

ATTEMPTS AT CONSTRUCTING COUNTER-SPACE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TWO ISTANBUL NEIGHBORHOODS

DOĞUKAN DERE

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2019

ATTEMPTS AT CONSTRUCTING COUNTER-SPACE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TWO ISTANBUL NEIGHBORHOODS

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Sociology

by

Doğukan Dere

Boğaziçi University

2019

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Doğukan Dere, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....Doğukan.....

Date16.07.2019.....

ABSTRACT

Attempts at Constructing Counter-Space: A Comparative Study of Two Istanbul Neighborhoods

This thesis analyzes the historical processes of counter-space experiments in two gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul: 1 Mayıs (Mustafa Kemal) and Küçük Armutlu. Unplanned urbanization, as a result of capitalist uneven development, has led to the formation of gecekondu neighborhoods all over Istanbul since the 1950s. From the moment of their formation gecekondu neighborhoods faced the threat of demolition due to their unauthorized status and other legal problems. The people of gecekondu neighborhoods developed different strategies in order to survive as a neighborhood. These strategies included patronage relations with legal populist parties as well as extra-legal institutions such as land mafias, forming their own organizations to struggle for their right for housing and legalization, etc. This thesis investigates the historically and spatially specific strategies developed by the actors within the neighborhoods of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu neighborhoods. These strategies are discussed as instances of “counter-space formation”, and later on counter-space consolidation or dissolution. The thesis presents four dynamics of the formation and permanency of the counter-spaces in these two neighborhoods: i) the demolition threats they faced ii) the legal status of these settlements iii) the structure of the organizations inhabitants have formed to protect their housing rights iv) the organization of the space, especially in a political and symbolic manner. It offers a detailed comparative analysis of the two cases based on the proposed four axes to explain why the counter-space formed in Küçük Armutlu has survived in the face of various threats while in 1 Mayıs it has failed and gave way to a commodified land and housing market.

ÖZET

Karşı Mekan İnşa Girişimleri:

İki İstanbul Mahallesinin Karşılaştırmalı İncelenmesi

Bu tez, İstanbul'un iki gecekondulu mahallesinde, 1 Mayıs (Mustafa Kemal) ve Küçük Armutlu'da ortaya çıkmış olan karşı-mekan deneyimlerini karşılaştırmalı ve tarihsel açıdan incelemektedir. Kapitalizmin eşitsiz gelişim yasasının bir sonucu olarak plansız kentleşme, 1950'lerden bu yana İstanbul'un dört bir yanında gecekondulu mahallelerinin oluşmasına yol açmaktadır. Yasalarca yasadışı ilan edildikleri için, gecekondulu halkı, evlerini yapmaya başladıkları andan itibaren yasal belirsizliklerin yanı sıra doğrudan yıkım tehdidiyle karşı karşıya kalırlar. Gecekondulu mahallerinde yaşayan insanlar bu durumla başa çıkabilmek için farklı stratejiler geliştirmişler. Bu stratejiler arasında yasal popülist partilerle geliştirilen himaye/iltimas ilişkileri, arazi mafyasına haraç ödemeye dayalı güvence elde etmeye çalışmak, barınma hakkı ve yasallaşma mücadelesini kendi özgücüne ve yerel örgütleriyle sürdürmek gibi yöntemler vardır. Bu tez, 1 Mayıs ve Küçük Armutlu'da ortaya çıkmış, daha doğrusu mahallelerdeki aktörler tarafından geliştirilmiş tarihsel ve mekansal olarak spesifik stratejileri incelemektedir. Bu stratejiler, karşı-alan oluşumu ve daha sonrasında korunması, geliştirilmesi ya da çözülmesi bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. Mevcut tez i) mahalleyi hedef alan yıkım süreçlerini ii) yerleşimlerin yasal statüsünü iii) mahallenin örgütsel yapısını iv) mekanın örgütlenmesini -özellikle politik ve sembolik açıdan-, karşı-mekanın oluşması ve devamlılığı açısından belirleyici dört ana etken olarak ortaya koyar; ve bu dört eksen temel alarak karşı-mekan deneyiminin neden Küçük Armutlu'da başarıya ulaştığını ancak 1 Mayıs'ta başarısız bir deneyim olarak kaldığını açıklamaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to begin by acknowledging my advisors: Tuna Kuyucu and Mine Eder, for their sincerity, very valuable guidance, intellectual support, fair criticisms, and patience.

Then, I would like to thank to the members of my thesis committee: Ayfer Bartu Candan, Şükrü Aslan, and Murat Cemal Yalçın; for their interest, guidance, and eye-opening conversations.

Even though they were not officially part of the dissertation process, I would like to mention precious support of Hatice Senem Doyduk, Bülent Küçük, and Ceren Özselçuk; as they contributed a lot to this thesis by the insights and motivation they provided in our discussions.

Turgut, Sinan, Ladin, Ilgın, Ayşe, Özgün, Tilbe, Ayşe Su, Baran, Kaan, Murat. Most of them were extremely busy due to their own agendas, yet they showed great solidarity in this process. I owe a debt of gratitude to them for their assistance. Without them, it would be much harder for me to come up with this thesis. Here, I want to express a special gratitude to Gizem who displayed enormous level of support whenever I need even though she was highly busy with her own thesis process.

My colleagues: Güzin, Caner, Turgut, Ekin, Ege; for their kind understanding and help during the last months as I was struggling with my thesis.

Meriç, who as always, did not spare his hearty companionship, understanding and support in each and every day of this period; Hazal, who did not hesitate to make me feel her sincere support during this whole process that at times became mentally

exhausting, and many friends who I can not name one by one in this limited space but the very existence of them was clearly a precious luck in this process as always.

Şota, Angel, Roza, Beyaz, Tekir, Siyah, Nohut, Suma and all other non-human friends; for all the things they have been teaching me, as well as the all the feelings we share which are indispensable for me during this period and throughout my life.

My parents, Serpil and Cemil Dere; always making me feel their precious unconditional love, support and understanding.

All inhabitants of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu; for their sincerity, hospitality and the inspiration . Especially Mustafa Abi and Engin as they spent their precious time to ease my way during my fieldwork in 1 Mayıs Mahallesi. And to Olcay who is still in prison as I finished this thesis and writing these sentences. I had a chance to meet him in Küçük Armutlu and he provided valuable and sincere support for my inquiry.

Lastly, I would like to present my respect and gratitude all those people around the world who build a neighborhood from scratch by their sweat and blood, in a struggle for their rights and their lives, as did the people of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu.

*During the initial two years of my master program preceding my dissertation year, I had monthly funding from TÜBİTAK as a scholarship holder.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 The motivation of the thesis, its aim and the research ques- tions.....	1
1.2 The structure of the thesis.....	10
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY.....	14
2.1 Theoretical framework and literature review.....	14
2.2 Methodology.....	35
2.3 Limitations.....	40
CHAPTER 3: 1 MAYIS NEIGHBORHOOD.....	43
3.1 The main features of the neighborhood	43
3.2 The pre-history of the neighborhood and its foundation.....	45
3.3 1 Mayıs neighborhood as a counter-space	47
3.4 The decline of the counter-space: The process of dissolution.....	58
3.5 The spatial interventions in 1 Mayıs neighborhood.....	74
3.6 The conclusion of the chapter.....	77
CHAPTER 4: KÜÇÜK ARMUTLU.....	80
4.1 The main features of Armutlu and Küçük Armutlu.....	80
4.2 The pre-history of the neighborhood.....	83
4.3 The construction of the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu: The foundation of Küçük Armutlu and the subsequent period of the struggle for existence.....	86
4.4 The continuance of the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu: 1992 Onwards.....	98

4.5 The spatial interventions of the counter-space experiment in Küçük Armutlu.....	111
4.6 The conclusion of the chapter	117
CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.....	119
5.1 The first two axes: The effects of demolitions and the variations in legal status	120
5.2 The third axis: The organizational	125
5.3 The fourth axis: (Re)production and (re)organization of space.....	137
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	144
6.1 Summary and concluding remarks.....	144
6.2 Further questions.....	152
REFERENCES.....	156
APPENDIX A: THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE BOGAZICI LAW.....	160
APPENDIX B: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM HALKIN YOLU (IN TURKISH).....	163
APPENDIX C: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM İÇERİDEN ANLATILAR: 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİNİN İNŞAASI - 1 (IN TURKISH).....	164
APPENDIX D: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT - 1 (IN TURKISH).....	165
APPENDIX E: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM İÇERİDEN ANLATILAR: 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİNİN İNŞAASI - 2 (IN TURKISH).....	166

APPENDIX F: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT - 2 (IN TURKISH).....	167
APPENDIX G: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM THE MİLLİYET NEWSPAPER (IN TURKISH).....	168
APPENDIX H: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT – 3 (IN TURKISH).....	169
APPENDIX I: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ INHABITANT (IN TURKISH).....	170
APPENDIX J: THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A KÜÇÜK ARMUTLU INHABITANT (IN TURKISH)....	171
APPENDIX K: THE LYRICS OF THE SONG WRITTEN AFTER SEVCAN YAVUZ.....	172

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> Justice and Development Party
ANAP	<i>Anavatan Partisi</i> Motherland Party
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> Republican People's Party
DEV-SOL	<i>Devrimci Sol</i> Revolutionary Left
DEV-YOL	<i>Devrimci Yol</i> Revolutionary Path
DHKP-C	<i>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi</i> Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
DP	<i>Demokrat Parti</i> Democrat Party
FSM	<i>Fatih Sultan Mehmet Mahallesi</i> Fatih Sultan Mehmet Neighborhood
FP	<i>Fazilet Partisi</i> Virtue Party
FTKSME	<i>Faşist Teröre Karşı Silahlı Mücadele Ekipleri</i> Squads of Armed Struggle Against the Fascist Terror
HDP	<i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i> Peoples' Democratic Party
HEP	<i>Halkın Emek Partisi</i> People's Labor Party
HMM	<i>Halkın Mühendis Mimarları</i> People's Engineers and Architects
İDMMA	<i>İstanbul Devlet Mühendislik ve Mimarlık Akademisi</i> Istanbul State Academy of Engineering and Architecture
İSKİ	<i>İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi</i> Water and Sewerage Administration of Istanbul
İTÜ	<i>İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi</i> Istanbul Technical University
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> Nationalist Movement Party

MLKP	<i>Marksist Leninist Komünist Parti</i> Marxist Leninist Communist Party
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerén Kurdistan</i> Kurdistan Workers' Party
PSAKD	<i>Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği</i> Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association
RP	<i>Refah Partisi</i> Welfare Party
SHP	<i>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</i> Social Democratic Populist Party
ŞPO	<i>Şehir Plancıları Odası</i> Chamber of City Planners
TAYAD	<i>Tutuklu ve Hükümlü Aileleri Yardımlaşma Derneği</i> Association for Solidarity with the Relatives of Prisoners and Detainees
THKO	<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu</i> People's Liberation Army of Turkey
THKP-C	<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi</i> People's Liberation Party/Front of Turkey
TKP/ML	<i>Türkiye Komünist Partisi / Marksist-Leninist</i> Communist Party of Turkey / Marxist-Leninist
TMMOB	<i>Türk Mühendis ve Mimarlar Odaları Birliği</i> Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TÜİK	<i>Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu</i> Turkish Statistical Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The motivation of the thesis, its aim, and the research questions

In the winter of 2013, I made my first visit to Küçük Armutlu. The reason for the visit was to realize a fieldwork for the final paper of my urban sociology course. As far as I know, Küçük Armutlu was threatened by gentrification due to the Teknopark Project of Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ)¹. My aim was to observe the reaction of the inhabitant against the gentrification attempt. Even though I thought that I already heard about the political orientations of the inhabitants of Küçük Armutlu, I was not expecting what I was about to witness.

As the bus passed through the roads of Armutlu, I had thoughts about the discrepancy between the nearby wealthy neighborhoods of Levent and Etiler, and the gecekondu neighborhood of Armutlu. Kahvehanes, bakkals, roads, irregular apartments of Armutlu all resembling a provincial town, in the face of famous shopping malls and sumptuous skyscrapers of Levent, luxurious and spacious apartments of Etiler, lavish social life of Beşiktaş which hosts “trendy” coffehouses and bars which are almost 7/24 overpopulated. However, when I got out of the bus in the station and began my walk from Büyük Armutlu to Küçük Armutlu, I witnessed yet another, and even more impressive drastic change in the atmosphere. The main road advancing through the heart of Küçük Armutlu were decorated with the waving red flags on both sides. The walls surrounding the roads were full of political banners, posters, slogans and symbols related with a radical revolutionary organization. The names

¹ A significant portion of the lands on which the neighborhood was settled upon is officialy under the deed of İTÜ. Occasionally, the university drives its will for the demolition of gecekondu settlements in this region. (Radikal, 2004)

and paintings of the revolutionary figures, especially those who lost their lives “in the struggle” were calling people to “the struggle” and to “a different world”.

All this was taking place at the center of Istanbul which has been governed by Islamist/conservative mayors since 1994, and in an oppressive situation in which people of the neighborhood still face injuries and deaths during police operations, just a bus away from my university (the Boğaziçi University), my living space (Beşiktaş), and the wealthiest neighborhoods of Istanbul, Etiler and Levent.

As I had spent more time in the neighborhood, get in touch with the inhabitants and activist, and deepen my research about the neighborhood, I had understand realized that it was not only about the abundance of surrounding political elements, and high-level of political partisanship within the neighborhood, there was a difference in the social fabric and organization of the social and economic realm. There were mass gatherings of the people in which social problems and potential solutions are discussed. If there was an urgent problem of any inhabitant, there was a corresponding emergent solidarity to solve it (for example, when the roof of a house was demolished due to a storm, the needed materials were collected from the hardware shops and it was rebuilt by a collective effort. Furthermore, I figured out that the neighborhood holds the initial planning to a large extent; the new settlement was constructed in a harmony with the principles of the initial planning, most of the spatial changes were realized with the consent of a committee which claims to care for the collective interest of the neighborhood.

Since this moment of my life, the given socio-spatial existence provoked an urge within me towards understanding the dynamics behind forming and preserving such spaces in poor urban neighborhoods. A few years later, when I was contemplating about the future subject of my master thesis, the same urge was still on my mind.

My curiosity was triggered even more given the re-consolidation of the oppressive character of the Turkish State especially towards religious and ethnic minorities, working class people, and radical revolutionary organizations. Remembering that the 1990s which corresponds to the initial years of Küçük Armutlu is characterized by excessive use of physical force targeting the areas and people that are marked by a support towards radical revolutionary organizations and the Kurdish Independence Movement. The question of how and why became much more intriguing. Moreover, Küçük Armutlu occupies enormous valuable lands due to i) a great Bosphorus view which is an important factor rising prices of houses and lands ii) its proximity to the E-80 highway and Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge passing through the Bosphorus iii) its proximity to the wealthy districts such as Etiler and Levent, and central business district of the city, Maslak. Hence the geographical positioning of Küçük Armutlu became the third important aspect enchainning my curiosity.

At the same period, I was also beginning to develop an interest for the neighborhood known as 1 Mayıs (May Day). 1 Mayıs neighborhood is another politically left-oriented poor neighborhoods of İstanbul. Like Küçük Armutlu, it was formed as a gecekondu neighborhood and became a focus locality for urban social movements in İstanbul for a while. Furthermore, my interest was even more triggered due to the social history of the neighborhood, especially the 1977-78 process including the People's Committee experience. This experience was very similar to the *counter-space* constitution process of Küçük Armutlu and it provided various significant similarities and differences to contemplate on.

During their initial phase, gecekondu neighborhoods are keen to develop collective action practices and solidarity networks because of the need of collectivity in the face of the demolitions and social needs as affordable food, clean water, transpor-

tation, electricity, security, etc. However, this tendency might be undermined through patronage relations developed with the municipalities, governing populist parties and land mafias. 1 Mayıs neighborhood, in the 1970s, presented a unique example in the history of gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul by promoting self-organization and self-governance on the basis of the People's committee which functioned as the democratically elected decision-making and executing central body. A peculiarity of the neighborhood was the planned spatial organization of the neighborhood by the People's committee which left a prominent and valuable experience. According to the plan developed by the People's Committee with the contribution of Urban Planners Chamber, every house should occupy the approximately same land, the field left empty for roads and needed social space can not be filled with any construction, every family can own only one house (those who possess any other house should be exempted from the neighborhood). After the dissolution of the People's Committee, the military coup of 1980 and the process of legalization in 1984 and between 1989-1994, the neighborhood lost its founding characteristics part by part.

Today, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi still consist of Alevi majority and significant Kurdish and Zaza population. Politics wise, in the general elections of June 2015, the total vote for the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) constitutes approximately percent of all votes in Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi; the former 48.5, and the latter 21.0 as the ruling, right-wing Justice and Development Party (the AKP) and its ally in the future (not yet in that elections) ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (the MHP) could get twenty-five percent all together (Seçim Atlası, n.d.). Additionally, radical leftist organization still possess significant level of sympathy and organizational action in the neighborhood as crystalized by the walls of the alleys that are covered with the names and slogans of these organiza-

tions. However, just like the other gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul, the settlement within the neighborhood appears as disorderly and chaotic . There are nearly no gardens left, and the buildings rise almost in an interwoven manner. The initially primacy of use-value regarding the housing and planning is replaced by the logic of capital interest and houses began to circulate as commodities in the “free market” of the city. Any kind of self-organizational or self-governing body, responsible of whole neighborhood, does not exist. The official *muhtarlık* appears as the legal governing mechanism, and the hometown associations (*hemşehri dernekleri*) together with the PSAKD Association (an Alevi association situated in the Cemevi which function as the socio-cultural center of the neighborhood), act as an intermediary mechanism in the solution of social and legal problems of the neighborhood.

In the light of all these, rather realizing a case study focusing on the peculiarities and particularities of a specific neighborhood, I decided on realizing an examination which will include both Küçük Armutlu and 1 Mayıs and try to understand dynamics reinforcing and undermining the self-organized, self-governing, collective structure that both neighborhoods aimed to form in their formation period; by hoping that the common aims, initial similarities, comparable processes, and divergent outcomes would provide a fertile ground on which a scientific comparison would reveal.

As stated, there are important similarities between these two gecekondu neighborhoods, especially regarding their initial phase (pre-counter space phase), which strengthen the logic behind this comparative inquiry and its validity. First of all, both of neighborhoods predominantly composed of Alevi people and people who already have pro-leftist political tendency. Secondly, both neighborhoods were formed on the lands already parceled by the land mafia (Aslan, 2016; Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). So there was a tension between the inhabitants and the land mafia as the inhabitants had

to pay in order to build and preserve their dwellings. Thirdly, even though there is a non-negligible difference regarding the levels, both neighborhoods were formed in a period in which the left-wing politics (both center-left and radical revolutionary left) were on the rise on the national level (the second half of the 1970s and the very late 1980s and the early 1990s). Fourthly, radical revolutionary organizations were very effective in the formation process of both neighborhoods and the People's Committees were formed under the leadership of them as juxtaposition of three folded process: increasing outside pressure (demands of land mafias and threat of demolition by the state), inner needs (physical needs of the neighborhood as clean water, electricity, affordable food, etc.), appropriate cadres and agendas of socialist organizations .

After the four main similarities of the initial / pre-counter space phase; there are three main similarities regarding the initial counter-space process in which neighborhoods developed their own institutions as part of their struggle for existence. First of them is a widespread discrediting in the mainstream media via labeling the neighborhoods as “liberated zones” in which, dangerous or terrorist organizations implement their rule by brutal force and rule over the neighborhood as they wish . Secondly, both neighborhoods had faced exhaustive demolition attempts and frequent police operations. Lastly, the main similarity which provides the basis of my thesis, both these two neighborhoods implemented fundamental features of a counter-space² which are described in this thesis as i) primacy of use-value/public interest over exchange-value regarding the planning ii) elimination or limitation of commodification

² The more detailed presentation and explanation regarding the how the term is conceptualized will be provided in the following section when the theoretical framework is explained

of land and houses iii) collective organization of social and physical needs of the neighborhood, as well as developing appropriate institutions and social practices.

Despite all these similarities, there are also significant differences among the two neighborhoods. However, as we will see in the forthcoming paragraphs, these differences do not undermine the conditions of comparison, indeed, some of them makes the main question of this thesis more interesting and more puzzling.

The first difference is the geographical one. As stated before, Küçük Armutlu is situated above (west of) Baltalimanı and close to the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge. Its central position and proximity to Etiler, Levent, and the Bosphorus make the locality one of the most valuable places in Istanbul. On the other hand, 1 Mayıs is on the border of Ümraniye and Ataşehir on the Asian side of Istanbul. The increasing urbanization nearby and development of Ataşehir as a growing district for the middle-income group and increased job opportunities for white-collar workers raised the value of the lands and houses in 1 Mayıs. There are two main outcomes of the given geographical difference. The first one is that some of Küçük Armutlu falls under the jurisdiction of the Boğaziçi Law, a special law to protect the Bosphorus strait and puts strict regulations for any construction in the “Boğaz Öngörüm Bölgesi” -the regions that are not on the Bosphorus line but just behind it and have a clear Bosphorus view-, and less strict regulations on “Boğaz Geri Görünüm Bölgesi” -more distant to the coastline- (See Appendix A). This difference obstructs and complicates the process of legalization of settlements in Küçük Armutlu (which might be accepted as a reinforcing factor for developing solidarity networks and collective resistance as the legalization does not seem realistic).

The second one is the fact that Küçük Armutlu attracts more attention from the rent-seeking construction bourgeoisie due to its high value. The land might generate

billions of dollars by -for example- the sale of luxurious residences if necessary legal arrangements are made or the existing laws are overlooked which appears to be a possibility in the current context of Istanbul as the settlements in the coastline of Ataköy show (Radikal, 2014). This threat might reinforce collective solidarity as there is a need for a strong anti-gentrification action. However, it also means that there are more assaults on the neighborhood as it whets appetite hence make it harder to consolidate a self-organized, collectively organized poor neighborhood in such locality.

The third difference is related to the second one in one aspect, but not limited to it. The attitude of the state and its forces were very similar towards both gecekonddu neighborhoods in their initial phases. However, if the whole historical processes of the two neighborhoods are evaluated, it would be fair to state that Küçük Armutlu has been exposed to more assaults and operations. Two main reasons can be suggested regarding this situation. The first one is directly related to the high-value of Küçük Armutlu, hence it might be argued that the displacement of the people of Küçük Armutlu might have primacy for the state and the bourgeois actors desirous for its gentrification. Secondly, while 1 Mayıs still appears as a strong hold for radical left, when the neighborhood was legalized in 1980 and obtained title deed allocation documents in 1984, its status as a “liberated zone” in the eyes of the state as weakened well as the weakening of collective existence accompanied by the void of self-governing organizational structures such as the People’s Committee. Küçük Armutlu, on the other hand, remained more or less “loyal” to its founding principles and preserved its highly organized structure, self-governing committees, and councils, as well as the limitations on the commodification of land and labor. As a result of this differentiation, after the operations of the 1980 military coup 1 Mayıs neigh-

neighborhood faced very limited demolition attempts compared to Küçük Armutlu. Regarding the assault and operations targeting political figures or organizations within the neighborhood, 1 Mayıs has been one of the top neighborhoods of Istanbul up to the present day; however, even in this realm the assaults and operations realized within Küçük Armutlu appear as more frequent and targeting not only specific political persons or a group of people, but the ordinary people thus perceived as “more threatening” regarding the daily lives of inhabitants of the neighborhood. Under normal circumstance, the expected result of this differentiation would be an undermining effect for the consolidation of the self-organized poor neighborhood as a counter-space as it increases the risks and prices for the inhabitants.

Considering all these similarities and differences, the question of why the paths differed in the given specific way became more interesting, and a multi-dimensional comparison between Küçük Armutlu and 1 Mayıs appeared as a very fertile choice to explore the dynamics reinforcing and undermining the formation and especially consolidation process of a self-organized, self-governing counter spaces in the context of unrecognized poor neighborhoods within the urban realm.

The research I conducted to find possible answers to this puzzling question took approximately six months. During these months, I conducted field research in both neighborhoods which involved regular visits to Küçük Armutlu and 1 Mayıs neighborhood, close observation of the physical and social environments, and in-depth interviews and focus group interviews with local inhabitants and prominent political figures, ex and present activists, members of various associations, etc.. The readings on the previous academic and non-academic materials, and studies on the related material as political journals, newspapers, official documents constituted the remaining part of my research. During this effort, four factors became prominent as

the main factors affecting the transformation of these gecekondu neighborhoods. The comparative analysis is constructed around these four axes: the event of demolition and demolition threat, the legal status of the settlements, the organizational structure of the neighborhood, and (re)production and (re)organization of space with a symbolic and political perspective.

1.2 The structure of the thesis

The chapter following the introduction presents the theoretical framework, literature review and the methodology of the thesis. The second chapter opens with the main question of the thesis followed by the explanation of the central concepts and their roots in the existing theoretical literature. The chapter continues with a theoretical discussion on the relationship between capitalism and modern urban reality. The discussion is succeeded by the presentation of the historical context of informal settlements within modern cities and the conditions of the formation of gecekondu neighborhoods in the metropolises of Turkey; more specifically, Istanbul. Then, I present the method (theoretical), and analytical structure of the thesis (analytic comparison based on historical, eventful, organization and spatial aspects), main questions, the four axes of analysis, the assertions of the thesis based on this four axes analysis. Lastly, the chapter concludes with the methodology of the fieldwork (design of the field research) and the limitations of the chosen methodology.

Chapter 3 begins with the historical context in which 1 Mayıs neighborhood was founded after laying the historical background. The chapter continues by presenting the process of foundation, the grand demolition on the 2nd of September 1977, the experience of the People's Committee associated with self-organization and self-governance (1977-1978), its dissolution and the succeeding historical pro-

cesses marked by three critical juncture (the 1980 military coup, the title deed allocation documents given in 1984, the transformation process between 1989-1994 under the municipal governance of Social Democratic Populist Party – the SHP) respectively. The main of this chapter is to explain the socio-spatial history of 1 Mayıs neighborhood and provide basis regarding the four axes-ed comparative discussion in the chapter 5.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to Küçük Armutlu. The chapter begins with providing brief information on the geography, demography, cultural and political disposition of the neighborhood. Succeeding the historical background, I present the founding process of Küçük Armutlu as a distinct neighborhood (apart from Armutlu) in detail. In the remaining of the chapter, the subsequent historical process is presented with a specific emphasis on i) the demolitions and demolition attempts ii) the decisive events in the collective memory of the neighborhood as the death of Seven Yavuz and the period of 2000-2002 marked by death fasts within the neighborhoods iii) organizational structures developed around or aside the People's Committee. Chapter 3 and chapter 4, the former for 1 Mayıs Mahallesi and the latter for Küçük Armutlu, aims to provide their socio-political and spatial history since their formation; and tries to realize this with a specific focus on the main four analytical axes of the thesis' (legal status of settlements, demolitions, organizational forms and institutions, political and symbolic spatial interventions) in order to provide the basis for the discussion in chapter 5 and the conclusion chapter.

Chapter 5 constitutes the core of this thesis as it provides a comparative analysis of the neighborhoods over the four axes listed above. In the first section of the chapter, the first two axes, the eventful and the legal, are evaluated together as determinants of the social perception of property and sense of collectivity within the

neighborhoods. The effects of the threat of demolitions, realized demolitions, and subsequent effort of rebuilding (the eventful axis); and the effects of different legal status as the existence of official documents as title deed, land deed, deed allocation documents or lack of any official document and different laws binding the lands and settlements such as Boğaziçi Law (the legal axis) are discussed. In the following section, the organizational structures of the neighborhoods are compared both in the process of counter-space formation and in the processes of consolidation (Küçük Armutlu) or the dissolution (1 Mayıs). This comparison includes the functioning of the central body i.e. the People's Committee, its subcommittees, other supporting or competing institutions. The third and the last section is devoted to the presentation of the spatial interventions, especially symbolic and political, and their effects on the creation and maintenance of collective memory and collective identity which appear to be crucial factors reinforcing the formation and consolidation of a counter-space.

As a result of these analyses, I propose following arguments: (i) for organized neighborhoods that does not dissolve after demolitions, the grand demolitions lead to immensely collectivizing and de-commodifying (thus pro counter-space) effects. Solidarity building networks for preparations (pre-demolition), collective physical resistance (during demolition), collective rebuilding process (right after demolition), providing basis for legitimacy-making counter-narratives and collective social memory (post-demolition) are four-folded process in which demolitions as an event influence the consolidation of a counter-space in an urban poor neighborhood. (ii) Legal status (or its lacking) may undermine (or promote) solidarity opportunities as well as collective understanding of properties as land and houses, as it enables individualization of these properties and circulation of them within the capitalist market as commodities. Additionally, it may lead to social stratifications as landlords and

tenants which may weaken the sense of collectivity. Thus, proposes a threat for counter-space consolidation. (iii) a central decision making and executing body that organizes the self-organization and self-governance of the neighborhood, and capable of needed sanctioning mechanism in order to struggle against the potential social problems within a counter-space (such as free-riding or other forms of emphasizing individual benefits at the cost of collective interests) appears as beneficiary and fundamental in the process of counter-space consolidation. Political and physical monopoly and homogeneity within the neighborhood, but especially within this central body appears to strengthen these capacities thus increases chances of the consolidation. (iv) The production and reproduction of the social space in a way that binds politics/symbolic interventions favoring collective identity, and physical interventions answering public needs, plays a significant beneficiary role in the consolidation of a counter-space (vi) regarding all these, durability and consolidation of a counter-space is a multi-dimensional process bounded to specific

Chapter 6, as the concluding chapter, provides a brief summary of the thesis and its main findings. The chapter proceeds by discussing the relation of the thesis with the existing literature and the thesis' possible contributions. The thesis concludes with future questions in order to provide some theoretical and empirical insights for future studies within the field.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Theoretical framework and literature review

2.1.1 The main question and the concept of counter-space

The main question of this thesis is to investigate dynamics that enable a reactionary spatial dynamism of urban poor neighborhood to expand into a constituent struggle to create a persisting counter-space in the context of *gecekondu* neighborhoods of Istanbul. Persistence is important because *gecekondu* neighborhoods, as it will be explained later in this chapter, possess some dynamics that can lead to formation of emergent solidarity during the neighborhood formation process, which appears temporarily as a counter-space but wither away quickly as the initial binding threat disappears. By necessity, this question of persistence and durability includes not solely reinforcing dynamics but also those undermining the survival of counter space in the given social context.

For the above-mentioned inquiry, the two “radical” neighborhoods of Istanbul; 1 Mayıs Mahallesi and Küçük Armutlu are chosen as the samples of this thesis. Both neighborhoods are (in)famous for their radical political history. Since their establishment, they have been a hotbed for radical leftist political organizations and examples of powerful neighborhood struggles against demolition attempts and gentrification. Yet the main reason why I choose to realize a comparative study of the two neighborhoods, lied in one main difference that squirms out of all other similarities and differences. The preservation of the collective identity and action accompa-

nied by the de-commodification of land and housing or at least significant limitations on their circulation as commodities in Küçük Armutlu whereas these features had been withered away in 1 Mayıs after the dissolution of the People's Committee. With reference to Henri Lefebvre's discussions in *Production of Space*; I prefer to inherit the concept of *counter-space* to frame the description stated in the previous sentence:

- i) promotion of the use-value and collective interest of the inhabitants rather than exchange-value / interest of the capital or a specific individuals/circles regarding the process of production and organization of the physical space of the neighborhood (Lefebvre, 1991, 2016)
- ii) total elimination or strong limitation of the commodification of the land and housing. In this manner, de facto ownership of householder does not include potential economic gains that can be derived from renting out or selling these houses
- iii) organization of daily life, especially the solution of the problems and needs of the neighborhood in a collective manner .

