

LOCATING TURKEY'S ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES WITHIN
ACTIVATION TYPOLOGIES: ENABLING OR WORKFARIST?

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Cemre Canbazer, certify that

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ABSTRACT

Locating Turkey's Active Labour Market Policies within Activation Typologies:

Enabling or Workfarist?

Labour market activation has emerged as a significant research area in the social policy literature due to the relevant policy developments of the last decades throughout the world. In Turkey, labour market activation mechanisms, including ALMP (active labour market policy) programmes, have also gained momentum in the policy framework, particularly in the last decade. This study explores the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey within the analytical framework put forth by Dingeldey (2007) and locates the case of Turkey in the activation typologies developed by Barbier (2004a) and Serrano Pascual (2007a). As the literature on activation typologies disregards the implementation dimension, the methodology of the study incorporates the thematic analysis of the 13 semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with İŞKUR officials and the content analysis of legal and policy documents regarding labour market activation in Turkey. The findings of the study reveal that ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey are stronger in their workfarist elements than in their enabling elements in comparison. Nonetheless, workfarist elements are not implemented coercively and systematically due to several institutional factors. Regarding the activation typologies, it is asserted that the case of Turkey diverges from the ideal types, but it is closer to the liberal type within the typology developed by Barbier (2004a) and the economic springboard regime within the typology developed by Serrano Pascual (2007a) when compared to the other types.

ÖZET

Türkiye Aktif İşgücü Piyasası Politikalarının Etkinleştirme Tipolojileri içinde

Konumlandırılması: Destekleyici mi Çalıştırmacı mı?

İşgücü piyasasının etkinleştirilmesi, dünya çapındaki politika gelişmelerine karşılık olarak sosyal politika alan yazınında son yıllarda rağbet görmekte olan bir araştırma alanı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Türkiye'de aktif işgücü piyasası politikası (AİPP) programlarını da içeren işgücü piyasası etkinleştirme mekanizmaları, özellikle son on yılda politika süreçlerinde ivme kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma, Dingeldey (2007) tarafından ortaya konan analitik çerçeve bağlamında Türkiye'nin AİPP ve diğer etkinleştirici işgücü piyasası politikası programlarının çalıştırmacı ve destekleyici bileşenlerini araştırmakta ve Türkiye örneğini Barbier (2004a) ve Serrano Pascual (2007a) tarafından geliştirilen etkinleştirme tipolojileri içinde konumlandırmaktadır. Alan yazınının uygulama boyutunu göz ardı etmesi sebebiyle çalışmanın yöntemi Türkiye'de işgücü piyasasının etkinleştirilmesine ilişkin yasal belgelerin ve politika belgelerinin içerik analizi ile 13 Türkiye İş Kurumu (İŞKUR) yetkilisiyle gerçekleştirilen yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakat sonucunda elde edilen verilerin tematik analizini bir araya getirmektedir. Çalışma, AİPP ve diğer etkinleştirici işgücü piyasası politika programlarının, çalıştırmacı bileşenlerinde destekleyici bileşenlerine göre daha güçlü olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bununla birlikte, çeşitli kurumsal etkenler nedeniyle çalıştırmacı bileşenler zorlayıcı ve sistematik bir şekilde uygulanmamaktadır. Çalışmada Türkiye örneğinin etkinleştirme tipolojileri açısından Barbier (2004a) tarafından geliştirilen tipolojide liberal tipe, Serrano Pascual (2007a) tarafından geliştirilen tipolojide ise ekonomik sıçrama tahtası rejimine daha yakın olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFDC	Aid to Families with Dependent Children
ALMP	Active Labour Market Policy
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CV	Curriculum Vitae
EES	European Employment Strategy
EU	European Union
ILO	International Labour Organization
İEP	On-the-job Training Programme
İİBK	Institution of Finding Job and Worker
İŞKUR	Turkish Employment Agency
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JSA	Jobseeker's Allowance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLMP	Passive Labour Market Policy
PRWORA	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
SEE	State Economic Enterprise
SYDV	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
TANF	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
TL	Turkish Lira
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institution
TYP	Programme for the Community Benefit

UB	Unemployment Benefit
UI	Unemployment Insurance
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One can notice the increasing penetration of ALMP programmes into daily life while waiting in the checkout queue in a supermarket in Turkey. It is quite likely to encounter a small signboard stating that a labour market training programme financed by the Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu, İŞKUR) is being operated in a workplace one walks into. The increasing visibility of ALMP programmes inspired some early questions regarding the evaluation of ALMP programmes of Turkey in a comparative activation framework which led to this thesis.

This thesis basically inquires research questions “Where Turkey’s ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes fit within the continuum between workfarist and enabling types?”, “Are the ALMPs in Turkey stronger in the workfare or enabling elements?”, and “Where does the case of Turkey approximate to within dominant activation typologies?”. In this study, firstly the legislative and policy framework is put under scrutiny to be able to address those inquiries. Secondly, a field work research relying on semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen İŞKUR officials was conducted to investigate the implementation dimension of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey. The literature on ALMPs and labour market activation revolves around the concepts of activation, workfare, employability, and enablement. Therefore, the programmes which are under scrutiny are also evaluated with respect to those concepts. The study has therefore two objectives: to evaluate the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes following the

analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007) and to locate the case of Turkey following that analysis within the prominent activation typologies found in the literature, namely those of Barbier (2004a) and Serrano Pascual (2007a).

Labour market policy undoubtedly constitutes one of the pillars of social policy. It is a prominent policy domain for welfare state transformation (Dingeldey, 2007). Welfare states went under transformations to integrate more people into the labour market due to the rising global competition in wages and increasing labour costs within the context of economic globalization (Barbier, 2004a, p. 47). The welfare state is presumed to be increasing labour costs and simultaneously encouraging welfare dependency (Barbier, 2004a, p. 47). In this framework, activation refers to a common characteristic of the changing relationship between social protection and employment or work (Barbier, 2004a, pp. 47-48). Labour market activation in that regard is in great demand from the perspective of many countries and supranational and international organizations.

ALMPs are labour market activation mechanisms (Kenworthy, 2010) as policies aimed at enhancing the prospects of unemployed persons to find jobs (Nie & Struby, 2011, p. 36). They are also adopted as a mechanism to address the problem of unemployment (Boone & Van Ours, 2009; Ehlert, 2015; Kenworthy, 2010). ALMP programmes basically entail the services of job search assistance, labour market training, private sector employment incentives, and the creation of public sector employment (Kluve, 2014, p. 9).

The origins of ALMPs have generally been traced back to the 1950s' Sweden in the literature (Barbier, 2004a; Kenworthy, 2010; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001). ALMP programmes started to proliferate in various countries in the mid-1990s, with Denmark and Norway being the pioneers in this movement (Lødemel & Trickey,

2001, p. 26). Correspondingly, the topic of ALMP has become a popular domain for academic inquiry in the early 2000s, following the popularization and the adoption of ALMPs in various countries, particularly in Europe.

Turkey is not an exception to the adoption of the activation trend. The public employment agency which would evolve into İŞKUR was established in 1946 and it then started to provide job placement services (The Republic of Turkey, 1946). The labour market activation efforts of Turkey intensified in the late 1980s with the promotion of labour force training courses which would be conducted by the public employment agency (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 1). In this period, structural adjustment reforms were influential on the labour market policy with respect to country's transition into neoliberal economic order. Workers were going to be displaced due to the privatization of state economic enterprises (SEEs), so they needed new ALMP programmes to be able to reintegrate into the labour market. In the early 1990s, steps were taken for establishing more extensive job search assistance and job placement services (Coşkun, 2017). The number and scope of ALMP programmes were extended as a response to the Marmara Earthquake in 1999 and economic crisis of 2001 (Savaşkan, 2007) and later during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Korkut, Kürşat, & Tetik, 2015). Today, ALMP programmes are used intensively in the country. To illustrate, over half a million individuals participated in labour market training programmes in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2020a).

Scholars have attempted to identify and cluster dominant activation approaches and activation regimes by drawing on individual country cases (e.g. Barbier, 2004a; Daguerre, 2007; Serrano Pascual, 2007a). Most studies distinguish between workfare and enabling approaches and types, albeit the terminologies

frequently differ (Barbier, 2004a; Bonoli, 2013; Daguerre, 2007; Dingeldey, 2007; Eichhorst & Konle-Seidl, 2008; Nelson, 2013). Two activation strands could be distinguished. The first activation approach which is referred to as “workfare”, “work-first”, or “demanding” is demarcated by its enforcing and punitive attitude towards welfare beneficiaries in case of non-compliance with labour market (re)integration requirements (Aurich, 2011; Barbier, 2005a; Bruttel & Sol, 2006; Dingeldey, 2007). Differently, an enabling or a social-democratic activation approach that highlights human capital development and prioritizes training is more generous regarding benefit levels and less strict regarding compliance regimens (Aurich, 2011; Barbier, 2005a; Dingeldey, 2007; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001). In this framework, while the US and the UK exemplify the first approach, the Nordic countries exemplify the second (Fossati, 2018, pp. 4-7).

According to the activation typology developed by Barbier (2004a), there are two main ideal activation approaches adopted across Europe and two corresponding activation types: the liberal regime and the universalistic regime. The liberal type aims to encourage and incentivize individuals to (re)integrate into the labour market (Barbier, 2005a, p. 8). In the universalistic type, on the other hand, social policies are not tied to work-related requirements and a relatively high living standard of living is ensured for welfare beneficiaries (Barbier, 2005a, p. 9). Within this activation typology, while the UK is identified as closer to the liberal type, Denmark is deemed closer to the universalistic ideal type and France is considered a hybrid case (Barbier, 2004a, pp. 56-57).

On the other hand, Serrano Pascual (2007a) comes up with an activation typology which has five ideal types distinguished by citizenship status and social rights in different institutional settings. These are the economic springboard regime,

the civic contractualism regime, the autonomous citizens regime, the fragmented provision regime, and the minimalist disciplinary regime (Serrano Pascual, 2007a). The economic springboard regime relies on incentivizing taking up work (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p.301). The civic contractualism regime aims at making sure that citizens fulfil their duties while offering extensive social rights (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, pp. 301-302). The autonomous citizens regime emphasizes individual and collective responsibility to achieve self-determination and guaranteeing the sustainability of the welfare state simultaneously (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 306). Under the fragmented provision regime, active social policy regime is rather decentralized and it fails to offer sufficient coordination and funding (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 308). The minimalist disciplinary regime, on the other hand, offers a limited scope of welfare state intervention for individuals excluded from the labour market (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 309).

An activating labour market policy typology was developed by Dingeldey (2007). Dingeldey (2007) characterizes and compares welfare state reforms in Denmark, Germany, and the UK regarding the strength of the workfare and enabling elements of their ALMPs. Both the workarist and the enabling policies aim to enhance labour market participation, nonetheless, workfare incorporate coercive elements, whereas enabling policies entail the improvement of labour market services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). To measure the mix of workfare and enabling elements, Dingeldey (2007) utilizes a set of indicators. For workfare policies, she uses the indicators of unemployment benefit cuts and enforced labour market activation (I), and compulsion through individual contracts (II). For enabling policies, on the other hand, she utilizes the indicators of activation via job placement, training programmes as part of activation policies, and the coordination of family

policy. Dingeldey (2007) concludes that while the UK is strong in workfare policies, Denmark is strong in enabling policies, and Germany is in the middle ground but closer to the stronger end regarding workfare policies (p. 847).

Against this background, the evaluation of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes which are currently being implemented in Turkey from a holistic point of view stands out as an important research topic. In that regard, this thesis focuses on the ALMP programmes such as job placement services and labour market training courses and other activating labour market policy programmes such as the unemployment insurance (UI) and childcare policy. Recognizing the significance of the growing interest in activating labour market policies at policy level in Turkey, this thesis is aimed at exploring the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMPs and other activating labour market policies which are in use in the country and locating the case of Turkey in activation typologies developed by Barbier (2004a) and Serrano Pascual (2007a). Therefore, this thesis mainly inquires the evaluation of the ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey in terms of the continuum between workfarist and enabling types. In that regard, the exploration of those programmes in terms of the strength of their workfarist and enabling elements and the location of the case of Turkey is within the prominent activation typologies are other research interests guiding this thesis.

Although there are various studies regarding the workfarist elements of certain ALMP or activating labour market policy programmes in the literature (e.g. Dörtlemmez, 2019; Gün, 2016; Kapar, 2017), there is limited research inquiring the workfarist and enabling elements of those policy programmes from a holistic point of view. The literature on activation typologies disregards the implementation dimension of labour market activation policies. Hence, this thesis draws on a

qualitative fieldwork which would bring the implementation dimension into analysis. There is also a gap in the literature regarding the approximation of the case of Turkey within activation typologies vis-a-vis their workfarist and enabling tendencies. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by evaluating the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes and locating Turkey in activation typologies developed by Barbier (2004a), Dingeldey (2007), and Serrano Pascual (2007a).

1.1 Research methodology

This thesis aims to explore the policy framing and the implementation of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey and locate the case of Turkey within activation typologies introduced by Barbier (2004a) and Serrano Pascual (2007a). In line with the literature, the two concepts that are being critically explored in the thesis are workfare and enablement.

In dealing with the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey, my research draws on the analytical framework introduced by Dingeldey (2007). In evaluating the workfare aspect, Dingeldey (2007) utilizes the indicators of unemployment benefit cuts and enforced labour market activation (I) and compulsion through individual contracts for workfare policies (II). In evaluating the enabling aspect, the indicators of activation via job placement (I), training programmes as part of activation policies (II), and the coordination of family policy (III) are being deployed. I will deal with these indicators in my exploration of the case of Turkey.

The research is designed as a qualitative study incorporating administrative data into the analysis by following the footsteps of Dingeldey (2007). The study

involved two phases. The first phase included content analysis of the relevant documents that provided the framing of ALMP in policy texts. The second phase included the in-depth interviews with the policy practitioners to get a better understanding of the implementation process of the ALMP.

In this framework, firstly, the relevant legal documents, policy documents, reports including but not limited to annual activity reports and development plans, and other administrative data published by İŞKUR and TÜİK are examined in order to understand the framing of the activating aspects of the labour market policy of Turkey. More specifically, the documents under scrutiny are the Constitution, the abrogated labour laws and the current labour law, the constituent and modifying laws of İŞKUR, the Law of the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity, the Law of Unemployment Insurance, the Law on Persons with Disabilities, the Law of Social Insurance and General Health Insurance, circulars of various active labour market policy programmes, directives of various labour market services such as training programmes and job placement services, directives on the employment of persons with disabilities and ex-convicts, directives on self-employment support schemes, directives, circulars and protocols regarding the labour market (re)integration of social assistance beneficiaries and the link between social assistance and employment, the National Employment Strategy and relevant action plans, central development plans and relevant specialization commission reports and action plans, and finally, the strategic plans, annual activity plans, labour market reports, statistics records, monthly statistical bulletins, and other bulletins of İŞKUR. Hence, the research covers legal and policy documents on labour market activation between 1936 and 2021. A complete list of those documents could be found in Appendix A.

At this level, the data are subject to qualitative content analysis. Content analysis is an approach relying on the analysis of documents and texts with reference to predetermined categories (Bryman, 2012, p. 289). In that regard, the characteristics of workfarist and enabling elements are sought for in the legislative and policy framework. While workfare typifies coercive components regarding labour market participation, enabling elements entail the improvement of labour market services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). Administrative statistics provided by OECD and TÜİK are also utilized. The initial analysis of the documents generated significant insights regarding the research question pertaining to the implementation dimension of ALMP and activating labour market policy programmes. At this point, it appeared crucial to critically explore the implementation process by interviewing policy practitioners and receiving their perspectives. Accordingly, qualitative interviews with the İŞKUR officials were planned as the second phase of the research.

İŞKUR is the main implementer of ALMPs and other labour market activation components such as the UI scheme in Turkey. In-depth interviews were conducted with İŞKUR officials from different levels in order to shed light on the implementation dimension of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes and to grasp a clearer understanding of their policy objectives, target groups, and implementations. By bringing the implementation dimension into analysis, the research aims to present the perspectives of the implementers of those policies and to interpret how workfarist and enabling elements of those programmes are transferred into practice.

Interviewing officials from different levels and departments of the organization could allow for exploring a wider perspective. Hence, the perspectives

of officials working in expert and street-level positions were needed to be explored. Expert interviews are critically important for research on policy implementation since experts are a part of the decision-making and implementation processes of a policy (Meuser & Nagel, 2009). Experts can provide researchers with insider knowledge (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009, p. 2). The delivery of public services involves more than the technical implementation of government regulations or laws and workers implementing them play a crucial role from that perspective (Caswell, Kupka, Larsen, & Van Berkel, 2017). ‘Street-level bureaucrats’ in that regard play a crucial role in that framework as they constitute the publicly delivered services themselves (Lipsky, 2010, p. 3). İŞKUR officials such as the job and vocational counsellors as street-level bureaucrats engage in daily interaction with job seekers, employers, and welfare beneficiaries. The experiences, observations, and perceptions of job and vocational counsellors working at İŞKUR provided empirical knowledge regarding the implementation of labour market activation policies in Turkey.

The field work research relies on semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with officials working at İŞKUR at different levels and different departments. Semi-structured interviews are preferred as they facilitate the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. Under this arrangement, the interview process is rather flexible and the respondent has leeway in how to answer the predetermined questions (Bryman, 2012, p. 471). Hence, open ended questions allow the respondents to reflect on their own perspectives and this is expected to better suit the objectives of the study. The interview questions could be found in Appendices B and C.

Purposive snowball sampling method was deployed to reach out the respondents. The reason why purposive sampling method is preferred is that the

respondents are from an occupational group which is hard to reach (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The initial contacts were made through personal contacts and then other contacts were established.

The goal of reaching a balanced composition of respondents from different positions is pursued. For that purpose, 13 interviews in total were conducted with employment experts, an administrator of a service centre, officials from the departments of Unemployment Insurance Benefit Service, Active Labour Force Services, and Employment Services, and job and vocational counsellors in a way to cover each specialization area: job seeker counselling, employer counselling, coaching persons with disabilities, vocational counselling, and the job clubs providing intensified services for disadvantageous groups such as women, the youth, ex-convicts, and the long-term unemployed.

Two respondents are employment experts working at the General Directorate of İŞKUR and other eleven officials work in two different İŞKUR service centres located in Istanbul. Seven respondents are job and vocational counsellors consisting of two job seeker counsellors, one employer counsellor, one vocational counsellor, one employment coach for persons with disabilities, and two job club leaders. One participant is from the administrative level of a service centre. Other three participants are officials from the Employment Services Department, the Unemployment Insurance Benefit Department, and the Active Labour Force Services Department. Table 1 demonstrates the profiles of the research participants.

Table 1. The Profiles of the Respondents in in the Field Work

	Department	Workplace	City
Respondent 1	Employment expert 1	The General Directorate of İŞKUR	Ankara
Respondent 2	Employment expert 2	The General Directorate of İŞKUR	Ankara
Respondent 3	Administrator	Service centre 1	Istanbul
Respondent 4	The Unemployment Insurance Benefit Service	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 5	The Active Labour Force Services	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 6	Job and vocational counsellor (Job seeker counsellor 1)	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 7	Job and vocational counsellor (Employment coach for persons with disabilities)	Service centre 1	Istanbul
Respondent 8	Job and vocational counsellor (Job seeker counsellor 2)	Service centre 1	Istanbul
Respondent 9	Job and vocational counsellor (Employer counsellor)	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 10	Job and vocational counsellor (Job club leader 1)	Service centre 1	Istanbul
Respondent 11	Job and vocational counsellor (Job club leader 2)	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 12	Job and vocational counsellor (Vocational counsellor)	Service centre 2	Istanbul
Respondent 13	Employment Services	Service centre 2	Istanbul

The field work component of the study was approved by The Ethics Committee for Master and Ph.D. Theses in Social Sciences and Humanities at Boğaziçi University. The ethics committee approval document could be found in Appendix D. All respondents were provided with consent forms informing them about the details and

the data protection principles of the research in which they participated (see Appendices E and F). The interviews were conducted in April 2021. While eleven interviews took place in the workplaces of the respondents, two of them were conducted via telephone or video calls due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ten interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Others were not voice-recorded in accordance with the preferences of the respondents. Instead, notes were taken down during those interviews.

The interviews yielded a large body of qualitative data. Interview data were subject to deductive thematic analysis with respect to the framework provided by Dingeldey (2007). As opposed to inductive thematic analysis, deductive thematic analysis is built on pre-existing theory or concepts (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 12). Deductive thematic analysis suits this study as its research questions are quite specific and they can therefore be coded for (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 12). Under this arrangement, the interview data is analysed thematically through the lens of Dingeldey's (2007) framework elaborating on workfarist and enabling policies. These themes are the transfer of the workfarist elements into practice and the transfer of the enabling elements into practice.

1.2 Outline of the chapters

The thesis is composed of five chapters including the introduction. Chapter 2 offers a review of the existing literature on ALMPs and other activating labour market policies. It firstly reviews the literature on the conceptualization and the historical development of ALMPs. Then it presents an overview of impact evaluation studies on different ALMP programmes in different contexts. In the second section of the chapter, the literature on significant concepts including activation, workfare,

employability, and enabling policies related to ALMP are presented. The third section reviews the existing literature on ALMP and activation typologies.

Chapter 3 provides a background of ALMPs and activating labour market policies in Turkey. It firstly presents a reflection on the historical development of ALMPs and İŞKUR as the public employment institution. It then presents the current framework of ALMP and other activating labour market programmes. The third section reflects on the link between social assistance and employment which has recently gained momentum in the changing social policy framework of Turkey. Finally, it presents an overview of studies on the workfarist and enabling aspects of ALMPs and other activating labour market policies in Turkey.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and activating labour market policy programmes which are currently being implemented in the country by relying on the analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007). It also elaborates on the implementation dimension of those policies under two major themes: the transfer of workfarist elements into practice and the transfer of the enabling elements into practice.

Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the research by referring to the existing literature on activation typologies. It locates the case of Turkey in the ALMP and activation typologies developed by Barbier (2004a), Dingeldey (2007), and Serrano Pascual (2007a).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

ALMPs have become a popular domain of academic inquiry since the early 2000s, following their widespread and extensive implementation in many countries, particularly in Europe since the 1990 (e.g. Boone & Van Ours, 2009; Daguerre, 2007; Ehlert, 2015; Kluve et al., 2007; Lowitzsch, Dunsch, & Hashi, 2017; McLaughlin, 1992; Van Berkel & Hornemann Møller, 2003). ALMPs have frequently been studied from a comparative perspective (e.g. Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2001), albeit many individual country analyses could also be found in the literature (e.g. Torfing, 1999).

This chapter presents a review of studies on ALMPs and explores the main concepts related to the topic. In the first section, the concept of ALMP is scrutinized with respect to its definition, aims, programme types, historical development, and impacts. The second section elaborates on the basic concepts which are central to the concept of ALMP: activation, workfare, employability, and enabling policies. The third section reviews the classification attempts which produced typologies of activation and ALMP approaches. The chapter is concluded with a summary of the review in the fourth section.

2.1 ALMPs

The term “active labour market policy” was first coined by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1993 (OECD, 1993). Since the 1990s, ALMPs have been defined as labour market policy interventions that are employed by the welfare state in order to “actively” enhance the employment

prospects of job seekers and to reduce aggregate unemployment (Kluve, 2014, p. 8). The concept of ALMP is contrasted with the concept of passive labour market policy (PLMP) which has historically demanded limited activity from the programme participants (Trickey, 2001, p. 252). PLMPs could be exemplified by measures including but not limited to unemployment and early retirement benefits (Nie & Struby, 2011, p. 37).

ALMPs have frequently been regarded as a mechanism which could be put to use to tackle unemployment (e.g. Boone & Van Ours, 2009; Ehlert, 2015; Kenworthy, 2010; Nelson, 2013; Nie & Struby, 2011). ALMPs include job search assistance, labour market training, private sector employment incentives, and public sector employment creation (Kluve, 2014, p. 9). Nonetheless, their underlying assumptions, extent, target groups, and relation to other policies vary between countries (Frøyland, Andreassen, & Innvær, 2019, p. 2; Kenworthy, 2010, p. 438).

2.1.1 Aims of ALMPs

The literature presents contrasting ideas when it comes to describing the aims of ALMPs. A common perception on the aims of ALMPs is the (re)integration of more people into the labour market. Some scholars put forth the improvement of the functioning of the labour market as a chief aim (e.g. Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Van Ours, 2004). Dar and Tzannatos (1999) point out that ALMPs can function as a mechanism to correct some market failure or to change an “economically efficient” result to a “socially desirable” one (p. 1). The aim of ALMPs could also be approached as bringing unemployed individuals back to work through the improvement of labour market functioning (e.g. Van Ours, 2004, p. 37). Accordingly, ALMPs aim at promoting labour supply mobilization through

programmes like job creation and job subsidies, the development of employment-related skills through measures like (re)training, and the promotion of an efficient labour market through employment services like job-matching and counselling (Dar & Tzannatos, 1999, p. 2).

If we look at the labour market functioning in detail, a distinction regarding the aims of ALMPs could be put forth on the basis of the labour supply and demand since ALMPs basically introduce interventions to the labour market. There are two main dimensions of the labour market: the demand side and the supply side (Sapsford & Tzannatos, 1993, p. 3). Whilst the demand side consists of producers of goods and services as employers buying labour services, the supply side is made up of individuals and households who are the suppliers of labour services (Sapsford & Tzannatos, 1993, p. 3).

A more pervasive approach in the literature considers the aim of ALMPs in terms of labour supply. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by the ILO underlines both the demand side and the supply side interventions to the labour market as ILO identifies the aim of ALMPs as “stimulating employment and job creation” (ILO, 2015, p. 1). It has also been argued that ALMPs are deployed in order to spur the demand and supply of labour during economic restructuring (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, pp. 13-14). In terms of the labour supply, the aims of ALMPs propounded in the literature could be summarized as:

- Increasing the individual employment chances of programme participants (Kluge, 2014, p. 8),
- Increasing individual earnings and productivity (Betcherman, Olivas, & Dar, 2004, p. i; Kluge, 2014, p. 8),
- Decreasing the risk of unemployment (Betcherman et al., 2004, p. i).

- Facilitating re-entry into the labour market (Ehlert, 2015, p. 1).
- Impelling welfare beneficiaries at the working age off to the labour market (e.g. Barbier, 2004a; Frøyland et al., 2019).

In line with the abovementioned objectives, the supply side interventions of ALMPs might have particular target groups such as the long-term unemployed, workers in poor families, and specific groups experiencing various labour market challenges (Betcherman et al., 2004, p. i). The principal target groups of ALMPs are groups which are associated with low employment rates, usually women, persons with low skills or low educational attainment, the youth, persons with disabilities, immigrants, and persons near retirement (Frøyland et al., 2019, p. 3).

The aims of ALMPs might vary from one welfare state to another. For instance, Kluve (2014) makes a cross-country distinction and argues that ALMPs target the most disadvantaged persons and thus, treat earnings as the chief outcome in the US, while the focus rests on employment outcomes and finding employment in Europe (p. 8).

The aims of ALMPs regarding the labour demand and supply may also vary in line with different ALMP programme types. While some ALMP programmes aim at enhancing the labour supply (e.g. training courses), some aim at increasing the labour demand (e.g. public works programmes and employment subsidies), and some aim at enhancing the operation of the labour market (e.g. employment services) (Betcherman et al., 2004, p. i).

2.1.2 ALMP programmes

The extent to which governments develop policies in order to address the problem of unemployment significantly varies from one country to another (Nelson, 2013, p.

255). ALMPs have manifested themselves in a wide set of policy forms in various welfare states. Indeed, various types of policies and programmes have frequently been classified under the headline of ALMPs in the literature. ILO (2015) lists public works programmes, hiring subsidies, vocational (re)training, and retraining, and the promotion self-employment as ALMP programmes (p. 1).

Dar and Tzannatos (1999) classify ALMP components with respect to their functions. The programmes aimed at the mobilization of labour supply include job creation and job subsidies, while the ones aiming at the development of employment-related skills include measures such as retraining, and the ones aiming at the promotion of efficient labour markets include the provision of job matching and counselling services (Dar & Tzannatos, 1999, p. 2). ALMP programmes consist of public works programmes or public service employment, job search assistance or employment services, training for the long-term unemployed, retraining, training for the youth, micro-enterprise development programmes, and employment or wage subsidies (Dar & Tzannatos, 1999, p. 33).

By referring to indicators developed by OECD (2006), Kluve (2014) classifies ALMPs into four categories: job search assistance (I), labour market training (II), private sector employment incentives (III), and public sector employment (IV) (p. 9).

Firstly, job search assistance mainly aims to improve the job searching effort of the individual, the overall efficiency of the job search process in addition to the quality of job matching (Kluve, 2014, p. 9). Job search assistance may include programmes like job search training, counselling, monitoring, job clubs as well as sanctions (Kluve, 2014, p. 9).

Secondly, labour market training consists of all programmes aimed at enhancing human capital through a set of training elements: classroom vocational/technical training, on-the-job training, basic skills training, life skills training, and job insertion (Kluve, 2014, p. 10). According to Kluve et al. (2007), training programmes are the most widely deployed ALMPs in Europe (p. 3).

Thirdly, the provision of private sector incentive consists of wage subsidy and self-employment assistance. Interventions providing wage subsidy are aimed at incentivizing changes in employer and/or worker behaviour in private sector employment with a view to encouraging employers to hire more workers or to keep jobs which would be lost in the absence of wage subsidy (Kluve, 2014, p. 10). Another private sector incentive is the provision of self-employment assistance which bestows grants or loans on unemployed persons who wish to start up their own businesses (Kluve, 2014, p. 10).

Finally, public sector employment programmes concentrate on the direct creation of public works or other activities producing public goods or services (Kluve, 2014, p. 11). Those measures usually target the most disadvantaged individuals and their costs on the part of the government are typically high (Kluve, 2014, p. 11). The main goal of public sector employment programmes is to keep their participants connected to the labour market and to inhibit human capital loss during the unemployment spell (Kluve, 2014, p. 11). They might also function as a safety net of last resort to provide income protection (Kluve, 2014, p. 11).

The different types of ALMPs are also elaborated by Bonoli (2010) who distinguishes four ideal types of ALMP: incentive reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. The first type, namely incentive reinforcement aims at consolidating work incentives for persons on benefit

by relying on tools such as tax credits, in-work benefits, time limits for benefits, benefit reductions, benefit conditionality and sanctions (Bonoli, 2010, p. 440). This type is particularly prevalent in English speaking countries (Bonoli, 2010, p. 440). The second type, employment assistance adopts the objective of tackling obstacles to employment and of smoothing (re)entry into the labour market (Bonoli, 2010, p. 440). The tools deployed by this ALMP type include placement services, job subsidies, counselling, and job search programmes (Bonoli, 2010, p. 440). Coupled with incentive reinforcement, it is also common in English speaking countries in addition to Nordic and continental European countries (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). The third type aims at keeping jobless persons occupied and hindering human capital erosion in the course of unemployment by maintaining instruments such as public sector job creation and training programmes for non-employed persons (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). This type was common in continental European countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). The last ALMP type introduced by Bonoli (2010) is human capital investment which is designed for enhancing the chances of employment by equipping jobless persons with necessary skills (p. 441). This ALMP type embraces the mechanisms of basic education and vocational training and it is most developed in Nordic countries (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441).

All in all, ALMP programmes include a wide array of labour market interventions which may involve supply side or demand side measures. Programmes may aim at employment and/or job creation. Countries adopt different combinations of ALMP programmes to promote labour market participation.

2.1.3 The historical development of ALMPs

The roots of ALMPs could be traced back to the 1930s when they first started to be discussed in Sweden (Barbier, 2004a, p. 52). The original ALMP was developed in Sweden and it consisted of a mix of macro-economic policies, wage policies, and a variety of selective interventions (Barbier, 2004a, p. 52). There are two distinctive views regarding the main objective of the original ALMP in the literature. Barbier (2004a) defines the original aim as full employment (p. 52). Bonoli (2013) asserts that ALMPs were not originally designed as a response to mass unemployment (p. 166). Rather, ALMPs were first created in the 1950s' Sweden in a context of full employment. According to Bonoli (2013), the original ALMP was aimed at tackling the lack of skilled labour force needed in the industrial sector. Thus, the first ALMPs were part of an economic policy tool to modernize national economies rather than a social policy in itself (Bonoli, 2013, p. 166).

Scholars usually approach the phenomenon of the proliferation of ALMPs from the perspective of welfare state transformation. Labour market policy has been a focal point in debates concerning welfare state transformation in the last decades (Clasen & Clegg, 2012, p. 135). According to Dingeldey (2007), what is common to “workfare”, “enabling” or “activating” states which adopt different paths to welfare state transformation is the notion that traditional welfare state policies with decommodification aims are being replaced by social policies prioritizing (re)commodification (p. 823). In this respect, activating labour market policy is supposed to be at the centre of the paradigm shift of welfare state policies (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 823).

Jessop (1993) asserts that the Keynesian welfare state which emerged during the post-World War II boom started to be tendentially replaced by the Schumpeterian

workfare state within the context of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (p. 7). According to Jessop (1993), the distinctive objectives of the Keynesian welfare state were the promotion of full employment in a comparably closed national economy via demand side management and the generalization of the norms of mass consumption in abstract terms (p. 9). The distinctive economic and social goals of the Schumpeterian workfare state could be summarized as the endorsement of market innovation, the structural competitiveness of open economies primarily via supply side interventions, and labour market flexibility over social policies (Jessop, 1993, p. 9). This shift may be typical in European cases (Jessop, 1993, p. 9).

According to Clasen and Clegg (2012), the core institution of labour market policy was unemployment benefit and contributory unemployment insurance and ALMPs were not among the major policy concerns in the old welfare state (pp. 137-138). An exception to this picture was Sweden, where ALMP in the form of retraining programmes was central to the labour market regulation (Clasen & Clegg, 2012, p. 138).

According to Bonoli (2010), OECD countries started to adopt active labour market policies in order to equip expanding industrial economies with skilled workers within the context of labour market shortage between the 1950s and the 1960s (p. 443). The key objective of ALMPs then was human capital investment (Bonoli, 2010, p. 443). In addition, public employment services were pervasively adopted in the 1960s to address the bottlenecks of the tight labour markets (Clasen & Clegg, 2012, p. 138).

In 1964, the OECD embraced the notion of active labour markets with a focus on the supplementation of human resources investment by referring to programmes in the US (Barbier, 2004a, p. 52). The revised notion provided a basis for a

universalistic portrait and the endorsement of supply side labour market policies along with employment services, vocational training, and employment creation for disadvantaged groups (Barbier, 2004a, p. 52). Hereby, the ALMPs were separated from their original features which included macro-economic and wage policies and this distinction paved the way for the commonly used differentiation between active expenditure (expenditure on programmes such as public employment service, vocational training, and subsidized employment) and passive expenditure (expenditure on programmes such as unemployment compensation and early retirement for labour market reasons) (Barbier, 2004a, pp. 52-53).

In the 1970s, the context of labour market policy-making changed significantly as industrial employment began to shrink, unemployment rates rose, developed economies started to become service-based, and female labour market participation started to increase (Clasen & Clegg, 2012, p. 139). In this context, labour market activation has become a domain of interest for policy-making due to rising labour costs, unemployment rates, and benefit dependency in many countries (Barbier, 2004a; Calmfors, Forslund, & Hemström, 2001). In the aftermath of 1973-1975 oil shocks which was denoted by persistently high unemployment rates, the function of ALMPs was to provide job seekers with occupation in many countries (Bonoli, 2010, p. 443).

ALMPs started to gain weight in labour market policies in many countries. For instance, ALMPs have been in use in the UK since the early 1980s with a focus on restoring the motivation and the skills of unemployed persons (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 8). Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) argue that public provision of activities such as job training, wage subsidies, and job search assistance became an ingredient of the modern welfare state (p. 4). These activities which are the backbones of

European ALMPs have also been a characteristic of the US welfare policy for more than three decades (Heckman et al., 1999, p. 4).

