THE SUPERMARKETIZATION AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE AGRI-FOOD GOVERNANCE: GAP CERTIFICATION IN ANTALYA

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Sercan Taş, certify that

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ABSTRACT

The Supermarketization and the Rise of Private Agri-Food Governance:

GAP Certification in Antalya

This study examines the rise of supermarket-driven private agri-food governance and its effects on agricultural producers in Turkey. The neoliberal restructuring of Turkish agriculture operates through private food standards and third-party certification schemes driven by supermarkets. In this respect, supermarketization and third-party GlobalGAP (ITU) certification are two parallel processes transforming the agricultural production and rural livelihoods in Turkey. This study examines these processes through an analysis of supermarket expansion, facilitative legal regulations, government subsidy policies and their overall effects on fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) producers in Antalya. The main argument is that supermarket-driven third-party certification has differentiating impacts of different scales on agricultural producers. It also argues that the social differentiating mechanisms of third-party ITU certification work through and as the result of changing agricultural policies in Turkey. This study is based on field research and in-depth interviews with agricultural producers, agri-food companies, government officials, Migros's Mediterranean region procurement center officers and engineers, agricultural cooperatives and third-party certification body auditors and certifiers in the Serik, Muratpaşa, Finike and Demre districts of Antalya. Apart from that, government statistics, agricultural law and regulation texts have been sources for this study.

ÖZET

Süpermarketleşme ve Özel Tarım-Gıda Yönetiminin Yükselişi: Antalya'da İTU Sertifikasyonu

Bu çalışma süpermarketler tarafından yaygınlaştırılan özel tarım ve gıda yönetimi ve bunun Türkiye'deki'tarım üreticilerine etkisini incelemektedir. Türk tarımının neoliberal yeniden yapılanması özel gıda standartları ve süpermarketlerce teşvik edilen üçüncü parti gıda sertifikasyonu ile işlemektedir. Bu açıdan, süpermarketleşme ve üçüncü parti GlobalGAP (İyi Tarım Uygulamaları) Türkiye'de tarımsal üretim ve kıralı dönüştüren paralel iki süreçtir. Bu çalışma, bu süreçleri süpermarketlerin yayılımı, kolaylaştırıcı yasal düzenlemeler, devletin destek politikaları ve tüm bunların Antalya'daki yaş sebze ve meyve üreticilerine etkileri üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, süpermarketlerce yaygınlaştırılan üçüncü parti sertifikasyonun tarım üreticilereri üzerinde farklı ölçeklerde ayrıştırıcı etkilere yol açtığını iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışma ayrıca, üçüncü parti İTU sertifikasyonunun sosyal ayrıştırıcı mekanizmalarının Türkiye'deki tarımsal politikalar aracılığı ve bu politikaların sonucu olarak işlediğini iddia etmektedir. Çalışma, Antalya'nın Serik, Muratpaşa, Finike ve Demre ilçelerinde tarım üreticileri, tarım ve gıda şirketleri, devlet görevlileri, Migros Akdeniz bölgesi satın alma merkezi sorumluları ve mühendisleri, tarım kooperatifleri, üçüncü parti sertifikasyon şirketi denetçileri ve sertifikerleri ile yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlar ve saha araştırmasına dayanmaktadır. Ayrıca, devlet istatistikleri ve tarım asa ve düzenleme metinleri de çalışmada kaynak olarak kullanılmıştır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study aims to examine the impacts of supermarket-driven agri-food certification and private governance on fresh fruit and vegetable producers in Turkey. I argue that the supermarket-driven third-party certification has been deepening the differentiation among the producers in Turkish agricultural sector. The transformation of the Turkish agricultural sector and the current changes in agri-food provisioning have accelerated through the neo-liberalization efforts of the Turkish state and the increasing dominance of agri-food corporations. In that respect, I also argue that the transformation of the Turkish agricultural sector through the supermarket-driven third-party certification cannot be examined by positioning the global corporate capital and the state as two opposing and conflicting actors. Rather, the pivotal role of the state in rearranging the markets has to be examined by looking at the relationalities and interdependencies between the global capital and the state.

Integration of Turkish agriculture to the global agri-food market has brought about changes in terms of the power relations among actors in the agricultural sector. Supermarkets have gained an edge and have emerged as authority figures in regulating the agricultural production, resource allocation and food distribution patterns in Turkey. The increasing power of supermarkets has provided them with the authority over the control, monitoring and provisioning of rural production. The emerging hegemony of supermarkets has been institutionalized through third-party certification bodies and quality certification schemes. In that sense, the increasing hegemony of supermarkets and supermarket driven-private governance in the

agricultural sector comes from processes of globalisation, market liberalisation and pro-corporate government regulation (Lawrence & Burch, 2007).

Globalisation in the agricultural sector has become a more noticeable phenomenon in Turkey with the expansion of supermarkets such as Migros, Metro, and Carrefour. Their influence has reached beyond the distribution of foods to determining the conditions of production with the introduction of private standards. Supermarket expansion and corporate concentration in a globalized agri-food system have brought about new governance models, rules, standards and institutions in the agri-food sector (Clapp and Fuchs; 2009). With the increasing awareness of the consumers about the food safety and food health, quality standards have become major components of the modern agri-food retailing and supermarkets. Many supermarket chains have generated their own certification standards to provide the new urban consumers with healthy, traceable, and quality food. As third-party certification has extended its scope of influence, it has turned into a component of agri-food marketing. Due to this, agricultural producers have evolved into major supermarket suppliers. These standards, in this sense, have contributed to the "structural power" of the supermarkets by differentiating both the products and the suppliers (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Arentsen 2009). In this context, competition based on food quality, sustainable food production and safety have emerged as part of the new mode of governance in the agri-food market, which has direct impacts on agricultural producers.

Private standards designed by supermarkets and agri-food corporations also signal a shift from public governance to private governance (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005). While the state was the main actor in food provisioning in previous periods, it has now turned into a facilitating actor for the acceleration of private

governance. This transformation has been enabled by a set of structural reforms, economic liberalization and the removal of trade barriers. Changing agricultural subsidy policies and diversification of government subsidies to agriculture in favour of private governance have also contributed to the privatization of agri-food governance. The changing laws and subsidy policies are also worthy of analysis for situating the third-party certification in the global processes of agricultural transformation.

In the analysis of supermarket-driven third-party certification and its impacts on producers, I take GlobalGAP and its adopted version, ITU Production (İyi Tarım Uygulamaları) in Antalya. GlobalGAP was chosen as the topic of this study due to the fact that it represents an intersection point of supermarketization and the rise of private governance in the agri-food sector. Studying GAP certification would reveal how private governance operates through the structural re-organization of institutions and introduction of new institutions. In this sense, the examination of the intersection of supermarkets and private governance will show how GAP certification has become a part of an overall neoliberal transformation. Migros, as one of the biggest supermarket chains, is the main driver of third-party GAP certification in Turkey. Therefore, this study will take Migros as its focus for tracing the relationality between the rise of the private governance, supermarkets, institutional changes and global trends.

1.1 The choice of Antalya for conducting fieldwork

Antalya was chosen as a suitable location in which to conduct field research on the changes in third-party GAP certification and the effects they had on agricultural producers. Antalya is a growing city with an increasing population located in the

Mediterranean region on the south coast of Turkey. The economy of the city is basically dependent on agriculture and tourism. It is an important agricultural hub with its ecology and climatic predictability. About one fifth of the land in Antalya is used for agricultural production, according to Antalya municipality data (Antalya - Economy, 2016). According to Turkstat statistics, the total agricultural area of Antalya is 3,670,960 decares. Of this whole, 490,730 decares is the area of vegetable production and 739,474 decares is the area of fruit production (Turkstat FFV Statistics, 2015). In this agricultural area, based on a 2014 data, there are 204 GAP-certified producers owning 21,258.52 decares of cultivated land and 138.842.500 kilograms of annual production (Good Agricultural Production FFV Statistics, 2014). It is also a main greenhouse production area since its appearancein the 1960s with its convenient climate conditions. Of all greenhouse areas in Turkey, 84.5% of glass greenhouses and 44.1% of plastic greenhouses are in Antalya. About 95% of greenhouses are used for fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) production (Çanakçı & Akıncı, 2004).

Based on the above-mentioned official data, it is seen that the average production unit of a single certified producer is 104 decares, which is much more than the average production unit in Turkey. Thus, the statistics revealed that an average GAP certified-producer is wealthier than the average agricultural producer in Turkey. Moreover, Antalya is a significant agri-food export city with its high volumes of high value-added FFV production.[1] The export-oriented character of

[1] As the agricultural production of developing countries has been restructured according to the demands of the global agri-food sector, high value-added FFV production has become one of the most important pillars of this process. Export-oriented high value-added agri-food commodities like fresh fruits and vegetables replaced the traditional crops in many developing countries in this period (Bernstein, 2010; Warn & Almas, 1997)

Antalya's agricultural sector brings along direct integration of farmers into global markets.

Considering the smallholder dominance in Turkish agriculture on the one hand, and increasing influence of internationalization and export-oriented production on the other, I argue that Antalya provided me with the opportunity to look at the experiences of different scales of producers in the face of increasing dominance of private governance. With these in my mind, I went to Antalya for my fieldwork as part of a TÜBİTAK research project probing into the third-party certification and its impacts on agricultural producers[2].

1.2 Methodology of the study

This research is based on fieldwork conducted in the Serik, Muratpaşa, Finike and Demre districts of Antalya. I stayed in these districts for three weeks in November 2014 and March 2014. The field research was conducted in farms, greenhouses, wholesale markets, agricultural company offices, cooperatives and ministerial directorates. During the fieldwork, I visited various types of farms and greenhouses of different sizes, producers, commissioners, traders, company owners, and farm workers.