As the thesis evaluated the processes of the formation and preservation of counter-space in a gecekondu neighborhood; the main question of thesis formed as under what circumstances a counter-space formed in a poor urban neighborhood can consolidate itself? Or to put it differently, which factors (dynamics/circumstances/conditions) reinforces and which factors undermines the durability/consolidation of an urban poor counter-space? During the thesis, I try to suggest possible arguments and counter-arguments based on comparison regarding the historical process of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu; both of them became self-organized counter-spaces in their initial years; however, later on, the former integrated into capitalist economy in which land and house “freely” circulated as commodities even though it preserved its political identity and culture; whereas, the latter, succeed to preserve strong limitations on commodification of land and housing, while remaining

as self-organized neighborhood struggling against the interventions of the capital and the state, thus consolidated as a counter-space.

2.1.2 Space and the social, capitalism and the urban

As these neighborhood are not in a vacuum, they are in a constant formation in their relation with the surrounding world which is characterized by the imperialist stage of capitalism. The understanding of the functioning and tendencies of this monopolistic stage of the capitalist mode of production is essential to understand the dynamics in which these neighborhoods are formed, and the urban renewal projects and legal or extra-legal interventions against which these neighborhoods constantly re-produce themselves. Housing problems which working segment of the population faces in modern urban spaces, also can not be thought independent of systematic analysis of bourgeois society and capitalism (Engels, 1995). Because of the given relations, I will briefly present the main theoretical framework I inherit with regard to the discussions on the relation between space and class struggle, more specifically between urban space and capitalism.

Henri Lefebvre (1991), conceived as one of the initiators of critical urban theory and Marxist/neo-Marxist examination of space, states the following sentences in his magnum opus, *The Production of Space* :

Capitalism and neo-capitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the 'world of commodities', its 'logic' and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of Monet and that of the political state. This space is founded on the cast network of bank, business centers and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information lattices. Within this space the town - once the forcing house of accumulation, fountained of wealth and center of historical space- disintegrated.(Lefebvre, 1991, p.53)

This assertion regarding capitalism relies on various claims that constitute his understating of a more general phenomenon; the relationship between social for-

mation/social entities and space. In this framework: i) (Social) space is a (social) product ii) every society creates a space, its own space iii) however, space is also historical due to its social character; thus when a new space is tried to be created, it may conflict with historically present space iv) class struggle is not the sole decisive actor of the production of social space; however, it is a fundamental determinant; the antagonistic conflict between labor and capital leads to conflicts in the social space, thus the urban space as well vi) however, the relationship between the social and political existence and space are not unilateral, indeed, dialectical. This dialectical has two dimensions; one is due to the fact that space always predates individuals, groups, and organizations who are trying to be actors on that space, like the relationship between the transformative power of humans and determining power of historical conditions. The other dimension is, even after the space is produced and reproduced by social, political actors, it affects and to some extent even determines the social, political and economic reality reflexively. As a result of all these premises, social space is never fixed; under capitalism, it is much more dynamic than other historical epochs as capitalism itself is the most dynamic social formation among class societies regarding production, destruction, and reproduction of productive forces and social forces of transformation.

Since the formation of cities, the struggle for sovereignty over the cities was a decisive part of class struggle thus central to the social formations (Aslan, 2016; p.45) Since the formation of independent cities in medieval Europe, the cities were spaces of proto-capitalist relations against the feudal formation. Modern urban reality is the space of modern capitalism in which modern bourgeoisie would born. As modern capitalism has been developing, cities have been facing a process of urbanization. Today, along with various other social problems, the demographic equilibrium be-

tween urban and rural, changed in favor of urban for the first time in the history of humankind. Yet, aside from slowing down the process accelerates exponentially. Even the space coded as “rural”, today cannot be thought independent from the process of urbanization (Brenner, 2013)

On the other hand, the urbanization is not a process of “urbanization” of non-urban lands, that is for once and done; the urbanization constantly re-produced within the cities in accordance with the needs of the capital. In this historical context, today modern cities become more and more commodified. Alongside being *escape vecu*, urban space itself becomes a commodity in which organic social phenomena of the past were transformed into capitalist economic relations one by one. During this process, the contradiction and struggle between the use-value and the exchange-value came to the forefront. As it argued by Karl Marx (2017); under capitalism, every commodity has two-sided character: use-value and exchange value. However, it should be remembered that use-value is presented outside of the exchange relations, on the other hand, exchange value necessitates exchange relations. Abstract universal exchange value necessitates universal marked and abstraction of labor-power as social necessary labor-time (Marx, 2017).

The still present process of unplanned urbanization had created and continues to create “illegal” settlement zones in which poor segments of the urban population develop their own solutions to the housing problem of modern capitalism. Within the modern urbanized cities, “illegally” established neighborhoods provide areas in which the given use-value / exchange-value contradictions are crystallized. In these regions, the conflict between the need of people as healthy living places and the need of capital for accumulation constitutes a manifestation of the contradiction between the use-value and exchange-value which are inseparable features of every commo-

ty under the capitalist mode of production. Whether they are called as a shanty town, favela, or gecekondu; these units originated from the juxtaposition of the need of labor power and lack of affordable housing supply in the cities which is manifested as problem of planning uncoupled with the lack of enforcement of regulations. In this situation, working populations who can not afford prices of the already established houses began to form their own shelters via informal solidarity networks or various patronage relations. These operations are realized on the “available land” regardless of the legal status or consent of the title owner. These settlements only produce use-value for the people as it provides a shelter; hence does not produce an exchange value or a commodity at that stage. However, due to the surrounding economy, these settlements have been incorporated to the capitalist circulation thus these entities obtain an exchange value and became a commodity. This process of commodification is a crucial moment in the dissolution of a counter-space as will be discussed under the section dwelling on the post-1980 1 Mayıs neighborhood.

2.1.3 The historical context of gecekondu phenomenon

Historically, the nineteenth century marked the formation of these type of neighborhood in the industrial centers of western capitalist centers, then the twentieth century witnessed the endemic spread of these neighborhoods all over the world. Today, the problem of housing identified with the so-called developing and under-developed countries, began to revive in the countries as the UK (Moore, 2015) as a sign of rising class contradiction within the imperialist centers.

At the end of the Second World War, İstanbul, the glorious capital of the Ottoman Empire, appeared as it lost its glitter as Ankara attracted the bulk of investment and projects as the capital of the yet established Turkish Republic. The population

was 860,000 significantly less than in 1897 when it was 1,059,000 due to various political and economic reasons. The history of gecekonduzation in Turkey can be traced back to the 1940s due to migration from rural areas to cities in need of job opportunity and social services such as schools and hospitals (Erman, 2000). During the 1950s and 1960s, an important substitution industrialization model centered around metropolises accelerated the process. In the first half of the 1960s, 59% of the population in Ankara, 45% of Istanbul, and 33% of Izmir were living in so-called irregular settlements as presented by the studies conducted in the given period by Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement (Buğra, 1998).

While state economic enterprises were more dispersed geographically, the spurt of industrial production was concentrated in İstanbul to a large extent. The primacy is given by the DP to İstanbul in the face of Ankara and relatively rapid industrialization led by the import substitution model, Istanbul began to take a mass number of migrants. From 1950 (983,041) to 1980 (2,772,708); the population nearly tripled. This trend convened with the scarcity and expansiveness of formal housing market for the new arrivers which were dispersed to industrial and service sectors, leading to the phenomena of gecekonduzation (Burkay 2006; Yavuz, 2014). Since the 1960s, the process of urbanization and gecekonduzation did not slow down for the metropolises of Turkey, especially for Istanbul. In each epoch, different economic strategies and socio-political backgrounds accompanied the migration flows; however, the main motivations of new-comers were usually same: get out of the stabile situation of the rural life corresponding to the lack of opportunities, mostly in the realm of jobs and possibly in the realm of social services and facilities. To be sure, Istanbul witnessed politically oriented migration flows in the last decades of the twentieth century due to radicalized politically laden situation of Turkey and surrounding countries (the mass migrations for Balkans, especially Bosnia and Bulgaria; forced

migration of Kurds due to the armed struggle between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the State, and most recently migrants of the Syrian Civil War).

Regarding this historical context, gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul, were always dynamics places socially, economically, and politically. The gecekondu neighborhoods and people were facing exclusion in various forms: social services and facilities, cultural exclusion and abasement (Adaman & Keyder, 2005), and spatial exclusion which separates them from the city (Yonucu, 2008, 2014). Legal exclusion is another aspect as legal non-recognition constitutes another “vulnerable” disposition. As an addition to numerous types of exclusion, the daily practices and collective memory of gecekondu people who just came from the more solidaristic social fabric of rural life; constitute another component of potential discontent and dynamism.

As a result, gecekondu neighborhoods, due to their legally ambiguous, physically threatened and socially excluded conditions possess a ground for a potential counter-space as it offers a practical solution to needs and contradictions of newly forming gecekondu neighborhood. There are two structural reasons that are central to this pro counter-space characteristic: i) -internal- collective needs as clean water, affordable food, electricity, security, building the house as quick as possible ii) - external- in order to be able to struggle against demolition attempt and constitute a pressure towards legalization collective stance is also necessary. The processes of formation, preservation, and legalization lead to a sense of collectivity among the gecekondu builders of the same social space. The collective effort of construction reveals a different understanding of property than the established exclusive/private understanding of houses and house owners. All of these processes also contribute to the specific understating of one’s relation with the dwelling they live on. This can be

summarized as exclusive (private) right on usage in terms of how to live in it (this surely has its own limits as well due to the social structure within which people live) and collective property in decisions (social, economic, political). This special form of social property relations is reinforced especially by the event of demolition which is an immensely important moment of high-level collective mobility and affection. The following process of re-construction which is realized generally as a fully collective practice in which people are sedulously laboring without knowing whose house they are building. Another reinforcement is due to the fact that the actions and decisions of one house affect the fate of other houses in the neighborhood struggle (both in physical resistances and legal.

However, these structural factors do not directly lead to radical mobilizations or the self-organization of gecekondu people for their rights. The same conditions (vulnerability based on ambiguity, physical threat, social exclusion) also forms a base for various political and economic patronage relations with land mafias and populist political parties which can be another way of “solving” daily needs of the neighborhood. In the context of the gecekonduzation process of Istanbul, either land mafias or local political figures (official or nonofficial), both of them having strong patronage relations with the state mechanism, can guarantee safety for gecekondu people in exchange for money. Hence gecekondu neighborhoods face a bifurcation right from the beginning: either to develop their self-organized struggle to defend their “right to shelter” and “right to city” which is almost impossible to do without the latter, or to get involved in patronage relationships either with local extensions of populist parties (such as the Democrat Party – the DP, the Justice Party – the AP, later on the SHP etc.) in exchange of vote and partisanship; or with land mafias in exchange for paying tribute; or sometimes, both of these relations at the same time.

The predominant portion of gecekondu neighborhoods in the given period of 1960-1980 did not possess a high level of counter-space characteristics. The reason behind was the emergence of land speculators and land mafias. As the gecekonduization as a social phenomenon began to emerge, land mafias emerged in the processes as the hegemonic and parasitic entities. The land mafias were basically gangs who have i) necessary connections with the state machinery in order to prevent demolition in their field and ii) physical violence capacity to assure their monopoly in the parcellation of the land which they do not official possess. The story was reversed. The process which can be expected to produce collective identity and collective social property relations in the field of house and land was transformed into a process which may not be legal but clearly reproducing capitalist relations. The land mafia practically holds the monopoly of land. Backed by the threat and -if necessary- use of the physical violence, it declares that it would not allow any settlement on “its land” if the necessary amount of money was not paid to the land mafia. On the other side of the coin, if it is paid, the mafia guarantees that the state will not demolish these houses and in a specific amount of time the settlements will be legalized. In this context, the new comers enter the monopolized market of house/land as the “free” individuals and decide to buy a specific amount of land in exchange with a specific amount of money. In that context, the gecekondu neighborhood is constituted by numerous people or families who realized this exchange with the land mafia, independent from each other (even they are related).

This situation was the faith of the various different gecekondu neighborhood of İstanbul including initial processes in 1 Mayıs and Armutlu before the involvement of the leftist political organizations with an agenda to struggle against the land mafia. Still, the ambiguous period in which neighborhood is “waiting” between demolish-

ment and legalization creates a sense of collectivity; when land mafias began to come up with extra demands in order to realize legalization (we need to bribe the mayor, municipal presidential, etc.), this can also be a cause for increasing collective identity. However, it is clear that the picture is significantly different than the one without the land mafia, and the sense of collectivity never reaches the point when the capitalist, private, exclusionary property of house and land is replaced by more collective understanding and de-commodification if a critical juncture does not happen. Whereas both 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu displays historical examples of such a critical juncture. This critical juncture is the point that needs of the *gecekondu* people, outside pressures (demolition threat and economic demands of land mafia), and political agenda of social organizations in the neighborhood and effectiveness of their cadres come together to form a central body in the neighborhood (the People's Committee) that aims to organize a collective social life in the neighborhood.

However, except cases in which radical leftist organizations took the leadership from the beginning, these two tendencies usually co-existed in the neighborhood, and almost always function as complementary. Even in some neighborhoods that have been associated with radical leftist politics since their formation, the conjunction of the will of some local people to earn more money, an opportunity to vertical structuring, and new waves of migration; lead to the formation of rent economy, an *immoral economy of housing* (Buğra, 1998). In this immoral economy, the new-comers of the later waves of migration had to pay rent to the first wave migrants who now became "gecekondu owners". If vertical structuring was overlooked by the state, this could lead to a situation of apartments owned by one a family; they live on one floor and remaining three or four floors rented out to the new-comers of the neighborhood. These kinds of economic transformations lead to the dissolution of the moral econo-

my which existed if the gecekondu neighborhood tried to exempt itself from the patronage of land mafias; furthermore, it reveals economic stratification, class conflict, and possibly demographic and cultural clusters among different ways of migrant within the neighborhood.

Aside from the economic realm, regardless of their integration to the capitalist economic system of the city; gecekondu neighborhoods continued to be politically vibrant and dynamic places. During the 1970s and 1990s, a significant number of the poor neighborhoods of Istanbul had the presence of left-oriented democratic associations and radical revolutionary organizations. Especially some neighborhoods as 1 Mayıs, Gazi Mahallesi, Nurtepe, Okmeydanı, Gülsuyu became the fortresses of the radical left and maintained as pro-radical left until today. Nevertheless, it would not be historically accurate to categorize gecekondu neighborhoods as places dominated by radical left politics (Karpas, 1976). Some gecekondu neighborhoods played the role of a vote reservoir of center-right populist government- the DP, the AP, etc.- in different historical processes. Less frequently, they might also act as a vote reservoir of center-left populism - the CHP during Ecevit's campaign in the 1970s, and the SHP in the 1989-94 period. Later on, during the last years of the 1980s and the entire 1990s; numerous gecekondu neighborhoods turned into places in which political Islamist line (the Welfare Party – the RP , the Virtue Party – the FP, and lastly, the AKP) gather significant support, mobilization, and organization (Tuğal, 2009). These two different positioning regarding involving in self-struggle or in patronage relations; and four different political dispositions listed above appeared to be contradictory. However, all of these radically different social and political stances root from the same realities and needs that people of gecekondu neighborhoods have.

Regarding the structural “trapped” nature of gecekondu neighborhood in various different aspects as presented in the previous paragraphs; patronage of land mafias or populist political parties, or self-organized struggle reveal as two different solutions attempt to the problem of survival. Similarly, natural discontent of people, who just moved from small towns, against the unfamiliar working and living conditions of the city could lead to more reactionary, conservative political disposition or radical revolutionary disposition. On the other hand, it should be stated that gecekondu neighborhood provides important chances of upward mobility however, this chance is bounded to the legalization or connivance. If there is legalization including a title deed, it would be better to not conceptualize this place as a gecekondu neighborhood anymore because its social, economic, and political dynamics will significant differ. For the other scenario, the content of the connivance decided by legal documents like title deed allocation document (tapu tahsis) or different patronage relations, is decisive to promote centrist or radical stances within the gecekondu neighborhoods. The reason why I dwell upon these is to be able to demonstrate how complex, interesting and important is the gecekondu phenomenon from both political point of view and sociological point of view.

In the last decades, urban struggles generated significant attention in social sciences, especially in sociology and anthropology. Even only in the context of Turkey, numerous studies were realized with a specific focus on the urban regeneration, gentrification and social movements against these currents (Uzun, 2003; Ergun, 2004; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Karaman, 2014; Islam & Sakızoğlu, 2015). Yet, there has been a trend -not limited to the context of Turkey- of repeating critical generalization about capitalism, neoliberalism, gentrification, at the same time, describing and praising local attempts of resistance. I believe that the complexity of the gecekondu

phenomenon with a variety of different historical cases provides an opportunity to go beyond that point

. The question, under which objective and subjective circumstances gecekondu neighborhoods verge towards different and contrasting political and social positions, which are mentioned in the previous paragraph, appears as did not attract enough interest within the field. Even though neighborhoods emerge as oppositional self-organized localities, it is common that these stances remain or eventually become limited to counter-demolition or counter-gentrification struggle. On the other hand, there are few examples that counter-demolition, counter-gentrification struggle of gecekondu neighborhoods are linked to a more comprehensive social struggle, going beyond reactionary mobilization to reach a constitutive mobilization in which space is organized to i) promote use-value at the expense of exchange-value as the determining force of the organization of physical space ii) limit or eliminate commodity feature of land and housing iii) constantly reproduce more collective way of sustaining the needs of the neighborhood and its inhabitants, and organizing daily life . This places can be conceptualized as counter-spaces as they correspond to the two fundamental premises of the Lefebvrian approach (1991); i) bringing use-value forward in expense of exchange-value driven organization of space, thus limitation of capitalist commodification of land and housing, ii) hosting counter-strategy practices that concretizes itself in the given space but does not limit itself to the given space, indeed, acknowledging comprehensive nature of “the struggle” (Lefebvre, 1991). These counter-space examples bring out an exciting question: how come some neighborhoods lose their counter-space-like formation and some maintain? what are the possible factors leading to this divergence?

In order to discuss possible answers to these questions, it will be beneficiary to make comparative research on two neighborhoods corresponding to the two different positions: both of them emerged as counter-spaces, then eventually, the one (1 Mayıs) lost its counter-space qualities even though remaining its pro-radical left political orientations and counter-demolition/gentrification reflexivity whereas the other (Küçük Armutlu) succeeded to remain as a counter-space despite the rises and falls.

2.1.4 The analytical axes and the related theoretical literature

The first task was to decide on the axes on which comparative examination will be realized i.e. the analytical axes. After my examinations on the field and secondary sources on the neighborhoods; I decided that it would be logical to limit the main content of the comparative analysis by four prominent axes of possible demarcation. These axes of possible demarcations are i) demolition and re-construction as a collectivizing “event” ii) legal status: existence or lack of title deed, land deed, or possessing intermediate forms of recognition as *title deed allocation* documents iii) organizational variety and capability of neighborhood (pro counter-space) iv) the symbolic and political (re)production and (re)organization of the social space.

Regarding the axis on the demolitions and re-construction process succeeding it, Nicholas Blomley (2004) provides important theoretical insight. In his influential book *Unsettling the City*, he addresses the complex affiliation of people of illegal settlements and their “property” which cannot be understood by merely legal understandings of property. Blomley (2004) argues that laboring on the land and house which is the case of *gecekondu* people is also a source of justification and legitimacy; furthermore “justifications for the property based on labor ... can also be used to

sustain community claim” (p.74). As legitimacy is derived from the labor given to these “properties”, the events and actions in which this labor is exerted again and again are crucial in the legitimacy-making process of neighborhoods, building solidarity and collective network, and hence the subjectivity of local people. Moreover, story-telling of this kind of events, which constitutes counter-stories (Delgado, 1989) of the neighborhood, plays a critical role in both identity-building and property claims (Blomley, 2004; p.51).

Grand demolitions (here I exclude demolitions of a few houses but refer to demolitions targeting whole neighborhood or a significant portion of it) correspond to both of Blomley’s emphases at the same time: collective laboring and providing identity-building and legitimizing stories. Resistance against demolition attempts is a collective laboring process that resembles the constituent labor of gecekondu people over land, bricks, and cement. If the demolition can be realized, then the labor of reconstruction is again a collective laboring process this time even more like the constitutive labor. (A realized grand demolition may also break the solidarity level of development of solidarity, collective networks, and organizational structures and their capacities become decisive at this turning point. This will be discussed with reference to the aftermath of the grand demolitions realized during the formation phase of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu). Thus, realized or not-realized attempts of grand demolitions and the succeeding process of reconstruction is very decisive events in the history of gecekondu neighborhoods and subjectivity of their inhabitants.

The attempts of demolition are faced when the settlements are not recognized officially or officially declared as illegal. However, in the recent decades, as a policy of the state to deal with the gecekondu question, or a pragmatic policies of vote-

seeking governments, some gecekondu neighborhoods were legalized; some of them could not be fully legalized but were given official documents that did not legalize the settlements as ordinary legal houses but promised their legalization in the future (1984, distribution of tape tahsis documents). For some neighborhoods, gecekondu people were provided with land titles without the provision of house titles. The second axis deals with how the legal status of house and land, and official documents gecekondu people possess affects the organization and social movement in the neighborhood with respect to the formation and maintenance of counter-space. Even though not focusing directly on gecekondu neighborhoods or zones of illegal settlement; there are some prominent academic works which concern with the relationship with home ownership and political/social mobilization.

In this literature, -especially among the works conducted until the 1980s-, the general tendency is to claim that home ownership usually weakens active political and social involvements other than voting (Harvey, 1976; Castells, 1977; Kemeny, 1977; Saunders, 1978). However, more recent researches challenged this tendency (Kingston, Thompson, & Eichar, 1984; Gilderbloom & Markam, 1995; Purcell, 2001). Purcell highlights the importance of various other social factors and claiming that it would be accurate to attain such a direct relationship between homeownership and the weakening of political involvement. The work of Kingston, Thompson, and Eichar (1984) presents an interesting discussion. They claim that we can not declare homeownership as generally de-politicizing because it increases the percentage of voting in the elections and this is also a political act. Also, it might well be thought that ownership would increase commitment to the neighborhood as well as reducing the fear of action. However, homeownership among the working class which may enable them for more political participation as they have house security; plays the

reverse role as it leads to fragmentation among working-class neighborhoods as owners and tenants thus have a dividing and passivizing effect. When *gecekondu* neighborhoods pass the stage of full non-recognition and attain some kind of legal or semi-legal documents on which people may realize legal or illegal property relations as selling or renting; a similar fragmentation reveals as a possibility. Even the fragmentation within the neighborhood remains limited psychology of owning a legal house or a realistic hope to do so supposed by an official document might easily affect the one's approach to its own property and property relations of the whole neighborhood, thus political and social mobilization.

In the context of the neighborhoods I have examined, there is another aspect of homeownership which appears to be even more important as it leads to a separation among the inhabitants: it is the emergence of the landlord-tenant relation. Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) highlight this duality as a significant obstacle in the way of collective resistance against urban renewal projects. In Başbüyük where all of the inhabitants had a strong social network and the structure of landlord-tenant was not yet developed, a strong and collective resistance movement was shaped; however, the property/tenure structure of the neighborhood which led to the differentiation of interests, became a determining factor which prevented a strong and collective resistance. The development of similar property/tenure structures is a possibility for *gecekondu* neighborhoods; however, it usually develops after attaining the title deed or intermediary documents (as the title deed allocation document) which provide the basis for commodification and individualization of housing. As will be discussed later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, a similar process took place in 1 Mayıs. Indeed, if this situation arose, it means that a part of the counter-space features limiting the commodification of the house and land has already disappeared so it can not be ac-

cepted as the reason for the dissolution of the counter-space. Yet, it is still very effective as the split it created among the inhabitants weakens the other features of the counter-space and the collectivity of the neighborhood to a significant extent.

A common problem of academic works on urban social movements is that they either present the existence and maintenance of these social movements as a direct extension of structural factors (Hechter, 1987; p.29), or contingent due to specific events or subjective interventions. However, in order to answer questions as to how come counter-spaces can be formed and sustained in some poor urban neighborhoods whereas cannot be formed or sustained in another, as an addition to structural factors laying the ground for the possibility, mezzo or micro level subjective factors must be addressed as well. The third axis is on the question of how organizational variety and capability effects formation and sustaining of a counter-space. When a counter-space is formed by a gecekondu neighborhood a few organizational problems show up that are vital for the persistence of the counter-space. Fundamental organizational problems can be listed as such: i) including as much human force from the neighborhood as possible to form a well-functioning and powerful self-organization and self-defense ii) avoiding problem of free-riding (Hechter, 1987) which may constitute an important problem for a collective/communal entity iii) providing quick decision and action-taking mechanisms which are required by threats of physical interventions and possible urgent needs of neighborhood iv) providing external networks that might help the struggle to preserve the counter space in three ways, bringing additional human power against demolition attempts, providing economic support, and realizing solidarity actions (demonstrations, meetings, campaigns, etc.) to raise awareness in public space.

For places as gecekondu neighborhoods in which people had to develop a collective reactionary action against demolition threats, what emerges as the first form of solidarity can be called as *emergent solidarity* and at this point, problems of sustaining a collective movement and a “counter-space” are -to a large extent- under the surface (Hirsch, 1986). However, incentives for continuing the involvement differ from the incentives of involving in the more reflexive, emergent solidarity (Hirsch, 1986). After that point, Hirsch argues, sense of social solidarity becomes more effective than the personal material benefit from involving to the movement: empowering social bonds, developing reciprocal relations, correctly chosen polarization, utilization of symbolic, ritualistic, collective demonstrations plays significant roles in that process. During this course, solidarity may be raised to a high level with the provision of non-marketed joint goods (collective goods) to group members -inhabitants of the neighborhood- (Hechter, 1987; p.38). However, this process of group-solidarity making through collective practices and supply of joint goods is accompanied by the possible free-riding problem. This issue requires the capability of exclusion and sanctioning as well as inclusion, reinforcing incentives and *monitoring capacity* (Hechter, 1987). These capabilities are very related to the formation and preservation of a well-functioning central body in the neighborhood.

As the fourth axis, the (re)production and (re) organization of social space appear to be a significant factor for the preservation of a counter-space. According to Lefebvre; “groups, classes or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as a subject unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating (or producing) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract descriptions, or mutate into fanta-

sies” (Lefebvre, 1991; p.416-417). The importance of producing its own social space is not limited to these crucial aspects revealed by Lefebvre. Certain organizations of social space necessarily reinforce certain subjectivities, promote certain collective memories and affections. There exists bulky literature that emphasizes the role of monuments in identity-making and creating or promoting a certain type of social memory (Osborne, 2001; Mitchell, 2003; Ahiska, 2001). Monumental structures have monumental effects on the social domain by referring to collective historical events and figures, are important elements of localities. They could embody certain collective memories and counter-narratives which are essential in the processes of legitimacy-making and identity-building (Yiftachel, 2009). Indeed, their role might be more effective for the continuation and strengthening of the sense of commonness, especially at the neighborhood level.

For gecekondu neighborhoods that possess counter-space qualities, which promotes use-value in the organization of the space over the exchange-value driven logic of capitalist organization of space; the juxtaposition of monumental structures with the publicly utilizable structures as parks, gardens, fountains, etc. could be very effective by i) producing collective goods for the inhabitants of the neighborhood ii) reinforcing a sense of communal property iii) promoting collective memories and values, all at the same time. However, neither the functioning of collective-identity promotion nor (re)production/(re)organization of space, are limited to the monumental structures. Murals, graffiti, and street writings are other components of intervention and re-organization of the social space in a political way. Regarding all these, an examination of production and reproduction of space via monumental structures, public service-oriented structures, mural, graffiti, street writings, constitutes

a notable part of an analysis of the social movements within gecekondu neighborhoods.

2.2 Methodology

This thesis compares the historical processes of the formation and evolution of two informal neighborhoods of Istanbul to analyze dynamics favoring and undermining the formation and consolidation of a counter-space. This attempt necessitates the methodology of historical comparison. In this section, I would like to explain the rationale behind the comparative methodology. Even though a detailed single-case analysis might enable us to dwell on the peculiarity of this case with more details, a comparative approach allows us to go beyond descriptive works more easily and present a more fertile basis for analytical contemplation on the main question of this thesis presented once again in the first sentence of this paragraph. Based on a series of abstractions that would enable us to assert a conceptual framework, on the basis of similarities between the two cases, highlights variations thus detect possible variables that determine or effects of the making and maintenance of counter-spaces in gecekondu neighborhoods.

The choice of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu is not a coincidence in that regard. Their political, cultural, demographical similarities, as well as the similarities between the processes of formation of these neighborhoods and the processes of formation of counter-space; offer a base on which we can identify the factors responsible for the divergent paths they have taken. The primary task was to specify potential variables that I predict to have a significant effect on the phenomenon (the persistence of the counter-space). While I tried to specify these variables, I follow three different methods: i) readings on theoretical works and similar case studies in order

to find possible identifying features that affect the content and the form of the social movement in neighborhoods of urban poor ii) readings on secondary sources and recollections of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu iii) detailed observations and in-depth interviews in the neighborhood. The following four main axes were distinguished as worthy of examining: i) frequency of demolitions/intensity of demolition pressure and effects it led afterward -as the collectivity of the rebuilding process and emergence of common narratives provides basis for identity-building and collective memory ii) the legal status of the settlements, effects of different official documents or the lack of any document iii) organizational variety and capability of pro counter - space iv) (re)production and (re)organization of the social space of the neighborhood. After that point, my work was to pursue a fieldwork to construct analytical narratives regarding how these neighborhoods have been formed and have evolved in order to compare them along these four axes; then, how each of these possible variables are perceived by the local people and how their memories, consciousnesses, and actions were influenced by them.

As the first axis, the information regarding the past demolitions was gathered by the previous works on the neighborhood and by the narratives of the inhabitants. The information regarding current demolition threats was gathered via interviews with members of neighborhood associations. Regarding the second axis, the information of legal statuses (whether they hold title deed, tapu-tahsis document, land deed, pay ecrimisil or do not possess any kind of official recognition) was gathered by interviews with neighborhood mukhtars and representatives of neighborhood associations. For 1 Mayıs neighborhood, the recollection and memoir book based on interviews and historical documents named *İçeriden Anlatılanlar: 1 Mayıs'ın İnşası* provided a very detailed picture of the organizational scheme and practices before

the military coup of 1980. Also, *1 Mayıs Mahallesi* written by Şükrü Aslan presented a pellucid picture for the organizational structure of the neighborhood, regarding before and after of the coup. After the military coup, the neighborhood did not face a counter-space building attempt; however, it hosted an organizational structure in which radical political organizations (revolutionary groups), cultural/ethno-religious associations (Cemevi and Alevi associations), neighborhood associations, fellow countrymen (hemşehri) associations and legal administrative structure (muhtarlık), co-existed. No doubt, it was hard and, in some contexts, impossible for me to gather detailed information for some of these organizational structures and their practical functioning. However, my main purpose was not to understand the detailed structure and functioning of every political/social/administrative organization in the neighborhoods, indeed, it was to gather the necessary level of information of each organization/institution with respect to their role in the daily life and social/organizational fabric of the neighborhood. For this purpose, I realized a series of interviews with people who were involved in these organizations, especially after the 1980s coup. In order not to limit information with a specific time interval which would increase the possibility of false considerations; I conducted interviews with at least one member of different generations covering each decade since the 1970s.