Although their roots go back to the post-World War II era, ALMPs started to proliferate in various countries in the mid-1990s, with Norway and Denmark being the pioneers of the trend (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, p. 26). In the mid-1990s, ALMPs started to be adopted in order to encourage and facilitate labour market reintegration of unemployed and non-working individuals (Bonoli, 2013, p. 14). In that period, the tools entail various combinations of incentive reinforcement and employment assistance (Bonoli, 2010, p. 443). Moreover, many countries started to reform their labour market policies with a view to integrating benefit recipients into the labour market with the underlying assumption that the existing policies rendered individuals too passive in the 1990s (Aurich, 2011, p. 294). ALMPs have significantly developed significantly since the 1990s across OECD countries (Bonoli, 2010, p. 435).

The labour market policies adopted and promoted by the EU has substantially contributed to the proliferation of ALMPs in European countries. In the Essen Summit of 1994, the European Commission has highlighted the concept of active policies to endorse the European Employment Strategy (EES) (Barbier, 2004a, p. 53). The circulation of the EES has boosted the adoption of ALMPs in the EU since 1997. The EES identifies five priority domains to intervene in the labour market: investment in educational training, job creation via flexible employment, wage moderation and reduction in non-wage labour costs, improvement in active labour market policies, and measures to tackle long-term unemployment (Daguerre, 2007, p. 19). The strategy underlines labour market interventions regarding both the labour demand and the labour supply. It promotes policy shift from a preventive towards a

more active approach to unemployment and encourages member states to enhance the effectiveness of active measures (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 186).

EES employs three principal instruments to promote activation policies: ideological persuasion, the provision of political resources, and reflexive deliberation and promotion of policy learning (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 26). Nonetheless, there are substantial differences among the member states in terms of their unemployment rates and ALMP expenditures (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 186). The EU does not impose any sanctions attached to the implementation of the strategy, apart from peer pressure in the form of recommendations to member states (Daguerre, 2007, p. 19).

2.1.4 Evaluation of ALMP: What does the literature tell?

A significant portion of the ALMP literature involves the evaluation of the impacts of ALMPs, either in the form of individual country cases or cross-country analyses (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2004; Boone & Van Ours, 2004, 2009; Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2010; Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Ehlert, 2015; Kluve & Schmidt, 2002; Kluve et al., 2007; Martin & Grubb, 2001; Nie & Struby, 2011). ALMPs may generate positive or negative effects on the labour market or they may simply prove ineffective (e.g. Boone & Van Ours, 2004; Calmfors, 1994; Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Dar, 2002). Those effects might occur on the job matching process, labour force participation, and on other policies (Calmfors, 1994, p. 13).

The literature suggests that ALMPs are not a panacea for the problem of unemployment (e.g. Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001). ALMPs need to be carefully designed and planned to be effective (Calmfors, 1994; Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001). ALMPs can significantly influence aggregate labour market outcomes if appropriate strategies are adopted (Martin &

Grubb, 2001, p. 9). Yet, ALMPs can be “a complement but not a substitute” to other measures adopted to address the problem of unemployment (Calmfors, 1994, pp. 37-38).

Dar and Tzannatos (1999) present a review of ALMP evaluation studies which had been conducted by ILO and OECD and they conclude that some ALMP programmes work for some participants in some cases and the impact and cost-effectiveness of ALMP programmes vary with their designs and the total macro and labour market framework by which they are surrounded (pp. iii-iv).

Based on a review of cross-country data sets of OECD countries, Martin (2015) points out that effective activation policies help to get the unemployed benefit recipients into work. Frederiksson (2020) argues that increasing expenditure on core and mixed ALMP programmes positively affect unemployed persons’ transition into employment in Europe. On the other hand, Calmfors et al. (2001) find some evidence on the positive impact of ALMPs in matching efficiency, labour force participation, and the reduction of open unemployment; but also argue that they might have negatively affected regular employment (p. 61).

ALMPs might have negative effects that could crowd out regular employment, even if they reduce unemployment (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 32). They might also have other unintended consequences. The unintended effects of ALMPs which influence their overall effectiveness are deadweight loss, substitution, displacement, and locking-in effects. The concept of the deadweight loss refers to the situation in which the outcomes of the programme would have also occurred in its absence (Calmfors, 1994, p. 17). The substitution effect could be defined as the extent to which jobs which are created for a specific category of workers take the place of jobs for other categories (Calmfors, 1994, p. 17). In that situation, the net

employment effect becomes zero (Betcherman et al., 2004, p. 16). The displacement effect usually occurs in the product market and refers to the situation in which a firm employing subsidized workers increases output but causes the displacement of outputs among firms which have not recruited subsidized workers (Betcherman et al., 2004, p. 16). Finally, the locking in effect is defined as the situation in which unemployed persons become locked-in temporary work and so that they reduce their search efforts for a regular job (Van Ours, 2004, p. 37). ALMPs may also lead to stigmatization as it is possible for persons who are placed in a job by the public employment service to get stigmatized (Kluve, 2014, p. 10).

Regarding the impact of individual ALMP programmes, the literature presents contrasting results as different programmes generate different outcomes and the same or similar programmes may result in different outcomes depending on the time, place, and context in which they operate. The ALMP programme which is the most frequently argued to have positive impacts on employment is the provision of employment services in the form of job search assistance and counselling (e.g. Calmfors, 1994; Card et al., 2010; Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001; Nie & Struby, 2011). Calmfors (1994) suggests that counselling and job search assistance services targeting the long-term unemployed have a positive impact on job-finding rates (p. 37). Dar and Tzannatos (1999) argue that job search assistance has a positive impact on employment and it is generally cost-effective compared to other ALMPs (p. iii). In another study, Martin and Grubb (2001) propound that counselling and job search assistance services seem to be cost-effective active measures when they are combined with monitoring measures for job seekers and work test. Later, Betcherman et al. (2004) also found that employment services generally had positive impact on employment in their study which adds 87 new

evaluation studies to the works covered by the study of Dar and Tzannatos (1999) (p. 293). Card et al. (2010) point out that job search assistance programmes have usually generated positive impacts, particularly in the short run. Nie & Struby (2011) argue that job search assistance programmes aimed at matching unemployed people with employers are effective in their analysis of OECD country cases. On the other hand, Boone & Van Ours (2009) find that public employment services ineffective in their study based on data from 20 OECD countries (p. 293).

Regarding training programmes, the impacts of training or re-training programmes vary according to their target groups, time, place, and context, yet training programmes have generally been associated with positive impact on employment (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2004; Boone & Van Ours, 2009; Card et al., 2010; Nie & Struby, 2011). Boone and Van Ours (2009) suggest that labour market training is an effective way to reduce unemployment rates and training improves the expected productivity by drawing on data from 20 OECD countries (pp. 293-295). Similarly, Nie and Struby (2011) argue that training programmes that provide unemployed workers with skills and are effective in their study of OECD country cases. As a specific form of training programmes, Card et al. (2010) propound that on-the-job training programmes have favourable relative impacts in the long run in their meta-analysis study covering micro-econometric evaluations of ALMPs based on 97 studies conducted between 1995 and 2007 (p. 453). On the other hand, Dar and Tzannatos (1999) find that training programmes targeting the youth have no positive impact on their employment prospects (p. iii). Similarly, Betcherman et al. (2004) later point out that training programmes have no positive impact when they target the youth (p. 293).

It could be argued that the impacts of other ALMP programmes have been scrutinized less frequently compared to employment services and training programmes. Public works programmes (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2004; Card et al., 2010) and wage subsidies are found to be ineffective in some studies (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2004; Boone & Van Ours, 2009). Microenterprise development and self-employment assistance schemes are argued to have positive impacts on older and better-educated beneficiaries (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2004).

2.2 ALMP and related concepts: activation, workfare, employability, and enabling policies

2.2.1 Activation

The concept of activation is central to the understandings of and discussions about ALMPs. In the literature, activation has been regarded as a new paradigm (e.g. Bonoli, 2013; Serrano Pascual, 2007b). It is approached as a general trend which is compatible with various combinations of welfare reforms in several countries (Barbier & Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004, p. 4). The activation trend pertains to a paradigm shift entailing the modification of policy instruments and goals (Eichhorst & Konle-Seidl, 2008, p. 7).

There are different definitions for the concept of activation in the literature. An exhaustive definition of activation is proposed by Barbier (2004a) according to whom the concept of activation refers to the introduction of an enhanced and explicit connection between social protection and labour market participation in the public policy domain (p. 48). Activation involves the critical remodelling of previous income support and social assistance schemes in terms of equity and efficiency and

the improvement of the different social functions of labour market participation and paid work (Barbier, 2004a, p. 48). Another similar approach highlights the aspect of designing benefit criteria and employment or training services with a view to moving unemployed benefit recipients into work (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, p. 8). From another perspective, activation policies could also be defined as policies highlighting the self-responsibility of citizens for their self-sustainability (Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011, p. 3). The definitions imply that some ALMP programmes have strong connections with the concept of activation.

Barbier (2004b) suggests that although the activation strategy has a novel aspect, it is not completely new, because social protection systems have been built on relationships between employment statuses and social protection from their start (p. 237). What is innovative about activation is the involvement of novel and systematic transformations to render the systems more employment friendly, differently from the past (Barbier, 2004b, p. 237).

Activation has become central to the modern welfare states due to various reasons including the financial retrenchment of the welfare state, the question of fairness, poverty reduction, social inclusion, women's independence and fulfilment, and external encouragement of supranational and international organizations such as OECD (Kenworthy, 2010, p. 435). Activation can be regarded as a key element of labour market policy in the post-industrial economy (Bonoli, 2013, p. 167).

Activation is also a key concept of the EES and the linchpin of the European social model which projects a knowledge-based society (Serrano Pascual, 2004a, p. 497). It has been argued that there is a convergence towards the activation paradigm in the EU due to the impact of the EES (Kluve et al. 2007; Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 23).

Moreira and Lødemel (2014) discern two waves of activation and call the activation trend of the late 1990s and early 2000s “the second wave of activation”, as opposed to the first wave of activation which entailed a transmission of workfarist elements from the US to Europe (p. 1). While in the first wave which took place in the early 1990s, the focus rested on work, the second wave of activation is characterized by an enhanced focus on the improvement of activation services delivery (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, pp. 1-2). In the second wave, there is a shift from a one-size-fits-all approach towards a more individualized and tailor-made approach in terms of the delivery of activation services to benefit recipients through mechanisms such as personal action plans in many countries (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, p. 2).

The core objective of activation is the elimination of labour market exit and the unconditional benefit options for working-age persons (Eichhorst & Konle-Seidl, 2008, p. 6). In this respect, the activation policies cover a broad spectrum of policies, gradually penetrating to social assistance policies, labour market policies, and pension policies (Barbier, 2005a, p. 6).

Activation policies have three fundamental characteristics: an individualized approach, an emphasis on employment, and contractualization (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). The individualized approach carries the objective of changing the individual behaviour, attitude, and motivation rather than creating the political conditions for the fair redistribution of wealth (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). The individualized approach in that regard favours the individualization of services and greater involvement of the client (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). Regarding the emphasis on employment, activation policies aim to influence individual behaviour in the labour market with a focus on employment and autonomy (Serrano Pascual,

2007b, p. 14). In this context, contractualization appears as a core principle in two ways (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). Firstly, the contract is a metaphor as far as the guidance and the legitimation of activation policies are concerned (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). Secondly, contractualization entails a change in the social contract (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14). In the framework of activation, citizens' access to rights has become conditional on their behaviour and attitude in terms of employment (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 14).

According to Kluve (2014), the chief components of activation are a timely intervention in the unemployment process by the public employment service and frequent contacts between job seekers and caseworkers (I), systematic monitoring and reporting of job searching activities (II), the establishment of back-to-work contracts or individual action plans (III), direct transfer of unemployed individuals to available jobs (IV), and referral to ALMP programmes (V) (pp. 8-9). Within this perspective, benefit sanctions apply in case of non-compliance. Van Berkel and Hornemann Møller (2003) identify the aim of activation policies as the termination of benefit receipt via the adoption of different strategical elements. Such approaches underline the connotation of activation and workfare.

Activation is also approached as a paradigm which transforms the welfare state into a "tutor" state carrying out supply side interventions in the labour market (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 21). This tutor state consolidates human capital and enhances individual agency by equipping people with ethical skills such as self-management and self-reliance to create a new type of worker who is more flexible, active, and employable (Serrano Pascual, 2007b, p. 21). In terms of social integration, Bothfeld and Betzelt (2011) stress that activation strategies highlight

labour market participation as the sole legitimate apparatus to achieve social integration (pp. 5-6).

Activation policies may incorporate pressure (i.e. conditionality and sanctions) and enabling measures (i.e. job search assistance services and job subsidies to place unemployed individuals in unsubsidized market jobs) (Bonoli, 2013, p. 167). While some scholars emphasize the workfarist elements of activation (e.g. Kluve, 2014; Van Berkel & Hornemann Møller, 2003), some scholars stress human capital enhancement (e.g. Serrano Pascual, 2007b), and some highlight its relation to social integration (e.g. Bothfeld & Betzelt, 2011). This distinction is going to be elaborated in the third section.

The link between the concepts of activation and ALMP needs more elaboration. Although these two concepts are closely related, they are different. In terms of the connection between labour market activation and ALMPs, it should be noted that the introduction of ALMPs preceded the emergence of the activation paradigm (Bonoli, 2013). While Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands were quick to embrace the activation paradigm, forerunners of ALMP such as Sweden and Germany proved slower to adopt (Bonoli, 2013). Nonetheless, ALMPs proliferated as active social policies within the context of the activation turn in Europe between the 1990s and the early 2000s (Bonoli, 2013, p. 167).

According to Moreira and Lødemel, although ALMPs are part of a policy set utilized to activate benefit recipients, differently from activation policies, ALMPs do not usually impose eligibility conditions to provide beneficiaries with income protection (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, pp. 8-9). An example of activation policy is unemployment insurance (UI). As is the most common unemployment benefit, UI is paid to unemployed workers who satisfy certain criteria such as work history (Nie &

Struby, 2011, p. 37). Although it is generally considered a PLMP (e.g. Martin & Grubb, 2001; Nie & Struby, 2011), it has also been argued that UI schemes might have activating elements in the literature (e.g. Barbier, 2005b). By considering the concept of activation as the introduction of a connection between social protection and labour market participation, Barbier (2005a) suggests that the social protection domains which could be activated in that sense exceeds traditional ALMPs and part of them is UI (p. 7). Particularly, the condition to seek employment while receiving unemployment insurance benefit in order to remain eligible is an activating element attached to UI (Barbier, 2004b, p. 237). For instance, Barbier and Fargion (2004) assert that UI has had an activation component with its obligation to seek work since its introduction in 1958 in the case of France (p. 444).

ALMPs constitute one of the ways of leading to labour market activation (Kenworthy, 2010). As such, some ALMP and labour market activation programmes overlap. According to Kenworthy (2010), policy tools that are deployed for labour market activation are benefit limits, cuts, and conditions, job search and job placement assistance, transportation assistance, in-work subsidy, employer subsidy, public employment, the promotion of part-time and flexible work arrangements, the reduction of tax disincentives to second earners, the reduction of real wages, the reduction of non-wage labour costs, the facilitation of employment protection regulations, the promotion of family-friendly policies, the enhancement of human capital, and career ladders. As could be seen, some tools of labour market activation are actually ALMP programmes. Kenworthy (2010) classifies three labour market activation strategies based on the aim of activation and the breadth of policies to be employed.

The first approach explicitly refers to ALMPs that aim at higher employment rate as a relatively narrow array of government programmes (Kenworthy, 2010, p. 438).

The second approach also concentrates on employment; however, it adopts a broader set of policy mechanisms such as the ones pertaining to public employment and fiscal policy (Kenworthy, 2010, p. 438).

The third approach also deploys a wide range of policy instruments; nonetheless, it conceives the aim of activation to be not solely higher employment rate, but also labour market success by paying more attention to skill development, placement in suitable jobs, the gainful employment, and the opportunity for mobility (Kenworthy, 2010, p. 438).

At this point, Kenworthy (2010) emphasizes the distinction between labour market activation programmes that deploy disincentives or punishments to force people into the labour market and enabling policies that enhance people's ability to be employed in good jobs and to progress in the labour market (p. 438).

The concepts of activation and ALMPs have received severe criticisms in the literature. A frequently highlighted criticism pertains to their supply side approach which relates joblessness to individual failure instead of structural changes or problems existing in the labour market (Frøyland et al., 2019, p. 5). ALMPs principally involve supply side interventions in the labour market with the aim of consolidating, stimulating or enabling jobless persons to leave welfare benefits and move into paid work (Frøyland et al., 2019, p. 1). By concentrating on the individual behaviour of the poor, activation discourses disregard the structural disadvantages experienced by vulnerable groups in current capitalist societies (Daguerre, 2007, p. 9).

The social policy discussions on activation or ALMPs mostly concentrate on supply side approaches directed at jobless individuals (Frøyland et al., 2019, p. 1). The reliance of ALMPs and the activation policies on the supply side interventions in the labour market has also been criticized (e.g. Frøyland et al., 2019; Ingold & Stuart, 2015). On the other hand, little attention is paid to demand side interventions that are aimed at activating employers or to combined approaches incorporating supply and demand side components in social policy discussions (Frøyland et al., 2019, p. 1). Another criticism regarding ALMPs is that they fail to contribute to the inclusion of individuals who are the most difficult to place in employment (Eichhorst, Kaufmann, & Konle-Seidl, 2008, p. 441).

2.2.2 ALMP and workfare

Another related concept is workfare. An important characteristic of active social policy is the introduction of work-oriented policies (Van Voorhis & Gilbert, 2001, p. vii). A key concept in this discussion is workfare or welfare-to-work policies. The concepts of ALMP, workfare, and activation are closely linked despite their differences and the literature significantly diverges in that respect. While some scholars approach workfare as a distinctive form of policy (e.g. Bonoli, 2013; Torfing, 1999), some scholars approach it as an ALMP (e.g. Lødemel, 2004), and some scholars deem ALMPs as part of workfare policies (e.g. Savaşkan, 2007; Yılmaz & Yentürk, 2018). The concept of workfare has frequently been studied in the literature (e.g. Barbier, 2004a; Besley & Coate, 1992; Jessop, 1993, 2002; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Mead, 1989; Peck, 2003; Peck & Theodore, 2001; Standing, 1990; Torjman, 1996). Although works on workfare predate works on ALMPs, they both gained ground around the 1990s.

Workfare is a term coined in the late 1960s as the contraction of the words “work” and “welfare” (Peck, 2003, p. 85). Although workfare schemes were first created in the US in the 1970s (Barbier, 2004a, p. 49), their antecedents are deemed to be the poor laws of the seventeenth century (Paz-Fuchs, 2008a; Torjman, 1996). The objective of the original schemes in the US and Australia was to make benefit claimants work for benefits which they receive (Paz-Fuchs & Eleveld, 2016, p. 1).

Workfare can be defined as a situation in which the receivers of financial aid through welfare are required to perform compulsory labour or service as a condition of their assistance (Torjman, 1996, p. 1). There are many definitions of the concept of workfare in the literature. Although the link between mandatory work and social assistance has been accentuated, workfare can be identified as an elusive concept due to the lack of consensus and clarity on the matter (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, pp. 3-4). The term is politically charged itself and workfare policies are easy to define neither in terms of their purpose nor their target group (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, pp. 3-4). Nonetheless, what is common about those distinctive definitions is the existence of a compulsory or mandatory element related to work (e.g. Barbier, 2004a; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Paz-Fuchs, 2008a; Peck, 2003; Torjman, 1996).

According to Lødemel and Trickey (2001), there are three substantial elements of workfare: It is compulsory, it is primarily about work, and it essentially concerns policies related to the lowest tier of public income support (p. 7). Similarly, Paz-Fuchs (2008a) suggests that such programs target the lowest social and economic tiers (p. 3). Another characteristic underlined by Paz-Fuchs (2008a) is that those programmes consider work as a mechanism to address social and economic problems (p. 3).

Workfare also refers to the process of work-oriented welfare reform (Peck, 2003, p. 85). According to Paz-Fuchs (2008a), the most pervasive goal of welfare reform is to boost self-reliance by moving welfare beneficiaries into the labour market (p. 3). Although workfare schemes were first introduced in the 1970s, they became popular in the late 1990s (Barbier, 2004a, p. 50).

Workfare has become a strong indicator of the prevalent method and logic of welfare reform in the US (Peck, 2003, p. 85). The most famous example of workfare is the US welfare reform in which the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) replaced the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 (Barbier, 2004a, p. 50). The act significantly changed or abolished the prominent social assistance schemes (O'Connor, 2001, p. 4). The welfare responsibilities of the federal government shrank and individual states were granted autonomy over welfare responsibilities (O'Connor, 2001, p. 4). The PRWORA introduced time limits and work requirements for benefit receipt for most recipients (O'Connor, 2001, p. 5).

The concept of workfare is different from the concept of activation (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, p. 9). Although both workfare and activation involve compulsion, activation policies do not only target social assistance beneficiaries, unlike workfare. Rather, activation applies to different types of benefits such as unemployment insurance and disability benefits. Moreover, while individuals are supposed to become self-sufficient through work in workfare, activation presents a wider set of options for putting them into work such as training, education and job search assistance services (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, p. 9).

Workfare programmes significantly differ due to a variety of factors including ideological justifications, the structural contexts, and path dependency (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, p. 34). One of the earliest works which differentiate between different workfare approaches belongs to Torfing (1999) who sets a distinction between defensive workfare and offensive workfare based on ideological differences. While defensive workfare refers to a punitive and preventive approach characterized by benefit reduction, flexibility, and control; offensive workfare is more integrative and inclusive and highlights activation, skill enhancement, and empowerment (Torfing, 1999, pp. 17-18). While the first type is prevalent in the UK and the US, Denmark is an example of offensive workfare strategy (Torfing, 1999, p. 6).

The logic of workfare has penetrated both to social assistance and labour market policies. Since the mid-1980s, policy reforms on labour market have been introduced to restrict and reform the principal programmes targeting unemployed persons, starting with access to benefits, which usually has been rendered more restrictive (Gilbert & Von Voorhis, 2001, p. 293). While the emergence of ALMP pertains to the flexibilization of the labour markets, workfare programmes could be deemed social policy equivalents of the flexible labour market in some ways, as they function to individualize employment relations, intensify competitive pressures at the bottom of the labour market, and promote low-paid work (Peck & Theodore, 2001, p. 120).

Regarding the relationship between ALMPs and workfare, Lødemel and Trickey (2001) conclude that it is difficult to distinguish between workfare schemes and ALMPs which target unemployed individuals since ALMPs, including workfare, are identified by the deployment of a mixture of incentives and disincentives or

carrots and sticks, to obtain the desired results on the assumption that people act in their best interest to help them increase their incomes (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001, p. 13). From another point of view, it could be argued that there is a move towards workfarist tendencies in development ALMP trajectories both in Europe and the US since the 1990s (Daguerre, 2007). Workfarist tendencies are observable in the labour market policy developments in Germany and the Netherlands (Bruttel & Sol, 2006). Fossati (2018) points out that all countries virtually combine some demanding components which put pressure on the unemployed individuals to hasten their labour market integration as part of their ALMP strategies currently (p. 4).

Workfare programmes and the logic of workfare have received criticisms. Paz-Fuchs (2008b) criticizes workfare on the basis that strict conditionality and coercive elements of the programmes pave the way for labour market structures which aggravate existing obstacles to good jobs, and thus, lead to further social exclusion instead of promoting social inclusion (p. 817). According to Bruttel and Sol (2006), forcing benefit recipients to accept any job offer contradicts the principle of free choice of labour and upholding employment to such a degree carries the risk of harming human capital if individuals are compelled to accept job offers beneath their education or training levels (p. 84). Workfare programmes also turn a blind eye on the problem of working poor by equating poverty with unemployment (Savaşkan, 2007, p. iii). Nonetheless, people in regular employment may not be able to escape from poverty due to low wages, unfavourable working conditions, and the lack of a social security system (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 67).

2.2.3 ALMP and employability

Employability is a key concept which lies at the heart of activation policies and ALMPs. Arguably, the original ALMP was developed as a response to the problem of employability in Sweden in order to ensure skill match (Bonoli, 2013), albeit the term was not explicitly used. Employability has frequently been mentioned as one of the major objectives of ALMPs in the literature (e.g. Eichhorst et al., 2008; Kluve, 2014; Nie & Struby, 2011; Serrano Pascual, 2007b) since one of the aims of ALMPs is to remove individual barriers to employment, including the lack of employability (Eichhorst et al., 2008, p. 5).

Despite its increasing popularity, employability is an elusive concept. In the literature, there is a consensus about the connotation of employability with individual characteristics. It mainly refers to “the individual's potential propensity to find or to be placed in a job” (Kluve, 2014, p. 8). According to Hillage and Pollard (1998), employability is related to the individual ability to gain initial employment, maintain employment, and obtain new employment if it is required (p. 2). Particularly from a life course perspective, employability is not solely defined as the ability to gain but also ability to maintain employment in the course of working life with a view to improving individual labour market outcomes (OECD, 2015, p.19). A more behavioural approach defines employability as “the collection of worker characteristics, including attitudes towards work, expectations regarding employment and wages, behaviours both in the labour market and on the job” (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 731). Employability is also approached as a form of subjectivity which is expected to complement self-managed and creative post-Fordist interpretations of work (Moore, 2010, p. 28).

Since the so-called passive welfare regimes are deemed to foster unemployment, welfare-to-work measures which are aimed at activating the unemployed are deployed as a response as a part of welfare reforms (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 731). Those measures typically entail compulsory participation in employability programmes and relying on job search and job-readiness activities by prioritizing labour force attachment and work (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 731).

According to Serrano Pascual (2000), there are three principal ways through which employability penetrates labour market policy. The first conceptualization of employability is related to the upgrading of unemployed person's technical skills via training to cater the needs of employers. The second one is a traditional interpretation which evaluates employability in terms of methodological and attitudinal abilities with a view to improving the personal ability to conduct the transition to work through measures like job search support. The third understanding of employability is related to the concept of activation with a view to motivating unemployed persons to find work through ALMPs or work incentives. This final conception renders social protection mostly dependent on compliance with certain conditions instead of an unconditional right (Serrano Pascual, 2000). Arguably, the third conception of employability is more pervasive today as employability is mostly dealt with through ALMPs which has strong bonds with the principle of activation.

Employability is increasingly being considered as the determinant of employment prospects (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 731). The concept of employability has entered the agenda of international organizations such as the OECD, the UN, and the WB in addition to supranational organizations such as the EU. Employability appears to be a prominent position in the employment and social policy guidelines of the EU since the 1990s (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 729). It has

been among the political pillars of labour market policies in many EU states since the late 1990s (Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009; McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002). The concept of employability is linked to the perceived skills gap of the labour force in some EU states (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002, p. 614).

Employability through improved training lies at the root of the EES (Daguerre, 2007, p. 4). One of the four main goals of the EES is “to move away from a passive fight against unemployment towards promoting sustained employability and job creation” (CEC, 1999, p. 7). It could be seen that this new strategy is considered “active” compared to previous strategies adopted to tackle unemployment. In this document, employability is presented alongside job creation as a response to unemployment. Hence, the EES highlights both demand and supply side interventions in the labour market. Nonetheless, what is striking about the document is its emphasis on employability. According to the EES, the goal of improving employability is “making sure people can develop the right skills to take up job opportunities in a fast-changing world” (CEC, 1999, p. 12). In order to ensure employability, opportunities for job offers, work experience, training and other activating measures must be offered to every individual (CEC, 1999, p. 12). The strategy approaches long-term unemployment as a detrimental factor for employability (CEC, 1999, p. 3). The document gives weight to the improvement of individual opportunities for skill enhancement to be able to adapt to the requirements of a changing labour market.

While some studies on ALMPs take the concept of employability for granted without embracing a critical approach (e.g. Kluve et al., 2007; Nie & Struby, 2011), the focus on employability has received criticisms as well. Those critiques involve the questionable impact of employability measures on employment. For instance,

some studies point out that there is no direct relationship between employability and employment and traditional labour market disadvantage still persists despite efforts to enhance employability (e.g. Nilsson & Ekberg, 2012; Wilton, 2011).

Other critiques problematize the reliance of employability on the individualization a social problem, unemployment and the obscuration of the demand side of the labour market. Serrano Pascual (2001) argues that policies which address the problem of unemployment at the individual level and personal failings instead of a lack of opportunities in the labour market paved the way for a new labour market policy orthodoxy which relies on work-first programmes. Within the employability framework, the responsibility of creating and sustaining employment is assigned to the labourer who is expected to take part in training persistently and to find new employment in the case of labour loss (Arı Kovancı, 2015, p. 247). For instance, OECD states that employability of young persons counts on the skills which they can bring to the labour market and the ability to accommodate future labour market needs, “whatever they may be” (OECD, 2015, p. 20). This implies that both current workers and job seekers need to adapt to changing labour market conditions individually in order to be able to (re)enter or remain in the labour market.

The improvement of individual employability is regarded as an essential step towards access to employment, especially for disadvantaged groups (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002, p. 616). This understanding bears the risk of individualizing the determinants of unemployment by disregarding the existing structural barriers to employment. When approaches focus on the individual and individualize a social problem, they bear the risk of augmenting social exclusion as they may push vulnerable persons towards employment at any price (Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009, p. 953).

Another problem is related to the subordination of the goals of job security and full employment over employability. In the contemporary labour market, the concept of employability relies on the idea that what is important for employees is no longer the security of their current jobs or the career prospects they have in their workplaces, but their overall employment security on the job market (Bernstrøm, Drange, & Mamelund, 2018). It could be argued that employability has replaced the objectives of job security (Bernstrøm et al., 2018; Pruijt & Dérogée, 2010) and full employment (Finn, 2000; Savaşkan, 2007). Employability is not only the ability to acquire but also to maintain employment over the course of working life (OECD, 2015, p. 19). In this framework, employability is approached as a lifebuoy which helps people survive in the labour market when there is no guarantee that they will not be pushed out of the boat easily and that there are enough places in the boats for everyone.

Another critique of the concept of employability pertains to its dependence on the supply side interventions while generally ignoring the demand side of the labour market (e.g. McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002; Peck & Theodore, 2000). This understanding locates the causes of and the corresponding remedies to the problem of unemployment on the supply side of the labour market (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 729). The deployment of the focus on employability on the matters pertaining to the workforce invalidate the impact of the conditions of the labour market regarding access to employment (Serrano Pascual, 2001).

From this viewpoint, the causes of unemployment are conceived in an individualistic and behavioural terminology in a way to disregard the problems of demand deficiency and job shortage (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 729). In this picture, the state does not have the capability and the responsibility to create jobs. Rather, the

state must concentrate on the supply side measures to flexibilize and to motivate the unemployed and the unemployed must be pushed back to work (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 729).

Policies which put work in the first place and attempts to promote job acquisition at all costs might have negative consequences (Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009, p. 952). The concept also disregards the issue of the quality of jobs available in the labour market. Labour market policy must concentrate on both the quantity and the quality of the jobs available in the labour market (Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009, p. 952). Approaches which rely on supply side interventions in isolation may not be adequate to address the problems of unemployment, social exclusion, and economic inequality (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p. 731). The need to integrate supply and demand side perspectives in employability-based frameworks has been highlighted by many scholars in the literature (e.g. Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009; McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002; Peck & Theodore, 2000).

2.2.4 Enabling policies

It could be argued that the topic of enabling labour market policies has been less frequently studied in the literature compared to the abovementioned concepts. In the 1990s, welfare state went under dramatic changes. In most countries, benefit systems became less generous and they have been connected to work requirements through active employment policies due to retrenchment policies (Maydell et al., 2006, p. 73). In this framework, policies promoting human capital investment and skill improvement have increasingly been deemed as active instruments for economic growth and innovation (Maydell et al., 2006, p. 73). The emphasis of welfare policy shifted from compensation to prevention in that regard (Maydell et al., 2006, p. 73).

During this transformation, the rights and responsibilities of job seekers and labour market participants were rebalanced (Knotz, 2012, p. 5). The preventive social policy approach involves the subordination of active labour force participation and human capital development over the provision of income support to people out of work (Maydell et al., 2006, p. 73). In this picture, social policies are being designed to enable more individuals to work and render them responsible for their own affairs (Maydell et al., 2006, p. 73).

The enabling approach to social policy is built on the assumption that job seekers need training, upskilling, and support to gain employability (Frøyland et al., 2018, p. 4). Enabling policies include the improvement of labour market mechanisms such as the training programmes and job placement services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). In addition to labour market services such as training, upskilling, and job counselling, they also entail policies aimed at tackling the compatibility of paid work and unpaid care work (Fregin, Levels, & Van der Velden, 2020, p. 261). Fregin et al. (2020) argue that enabling policies should make sure that unemployed individuals are purposefully (re)trained to endow them with the skills that match labour market demands (p. 261).

2.3 Activation and ALMP typologies

Labour market policies have been redesigned during the rise of the activation turn in the 1990s (Knotz, 2012, p. 5). This process involved the introduction of restricting requirements imposed on job seekers and benefit claimants on the one hand, and the improvement of services such as job placement services on the other (Knotz, 2012, p. 5). Different combinations of workfare and enabling policies indicate the existence of different paths to development within the context of a novel paradigm of welfare

state transformation (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 824). According to Barbier (2004a), the public policy strategies adopted in that regard are intertwined with peculiar national value sets and national systems of social protection (p. 77).

Against this intricate background, there has been a great effort put forth by scholars in order to typify and classify different activation regimes and ALMP approaches. Although most efforts cluster dominant approaches in country cases, different elements and approaches can coexist in one country (Barbier, 2004a, p. 48). To illustrate, Barbier (2004a) points out that strategies encapsulating human capital model and work first models could be observed in the US in the early 1990s (p. 48). Dingeldey (2007) also recognizes this potential coexistence and evaluates the strength of workfare and enabling elements of activating labour market policies in individual country cases.

2.3.1 Activation typologies

In the literature, there have been many attempts to differentiate activation regimes and to create typologies, albeit the bases of the distinctions vary. According to Barbier (2004a), although there is a common tendency towards activation which is a common characteristic of the established connection between employment and social protection in the EU, there is a diversity in the way it is implemented due to the different historical traditions, the conception of demands of individuals on society, and the citizenship ideal. It is also argued that this division springs from the contrast between the ideological foundations of the enabling ALMPs which first came into being in Sweden in the 1950s and those were put forward by liberal countries in the 1980s (Fossati, 2018, p. 4). From another perspective, the significant factors accounting for the variation could also entail the social model, the employment

regime, the labour market situation, and the actors involved (Serrano Pascual, 2004b, pp. 9-10).

An extensively deployed distinction is between approaches that mainly depend on incentives and sanctions and approaches that aim at human capital investment (Frøyland et al., 2018, p. 3). The distinction has been conceptualized by several scholars from many different approaches (Frøyland et al., 2018, p. 3). Activation policies are usually classified into two groups (Aurich, 2011). The literature mainly distinguishes workfarist policies which impose work-related demands on benefit claimants and enabling policies which entail the improvement of labour market services and emphasize human capital development, albeit conceptual terms given by scholars change (e.g. Barbier, 2004a; Dingeldey, 2007; Fossati, 2018).

The first approach which is usually referred to as “work-first”, “workfare”, or “liberal” is demarcated by its compulsory and draconian approach in terms of labour market participation, its emphasis on labour market (re)entry, and its punitive attitude towards beneficiaries in case of non-compliance with the requirements it imposes (Aurich, 2011; e.g. Barbier 2005a; Bruttel & Sol, 2006; Dingeldey, 2007). In the workfare approach to activation, labour market services are not very pervasive and benefit levels are relatively low (Aurich, 2011, p. 297). Those interventions are characterized by stronger coercion compared to human capital-oriented interventions which perversely attach priority to long-term vocational upskilling (Lindsay & Serrano Pascual, 2009, p. 951).

The enabling or social-democratic activation type that highlights human capital development is supposedly more generous when it comes to benefit level and duration and more lenient regarding compliance regimens (Aurich, 2011; e.g.

Barbier, 2005a; Dingeldey, 2007; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001). From this perspective, education and training are prioritized over direct labour market participation (Aurich, 2011, p. 297). Enabling measures usually entail the provision of social services such as personalized support, case management, social assistance, psychological support, childcare, and vocational training with a view to improving the human capital of job seekers (Eichhorst et al., 2008).

