transition, has canalized its energy to the establishment of a green economy by protecting workers and their communities' rights.

Just transition has initially emerged due to environmental protection policies and related job losses; and with the declaration of net-zero carbon economies and announcements of plans to shut down coal-fired power plants from governments, it has become more related to climate policies, especially in the global North (OECD, 2017). As environmental, climate, and energy justice, just transition can be thought of as a political struggle for just and equitable solutions toward a low carbon economy.

International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)[11] defines just transition as follows:

> A Just Transition secures the future and livelihoods of workers and their communities in the transition to a low-carbon economy. It is based on social dialogue between workers and their unions, employers, government, and communities. A plan for Just Transition provides and guarantees better and decent jobs, social protection, more training opportunities, and greater job security for all workers affected by global warming and climate change policies.

[11] https://www.ituc-csi.org/just-transition-centre

Besides these items about the jobs, Rosemberg (2010), who was the former ITUC executive, indicates that a just transition needs to include "sound investments in low-emission and labor-intensive technologies and sectors; research and early assessment of social and employment impacts; social dialogue and democratic consultation of social partners and stakeholders; local analysis and economic diversification plans" (pp. 143-144). These requirements for a just transition means that just transition is a term not only used for decent and green jobs but also applies a broader justice agenda in terms of its distributive and procedural concerns (Rosemberg 2010; McCauley & Heffron 2018).

2.4 The quadrant of justice

Stevis and Felli (2015) propose an analytical tool to categorize the existing labor movements advocating for just transition. Their analytical tool draws on the current debates on environmental justice, and it is based on the notions and concepts that are the end-products of those debates. They classify approaches to environmental justice along two different dimensions:

- Whether the claims of justice are seen to be achievable within the existing political/economic structure of the society, or whether a structural transformation in the system is required;
- Whether the understanding of justice includes nature per se and if doing justice to nature is included as a separate category (the eco-centric approach), or whether social justice concerns are also taken into account in addition to environmental justice concerns.

In the light of these discussions, they have proposed four ends in their analytical tool: affirmative vs. transformative (inspired by Fraser (2005)); ecological vs. environmental justice (inspired by Schlosberg, 2013).

When they investigate just transition struggles, they state that there is no movement falling under the category of affirmative ecological justice, which is doing justice to nature in a reformist manner without considering its social aspects. They name varieties of just transition as *just transition and the "shared solution approach"* such as policy proposals of ILO, UNEP that basically share the criteria of affirmative environmental justice that propose win-win solutions; i.e., the just transition and the differentiated responsibility approach (transformative environmental justice), that puts emphasis on the distributive consequences of climate policies and defend climate policies that protect the losers of such transition; and the just transition and the social-ecological approach (transformative ecological justice), that problematize capitalism, and its profit-seeking morality by exploiting nature and labor as the main source of social and ecological injustices.

Inspired by Stevis & Felli (2015), I will use a similar analytical tool to analyze the positions of climate mitigation advocates in Turkey. The first dimension of the analysis is about the political economy of justice, whether they take justice as distribution (Rawlsian justice) vs. justice beyond distribution (political processes, recognition, participation, functioning, and the role of institutions of power). For the second dimesion, I propose that the affirmative eco-centric approaches match with Martinez-Alier's(2002) first two current: conservationism, and the gospel of eco-efficiency. Such approaches do not need a systemic change, and only seek to protect the environment, if they are not just suggestions for greenwashing, sometimes at the expense of people. The second end of this dimension represents an economic

transformation with a focus on social aspects. In this line, different understandings of justice can be thought of as operating within and at different ends of the spectrum of eco-centricism and socio-ecological justice (see Schlosberg, 2013; Martinez-Alier 2002, Stevis, 2000).



Figure 2. The quadrant of justice

CHAPTER 3

CURRENT MITIGATION POLICIES AND THEIR SOCIAL IMPACTS

In this chapter, after briefly mentioning why emission reductions are necessary, I will first explain the steps taken or planned to be taken to reduce emissions in the world and in Turkey. Then, I will provide an overview of the possible social consequences of such mitigation policies.

In the previous chapter, the impacts of global warming, especially on vulnerable groups and regions, have been listed (mainly drawing on IPCC, 2014, 2022). According to the *Special report: Global warming of 1,5°C*, major climate change catastrophes are only preventable if global temperature increase can be kept under under 1,5°C until the year 2100 (Figure 2 indicates how close we are to 1,5°C). Thus 1,5°C has been set as a reachable goal, requiring a smaller adaptation effort than what will be needed at any higher increase in global temperature (see IPCC, 2018, for comparison of the impacts of 1,5°C and 2°C increase). Beyond a 1,5°C increase, the adaptation is likely to bring more severe costs.

IPCC's *Fifth assessment report* (IPCC, 2014) indicates representative concentration pathways (RCPs), through modeling different climate scenarios. These scenarios are called the peak and decline scenario (RCP2.6); the stabilization scenario (RCP4.5); the climate policy intervention scenario (RCP6.0); and the comparatively high greenhouse emissions scenario (RCP8.5). These scenarios lead to a 1.3-1.9°C; 2-3 °C; 2.6-3.7°C; 4.0-6.1°C increase compared to pre-industrial levels, respectively.



Figure 3. The current global warming is compared with a 1,5°C increase (IPCC, 2018)

While RCP8.5 represents fossil-fuel-dependent economies with no climate policy; for the RCP2.6 scenario to come true, ambitious mitigation plans need to be implemented.[12] As seen in figure 3, the RCP 2.6 scenario means a sharp decline in greenhouse gas emissions.



Figure 4. Global CO_2 emissions and scenarios for the 21st century (IPCC 2014)

[12] https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-four-years-left-one-point-five-carbon-budget

These scenarios show that under the business-as-usual scenario, the world will become inhabitable in the near future. To avoid the disastrous impacts of climate crises, the ultimate 1.5 °C goal should be achieved, and the achievement of this goal depends on the realization of ambitious climate plans.

Ambitious climate plans translate themselves into a dramatic change in the economy. From energy, industry, agriculture, transportation, and construction to land-use change, each sector contributes to the increase in greenhouse gas emissions, and thus there is a need for transformation in each sector of the economy. Figure 4 shows greenhouse gas emissions at the sectoral level. As can be seen in Figure 4, the energy sector is responsible for 73.2% of all emissions, and thus energy transformation lies at the core of combatting climate change.[13]



Figure 5. Global greenhouse gas emissions by sector
Source: https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector

[13] https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector

To reduce emissions from the energy sector, there are policy objectives that aim at energy efficiency, renewable energy use, and carbon reduction with carbon capture and storage. This thesis will discuss the first two objectives, but will not consider the policies to develop and preserve carbon sinks—the so-called negative-emission technologies-- either through forestry carbon projects such as REDD+[14] or carbon capture technologies. There are two reasons for that: First, promises of future reforestation occupy a lot of space in governments' mitigation policies and companies' offsetting strategies; however, the pace of deforestation is slow and only advancing. Second, in future projections, negative emission technologies are highly reliant on keeping climate change below 2°C, but apart from smaller-scale trials and applications, these technologies have not been advanced yet. Scenarios created based on carbon capture technologies that might be developed in the future postpone the steps that need to be taken today to the future and lead to using of these future technologies as arguments for technology optimism (Anderson & Peters, 2016).

The two policy objectives that I discuss, i.e., energy efficiency and renewable energy use, try to minimize energy consumption with efficiency measures and reduce fossil-fuel dependency on the production side with interventions that aim to increase the share of renewable energy and reduce the share of fossil fuels in the system. Economic instruments and regulatory schemes—such as carbon pricing, taxes and fees on fuels and energy consumption, subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency, subsidy reform for fossil fuels (withdrawal of subsidies), investments in renewable energy or low-carbon technologies and infrastructures, and measures to expand public and low energy modes of transportation—could be

[14] Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. This program benefits countries as it offset the emisissions with the existing forests.

counted as policy tools to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Although it is argued that with high-consumption patterns of the upper classes and economic growth, it is not possible to reduce emissions to the intended point since absolute decoupling, i.e., using less energy and materials to secure the same rate of growth, is not possible (Hickel & Kallis, 2019), the current mainstream climate policies have not included a reduction in demand-side into their agenda till very recently (Mastini, Kallis & Hickel, 2019; DIEM, 2019[15]). It is only in the recent IPCC report that degrowth, i.e., equitable downscaling of the economy, has been mentioned several times as the ultimate solution to climate change (IPCC, 2022; Parrique, 2022).

3.1. A brief explanation of climate mitigation policies[16]

This thesis covers only those mitigation policies suggested in policy texts and/or implemented in practice that have direct distributive effects. The problem of mitigating emissions is addressed through a wide range of climate policies from direct investment to public subsidies, from R&D investments to the establishment of new institutions, from education to capacity building. For example, not only setting up renewable energy power plants but also investing in the development of renewable energy technologies are to be considered a climate mitigation policy. Or, as mentioned in the *Blueprint for Europe's Just Transition* (DIEM, 2019), establishment of an environmental justice commission is also a governance-related climate policy. In addition to their contribution to reducing emissions, these policies can be assessed through the lens of justice; however, assessing these policies within

[15] A report called "A blueprint for Europe's just transition" written by the pan-European political movement Democracy in Europe Movement 2025.
[16] See Lamb et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019; Michaelowa et al., 2018; Büchs et al., 2018; Boyce, 2018.

the framework of social and ecological justice is not an easy task, since they are too complex to evaluate in terms of their distributive impacts. The most popular mitigation policies are described below.

- Carbon pricing

Carbon pricing is a policy tool to internalize the external costs of carbon emissions by putting a price on the tons of carbon that emitters generate, and thus creating incentives to use less environmentally-harmful ways of production and consumption. This policy can be designed in various ways. The most widely used way to put a price on carbon is the carbon trading system, i.e., cap & trade. This system first decides the total quantity of emissions, i.e., puts a cap on total emissions, and this total amount of emissions is allocated between economic bodies, be it sectors, companies, or households. Then its price is determined in the market, so the market decides the price of the permits. On the other hand, the carbon tax puts a price on carbon and hopes to reduce emissions with this disincentive. In that sense, putting a carbon tax does not determine the total amount of emissions (Büchs et al., 2011).

- Tax on energy use

Different from the carbon tax, the tax on energy use is levied directly on energy production, distribution, and consumption. Taxes on energy use, although not a direct climate policy, can be considered as a climate policy since they are expected to restrict fossil dependency.

- Subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency in the buildings:

This policy ensures that insulation that makes energy consumption in buildings more efficient is supported by public policies and private partnerships. The policy's aim is to both reduce household energy use in line with net-zero targets.

- Subsidy reform for fossil fuels (withdrawal of subsidies)

As governments continue to subsidize the fossil fuel industry with dozens of billions of dollars through tax exemptions and direct funding to lower the cost of fossil-fuel-dependent energy production, this policy aims at eliminating these tax exemptions and funding, and introducing deterring taxation on oil, gas, and coal.

- Investments in renewable energy

Since emission reduction will not occur unless energy production is transformed, renewable energy expansion is at the forefront of climate change policies to reduce the climate impact of energy production and meet existing energy demand. These investments can be locally-based or large-scale centralized energy projects, and owned by public or private entities.

- Measures to expand public transportation and low energy modes

The provision of well-connected, frequent, and reliable public transportation plays an important role to reduce transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions since it reduces the use of private cars and related energy consumption.

3.2 Mitigation Policies in the World

While scientific studies on climate change and its adverse effects are accumulating without leaving any room for denial or doubt, the steps that needs to be taken in line with the scientific information are taken very slowly and insufficiently at both the international and national levels. Since the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, i.e., the world's first greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction treaty that targeted to reduce emissions by 5% below 1990 levels, six assessment reports have been published by IPCC[17]; however, GHG emissions have continued to rise due to lack of any

[17] For the policy milestones, this website can be checked: https://unfccc.int/timeline/

significant steps toward mitigation. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005. After 10 years, The Paris Agreement, which was adopted in 2015, replaced the Kyoto Protocol. While the former considered developed countries as the only responsible ones for climate change mitigation, the latter recognized that dealing with climate change requires the cooperation of all countries.

The Paris Agreement was adopted by 196 countries, and so far, only four countries, i.e., Iran, Eritrea, Libya, and Yemen, are left to ratify it.[18] It indicates its three main purposes in Article 2, which are about mitigation, adaptation and resilience, and finance respectively, as follows:

> (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
> (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and
> (c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

In line with these purposes, according to the Paris Agreement, each party must submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC secretariat, to be updated every five years. NDCs indicate the country's intended climate efforts, such as their emission reduction targets, financial resource allocation, and capacity building for mitigation and adaptation.

However, many problems associated with NDCs have shown that by themselves, they are not enough to combat climate change. The first and most important of these problems is the concern of whether the sum of the nation-states' unique contributions can produce a solution to a global problem. NDCs declared so

[18] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en

far will lead to the global temperature rise at 2.7 degrees, which is not even coming close to the 1.5 degrees target (UNEP-CCC, 2021). Second, NDCs can be considered technical reports for emission reduction. In other words, they do not include the concerns about how different segments of the society can be affected by these reductions, and how the costs and benefits that will arise during the transition process will be shared in the society (Allam et al., 2022).

To fill this gap, governmental bodies have started to announce various kinds of green new deals. When it comes to building an economy compatible with climate change, the Green New Deal is the most prominent solution in terms of scope and realism.

The Green New Deal adds ecological concerns to the comprehensive public policy initiative, the New Deal, that was put into practice in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt came to office as the president in the USA right after the Great Depression of 1929, which had turned the economy and social life upside down. The New Deal basically aimed to increase employment and expand the scope of social welfare. In an environment where thousands of companies went bankrupt, millions fell into poverty and could not meet their very basic needs due to the inadequacy of social welfare safety nets, the collapse of the markets and the accompanying panic were quelled by Roosevelt's policy agenda that located the state in the economic life as an important figure based on the principles of Relief (from poverty and unemployment), Recovery (of the economy), and Reform (to avoid similar consequences in the future). Also, although it is not related to the new deal concept directly, it is important to remember that the dominance of the "welfare state" in Europe after the devastating impacts of World War II was similar to Roosevelt's new deal in terms of the state being active in the fight against unemployment, ensuring justice in the

distribution of income and wealth, and meeting basic needs such as health, education, transportation, and shelter. This economic trend was interrupted by the neoliberal turn in the 1980s (Adaman, 2021; Pettifor, 2020; Barbier, 2010).