The inclusion of a wide range of actors such as producers, intermediaries, supermarkets, third-party certification bodies, and commissioners became an advantage for this study in terms of illustrating the circulation of agri-food

[2] This project, "The Socio-Economic Consequences of Certification in Good Agricultural Practices and Organic Production" was diected by Prof. Zafer Yenal in Boğaziçi University Department of Sociology. It covered different cities in Turkey, such as Antalya, Aydin, and İzmir. In this project, I worked as the research assistant for two years. Apart from the fieldwork and in-depth interviews, a survey was conducted by an independent survey company. The questionnaire of the survey was conducted in Feriköy organic market as the pilot research. In the next chapters, I will refer to some of the results of the survey conducted for this project.

commodities and the socioeconomic relations surrounding it. Farm visits allowed me to gain insights about the production processes and labour relations that are constituted around the certified production. Moreover, visiting farms and greenhouses provided me with better communication with the producers, and I had the chance to observe the FFV production conditions first hand. Some of the producers were interviewed in their company offices, which brought the opportunity to see the widening gap and the contrasts between small and large-scale producers.

In addition to visiting farms and business offices, I spent three days in the Antalya wholesale market to understand the exchange relations between the producers and the buyers. In the wholesale market, I was able to meet and talk with groups of commissioners, producers and traders during their bargaining. Seeing the wholesale market, as the unvarnished site of commodity relations, contributed to this study in terms of my ability to examine the power relations among the actors in the agri-food sector.

Cooperatives as both the representatives and the input creditors of producers contributed to this study by drawing a picture of economic relations in the agricultural sector. This study used the cooperatives to explicate the (re)constitution of interdependencies based on indebtedness relations. Moreover, cooperatives provided this study with a more comprehensive framework in terms of giving me the opportunity to examine the policy-making power of the state.

Fieldwork in Migros and third-party certification bodies was also vital in the sense that the interviews with the procurement officers, engineers, auditors and certifiers revealed how corporate governance in the agri-food sector creates its own quality standards in the supermarket-driven agri-food sector. Also, in-depth

interviews with these actors illustrated the inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms immanent in private food governance.

Lastly, interviews with the state officials in the district directorate of the Ministry of agriculture, food and livestock offered me the opportunity to learn what is occuring in the agri-food sector in the different districts of Antalya. My visits to directorate officials also provided me the opportunity to witness encounters between producers and state officials.

All in all, fieldwork in different sites of agricultural production, monitoring, governance and retailing enabled me to examine the different aspects of private governance from the perspective of different actors operating in agri-food sector. Throughout the fieldwork, I tried to be careful about the diversity of the producers by widening the range of the interviewees to include various scales of producers, commissioners, traders, third-party certification auditors and certifiers, cooperatives and government officials.

Apart from the fieldwork, this study utilized secondary resources such as legal documents, government statistics, and TV and website commercials. In this respect, I examined the changes in the legal framework, subsidy policies, and government statistics to better situate the fieldwork in the general context of private governance and neoliberal transformation.

To sum up, examining the semi-structured in-depth interviews and the secondary data, I tried to explore the increasing hegemony of private governance and its effects on agricultural producers. By doing this, I also aimed to draw a comprehensive picture of the local, national and international mechanisms pushing forward private certification and of the resulting impacts on the overall agri-food production.

1.3 The contents of chapters

In the second chapter, the theoretical approaches to the global agri-food transformation and agricultural industrialization will be analysed with the aim of situating the supermarket expansion and agricultural transformation of Turkey into the global context. Friedland's commodity systems approach, Friedmann and McMichael's "food regimes" approach, Gereffi's global commodity chain approach, and the actor network theory will be examined in order to draw a theoretical framework in terms of the supermarket expansion and its impacts in Turkey (Friedland, 2001; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989).

The third chapter will examine the agricultural transformation in Turkey by focusing on the legal institutional setting and economic transformation that have set the ground for supermarket expansion. Supermarket-led private food governance is expanding across the borders of national economies through new technologies, deregulations and re-regulations adjusted by national governments. The expansion of supermarkets and private agri-food governance have challenged or reshaped the previous rules, norms and regulations constituted by the national governments in the context of the protectionist and import-substituted agricultural economy. In many developed and developing countries, regulatory roles of national governments and public regulatory bodies have been eliminated or restructured according to the requirements of neoliberal governance in the agri-food sector. The emergence of supermarkets as new food authorities cannot be considered separately from the historical and institutional context of Turkish agriculture. Turkish agriculture has been experiencing a set of transformations in the last decades, specifically since the 1980s. The dismantling of the import-substitution developmentalist model has

bolstered the restructuring of the agricultural sector in Turkey. Turkey's entry into the Customs Union in 1995, along with bilateral agreements to eliminate the trade barriers, neo-liberal restructuring and loan agreements after the 2001 crisis and the EU negotiation process have all contributed to the integration of the Turkish agriculture into the global economy. These steps towards the transformation of Turkish agriculture in terms of the legal and economic restructuring of the economy will be analysed in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter will examine the rise of retailer-driven private governance and its effects on the agri-food supply chains. It is generally recognized that new regulations in globalized agri-food systems operate on a transnational setting (Marsden, Flynn, and Harrison, 2000). As food retailers and supermarkets source their agricultural products from different regions of the world, food is governed more and more by third-party private standards and transnational corporations. For this purpose, standards such as EurepGap, GlobalGAP, FOODTRACE, Codex, and Good Manufacturing Practices have been developed by international organisations. As a result of these developments, supermarkets have gained the authority status and hegemony over agri-food markets, and the power to exercise considerable cultural economy power in the agri-food systems (Dixon, 2007). Third-party certification bodies, responsible for quality certifications, have emerged as significant actors in the context of agricultural transformation. Concentration of the supermarket hegemony and the introduction of quality standards and certification schemes in the agricultural sector have had direct impacts both on the production and the consumption ends of the food chains. In this respect, the GlobalGAP and its Turkey-specific adaptation (ITU) will help explain the impacts of retailer-driven quality standards, technologies of audit, and certification on the fresh fruit and vegetable

producers in Turkey's Antalya province and the institutional context in which these standards have come to dominate. It will also examine the power relations and negotiations between supermarkets and other actors such as the state, wholesale markets and producers. The mediating role of the state in restructuring power relations will also be examined through the agri-food regulations and laws. Private standards, changing norms and production methods introduced by supermarket organisations will be examined in terms of their impact on the shifting power relations in the agricultural sector. This chapter will try to show how raising awareness on food safety is channelized into introduction of quality certification and private standards by supermarkets. The concepts of "health", "food safety", "food security", "healthy food" and "sustainability" will also be analysed in terms of the moral discursive power of supermarkets.

In the fifth chapter, I will examine the social differentiation impacts of supermarket-driven private standards on the agri-food producers and the changing patterns of agri-food production, processing, provision and retailing based on the fieldwork conducted in Antalya. The narratives and perceptions of the producers, supermarkets, local authorities, certification firms and wholesalers will be analysed to show what kind of impacts supermarket expansion has on the agricultural sector. The expectations of the producers and supermarkets from the state and the perceptions about the role of government will be presented to show the changing power relationships in the agricultural sector.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO AGRI-FOOD TRANSFORMATION

The global transformation of agri-food sectors and changing agri-food provisioning systems have been examined by various scholars in the context of different conceptual frameworks (Busch, 2000; Busch and Bain, 2004; Morgan, Marsden, and Murdoch 2006; McMichael, 1994, Hamilton, 2009; Friedland, 2001; Bernstein, 2005; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; Burch and Lawrence, 2007; Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Goodman and Watts, 1997). In general, these approaches focus on different aspects of agri-food transformation and supermarketization in both micro and macro levels. I will utilize the main theoretical approaches to agri-food transformation such as commodity systems analysis, food regimes, global commodity chains and networks approaches, and actor network theory as the theoretical basis of this study. Commodity systems, food regimes and commodity systems approaches address agri-food change within the macro level dependencies between countries, while approaches deriving from the actor network theory focus on micro-level networks and local relationalities as an alternative to the grand narratives of the former ones. In this chapter, these theoretical approaches to agri-food transformation are presented to situate the Turkish agri-food transformation and supermarketization into a conceptual framework.

2.1 Commodity systems analysis

William Friedland's commodity systems analysis focuses on rural identity, that is estranged from itsoriginal interest in the material and social worlds of agricultural producers (Hamilton, 2009; 17). Friedland advocated the idea that sociologists need

to focus on the commodity systems that shape the lives of rural people. He identified five interlinked components that define the commodity systems: production practices in modern agriculture, grower organisations, labour supply and labour practices, scientific research in agriculture, and marketing and distribution. Based on this, he conceptualized three new methodological arenas to be examined: the scale of commodities, sectoral organisation and the state, and commodity culture (Friedland, 2001). In a previous study, Friedland (1994) discussed the changing nature of the fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) industry in the process of globalisation. In that study, he examined the impact of transnational and multinational corporations in the context of FFV industry by defining three basic segments: producers, marketers, and distributors. Based on these three segments, he stated that the distribution of the FFV was globalising while firms in the production and marketing remain local, regional, or national-based. The importance of the FFV industry comes from the increasing demand for FFV from urban consumers in a globalizing world. The result of the demand for FFV has been the development of centralised distribution channels, which requires technological and capital-intensive investments.

The globalisation of agriculture has been transforming conventional production systems by introducing new production technologies. As mechanisation transformed the agriculture and rural livelihoods after the 1950s, the introduction of high yielding hybrid seeds and audit systems have been transforming the nature of production and labour practices (Aysu, 1999). Under the impact of the emerging corporate agri-food industry, grower organisations, especially those in developing countries, have lost their power and source of income, particularly in the fields of marketing and distribution.

Corporate power and a concentration of supermarkets have direct impacts on the marketing and distribution of food products. As seen, the most advantageous actors in utilising the logistics revolution[3] are the supermarkets. The resulting impact of the increasing centralisation of distribution is a decreasing role of local supply channels. By decreasing the costs of distribution by using centralised distribution and procurement channels, supermarkets increase their competitive advantage over the local food networks and conventional supply chains. This framework, drawn by Friedland, will be utilized as one of the conceptual tools to situate the transformation of food retailing and its effects in Turkey. While it has some drawbacks and an over-generalized understanding of agri-food transformation, it is still a necessary tool to make sense of the relationality between the transformation of Turkish agriculture and the effects of globalization. In this regard, the commodity systems approach, together with food regimes approach will contribute our understanding of how local is transformed through global processes. Now I will briefly discuss major tenets of food regime approach.