Being one of the earliest studies that classify activation models in the literature, Lødemel and Trickey (2001) identify two policy types designed for getting welfare recipients into work in their seminal work which examine the evolution of the balance of rights and duties in social assistance in countries. Whereas the first type that they discern, namely labour market attachment relies on ‘work first’ policies, the ‘human resource development’ type puts emphasis on the need to improve the human capital of programme participants in order to ensure the transition to jobs with sufficient levels of payment (Lødemel, 2001, p. 296).

Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states can serve as a starting point for classifying the activation regimes (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 276). With respect to the arrangements between the state, market, and family, Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies welfare state regimes into three types: the liberal welfare states, the corporatist welfare states, and the social-democratic welfare states. Firstly, the liberal welfare states rely on modest social insurance and means-tested social assistance schemes for the low-income groups subject to strict eligibility rules which cause stigmatization for the recipients. In those regimes, the state promotes reliance on the market, with minimal de-commodification impact. The examples of this type include Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA.

Secondly, the corporatist welfare states rely on status distinctiveness and traditional family form of which the male breadwinner is the centre. In those regimes, social rights are based on class and status, hence they are not completely redistributive. State's willingness to eliminate the role of the market in welfare provision differentiates it from the first regime type. The examples of this type are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.

Thirdly, the social-democratic welfare states are based on the principles of equality of high standards available to the middle class, universalism, and decommodification. They aim to emancipate the individual from both market and family to ensure individual independence by taking responsibility to care for children, elderly and the helpless. Full employment guarantee is another characteristic of this type. The cases of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden exemplify this type.

Aurich (2011) argues that activation regime typologies are based on the rationale that the generous welfare states which happen to be the social-democratic ones according to Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification are to embrace a more generous and humane approach to activation through human capital development or social-democratic activation policies (p. 298). On the other hand, the less generous welfare states which fall under the category of the liberal type according to Esping-Andersen (1990), are deemed to adopt work-first or liberal activation policies. The existence of a continental type of activation which has hybrid characteristics has also been discussed in the literature as a third type (e.g. Barbier & Fargion, 2004; Barbier, 2005a; Clegg, 2007; Daguerre, 2007; Knotz, 2012).

By drawing on quantitative data from 20 OECD countries, Knotz (2012) demonstrates that countries are similar with respect to the degree of enforcement.

Nonetheless, they differ with respect to the degree of support they provide (Knotz, 2012, p. 5). In this picture, Knotz (2012) argues that it is possible to distinguish the “three worlds of activation” (p. 5). According to the results of the analysis, the Anglo-Saxon countries are the leaders in terms of enforcing activation (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). The focus is on maximizing economic activity by offering as little option other than market employment as possible (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). The Anglo-Saxon countries offer low benefits in combination with strict behavioural requirements and restricted social rights to compensate (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). The Nordic countries, on the other hand, provide higher benefit levels and comprehensive services (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). The objective of the maximization of employment prevails, but rather than promoting complete commodification, the activation obligations are balanced with rights such as access to childcare services or training programmes (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). Thirdly, the Continental European countries show an intricate pattern. In this type, benefit levels are high, but access to them is rather restricted in line with social insurance principles (Knotz, 2012, p. 30). They are weaker in terms of the social rights of benefit claimants and job seekers compared to the Nordic countries (Knotz, 2012, p. 30).

Barbier (2004a, 2004b, 2005b) comes up with two main ideal types of activation regimes adopted across Europe, based on analyses of assistance and labour market policies: the liberal regime and the universalistic regime. Those two ideal types are polar opposites (Barbier, 2004a, p. 56). In this framework, while the UK is closer to the liberal type, Denmark is closer to the universalistic ideal type and France indicates a hybrid case (Barbier, 2004a, pp. 56-57).

The liberal type primarily aims at improving the individual's relationship with the labour market for the sake of social equity and efficiency (Barbier, 2005a, p. 8).

Regarding the employment and activity regime, high employment rates are persistent but inactivity for some groups and gender inequalities in employment rates are observed (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). In this type, ALMPs and social policies in general are assigned a role limited to incentivizing individuals to seek employment (Barbier, 2005a, p. 8). Benefits are low, usually accounting for a small portion of market wages and they are offered for a short duration (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). The tools embraced in this type are the provision of quick information and matching services, short-term vocational training programmes, tax credits, and in-work benefits (Barbier, 2005a, p. 8). Within this framework, measures are aimed at encouraging people to become as active as possible by accepting any available job since having a job is deemed as the “normal” path to private and social protection and it is expected that work systematically takes over from assistance (Barbier, 2005a, p. 8).

On the other hand, the second type proposed by Barbier (2005a), namely the universalistic ideal type offers comprehensive services for every citizen and ensures a relatively high standard of living for beneficiaries by providing generous benefits (p. 9). High-value and long-term benefits are provided (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). In this context, social policy is not tied to work requirements and thus, it goes on to enhance well-being (Barbier, 2005a, p. 9). With respect to the activation regime and employment, high full-time employment rates across the labour force and gender equality on the labour market are observed (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). A significant proportion of the labour force is employed in public sector jobs (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). Unemployment and poverty risks are highly socialized under this approach (Barbier, 2004a, p. 58). Employment services and institutions are usually decentralized and they involve social actors such as local authorities (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). While the liberal type provides minimum income protection and highlights

individualism and self-reliance, the universalistic activation regime attempts to balance societal and individual demands in a reciprocal way (Barbier & Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004).

Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004) also suggest a third ideal type of activation which could be described as the continental type. The example of this type is France which exhibits elements from both ideal types (Barbier & Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004, p. 8). Barbier (2005a) approaches the case of France as a distinguished activation type which highlights the objective social integration. Workfare policies followed a different path in France (Barbier, 2004a, p. 60). According to him, due to the lack of market jobs, policies providing benefits for those who were disadvantaged in the labour market such as the youth, the long-term unemployed, and unqualified gained importance in line with the solidaristic tradition that prevailed in France (p. 60). The ALMPs and employment policies of France are more similar to their Scandinavian and German counterparts compared to the British ones (Barbier, 2004a, p. 60).

Following Barbier, Daguerre (2007) also distinguishes three activation approaches. The first one is the work-first approach which is aimed at assisting the long-term unemployed to (re)enter the labour market via a mixture of coercion, compulsion, and financial incentives (Daguerre, 2007, p. 5). This approach is mainly observed in the UK and the US (Daguerre, 2007, p. 5).

Secondly, within the context of the human capital approach which is prevalent in Scandinavian countries, employment policies are aimed at equipping job seekers with better qualifications via job training activities in order to enhance their employability (Daguerre, 2007, p. 4).

Thirdly, the social integration model which aims at tackling the impact of structural obstacles experienced by vulnerable individuals attributes the role of an employer of last resort to the state which creates temporarily subsidized jobs in the public and non-profit sectors (Daguerre, 2007, pp. 5-6). Differently from the work-first or the human capital approach, the provision of minimum income for the long-term unemployed in exchange for a contract making the beneficiaries to receive assistance to reintegrate into the labour force and into the society in Continental Europe (Daguerre, 2007, p. 5). In France, a minimum income scheme based on the goal of achieving social integration and tackling the structural barriers experienced by vulnerable individuals in a highly selective labour market (Daguerre, 2007, p. 5). Hence, France exhibits some characteristics of both main activation types.

Bruttel and Sol (2006) also contrasts the work-first and human capital approaches to activation. They argue that the work-first approach which is popular in the Anglo-Saxon countries concentrates on putting beneficiaries into work as soon as possible regardless of questions of skills and labour market demand by prioritising labour market attachment (2006, pp. 70-71). In this regard, job search activity is essential in itself, based on the belief that that any job regardless of its precarity can serve as a stepping stone rather than building a long-term career objective (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 71). This strategy might also entail very short-term training if it helps immediate entry into a new job (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 72).

On the other hand, the human capital development model which was the dominant character of ALMPs in Europe in the 1990s, as well as the EES, emphasizes the enhancement of marketable skills and social attitudes which contribute to the acquisition of suitable jobs (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 70). The main objective of this model is to help beneficiaries to improve their education and skill

levels before searching for jobs as this approach deems employment as a long-term goal (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 72).

By relying on the differentiation of the work first and human capital development models, Bruttel and Sol (2006) analyse labour market policy developments in Germany and the Netherlands in terms of the indicators of active labour market budgets, unemployment benefits systems, the definition of suitable work, and the employment of sanctions in addition to general policy developments. In order to identify work first tendencies, Bruttel and Sol (2006) employ four indicators at an operational level:

The first one is the budgetary volume and programme composition of ALMP in the sense that a decrease in the budget designated to long-term programmes like training and job-creation might indicate a shift towards the work first approach, whereas an increase in job search programmes might consolidate the short-term character of the approach (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 73). The second and third indicators are a stricter unemployment benefit regime and a broader understanding of suitable work, as they both entail pushing jobs seekers into work as quickly as possible (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 73). The last indicator is sanctions in the sense that they pose an essential component of activating unemployed persons (Bruttel & Sol, 2006, p. 73). They conclude that the work first approach is gaining currency in both Germany and the Netherlands (2006, p. 69).

Activation typologies are not limited to the ones that mainly rely on the distinction between workfare and enabling approaches in the literature. Serrano Pascual (2007a) presents a distinctive classification framework for activation approaches.

According to Serrano Pascual (2007a), two key factors help distinguish between different activation regimes: governance structure and institutional setting such as administrative and management reforms (I) and hegemonic regulatory assumptions including cultural assumptions and modes of managing individuals (II) (pp. 278-279). Regarding governance structures and institutional setting, Serrano Pascual (2007a) highlights the roles of the institution and social actors representing civil society (p. 278). Hegemonic regulatory assumptions entail assumptions on the meaning of work, the meaning of citizenship, the actor responsible for unemployment, and the duties of job seekers (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 278). From that perspective, two modes of managing individual emerge: moral-therapeutic management of the behaviour of welfare recipients and matching up workers to market demands through adaptive skills management (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, pp. 294-297). While the former relies on the assumption that individuals are passive by nature and they need to be forced to fulfil the moral duty to take responsibility for their lives; the latter deems individuals as autonomous beings who need certain resources such as education and skills (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, pp. 294-297).

On that basis, Serrano Pascual (2007a) presents five ideal activation regime types by highlighting citizenship status and social rights in different institutional settings. Firstly, the economic springboard regime is characterized by the heavy stress on making sure that citizens fulfil the duties in their contract with the community, especially the duty to achieve financial independence (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). An example of this type is the UK as it relies on incentivizing work (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). Secondly, the civic contractualism regime denotes a strong emphasis on ensuring citizens fulfil their duties like the economic springboard regime. Differently from the first model, citizens also enjoy extensive

social rights ensured by an interventionist welfare state (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 302). An example of this model is the Netherlands due to the prevalence of contracts in the country (2007a, p. 303). Thirdly, under the autonomous citizens regime, the focus rests on both individual and collective responsibility to achieve self-determination and ensuring the sustainability of the welfare model enjoying a high level of public support (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 306). This type is seen in Sweden as it supports the individual to enter the labour market through employability measures (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 306). Fourthly, the fragmented provision regime is characterized by differences in the approach to and the extent of different welfare interventions (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 308). Under this regime, active policy management is decentralized, while the coordination and funding are insufficient (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 308). An example of this type is Spain (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 308). Finally, the minimalist disciplinary regime is demarcated by the limited extent of state welfare intervention to protect or support people excluded from the labour market and other risk groups (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 309). Under this regime, minimalist interventions are designed to ensure that individuals fulfil their duties as citizens (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 309). Although this type has no true representative, Portugal is closer to this type (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 309).

In the framework presented by Serrano Pascual (2007a), the economic springboard regime is demarcated by its focus on the regulation of benefit claimants' obligation and duties and the dominance of moral-therapeutic regulation of behaviour in terms of modes of managing the individual (p. 301). The civic contractualism regime is built on the provision of rights and the regulation of obligations of citizens (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). The dominant mode of

managing the individual is the moral-therapeutic regulation of behaviour (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). The autonomous citizens regime is based on the provision of rights and the regulation of obligations like the civic contractualism regime, but its mode of managing the individual is matching regulation (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). While both the fragmented provision regime and the minimalist disciplinary regime provide limited rights and expect limited obligations, they differ in terms of their dominant modes of managing the individual (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301). While in the former matching regulation prevails, moral-therapeutic regulation of behaviour is dominant in the latter (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 301).

All in all, the literature presents a rich background in terms of the classification of different activation approaches. The next section elaborates on the classifications of ALMP approaches.

2.3.2 ALMP typologies

There are also attempts to classify ALMP types and approaches in the literature. Regarding the types of ALMPs, Bonoli (2010, 2011) presents a classification based on the dimensions of employment market orientation and the level of human capital investment. The employment market orientation which gained currency in the activation turn in the late 1980s and 1990s could be regarded as the degree to which the goal of labour market policy should put individuals in unsubsidized jobs (Bonoli, 2011, p. 183). On the other hand, the second dimension, namely human capital investment refers to whether programmes are based on the investment in the human capital of jobless persons (Bonoli, 2011, p. 184). In that regard, enhancing the skills of jobless individuals in order to smooth their transition into the labour market and to

improve productivity for the society's sake in total, in the shape of vocational training or improvement of the skills demanded by the labour market (Bonoli, 2011, p. 184).

Bonoli (2010) classifies the four types of ALMPs that he discerned from that perspective (p. 441). Those ALMP types are incentive reinforcement, occupation, employment assistance, and upskilling (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). Incentive reinforcement is strong in terms of pro-market employment orientation and it has no orientation towards human capital investment (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). On the other hand, the occupation type is weak in terms of both orientations (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). Employment assistance has strong qualities in terms of pro-market employment orientation and it is weak regarding investment in human capital (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441). Finally, upskilling is strong from both dimensions (Bonoli, 2010, p. 441).

A distinction between demanding ALMPs and training-based ALMPs is elaborated by Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) and Fossati (2018). Demanding ALMPs entail efforts which pushes unemployed individuals to hasten their labour market (re)integration through the required job searching activities, benefit cuts, and job search supervision schemes (Eichhorst & Konle-Seidl, 2008, p. 5). In that regard, demanding ALMPs attempt to precipitate labour market integration for unemployed individuals who are deemed individually responsible for their plights (Fossati, 2018). According to Fossati (2018), the design of demanding ALMPs implies an underlying assumption that unemployment stems from the individual herself or himself rather than the existence of structural problems (p. 4). From this perspective, the unemployed individual prefers receiving benefit over working, thus, necessitating the disposition of some negative incentives in addition to imposition of sanctions to accelerate labour market (re)integration. Furthermore, demanding ALMPs magnify the vulnerability of the unemployed persons faced with the labour market demands,

particularly concerning the quality of a new job such as lower wages. Demanding ALMPs prevalent in the UK and the US (Fossati, 2018).

On the other hand, in Nordic countries, ALMPs have been built on an understanding of human capital enhancement due to the fact that unemployment was deemed a structural problem, hence the focus has been on consolidating the employability of workers via human capital investment (Fossati, 2018, p. 7). The training-based ALMPs inhibit the marginalization of persons who have low or outmoded skills and reconcile labour demand and supply (Fossati, 2018). Fossati (2018) draws attention to that the case of Continental European countries have been classified in the literature as an in-between type, relying on strategies that highlight social integration through occupational programmes with moderate human capital investment levels (p. 7).

In a similar vein, Dingeldey (2007) contrasts the conceptions of workfare state and the enabling welfare state in her work which compares the tendencies of activating labour market policies and the paths towards activation in Denmark, the UK and Germany, each corresponding to the different welfare state regimes introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) by relying on the indicators of the strength of the workfare elements and the strength of the enabling elements of activating labour market policy (p. 824). To measure the mix of workfare and enabling elements, Dingeldey (2007) utilizes the indicators of unemployment benefit cuts and enforced labour market activation and compulsion through individual contracts for workfare tendencies and activation via job placement, training programmes as part of activation policies, and the coordination of family policy for enabling tendencies.

An ongoing divergence of ALMPs persists within the new paradigm of activation (Dingeldey, 2007). It could be argued that the workfarist and enabling

approaches share the aim of enhancing labour market participation. Nonetheless, their manners to achieve that end differ. ALMPs entail a combination of policies that impose labour market participation on one hand and services that enhance the employability of individuals and enable them to enable individuals to pursue their path leading to employment on the other (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 823; Fregin et al., 2020, p. 258). Workfare has coercive and enforcing components regarding labour market participation and it is implemented by benefit cuts, the tightening of eligibility rules, the increasing conditionality, and the introduction of compulsory labour market programmes (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). On the other hand, enabling policies entail the development of labour market services such as training programmes and placement services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827).

In her attempt to comparatively analyse activating labour market policies in terms of workfare and enablement, Dingeldey (2007) also brings childcare and unemployment benefit policies into analysis in addition to ALMP in a way to include all activating labour market policies. Dingeldey (2007) finds that while the UK is strong in workfare policies, Denmark is strong in enabling policies, and Germany is in the middle ground but closer to the stronger end in terms of workfare policies (p. 847). Although workfare policies gained ground in all three countries during their welfare state transformations, workfare is the weakest in Denmark and the strongest in the UK (Dingeldey, 2007, pp. 834-845). In terms of enablement, Denmark has the most extensive set of enabling policies, while the UK is the weakest in that regard (Dingeldey, 2007, pp. 844-845).

The attempts to create activation typologies and classifying welfare states on that basis has received criticisms in the literature. Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) criticize the attempts to typify activation approaches as welfare states are not frozen

or static to provide a solid basis for distinction (p. 9). Aurich (2011) criticizes those two- or three-type typologies on the basis that they employ a one-dimensional analysis of social rights and goes on to propose a distinction between different dimensions of activation policy, instead of a distinction between different types: “incentive creation” which entails possible incentive impacts of policy mechanisms and “active support” which concentrates on the enabling character of activation policies (pp. 299-300). The framework put forward by Aurich (2011) distinguishes three types of activating unemployment policies: recommodification policies which focus on the creation of incentives, enabling policies which concentrate on active provision support, and coercive welfare policies which denote a hybrid type in between (p. 301).

According to Moreira and Lødemel (2014), rather than attempting to cluster or to map activation regimes, scholars need to focus on the processes of change in order to be able to completely grasp the second wave of activation reforms. From another perspective, Clasen, Clegg and Goerne (2016) point out that most of the studies on ALMPs which aim to detect the socio-economic and political determinants of ALMP variation rely on available quantitative data to present a comparison of cross-national policy trends. Nonetheless, they argue that from the perspective of social policy, this policy field needs to be studied with more critical engagement and by more conceptually and theoretically informed qualitative field work.

2.3.3 The question of convergence

In the literature, the question whether the activation trend leads to convergence among different welfare state regimes has also been studied by many scholars (e.g. Barbier, 2005a; Bruttel & Sol, 2006; Dingeldey, 2007; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001;

Serrano Pascual, 2007a). While Bruttel and Sol (2006), Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008), and Serrano Pascual (2004a, 2007b) argue that there is a convergence pattern between different welfare states, scholars like Dingeldey (2007), Graziano (2012), Lødemel (2004), and Peck and Theodore (2001) state that there is either no or limited convergence trend.

It is argued that although activation policies differ significantly, there is also a convergence trend regarding the social norms which inspire them, at least in Europe (Serrano Pascual, 2004a, p. 515). In another study, Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) present an assessment of national activation trajectories and the effectiveness and efficiency of activation policies in terms of basic principles, target groups, instruments, and governance models in Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. They conclude that a contingent convergence pattern of mechanisms, target groups, governance, and outcomes could be detected (2008, p. 2). Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) point out that continuing reforms pave the way for a contingent convergence between countries (p. 432). Thus, they argue that existing typologies which are aimed at classifying activation strategies should be questioned accordingly (2008, p. 2). The process of this contingent convergence is characterized by a consolidation of work requirements, sanctions, reduced training expenditure, and a more individualized approach to activation service delivery (Moreira & Lødemel, 2014, p. 7).

By adopting two dimensions of activation (human capital investment and employment market orientation) following Bonoli (2010), Graziano (2012) examines ALMP spending figures in seven OECD countries to explore activation and observes a limited convergence pattern between the activation policies in the EU. Graziano (2012) attributes the lack of convergence between EU countries in terms of

activation policies to the softness of the EES and to the lack of administrative capacities in the member countries to transfer innovative activation policies into practice (p. 312).

From another point of view, by putting forward a comparison of policy developments in Denmark, Germany, and the UK, Aurich argues that the activation trend has led to novel discrepancies between welfare states. There is cross-convergence among welfare states in the sense that despite some common patterns, new differences and reversed directions of reform take place rather than a constant divergence or gradual convergence (Aurich, 2011, pp. 311-313).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to reflect on the existing body of the literature on ALMPs and other related concepts. The broad literature on ALMPs has provided rich empirical knowledge and well-developed concepts that present a comparative outlook of the processes and features of ALMP implementations in diverse contexts.

A dichotomy between ALMPs and PLMPs emerged in the second half of the twentieth century and have been underscored ever since. As it has been elaborated in this chapter, ALMPs have been adopted by many countries to intervene in the labour market in various ways since the 1950s and they have become more influential in labour market policy-making since the 1990s with respect to the pressing global challenges and the corresponding transformations of welfare states. ALMPs constitute a central policy domain for welfare state transformation.

ALMP programmes entail a broad set of labour market interventions which may target the supply side or the demand side of the labour market. The literature review suggests that ALMPs are mostly associated with interventions in the labour

supply. While the original ALMP entailed a combination of macro-economic policy measures, ALMPs started to be stripped off their original characteristics and to be understood from the perspective of human resources investment with the adoption and promulgation of the concept by the OECD in the mid-1960s (Barbier, 2004a, p. 52). This approach paved the way for the dominance of the supply-side understanding of the concept of ALMP (Barbier, 2004a).

In this respect, the concept of ALMP cannot be discussed in isolation from the concepts of activation, workfare, employability, and enablement. To sum up, although the policy orientations of activation, workfare, employability, or enablement share the aim of enhancing labour market participation, their underlying assumptions, their policy tools, and their paths to reach that end differ. It could be concluded that they all reflect individualistic understandings of labour market intervention.

The impacts of various ALMP arrangements in different settings have been studied extensively in the literature. Nonetheless, the impact evaluation literature on ALMPs reveals that although they are extensively deployed against unemployment, ALMPs are no magic bullet in the fight against the problem of unemployment (e.g. Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001). Moreover, they might have unintended impacts on regular employment, even if they reduce unemployment (Kluve et al., 2007). These suggestions and findings underline the importance of the thought and design processes of ALMPs prior to their introduction.

The pervasive adoption of ALMPs by many countries with different underlying assumptions and different path dependencies and under different institutional settings have led to different approaches to activation and ALMPs. The literature suggests that albeit there are no pure types, dominant approaches to

activation and ALMPs can be distinguished. Evidence from the literature implies that ALMP orientations dominant in individual countries can be discerned. A popular classification in that regard is based on the discrepancy between coercive approaches that impose work-related requirements and depend on incentives and sanctions in that regard and enabling approaches that put human capital investment at the centre (Frøyland et al., 2018, p. 3). Scholars have usually evaluated different approaches to ALMPs and other activating labour market policies with respect to their workfarist and enabling tendencies and came up with ideal types. Those typologies help determine the dominance of the workfarist and enabling approaches in a given country and locate individual countries in certain typology clusters. Although the classification attempts have been criticized in the literature (e.g. Clasen et al., 2016; Moreira & Lødemel, 2014), they are certainly helpful to provide a snapshot of the dominance of the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in a given country.

The aim of this study is to determine the dominant elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey and to locate this peculiar case within prominent activation typologies found in the literature. Turkey is not an exception to the embracement of the activation trend. ALMP programmes started to proliferate since the late 1980s and they continue to gain momentum in Turkey, particularly in the last two decades. To provide a basis for discerning the dominant activation orientation in Turkey, the following chapter presents a background of ALMPs and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey. In line with the suggestions from the literature, the UI scheme and the provision of childcare services in relation to the labour market are also covered in addition to ALMPs in order to be able to better grasp the activation trend in general.

CHAPTER 3

THE BACKGROUND OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN TURKEY

Locating Turkey in an activation typology is not a straightforward task. As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, historical legacies and path dependencies of individual countries play a vital role on their welfare arrangements (Barbier, 2004a, 2004b). The case of Turkey has its peculiarities accordingly.

This study focuses on the ALMP programmes which are being implemented by İŞKUR with the addition of two policies which have activating elements: the UI and the family policy. Although the UI generally considered a PLMP in the literature (e.g. Martin & Grubb, 2001; Nie & Struby, 2011), it has also been argued that UI schemes might have activating elements (e.g. Barbier, 2005b). By considering the concept of activation as the introduction of a connection between social protection and labour market participation, Barbier (2005b) suggests that the social protection domains which could be activated in that sense exceeds traditional ALMPs and part of them is UI (p. 7). For instance, Barbier and Fargion (2004) assert that UI has had an activation component with its obligation to seek work since its introduction in 1958 in France (p. 444).

As a relatively new mechanism in the case of Turkey compared to many European countries, UI has become a part of the activation policy in the case of Turkey (Gün, 2016, p. 1315), particularly regarding its eligibility and maintenance criteria, in addition to the duration and the level of payments (Savaşkan, 2009). Savaşkan (2009) further argues that the UI implementation in Turkey reflects an example of workfare programmes as an ALMP in Turkey (p. 215). In addition, the coordination of the family policy is crucial in terms of increasing the employability

of women who have dependent children (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840) and it therefore needs to be scrutinized as a policy domain which potentially has activating elements.

This chapter elaborates on the development of ALMPs in Turkey which provides the background firstly for my analysis that deals with the workfarist and enabling tendencies of ALMPs (Dingeldey, 2007) and secondly for my attempt to locate them within the activation typology developed by Barbier (2004a). Although it is accepted that ALMP programmes proliferated in the late 2000s in Turkey (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a, Paragraph 65), their introduction in the country goes back to the 1990s. Active and passive labour market policies have attracted attention in Turkey since the 1990s (Varçın, 2004, p. 100). Yet an increasing emphasis on the link between social assistance and employment is rather a recent phenomenon. To present an account of the development of ALMPs and other activating labour market policies in the context of Turkey, one should start with the development of public employment services. First, I provide an overview of the historical development of the ALMPs and the public employment agency which evolved into İŞKUR. After that, the development and characteristics of ALMP programmes are elaborated on. Finally, the increasing emphasis on the link between social assistance and employment is discussed.

3.1 The historical development of ALMPs and the public employment agency in Turkey

3.1.1 Early days of İŞKUR and employment services

For a long period, the provision of employment services was limited to job matching services and sending emigrant workers to Europe in Turkey. Such services were

carried out exclusively by the public employment agency in the country. The Labour Law of 1936 (no. 3008), the first Labour Law of the Republic of Turkey, laid the foundation for a public employment agency, albeit the establishment of the agency did not take place until 1946. According to the Labour Law, the agency acts as a regulating and mediating body in the matters of placing workers in the jobs for which they are suitable and finding suitable workers for various state jobs as a public duty (The Republic of Turkey, 1936, Article 63). Hence, the name of the planned public employment agency was “İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu”, literally indicating an organization for finding job and worker (The Republic of Turkey, 1936, Article 64). The duties of the organization defined by the law included; gathering information about all kinds of jobs, regularizing labour supply and demand, announcing the lists of employers and workers, taking actions for enhancing the vocational training of workers and raising qualified workers, determining and mediating the implementation of the central or local measures which would impede social problems by keeping track of the fluctuation of wages and comparing them to the increases in the living expenses, and mediating employment contracts without any charges (The Republic of Turkey, 1936, Article 64). The law also prohibited the establishment of private employment agencies (The Republic of Turkey, 1936, Article 65/a).

The public employment agency of Turkey, namely the Institution of Finding Job and Worker (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu, İİBK) was formally established in 1946 with the promulgation of its constituent law, the Law on the Establishment and Duties of The Institution of Finding Job and Worker (no. 4837) (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun) (The Republic of Turkey, 1946). Strikingly, the establishment of the institution predates the adoption of the Employment Service Convention (no. 88) by the ILO in 1948 (Alper, 2003). That

convention came into effect in 1949 in Turkey (The Republic of Turkey, 1949). The Labour Law (no. 1475) which came into effect in 1971 conceded the same duties as registered by its predecessor (The Republic of Turkey, 1971, Article 84). The Labour Law of 1971 defined employment services as a public service and it reiterated the state monopoly over employment services except for agricultural jobs (The Republic of Turkey, 1971, Articles 83, 85).

Until the late 1980s, the public employment agency mainly functioned as a mediator for sending workers from Turkey to European countries (Korkut et al., 2015, p. 117). Until the 2000s, the services provided by the institution remained rather limited, let alone reaching all job seekers (Korkut et al., 2015, p. 117). İİBK was insufficient to meet the labour force demands of the private sector and as the services are mostly catered for the needs of the public sector. In addition, the placement of persons with disabilities, ex-convicts, and persons affected by the events of terror in jobs was prioritized (Uçkan Hekimler, 2005, p. 174). The non-compliance of the services offered by the institution with the ILO standards and the need for modernization also necessitated reconstructing (Karaçor, Mangır, Güvenek, & Kayhan, 2019, p. 273).

There were other factors which paved the way for the reconstruction of İİBK. The employment services provided by İİBK proved insufficient to keep up with the changing economic system and market structure in the 1980s and the 1990s (Coşkun, 2017, p. 125). The neoliberal transformation which Turkey went under accelerated in the 1980s. The privatization of the SEEs was a prominent component of this transformation. In this period, the need for reintegrating SEE employees who would lose their jobs as a result of the privatization into the labour market emerged.

3.1.2 Upskilling the labour force

The need for a skilled labour force was one of the main driving forces of the developments that took place in the late 1980s. Training programmes were promoted in the 1980s and 1990s for that end. The 1988 directive regulates labour force training courses which would be opened by İİBK alone or in cooperation with other public institutions with an aim of promoting employment and preventing unemployment (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 1). The target groups of the courses are defined as unemployed persons (lacking information and skills) who are registered with the institution and persons who want to change their vocation or start up their own businesses (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 1). The courses were projected to be opened for vocations which are needed in the labour market or has a labour force deficit (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 2).

Another agenda which came to the fore was the provision of employment services by privately owned employment agencies. A directive regulating private employment counselling services came into effect in 1987. Nonetheless, it was not until 2003 when the provision of employment services by private agencies gained solid legal ground in Turkey.

The efforts to restructure İİBK accelerated in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the WB emerged as an important actor as a financial supporter (Gümüş, 2020, p. 215). İİBK went under a significant restructuring process through projects implemented in cooperation with the WB and the Employment Institution of Germany (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) in the 1990s (Korkut et al., 2015, pp. 108-109). The project aimed at the reorganization of İİBK was executed in cooperation with the Employment Institution of Germany. ALMPs were among the measures adopted in

the process of structural adjustment in terms of the objectives of fighting unemployment and creating employment in the 1990s and 2000s (Gümüş, 2020, p. 215). The deployment of ALMPs as a tool for tackling the problem of unemployment coincides with the activation of the role played by the WB with its political influence and financial support in the form of loans. A significant portion of the ALMP programmes which were put into practice between 1993 and 2000 was realized thanks to the loans provided by the WB (Dertli, 2009, p. 611). Hence, İİBK consolidated its role in the implementation of ALMPs by dint of the loans provided by the WB in the 1990s (Varçın, 2004, p. 103).

In the 1990s, the prominent ALMP programmes conducted by İİBK were jobs search assistance services and employment services (Dar & Tzannatos, 1999, p. 5). The project carried out in cooperation with the WB entailed the provision of job counselling services for workers who became redundant due to the privatization of SEEs in Turkey (Dar & Tzannatos, 1999, p. 5). Another emerging activation mechanism at the time was the job and vocational counselling service. In order to develop the job and vocational counselling services, 20 İİBK personnel received training in Turkey and Germany between 1990 and 1991 and started to perform as job and vocational counsellors in the pilot areas as a part of the project (Coşkun, 2017, p. 141).

A pioneer project which was implemented during the reconstructing efforts was the Employment and Education Project (İstihdam ve Eğitim Projesi). The project was initiated in 1993 and lasted until 2000 with the financial support of the WB (İŞKUR, n.d.). Among the objectives of the project, providing employment for unemployed persons with low skills through vocational training, developing an information system for the labour market, and increasing female employment are

mentioned (İŞKUR, n.d.). Vocational training courses which were aimed at meeting the demands for the qualified labour force of the job market were promoted as part of the project (İŞKUR, n.d.). Within the scope of the programme, regional public works programmes (Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programı, TYÇP) were also organized after the destructive earthquake in 1999 (Kapar, 2017, p. 318). TYÇP is the public works programme which provides temporary income support in exchange for working in public institutions for a defined period of time.

Another significant project which was supported by the WB was the Privatization Social Support Project (Özelleştirme Sosyal Destek Projesi, ÖSDP) (WB, 2000). The project targeted persons who would lose their jobs due to the privatization of SEEs. It provided counselling and training programmes in addition to the work programmes for the community benefit (TYÇP) (Gümüş, 2020, p. 216). Along with training, reemployment services were also provided for this target group between 2002 and 2005 (Varçın, 2004, p. 119).

ALMPs were first mentioned in the Seventh Five Year Development Plan which covers the years between 1996 and 2000 (The Republic of Turkey, 1995). The plan underlines the need for flexicurity arrangements in the labour market and harmonization measures including (re)training programmes to enable the labour force to respond to the needs of the labour market. In that regard, it is stated that active labour market measures are to be taken within the scope of globalization and the EU harmonization policies (The Republic of Turkey, 1995, p. 54).

A directive aimed at training the labour force came into action in 1996. This time, it was aimed at improving in addition to training the labour force (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1996). Another difference from the previous directive of 1988 in addition to the introduction of the aim of improving the labour force was

the target group. Differently from the directive of 1988 which it replaced, this directive targeted workers who were going to lose their jobs due to privatization in addition to registered unemployed persons who cannot be and have no chance to be placed in a job, persons who wish to change or develop their vocation, persons with disabilities, unqualified workers who wish to gain a vocation, and persons who wish to start up their own businesses (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1996, Article 2).

3.1.3 The transformation of the labour market policies: the growing interest in ALMPs

The turn of the millennium brought about significant changes for the labour market policies of Turkey. The structural adjustment reforms, the start of the EU accession period, and the economic crisis of 2001 were all influential on the way through which labour market policies were transformed.

Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for the EU membership in 1999. In addition to the structural adjustment reforms, the EU candidacy also precipitated the transformation of employment services (Biçer, 2014, p. 90). The EU accession process necessitated the harmonization of the employment policies of Turkey with those of the EU and the approximation of the employment policies of Turkey to the EES (Mahiroğulları & Korkmaz, 2018, p. 106). The EU asked candidate countries to modernize their public employment institutions who were going to join The European Network of Public Employment Services following their accession (Çetinkaya, 2011, p. 43). After this point, İŞKUR and the employment policies went under significant changes and the influence of the EU started to outweigh the influence of the WB.

A cornerstone of the transformation of the employment policies in Turkey was the enactment of the Law of Unemployment Insurance (no. 4447) (İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu) which came into effect in 1999. The law defines unemployment insurance as a compulsory insurance which compensates the income loss for a certain period and to some extent of insured and unemployed persons who lose their job without their intention or fault, although they have the desire, ability, health conditions, and competence to work (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 47/c). As it is going to be discussed in detail in the following section, the UI scheme came with some workfare elements in terms of being ready to work, actively seeking employment, and participating in vocational training programmes.

The first legislative attempt to reestablish İİBK was the promulgation of the Statutory Decree on the establishment of the Turkish Employment Institution and Amending Certain Laws and Statutory Decrees (no. 617) (Türkiye İş Kurumunun Kurulması ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname) in 2000. The statutory decree had renamed İİBK as the Turkish Employment Institution (Türkiye İş Kurumu, İŞKUR) and brought about significant changes regarding the duties of the institution (The Republic of Turkey, 2000). It also set the legal basis for privately owned employment agencies (The Republic of Turkey, 2000). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) repealed the law which set the legal basis of the statutory decree in the same year as a result of the authorization case regarding the law, resulting in the repeal of the statutory decree as well (Coşkun, 2017, p. 152). The court decision allowed nine months for a new regulation, nonetheless the legal basis of the reorganization of the institution was not set until 2003 (Coşkun, 2017, p. 152).