Inspired by Roosevelt's new deal, the Green New Deal was introduced into political and academic life for the first time in 2007 by Thomas Friedman (2007), a columnist for *The New York Times*. Since then, it has started to occupy an increasingly important place in public and policy debates. As it is known, In the US, in February 2019 representatives AOC and Ed Markey presented the Green New Deal that linked environmental and economic programs to the US Congress. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Commission announced the European Green Deal in December 2019 (see Figure 5 below for the similarities between the Green New Deal in the USA and Europe's Green Deal [Bloomfield & Steward, 2020]). Besides reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst consequences of climate change, these political scripts aim to take steps to correct social problems such as employment, poverty, economic inequality, and injustice. In this respect, the Green New Deal does not take the transition to a low-carbon economy only as a technical/technological transformation, but it proposes a policy that puts social welfare at the center and presents a framework that emphasizes participatory democracy and pluralism, although it is not yet clear whether governments have the will and ability to translate this framework into a viable policy.

The Green New Deal has been adopted by governments with different political views. In this respect, it is difficult to agree on what it represents. Fundamentally, however, Green New Deal advocates going beyond market-based environmental policies, emphasizing the need for the state, coordination, and public investment to take an active role in the economy. In that sense, it is a significant

break with the neoliberal dogma that has dominated the world for the last 40 years (Mastini et al., 2021).



Figure 6. The similarities between the Green New Deal in the USA and Europe's Green Deal (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020)

Besides these two major political engagements, there are other green new deal (GND) proposals, for example, Bernie Sanders's GND, UK Labor Party's GND, GND of Australian Greens, K-New Deal from South Korea, and A *Blueprint for Europe's Just Transition*, written by DIEM25. All of these policy packages propose a framework for just transition (Zografos & Robbins, 2020). Also, while the US and EU aim to be carbon neutral[19] by 2050, China plans to hit net zero[20] by 2060. Recently at COP26 at Glasgow, India has announced that the deadline to be net-zero for India will be 2070. Moreover, while some European countries such as Belgium, Austria, and Sweden have already become coal-free; Portugal, France, the UK, Italy, and Ireland will achieve a coal phase-out by 2025; Greece, Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, Slovakia, and Hungary will phase the coal out by 2030. Germany plans to be coal-free by 2038. Some of the countries have not had any phase-out discussion

[19] Carbon neutrality means the balance between the amount of carbon emissions and carbon removal from the atmosphere.
[20] Net zero emission mean being carbon neutral.

such as Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Poland, Serbia, and Turkey. In the Czech Republic, North Macedonia, Slovenia, Spain coal phase-out is under discussion.[21] Also, China has announced that it will not support any new coal-fired power plants abroad, India will reduce the role of coal in its energy mix gradually, while not reducing to use of coal in absolute terms.

Another key mitigation policy tool, emission trading schemes (ETS) have been established at regional and national levels. The legislated mandatory emissions trading schemes are EU ETS, New Zealand ETS, South Korean ETS, Kazakhstan ETS, and Swiss ETS. Also, the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to trade emissions with each other. At the regional level, cap-and-trade schemes have been established in California, the US; Quebec, Canada; Tokyo and Saimata, Japan.[22] Lastly, the carbon tax has been implemented since 1990, starting in Finland and ranging from 137 USD per metric ton of CO_2 equivalent in Sweden to less than 1 USD in Poland.[23]

3.3 Where is Turkey in terms of mitigation policies?

Studies conducted mostly in global North countries show that climate policies have emerged as a threat for the vulnerable groups, i.e., the economically-disadvantaged, racial and ethnic minorities, the uninsured, low-income women and children, the elderly etc., as their implementation is likely to increase the price of necessities (Büchs et al., 2021), and would lead to regressive distributional impacts (Lamb et al.,

[21] https://beyond-coal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Overview-of-national-coal-phase-out-announcements-Europe-Beyond-Coal-January-2021.pdf

[22] https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/EmissionsTradingSchemes

[23] https://www.statista.com/statistics/483590/prices-of-implemented-carbon-pricing-instruments-worldwide-by-select-country/

2020; Büchs et al., 2011) if these groups are not compensated for potential losses. Also, decreased demand for fossil fuels is expected to lead to job losses, localized economic decline, and risk of social unrest (Lamb et al., 2020; Garcia-Garcia et al., 2020; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). In some countries, these issues have gradually become a part of welfare policies and there have been attempts to address the potential challenges, as in the example of *The Fit for 55 Package*.[24] However, many others conduct discussions on who bears responsibility and where costs and benefits should be allocated as a way to delay climate action (Lamb et al., 2020) or disregard these discussions due to lack of institutional capacity and/or unwillingness to handle them.

As mentioned above, ambitious governmental plans for climate policy are on the way in many global North countries, and these plans will be the push factor to become a carbon-neutral economy not just within their borders but also, through trade, finance, and further political relationships, in other countries. Climate mitigation policies that have been implemented so far and the ones that are on the way show that the emission reduction policies implemented as part of a consistent and climate-sensitive program will also bring about structural changes in developing countries (Urban, 2014).

The transformation of climate policies (and their relationships with social polices) in developing countries cannot be evaluated without considering the distributional impacts and the challenges of addressing them through social policies. To see how climate policies will take shape in such contexts, it is necessary first to analyze the existing position of these countries towards climate policies.

[24] *The Fit for 55 Package* is a proposal to ensure that EU policies achieve climate goals not at the expense of social goals.

In Turkey, the total GHG emissions have increased by 137% since 1990, and the energy sector's share stands at 72%—the bulk being generated by coal-based energy plants (IEA, 2021b). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shared "Turkey's target of zero emissions by 2053" with world leaders at the G20 summit in Rome—in line with the recent ratification of the Paris Agreement, which seems like a turning point for Turkey. However, according to experts, it is not possible for Turkey to reach the zero-emission target in 2053 by continuing its current coal policies (Şahin et al., 2022). The announced 2053 net-zero emission target indicates that Turkey has initiated a new and ambitious process in terms of emission reduction policies. In order for the announced climate targets to be achieved, radical changes must be made in the country's energy policy.

On the other hand, the expansion of coal use that has been observed in the country in the recent decades contradicts the recently-announced emission reduction goals, and when it comes to emissions, the energy sector is the single greatest contributor of Turkey's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. According to the data of Turkey Electricity Transmission Inc. (TEİAŞ), the share of coal-fired power plants, total 68 in number, in Turkey's electricity generation is 35%. Furthermore, the share of coal-based electricity generation in Turkey's total electricity production has increased by 39 percent in the last 5 years (TEİAŞ, 2021). Thus, there exists a very strong probability that Turkey will not give up coal in the near future. To add to that, among the current energy plans of the country, there are still targets to open new coal reserve areas and increase the electricity production by relying more on domestic coal (as currently roughly one-third of combusted coal in power plants is imported; Adaman & Arsel, 2016). Given that in the context of the fast-declining costs of renewable energy, new coal power plants are unlikely to be economically efficient;

thus, pursuing further expansion of coal-based electricity generation creates a paradoxical situation (Adaman & Arsel, 2016). The question of why, despite these facts, the government insists on a carbon-intensive pathway, that is, the political economy of the chosen direction might be the subject of another research.

Turkey's coal-seeking direction is also myopic in not taking into account currently occurring and likely to happen transformations in the economic sphere worldwide. With the Paris Agreement, many countries have accelerated their climate change mitigation policies and set targets to completely exit coal energy. In line with calls for immediate limits on emissions, many developed countries have set this target for 2030 or even before. Coal-use is declining on a global scale as a result of negative externalities of coal energy and cost reductions in renewable energy and energy storage. This trend is expected to accelerate in the coming years, which will take away the economic rationale behind coal investments and lead to the growing risk of stranded coal assets. As an example from Turkey, according to the report *The feasibility of coal in the age of renewable energy: The case of Hunutlu Thermal Power Plant*, prepared by WWF-Turkey and SEFiA (2021), the Hunutlu Thermal Power Plant, which is expected to be opened late this year, will not be able to pay back the investment costs during its 30-year economic life—an account that does not even include social and ecological costs.

Also, "The Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism", which will be put into effect at the reporting level in 2023 and implemented from 2026 onwards within the scope of the European Green Deal (A European Green Deal, 2019), also provides an economic justification for countries that trade with the European Union to abandon their coal policies. If Turkey does not change its energy policy, the GDP is expected to decline in the range of 2.7%-3.6% by 2030 due to "The Border Carbon

Adjustment Mechanism" (Acar, Aşıcı & Yeldan, 2021). This scheme is expected to affect carbon-intensive industries such as cement, iron and steel, machinery, automotive, ceramics, glass, and paper.

Despite all these, President Erdoğan has recently wowed that Turkey "is determined to make coal one of our country's new sources of national power" and is "getting ready to say [to the world], 'now is the time for coal' along with 'now is the time for Turkey.'"[25] Emphasizing that the most important reason for the current account deficit in the budget is imported energy, President Erdoğan pointed out the richness of domestic (lignite) coal reserves in Turkey. This argument seems to be flawed for two reasons: i) wind and sunlight are not imported either; ii) it is observed that the installed capacity of imported coal has increased quite rapidly in the last 20 years in Turkey as the thermal value of imported coal is much higher than that of domestic coal. For example, the Hunutlu thermal power plant has been built with a technology that certainly needs imported coal (WWF-Turkey & SEFIA, 2021).

Hence, although it seems economically reasonable for Turkey to update its energy targets and create a comprehensive and realistic strategic plan for a low-carbon economy, the official position seems to keep relying on coal. Perhaps, as mentioned above, pure economic explanations cannot fully explain countries' energy policies, and environmental and social costs alone may not be seen as adequate reasons to give up coal. In countries like Turkey, where it seems reasonable to phase-out coal, the direction of not phasing-out and more investments in coal remain a question of political economy—perhaps beyond the validity of economic, social, and ecological reasons. Previous studies on this subject have engaged with the politics of energy from a social science perspective (Özkaynak et al., 2018), the underlying

[25] https://tr.sputniknews.com/20180605/erdogan-zonguldak-iftar-secimler-konusma-1033740976.html

reasons of the ongoing dependence of Turkey on coal (Ayas & Wiseman, 2022), and Turkey's failure of implementing climate policies in spite of legislative capacity (Adaman & Arsel, 2016). These studies offer us insights into why coal phase-out is not happening in Turkey.

3.4 A brief look at the hegemonic understandings and dynamics among climate action advocates

To understand climate advocates' position in terms of mitigation policies, it is important to analyze their historical and current relationship with the state (Akbulut, 2019). In Turkey, historically, catching up with the West economically and modernizing the society through economic growth have always been a high priority (Akbulut, 2011).

Growth, especially during the rule of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the last 20 years, has been prioritized despite its social and ecological costs, which have accelerated to an unprecedented scale (Adaman, Arsel & Akbulut, 2018). To achieve economic growth, successive JDP governments have principally promoted energy and construction sectors, which have brought about multidimensional impacts on society and ecology. Hydroelectric power plants, nuclear energy investments, staying stuck with coal, all newly opened and planned coal thermal power plants can be thought of as emblematic under this narrative. Such projects and the growth hegemony expressed through these projects can be perceived as the embodiment of ideas of development and modernization, which in turn attract broad-based social support.

All these dynamics can be considered obstacles to the formation of a grassroots movement on climate in Turkey (Çoban, 2021). Although energy projects

cause local resistances, their direct relation to climate change is not recognized by large sections of society. In addition to energy projects, most people do not associate the variability in agricultural production (Adaman, Avcı, Kocagöz & Yeniev, 2020), the infrastructure problems in cities, and the effects of extreme weather events and heatwaves, with climate change (KONDA, 2021).

In this respect, although climate change politics lack a grassroots movement, and climate advocates are essentially made up of academics, municipalities, and NGOs, there still exists a climate movement that articulates its opposition to fossil fuel dependent growth. While the incumbent government has embellished fossil fuel-dependent pathway with the promises of economic growth, power, and prestige, with an aim to establish the success stories of the "New Turkey", climate advocates disagree with this position. They, instead, have been drawing attention to the environmental and social impacts of these projects (Özkaynak, Aydın, Ertör-Akyazı & Ertör, 2015), and argue that the green transformation of the economy is a must.

When we look at these movements through the lens of the hegemonic understanding mentioned above, it is possible to say that the political position of the JDP has brought some disadvantages, particularly for climate advocates. The fear of being criminalized, which manifests itself especially in the last periods of the JDP, can be given as an example of it. Another contextual factor that has influenced the climate movement in the JDP era is the mobilization of different capital groups, and the reinterpretation and domination of Islam (Demiralp, 2009). Combining these two ideological and economic tools into a growth-oriented conservative political position, the JDP torpedoed the grounds of discussion where social opposition could have flourished. Moreover, JDP has continuously declared those who opposed such

growth projects as traitors and terrorists—all of which have further deepened political polarization in the country (Özler & Obash, 2018; Arsel, 2012).

On the other hand, the strong and brutal application of the JDP's existing growth fetish has led some people to begin questioning the idea of growth and development. Even conservationist groups such as TEMA and WWF, who previously worked very closely with the government, had to take a clear stance against such plunder projects. However, the rapid progress of the projects and the lack of ground for the opposition to have political discussions have narrowed the space of political action both in a practical and intellectual manner. More generally, civil society groups have had to engage in reactive activism rather than strengthening their organizational structure and creating alternatives (Kadirbeyoğlu, Adaman, Özkaynak & Paker, 2017). With an increase in polarization, environmental struggles have often remained thin, drawing criticism toward the JDP rather than the neoliberal system itself. This has been preventing people who have different political positions but common ecological concerns to come together to raise their voices. More specifically, this situation has prevented a likely inclusion of poor people, such as peasants whose living spaces were directly threatened by such projects, poor people living in the city and having difficulty meeting their basic needs, or workers working under bad conditions in such projects. It can be argued that people affected by the same problem but with different reasons are more likely to bring the pieces of the puzzle together and pursue a systematic and structural change rather than focus on their particular problems in isolation (Angelouvski, 2015). All the aforementioned groups have been impacted socially by Turkey’s fossil-fuel-dependent growth path, however, it is difficult to say that different actors managed to come together and get organized. Although various groups started to question fuel-dependent projects at all

costs, the failure of such groups to line up against these projects has been weakening the potential for counter-hegemonic politics.

3.5 The justice impacts of mitigation policies

The drivers of climate injustice are as follows: those who contribute least to climate change emissions are those who suffer the most from the consequences of climate change. Besides, the potential of ideas, design, and implementation of climate policies are likely to produce additional injustices. As mentioned above, the steps to reduce emissions have created no significant improvement to stop climate change, so it cannot be said that the lives of those who bear the burden of climate change have become easier in this respect. On the other hand, when it comes to climate policies, it is possible that the steps targeting to reduce emissions can be unfair and socially harmful.

As governments have already submitted their NDCs and many of them have updated their plans with more ambitious emission-reduction targets in the past few years, we can expect climate mitigation policies to be implemented more seriously in the upcoming years. Besides, some of the programs to get out of the ecological, social, and economic crises deepened by the Covid-19 pandemic have accelerated the transition to low-carbon economies since they have been shaped not only for the recovery from the damage during the Covid-19 but also around future-oriented planning that aligns with NDCs (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020).