In this fieldwork, I visited the 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu regularly for five months between September 2018 and March 2019. During these visits to 1 Mayıs, I realized fifteen in-depth interviews and numerous focus groups. The interviewees consist mainly of the people who were active in the pre-1980 process associated with the counter-space experience. I focused on realizing interviews with a candidate for muhtarlık, and current and ex-active members of local institutions as neighborhood associations, hemşehri associations, the local branch of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural

Association (PSAKD), and socialist organizations. Additionally, I made interviews with the “ordinary people” who run coffeehouse or works in stores in the neighborhood. Regarding Küçük Armutlu, I realized six in-depth interviews and only one focus group interview. The interviewees were the mukhtar of Baltalimanı, current, and ex- effective members of the Cemevi Associations, a person who had an affiliation with the revolutionary organization within the neighborhood, and an important local figure who has been active in the meetings of People’s Committee and the People’s Council, and a store keeper.

For Küçük Armutlu, the book was written by Ali Osman Köse was the mere written source, hence despite the question regarding its academic/scientific/objective condition I had to use it. Additionally, and interviews realized by local people who participated in local democratic organizations as Halk Meclisi and with people who lived there enough to witness the ways in which organizational problems of a counter-space is handled. Surely, the decades-long criminalization of the neighborhood and various legal and physical operations the people of Küçük Armutlu faced in the last two years made the gathering of such information much harder.

The fourth axis needs to be divided for practical reasons. For the monumental structures, collective spaces, artworks, and street writings still existing, my way of exploration was the walks I realized by myself or with a local companion. For those spatial interventions that does not stand today, I consulted on various different means as periodical political publishings of revolutionary organizations, periodical professional publishings (the related journals of socialist engineers and architects) the books, thesis, articles written on neighborhoods and photographs that I could reach with my personal network.

By all these means, I tried to learn the situation of each neighborhood regarding all these four axes since the formation of the neighborhoods and how they transformed over time and how these are effective regarding the building, sustaining, developing processes of counter-spaces. In order to not limit my argument with my own logical inferences, I tried to realize conversations with local people, in which they tell about their perception on the relations between all these factors and the situation and transformation of the neighborhood. These conversations were focused mainly around; i) how common politicized affects, memories, subjectivities were created and reinforced by grand demolitions and spatial re-organizations ii) how certain organizational structures enable inhabitants to feel like a part of a close community thus empowered, or certain other organizational structures limit sense of community at the level of neighborhood by separating people into other identities iii) how one's relation -official and de facto- with the land and housing it lives on, affects the perception of property and more generally sense of collectivity.

This fieldwork included i) observations including daily conversation among local people on the given issues - which can be witnessed frequently after a certain level of sincerity is present ii) focus group interviews with "ordinary people" of the neighborhoods usually realized in the Cemevi of each neighborhood iii) semi-structured interviews with people who had affiliation with political organization or other association which had significant functioning in the social fabric of the neighborhoods in any period.

In order to reach local inhabitants who both have the necessary experience and would be willing to narrate, I relied on the snowball method of reaching and selecting interviews. Other than interviews realized directly with specific expert or official; all interviews were realized by the snowball sampling developed around my first

contacts within the neighborhoods. Before these interviews, the fact that they will be used in a sociology thesis with a specific content was declared to the interviewees and the oral consent of each participant was taken. However, for the sake of comfort and security of interviewees, no audial or visual records of these interviews were taken. Written notes taken during the conversations, were the sole records kept for the process of thesis writing.

2.3 Limitations

Inevitably, all methodical choices come with their limitations and problematic aspects. Needless to say, this thesis is no exception. First of all, the snowball sampling used for the interviews with the inhabitants of the neighborhoods limited the variety of people I could engage with during my fieldwork. The first people I interact within the neighborhood were those I met through my already existing political and academic networks. In both cases, the people I met were still engaged or was engaged in neighborhood activism. Thus, the succeeding network developed from these people inevitable bore the given birthmark. In order to balance possible disruptive disposition as such, I tried to spend time in public spaces as kahvehane (local coffeehouse) and Cemevi and tried to engage with casual conversations with people who are not affiliated with pro-leftist political organizations or associations. However high-level politicization embedded in the cultural identity of the neighborhood residents made it very hard to encounter with a person who is totally detached from the leftist political disposition or collective narrative/memory regarding the past of the neighborhood. Even though it is not impossible for these neighborhood inhabitants to collectively hold a single narrative, it is more probable and realistic that there are other narratives circulating among people regarding the history of the neighborhood, its counter-

space period and political organizations that are effective in it. Even if these disputing narratives are probably are held by a relatively small number of people, the lack of such voices in this thesis; might be addressed as a shortcoming that I could not succeed to surpass.

In my attempt to understand the political history and organization structure of Küçük Armutlu since its formation, the lack of previous academic work and even very limited existence of non-academic works left me no choice but rely merely from the Ali Osman Köse's non-academic and politically-oriented book, Evren Gönül's master thesis and narratives of local people I could reach. As a matter of course, I tried to make cross-check between narratives and secondary sources that I had a reach. Yet, the limited scope of them also limited my ability to utilize a more advanced fact-checking mechanism. Hence, the situation brought forward the question of reliability, especially regarding the narratives and information presented about the self-governing organizational structure of the neighborhood. However, various reasons beyond my control made it impossible to reach neither official documents of the state or possible discordant inhabitants of the neighborhood that might provide alternative or even conflicting narratives regarding the issue. Additionally, the conversations I held with various different people who possess very different demographic backgrounds and lived in the settlement since the beginning, showed a consistency among themselves and with the book written by Ali Osman Köse, regarding the narratives on the political history of the neighborhood as well its organizational structure. Thus, I did not hesitate to include them into consideration as a part of the data source of this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

1 MAYIS NEIGHBORHOOD

In this chapter, first I will briefly present (i) the main geographical, demographical, and social features of 1 Mayıs Mahallesi. Subsequently, I will present (ii) the history and social conditions of the social and physical place which then became 1 Mayıs Mahallesi and the formation process of the neighborhood (iii) the experiment of counter-space formation and constitution in 1 Mayıs during the years of 1977-1978 (iv) the historical, organizational, legal, political process of dissolution of the counter space and the subsequent social fabric of the neighborhood (v) the spatial intervention in 1 Mayıs during and after the counter-space experiment . The chapter proceeds in chronological sequence in order to present historical journey of the neighborhood since first settlements till present; however, this chronological sequence is structured with respect to the main question and analytical axes of the thesis.

3.1 The main features of the neighborhood

Today, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi is located on the Anatolian side of the İstanbul at the intersection of Ümraniye and Ataşehir municipalities around the O-4 Highway. It marks a terrain reaching over four official neighborhoods: Mustafa Kemal -which is the name under the neighborhood was formally recognized by the state right after the 1980 military coup-, Aşık Veysel, Esenevler, and Site. The former two neighborhoods are under the district of Ataşehir and the latter two are under the district of Ümraniye. So, the neighborhood covers the north border of Ataşehir towards O-4 and Ümraniye, and the south border of Ümraniye towards Ataşehir and O-4. However, when the neighborhood began to emerge in the 1970s, Ümraniye was just recog-

nized as a district and its population was limited to 22,969 (today, its approximately 700,000) and Ataşehir was not even present as a district, was a vast unoccupied land (TÜİK, 1970). At that time, the lands on which 1 Mayıs rose, was known as “Kaplanağa Mevkii” (Kaplanağa Direction) in which merely 15-20 households were present (Aslan, 2016, p.94).

During the formation process of 1 Mayıs as a neighborhood, poor people from various different demographic backgrounds came to the neighborhood. Those were the people escaping from the deficiency of rural life in villages and small Anatolian towns and people who can not afford rent in Istanbul so decide to build their own gecekondü houses. Demographically, there were a significant population with Black Sea origin, some of them related with the “şebeke”³ which is constituted by a few Black Sea originate families who developed some networks and patronage relations enabling them to function as a land mafia. However, the overwhelming majority of the population, especially those who came after the 1975, were Alevi people (some of them identify themselves as Turkish Alevi, Turkish Alevi, Kurdish Alevi, Zaza Alevi or just as Alevi) especially from cities of Sivas, Tokat, Çorum, Erzincan, and Dersim (Tunceli). Today the demography of the neighborhoods has changed. The coupling of moving outs and moving ins with the growing geographical scope and population is the main reason for that change. Hence, the neighborhood became more diverse, heterogeneous social space. However, the historical center of the neighborhood, which was already occupied before the 1989-1994 process of vertical and horizontal expansion, is still predominated by the same ethno-religious background.

Initially, the inhabitants were new-comers seeking for job – usually employed as a ‘cheap labor- or members of the proletariat or the lumpen proletariat of Istanbul.

³ How the inhabitants of the neighborhoods call the land mafia and the local people who are suspect to have a direct interest base relation with them.

Today, most of the inhabitants are still people who has to sell their labors in the capitalist labor market in order to survive. However, as the neighborhood develops and capitalist relations infiltrate in it, some individuals -even very limited in numbers- within the neighborhood became esnaf (shopkeepers), owners of many shops and restaurants, or rentiers possessing numerous apartments they rent out.

Politics wise, the neighborhood became the stronghold of the revolutionary right at its formation process. In the constitution of the counter-space, the revolutionary organizations were powerful to the extent that they were single-handedly governing whole neighborhood by sharing zones among different political organizations. Even though there was a significant down in the 1980s as an outcome of the 1980 military coup, and a strong up in the 1990s as crystallized in the events succeeding the Gazi Massacre⁴, the neighborhood still preserves its fame characterized with affiliation with radical left. However, the feelings/actions of the inhabitants appear as transformed from an active support to a sympathy combined with a nostalgia.

3.2 The pre-history of the neighborhood and its foundation

The year of 1968 was marked by revolutionary uprisings all over the world. As the phrase goes “the wind was blowing from the Left”. In Turkey, the continuum of 68 was marked by the rapid radicalization of mass youth movements towards the formation of various Marxist armed organizations as the People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (the THKP-C), the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) , the Communist Party of Turkey / Marxist-Leninist (the TKP/ML)⁵. The emergence of these organizations and the leftist hegemony among universities and metropolitan centers were crushed by the military coup of 1971. Most of the leading cadres were

⁴ The event is explained in the last full paragraph of the subsection 3.4.2.4.

⁵ The last organization was established after the 1971 Turkish military memorandum

shot, captured and executed, or at least imprisoned. After a very brief period of “silence” with the positive effect of the 1974 General Amnesty (known as the Rahşan Amnesty) which lead to the return of hundreds of dedicated revolutionary cadres back to the social struggle; the mid 1970s lead to recovery of revolutionary organizations and popularization of leftist/socialist/communist politics. The years in which 1 Mayıs Mahallesi began to emerge as a gecekondu neighborhood correspond to these years of rising and popularization.

Today the social space called as 1 Mayıs neighborhood consists of four official neighborhoods and divided between the Ataşehir and Ümraniye Districts. 1 Mayıs is surrounded by 0-4 Highway and Ümraniye on the North, Ataşehir on the East and Esatpaşa on the West. Until the mid-1970s, only a handful of gecekondu houses were established by the people who work on the nearby quarries. As the need of workforce and the problem of housing rose, beginning with the early 1970s the number of gecekondu’s began to increase. The years of 1972,1973 and 1974 passed with numerous destructions; despite these demolitions, a concentration that can be called as the neighborhood had been reached in 1975. At that point, the population was predominantly composed of those who work in these quarries and their relatives just came for building their own gecekondus. Surely, as in the formation process of any other gecekondu neighborhoods, “the opportunist” which aimed to accumulate land and housing which will someday turn into legal properties were also present in the picture (Erder, 2013; Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). As stated at the end of the previous sub-section, the land mafias were central figures in the formation of gecekondu neighborhoods. These groups usually had affiliation with local governing bodies, which is essential for their functioning: monopoly on parceling and selling lands. 1 Mayıs was not an exception in that aspect. A local land mafia was parceling and sell-

ing land on the area that was called as Kapanaglı site of Ümraniye at these days (Ümraniye was still a “village” of Üsküdar municipality).

3.3 1 Mayıs neighborhood as a counter-space

3.3.1 The ground and the spark: the first public elections

During the years of 1975-76-77, the neighborhood faced a mass migration from i) members of urban working class that can not afford rents in “ legal” houses in inner-city ii) relatives of the already established gecekondu people both from Istanbul and from small town, rural regions, especially Erzincan, Tokat, Tunceli(Dersim), and Sivas iii) “opportunists” who think that despite the demolishment attempts, the neighborhood will continue to develop and someday will be legalized, hence it is a profitable investment to join the process.

Due to the political environment, the left-wing politicization was spreading among poor, working class people. This trend of raising awareness against injustice among people led to the increasing tension between gecekondu people and landlords/land mafias. The “leftist” workers of the neighborhood began to challenge the authority of these landlords and land mafias and began to object their demands. This uneasiness was not peculiar to 1 Mayıs at that time period regarding the gecekondu neighborhoods. However, quickly, by the effect of political connections of these workers and the general tendency of local people founding the neighborhood (mostly pro-leftist, Alevi); the scene drastically changed as radical political organizations got involved in the neighborhood struggle with a political agenda corresponding to the needs and demands of local people. These facts led to rapid popularization of these

movements (especially Halkın Kurtuluşu, Halkın Yolu, Halkın Birliği, and Partizan) among the local people and recruiting of even new revolutionary cadres among them.

This involvement of revolutionary organizations was neither a coincidence nor exception in these years. In the perspective of many revolutionary movements, the process of gecekonduzation was dominated and exploited by land mafias; hence uniting the gecekondu people with a right-based perspective and to constitute social spaces in which needs of the people were realized by self-organization and self-governance were accepted as part of the obligations of revolutionary movements.

During the years of 1975-76, while popular displeasure against land mafia rose, the popular support for the revolutionary organizations accrued. Yet, because the organization of these leftist groups was at infancy, they could not succeed or hesitated to take decision and actions including usage of physical force against the land mafia and their alleged collaborators. The strengthening of these leftist groups was succeeded by merging of these groups (not dissolving their own organization but congregating on the base of the principal: “unity of the action, freedom of the propaganda”) in order to comprise a counter-focus in the neighborhood. When the first months of 1977 arrived, the counter-focus had emerged as a power but was not yet institutionalized. The newspapers of these revolutionary groups clearly demonstrate the formation of this dynamism in the neighborhood and the level of importance attributed by these organization to it:

We took the support of all the people since the struggle against the tricksters’ fleecing the people depended on the concrete interest of them. The trickster within the management of the association had to leave when the revolutionaries took the support of people and united them about the issues such as keeping the shanty houses’ lands inside the established zone based on the necessity, building only one shanty house(gecekondu) for each, living in the shanty houses that are built, not giving bribes, by accounting the common expenses correctly, collecting money equally from everyone. (See Appendix B)

Under these circumstances, most of the inhabitants were still engaged in some kind of economic relation with land mafia, paying them money for land, etc., yet also growing sympathy toward the counter-focus, developing connections and wishing removal of the pressure of the land mafia (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). The situation, at that time, reached a level that can easily be defined as a dual power structure. It is important to mention that at that point there were still some local people who were in favor of land mafia and people who were affiliated with them, due to relations based on economic interest and kinship networks. Regarding the rising political tension and polarization all over the country, the new equilibrium was open to potentially violent conflict within the neighborhood.

Since the early days of the neighborhood, a place functioning as a common local was formed under the name of “dernek” (association) in which people gather and discuss the problems of the neighborhood. Under this sharpening of dual structure, a meeting in the May of 1977, “dernek” witnessed hot and tense debates around the problems of the territory. It escalated quickly due to “absurd demands” of the land mafia affiliated people in the meeting. One of the people who participated in this meeting, -who later became first vice-president, then the president of the committee and in the 1980s, and later elected as mukhtar (official local authority)- was Sabri Koçyiğit:

In this meeting, he said for every shanty house, 300 TL must be gathered from each shanty house owner. When we asked what will happen with that money “this is a gendarmerie region, with this collected money, the wife of the gendarmerie commander of Istanbul will be taken out to dinner in a restaurant next to Bosporus. Therefore, they will not get the support of the gendarmerie commander of Istanbul, the commander will not send the gendarmerie to the neighborhood. I was the first person to raise an objection. I said things can’t be done like this. Taking somebody out to dinner wouldn’t work. The right for shanty houses can be won with resistance here like happened in Zeytinburnu, Sağmalcılar, Taşlıtarla, Gülsuyu... That day, the majority refused to give money. The ruse of the lords of shanty houses and the board of aldermen was invalidated that

day. Nobody gave money. Then, the lords of shanty houses came and wanted me to join them, “let's gather the money” together. I said, “no, it does not work like this”. These discussions took a week, ten days with them. Finally, their initiative was broken, they saw it was not working. “What to do,” they asked, “We will hold an election, we will constitute a committee with the open vote, open canvass...” I said. And they accepted. (See Appendix C)

The option of the election in which all local people will vote to elect their legitimate representatives prevailed in such a situation. This disposition prevailed so easily due to the self-confidence of both sides. The revolutionaries were confident due to their popular support among the people, and the pro-land mafia components were confident due to their economic interest and kinship-based networks.

In the subsequent days, the election was realized, and the committee was elected. The spark was the hot debate realized in the “association” and the outcome was the critical juncture, that leads to the formation of 1 Mayıs neighborhood as a unique urban experiment of counter-space building.

3.3.2 The people's committee of 1 Mayıs neighborhood

The committee was composed of eight people. Three of the elected eight representatives were close to or affiliated to the “şebeke” (the name given to the land mafia by the local inhabitants of 1 Mayıs). The remaining five seats were taken by people suggested and supported by socialist organizations. This result revealed a picture in which anti-land mafia, pro-socialist was a clear majority in the people's committee; enabling them to take decision corresponding to their political line. The first task of the people's committee was to elect its president. Kazım Bayboğa (from the socialist sects) was elected as the president; Sabri Koçyiğit (a local sympathizer affiliated with Partizan) was elected as the vice-president. After this point, the left coalition was effective in the committee and the other members of the committee became ineffectual. The two of the three, resigned from the position and left the neighborhood.

The other member, Hamdi Akyüz, approves the new way in which the committee will function and began to work accordingly. The president of the first people's committee Kazım Bayboğa expresses the functioning of the committee:

As the committee, we had a notebook. The decisions we made in the meetings were written down there. Even though we saw each other every day and work together, we made decisions every week. The decisions were written down to the notebook. The committee members who weren't agreed on the decisions put annotations. Every house zone in the neighborhood and whom they were belonged to was written in that notebook. Therefore, there wouldn't be any change without our knowledge. We would interfere directly. In the same way, when there was some disagreement between the house owners we would interfere. And the problem would be solved. (See Appendix D)

The socialist newspapers greeted the establishment of the People's Committee with great enthusiasm (Aslan, 2016). This enthusiasm was fueled by the fact that this committee was a novel form regarding the organization of the poor people in the gecekondu neighborhoods. This form, reaching beyond local organizations of each revolutionary organization and other forms of mass struggle as associations, shouldered the "burden" of constituent politics.

In this constituent process, the principles of the people's committee were clear:

i) prioritizing cooperation with the people who want to erect a gecekondu however cannot effort to do so ii) encouraging people to move into neighborhood if they are in need and will resist in the face of demolition threat iii) those who are not in need of a shelter but join the process due to "commercial concern" will not be accepted because they lack proper pertinacity which is necessary for the resistance against the land mafia and the state hence detecting people who already have house(s) in other regions of Istanbul and expel them from the neighborhood due to same reasons with the previous clause iv) aiming for equality regarding the size of the land. This explosion usually included a compensation payment by the committee to the builder of the gecekondu in order to not cause infelicity as the committee did

not want to risk its legitimacy. However, the committee was careful with the payments not to exceed the cost of the construction of that *gecekondu*.

The People's Committee, regarding all these principles, did not limit itself to reactionary practices, on the contrary, it began to develop constituent, micro institutions in order realize itself as the central institution of a self-governing neighborhood. This process of re-organization of the neighborhood as a "leftist" self-governing entity crystallized in the mid-August of 1977 for the first time. Only three months had passed after one of the most violent assaults targeting a legal demonstration in the history of the Turkish Republic. The most populous working-class demonstration until that day was taking place at the most prominent square of the country. During the 1st of May of 1977, the Taksim Square hosted approximately 500,000 people. Suddenly, "unknown" people open fire on the mass; due to shooting and confluence, at least thirty-four people died (BBC, 2014). The shock and anger were still too fresh and too strong. The People's committee of the neighborhood proposed to name the neighborhood after the memories of these martyrs of the 1st of May. On the meeting dated August 14, 1977; the neighborhood residents decided on the new name with the majority. The neighborhood became "1 Mayıs Mahallesi".

In 1 Mayıs, the revolutionary cadres were present as a prominent figure among the inhabitants since the very foundation of the neighborhood. Even before the People's Committee had been formed, revolutionary circles had been keeping the region in close sight and sending important militants into the area for political activity. The groups that held greater influence in the neighborhood were the so-called "Maoist" groups of the time: Halkın Kurtuluşu (People's Liberation), Halkın Birliği (People's Unity), Halkın Yolu (People's Path), and Halkın Gücü (People's Power – later to evolve into Partizan/Partisan). Though relatively weaker throughout the process,

movements which had emerged from the THKP-C, such as the Revolutionary Path (the Dev-Yol) and the Revolutionary Left (Dev-Sol) were also present in the neighborhood. During the founding of the committee, the collaboration between the two political forces played a decisive role in allowing revolutionaries to take control of the committee's administration. As a result of this cooperation, the first committee was headed by Kazım Bayboğa from Halkın Yolu, and his deputy was Sabri Koçyiğit from Halkın Gücü. Koçyiğit, who was the deputy chairman of the committee at the time, recalls that despite the unity displayed during the action, the competition between the groups until the 2nd of September Great Demolishing was a problem second only to the struggle against the state (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). Memoirs from inside the neighborhood at the time also speak of serious disagreements between the Partizan/Halkın Gücü and groups such as the Halkın Kurtuluşu, Halkın Yolu, Halkın Birliği, Kawa and others with regards to the course of action to be taken against the demolishing. Sabri Koçyiğit describes the day after the 2nd of September – a turning point in the history of the neighborhood – as follows:

We all had different regions where we in force. But then, we left the past behind us. We were trying to revive the morale which had wavered. Every fraction was encouraging the construction of gecekondu in their own area. The others in their own areas, and we in our own started supporting the people a little bit, agitating, restoring morale, and restarted the construction of gecekondu settlements. But there was disunity; as everyone had their own region, there was multi-polarity.” (See Appendix E)

This “multi-polarity” was eventually resolved as a result of the following events: At first, during the People's Committee elections, there was a heated debate on whether people/revolutionaries who contributed to the neighborhood, but did not necessarily live there, could vote. Due to this disagreement, the election was boycotted by the Halkın Gücü/Partizan group. As a result, Erol Bektaş of the Halkın Kurtuluşu was elected committee chairman and Kâzım Bayboğa of the Halkın Yolu came in second,

becoming the deputy chairman. The Halkın Gücü/Partizan group, which had boycotted this election, refused to recognize the initiative of this committee and moved to an empty part of the neighborhood -inhabited largely by newcomers and falling outside of the committee's zone of the initiative- known as "Zone D." Here, they started pursuing their own political activities. These activities were highly successful and, after a while, the influence of Halkın Gücü/Partizan in the neighborhood, as well as the people's sympathy towards them, increased. On account of certain problems experienced by the committee in the neighborhood as well as problems within the committee, a new election was called. But because there was no agreement as to how this election was to be held, the faction headed by Halkın Kurtuluşu and the faction headed by Halkın Gücü/Partizan boycotted each other's elections, leading to two separate elections. However, there was a great disparity between the number of people participating in these elections, far fewer people had participated in one electoral process compared to the other. This showed that the committee headed by the Halkın Gücü/Partizan was the one, which was practically operational, and held the initiative in the neighborhood. From this point onward, until the dissolution of the committee, Halkın Gücü/Partizan was the determining force in the committee.

The Development of the counter-space and more developed organizational structure accelerated after a catastrophic event. The Grand Demolition of 2nd of September 1977 is the most powerful event in the collective memory of the neighborhood, indeed it is called as "the event" by the inhabitants who lived through it.

3.3.3 The grand demolition of September 2, 1977

1 Mayıs neighborhood became a focal point for different actors. For revolutionary organizations, it was an example of banding the needs of poor people and the path of

revolution, thus an important locality to support and learn from. For the state, it was a very bad example that needs to be eliminated or at least depoliticized. In line with accelerating revolutionary activities in the neighborhood, the pressure on “the political actors” multiplied as well as threats and operation. However, the committee thought that the state will not limit itself with political pressure and expected a physical attempt towards demolishing the neighborhood. Due to this expectation, and the structural uncertainty embedded in gecekondü neighborhoods, the committee acknowledged anti-demolishment duties as its central devoir. This devoir was two-folded: i) preparation within the neighborhood at the level of physical material, propaganda, and coordination ii) -if needed- mobilizing support from outside of the neighborhood both in terms of bringing people to physically resist to demolishment, and spread voice of the neighborhood across the country.

On the 2nd of September 1977, the demolition unit equipped with the hundreds of heavy police forces arrived at the neighborhood. Firstly, they discharged the procedure and made two successive warning announcements stating that the buildings are illegal, they will be demolished, the people must leave the area. As people did not want to leave their houses, the negotiations began between the committee and the state forces. During these negotiations, more and more people gathered. Now, the picture was the following: on one side there were hundreds of people building a barrier with all equipment they have, and on the other side congregation of the police forces with armored vehicles. After long inconsequential negotiations, inhabitants of 1 Mayıs equipped with all the thing they can find including stone and soil, began to force the police barricades. There began the attack of the police forces and corresponding resistance. The clashes extended throughout the day. The gecekondü people were grappling with nightsticks, tear gases, and smoke bombs. Suddenly, the

critical threshold exceeded; guns were fired. According to some national newspaper, the clashes turned into armed conflagration on both sites. On the other hand, People who were part of the resistance at that time declared that the fire was single-sidedly opened from the roof of side-neighborhood and people were shot to death intentionally.

The people who died...For instance, Hasan Kızılkaya was shot in his forehead by the long-range weapons. One by his wrist, one by his heart, but by being targeted by long-range weapons. The majority died this way. The clash I have been talking about took until 4 pm. Police could not demolish the shanty houses; they had to step back. Under those circumstances, the military was called for help because the police were not enough to demolish the houses. But at the same time, among the People's Committee members and the masses, the pessimism started. Some of the members of the People's Committee and some of the people proposed to step back by saying the resistance reached its aim, resisting more would cause loss. These ideas brought panic to the people including the committee. Around 4 pm, a decision to retrieve was made, to some voluntarily, to some reluctantly... The law enforcers who saw the people fell back, they took courage from this and they attacked again. The engineering vehicles and bulldozers destroyed the neighborhood from 4 pm to 5.30- 6 pm with the falling apart of the people in panic and leaving the area. (See Appendix F)

On the daybreak of the 3rd of September 1977, the neighborhood reflected an apocalyptic scene. The state forces leveled all buildings with the ground. The cries of babies, requiems and murmurings loudening among the ruins were accompanied by shoutings displaying determination of the gecekondu people "even if we have to find tents, demand it from the red crescent or somewhere else; we will erect our homes, even in the forms of tents. And our homes will be right here again" (Aslan, 2016, p.142). On the same field, labor of re-construction of demolished gecekondu was also present but less common. It must be mentioned, there was also a significant amount of gecekondu people who left the neighborhood on that day with sorrow; due to loss of hope and the threat they felt by the level of "armed conflict" reached.

Under these circumstances, the 3rd of September marked a critical juncture in which realization of one possibility among all others, irreversibly affected the history of the neighborhood. This was the decision of the People's Committee not to dissolve itself, not withdrawing from the neighborhood, on the contrary, to undertake rapid process of re-construction via including as much as "reliable and in need" people in this process by inviting them to have their own free houses here at "expense" of participating in the process of construction and the struggle for defense.

As a result of this attitude, the neighborhood had been reborn from its ashes. In this instance, the social fabric of the neighborhood was even more compatible with socialist ideals due to several reasons: i) the committee's reputation as the sole legitimate functioning local body was reinforced ii) before the grand destruction, the committee was hesitant to intervene to the size of the lands already parceled by *gecekondu* owners; however the grand destruction provided a situation in which new *gecekondu* should be made from the beginning and by the approval of the committee, hence in more accordance with the equality principle iii) the people who came after the grand destruction were investigated in more detail by the committee and themselves were venturing a political contestation with the state forces. Thus, the given population were much more inclined toward socialist organizations and socialist values. Two "external" factors were also crucial in this success of rapid revival: i) immense labor power provided by the revolutionary youth movement -especially from the universities (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017) ii) the support provided by the different socialist groups reaching beyond the scope of physical supply of human and building materials, to organize campaigns all over Istanbul to gather a chamber to solidarity among the neighborhood including economic support and political solidarity crystallized with demonstrations, meetings, and propaganda in the printed press.

The bulk of the re-construction process took only two months. This rapid construction of dwellings accompanied by “illegal” construction of electrical infrastructure continued with high speed after the re-construction of the demolished houses was completed. These operations imply a high level of organizational capacity. In this process, the people’s committee developed its sub-organs; solidarity, coordination, organizational division of labor in the neighborhood significantly advanced.

3.4 The decline of the counter-space: The process of dissolution

In this thesis, the counter-space was described in a very precise way by three fundamental qualities: (i) the primacy of use value/collective interest of the inhabitants over the exchange value/individual interest or the interest of capital regarding the organization of the social space (ii) elimination of -or at least limitation on- the commodification of land and housing within the neighborhood (iii) collective organization of the solution of social needs and problems of the neighborhood. When we look to the contemporary situation of 1 Mayıs, especially the first two, but arguably the third one as well, appears to be decimated. This situation did not take shape in a day. It is a result of a years-long historical process. Even though events as the 15th March Incident led to the dissolution of the People’s Committee and the 1980 Military Coup are the two prominent critical junctures in that transformation; the organizational, legal, political, and spatial changes -which are not isolated from each other; indeed, mutually effects themselves to a significant level- are also very influential in that process of dissolution of counter-space qualities of 1 Mayıs Neighborhood.

3.4.1 Organizational structure

The counter-space experiment in 1 Mayıs was associated with a specific institution, the People's Committee. The 15th of March Incident which happened less than a year after the formation of the committee, marks a decisive juncture in the counter-space experiment of the neighborhood as it led to the dissolution of the People's Committee. Just as the central role of the People's Committee as well as its structure and functioning, its dissolution and newly formed organizations and institutions within the neighborhood providing central functions of the social fabric, are also crucial components of the transformation that 1 Mayıs neighborhood faced. The dissolution of the counter-space qualities is very much related to these organizational/institutional changes.

3.4.1.1 The dissolution of the people's committee

During the reconstruction process of 1 Mayıs neighborhood, a new demolition order was not notified to the police forces or zabıta (the municipal police). At the same period, anti-propaganda news and articles in the mainstream newspaper were in decrease as well. In early 1978, it appeared as if the neighborhood was tacitly accepted by the authorities. However, the events took place on the 15th of March 1978, marked a second critical juncture in the history of the neighborhood, which eventually led to the dissolution of the people's committee. On this day, five right-wing workers were killed inside the borders of the neighborhood. Conflicting and competing stories are present regarding the event. The mainstream media and the right-wing newspaper represented the event as the massacre realized with the order of the people's committee thus a crystallization of the myth of "liberated zone" in which "terrorist" and "anarchist" organization constituted their own judicial system including

judging and punishing (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017) . However, the various accounts narrated by different political figures active in the neighborhood at that time period, are both consonant with each other and display a different story. According to the inhabitants who are affiliated with radical revolutionary organizations and took initiative in the organization of the people's committee the event revealed as explained in the following paragraph.