In 2001, Turkey experienced a harsh economic crisis, which could be defined as the first capitalist crisis of Turkey (Buğra, 2008, p. 220). The crisis resulted in a significant rise in the unemployment rate which jumped to 10.3 per cent in 2002 from 6.5 per cent in 2000 (TÜİK, 2021a). The Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) was initiated in cooperation with the WB in order to cushion the social and economic impacts of the economic crisis in 2001 (WB, 2001). The main policy tools proposed by the project was conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and loans for the improvement of the employment opportunities of the poor with a view to reducing poverty in the country (WB, 2001). The key objective of the SRMP is defined as creating a social assistance system targeting the poorest in a way to provide not only a “safety net” but also a “trampoline” that helps the poor escape poverty (WB, 2001). Enhancing the quality of the employability training activities under the local initiatives, supporting income-generating sub-projects, technical and life skills training activities targeting the unemployed youth, and temporary community employment opportunities which would promote workfare activities are mentioned among the prominent goals of the project (WB, 2001). Hence, the forthcoming labour market regulations took place within a context in which international actors played a significant role.

The legal regulations which were enforced after the crisis of 2001 set the necessary framework for the transformation of institutions in line with the market needs. The impact of the crisis of 2001 provided justification for the increasing focus on ALMPs and accelerated the restructuring of İİBK in that framework (Küçüküklü, 2019, p. 88). Within this context, the policy orientation of the public employment agency changed from demand side interventions to supply side interventions in the

labour market and from employment to employability in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 76).

The year 2003 brought about two important legislative developments for İİBK. Firstly, the Labour Law (no. 4857) was promulgated in May 2003 (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a). The new labour law extended the duties of İİBK and provided the legal basis of the privately owned employment agencies. In June 2003, the Law on Certain Regulations about the Turkish Employment Agency (no. 4905) (Türkiye İş Kurumu İle İlgili Bazı Düzenlemeler Hakkında Kanun) came into effect. The law changed the name of the institution to “Turkish Employment Agency” (Türkiye İş Kurumu, İŞKUR). The institution was reorganized as an administratively and fiscally autonomous body under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 1). The name and legal basis of İŞKUR were changed with a greater emphasis on ALMP (Savaşkan, 2007). Then, the name no longer implied job placement services solely. It rather reflected the whole domain of employment. Moreover, İŞKUR was authorized as the prominent actor in the execution of ALMPs in Turkey (Yıldız, 2016, p. 250).

The main duties of İŞKUR are defined as the enhancement, extensification, and the protection of employment; supporting activities aimed at preventing unemployment; and executing the unemployment insurance services in its constituent law (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 1). Other duties include:

- Supporting the creation of the national employment policy,
- Locally and nationally compiling, analysing, interpreting, and publishing labour market data,
- Establishing the Labour Market Information Advisory Board and coordinating the work of the Board,

- Conducting and procuring labour force need analyses to determine the supply and demand of the labour force,
- Conducting and procuring job and vocation analyses,
- Providing job and vocational counselling services,
- Developing and implementing workforce training, vocational training and workforce adjustment programs to increase the employability of the labour force,
- Organizing training seminars for the workforce in employment,
- Carrying out efforts to regularize labour demand and job seeking,
- Contributing to the placement of the labour force into jobs suitable for them at home and abroad,
- Contributing to finding a suitable labour force for various jobs,
- Contributing to the employment of the labour force which is difficult to employ and to the recruitment of the legally obliged labour force for workplaces to employ,
- Fulfilling the duties assigned to the institution regarding private employment agencies,
- Following the decisions taken by the European Union and international organizations regarding labour force, employment, and working life and implementing the bilateral and multilateral agreements, conventions, and recommendations of the Government of the Republic of Turkey is a party within the purview of the institution (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 3).

While İİBK prioritized job matching and job placement services, the 2003 Law assigned new duties to İŞKUR and rendered it more active (Coşkun, 2017, pp. 152-

153). The 2003 Law bestowed a new characteristic upon the institution and İŞKUR has been assigned the role of implementing active employment policies since then (Yıldız & Çiloğlu Yörübulut, 2017, p. 98). With its extended duty area, İŞKUR also became the executor of the Unemployment Insurance.

Moreover, the establishment of privately owned employment agencies was permitted with the 2003 Law in a way to terminate state monopoly over job placement services, hence implying a fragmentation in the implementation of the policies (Gümüş, 2020, pp. 214-215). With the establishment of the privately owned employment agencies, İŞKUR embraced a market-based labour force management approach as a part of the neoliberal practices (Özügür, 2003, pp. 59-74). Privately owned employment agencies have played a significant role regarding the individualization of employment which holds employees responsible for their predicament in Turkey since then (Işıklı, 2016).

The emphasis on the supply side interventions in the labour market as a response to the problem of unemployment continued rapidly after the promulgation of the constituent law of İŞKUR. In this context, the improvement of employability is embraced as a panacea for the problem of unemployment (Işıklı, 2016). The Directive of the Services of Labour Force Training and Harmonization (Türkiye İş Kurumu İşgücü Yetiştirme ve Uyum Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği) came into force in 2004. This directive mainly regulates labour force training, vocational training, labour force harmonization programmes in addition to training seminars for the labour force in employment and the work programmes for the community benefit to increase the employability of the labour force (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2004, Article 2). This directive has a wider target group and includes

vocational training and rehabilitation measures for persons with disabilities and ex-convicts (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2004, Article 4).

3.1.4 The enlargement of the services of İŞKUR and the growing emphasis on employability

The crisis of 2008 triggered another wave of change for the range and the scope of the services provided by İŞKUR. The unemployment rate rose from 10.3 per cent in 2007 to 14 per cent in 2009 (TÜİK, 2021a). The Ministry of Labour and Social Security initiated the efforts to put forward a national employment strategy in 2009 (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a, Article 7). With the financial crisis of 2007-2008, İŞKUR's activities were enhanced and a significant increase was observed in both the number of the courses and course participants supported by İŞKUR (Biçer, 2014, p. 93).

Besides, a directive for the regulation of the labour force harmonization services was introduced in 2008. The directive mainly regulates vocational courses and work programmes for the community benefit with an emphasis on the *employability* of the labour force. It targets unemployed persons registered to İŞKUR and convicts in the penal institutions who are to be released in the next three years (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2008, Article 2). The directive includes entrepreneurship and vocational training, guidance and counselling services, the programmes for the community benefit, and training seminars for the labour force in employment which are aimed at facilitating their placement in a job and supporting them to start up their own businesses by increasing their employability of the target group in response to the needs of the labour market (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2008, Article 2/1). It also mandates the participation of the current

unemployment insurance beneficiaries in the training activities suitable for them and their vocation, with a sanction of benefit cut in the case of non-compliance without a valid reason (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2008, Article 21).

The growing interest in the active policies manifested itself in the Directive of Active Labour Force Services (Aktif İşgücü Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği) of 2013. The main objectives of the directive are determining the principles and procedures regarding the implementation of the active labour force services organized by İŞKUR for supporting the protection and enhancement of employment; the development of the vocational qualities of the unemployed, the reduction of unemployment; and the integration of the groups in need of special policies into the labour market (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 1). The directive regulates the vocational training courses, on-the-job training programmes, entrepreneurship training programmes, and the programmes for the community benefit which are to be realized by İŞKUR in line with the needs of the labour market (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 2/1).

The National Employment Strategy covering the years between 2014 and 2023 was introduced in 2014. The central approach of the strategy is flexicurity (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a, Article 8). The strategy is built upon four basic policy axes: the consolidation of the link between education and employment (I), the provision of security and flexibility in the labour market (II), the enhancement of the employment of the groups needing special policies (III), and the consolidation of the link between employment and social protection (IV) (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a, Article 8). The prioritized development goal of Turkey is built upon enhancing the sensitivity of education to employment in the National Employment Strategy (Biçer, 2014, p. 94).

Within the perspective of the Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018), the activation of the labour market programme is presented among the prioritized transformation programmes (The Ministry of Development, 2015, p. iv). In 2015, an action plan for the labour market activation programme was released within the framework of the Tenth Development Plan which covers the years 2014 and 2018. The programme's motivations are manifold. The programme emphasizes the need for solving the problems faced during the job matching processes, increasing female labour force participation and employment rates, strengthening the link between social assistance and employment, and effectively implementing flexible work arrangements (The Ministry of Development, 2015, p. 1). The objectives of the programme are defined as increasing qualified and decent employment, reducing unemployment, and enhancing the efficiency of the labour force through the activation of the labour market, which are required by a competitive economy (The Ministry of Development, 2015, p. 1). The target groups are defined as the unemployed, women outside of the labour force, and informal workers and employers (The Ministry of Development, 2015, p. 1). The goals of the programme are increasing female labour force participation and employment rates, the extensification of flexible work arrangements, the consolidation of the link between social assistance and employment, the enhancement of the effectiveness of the employment incentives (The Ministry of Development, 2015, p. 1).

One of the components of the programme is the activation of the active labour force programmes which is embodied in the policies of monitoring and evaluation of the active labour force programmes and increasing the numbers and upskilling the job and vocation counsellors (The Ministry of Development, 2015, pp. 9, 11). The plan recognizes the deficiency of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Turkey.

Overall, the account of the development of ALMPs in Turkey suggests that the state of being unemployed is perceived as a passive attitude (Biçer, 2014, p. 94) and unemployed individuals need to be activated to re-enter the labour market. For that reason, training programmes or public works programmes are put forward as a solution (Biçer, 2014, p. 94). The focus is mainly on supply side interventions in the labour market and they usually dwell on the employability of the labour force.

3.1.5 A review of studies on the development of ALMPs in Turkey

The literature presents critical studies regarding the development of İŞKUR and ALMPs in Turkey. Biçer (2014) argues that the employment strategy mostly involves supply side interventions in the labour market and it is designed for reducing the burden on the employers (p. 94).

Kumaş (2010) argues that the main problem of İŞKUR is that it is defined as merely a supporting institution in the 2003 Law (p. 149). İŞKUR engages in micro-level employment services rather than macro-level policies (Akyıldız, 2019, p. 94). For that reason, it cannot engage in human resources planning from a macro level perspective (Kumaş, 2010, p. 148). This might partly explain the inefficiency of its services. Nonetheless, it is open to debate whether further empowerment of the institution would generate better results for the labour force.

Çetinkaya (2011) evaluates the opinions of social partners regarding the historical transformation of İŞKUR. Based on questionnaires conducted with representatives of İŞKUR, trade unions and employer's unions, Çetinkaya (2011) finds that while the representatives of İŞKUR are more optimistic about the transformation of İŞKUR, the representatives of trade unions are rather displeased

with the changes and the representatives of employer's unions deem them insufficient (p. 39).

The process of EU accession has an undoubtful impact on the development of ALMPs in Turkey. In that regard, there are several studies which evaluate the integration of ALMPs in relation to the EU accession process (e.g. Çiçeksoğüt, 2019; Taş & Bozkaya, 2012) and its compatibility with the EES (e.g. Özen, 2015). Regarding the employment policies of Turkey, Özen (2015) argues although Turkey legally complies with the EES, the lack of a national employment strategy and coordination is the major problem according to the progress reports of Turkey prepared by the EU (p. 78). In another work, Şahin (2014) analyses the EES as the basis of the National Employment Strategy of Turkey and argues that the common solution to unemployment adopted by those two strategies is the creation of cheap and insecure human capital (p. 57).

The evaluation of ALMPs in terms of their target groups is also another dimension which has received attention in the literature (e.g. Baydoğan, 2012; Çetinkaya, 2008; Erol, 2013; Es & Güven, 2018; Etcı, Avcı, & Çağan, 2019; Kluve, 2014; Metin, 2016; Özaydın, 2013). For instance, Özaydın (2013) examines the role of ALMPs in terms of tackling youth unemployment in Turkey and concludes that the perspective of the youth needs to be incorporated into policies which aim to fight youth unemployment. Etcı et al. (2019) scrutinize the role of ALMPs implemented by İŞKUR in the province of Muğla and conclude that despite the training programmes, the job placement rates of young job seekers are low and existing policies are insufficient to ensure employment (p. 271).

In addition, there are studies which scrutinize ALMPs from a gender perspective in the literature (e.g., Aşkın & Aşkın, 2017; Binek, 2019; Güray, 2012;

Özkan, 2013). For example, Güray (2012) evaluates the impact of the vocational training courses on women's empowerment in Turkey and find that the training programmes contribute to self-confidence and socialization of women, although they fail to increase the employment level of women sufficiently (p. 90). Çiftçi and Yenihan (2019) examine the regional resistance to the entrepreneurship programme of İŞKUR from a gender perspective and find that regional resistance to women's entrepreneurship is higher in Eastern and South-Eastern regions of Turkey compared to other geographical regions (p. 129).

Although the number of studies on ALMPs are abundant in Turkey, there are significant gaps in the literature. There is a significant gap in the literature regarding the country-wide impact analysis of ALMPs as propounded by Kayaduvar (2015), particularly regarding the unintended consequences of ALMPs such as the deadweight and substitution effects (p. 6). Studies which evaluate ALMPs from a holistic point of view are also missing. The restricted volume of qualitative studies reflecting on the opinions and experiences of different social actors also constitute a significant gap. In addition, scrutinizing the case of Turkey in relation with the existing activation and ALMP typologies also stands out as a missing research area. In order to be able to better address the latter inquiry, the following section elaborates on the characteristics of individual ALMP programmes which are currently in use and being implemented by İŞKUR.

3.2 Active labour market policy programmes in Turkey

The labour market policies which are utilized to tackle unemployment in Turkey could be classified into PLMPs and ALMPs (Mahiroğulları & Korkmaz, 2018, pp. 132, 144). Although Hekimler (2008) points out that the only PLMP mechanism in

usage in Turkey is the unemployment insurance scheme (UI) (p. 12), Mahiroğulları and Korkmaz (2018) suggest that the PLMPs which are in use are the UI (I), the wage guarantee fund (II), and indemnities (i.e. severance and notice pay and job loss indemnity) (III) (pp. 132-143). The ALMPs that are being implemented in this context could be classified into four: policies aiming to enhance employability (vocational training programmes, job and vocational counselling services, and employment mediation activities) (I); policies aiming to prevent the termination of employment (short-time working payment and legal regulations to obstruct dismissals) (II); policies aiming to create new employment areas (incentives to increase investments and employment, self-employment supports, and the creation of new public employment areas) (III); policies aiming to increase employment in the existing workplaces (flexible work and the requirement to hire disabled persons and ex-convicts) (IV) (Mahiroğulları & Korkmaz, 2018, pp. 144-168).

The ALMP programmes which are currently implemented by İŞKUR could be grouped as the job and vocational counselling services, vocational training courses, entrepreneurship training programmes, programmes for the community benefit, on-the-job training programmes, policies for persons with disabilities and ex-convicts, and the social work programme.

In the Directive of Active Labour Force Services, active labour force services are defined as activities which are conducted to protect and increase employment, improve the vocational qualities of the unemployed, reduce unemployment, and help groups with special policy needs to integrate into the labour market (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, 4/1-a). Most ALMP programmes are financed by the Unemployment Insurance Fund in Turkey (Demir & Özyılmaz Misican, 2018, p. 45). The courses, programmes, and projects regulated under the directive are also

financed by the budget of İŞKUR composed of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, the fund transferred to İŞKUR for the vocational training of those who became unemployed as a result of privatization following the Law on Privatization Implementations (no. 4046) (Özelleştirme Uygulamaları Hakkında Kanun), and loans and/or grants allocated for İŞKUR as a result of agreements with international organizations (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, 91/1).

The unit of İŞKUR that is responsible for the conduct of active labour market services is the Department of Active Labour Force Services established according to the Law on Certain Regulations about the Turkish Employment Institution (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 8). The duties of the Department of Active Labour Force Services are defined by the Law as the following:

- Organizing vocational training, vocational development, and vocational replacement courses,
- Providing or procuring vocational training and vocational rehabilitation services which facilitates the employment of groups which require special policies in employment,
- Implementing other labour force training and harmonization programmes

(The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 3/b).

The department responsible for the implementation of active labour market policies was created as early as 2003 during the reorganization of İİBK. The assigned duties of the department revolve around the vocational development and harmonization of the labour force, hence dwelling on supply side interventions in the labour market which is an important pillar of the active labour market policies.

This section focuses on the ALMP programmes which are being implemented by İŞKUR in addition to other activating labour market policies including the UI scheme and the coordination of the family policy (Dingeldey, 2007).

3.2.1 The introduction of job and vocational counselling in employment services

Employment services in the form of job placement and matching has been a part of the services offered by İŞKUR since its foundation in 1946. A recent development regarding employment services is the introduction of job and vocational counselling system (Yıldız & Çiloğlu Yörübulut, 2017, p. 97). The counselling service covers the employment-generating and employment protection activities targeting job seekers who seek employment within the scope of the services of İŞKUR, as well as employers, and education and training institutions (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2015, 4/1-d). It entails the provision of counselling services which focus on employment for job seekers, employers, and students.

In this system, job seekers and employers are registered to the İŞKUR system and each school is assigned to the portfolio of a job and vocational counsellor. Within the scope of the services, counsellors support job seekers who are registered to İŞKUR to find employment, to eliminate their vocational adjustment problems, to improve their vocational skills, and to change their jobs and vocations (İŞKUR, 2021a). Systematic assistance is provided to the individual job seeker to choose the job and vocation which best suits his or her desire and situation, to benefit from the training opportunities related to the chosen vocation, to be placed in a job, and to adapt to the job through the comparison of the individual qualities of the job seeker and the qualifications and conditions required by jobs or vocations of the choice (İŞKUR, 2021a). They also support students to choose a vocation (İŞKUR, 2021a)

The services include the provision of information about the regulations and responding to the demands about the labour market such as recruitment for employers (İŞKUR, 2021a). The duties of the job and vocational counsellors include:

- Providing consultancy services for job seekers, employers, and education and training institutions,
- Carrying out promotional and cooperation activities related to consultancy services,
- Reporting job and vocational counselling activities,
- Conducting labour market research,
- Being in constant cooperation with employers, education and training institutions, relevant institutions and organizations,
- Referring the counselee to the services provided by İŞKUR or relevant institutions and organizations in accordance with his or her personal situation and needs and to follow up the results,
- Creating an individual action plan when necessary by considering the counselee's personal characteristics (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2015, Article 7-1).

As could be seen, job and vocation counsellor is responsible for the fulfilment of a wide range of duties. In this system, a counsellor fulfils every duty related to employment and education (Yıldız & Çiloğlu Yörübulut, 2017, p. 97).

Job matching service is also provided by private employment agencies alongside İŞKUR. Although Turkey is a party to the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention of ILO (no. 96) since 1952, İİBK exercised a monopoly in terms of the provision of employment services until 2000 (Uçkan Hekimler, 2005, p. 174). As the statutory decree aimed at reorganizing İŞKUR was annulled by the

Constitutional Court in 2000, the establishment of private employment agencies was granted legal basis with the promulgation of the Labour Law of 2003 (no. 4857) (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a). Later in the same year, the Law no. 4904 which established İŞKUR in 2003 framed the functioning of privately owned employment agencies in detail (The Republic of Turkey 2003b). Article 17 of the Law on Certain Regulations about the Turkish Employment Institution states that the mediation service to place job seeker in jobs for which they are suitable and finding suitable workers for various jobs can be performed by both İŞKUR and privately owned employment agencies (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b). Privately owned employment agencies can be opened upon the permission of İŞKUR and they are subject to the supervision of İŞKUR (The Republic of Turkey, 2003b, Article 17). Private employment agencies are authorized to carry on mediation services such as job matching except for jobs in public institutions. As of 2020, there are 525 privately owned employment agencies across the country (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 57).

Recently, job and vocational counsellors have been branched out into five groups in accordance with their educational background, skills, and achievements with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the services for job seekers, employers, and students (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 52). These groups are job seeker counsellors, employer counsellors, vocational counsellors, employment coaches for persons with disabilities, and leaders of the Job Clubs which provide intensified counselling services for groups experiencing challenges in the labour market (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 52).

A novel project regarding the job and vocational counselling services is the Job Clubs Project (İş Kulüpleri Projesi) which was launched in 2017 (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 61). The project is designed as an intensive job and vocational counselling

programme which specifically targets groups needing special policies including women, young persons, persons with disabilities, long-term unemployed individuals, drug addicts, and social assistance beneficiaries (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 61). The objective of the programme is to provide the target group with the motivation to look for a job and methodological support regarding job search (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 61). In addition to raising the motivation to seek employment, other alleged functions of the project are to boost self-confidence, to show that there is a job for anyone who wants to work, to provide information about where and how to find a job, and to ensure that the participants are placed in the best job possible and as soon as possible (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 61). Intensive training courses lasting for from two to five days are organized for small groups as part of the project (İŞKUR, 2021c). A curriculum is designed for each target group for a specific period in the scope of the project (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 61). The job clubs operate in 68 provinces of the country and 81,869 individuals participated in the project between 2017 and 2020 (İŞKUR, 2021b, p.73).

It has been argued that the matching services provided by İŞKUR are not in harmony with the demands of the labour market (Kumaş, 2010, p. 150). By drawing on data on the number of open jobs, the number of the registered of job seekers, and the number of individuals placed in a job from the year 2008, Kumaş (2010) detects a mismatch between the matching service and the labour demand (p. 150).

Nonetheless it should be noted that the services provided by İŞKUR went under significant changes since 2008. In a more recent study, Şahin, Nal and Kaya (2019) scrutinize the impact of matching and employment services implemented by İŞKUR as a response to unemployment and find that the general job placement rate in the labour market is higher than job placement rate via İŞKUR in Turkey (p. 161).

3.2.2 Vocational Training Courses (Mesleki Eğitim Kursları, MEK)

Vocational training courses are one of the earliest and the most prominent ALMPs implemented by İŞKUR (Uyar Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008, p. 60). As mentioned above, their roots could be traced back to the year 1988 when a directive on the training of the labour force was introduced (Varçın, 2004, p. 103). Prior to this directive, vocational training was deemed primarily a responsibility of vocational education schools; nevertheless, after the directive, İİBK started to play an active role in the implementation of vocational training as ALMP programmes in Turkey (Varçın, 2004, p. 103).

Vocational training courses involve vocation acquisition, development and replacement trainings which are organized for improving the qualifications and increasing the employability of those who do not have any profession, who have a profession but cannot find a job in their profession or who are not qualified in their profession (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 4-o).

Alongside the regular courses which do not come with employment guarantee, there are also employment guaranteeing courses which aim at qualifying job seekers who lack qualification (Uyar Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008, p. 60). The courses target persons with disabilities, convicts, and ex-convicts (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 4). Almost all vocational training courses are financed by the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Biçer, 2014, p. 94).

The courses can be operated in cooperation with or through service procurement from education and training institutions subject to the Ministry of National Education, universities, private education institutions, private sector workplaces, public institutions, foundations and associations which have economic

enterprises, and private employment agencies (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 10/1). The curricula of the courses must be approved by the Ministry of National Education (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 28/1). The duration of the courses cannot exceed 160 actual days (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 29/2).

The criteria for being eligible for participation are as the following: being registered to İŞKUR as unemployed, being over the age of 15, having special qualities determined in accordance with the requirements of the vocation, benefiting from job and vocation counselling services, not being a retiree, and not having completed another course organized for the same vocation by İŞKUR (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 32/1).

During the selection of the participants, job and vocational counselling services are provided. Participants are ideally selected in line with the principles of impartiality and equality of opportunity from unemployed persons registered to İŞKUR. Disadvantaged persons who are defined as persons who are comparably difficult to gain employment such as women, young individuals, long-term unemployed persons, and persons with disabilities are given priority in the participation in the course in compliance with the qualities of the course and the number of participants (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 34). The courses have strict attendance requirements (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 36/1). A payment covering the necessary expenses determined by the Board of Directors of the İŞKUR are paid to the participants for each full actual training day they attend (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 44/1). As part of the programme, general health insurance premiums and work accident and occupational disease insurance premiums of participants are

covered by İŞKUR during the courses (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 41)

In the employment guaranteed vocational training courses, at least fifty per cent of the trainees must be recruited within 30 days at the latest from the date the course exam result is announced, and they must be employed for not less than 120 days, at least for the amount of the days of the actual course (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 40/1).

Albeit it is one of the most intensively implemented activities by İŞKUR, vocational training courses may prove incapable of solving the problems of unemployment as individuals might participate in them for the cash benefit they provide and to make use of their free time (Kumaş 2010, p. 148). Şen (2016) evaluates the vocational training courses as part of ALMP programmes in Turkey and concludes that the impact of the courses on unemployment depends on the creation of enough jobs for the new labour force (p. 88).

An experimental study of the WB (2013) draws upon a representative sample of general vocational training courses which occurred between December 2010 and June 2011 in 23 provinces of Turkey (p. viii). The findings of the study demonstrate that programme participants are less likely to seek employment compared to the average urban job seekers (WB, 2013, p. 15). The trainees attribute great importance to İŞKUR training programmes as they believe that the programmes are perceived valuable by employers and respectfully, they are helpful for finding better jobs (WB, 2013, p. 19). Overall, the impact of the training courses implemented by İŞKUR is found to be negligible with a small but significant impact on employment quality (WB, 2013, p. 20). Nonetheless, the study asserts that privately provided and competitive İŞKUR training courses have a bigger net return (WB, 2013, p. 27). WB

(2013) mainly attributes the low impact of İŞKUR training under scrutiny to the low value-added of the courses regarding the skills they aim to enhance and to the fact that İŞKUR trains the most educated job seekers, while most of the labour force consists of low-skilled workers who experience the greatest challenge in the labour market (pp. 34-35).

On the other hand, Kayaduvar (2015) evaluates the impact of vocational training courses of İŞKUR in Ankara and concludes that the contracting out of the vocational training courses to private contractors results in malfunctioning and hence, they fail to boost the employability of the trainees.

3.2.3 The Entrepreneurship Training Programme (Girişimcilik Eğitim Programı)

The objective of the Entrepreneurship Training Programme is to support persons registered to İŞKUR to start up and develop their own businesses (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 78/1). Until 2010, the entrepreneurship training programmes were implemented as the programme for those who wish to start their own businesses (Korkut et al., 2015, p. 128). After 2010, they were reorganized as entrepreneurship training programmes (Korkut et al., 2015, p. 128). This programme aims at tackling unemployment by both ensuring the employment of the participant and the potential employees who will be recruited by the participant (Korkut et al., 2015, p. 128).

The courses can be organized in cooperation with or through service procurement from universities, private education institutions, trade associations, foundations, and associations (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 81/1). The participation criteria are as the following: being registered to İŞKUR, being over the age of 18, and not having completed the same module before

(The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 82/1). The beneficiaries of the programme are required to benefit from job and vocation counselling services (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 83/3). Attendance to the course is compulsory (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 84/1). A payment covering the necessary expenses determined by the Board of Directors of the İŞKUR is paid to the participants for each full actual training day they attend (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 86/1-b). As part of the programme, general health insurance premiums and work accident and occupational disease insurance premiums of participants are covered by İŞKUR during the courses (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 87/4). Participants who complete the programme are given a programme participation document (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 89).

3.2.4 The Programmes for the Community Benefit (Toplum Yararına Programlar, TYP)

The Programme for the Community Benefit (TYP) is basically the public works programme being implemented in Turkey. It relies on the fulfilment of a work or service for the public good directly or through a contractor (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 62-1). The objective of TYP is defined as providing temporary income protection and ensuring labour market harmonization for the unemployed, particularly for those who are least to be employed due to detachment from work habit and discipline in the places with or in times of intensive unemployment (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 62-1). Çapar Diriöz (2012) approaches the programmes for the community benefit as

publicly financed programmes that offer temporary employment opportunities in public institutions for low wages (p. 26).

In the first phases of the programmes, they were referred to as “Work for the Community Benefit Programme” (Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programı, TYÇP), nonetheless later the word ‘work’ was omitted due to criticisms and they were renamed “Programmes for the Community Benefit” (Toplum Yararına Programlar, TYP) (Kapar, 2017, p. 323). However, Kapar (2017) highlights that those programmes still function as workfare programmes despite the change of the name (p. 325).

The work programmes for the community benefit (then Toplum Yararına Çalışma Programları, TYÇP) have been implemented by İŞKUR for various reasons (Varçın, 2004, p. 121). They could be aimed at facilitating the transition period during the implementation of structural adjustment reforms (Varçın, 2004, p. 49).

The first set of those programmes were introduced within the scope of the Privatization Implementation Assistance and Social Safety Net Project which was signed by the Undersecretariat of Treasury and the WB in 1994 as a response to the privatization of some SEEs within the context of the structural reforms that Turkey went through (Varçın, 2004, pp. 114, 121-122). In that phase, the TYÇPs targeted people who became unemployed due to the privatization measures (Varçın 2004, p. 122). Nonetheless, those programmes could not generate the projected impacts due to the low take-up rate and the provision of an amount approximating the minimum wage merely (Varçın, 2004, p. 122).

After the two earthquakes that took place in the Marmara region in 1999, İŞKUR introduced TYÇPs in the cities that were destructively affected (Kapar, 2017, p. 318; Varçın, 2004, p. 122). The TYÇPs were also launched in the aftermath of the

economic crisis of 2001 financed within the scope of the Privatization Social Support Project (Özelleştirme Sosyal Destek Projesi, ÖSDP) in two phases between 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 (Çapar Diriöz, 2012, pp. 145-146).

The Directive of Labour Force Harmonization Services which was published in 2008 paved the way for the proliferation of the work programmes for the community benefit in a uniform fashion in the whole country through the agency of İŞKUR (Kapar, 2017, p. 319). According to Kapar (2017), the proliferation of the TYPs and the extension of their scope coincides with the economic crisis of 2008 (p. 319). Thus, it is suggested that the TYPs are deemed as a mechanism that could cushion the detrimental effect of the crisis.

The participation criteria for the TYP are as follows: having registered to İŞKUR as unemployed, being over the age of 18, not being granted retirement or invalidity pension, and not being a student (except for being registered at the Open University) (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 67-1). TYPs can be implemented in the areas of environmental cleaning, the renewal of public infrastructure, landscaping in public schools, cleaning and restoring, the protection of historical and cultural heritage, afforestation, park landscaping, vale improvement and stream remediation, and efforts to prevent erosion (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 65-1).

Attendance is compulsory and 14 days unpaid leave conditional upon the approval from İŞKUR or contractor (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 71-1). The weekly duration for TYP is 45 hours (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66-1). A TYP programme cannot be implemented for longer than 9 months (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66-2). The maximum participation duration for a participant is 24

months in total (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66-4). For a participant, the maximum duration of participation is nine months in 12 months and he or she can start benefiting from the programme after 12 months following his or her participation (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66-3).

After the completion of the programme, those participants who did not accept three job offers made by İŞKUR which were suitable for their qualifications without a valid cause cannot reapply for another TYP in 24 months, starting from the last day of the programme (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66-1-5). The participants receive the daily minimum wage, calculated on a daily basis (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 73-1). Social security premiums of the participants are also covered within the scope of the programme (The Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services, 2013, Article 73-3).

The participants can be determined by the methods of listing based upon interviews or job and vocation counselling, notary's draw, or a specific combination of them (The Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services, 2019, Article 9). The provincial directorates of İŞKUR have the authority to determine the selection method in order to select the suitable participants for the characteristics of the work, to enhance the employability of the unemployed individuals who are difficult to gain employment, to take the socioeconomic discrepancies of the province into account, and to inhibit the participation of persons who may disrupt the programme or cause the programme to fail (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 68-4). Participants are selected from persons having the education, age, and gender qualities which are the most suitable for the programme and the ones who reside in close locations to the programme location (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 68-2). Unemployed persons who are least likely to be

employed are prioritized (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 68-3). In practice, groups most disadvantaged in finding employment: women, persons with disabilities, ex-convicts, individuals over the age of 35, individuals who are wounded during the fight against terrorism but not counted as invalid are prioritized during the selection of participants (İŞKUR, 2021d). In 2019, 59 per cent of the programme participants were women (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 47).

Regarding the critiques that these programmes receive, Gün (2013) argues that the TYPs which target unemployment could be considered workfare programmes and they resemble the New Poor Laws of the nineteenth century England which projected that the receivers of public assistance would be forced to work for the public good, for instance, in workhouses. Erikli and Bayat (2016) state that the implementation and the proliferation of the TYPs after the economic crisis of 2008 in Turkey resemble the employment patterns during the implementation of the Tennessee Vale Project in the USA after the Great Depression of 1929, as they are both regarded public employment creation programmes. Aşkın and Aşkın (2017) deem the TYPs as ALMPs in their study in the province of Tokat. Their study suggests that the positive impacts of the TYPs on the labour market in Tokat is rather limited and they cause some reverse effects including the substitution impact (2017, p. 1). Kapar (2017) also argues that the TYPs retain a robust substitution impact, i.e. the participants of those programmes substitute the potential employees that could be recruited by the beneficiary public institutions (p. 332).

Kapar (2017) points out that the Programmes for the Community Benefit locate their beneficiaries within the most inferior level with respect to the precarious and insecure working conditions that they impose (p. 319). According to him, the reason behind the intensive demand to participate in the programmes is its provision

of access to temporary income support, due to the underdeveloped social assistance and the insufficient unemployment benefit systems in Turkey (2017, p. 321). For the public institutions which benefit from those programmes, they turn out to be quite desirable as they provide them with a flexible labour force supply which could be utilized free of cost (Kapar, 2017, p. 322).

3.2.5 The On-the-Job Training Programme (İşbaşı Eğitim Programı, İEP)

The on-the-job training programmes (İEPs) entail training conducted during the fulfilment of the job in private workplaces which meet the minimum criteria set by İŞKUR in order to provide participants with vocational experience (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 4-1-j). The programmes aim at reducing unemployment by increasing the employability of the labour force when the labour supply and demand do not match (Çapar Diriöz, 2012, p. 25). Just like TYP, İEP became more pervasive after the economic crisis of 2008, and the numbers of its beneficiaries and the financial sources allocated to it has expanded significantly after that year (Kapar, 2017, p. 334)

İEP is designed for individuals who wish to complement their theoretical education with practice and to gain vocational experience (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 45-1). İEP can be organized in non-public workplaces which are registered to İŞKUR and who have at least two registered employees (İŞKUR, 2021e). The maximum duration of the programme varies with the sector in which it takes place. While this is six months at maximum in workplaces and vocations operating in informatics and manufacturing; it is nine months at maximum for vocations related to journalism (reporting); three months for other sectors (İŞKUR, 2021e). İEP could be organized for up to nine months for

young persons between the ages of 18-29 in vocations for today and the future such as cyber security, cloud computing, and coding (İŞKUR, 2021e).

The daily duration of the programme cannot be shorter than five hours and longer than eight hours (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 53-1). The programme cannot exceed 45 hours in total and six days weekly (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 53-1). The total duration of the programme cannot be longer than 320 actual days (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 53-1). The maximum duration of participation in İEP is 320 actual days in 24 months for participants (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 52-1).

Attendance for the programme is compulsory (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 53/1). Participants who have acceptable excuses can use paid leave. Health-related excuses need to be documented by a medical report and health leave cannot exceed five days in total (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 53/1). The total leave duration except for health reasons cannot exceed one-tenth of the total duration of the programme. This maximum leave duration includes health leave exceeding five days (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 54/1). Exceeding this limit results in dismissal (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 54/1). Certain types of insurance premiums of programme participants are covered by İŞKUR during the programme (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 55/2). The programme covers general health insurance and work accidents and occupational diseases insurance premiums but excludes retirement and severance and notice payment premiums (Kapar, 2017, p. 336).

The participation criteria of İEP are as the following: being registered to İŞKUR as unemployed, being over the age of 15, having utilized the job and vocational counselling services of İŞKUR, not being a blood relative from the first and second degrees or spouse of the employer, not being a retiree, and not having worked for the employer in question in the last three months before the commencement of the programme (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 52/1). Unemployment insurance receivers can take part in programmes, albeit they cannot participate in the programmes organized in the workplaces which are party to their leave statement while receiving unemployment insurance benefits (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 52/1).