Although green new deal resolutions can be thought of as a framework for a just transition and transformation—since they are explicitly concerned about the issues of decent work, job losses, poverty eradication, and regional economic decline—they are generally very diverse proposals, and thus, they have not

addressed policies to deal with the possible injustices in a systematic way (Gough, 2021). In that regard, they have achieved the integration of social and ecological concerns; yet, beyond proposing a framework, have fallen short of devising measures to tackle possible negative impacts of mitigation policies to guarantee a just low-carbon transition.

Tackling the unjust outcomes of possible mitigation policies would be useful for the acceptability of these policies as well. Especially in democratic countries, the public support for climate policies significantly affects the applicability and persistence of these policies (Bergquist, Mildenberger & Stokes, 2020; Lamb et al, 2020; Büchs et al., 2011). However, it can also be argued that the questions of legitimation are not that straightforward when it comes to climate policies. States might not enact climate policies simply because there is an objective reason, such as being good for the environment or getting support from the society to deal with environmental problems, besides these reasons, it might want to reproduce the state rule by making their concern with climate change visible and demonstratable. Whether the demand for just climate policies is bottom-up defines the degree to which these policies end up being just, at least in a participatory manner. In another scenario, it is also possible that the state needs to first convince society to ask for climate mitigation policies and then satisfy aspirations of the society. If there is no popular and strong bottom-up demand for just climate policies, then such policies would end up being unfair and socially harmful, which will affect the further popularity of these policies and can create a negative loop to get stuck in a brown economy (Arsel, 2022).

However, beyond pragmatic considerations of the functionality of fair climate policies in terms of popularity and state power, knowledge production may

contribute to progressive social transformation as well as being embedded in social processes. The implementation of mitigation policies is currently an ongoing debate in the world, and whether and how climate policy will be implemented is a field of struggle. Therefore, the importance of ensuring that the transition to climate neutrality is delivered in a socially just manner has gathered growing momentum in the academic literature as well. In this way, many academic studies have also been directly involved in this struggle from the position that climate policy should be fair and equitable (Büchs, Ivanova & Schnepf, 2021; Lamb et al, 2020; Garcia-Garcia et al., 2020; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013; Büchs et al., 2011).

So far, a large body of literature has identified the pros and cons of different climate mitigation policies in terms of their impacts on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion, and how these policies influence procedural justice. While many of them are directly case studies or modeling of some impacts at local, national, and international levels, recently, there have been theoretical papers and review articles on the justice dimension of mitigation policies as well (Lamb et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019).

The literature on mitigation policies (Büchs et al., 2021; Lamb et al, 2020; Garcia-Garcia et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013; Büchs et al., 2011) shows that many policy instruments to mitigate climate change have the potential to generate both positive and negative impacts on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion. The extent and direction of these outcomes depend on how policies are designed and implemented, and whether the action taken addresses potentially regressive outcomes. With the active implementation of additional measures to ensure that positive impacts are maximized, and negative impacts minimized, climate change mitigation policies can

help improve the living circumstances of the most vulnerable, thus actively reducing existing inequalities.

As mentioned above, the potential negative impacts of mitigation policies would be on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion. Recently, Lamb et al. (2020) and Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi (2019) explicitly explored the possible social impacts of mitigation policies. Lamb et al. (2020) did an ex-post literature review and looked at 196 studies to analyze the social impacts of subsidies to energy efficiency retrofits and renewable energies, renewable deployment, taxes (both on energy and carbon), and feed-in-tariff. Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi (2019) divided the policies according to their policy objective into three: reduced energy consumption, reliance on renewable energy policies, and policies to develop and preserve carbon sinks. Insulation projects, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, investment in well-connected public transportation, and discouragement of the use of private cars are under the first category; feed-in tariffs, coal-phase put, hydroelectric dams, both large-scale and decentralized renewable energy investments, electrification of transports, investments in biofuel are under the second category; and forestry carbon projects are under the third one. Besides, Büchs et al. (2011) compare carbon tax and the implementation of various carbon trading schemes in terms of their distributive impacts. And very recently, Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe (2022) published a report on the socio-economic impacts of policy proposals of the *Fit for 55 Package* and the ways to deal with the potential harmful impacts of these policies.

This literature shows that there are justice implications of mitigation policies, and the justice implications are not limited to the distribution of goods and bads. Mitigation policies might avoid inequitable distributive impacts; however, there is

also a risk of not addressing existing structures of injustice. Beyond that, mitigation policies can reproduce and deepen inequities. As Schlosberg (2012) indicates, we can benefit from the concepts of justice to design and implement climate policies in a just way since these concepts can contribute to policy-making processes within the context of countries by allowing us to move away from the abstract and ideal meanings of justice.

One of the framings here is the Rawlsian justice, which advocates for an equitable distribution of ecological and economic goods and bads in the context of climate change. If applied to mitigation policies, this framing, i.e., distributive justice, draws our attention to who bears the brunt of mitigation policies, and who would benefit from them, which creates an enabling basis to come up with a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. On the other hand, lack of recognition, both socially and politically, of social groups and different cultures, can be seen as the root cause of the maldistribution of benefits and burdens. In that case, participatory justice sees the underlying reason behind the distributive inequities as institutional and cultural processes and decision-making mechanisms. In the context of climate justice, and mitigation policies more precisely, this approach means drawing attention to the risks of harm in the case of lack of recognition, and thus promotes the participation of groups that will be directly or indirectly affected by these policies, both in the design and implementation of mitigation policies. Lastly, one of the approaches that will shed light on climate justice is the "capabilities" approach developed by Sen and Nussbaum. Sen defines the concept of capabilities as the freedom not to be exposed to harmful situations that every rational person would like to avoid, such as hunger, poor health, premature death, lack of education, political pressure, etc. Within this framework, poverty is defined as a lack of capability. To

the extent that the capabilities are not only related to the level of income, the debate on poverty extends to other social policy areas such as education and health, and increasingly to whether political regimes are democratic or not. Thus, as Schlosberg (2012, p.452) indicates, the capabilities approach "can help address a range of concerns brought by climate change—from distributions of vulnerability; to recognition of peoples, places, and their relationships; to a number of threatened basic rights."

Considering the positive or negative impacts on different socio-economic groups, in order to maximize the benefits of these policies and minimize the negative side effects, a series of social policy measures or complementary policies have been under discussion (Koch, Gullberg, Schoyen & Hvinden, 2016; Gough, 2013b; Gough et al., 2008). Mechanisms to compensate the potential losses of vulnerable groups in order to reduce the regressive distributional effects, education programs and re-employment of workers to compensate for job losses, giving priority to poor and energy-poor households in subsidies to investments to increase energy efficiency, ensuring consultation with and participation of directly affected groups can be counted as examples of these measures. Besides, the income from carbon pricing policies (both tax and permit) can be used in many ways such as tax reduction, allocation to the general budget, prevention of climate change mitigation and adaptation, direct transfers, and development financing, which would have different effects on the outcomes of the such policies.

3.6 Conclusion

Although Turkey has well-developed environmental legislation and a strong administrative capacity (Adaman & Arsel, 2016), there is a huge gap between the

environmental laws and their implementation. NGOs, activists, academics, and local governments are important actors in to filling this gap and pushing environmental policies to be implemented,. The same actors stand against the inaction of the state on climate change. In that sense, it is important to analyze the perspectives of the actors engaged with the impacts of climate change on poverty, inequality, labor market, social cohesion and justice in the context of climate mitigation policies.

Considering the importance of the multiscale, pro-poor and pro-worker climate policy, the study aims to reveal whether these actors advocate only for climate action or whether they take the distributive impacts of these policies and their potential repercussions for poverty, inequality, labor market, social cohesion, and justice into account given the circumstances of Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE PERSPECTIVES OF CLIMATE ADVOCATES' ON CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICIES

This chapter aims to analyze the positions of climate action defenders—climate activists, academics, and municipalities with environmental concerns—in Turkey *vis-à-vis* different climate mitigation policy mechanisms from a justice perspective so as to understand whether and to what extent they consider the social justice dimension of mitigation policies when advocating the implementation of these policies.

Twenty-one in-depth interviews were conducted within the scope of the thesis. Among the interviewees, seven are academics working on the social effects of climate change, 10 are representatives of different non-governmental organizations working on various issues related to climate change, three are employees in the environmental protection and/or climate change departments of municipalities. In addition, two interviews were conducted with consultants from the ministry of environment, urbanism and climate change, and the ministry of energy and natural resources.

At the beginning of the study, my initial aim had been to see more employees in various municipalities. However, it was soon realized that municipalities were not very active in implementing climate policies due to financial, technical, human resource, and legislative constraints, except for the issues of waste disposal and public transportation. Instead, after three interviews with local government employees, I decided to just examine the climate change action plans of the rest of the initially-aimed municipalities. Beyond that, although I had no intention of

meeting with the relevant ministries at first, I added them to my sample since the government started to be active in climate action recently with the ratification of the Paris agreement. However, it is important to note that, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, I have primarily focused on activist stakeholders, rather than consultants from the ministries since the incumbent government has so far shown no proper interest in addressing the climate crisis. In addition to my in-depth interviews, I examined the written documents of the advocates whom I have interviewed on climate policies and the justice dimension of climate policies.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim, and I analyzed their content according to these two levels:

- The effects of mitigation policies on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion. Which complementary social policies do they propose to compensate for likely negative impacts of these policies (as hypothetical questions)?
- The degree to which academics, municipalities, and civil society in Turkey have concerned about the justice dimension of climate mitigation policies (as a meta-analysis question)?

After that, given the perception of potential risks of climate policies and how social policies can compensate for these risks represent different approaches to justice, the analysis seeks to explore where these approaches get positioned in the analytical tool discussed in the second chapter, i.e., the quadrant of justice.

4.1 Social impacts of mitigation policies

This section focuses on the social impacts of mitigation policies on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion perceived by climate advocates in

Turkey. During the interviews, it was requested that these policies should be evaluated separately from each other, as their combined effects may be difficult to evaluate. In addition, it was emphasized that the questions should be answered by focusing on the transition period since the social effects of mitigation policies are specific to this period. When a net-zero economy is achieved, there will be no additional cost of mitigation policies, e.g., when electricity is produced entirely from renewable sources, electricity bills cannot be affected by carbon prices. It has been stated that these policies will have a positive impact in the long run, as long as they serve to the transition of a net-zero economy.

During the interviews, it became clear that the *Mouvement des Gilets Jaune*, which occured in 2018 in France, was a milestone to start to reflect on the justice dimension of the mitigation policies in the imaginations of climate action advocates in Turkey as well. As can be remembered, rising fuel prices and criticisms of the high cost of living, due to the policy of President Emmanuel Macron to continue his economic growth plans together with climate targets, had caused an outrage in the society. When the participants were asked about the possible negative effects of climate policies, this protest was the first thing that came into their minds.

> It is important that climate and energy policies are formulated in a fair, equitable and beneficial way for the society, in order to decarbonize [the economy] and not to create injustice in the society. For example, let's consider the “yellow vests”. You know, the reason behind it was the increase in fuel prices in France. I mean, it would lead to behavioral change at a point where you increase [the price of fuels]. But a group led by the middle class burned the streets [in Paris]. You know, people don't want to be burdened with the costs that much. That's why, when we look at the developed countries from a historical perspective, we see that the justice dimension of the policies implemented has not been paid that much attention. (NGO 1) (APPENDIX D, 1)

In this respect, although 2005 is considered as the beginning of the climate movement in Turkey (Baykan, 2013), it can be said that the seeds of the debate on

the justice dimension of mitigation policies were planted with the *Mouvement des Gilets Jaune*. Besides, recently, with the increasing popularity of carbon pricing policy in Turkey, climate justice arguments have begun to be expanded in their meaning and redefined to include mitigation policies.

> Climate justice comes to me like applying climate policies without creating additional inequality. In other words, when the climate policy is implemented, it should make everyone better off in terms of climate-related effects without causing inequality. (Academician 1) (APPENDIX D, 2)

It has been argued that these policies impose extra costs if they are not compensated, especially on the poor and workers.

> If each of them [policies] is applied individually, of course, there might be negative consequences. If you neutralize them, climate policy would lead to positive results. Negative impacts are possible without doing anything to neutralize them. (Academician 2).(APPENDIX D, 3)

> Such a pricing mechanism will definitely increase the prices of many products. Not only electricity but also food, what we normally eat and drink… It may lead to more poverty at that point, too. But I should say that it is only common sense; we have no analysis so far on that. (NGO 3) (APPENDIX D, 4)

During the interviews, consistent with the literature (Lamb et al., 2020; Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019), low carbon investments such as the energy efficiency-retrofit, renewable energy investment, and investment in public transportation, have been linked to positive impacts, i.e., a decrease in the risk of energy poverty, decrease in the care work at home, a creation of new jobs, etc. For example, on investing in renewable energy systems, academician 5 expressed the following:

> The incentive should have a positive effect. In particular, it should have a positive effect on employment. It should also have a positive effect on poverty. I think that when you give subsidies to these, it will have a positive impact on both the energy sector, especially decentralized energy, which will seriously improve income justice, and also on poverty and income sources, and livelihoods. Let's consider that everyone is installing solar panels on the roof of their house in Anatolia. Assembly, repair, maintenance... This creates a local economy. This both increases employment and corrects income

> inequality. Because the current energy system is centralized, so the money goes to certain coal miners. We are already importing natural gas. Distribution companies are always the same companies, like Enerjisa. The money goes to three or five distribution companies. It is totally central. It increases income inequality. Employment may go up a little, but it will certainly increase income inequality. This policy will facilitate access to energy services, what happened in Isparta[26] would not happen again. I think it will have a very positive effect on social cohesion. (APPENDIX D, 5)

On the other hand, the policies that would lead to an increase in the prices of energy, essential goods, and electricity and job losses at the regional level—due to various policies such as carbon pricing mechanisms, tax on electricity and fossil fuels, and removal of subsidies from the fossil fuel industry—have been associated with negative impacts by climate advocates during the interviews. However, there were also opinions that these policies might have a negative impact at the regional level, but would have an overall positive impact at the macro level:

> So, it's a complex situation. It [the transition] can also have a positive impact, for example, on poverty and livelihoods. The transformation will be accelerated with the taxes on energy and fuel. Rooftop solar energy would become widespread [with the implementation of this policy], and this would increase employment. It would also have a positive impact on poverty and livelihoods. I mean, this policy would be effective for people who create new livelihoods in the long run. There are very indirect feedback mechanisms there. Of course, we think that when they put a charge on something, the poor will be affected first. It will have a direct impact on the poor since prices will increase. People will become even poorer. But you know, in terms of accelerating the green transformation, it will probably have a positive effect as well, as it will create new businesses. But you know, it is not certain in which sector it will have a positive effect on employment, in which sector it will have a negative effect. Let's consider the thermal power plants—they will directly be affected. These policies will also have a negative impact on heavy industry. (Academician 4). (APPENDIX D, 6)