2.2 Food regimes approach

The "food regime" concept was developed in the 1980s as an analytical tool to understand the changing relations between nation-states and food globalisation. It focuses on the state/capital nexus, examining the relations of food production and consumption that condition the restructuring of the interstate system and industrial

[3] Logistics revolution and supermarket-led modern retailing have gone hand in hand. As large retailers and processors have modernised themselves, they have developed their own distribution and procurement centres. They have coordinated their procurement and supply chains expanding their impacts on regional, national and the global level. This coordination of procurement systems has been enabled with the introduction of new technologies such as computers, bar code systems and modern transportation.

capitalist social relations (McMichael, 1995; McMichael, 2009; McMichael, 2016; Friedmann, 2016). Friedmann defines two different food regimes that point out the history-specific geopolitical-economic organisation of food.

The first food regime is the period between 1870 and 1914. This period is characterized by British hegemony and extensive capital accumulation by means of supplying workers for producing cheap grains and meat from the New World (Yenal & Yenal, 1993). The first regime was constructed through wage labour, and the capitalist production relations in which context the capital accumulation had direct impacts on the agricultural sector. This phase was the beginning of the integration of agriculture into the world market. Technological developments such as mechanization and the production of high yielding seeds and pesticides and new communication technologies enabled the centralisation of power in the colonising first-world states that resulted in rising dependency relationships between the First World and the Third World.

The second food regime coincided with the post-war era and US hegemony. The decolonisation and the consolidation of the nation-states accompanied an increasing internationalisation of agriculture with the introduction of the US food aid policies and the Marshall Plan. This period is characterized by the spread of mechanisation and modern production techniques, including the use of hybrid seeds to semi-peripherial and peripherial countries. The post-war era was characterized by the developmentalist paradigm and agricultural subsidies in those countries. McMichael and Friedmann (1989) point out two opposing movements in this regime. On the one hand, there was the extension of the state system to former colonies, which brought about the integration into the second food regime. On the other hand, there was the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors by agro-food capitals (Friedmann

and McMichael, 1989). Intensification of agriculture in developed and developing countries was accompanied by the concentration of global chains transgressing the boundaries of national economies. Within this context, national economies and the authorities of the national governments are challenged, hampered or re-shaped.

The emergence of a third food regime has been a hot topic of debate since the 1980s. The neo-liberal restructuring after the 1980s has brought along new ways of capital accumulation, financialisation, new technologies of production and distribution, and raising awareness of ecological and health issues (Burch & Lawrence, 2009). In a 2005 article, Friedmann claims that a corporate-environmental food regime is emerging as a part of the extending restructuring of capitalism (Friedmann, 2005). She identifies the new food regime through the social movements of ecological and health related issues. The quality of food, food safety, environmental concerns, animal welfare, and fair trade that arose in the last period of the second food regime laid the foundations of a new food regime which is based on quality-audited food supply, third party certification and food standards. Agri-food corporations and supermarkets have been the major actors both in responding to these demands and implementing these standards. Most of the global agri-food corporations set their own standards in alliances with each other. This signalled another shift from public governance to private governance. Friedmann also claims that, by introducing the audit technologies such as Eurep-GAP and Global-GAP, the new food order would most likely deepen the inequalities between rich and poor consumers. It has also direct differentiating impacts on agricultural producers. This regime is identified as "corporate-environmental" in the sense that it represents a "convergence of environmental politics" and corporate repositioning through the supermarket-led food supply chains (Bernstein, 2015).

While the first period was consolidated under the British hegemony in the world economy with the aim of providing cheap foodstuff for urban working populations, the second regime was characterised by the developmentalist paradigm, food aid policies, and government protections to create national markets and integrate them to the world market. The third food regime can be identified as "corporate-environmental" in terms of increasing food standards, market-making power of supermarkets and a transnational governance of food. The food regimes approach provides us with an understanding of the broader and long-term transformation of agriculture. The world-scale geographical dependencies of different regions can be captured with the food regimes approach. The tools generated by the food regimes approach enable a general conception of the changing forms of capital accumulation, agri-food concentration, and emerging power relationships.

The food regimes approach, as a developed version of the commodity systems approach in many ways, provides a more detailed conceptual framework for the examination of supermarket-driven agrifood governance, certification and their impacts on agri-food producers in Turkey. Because the scholarly literature on food regimes analyzes the rising influence of private governance in the agri-food sectors in detail, it provides this study with enriching conceptual and analytical tools to examine supermarket-driven private certification, both historically and sociologically. In other words, the food regimes approach helps both to situate the agri-food transformation of Turkey in a historical context in terms of the changing patterns of food governance since the 1950s, especially the 1980s, and to explicate current changes introduced by supermarket-driven private governance, specifically the Good Agricultural Practices certification.

2.3 The global commodity chains approach and networks approach

The commodity chain approach was developed by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) to understand and explain an increasingly integrated global economy. A global commodity chain, according to Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, "consists of sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world economy" (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; 2). As production and distribution of goods dispersed all over the world, new flexible specialisation and technologically dynamic forms of organisation over production and distribution expanded internationally. In this regard, the commodity chain concept becomes an analytical tool to conceptualize the integration of the world economy and changing patterns of production, consumption and interstate dependencies. The commodity chain concept first originated from the world-system analysis of Hopkins and Wallerstein and was defined as "a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity" (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986). To map the chain, one should trace the steps of the chain from production from raw materials to distribution to the final consumer. Technological innovations, changing patterns of industrial organisation, labour and capital linkages are the areas that the commodity chain approach analyzes. The commodity chain concept is useful to depict the global networks transgressing the boundaries of the national economies. Wallerstein and Hopkins differentiate between different "boxes" that contstitute a commodity chain. A box is defined as "a particular, quite spesific production process" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986). The boxes that they define are social products showing the concentration and monopolisation of production by different actors. The

geographical and social structure of each box determines the role of the actors, for instance producers, that are included into or excluded from the chain. The links connecting the boxes are socially and economically produced and shaped. As the expansion and concentration of global agri-food corporations have increased, the integration of the boxes has intensified. The revolutionary transformations in production, transportation and communication technologies enabled global disribution of goods that are produced in different regions of the world. Retail corporations, by utilising these technologies, have played a significant role in the globalisation of the distribution of goods. The capital flow in the world has become more and more global with the industrialisation of retailing, in other words, "the retail revolution". (Lichtenstein, 2009). Within this context, big buyers in the retail industry have begun to shape the production networks all around the world. This transformative role of the big retailers is alo examined in terms of their "market making" capacity (Petroviv & Hamilton, 2011).

One should not treat markets as entities operating outside of the institutional power relations; markets are the mechanisms created by institutional arrangements and social processes. They should not be treated as non-institutions in the sense that they are embedded in social and political mechanisms, governmental institutions, legal arrangements in their own contexts. The institutional frameworks created by the inter-state relations can both encourage or prevent the global chains crossing trade boundaries of those countries. The relations of embeddedness are constructed as a result of the ideological positioning of the states and resulting policies (Wallerstein, 2009).

Not only are big retailers embedded, they also restructure those contexts in which they are embedded. Retailers as intermediary agents create their own markets by

selecting suppliers, introducing new technologies, and defining production and distribution norms and standards. As intermediary actors, retailers connect millions of suppliers with billions of consumers. However, their role is not limited to being mere intermediaries. As Petrovic and Hamilton state, they are main players that are larger than any consumer goods manufacturers with their market integratory roles. They both establish networks of suppliers, customers and big manufacturers and shape the relationships within this network by introducing the patterns, standards and norms of new relationships. By using their advantage of vertical and horizontal integration, they gain the capacity to organise the markets.

The commodity chain approach in agri-food studies focuses on the global sourcing of agri-food products from different parts of the world. The specific focus is located on production of food in "peripheral" developing countries and the global distribution of it. Thus, Turkey, in this sense, becomes an appropriate region to be located in a global setting in terms of supermarket expansion in the commodity chains context. It is also important to grasp the various regional and local context-specific characteristics in order to avoid the risk of over-generalisation of the commodity chain approach. Critics of this approach, in this sense, also emphasize its inability to capture the geographical complexity in the investigation of commodity and production systems (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009, p. 45). To overcome such deficiencies, the institutional context in a specific region or country is seen as a must to be inserted in the global commodity and value chains analysis. Cultural, geographical, social, and historical specificities of specific regions should be taken into consideration to avoid any kind of over-generalization and to capture the distinct patterns of production and distribution in various parts of the world.

Without overlooking the local context and regional relationships, it is important to investigate how food supply chains are constructed by specialist producers, to examine the links between the producers, retailers, local and national authorities in the supply chain, and to identify the patterns of relationalities, social and economis relations in the context of a given socio-economic region (Ilbery and Maye, 2008). The geographical factors and complexities, along with local and national government policies, determine the structure of the commodity chains in spesific regions. Policies encouraging an export-oriented economy have transformed the states into the facilitator actors in the spread of global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994). Thus, the states and big retail corporations should not be considered as essentially opposite and conflicting forces. Definitely there are tensions between the global impact of transnational corporations and the national contexts. There are also differences between the ways states and regional contexts mediate these transformations. The contextual tensions and differences determine the ways in which the producers participate in the operations of these commodity chains. The insertion of the institutional analysis into the global commodity chains approach enriches the understanding of the position of the local in the global. Legal and institutional frameworks not only determine the rules of the game, they are also important in the sense that they are the products of an existing cultural, social and economic history of those various regions. Associating the institutional formations, legal arrangements and regulations helps to understand the co-operation and coexistence of place, culture, geography, and history (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). The legal-institutional frameworks, the role of international organisations and states in the development of GCCs, therefore, should be considered crucial issues in the global commodity chain studies.