Students who meet the participation requirements can also participate in programmes. Nonetheless, they receive a lower amount of payment. While job seekers are paid 108.68 TL a day as an indispensable expense (*zaruri gider*), students receive 81.51 TL. Unemployment insurance payment beneficiaries receive 54.34 TL (İŞKUR, 2021e). The programme expenses are financed by the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Kapar, 2017, p. 333).

There is an employment generating component in the programme. For employer's request for new participants to be accepted, at least 25 per cent of the participants must be employed in the same vocation in the workplace in question or in another workplace at least for 60 days or pledged to have been employed by the employer in the last year (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 51/1). Nonetheless, it has been argued that the programmes function to promote employment in the profit-seeking private sector and the objective of supporting employers have taken precedence over providing vocational training on the job (Kapar, 2017, pp. 333-334).

3.2.6 Policies designed for persons with disabilities and ex-convicts

Compulsory employment of persons with disabilities and ex-convicts in the form of employment quotas has roots in labour laws in Turkey. Firstly, a compulsory employment quota was introduced for persons with disabilities and ex-convicts in the Maritime Labour Law (no. 854) in 1967 which addressed the principle of positive discrimination (Durmaz, 2017, p. 263). Later, Labour Law introduced in 1971 specified compulsory employment quotas for persons with disabilities and ex-convicts (The Republic of Turkey, 1971, Article 25). İİBK adopted a guideline called the Regulation on the Employment of the Disabled (Sakatların İstihdamı Hakkında Tüzük) for the employment of persons with disabilities which projected the opening of vocational training courses in 1987 (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1987). Vocational training courses for convicts and ex-convicts were initiated in 2001 in order to facilitate their integration into the labour market (Şen, 2016, pp. 77-78).

According to the Labour Law of 2003, employers are obliged to allocate three per cent of their number of employees for persons with disabilities in their workplaces employing more than 50 workers (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 30). In public workplaces, this obligation is specified as 4 per cent for persons with disabilities and two per cent for ex-convicts respectively (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 30). The Law on Persons with Disabilities came into action in 2005 imposes the principle of non-discrimination and projects the adoption of measures for the integration of persons with disabilities into the labour market (The Republic of Turkey, 2005, Article 14).

Currently, public and private workplaces employing more than 50 workers are obliged to employ persons with disabilities and ex-convicts in line with Article

30 of the Labour Law of 2003 (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a). Those employers can find the workers whom they are obliged to employ through İŞKUR (The Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services, 2020, Article 12). Other measures were also adopted in line with ALMPs targeting persons with disabilities and employment services, vocational training courses, and employment quotas. Moreover, persons with disabilities and ex-convicts who wish to start up their own business have been supported with grants since 2014 (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014b).

3.2.7 The Social Work Programme (Sosyal Çalışma Programı)

The Social Work Programme was first introduced as a TYP implementation for higher education students as an addition to the Directive of Active Labour Force Services in 2018 (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Supplementary Article 1). The programme launched as a training programme targeting formal higher education students in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2019a). The objective of the programme is to enhance the vocational qualities of the higher education students, getting them acquainted with the working life, enabling them to participate in services provided in the areas of high social interest, and helping them gain work discipline (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 3/1). It can be organized by a public institution in the areas of conservation of nature, the restoration, the protection, and the promotion of the cultural heritage, the maintenance of libraries, and supporting the cultural and social services of public institutions for up to three months (İŞKUR, 2019a, Articles 4, 6). The participation criteria are:

- Being registered to İŞKUR as unemployed,
- Being over the age of 18,

- Not receiving pensions,
- Being an actively registered higher education student
- Not being enrolled in a compulsory traineeship (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 8/1).

A student can participate in the programmes for up to 90 days within the duration of his or her higher education (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 7/2). The duration of work is regulated as three days a week and eight hours in a day (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 7/2). The participants can be determined by the methods of listing, notary's draw, or a specific combination of them (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 9/3).

Attendance is compulsory and participants are entitled to five-day unpaid leave only (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 12). Non-compliance results in dismissal. The participants receive the daily minimum wage, calculated on a daily basis (İŞKUR, 2019a, Article 14/2).

The Social Work Programme resembles the Programme for the Community Benefit as it provides public institutions with temporary workers who lack social security. Moreover, the programme areas may fail to match the vocational expectations of many students as they are quite limited.

3.2.8 Employment subsidies

There are various employment subsidy schemes regulated by different legal arrangements in Turkey. Firstly, it should be noted that the social insurance component of the social security system of Turkey resembles the Bismarck model in which certain amounts of premiums deducted from the wages of employees are collected in a joint pool for short-term (including insurance for work accident, occupational diseases, sickness, and maternity) and long-term insurance schemes (insurance for invalidity, old-age, and survivors' insurance) (The Social Security

Institution, 2019, p. 18). Both employee and employer contribute to the social insurance scheme. While employee contributions account for approximately 15 percent, the employer contribution approximately account for 21.5 percent (Balkan, Cilasun, & Turan, 2016, p. 4).

The employment subsidies proliferated after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Some subsidy schemes target specific groups such as women, young persons, persons with disabilities, social assistance beneficiaries, and UI beneficiaries. In 2008, the government launched an employment subsidy programme for the target groups of young individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 and women above the age of 18 in order to enhance the formal employment prospects of disadvantaged groups by decreasing the employment costs (Balkan et al., 2016, p. 2). In a nutshell, employment subsidies usually entail employer subsidies which aim to incentivize private sector businesses to recruit new employees (Adaman & Erus, 2018, p. 1). The rationale of the subsidies relies on covering employer's share of social security premium contributions to varying degrees depending on the scheme type. For instance, a scheme introduced in 2018 aims to incentivize the recruitment of young individuals between the ages of 18 and 25 in manufacturing businesses (Adaman & Erus, 2018, p. 1).

Another programme incentivizes the recruitment of women, young individuals, the holders of vocational competence certificates who have been unemployed for the last six months (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 143). There is an employment subsidy scheme for individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 who are employed within the three months following the completion of the on-the-job training programme (Adaman & Erus, 2018, pp. 1-2). The subsidy is payable for up to 42 months (Adaman & Erus, 2018, pp. 1-2). Another scheme incentivizes the formal

employment of persons with disabilities (The Republic of Turkey, 2008). There is also an employment subsidy programme aimed at promoting the formal employment of social assistance beneficiaries in the private sector (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2017a). The scheme covers the full share of employer's social security contribution. It does not only cover the individual social assistance beneficiaries themselves but also those who live in the place of residence of social assistance beneficiaries. Another scheme is designed for the employment of UI beneficiaries in private workplaces (The Republic of Turkey, 2009)

The employment subsidies are not limited to above-mentioned schemes. There are also schemes which are aimed at ensuring re-integration into the labour market and the transition from informal to formal employment in the same workplace (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. v). Another one aims at incentivizing the termination of the short-time working arrangement as part of the normalization process during the COVID-19 pandemic (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. v).

Balkan et al. (2016) evaluate the impact of the employment subsidy programme launched in 2008 on the formal employment probabilities of women by using 'difference-in differences' technique and find that the programme did not effectively increase the employment prospects of women compared to men who are not eligible for the programme but increased the formal employment of women in the labour market significantly. Erinç Yeldan (2016) also investigated the impact of the employment subsidy programme and by using an applied general equilibrium model find that the returns of the subsidization package introduced in 2008 were rather limited. Adaman and Erus (2018) argue that employment subsidies introduced in 2017 contributed to two percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate alongside other policies (p. 1). The reliance on the unemployment insurance fund in

terms of financing the employment subsidies and the sustainability of employment raises concern (Adaman & Erus, 2018, p. 1).

3.2.9 ALMP programmes introduced or activated during the COVID-19 pandemic

The first COVID-19 case in Turkey was confirmed on 11 March 2020 (The Ministry of Health, 2021). The measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey within the scope of ALMPs are short-time work and the prohibition of dismissal. Both short-time work and the prohibition of dismissal could be regarded as ALMP measures as they are policies developed in order to prevent the termination of employment (Mahiroğulları & Korkmaz, 2018, pp. 155-157).

As one of the earliest measures taken regarding working life during the COVID-19 outbreak in the country, short-time work and short-time work payment were activated in order to prevent dismissals (Koca, 2020, p. 80). Short-time work already existed in the labour regulations in Turkey prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The concepts of short-time work and short-time work payment were introduced in Article 65 of the Labour Law, nonetheless, it was added to the Law of Unemployment Insurance in 2008 (Yamakoğlu & Karaçöp, 2014, p. 481). Today, it is regulated in the Supplementary Article 2 of the Law of Unemployment Insurance according to which weekly working time could be temporarily reduced or activities in the workplace could be completely or partially ceased temporarily within the scope of short-time work due to general economic, sectoral, or regional crises and compelling reasons (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Supplementary Article 2). It cannot exceed three months (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Supplementary Article 2). In the case of short-time work, short-time work payment is paid to workers who meet the criteria of unemployment insurance benefit apart from the termination of

the labour contract (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Supplementary Article 2). Daily short-time work payment as calculated as 60 per cent of the average daily gross earning of the worker in the last twelve months. The President of the Republic is authorized to extend the duration of short-time work for up to six months (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Supplementary Article 2).

The eligibility criteria for short-time work payment were rather strict (Yamakoğlu & Karaçöp 2014, pp. 481-482). Following the confirmation of the first COVID-19 case in Turkey, the eligibility criteria for short-time payment were eased to include more workers on the March 26, 2020 (The Republic of Turkey, 2020a) and the application procedure by the employer was facilitated for employers on April 17, 2020 (The Republic of Turkey, 2020b). The duration of short-time payment has been extended until June 30, 2021 (The Republic of Turkey, 2021a).

The Labour Law of 2003 rendered it obligatory to build the termination of the labour contract of workers who have worked for more than six months and working in a workplace which employs more than 30 people for valid reasons (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 18). During the COVID-19 outbreak, a temporary article was added to the Labour Law on the April 17, 2020 (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Temporary Article 10). This article prohibited the termination of the labour contract by the employer apart from situations that do not comply with the rules of morality and goodwill (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Temporary Article 10). The validity of the article has been renewed many times and it was extended until June 30, 2021 (The Republic of Turkey, 2021b).

The following section elaborates on other activating labour market policy programmes: the UI scheme and the coordination of family policies in Turkey.

3.3 Other activating labour market policies

3.3.1 The UI scheme

The contribution-based UI scheme is the only unemployment benefit scheme of Turkey. On the other hand, the cash fee support scheme (nakdi ücret desteği) which was introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic included persons who lost their jobs during the pandemic. This might imply the introduction of a non-contributory unemployment assistance scheme for the first time in Turkey (Öçal & Korkmaz, 2020). Nonetheless, its scope is quite restricted and it is implemented for a limited period of time (Öçal & Korkmaz, 2020).

The unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in 1999 and it has had its activating elements since then. UI is the only social insurance component which is not administered by the Social Security Institution in Turkey. Instead, it is administered by İŞKUR (The Social Security Institution, 2019, p. 2). Contribution to UI is compulsory in formal employment (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 48). An insured unemployed is identified as a person who loses his or her job due to the reasons specified in the relevant articles of the law while working as an insurance holder in a workplace covered by the law and declares that he or she is ready to work by applying to the public employment institution, then İİBK, later İŞKUR (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 47/e). An insured unemployed person receives unemployment insurance benefit and is offered services for job replacement and vocational training courses in addition to other active labour force services (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 48).

The premia of the unemployment insurance are contributed to by the insurance holder, the employer, and the state. They contribute as one per cent, two

per cent, and one per cent of the monthly gross earning taken as basic to premium respectively (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 49). The unemployment benefit is calculated on a daily basis and it is the 40 per cent of the average daily gross earning taken as basic to premium, considering the monthly gross earning taken as basis to premium in the last four months (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 50). On the other hand, the amount of the UI benefit cannot exceed the 80 per cent of the gross minimum wage (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 50).

To benefit from the insurance, the insurance holder must have been subject to the employment contract for the last 120 days before its termination of the contract (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 51). Moreover, he or she must have worked and his or her unemployment insurance premiums must have been paid at least for 600 days in the last three years before the termination of the contract (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 51). The duration of benefit receipt varies between 180 and 300 days, varying in accordance with the number of days for which unemployment insurance premiums are paid (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 51). According to the law, benefit cut sanction applies if an unemployment insurance beneficiary rejects a job offer made by İŞKUR without a valid reason, if the job offer is suitable for his or her vocation, whose working and wage conditions are close to the conditions of his or her last job, and if the offered job is located in the municipal boundaries of his or her place of residence while receiving the benefit (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 52). Rejecting to participate in vocational training and failing to attend without a valid reason result in benefit suspension (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 52).

A directive specified for the vocational training of unemployment insurance beneficiaries followed the Law of Unemployment Insurance in 2000. The objective

of the directive is to regulate the principles and procedures related to the vocational development, vocational replacement, and vocation acquisition training aimed at reemployment of the unemployed persons entitled to the unemployment insurance benefit (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2000, Article 1).

Immervoll and Scarpetta (2012) argue that OECD countries that pay relatively short-duration UI benefits generally entail relatively light activation measures (p. 3). In Turkey, UI is offered for up to 300 days, while this may be up to five years in some OECD countries (Immervoll & Scarpetta, 2012, p. 5).

Nonetheless, it is open to debate whether the activating measures associated with UI benefit provision are relatively light. Venn (2012) compares eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits in OECD and EU countries by deploying four indicators: entitlement conditions, job search requirements, monitoring of job search activities, and sanctions for failing to comply with behavioural requirements. In this study Turkey ranks the sixth most strict country in terms of eligibility criteria for unemployment benefit among the 36 countries under scrutiny. In terms of entitlement criteria, Turkey is the strictest country (Venn, 2012, p. 15). Regarding the strictness of sanctions, Turkey ranks the third (Venn, 2012, p. 19).

On the other hand, in terms of the demanding aspects of eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits, Turkey is argued to be the fourth most lenient country among 40 OECD countries (Langenbucher, 2015). The indicators of the analysis are availability during ALMP participation, demands on occupational mobility, demands on geographical mobility, other valid reasons for refusing job offers, frequency of job search monitoring, documentation of job search activities, sanctions for voluntary unemployment, sanctions for refusing job offers, sanctions for repeated refusal of job offers, sanctions for refusal/ failure to participate in counselling interviews or

ALMPs, and sanctions for repeated refusal/failure to participate in counselling (Langenbucher, 2015, p. 11). Turkey is not deemed among the strictest countries in terms of the demanding aspects of eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits in comparison.

In a more recent study, in terms of the activation requirements for job seekers during UI benefit receipt, Immervoll and Knotz (2018) locate Turkey among the most lenient OECD countries. For instance, UI beneficiaries are not required to document their job seeking efforts, while many countries impose this requirement (Immervoll & Knotz, 2018, p. 35). The indicators adopted by Immervoll and Knotz (2018) are availability requirements, job search requirements, and sanctions. Thus, the literature suggests that while the UI scheme in Turkey is very strict in terms of eligibility criteria, it is not considered among the most demanding countries regarding the activation requirements for UI beneficiaries.

As a relatively new mechanism compared to many European countries, UI has become a part of the activation policy in the case of Turkey (Gün, 2016, p. 1315) particularly regarding its eligibility and maintenance criteria, in addition to the duration and the level of payments (Savaşkan, 2009). The UI as a workfare scheme as it is only payable in exchange for job seeking and participating in employability training programmes (Savaşkan, 2007, pp. 102-110). Savaşkan (2009) puts forth the argument that the UI implementation in Turkey reflects an example of an ALMP with workfarist tendencies in Turkey (p. 215).

3.3.2 The coordination of the family policy

The female labour participation rate is significantly lower than the male labour participation rate in Turkey. While the male labour force participation rate is 78.2 per

cent, the female labour participation rate is 38.7 per cent for the 15-64 age group in 2019 (OECD, 2020, p. 147). The problem posed by the low female participation rate has been attributed to childcare and early childhood education and care services in Turkey (Ecevit, 2012, p. 220).

Regarding the coordination of the family policy, it should be noted that Turkey has a familiarist welfare regime in which the family has the primary role to provide care for its dependents in need of care (Akkan, 2018, p. 1). The provision of care is family-centred in Turkey and this is a factor contributing to the low female labour participation rate (Ecevit, 2012, p. 223). Although the number of childcare and early childhood education and care services increased in the recent decades, participation rates in those institutions are quite low, particularly for children below the age of three (Ecevit, 2012, pp. 230-231; WB, 2015, p. 7). There is in fact demand for childcare and preschool services, however, the utilization is low due to the existing cost and price-quality structures (WB, 2015, p. 7). The services addressing the needs of working mothers are private services which are more expensively priced (WB, 2015, p. 7). The difference between earnings and the cost of those institutions is not sufficient to justify labour force participation for most women (WB, 2015, p. 7).

Regarding the legal basis, workplaces employing more than 150 female workers have to provide childcare service in the workplace or in proximity for the care needs of the children of the workers between the ages 0-6 (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 13-2).

Female workers have the right to a total of 16 weeks maternity leave of which eight weeks is to be used prior to the childbirth and eight weeks following the childbirth (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 74). They can use six months of

unpaid leave (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 74). Female workers who have children below the age of one are legally entitled to leave for one and a half hours a day (The Republic of Turkey, 2003a, Article 74).

Another scheme regarding maternity leave is the Part-time Work Benefit (Yarım Çalışma Ödeneği) whose aim is defined as ensuring the harmony between work and family life (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 103). Under this scheme, women workers may use unpaid leave for the half of the weekly working time for 60 to 360 days following the termination of the maternity leave (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 103). Female and male workers who adopted a child under the age of three can also benefit from this scheme (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 103). Claimants may be eligible for the part-time work benefit which covers the duration of unpaid leave (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 103). Claimants should work half of the weekly working time and he or she should have paid unemployment insurance premia at least for 600 days in the last three years before the childbirth or the adoption (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 104). It is a flat-rate benefit calculated on the basis of the daily minimum wage (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 104). The duration of benefit is 60 days in the first childbirth, 120 days in the second childbirth, and 180 days in the third childbirth (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 104).

In Turkey, a type of tax credit called the Minimum Subsistence Allowance (Asgari Geçim İndirimi) which varies with marital status and number of children was introduced in 2008 (Türkay, 2017). As an in-work benefit, it has arguably an activating element in terms of incentivizing people who have dependent children to take up a job.

With respect to the family policy measures specifically designed as part of ALMPs, a project named the Mother at Work Project (İş'te Anne Projesi) was introduced in 2018. The project is developed upon the Active Labour Force Services

with the aim of reaching groups in need of special policies. The aim of the project is defined as enhancing the employability of women (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. viii). Within the scope of the project women who have children between the ages 0-15 receive 110 TL daily instead of 108.68 TL while they participate in the on-the-job training programmes and receive the job-guaranteed vocational training programmes instead of the daily allowance of 70 TL (İŞKUR, 2021f). Social assistance beneficiaries are prioritized in the project (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70).

Another scheme introduced as part of ALMP programmes is the Child Care Support (Çocuk Bakım Desteği). It was introduced in 2018. The objective of the scheme is defined as enhancing the labour force participation of women who are in a disadvantageous position in the labour market and addressing the skilled work force need in the sectors of manufacturing and industry (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70). In this scheme, women who have children between the ages of two and five can receive 400 TL monthly kindergarten support while they participate in the on-the-job training programmes in the manufacturing sector and in the vocational training courses in the industry sector (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70). It is only given for one child and only within the duration of the course (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70).

The next section provides a background of the establishment of a link between social assistance and employment in Turkey, which could be deemed as part of the activation phenomenon in Turkey.

3.4 The link between social assistance and employment

Social assistance is not a labour market policy per se. Nonetheless, it can be linked to labour market activation requirements, as it is becoming the case in Turkey. Thus, a discussion on the activation policies should include the recent developments on the

link between social assistance and employment. The link between social assistance and employment is quite closely associated with participation requirements in the ALMP programmes.

Particularly since the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2001, a link between work and access to public social assistance has been emphasized and consolidated at the discursive level and in policy-making in Turkey (Kapar, 2017; Kutlu, 2016). The attempts to establish and strengthen this link gained velocity in the 2010s. Many studies elaborating on the growing emphasis on the link between employment and social assistance in Turkey have been published in the recent years (e.g. Kapar, 2017; Kutlu, 2016).

Kutlu (2017) argues that the social assistance system has a fragmented structure in Turkey. At the national level, social assistance is managed by the Social Assistance Directorate General under the Ministry of Family and Social Services. Locally, it is carried out by Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakıfları, SYDVs) which operate under the chairmanship of the provincial and sub-provincial governors (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2017b).

According to Kutlu (2017), the relationship between social assistance and employment has a dual character in Turkey: social assistance schemes are structured with employment at the centre and they are aimed at increasing the labour market participation of their beneficiaries. In the recent years, the objective of activating social assistance recipients has become quite visible in policy documents.

As part of the protocol between İŞKUR and Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations s, service points have been established in all Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations s across the country and assigned Social Assistance and

Solidarity Foundations officers have been trained and authorized by İŞKUR to register job seekers to the system (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 56). The objective is defined as directly integrating social assistance beneficiaries who are able to work into employment by referring them to suitable labour demands and ALMP programmes (İŞKUR 2021b, pp. 55-56).

Thus, it could be argued that the İŞKUR service points which are located at Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations serve as a bridge which incorporates social assistance and ALMPs. Kutlu (2017) points out that the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations function as labour force institutions with İŞKUR Service Points established in them (p. 235). Moreover, Kapar (2017) suggests that the scope of workfare programmes in Turkey is not limited to the policy area of İŞKUR as social assistance beneficiaries are sometimes forced to work in exchange for social assistance by Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations in line with the instructions of the district governorship (p. 318).

The policy-level attempts to establish and activate a link between social assistance and employment could be traced back to the year 2010 when an action plan was introduced in order to integrate social assistance recipients who are able to work in the labour market (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a, Paragraph 124). In 2010, the Economic Coordination Committee decided to establish a strong link between social assistance and employment (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014). The National Employment Strategy also underlines the issue (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a). The rationale of consolidating the link between employment and social protection relies rendering citizens in poverty who are able to work productive and ensuring that they acquire sustainable income (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014a).

The Tenth Development Plan also highlights the importance of implementing programmes which are aimed at enhancing the employability of the poor groups and rendering them productive by strengthening the link between social assistance and employment (The Republic of Turkey, 2013). In 2014 and 2015, two circulars were circulated by the General Directorate of Social Assistance of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies which set the procedures and principles of the activation of the link between social assistance and employment. According to the first circular, persons between the ages of 18 and 45 and who do not receive disability benefit, living in the households which are found to fall into the bottom category according to the means test and have no one working in the house must be listed (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraph 2.1). The persons on the list are to be invited to the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations, for interviews by starting with the ones who are the most disadvantageous according to the social assessment and having certain characteristics such as receiving more assistance and having many children (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraph 5.2).

Those who are deemed capable of working according to the interviews conducted with them were to be registered, their curricula vitae were to be created, they were to be referred to job vacancies, they were to apply for jobs and the applications were to be monitored by temporary employment officers in Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3). Moreover, appointments with job and vocation counsellors must be arranged, they were to apply for vocational training courses, be referred to TYPs (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3).

The circular introduces a vague set of criteria in terms of determining whether a person could be deemed capable of working: not being able to work physically, either proven by a medical board report or detected during the interview, being the only person who can respond to the care needs of persons with care needs in the house, living too far from workplaces for daily transportation, and any other hindrance determined by the interviewer (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraph 6.1). The circular also projects employment incentives in the form of temporary assistance (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraph 3). Social assistance beneficiaries who fail to participate in employment and any employment-generating activity without a valid reason would not be conferred any cash assistance apart from central and regular aids conferred by the Board of Trustees (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2014, Paragraph 4.1).

In 2015, another circular clarified that the benefit cut sanction would be applied to the whole household of the person in question if he or she does not take up employment or refuses to participate in employment generating activities without a valid reason (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2015).

A supplementary article was added to the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity of 1986 introducing employment subsidy for social assistance beneficiaries (The Republic of Turkey, 1986). According to this employment subsidy, the employer's share of social security premiums of the unemployed persons registered to İŞKUR and received regular cash assistance at least once in the preceding year was to be covered by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies for one year in 2016 (The Republic of Turkey, 1986, Supplementary Article 5).

The addition which was made in 2016 to the Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity projected that a person who is able to work and dwelling in the residential address of a person who had received regular cash assistance at least once in the preceding year to be registered by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies to the İŞKUR system. The registered person is required to take part in vocational training or other active labour force programmes (The Republic of Turkey, 1986, Supplementary Article 5). Those who reject participating in vocational training or other active labour force programmes or a job offer made by İŞKUR for three times are sanctioned by the cut of regular cash benefit for a year following the detection of non-compliance (The Republic of Turkey, 1986, Supplementary Article 5).

In 2017, the issue of the employment of social assistance beneficiaries was put forth by a directive by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in order to regulate social security premium incentives which are bestowed upon employers who employ the beneficiaries of regular cash assistance programmes (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2017a, Article 1).

A protocol was signed in 2018 between the General Directorate of İŞKUR and the General Directorate of Social Assistance of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in order to enhance the employment of social assistance beneficiaries who are able to work (İŞKUR & the General Directorate of Social Assistance, 2018, Article 3). A circular distributed in 2019 regulates the procedures of the channelization of social assistance beneficiaries into employment (İŞKUR, 2019b). The circular clarifies the concept of valid reason which could justify non-compliance of the social assistance beneficiaries. The valid reasons are listed as the death of a spouse, parent or sibling; or their or his/her own illness certified by a

medical report, natural disasters, the fulfilment of a public duty, impossible transportation, military service, being under detention or sentenced, the cases of war, state of emergency, state of siege, quarantine due to epidemic diseases (İŞKUR, 2019b, Article 13-3).

The recent developments demonstrate that the efforts to enforce social assistance beneficiaries into work have been intensified. The benefit cut sanction in the case of non-compliance with the requirements of job searching activity and participation in ALMP programmes imply strong workfarist elements.

3.5 A review of studies on the evaluation of the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMPs in Turkey

In terms of Turkey's approximation within the classification framework of activation and ALMP typologies regarding their workfarist and enabling tendencies, there are few studies in the literature and most of them focus on individual programme types with one exception (e.g. Gün, 2016). Constructed on the classification of activation policy approaches into the categories of harmonization and workfare by Kapar (2006) who adopted the classification from Barbier (2001), Gün (2016) presents an argument about the approximation of the activation policies of Turkey within that framework. According to Kapar (2006), the harmonization approach is based on meeting the expectations of unemployed individuals through publicly funded income and service support in addition to vocational training and temporary employment programmes which are prevalent in the continental Europe (pp. 360-361). On the other hand, the workfare approach which is prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries forces unemployment benefit and social assistance claimants to work in any job they are offered (Kapar, 2006, p. 361). It is argued that the activation policies of Turkey

could best be described as a mixed model while being closer to the workfarist end of the spectrum as the country tends to extend its ALMP implementations through UI (Gün, 2016, p. 1310). Nevertheless, Turkey exhibits the characteristics of both approaches (Gün, 2016, p. 1310). In terms of the harmonization approach, Turkey implements the vocational training courses and temporary employment programmes, while it also enforces the UI beneficiaries to participate in the vocational training courses and seek employment (Gün, 2016, p. 1310). However, this classification is not the main focus of the article and the argument is not elaborated.

Regarding workfarist tendencies, a tendency towards workfare in Turkey is observed in a way to consolidate market hegemony viz-a-viz the transformation of social policy within the context of the neoliberal governance system (Savaşkan, 2007, 2009).

In terms of programme-based evaluations, the vocational training programmes, the programme for the community benefit, on-the-job training programme, and the UI are the most commonly evaluated programmes in the literature on Turkey. The Programme for the Community Benefit, the On-the-job Training Programme and the UI scheme they are deemed closer to the workfarist end in the literature on Turkey (e.g. Gün, 2016; Kapar, 2017). According to Savaşkan (2007), the aim of workfare programmes is to integrate the disadvantaged groups into the market through the enhancement of their employability by training programmes and self-employment incentives (p. 5). In that respect, employability training programmes for wage labour and for self-employment provided by İŞKUR has workfarist tendencies (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 198). Moreover, the Programme for the Community Benefit could also be considered a workfare programme since it aims at integrating programme participants into the labour market by making them work in

transitional and low-pay public work on the condition of seeking employment (Savaşkan, 2007, pp. 86-87). Savaşkan (2007) also approaches the UI as a workfare scheme as it is payable with the requirement of job seeking activities and participating in employability training programmes (pp. 102-110).

From a comparative perspective, it could be argued that the programme for the community benefit has been regarded as a workfare programme more frequently than other programmes in the literature (e.g. Dörtlemez, 2019; Gümüş, 2020; Gün, 2013; Kapar, 2017). Gün (2013) propounds that programmes for the community benefit could be considered workfare programmes and they, in fact, resemble the New Poor Laws of the nineteenth century England which projected that the receivers of public assistance would be forced to work for the public good, for instance, in workhouses. In his comparative study evaluating different public works programmes in various countries, Dörtlemez (2019) approaches the Programme for the Community Benefit as a social assistance tool, hence indicating a workfarist tendency which links access to social assistance with work. Gümüş (2020) deems the programme for the community benefit as the embodiment of the workfarist tendency of the neoliberal social policy in the case of Turkey (p.223).

Kapar (2017) states that the Programme for the Community Benefit and the On-the-job Training Programme could be deemed both ALMP and workfare programmes. He points out that those two programmes could be considered workfarist social assistance schemes which are granted in exchange for work and entail the employment of the unemployed under precarious and insecure working conditions in exchange for public social assistance (2017, p. 334).

On the other hand, there are many studies which highlight the enabling aspects of ALMPs in Turkey in terms of their orientation to upgrade the skills of job

seekers in the literature, particularly with respect to vocational training courses (e.g. Germir, 2012; Işığışok, 2012; Şen, 2016; Şener, 2010; Uyar Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008; WB, 2013). As the aim of the skill upgrading through ALMPs is enhancing employability with a view to responding to the labour demand of the market, it could be assumed that ALMPs in the form of vocational training programmes also has a market orientation. Nonetheless, the enabling aspects of them should not be ignored.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at presenting a desk review of the developments and characteristics of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in the context of long-term economic restructuring in Turkey. To that end, the development of the public employment agency (currently İŞKUR) and ALMP programmes which are being implemented by İŞKUR in addition to other two activating labour market policy programmes, the UI scheme and the coordination of the family policy, and the link between social assistance and employment which is recently being further consolidated were put under scrutiny in this chapter.

The case of Turkey is not an exception to the pervasive adoption of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes. The public employment agency was established in 1946 mainly with the aim of providing intermediary employment services. In that regard, it is evident that job matching and job placement services have a longer history than other ALMP programmes in Turkey.

In the 1980s, the introduction of vocational training services as part of employment services followed job placement services with a view to ensuring labour force harmonization. However, a substantial boost in the number and the extension of the scope of ALMP programmes did not take place until the 2000s in the country.

The background review suggests that the development of ALMP and other activating labour market policies in Turkey has had strong connections with the economic structure, the influence of external actors such as the EU and the WB, and the economic and financial crises the country experienced.

International actors such as the EU and the WB played a significant role in the economic restructuring projects. The concepts of employability and workfare started to penetrate into the legal and policy framework of labour market policy around the turn of the millennium in particular. While the concept of workfare is still persistent albeit implicitly, the concept of employability is explicitly at the centre of labour market policy documents, as exemplified by the Directive of Active Labour Force Services which came into effect in 2013. In the emerging picture, the state of unemployment is deemed a passive position (Biçer, 2014, p. 94) and unemployed individuals hence need to be activated to improve their employability and (re)integrate into the labour market.

It is evident from the background review that there has been a dramatic transformation regarding the number, extent, scope, and the functioning of ALMP programmes in Turkey in the last two decades. This transformation cannot solely be accounted for by the influence of the external actors such as the EU or the WB. The political will which is predominantly exercised by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) has also contributed to the establishment of a new labour regime which could be defined as “authoritarian flexibilization” in Turkey (Çelik, 2015). While an authoritarian tendency is pursued in collective labour relations, flexibility is preferred when it comes to individual labour relations by the JDP (Çelik, 2015). In this picture, the emphasis on supply side interventions in the labour market and the concept

employability which individualizes the problem of unemployment also reflects the political will.

The review suggests that some ALMP or activating labour market policy programmes have strong workfarist tendencies. The UI scheme of Turkey has coercive work-related components which impose benefit cut and suspension sanctions on benefit claimants. The Programme for the Community Benefit also has a workfarist tendency which offers social assistance in exchange for work (Kapar, 2017) and requires the acceptance of the third job offer made by İŞKUR by the beneficiary at the latest to qualify for the reapplication criteria to the programme. Moreover, the social assistance scheme has significant activating and workfarist elements which require beneficiaries to participate in work-related activities such as registering to İŞKUR, participating in interviews, creating CVs within the context of the phenomenon of the link between social assistance and employment which has become more visible in the last decade in the country. These programmes strikingly deploy workfarist mechanisms to ensure labour market (re)integration. Nonetheless, the implementation dimension is important in the discussion as the existence of those workfarist requirements in the legal and policy framework may not mean that they are systematically implemented in real life situations in Turkey.

On the other hand, the review implies that some other ALMP or activating labour market policy programmes have enabling elements which can contribute to the employability of their beneficiaries such as the vocational training courses and job and vocational counselling services. Indeed, there is an extension in those services, particularly regarding their participation figures. However, the question of implementation and quality of the services again emerges as a significant component of the discussion when it comes to enabling elements.

Taking the implementation dimension into consideration is crucial for the evaluation of both workfarist and enabling elements of the ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey. The next chapter provides a two-level qualitative examination of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes with respect to their workfarist and enabling elements within the analytical framework introduced by Dingeldey (2007). While the first level analysis adheres to the analysis of Dingeldey (2007) by solely relying on the legal and policy framework and administrative data, the second level analysis incorporates the implementation dimension by drawing on the results of thirteen semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with officials working at different levels and departments of İŞKUR.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents an analysis of the ALMPs and other activating labour market policies in Turkey concerning their workfarist and enabling elements. Since different elements might exist in a country at a given time (Barbier, 2004a, p. 48), a nuanced approach is needed. The analysis is conducted at two levels.

The first level of analysis draws on the analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007) and deals with the content analysis of legal and policy documents and administrative data. To that end, the labour laws, relevant directives, protocols, in addition to the annual activity reports and statistics published by İŞKUR are being reviewed. Data from TÜİK and OECD databases were also utilized when necessary. Drawing on the document analysis, the first section attempts to evaluate the ALMPs and other activating labour market policies of Turkey between workfare and enablement viz-a-viz the typology developed by Dingeldey (2007).

The second level of the analysis incorporates the findings adopted from the deductive thematic analysis of thirteen in-depth interviews conducted with officials from İŞKUR in order to bring the implementation dimension into the discussion on the workfarist and enabling elements of the ALMPs and other activating labour market policies in Turkey. This section also allows for the incorporation of the link between social assistance and employment. Again, two ideal types developed by Dingeldey (2007) were chosen to provide the framework of the analysis. Hence, the interview data were deductively analysed under two themes: the transfer of workfarist elements into practice and the transfer of the enabling elements into practice.

4.1 Between workfare and enablement: the analysis of the ALMP framework of Turkey

This section explores the ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes in Turkey from a comparative perspective within the framework developed by Dingeldey (2007). Dingeldey (2007) provides an analysis of the workfare and enabling elements of ALMPs in Denmark, Germany, and the UK from a comparative perspective. She chooses these countries for analysis as each represent a welfare state regime type: Denmark is a universal, Germany is a continental, and the UK is a liberal welfare state (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 828). Dingeldey (2007) deploys the concepts of “workfare” and “enabling” to denote ideal types of different mixtures of policy elements aimed at promoting labour market participation (p. 827).

According to Dingeldey (2007), workfare and enablement are not alternatives of each other, they are rather mutually constitutive elements of ALMPs (p. 827). With that being said, it is possible to evaluate the extent of workfare and enabling policies independently from each other (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). Dingeldey (2007) provides a qualitative evaluation of workfare and enabling elements of ALMPs in order to facilitate comparison (p. 828).