> When a coal mine is closed, it is necessary to enable people there to acquire new skills. You should find jobs for them and you should create an alternative economy there. For example, we need to consider establishing a renewable energy facility there. Things need to be done, you know; and these can be done locally and regionally. But I think since the transformation must be huge, that is, if we are not talking about something that will affect only two or three regions, if we are talking about a total economic stance, it seems

[26] In winter 2022, Isparta has been faced three days-long power cut, when the city under snow. https://m.bianet.org/english/life/257325-days-long-power-cut-in-isparta-one-person-found-dead

> to me that these measures should be taken at the macro level. If you create such a big transformation, then it will already create so many jobs due to renewable energy and new infrastructure investments; then, the loss of work on the other side may become insignificant. So, it's true that you must do something for unemployed people. All these things need to be done, but I think what really needs to be done is at the macro level. In other words, you should establish such an incentive and tax mechanism that will make it sure that the economy and employment will increase in certain areas. And it doesn't have to be specific to renewable energy. (NGO 2)(APPENDIX D, 7)

Besides, during the interviews, it was frequently emphasized that carbon and energy pricing policies can have a negative impact on basic livelihoods:

> Who will bear the cost of this? There is a discussion of an emission trading system in Turkey at the moment. There is a debate on the transformation in energy. Very nice! But when talking about it, something is always said: "Oh, the private sector needs additional investments. Where can we meet this investment cost? Let's finance it from the [mitigation] instruments." Energy prices will increase for a while due to the investment need of the private sector. We have already experienced the increase in natural gas prices since the economic crises; many people have already been unable to access electricity, you know. Therefore, first of all, this should be taken into consideration. (NGO 6) (APPENDIX D, 8)

However, among carbon pricing policies, it has also been put forward that the carbon tax may have a more direct negative impact on poverty and livelihoods than the emissions trading system:

> The increases arising from the emission trading system may not be reflected directly on products and services, directly on consumers. However, the probability of direct reflection of a carbon tax on consumers is much higher. (NGO 6) (APPENDIX D, 9)

> The emission trading system is a mechanism debated within the sector. It may or may not be reflected in the prices as in the case of a carbon price. That is, it changes depending on how you set it up. It can be balanced within the competition system in the market. But a carbon tax is not like that. The carbon tax is reflected directly on the prices and, in fact, on the consumer. (Academician 5) (APPENDIX D, 10)

I summed up the possible social risks that have emerged in many of the interviews about the most debated mitigation policies in Table 2 below. I have simply listed the concerns around the positive and negative impacts of mitigation policies and the reasons behind these impacts. Since the opinions for these impacts

have not been in a strong conflict with each other, I preferred to add all of the comments together, since contrasting opinions were at a level that can easily be ignored.

Table 2. The Possible Social Risks That Have Emerged in Many of The Interviews About the Most Popular Mitigation Policies

Policy Measures	Potential Social Impacts					Comments
	Poverty and livelihoods	Energy poverty	Gender and geographical equality	Employment	Social Cohesion	
Emission Trading Scheme	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Possible regressive impacts (income), higher heating costs, increase in the prices of basic consumer's goods, job losses due to the closure of factories that cannot produce carbon neutral products, localized economic decline, risk of social unrest
Carbon Tax	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Possible regressive impacts (income), higher heating costs, increase in the prices of basic consumer's goods, job losses due to the closure of factories that cannot produce carbon neutral products, localized economic decline, regional disparities due to season
Tax on energy and fossil fuels	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Energy poverty, increase in the prices of basic consumer's goods, higher heating costs
Energy efficiency-retrofit	Positive/Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive/Negative	Green jobs, increase in rent, risk of gentrification, decrease in carework at home
Renewable energy investment	Positive/Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	May have possible regressive impacts especially with private investment, would be expensive, leading energy poverty, need grid infrastructure, low SES neighborhoods would not benefit from that, regionally distributed employment, if decentralized, progressive distributional impacts
Removal of subsidies from fossil fuels	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Regressive distributional impacts, localized economic decline , risk of social unrest, risk of social unrest, increase in the prices of basic consumer's goods, job losses, increase in the prices of heating and electricity, fuel poverty
Investment in public transportation	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Create new jobs, increase in the mobility of middle and low SES groups, increase in social encounters

In the interviews, it was stated that the negative impacts of policies were expected to be experienced more intensely by the young population, new employees, single-income households, the population living in colder climates, and women due

to reasons such as low-paid work and/or living in households with poor insulation. It is emphasized that these groups would be impacted by the consequences of mitigation policies differently due to the existing power structures unless these power relations will be changed and renegotiated through complementary policies. The policies that were asked about during the interviews were the ones that are the most widely implemented or planned. Similar to the results in the literature, the interviews indicated that mitigation policies are expected to have an impact on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion. In this respect, when speaking hypothetically for the case of Turkey, the possible adverse effects of mitigation policies that have been scrutinized so far are also expected to manifest themselves when they are implemented.

4.2 Social policies for the negative social impacts of mitigation policies

This section demonstrates potential regressive outcomes of mitigation policies from the eyes of climate advocates in Turkey. They were asked to think about the impacts of mitigation policies on affordability, employment, equality, and social cohesion, which have been discussed in the previous section, and then possible complementary policies to maximize the benefits of these policies or to minimize the adverse effects to ensure that mitigation goals to go hand in hand with social goals. The necessary measures have been suggested to guarantee access to the basic needs for all people, reduce the regressive distributional effects, and prevent employment losses at the regional level. I will analyze the policies put forward in this section thematically, i.e., market mechanisms, income and wealth inequality, and participation and minimum thresholds.

4.2.1 Market mechanisms

Compensation measures, in mainstream climate policies, are generally aimed at reducing the burden of transformation on industrial enterprises. The polluting industries anticipate that it will not be possible to escape from the green transformation, especially with the implementation of EU ETS. According to them, Turkey is expected to experience a similar transformation soon that has taken place in Europe (Ministry 2). The concern here is that mitigation policies will place a huge burden on polluters. To ward off some of the negative impacts of this transformation, which focuses on greenhouse gas reductions, some argued that it may harm the profitability of companies, and thus, carbon leakage may occur.[27] While defending this position, attention was drawn to the social effects of the cost that would occur on the production side. Emphasizing the importance of the polluting sectors for the economy in Turkey, it was stated that possible losses should be compensated; otherwise, it might have consequences such as harm to economic growth, employment losses, and therefore an increase in poverty. They claimed that some industries are indispensable for Turkey and pointed out that measures should be adopted to compensate for these adverse effects (Ministry 1). It was argued that taxing carbon emissions and using the revenues to reduce taxes on labor and capital would increase the efficiency of the tax system.

In this respect, the first of the policy recommendations that emerged during the in-depth interviews was a neutral tax, that is, the state pays workers' insurance premiums from public funds which is the equivalent of the total amount of carbon price that the company should pay. This policy was recommended so that companies

[27] See also https://pmrturkiye.csb.gov.tr/reports-in-turkish/?lang=en

do not downsize and lay off workers or employ workers informally while reducing their carbon emissions.

> Companies must pay a carbon tax. But in order not to incur too much cost while doing this, maybe they will lay off workers, right? The state should take the responsibility of social security premiums that they must pay in order not to fire workers. (Academician 2) (APPENDIX D, 11)

Besides, a direct cash transfer program to poor households in order to mitigate the burden of carbon pricing policies is recommended as a solution. To implement this policy, the first step is to identify the segments in the society that are most affected by carbon pricing and cash transfer should be made to these targeted groups. However, this policy has been criticized not only for its bureaucratic cost, but more importantly, for being too inefficient unless the poor change the fuel they use in their households. Financial support to these families instead of reducing the energy costs and energy type of the households are considered as throwing money on the street.

> You can give income support to poor groups. But with corrective income support, they will go and buy coal again. So, unless there is an alternative, fuel will continue be a problem in terms of the infrastructure of their houses. It's such a difficult issue. It's not enough to say let's give income support. We should be imagining a system where everyone can install solar panels to their roofs. (Academician 3) (APPENDIX D, 12)

During the in-depth interviews, these policies, which are not expected to bring structural transformations against the possible adverse effects of climate policies, were criticized in many ways. One of the criticisms for the neutral tax was that it does not directly cover informal workers, although it would prevent informality to increase. In addition, instead of bringing a constructive solution to the rights of workers and their relations with the means of production, it is stated that this is a policy that proposes a transfer of resources to persuade capital groups to mitigate their emissions. However, this resource can be transferred to other public

services, and thus, there is an opportunity cost to support the capital groups. This policy also contradicts the polluter pays principle. Considering that it consists of high-income segments, this policy may increase income inequality.

For the direct cash program, it was seen as shallow and inadequate since the bureaucratic cost is expected to arise from the difficulty of identifying the segment most affected by carbon pricing and administrative requirements; direct cash transfer policies are likely to increase social exclusion, especially during the determination of these groups; and the fact that this policy will neither reduce emissions nor be a permanent solution against social impacts unless there is energy transformation in the households.

4.2.2 Income and wealth inequality

During the interviews, it has been emphasized that additional injustices that will be created by climate policies cannot be prevented without correcting income and wealth inequality. Income and wealth inequality has been presented as both the cause and effect of climate change and a problem that climate policies cannot solve alone. In this respect, it has been frequently stated that policies to ensure income justice should be prioritized.

> The consumption patterns are so differentiated. It is so differentiated that for the richest one percent of the world, and let's expand it a little more, the richest ten percent population, there is no change in their consumption patterns, no sacrifice, no transformation, the heating or cooling of the buildings, the amount of water they use, the foods they consume which are mostly processed meat and livestock products, methane gas-intensive products. Designs that will be made without directly interfering with the class issue would not come close to fill such a deep structural unfair systemic gap, to patch this unfairly designed transformation phenomenon. In other words, the fight against poverty should actually be placed as the main agenda for energy transformation and reduction in emissions. (Academician 7) (APPENDIX D, 13)

> In order to ensure climate justice, you need to take measures to establish a more equitable social structure. Probably the right thing to do here is to impose a robust wealth tax in Turkey (Academician 1) (APPENDIX D, 14)

It is stated that the existing income and wealth injustice prevents the implementation of climate policies and that this transformation can only be achieved fairly with income and wealth justice. In particular, it has been argued that it is meaningless to talk about climate policies without bringing the lives of the rich closer to the subsistence level, i.e., without closing the gap between the lives of the richest, who have the most damaging mode of living in the world in terms of their environmental and climate impact, and the poorest.

> As an extension of this injustice in the distribution of income in the world, it causes the tools we will use to combat climate change to be unfair and ultimately inefficient. (Academician 6) (APPENDIX D, 15)

Another point that emerged during the interviews was that in addition to the policies to correct income and wealth inequalities, implemented with the climate policies, the climate policies themselves can be designed to correct income and wealth inequality.

> If there are additional corrective measures, additional measures that can improve the income distribution, or if some climate policies and energy policies can be applied according to justice principlesthey can have a corrective effect, at least in terms of the functional distribution of income. (Academician 2). (APPENDIX D, 16)

In addition, the progressive carbon tax has been proposed since it is evident that it helps reduce carbon emissions by causing a behavioral change in consumers as well as a change in production patterns, and has a corrective effect on income justice. However, it has been revealed that it would be difficult to implement this policy for the areas in which personal consumption is hard to track.

> It is preferable to impose additional taxes on the user. But the infrastructure should allow that. I mean, for example, you do this when you use electricity—it's very easy. But how are you going to do it with flying—what if the airline you use is not taxed? (Academician 1) (APPENDIX D, 17)

Another view is that the limited redistribution of resources through social policy may not be sufficient. They have stressed the necessity that the social use and ownership of the land, labor, and capital should be redistributed to ensure climate change mitigation policies protect vulnerable groups.

> If a systemic change is to be made, we should go beyond to defend the existing human rights. A better wage, and shorter working hours. We must rebuild the relationship with the means of production. If we continue to follow the existing path, it will only be a matter of limiting the exploitation of nature. Maybe there will be big players in the new version, maybe there will be big players, maybe small producers will not be protected, and there will be carbon-neutral big farms. Flexible working conditions, labor exploitation will continue. (NGO 5) (APPENDIX D, 18)

4.2.3 Participation

Another point that climate advocates draw attention is the importance of the participation of different stakeholders in policy-making processes in order to be protected from possible regressive effects of climate policies.

> At the core of the emergence of this problem [climate crisis] there are actors that design economic policies. Capital is more influential. This is the case all over the world, but especially in Turkey, policymakers first turn to business organizations for economic and environmental policies. It can also happen in some other countries as well in the following manner: When there are demands from the society and policymakers will put forward an initiative in line with these demands and then negotiate this initiative with the business world. The business world, of course, has always more access to decision-makers because it has more resources. Unfortunately, this is the case everywhere. (Municipality 2) (APPENDIX D, 19)

In the interviews, it has been expressed that it is necessary to determine which tools should be used to design participatory processes, and who will have the power of representation. Such determinants were found to be important to guarantee the political participation of the most affected ones.

> The implementation processes of these policies… open or more closed? So, I don't know, how should the permit system be conducted? Inspection of permit? To whom are you going to get it done? Where will you position the people? Are you going to make your political party mate do it? Procedural justice depends entirely on how these policies are implemented. How

> transparent are these things? How participatory is it? To what extent and how are the sanctions applied? How top-down, how hierarchical is it? Is anyone else being slapped while doing this? What happens to the money collected here? Where is it going? Are we transparent or not, participatory or exclusionary? Are we insiders? All these are important. (Academician 1) (APPENDIX D, 20)

It has been pointed out that meaningful participation in the planning of climate policies should be as encompassing as possible, including citizens assemblies. The main focus should be on participatory budgeting. In this regard, according to interviewees, to include local decisions and local needs to the final decision, the transition should be planned with the active participation of citizens on issues that will impact them, such as where the public transportation or insulation projects will be done, how much budget will be allocated to each project, etc.

> It is necessary to talk about which particular groups, which business groups, which neighborhoods will be affected by this process. The whole budget and budget items should be discussed with the stakeholders. Different distributions can be made between budget items. Local output is required. Then these should be reflected in local policies immediately. That's why I see city councils as very important. (NGO 1) (APPENDIX D, 21)

4.2.4 Minimum thresholds

The main emphasis in the interviews is on meeting the basic needs of the lower and middle-income groups with a rights-based approach, i.e., universal basic services. The interviewees stated that the access to basic needs has been left to the logic of the markets in the neoliberal era, and instead, basic needs such as health, education, food, and shelter should be provided from public resources in a way that is accessible to everyone. The "leave no one behind" principle can only be realized in this way, according to respondents.