The commodity chain approach, which is rooted in production systems, distinguishes between two main types of commodity chains in terms of the coordination of the production systems. The first type is identified as producer-driven commodity chains, which refers to industries in which transnational corporations or big manufacturers play a central role in controlling production (Gereffi, 1994). These industries are mainly technology-intensive industries such as automotive, computers, aircraft, and electrical machinery. The distinguishing feature of the producer-driven commodity chains, as stated in Gereffi, is the control exercised by the administration of those companies. The second type of commodity chain is the buyer-driven commodity chain, in which large retailers, brand-name merchandisers, and trading companies play a central role in organising the decentralized production networks especially in the Third World countries (Gereffi, 1994). Buyer-driven commodity chains are pivotal, especially in labour-intensive consumer goods sectors like the agri-food industry. In buyer-driven commodity chains, developing countries in newly emerging economies such as Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico are producer-exporter regions under the imposed contracts and standards of the transnational chains. The changes in the structure of retailing and specialized flexible production have triggered the expansion of the buyer-driven commodity chains. Gereffi's use of the concept "buyer-driven" also implies a power shift from producers to buyers. Transnational retailers (buyers) have gained the advantage to subordinate smaller producers by capturing the hegemony in the markets. Smallholder participation in commodity chains emerges as an important area of study in the global commodity chains research.

Apart from the critics who emphasize emphasizing the importance of geography and context-specific characteristics, other scholars too criticise the chain approach,

stating that the chain metaphor implies a linear understanding which overlooks complex relationships and structures (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002). Due to this restrictions of the chain approach, they offer the concept of network to grasp the complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional links intrinsic to those systems. The global production networks (GPN) is a concept presented by Henderson et al. who claim to understand changing power dynamics between different actors and institutions in a more multi-dimensional global, local and regional settings. Therefore, space and context-based institutional dimensions need attention in the examination of governance structures of the commodity chains to place the globalisation and global scale transformations. Apart from the commodity systems and the food regimes approach, the later critiques which emerged with an emphasis on network enriched the agri-food studies in terms of understanding the localities within their own specificities and contexts. As the macro perspectives of the former approaches center more upon macro processes in the global economy, network as an analytical tool has drawn the attention of agri-food scholars to the specificities of actors, their interconnectedness, and their relationalities and anomalies which deviate or separate from the macro processes in some ways. The actor network approach, in this respect, contributed to the critiques of macro perspectives.

2.4 The Actor-Network Theory

The move from food regime approach has been more obvious with the introduction of the actor network theory, which originated from Bruno Latour's *Reassembling the Social* (Latour, 2007). The networks approach has been constructed on the basis of the critiques of orthodox accounts of globalisation which take globalisation as a all-

encompassing system rather than as a contested and partial process where the local should be interpreted within the global dynamic of the development with its contested and contradictory aspects (Thrift & Amin, 1995). Proponents of this theory claim that transnational and global corporations are embedded in the particular legal and regulatory contexts which are the domanis of those contests. As Whatmore and Thorne suggests, the reach of these global corporations and systems depends in general upon the intricate interweavings of *situated* people, artefacts, codes, and living things and the maintenance of particular tapestrips of connection across the world (Whatmore & Thorne, 1997). Therefore, it could be stated that there is not a single all-encompassing logic of capitalism and globalisation. As they suggest, the people, artefacts, codes and living things, namely actors, determine the character and the scope of the globalisation within the contested spaces of globalisation. To understand the complex structure the supply chains, these contested spaces, contexts, regions, countries and processes should be taken into account in the analysis of commodity networks.

The concept of network is defined as "a coordinated set of heterogenous actors which interact more or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating goods and services" (Callon, 1991). Callon problematizes the unlinear type of global change and leaves space for the contestations of different actors within the heterogenouity. The Actor-Network Theory also problematizes the micro-macro duality by conceptualizing the agency of different actors in their own complexities of networks, the inter-dependency and inter-actions of the micro and macro processes and actors. The networks are composed of connections and lines of flows rather than fixed surfaces and boundaries (Whatmore & Thorne, 1997).

From this point of view, actor-network theory proposes the concepts of hybrid networks and modes of ordering to avoid the global-local and macro-micro distinction and focus on the connectivities and lines of flows. Latour even suggests concentrating on the connectors" that will be allowed to freely circulate without ever stopping at a place called context or interaction (Latour, 2007, p. 193). These distinctions such as micro-macro and local-global are created by the body politic, that Latour describes in the same study as "shadows".

Global-local nexus in the GCC and world systems theory tends to portray localities as "economic victims" of globalisation and characterizes the global powers as "above-present" entities (Michael, Taylor, & Johnson, 1995). On the other hand, the dependency relations can't be reduced to that; rather the relations and connectivities are much more complex as a esult of the actions of various actors. Changes in global order are composed of complexities and contingencies. As Latour claims:

> The markets... are indeed regulated and global, even though none of the causes of that regulation and that aggregation is itself either global or total. The aggregates are not made from some substance different from what they are aggregating. No visible or invisible hand suddenly descends to bring order to dispersed and chaotic individual atoms. (Latour, 1993; 122)

It is much more an issue of aggregation of entities rather than a totality of an all-encompassing structure that the global system is made up of. Aggregation itself constitutes an order which is neither local nor global. In that sense, there is not an overarching, omnipotent invisible hand which organizes the chaotic individual atoms, it is the aggregation from which regulation originates as individual entities come together. Considering these, the processes, the aggregates and the lines of flows have to be taken into account in the examination of supply chains (Whatmore

& Thorne, 1997). Situating and mapping the global order must not be reduced to dichotomies or to an a priori conceptual 'shadows'.

Latour problematizes the macro-micro and core-periphery dependencies with the concept of network lengthening without reconstructing those global-local dichotomies. He does this by emphasizing the complexity of different processes, lines of flows and interdeprendencies. Networks are heterogeneous in the sense that the organisations, agents, society, systems and structures are all *effects* generated in patterned networks of diverse human and non-human materials (Law, 2011). For Law, the systems should not be taken for granted as if there was a macro system on the one hand and different entities on the other. Interactions among pieces constitute the tensions, conflicts, flows and networkings in such a way that they cancel the duality of micro-macro, core-periphery, local-global. As Latour suggests,

> …modern societies can not be described without recognising them as having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary character that is never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structure, systems. (Latour, 1990)

In this respect, it is important not to stick to the world systems approaches in the analysis of micro level transformations in the Turkish agricultural sector in the context of supermarketization. Anchoring in those macro and micro and global and local-based approaches without utilising the theoretical tools of the actor-network theory will limit an analysis of agricultural change and supermarketisation to a narrow frame which would prevent us from grasping the specificities and constestations within the Turkish context. In that respect, analysing the supermarketization in Turkey will require benefiting from the theoretical and analytical tools of the actor-network theory and not overlooking the thread-like intersecting and differentiating networkings in the process of supermarketization. It

will also help us grasp the minor stringy inter and cross — connectivities of different agents and entities, supermarkets, state, certification bodies, producers, wholesalers, and consumers — in the overall transformation of Turkish agriculture. Therefore, I will benefit from the above-mentioned theoretical approaches in the analysis of supermarket expansion and its effects on different segments of producers. By doing so, I will try to avoid micro-macro and local-global dualities and strive for overcoming the state-corporate power duality that Philip McMichael uses in his analysis of food regimes (McMichael, 2005). Overcoming the state power-corporate power duality will show us the pivotal role of the state in overall supermarket expansion and the ways that the state and corporate powers overlap in transforming the agricultural markets. I claim that both the approaches deriving from the world systems theories and the actor network theory will complement each other in this study to show how supermarketization transform the agricultural sector and the lives of the producers.

In the next chapter, I will make a short overview of the transformation of Turkish agriculture to locate the current rise of the supermarket-driven private governance and GlobalGAP/ITU certification into a historical context.

CHAPTER 3

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION IN TURKISH AGRICULTURE

In this chapter, I will analyse the transformation of agriculture to understand the institutional and legal background that paved the way to the changes in the food retail sector, and their effects on agricultural producers, and emerging relations of power in the agricultural sector. The economic policies in Turkey from 1950 to 1980 and from 1980 to today will be the historical periods to be analysed in this chapter.

3.1 The Development of Turkish agriculture between 1950 and 1980

The 1950s in Turkey witnessed an increasing mechanisation and intensification in pesticide and fertilizer use, expansion in cultivated areas, and an increase in productivity. The state, in accordance with the international order, saw agriculture as a source of industrial development. It brought about state investments and protection in this sector.

The Turkish government in this period accepted American expertise and rural development plans within the context of the Marshall Plan (Yenal, 2000). As a result of Marshall Aid, large numbers of tractors were imported to Turkey with the aim of mechanizating agricultural production. While the number of tractors in Turkey was 1,750 in 1948, their number increased to 16,000 in 1950 and 40,000 in 1955 (Keyder, 1988). In this period, new lands opened for cultivation with the increasing use of tractors and machines. According to Köymen, this mechanization process triggered the concentration of land in fewer hands (Köymen, 2008).

This period was basically named as the post-war international regime in the agri-food literature. One important characteristic of the post-war international food regime was the food aid from the U.S. to developing countries with the aim of disposing of U.S. surpluses and creating a stable market for American production (Friedman, 1990, p.16).

International food aid was institutionalized as a means of development and humanitarian assistance by the United States, which is also known as PL 480. Third world countries paid for PL480 in their national currencies and the American government spent that money in developing countries for investment. Turkey, as a receiver country, was taking steps to integrate its agriculture to the international market by welcoming these programs.

The capital accumulation in Turkish agriculture gained speed with the intensification of state support, government credits, and the input subsidies in the 1960s. As Aydin states, "the Turkish state acted as the guardian or manager of national development between 1950 and 1980" (Aydin, 2010). The number of crops whose harvest the government bought at pre-determined support prices rose from seven during the 1960s to nineteen by the mid-1970s (as cited in Yenal, 2000, p. 56) With the price supports, the volume of production increased in the entire agri-food sector. Rural producers in this period enjoyed the protectionist policies and government subsidies and credits.

Turkish agriculture at the end of 1960s had witnessed increasing efficiency and productivity under the impact of the Green Revolution. Increasing research and investments in agricultural productivity brought about the use of high-yielding seeds, chemicals and pesticides coupled with increasing mechanization. It is also claimed

that the Green Revolution caused small-scale producers to lose the control over their traditional seeds (Özkaya, 2006).

Similar to later periods, the agricultural policies in Turkey in this period were shaped in conformity with international market policies. The emphasis was on the complementarity of agricultural and industrial development, which meant the import-substitution policies in agriculture and industry with the help of foreign aid (Aydin, 2005). The complementarity of agriculture and industry in Turkey can be understood by considering the American government's subsidies to export and substantial fiscal and credit subsidies to farmers in order to support the development of agro-technologies (Yenal and Yenal, 1993).