The concept of workfare denotes coercive and enforcing elements regarding labour market participation and it could be generated by benefit cuts, the tightening of eligibility criteria, the increasing conditionality of transfer payments, the introduction of work tests, and compulsory labour market programmes or the imposition of work requirements (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). On the other hand, enabling policies entail the improvement of labour market services, particularly that of training programmes and job placement services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 827). Dingeldey (2007) considers the coordination of family policy such as the supply of

childcare facilities among activating labour market policies as the enhancement of gender equality and the employability of women with children could be acknowledged as a general objective of activation (p. 827).

In order to measure the combination of workfarist and enabling elements, Dingeldey (2007) explores the strength of workfare elements and the strength of enabling elements. The indicators which are deployed by Dingeldey (2007) to evaluate workfare elements are cuts in unemployment benefit and enforced labour market activation (I) and compulsion through individual contracts (II). The indicators of the strength of enabling policies are activation via job placement (I), training programmes as part of activation policies (II), and the coordination of family policy (III) (Dingeldey, 2007). Dealing with the indicators provided by Dingeldey (2007) and applying content analysis to policy documents and administrative data regarding ALMPs, I aim to discuss the features and the level of strength of workfare and enabling elements of ALMPs in Turkey from a comparative perspective.

4.1.1 Workfarist elements

4.1.1.1 Cuts in unemployment benefit and enforced labour market activation

All countries in the analysis of Dingeldey (2007) have some activating elements regarding labour market participation in their unemployment benefit (UB) schemes one way or another. To begin with, in the scheme of Denmark, an UB claimant is obliged to accept any reasonable job offer from the first day of unemployment spell (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). This obligation includes jobs which require daily travel duration to work up to four hours (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). A mandatory activation period begins after one year of unemployment and after six months for individuals

under the age of 30 (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). During the activation period, the beneficiary has the right and duty to participate in education or training programmes (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). It could be argued that the UB is generous in terms of both in terms benefit levels and duration (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). The UB replaces 90 per cent of former wage (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 830). The duration of UB is four years (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 830). In order to be eligible, one year membership in the scheme and one year of employment within the last three years is required in Denmark (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 830).

In the case of Germany, there is a two-tier UB system. UB II consists of an unemployment assistance scheme and a social assistance scheme and it provides a lower flat-rate benefit (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). UB replaces 60 per cent of former wage for single beneficiaries and 67 per cent for beneficiaries with dependants (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). Sanctions apply if the beneficiary refuses job offers or to participate in employment services (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). The beneficiaries might be offered jobs for which they are not trained (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). There are also tight regional mobility requirements (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). There is no strict timetable for mandatory activation for UB recipients (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). The long-term unemployed, on the other hand, can be subject to “pure workfare” as UB II beneficiaries are required to take up any job offer and they can be demanded to work in public works (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832).

In the UK, Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) is a contribution-based scheme and it offers a flat rate benefit to beneficiaries (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). After six months, means testing is required for the continuance of the receipt (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). Job search assistance is offered and it is mandatory for certain groups such as the youth (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). During the subsequent intensive activity

period, different activation options are offered for different target groups (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). For instance, subsidized employment, participation in environmental work, work in the voluntary sector, or participation in a free training programme options are offered for young beneficiaries (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831).

Beneficiaries above the age of 25 are also required to participate in the activation programme after 18 months (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). Participation is also compulsory for the partners of beneficiaries under certain circumstances (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831). Older beneficiaries, persons with disabilities, and lone parents are not required to participate in the activation programme, however, lone parents are required to attend work-focused interviews (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 831).

The contributory UI benefit scheme of Turkey is strict in terms of its entitlement criteria (Venn, 2012). At least 600 days of contribution in the last three years and 120 days of employment in the last four months preceding the termination of the employment contract are required (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 51). In 2019, 1,955,041 people applied to the UB and slightly higher than the half of them were found eligible (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 82). In 2020, 1,510,856 people applied for the benefit, nonetheless, approximately one thirds of them were found eligible for it (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 99). Hence, this might result from the disruptive impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the working life.

In 2019, the number of UB recipients who exhausted their benefits is slightly higher than those whose benefit is cut due to taking up a new job or non-compliance with the requirements (İŞKUR 2020b). But it should be noted that this estimation excludes those who are still receiving UB in the same year.

The UI benefit replaces 40 per cent of the former gross earning and it has a maximum threshold, it cannot exceed 80 per cent of the gross minimum wage (The

Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 50). The benefit is offered from 180 to 300 days, depending on the duration of the contribution to the scheme. The literature suggests that in terms of benefit duration and replacement level, the UI is not a generous scheme (Gün, 2016; Venn, 2012). In Turkey, the activation period starts immediately with the conferral of the right to UI benefit. Beneficiaries are required to be ready to take up a job and they are offered job placement services, vocational training courses, and other ALMP services (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 48). Benefit cut sanction is applied if the beneficiary does not accept a job offer made by İŞKUR without a valid reason. The job offer must be suitable to the occupation of the beneficiary, it must match the standard of his or her previous job, and the workplace in question must be located within the municipal borders of his or her place of residence (The Republic of Turkey, Article 52). Refusal to participate in vocational training courses and failure to attend without a valid reason is sanctioned by benefit suspension (The Republic of Turkey, 1999, Article 52).

Table 2 which is adapted from Dingeldey (2007) shows the UB level as percentage of former wage, entitlement requirements, duration of benefit, the timing of the start of the activation period, and the right to remain in the previous occupation, which is also referred to as occupational protection in Denmark, Germany, the UK, and Turkey.

Table 2. Workfarist Elements of UB Schemes of Denmark, Germany, the UK, and Turkey

	Denmark	Germany	The UK	Turkey
UB level as % of former wage	Around 90 %	60 per cent for singles, 67% for claimants with dependants	Flat rate allowance, means-tested after 6 months	40 % of former wage, cannot exceed 80 % of the minimum gross wage
Access to UB	1 year membership, 1 year of employment within the last 3 years	1 year of employment within the last 3 years	A minimum amount should have been paid during the last 2 years	600 days of contribution in the last 3 years & 120 days of employment in the last 4 months preceding the termination of the employment contract
Duration of UB	4 years	1 year	6 months, means-tested after 6 months	From 180 to 300 days depending on the duration of contribution in the last 3 years
Start of activation period after	Mandatory after 1 year (6 months for unemployed individuals under the age of 30)	Mandatory to accept community work after 1 year, compulsory activation applies selectively	Mandatory activation after 6 months for under 25, 1 year for long-term unemployed below 25, interviews for lone parents	Immediately, mandatory to be ready to start employment, actively seek employment, participate in ALMP programmes
Occupational protection	None	None	None	Yes

Source: Dingeldey, 2007, p. 830

As demonstrated in Table 2, in terms of benefit level, Turkey is less generous than Denmark and Germany. As the benefit offered in the UK is flat-rate, it is incomparable to the UB offered in Turkey. Regarding the entitlement criteria, Turkey

is the strictest. The duration of the UB in Turkey is shorter than in Denmark and Germany, and either equal to or longer than in the UK, depending on the days of contribution by the beneficiary. The activation period starts the most instantly in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey offers occupational protection as the job offer made by İŞKUR needs to be suitable to the occupation of the beneficiary, diverges from all countries in comparison.

4.1.1.2 Compulsion through individual contracts

According to Dingeldey (2007), the contract made between the public employment service in the form of a personal adviser and the individual client explicates the conditionality of social rights (p. 833). It demands a sort of “reciprocity between the state and individual activity” at best and “pure obedience on the part of the individual” at worst (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). As such, it is a strong indicator of workfarist policies as it imposes compulsion.

Regarding individual contracts within the context of labour market activation, there are individual action plans in Denmark, the jobseeker’s agreement and individual action plans in the UK, and the integration agreement in Germany (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). In Denmark, individual action plans must be developed before the UB recipient receive his or her first activation offer (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). The UB recipients are obliged to attend interviews in the employment offices once in every three months (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). In Germany, an integration agreement needs to be signed by each UB beneficiary to prove his or her job seeking efforts (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). In the case of the UK, officials have discretionary powers to set up a route which oblige the beneficiary to seek employment in a certain manner and to take necessary measures to improve his or her employability (Trickey

& Walker, 2000, p. 188, as cited in Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). Individual action plans are required to be agreed upon before the activation period starts. Non-compliance or failure to accept job offers results in benefit withdrawal (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833). Nonetheless, many programme officials do not control benefit rules strictly, as many of them reckon that the fear of sanctions motivate clients to comply with the requirements (Joyce & Pettigrew, 2002, as cited in Dingeldey, 2007, p. 833).

In Turkey, job seekers can be offered individual action plans upon their application to İŞKUR service centres, but they are not required to sign contracts. On the other hand, UI beneficiaries are required to sign contracts stating that they have to be ready to take up a job and they have to accept any suitable job offer made by İŞKUR unless they have a valid reason for receiving UI benefit. In the case of non-compliance, benefit cut sanction is applied. Nonetheless, beneficiaries are not required to document their commitment to job seeking activities. Moreover, UI benefit recipients are required to accept vocational training offers made by İŞKUR unless they present a valid reason. In the case of non-compliance, the UB is suspended until the beneficiary complies with the requirement in question.

4.1.1.3 The strength of workfare policies in comparison

With respect to the level, access, and duration of UB and the extent of the obligation to comply with activation measures, all countries involve some workfarist elements (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). Turkey is not an exception to this picture. Workfare policies can be regarded as weakest in Denmark where the highest level of decommodification regarding the level and duration of benefit is observed (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). Moreover, mandatory activation period starts after one year of unemployment and it offers many options for beneficiaries (Dingeldey, 2007,

p. 834). In the case of Germany, the results are mixed. Workfarist policies are limited to increased work requirements and the abolition of occupational protection for short-term unemployed individuals (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). Nonetheless, income replacement level is high (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). The long-term unemployed receive only minimum income support and work obligations under the second tier UB (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). In the case of the UK, the low level of replacement and the beginning of the activation period indicate strong workfare accent while respective options are similar to that of Denmark (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834).

Dingeldey (2007) argues that the low level of social protection for the UB recipients implies that exposure to market pressures must be acknowledged as much stronger in the UK than in Denmark and Germany (p. 832). Nonetheless, the UK does not have a pure workfare approach either as it provides different options for mandatory work programmes and they are not compulsory for certain groups such as lone parents with dependent children (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 832). Dingeldey (2007) lists the countries under study in terms of the strength of workfare policies as the UK, Germany, and Denmark from the strongest to the weakest. In terms of enforced labour market activation, considering the existence of the respective benefit cut sanction and the immediate start of the activation period, it could be argued that Turkey has stronger workfare elements than Denmark, Germany, and the UK. On the other hand, the duration of benefit, the calculation of the benefit on the basis of former income, and the existence of occupational protection indicate that Turkey has weaker workfarist elements compared to the UK.

4.1.2 Enabling elements

4.1.2.1 Activation via job placement

According to Dingeldey (2007), all three countries went under significant changes in a way that job placement services were reorganized and privatized in different ways and to different extents (p. 834). In the case of Denmark the monopoly of the public employment services over job placement services was abolished in 1990 and private enterprises, trade unions, and public institutions were authorized to offer employment services in 2003 (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 835). There were also attempts to merge UB and social assistance services by creating joint job centres (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 835).

In Germany, the UB I and the UB II schemes are carried out by different offices as UB II is carried out by consortia consisting of local PES offices and municipalities (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). Private placement agencies also operate, but they are not extensively used (Dingeldey, 2007, pp. 834-835). Temporary work agencies were also established (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 835). They employ and lend out job seekers by deploying temporary work as a transition mechanism (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 835).

In the case of the UK, the employment service and the benefit agencies were merged into Job Centre Plus in the early 2000s (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834). A public-private agency carries out placement services for long-term unemployed individuals in most parts of the UK (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 834).

In Turkey, the public employment agency (then İİBK, now İŞKUR) offers job placement services since its establishment in 1946. İŞKUR has a central organization under which the provincial organization operates (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 5). Under the

provincial organization, there are provincial directorates. Some provincial directorates have service centres conducting services under them (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 4). Currently, there are a provincial directorate in each province and there are 79 service centres in total in the country (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 4).

While İŞKUR still has the monopoly over some services such as the conduct of the UI benefit scheme, job placement services can be offered by other entities. The monopoly of the public employment agency over job placement services was abolished and privately owned employment agencies were permitted to offer job placement services upon authorization from İŞKUR in 2003. Local administrations also offer employment services (Solmaz, 2018).

The introduction of the job and vocational counselling service in 2012 changed the way in which job matching services are offered. It has been argued that the job and vocational counselling service significantly contributed to the increase in the job placement figures (Korkut et al., 2015). While 8915 people participated in individual interviews in 2002, this number jumped to 7,057,356 in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 60). Regarding the job placement figures, 125,071 individuals were placed in jobs in 2002 whereas 1,490,276 job placements were mediated by İŞKUR in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2021g). Job placement figures rose steadily from 2012 onwards until 2020 before the COVID-19 outbreak (İŞKUR, 2021g). Therefore, it could be asserted that the job placement services improved in Turkey in terms of reaching more people.

4.1.2.2 Training programmes as part of activation policies

Training mechanisms were not developed as part of ALMPs during the 1970s, but their efforts increased with their activation policies in Denmark and in the UK (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 835, 837). On the other hand, vocational training has been

institutionalized since 1969 and it was extensively utilized during the reunification process in Germany (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 837).

In Denmark, education and training options are offered, particularly for the unemployed individuals (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 837). There is an apprenticeship programme for adults in addition to short-term labour market training programmes and counselling services and language courses offered to migrant workers (Dingeldey, 2007, p.837). Labour market training spending was 0.86 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 and it is exceptionally high in a way to imply the importance attached to labour market training in the country according to Dingeldey (2007, p. 837).

In Germany, a new approach was adopted in 2003 stating that only those training schemes that promise employment opportunities for at least 70 per cent of training participants should be subsidized (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). An increase in the number of short-terms schemes in labour market training and programmes targeting the young unemployed individuals such as preparation for vocational training and vocational training is observed (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). Nonetheless, there is a decreasing trend in training provision compared to the reunification process (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). The number of participants in training courses was 567,827 in 2003 in Germany (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 841).

In the case of the UK, training is offered as an option during the activation period of UB receipt (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 837). The spending on labour market training is comparably low in the UK, 0.02 per cent of GDP in 2002-2003 (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 837). According to Dingeldey (2007), this implies the that training and skill enhancement is rather underdeveloped in the case of the UK (p. 837).

In Turkey, vocational training courses entered the agenda of the state in the late 1970s, and they are exemplified in the Fourth Five Year Development Plan covering the years between 1979 and 1984 (The Republic of Turkey, 1979). The need for vocational training was attempted to be addressed with the promulgation of the İİBK Directive of Labour Force Training in 1988 with the objective of enhancing the skills of the labour force. Vocational training programmes constitute one of the earliest activation measures, only preceded by job matching services. The issue was readdressed in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis in Turkey with an emphasis on the employability of the labour force. Today, there are various training programmes provided by İŞKUR, such as the on-the-job training programme, vocational training courses, and the entrepreneurship training courses. UB recipients are legally obliged to take part in vocational training courses unless they take up a new job during the time that they are receiving benefit. In 2019, 126,310 training courses were organized in total and 568,420 people participated in them (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 49). 53 per cent of the participants are women and 65 of them are between the ages of 15 and 29 (İŞKUR 2020a, pp. 49, 50). Hence, training programmes are mostly utilized by younger individuals.

The expenditure on training courses was 2,420,044,243 TL in 2019 (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 49). This makes up 0.056 per cent of GDP in that year (TÜİK, 2020). Hence, the spending on training courses was 0.056 percent of GDP in 2019. Regarding the figures of spending of training programmes within active labour market programmes as a percentage of GDP, the OECD average is slightly higher than 0.1 per cent (OECD, 2018, p. 139). So, Turkey is below the OECD average regarding public expenditure on training programmes as a share of GDP.

4.1.2.3 The coordination of family policy

The coordination of labour market and family policy is crucial for enhancing the employability of women who have dependent children (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). This is particularly addressed via the provision of childcare facilities in all three countries under scrutiny (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). According to Dingeldey (2007), the emphasis on activating women with dependent children is the strongest in Denmark which introduced a wide array of measures in that regard (p. 840). In the UK and in Germany to some extent, the increases in participation rates for women with children have been mostly in part-time work arrangements (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840).

In Denmark, a transitional labour market strategy is adopted to address childcare needs and labour market reintegration is guaranteed (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 840). Childcare facilities expanded and they covered 59.2 per cent of all age groups in 2007 (Dingeldey, 2007, pp. 840-841). As a consequence, Denmark has the one of the highest employment rates for women with children in OECD (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 841).

In the case of Germany, the scope of activation policies aimed at promoting labour market participation among women with children is modest (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 843). The underlying assumption of many family policy mechanisms is the male breadwinner family model as the norm and that women with dependent children work in part-time arrangements at most (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 843). Tax reductions apply for sole breadwinner families in a way to disincentivize married women with children to work full-time (Dingeldey, 2001 in Dingeldey, 2007, p. 843). The unpaid parental leave scheme allows for labour market absence for three years (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 843). On the other hand, childcare facilities cannot address the needs for all

age groups of children and women who wish to work full-time (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 843).

In the UK, in-work benefits in the shape of tax credits which vary with the number of children are offered (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 842). Day care attendance for 3-4 year-olds is very high (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 842). Nonetheless, the provision of care does not cover the whole working day under some arrangements (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 842). Hence, the ostensible increase in the labour market participation of women with children might be due to part-time work arrangements which pay below a living wage (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 842).

Female labour force participation rate was 38.7 per cent in 2019 in Turkey (OECD, 2020, p. 147). It is almost half of the male labour force participation rate in Turkey (OECD, 2020, p. 147). The OECD average of female labour participation rate was 65.1 per cent in 2019 (OECD, 2020). Female labour force participation rate is significantly lower than the OECD average. In Turkey, 1.3 per cent of women between the ages of 18 and 64 stated that they had never worked due to childcare responsibilities (TÜİK, 2018). This phenomenon has been associated with the limited provision of childcare facilities (Ecevit, 2012; Akkan & Serim, 2018). Public facilities do not cater for the needs of women with dependent children who work full-time in the private sector and private facilities cost too much to justify labour market participation for most women (WB, 2015, p. 7). In other words, it is suggested that the gap between earnings from employment and the cost of childcare is too little to incentivize most women with dependent children to take up work.

In Turkey, 11.9 per cent of women between the ages of 18 and 64 stated that they had had a career break for at least a month due to childcare responsibilities (TÜİK, 2018). Although there are some part-time work arrangements for women

following childbirth, the duration arrangement which provides income compensation for non-worked hours is limited. Moreover, although projects like the Mother at Work and the Child Care Support are provided as parts of certain ALMP programmes implemented in certain sectors, it could be argued that their scope and generosity are rather limited. The Child Care Support is available for women participating in On-the-Job Training Programmes in manufacturing and Vocational Training Courses in industry (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 58). In 2019, 90,302 women participated in those training programmes which were implemented in the aforementioned sectors (İŞKUR, 2020b). Nonetheless, only 316 women benefited from the childcare support in 2019 in Turkey (İŞKUR, 2020a, p. 58). This figure was 73 in 2020 (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70), most probably due to the disruptive impact COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the childcare support of 400 TL may not be sufficient to fully cover the kindergarten expenses, as the average price of kindergarten and day care centres was 1306.3 TL in April 2021 in the country (TÜİK, 2021b). It is also worth noting that the amount of the support has not been raised since its introduction in 2018.

The Mother at Work Project reach more women compared to the Child Care Support Project in comparison. In 2020, 20,247 women participated in the project (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 70). Nonetheless, this project contributes to the daily amount of benefit provided in the On-the-job Training Programmes by 1.32 TL. The contribution of the project is significantly higher in the Vocational Training Programmes, as it pays 40 TL more compared to the regular daily amount of payment. On the other hand, those schemes do not continue after transition into employment, hence they may not be able to increase female labour force participation since support does not continue in the case of employment.

4.1.2.4 The strength of enabling policies in comparison

Dingeldey (2007) suggests that in comparison, Denmark offers the most comprehensive combination of enabling policies regarding the evolution of the number of participants and quality of training programmes, and the development of childcare facilities in the country (p. 844). Germany exhibits mixed results but enabling policies as part of activating labour market policy can be identified as rather weak (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 844). The UK, on the other hand cannot come close the levels of quality and extent of enabling policies achieved in Denmark (Dingeldey, 2007, p. 844).

In terms of expenditure on training courses, Turkey's spending on training programmes as a share of GDP is significantly lower than the OECD average. Moreover, enrolment rates in early childhood education and care services for children between the ages of zero and five of Turkey is the lowest compared to all three countries (OECD, 2010; OECD, 2019).

Regarding the strength of enabling policies, it could be asserted that Turkey is the one with weakest enabling elements in comparison, particularly when the coordination of the family policy is taken into account. While job placement services are extensive in all three countries and there are no drastic differences in terms of the extent training courses, except for the UK, there is a striking difference regarding attendance to childcare facilities in Turkey. It should be noted that this analysis disregards the quality of the services. Dingeldey (2007) lists the countries in terms of their enabling policies from the strongest to the weakest as Denmark, Germany, and the UK (p. 845). Turkey could be added to the end of the list as its enabling policies are weak in comparison, particularly with respect to public spending on training programmes and the coordination of family policy.

Both indicators of workfarist policies, namely cuts in unemployment benefit and enforced labour market activation (I) and compulsion through individual contracts (II) are quite strong in the case of Turkey at the legal and policy levels. With that being said, it should be noted that they are not always implemented as the results of the field work of this study suggests. The fact that they are not always implemented does not mean that they do not exist, they are adopted in the legal and policy framework. Different results can be reached when the indicators of enabling policies, namely activation via job placement, training programmes as part of activation policies, and the coordination of family policy are analysed individually. While job placement services and training programmes could be deemed successful in terms of their extent; the quality and impact of those services begs further research. Moreover, public spending on training programmes as part of ALMPs is significantly lower than the OECD average. More importantly, the coordination of family policy is quite weak, particularly when the gap between female and male labour market participation rates are taken into consideration. Overall, activating labour market policies in Turkey could be associated with stronger workfarist policies compared to enabling policies in Turkey.

4.2 The implementation dimension of workfarist and enabling elements of ALMPs in Turkey

This section elaborates on the deductive thematic analysis of legal and policy documents, administrative data, and the findings of the field work of this study. The field work draws on semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with thirteen officials working for İŞKUR. By keeping the indicators developed by Dingeldey (2007) in mind, this section aims to present a discussion on the workfarist and

enabling elements of ALMPs in Turkey by mainly focusing on the implementation dimension of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes. The findings of the research are discussed under two major themes: the transfer of workfarist elements into practice and the transfer of the enabling elements into practice.

4.2.1 The transfer of workfarist elements into practice

Barbier (2004a) characterizes workfare as the demanding element imposed on social benefit claimants to fulfil work-related requirements (p. 49). This requirement might take various forms, but it is always mandatory (Barbier, 2004a, p. 49). Dingeldey (2007) also underline the coercive and enforcing elements of workfare with respect to labour market participation (p. 827). Therefore, not all work-related activities associated with social benefits or measures aimed at increasing labour market participation should be deemed workfarist unless they involve compulsion.

Both legal arrangements and policy documents indicate workfarist elements particularly with respect to the UI scheme, the Programme for the Community Benefit, and the social assistance system, as the literature also suggests. Workfarist tendencies are internalized within the legal and policy framework. But are they transferred into practice? The main focus of this section is on the implementation dimension of those policy programmes with a view to answering this question.

As the literature suggests, the legal basis of the UI scheme of Turkey has enforcing elements regarding labour market activation. The UI scheme requires claimants to be ready to take up a job, to participate in vocational training arrangements of İŞKUR, and to accept any suitable job offer made by İŞKUR unless they have a valid reason during the benefit receipt. With that being said, the findings

of the field work suggest that the labour market activation requirements associated with UI receipt are not always implemented in practice. This may imply a gap between policy and practice.

The respondents provided different explanations regarding the gap between policy and practice which may stem from various reasons. They could be grouped as the economic circumstances, the organizational structure, and the lenience of the rules in the sense that they are not coercive enough to allow for the strict control of the compliance with the requirements.

One reason for non-implementation of workfarist policy that was revealed in the field was the economic hardship. An official from administrative level in a service centre emphasizes the economic factor and states that those requirements are not implemented although they exist in the legal framework: “If you refuse a job offer or to participate in a course, your benefit is cut. It [the sanction] exists in the legislation, but it is not implemented. They are too difficult to implement under these economic circumstances”.¹ From the perspective of the respondent, the UI benefit provides a mechanism for income maintenance during unemployment spell. The implementation of the benefit cut sanction would deprive the beneficiaries of cash support. The respondent suggests that although the legal framework with its workfarist requirements provides the ground for the official to implement them, it is not practiced as the official finds the sanctions too harsh to implement during economic downturn. In this view, the non-implementation is perceived as part of institutional policy.

Secondly, the organizational structure and the disempowered position of İŞKUR for applying sanctions in the case of non-compliance is provided as a reason

¹ Eğer bir iş teklifini ya da kursa katılmayı reddederseniz ödeneğiniz kesilir. Bu mevzuatta var, ama uygulanmıyor. Şu anki ekonomik ortamda uygulanması çok zor.

for non-implementation. An employment expert argues that it is not possible to implement those requirements due to the lack of an efficient mechanism:

The UI beneficiaries should be able to work at a job during the time that they receive benefit and İŞKUR must be more influential regarding its instructions during that period compared to other times. We cut UI benefit on the basis of not seeking employment only once in 2020. It was because the beneficiary went abroad. I mean, we cut the benefit of that beneficiary by saying “How come did you leave without notifying us?”. Apart from that, we do not have an efficient mechanism. I mean, I think the public authority in Turkey cannot make the final decision regarding coercive and conditional matters. For that reason, even if we set up the mechanisms properly and ensure the integration among institutions through technological infrastructure, there are no sanctions in the case of non-compliance at the end of the day. This disempowers us. We are not able to force anyone. (Employment expert 1) (see Appendix G, 1)

In this picture, İŞKUR emerges as disempowered organization as an implementing body. This implies the perception of institutional incapacity. The organization does not have the capacity to transfer the sanctions into practice. According to Employment expert 1, the organization has rather a disempowered position: “İŞKUR has the position of an unarmed soldier within the organization and it cannot threaten or inflict fear on the opposite side”.² Here, the respondent makes a war analogy and deems the beneficiaries located on the opposite side. Besides, the disempowered position of İŞKUR compared to an unarmed soldier sent to the front line. In this framework, İŞKUR is expected to implement the sanctions, but it lacks the necessary capacity to do so. Thus, although benefit cut and suspension sanctions have legal basis and the mechanism exist, sanctions are not always implemented.

Another point highlighted by this job seeker counsellor is that the system may not be working properly due to the fact that claimants are not asked to document and prove their job seeking efforts. The job seeker counsellor has the power to cut the benefit if the claimant refuses the job straightforward. However, they cannot find out

² Yapı içerisindeki silahlı, tabancasız asker konumunda bir İŞKUR var ve tehdit edemiyor karşı tarafı, korkutamıyor.

about the details of the job interview which claimants are referred to. The process cannot be followed by İŞKUR. Hence, they cannot directly cut the benefit if the job interview is not successful since it is also possible that the employer did not want to recruit the claimant:

We usually implement this as the following, so that it is more precise: if I send three job offers to the person and if he or she... If he or she rejects the first time, I cut [the benefit] then as well by the way. For instance, if someone came and said “No, I will not go to that job” and explicitly rejected I can send referral to cut both UI benefit and social assistance. But if you go and it is unsuccessful... Of course, I do not know what happens during the job interview. I do not know whether that person goes and says: “No, I am not looking for a job” or he or she genuinely wants to take up the job and the employer disagrees, I do not know. So, I cannot cut the benefit directly. In fact, I legally have the right to do so. But in order to make sure... Of course, I make a job offer matching the standards of his or her last job in terms of the last wage and last job by the way. If it is unsuccessful for the third time, I refer the benefit cut automatically through the system. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 2)

Apart from the institutional incapacity, another point highlighted by the respondents related to the lenience of the rules. An official working from the UI Benefit Service of a branch of İŞKUR recounts that the rules are not coercive enough to be conducive to translate the requirements into practice:

In terms of being demanding, it [the UI scheme] is a little bit demanding in terms of its eligibility criteria, but it is the easiest [scheme] in terms of payment. I mean, the benefit is cut if a UI beneficiary does not accept the third invitation in Germany. There is no such thing in Turkey. If you send an offer and the beneficiary does not accept, you do not cut the benefit. He or she has a reason, but it is not reasonable. In fact, you can go to anywhere by two lines in terms of transportation in İstanbul. But a man from the district of B. turns down a job offer in M. by stating that it is too far. There is one line in between. We are demanding while we confer the benefit, our criteria are difficult [to meet]. The thing with the 600 days in the last three year, the condition of 120 days in the last four months... And he or she must leave off not because of his or her own fault. (Official from UI Benefit Service Department) (see Appendix G, 3)

As can be seen, the official also internalized workfarist requirements associated with the delivery of the UI benefit as presented by the legal framework. He or she believes

that sanctions must be applied in the case of non-compliance. Although he or she admits that the scheme is demanding and coercive in terms of its entitlement criteria, labour market activation requirements such as job offers cannot be controlled even if they are intended to be implemented. This is because benefit claimants can easily circumvent the requirements as an element of system-based reason. In the abovementioned example, the beneficiary in question can turn down a job offer on the basis that the workplace is not located within the municipality border of his or her place of residence, although he or she can travel there by one line.

Another system-based reason for why the sanction cannot be applied is that the personal information about the benefit claimant such as the contact details, education and work history is based upon the personal declaration of the claimant. Since the personal details of the claimant such as his or her occupation and contact information are registered on the system in accordance with the declaration of claimant, the claimant can circumvent the requirement and may not receive any job offer by incorrectly stating his or her occupation as an occupation for which labour demand is limited, as occupational protection is provided in the UI benefit system in Turkey:

We are not coercive during the payment process at all. Because we operate through declaration. It is completely based on declaration! Even the address of the guy is declared by himself. He comes here, he says his occupation is that, but you do not ask for any documentation, he says he lives there, you do not ask for any documentation, he says he graduated from that university, you do not ask for any documentation. So, that person can continue to receive the benefit for ten months. Perhaps the colleagues here do not know that in terms of... During the registration, if you register a different occupation which is the rarest to be found, the system does not send you any job offer. Because he says he is an oboist. Is there a sector for that? No. (Official from UI Benefit Service Department) (see Appendix G, 4)

So, the official from the UI Benefit Department states that by declaring incorrect details, the claimant can avoid receiving any communication from İŞKUR.

Moreover, if they declare their occupation as an occupation difficult to match with labour demand, they may not receive any job offer and hence, they can continue to receive their UI benefit without facing any sanction.

Another point highlighted about the malfunctioning of the system is that the system may not be working properly since claimants are not asked to document and prove their job seeking efforts. A job seeker counsellor has the power to cut the benefit if the claimant refuses the job straightforward. However, they cannot find out about the details of the job interview to which claimants are referred. The process cannot be monitored by İŞKUR. Hence, they cannot directly cut the benefit if the job interview is not successful since it is also possible that the employer did not want to recruit the claimant:

We usually implement this as the following, so that it is more precise: if I send three job offers to the person and if he or she... If he or she rejects the first time, I cut (the benefit) then as well by the way. For instance, if someone came and said “No, I will not go to that job” and explicitly rejected I can send referral to cut both UI benefit and social assistance. But if you go and it is unsuccessful... Of course, I do not know what happens during the job interview. I do not know whether that person goes and says: “No, I am not looking for a job” or he or she genuinely wants to take up the job and the employer disagrees, I do not know. So, I cannot cut the benefit directly. In fact, I legally have the right to do so. But in order to make sure... Of course, I make a job offer matching the standards of his or her last job in terms of the last wage and last job by the way. If it is unsuccessful for the third time, I refer the benefit cut automatically through the system. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 5)

On the other hand, although the job seeker counsellor can cut the benefit in the case of refusal of the first job offer, he or she takes initiative and waits until the third offer. This job seeker counsellor states that he or she actually applies the benefit cut sanction if the third job offer is refused by the claimant. Hence, the findings of the fieldwork suggests that officials can make discretionary decisions.

As could be seen, the workfarist requirements associated with the UI benefit scheme are not or cannot always be implemented in the case of Turkey. They can

potentially be transferred into practice and sometimes they are. Nonetheless, the literature suggests a gap between policy and practice. This may be due to the concerns over the economic circumstances, problems with the organizational structure of İŞKUR, and the lenience of the system.

The fact that workfarist requirements do not always translate into practice does not negate their existence. On the contrary, they have a firm basis in the current legislative and policy framework. Due to concerns over the overall economic framework, the organizational capacity, the design of the system, and discretionary decisions of the officials, workfare framework of the UI scheme in the documents is not operationalized at the organizational level of İŞKUR.

The Programme for the Community Benefit is classified as an activity aimed at promoting work discipline by İŞKUR (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 54). After the completion of a Programme for the Community Benefit, programme participants are required to accept the third job offer made by İŞKUR which is compatible with their qualities unless they have a valid reason at the latest. In the case of non-compliance, the participant cannot reapply to another Programme for the Community Benefit for 24 months (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2013, Article 66/5). This could be deemed a workfarist element which could be found in an ALMP programme since it imposes a coercion on the programme participants who wish to continue taking part in the programmes.

The findings of the field work suggests that the implementation of this requirement is quite limited if not non-existing. The requirement is not very well-known among the respondents. During the interview, an official from the Employment Services Department asserted that this requirement does not exist in the legislative framework. An official from The Department of Active Labour Force

Services Department states that participation is the programme constitute the job of the programme participant and they do not make any job offer further: “In fact, it [the programme] is their job, so we do not refer them to another job”.³ This implies that the workfarist requirement of the programme is not extensively implemented. However, as it is the argument with the UI scheme, non-implementation does not mean non-existence. The requirement has its roots in a directive, so it can potentially be implemented.

A job seeker counsellor (Job seeker counsellor 1) stated that he or she does not know the details about the requirement, but he or she estimated that it cannot be monitored due to the case load of the job and vocational counsellors: “I do not know very much about it, but I estimate that it is the same [with the UI benefit]. I do not think that it is something that can be followed up closely”.⁴ This statement again implies a perceived problem with the organizational capacity of İŞKUR. Due to the heavy case load of the officials, the respondent did not deem it feasible to implement this requirement.

As discussed in Chapter 3 in detail, the consolidation of the link between social assistance and employment is a recent phenomenon which manifests itself at policy level (Kapar, 2017; Kutlu, 2016). The social assistance system involves the referral of social assistance beneficiaries who are deemed ‘able work’ to İŞKUR for participating in job placement services. Just like in the case of the UI scheme, non-compliance is sanctioned by benefit cut within this context. It could be assumed that such a system requires coordination between two different government bodies, namely İŞKUR and the General Directorate of Social Assistance.

³ O orada onların işi oluyor aslında, yani, başka bir işe yönlendirmiyoruz.

⁴ Bu noktayı çok şey yapmıyorum ama yine aynıdır diye tahmin ediyorum. Çok takip edilebilen bir şey olduğunu düşünmüyorum.

An employment expert recognizes the consolidation of the link between social assistance and employment and the progress made in that regard, but the efforts are not deemed very effective and it was suggested that they do not generate a conclusive impact:

In terms of the link between social assistance and employment, there is a consolidation and progress. I mean, we have protocols with Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations. In the scope of those protocols, Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation officials are granted some privileges in terms of accessing to the İŞKUR database in order to channel their service beneficiaries into employment. But there is no efficiency or a conclusive impact on this breakdown. (Employment expert 1) (see Appendix G, 6)

Employment expert 2 also draws attention to a similar pattern: “We put forth significant effort in that regard [to integrate social assistance beneficiaries into the labour market]. But in the end, they have not turned out to be very efficient”.⁵ Thus, it is highlighted that although there is a cooperation between Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations and İŞKUR, it does not come out to be very effective in terms of consolidating the link between social assistance and employment.