> The arbitrator state, equidistant from all income groups, has turned into a neoliberal state. I allow the markets to function well, the only thing they think. The impartial state based on the understanding of the distribution of the world's resources in the most equitable way in energy, production, and inputs in the markets has turned a blind eye to the distortion and injustice in the income distribution in the world. This problem disrupted the perception that

> the state should provide the basic needs. And then, many people could not access their basic needs, which mean keeping this problem out of sight. (Academician 7). (APPENDIX D, 22)

> You know, housing, health, education, free access to these, creating equal opportunities might be very critical. (NGO 4). (APPENDIX D, 23)

As the quotes above demonstrate, the participants expressed the need for reliable, equitably-accessible basic services that would be a solution to the potential negative impacts of climate mitigation policies. They have proposed this policy, especially as a precaution against the price increases that would be reflected in the access to basic needs as well as job losses in the transition period. Besides being a precaution against possible risks of regressive outcomes, such policies are important in terms of providing a paradigm shift, an alternative to neoliberal hegemony. During the interviews, the participants emphasized that universal basic services could provide a more systemic change compared to universal basic income.

> The universal basic income can even legitimize being unemployed. Some people will be unemployed. Let's give them a basic income. You know, if you want to support people when they are unemployed, you should have unemployment insurance. If you provide a quality public service, and if you make it accessible to everyone, such an income may not be needed. We should think about transforming the system in the right direction, that is, transforming it fundamentally. Again, if everything is to be solved within the market, this will not be a systemic change. People's access to health, their access to education ... these can be solved with accessible basic services. (Academician 4). (APPENDIX D, 24)

In this context, universal basic services can be considered as a set of services that people are entitled to.[28] It is argued that people are entitled to certain rights such as food, shelter, transportation, and education, which are essential for their functioning, and that these rights should be offered to people regardless of their

[28] Here it is important to remember that *The entitlements* is defined by Sen as "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces" (Sen, 1984, p.497).

income. In this respect, these rights are presented to people since they are members of a society, and thus this approach is beyond distributive concerns.

4.3 To what extent have justice concerns been taken into consideration by climate advocates?

Turkey has been neither enthusiastic nor prepared to implement climate policies. Following the ratification of the Paris Agreement, Turkey held a climate council in February 2022, and in this council the proposal of a gradual exit from coal was omitted while the council decisions were being read. This was just another sign that Turkey will not take essential steps and implement policies to mitigate its emissions in the near future. The lack of ambitious plans for climate policies in Turkey directly affects this research, which is conducted to find out possible injustices that climate policies might create. If climate policies were implemented, climate advocates' struggle for climate change could be channeled into other focal points; but for now, the advocates remain stuck with the absence of climate policies and the struggle with this apathy. For this reason, there is a need to contextualize and interpret this dynamic as part of the justice concerns during the climate policymaking in Turkey.

Based on the hypothesis that Turkey's apathy in designing and implementing climate policies shapes the positions of climate advocates, I asked to what extent the possible negative effects of the mitigation and social policies toward these effects are on their agenda. Although they had ideas to make a statement on this issue during the interviews, it was a topic that was not on their agenda in general, as confirmed by academics, civil society, municipalities, and the representatives from the ministries.

The main reason for this situation is that Turkey had not ratified the Paris Agreement for many years. One climate activist put it this way:

> I don't think we care. We weren't aware of it either—until the Paris Agreement was ratified. Because the main discourse of environmental organizations in Turkey for six years was that Turkey should ratify the Paris Agreement and be an actor in climate policies. So, there was no need to say anything beyond that. Because we got stuck there. So, a lot of efforts have been towards to lobbying or advocacy on this issue. (NGO 2) (APPENDIX D, 25)

It has been stated that, although the expressions sound good in rhetoric, even climate justice activists have not been able to grasp the meaning of climate justice in general and not specific only to mitigation policies.

> For now, civil society is not very strong in this field. I mean, there is a justice perspective in the most general sense. But I think it is empty even in the eco-socialist segment, even among those who express it the most. It is not based on any serious research or grassroots movement. I don't see any serious description in terms of content. There is an emphasis on justice at a discursive level. There is an emphasis on equality. But of course, the climate movement in Turkey … mostly focuses on issues such as emissions and coal exit. Also, they have focused on Nationally-Determined Contributions and on Turkey's targets on reducing emissions. (Academics 5) (APPENDIX D, 26)

Advocates from municipalities expressed that they do not design their mitigation policies by taking into account how they will directly affect the most disadvantaged segments; but ultimately, they do take care that policies appeal to the lower and middle classes.

> Let’s take electric buses as an example. Or, consider the examples of energy transformation and energy efficiency in the buildings of the municipality. Mitigation policies actually provide a service without separating the income groups. There is no need to distinguish between income classes in most of the actions we take or the actions we plan. But others may have adverse impacts on the poor. We try to be fairer without realizing it. I would like to admit that we did it [implementing mitigation policies that are beneficial for low-income groups] unconsciously. (Municipality 1) (APPENDIX D, 27)

At this point, it is important to note that recent developments on climate crisis—such as the ratification of the Paris Agreement, and the emission trading system that is planned to be implemented in Turkey—have been accelerating the effort of civil society about a just transition. These studies have increased in number, and they are mostly focused on the coal phase-out in the last years. Although these

new developments herald that the justice dimension of mitigation policies will be studied by wider circles in the coming years, they are too few to change the main dynamic as of today.

4.4 An analytical tool: the quadrant of justice

This thesis proposed a heuristic analytical tool that conceptualizes the main approaches to the concept of justice regarding the impacts of mitigation and related social policies as the solutions to the drawbacks of emission reduction. It conceptualizes it on two main axes. The first axis aims to divide and compare different approaches of climate advocates towards how climate mitigation policies should be designed and implemented, based on contemporary justice theories and approaches. While Stevis & Felli (2015) utilize the tool to conceptualize affirmative and transformative approaches to just transition, I use it to conceive of the idea of justice regarding mitigation policies within distributive justice and justice beyond distribution (political processes, recognition, participation, functioning, and the role of institutions of power). The second axis divides the justice approaches in terms of being eco-centric and socio-ecological. This second division explains whether people demand and focus on only emission reductions to save the planet from climate change, or they also include the social impacts of this transformation into account. In the thematic analysis, I divide the approaches into four for the first axis:

- Utilitarian Approach: Compensation measures that aim directly to protect industrial enterprises. These policies aim to take into account the cost of mitigation policies over the industry and indirectly prevent the reflection of this cost on workers and consumers in order not to harm the industry and economic growth as well as to prevent carbon leakage. The commitment to a competitive,

growth-oriented, capital-accumulating economic model is clear in this approach and it, thus, aims to decrease the pressure on nature without questioning the exploitation of labor and further commodification of nature.

- Rawlsian Approach: This approach proposes to ensure income and wealth justice as a way to correct the negative social effects of mitigation policies. Based on the fact that wealth and poverty are relational, they argue that they must be redistributed in order for mitigation policies to work, i.e., the high SES groups should tramsform their consumption patterns into a sustainable track, while the access of lower classes to basic needs should be guaranteed.
- Participatory justice: According to this view, not only the distribution of material things but also how to govern this redistribution is important. The participation of vulnerable groups in decision-making mechanisms in order to address issues of unequal material distribution and misrecognition is necessary. Otherwise, it is not likely to be informed about which segments are affected by climate policies and how. Also, to design complementary social policies in a way that will eliminate the grievances of the most affected segments, participation of these segments into decision-making processes is seen as a must.
- Capabilities Approach: Policies that propose to set up provisioning systems to meet the basic needs fall under this approach. These basic needs include nutrition, shelter, education, and health services. They are evaluated as citizenship-based rights and proposed in case mitigation policies put an additional barrier to accessing these basic needs. The assumption of this approach is that equitable entitlement to basic needs cannot be guaranteed within a market system, and thus to ensure the functionings of all, they should be given as rights/entitlements.

While the utilitarian approach is mostly supported by ministries and international mainstream non-governmental organizations, the other three approaches are advocated by climate advocates in Turkey in different configurations and are mostly seen as complementary to each other. However, it should be noted that it is possible to talk about a spectrum among climate advocates ranging from reformist to revolutionary sides. As one participant stated:

> There is an eco-socialist wing. There is also a reformist wing. You can put it like this: One of the groups has more international connections, and as I just said, it tries to follow state policies. You know, this group has a tendency to propose a change by lobbying, to be an element of the pressure, and to see the risks and opportunities of the system. On the other hand, there are people thinking that we need to keep the capital out of this business. They say that if we are going to achieve this, it will only happen with the people. (NGO 2) (APPENDIX D, 28)

This distinction is basically determined by looking at the views on how different it is from the sustainable development approaches that have been put into practice before, and whether the transformation can be realized within the existing social-economic order as envisaged. From this perspective, on the one hand, there is a reformist view of the redistribution of resources within the existing socio-economic order with the help of new green jobs and technologies; on the other hand, a world view that goes beyond the emphasis on the winners and losers and argues that the transition to a low-carbon economy cannot be possible without participatory and democratic planning and without reformulating the power and production relations. The argument here is that the combination of different conceptions of justice can exert a gravitational force towards the latter. In other words, the distribution of the resources by itself is not sufficient, as is often stated in the dialogue of contemporary theories of justice with each other; but on the other hand, participation or functionings cannot be ensured without redistributing resources. All three elements of justice are needed to address power relations and redistribute power, as otherwise

redistribution may remain sluggish and reproduce vulnerabilities since it is unlikely to result in long-term structural change.

During the interviews, mentioning the different elements of justice together had gone hand in hand with the emphasis on the necessity of a structural transformation. While a distribution-based understanding of justice has fallen short to address winners and losers when it has not challenged power relations and governance issues, it can be said that the emphasis on participation and capabilities has brought additional political pressures on how the transformation would take place. On the other hand, during the interviews, there was no tension between justice as distribution and justice as recognition. Participants' definitions of climate justice revealed that they have seen these two approaches to justice as complementary rather than contradictory.

The second dimension of the analysis is whether these different positions have an anthropocentric or eco-centric point of view. Environmentalists in Turkey have generally struggled to lighten the pressures on the environment so far. Environmental protection-based struggles have not generally come together with the labor movement. Climate advocates' position can also be evaluated as more eco-centric[29], as well, although it has become prone to change with the recent

[29] The concept of eco-centric as used in this thesis is different from the one Inglehart uses in his post-materialism approach. Inglehart (1971, 1977) claims that as societies industrialize, they move away from materialist concerns towards post-materialistic values (including caring for the nature). According to him, the damage to nature, especially in developed countries, can be prevented by the struggle that arises around these post-materialist humanistic values. The lack of grassroots movement by climate action advocates in Turkey, in the first instance, seems to support Inglehart's argument that only in fully developed countries will there be actual concern for environmental issues. However, there are many grass-root environmental movements (including the one on climate crisis) in Turkey that oppose and struggle against energy projects that come with adverse effects on the nature. This struggle is generally fought with both materialist concerns (e.g., damage to livelihood, deterioration of air quality) and post-materialist motives (e.g., sanctity of rivers). The notion of eco-centricity used for climate advocates in this thesis is not the Inglehart's account of post-materialism. It refers to not prioritizing environmental justice issues in their approach to environmental activism. The reasons why climate action advocates stuck to an eco-centric side on the justice dimension of mitigation policies are discussed in Chapter 3.5 of this thesis.

developments in terms of climate policy in Turkey such as the ratification of the Paris Agreement. The fact that Turkey has not ratified the Paris Agreement for many years and has not taken proper steps in terms of mitigating emissions has caused climate advocates to direct almost all their energies to make calls to reduce Turkey's emissions for years; and, consequently, studies on how this transformation may affect different segments of society and what measures can be taken against possible negative effects have remained very limited. Their stand can be summarized as what is good for the environment is also good for people, which makes sense in most cases; however, it is obvious that it has been lacking a political economy dimension. They have been focused on the direct impact of climate change and have been in a position that if climate change can be stopped, disasters from the climate crisis would not come out and, thus, vulnerabilities would disappear. In this position, there is no place for the concerns about the effects of mitigation policies. In this respect, as stated above, although there have been a few studies on this subject in the last years, it can be said that climate advocates have generally acted with an eco-centric point of view in terms of climate mitigation policies.

This analytical tool can be used to determine how fair future mitigation policies will be, both in the steps of policy design, policy implementation, and management. In this respect, this quadrant has aimed not only to understand the positions of climate advocates within the scope of this study but also to provide a framework that can be used in future studies and to contribute to a deeper examination of existing challenges behind a just transformation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We are at a turning point in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of economic activities in the world—and Turkey should be a part of it. If the necessary steps are not taken, the world will become an unhabitual place for humans and nonhuman creatures. However, it is equally essential to discuss to what extent the steps to be taken to prevent climate collapse from happening are just, and if not what should be done to make them just. Thus, this thesis has been written to understand to what extent and how climate advocates, i.e., academics, civil society and municipalities, in Turkey evaluate through the filter of justice the likely social impacts of mitigation policies during their design, implementation, and management. To understand that, first of all, a short visit was made to contemporary justice theories. Since the concept of justice is vague when used alone, in the second chapter different approaches hidden under the word *justice* have been introduced to clarify the spectrum. Through chapter three, existing and potential policy proposals to mitigate emissions have been explored. Chapter four has examined how climate advocates in Turkey have been addressing the social impacts of existing policies and policy proposals to reduce emissions. Thereafter, they have been asked to what kind of social policies they would propose against the potential adverse social effects of these policies. At the end of the analysis, the existence of different understandings of justice, particularly in the complementary social policies to alleviate the negative social impacts of mitigation policies, has been addressed.

While discussing different approaches to justice, the focus has been on distributional and recognitional justice, and justice as capabilities. Considering that

these debates are still in dialogue with each other in the justice literature and can create contradictions at some points, it was helpful to state that different approaches to justice were conveyed more linearly in this thesis. As it was revealed during the interviews, more radical complementary policies in terms of challenging the existing socio-economic structure have been proposed by climate advocates when they have adopted a combination of different justice typologies while expressing their thoughts on that issue.

While this research has focused on the effects of mitigation policies on poverty, equality, employment, and social cohesion, it has taken the nation-state as the relevant unit and policy implementer. Thus, the measures that international corporations might have taken to reduce their emissions have not been included in the scope of the study. Intergenerational and international justice was not included in the scope of the study as well. In this respect, neither how future generations will be affected by these policy steps nor the concern about the justice dimension of historical emissions have not been taken as the subject of the research. Policies were asked to be evaluated under the conditions of the time and geography we are in now, and interviewees were asked to assume that Turkey is responsible for climate change as well. Lastly, the policies included in the subject of the research, i.e., carbon pricing, taxes and charges on energy and fuel, subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency, public and private investments in renewable energy, and low carbon technologies and infrastructures, subsidy reform for fossil fuels, strengthening the public transport network, have been asked to be evaluated separately since the effects of combinations of these policies can be very complicated—thus challenging to predict.