The import-substitutionist paradigm of this period was coupled with the consolidation of newly emerging nation-states all around the world. In this period, we see the establishment of agro-industrial complexes in the context of the complementarity of agriculture and industry. With the help of foreign aid, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, including Turkey, tried to develop their industrialization, which resulted in proletarianization. The integration of agriculture and industry for urban areas through rural production was achieved to a large extent. Unlike many peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, Turkey reached to a considerable level of self-sufficiency in most agricultural products. The urban populations in the country increased parallel to the import-substituted developmentalist model after the 1960s and also parallel to the developments in the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector was utilized as a source from which cheap food for the urban population and export commodities were acquired (Aydin, 2005). The combination of import-substitutionism, protectionist policies, the Marshall Plan, and PL 480 transformed both the rural and the urban structures.

Within this economic and political framework, petty-commodity production gradually diffused to rural areas among small-producers in Turkey (Keyder, 1988). Rural households which were previously excluded from the capitalist relations of production began to produce for the market exchange along with the production for subsistence. During this period, we do not actually see the disappearance of small-scale production. Quite the contrary, state policies (input subsidies, government purchases with pre-determined prices, cheap credits for farmers) after 1950 favoured the small-scale producers that enabled the spread of petty-commodity production in rural areas. These policies were implemented in accordance with the policy recommendations and requirements of the World Bank and international capital to integrate small-scale farming into the world market and to strengthen the commercialization of the agricultural sector. In contrast to other Third World countries where small-scale farming was began to be excluded, Turkey experienced an expansion of petty-commodity production in the small-scale farms.
While the purpose of these policies was the integration of agriculture into the international market, the operations of international capital were comparatively limited in this period. The state was the main actor with its protective and interventionist policies for subsidizing the agriculture, was founding SEEs (state economic enterprises) and providing cheap credits for farmers through the state-owned Ziraat Bank.

The early post-war policies laid the groundwork for the highly globalized world food economy (Clapp, 2012). They opened up new spaces where new practices and norms such as the diffusion of petty-commodity production among small-scale producers in Turkey came to dominate.

However, the food politics in Turkey and in the world started to change with the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis in the early 1970s (as cited in McMichael, 1994). The end of the 1970s signalled the end of the import-substitution policies, namely the developmentalist era. During the 1970s, developing countries like Turkey became heavily indebted and fell into difficulty trying to paying for food imports. Following this, according to McMichael and Friedman, "the role of these states in organizing agriculture has been eroded by international financial organizations which demand that these countries' economies be re-organized towards export" (McMichael, 1989 as cited in Yenal and Yenal, 1993; 26). The new era was characterized by the restructuring and re-organization of agriculture according to the demands of transnational agro-food corporations. New agents and actors started to emerge with the reorganization of agriculture. Yet the loss of power of a nation-state does not necessarily mean the breakdown of its power in the market. I claim that the states and government institutions were transformed into intermediary agents in the reorganization of sectoral balances for the benefit of transnational corporations (TNC) and private capital. The structural reforms implemented by post-1980 governmets in Turkey demonstrates this argument.

3.2 The developments in Turkish Agriculture since the 1980s

As a result of the above-mentioned developments in the 1970s (institutional and economic instabilities and unsustainable indebdtedness), developing countries faced high levels of external debt in the early 1980s.

Clapp explains:

> The IMF and the World Bank stepped in to provide emergency loan packages to developing countries to enable them to repay their debts. However, in this process poor countries gained new loans with the international financial

> institutions (IFIs), and had to meet certain conditions to obtain funds. The loans were conditional on the adoption of SAPs (Structural Adjustment Policies) that required that developing countries make economic policy changes, typically reforms that followed a neoliberal policy agenda that was being pushed by both rich country governments and the IMF and World Bank at the time. (Clapp, 2012, p. 60)

As in many other countries, the 1980s signalled the end of developmentalist policies and the beginning of a neoliberal economy in Turkey. In this respect, the Turkish economy started to change its route from an import-substituted economy to an export-oriented model. In response to the international change toward the export-oriented model, successive governments of the 1980s started to implement neoliberal policies in the economy.

These policies included structural adjustment programmes, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, elimination of subsidies, reduction of public investment and withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere. While transnational capital in the pre-1980 period was mainly interested in input markets, the 1980s witnessed the effort of transnational capital to control food chains via big food corporations, supermarkets and various kinds of agribusiness TNCs. In this respect, the previous developmentalist policies were considered by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as highly protectionist and as constituting impediments for development. A greater integration of the state in capital circuits, a hightened responsiveness of the state as an instrument of regulation of the interests of transnational finance capital, a recasting of the operating principles of the state system away from national economic coherence, reorientation of state institutions of policy formation and a reorganisation of social structures consistent with the internationalisation of segments of the domestic economy were the requirements

imposed by the new international order on developing countries like Turkey (McMichael and Myhre, 1991, p. 83).

The adoption of neoliberal policies in Turkish agriculture should be considered in conjunction with above-mentioned international developments. Turkey was under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to cut its public expenditures and subsidies. These new structural adjustment policies had direct impacts on the Turkish agricultural sector.

As a result of these adjustment policies, governments at the beginning of the decade lowered the level of subsidies for inputs and raised the interest rates on farm credits. The number of crops whose production was supported fell from 22 in 1980 to 10 in 1990 (Yenal, 2000, p. 65). This change pushed the traditional crops under the hegemony of the world market without any protection. The removal of input subsidies and a decrease in the amount of cheap credits resulted in the decline in incomes of small-scale producers, which laid the ground for capital intensification in the agricultural sector. Petty-commodity producers responded to these by reducing spending for and investments in production, intensifying labour, increasing the production for self-subsistence, lowering standards of living, raising the stakes by expanding production, diversification of activities and sources of income, and more recently, applying new quality standards and certification (Keyder and Yenal, 2011, Ecevit, Karkıner, and Büke, 2009).

Furthermore, Turkey started to restructure its agriculture, replacing or complementing traditional crops with high-value cash crops due to the impositions coming from the international financial organizations. This agro-export restructuring in the Global South changed the food order internationally. McMichael and Mhyre explain it as “the new international division of labour where the South specializes in

exports of labour-intensive luxury crops (off-season FFVs, beef, poultry, fish), and the North specializes in exports of capital-intensive low-value raw foods such as grains" (as cited in P. McMichael and D. Myhre, 1991; 93). The promotion of agro-export production increased the internationalization of agriculture in the developing world. Agro-export production has been the basis for a policy of export-substitution. The new export-oriented luxury-food agro-industry has become the world's fastest growing sector, accounting for 25% of the Third World's total processed output in 1980, much of which is marketed by transnational corporations (McMichael and Myhre, 1991, p. 94). Also, in this period the consolidation of control and coordination of food chains by the private capital accelerated.

The acceleration of these reforms differs from one country to onether due to the level of their commitment to encouraged or imposed structural reform programmes. In Turkey, proper implementation of these reforms was delayed as a result of the unwillingness of governments due to their populist agenda regarding the rural population. Despite the discontent of the IMF and the World Bank, Turkish governments continued to intervene in prices and re-introduced subsidies and supported prices for some agricultural crops throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Aydin, 2010).

Yet the populist policies of the governments came to an unsustainable situation, so the governments started to comply properly with the conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank, especially in the 2000s. In the 1990s, Turkey experienced political instabilities due to the fact that governments did not have the powerful support of the masses, which meant that they were unable to succeed in implementating these policies. However, these years prepared the judicial and institutional framework for the implementation of neoliberal policies in the

agriculture. For instance, in the five-year development plans, steps for transforming agriculture were outlined according to the demands of the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, accession negotiations with the EU encouraged Turkey towards a more liberal economic policy. The IMF, the World Bank and the EU required Turkey to privatise state-owned organizations, eliminate all kinds of support, import duties, and trade barriers in the agricultural sector.

In the context of the EU negotiations, the compliance of Turkish agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been a requirement. The structural problems in Turkish agriculture identified by the EU were: the small size of agricultural holdings, fragmented and scattered farms, low efficiency, and insufficiencies in production and marketing infrastructures. These problems also included low levels of professional agricultural activity, low investment capacity, illiteracy and low levels of education, unpaid labour conditions in a large proportion of agricultural labour, low income levels, lack of alternative income sources, ineffective institutional structures and farmer organizations, insufficient development of physical, social and cultural infrastructures, high rates of self-subsistence farming activities, and high rates of hidden unemployment (Köse, 2012). Because protective policies were seen as impediments to development by the international financial organizations, they had to be eliminated and comprehensive reforms were recommended to resolve the inefficiencies and problems in agriculture.

From this point of view, objectives for agriculture had already been established in 2000. These were the development of a land register system, animal identification systems, plant passport systems, administrative structures suiting these reforms, modernization of food-processing, food quality, food safety, and creating

standardization. The EU had reached its level of development with huge subsidies years before.

The economic crisis in 2001 became a cornerstone for the Turkish economy. The recovery of the economy after the collapse necessitated a rapid implementation of neoliberal reforms. Since 2001, and mainly under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, important agricultural policy changes have been introduced (Burrell and Oskam, 2005). The Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) has been an experiment in major agricultural policy change and institutional changes regarding agriculture.

3.2.1 The Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP)

Following the financial crisis of 2001, the IMF and theWorld Bank imposed major changes and reforms in macroeconomic and agricultural policies as a recovery package. ARIP signalled a major transition from a relatively protected agricultural sector to a more market-oriented economy. Under the ARIP, the minium price policy, input subsidies, and cheap credits had to be removed. At the institutional level, SEEs such as the state monopoly for tobacco and alcohol products (TEKEL), tea products (ÇAYKUR), meat and fish products (Et-Balık Kurumu), and dairy products (Süt Endüstrisi Kurumu) had to be privatized and producer sales unions such as Çukobirlik, Tariş, and Trakya Birlik had to be restructured towards a market-oriented form (Keyder, 2013). These reforms shifted the power from governmental bodies to private capital and institutions. The main aims of the agricultural policy were stated as constructing an agricultural sector which is sustainable, competitive, efficient, and organized in the context of effective use of resources.