Another significant point is the lack of coordination and cooperation between those two government bodies:

If you ask me whether there is a complete coordination and continuous cooperation there, [the answer is] no, unfortunately not.⁶ (Employment expert 2)

It is clear that the respondents deem the strategies adopted to integrate social assistance beneficiaries who are considered able to take up a job into the labour market rather ineffective. This ineffectiveness might be attributable to the lack of coordination and cooperation between two different government bodies, as exemplified by the statement above. Nonetheless, some respondents also revealed

⁵ Bununla ilgili çok ciddi çalışmalar da yaptık. Ama nihayetinde çok etkili olmadı.

⁶ “Orada tam anlamıyla bir eşgüdüm var mı, tam anlamıyla bir işbirliği sürekli olarak var mı?” diye soruyorsanız, hayır, maalesef.

their perceptions on social assistance beneficiaries in a way to imply that they share an underlying assumption of workfarist approach. The assumption is that social assistance beneficiaries might be profiting from welfare schemes (Barbier, 2004a, p. 58). The belief is that social assistance beneficiaries may not be willing to take up a job and stop receiving social assistance. This understanding also sheds light on the perception of some respondents about the inefficiency of the efforts to consolidate the link between social assistance and employment. The system may not be working as social assistance beneficiaries do not prefer cooperating. Employment expert 2 puts it as: “For instance, regarding social assistance receipt, some people are... I do not know how to put it, I do not want to say ‘dependent’ but some people might consider it [benefit dependency] a life style”.⁷ For this respondent, some social assistance beneficiaries live on welfare on purpose. This implies an internalized understanding of workfare. Another employment expert presents a portrayal of a social assistance beneficiary who can be subject to labour market activation interventions as the following:

I mean, we know at least one person who is 40 years old, he has no income and is able to work, he does not have any disability or anything of the sort and he is a male, we prioritize men with a sexist assumption as part of the policy of the institution, I do not know why, he does not show up when we invite him [to İŞKUR]. The second time we invite him to the institution, we tell him that he will receive 50 TL to cover the transportation expenses, I mean, we give him money, he comes to take the money, he takes it and leaves and next time we invite him, he never shows up. (Employment expert 1) (see Appendix G, 7)

This portrayal implies that a social assistance beneficiary who is able to work is actually not willing to seek employment as he does not go to the institution even when he is invited and can only be motivated by monetary gain. An internalized conception of workfare also manifests itself about dependence on social assistance at

⁷ Mesela, bazı insanlar sosyal yardım alma noktasında nasıl diyelim, "bağımlı" demek istemiyorum, ama bunu hayat tarzı haline getiren bir kesim olabilir mesela.

the discursive level. The respondent believes that for some beneficiaries, social assistance is not deemed a temporary relief, but rather a lifestyle or a means of subsistence.

While employment experts are concerned with the link between social assistance and employment, officials working at the service centre level, do not express that they feel responsible for activating social assistance beneficiaries. A job seeker counsellor states that they are not expected to focus on social assistance beneficiaries in terms of their labour market activation efforts:

There is no such expectation. From time to time, it is brought to the agenda probably following discussions. So they sometimes give us the statistical data on those who take up a job while receiving the UI benefit or social assistance benefit and their proportion and so on. But there is no pressure on us like “We will specifically advance on them [social assistance beneficiaries]. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 8)

It is obvious that the labour market activation of social assistance beneficiaries is not an unfamiliar topic for İŞKUR officials. On the other hand, this job seeker counsellor states that he or she does not feel under pressure to put effort into integrating social assistance beneficiaries into the labour market. An official from the employment services department expresses that he or she does not consider the labour market activation of social assistance beneficiaries in among his or her main duties:

In fact, we have integration between our systems [between the systems of İŞKUR and Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations]. We can see the social assistance beneficiaries on our system, it tells whether someone receives social assistance, but it is not directly our area. We do not intervene directly since it is not a benefit we confer. (Official from Employment Services Department) (see Appendix G, 9)

The reason why this official does not consider the labour market activation of social assistance beneficiaries as part of his or her duty field is that İŞKUR is not the institution which confer social assistance benefits in the first place. It is not the governmental body which is responsible for the social assistance schemes. In that

regard, the respondent expresses that he or she does not feel responsible for the conduct of that task directly, and hence does not intervene in unless he or she is asked by the government body responsible for the delivery of social assistance:

From time to time they call us from the Ministry of Family and Social Policies [the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services] and say: “We refer this person to you, help him or her to find a job”. We help them, if we detect any malicious intentions we give negative feedback to the other party [the ministry] and ensure that the benefit is cut. Bu have we ever done it? We have not. (Official from the Employment Services Department) (see Appendix G, 10)

Hence, some perspectives imply that the efforts to consolidate the link between social assistance and employment may prove inefficient due to the fragmented nature of the system. The findings suggest that although the distribution of tasks is quite clear between the government bodies involved and the technical infrastructure allows for the integration of services regarding the labour market activation of social assistance beneficiaries, the workfarist requirements are not usually transferred into practice.

An employment expert explains the non-implementation of workfarist requirements with populist intentions embedded in the political culture.

According to an employment expert, the lack of initiative capacity of political actors to transfer those policies into practice might explain this phenomenon:

When he does not show up we cannot ask him “Who do not you come? You are sitting at home” and cannot initiate a mechanism to cut social assistance. There is a directive on that and it has a provision regarding benefit cut, we wrote it down. But we cannot do this to anyone in practice. Because no minister wants to be the one who cut social assistance benefits. We do have the technical infrastructure. As İŞKUR, we can see who receives social benefit in what way from the General Directorate of Social Assistance. We know about the number of the people in that household, their address etc. We can get information on their educational level from the Ministry of National Education. We have the information and data. We can centrally plan it so easily and go to someone. So what happens then? What if he or she says “Brother, I do not want to work, I will only receive social assistance”, will there be a sanction for that? (Employment expert 1) (see Appendix G, 11)

According to the statement, central planning regarding labour market activation of social assistance beneficiaries is quite possible thanks to the technological infrastructure and integration of the electronic public services. Nonetheless, as it is a politically charged issue, ministers avoid taking initiative to enforce the workfarist requirements associated with social assistance receipt. Moreover, workfarist elements demand high institutional capacity of the welfare bureaucracy which is lacking in the context of Turkey. Hence, İŞKUR does not have the capacity to enforce labour market activation elements on social assistance recipients which exist in the legislative and policy framework; they are not empowered to apply the sanctions.

4.2.2 The transfer of enabling elements into practice

The enabling aspects of ALMP and activating labour market policy programmes cannot be disregarded. As propounded by Dingeldey (2007), job placement and training services and the coordination of the family policy are significant indicators of enabling policies. As discussed in the previous section, the coordination of the family policy regarding labour market activation is rather weak in Turkey. Job placement services have roots which could be traced back to the establishment of İŞKUR in 1946. Training programmes also have deep roots which go back to the 1980s. Nonetheless, an analysis of the policy and legal documents imply that the objective of the labour force training has shifted from vocational acquisition to job acquisition. The İİBK Directive of Labour Force Training (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu İşgücü Yetiştirme Yönetmeliği) of 1988 defines its objective as training a job seeker in a vocation (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 1). It states that during the selection of the participants, persons who do not have a vocation are

prioritized (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1988, Article 9). The 1996 directive omit the objective of vocational acquisition and highlights the training of a labour force in the demanded areas (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1996, Article 1). Persons who do not have a profession are no longer prioritized in the participant selection process (The Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1996, Article 8). The 2004 directive on the training of the labour force and the 2008 directive on labour force harmonization have similar characteristics. This might have some implications in terms of the flexibilization of the labour force in Turkey. Moreover, it also has a connection with the concept of employability since having a vocation may not be sufficient to stay in the labour market for a lifetime since the labour market demand is likely to change over time. But being able to adopt to different jobs may ensure longer stay in the labour market over the life course.

The concept of employability gained emphasis in the labour market agenda after the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey (Savaşkan, 2007, p. 76). Indeed, policy documents underline the objective of employability with a growing emphasis since the Directive of the Services of Labour Force Training and Harmonization was introduced in 2004. The findings of the analysis of the labour force training directives combined with the findings of the field work suggest that enabling policies have been associated with policies aimed at enhancing employability of the labour force. Thus, enabling policies correspond to the policies which improve individual employability in this context.

The concept of employability is mainly approached from two aspects in the literature. While one approach highlights the ability to gain and maintain employment in the labour market through skill enhancement (e.g. Hillage & Pollard, 1998; OECD, 2015), the other approach underlines the attitude towards work (e.g.

Peck & Theodore, 2000). The findings of the field work imply that both approaches are prevalent in the case of Turkey.

When asked about the concept of employability, a job seeker counsellor clearly approached employability as an attitude towards work:

In fact, employability is a process which manifests itself within the first two or three minutes of the meeting. I mean, you can determine how he or she [the job seeker] is sincere about the job search and how much he or she wants it during the meeting. Because if I conduct a meeting with someone who has vocational training background, we discuss through what channels to search for a job and how many employers are currently looking for employees on my system and then we start to examine vacancy announcement samples. The fact that he or she listens to you, he or she asks questions, he or she wants to participate in the job interview... After I talk about the vacancy announcement, the workplace, and the details, I ask whether he or she wants to participate in the job interview. It [employability] is something which can be determined on the basis of those points. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 12)

So, according to this view, employability is deemed an approach to work as it is equated with “being willing to take up a job”. This willingness is an attitude which can be detected by the counsellor during the job counselling meeting.

The respondents also detect a problem stemming from the lack of employment-related skills in job seekers and they highlight the need to improve their skills. This pertains to the skill enhancement approach in the concept of employability. A job seeker counsellor highlights this problem:

In fact, there are so many people who do not have a vocation... You can even refer everyone who applies to the institution (İŞKUR) to search for a job. Because it manifests itself as a very big problem. “I can take up any job, it does not matter”, “What job are you looking for?”, “Unqualified” ... It is really a big percentage. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 13)

The job seeker counsellor states that most of job seekers applying to the institution lack a vocation and they are mostly unskilled. The lack of skills is deemed a serious concern from the perspective of the job seeker counsellor. The job club leader also

emphasizes the importance of self-improvement for persons with lower educational attainment:

I mean, the guy says “Everything is okay” after graduating from the primary school. Most of them are already people who started working after graduating from the primary or the secondary school. But now they are unemployed and they are in trouble now for that reason. In order to be able to overcome this trouble, they need to improve themselves, they need to be different from others. There is a generation coming from behind. But they are not aware of it and they deny it. In fact, we are trying to enlighten people to some extent for this reason, we tell them to improve themselves. (Job club leader 2) (see Appendix G, 14)

From this perspective, in order to escape unemployment, job seeker needs to improve oneself. What is more, job seeker must be able to compete with younger generations that are to come. However, the job club leader argues that job seekers are not aware of this potential competition with younger generations and refuse to improve their employability.

The findings of the field work suggest that enabling elements do not apply in the same way for persons from different backgrounds. ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes prioritize persons from disadvantaged backgrounds in the case of Turkey. This has the potential to offer enabling services to persons from disadvantaged backgrounds as they could enhance their employability. For instance, it was discussed in Chapter 3 that the Job Club services provide intensified employment services for persons from the most disadvantaged background. A job club leader stated that they cannot reach every group even when they are specifically targeted:

Roma citizens are also among the disadvantaged groups, let us add them, too. But it did not work. We experienced extreme difficulties. I mean, Roma people do not want to participate in. We cannot even convince people to try. (Job club leader 1) (see Appendix G, 15)

This perspective implies that a mechanism which is specifically developed to reach persons from the most disadvantageous backgrounds does not work for some groups

it targets. In contrast, some respondents underline that the job matching services provided by İŞKUR cannot offer many options for persons with higher educational attainment:

When an educated person comes, no vacancy announcement suitable for him or her can be found. They are referred to Kariyer.net. They already know about these channels. But we refer applicants not to send them back empty-handed. After all, we have to provide services. (Job seeker counsellor 2) (see Appendix G, 16)

So, a job seeker with higher educational attainment level may not be offered job opportunities matching his or her expectations as those vacancies are not usually announced through the system of İŞKUR. Instead, he or she is advised to search for a job through a well-known online job matching platform as a solution. This job seeker counsellor considers this referral as a part of the service he or she provides. Another official states that in addition to the fact the firms in need of skilled labour force do not announce job vacancies through the system of İŞKUR, job seekers with higher educational attainment usually do not prefer applying to İŞKUR in order to benefit from the job placement services it has to offer:

For instance, no job seeker from upper classes, particularly university graduates, engineer, architects, teachers, doctors etc. applies to us. The firms looking for those qualifications do not advertise job vacancies through us, they go and do it through Kariyer.net. That person goes and applies it. This is our weakness in active (policies). On the contrary, we tell workers who come here to apply to Kariyer.net after we find out about their educational attainment levels and vocations. So, that guy does not come to us to look for a job. (Official from the UI Benefit Service Department) (see Appendix G, 17)

Again, İŞKUR does not offer many options to persons with higher education attainment. Instead, those job seekers are referred to an online job search platform. The official detects this job matching problem as a weakness in terms of the well-functioning of ALMP programmes. For instance, they cannot make a job offer to UI beneficiaries with higher educational attainment levels due to the principle of occupational protection of the UI scheme in Turkey. Hence, those beneficiaries

cannot be “activated” via the UI scheme and go on to receive benefit. Therefore, they are not provided with an extensive job placement services while seeking work and they are not activated while they are on UI benefit. Obviously, enabling elements do not work for them.

Regarding the low female labour force participation rate of women in Turkey which is usually attributed to childcare responsibilities in the literature, it goes without saying that women with dependent children need to be supported by enabling policies. In that sense, the coordination of the family policy is of utmost importance. Nonetheless, it is not possible to talk about a strong orientation in terms of enabling or employability enhancing policies with respect to the coordination of family policy in Turkey. Regarding the family policy measures introduced as part of ALMP programmes, some respondents underline the weaknesses of those measures in supporting women with dependent children in the labour market. The official from the Active Labour Force Services Department suggests that women with children need policies providing more support: “I mean they [women] can be supported more. They [policies] can be improved more, particularly for mothers, for working mothers. It can be improved in terms of wages, working hours, and working conditions”.⁸ So, the need to improve the labour market conditions for women with dependent children is recognized by this official.

On the other hand, the amount of the support provided within the scope of the Mother at Work project is put under scrutiny by some officials. The official from the Active Labour Force Services Department draws attention to the amount of support:

We pay 110 TL to mothers who have children between the ages of five and 15 while the regular payment is 108 TL. In fact, the difference is two liras if you think about it, it could have been higher. But it is a good thing to have

⁸ Yani daha fazla desteklenebilir. Daha geliştirilebilir özellikle anneler için, çalışan anneler için. Hem ücretler bakımından hem de mesai saatleri, şartları bakımından daha iyi olabilir.

support. (Official from the Active Labour Force Services Department) (see Appendix G, 18)

The official from the Employment Services Department questions the incentivizing impact of the support: “But now it [the support] is almost non-existing, we pay 1.40 TL more to mothers with children a day. I do not know whether it is an incentive”.⁹ As the respondents suggest, the amount of the support provided within the scope of this project is critically low. The Child Care Support Project, on the other hand, offers a more generous support. Nonetheless, this project may be problematic for women during its implementation as the support is provided upon the presentation of invoice taken from the childcare facility:

If she [the beneficiary of the project] has a child attending kindergarten, she can receive a cash benefit of 400 TL on the condition that she presents the invoice. But she receives the support afterwards, not when she pays the tuition, she can receive it in exchange for invoice. (Job seeker counsellor 1) (see Appendix G, 19)

Hence, women in need of cash support to make payment to the kindergarten in before she receives the first payment of the cash support might find it challenging to register their children to a childcare facility in the first place. Moreover, this support is only provided for one child and it does not continue if the beneficiary takes up regular employment. Therefore, its enabling impact is open to debate.

Another problem pertains to the under provision of care facilities within workplaces. Job seeker counsellor 1 underlines this problem: “It has been almost eight years since I started this job and I have never seen a workplace with a kindergarten. If there were, they would benefit [from the kindergarten] but I have never come across”.¹⁰ Although it is a legal obligation to set up childcare facility

⁹ Ama yani şu anda sanki yok gibi, 1 lira 40 kuruş her gün fazla ödeme yapıyoruz çocuğu olan annelere. Bu tabii bir teşvik midir, bilemiyorum.

¹⁰ Hemen hemen sekiz yıl oldu işe başlayalı, hiç kreşi olan bir işletme görmedim. Olsaydı yararlanırlardı, ama ben hiç denk gelmedim.

arrangements in workplaces employing more than 150 women, this obligation is not extensively observed in Turkey. Thus, although there are enabling policies which aim at enhancing the employability of women with dependent children, they are not very well developed.

A further thought regarding the coordination of the family policy pertains to the fact that those arrangements can only cater for women in formal employment (to some extent), while informal employment is a significant problem particularly for women in Turkey. In August 2020, informal employment rate was 40.1 per cent for women (TÜİK, 2021a). Hence, it could be argued that a significant portion of women in the labour market cannot benefit from in-work benefits.

The emphasis on employability in the context of enabling policies cannot be disregarded. Regarding the scope of job placement services, training courses, and the coordination of the family policy, there are some enabling elements existing in the ALMP and activating labour market policy structure in Turkey. Nonetheless, they are rather weak, particularly when the coordination of family policy is taken into account.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to present an analysis of the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey within the analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007) at two levels.

The first level of the analysis suggests that both indicators of workfarist policies, cuts in unemployment benefit and enforced labour market activation (I) and compulsion through individual contracts (II) are quite robust in the legal and policy framework in Turkey. The entitlement and eligibility criteria for UI benefit are quite

strict. The level of replacement and the duration of benefit receipt indicate that the scheme is not generous. Moreover, the activation period starts immediately after the grant of the right to UI benefit. UI beneficiaries are required to sign contracts to comply with the labour market activation requirements which impose benefit cut and suspension sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Therefore, it could be asserted that they are potent in terms of both indicators in the case of Turkey.

The evaluation of the enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes, on the other hand, bears more complicated results with respect to the indicators of activation via job placement, training programmes as part of activation policies, and the coordination of family policy. There is an improvement in job placement, labour market training, and childcare services in Turkey, particularly regarding their extension in the recent decades and the existence of enabling elements in that picture cannot be disregarded. Nonetheless, they still have their weaknesses when compared to other countries. The quality and impact of job placement services and training programmes need to be taken into consideration while evaluating their enabling elements. Public expenditure on training programmes is significantly lower than the OECD average. The coordination of family policy has significant weaknesses as it is embodied in the gap between female and male labour market participation rates in Turkey. Although the number of childcare facilities and support mechanisms for women who have dependent children and wish to (re)enter or stay in the labour market have increased, the female labour force participation rate is still low compared to the OECD average. Moreover, existing childcare schemes fail to cater for the needs of most women working in the private sector due to longer working hours and lower wages (WB, 2015). In addition, although projects like the Mother at Work and the Child Care Support are integrated into certain ALMP

programmes in certain sectors, it is evident that their scope and generosity are rather limited.

The second level of the analysis which incorporates the implementation dimension into the discussion suggests that the workfarist requirements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes are not always implemented as the results of the field work conducted with İŞKUR officials imply. The reasons for non-implementation put forth by the respondents could be grouped as the economic circumstances, the organizational structure, and the design of the system. The field work also indicates that the enabling elements of those programmes are not very strong in practice and their implementation do not always reflect the existing legal and policy framework. According to the results of the field work, enabling elements do not work for every person in the same way.

The analysis demonstrates that the workfarist elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes are stronger when compared to enabling elements according to the indicators adopted by Dingeldey (2007). Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that enabling elements do not exist at all. In fact, the introduction of the enabling policies actually predates the introduction of the workfarist policies in Turkey. Thus, adopting a more nuanced identification is crucial. Hence, it could be argued that Turkey exhibits a combination of both of those elements while workfarist elements are stronger in comparison.

While it could be concluded that the ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey could be associated with more robust workfarist elements compared to enabling elements in Turkey, it is strikingly evident that both workfarist and enabling elements are simultaneously being more and more accentuated in Turkey, particularly in the recent years.

The following chapter discusses the findings of the analysis with reference to the existing body of literature. It also aims to locate the case of Turkey within the activation typologies developed by Barbier (2004a), Dingeldey (2007), and Serrano Pascual (2007a).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The case of Turkey is quite peculiar with respect to the development of ALMPs and other activating labour market policies when the impacts of path dependency, political will, external actors are taken into account. It is hence a difficult case to fit an ideal type. Therefore, a nuanced approach is needed to evaluate their workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes.

The evaluation of the workfarist and enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes of Turkey is conducted at two levels in this study. While a desk study was sufficient to adopt and mirror the analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007), a second level which incorporated the implementation dimension into the analysis was added as the existence of certain rules and regulations in the legal and policy framework does not necessarily mean that they are going to be implemented systematically in Turkey. Thus, while the existing literature disregards the implementation dimension so far, this study sought to incorporate the implementation dimension into the analysis by conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews with İŞKUR officials working at different levels and positions. This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis and discusses the case of Turkey within the framework of the activation typologies by Barbier (2004a) and Dingeldey (2007) and to locate Turkey within those typologies.

Within the analytical framework developed by Dingeldey (2007), it could be argued that Turkey is clearly stronger in terms of its workfarist elements compared to its enabling elements when the implementation dimension is not taken into

consideration. The incorporation of the implementation dimension into the analysis complicates the picture as there is a gap between policy and practice regarding the workfarist elements. Nonetheless, the coordination of the family policy falls short in terms of enabling women to participate in the labour market. While the implementation dimension smooths the edges of both workfarist elements and enabling elements, it could still be argued that the workfarist elements are more pronounced than the enabling elements of ALMP and other activating labour market policy programmes.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state regime typology provided a starting point for many scholars to develop activation typologies in the literature (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, e.g. Barbier, 2004b; Daguerre, 2007). First of all, it should be noted that there is no consensus about Turkey's location within welfare state regime typologies in the literature. Turkey does not completely fit any welfare state regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990). Ferrera (1996) identified a Southern European welfare regime model based upon the cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by paying attention to institutional and political arrangements. The main characteristics of this model are a fragmented and corporatist income maintenance system, universalistic health services, low degree of state involvement in the sphere of welfare and a collusive combination between public and non-public institutions, and the persistence of clientelism (Ferrera, 1996, p. 17). With reference to the main characteristics, it has been argued that the welfare regime of Turkey resembles this model (Buğra & Keyder, 2003, 2006; Gough, 1996; Grütjen, 2009). On the other hand, this position has been contested in the literature (Yılmaz & Yentürk, 2018, pp. 8-9; e.g. Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010).

Regarding the activation approach typology developed by Barbier (2004a), it could be argued that although it is not a typical example of either approach, the dominant approach in Turkey is closer to the liberal type than it is to the universal type. Firstly, in terms of the national systems of social protection, Turkey is neither a liberal nor a universalistic welfare state. From that perspective, it does not match the basic characteristic of either approach.

The justification of activation protection of the liberal approach in terms of labour market and social assistance rests on the assumption that social assistance beneficiaries profit from welfare transfers and not all of them are actually needy (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). Such position is not dominant in the universalistic type where activation policies and programmes target all citizens (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). This assumption can be detected in the policy and legal documents in Turkey, particularly with respect to the growing emphasis on the link between social assistance and employment. In Turkey, there are certain ALMP programmes which prioritize the participation of social assistance beneficiaries such as the Job Clubs. Moreover, the field work provides evidence to support the existence of such an assumption as the research participants revealed in their accounts that they internalized such an underlying assumption. It is being expressed that for some beneficiaries, social assistance is not a temporary relief, but rather a lifestyle or a means of subsistence. This complies with the underlying assumptions of the liberal activation approach which relies on workfarist arrangements compared to the universalistic approach.

While the liberal approach adopts a punitive and disciplinary strategy, the universalistic approach relies on the reciprocal engagement strategy (Barbier, 2004a, p. 58). In terms of this comparison, Turkey is again closer to the liberal type. In

Turkey, certain activating labour market policy programmes such as the UI Benefit, the Programme for the Community Benefit, and social assistance scheme involves punitive elements. In addition, the Programme for the Community Benefit is defined as a disciplining activity as an ALMP programme (İŞKUR, 2021b, p. 54). Moreover, strict benefit cut sanctions are projected in the legal and policy framework, although they are not usually transferred into practice.

While unemployment and poverty risks are highly socialized in the universalistic type, this is not the case in the liberal type (Barbier, 2004a, p. 58). Turkey is closer to the liberal type in that regard, as the only unemployment benefit mechanism is contribution-based and it is not generous in terms of its income replacement level and the duration of benefit. Benefits are short-termed and low-value in the liberal type, and long-term and high-value in the universalistic type (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). In terms of benefit level and duration, it could be asserted that Turkey is closer to the liberal type.

Regarding employment service and institutions, the administration has a central character in the liberal type (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). On the other hand, it is decentralized and involves social actors such as local authorities in the universalistic type (Barbier, 2004a, p. 59). With its central administration of employment services, Turkey again resembles the liberal type.

It could be argued that in terms of the two opposite ideal types introduced by Barbier (2004a) regarding activation, Turkey is closer to the liberal type than the universalistic type. Nonetheless, it does not completely fit either type. This finding complies with the argument propounded by Gün (2016) which identifies Turkey as a mixed system combining elements from the workfarist and harmonizing types in terms of the character of its activation policies.

When we characterize workfare with compulsion; that is to say that engaging in work-related activities in order to receive welfare benefit according to Barbier (2004a) and Dingeldey (2007), not all ALMP programmes has workfarist elements in Turkey. But they are strongly associated with the UI scheme, the Programme for the Community Benefit, and the social assistance scheme under the current legislative framework. With that being said, the realization of those workfarist requirements may not match the policy objectives. This may be partly due to the fragmented nature of the systems of social assistance and employment services. However, the dominant underlying assumptions and the legal and policy framework indicate strong workfarist tendencies. Even if it could be argued that not all ALMP programmes have compulsory elements regarding work-related activities, prominent ALMP programmes such as the job placement and training services are deployed as tools in order to ensure workfarist ends as their deployment is mandatory for UI and social assistance beneficiaries and the participants of the Programme for the Community Benefit. It could be argued that the overall picture of ALMPs and other activating labour market policies are strong in terms of workfarist elements in Turkey. Nonetheless, organizational incapacity to implement them usually prevents them from being transferred into practice.

On the other hand, Serrano Pascual (2007a) presents a distinctive activation typology which is based on five ideal types distinguished by their citizenship status and social rights they offer in different institutional settings. Those five types are the economic springboard regime, the civic contractualism regime, the autonomous citizens regime, the fragmented provision regime, and the minimalist disciplinary regime (Serrano Pascual, 2007a). The economic springboard regime basically aims at incentivizing taking up work (2007a, p. 301). The civic contractualism regime

provides the citizens with extensive social rights and aims at making sure that citizens fulfil their duties in exchange (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, pp. 301-302). The autonomous citizens regime highlights the individual and collective responsibility to achieve self-determination and guaranteeing the sustainability of the welfare state financially at the same time (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 306). In the case of the fragmented provision regime, active social policy regime is delivered from a decentralized framework and it falls insufficient in terms of coordination and funding (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 308). Finally, the minimalist disciplinary regime offers a limited scope of welfare state intervention for individuals excluded from the labour market (Serrano Pascual, 2007a, p. 309).

From this perspective, it is not a straightforward task to determine the location of Turkey, as it does not fully fit any type. The civic contractualism regime, the autonomous citizens regime, and the minimalist disciplinary regimes can easily be ruled out as the role of contracts is not very dominant, individuals are not fully supported, and the scope of rights is not as limited as in that type in Turkey, respectively. However, at the first glance, the case of Turkey exhibits some characteristics of the economic springboard regime and the fragmented provision regime.

In terms of the trade-offs between rights and obligations, the case of Turkey is similar to the economic springboard regime as the emerging picture puts strong emphasis on the regulation of the obligations and duties of benefit recipients. Although the scope of rights provided is rather limited, the obligations are not. Hence, in terms of this dimension, it could be asserted that the case of Turkey is closer to the economic springboard regime than it is to the fragmented provision regime.

Regarding the second dimension, namely the mode of managing the behaviour of the individual, the case of Turkey displays the characteristics of both the moral-therapeutic regulation of the behaviour and matching regulation. Serrano Pascual (2007a) asserts that those modes can coexist as they are not mutually exclusive, but one or the other predominates in each country (p. 294). With respect to these two extreme modes, it could be argued that the moral-therapeutic management predominates the adaptive skills management as the analysis suggests.

Overall, as my analysis reflects, due to the existence of strong incentives to take up work at least in the legislative and policy framework, it could be asserted that the case of Turkey resembles the economic springboard regime compared to the other regime types introduced by Serrano Pascual (2007a).

The findings of the study suggest that enabling policies and their enabling elements need to be improved, particularly when the coordination of family policy is considered. Information flow needs to be ensured so that more people could be aware of their existence. Besides, as informal employment is very pervasive in Turkey, especially among women, transition into formal employment must be promoted through feasible mechanisms.

Regarding the workfarist elements, as the literature suggests (Gün, 2016; Savaşkan, 2009; Venn, 2012) the entitlement and eligibility criteria of the UI scheme is strict in Turkey. In addition, the benefit duration is short and income replacement level is low in comparison. Moreover, benefit cut and suspension sanctions existing under the UI and social assistance schemes could be deemed too coercive when there is not enough employment creation. The quality of the available jobs in the labour market also needs to be taken into account while designing mechanisms which involve the imposition of such coercive elements on beneficiaries.

This study is not without its limitations. The findings of the field work cannot be generalized as the number of the respondents is quite limited and it cannot be expected to fully grasp the whole picture by relying on this study. Moreover, the respondents are composed of members of only one social partner, namely the public employment agency. The incorporation of the perspectives of other social partners such as the programme beneficiaries is crucial to provide a clearer picture in terms of the implementation dimension of those policies and to explore their transfer into practice in context.

There are other studies missing in the literature on the case of Turkey. Impact evaluation studies need to be conducted to conclude whether those programmes are successful in terms of realizing labour market activation, particularly when their budget constraint are taken into consideration. Finally, comprehensive research which explore the quality of the services provided as part of activation strategies must be conducted.

APPENDIX A

THE LIST OF THE LEGAL AND POLICY DOCUMENTS ON LABOUR MARKET ACTIVATION IN TURKEY

A.1 Laws and regulations

- Labour Law (İş Kanunu) no. 3008 (1936)
- The Law on the Establishment and Duties of The Institution of Finding Job and Worker (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun), no. 4837 (1946)
- Law on Approval of Contract no. 88 on the Establishment of Employment Service (İş ve İşçi Bulma Servisi Kurulması Hakkındaki 88 Sayılı Sözleşmenin Onanmasına Dair Kanun) no. 5448 (1949)
- Maritime Labour Law (Deniz İş Kanunu) no. 854 (1967)
- Labour Law (İş Kanunu) no. 1475 (1971)
- Law on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Kanunu) no. 3294 (1986)
- Regulation on the Employment of the Disabled (Sakatların İstihdamı Hakkında Tüzük) (1987)
- Directive on Private Employment Counselling and Labour Training Service (Özel İstihdam Danışmanlığı ve İşgücü Yetiştirme Hizmeti Yönetmeliği) (1987)
- The İİBK Directive of Labour Force Training (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu İşgücü Yetiştirme Yönetmeliği) (1988)
- Law on Privatization Implementations (Özelleştirme Uygulamaları Hakkında Kanun) no. 4046 (1994)

- The General Directorate of the İİBK Directive on Labour Force Training and Development (İş ve İşçi Bulma Genel Müdürlüğü İşgücü Yetiştirme ve Geliştirme Yönetmeliği) (1996)
- Law of Unemployment Insurance (İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu) no. 4447 (1999)
- The Statutory Decree on the Establishment of the Turkish Employment Institution and Amending Certain Laws and Statutory Decrees (Türkiye İş Kurumunun Kurulması ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname) no. 617 (2000)
- Directive on Vocational Development, Replacement and Acquisition Training of the Insured Unemployed Receiving Unemployment Benefit (İşsizlik Ödeneği Alan Sigortalı İşsizlerin Meslek Geliştirme, Değişirme ve Edindirme Eğitimi Yönetmeliği) (2000)
- Labour Law (İş Kanunu) no. 4857 (2003)
- Law on Certain Regulations on the Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu ile İlgili Bazı Düzenlemeler Hakkında Kanun) no. 4904 (2003)
- Directive on Labour Force Training and Harmonization Services of Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu İşgücü Yetiştirme ve Uyum Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği) (2004)
- Directive of Private Employment Agencies (Özel İstihdam Büroları Yönetmeliği) (2004)
- Law on Persons with Disabilities (Engelliler hakkında Kanun) no. 5378 (2005)
- Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law (Sosyal Sigortalar ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanunu) no. 5510 (2006)

- Law on Amending Labour Law and Certain Laws (İş Kanunu ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun) no. 5763 (2008)
- Directive on the Private Employment Agencies (Özel İstihdam Büroları Yönetmeliği) (2008)
- Directive on Labour Force Harmonization Services of Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu İşgücü Uyum Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği) (2008)
- Law Amending the Unemployment Insurance Law and the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law (İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu ile Sosyal Sigortalar ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun) no. 5921 (2009)
- Directive on the Procedures and Principle to be Applied while Recruiting Ex-convicts or those Injured in the Fight against Terrorism at Public Institutions and Organizations (Kamu Kurum ve Kuruluşlarına Eski Hükümlü veya Terörle Mücadelede Malul Sayılmayacak Şekilde Yaralananların İşçi Olarak Alınmasında Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik) (2009)
- Directive on Short-time Working and Short-time Working Payment (Kısa Çalışma ve Kısa Çalışma Ödeneği Hakkında Yönetmelik) (2009)
- Directive on Domestic Job Placement Services (Yurtiçinde İşe Yerleştirme Hizmetleri Hakkında Yönetmelik) (2009)
- Directive on Development and Support Programmes for Small and Medium Enterprises (Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Geliştirme Destek Programları Yönetmeliği) (2010)
- Directive of Active Labour Force Services (Aktif İşgücü Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği) (2013)
- Directive of the Programme for the Community Benefit (Toplum Yararına Program Genelgesi) (2013)
- Directive on Private Employment Agencies (Özel İstihdam Büroları Yönetmeliği) (2013)
- Directive on the Principles and Procedures on the Conduct of Job and Vocational Counsellors (İş ve Meslek Danışmanlarının Çalışma Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik) (2014)

- Directive on the Commission Authorized to Use Administrative Fines Collected from Employers who do not Employ Persons with Disabilities and Ex-convicts (Engelli ve Eski Hükümlü Çalıştırmayan İşverenlerden Tahsil Edilen İdari Para Cezalarını Kullanmaya Yetkili Komisyona dair Yönetmelik) (2014)
- Procedures and Principles on the Activation of the Link Between Social Assistance-Employment (Sosyal Yardım-İstihdam Bağlantısının Etkinleştirilmesine İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar) (2014)
- Directive on the Procedures and Principles about the Assignment and Conduct of Job and Vocation Counsellors (İş ve Meslek Danışmanlarının Atanma ile Çalışma Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik) (2015)
- Directive of Private Employment Agencies (Özel İstihdam Büroları Yönetmeliği) (2016)
- Directive on the Employment of Social Assistance Beneficiaries (Sosyal Yardım Yararlanıcılarının İstihdamına İlişkin Yönetmelik) (2017)
- Protocol on the Channelization of Social Assistance Beneficiaries into Employment (Sosyal Yardım Yararlanıcılarının İstihdama Yönlendirilmesi Protokolü) (2018)
- Procedures and Principles of Providing Child Care Support to Women who Participate in Vocational Training Courses in the Industrial Sector and On-the-job Training Programmes in the Manufacturing Sector (Sanayi Sektöründeki Mesleklerde Düzenlenen Mesleki Eğitim Kurslarına ve İmalat Sektöründeki Mesleklerde Düzenlenen İşbaşı Eğitim Programlarına Katılan Kadınlara Çocuk Bakım Desteği Verilmesine İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar) (2018)
- Procedures and Principles on the Support to Female Employment through the Mother at Work Project (Kadın İstihdamının İşte Anne Projesi ile Desteklenmesine İlişkin Uygulama Usul ve Esasları) (2018)

- Circular on the Procedures related to the Channelization of Social Assistance Beneficiaries into Employment (Sosyal Yardım Yararlanıcılarının İstihdama Yönlendirilme İşlemleri Genelgesi) (2019)
- Circular on the Procedure on the Channelization of Social Assistance Beneficiaries into Employment (Sosyal Yardım Yararlanıcılarının İstihdama Yönlendirilme İşlemleri Genelgesi) (2019)
- Circular on the Social Work Programme (Sosyal Çalışma Programı Genelgesi) (2019)
- Procedures and Principles Regarding Long-Term Insurance Premium Support to those who Get Employed while Receiving Unemployment Benefit under the Additional Article 7 of the Unemployment Insurance Law no. 4447 (4447 Sayılı İşsizlik Sigortası Kanununun Ek 7. Maddesi Kapsamında İşsizlik Ödeneği Alırken İşe Girenler İçin Yapılacak Uzun Vadeli Sigorta Primi Desteği Uygulamasına İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar) (2020)
- Circular on the Passive Labour Force Services of Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu Pasif İşgücü Hizmetleri Genelgesi) (2020)
- Circular on the Employment of Persons with Disabilities, Ex-convicts, and Those who are Wounded during the Fight against Terrorism but not counted as Invalid (Engelli, Eski Hükümlü ve Terörle Mücadelede Malul Sayılmayacak Şekilde Yaralananların İstihdama Hakkında Genelge) (2020)
- Law Amending Certain Laws (Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun) no. 7226 (2020)
- Law on Reducing the Effects of the New Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic on Economic and Social Life and Amending Some Laws (Yeni Koronavirüs (COVID-19) Salgınının Ekonomik ve Sosyal Hayata Etkilerinin Azaltılması

Hakkında Kanun ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun)
no. 7244 (2020)

- Presidential Decrees (Cumhurbaşkanı Kararları) (2021)

A.2 Plans and Reports

- The National Employment Strategy (2014-2023) and Action Plans (Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi [2014-2023] ve Eylem Planları)
- The Five-year Development Plans of the Republic of Turkey (T.C. Kalkınma Planları)
- The Special Commission Report on Labour Market of the 8th Five-year Development Plan (Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı İş Gücü Piyasası Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu) (2001)
- The Special Commission Report on Labour Market of the 9th Development Plan (Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı İşgücü Piyasası Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu) (2007)
- The Special Commission Report on Employment and Working Life of the 10th Development Plan (Onuncu Kalkınma Planı İstihdam ve Çalışma Hayatı Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu) (2014)
- The Action Plan on the Labour Market Activation Programme of the 10th Development Plan (2014-2018) (Onuncu Kalkınma Planı [2014-2018] İşgücü Piyasasının Etkinleştirilmesi Programı Eylem Planı)
- The Special Commission Report on Labour Market and Youth Employment of the 11th Development Plan (On Birinci Kalkınma Planı İşgücü Piyasası ve Genç İstihdamı Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu) (2018)
- Annual Activity Reports of İŞKUR (İŞKUR Faaliyet Raporları)

- Annual Statistics of İŞKUR (İŞKUR İstatistik Yıllıkları)
- The Labour Market Reports of İŞKUR (İŞKUR İşgücü Piyasası Raporları)
- The Bulletin of the Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu Bülteni)
- The Bulletin of Unemployment Insurance (İşsizlik Sigortası Bülteni)
- Monthly Statistical Bulletins of İŞKUR (İŞKUR Aylık İstatistik Bültenleri)
- The Strategical Plan of İŞKUR (2019-2023) (Türkiye İş Kurumu Stratejik Plan [2019-2023])

APPENDIX B

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

B. 1 Interview questions for service centre officials of İŞKUR

1. In what position do you work at İŞKUR? For how long have you been working in that position?
2. What are the target groups of active labour force policies? Which groups are prioritized?
3. How do you decide to channel an applicant to open jobs or active labour force programs? How do you decide on the active labour force program to direct applicants?
4. Can you access to the information about the social assistance beneficiary status of an applicant? How does the process of placement or referral to programs work for social assistance beneficiaries?
5. How is the job offer application made for the participants of Programme for the Community Benefit (TYP)? Are there any sanctions if the offer is not accepted by the beneficiary?
6. Are the UI beneficiaries expected to prove their job search efforts? Is it controlled?
7. How does the process of directing unemployment benefit recipients to vocational training courses and making job offers to them work? How is it decided whether to direct to vocational training or to employment?
8. Is the benefit cut sanction is applied in case of refusal to seek a job, job offers or participation in courses?