As a robust finding, climate advocates in Turkey have been expecting low carbon investments such as the energy efficiency-retrofit, renewable energy investment, and investment in public transportation to have positive social impacts such as a decrease in the risk of energy poverty, a decrease in the care work at home, creation of new jobs; however, if the policies are likely to increase fuel prices and/or lead to shutting down of businesses, they have also anticipated social drawbacks for these policies like regressive distributional impacts, rise in unemployment, and increase in the prevalence of poverty.

This thesis has proposed a quadrant to map the existing positions of climate advocates toward the mitigation policies and possible solutions to the drawbacks of these mitigation policies. The dimensions of the quadrant try to understand where the proposed complementary policies for these drawbacks fit into different approaches to justice. The vertical one has two ends, i.e., distributive justice and justice beyond distribution. During the interviews, some interviewees emphasized that only the redistribution of existing income and wealth could compensate for the adverse effects of mitigation policies. At the same time, others also talked about the minimum and maximum thresholds on needs,and the participation in decision-making mechanisms. Additional concerns and principles in terms of fairness have been observed to generate more robust demand for mitigation policies to be fairer. This is one of the most important results of the thesis.

The second dimension of the quadrant focuses on whether the proposed policies are eco-centric or combine social and ecological justice together. Although the fictionally proposed complementary policies evaluate environmental and social issues together and have a multidimensional emphasis on justice, the answers to the meta-analysis question, i.e., the degree to which climate advocates in Turkey have

concerned about the social justice when it comes to mitigation policies, show that they have largely not been considering mitigation policies together with their social dimensions. It can be said that they have adopted a more eco-centric perspective on mitigation policies, at least as of now. The effect of Turkey's failure to give the green light for mitigation policies on this conjuncture is undeniable. In the last year, the increase in projects that focus on "just transition", especially by the civil society, and the opening of new climate departments in municipalities, can be thought of as the heralds that climate advocates will be more engaged with the social justice dimension of mitigation policies in the near future. However, hypothetically speaking, if the government will push the button on mitigation policies tomorrow, it is unlikely that climate advocates will be able to present a comprehensive and satisfactory program on this issue. The emissions trading systems and coal phase-out applications have already started in the global North countries, and climate advocates in Turkey have no reason to think it would not be in Turkey soon.

Precisely at this point, this thesis makes a political, analytical, and theoretical contribution. Politically, the study can enhance policy issue understanding, reframe the policy debate, and shape future policy development—by revealing diverse social policy responses to climate mitigation policies. Understanding how the design and implementation of mitigation policies, as well as complementary ones that address their social impacts, diverge would contribute to the policy sphere for the sustainable and equitable transition since it has the potential to reveal the challenges in a rather comparative manner. Since the study compares different understandings of justice, it would provide some insights into the challenges facing the transition period.

Theoretically, it contributes to the literature on the political economy of the environment in Turkey, which mainly focuses on environmental conflicts that

intersect with the axes of race, gender, and class, and to the bridge between social and climate policies to make it more visible academically. In addition, the thesis contributes to the studies on re-reading the social effects of climate policies through the lens of justice by making use of the significant corpus of contemporary justice theories.

Analytically, the quadrant, which was developed on the study by Stevis & Felli's (2015) varieties of environmentalism, can be used as a tool to evaluate current and future climate policies and for self-reflection for climate advocates, especially mitigation policies, in Turkey.

One of the shortcomings of the research is that it lacks a comprehensive analysis of how mitigation policies will take place in the political-economic atmosphere of Turkey. In Turkey, the challenges of the socio-economic and political atmosphere, i.e., social rights not defined as citizenship rights, low per capita income, severe income and wealth inequality, high accumulation of foreign debt, limited technological capacity, an authoritarian governance structure, a considerable informality in economic life as well as the economic depression that has been deepening since 2016, are often raised as an impediment to the implementation of any kind of mitigation policy, which then feeds into an unwillingness to reflect on justice outcomes. For this reason, during the in-depth interviews, it was asked to imagine climate mitigation policies in a setting where this atmosphere is milder than experienced today. Otherwise, it makes no sense to ask about price increases due to carbon pricing mechanisms in an economic depression in which the current annual inflation rate is 142.63%.[30] Although this decision has provided a reflection on the

[30] https://enagrup.org

justice dimension of the mitigation policies, the analysis has remained tangential to Turkey's fundamental dynamics.

The other limitation of this study might be the sampling method used. Although I asked experts to confirm my list and tried to capture diversity as much as possible, I might have missed some perspectives and positions on this issue.

In order to overcome these limitations, it is necessary to study each policy proposal in detail and their combinations to address the side effects well. Research should be methodologically diverse to further understand these policies' justice impacts.

Simultaneous efforts should be made to address climate change and the challenges of the ecological transition. So far, scant attention has been directed to meeting low-carbon and just economies, and thus investigation of the impact of mitigation policies is extremely needed.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Participant number	Group	Institution	Date
1	Academician 1	Boğaziçi University	10.11.2021
2	Academician 2	Boğaziçi University	16.11.2021
3	Academician 3	İstanbul Bilgi University	17.11.2021
4	Academician 4	Boğaziçi University	18.11.2021
5	Academician 5	İstanbul Policy Center	22.11.2021
6	Academician 6	Abant İzzet Baysal University	6.12.2021
7	Academician 7	Kadir Has University	11.04.2022
8	NGO 1	Zero Discrimination Association	11.11.2021
9	NGO 2	The Green Thought Association	19.11.2021
10	NGO 3	European Climate Foundation	22.12.2021
11	NGO 4	European Climate Action Network	3.02.2022
12	NGO 5	350.org	24.01.2022
13	NGO 6	WWF-Turkey	8.02.2022
14	NGO 7	SHURA	9.02.2022
15	NGO 8	European Climate Action Network	17.02.2022
16	NGO 9	Greenpeace Turkey	15.02.2022
17	Municipality 1	İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality	7.12.2021
18	Municipality 2	İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality	19.04.2022
19	Municipality 3	Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality	26.11.2022
20	Ministry 1	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources	18.02.2022
21	Ministry 2	Repuclic of Turkey Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change	20.04.2022

APPENDIX B

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (IN ENGLISH)

1) Demographic Information

a) Could you briefly introduce yourself? (age, gender, education, occupation, income)

b) How many years have you been working in the institution that you work for? Have you worked for another environmental organization before?

2) On climate change:

a) How many years have you been working on climate change/climate policies?

b) Could you briefly talk about your work on climate change? (corporate/individual) What are you doing? What are the projects carried out in this process and what are the aims of these projects?

c) How successful do you think your projects were, did you achieve the results you wanted from the projects? (at local/national/international scales)

d) How do you think these projects/works affect the public?

3) On climate justice:

a) What are your views on the social impacts of climate change in general?

b) Who is most affected or expected to be affected by climate change?

c) What comes to mind when you think of climate justice, what do you think about this concept?

4) On Turkey's role in Climate Change:

a) If we leave aside the global justice on climate change, that is, if we do not focus on the point of view that developed countries should take more serious steps according to historical emisons, and if we accept that Turkey should

take the necessary steps, what do you recommend Turkey about climate change? What steps should Turkey take?

5) General questions for mitigation:

a) What policies do you think should be implemented to reduce carbon emissions?

b) Do you see the effects of these proposed policies on society as positive or negative?

c) Do you think these policies affect all segments of society equally or do they affect different socio-economic groups differently?

d) What kind of effects do you expect these policies to have on different social segments, can you talk about both positive and negative effects?

6) Direct questions on mitigation policies:

a) Ensuring that climate and energy policies are fair, equitable and beneficial to society is critical both for decarbonisation and for maintaining societal support for these policies.

So far, especially in the context of developed countries, the policies implemented have been focused on issues such as access to electricity, affordability of energy, employment, distributive justice and equality, livelihoods and poverty, procedural justice (participation and having a voice in decision-making processes that affect oneself), subjective well-being, and climate change. It is known that policies have social consequences and impacts. Various studies have been conducted to show that climate and energy policies are generally insufficient to provide positive social results.

However, across countries' contexts and policy types, there is a wide variety of climate policy examples that simultaneously achieve both social and climate goals. This requires paying attention to distributive and procedural fairness in policy design and establishing appropriate mechanisms to ensure that policy costs and benefits are shared fairly.

This is why it's important to avoid negative social impacts: these policies can have unjust or socially negative impacts, and may be deemed unnecessary because of these impacts, creating a societal demand for their repeal (like yellow vests).

In the studies carried out, the prominent mitigation policies are as follows: carbon pricing: allocating permits to specific industries; carbon pricing: taxing carbon; the imposition of taxes or charges on energy and fuel; subsidies on investments to improve energy efficiency, such as insulation; public investment in renewable energy (except HEPP) or low-carbon technologies and infrastructures (another scenario is that these investments are made through companies); subsidy reform for fossil fuels (withdrawal of subsidies); strengthening the public transport network

It can be said that it has positive or negative effects on the following issues:

(1) on poverty and livelihoods

(2) access to and affordability of energy services

(3) distributional effects by income, gender, and geography

(4) effects on employment

(5) effects on social cohesion and conflict

If we go over these policies, what kind of positive or negative effects can policies have on these six headings?

Policy Measures	Potential Social Impacts				
	Poverty and livelihoods	Energy poverty	Gender and geographical equality	Employment	Social Cohesion
Emission Trading Scheme					
Carbon Tax					
Tax on energy and fossil fuels					
Energy efficiency-retrofit					
Renewable energy investment					
Removal of subsidies from fossil fuels					
Investment in public transportation					

7) General question on policy recommendations:

If we consider the positive or negative effects you have mentioned, that is, if we look at the impact aspects of these policies and the segments of the population that can be directly and seriously affected by these policies, in parallel with the climate change mitigation policies, it is necessary to maximize the benefits of these policies or to minimize the negative side effects. What could be the measures or complementary policies to be taken? You can answer this question by considering

complementary policies regarding both the design process of the policy, its implementation and the potential negative effects of the mitigation policies implemented.

8) Direct questions on policy recommendations:

a) What are the mechanisms for compensating the potential losses of vulnerable groups in order to reduce the regressive distributional effects?

b) What can be done to prevent employment losses?

c) How do you think the income from carbon pricing policies (both tax and permit) should be used? (possible uses: tax reduction, allocation to the general budget, prevention of climate change, direct transfer and development financing)

d) Strengthening the public transportation network and increasing its quality may be reflected in transportation prices. What can be done to ensure that especially the poor benefit from transportation vehicles and to meet their transportation needs?

e) To give priority to poor and energy-poor households in subsidies to investments to increase energy efficiency such as insulation?

f) What do you think about the social policies like Universal Basic Income and Universal Basic Services?

APPENDIX C

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (IN TURKISH)

Derinlemesine Görüşme Soruları:

1) Demografik bilgiler

a) Kendinizi kısaca tanıtır mısınız? (yaş, cinsiyet, eğitim, meslek, gelir durumu)

b) Çalıştığınız kurumda kaç senedir çalışıyorsunuz? Daha önce başka bir çevre örgütünde çalıştınız mı?

2) İklim değişikliğine dair:

a) Kaç seneden beri iklim değişikliği/iklim politikaları ile ilgili çalışıyorsunuz?

b) İklim değişikliği ile ilgili çalışmalarınızdan kısaca bahseder misiniz? (kurumsal/bireysel) Neler yapıyorsunuz? Bu süreçte yürütülen projeler ve bu projelerin amaçları neler?

c) Projelerinizin ne kadar başarılı olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz, projelerden istediğiniz sonuçları elde ettiniz mi? (yerel/ulusal/uluslararası ölçeklerde)

d) Bu projelerin/çalışmaların kamuoyunu nasıl etkilediğini düşünüyorsunuz?

3) İklim adaleti üzerine:

a) Az sonra bu konuda daha ayrıntılı konuşacağız, ama genel olarak iklim değişikliğinin toplumsal etkileri hakkındaki görüşleriniz nelerdir?

b) İklim değişikliğinden kimler en çok etkileniyor ya da etkilenmesi bekleniyor?

c) İklim adaleti deyince aklınıza ne geliyor, bu kavram hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

4) Türkiye'nin İklim Değişikliğindeki rolüne dair:

a) İklim değişikliği konusunda küresel adaleti bir kenara bırakacak olursak, yani tarihsel emisonlara göre gelişmiş ülkelerin adım atması gerekiyor, gelişmekte olan ülkeler bir şey yapmasa da olur gibi bir bakış açısını merkeze almazsak

ve Türkiye'nin de gerekli adımları atması gerektiğini kabul edecek olursak, sizce Türkiye iklim değişikliği konusunda hangi adımları atmalı?

5) Azaltıma yönelik genel sorular:

a) Sizce karbon salımını azaltmak için hangi politikalar uygulanmalıdır?

b) Önerilen bu politikaların toplum üzerindeki etkilerini olumlu mu yoksa olumsuz mu görüyorsunuz?

c) Sizce bu politikalar toplumun tüm kesimlerini eşit mi etkiliyor yoksa farklı sosyo-ekonomik grupları farklı mı etkiliyor?

d) Bu politikaların farklı toplumsal kesimler üzerinde ne tür etkileri olmasını bekliyorsunuz, hem olumlu hem de olumsuz etkilerinden bahseder misiniz?

6) İklim ve enerji politikalarının adil, hakkaniyetli ve toplum için faydalı olmasını sağlamak, hem karbonsuzlaşmak için hem de bu politikalara yönelik toplumsal desteği sürdürmek için kritik öneme sahip. Şimdiye kadar özellikle gelişmiş ülkeler bağlamında bakıldığında, uygulanan politikaların elektriğe erişim, enerjinin satın alınabilirliği, istihdam, dağıtımsal adalet ve eşitlik, geçim kaynakları ve yoksulluk, prosedürel adalet (kendini etkileyen kararlar alma süreçlerine katılım ve söz sahibi olma), öznel refah gibi konularda, iklim politikalarının sosyal sonuçlar ve etkileri olduğu biliniyor. İklim ve enerji politikalarının genellikle olumlu sosyal sonuçlar sağlamada yetersiz kaldığına yönelik çeşitli çalışmalar yapılmış durumda. Bununla birlikte, ülkelerin bağlamları ve politika türleri arasında, hem sosyal hem de iklim hedeflerine aynı anda ulaşan çok çeşitli iklim politikası örnekleri var. Bu, politika tasarımında dağıtımsal ve prosedürel adalete dikkat etmeyi ve politika maliyetlerinin ve faydalarının adil bir şekilde paylaşılmasını sağlamak için uygun mekanizmalar kurmayı gerektiriyor. Olumsuz sosyal

etkilerden kaçınmak bu nedenle önemli: bu politikaların haksız veya sosyal olarak olumsuz etkileri olabilir, ve bu etkilerden dolayı gereksiz bulunabilir, yürürlükten kaldırılması ve iptal edilmesi için toplumsal bir talep oluşturulabilir (sarı yelekliler gibi).