According to the principles of the committee regarding the distribution of land and housing, it was not permitted to hold a gecekondu on the neighborhood if you already possess any house on any other neighborhood of Istanbul. The three workers who were members of a rightist union, were dispossessed by the committee accused of contradicting this principle. Their houses were given to others who are in need. After facing the dispossession, the three workers went to the closest "Ülkü Ocakları" (an extreme right-wing organization). Taking the head of Gültepe Ülkü Ocağı and another relative of him, five of them returns to 1 Mayıs neighborhood. They enter the coffeehouse run by a member of the people's committee, assault relatives of the coffeehouse owner and threaten the Committee-affiliated people. In a very short amount of time, the event was heard by the sympathizers of the TKP/ML in the neighborhood. They immediately arrive at the coffeehouse. After searching all five and find out various sharp objects as bayonets, etc. and a gun; they decided that the group's act should be perceived as an act of violence against the neighborhood. Even though inner debates happen whether to inform the committee or the TKP/ML authority in the neighborhood; neither of these authorities was informed. These sympathizers appear to have taken the five rightists to a nearby quarry and execute them in it.

The event was reflected in the mass media on the 20th of March. The news and articles were in a race to mystify “the liberated zone”, claims of people’s court, people’s prison, death squads directed by the people’s committee were all over the newspapers as Tercüman and Hürriyet (Aslan, 2016). The event and its representation in the mainstream media lead to uneasiness among the people of 1 Mayıs neighborhood. Doubts began to emerge about the committee and the revolutionary organizations. However, it should be said that overall majority of the people -even though disturbed by the event, were standing behind the committee and the revolutionaries inside it, and perceiving event as a provocation against the neighborhood as it is crystallized by the public statement of the neighborhood, published in Milliyet on the 24th of March:

The individuals whom we chose for the People’s Committee are not strangers. They are also people from the neighborhood... The individuals who consisted of the committee are the ones who help the people, act as if people’s problem are their own problems. They help the people, who are fired from their jobs, they help the ones who are out of money, they embrace the problem of all the people. Five friends from that committee are under custody now, have been tortured. The committee helps to solve the problems without any expectations... (See Appendix G)

Yet, a drastic change in the atmosphere was witnessed instantly after the event. Right after the event, under the favor of political mystique created by the national media, the police forces entered the neighborhood and realized subsequent operation regarding political figures of the neighborhood. In a very short amount of time, members of the committee either had to escape or were captured by the state forces, hence the committee was dissolved in the spring of 1978.

3.4.1.2 The formation of the elderly committee, the newly forming institutions and social fabric after the 1980 military coup

After the dissolution of the people's committee, unplanned growth, confusion, and dreariness unfold regarding the growth of the neighborhood and its self-governing daily practices. The lack of any physical attempts to demolish the neighborhood prevented revelation of the organizational deficiency in the defense of the neighborhood; however, the local people were still inclined to organize as they believe that organizing - in one way or another - is necessary for masses to defend their rights. In this period, the mass meetings of inhabitants were still held frequently in order to discuss issues of the neighborhood. In the second half of 1979, these meetings revealed a decision towards the formation of a new committee "the Elderly Committee". This committee was more representative than a local governing body directing the self-organization and self-governance. To be sure, it still possessed a significant force in the decision-making within the neighborhood, yet, it did not describe itself as the governing organ of the neighborhood which aims to organize the neighborhood in accordance with the political principles asserted by the people's committee.

The committee was formed by four elder men. They were also socialist/pro-socialist people and the distribution of the seats were organized with regard to the social existence of the revolutionary organizations on the neighborhood. However, the change in the name and in the self-description of the committee implied an important shift in the struggle of the neighborhood as well as its level and form of self-organization. From that point on, until the 1980 military coup, the main aim of the committee was legitimization and legalization of the neighborhood - with preserving political stance of the neighborhood if possible - by a strategy which does not accept every state institution as an enemy to struggle against but some as obligatory re-

spondent. No doubt, the simultaneous electoral success of the CHP, especially at the municipal level, had a significant enabling effect on that respect as both the central government and municipality became more friendly towards the neighborhood.

The first task of the elderly committee was to take the first steps towards legal recognition of the neighborhood. This required applying to district governorship (kayamakamlık) which is done by the elderly committee. Even though any official progress did not happen at that visit, verbal admission by the district governor was perceived as the first step towards official recognition. Beginning with the spring of 1979, until the September 1980, the elderly committee realized successful developments in three different realms, all of which contributed to social needs of the neighborhood as well as its legal recognition. The first of them was the building of four schools in and around the neighborhood. The current names of these primary schools are as the following: i) 30 Ağustos ii) Necatibey iii) Orhan Veli iv) Eflatun Gem Güney. However, back at that time they were announced as Şehitlik (refers to martyrs of the grand destruction), 1 Mayıs E-5, 1 Mayıs Taşocağı, and 1 Mayıs Mandıra Yanı. Three out of four were containing the name of the neighborhood as decided by the inhabitants. This was the first time in any official documents, the name of the neighborhood took its place. The second was the establishment of the 1 Mayıs People's Consumption Cooperative. In September of 1979, while the neighborhood was still on the status of illegality, the cooperative was officially acknowledged by the register no. 166558 under the name of "1 Mayıs Mahallesi Halk Tüketim Kooperatifi". At the foundation point, four hundred inhabitants who paid the necessary amount of 1000 TL (approximately 30 dollars), were involved. With the effect of the black market in staple food and prevalent poverty in the neighborhood, reasonably priced cooperative attracted attention in a small amount of time. Interestingly, rather than

competition, solidarity based on reciprocal benefits marked the relation between the local *bakkals* and the cooperative as declared by the inhabitants who witnessed the pre-1980 process: “It did not lead to a competition negative for the bakkals; indeed, they were able to buy product cheaper than the prices imposed by the monopolies and the black market both for their consumption and for selling in their shop”.

Lastly, just before the military coup of September 1980, in the summer of the same year, a medical unit was opened in the neighborhood under the name of “1 Mayıs Sağlık İstasyonu” by İstanbul City Health Authority. Until this moment, the only medical service was a few days a week in an unofficial “medical center” by voluntary labor of socialist doctors and medical students. The given span of one and a half year was, thus, marked by the “successful” steps of the elderly committee to obtain basic services and official recognition of the neighborhood and its name albeit in an indirect way.

Even though the Elder’s Committee continued to possess a political tendency and a quality of being an authority for the resolution of local disputes, henceforth it came to the fore as a diplomatic organ of representation that is decisive on the relations with the state and outside of the neighborhood, rather than a central organ of self-government. The 12 September Coup and the process in its aftermath amplify this trajectory. Just after the 12 September, the neighborhood was legalized under the name of Mustafa Kemal, and thereby a legal administrator (*mukhtar*) is assigned. As the Elder’s Committee day by day transformed into a board of representatives or alderman with increasingly diminishing features of self-governance, a counter-commodification experience such as the Halk Tüketim Kooperatifi was quickly rendered inoperative by police operations and oppression, and thus dissolved (Aslan, 2016).

Despite all these developments, the neighborhood does not lose its collective culture with respect to both its solidarity in organizing the daily life and the prevention of commodification. Thus, even if its organizational mechanisms and political aspect are damaged, in line with the Lefebvrian definition previously proposed (1991), this place still possesses certain central features of a counter-space. The loss of its counter-space qualities, however, mainly occurs throughout the processes from 1984 to mid-1990s which are explained in detail in the chapter on the historical journey of 1 Mayıs neighborhood. During this period, the capitalist understanding of land and housing as commodities, re-individualization of property relations and replacement of collective organization of daily life based on mahallelilik (the identity of sharing the same neighborhood) is replaced by social fabric based on hemşerilik (the identity of fellow townsmanship⁹ organized around numerous fellow townsmen associations. After the dissolution of self-organized institutions favoring counter-space and collectivity; the local branch of the PSAKD, the neighborhood associations, the muhtarlık accompanied the hemşehri associations as the important social institutions effective for local politics, interest groups, solidarity network and solution to the disagreements among the inhabitants.

Today, the 1 Mayıs neighborhood still possesses an ambiguous and eclectic existence. On one hand, it appeared to be integrated with the system and normalized as bus lines, banks, official state institutions are established and function more or less as any other poor neighborhood of Istanbul. The clashes on the streets are not routine anymore and became coincidental and marginalized in most cases. By development of private property and advancements in “entrepreneurship”; the main street now is full of shops, local and nation-wide stores, markets, and off-license stores. On the other hand, the neighborhood still sustains its political past or identity; mostly in the

cultural realm, but not limited to it. Most of the hometown association are left-oriented and famous revolutionary figures as Deniz Gezmiş still adorn their walls. The local people in their chats on the streets on in their coffeehouse did not give up the name of 1 Mayıs (it is very rare to hear them saying the official name of the neighborhood) and keep the political history of the neighborhood alive by memory refreshing conversations. In the more contemporary political realm, there are still important signs that demarcate 1 Mayıs from an ordinary gecekondü neighborhood: i) the slogans of various “illegal” radical left organizations including the PKK, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) and the Marxist Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) are constantly renewed on the outer walls of stores and apartments; demonstrating that even marginalized compared to the past, radical revolutionary movements still holds a place in the neighborhood ii) the local branch of PSAKD and Cemevi functions as a cultural, social, and political center in which the left politics in general, Alevi culture and the collective identity of the neighborhood continues to reproduce itself iii) during the 2000s and still in nowadays, if any threat of demolition appears the neighborhood can effectively organize without even waiting for a physical attempt, thus organizational memory and consciousness are still at high-level. Nevertheless, there is a fact that every dialogue with a person who was in the formation struggle of the neighborhood ratifies: Today, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi even though preserve its political content to some extent, estranged from the founding principles of the neighborhood. The neighborhood embodies capitalist relations in the field of housing and land, as well as nearly full integration with the capitalist economy of the city thus, could not prevent the emergence of class differentiation and economic stratification within the neighborhood.

3.4.2 Legal and political transformation: Effects on the perception of property and the threat of demolition targeting the neighborhood

As highlighted in the first and second chapter of the thesis, the processes of counter-space constitution, consolidation, and dissolution are not one-dimensional but includes various different eventually, legal, organizational, spatial dynamics and factors. In accordance with the four axes of the main framework of the thesis, the dissolution of the counter-space in 1 Mayıs Mahallesi is effected by factors as legal status, frequency of demolitions (or its lacking), spatial interventions (or its lacking) as addition to the organization factors evaluated in the above sub-section. In this sub-section, I will address the effects of the changes in the legal status (the legal recognition of the neighborhood and the legal status of the settlements) as well as the transformations in the political atmosphere, local and nation-level governance. These changes, even though they are not legal changes, have similar effects on the social fabric thus the counter-space via their effect on decreasing the demolition threat and leading to more suitable ground for individualization and commodification of social property relations (e.g. the 1989-1994 process of the SHP governance in Istanbul Municipality).

3.4.2.1 Political impacts of the 1980 military coup

The military coup of September 12, 1980 is widely accepted as “the” critical juncture of the social/political history of the Turkish Republic. The coup was realized in a context that the radical left was increasingly mobilized and organized all over the country (Samim, 1981); simultaneously, the armed conflicts between the radical left and rightist actors as well as counter-guerilla organizations were increasing in numbers and spreading in geographical scope. The 12th September Coup closed all polit-

ical organizations and non-governmental organizations - allegedly politicized- regardless of their position on the political spectrum. However, this fact does not explain either the social political scope/effect of the coup or its political content. During the process of military governance which lasted officially until the autumn of 1983 (the date of first elections after the coup): i) at least 1,683,000 people were black listed (out of 44 million population including children and aged people) ii) 650,000 people were detained iii) 230,000 people were put in 210,000 cases iv) 7,000 people sued with the demand of death penalty, 517 people were given the sentences, 49 of them were executed v) 14,000 people were expatriated vi) 23,667 associations were closed vii) 49 tons of newspapers, magazines, and books were annihilated due to “inappropriate content (Birgün, 2015).

The discourse of the coup was based on ending “the fight of brothers” and being against both right-wing and left-wing radicalism; however, all the process was targeting a high level of politicization and unionization among the working class which made the realization of the transformation needed by the Turkish bourgeoisie impossible. These “needed steps” crystallized in the decrees of January 14 and realized only after the military coup with the help of dissolution of unions, NGO’s and political parties. The Decrees of January 14 aimed at i) transformation to free market economy and full integration with the world market ii) export-oriented model instead of import substitution iii) decrease in the role of the state in the economy, especially the state enterprises iv) decrease in the role of the state in price-control. The military coup was realized to these economic transformations, and eliminate the risk of a socialist or pro-socialist revolution which became a solid threat for the state and the bourgeoisie in the last years of the 1970s.

The effect of the military coup was very powerful in the 1 Mayıs neighborhood as well. Nearly all of the organized revolutionaries living or organizing in the neighborhood were captured or had to run away. Yet, the elderly committee was still functioning. The members of the committee, as well as the majority of the inhabitants of the neighborhood, were still socialist/pro-socialist people. However, the given committee, in the given context, had to accept dropping its name in exchange of official recognition by the state -which was equal to a military official at that time-.

3.4.2.2 Legal recognition of 1 Mayıs neighborhood under the name of Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi

At that point, the “success” of the military coup damaged revolutionary movements and limit their political activities to a large extent. In that context, “the revolution” appeared to be removed from the short-term agenda of the ordinary people. The revolution was postponed, the state appeared as the sole authority again. In this picture, the main task of the elderly committee according to the inclination of the inhabitants became the official recognition i.e. legalization of the neighborhood. Even though the neighborhood was a symbol of “liberated zones” in the eyes of the state by its radical political stance, this demand was not incompatible with the agenda of the military coup. Indeed, the strategy of the new government for the gecekondü neighborhoods was non-intervention. In the case of highly politicized gecekondü neighborhoods, the agenda of the junta appeared as i) to suppress all political actors and organizations ii) but to provide fundamental services and legal recognition to prevent the tendency of the inhabitants towards “radical organizations”. In this context, the first step came from the junta.

It was after the military coup. The Commanders were the only ones who can decide. Once, it was said that regiment commander was calling the

committees from some neighborhood around Ümraniye, including ours. In front of the committees in the meeting hall, there was a piece of paper that was written which neighborhood they came from. On ours, May Day neighborhood was written. While the regiment officers came in and saw ours, he got angry all of a sudden, “throw that paper away” he said while staring at us. He was pissed off about the “May Day” name. Then, he made a speech on neighborhood units and gave us a file and told us to go to Ümraniye gendarmerie station and to solve the “name” problem... The other day, Rifat Kılavuz, Uncle Kemal and Uncle Hüseyin went to the station with Hasan Hayri Dilek because I had to go to work. After a short conversation, the captain said the neighborhood would be called “Mustafa Kemal Neighborhood” ... Then, the neighborhood became legalized. (See Appendix H)

It should be stated that legal recognition of the neighborhood made administrative functioning much easier for the military government as it can assign a mukhtar, and the existence of a muhtarlık enables population tracking which was an important instrument of the central state machinery at the given period.

3.4.2.3 “The settlement amnesty” of 1984: Title deed allocation document and its effects in the neighborhood

Motherland Party (the ANAP), which was the ruling party both in the parliament and in the local elections in most of the cities including İstanbul between 1983 and 1989 after the military rule, extended the policies of the military rule in various realms. The populist attitude in the gecekondu question was no exception. Taking one step forward, the ANAP government began to distribute *tapu-tahsis* documents which were allegedly temporary documents for gecekondu owners, and will eventually provide them official deeds in exchange. This was a crucial move in terms of manipulating voting behavior, and even more to consolidate hundreds of thousands poor people to the “order” by the hope of legal recognition and economic prosperity even though it is still uncertain and obviously limited. The social effect of this legal document which provokes hope, enable the development of exclusionary individual

property and market relations in the field of housing will be analyzed detailed in the first section of Chapter 4.

3.4.2.4 The revival of social movements and the rise of the SHP

The last years of the 1980s witnessed a revival in every realm of social movements. Profound recovery in the political and social field revealed itself for the first time in the “spring protests” of 1989 as the public employees arose for their usurped right to unionize. Politicization among the university youth proliferated simultaneously. The process made its peak at the great miner march from Zonguldak to Ankara began on the 30th of November 1990, ended on the 6th of February 1991. The period until the late 1990s witnessed sharp rise in various struggles (public workers -especially education workers- ,the mine workers, youth movement, the struggle of Kurdish People, recovery and revival of the various radical leftist organizations as the TKP/ML, Dev-Sol (later on the DHKP-C), etc. . However, the same period also marked the further integration of the economics of Turkey to neoliberal principles as well as further economic integration of towns and poor urban neighborhoods into capitalist economic relations.

In the 1989 local elections, results were a significant victory for the SHP. It was the first party by %28.69, succeeded by the True Path Party (DYP) led by Süleyman Demirel (%25.13), and the governing party, ANAP could get only %21,80. Six out of the eight metropolitan municipalities were won by SHP whereas the remaining two cities were shared by the DYP and RP. 1 Mayıs neighborhood, similar to many other left-orientated poor neighborhoods, provided a strong vote basis for the SHP in 1989 local election. During the election campaign, explicitly or indirectly, the majority of the radical leftist organizations supported SHP against the

center-right ANAP government. As a result of that SHP administrations were sympathetic towards these gecekondu neighborhoods. Moreover, some cadres of district municipalities were filled with known figures (naturally left-oriented) of these gecekondu neighborhoods who usually play a facilitating role in solving problems of the neighborhood.

At that time, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi was a stable place to a large extent. After 1984, the duty of the first mukhtar assigned by the junta had ended. After that, Sabri Koçyiğit, former head of the famous people's committee and the former member of the Maoist revolutionary organization the TKP/ML, was elected as the mukhtar of the neighborhood. The election results lead to a positive atmosphere in the neighborhood due to numerous reasons. The two most prevalent reasons were i) -the political-the weakening the rule of center-right ANAP ii) the informal guarantee given by SHP to the gecekondu neighborhoods. The poor gecekondu neighborhoods that constituted a vote reservoir for the party, were given the promise that "illegal" settlements will not be demolished, and the municipal administration would do as much as it can, to legalize these settlements which correspond to the distribution of official house title deed. Under this circumstance, the construction of new houses skyrocketed. Until this day, due to the constant uncertainty, the landscape of the neighborhood was compromised by the single-story gecekondu houses. During the 1990-1995 period, the neighborhood witnessed both horizontal but essentially vertical expansion with the de facto guarantee given by the SHP municipalities. Throughout the 1990s, the weak coalition governments and constantly changing municipal administrations hesitate to pitch against the gecekondu neighborhoods and realized populist policies which favored further vertical expansion.

The same period lead to two seemingly paradoxical development in the neighborhood as well: i) formation of the village or small town originated associations (hemşehri dernekleri) ii) re-politicization of the neighborhood in a radical fashion. The first development coincides to the first years of the 1990s. Nearly all such association were formed in the years of 1991-92. It appears that the weakening of the political identity binding the neighborhood and removal of the constant threat of deconstruction which reinforces the collective identity of “mahallelilik”; the kinship and hometown networks came to the fore as functioning social mechanism. In my fieldwork, I witnessed countless times that people accepting this trend and complaining about it. One of the most remarkable statements regarding this issue was voiced by a managing member of the local branch of PSAKD “When 1 Mayıs was “the 1 Mayıs” we were solving every problem among ourselves, but collectively. After that hemşericilik (favoring the ones who came from the same town) emerged in the neighborhood; now event the votes are decided by these relations; unfortunately, it damaged our sense of collectivity”.

During the early 1990s as the society expedited its re-organization around democratic non-governmental organization; by the support and encouragement of the revolutionary actors, these organizations were officially formed and eventually became both socializing spaces and important political chambers of the neighborhood. The other development corresponds to the overlap of the two interrelated phenomena i) revival of the radical revolutionary left ii) mass mobilizations in the numerous gecekondu neighborhood -especially among Alevi and Kurdish population- under the leadership of these radical revolutionary organizations on the rise. The crystallization of these processes was the Gazi Rebellion in March 1995. On the 12th of March, three coffeehouses and one patisserie were raked in Gazi Mahallesi (a gecekondu

neighborhood populated by Kurdish Alevi population on the European side of Istanbul) by unknown people (later, appeared to be counter-guerrilla units). During these assaults, 25 people were injured and one *dede* (religious community leader of Alevi communities) was killed. Local people gathered and marched toward the police station in the neighborhood to protest. The answer by the state forces was to open fire on the people with automatic rifles. After this point, the events transform into an armed rebellion led by the coalition of radical revolutionary organizations holding power in Gazi Mahallesi. The event spread to various other Kurdish/Alevi/poor gecekondu neighborhoods rapidly. During the four days of clashes, 22 people were killed, and 155 people were injured. This period marks an important point in the collective socio-political memory of 1 Mayıs Mahallesi as well:

After we heard the news about the events, a mass protest was organized. However, the friends who led the demonstrations went to Gazi neighborhood. Back then, I told them not to go, we need people to set the order here. That day, it was not even clear who was leading the march. Some people from the mass led us to somewhere, to the place where the police were, then the moment the police attack started, there were some places nearby such as shelters and containers. Near the place where stands a school today, they shot us with long-range weapons. That day, our friends died. After that day, to be honest, the people from the neighborhood refrained from pouring to the streets. (See Appendix I)

3.5 The spatial interventions in 1 Mayıs neighborhood

The 1 Mayıs Neighborhood has been following a dynamic course in terms of spatially since its establishment. In the initial process, the dynamism was due to two main factors: Ever-growing number of gecekondu settlements due to new-comers, and consecutive demolitions. Another component of this dynamism, during the years of 1977-78 was the People's Committee. In accordance with its principles presented in sub-section 3.3.2., The People's Committee realized a series of spatial intervention mainly focused on the physical distribution of the space. The principles as equal land

to each inhabitant was the primary factor in the distribution and regulation of physical space. However, it was alone in that respect. Provision of public spaces needed for a “healthy” social life within the neighborhood was another prominent factor. Based on these and similar main principles, the People’s Committee, prepared and presented a neighborhood settlement plan with the contribution of the Chamber of City Planners (ŞPO under the Union of Turkish Engineer and Architect Chambers -the TMMOB). In addition to the institutional and professional support from the TMMOB, voluntary students from the Boğaziçi University, State Engineering and Architecture Academy of Istanbul (İDMMA, nowadays Yıldız Technical University), and İTÜ actively participated in the planning and the implementation stages. Despite these, this planned neighborhood construction/expansion project was ultimately unsuccessful on account of several reasons according to Arif Bilgin, who took part in this process: I) Settlement patterns in the area had started off in an arbitrary fashion and developed in that manner; II) The inhabitants did not have “sufficient” level of urban consciousness and were persistent when it came to demanding more land for themselves and their relatives emigrating to the area; III) Political rivalries between various groups; IV) The state’s perpetual plans for demolition. (Aslan, 2016).

Regarding this dynamism did not remain a characteristic of the neighborhood, as can be observed during the early 1990s. The period starting with the establishment of schools and medical centers during the CHP municipality, right before the 1980 coup, and lasting until the 1990s can be named as “the period of serenity.” With the process following the 1989 election, construction in the neighborhood became widespread both horizontally and vertically. The appearance of the neighborhood started to change with the shops, grocery stores, monopolies and restaurants opening on the

main street, where the Karakol Stop is located. Not directly in this current, the succeeding current of the opening of branches of large companies and ATM's of some banks transformed the outlook of the main street towards a "normalization" from its past as a "liberated zone." However, as it can be understood from the above sentences, this change did not mean the end of dynamism; indeed, it led to a more radical social and physical dynamism within the space of 1 Mayıs beginning with 1989.

Alongside this planning attempt, there were other spatial intervention (before the 1980 military coup) which are not producing or transforming physicality of a space but rather impose a symbolic and political aspect to it. By these, I indicate the namings as: (i) 1 Mayıs E-5 Elementary School (ii) 1 Mayıs Taşocağı (Quarry) Elementary School (iii) 1 Mayıs Mandıra Yanı (side of the dairy) and (iv) 1 Mayıs Sağlık İstasyonu (Medical Station) (v) Şehitlik (Martyrdom) Elementary School. All these institutions were opened to the service by the state; however, their names were given by the people of 1 Mayıs. These symbolic and political intervention to the space were very important to constitute and maintain a collective identity, common social memory, a specific type of "resisting"/"remembering" political subjectivity.

After the military coup of 1980, in a situation in which all organizations and institutions were dispersed, the spatial interventions of the pro counter-space forces were limited to the writings on the walls, graffiti, and similar temporary and very limited means of symbolic/political intervention. After that point, there were only two prominent spatial interventions that can be conceived as pro counter-space. The first one is the cemevi (sanctuary of the Anatolian Alevis but also a social and cultural center). The 1 Mayıs Cemevi, today, hosts the most crowded local branch of PSAKD which is active all over the Turkey and in Europe. During the process of its construction, the land on which Cemevi was constructed was seized as a result of

political struggle including violent clashes, and thus the given social space is a “loaded” place for the people who lived through that period. However, there are no monumental entities which remind the historical background or highlight the collective identity and the political history of the neighborhood. Additionally, when the cemevi was established as a result of social struggle; the counter-space characteristic of the neighborhood was already deteriorated to some extent after the years marked by the lack of any self-governing self-organizing organizational structure/institution within the neighborhood.

The second spatial intervention/production as such is Deniz Gezmiş Parkı (the Deniz Gezmiş Park). In another context, this would be a good example for pro counter-space spatial intervention/production as it unifies the public interest (the need of inhabitants of the neighborhood) and a symbolic intervention that promotes the certain common identities, memories, values, figures (Deniz Gezmiş is a prominent revolutionary youth leader of the 68 in Turkey, perhaps the most widely known one). However, this spatial production was realized after the neighborhood lost its counter-space character to a very large extent. More importantly, neither the physical production nor the naming was realized by any self-organizational institution/force of the neighborhood but was realized by the Ataşehir Municipality governed by CHP.

3.6 The conclusion of the chapter

To sum up, 1 Mayıs neighborhood was formed as a counter-space and collective community in a very early phase of its existence. The needs for collective action (in order to needs as collective resistance against demolitions, affordable food, clean water, electricity, security), the reaction of the local people against the land mafia and the state forces which thought as targeting their houses as “illegal settlements”

however not intervening the illegal houses if they are bribed by the land mafia, and the initiative and leadership of radical revolutionary cadres juxtaposed as main factors leading to the emergence of a self-organizational, self-governing counter-space.

The formation of local institutions as the People's Committee were central in that process. After the development of additional organizational mechanisms as sub-committees, social life became more and more organized and collective in a rapid process. But as the People's Committee had to dissolve, then due to the September 12th Coup, the neighborhood's self-organized self-governance mechanism was significantly damaged. Even though a solid collective neighborhood culture, identity, and memory were formed, they eventually weakened due to lack of institutions and mechanism (as the People's Committee, the public assemblies, monumental structures, etc.) that will consolidate and reinforce them. The further degeneration of the remaining counter-space qualities took place i) after the title deed allocation was given and led to individualization and commodification of house property iii) the allowance of uncontrolled expansion of buildings during the 1989-1994 period under the municipal governance of the SHP which led to further commodification of land and housing as well as damaging the homogeneity of the neighborhood. The homogeneity replaced by two types of heterogeneity: i) the economic one, as economic stratification emerged among the inhabitants due to developing property relations ii) demographic one, as the new construction led to the arrival of new people to the neighborhood as homeowners and tenants. Both trends further damaged the already weakening collective identity and make it harder to re-form a counter-space.

As the result of these processes today, the 1 Mayıs neighborhood is a very unplanned social space in which multi-floored apartment buildings cover the main street, and nearly all space was reserved for the necessary public spaces and

green fields in the initial plan, were occupied with irregular buildings. The given dissolution of the counter-space in 1 Mayıs can be understood by the analysis of the eventful/legal/organization/spatial dynamics which is explained in separate sections under the fourth sub-chapter within this chapter, will be further analyzed comparatively and in detail in the Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

KÜÇÜK ARMUTLU

In this chapter, I will first present (i) the main geographical, demographical, cultural, and political properties of the neighborhood, then (ii) the social background and historical process before the process of formation of Küçük Armutlu from Armutlu as a distinct, organized community. Subsequently, I will present and discuss about (iii) the process of counter-space constitution in Küçük Armutlu which corresponds the formation of the neighborhood as a distinct social entity and the subsequent period of the struggle for existence; and the succeeding period in which the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu (iv) the process of counter-space consolidation. Both processes, the former, 1989-1992, the latter, 1992 onwards; are presented and discussed with the four main axes: the eventual (mostly demolitions but including other decisive events), legal (legal status of the settlements), organizational (the main institutions in the social fabric of the neighborhood), spatial (production and organization of the social space, especially in the symbolic and political manner). The chapter is concluded with a brief section (v) that summarizes the chapter's content and presents its relevance for the thesis.

4.1 The Main features of Armutlu and Küçük Armutlu

4.1.1 Geography, demographics, culture and politics of the neighborhoods

Armutlu is a neighborhood that resides in the boundaries of Sarıyer Municipality, surrounded by Baltalimanı neighborhood to north and east, E-80 Highway and Hisarüstü to the south, and the lands of İTÜ/Maslak to the west. The official name

given by the state when the neighborhood is recognized as a district is Fatih Sultan Mehmet Mahallesi (FSM) referring to the famous Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror. However, as commonly seen in the former gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul, after their official recognition by the state, the official boundaries do not correspond to the neighborhood as a living organic unit. In this respect, it should be stated that Armutlu consists of the lands of the FSM and a small portion of the lands officially seen inside the Baltalimanı neighborhood, which corresponds to a few hundred dwellings.

Armutlu consists of two, to some extent connected but different neighborhoods: Büyük Armutlu and Küçük Armutlu. Büyük Armutlu labels the area beginning with the first settlements after the entrance from the E-80 Highway, ending with the bus terminal "FSM Son Durak" which constitutes the focal point of Armutlu due to its position, its structure -the only square of the neighborhood-, and its function -the main center of transportation-. Küçük Armutlu, on the other hand, marks the triangular area between the bus terminal on the south, water treatment plant of Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (İSKİ) on the west, and the Behçet Kemal Çağlar High School on the east.

The official population of FSM is 15,557, as announced by the muhtarlık. Regarding the deviation of registration, it would be logical to think that the real population is a little bit more crowded than the official numbers. Including a few thousand people who live in Küçük Armutlu but officially resides in the borders of Baltalimanı, the approximate population of Armutlu should be around 20,000. Küçük Armutlu, as a specific region of Armutlu, possesses around 4,000-5,000 inhabitants. The exact neighborhood, this thesis examines along with the 1 Mayıs Mahallesi, is this latter neighborhood: Küçük Armutlu.

Küçük Armutlu is culturally, demographically, but especially politically distinct from the other component of Armutlu. Demographically; Büyük Armutlu consists mainly of Black Sea originated people also describe themselves as Turk-Sunni; Küçük Armutlu on the other hand, does not differ totally in terms of origins of inhabitant, yet the ethno-religious population of Alevi origin constitutes the majority in it. Politically, the voting behavior of Büyük Armutlu tends towards right-wing majority in favor of AKP and MHP; whereas Küçük Armutlu displays a pro-revolutionary political disposition with a strong affiliation with the Dev-Sol tradition which interestingly usually fall into CHP and HDP votes in the election. Culturally, Küçük Armutlu displays a very specific, highly politicized outlook, consisting of the Dev-Sol tradition and Alevi identity whereas the other region of Armutlu does not display any peculiar cultural disposition than other Black-Sea originated gecekondu neighborhoods of Istanbul. Here, I would logically to present the brief history and fundamental features of the Dev-Sol tradition which occupies a central role in the whole process of Küçük Armutlu, since its very founding until the present day.