3.2.1.1 Direct Income Support (DIS)

Under the ARIP, direct income support (DIS) payments were introduced in the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan, which replaced input and price subsidies. In fact, the direct income support system was introduced as a compensation tool for the losses of farmers during the transition period in which subsidies were abolished. The DIS was thus planned as a short-term policy to encourage farmers to continue with farming, but in the production of alternative crops (Aydin, 2010). It also aimed at coodination with the EU agricultural policies and the CAP. The elimination of all existing support policies and the introduction of the direct income support system is not only about the economic structure of agriculture; it also aimed at changing the kinds of products and the ways of production.

According to the DIS system, holdings below one decare and above 500 decares were excluded from the support system. Registry to the farmer registry system was set as a condition for farmers to benefit from support payments. Considering the 500-decares limit, one can first say that it has a purpose of not favouring the very big producers. However, as Aydin says, big landowners transfer any land above the ceiling to their relatives so as to get the maximum benefit. On the other hand, the cost of processing the documents discourages small producers from applying for direct income support (Aydin, 2010). In many instances, large numbers of tenants were excluded from the support system because a deed was a condition for benefiting from the support. Since the program depends on land, an important amount of the support payments go to the large farmers. In this way, it turns into a means of differentiation between small and large producers. Also in places where the

monitoring and control mechanisms were not adequate, it was impossible to control the farms to check whether they were cultivated or not. The DIS, by linking the support to land — not to production — is referred to as “decoupled support”. Some state that the decoupled structure of the DIS separates the agriculture from production (Gunaydin, 2009).

Yet the share of direct income support in the agricultural budget declined from 80.4% in 2004 to 34.1% in 2008. In 2009, the DIS was abolished and governments returned to the previous differentiated support mechanisms. Despite reverting to the previous system, the share of the allocated resources to agricultural supports in the GNP was 0.6% in 2008, lower than the legally mandated 1% limit.

3.2.1.1 Restructuring of the Agricultural Sales Cooperative Unions (ASCUs) and the privatization of State-owned Economic Entreprises (SEEs)

The ARIP also brought along the political agenda for the privatization of SEEs and the reorganization/restructuring of agricultural cooperatives. Steps were taken in the course of restructuring agricultural cooperatives to make cooperatives autonomous in management and financially independent (Keyder and Yenal, 2011). The new law envisaged the withdrawal of appointments to the cooperatives by the state and gave autonomy to cooperatives. Secondly, it halted the financial support of the government to the cooperatives (Cenkış, 2008). Thirdly, agricultural sales cooperatives were banned from investment and manufacturing for the market, which prevented their economic activity. In addition, a restructuring board was created by the government for the control of the activities of the ASCUs. The law deprived the cooperatives of their material gains under the name of autonomy. The logic behind this legal arrangement was the rationalizing the structure of cooperatives. But the law

in fact became an institutional change in the course of agricultural neoliberalization. The the 1990s and the 2000s witnessed also the privatization of SEEs. As mentioned earlier, state involvement in the agricultural sector was much broader between 1950 and 1980. The foundation of SEEs coupled with the protection of small-scale producers in the import-substitutionist era. In terms of the agrrements with the World Bank and the IMF, the liquidation of the state-owned enterprises have been a structural necessity. Although these enterprises were not capable of the purchase and marketing of all the production of farmers, they were in a vital position for providing a financial security for producers with price guarantees.

The first wave of the liquidation of enterprises in Turkish agriculture was accomplished in the 1990s when the Feed Industry (*Yem Sanayi*), the Meat and Fish Authority (*Et-Balık Kurumu*), the Dairy Industries Authority (*Süt Endüstrisi Kurumu*) were privatized. (Aysu, 2002, as cited in Ozturk, 2012). In the 2000s, the privatizations gained momentum in the sugar and tobacco sector. Parallel to the elimination of the government support to these sector, legal arrangements were outlined for the privatization of sugar plants and factories, along with production quotas. In tobacco sector, price support was eliminated in 2002 and TEKEL was privatized in 2007. With these measures, the production of tobacco declined after the privatization period.

These privatizations, coupled with decreasing supports, encouraged the monopolisation of private capital in these industries and pushed small farmers into the arms of free-market conditions.

3.2.1.2 Changes in the Agrarian Law and the Seed Law

In 2006, two laws passed in the parliament in the course of restructuring the agricultural sector according to the demands and requirements of international capital. The Agrarian Law (No. 5488) envisages using support mechanisms without interfering with the working of the free-market, encouraging the role of private sector, protecting natural and biological resources, recognizing intellectual property rights, strengthening producer organizations, marketing products, competitiveness, sustainability and health, and decentralization. As Aydin points out, the objectives and principles of the law are full of contradictions. The introduction of intellectual property rights for seeds in itself deprived millions of farmers of their traditional seed varieties and pushed them into the arms of transnational companies (Aydin, 2010). In contradiction with the claims of the law, private companies are favoured by this law in that they can easily monopolize the seed market by obtaining patents on traditional varieties. Additionally, the law, by encouraging contract farming with supports, pushes the small-farmers to accept contract farming conditionalities that food corporations require.

The Seed Law (No. 5553) specifies in detail the intellectual property rights on seeds. It requires in article 4 that all seed varieties must to be registered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; in article 5, only the registered and Ministry-certified varieties can be produced and sold in the market, and the production areas and standards are determined by the Ministry in line with EU standards. Linking production and trade of the seeds to certification by the Ministry and bringing intellectual property rights increased the vulnerability of millions of traditional seed users (Aydin, 2010). This law brought about the establishment of a Variety Registration and Certification Centre within the ministry. It also established the

Turkish Union of Seed Producers (TUSP) for the implementation of testing, controls, monitoring of the seeds produced and traded. The TUSP, as a non-state organization, increased the consolidation of the hegemony of private firms in certification and monitoring. It was also authorised to punish offenders of this law — those who produced and sold seeds without Ministry certification and permission. Considering the weaker position of the small-producers in the market, it can easily be inferred that the beneficiaries of this law would be the transnational seed corporations. Small-producers using and selling traditional seeds lost the power over their resources with this law in the face of the firms registering intellectual property rights.

To sum up, in the 1950-1980 period, Turkish agriculture enjoyed protectionist policies of the government. In this period, agricultural producers were supported with input and price subsidies, cheap credits, pre-determined prices, and SEE purchases. The outcome of it was the emergence of a homogenized food market (Yenal, 2000). Within the international political context, Marshall Aid was utilized in the modernization of agriculture. New technologies, tractors, pesticides and chemical fertilizers were used by even small-scale producers. These all brought about the integration of small producers into the world market and petty-commodity production was strengthened. Even though agriculture was integrated into the world market in this period, the diffusion of the transnational capital into the agro-food sector was limited, compared to the post-1980 period.

After the 1980s, the Turkish economy underwent a neoliberal transformation period with respect to the introduction of export-oriented economic model. The economic crisis of the 1970s changed the direction of the economy towards a neo-liberal tendency. While Turkish governments were unwilling to follow radical transformation policies until the 2000s, the 2001 economic crisis was a turning point

for the introduction of radical reforms. The catchwords of the new period have become competitiveness, sustaniability, reform, efficiency, and so on. The World Bank and IMF directed a neoliberal programme that included liquidation and privatization of SEEs and public properties, deregulation of the economy, restructuring institutions according to the demands of international financial institutions and transnational capital, and cutting the subsidies for agriculture. Considering the vulnerability of small-scale producers, these reforms meant the dispossession of farmers from their sources of income. In general terms, the commodification of agriculture intensified after the 2000s. These changes in the conditions of agricultural production have significant implications for the distibutiton channels of food products.

CHAPTER 4

SUPERMARKETIZATION AND THE RISING HEGEMONY OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION: GlobalGAP AND ITU

In the last decades, the internationalization of supply chains has accelareted due to various economic and social changes in developed and developing countries. Supermarkets as global market-makers of the emerging buyer-driven retailing economy have become one of the important forces which have significant impacts on the lives of producers, consumers, retailers and other sectors (Gereffi, 2001; Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Ertek & Griffin, 2002). The rise of supermarkets has transformed manufacturing into a corporate-led structure where buyer corporations play a major role in restructuring of the food production. The factors influencing the expansion of supermarkets and retailer hegemony over the agricultural sectors warrant analysis before explicating their ways of power exertion on producers.

The determining factors that facilitate the expansion of supermarket hegemony are defined as market liberalisation and the withdrawal of trade barriers, globalisation due to market liberalisation, and pro-corporate regulation in line with the changing role of the state (Burch & Lawrence, 2007). The increasing power of international organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), the IMF, and international agreements such as the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the consequent removal of trade barriers facilitated the international expansion of transnational corporations. In developing countries, including Turkey, structural adjustment programs imposed via trade and credit agreements with WB and IMF

paved the way for a neoliberal market which created favourable conditions for supermarket expansion. The impact of supermarkets, in this way, reached beyond the national borders and transformed the food manufacturing in a global scale.

In a neoliberalizing world economy, food and agri-food sectors' globalisation has gone hand in hand with the industrialization of agricultural production (Cook, Barrett, Cacho, & Reardon, 2001). Intensification of technology and modern input use in agricultural sectors have changed the course of agricultural production, which brought about quantitative changes and high productivity. Apart from that, the methods of manufacturing, production, procurement and distribution have also evolved. Industrialized production, transforming agriculture to an agribusiness, has worked through the intensification of technology use and the utilization of modern agro-processing methods. The rise of technology, in parallel with globalizing marketing operations through market liberalisation, enabled supermarkets and food retail chains to integrate their business activities both horizontally and vertically through mergers, takeovers, acquisitions and strategic partnerships (Burch & Lawrence, 2007). Domestic and international supermarket chains in developed and developing countries expanded their scope of influence through the purchase the smaller-scale retail chains or partnerships.Their influence in restructuring the agri-food sector in not limited to the economic sphere. It is worth noting that the influence of supermarket chains has moved beyond distribution to production and processing (Dixon, 2002). The organizational structures of supermarkets have evolved to a model which gave them the power to transform agricultural producers into contracted suppliers. To reduce the inefficiencies and market failures, retailers demand products with specific characteristics coming from reliable suppliers who can meet the

requirements of quantity, quality, frequency and timing in terms of food supply (Blandon, 2006).