Yapılan çalışmalarda,

-karbon fiyatlandırma: belirli sektörlere permi dağıtmak

-karbon fiyatlandırma: karbonu vergilendirmek

-enerji ve yakıt üzerindeki vergiler veya harçlar konması;

-yalıtım gibi enerji verimliliğini arttırmaya yönelik yatırımlara sübvansiyonlar;

-yenilenebilir enerji (except HES) veya düşük karbonlu teknolojilere ve altyapılara kamu yatırımı (başka bir senaryo da bu yatırımların şirketler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmesi)

-fosil yakıtlar için sübvansiyon reformu (sübvansiyonların geri çekilmesi)

-toplu taşıma ağının güçlendirilmesi

politikalarının

aşağıda sayacağım konular üzerinde olumlu ya da olumsuz etkileri olduğundan söz edilebilir:

(1) yoksulluk ve geçim kaynakları üzerinde

(2) enerji hizmetlerine erişim ve bu hizmetlerin karşılanabilirliği

(3) gelir, cinsiyet ve coğrafyaya göre dağıtımsal etkileri

(4) istihdam üzerindeki etkileri

(5) toplumsal uyum ve çatışma üzerindeki etkileri

bu politikaların üzerinden gidecek olursak, sizce bu altı başlık üzerinde politikaların olumlu ya da olumsuz ne gibi etkileri olabilir?

	karbon fiyatlandırma: belirli sektörlere permi dağıtmak	karbon fiyatlandırma: karbonu vergilendirmek	enerji ve yakıt üzerindeki vergiler veya harçlar	yalıtım gibi enerji verimliliğini arttırmaya yönelik yatırımlara sübvansiyonlar	yenilenebilir enerji veya düşük karbonlu teknolojilere ve altyapılara **kamu yatırımı**	yenilenebilir enerji veya düşük karbonlu teknolojilere ve altyapılara **özel sektör yatırımı**	fosil yakıtlar için sübvansiyon reformu (sübvansiyonların geri çekilmesi)	toplu taşıma ağının güçlendirilmesi
yoksulluk ve geçim kaynakları üzerinde								
enerji hizmetlerine erişim ve bu hizmetlerin karşılanabilirliği								
gelir, cinsiyet ve coğrafyaya göre dağıtımsal etkileri								
istihdam üzerindeki etkileri								
toplumsal uyum ve çatışma üzerindeki etkileri								

7) Politika önerilerine dair genel soru:

Peki bu saydığınız olumlu ya da olumsuz etkileri düşünürsek, yani bu politikaların etki yönlerine ve bu politikalardan doğrudan ve ciddi şekilde etkilenebilecek nüfusun alt kırılımlarına bakacak olursak, iklim değişikliği azaltım politikalarına paralel olarak, bu politikaların faydalarını en üst düzeye çıkarmak veya olumsuz yan etkileri en aza indirmek için alınacak önlemler veya tamamlayıcı politikalar neler olabilir? bu soruyu, hem politikanın tasarlanma süreci, hem uygulanması hem de uygulanan azaltım politikalarının olası olumsuz etkilerine yönelik tamamlayıcı politikaları düşünerek cevaplayabilirsiniz.

8) Politika önerilerine dair doğrudan sorular:

a) Regresif dağıtımsal etkileri azaltmak için kırılgan grupların potansiyel kayıplarını tazmin etmeye yönelik mekanizmalar neler olabilir?
b) İstihdam kayıplarını önlemeye yönelik neler yapılabilir?
c) Karbon fiyatlandırma politikalarından (hem vergi hem de permi) elde edilen gelir sizce nasıl kullanılmalı? (muhtemel kullanım yolları: vergi indirimi, genel bütçeye tahsis, iklim değişikliğinin önlenmesi, doğrudan transfer ve kalkınmanın finansmanı)
d) Toplu taşıma ağının güçlendirilmesi ve kalitesinin artmasının, ulaşım fiyatlarına yansıması söz konusu olabilir. Özellikle yoksulların ulaşım araçlarından faydalanmalarını sağlamak ve ulaşım ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için neler yapılabilir?
e) Yalıtım gibi enerji verimliliğini arttırmaya yönelik yatırımlara sübvansiyonlarda yoksul ve enerji yoksulu hanelere öncelik verilmeli midir?
f) Evrensel temel gelir ve/veya evrensel temel servisler gibi politikaları nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

APPENDIX D

LONG QUOTES IN TURKISH

1) “İklim ve enerji politikalarının adil, hakkaniyetli ve topluma faydalı olduğu kadar önemli olması, ekonomiyi karbondan arındırmak ve toplumda adaletsizlik yaratmamak için önemlidir. Örneğin sarı yeleklileri ele alalım. Biliyorsunuz, bunun nedeni Fransa'da akaryakıt fiyatlarının artmasıydı. Yani yakıt fiyatını artırdığınız bir noktada davranış değişikliğine yol açacaktır. Ama orta sınıfın başını çektiği bir grup sokakları yaktı. Bilirsiniz, insanlar maliyetlere bu kadar yüklenmek istemezler. Bu nedenle bugüne kadar gelişmiş ülkelere baktığımızda uygulanan politikaların adalet boyutuna pek dikkat edilmediğini görüyoruz.” (STK 1)
2) “İklim adaleti bana ilave eşitsizlik yaratmadan iklim politikaları uygulamak gibi geliyor. Yani, iklim politikası uygulandığında eşitsizliğe neden olmadan iklime bağlı etkiler açısından herkesi daha iyi hale getirmeli.” (Akademiyen 1)
3) “Tek tek her biri tek başına uygulandığı takdirde olumsuz sonuçlar var elbette. bunları nötrleyince iklim politikası olumlu sonuçlara yol açabilir mi dersen evet.Evet. Çünkü başka yanımda onu nötrleyecek bir şey şey yapmadan, politika gütmeden olumsuz etkileyebilir.” (Akademisyen 2).
4) “Böyle bir fiyatlandırma mekanizması kesinlikle birçok ürünün fiyatını artıracaktır. Sadece elektrik değil, yemek de, normalde ne yiyip ne içtiğimiz… O noktada da daha fazla yoksulluğa yol açabilir. Ama bunun sadece öngörü olduğunu söylemeliyim, bununla ilgili henüz bir analizimiz yok." (STK 3)

5) “Ya teşvikin pozitif etkisi olması lazım. Yani özellikle istihdam üzerinde pozitif etkisi olur. Yoksulluk falan üzerine pozitif etkisi olması lazım. Çünkü şimdi bunlara sübvansiyon verdiğin zaman hem enerji işlerinde, hani özellikle dağtık enerji tarzı bir şey diyeyim. Ciddi bir hem gelir adaletini düzeltmeye yönelik hem de yoksulluk ve gelir kaynakları üzerine geçim kaynakları üzerine olumlu etkisi olacağını düşünüyorum. Çünkü bu bir şey networkü yaratır. Yani şey gibi, ne bileyim çanak anten takmak gibi yani sonuçta sen herkesin evinin çatısına, özellikle Anadolu'da işte güneş paneli taktığını düşün. Ve bunun montajı var, tamiratı var, Bakımı var. Bu bir yerel ekonomi yaratır. Bu hem istihdamı arttırır hem gelir adaletsizliğini düzeltir. Çünkü mevcut enerji sistemi merkeziyetçi yani belli işte kömür madencilerine gidiyor para. Doğal gaz zaten ithal ediyorsun. Dağıtım firmaları belli. Yani işte enerjisa bilmem ne. Üç beş tane dağıtım firmasına gidiyor para. Tamamen merkezi yani. Gelir adaletsizliğini arttırıyor. Istihdam belki biraz sağlıyor ama gelir adaletsizliğini arttırıyor. Enerji hizmetlerine erişimi kolaylaştıracaktır aynı şekilde bence. Istihdamı arttıracaktır. Toplumsal uyum üzerine de bence gayet olumlu etkisi olur.” (Akademisyen 5)

6) “Karmaşık bir konu bu. Dolaylı olarak işte enerji ve yakıt üzerindeki vergi dönüşümü hızlandıracağı için. Mesela çatı tipi güneş enerjisi yaygınlaşmasını sağlayacak. Ve o da istihdamı arttıracak. O da yoksulluk ve geçim kaynağı demek. Yani yeni geçim kaynakları yaratacak insanlar aslında. Mesela hani çok dolaylı feedback mekanizmaları var orada. Yani tam etkisi ne olacak, böyle bana şu anda çok yani tabii ki hani şunu düşünüyorsun. Bir şeyin üzerine vergi,harç koyduğunda tabii ki en başta yoksullar etkilenir gibi

düşünüyoruz. Yani bu bir hepsi için geçerli gerçi bu. Evet yani direkt fiyatlar artacağı için özellikle. İnsanlar daha da yoksullaşacaktır. Ama hani dönüşümü hızlandırması açısından, yeni iş kolları falan yaratacağı için büyük ihtimalle.. Pozitif etkileri de var ama hani işte hangi sektördeki istihdam üzerinde pozitif etki, hangi sektördeki negatif etki yani şimdi mesela termik santraldekiler üzerinde negatif etkisi olacaktır. Ağır sanayideki yüzünde negatif etkisi oldu tamam, ama başka sektörlerde istihdam arttıracaktır." (Akademisyen 4)

7) "Ne bileyim bir yerde kömür madeni kapatılıyorsa oradaki insanın yeni beceriler edinmesini sağlayacaksın. Onlara iş bulacaksın. Ya da işte o bölgeyi işte kömür çıkıyorsa o bölgede, orada bir ekonomi yaratacaksın. Orada yenilenebilir enerji tesisi kuracaksın. Falan filan. Bunlar mantıklı tabii. Yeni şeylerin yapılması lazım. Hani bölge bölge yerellerde bunlar yapılabilir.Ama bence dönüşüm çok büyük olması gerektiği için yani böyle iki üç yerini etkileyecek bir şeyden bahsetmiyorsak eğer hani topyekun bir ekonomik duruştan bahsediyorsak bu önlemlerin de makro düzeyde alınması gerekir gibi geliyor bana. Yani mesela eğer bu kadar büyük bir dönüşüm yaratırsan o zaman zaten yenilenebilir enerji ve altyapı yatırımları nedeniyle o kadar çok iş yaratmış olunur, ki zaten öbür taraftaki iş kaybı önemsiz hale gelebilir. Makro anlamda. Yani o işsiz kalan kişi için tek başına bir şey yapman gerekiyor doğru. Erken emeklilik mesela bu tarz kişilere yönelik hak kaybı uğramış kişilere yönelik erken emeklilik olabilir. Gençse işte yeni iş becerileri kazandırmak olabilir. Onlara öncelikli olarak iş sahası açmak olabilir. Bunların hepsinin yapılması lazım ama asıl yapılması gereken yine de bence makro düzeydeki şeydir. Yani öyle bir teşvik ve vergi mekanizması

kuracaksın ki belli alanlarda zaten istihdam çok artacak. Belli alanlardaki ekonomi zaten çok canlanacak. Ki bu sadece yenilenebilir enerjiye özgü olmak zorunda da değil. (STK 2)

8) “Bunun bedelini kim ödeyecek? Şu anda Türkiye'de bir emisyon ticaret sistemi tartışması var. Enerjide dönüşüm tartışılıyor. Çok güzel. Ama bundan bahsederken hep bir şeyler söyleniyor. Aaa. Özel sektörün ek yatırıma ihtiyacı var bu yatırım ihtiyacını nereden karşılayabiliriz, bu ihtiyacı azaltım araçlarından karşılayalım. Özel sektörün yatırım ihtiyacından dolayı enerji fiyatları bir süre daha artacak. Ekonomik krizlerden bu yana doğalgaz fiyatlarındaki artış, zaten birçok kişi elektriğe erişemez hale geldi biliyorsunuz. Bu nedenle, her şeyden önce bunun dikkate alınması gerekir." (STK 6).
9) “Emisyon ticaret sisteminden kaynaklanan artışlar doğrudan ürün ve hizmetlere, doğrudan tüketicilere yansımayabilir. Ancak bir karbon vergisinin tüketicilere doğrudan yansıma olasılığı çok daha yüksek.” (STK 6)
10) "ETS sektör içinde bir mekanizma. Karbon fiyatı olarak fiyatlara yansıyabilir veya yansımayabilir. Yani nasıl kurduğunuza göre değişir. Piyasadaki rekabet sistemi içinde dengelenebilir. Ama karbon vergisi öyle değil, karbon vergisi doğrudan fiyatlara ve hatta tüketiciye yansıyor.” (Akademisyen 5)
11) “Şirketler bir karbon vergisi ödemeli. Ama bunu yaparken çok fazla masrafa girmemek için belki işçi çıkarırlar değil mi? Devletin işçileri işten çıkarmamak için ödemesi gereken sosyal güvenlik primlerini ödemesi gibi. Aynen öyle." (Akademisyen 2)
12) “Yoksul gruplara gelir desteği verebilirsiniz. Ama düzeltici gelir desteğiyle gidip tekrar kömür alıyorlar. Bu nedenle, bir alternatif olmadığı sürece,

evlerinin altyapısı açısından yakıt gibi bir şey hala sorun olabilir. Bu çok zor bir konu. Gelir desteği verelim demek yetmez. O zaman herkesin kendi çatısından panel, belki güneş paneli kurabileceği bir sistem hayal etmeliyiz." (Akademisyen 3)

13) "Tüketim kalıpları o kadar ayrışmış. O kadar farklılaşmış ki bir yerde dünyanın en zengin yüzde biri ve hadi birazcık daha genişleterek yüzde onluk nüfus tüketim kalıplarında hiçbir değişikliğe hiçbir fedakarlığa, hiçbir dönüşüme işte binaların ısıtılması ya da soğutulması kullandıkları su miktarı tükettikleri gıdalar çoğunlukla işlenmiş et ve hayvancılık ürünleri dolayısıyla metan gazı yoğun ürünler gibi. Bu bu sınıfsal meseleye doğrudan doğruya müdahale etmeden yapılacak bir işte tasarımlar, işte karbon fiyatlaması olsun emisyon ticaret sistemi yoluyla karbonun fiyatlanması bu emisyon ticaret sistemi içerisinde işte permilerini kirletici haklarının bedavadan dağıtımı veya açık arttırma mekanizmasıyla fiyatlandırılması olsun. Bunların bu kadar derin yapısal sistemik bir uçurumu kapatmaya, bu adaletsiz dönüşüm olgusunu yamamaya yeterli olmayacağını görüyoruz. Yani yoksullukla mücadele aslında enerjide dönüşümün emisyonlardaki azaltımın bir tasarımı olarak ana gündem maddesi olarak oturtulması gerekiyor (Akademisyen 7).