4.1.2 The Dev-Sol tradition

The Dev-Sol is a radical revolutionary political movement which claims to have Marxist-Leninist ideology and aim for a people's democratic revolution which will pave the way for a socialist revolution of the proletariat. The movements are formed by a separation from the most populous revolutionary movement of the time, Dev-Yol, in 1978. The movement claims the legacy of the THKP-C founded by Munir Ramadan Aktolga, Yusuf Küpeli, and Mahir Çayan who is one of the three most influential revolutionary figures of the 68 in Turkey along with Denis Gezmiş (a founding cadre of THKO and a leading figure among youth revolutionaries), and

İbrahim Kaypakkaya (a founding cadre of TKP/ML and a leading figure among youth revolutionaries). The Dev-Sol became a prominent force within the radical left in Turkey in the late 1980s. During the 1990s, it was very effective in the universities, poor neighborhood and even cultural centers of the city as Beşiktaş and Kadıköy. In the year of 1994, the organization formed a political party and armed front named as the DHKP-C. The political tradition became prevalent by various armed assault targeting important figures including deaths of Nihat Erim (former prime minister), Memduh Ünlütürk (a major general of the Turkish Armed Forces), Özdemir Sabancı (a member of the second wealthiest family of the Turkish bourgeoisie); and their prominent role in 1996 and the 2000-2007 death fasts resulted with more than 100 decedents for the organization (Bargu, 2008, 2014).

Even though the organization recruited people with very different social backgrounds; Alevi population, especially from Sivas, Dersim (Tunceli; the official name of the city) Erzincan, and Tokat, constituted the majority of its members and sympathizers. Accordingly, some rituals of the organization shared important features with the Alevi tradition. The usage of symbols as the zulfıqar (the sword of Ali the caliphate) by the members of the armed front, the red headband by the death fasters are just two examples for this interaction.

4.2 Pre-history of the neighborhood: The first settlements and the process of becoming a neighborhood)

Until the early 1980s, Armutlu was a rural area at the outskirts of the city. There were only a handful of families occupied predominantly with gardening. The area was known with its tasty raspberries and pears (*armut* is the Turkish word for pear; the reason why the neighborhood is called as such). The families were earning their

livings mostly by selling herbs and fruits to the predominantly wealthy inhabitants of nearby districts (Bebek, Arnavutköy, Yeniköy, and Beşiktaş, especially towards Teşvikiye, inhabited by an important portion of the high-rank state officials and urban elites at the time). The neighborhood also hosted quarries, benefitting the limestone-rich soil, and for long years, used to provide stones and stone chips (*mıcır*).

As noted in previous sections, the 1950-1980 period in Istanbul was marked by high-speed urbanization accompanied with the need of workforce due to (i) industrialization and (ii) the growing service sectors in the city center. This process, together with the state's incapability and unwillingness to provide sufficient accommodation in quality and quantity, gave birth to numerous gecekondu neighborhoods such as Ümraniye, Okmeydanı, and Bağcılar. Armutlu may be seen as one of the last rings of this chain.

Even though migration due to urbanization began in the 1970s, it was not ample enough to perceive as a “flow;” rather, it appeared to be at the scope of a sprinkling of families predominantly from the Black Sea Region. The trend of a sharp rise of the population was reached in the early 1980s and made its peak in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Indeed, it would be accurate to claim that Armutlu began to become a neighborhood during the 1980s. In neighborhoods like Armutlu, in-city migration was very common as the newcomers among the urban working class aimed at freeing themselves from the pressure of house rent. In the first year of that decade, the newcomers were predominantly from the Black Sea region, especially from Rize. However, towards the mid-1980s, the Alevi population emerged in the neighborhood as the predominant demographical factor (from Tokat, Sivas, Maraş, Erzincan, and Amasya). The trend accelerated in the late 1980s and continued in the 1990s—at that point as a result of conscious political choice.

It is important to mention the historical connection between Hisarüstü neighborhood and Armutlu in order to understand the social and political origins of Küçük Armutlu. Hisarüstü as a neighborhood began to form in the early 1970s around the campus of Robert College, which became Boğaziçi University in 1971. After that year, the process of settlement accelerated owing to the university and the development of nearby bourgeois neighborhoods, namely Levent and Etiler, especially due to the service sector they needed. Before the construction of the second bridge over the Bosphorus—the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge—the two neighborhoods were geographically and to some extent socially connected; indeed, with its limited level of development, Armutlu was like a continuum of Hisarüstü. After the completion of the bridge in 1988, the two neighborhoods were physically separated by the E-80 Highway, thus socially by the concretization of various social, economic, and political variations. Yet, the diminishing connection left two legacies: (i) Alevi population and culture, (ii) components that have sympathy towards revolutionary youth and revolutionary values. The former was due to the demography of Hisarüstü, in which Alevi community hold the majority as an ethno-religious identity; the latter was due to the close connections between revolutionary youth movements, especially Dev-Yol, and Hisarüstü residents reinforced by the existence of the Boğaziçi University. Before the 1980 coup d'état, the Boğaziçi University was also a social fabric that various revolutionary organizations were organized—among them, Dev-Yol was the most prevalent one. Here, it is necessary to remind that the Dev-Sol, which would eventually be the power that establishes the neighborhood with the people and holds there until today, was formed by actors who were inside the Dev-Yol before the separation realized in 1978.

4.3 The construction of the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu: The foundation of Küçük Armutlu and the subsequent period of the struggle for existence

There are two main historical moments which can be perceived as decisive junctures in the formation of Küçük Armutlu. Firstly, the year 1987 marks a milestone in the history of Armutlu. While the population of the neighborhood reached four-digit numbers, a different path to build gecekondu emerged in the neighborhood with the leadership of the Dev-Sol. Until this day, gecekondu in Armutlu (the overwhelming majority of them was in the area of Büyük Armutlu, as called today) were built in the places that newcomers bought from the land mafias that illegally parceled out the given territory.

In that process, the Dev-Sol had some sympathizers in the neighborhood. The Dev-Sol as a political organization evaluated gecekondu neighborhood as the weak link of the cities. Thus, the organization gave primacy to organize gecekondu people and in that attempt, providing a solution to the needs and problems of gecekondu people. This inclination merging with the increasing unease among the newcoming population in the face of demands of the land mafia led to a result in which a section of inhabitants of Armutlu and some newcomers were organized by the support and the leadership of the Dev-Sol in order to claim the land where today Küçük Armutlu resides. Even though it relied on the demands of the local people, the action was already planned, thus, a result of a priori decision by the Dev-Sol. The decision/action was crucial in various aspects: (i) challenging the land mafias which were common elements of the gecekonduzation process of İstanbul, (ii) acting as an organized “community” in all manners—the housing plans, neighborhood gatherings, street committees, organization of night duties, etc. After that point, i.e. the year 1987, the story of Küçük Armutlu has become the story of the struggle of a self-organized

community against the pressure and attacks by land mafias, different capital groups that want to confiscate the land, and the state that hesitates to accept the social and political reality of the neighborhood.

The first actions were (i) establishing a well-functioning people's committee, (ii) designing a plan of the all projected/potential settlements in Küçük Armutlu, (iii) internal and external mobilization of labor for gecekondu-making and—if needed—defending them, and (iv) organizing regular and frequent mass meetings for gecekondu people.

4.3.1 The People's Committee in Küçük Armutlu

In Küçük Armutlu, the only active political force was the Devrimci-Sol from the very beginning. Until 1989, the land mafia ruled over the neighborhood, they divided the land and sold it to newcomers at prices that they determined. When Devrimci-Sol became strong in the area, the people of the area known as Küçük Armutlu started refusing to pay the land mafia. After a large-scale demolition in 1989, when many houses in the neighborhood were torn down, Devrimci-Sol – in light of the tendencies displayed by the community, the broader political atmosphere, and their own political/organizational goals – invited the people to settle in the area, a move which demonstrated that they were now a force in the region. The period between 1989 and 1992 witnessed constant demolition threats by the state and countless armed confrontations between Devrimci-Sol and the land mafia. By 1993, the land mafia had acknowledged Devrimci-Sol's control over Küçük Armutlu and they retreated to Büyük Armutlu where they continued their rent economy for a while.

This political differentiation has undoubtedly been an important factor in the classification of Küçük Armutlu as a distinct neighborhood, and not just a part of

Büyük Armutlu. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to take 1989 as the date when Küçük Armutlu was established as a neighborhood and a counter-space. From the founding in 1989 onwards, there has been a People's Committee in Küçük Armutlu. This People's Committee was established under the leadership of one organization and operated under one the authority of one political group. However, from the very onset, this committee has borne the goal or at least claim of being transparent towards the people – barring “necessary” precautions taken in the name of security. As there has been no general amnesty from that period (which was the case of 1 Mayıs) until today and some of these activities can be problematic in the contemporary political/judicial situation of Turkey, it was not possible to provide information about the members of the first committee, the number of members and its operational dynamics. Although there are fragments of information, unfortunately, these cannot be tested for accuracy or consistency in light of second-hand sources. However, it is possible to look at the principles of the first committee, its practical activities in the neighborhood and how its sub-organizations worked through popular participation.

The principles of the Küçük Armutlu People's Committee are principles which attempt to regulate the process of gecekondü settlement and expansion were the following:

- I. No houses in Küçük Armutlu can be larger than 120 square meters. The only condition of exceeding the limit is the structure of the land that the house is located.
- II. Nobody can rent out or buy his house.
- III. No house can have more than two floors except the cases such as the necessity to find a house to the married child.
- IV. One who already has a house cannot settle in Küçük Armutlu.
- V. All the inhabitants of Küçük Armutlu must obey the basic moral values. (Gönül, 2009, p.30)

As a unique characteristic of Küçük Armutlu, the People's Committee was not spontaneously established upon a political tendency designation based on an open elec-

tion with the direct participation of all people. However, after the regionally influential Revolutionary-Left took the decision to unite the neighborhood with such an organ, the militants initiated a political effort to establish a People's Committee in the neighborhood. In seeking to protect their right to housing fundamentally, the people of Küçük Armutlu have joined the process and with the advent of their participation, an operating People's Committee was organized in the neighborhood. This People's Committee consisted directly of the militants of Dev-Sol and the prominent, beloved and veteran residents who could coordinate their efforts with them. Throughout the process encompassing the establishment of the neighborhood and the period between 1989-1992, which can be characterized as the defense phase; the principal operation of the committee was forming a neighborhood plan with the contribution of the Revolutionary-Left affiliated architecture or engineering students involved, and subsequently leading and overseeing that the realization of all the public works, including the distribution of land, residential construction, road construction, were occurring accordingly with that plan. The construction processes of new shanties were not merely left to the labor of its future habitants but were organized by the committee.

In addition to this planning, realizing and overseeing role adopted during the construction phase, another fundamental duty of the Committee was the provision of security to the neighborhood. In those first years riddled with routine police operations and armed attacks of groups related to the land mafia, the People's Committee organized night watch for "security". Guard duty began around the hours people withdrew from the streets every night and ended in the morning as the day illuminated the streets. For each of the four regions designated by the neighborhood's committee, there were at least four watchmen assigned, and one amongst them was designated as the chief watchmen. These chief watchmen were generally chosen

amongst those with closer relations to the Dev-Sol. If any dangerous situation was observed in the neighborhood communication is made via predesignated intercommunication methods such as blowing a whistle; if necessary, most of the neighborhood folk promptly gather in a spot called “resistance hill” by everyone mobilizing their closest neighbors (Köse, 2012).

Another issue of the committee is to resolve any disputes occurring in the neighborhood that remain unresolved if left on its own. This function, that is not merely limited to the scope of land/zoning disputes, extends to various other issues such as domestic disputes and mistreatment of partners. Another function of the committee is to undertake “consciousness raising” efforts. These efforts consist of journal and pamphlet distributions, announcements and organizing public meetings.

The People’s Committee is principally responsible for the resolution of various problems arising out of exclusion (Gönül, 2009). Acknowledging the needs such as road, water, and electricity as a right, it strives to organize and lead a struggle amongst the neighborhood folk to seize those rights. However, it does not postpone these questions to a date when these needs might be acquired as a legal right. Just as the right to housing is not postponed and immediately attempted to be resolved, these issues manifesting as daily needs are also tackled by the People’s Committee. The activity of collective shopping and its public redistribution in order to inexpensively satisfy the needs of the residents is a significant example in this case. The markets later formed in the neighborhood, which are titled as ‘Halk Market’ (People’s Market), became a significant instrument for the people to satisfy their daily needs far more cheaply than for-profit markets.

Although Küçük Armutlu is a geographically small neighborhood as compared to the most of the similar “leftist”/“political” neighborhoods, the need for a subcom-

mittee territorially dividing the neighborhood has also emerged here in a short time. As I have detailed previously while depicting the watch system, the neighborhood is divided into four areas. In these areas, a central people's committee focusing directly on that area's problems was formed alongside correspondingly operating four other committees. One of the foremost functions of this subcommittee during the first period was the incorporation of the ordinary people into the watch practice, in order to protect the houses of the people and prevent theft and prostitution. This incorporation allowed the neighborhood to connect both with the Revolutionary-Left and the local People's Committee more organically. Subcommittees are also responsible for knowing every single person in their area and identifying potentially dangerous persons and currents in advance. In the same manner, it is the duty of these committees to be aware of those houses in need and satisfy these needs either directly as a committee or together with the people cooperatively. The qualities required for someone to take office in these committees are stated as such: to be adopting, diligent, and capable of problem-solving. Misconduct, lying, accepting bribe, demonstrating a moral weakness, favoritism and loafing are reasons for direct dismissal. Dismissal may occur upon the complaints of the people or other committee members' identifications. The alleged crime needs to be discussed in the committee, clarified and decreed.

4.3.2 Supplementary organizations outside of Küçük Armutlu: The solidarity among the gecekondu neighborhoods

There are also supplementary organizations and institutions which are not directly located within the neighborhood but was active and beneficiary for the consolidation of the counter-space as part of the organizational capacity of the dominant political organization of the neighborhood, the Dev-Sol.

These are district/neighborhood associations. These were organized under the leadership of the Dev-Sol tradition were also important parts of the empowering gecekondu neighborhoods. At this period, 21 district/neighborhood associations, 17 of which in İstanbul, were founded and active.

AKAD - Alibeyköy, BAHKAD - Bakırköy, BEYKAD - Okmeydanı, BİKAD - Beykoz, ÇİHKAD - Bağcılar/Çiftlik, EKAD - Esenler, GAZİ-DER - Gazi Mahallesi, GOPKAD - Gaziosmanpaşa, GÜLKAD - Gültepe, HAKAD - Haliç, KAR-DER - Kartal, KKDD - Kadıköy, SULKAD - Sultançiftliği, SKDD - Samandıra, ÜM-DER - Ümraniye, YEN-DER - Yenibosna, EMEKAD – Beyazıt (Köse, 2012).

These institutions were crucial in order to realize (i) supporting demonstrations if needed, (ii) campaigns for monetary support, and (iii) most importantly—if a physical attempt of demolition is present—to mobilize their support to Küçük Armutlu (or any other gecekondu neighborhood under such a danger) in order to participate in clashes.

4.3.3 The prominent events during the years of 1989-1992

The second founding moment in the history of Küçük Armutlu is the assaults and resistances countering them during 1989-1990. After the relatively “peaceful” years in which the neighborhood was unfolded and developed its own self-governing practices, the expected attack of the land mafias happened in 1989. The land mafia that already parceled the given land, thus all inhabitants had to pay their “share”—just as the people living in the other part of Armutlu, realized armed assaults on the neighborhood in order to terrorize the place and make the gecekondu people either pay or leave due to fear. However, under the leadership of the Dev-Sol militants, the gecekondu people struck back. The unexpected armed resistance surprised the land

mafia. The result was the reverse of what was expected; this process led to an increasing reputation of the organization in the neighborhood, arming of the ordinary gecekondu people by their kinship networks or logistics of the organizations, and legitimization of the Armed Struggle Squads against Fascist Terror (FTKSME). The repelling was succeeded by the so-called “punishment” of Fezail Bulak, the alleged leader of the local land mafia. After that point, the land mafia could not realize any extensive assaults on the neighborhood.

The date of 23 July 1990 marked the first “official” demolition attempt targeting Küçük Armutlu. The demolition attempt regarding illegal settlements coupled with the discourse of “liberated zone” and “hotbed of terrorism,” and the intervention turned into a special operation involving 2,000 police officers.

In this assault, Hüsni İşeri, a 42-year old peddler, was killed by bullets, declared the first martyr of Küçük Armutlu. The hours-long struggle against the assault and the first death while defending their gecekondus led to a juncture in the understanding and affection of the inhabitants. Even today, this incident prevails in the narratives of the people of Armutlu during interviews or conversations as the establishing event of the neighborhood.

The second official attempt to demolish the neighborhood came in the same year, this time due to “national security reasons”. The state declared that the ongoing Gulf War necessitated the construction of anti-aircrafts on the hills of the Bosphorus. Küçük Armutlu was chosen as the most proper place for the construction. Even though did not bring forward the July assault, there was already an official notification demanding proper further action for the construction of anti-aircrafts, given on June 10, 1990. The people of Küçük Armutlu decided to make their voices heard in the public sphere in order to prevent a second physical attempt of demolition based

on the excuse of anti-aircraft construction. On the 2nd of October, 2,000 Armutlu people attended a demonstration declaring they will not leave the neighborhood that they created with their own labor. On the 5th of December, around 1,000 people gathered in front of the main administrative building of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and presented 300 petitions stating their problems and demands. As a result of this presence in the public sphere and the preceding declaration of resistance, the discourse of illegal settlement and the preservation of the right of private property were put on the back burner. The shift furthermore meant reinforcing and agitating discourses of “liberated zone,” “terrorist actors,” “the police/the state cannot enter the region.”

The second extensive operation by the state regarding Küçük Armutlu happened on January 31, 1991. Around 05:00 in the morning, police (around a thousand officers) backed by military forces conducted an operation, in which numerous houses were irrupted. This operation did not contain the claim of demolishing illegal settlements but solely concentrated on bringing the order back to a so-called liberated zone. Around 100 people were taken into custody. As the local people of Armutlu express, the overall effect of the operation was the reverse of the expected:

We understood that they don't want us here. The rich want here too, the places they have is not enough for them. They mobilize the mafia; the police and they want to fire us from here. But we lived through so much that we said we are not leaving. We will resist, if they demolish, we will build again. Only our dead bodies can leave here. (See Appendix J)

The third extensive operation within the borders of the neighborhood was realized on May 20, 1992. The operation was realized after midnight with approximately 2,000 police officers. A total of 27 people were taken out of their houses into the custody. After this operation, the two elementary schools within the scope of Küçük Armutlu began to be used as police stations. In the following weeks, a few more operations

were conducted by police forces to the neighborhood, but these were very limited in scope compared to the former.

As a response to these operations, various national and international groups visited the neighborhood with the aim of supporting the neighborhood and building up pressure on the state. Some of the prominent visits are as follows:

i) A group of lawyers affiliated with Tüm Özgür-Der and the People's Labour Party (HEP; a left-wing pro-Kurdish Movement Party, can be conceived as predecessor of HDP) after the 25th of June of 1992, which was the day in which one house was set on a fire in Küçük Armutlu.

ii) A group consisting of members of the SHP, on the 15th of July, due to the assaults realized in June.

iii) Two different visits by two distinct groups from Germany during late July and early August, in which the committees held various meetings with municipalities, popular political parties such as the DYP and the SHP, and the German diplomats in Turkey with the aim of highlighting the situation of Küçük Armutlu.

On September 3, 1992, a notable event indicated the level of solidarity developed around the struggle of Küçük Armutlu, especially the level of legitimacy it has in the eyes of the municipal employees of Sarıyer. The municipal police (zabıta) of Sarıyer district, who were also used as demolition units by the district municipality, was forced to undertake a demolition operation in Küçük Armutlu. Under the leadership of chief municipal police, Ali Oral, the team rejected to involve in any kind of demolition attempt targeting the houses of Küçük Armutlu. In his statement, Ali Oral expressed their stance as “We will even break our own arms and lie down for three months rather than causing a breaking (deviation from) our ideology.” (Köse, 2012, p.60)

Another notable and unforgettable event in the history of Küçük Armutlu took place in 1992. The event that provided inspiration for songs (See Appendix K) still persists as a vivid and painful experience in the collective memory of the inhabitants. On the 17th of November, a first grader in the elementary school, Sevcan Yavuz, was crushed by a police riot van in the school garden of Hacı Mehmet Şalgamcıoğlu Elementary School, one of the two elementary schools in Küçük Armutlu that are used both as schools and police stations/parking zone of riot vans at the same time. While the police department claims that this was an unfortunate accident, a 7th-grade witness tells a contradicting story:

We said that there is a child behind you, but he did not listen to us, he raised his head out of the vehicle and said: ‘are you dreaming.’ The vehicle crushed the child first as it was going backward. It stopped when he heard the scream and by going forward, it crushed the child again (Köse, 2012, p.67)

The same day after the school, the students decorated the place Sevcan was crushed with flowers and transformed the place to a zone of sit-in protest with the joining of the parents. Occasionally, slogans such as “Killer Police, leave the school!” were used. For two days, the tension between the people and the police forces continued. On the 18th of November, there was a school boycott organized by families, who declared that they do not send their children again to this school if the police forces do not retreat and free the school and its garden. The funeral rite expected to be realized in the neighborhood was conducted in the hometown of the family of Sevcan, Zonguldak after the police forces “inform” the family about the dangers of realizing the funeral in Küçük Armutlu, and that their decision could trigger some provocations and ‘unwanted events’ in the neighborhood. The same night, the police forces had left the school hastily; yet, Dumlupınar İlkokulu, the other elementary school of the neighborhood continued to serve as a police station for a while.

All these operations and solidarity campaigns enhanced a two-folded political character among the Küçük Armutlu population: (i) Believing in constant resistance venturing the potential prices is the only way to gain a right, and (ii) trying to bridge the local struggle with the national level or even the international level political sphere.

Within this context, the land mafia retreated from Küçük Armutlu in 1992 after three years of armed clashes. Nowadays, there is a clear hegemony of the Dev-Sol in the neighborhood, the people's committee formed its sub-committees, and a variety of daily needs of inhabitants were fulfilled via these committees. Küçük Armutlu became a neighborhood with clear borders, well-established order, significant counter-space qualities, including the prevention of circulation of house and land as commodities, and collective organization of daily life. After that point, the historical process of Küçük Armutlu is a process of developing different strategies of struggle including consolidation of existing organizational forms and developing new ones in order to consolidate itself as a counter-space in the face of against the threat of grand demolitions and criminalization accompanied by extensive police operations.

4.4 The continuance of the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu: 1992 Onwards

Although, it is not possible to single out any specific date, 1992 would be an appropriate date to claim that Küçük Armutlu had become more or less a proven place. A more established and developed social relations began to flourish in the neighborhood. This process led to a new situation for the neighborhood. The two decisive aspects was: (i) anti counter-space effects of the gradually individualizing perception and functioning of the ownership/property (of houses and lands) – due to both weak-

ening of pro counter-space dynamics of gecekondu neighborhood during their struggle for first settlements, and effects of social and economic order which surrounds the neighborhood from outside and began to burgeon from inside (ii) as the emergent situation of omnipresent threat of total destruction is replaced by a still threatening but a different situation in which physical attempts to demolish or eliminate the whole neighborhoods were not realized, the needs for different types of solidarity networks and organizational structures emerged in order to replace the ones functioning under emergent solidarity. In this sub-chapter, the threats to the counter-space consolidation and anti-counter-space tendencies, will be presented. Additionally, the eventful, legal, organizational, and spatial conditions/changes during this period, in which against all these obstacles the counter-space succeed to survive, will be presented and their relationship with the durability of the counter-space will be discussed.

4.4.1 The major attempts of demolition in the neighborhood after 1992

After the neighborhood fully established its presence in 1992, occasional attempts at demolition continued. However, neither the neighborhood dwellers nor those leading the operations considered these attempts to be aiming towards a complete annihilation of the neighborhood. Nonetheless, the continuing operations served their purpose of making the neighborhood dwellers feel that they are not “legal”, that they are not wanted there by the state and therefore must accustom themselves to the feeling of being on the verge of forceful displacement. Episodes of resistance against the demolition, the collective they engendered, as well as the processes of reconstruction in demolished areas provided intense experiences which refined the neighborhood dwellers’ skills in collective thinking and collective praxis. Further-

more, these experiences enriched the collective memory built and shared by neighborhood dwellers as the constitutive elements of identity-building counter-narratives (Blomley, 2004).

The first of these demolitions took place on September 13, 1994. The demolition squad, accompanied by nearly five-hundred members of the riot police, attempted to demolish houses near the İSKİ Reservoir and Radar with the stated reason that these houses stand on various institutions' private property and that they are built without a permit. The exact location of this demolition was not within the resistance area controlled by the People's Committee but was situated at its margins. Nevertheless, in order to suppress a potential resistance to this demolition from the area under the control of the People's Committee, the police forces surrounded the targeted area and stopped access to the area of demolition from other parts of Küçük Armutlu. Under the leadership of the People's Committee, people of Küçük Armutlu did face the riot police in an attempt to stop the planned demolitions. Although the group persisted through the policemen's announcement "We aren't touching your homes, why are you resisting?", the protestors were dispersed following physical intervention by the riot police. Five protestors were detained on that day. Those living in the 18 squatter houses directly targeted by the demolition squad could not resist for long. Erdoğan Çelebi, who continued his protest by intentionally cutting parts of his body with a knife on the roof of his house (while right next to his child) for nearly an hour, was eventually convinced by his family members and the people around him to end this protest. Following the initial protest, the demolitions of 18 targeted squatter houses were eventually realized.

The second demolition took place in July 1998. This time the alleged reason for the demolition was the plan to build a "biological facility" in the area. A decision

was made to demolish those houses that fell within the area of the facility's development plan—as all of these houses already lacked legal status. In the first three weeks of the month of July, many houses were demolished by Sarıyer Municipality accompanied by the police. Although payments were made to homeowners for demolitions, the prices paid were well below the amounts that the homeowners deemed appropriate.

After this date, there were no demolitions at a comparable scale in Küçük Armutlu. However, there were other incidents that can be clustered together with residential demolitions, and which were equally important for shaping collective memory and effectively mobilizing people in the neighborhood. The first of these incidents took place on November 17, 2001⁶, when a playground named after and in memory of Sevcan—a significant figure in the collective memory of the neighborhood—was demolished by the police. The demolition of this playground met with the considerable reaction in the neighborhood, and in the aftermath of the demolition there emerged clashes between the police and neighborhood dwellers alongside the members of Devrimci-Sol Tradition. After the playground's demolition, the area was made into a parking lot for water cannons of the riot police. In March 2002, a decision was taken to build a permanent police station in this lot. On October 11, 2002, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Police Station was opened on the site.

Throughout these demolitions and urban development process, the people of Küçük Armutlu have continued to sustain a counter-space. Meanwhile, a set of events—shaped by the macro-political landscape more so than the internal neighborhood dynamics—were effective in enhancing the collective memory and refining

⁶ Some sources indicate November 13, as the date while there are others indicating November 17. No certain date was agreed upon during interviews.

the collective perspective on house/land issues in the neighborhood: the years between 2000-2002 when the Death Fasts of 2000-2007 were taking place had heavily impacted the neighborhood.

4.4.2 The 2000-2002 process marked by the death fasts

In 2000, the Republic of Turkey declared its purpose to execute a new prison model plan as a part of its European Union accession program: F-type prisons. In this new model, every prisoner would have their own individual cell, thus the state claimed that every prisoner would have an individual, private space which would be more comfortable than the old prison in which tens of prisoners slept in the same ward and sometimes the prison wards had an insufficient amount of beds. Nonetheless organized political bodies living in communal groups considered this plan as an intervention to the communally organized structure of the prison ward, which was aiming to atomize and isolate revolutionaries. Hence, they declared that they would not accept this imposition.

Just as the State began to implement the transition towards F-type prison cells, on the 20th of October 2000; DHKP-C, TKP(ML) and TKİP prisoners declared themselves to be on hunger strike in resistance to the transition. The hunger strikes eventually turned into death fasts. The main demands were i) abolishment of F-type prisons ii) abolishment of 3713 anti-terror law with all its associated consequences iii) abolishment of ‘triple protocol’. There were other demands such as putting to trial the torturers, the overseers responsible the deaths during the '96 death fasts, and the release of prisoners in bad health conditions. 289 prisoners began the death fast; a total of 1249 people attended hunger strikes and death fasts at the first instance.

Moving from the legacy of the 1996 Death Strikes, and the mounting public pressure

put on by a coalition of intellectuals, revolutionaries, democrats, and progressives; the state engaged in negotiations with a commission of death fasters mediated by a commission of ‘intellectuals’ which included prominent figures as Yaşar Kemal, Oral Çalışlar and Can Dündar. However, on December 19, the police and military forces initiated synchronized assaults on twenty prisons. During these operations, thirty political prisoners and two gendarmes lost their lives. The incident was named as Hayata Dönüş Operasyonu by the state, the literal translation of which is “Operation Bringing Back to Life”. It was also called as the "massacre of 'back to life'" by opposing camps.

After the operation, thousands of political prisoners were transferred to new F-type cells in quick succession. They were designed for three prisoners and one prisoner in each and for three prisoners, 25 square meters in total as duplex cells; for one prisoner an 11 square meter cell in total including a 1.5 square meter space for toilet and shower. The physical unity of revolutionaries had probably been a contributing factor to the persistence of a death fast by retaining high morale. However, even as physical factors changed and the prisoners were isolated, the Death Fast continued and radicalized, as demonstrated by the rise in the number of participants and overt shows of dedication by the participants. On the 21st of March 2001, Cengiz Soydaş died in Sincan F-type prison, which marked the first death of the 2000-2007 Death Fasts. Eventually, when the fast ended in 2007, 122 people had died in the process. As a response to the first death, the state legalized the policy of isolation by enacting an amendment regarding the 16th article of anti-Terror Laws and began to release some of hunger strikers and death fasters as a public relations strategy.

Circles influenced by the Dev-Sol tradition responded in two ways to the steps were taken by the state: i) participants who were not prisoners themselves (especially

through the Association for Solidarity with the Relatives of Prisoners and Detainees (the TAYAD) joined death fasts and hunger strikes to give support to the prisoners, ii) DHKP-C prisoners who were released sustain the death fasts in newly-formed resistance houses. During this period, Küçük Armutlu became the most prominent neighborhood among the de facto constitutions and strongholds of the aforementioned political organization.

Before the Operation Back to Life took place, the demonstrations in support of the death fasts had already begun in Küçük Armutlu. On the 2nd of December, members of the TAYAD started indefinite hunger strikes in Armutlu Cemevi to give support to the prisoners. After the association's Marmara branch had been raided and sealed by the police, the TAYAD members continued the death fast in the house of Şenay Hanoğlu who was also a death faster; and hence the death fast process in Küçük Armutlu began.

Gülsüman Dönmez, a TAYAD member, became the first decedent on 9th of April 2001. The farewell was organized, and a crowded funeral took place at Küçük Armutlu Cemevi. Gülsüman Dönmez was a laborer and a prisoner's relative, who was living in Küçük Armutlu since 1994. Canan Kulaksız, a 19-year-old student of Ege University Biology Department became the second decedent of the death fasts in Küçük Armutlu on the 15th of April, the 137th day of her death fast. The third death took place on the 22nd of April. Şenay Hanoğlu, a laborer who lived in Küçük Armutlu since 1990, lost her life on the 160th day of her death fast, leaving her daughter and son behind. Her funeral became a demonstration which around 1500 people attended, where they stood a moment of silence and sang anthems. Zehra Kulaksız, a Dev-Genç member, and the sister of Canan Kulaksız lost her life on the 221st day of her death fast and became the fourth martyr.

The death fast resistance in Küçük Armutlu had started in Şenay Hanoğlu's house, nevertheless, the number of the resistance houses multiplied after the death fasters released from prison continued their fast in the neighborhood. By July 2001, there were numerous resistance houses belonging to Sevgi Erdoğan, Osman Osmanağaoğlu, Ali Rıza Demir, Gülay Kavak, Zeynep Arıkan, Ümüþ Şahingöz, Hülya Şimşek, Abdülbari Yusufoglu, and Arzu Güler. On the 14th of July, the first death among the released prisoners who were expected to end the death fast took place: Sevgi Erdoğan lost her life.