9. Is an individual action plan prepared for applicants? Are any contracts signed with job seekers and active labour force program participants? (If yes) Is the person sanctioned in case of non-compliance?
10. According to your observations, is there a mismatch between the qualifications and skills possessed by job seekers and those sought by employers? (If yes) What is being done to resolve these and ensure matching?
11. How is it decided whether an applicant is employable or not? What interventions are deployed to enhance their employability?
12. How do you decide which job to direct the applicant to?
13. How do you define the concept of “suitable job”? How do you determine the job that is suitable for an applicant?
14. How would you describe the objective of the on-the-job training program (İEP)?
15. How is it decided which vocational training course a person will be directed to?
16. Is there an employment obligation at the end of the vocational training courses (MEK)? How does the process work? Are any sanctions imposed on the employer if the employer does not recruit participants?
17. Which points are taken into consideration in the participant interviews of employment-guaranteed vocational training courses? How does the employment process work?
18. Can the participants benefit from the kindergarten facilities offered at the workplaces in İEPs, TYPs, and MEKs organized at workplaces?
19. How do the support mechanisms for female participants with children work within the scope of İEP and MEK?

20. How have ALMPs changed during the COVID-19 pandemic?

B. 2 Interview questions for employment experts

1. In which position do you work at İŞKUR? How many years have you been working in this position?
2. What is the main objective of active labour force programs in Turkey?
3. What do you think are the biggest problems of the labour supply in Turkey?
Is there a mismatch between the labour supply and labour demand?
4. Which of the objectives of creating employment and ensuring labour force harmonization is preferred within the scope of active labour market policies in Turkey? What do you think is the reason for this?
5. What are/who are the target groups for participation in active labour force policies? Which groups are considered priority?
6. To what extent is the European Union Social Policy and Employment Acquis effective in determining the practices? Is the European Employment Strategy taken into account?
7. What is the main objective of TYP? (How is the increase in programme quotas in periods such as natural disasters and economic crises explained?)
8. How would you explain the significant increase in the number of beneficiaries of İEP and TYP in 2013?
9. Which social insurance premiums are covered for İEP and TYP participants?
10. What steps have been taken to direct social assistance beneficiaries to employment? What methods are followed?
11. What methods are followed for channelling UI beneficiaries into employment? receiving unemployment benefits?

12. How did the job placements take place before the launch of the job and vocational counselling system at İŞKUR?
13. How would you define the concept of “suitable job”?
14. How would you define the concept of “employability”?
15. How is the connection between vocational training and labour demand established? How is it decided in which sectors to open courses? How is it decided in which fields/sectors job-guaranteed vocational training courses will be opened?
16. What do you think is the main objective of the İEP?
17. What do you think are the biggest problems of the labour market in Turkey?
18. How would you evaluate the active labour force policies being implemented in Turkey? What do you think are their strengths? What are their weak points? What kind of implementations would be more effective?
19. How have ALMPs changed during the COVID-19 pandemic?
20. Do you think the short-time working allowance and the prohibition of dismissal are sufficient to protect the employees in this period?

APPENDIX C

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (TURKISH)

C. 1 İŞKUR hizmet merkezi çalışanlarına sorulan sorular:

1. İŞKUR'da hangi pozisyonda çalışıyorsunuz? Kaç yıldır bu pozisyonda çalışıyorsunuz?
2. Aktif işgücü politikaları için hedeflenen gruplar nelerdir/kimlerden oluşur? Hangi gruplara öncelik veriliyor?
3. Bir danışan başvurduğunda açık işlere mi, yoksa aktif işgücü programlarına mı yönlendirileceğine nasıl karar veriyorsunuz? Hangi aktif işgücü programına yönlendireceğinize nasıl karar veriyorsunuz?
4. Danışanın sosyal yardım yararlanıcısı olup olmadığı bilgisine erişebiliyor musunuz? Sosyal yardım yararlanıcıları için işe yerleştirme ya da programlara yönlendirme süreçleri nasıl işliyor?
5. Toplum Yararına Programları (TYP) katılımcılarına yönelik iş teklifi uygulaması nasıl yapılıyor? Teklifin yararlanıcı tarafından kabul edilmemesi halinde herhangi bir yaptırım uygulanıyor mu?
6. İşsizlik ödeneği alanların aktif iş arama çabalarını kanıtlamaları bekleniyor mu? Bu kontrol ediliyor mu?
7. İşsizlik ödeneği alanların mesleki eğitim kurslarına yönlendirilme ve bu kişilere iş teklifinde bulunma süreçleri nasıl işliyor? Mesleki eğitime mi yoksa işe mi yönlendirileceğine nasıl karar veriliyor? (Ödenek alanlarla görüşülüyor mu? Onların görüşleri dikkate alınıyor mu?)
8. İş aramama, iş tekliflerinin ya da kurslara katılımın reddi halinde ödenek kesme yaptırımı uygulanıyor mu?

9. Danışanlar için bireysel eylem planı hazırlanıyor mu? İş arayanlarla ve aktif işgücü program katılımcılarıyla herhangi bir sözleşme imzalanıyor mu? (Cevap evetse) Uyum gösterilmemesi durumunda kişiye bir yaptırım uygulanıyor mu?
10. Gözlemlerinize göre iş arayanların sahip olduğu ve işverenlerin aradığı kalifikasyon ve beceriler arasında bir uyumsuzluk var mı? (Cevap evetse) Bunları gidermek ve eşleştirmeyi sağlamak için neler yapılıyor?
11. Bir danışanın istihdam edilebilir olup olmadığına nasıl karar veriliyor? İstihdam edilebilirliği arttırmak için ne gibi müdahalelerde bulunuluyor?
12. Danışanı hangi işe yönlendireceğinize nasıl karar veriyorsunuz?
13. “Uygun iş” kavramını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Bir danışana uygun olan işi nasıl belirliyorsunuz?
14. İşbaşı Eğitim Programı’nın (İEP) amacını nasıl tanımlarsınız?
15. Bir kişinin hangi mesleki eğitim kursuna yönlendirileceğine nasıl karar veriliyor?
16. Mesleki eğitim kursları (MEK) sonunda istihdam zorunluluğu var mı? Süreç nasıl işliyor? İşverenin katılımcıları işe almaması halinde işverene herhangi bir yaptırım uygulanıyor mu?
17. İstihdam garantili mesleki eğitim kurslarının katılımcı mülakatlarında hangi noktalara dikkat ediliyor? İstihdam süreci nasıl işliyor?
18. İEP, TYP ve iş yerlerinde düzenlenen MEK’lerde katılımcılar iş yerlerinde sunulan kreş imkânlarından yararlanabiliyor mu?
19. İEP ve MEK dâhilinde çocuk sahibi kadın katılımcılara yönelik destek mekanizmaları nasıl işliyor?
20. COVID-19 salgını sırasında aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları nasıl değişti?

C.2 İstihdam uzmanlarına sorulan sorular:

1. İŞKUR’da hangi pozisyonda çalışıyorsunuz? Kaç yıldır bu pozisyonda çalışıyorsunuz?
2. Türkiye’de aktif işgücü programlarının temel amacı nedir?
3. Sizce Türkiye’deki işgücü arzının en büyük sorunları nelerdir? İşgücü arzı ve talebi arasında uyumsuzluk var mı?
4. Türkiye’de aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları kapsamında istihdam yaratma ve işgücü uyumu sağlama amaçlarından hangisi daha çok tercih ediliyor? Sizce bunun nedeni nedir?
5. Aktif işgücü politikalarına katılım için hedef gruplar nelerdir/kimlerden oluşur? Hangi gruplar öncelikli sayılıyor?
6. Uygulamaların belirlenmesinde Avrupa Birliği Sosyal Politika ve İstihdam Müktesebatı ne ölçüde etkili oluyor? Avrupa İstihdam Stratejisi (European Employment Strategy) dikkate alınıyor mu?
7. TYP’nin temel amacı nedir? (Program kontenjanlarının doğal afet ve ekonomik kriz gibi dönemlerde artması nasıl açıklanıyor?)
8. İEP ve TYP’nin yararlanıcı sayılarında 2013 yılında yaşanan ciddi artışı nasıl açıklarsınız?
9. İEP ve TYP’de katılımcıların hangi sosyal sigorta primleri karşılanıyor?
10. Sosyal yardım yararlanıcıların istihdama yönlendirilmesi için ne gibi adımlar atıldı?
11. İşsizlik ödeneği alanların yeniden istihdam edilmesi için ne gibi yöntemler izleniyor?

12. İŞKUR’da iş ve meslek danışmanlığı sistemine geçmeden önce işe yerleştirmeler nasıl gerçekleşiyordu?
13. “Uygun iş” kavramını nasıl tanımlarsınız?
14. “İstihdam edilebilirlik” kavramını nasıl tanımlarsınız?
15. Mesleki eğitim ve işgücü talebi arasındaki bağlantı nasıl kuruluyor? Hangi sektörlerde kurslar açılacağına nasıl karar veriliyor? İstihdam garantili mesleki eğitim kurslarının hangi alanlarda/sektörlerde açılacağına nasıl karar veriliyor?
16. Sizce İEP’in temel amacı nedir?
17. Sizce Türkiye’de işgücü piyasasının en büyük sorunları nelerdir?
18. Türkiye’de uygulanmakta aktif işgücü politikalarını nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?
Sizce güçlü yanları neler? Zayıf yanları neler? Nasıl uygulamalar olsa daha etkili olurdu?
19. COVID-19 salgını sırasında aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları nasıl değişti?
20. Sizce kısa çalışma ödeneği ve işten çıkarma yasağı bu dönemde çalışanları korumak için yeterli oluyor mu?

APPENDIX D

ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 29.03.2021-9881

T.C.
BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME
KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı : 14
Toplantı Tarihi : 25.03.2021
Toplantı Saati : 13:00
Toplantı Yeri : Zoom Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen, Prof. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie
Bulunmayanlar :

Cemre Canbazer

Sosyal Politika

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"The Placement of the Active Labour Market Policy Regime of Turkey within the Activation Typologies" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığımız SBB-EAK 2021/7 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 25 Mart 2021 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza alınamadığı için bu onam mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Ebru Kaya tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Prof. Dr. Ebru KAYA
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr.Ebru KAYA
Raportör

SOBETİK 14 25.03.2021

Bu belge 5070 sayılı Elektronik İmza Kanununun 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

APPENDIX E

CONSENT FORM

Supporting institution: Boğaziçi University

Title of the research: The Placement of the Active Labour Market Policy Regime of Turkey within the Activation Typologies / Türkiye Aktif Emek Piyasası Politikası Rejiminin Etkinleştirme Tipolojileri içinde Konumlandırılması

Project Executive: Assoc. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz

E-mail address: xxx@boun.edu.tr

Phone number: +90 212 XXX XX XX

Researcher's name: Cemre Canbazer

E-mail address: xxx@gmail.com

Phone number: +90 538 XXX XX XX

Dear respondent,

Project subject: A scientific research project titled “The Placement of the Active Labour Market Policy Regime of Turkey within the Activation Typologies / Türkiye Aktif Emek Piyasası Politikası Rejiminin Etkinleştirme Tipolojileri içinde Konumlandırılması” is being conducted by Boğaziçi University Department of Social Policy faculty member Assoc. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz and Social Policy Master's student Cemre Canbazer. This research aims to place active labour market policy programmes in Turkey within the international classification framework by comparing them with examples from the world. For this purpose, active labour market policies implemented in Turkey will be examined in terms of their workfarist and enabling components. Within the scope of the research, it is aimed to conduct in-depth interviews with official from the Turkish Employment Agency which is the implementer of these policies, in order to better understand the implementation dimension of active labour market policies.

Consent: As part of this research, we invite you to conduct an interview that will take approximately 40 minutes. We would like to inform you about the research prior to your decision. If you agree to participate in the research, we will conduct an interview consisting of 20 questions with you. We do not expect you to represent your institution in this interview. We would like to hear your personal views and experiences as an expert working in this field. All personal information, your name, and contact information that you will share with us during the interview will be completely confidential and they will not be shared with anyone. No information that can be attributed to your name or that will directly point to you will be included in any way during the research and in the output of the research. Your transfers will not be attributed directly to you.

Participation in this research is completely voluntary and you will not be paid or rewarded for your participation in it. If you give your consent to participate in this study, you have the right to withdraw from the study at any stage of the study without giving any reason. You can opt out of participating in the study at any time. You do not have to answer questions which you do not want to answer. If, after the interview, you change your mind and decide that you want to withdraw from the research, please contact us.

It is necessary to audio-record the interviews we will conduct in order to reflect the experiences and opinions you conveyed correctly to the research. While the voice recordings are transcribed, names and personal information will be anonymized and coded in order to protect confidentiality. Audio recording files and transcripts of audio recordings will be destroyed after the work is completed.

It is expected that the research will benefit society and academic studies in the context of active labour market policies in Turkey in the future. The research we want to carry out is not expected to pose any risk to you. However, we can interrupt or postpone the interview at any time during the interview. If you state that you give up on interviewing or contributing to the study, the interview records will be deleted and will not be used for scientific evaluations based on the research.

If you have any questions about the study, please ask before signing this form. If you have any questions later, you can ask the project coordinator (Assoc. Prof. Volkan Yılmaz, Office Phone: 0212 XXX XX XX) or the researcher (Cemre Canbazer, Phone: 0538 XXX XX XX). You can consult Boğaziçi University Social and Human Sciences Master's and Doctoral Thesis Ethics Review Committee (SOBETİK) (sbe-ethics@boun.edu.tr) regarding your rights related to the research.

If your address or phone number change, please let us know.

I understood what was told to me and what was written above. I have / do not want to receive a copy of this form (in which case the researcher keeps this copy).

I agree to participate in the study.

☐ I allow audio recording during the interview to be held within the scope of the study.

The name and surname of the participant:.....

Signature:

Date (DD/MM/YYYY):...../...../.....

APPENDIX F

CONSENT FORM (TURKISH)

Araştırmayı destekleyen kurum: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi
Araştırmamanın adı: The Placement of the Active Labour Market Policy Regime of Turkey within the Activation Typologies / Türkiye Aktif Emek Piyasası Politikası Rejiminin Etkinleştirme Tipolojileri içinde Konumlandırılması
Proje Yürütücüsü: Doç. Dr. Volkan Yılmaz
E-mail adresi: xxx@boun.edu.tr
Telefonu: 0212 XXX XX XX
Araştırmacının adı: Cemre Canbazer
E-mail adresi: xxx@gmail.com
Telefonu: 0538 XXX XX XX

Sayın katılımcı,

Proje konusu: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal Politika Anabilim Dalı öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Volkan Yılmaz ve Sosyal Politika Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Cemre Canbazer tarafından The Placement of the Active Labour Market Policy Regime of Turkey within the Activation Typologies / Türkiye Aktif Emek Piyasası Politikası Rejiminin Etkinleştirme Tipolojileri içinde Konumlandırılması adlı bilimsel bir araştırma projesi yürütülmektedir. Bu araştırma Türkiye'deki aktif emek piyasası politika uygulamalarını dünya örnekleriyle karşılaştırarak uluslararası tasnif çerçevesine oturtmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla Türkiye'de uygulanan aktif emek piyasası politikaları sahip oldukları çalıştırıcı ve olanak sağlayıcı bileşenler açısından incelenecektir. Araştırma kapsamında, aktif emek piyasası politikalarının uygulama boyutunun daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için bu politikaların uygulayıcısı konumunda olan Türkiye İş Kurumu temsilcileri ile derinlemesine mülakatların gerçekleştirilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Onam: Bu araştırma kapsamında sizi yaklaşık 40 dakika sürecek olan bir mülakat gerçekleştirmeye davet ediyoruz. Kararınızdan önce araştırma hakkında sizi bilgilendirmek isteriz. Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde sizinle 20 soruluk bir mülakat gerçekleştireceğiz. Bu mülakatta çalıştığınız kurumu temsil etmenizi beklemiyoruz. Sizin bu alandaki bir uzman olarak sorularımıza ilişkin kişisel görüş ve deneyimlerinizi öğrenmek istiyoruz. Mülakat sırasında bizimle paylaşacağınız tüm kişisel bilgiler, isminiz ve iletişim bilgileriniz herhangi biriyle paylaşılmayacak, araştırma sırasında ve araştırmanın çıktısında isminize atfedilebilecek ya da sizi doğrudan işaret edecek bir bilgiye hiçbir şekilde yer verilmeyecektir. İsmi ve bu bilgiler tamamen gizli tutulacaktır. Aktarımlarınız doğrudan size atfedilmeyecektir.

Bu araştırmaya katılmak tamamen isteğe bağlıdır ve çalışmaya katılımınız karşılığında size herhangi bir ücret veya ödül verilmeyecektir. Bu çalışmaya katılmaya onay verdiğiniz takdirde çalışmanın herhangi bir aşamasında herhangi bir sebep göstermeden çalışmadan çekilme hakkına sahipsiniz. İstedığınız zaman çalışmaya katılmaktan vazgeçebilirsiniz. Cevap vermek istemediğiniz soruları

cevaplamak zorunda değilsiniz. Görüşme sonrasında, fikrinizi değiştirir ve araştırmadan çekilmek istediğinize karar vererseniz lütfen bizimle bağlantıya geçin.

Aktardığınız deneyimlerin ve görüşlerin araştırmaya doğru yansıtılması için gerçekleştireceğimiz mülakatların ses kaydına alınmasına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Ses kayıtları yazıya aktarılırken gizliliğin korunması açısından isimler ve kişisel bilgiler anonim hale getirilerek kodlanacaktır. Ses kayıt dosyaları ve ses kayıtlarının yazıya dökülmüş halleri çalışma tamamlandıktan sonra imha edilecektir.

Araştırmanın ileride Türkiye’de aktif emek piyasası politikaları bağlamında topluma ve akademik çalışmalara yarar sağlaması beklenmektedir. Gerçekleştirmek istediğimiz araştırmanın size bir risk getirmesi beklenmemektedir. Ancak görüşme sırasında dilediğiniz anda görüşmeyi kesebilir ya da erteleyebiliriz. Görüşmekten veya çalışmaya katkı vermekten vazgeçtiğinizi belirttiğiniz takdirde görüşme kayıtları silinecektir ve araştırma üzerinden yapılacak bilimsel değerlendirmeler için kullanılmayacaktır.

Bu formu imzalamadan önce, çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız varsa lütfen sorun. Daha sonra sorunuz olursa, proje yürütücüsüne (Doç. Dr. Volkan Yılmaz, Ofis Telefonu: 0212 XXX XX XX) ya da araştırmacıya (Cemre Canbazer, Telefonu: 0538 XXX XX XX) sorabilirsiniz. Araştırmayla ilgili haklarınız konusunda Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Yüksek Lisans ve Doktora Tezleri Etik İnceleme Komisyonu’na (SOBETİK) (sbe-ethics@boun.edu.tr) danışabilirsiniz.

Adres ve telefon numaranız değişirse, bize haber vermenizi rica ederiz.

Bana anlatılanları ve yukarıda yazılanları anladım. Bu formun bir örneğini aldım / almak istemiyorum (bu durumda araştırmacı bu kopyayı saklar).
Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

☐ Çalışma kapsamında gerçekleştirilecek mülakat sırasında ses kaydı alınmasına izin veriyorum.

Katılımcı Adı-Soyadı:.....

İmzası:

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

APPENDIX G

LONG QUOTATIONS OF RESPONDENTS (TURKISH)

1. İşsizlik sigortası alanları işsizlik sigortası aldığı dönemde çalışabilir olması ve o çalışabilir olduğu dönemde de İŞKUR'un söylediği şeylerde başka dönemlere göre daha çok İŞKUR'un lafının geçmesi gerekir. Biz 2020 yılında yalnızca bir kişinin iş aramadığı için işsizlik sigortası aldığı dönemde işsizlik sigortasını kestik. O da yurt dışına çıkmış. Yani yurt dışına çıkanın da "Hayırdır, sen niye bize söylemeden gittin?" deyip işsizlik sigortası ödemelerini kestik. Onun dışında da böyle bir etkin mekanizmamız yok. Yani Türkiye'de kamunun zorlayıcı, şartlı konularda son kararı alamadığını düşünüyorum. Alamadığı için de biz mekanizmaları doğru kursak da teknolojik altyapıyla iki kurum arasında entegrasyon sağlasak da nihai olarak olmadığında olacak bir yaptırım yok. O da bizim gücümüzü kırıyor. Biz kimseyi zorlayamıyoruz.
2. Biz genellikle bunu şöyle uyguluyoruz biraz daha kesin ve garanti olması açısından, en az diyorum üç defa kişiye ben iş yönlendirmesi verdiğem ve üçüne de çeşitli nedenlerle . . . Bir kere, yani reddediyorsa ilkinde de kesiyorum bu arada. Mesela, bir kişi geldiğinde, "Hayır, ben bu işe gitmem" diyorsa, açık bir şekilde reddettiye hem işsizlik maaşı hem sosyal yardımını kesmek için gönderebiliyorum. Ama gidiyorsan, görüşüyorsan ve olmuyorsa, tabii, şimdi iş görüşmesi sırasında neler yaşandığını ben bilemiyorum ki yani. Kişi gidip "Hayır, ben iş aramıyorum" mu diyor, yoksa, yani, hakikaten samimi bir şekilde işe girmek istiyor da işveren mi kabul etmiyor, bunu bilemediğimden hemen kesemiyorum. Aslında buna hakkım var yasal olarak. Ama böyle biraz daha garantiye almak açısından yani, tabii son çalıştığı iş, son aldığı maaş, son çalıştığı işle aynı standartta bir iş teklif ediyorum bu arada ve üçüncü seferinde de artık olmuyorsa kesme bahsiyle gönderiyorum, sistem üzerinden otomatik yaptığım bir işlem bu.
3. Zorlayıcı olarak, hak ediş şartlarına göre biraz zorlayıcı, ama ödemedeki en kolay. Yani Almanya'da işsizlik ödeneği alan bir kişiye bir davet gönderdi, iki davet gönderdi, üçüncüsünde kesiyor ödeneği. Bizde öyle bir şey yok. Yani seni davet gönderirsin, kabul etmiyor, kesmiyorsun. Gerekçesi var, ama mantıklı değil. İstanbul içerisinde ulaşım açısından her yer iki vesaitle gidebilirsin aslında. B.'deki adam M.'deki işe "uzak" deyip gitmiyor. Bir vesait var. Biz ödeneği bağlarken zorluyoruz, şartlarımız zor. Son üç yılda altı yüz gün olayı, son dört ayda yüz yirmi gün olma olayı, işten kendi kusuru dışında çıkması lazım.
4. Öderken hiçbir zorlayıcılığımız yok. Çünkü beyan usulü çalışıyoruz biz. Tamamen beyan! Adamın adresi dahi beyan. Sana geldi buraya, ben şu meslek sahibiyim diyor, hiçbir belge istemiyorsun, şurada oturuyorum diyor, hiçbir belge istemiyorsun, ben bunu şuradan mezun oldum diyor, üniversite, hiçbir belge istemiyorsun. Kişi de ödemesini devam ettirebiliyor on ay boyunca. Belki bunu buradaki arkadaşlar da bilmez, şey açıdan bilmez, kaydederken farklı bir meslek, en bulunmayan mesleği kaydetse onu sistem iş

daveti göndermiyor. Çünkü obua sanatçısıym diyor Böyle bir iş sektörü var mı? Yok.

5. Biz genellikle bunu şöyle uyguluyoruz biraz daha kesin ve garanti olması açısından, en az diyorum üç defa kişiye ben iş yönlendirmesi verdiğem ve üçüne de çeşitli nedenlerle... Bir kere, yani reddediyorsa ilkinde de kesiyorum bu arada. Mesela, bir kişi geldiğinde, "Hayır, ben bu işe gitmem" diyorsa, açık bir şekilde reddettiye hem işsizlik maaşı hem sosyal yardımını kesmek için gönderebiliyorum. Ama gidiyorsan, görüşüyorsan ve olmuyorsa, tabii, şimdi iş görüşmesi sırasında neler yaşandığını ben bilemiyorum ki yani. Kişi gidip "Hayır, ben iş aramıyorum" mu diyor, yoksa, yani, hakikaten samimi bir şekilde işe girmek istiyor da işveren mi kabul etmiyor, bunu bilemediğimden hemen kesemiyorum. Aslında buna hakkım var yasal olarak. Ama böyle biraz daha garantiye almak açısından yani, tabii son çalıştığı iş, son aldığı maaş, son çalıştığı işle aynı standartta bir iş teklif ediyorum bu arada ve üçüncü seferinde de artık olmuyorsa kesme bahsiyle gönderiyorum, sistem üzerinden otomatik yaptığım bir işlem bu.
6. Sosyal yardım-istihdam bağlantısı bakımından bir güçlenme ve ilerleme söz konusu. Yani SYDV'ler üzerinden evet, aramızda protokoller var, bu protokoller kapsamında SYDV'lerde hizmet alanların istihdama yönlendirilmesi için SYDV'deki kişilerin İŞKUR veri tabanına erişimiyle ilgili bazı ayrıcalıklar var. Ama bu alt kırılda fazla bir verimlilik ya da sonuç alıcı bir etkisi yok.
7. Yani biz en azından sosyal yardım alan birini biliyoruz, 40 yaşında, geliri yok ve çalışabilir durumda, engellilik ve benzeri durumu da söz konusu değil ve erkek, burada da yine cinsiyetçi olarak önce erkeği önceliyoruz, neden bilmiyorum, kurum politikası olarak söylüyorum, kuruma davet ettiğimizde gelmiyor. Kuruma ikinci kez davet ettiğimizde diyoruz ki sana 50 lira vereceğiz, geliş-gidişin bu 50 liranın içinden karşılayacaksın, yani para veriyoruz, parayı almak için geliyor, parayı alıyor, gidiyor ve sonra da bir daha çağırdığımızda bir daha gelmiyor.
8. Böyle bir beklenti yok. Dönem dönem herhalde yani bahsedildikçe böyle, gündeme geldiği dönemler oluyor. İşte, işsizlik ödeneği gibi bazı bu şekilde istatistikler de veriliyor, sosyal yardım alırken işe girenler ya da işsizlik ödeneği alırken işe girenler, ne kadarı kesildi gibi. Ama "Özellikle bunların üzerine gideceğiz" gibi bir şey yok, bir baskı yok yani.
9. Esasında sistem entegrasyonumuz var, sosyal yardım yararlanıcıları sistemimizde görünüyor, şu kişiler sosyal yardım alıyor diye görünüyor, ama direkt bizim alanımız değil aslında. Bizim verdiğimiz bir yardım olmadığı için direkt müdahalemiz yok onlara.
10. Zaman zaman Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığından bizi ararlar, derler ki "Biz bu kişiyi yönlendiriyoruz, buna iş bulunması hususunda yardımcı olun" diye. Yardımcı oluyoruz, eğer bir art niyet seziyorsak karşı tarafa olumsuz bildirimde bulunup sosyal yardımın kesilmesini sağlıyoruz. Ama yaptık mı? Yapmadık.

11. Biz gelmediği zaman ona bir sen evde oturuyorsun, niye gelmiyorsun diyemiyoruz ve bunu sosyal yardımı kesmek üzerine bir mekanizmayı çalıştıramıyoruz. Bunun yönetmeliği de var, yönetmeliğe göre kesilir hükmü de var, yazmışız. Ama uygulamada bunu kimseye yapamıyoruz. Çünkü hiçbir bakan ben sosyal yardımları kesen kişi olamam diyor. Hayır, teknik altyapı da var. Biz gerçekten İŞKUR olarak şu anda Sosyal Yardımlaşma GM'nin kime, hangi kaleminden ne kadar yardım yaptığını aynı, nakdi fark etmez, biliyoruz ve o hanenin nüfus vatandaşlıktan sayısını, yerini, yurdunu, her şeyini biliyoruz yani, işte, MEB'den eğitim seviyesini alabiliyoruz gibi konularda bayağı hani, teknolojik olarak E-devlet entegreli ve kurumlar arası anlık veri paylaşımıyla ciddi bir güç var aslında. Bilgi, veri elimizde. Merkezi olarak bunu çok rahat planlayabiliriz ve isme bile gidebiliriz. Ama ne olacak yani? "Ben çalışmak istemiyorum kardeşim, sadece sosyal yardım alacağım" derse birisi bunun yaptırımını olacak mı?
12. İstihdam edilebilirlik aslında kişiyle görüşmeye başladığınızda zaten iki-üç dakika içerisinde kendini belli eden bir süreç oluyor. Yani iş arama konusunda ne kadar samimi olduğu, bunu ne kadar istediği, yani bir konuşma sırasında bunu tespit edebiliyorsunuz. Çünkü hani, beraber eğer bir meslek eğitimi almış bir kişiyle görüşme yapıyorsam işi hangi kanallardan arayabileceği gibi ya da şu an için benim sistemimde o pozisyonda kaç işverenin personel aradığını konuşuyorsun ve sonra örnek ilanlar incelemeye başlıyorsun. Zaten seni dinlemesi, dinliyor olması, sorular sorması, görüşmek istemesi... İş ilanı ve iş yerinden, detaylarından bahsettikten sonra iş görüşme yapıp yapmak istemediğini soruyorum. Bu noktalarda artık tayin edilebilen bir şey.
13. Aslında o kadar fazla mesleksiz insan var ki... Kuruma iş aramak bahsiyle başvuran herkesi meslek edindirme kursuna yönlendirseniz yeri aslında. Çünkü yani gerçekten çok büyük bir problem olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. "Ne iş olsa yaparım, fark etmez", "Ne iş arıyorsunuz?" "Vasıfsız" falan gibi, gerçekten çok büyük bir yüzde bu.
14. Yani adam ilkokulu bitirdikten sonra her şey tamam diyor. Yani çoğu da zaten ilkokulu bitirdikten sonra, ortaokulu bitirdikten sonra iş hayatına atılmış insanlar. Ama şimdi işsizler ve ve şimdi işsiz oldukları için de sıkıntı yaşıyorlar. Bu sıkıntıyı aşabilmeleri için kendilerini geliştirmeleri gerekiyor, diğerlerinden farklı olmaları gerekiyor. Arkadan bangır bangır bir nesil geliyor. Ama bunu farkında değiller ve reddediyorlar. Aslında biz de bunun için biraz aydınlatmaya çalışıyoruz insanları, "Kendinizi geliştirin" diyoruz yani.
15. Roman vatandaşlar da dezavantajlı gruplar arasında, onları da ekleyelim. Ama olmadı, çok zorlandık biz. Romanlar katılmak istemiyor yani. Denemeye bile ikna edemiyoruz insanları.
16. Eğitimli birisi geldiği zaman ona uygun ilan olmuyor. Kariyer.net'e yönlendirme yapılıyor. Zaten onlar bu kanalları biliyorlar. Geleni boş çevirmemek adına yönlendiriyoruz. Biz sonuçta hizmet vermek zorundayız.

17. Mesela řu an iř arayan hiřbir kiři zellikle niversite mezunu mhendis, mimar, ğretmen, doktor, st sınıf kiřiler bize bařvuru yapmaz. Bize o iři arayan firmalar da ilan vermez, gider Kariyer.net'e ilan verir. O kiři de gider oraya bařvurur. Bizim aktifteki zayıflıėımız bu. Biz bilakis, buraya gelen iřilere mezuniyetini ve mesleėini ğrendikten sonra Kariyer.net'e bařvur diyoruz yani. Dolayısıyla o adam bize gelmiyor iř aramak iin.
18. İřte, ocuėu olanlar, beř yařtan on beř yařa kadar anneler iin de 110 lira gibi bir deme yapıyoruz, diėer programlarda 108 lira. Bakınca iki liralık bir fark var aslında, biraz daha yksek olabilir. Ama desteėin olması iyi bir řey.
19. İřte, ocuėu olanlar, beř yařtan on beř yařa kadar anneler iin de 110 lira gibi bir deme yapıyoruz, diėer programlarda 108 lira. Bakınca iki liralık bir fark var aslında, biraz daha yksek olabilir. Ama desteėin olması iyi bir řey.

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