14) "İklim adaletini sağlamak için daha adil bir toplumsal yapı oluşturmaya yönelik tedbirler almanız gerekiyor. Muhtemelen burada yapılacak en doğru şey, Türkiye'de sağlam bir servet vergisi uygulamaktır" (Akademisyen 1)

15) "Dünyadaki gelir dağılımındaki bu adaletsizliğin bir uzantısı olarak iklim değişikliğiyle mücadele, karbon emisyonlarını azaltmak için kullanacağımız araçların adaletsiz ve nihayetinde verimsiz olmasına neden oluyor." (Akademisyen 6).

16) “Ek düzeltici önlemler varsa, gelir dağılımını iyileştirebilecek ek önlemler varsa veya bazı iklim politikaları ve enerji politikaları örneğin adalet ilkelerine göre uygulanabilirse, en azından fonksiyonel dağılım açısından düzeltici bir etkisi olabilir. Gelir, gelir dağılımı üzerinde.” (Akademisyen 2)
17) “Kullanıcıya sürekli artan vergiler koymak tercih edilir. Ancak altyapı buna izin vermeli. Yani bilmiyorum mesela elektrik kullanırken bunu yapıyorsunuz. Çok kolay. Ama bunu havacılıkta nasıl yapacaksın?” (Akademisyen 1)
18) “Sistemik bir değişiklik yapılacaksa, mevcut insan haklarını savunmanın ötesine geçmeliyiz. Daha iyi bir ücret ve daha kısa çalışma saatleri. Üretim araçlarıyla olan ilişkiyi yeniden inşa etmeliyiz. Mevcut yolu izlemeye devam edersek, mesele sadece doğanın sömürülmesini sınırlamak olacaktır. Belki yeni sürümde büyük oyuncular olacak, belki büyük oyuncular olacak, belki küçük üreticiler korunmayacak, karbonsuz büyük çiftlikler olacak. Esnek çalışma koşulları, emek sömürüsü devam edecek.” (STK 5)
19) “Bu sorunun ortaya çıkmasının özünde ekonomi politikalarını oluşturan aktörler var. Sermaye daha etkili. Bu tüm dünyada böyle ama özellikle Türkiye'de politika yapıcılar ekonomi ve çevre politikaları için önce sermaye gruplarına yöneliyor. Bazı ülkelerde de şu şekilde olabiliyor: Toplumdan talepler var ve politika yapıcılar toplumdan gelen talepler doğrultusunda bir girişimde bulunuyor ve ardından bu girişimi iş dünyası ile müzakere ediyor. İş dünyası, elbette, daha fazla kaynağa sahip olduğu için karar vericilere her zaman daha fazla erişime sahiptir. Ne yazık ki bu her yerde böyle.” (Belediye, 2)

20) “Bu politikaların uygulama süreçleri… açık mı yoksa daha kapalı mı? Yani bilmiyorum, permi sistemi nasıl yapılmalı? Perminin denetlenmesi kime yaptıracaksınız? İnsanları nereye konumlandıracaksınız? Partidaşına mı yaptıracaksın ? Prosedürel adalet, tamamen bu politikaların nasıl uygulandığına bağlıdır. Bunlar ne kadar şeffaf? Ne kadar katılımcı? Yaptırımlar ne ölçüde ve nasıl uygulanıyor? Ne kadar yukarıdan aşağıya, ne kadar hiyerarşik? Bunu yaparken kaytarılan birileri var mı? Burada toplanan para ne olacak? Nereye gidiyor? Şeffaf mı, değil mi, katılımcı mı yoksa dışlayıcı mı? içerici miyiz? Bütün bunlar belirleyecek.” (Akademisyen 1)

21) “Bu süreçten hangi grupların, hangi iş gruplarının, hangi mahallelerin etkileneceği konuşulmalı. Tüm bütçe ve bütçe kalemleri paydaşlarla tartışılmalı. Bütçe kalemleri arasında farklı dağıtımlar yapılabilir. Yerelden gelen çıktılar önemli. Çıktılar, bir an önce yerel politikalara yansıtılmalı. Bu nedenle kent konseylerini çok önemli görüyorum.” (STK,1)

22) “Bütün gelir gruplarına emek, emeğiyle geçinen insanların farklılaşmasına eşit uzaklıkta duran işte hakem devlet yani neoliberal devlet anlayışı piyasalarda sadece kuralları ben koyarım. Piyasaların iyi işletmesine olanak sağlarım. Piyasalarda en verimli bir şekilde dünya kaynaklarını enerjide, üretimde girdilerde en verimli, en etkin bir şekilde dağıtır anlayışına dayalı hakem, tarafsız devlet anlayışı işte bin dokuz bin dokuz yüz seksen sonrasında dünyada yaşanan bu gelir dağılımındaki çarpıklığa, adaletsizliğe göz yummak bir yerde bu sorunu gözlerinden ırak tutmak anlamına geldi. Bu sorun devletin temel ihtiyaçları karşılaması gerektiği algısını bozmuştur. Ve sonra birçok insan temel ihtiyaçlarına ulaşamadı, bu sorun gözlerden uzak tutuldu. (Akademisyen, 7)

23) “Biliyorsunuz, barınma, sağlık, eğitim, bunlara ücretsiz erişim, fırsat eşitliği yaratmak daha kritik olabilir.” (STK 4).

24) "Yani evrensel bir temel gelir. İşsiz kalmayı bile meşrulaştırıyor. Bazı insanlar işsiz kalacak. Onlara temel bir gelir verelim. Yani, insanlara işsizken destek olmak istiyorsanız işsizlik sigortası yaptırırsın. Kaliteli bir kamu hizmeti, herkese açık hale getirirseniz böyle bir gelire ihtiyaç olmayabilir. Sistemi doğru yöne çevirmeyi, yani kökten dönüştürmeyi düşünmeliyiz. Yine her şey kendi içinde çözülecekse, bu sistemsel bir değişim olmayacak. İnsanların sağlığa erişimi, eğitime erişimi... Erişilebilir temel hizmetlerle bunlar çözülebilir.” (Akademisyen 4)

25) “Bence gözetmiyoruz. Çok farkında da değildik. Paris Anlaşması onaylana kadar. Çünkü Paris anlaşması onaylana kadar altı yıldır Türkiye'deki çevre örgütlerinin ana söylemi Türkiye Paris Anlaşması'nı onaylamalı ve iklim politikalarında bir aktör olmalıydı. Yani bunun ötesine geçecek herhangi bir şey söylemeye gerek kalmadı. Çünkü orada takılı kaldık. Hı hı. Dolayısıyla yoğun emeğin kendisi biraz daha hani bu konuda lobi yapmaya ya da bu konuda savunuculuk yapmaya gitti. biraz da kolaycılık belki.” (STK 2)

26) “Şimdilik sivil toplum bu alanda çok güçlü değil. Yani en genel anlamda bir adalet perspektifi var. Ama eko-sosyalist kesimde bile, hatta bunu en çok dile getirenler arasında bile boş olduğunu düşünüyorum. Herhangi bir ciddi araştırmaya veya taban hareketine dayanmıyor. İçerik açısından ciddi bir içerik göremiyorum. Söylemsel düzeyde adalete vurgu var. Eşitlik ve benzeri bir vurgu var. Yapılan çalışmalar var. Ama tabii ki Türkiye'deki iklim hareketi, sivil toplumun iklim hareketi hala daha çok emisyon ve kömür çıkışı

gibi konulara odaklanıyor. Ayrıca NDC'lere, Türkiye'nin hedeflerine odaklanmış durumda.” (Akademisyen, 5)

27) “Şimdi gerçekten mesela, alt eylemlere indiğimizde örneğin elektrikli otobüsler de belki o kapsama girer. Çünkü eylemlerden bazıları da mesela o elektrik otobüsleri toplu taşımada etkili otobüslere geçiş gibi. Işte yine İBB binalarında enerji dönüşümü, enerji verimliliği vesaire gibi konular var. Azaltım politikaları aslında gelir grubunu ayırmadan uygulanıyor. Aldığımız aksiyonlar ile planladığımız aksiyonlarda gelir sınıfları arasında ayrım yapmaya gerek yok. Belki farkında olmadan daha adil davranıyoruz. Kabul edeyim. Düşük gelir seviyelerini ilgilendiren yatırımlara yöneliyoruz. Eylemlere baktığımda kesinlikle alt gelir düzeyini, hatta eylemlerin uygulanmasını etkileyecektir. Ama farkında olmadan yaptığımızı itiraf etmek isterim. (Belediye 1)

28) “Eko-sosyalist bir kanat var. Bir de reformist kanat var. Şöyle de diyebilirsiniz, daha çok uluslararası bağlantıları olan ve az önce de söylediğim gibi devlet politikalarını takip etmeye çalışıyor. Biliyorsunuz, lobicilik yaparak, baskı unsuru olarak, sistemin risklerini ve fırsatlarını görerek değişim önerme eğilimi var. Öte yandan sermayeyi bu işin dışında tutmamız gerektiğini düşünenler de var. Bunu başaracaksak, ancak halkla olacağını söylüyorlar.” (STK, 2)

APPENDIX E

APPROVAL OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 03.11.2021-36943

T.C.
BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI KARAR TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı	:	22
Toplantı Tarihi	:	13.10.2021
Toplantı Saati	:	14:00
Toplantı Yeri	:	Zoom Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar	:	Prof. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen
Bulunmayanlar	:	

Gökçe Yeniev
Sosyal Politika

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"Exploring social justice implications of mitigation policies: positions of climate action advocates in Turkey" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığınız SBB-EAK 2021/61 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 13 Ekim 2021 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza alınamadığı için bu onay mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Fatma Nevra Seggie tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra SEGGIE
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr.Fatma Nevra SEGGIE
Raportör

SOBETİK 22 13.10.2021

Bu belge 5070 sayılı Elektronik İmza Kanununun 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

APPENDIX F

CONSENT FORM

KATILIMCI BİLGİ ve ONAM FORMU

Araştırmayı destekleyen kurum: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi

Araştırmanın adı: Azaltım Politikalarının Sosyal Adalet Üzerindeki Etkileri: Türkiye'deki İklim Eylemi Savunucularının Pozisyonları

Proje Yürütücüsü: Prof. Dr. Ünal Zenginobuz

E-mail adresi: zenginob@boun.edu.tr

Telefonu: 0212 359 7644

Araştırmacının adı: Gökçe Yeniev

E-mail adresi: g.yeniev@gmail.com

Telefonu: 05428236705

Sayın katılımcı,
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal Politika öğrencisi Gökçe Yeniev tarafından hazırlanan yüksek lisans tez araştırmasına ilişkin çalışmasına katılımınız rica edilmektedir. Lütfen aşağıdaki bilgileri okuyunuz ve katılmaya karar vermeden önce anlamadığınız herhangi bir şey varsa çekinmeden sorunuz.

Tez konusu: Bu tez, Türkiye'deki iklim eylemi savunucuları, akademisyenler ve belediyelerin farklı iklim azaltma politika mekanizmalarına ilişkin algılarını ve tutumlarını adalet perspektifinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu aktörlerin azaltım politikalarının bölüşümsel sonuçlarını ne ölçüde ve nasıl dikkate aldıkları ve azaltım politikalarının eşitsizlikler, yoksulluk ve adalet açısından sonuçları, dağıtımsal maliyetleri ve sosyal gruplar arasındaki yük bölüşümü hakkındaki görüşleri incelenecektir; Bu açıdan, iklim eylemini nasıl çerçevelendirdikleri; yoksulların ve marjinal grupların kırılganlıklarının azaltılmasını ne ölçüde savundukları; azaltım politikalarının etkilerini hafifletme politikalarına dair düşünceleri; yoksul yanlısı azaltım politikalarının Türkiye bağlamında nasıl planlanması ve uygulanması gerektiğine dair görüşleri anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Tez araştırması Kasım 2021-Ocak 2022 ayları arasında 2 ay sürecektir.

Onam:

Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları, belediyeler ve akademisyenlerle, iklim politikalarına dair algının sosyal adalet perspektifinden anlaşılmaya çalışıldığı bu çalışmaya katılmaya sizi davet ediyoruz. Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde, sizin belirlediğiniz bir süre zarfında sizinle açık uçlu sorulardan oluşan derinlemesine bir mülakat gerçekleştirilecektir. Mülakat süresi sizin yanıtlarınıza göre şekillenecektir ve 45 ile 90 dakika arasında olacaktır. Onayınız alındığı takdirde mülakat sırasında ses kaydı alınacaktır.

Sorulan soruların doğru veya yanlış bir cevabı yoktur, bu sebeple kendinize en uygun ve doğru gelen şekilde cevaplamanız beklenmektedir.

Çalışmaya katılmanız tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Sizden ücret talep etmiyoruz ve size herhangi bir ödeme yapmayacağız. İstediğiniz zaman çalışmaya katılmaktan vazgeçebilirsiniz ve araştırmanın herhangi bir aşamasında herhangi bir sebep göstermeden onayınızı çekebilirsiniz. Bu durumda sizden almış olduğumuz veriler elektronik ve yazılı ortamlardan silinecektir.

Bu araştırma bilimsel bir amaçla yapılmaktadır, isminiz, kişisel verileriniz ve mülakatta alınan ses kaydı tamamen gizli tutulacaktır. Toplanan bilgiler araştırmacının bilgisayarında gizli bir dosyada tutulacaktır. Ayrıca, araştırmacı tarafından katılımcıların isimleri değiştirilerek saklanacak ve kullanılacaktır. Katılımcıların bilgilerine sadece proje araştırmacısı Gökçe Yeniev ve proje yürütücüsü Prof. Dr. Ünal Zenginobuz ulaşabilecektir.

Yapmak istediğimiz araştırmanın size risk getirmesi beklenmemektedir. Kişisel verileriniz bir kodlama sistemi ile saklanacak ve sizden herhangi bir ek bilgi talep edilmeyecektir.

Bu formu imzalamadan önce, çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız varsa lütfen sorun. Daha sonra sorunuz olursa, araştırmacıya (Cep Telefonu: 5428236705) sorabilirsiniz. Araştırmayla ilgili haklarınız konusunda Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Yüksek Lisans ve Doktora Tezleri Etik İnceleme Komisyonu'na (SOBETİK) sbe-ethics@boun.edu.tr mail adresine yazarak danışabilirsiniz.

Adres ve telefon numaranız değişirse, bize haber vermenizi rica ederiz.

Bana anlatılanları ve yukarıda yazılanları anladım. Bu formun bir örneğini aldım / almak istemiyorum (bu durumda araştırmacı bu kopyayı saklar).

Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Ses kaydı alınmasını kabul ediyorum. ☐

Katılımcı Adı-Soyadı:……..
İmzası:……
Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

Araştırmacının Adı-Soyadı: Gökçe Yeniev
İmzası:.....

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

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