In parallel with the ongoing struggle, armed forces of the state intensified their 'precautions' concerning the neighborhood. As a result of their intensified measures, Küçük Armutlu was blockaded by the police forces on the 22nd of July 2001. Even though the topography of the neighborhood allowed people to get into the neighborhood without getting caught checkpoints, all the roads to the neighborhood were controlled by the police forces. The people of Küçük Armutlu to this day remember that period as 'the siege'.

Under this 'siege', Osman Osmanağaoğlu lost his life, on the 299th day of his death fast, on the 14th of August in Küçük Armutlu. He was a 25-year old revolutionary, who started the death fast in prison and continued his resistance in Küçük Armutlu after he was released. By that time, the blockade was getting intensified, film screenings were prohibited, even flowers brought by the supporters for the resistance houses were taken at the control points around the boundaries of the neighborhood. Intensified blockade and the criminalization policies against the Küçük Armutlu people were strengthening the hatred and solidarity against the 'enemy'. On the 24th of August, Ufuk Keskin who was under arrest as part of a DHKP-C case and a supporter of the people's demands against the existing blockade, carried out an

act of sacrifice by self-immolation. Right after this, Hülya Şimşek (born in Erzincan) who was a deeply loved figure in the neighborhood, became a death fast decedent on the 286th day of her resistance.

Death fasters Gülay Kavak and Ümüş Şahingöz lost their lives on 7th and 14th of September respectively. On the 15th of September, a highly crowded march with torches were taking place. Police forces attacked the crowd right after the march. After the crowd got scattered, police continued their attack and targeted the resistance houses located at the inner parts of the neighborhood. People formed barricades around the houses as a response and the clashes between the Küçük Armutlu people and the police continued for a long period of time. The neighborhood was under a cloud of tear gas, the police panzers were hit by Molotov cocktails thrown from the red flagged barricades. Even though many tear gas cans were thrown into the first resistance house of the neighborhood during the clashes, no one was hurt since the house was evacuated by the people as a precaution. İbrahim Erler who was arrested under DHKP-C case carried out another sacrifice by self-immolation. immolations lead to a rising sympathy and sense of commonality between the people of Küçük Armutlu and the organization. In the meantime, Abdülbari Yusufoğlu and Zeynep Arıkan and Ali Rıza Demir lost their lives on the 20th and 27th of September respectively.

The social space and time in Küçük Armutlu now were determined by the progression of the death fasts through resistance houses, funerals, clashes, political and social organizing etc. On the first anniversary of the death fasts (which started on 20th of October 2000), between the 18th and the 21st of October 2001, people organized a set of events. On the first day of the anniversary, a resistance house was transformed into the Museum of Martyrs of the Death Fast. On the 19th of October,

after a prayer in Armutlu Mosque, dinner was served in Küçük Armutlu Cemevi. On the 21st of October, a huge people's forum and a concert involving prominent progressive figures such as Mehmet Özer, Ali Ekber Çiçek, and Grup Yorum took place.

Most of the inhabitants of the neighborhood remember this period as a severe ordeal in which they themselves were involved. The emergence of a political agenda that surpassed the legal and economic grievances of the gecekondu neighborhood provided the grounds for a strong collective identity, hence marked the counter-space with solidarity that would solidify its character.

Nevertheless, the most important incident in this respect was Küçük Armutlu's version of the Hayata Dönüş Operation, which was executed on the 5th of November 2001. On the 5th of November, after a couple of hours of a power outage, an extensive police force began a large-scale operation. Demolition equipment were also present in the operation, yet they only headed towards the death fast houses. The first resistance against the operation was carried out by Haydar Bozkurt. After stating that he would set himself on fire if the operation did not halt, Haydar Bozkurt set himself on fire and became the first decedent of the operation. The first house exposed to the police attack was Şenay Hanoğlu Resistance House. During this first attack, Sultan Yıldız, Bülent Durgaç, Arzu Güler and Barış Kaş who were in this resistance house, lost their lives. Police forces retreated from the neighborhood after the long-lasting clashes. The death fasts, police operations, and blockades continued to set the agenda of the neighborhood until 2003, the year in which the prominence of death fasts began to weaken in the neighborhood and the threat of demolitions became a decisive, hot topic once again.

4.4.3 Organizational structure in the neighborhood during the consolidation of the counter space: The pro counter-space institutions and organization means

Since 1993, different agendas took on prominent roles in the everyday struggles of the neighborhood. There were times that a threat of mass demolition increased and public meetings were organized against a possible demolition (2003 and the period since 2011); when there were demanding political agendas set by the Dev-Sol Tradition, that become a part of the daily life in the neighborhood (the 2000-2002 process), or when the needs of the public, struggle for basic rights and fight against “corruption” (theft, prostitution, spying on public as coded by the people) became more pronounced. In different periods, different organizations and institutions have become prominent in the everyday struggles of the neighborhood.

I have explained before the organizational structure and functioning in the founding period of the neighborhood (1989-1992). The period from 1992 to 1997, though, has progressed through the People’s Committee and the main aim has been to develop committees to supplement the People’s Committee. These committees consisted of four sub-committees that would run as an extension of the People’s Committee for each of the four regions of the neighborhood, a Justice Committee of three people to enact justice and a People’s Council of seven people to resolve disagreements.

In the year of 1997, other democratic organizations began to flourish within the neighborhood. The most prominent one out of these is the People’s Council Initiative. Prominent figures of the public and responsible revolutionaries of the neighborhood were permanent participants of this structure, which was also open to the public, and where every participant had a right to speak.

Another step for the organization of the neighborhood was the election of a mukhtar who was in favor of the People's Council Initiative. In 1994, Armutlu with some parts of Küçük Armutlu was recognized as an official neighborhood with the name of Fatih Sultan Mehmet. However, a significant amount of Küçük Armutlu's population is under the Baltalimanı Neighborhood and hence, bounded to the local authority of Baltalimanı. In the local elections in 1997, Muharrem Şimşek was elected as the candidate supported by the People's Council Initiative. The victory was celebrated joyfully in the neighborhood. Now there was a mukhtar in the office that would work in harmony with the self-governance and self-organizing principles of the neighborhood.

During the same period, Baba İshak Cultural Centre was opened in the neighborhood as a part of extending the democratic organizations of the neighborhood. This center, which opened on the 23 September 1998, became a very important public area, in fact a center, for the social and cultural life of the neighborhood. The local branch of PSAKD / Küçük Armutlu Cemevi eventually replaced it but still served a very similar purpose.

In 2005, October 3, people of Küçük Armutlu established another democratic organization, 'Association for Conserving, Sustaining and Beautifying Küçük Armutlu' (Armutlu'yu Koruma, Yaşatma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği). The association undertook various projects in less than a year: i) managed to keep the public clinic open that was under the threat of closing down both through campaigns and legal/judicial intervention ii) facilitated the solving of the plumbing problem by the municipality, which was causing water cuts in the neighborhood iii) held public meeting against theft and drugs which were perceived by the inhabitants as great problems of the neighborhood v) brought natural gas to the neighborhood after col-

lecting signatures door to door and handing them into the İGDAŞ, the institution of the metropolitan municipality responsible for the provision natural gas. The 'sealing' on 19 April 2006 became a major obstacle for the association's activities. With the decision of banning the association from functioning, closure of the association, and confiscation of its properties, in the year of 2010, it was permanently shut down (Köse, 2012).

After the neighborhood was announced as a high-risk earthquake-prone region in 2011, public meetings with strong participation were organized like the 2003 episode and the People Committee's Against Demolitions-, which became active only during a clear demolition threat, were founded again and re-organized in order to mobilize fellow inhabitants.

The People's Engineers and Architects (HMM) is another organization that played an important role in the social and political structure of Küçük Armutlu in the 2010s. Founded with the principle of engineering and creating architecture for the people, and consisting of socialist engineers and architects, the HMM carried out various projects in a non-profit manner, at times by itself and at times in cooperation with the Council of Architects, with which it shares a similar worldview and practical approach despite having different organizational structures. The wind turbine project in Almus, Tokat, the water turbine in Hozat, Dersim (Tunceli) to bring electricity to a village consisting of a single household, public garden and seed center project in İzmir Doğançay are among some of these projects. During this period, the HMM has been undoubtedly the most active in Küçük Armutlu. Many projects like Dilek Doğan Fountain, Şenay Gülsüman Public Garden, and Wind Turbine have been implemented by the HMM. The Dilek Doğan Park, which was being constructed by the collective construction workshop organized by the students and professors

of architecture, has since been demolished by the state. Academic Hatice Senem Doyduk who was as one of the heads of the project, also a faculty member of Sakarya University, was arrested. The effects of the HMM were not limited to projects that had functional and symbolic value. The HMM had a permanent presence in the neighborhood through some of its standing members, who produced solutions for the daily problems of the public with their technical expertise. They also maintained a presence both as political actors and as technical experts in the People's Council.

Finally, the Fall Celebration(Güz Şenlikleri) Tradition is worth mentioning, even if it is not a structure but an event, given its importance in the organization of the neighborhood as a counter-space. The Fall Celebration activities have been taking place in September since 2004 and are organized by the local branch of PSAKD and the Sarıyer Youth Organization. The Celebration generally consists of movie screenings, panels, slide shows, and concerts. Each celebration also has a main political slogan. In 2004, the first year of the celebration, the slogan was 'Resistance Against Corruption - Pir Sultan Abdal Tradition Against Alienation' followed by 'Against Demolitions' in 2005. These celebrations had an important function of bringing individuals together that had little contact in everyday life, strengthening the neighborhood solidarity and providing psychological support to the members of the neighborhood as artists and people outside the neighborhood joined the celebrations.

4.5 The spatial interventions of the counter-space experiment in Küçük Armutlu

Since its establishment, Küçük Armutlu has been a regular zone developed with a settlement plan. Being regular and planned is very much related with the fact that neighborhood is established with the presence of a specific political line and functioning organizational mechanisms. When the first settlements had been construct-

ing, the militants of Dev-Sol, who were students of engineering and architecture departments of nearby universities and carrying a political activity within the neighborhood, set forth a settlement plan for the neighborhood. The neighborhood had been constructed in accordance to this plan to a large extent. This physical organization/distribution of the space also corresponds to a political stance. The fundamental principles behind the spatial organization of the neighborhood were rooted from the social and political understanding of the Dev-Sol; and subsequently, these principles and certain practices as the extension of them, reinforces certain kind of social, political, economic relations whereas undermining some others. The permanent rules as the need for the permission of the People's Assembly for any kind of horizontal or vertical extension of houses, the untouchability of certain green areas and common public spaces, a road should pass in front of every house, etc. are clearly derived from certain political and social point of view, and, they also dialectically effect the social fabric of the neighborhood in a specific way (towards more collective social conditions).

The core of this thesis spatial analysis is not centered around the physical organization of the buildings, settlement plans, etc. in these poor urban neighborhoods, but the spatial intervention somehow related to the cultural/political/social field via symbolic ways. When we examine these kinds of spatial interventions leading to (re)production and (re)organization of the symbolic social space within these neighborhoods, it is possible to put forward two main categories.

The first category is widely seen in the politicized gecekondu neighborhoods of Turkey. It consists of merely symbolic, discursive, propagandistic content. The murals, street writings, (political and symbolic) naming of already existing places are

listed under that category. These types of spatial interventions possess indispensable effects on shared social memory, collective identity, and political subjectivity.

The spatial productions and interventions corresponding to the second category are relatively rare. These spatialities brings together the public need, the common interest of the inhabitants and the symbolic, discursive, propagandistic aspect provoking the shared social memory, collective identity and specific kind of political subjectivity. Henceforth, these spatial productions and intervention may well be conceptualized as monumental spaces satisfying collective needs. This kind of spatial productions and interventions possess a potential of high level of pro counter-space effect because they can bind together the political/symbolic and the social and physical needs of the community in a collectively organized way. This is very important and enabling for the durability of a counter-space. These assertions will be discussed more detailedly in the paragraphs below and the related section in the next chapter (5.3).

The prominent examples of the first category in the history of Küçük Armutlu are the park named after Hüsnü İşeri, the playground named after Sevcan, and the murals of Hasan Ferit Gedik. The first grand demolition attempt in Küçük Armutlu constitutes a core component of the collective identity-building, as it provides a genesis / constituent event for the counter-narrative. These counter-narratives as displayed by Blomley (2004) are decisive for legitimacy-making and property claims for “illegal” settlements. Hüsnü İşeri, the “first martyr” of the neighborhood, occupies an essential place in these counter-narratives as a prominent figure embodying “the culture of the neighborhood”. Sevcan, who was a 7-year-old girl crushed by a police van in her schoolyard, is another immensely powerful figure for the collective memory/identity of the neighborhood. After the opening ceremony of the Baba İshak

Cultural Center on the 23rd of September 1998; the people of Küçük Armutlu marched to the two existing parks of the neighborhood to rename them. The public parks were named after Hüsnü İşeri and Sevcan Yavuz. This was not an official process in accordance with the legal procedure rather an independent act of local people. The signboards were placed in front of the parks and after that day, the places have been called by the names of these two figures from recent history. This symbolic/political intervention was an important act, as these two parks were routinely visited by inhabitants and are widely referred to when giving directions. The symbolic/memorial/identity and collectivity reinforcing the effect of the Sevcan Children's Park rose even more after its demolition by the police forces on the 17th November 2001 and the construction of a police station which officially opened on 11th of October 2002, over the ruins of the Sevcan Children's Park.

The mural of Hasan Ferit Gedik is another example of these kinds of spatial interventions which reinforce the collective memory and identity of the neighborhood, and contribute to the counter-narrative of Küçük Armutlu. Hasan Ferit Gedik was raised in Küçük Armutlu as the child of working-class parents. It was in this neighborhood that he was introduced to revolutionary struggle and he joined their campaigns against degeneration and drugs. On the 29th of September 2013; Hasan Ferit Gedik was shot during a demonstration/public statement against drug gangs in Gülsuyu - which is another poor gecekondu neighborhood of İstanbul⁷. He was widely acknowledged as one of the "Gezi Martyrs" and became an important figure of the neighborhood identity of Küçük Armutlu. After his death, a mural of him was painted to the wall of a gecekondu which is on the walkway through the Cemevi, and thus

⁷ Gülsuyu'nda Eylemcilere Ateş Açıldı, Bir Genç Öldürüldü [News]. (2013, September 30). Bianet.

stands as a very central location. The vivid painting of a young member of the community, who inhabited the place and had daily contact with its inhabitants, was known for his sincerity and has now been killed for his struggle against drug gangs; became a solid symbolic/political intervention promoting the culture of resistance and sense of communality within the neighborhood.

The prominent examples of the second category in the history of Küçük Armutlu are the public garden named after Şenay and Gülsüman, the public library named after Hüsnü İşeri, the public house for caring of elderly people – named after Sevgi Erdoğan, and the public fountain named after Dilek Doğan.

The Şenay ve Gülsüman Halk Bahçesi (Şenay and Gülsüman People's Garden) is one of the most prominent examples of this kind of spatial production. Under the leadership of the HMM, a public garden was constructed by volunteers from among the residents of Küçük Armutlu. This garden functions as common land, upon which people can plant vegetables and fruits. Just like the laboring process, the harvest is shared collectively. Actually, as suggested by the initial plan of Küçük Armutlu, even today all houses have their own large gardens thus people who are willing to do so, plant vegetables and fruits as they wish. However, this garden collectivizes the process and provides advanced technical support via the HMM. The name of the garden is dedicated to the two death fast decedents who lost their lives in “the resistance houses” of Küçük Armutlu.

The Hüsnü İşeri Library is another cardinal space for the keeping collective memory alive. The Hüsnü İşeri Library is located in a room of the Cemevi building. The Cemevi building serves as the cultural and social center of the neighborhood, and the garden of the Cemevi serves as the public meeting place where inhabitants gather, socialize and have conversations about any topic. When the weather condi-

tions are not appropriate for the garden, there is a common room inside the building with the same purpose. The Hüsni İşeri Library is side room of this common room, thus it is easily accessible and frequently used by inhabitants interested in making use of it.

Sevgi Erdoğan Cemevi Vefa Evi (Loyalty House) is another example of the second category of spatial interventions which can be conceptualized monumental spaces satisfying collective needs. The place is named after Sevgi Erdoğan, a militant of the Dev-Sol tradition who lost her life as she continued her action (death fast) in Küçük Armutlu after she was released out of the prison. Its dedicated to the elderly people of the neighborhood who are not capable of living by themselves and in need for constant care. The neighborhood organizes a care list which in order to prevent any deficiency in their caretaking. The house is visited by voluntary inhabitants at least two times a day to fulfill the needs of the elderly people living in it.

Lastly, the HMM erected a still functioning public fountain dedicated to Dilek Doğan. Dilek Doğan was a 24 years old inhabitant of Küçük Armutlu who was living with her family. On the 18th of October 2015, their house was subjected to a mid-night raid by thirteen police officers including members special operations. The alleged official reason for the raid was the search for a person who had been involved in the assault on the Consulate General of the USA, conducted by the DHKP-C. However, any connection between family members and the aforementioned organization could not be proven. During this operation, as revealed by the video recordings of the event, Dilek Doğan was shot at point blank range by a police officer, during a verbal exchange without any major physical tension (T24, 2015). Dilek Doğan lost her life after one week of intensive care. After Hasan Ferit Gedik, Dilek Doğan -even though she was not part of any organized struggle- became a prominent figure for the identi-

ty and collective memory of the neighborhood, her death reflecting “the cruelty” to which Küçük Armutlu has been exposed to since its very founding. In addition to the name and the photo, the monumental fountain carries a red star, a universal symbol for communist revolutionary movements all over the world. The Dilek Doğan fountain keeps the name of Dilek Doğan alive while providing free water to all living things in the environment at the same time.

These three buildings, as well as similar buildings constructed by the HMM and the local people of Küçük Armutlu, have a two-fold function for the counter-space. Firstly, they constitute places which provide for the needs of the neighborhood (such as water, vegetables, fruits, and books in these cases) in a collectivized form in which i) Volunteering inhabitants are incorporated to the production process; ii) The utilization process is not individualized and rather has to be realized in a public space. Secondly, by their names, the design of their outlook and the symbols they possess, these places have powerful monumental effects, recalling historical events significant to the history of the place and figures who stood for the collective identity of the neighborhood. This is crucial for bringing together the fundamental values required for the consolidation of the counter-space.

4.6 The conclusion of the chapter

In this chapter, I tried to analyze the historical process which brings Küçük Armutlu to its present (to the date I began my studies, early 2017) state as it persists to preserve central counter-space features and its collective identity and collective action praxis. This historical analysis is realized through a specific emphasis on the decisive events, transforming organizational structure, spatial interventions with the legal status of the neighborhood/the settlements on the background. The formation of the

People's Committee appears as the fundamental mechanism enabled the constitution and functioning of the counter-space in Küçük Armutlu.

Later on, it was reinforced by the formation of sub- and affiliated committees (the region committees, the committee for justice, etc.) and, beginning with 1997, formation of democratic mass institutions as the People's assembly, the neighborhood associations with different names, the local branch of PSAKD and the Cemevi. In this historical process, the demolitions, the inhabitants lost their life in these demolitions, police operations or various assaults, and the process of the death fasts within the neighborhoods played an important role to generate and expand the sense of collectivity among the inhabitants of Küçük Armutlu. The spatial production and organization satisfying some needs of the neighborhood (not individually but collectively) and promoting the sense of collectivity and particular political subjectivity at the same time, appear also as key elements of this process. After all these processes and factors, Küçük Armutlu appears to remain loyal to its founding principles of collectivity and planning, in which commodification of land and housing is limited and the use-value has the primacy over the exchange-value regarding the organization of the space as well as promotion of collective interest at the expense of potential individual gains.

The next chapter will provide a comparative analysis/discussion of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu neighborhoods, based on the all historical and structural information provided in this and the previous chapter. This endeavor will be realized with reference to the four axes-ed main analytical framework: eventful, legal, organization, and spatial aspects.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter constitutes the core of this thesis as it presents a comparative discussion on the counter-space experiences of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu. This comparative inquiry is realized by handling significant historical/political/social processes since the establishment of the two neighborhoods. However, this inquiry has a concrete analytical framework on which the analyses are realized. It is the framework presented in Chapter 2 within the section explaining the analytical framework. This framework proposes and approaches (i) demolitions and the threat of demolition (ii) legal status of the settlements (iii) organizational structure within the neighborhood (iv) (re)production and (re)organization of the social space, especially in the symbolic and the political manner, as the four decisive axes of a counter-space constitution and consolidation process. In the lights of all information provided in the previous two chapters, this chapter evaluates how these axes are effective in the counter-space consolidation or dissolution process, especially by focusing on the differences among the two neighborhoods regarding these four axes. While realizing this inquiry, the structure of the chapter is constructed as the first two, the third, and the fourth axes are evaluated as independent of each other; however, both the historical processes explained in the previous chapters, and the forthcoming analysis sub-chapters demonstrate that actually these four axes are very interrelated and interactive among each other. Lastly, the main aim of this inquiry is to reach potential theoretical deduction regarding which factors are effective in the consolidation/dissolution of a counter-space emerged in an urban poor informal neighborhood, and how? These deductions will be presented concisely in the following chapter, the conclusion.

5.1 The first two axes: The effects of demolitions and the variations in legal status

In this chapter; demolitions as an event and phenomenon, and legal status, via their direct and indirect effects (both positive and negative) on the given counter-space experiments, will be covered. This investigation will be conducted through the developments/process within the historical evolution of the two neighborhoods. Actually; the 4 axis that consists the analytic framework of this thesis are in a mutual relationship of interaction and affecting one another (as I will demonstrate that in the 4 subsection of this chapter); however, especially the phenomena constituting the first two axes: demolitions/ the threat of demolition/its effects and the legal status are inseparably interwind. Consequently, this sub section will progress in a flow that these axes are engaged in one another.

Unlike “legal”/authorized neighborhoods of the city, gecekondü neighborhoods rise above legal uncertainty. When these two neighborhoods were built at the first place, their legal status were quite the same. All the settlements were “unauthorized”, and even so that not only the houses were illegal due to lack of full title deed, they even in a position of “occupier” as they lack the land titles. Moreover, as the land was just exposed to housing and population, the neighborhoods were not officially recognized as an official neighborhood . In 1 Mayıs, the progress of urbanization started by the acquisition of the land through hand of land mafia, but after the establishment of the People’s Committee, gecekondü settlements started to get build collectively by the people with respect to the need of the newcomers who did not have the budget to pay rent or to construct their own houses. The initial process was similar in the neighborhood of Armutlu as well (involvement of land mafia); however, when the Küçük Armutlu was emerging a distinct neighborhood, a specific region was marked by a political organization and by the call of the very same organization

poor people were invited to come and collectively build their houses on that territory without any payment to the land mafia or any other organization. As these settlements are unauthorized, the demolition by the state is a possibility since the beginning. However, in the example of 1 Mayıs and Armutlu, the attempts of grand demolitions were added to the agenda only after the local people rejected any patronage relations with land mafias or populist political parties and began to constitute a self-organizing, self-governing counter-space. In this process, comprehensive operations, almost resembling military invasion, accompanied the demolition attempts. The threats of demolition, the attempts of demolition, and the realized demolitions all have important determinant effects in the constitution of solidarity networks, self-organizing mechanisms, communal understanding of ownership and property regarding land and houses, and collective identity via shared social memory. This process is similar in both neighborhoods.

The differentiation among the neighborhoods regarding these axes emerges after the process 1 Mayıs faces after the 1980 Military Coup. The divergence is due to a series of transformations. First of all, 1 Mayıs neighborhood is officially recognized under the name of Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi right after the military coup. Secondly, there is no physical attempt of grand demolition in 1 Mayıs after 1982 as a result of *gecekondu* policies of (i) the junta (ii) the ANAP government (iii) local governances of Istanbul, which benefited from the urban poor, as the RP and the SHP. These strategies did not only include toleration as not attempting demolition, but they also took some steps toward the legalization. These were (i) 1984 “Zoning Amnesty” and the subsequent allocation of title deed allocation documents (ii) the process 1989 -1994 which was not related to a direct legal change, but the attitude of the SHP municipality caused new wave of vertical and horizontal structuring. Both

these practical strategies and related legal changes had some important counter-space weakening effects.

As stated above the 1984 Zoning Amnesty, lead to distribution of title deed allocation documents to formerly unauthorized settlements as in the case of 1 Mayıs. These documents are not full title deeds which provide a legal basis for establishing houses and involving commercial relations, yet, they represent the commitment of the state regarding the allocation of full title deeds in the future. By extension, this document (i) provides a legal recognition for the settlements (ii) leads to a less ambiguous waiting position for the dwellers.

This new waiting situation is more passivizing that the former one because now a significant hope of full legalization (title deed) is present, thus the inhabitants know began to think they have “something to lose”. Thus, two types of “waiting” subjectivity differ significantly as they lead to different subjectivities, political stances and economic relations among the gecekondu inhabitants. If a neighborhood is in a position in which title deed allocation certificate or land title is given but the building permits are not given, it appears to lead to a more optimistic situation of “waiting” and uncertainty/ambiguities that favors a passivation in gecekondu neighborhoods (Kuyucu, 2014), whereas total lack of any official documents regarding the property relations of land and housing in the neighborhood leads to a different position of uncertainty which usually results in either self-organized struggle to exist or engage in political and economic patronage relations. It may also be argued that because title deed allocation documents provide certain security and weakens fragility and vulnerability of inhabitants, it would reinforce their mobilization capacity. However, even if we accept this kind of relationship among the security/vulnerability and social movement capacity; the same phenomenon (title deed allocation documents)

also leads to individualizations of ownership understanding of inhabitants and may lead social/economic stratification within the neighborhood which in the long run, significantly undermine a collective mobilization on the basis of fundamental counter-space premises.

This development, with the absence of a common pro-counter space based organizational entity and demolitions, leads to individualizing effect on the understanding of ownership and property of houses and lands. Moreover, this legal format, somewhat hampers the already subsided threat of demolition. At this stage, most of the houses in the neighborhood are still one-roomed or two-roomed merely meeting the needs of inhabitants. However, all these developments (lack of demolitions - weakening the need of collectivity, the 1984 amnesty, and the 1989-1994 process) lead to acceleration of these trends of commodification of land and housing as well as individualization of sense of ownership. With a rapid horizontal and vertical housing, a demand that exceeds beyond basic need of accommodation emerges. Even in places that do not have direct property ownership right, the resident down there starts to develop new property relations like legal or extra-legal tenantry, and commercial relations over the apartments and lands. The concept of ownership of the land and property evolves from communal to exclusive and both elements become commodified.

On the other hand, Küçük Armutlu did not exist in 1984. So, it was not within the scope of the given law, thus the inhabitants of Küçük Armutlu does not possess title deed allocation documents. Moreover, the neighborhood had not faced any process of legalization in terms of authorization of the settlements, since its formation. Up to this present day, most of the settlements in Küçük Armutlu is located on the lands of İTÜ, Kızılay, or other third parties. Additionally, these settlements do not

only lack the full title deed but any form of legal recognition that maybe not legally, but de facto provide a guarantee thus reduce the chance of demolition and lay the ground for development of individualization of the sense of ownership and commodification of housing and land. In fact, a small portion of Küçük Armutlu is depicted as the “Boğaz Öngörünüm Bölgesi” under the scope of the Boshprous Law. Within this territory, any kind of construction need a special permission of the relevant specific council. Thus, the legalization for the settlements within this status appear even more unrealistic. However, it should be remembered that this only constitutes a very narrow region of Küçük Armutlu. Majority of the settlements of Küçük Armutlu are not bounded with this status.

If we have look from the perspective of demolitions (threat, attempt, realized); even though Küçük Armutlu never experienced a total demolition as in the case of the Grand Demolition of September 2, 1977 in 1 Mayıs, because of the legal situation provided above and various social and political reasons provided in the chapter 4, continued to face the threat of demolition and comprehensive police operation throughout its history. The two neighborhood displays a similarity regarding the continuity of the comprehensive police operations throughout their history even though they may differ in intensity and frequency. However, Küçük Armutlu is differentiated from 1 Mayıs, as the threat of demolition persisted during the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Even though a grand demolition has not been realized within Küçük Armutlu, a series on demolitions with limited scope were realized within and nearby the neighborhood.

These differentiations in terms of the legal status and demolitions (the threat of them, the scope and the frequency) unfolding during the counter-space processes, are certainly effective determinants regarding the durability of a counter-space. Just

as the demolitions are highly effective for the counter-space constitution in several ways (i- solidarity network building and collectivizing effect of the precautions against the demolition threat, ii- the effect of collective resistance at the moment of demolition attempt and collective laboring during the re-construction of the dwellings, which constitutes emergent solidarity among inhabitants and promotes communal understanding of ownership/property of houses and lands rather than the exclusionary and individual, iii- the effect of constituting a central part in the counter-narrative and common social memory of the inhabitants which is very important for the consolidation of the collective identity) as well the legal status (it leads to need of involving in patronage relations or developing a self-organized neighborhood in order to survive in this hostile legal framework); due to very same reasons, as the other side of the medallion, the same factors are significantly effective in the consolidation or the dissolution of the counter-spaces.

5.2 The third axis: The organizational

Every social structure produces certain organizational structure including organizations, institutions, social networks, etc. The relationship between the underlying social structure and the organizational structure is not unliteral but dialectical. These organizational entities have effects as supporting, deepening, challenging, transforming the some of the underlying social conditions on which they rise. In the case of unauthorized poor urban neighborhoods (gecekondu neighborhoods in the context of Turkey), I presented the lacking, excluded, under threat condition of these social entities especially in the process of formation (section 2.1.3.). This specific condition needs certain organization means to deal with physical and social lacking, exclusion, and the threat of demolition and land mafias. The form, content and functioning of

the organizational elements emerged in this process are crucial in the fate of the neighborhood. In this sub-section, firstly, the effect of the initial organization elements of the neighborhoods on the constitution of a counter-space will be discussed. However, after the neighborhood is established, (in our cases, they are established as counter-spaces) social structure and social fabric began to change. Hence, there should be accompanying transformations and novelties in the organizational realm to be able to consolidate the counter-space; primarily, (i) the need for developing less reactive and more pro-active, more consistent, and more permanent kinds of solidarity and collective actions rather than the emergent solidarity which naturally the dominant form of solidarity/collective action in the initial phase decided by the collective resistance against the grand demolition threats and collective settlement constructions, and relatedly, (ii) providing certain regulatory mechanisms that are capable of disciplining via warnings and penal sanctions. Secondly, this sub-section will comparatively evaluate the role of organizational structure, different organizational entities for the durability (or dissolution) of a counter-space after it is once constituted.

5.2.1 During the process of counter-space constitution

As stated earlier, the peak of the counter-space experience in 1 Mayıs neighborhood was lived through between the summer of 1977 and the March of 1978 until the People's Committee disbanded. Regarding Küçük Armutlu, it would not be unfair to say that it was emerged originally as a counter-space neighborhood in 1989. The formation of local central governing bodies in the name of people's committees were essential in the process of counter-space constitution in both neighborhoods. The committees were effective as their functioning (i) reflects the self-organizing capaci-

ty of the gecekondu people, increasing their self-esteem in that respect (ii) increases the organizational capacity of the neighborhood as it prepares and coordinate neighborhood for the present and future threats (iii) strengthening the solidarity networks and collective action within the neighborhood by promoting solutions based on collective laboring rather than individual or philanthropic/charity type solutions to the social and physical needs of the neighborhood (iv) provides regulatory mechanism that can limit potential organizational problems of a counter-space formation process as free-riding, selfishness, opportunism, and collaboration with the counter counter-space forces.