4.1 Supermarket expansion in Turkey

In the context of the globalising agri-food sector, a "supermarket revolution" (Reardon & Hopkins, 2006) has gained an edge over the conventional retail channels and producers. While it had been experienced in the First World countries within a slower trend, the experience of developing countries with supermarkets has been much faster than in the Western world. Until the 1980s, the agri-food sector in Turkey operated basically from wholesale markets, street bazaars and small grocery shops. The profound changes in terms of supermarket expansion began in the late 1980s in Turkey. Before the 1990s, we still can see some exceptional attempts by the Turkish state for the modernization of food retailing. For instance in 1953, the Turkish government invited the Swiss firm Migros to invest in a joint venture in Istanbul. Inferring from this, we can understand that there were government efforts to benefit from the know-how of modern retailing (Erkip & Ozuduru, 2015). It also shows us the preferences of the Turkish state in terms of food retailing in the sense that it took steps to transfer the knowledge and expertise of a foreign retailer into the Turkish market. After Migros invested in the Turkish agri-food sector, it opened its first store in 1957 (45 Yılın Öyküsü MİGROS, 1999). The entry of Migros into the Turkish agri-food sector has been identified as the first wave of supermarket diffusion in Turkey (Franz, Appel, & Hassler, 2013).

Except from the exceptional case of Migros, the period until the late 1980s was a low dynamic phase with a few supermarket entries into the Turkish market. These supermarkets included Gima in 1956, OYAK in 1963, and Tansaş in 1973 as

part of public investments (Erkip & Ozuduru, 2015). However, supermarket expansion in Turkey accelareted in the late 1980s and early 1990s at about the same time as in Latin America, South and East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (Atasoy, 2013). Similar to other developing countries, supermarketization developed in the context of economic liberalisation and foreign direct investment in the agri-food sector. With increasing interest of the TNCs in the Turkish market after Turkey's abandonment of import-substitutionist policies and deregulation of the previously state regulated sectors, the 1990s were experienced as a highly dynamic process regarding the market entry of transnational supermarket chains in Turkey. In 1990, the Metro Group entered the Turkish market operating on a wholesale concept for professional customers (Franz, Appel, & Hassler, 2013). In 1998, it opened its first hypermarket-type store with the Real brand. After the Metro Group, Carrefour entered the Turkish market in 1991. In 1996, it established a joint venture with the Sabancı Group, one of the biggest holdings of Turkey.

Despite the fact that the 1990s were relatively dynamic compared to previous period, the acceleration of supermarketization in Turkey was experienced more slowly than in Latin American and Eastern European countries (Franz, Appel, & Hassler, 2013). The slow expansion is explained by the fragmented retail structure, which made vertical integration more difficult (Tokatli & Boyaci, 1998). Considering agriculture as a supply source of supermarkets, smallholder dominance in the Turkish agricultural sector can be another factor that slowed the supermarketization trend in Turkey. During subsequent years, local supermarket chains improved their scope of operations and strengthened their vertical integration utilizing the sectoral information initiated by the foreign retailers.

As the competition increased, the agri-food sector began to experience a segmentation process. Discount stores, in this context, became an important part of agri-food retailing, especially in European countries. Their share in the agri-food sector increased in countries such as Germany and France (Vorley, 2006). A similar process was also experienced in Turkey. In 1995, the BİM supermarket chain was founded as a discount store like European counterparts such as Aldi and Schwarz. After BİM, Şok and A-101 supermarkets started their operations in the Turkish agri-food sector. While the supermarkets had targeted urban upper-middle classes in the previous periods, they came to a position of serving all classes with different types and different sizes of stores. Today, the supermarket sector in Turkey is dominated by national and international chains: Migros, CarrefourSA, Metro, Bim, A-101, Şok, Tesco-Kipa and regional chains such as Çağdaş, Burda, Çağrı, Beğendik. The rising dominance of supermarkets in the agri-food sector can also be inferred from the fast moving consumer goods statistics. The share of organized retailing increased from 31.26% to 50.86% from 2005 to 2011 with the boom of discount stores such as BİM and A-101 (Erdogan, Akkaya, Ünübok, İnce, & Işık, 2012). According to the same report, BİM, getting ahead of Migros, took the leadership position in 2009. The growth trend in the sector is not unique to BİM. Migros and other chains are also experiencing a growth trend in the last years with the overall growth in the retail sector. According to 2014 statistics, 17 of the top 100 and 7 of the top 10 retail companies are supermarket chains, among which are BİM, with 14 billion TL in sales and Migros, with 8 billion TL in sales, as the largest ones (Retailler, 2016).

Despite the smallholder farmers' dominance in the agricultural sector in Turkey, the rapid rise of supermarkets has brought not only new quantitative technologies and innovations in distribution, procurement, price control, channel

control or retailing, as Coe and Hess state, it has also introduced quality procedures and certification schemes in the agricultural sector as part of qualititave changes (Coe & Hess, 2005). In the context of accelerating supermarket hegemony, agri-food production has been more and more governed by the private governance mechanisms and the economies of quality (McMichael & Friedmann, 2007). Their scope of influence has grown qualitatively in the sense that they have gained the power to rearrange the agricultural production through private quality standards.

4.2 The rise of food quality standards

Along with the supermarket-driven private food governance, new private governance institutions have emerged. Institutionalization of the private standards have emerged with certification in the agricultural sectors which influenced the developed and developing countries.

Increasing concerns about health, food safety and sustainability have all contributed to and have been consolidated by the private quality regime over food production. Studies show that increasing demand from the middle and upper-class consumers in developed and developing countries contributed to the proliferation of private food safety and quality standards that supermarket chains have capitalized on (Henson & Reardon, 2005; Busch & Bain, 2004). Therefore, private food governance has emerged as one of the results of the raising concerns about food safety, transparency, accountability which have been fostered by the giant food processors and retailers.

As the supermarkets introduced quality certification and private standards schemes, the power balance shifted from the producers to the retailers. While in the past food provisioning was dominated by large food producer companies,

supermarkets have begun to impose their market power and financial dominance on other actors such as food producers, either on a small or large scale. The dependence of retailers on food producers has decreased to a considerable degree such that they have begun to change the course of food provisioning with the global standards they have created through empowering the third-party certification. The growing role of supermarkets in setting private standards and private food governance mechanisms manifests both their market power and political power (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Arentsen, 2009). The producers found themselves subordinated to the requirements of retail chains in terms of their production methods, processes, quality, and safety standards. The subordination of the farmers has occured in various ways.

Private food standards, in contrast to their legally defined "voluntary" structure, have become the hallmark of supermarket-dominated agricultural production in the sense that they have gained a mandatory status in practice for agricultural producers who are doing traditional farming (Henson & Humphrey, 2009). As the acceleration of supermarketization created a buyer-driven economy in the agri-food sector, agricultural producers began to strive for participating in the buyer-driven value chains. In contrast to previous periods that were characterized by loose relationships between the buyers and the producers, buyer-driven value chains reversed these relationships, bolstering the retailer power in manufacturing sectors. The acceleration of the buyer-driven economy, therefore, required a new regulatory context, in other words, a convenient economic environment and law to rearrange the sectoral trends and redistribute the roles for the agents in the sector. In the context of this restructuring, I claim that the state, as a policy and law-making authority, has played a pivotal role in terms of setting the rules, making the necessary regulatory and economic arrangements and redirecting government resources. I have taken

GlobalGAP (Good Agricultural Practices), one of the most dominant forms of private governance, and its Turkish counterpart İTU, as the focus of analysis of the relation between third-party certification and supermarkets and its impacts on agricultural producers.

4.3 Institutionalization of private governance and third-party certification

As supermarket chains are increasing their capacity to integrate national agricultural sectors with the world market, their dominance in terms of rule-setting is also increasing. To explicate how voluntary private standards have gained a de facto mandatory structure in the agricultural sectors of developing and developed countries, I will dwell on the institutionalization of private food governance and third-party certification. Apart from the push and pull factors shaping this process, the legal regulatory framework of private governance is also worthy of emphasis.

4.3.1 The emergence of Eurep and GlobalGAP in the context of private food governance

In a global agri-food industry, the sites of global private food governance have gained legal status based on international agreements and the rise of international institutions and the global chains (Casey, 2007). The legal and regulatory framework of private food standards have been constituted according to different categories, which are in line with privatization trends in the agri-food sector.

Quality standards are examined in two categories: one is formed by regulations countries impose on imports, which are mostly subject to Agreements on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary barriers (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the other is composed of standards emerging from retailers and food chains

(Herzfeld, Drescer, & Grebitus, 2011). In the constitution and expansion of the standards, the advent of the WTO was a significant facilitating factor. In addition to agri-food retailers, the WTO also made food safety and sustainability a policy agenda as a result of rising concerns about food throughout the world (Henson & Caswell, 1999).

Within this context, Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) emerged as part of the supermarket-driven commodity chains, with claims that they deliver healthy food through secure retail channels to consumers. The history of the GlobalGAP dates back to 1996, when 13 large European retailers of the Euro-Retailers Produce Working Group (Eurep) agreed to define private quality standards.[4] Eurep aimed to address increasing consumer demands for food security and safety by mitigating the risks emerging during the agricultural production and processing. In the 1990s, the European-Retailers Produce Working Group, which consists of large-scale European food retail chains, created EurepGAP to define the safety and security procedures of production with respect to consumer food safety, hygiene, labor conditions, animal welfare and environmental management in terms of agricultural production (Amekawa, 2009). At the time of its introduction, EurepGAP focused on fresh fruits and vegetables, which became the major product of export-oriented agricultural sectors in the context of neoliberal globalisation. Later, it widened its scope to include other crops, livestock and aquaculture produce into private governance. It presented itself as a private body that sets private voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products. It was founded as an equal partnership and collaboration of agricultural producers and retailers to establish certification

[4] Nicolien van der Grijp, 'The Retailer-Led Initiative EurepGAP from the Perspective of Global Legal Pluralism' BRASS and CARR Workshop Risk and Regulation in the Food System 7-8 October 2004, 8 accessed 29 Sep 2016.

standards and rules and to provide pre-farm gate standards covering agricultural production and retailing process from the seed to the consumer (Schneider & Gay, 2006).