In 1 Mayıs, it was clear that a centralized approach to resolving these questions would lead to far more productive results. By dismantling electricity poles in empty plots of land on the Anatolian Side and planting them in the neighborhood, the lighting question was solved. Siphoning energy off the power grid in the adjacent neighborhood brought electricity into the neighborhood. With this, the problems pertaining to lighting and electricity were partly resolved. Another vital issue was the supply of water. Through their various connections, the People's Committee discovered that the water pipe from the Ömerli Dam traveled through the neighborhood. The pipe was burst and reconnected to other lines, providing the neighborhood with water.

In the meantime, the People's Committee was also intervening in the regions that were developing in opposition to the principle of a planned settlement, attempting to straighten and plan roads, streets, and areas that were to be left empty in accordance with the plan. On top of all this, the committee also maintained its right to say in land distribution and construction i.e. the monopoly over the decision regarding the settlements. People who owned homes in other areas were not given land,

renting – and apart from exceptional circumstances – the sale or trade of land was not allowed. Reallocations were decided upon by the committee in order to prevent the emergence of a market economy through the sale of land. When the committee decided that a certain person was to leave the neighborhood due to the aforementioned reasons, those sent away were provided compensation for the cost of the construction they had undertaken until that point and the housing unit was transferred to someone else who needed it. The committee had also established a budget for those who had no funds to build a home for themselves. This budget provided these people with the necessary means to construct their own homes (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017).

After the 2nd of September, a People's Tribunal –working in tandem with the People's Committee - was established. This was a judiciary mechanism, which attempted to ameliorate contradictions that could pose a threat to the collective sense of belonging and the collective functioning of the broader neighborhood. It was not so much an organ of political decision-making as it was a tool of mediating personal disagreements between the people over land or other issues dispute resolution. The People's Tribunal was made up of five people and was led by a revolutionary affiliated with the Halkın Gücü/Partizan line and was under the influence of that particular political line. This five-person committee would always listen to both sides before reaching a verdict. If one or both parties objected to the decision, the people (i.e. all those from among the masses that were willing to participate) would be assembled and the parties would explain their issues to this public. The committee, in turn, would explain the decision that was taken and the reasons for it. Then, this would be opened up to a vote by the people. The decision by the people was taken as the final say in any given matter resolved in this way.

In time, the size that the neighborhood had attained required establishment of sub-committees. The neighborhood was already divided into zones named A, B, C, D, and E. The People's Committee established sub-committees for each zone. Thus, five regional committees tied to the People's Committee as a central organ were established. These five sub-committees resolved practical issues within their own zones and would then report to the Central People's Committee. For more complicated or difficult issues, they acted under the directives of the Central People's Committee as a supporting organ and a direct link was present between it and the people of the neighborhood.

This organizational mechanism, which operated in the 1 Mayıs neighborhood from mid-1977 until its dissolution in March 1978, had many positive gains in terms of the creation and preservation of a counter-space. Firstly, the very existence of the People's Committee itself was of great importance. This was a decision-making body and a tool of self-governance that carried out practical activities; its membership was directly elected by the people and was constantly under their supervision (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). It embraced a line, which emphasized use-value over exchange-value and stood against the commodification of land and housing. Secondly, large numbers of people constituting the inhabitants of this counter-space were mobilized to engage in practical activities directed at meeting their everyday needs (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017). The activities during this period demonstrate that the people had embraced this central apparatus and the collective spirit of this counter-space. Third, two measures were taken to ensure that the counter-space was produced and maintained, by limiting opportunities for personal profit and becoming "free-riders": i) The formation of sub-committees allowed the process to expand in a manner where it encompassed each and every household, allowing everyone to participate in the ac-

tivities of the committee; ii) The establishment of judiciary mechanisms, which included the people in the process, meant that there were organs that could interfere in problems rather than letting them resolve through their own means and, importantly, were seen as legitimate by the people (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017).

In Küçük Armutlu, the situation was similar but slightly different. First of all, the more complex process of the people's committee's formation in 1 Mayıs, was much more direct as it is decided single-handedly as a policy of the Dev-Sol. Moreover, the organization were aware of the 1 Mayıs experience. A Dev-Sol affiliated engineering student, who took part in the founding of Küçük Armutlu and made significant contributions to the initial plan identifying the settlement structure, also confirms that examples like that of the 1 Mayıs Mahallesi were historical experiences which they took as a reference point for themselves. (Anonymous I, Personal Communication, 2019)⁸

In Küçük Armutlu the only active political force was the Devrimci-Sol from the very beginning. Until 1989, the land mafia ruled over the neighborhood, they divided the land and sold it to newcomers at prices that they determined. When Devrimci-Sol became strong in the area, the people of the area known as Küçük Armutlu started refusing to pay the land mafia. After a large-scale demolishment in 1989, when many houses in the neighborhood were torn down, Devrimci-Sol – in light of the tendencies displayed by the community, the broader political atmosphere, and their own political/organizational goals – invited the people to settle in the area, a move which demonstrated that they were now a force in the region. The period between 1989 and 1992 witnessed constant demolishment threats by the state and

⁸ From an interview with an engineer who was affiliated with the political movement and took part in the founding process of the Küçük Armutlu. The exact name and date are not recorded or presented for the sake of anonymity.

countless armed confrontations between Devrimci-Sol and the land mafia. By 1993, the land mafia had acknowledged Devrimci-Sol's control over Küçük Armutlu and they retreated to Büyük Armutlu where they continued their rent economy for a while.

This political differentiation between Büyük and Küçük Armutlu has undoubtedly been an important factor in the classification of Küçük Armutlu as a distinct neighborhood, and not just a part of Büyük Armutlu. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to take 1989 as the date when Küçük Armutlu was established as a neighborhood and a counter-space. From the founding in 1989 onwards, there has been a People's Committee in Küçük Armutlu. This People's Committee, unlike the one in 1 Mayıs, was established under the leadership of a single organization and operated under the authority of a single political group. However, from the very onset, this committee had a claim regarding being transparent towards the people while barring "necessary" precautions taken in the name of security. As there has been no general building amnesty from that period until today⁹ it was not possible to provide information about the members of the first committee, the number of members and its operational dynamics. On the other hand, positive prescription for the pre-1980 period and the political amnesties after these years, ease the situation for 1 Mayıs neighborhood. Although there are fragments of information regarding the inner functioning and detailed practices of the People's Committee in Küçük Armutlu, unfortunately, these cannot be tested for accuracy or consistency in light of second-hand sources. However, by looking at the principles of the People's Committee, its practi-

⁹ Except "the settlement peace" in 2018; because it is still in process, it can not be incorporated to the scope of this thesis. Interestingly, most of Küçük Armutlu's population appeal in order to benefit from the amnesty. However, when I talk with the muhtar and different professionals / NGO activist, they stressed that the settlement in Küçük Armutlu can not benefit from this amnesty as they do not fit to the arrangement within the relevant law.

cal activities in the neighborhood and how its sub-organizations worked, the positive effect of this organizational structure in the counter-space constitution period can be presented. This is detailed explained in the sub-section 4.3.1.

Although the principles of the committee focused on the principles of the on-going construction project, the needs of a newly emerging gecekondu neighborhood imposed other responsibilities on it. The basic daily needs of the neighborhood, such as food, water, lighting and security among other things, were not provided by the state. Furthermore, it was either impossible or too risky/costly for these to be met by people in the neighborhood – either individually or in groups. Thus, the main difference within the political situation accompanying the formation of the people’s committee and the counter-space was the political multi-polarity/heterogeneity in the case of 1 Mayıs whereas monopoly and homogeneity in Küçük Armutlu. Especially before Halkın Gücü/Partizan gained the upper hand in the committees, the situation of political multi-polarity/disunity in the neighborhood could manifest itself in ways in which harmed the sense of collective belonging in the neighborhood (especially when there were disagreements between political groups and these disagreements were communicated to the people). Moreover, this state of competition also led to a situation where organizations thought of their own strength in the area before all else and created a “marketplace” of sympathizers/supporters, bearing in mind the next committee elections and range of influence among the local people, which led to certain practices not being implemented effectively due to the aim of gaining more supporters or the fear of losing support.

5.2.2 After the construction of the counter-space: during the period of consolidation or dissolution

Even though the multi-headedness/multi-polarity and single-headedness appear as a significant discrepancy in the foundation level of these two counter-space experiences, this difference has not grown into a factor that would bring about great adversities in the formation of counter spaces. Even if there exists some differences and discrepancies at that early stage, the process of formation of self-organizing central administrative bodies (very similar to each other in terms of fundamental principles) as well as the construction of counter spaces in the given neighbourhoods has progressed to a great extent with success.

The essential significant difference between these two experiences roots from the fact that, the settlement in the 1 Mayıs neighbourhood had already reached a certain level compared to the original situation of Küçük Armutlu. Hence, it has been way harder for the pro-counter-space power to launch spatial interventions. Even though this has an effect in the failure of some sort of a planned settlement, the question that whether this initiative would be capable of transforming the already existing spatial distribution in a way that is more suitable to a counter-space; to a more planned, more equalitarian counter-space in the long term, remains as a speculation due to the fact that the People's Committee had disappeared in almost a year after its establishment. The bifurcation that gives birth to the essential rupture in between the courses of these two experiences (especially in the organizational field but also consequently from a more general point of view) is the decomposition of the People's Committee in the 1 Mayıs neighbourhood and it being replaced by other institutions, organizations and social networks which have different functions and effects in the social mechanism. On the contrary, the People's Committee and later on the People's Assembly continued their existences as pro-counter-space central institutions that possess an administrative and controlling power in Küçük Armutlu. Moreover,

whether having organic connections to this pro-counter-space central institution or not; various mechanisms and democratic associations had been developed in the neighbourhood. Additionally, some practical steps which have an important organizational utility in the locality as network developing and event holding significantly contribute to the organizational structure of the neighbourhood.

In the 1 Mayıs neighbourhood the People's Committee was firstly replaced by the Elderly Committee. This committee had not functioned as a pro-counter space self-organizing central administrative institution but mostly had tried to fulfil the functions of representing the legal recognition struggle in the neighbourhood, having the role of mediation in disputes and keeping the neighbourhood as a collective institution. The characteristics, principles, and the pro counter space steps of the Elderly Committee, especially prior to 1980, had already been mentioned in detail in the relevant section (3.4.1.2) However, given these positive steps, replacement of an institution which is constituent and organizational such as the People's Committee with an institution which is representative and acts as a mediator such as the Committee of Elders, independent from all the intentions, had negative effects in the continuity of the counter-space. The prominent negative effects can be clumped together as such: (i) the failure in detecting and removal of those who arrive in the neighbourhood not because of a need for a gecekondü, but for their own economic interests in having another house (ii) the lack of a central mechanism that has a central plan against demolition and the land mafia and an institution to agitate the people for such threats (iii) the shift from being an organization that the people fulfil their needs with their own collective labour to an organization that demands more service from the state. Even though these three points have influence on a certain extent, for the 1 Mayıs neighbourhood they have not been critically determinant. The threats men-

tioned in the first two point had already started signalling a decay before this transformation thus the negative effects remain limited. The third point is also present -to some extent- even in the social spaces as Küçük Armutlu where already a self-organized counter-space exists; it seems as after a time such trend emerges as an inevitable part of the rights movement among the inhabitants.

The main difference roots from shortcoming in three articles such as: (i) whether appropriate legal status exists or not, preventing commodification of houses and lands and individualization of the sense of ownership within the neighbourhood via the rules and principles established by the self-governing committee and the capacity to realize a control mechanism on the application of rules and principles (ii) organizing spatial interventions, practises, events that can keep the spirit of the communality alive which is enhanced through the collective identity, collective memory and the foundational counter-narratives (iii) developing mechanisms of surveillance, warning, and penal sanctions that will limit the abusing of individuals or groups make the abuse more costly for them which is vital to the continuity of a counter-space (or any such collective).

1 Mayıs, together with the factors that have been mentioned in other aspects, had started to lose its counter-space features after the disintegration of the People's Committee and other shortcomings that started to appear stronger after 1980. Between the years 1989 and 1994, both these organizational shortcomings and the fellow countryman associations becoming one of the main organizational institutions in the changing social fabric of the neighbourhood gave birth to recently emerging economic layers, demographical heterogeneity and the free circulation of houses and lands as commodities and moreover to fellow-townsmanship (*hemşericilik*) that constitutes an axis that divides the neighbourhood. Still today, in the elections held in the

neighbourhood where a candidate is from and which fellow-townsmanship organizations support him/her could matter more than the candidate's political views. All these differentiations in this organizational institution have been determinant factors in the weakening of the counter-space initiative and later on in its dissolution, and during the 1980s and 1990s when the radical political identity had re-emerged and the radical left once again became rather active in the neighbourhood, these transformations were important determinants of the fact that there had never been a second counter-space constitution process within the neighbourhood.

On the other hand, when we take a look at the Küçük Armutlu case, we see that the continuity of the functioning of a self-organized, self-managed central tool in the neighbourhood has a positive effect on the durability of the counter-space in the light of the above-mentioned aspects. In addition to this, the same case portrays how supplementary organizational structures, have positive and vital effects when the emergent solidarity is no longer needed as strongly as it was once, the social life in the neighbourhood becomes more or less stable, and hence, the need for the building and protecting of more permanent forms of solidarity occurs, in order to preserve and consolidate of the counter-space. These kind of supplementary organizational steps can be exemplified as: (i) the constitution of neighbourhood association that will serve to the betterment of the neighbourhood, (ii) election of mukhtars who will work in accordance with the counter-spatial interests of the neighbourhood, (iii) building of social/cultural centres that will increase the daily life communication/interactions among the locals and develop the common culture; such as Baba Ishak Cultural Centre and the Cemevi, (iv) holding events such as the Fall Festival that will keep the collective memory alive and politicize the current situation with the legacy of the past, (v) the developments of an organization as the HMM that

plays a crucial part in the creation of a spatial strategy in the neighbourhood and its practical realization as well as helping the fulfilment of certain daily needs of the neighbourhoods with their professional ability and knowledge but not by solely their own effort but via organizing collective ways as much as possible.

5.3 The fourth axis: (Re)production and (re)organization of space

In this sub-chapter, the two neighborhoods, the two counter-space constitution experiments will be compared with respect to the spatial intervention, especially the symbolic and political (re)production and re(organization) of the social space. The spatial interventions of each cases are presented in the relevant sections of the chapter 3 and chapter 4. Yet, let me concisely recapitulate in order to remind the basis of the comparative discussion.

At the initial process of counter-space formation, there is one major similarity between the two cases: in both cases, the institution which function as the central body of the counter-space constitution process aimed for the total regulation of the physical space in a way that promotes i) use-value of the public at the expense of potential exchange value or interest of individuals within the neighborhood or interest groups outside of the neighborhood ii) principle of equality and justice - as operationalized by these committees iii) the sense of collectivity. This regulative aspect is presented and discussed detailedly in the relevant sections of chapter 3 and chapter 4, and the previous sub-chapter on the organizational axis. In the context of this sub-chapter, it is important to emphasize that the capacity of pro counter-space forces in Küçük Armutlu to regulate the social space to a large extent, which was harder in 1 Mayıs due to various aforementioned reasons and thus remain limited, was very important as it lay a more stable ground for the constitution and consolidation of a col-

lective community which will share a collective identity, common social memory, and will not give a way to re-commodification of land and housing, and re-individualization of sense of ownership/property regarding the land/house they live on.

Regarding the core content of this sub-chapter, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi and Küçük Armutlu displays significantly different practices in terms of practices of symbolic and political (re)production and (re)organization of the social space. Today, for people who experienced the process of formation of the highly violent and political times during the Gazi Uprising, the neighborhood is full of political and symbolic value and their collective memories and identities are still affected by what the spaces of 1 Mayıs make them feel and remember. However, it is very hard to claim that the social space itself possesses physical components producing these effects. It is more about the memories of the people who lived through these periods. There are almost no political and symbolic re-production and re-organization attempts that have successfully remained to this day to produce a collective memory/history/subjectivity/identity that will reinforce the consolidation of counter-space.

The 1 Mayıs Cemevi, hosted by the largest branch of PSAKD (in terms of number of members) holds an important place in the neighborhood both culturally and socially. The land of the Cemevi was again seized as a result of political struggle including violent clashes, and thus is a “loaded” place for the people who lived through that period. However, there are no monumental entities which reveal the given historical process or stress the collective history/identity of the neighborhood. There are only wall writings and murals displaying Alevi discourses of honesty, open-mindedness, and defiance against oppressors – though the latter does signifi-

cantly intersect with “revolutionary values.” The political/symbolic spatial interventions in the rest of the neighborhood are limited to the street writing/graffities of the radical organization as MLKP, DHKP-C, and PKK. Even though there had never been structures that bind together the monumental value and use-value for inhabitants constructed by the self-organizational forces of the neighborhood; there was still a symbolic and political re-organization of the social space -at least on the level of titles- during the process between 1977 and 1980. First of all, the naming of the neighborhood as the First of May is the most obvious symbolic/political intervention that affects the collective identity of the neighborhood. After that, three schools and the medical center opened in the neighborhood before the 1980 coup were named after the name of 1 Mayıs, which symbolizes the neighborhood struggle for existence and recognition as well the memory of the bloody 1977 Mayday. These are: i) 1 Mayıs E-5 Elementary School ii) 1 Mayıs Taşocağı (Quarry) Elementary School iii) 1 Mayıs Mandıra Yanı (side of the dairy) and iv) 1 Mayıs Sağlık İstasyonu (Medical Station). Additionally, another school of the neighborhood was officially named as Şehitlik (Martyrdom) Elementary School, for the memories of the people who lost their lives during the resistance against the grand demolition of the 2nd of September 1977.

In 1 Mayıs, the symbolic and political interventions to the organization of the social space were limited to the naming of places, even before the 1980 military coup. After the coup, the symbolic and political re-production and re-organization of the space by forces favoring the counter-space, self-organization, and self-governance disappeared almost entirely. This appears to have been a crucial factor that eased the process of the withering away of counter-space features of the neigh-

neighborhood, and the losing of “that old culture” and “that old consciousness” as reflected in the complaints of many elderly inhabitants of the neighborhood.

Küçük Armutlu displays a considerably different case in the realm of symbolic/political re-production and re-organization of the social space. The variety of spatial intervention in terms of both form and content is a demarcating feature of the counter-space experience of Küçük Armutlu as a neighborhood. Firstly, it should be stated that, since the very founding moment of the neighborhood, there existed a centrally organized perspective (generated by the Dev-Sol tradition) regarding the spatial organization of the neighborhood and symbolic/political interventions to it. As stated earlier, in terms of the physical organization of settlements, the neighborhood had a plan and hence a planned expansion of settlement which favored the social needs of inhabitants and prevented the horizontal and vertical expansion of houses. Even though the symbolic and political organization of the space intensified in the 2010s, it was effectively present since the very founding process of the neighborhood. These interventions can be evaluated in two categories: i) merely symbolic and/or political as naming of already existing spaces, street writings and murals ii) juxtaposition of the use-value/public interest (solution to social needs of the inhabitants in a public space by a collectivity promoting way) and symbolic/political aspect. The first category contains the spatial interventions serving as constant evocators of collective history and the founding principles of the neighborhood as a united political entity. This category is present for nearly all political neighborhoods, including 1 Mayıs. The second category contains spatial productions which simultaneously provide social utility to the inhabitants of the neighborhood and reinforce collective memory, identity, and related social/political values. As presented in the sub-chapter 4.5; Şenay Gülsüman People’s Garden, Hüsnü İşeri Library, Sevgi Erdoğan Cemevi

Loyalty House, Dilek Doğan Fountain are the prominent examples of the second type of spatial interventions realized during the counter-space experience in Küçük Armutlu. The mural of Hasan Ferit Gedik, political writings and graffiti on the wall glorifying the political culture and collective identity of the neighborhood, the naming of two parks after Hüsnü İşeri and Sevcan Yavuz are the prominent examples of the first type of spatial interventions. As explained in the same section, the effect of the spatial intervention under the first category for the durability of a counter-space should not be undervalued, especially their role to strengthen the collective identity and highlight mobilizing historical figures and moments such as Hüsnü İşeri, Sevcan Yavuz, and Hasan Ferit Gedik. They play an important role to keep the collective identity, common social memory, a certain type of political subjectivity alive. However, similar type of spatial interventions were present in the counter-space experiment of 1 Mayıs Mahallesi as well. The contrast between the two cases in the realm of spatial interventions appeared to be the second category. The counter-space in Küçük Armutlu, succeeded to realize spatial production which is very valuable for the consolidation of a counter-space. In order to prevent self-repetition (subchapter 4.5), I would not readdress the pro counter-space function of these spatial production one by one. Yet, I do not hesitate to little bit of repetition - as it is necessary to state the core of this section- while depicting the overall function of these type of social productions and why this specific type of spatial intervention is crucial and very beneficiary for the consolidation of a counter-space.

These buildings, which I referred as monumental spaces satisfying collective needs, possess two fundamental benefits for a counter-space at the same time. First of the two is that they constitute social space which people can satisfy their needs freely and collectively. As addition to collectivizing the provision of the needs of

inhabitants so preventing the individualization of problem-solving logic, the way of organizing the functioning of such places (e.g. Şenay Gülsüman People's Garden, Sevgi Erdoğan Cemevi Loyalty House, etc.) promotes the self-laboring and self-organization of the local people as volunteering inhabitants are incorporated to the production process. Secondly, by their names (all of them) , the design of their outlook and the symbols they possess (Especially Dilek Doğan Fountain), these places heavily laden with a strong monumental aspect. The related effect of these social space is recalling the historically significant events and figures of the neighborhood and the struggle, which a significant portion of the inhabitants associated themselves with. These events and figures constitute an inseparable part of the collective identity of the neighborhood. Thus, these social spaces created by the labor of the inhabitants themselves and the pro counter-space forces within the neighborhood, function as interpellatives of “the common past” and “common values” which are, in the case of Küçük Armutlu, directly associated with the preservation and consolidation of the central features of the counter-space.

On the other side, this type of spatial production, monumental spaces satisfying collective needs were never produced by the pro counter-space elements of 1 Mayıs neighborhood, even when the People's Committee was functioning as the central self-organizational, self-governing body of the neighborhood from the mid 1977 to the March of 1978. Because of this lack, the counter-space in 1 Mayıs was deprived of an effective mean, potential glues of the neighborhood, that can constitute social spaces (i) politicizes the public venues of daily life (ii) reinforce collective identity, common social memory, and certain type of political subjectivity favoring the continuum of a counter-space by recalling emotionally and politically laden historical events and figures from the past of the neighborhood (iii) collectivizes the

solution of common needs of the inhabitants (as free books, clean water, affordable health food, etc.) (iv) as a result of the third function, making inhabitants more inclined towards “using” these places thus increasing the level of social interaction among the neighbors. Beside all other historical, political, economic, legal, organizational factors; lack of such spaces -which may reinforce a counter-space in at least four ways as listed in the previous sentences- appears to have a role in the dissolution of the counter-space. Vice versa, very substantial in the preservation and consolidation of a counter-space.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary and concluding remarks

This thesis analyzed the dynamics of the transformation of the social fabric in 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu neighborhoods of Istanbul. Both of the neighborhoods are famous -or infamous- as “radical” and “dangerous” neighborhoods due to being strongholds of radical leftist political organizations for a long time. However, the various neighborhoods of Istanbul (Sarigazi, Okmeydanı, etc.) show that political stances of inhabitants do not necessarily lead to an alternative organization of daily life in a way that counters capitalist economic and social relations and promoting more communalist and collective ways of living. Both 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu displayed an example of Lefebvrian conception of counter-space (1991) in which i) exchange-value oriented utilization of space ii) commodification of land and housing were limited to a significant extent. Instead of exchange-value oriented organization of space and commodification of land and housing, these counter spaces presented a social space in which i) use-value regarding the inhabitants of the neighborhood was the primary determinant in the organization of space ii) the circulation of land and housing as a commodity was limited to a significant extent, a more communalistic understanding of property relations in the field of land and house were tried to be developed iii) a collective way of organizing daily life especially in the realm of solving problems and as water, electricity, security, affordable foods, houses in need of repair.

In 1 Mayıs neighborhood, this experience was limited to a time period shorter than 1 year. The People’s Committee was quickly dispersed after the incident of the

extermination of five rightists in the neighborhood in March 1978. After the dissolution of the People's Committee; various social, economic, cultural, and political factors lead to a process in which counter-space qualities of the neighborhood eventually wither away. On the other hand, even though there have been ups and downs in which these qualities become bolder or too loose, Küçük Armutlu has maintained the main pillars of its socio-political fabric since its formation: i) use-value was prioritized rather than exchange value in the production and organization of the space ii) commodification of land and housing was limited to a very large extent iii) more communalist and collective understanding and functioning of property, especially with respect to land and houses was continuously promoted. The divergence between the two neighborhoods constitutes the main problematic of this thesis. This puzzle becomes more intriguing with the fact that Küçük Armutlu having dramatically higher rent value than 1 Mayıs neighborhood which is an important factor threatening a counter-space. Hence, the thesis was organized to analytically evaluate the divergence and the variations among the neighborhoods which might lead to the given divergence.

In this perspective, the thesis focused primarily on the four dynamics that are prevailed in the examination of the historical processes of the two neighborhoods via related readings and the fieldwork: i) effects of the demolitions and demolition attempts ii) effects of legal status, expectation of legal recognition, or non-recognition iii) effects of organization structure of the social fabric within the neighborhood iv) symbolic and political re-production and re-organization of the social space.

Gecekondu neighborhoods, or unauthorized poor urban neighborhoods in general, rise in and on specific conditions. These are (i) lacking in terms of physical needs: lightening, road, electricity, clean water, affordable healthy food (ii) imperil-

ment with regard to its unauthorized existence and related ambiguity about possible legalization. These structural conditions lead to a situation which is fertile for a counter-space constitution or patronage relations with land mafias or populist political parties as the same vulnerabilities (physical needs and threat of demolition) might be eased either by a solid self-organization or patronage relations. Thus, when the latter path is rejected by the inhabitants, it is not a slim chance for an unauthorized poor urban neighborhood to constitute a counter-space. However, as the time passes, both internal and external (to the neighborhood) processes hardens the continuations of a counter-space as such. If we look at the fate of these kind of poor urban social spaces, the preservation and consolidation of a counter-space is unusual and infrequent. This process of preservation and consolidation of a counter-space appears as complex process in which all these four axes are intertwined. The existence of demolition/demolition attempts/demolition threats affects the social perception of the house ownership, collective identity, social memory and organizational needs, thus the basis of a counter-space. However, the existence of demolition/demolition attempts/demolition threats are directly linked to another axis: the legal status of the settlement, and de facto linked to the organizational axis as organizational situation with the neighborhood might make the state more keen for a demolishment operation due to political reasons, or contrarily, it may push any demolition attempt back with its organizational power. On the other hand, organizational axis clearly gets effected by the demolition axis and legal status axis, as a change in them leads to corresponding effects on the organization reality of the neighborhood. And lastly, the social space, especially symbolic and political (re)production and (re)organization of it, overtly effected by demolitions and more by organizational axis as the case of Küçük Armutlu demonstrate how specific organizational approaches and institutions

might lead decisive differences in that realm. In return, the social space and especially symbolic and political (re)production and (re)organization of it, have an immense effect on collective identity, social memory, and, political subjectivity thus clearly influences other axes as demolitions, legal status, and organizational structure.

Taking all these into consideration, this thesis argue that preservation and consolidation of a counter-space is a complex and multi-dimensional process in which eventful (demolitions and other crucial events), political economic (legal status and recognition), organizational (the institutions inside the social fabric of the neighborhoods and their functioning), spatial/symbolic (production and reproduction of certain memory, values, norms, a collectivity) dynamics are co-functioning. This complexity; however, does not prevent us to reach analytic claims with respect to each axis. On the contrary, presenting this four axes-ed framework, recognizing this complexity and interrelatedness, yet at the same time deducing clear analytic claims for each axis that can be tested by future researches is, I believe, the contribution of this thesis.

As a result of the inquiry of this thesis, the following main assertions can be suggested:

I. The demolitions targeting a large number of gecekondu at the same time (grand demolitions) play a significant role in four-folded fashion: i) the process of resistance against demolition units and police forces raises the level of solidarity and collective identity ii) if the demolition is realized, the reconstruction process could be a process in which collective understanding and functioning of the property of land and housing is expanded as the local people and revolutionaries who came to act in a solidarity, re-build houses without even knowing which house is whose.

The first two are decisive in the process of counter-space formation in gecekondu neighborhoods as best exemplified by the grand demolition of 2nd of September in 1 Mayıs neighborhood and the 1989 demolitions in Küçük Armutlu. The demolitions and the threat of demolitions lead to two significant dynamics effective for the consolidation of a counter-space: iii) the (counter)narrations (Blomley, 2004) based on the events of grand demolitions plays immensely pivotal role in the formation and maintenance of collective memory of the neighborhood by which both inhabitants obtain legitimacy of their rights on the land and housing that conflicts with the legal status, and, more understanding of collectively owned land and housing is kept alive iv) even the grand demolitions did not happen for a long time, if the threat of demolitions is still felt like a potential and realistic threat by the inhabitants of the gecekondu neighborhood, it leads to urgent solidarity (Hechter, 1987) in a similar way to the initial formation process of the neighborhood, thus reinforces reciprocal need thus more collective action leads to the more collectivized understanding and functioning of land and housing, hence the consolidation of the counter-space qualities. However, the official decree is not the mere decisive factor in that aspect as in Turkey, there are numerous cases in which official decree of demolition was never realized. The feelings of inhabitants are shaped by various different factors as legal decrees, development in the judicial process, public comments of the government official regarding the neighborhood, the attitude of the municipality and the police forces, etc.

II. The legal status is a serious factor affecting the political attitudes of gecekondu people. The legal status of neighborhood, land, and housing all are decisive in this aspect. In the formation process, none is yet present. The neighborhood is in limbo. This situation of exclusion, deprivation, and vulnerability,

indeed, might just provide the conditions for the formation of a self-organized, self-governing counter-space as well as providing a basis for compliance and patronage relations in order to survive. In the context of Turkey, the official recognition of the neighborhood is usually attained within a limited amount of time (1980 for 1 Mayıs, 1994 for Armutlu) even though it might be detached with its historical or self-prescribed name and assigned with a name reflecting the will of the state as in the case of 1 Mayıs (Mustafa Kemal) and Armutlu (Fatih Sultan Mehmet). Thus, the legal status of the neighborhoods are no longer factors in the neighborhood struggle at least in the scope of this thesis. However, the legal status of the land and houses remain as the main agenda of the gecekondu inhabitants until they attain full-fledged house title deed. As the difference between 1 Mayıs neighborhood and Küçük Armutlu displays i) even though the legal title deed has not provided yet, existence of a “realistic” opportunity to obtain a full-fledged house title deed reinforced by documents as ‘tapu tahsis’ (a document given by the state that promises a title deed will be given in the future) or land title, re-individualize house and land by enabling informal circulation of these in the capitalist market as commodities thus weakens the principal feature of a counter space ii) the non-existence of a “realistic” opportunity to obtain a full-fledged house title as in the case of Küçük Armutlu due to the Boğaziçi decree favors organized resistance as the sole option, especially if the neighborhood would not choose to get involved in political and economic patronage relations with the land mafias and/or the governing political parties. The way of resistance necessitates collective act in the neighborhood which reinforces more collective understating and functioning of property relations especially in the field of housing and land, this is for the benefit of the consolidation of a counter-space.

III. The experience of social movements in 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu neighborhoods highlights the beneficiary role of a central decision making and executing body that organizes the self-organization and self-governance of the neighborhood for the formation and consolidation of a counter-space, especially after the emergent solidarity (Hirsch, 1986) leaves its place to permanent solidarity networks and collective community . This central body is not solely crucial for its function in the physical defense, provision of the needs, reinforcement of the sense of collectivity in the neighborhood; but for executing necessary surveillance and penal mechanism in order to tackle with potential problems of a counter-space which could weaken the sense of collectivity as free-riding, cooperation with outsiders, and other attitudes risking collective interests for the sake of individual interests (Hechter, 1987). No doubt, such a body must be acknowledged as legitimate and embraced by the inhabitants of the neighborhood and relatedly must incorporate as the inhabitants to its functioning.

Based on the experiences of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu, the following claims can be asserted: i) the formation of sub-committees and involvement of ordinary local people from each zone of the neighborhood in them have a positive effect both on the development of the consciousness of self-organization and embracing the people's committee as their own body ii) not limiting itself to producing solutions to the daily problems and basic needs of the neighborhoods but being the pioneer by the amount of labor they put in the process of physical application of this solution is another important factor which favors the legitimacy of the committee and the sense of collectivity within the neighborhood iii) the existence of political rivalry among political groups might be harmful for the consolidation of a counter-space due to two main reasons. Firstly, if the propaganda of a political

group includes anti-propaganda of another political group, this may lead to a general suspicion regarding the committee given that the other group is also in the committee or possibly the other groups also runs a similar process for their “rivals”. Secondly, and more importantly, this multiplicity of political groups transforms the neighborhood to a market in which different political parties compete for sympathizers and militants. In that framework, political parties usually hesitate to force radical transformations or execute necessary mechanisms of restrictions let alone the lack of ability to legitimately practice surveillance and penal mechanisms. Even if a political party prefer to insist on limitation on the individualization of commodities as land and houses, in favor of the “collective interest” of the neighborhood, it might lead to shift of some of their sympathizers to the other groups due to opportunity possibility of economic gain through these commodities as in the case of 1 Mayıs neighborhood (The Boğaziçi Law, leads to different dynamics in Küçük Armutlu as it significantly limits a chance of individual gain).

IV. Re-production and re-organization of the social space, especially in a symbolic and political manner, might be a very effective mean to consolidate a counter-space. Social space, in a classical Marxist sense, perceived as a result of underlying social factors and processes. There is no doubt that space is defined by these phenomena. However, regarding this case, in one of the two neighborhoods dominated by political actors with very similar class-orientations and experienced formation of a counter-space (1 Mayıs) symbolic interventions to the social space remains very limited, almost negligible; whereas, in the other neighborhood (Küçük Armutlu), the symbolic interventions to the social spaces constitute one of the main pillars of the counter-space. The experience of Küçük

Armutlu demonstrates i) similar underlying social conditions lead to different social spaces with the will of a political subject ii) to what extent the re-production and re-organization of social space in a symbolic and political manner can affect the social space itself as indicated by the difference between the skew and dense housing of 1 Mayıs neighborhood and the still existing planned structure of Küçük Armutlu. This reciprocal effect comes with the reinforcing power of these interventions on the counter-space consolidation process. Structures which have both monumental and public use functions as Dilek Doğan Çeşmesi, Şenay ve Gülsüman Halk Bahçesi, Sevcan Çocuk Parkı, and political graffities, as well as murals, play a significant role in keeping the collective memory of the neighborhood live and vivid. Without a doubt, this function is very beneficiary for the persistence of the dynamics fostering the existence of a counter-space.

6.2 Further questions

The given research propounds the role of a central body and supplementary and capillary bodies for the formation, and especially for the consolidation of a counter-space in a gecekondu neighborhood via the examples of 1 Mayıs and Küçük Armutlu. Numerous advantages of this type of organizational structure within the social fabric of a gecekondu neighborhood are presented throughout the thesis and summarized in this chapter within the third section when the main assertions of the thesis briefly presented under the four sections. However, like every structure or mean, the advantages come along with the disadvantages. The inability to fill the void emerged after the dissolution of the People's Committee in 1 Mayıs neighborhood after 1978, and individualistic actions of some inhabitants during the periods when the power of the People's Committee and the People's Council were relatively weakened due to intensified police operations regarding the figures involved in these

institutions, indicates some of these disadvantages. Needless to say, the potential disadvantages of this type of organizational structures are not limited to this episodes of weakness, various different argumentations can be offered with respect to this discussion as the lacking of check and balance mechanisms, potential inclination of inhabitants towards not taking self-initiative and expecting it from the committee or from the vanguards, etc.

Regarding all these, a comparative analysis of a counter-space which is central organized but trying to realize the principles of self-organization and self-governance as well, and a counter-space that is organized more vertically in an organizational structure more similar to the experience of direct democracy would be interesting and beneficiary to compare and contrast advantages and disadvantages of these two type of organizational structures for the formation and consolidation of a counter-space in various different aspects as i) control and sanctioning mechanisms ii) creating and sustaining a collective identity iii) de-commodification of land and housing iv) organizing a collective functioning in various aspects including provision of needs, solution of problems, defending the neighborhood from the possible threats, etc. The outcomes of such an inquiry might provide a humble contribution to the critical urban studies and the social movements studies with an organizational emphasis.

A counter-space provides a social praxis that reaches beyond the reaction-based movement, which usually constitutes the limit which most of the struggles realized by poor urban neighborhoods in the face of demolition and displacement threat, towards a pro-active/constituent praxis. This outreach indicates a limitation of the commodification of basic rights bundle under the right to the city which can be summarized as affordable and healthy living conditions in which people are also sub-

ject of the organization of the space. By this way, counter-spaces may possess an exceptional role to surpass dichotomies as economic rights or political rights, reform or revolution, reactionary politics or pro-active politics. They also provide a social space in which different ideologies -in these cases, variations of socialist/communist ideology- can materialize themselves thus provide a glimpse of possibilities of a different social fabric organized around more egalitarian, communalistic and use-value based principles. Therefore, I was interested in the question of what are the dynamics/factors favoring long-lasting consolidation of counter-spaces in a very hostile environment crystallized by legal and extra-legal assaults realized by municipalities, police forces, and land mafias. My observations during my presence in these neighborhoods and detailed readings of memoirs of people who participated in central bodies of the 1 Mayıs experience, raised some riddling question in my mind.

For gecekondur neighborhoods, after securing its existence in the preliminary risky years via resistance or patronage relations, the fate is usually the development of a rent economy based on the capitalist circulation of house and land. Even if the neighborhood could not obtain an official deed, these relations develop a base for other documents as tapu tahsis and land deed. Thus, after the existence of secured neighborhood, the inhabitants of neighborhood develops two tendencies that may undermine the dynamics reinforcing a counter-space: i) trying to obtain rent gains by building extra floors and letting them out ii) expecting to obtain a legal title deed which may turn a person who owns three or four floors (which is not very rare for the first wave of gecekondur builders of a neighborhood) to a rich person if a “successful” gentrification is realized. As an addition to these tendencies, it is a fact that these counter-spaces are not in a vacuum, indeed, a part of a metropolis. Thus, as time progresses it gets more connected with the surrounding economic, social, cul-

tural conditions due to various different factors. One of them is the fact that the people living within these neighborhoods usually work outside of the neighborhood thus had to engage in relations that may attract some people. Additionally, the counter-space *gecekond* neighborhoods attract constant economic, political and legal pressures. Regarding all these factors, even if a counter-space can be consolidated for a long period, it is certain that the struggle to do so would be very hard, costly and swimming against the current. Thus, solidarity networks among counter-spaces and between counter-spaces and other social/political movements with similar political perspective appear to be crucial in order to avoid isolation of these spaces. Hence further scientific inquiries questioning the relations and networks among counter-spaces and between a counter-space and a broader political organization with a transformative political agenda might be interesting.

REFERENCES

- 12 Eylül Darbesi'nin Korkunç Bilançosu. (2015, May 10). *Birgün*. Retrieved from: <https://www.birgun.net>
- Arslan, R. (2014, April 30) 1 Mayıs 1977: Yaşayanlar ve arşivler anlatıyor. *BBC News*. Retrieved from: [https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/04/140430_1_mayis_1977.%20\(y.y.\)](https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/04/140430_1_mayis_1977.%20(y.y.)).
- Aslan, Ş. (2016). *1 Mayıs Mahallesi: 1980 öncesi toplumsal mücadeleler ve kent*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. (Original work published 2004)
- Adaman Fikret, & Keyder Çağlar. (2005). Türkiye'de Büyük Kentlerin Gecekondu ve Çöküntü Mahallelerinde Yaşanan Yoksulluk ve Sosyal Dışlanma. *Avrupa Komisyonu Çalışma, Sosyal İşler ve Fırsat Eşitliği Dairesi*.
- Ahiska, M. (2011). Monsters that remember: Tracing the story of the Workers' Monument in Tophane, İstanbul. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 45, 9–47. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600001291>
- Anonymous I. (2019, February), Personal Interview.
- Anonymous II. (2019, January). Personal Interview.
- Anonymous III. (2019, January). Personal Interview.
- Bargu, A. B. (2008). *Martyrs of Hunger: Sovereignty in the age of sacrifice*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bargu, B. (2014). *Starve and Immolate: The Politics of Human Weapons*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Blomley, N. (2003). Law, property, and the geography of violence: the frontier, the survey, and the grid. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93(1), 121–141. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8306.93109>
- Blomley, N. K. (2004). *Unsettling the city: urban land and the politics of property*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Brenner, N. (2013). Theses on urbanization. *Public Culture*, 25(1), 85–114. <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-1890477>
- Buğra, A. (1998). The immoral economy of housing in turkey. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 22(2), 303–307. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00141>
- Burkay, H. Ö. (2006). *Social Policy of Urban Transformation: Social Housing Policies in Turkey from the 1980s to Present* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis). Boğaziçi University, İstanbul.

- Castells, M. (1979). *The urban question: A Marxist approach* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (1. MIT Press paperback ed.).
- Delgado, Richard. (1989) "Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative." *Michigan Law Review*, 87, 2411–2441
- Dilek Doğan'ın vurulma anı ve ertesinde yaşananlar ortaya çıktı; polisin ilk sözleri "kelepçe" olmuş! (2015, December 20). *T24*. Retrieved from <http://t24.com.tr>
- Engels, F. (1995). *The Housing Question*. The Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/housing-question/>
- Erbil, Ö. (2014, January 23). Ataköy Sahilinde Skandal. *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr>
- Erder, S. (2013). *İstanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye*. İstanbul: İletişim. (Original work published 1996)
- Ergun, N. (2004). Gentrification in Istanbul. *Cities*, 21(5), 391-405.
- Erman, T. (2001). The Politics of Squatter (Gecekondu) Studies in Turkey: The Changing Representations of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse. *Urban Studies*, 38(7), 983–1002.
- Ertuncay, A. T., & Aslan, İ. (2017). *İçeriden Anlatılar: 1 Mayıs Mahallesi'nin İnşası*. İstanbul: Patika Kitap.
- Gilderbloom, J. I., & Markham, J. P. (1995). The impact of homeownership on political beliefs. *Social Forces*, 73(4), 1589-1607.
- Gönül, E. (2009). Demanding "Justice and Freedom" at the Urban Margin: An Ethnography of Küçükarmutlu in Relation to Transgressive Politics of Space (Unpublished M.A. Thesis). Boğaziçi, İstanbul.
- Grup Özgürlük Türküsü (1996). Sevcan [Recorded by: Grup Özgürlük Türküsü]. On Gününü Umuda Ayarla. İstanbul.
- Gülsuyu'nda Eylemcilere Ateş Açıldı, Bir Genç Öldürüldü . (2013, September 30). *Bianet*. Retrieved from <https://www.bianet.org>
- Harvey, D. (1976). Labor, capital, and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies. *Politics & Society*, 6(3), 265-295.
- Hechter, M. (1987). *Principles of group solidarity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Hirsch, E. L. (1986). The creation of political solidarity in social movement organizations. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 27(3), 373–387.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1986.tb00267.x>
- Islam, T., & Sakızlıoğlu, B. (2015). The making of, and resistance to, state-led gentrification in Istanbul, Turkey. *Global gentrifications: Uneven development and displacement*, 245.
- 1 Mayıs 1977: Yaşayanlar ve arşivler anlatıyor. (April 30, 2014). *BBC News Türkçe*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce>
- Karaman, O. (2014). Resisting urban renewal in Istanbul. *Urban Geography*, 35(2), 290-310.
- Karpat, K. H. (1976). *The gecekondü: Rural migration and urbanization*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Katharyne Mitchell (2003) Monuments, Memorials, and the Politics of Memory, *Urban Geography*, 24:5, 442-459.
- Kemeny, J. (1977). A political sociology of home ownership in Australia. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 13(1), 47-52.
- Kingston, P. W., Thompson, J. L., & Eichar, D. M. (1984). The politics of homeownership. *American Politics Quarterly*, 12(2), 131-150.
- Köse, A.O. (2012). *Küçük Armutlu*. İstanbul: Boran Yayınevi.
- Kuyucu, T., & Ünsal, Ö. (2010). ‘Urban transformation’ as state-led property transfer: An analysis of two cases of urban renewal in Istanbul. *Urban Studies*, 47(7), 1479-1499.
- Kuyucu, T. (2014). Law, Property and Ambiguity: The Uses and Abuses of Legal Ambiguity in Remaking Istanbul's Informal Settlements. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38(2), 609-627.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The production of space*. Oxford, OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (2003). *The urban revolution*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (2016). *Şehir Hakkı* (I. Ergüden, Çev.). İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık.
- Marx, K. (2017). *Capital, a critical analysis of capitalist production*. London 1887.
- Moore, R. (2015, March 14). Britain's housing crisis is a human disaster. Here are 10 ways to solve it. *The Observer*.
Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/14/britain-housing-crisis-10-ways-solve-rowan-moore-general-election>

- Osborne, B. S. (2001). Landscapes, memory, monuments, and commemoration: Putting identity in its place. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 33(3), 39-77.
- Purcell, M. (2001). Neighborhood activism among homeowners as a politics of space. *The Professional Geographer*, 53(2), 178-194.
- Samim, A. (1981). The tragedy of the Turkish left. *New Left Review*, 126(1), 60-85.
- Saunders, P. (1978). Domestic property and social class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(1-3), 233-251.
- Seim Atlası. (n.d.). *Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi 2015 Seim Sonuları*. Retrieved from <http://www.secimatlasi.com>
- Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. (1970). 1970 Genel Nüfus Sayımı Veri Tabanı. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20170113092202/http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/13-01-2017-12:22:13-45838229811309049891916946953.html?>
- Uzun, C. N. (2003). The impact of urban renewal and gentrification on urban fabric: three cases in Turkey. *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 94(3), 363-375.
- Ünsal, Ö., & Kuyucu, T. (2010). Challenging the neoliberal urban regime: Regeneration and resistance in Başbüyük and Tarlaşı. *Orienting Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe*, 51-70.
- Yavuz, I. (2014) *Gecekondu Housing and Gecekonduzation Process in Turkey*. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis) Hafencity University, Sose, 2014.
- Yıldız, U., & Soykan, T. (2004, October 21). Armutlu küçük, derdi büyük. *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr>
- Yiftachel, O. (2009). Critical theory and 'gray space': Mobilization of the colonized. *City*, 13(2-3), 246-263.
- Yonucu, D. (2008). A Story of a Squatter Neighborhood: From the place of the "dangerous classes" to the "place of danger". *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 50-72.
- Yonucu, D. (2014). Türkiye'de Bir Yönetim Biimi Olarak Mekansal Ayırıştırma: Tehlikeli Mahalleler, Olağanüstü Hal ve Militarist Sınır Çizimi. In A.B. Candan & C. Özbay (eds.). *Yeni İstanbul Çalışmaları*. İstanbul: Metis.

APPENDIX A

THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE BOGAZICI LAW

Boğaziçi Kanunu no. 2960:

“ Amaç:

Madde 1 – Bu Kanunun amacı; İstanbul Boğaziçi Alanının kültürel ve tarihi değerlerini ve doğal güzelliklerini kamu yararı gözetilerek korumak ve geliştirmek ve bu alandaki nüfus yoğunluğunu artıracak yapılanmayı sınırlamak için uygulanacak imar mevzuatını belirlemek ve düzenlemektir.

Tanımlar :

Madde 2 – Bu Kanunda kullanılan bazı terimlerin tanımları aşağıda gösterilmiştir.

- a) Boğaziçi Alanı; Boğaziçi kıyı ve sahil şeridinden, öngörünüm bölgesinden, geri görünüm bölgesinden ve etkilenme bölgelerinden oluşan ve sınırları ve koordinatları bu Kanuna ekli krokide işaretli ve 22/7/1983 onay tarihli nazım planda gösterilen alandır.
- b) Boğaziçi sahil şeridi; Boğaziçi kıyı kenar çizgisi ile 22/7/1983 tarihli 1/5000 ölçekli nazım planında gösterilen hat arasında kalan bölgedir.
- c) Öngörünüm bölgesi; Boğaziçi sahil şeridine bitişik olan ve 22/7/1983 tarihli 1/1000 ölçekli imar uygulama planında gösterilen bölgedir.
- d) Geri görünüm bölgesi; öngörünüm bölgesine bitişik olan ve 22/7/1983 tarihli 1/5000 ölçekli nazım planında gösterilen coğrafi bölgedir.
- e) Etkilenme bölgesi; öngörünüm ve geri görünüm bölgeleri dışında 22/7/1983 tarihli ve 1/5000 ölçekli nazım planında gösterilen ve Boğaziçi sahil şeridi, öngörünüm ve geri görünüm bölgelerinden etkilenen bölgedir.

(1) 24/2/1984 tarih ve 2981 sayılı, "İmar ve Gecekondur Mevzuatına Aykırı Yapılara Uygulanacak Bazı İşlemler ve 6785 Sayılı İmar Kanunun Bir Maddesinin Değiştirilmesi Hakkındaki Kanunun" 23/a maddesi ile, 16/3/1983 tarih ve 2805 sayılı Kanun yürürlükten kaldırılmış; aynı kanunun 22 nci maddesinin (a) bendi hükmü ile de "Boğaziçi Kanunundaki 16/3/1983 tarih ve 2805 sayılı Kanunla ilgili hükümler yerine mezkûr 2981 sayılı kanun hükümlerinin uygulanacağı" belirtilmiştir.

6302

İKİNCİ BÖLÜM

Genel Esaslar, Orman Alanları, Yeşil Sahalar

Genel esaslar:

Madde 3 – Boğaziçi Alanının korunması ve geliştirilmesinde ve imar mevzuatının uygulanmasında aşağıdaki hususlar esas alınır.

a) Boğaziçi Alanında yeralan kültürel ve tarihi değerler ve doğal güzellikler muhafaza edilir ve doğal yapı korunur.

b) Boğaziçi Alanı bu Kanunun amaçlarına uygun olarak ve doğal ve tarihi çevreye uyumu gözetilerek güzelleştirilir ve geliştirilir.

c) Boğaziçi Alanında tarihi ve milli kültürümüze dayanan yaşamın yeniden canlandırılması, mesire yerlerinin geliştirilmesi ve gezinti alışkanlıklarının sürdürülmesi teşvik edilir.

d) Boğaziçi Alanındaki kültür ve tabiat varlıklarının onarımına öncelik verilir.

e) Boğaziçi Alanındaki yapılar bu Kanun hükümlerine ve imar planları esaslarına göre

yapılır, aykırı olanlar derhal yıkılır veya yıktırılır.

f) (Değişik : 3/5/1985 - 3194/47 md.) Boğaziçi alanında mevcut planda nüfus ve yapı

yoğunluđu gözönüne alınmak kaydı ile plan değışikliđi yapılabilir.

g) (İptal : Ana. Mah; 11/12/1986 tarih ve E. 1985/11, K. 1986/29 sayılı Kararı ile.)

h) Boğaziçi sahil şeridi ve öngörünüm bölgesinde turizm ve rekreasyon amacı ile ayrılan alanlara toplumun yararlanmasına ayrılan yapı yapılır ve bu husus tapu sicillerine işlenir. Toplumun yararlanmasına ayrılan bu yapılar amaç dışı kullanılamaz.

i) Boğaziçi Alanında kıyılar ancak kamu yararına kullanılır.

j) Boğaziçi sahil şeridinde ancak toplumun yararlanacağı dinlenme, gezinti ve turizm tesisleri imar planlarına uygun olmak şartı ile yapılabilir.

k) Boğaziçi Alanında kıyıda ve sahil şeridinde boş alanlar veya boşaltılacak sahalar "j" fıkrasındaki esaslara göre değerlendirilir.

l) Boğaziçi Alanında kömür ve akaryakıt depoları, tersaneler ve sanayi tesisleri kurulamaz.

m) Boğaziçi su yolunda hurda gemi ve benzeri araçlar bırakılamaz.

n) Boğaziçi Alanında imar planlarında parseller için belirlenen kullanım kararları tapu sicillerine işlenir.

o) Boğaziçi Alanında kamu hizmet ve tesislerine ayrılan alanlarda geçici inşaat müsaadesi verilmez. Ancak; Boğaziçi öngörünüm, geri görünüm ve etkilenme bölgelerinde kamu hizmet ve tesislerine ayrılan alanlarda 40 m2'yi geçemeyen bekçi kulübesi, büfe, çay ocağı gibi yapılara imar uygulama programı uygulanana kadar Boğaziçi İmar İdare Heyetince müsaade edilir.”

APPENDIX B

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM HALKIN YOLU

(IN TURKISH)

“Üçkağıtçıların halkı soymasına karşı giriştiğimiz mücadelede halkın somut bir çıkarına dayandığı için hepsinin desteğini sağladık. Dernek yönetiminde olan üçkağıtçılar; devrimciler, gecekonduların ihtiyaca göre tespit edilecek alan içinde kalması, herkesin sadece bir gecekondular yapması, yapılan gecekondularda oturulması, rüşvet verilmemesi, ortak harcamaların doğru hesaplanarak herkesten eşit miktarda alınması konusundaki çalışmalarında halkın desteğini ve birliğini sağlayınca gecekondular mahallesinde ve dernekten ayrılmak zorunda kaldılar.” (Halkın Yolu, Issue 44)

APPENDIX C

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM

İÇERİDEN ANLATILAR: 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ'NİN İNŞAASI - 1

(IN TURKISH)

“Bu toplantıda gecekondlu sahiplerinden her gecekondlu başına o zamanın parasıyla 300 TL para toplanması gerektiğini söyler. Ne olacak bu parayla dediğimizde de, burası jandarma bölgesi, bu toplanan parayla İstanbul İl Jandarma Komutanı’nın karısı boğazda yemeğe götürülecek. Böylece de yıkım için İstanbul il jandarmadan destek alamayacaklar, Jandarma Komutanı jandarmayı mahalleye yollamayacak dediler. İlk ben itiraz ettim. Bu işin böyle olmayacağını söyledim. Onu bunu yemeğe götürerek bu işlerin olmayacağını söyledim. Zeytinburnu’nda, Sağmacılar’da, Taşlıtarla’da, Gülsuyu’nda nasıl kazanıldıysa, burada da gecekondlu hakkı ancak böyle direnişle kazanılır, dedim... Çoğunluk para vermeyi reddetti o gün, Gecekondlu ağalarının, ihtiyar heyetinin kurmuş olduğu bu tezgah o gün boşa çıkmış oldu. Kimse de para vermedi. Ondan sonra gecekondlu ağaları geldiler ve beni de kendilerine katmak istediler. Beraber götürelim dediler. Yok, dedim öyle olmaz. Onlarla bu tartışmalar bir hafta, 10 gün sürdü. En sonunda inisiyatifleri kırıldı, baktılar bu iş olmuyor. Ne yapalım, dediler seçim yapcağız dedim. Açık oy açık sayımla heyet oluşturacağız... Bunlar da kabul ettiler” (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017; p. 63-64)

APPENDIX D

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT - 1 (IN TURKISH)

“Komite olarak bizim bir defterimiz vardı. Toplantılarda aldığımız kararlar oraya yazılırdı. Her gün görüşmemize ve birlikte çalışmamıza karşın her hafta kararlar alırdık. Kararlarımız deftere yazılırdı. Kararlara katılmayan komite üyeleri şerh koyarlardı. Mahalledeki tüm konut yerleri ve bunların kime ait olduğu bu defterde yazılıydı. Bu yüzden bilgimiz dışında bir gelişme olmazdı. Hemen müdahale ederdik. Aynı şekilde konut sahiplerinin aralarında da ihtilaflar olduğunda biz devreye girerdik. Sorun çözülürdü” (Aslan, 2016; p.108)

APPENDIX E

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM

İÇERİDEN ANLATILAR: 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ'NİN İNŞAASI - 2

(IN TURKISH)

“Bizim bölgelerimiz ayrı ayrı. Artık geçmişi bir kenara bıraktık. Yıkılan moralleri ayağa kaldırmaya çalışıyoruz. Herkes kendi bölgesinde gecekondü yapımını teşvik ediyordu. Onlar kendi bölgelerinde, biz kendi bölgelerimizde insanlara azıcık destek olarak, ajite çekerek, moral vererek gecekondü yapımına tekrar başlandı. Ama çok başlılık var. Herkesin kendi bölgesinde olması çok parçalılığını getiriyordu.” (Ertuncay & Aslan, 2017; p.69)

APPENDIX F

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT - 2 (IN TURKISH)

“Ölen insanlar, hemen çatışma alanının kenarında bulunan eski mahallede, bunların üzerindeki polislerin uzun menzilli silahlarıyla vurulan kişilerdir. Mesela Hasan Kızılkaya, uzun menzilli silahlarla tam alnının ortasından vurulmuştur. Biri göğsünden, bir diğeri kalbinden ama uzun menzilli silahlarla hedef seçilerek vurulmuştur. Çoğunluğun ölümü bu şekildedir. Sözünü ettiğim çatışma saat 16’ya kadar sürdü. Polis gecekonduları yıkamadı; geriye çekilmek zorunda kaldı. Bu durumla beraber askeriyeden takviye güç istendi. Çünkü yıkıma gücü yetmiyordu. Ama bu arada kHalk Komitesi üyeleri arasında ve genel kitlede bir karamsarlık başlamıştı. Halk Komitesi üyelerinin bazıları ve halkın bir bölümü direnmenin hedefine ulaştığını, daha fazla direnmenin daha fazla kayıp getireceğini ve bu nedenle geri çekilmek gerektiğini öneriyorlardı. Komite de dahil olmaz üzere halk içinde bu fikir teatrisi bir yerde paniği de beraberinde getirdi. Saat 16 sıralarında kimilerine göre kerhen, kimilerine göre de isteyerek geri çekilme kararı verildi. Halkın geriye çekildiğini gören kolluk kuvvetleri bu durumdan cesaret alarak bir saldırıya daha geçtiler. Halkın panik içinde dağılması ve alanı terk etmesiyle iş makineleri ve dozerler saat 16’dan 17.30 veya 18’e kadar maahlleyi adeta silindir gibi ezdi geçti.” (Aslan, 2016; p.133-134)

APPENDIX G

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM
THE MİLLİYET NEWSPAPER (IN TURKISH)

“Halk Komitesi olarak seçtiğimiz kişiler, dışarıdan seçtiğimiz kimseler değiller. Onlar da buranın halkıdır... Komiteleri oluşturan kişiler, halkın yardımına koşan, dertlerini içlerinde hissedenden kişilerdir. İşinden kovulan, parasız kalanlara yardım ederler. Onların dertlerini üzerine almışlardır. Bu komiteden beş arkadaşımız şimdi gözaltına alınmış, işkence yapılmaktadır. Komite, hiçbir karşılık beklemeden sorunlarımızın çözülmesine yardımcı olmaktadır... ” (Milliyet, March 24 1978)

APPENDIX H

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ: 1980 ÖNCESİ TOPLUMSAL MÜCADELELER VE KENT - 3 (IN TURKISH)

“Askeri darbeden sonraydı. Komutanlar tek karar verici durumdaydı. bir gün alay komutanı bizim mahallemizin de dahil olduğu Ümraniye çevresindeki bazı mahallelerden birer heyeti toplantıya çağırdığı söylendi... Toplantı salonuna gelen heyetin önünde, geldikleri mahallenin isminin yazılı olduğu bir kağıt vardı. Bizimkinde de 1 Mayıs Mahallesi yazıyordu. Alay komutanı içeri girip bu kağıtlara göz gezdirince birden öfkeleni ve bize bakarak ‘kaldırın o kağıdı’ dedi. 1 Mayıs ismine kızmıştı. Sonra muhtarlıklara ilişkin bir konuşma yaptı ve bize bir dosya vererek, ertesi gün Ümraniye Jandarma Karakolu’na gitmemizi ve isim konusunu orada çözmemizi istedi... Sonraki gün ben işe gitmek zorunda olduğum için Hasan Hayri Direk’le birlikte Rifat Kılavuz, Kemal Amca ve Hüseyin Amca gidiyorlar. Yüzbaşı, kısa bir görüşmeden sonra mahallenin adının Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi olacağını söylüyor... Mahalle böylece yasallaşıyor.” (Aslan, 2016; p.180-181)

APPENDIX I

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A 1 MAYIS MAHALLESİ INHABITANT (IN TURKISH)

A section of an interview in which an elderly inhabitants tells the effects of the Gazi Events to the political and social atmosphere of 1 Mayıs neighborhood:

“Olayların haberin buraya gelir gelmez burada bir toplu yürüyüş konuldu. Yalnız burada başı çeken arkadaşlar hep Gazi Mahallesi’ne gittiler. Ben o zaman demiştim gitmeyin buradaki düzeni koruyacak birileri lazım diye. O gün yürüyüşü kimin yönettiği bile belli değil gibi bir hava oluştu. Kitlenin içinden birileri bizi bir yerlere yönlendirdiler, polislerin olduğu tarafa doğru sonra tam polis müdahalesi başlarken, yan tarafta konteynır, baraka tarzı yerler vardı. Şimdi okul olan şu yerin tarafında, oradan uzun namlulu silahlarla üzerimize ateşler açıldı. Yanımızda arkadaşlarımızı ölü verdik o gün. O günden sonra da mahalle halkı sokağa çıkmaya çekinmeye başladı açıkçası” (Anonymous II, Personal Communication, 2019)

APPENDIX J

THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE QUOTATION FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A KUCUK ARMUTLU INHABITANT (IN TURKISH)

A paragraph from an interview with a Küçük Armutlu inhabitant:

“Anladık ki burayı bize yar etmek istemiyorlar. Sahip oldukları yerler yetmemiş, gözü var burada zenginlerin. Mafyayı polisi seferber etmişler bizi buradan kovmak istiyorlar. Ama başımıza öyle şeyler geldi ki biz de dedik ki biz buradan gitmeyeceğiz. Direneceğiz, yıkarlarsa bir daha yapacağız. Çıkarsa ölümüz çıkacak buradan.” (Anonymous III, Personal Communication, 2019)

APPENDIX K

THE LYRICS OF THE SONG WRITTEN AFTER SEVCAN YAVUZ

“Armutlunun karakolmuş okulları
Bahçesinde bir panzer yatarmış
Panzerin gölgesinde büyümüş çocuklar
Panzer çocuğun topunu çalmış
Çocuk koşmuş topunu almaya
Panzer yürümüş çocuk yedi yaşında kalmış

Yaprakta ki yeşil benim
Okulda ki bahçe benim
Direnişte doğdum da ben
Adım ondan eylem benim
Armutluda doğdum da ben
Adım ondan eylem benim

Yedi yaşında dillerim
Yedi yaşında düşlerim
Panzer ezdi yüreğimi
Donup kalan gözler benim

Dağ benim, deniz benim
Ördüğümüz konu benim
Yıkımlarda doğdum da ben

Adım ondan umut benim

Armutluda doğdum da ben

Adım ondan umut benim

Boğazda ki martı benim

Karıncanın yükü benim

Paylaşmayı öğrendim de

Adım ondan Sevcan benim" (Grup Özgürlük Türküsü, 1996, Track 2)