Eurep created a system which aimed at the participation of stakeholders such as producers, handlers, certification bodies, fertilizer industry, and buyer supermarket chains. Based on this participatory system, EurepGAP declared five strategic pillars to support decision-making within this participatory system. These are stated as partnership, integrity, benchmarking, stakeholder involvement, and efficiency and effectiveness (Schneider & Gay, 2006).

Partnership, as the first and the most important pillar, aims for the equal representation of all participants and open access to certification systems. Integrity aims to develop industry-led standards in accordance with accreditation rules. Benchmaring is the working of independent, transparent and fair principles demonstrating equivalence and facilitating recognition of national and regional farm assurance schemes. Stakeholder involvement, as a profoundly emphasized significant pillar, works as the principal to meet the specific informational and data-based needs of the members in collaboration with governmental and non-governmental bodies to foster a participatory and consultative system to develop the harmonisation of GAP standards (GlobalGAP, 2016). In addition, the opinions of stakeholders outside the industry such as consumer and environmental organisations and governments are considered in the constitution of the participatory character of the strategic pillars and the protocols. Lastly, efficiency and effectiveness operate as a principle for producing cost-effective solutions for its members and avoiding the duplication of standards and systems.

Based on the aforementioned strategic pillars, EurepGAP covered the monitoring of the agri-food production and processing processing from the farm to the shelf. The systematic approach and the efforts of the EuropGAP stakeholders brought them success. In 2002 the number of EurepGAP-certified producers reached 3,892 in 18 countries worlwide and the organisation's retail membership had expanded to 22 European retailers (cited in Casey, 2007). In a short time, the expansion of EurepGAP gained a powerful status that included Integrated Farm Assurance (IFA) standards by 2007. In 2008, EurepGAP covered more than 80 countries with more than 9,.000 certified producers and more than 100 independent accredited certification companies (GlobalGAP 2008a, cited in Amekawa, 2009). In 2007, EurepGAP changed its name to GlobalGAP. Today, GlobalGAP has become a worldwide organisation with 387 members, 160,000 producers in 124 countries, more than 400 certified products, 24 standards, 1,700 field inspectors and auditors working for 136 certification bodies accredited by 33 accreditation bodies with a common goal of private governance and promoting Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP North America Inc., 2016).

According to 2004 statistics, about 85% of all European retailers require GlobalGAP certification in their procurements (Busch & Bain, 2004). The influence of the GlobalGAP diffusing into other regions of the world such as the Americas and Asia. The biggest supermarket chains such as Walmart, Tesco, Ahold, Aldi, and Migros are both members and constituents of the GlobalGAP. As stated, membership in GlobalGAP is open to producers and suppliers, retail and food service suppliers, associate certification bodies, service providers and consultants. In this respect, it constituted itself as the collaboration of conflicting interests of all participants in the agri-food sector. It provides its stakeholders with networking, cost savings,

marketing collaboration and promotion. In addition to IFA Standards, it covers Harmonized Produce Safety Standards, Produce Safety Standards, and complementary specialized standards and add-on procedures to maintain the private governance of the global food supply. To construct its credibility and independence, the certification, based on the above-stated standards, is maintained by accredited third-party certification bodies.

To be an accredited certification body, a membership in the International Accreditation Forum and participation in a Multilateral Agreement (MLA) on Product Certification are required from candidate third-party certification companies. This brings subjection to international agri-food auditing regulations and the adaptation of local agricultures to them. The international private regulations and standards have been adopted by many nation states in the course of neoliberal adjustment policies. In Turkey, the same process was also experienced.

4.3.2 The adaptation of GlobalGAP in Turkey: ITU

In 2004, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock issued a regulation defining the legal framework for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) (İyi Tarım Uygulamalarına İlişkin Yönetmelik, 2004). This regulation aimed at popularising the implementation of GAP and defining certification standards in Turkey. According to the regulation, quality certification of the agricultural production activities are subject to the certification standards initiated and audited by the Ministry-authorized independent third-party certification bodies and higher level accreditation bodies. The conditions for certification are claimed to provide higher added value for producers and safety for consumers and retailers within the agri-food system and to mitigate the potential environmentally and health-related harmful effects of

agricultural production. ITU, the adapted Turkish version of GAP, was issued as a means of increasing and maintaining the competitive power of Turkey agriculture.

The third-party certification bodies conducting the documentation, auditing, monitoring and control of agricultural production and processing are accredited by Turkish Accreditation Institution (TURKKAK) authorized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Livestock (Özkan, Hasdemir, & Uzunçam, 2015). The criteria for accreditation was based on ISO 17065:2012 standards (ISO/IEC 17065:2012, 2016). TURKKAK was founded as a state institution responsible for governing the accreditation of third-party certification bodies providing the legal framework of private governance. It also has the responsibility to monitor the impartiality and independence of the third-party certification standards and bodies. The legal framework emphasizes that ITU is a volunteer system that is not a prerequisite but a facilitator for the global market access. According to the statistics, the number of third-party certification bodies increased substantially in the last decade due to these efforts. Today, there are about 24 third-party certification companies in the agricultural sector that monitor and certify the producers (The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Livestock, 2016).

To become a certified producer, there are a number of requirements to be met by producers. The first of these is risk evaluation before applying for certification. It states that the producers have to know what was cultivated in the production area in the previous years. If there are uncontrollable risks, the candidate cannot be an ITU-certified producer. Risk evaluation includes the consideration of the soil type, groundwater level and water quality, erosion potential, availability of sustainable irrigation, parasites and other insects and the effect of the farm on neighbouring cultivated farms. Upon considering these factors, the producers can apply to third-

party bodies for certified production. When it comes to production process, traceability and documentation become crucial requirements. All activities such as fertilisation, irrigation, chemical pesticide use, the brands of pesticides, the equipments used, the name of the person using those inputs and the amount of used input should be documented to meet the traceability of production. Furthermore, producers have to document cultivation and irrigation dates and the methods used. Using appropriate methods in farming has become a requirement for protecting the environment in the context of private certification. Quality seeds and seedlings have to be used to maintain quality production and environmental protection.

Based on these principles, regular monitoring and control and audits are conducted by the certification body inspectors to check if the producers are meeting the certification requirements. Inspectors and auditors of the certification bodies trace the production processes and the methods based on the documentation of the producer. These controls also include laboratory analysis of the soil, product, and leaf of the FFVs. The TPC body has to make a laboratory analysis of product/soil/leaf samples twice a year. Auditors trace the process based on the minimum standards defined by the Ministry and GlobalGAP. At the beginning of each season, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Livestock issues a list of pesticides and fertilizers that can be used as appropriate inputs. Therefore, producers are obliged to use inputs from among a list of approved brands. If the certification body detects any input use not included in the list, the producer faces the risk of disqualification from the certification scheme. Chemical pesticide use is advised as the last solution for agricultural protection.

When we look at the producers' side, there are various push and pull factors for their utilization of these methods. On the one hand, a government subsidy to

alternative methods represents a significant pull factor for producers. On the other, the practical necessity for high productivity and lack of know-how represent push factors. From my field interviews with the producers, I found out that the use of chemical input is still very high among the producers. One of the small-scale producers, Mehmet, stated:

> Every year, we are buying tons of pesticides and fertilizers. If you don't buy chemical pesticides, there is no way to cope with the insects. If you don't buy fertilizer, you can't earn money because you can't get high productivity. I am spending lots of money for these. [Appendix, 1]

Biological control — instead of chemical pesticide use — is being supported by the Ministry through subsidies. According to the 2014 agricultural regulation issued with the number 2014/6091, the Ministry provides subsidies to producers using biological methods to fight insects. This regulation envisaged financial subsidies to producers who prefer alternative biological methods in agricultural production to further strengthen the environmental protection. Both open farming and greenhouse production are included in the subsidy system of biological and bio-technic pest control as shown in Table 1[5]:

Table 1. Biological and Biotechnical Protection Subsidies

Type of Produce	Biological Pest Control (TL/da)	Bio-technic Pest Control (TL/da)
Greenhouse (tomato, pepper, cucumber, carrot, pumpkin)	350	110
Citrus	35	35
Tomato (open-area)	-	20
Apple	-	35
Vineyard	-	35
Onion	-	35

[5] T.C. Resmi Gazete, 29019, 3 Jun 2014

As far as I observed during my field interviews in Antalya, biological and bio-technic pest control is mostly utilised by large-scale producers. These are mostly company-type agricultural producers that have their own business offices in central places in Antalya or in the wholesale market. When I asked the large-scale producers the reason for using biological techniques, they stated the government subsidies as the main factor. One of the large-scale greenhouse owner producers stated:

> Biological control is a professional and a healthier method. We are using it instead of intensive chemical use. The state support is also encouraging us to shift our ways of production into a healthier model. If there is no state support, believe me, most of the producers will keep on using the old conventional methods that they learned from their fathers. [Appendix, 2]

While small-scale producers prefer chemical pesticides despite the high cost of inputs, large-scale producers are observed to be more innovative and eager to make use of biological control. Considering that the government subsidy mechanism is operating on a cultivated area-based system, large-scale producers (among the ones I interviewed) are enjoying the advantage of biological control subsidies initiated by the government. On the other hand, smaller scale producers keep relying on chemical use. All in all, government subsidies for biological control is an important factor in the acceleration of private certification.

Apart from push factors, the transformation of the quality standards and the rapid acceleration of the third-party certification are directly related to pull factors such as changing consumption patterns. The middle and upper classes in developed countries are questioning the safety and quality of food they consume as a result of the raising anxieties caused by the industrialization of the food sector. Social and environmental concerns are also part of this transformation (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). The demand for quality, safety and environmentality from consumers forced food

chains to create different sets of standards to communicate information about the products. The demand is more specifically for the production and processing of food. As the demand for food quality and safety increased, coupled with other social and environmental concerns, the quality standards have become more and more an effective tool for food governance.

4.3.3 Rationality of the third- party GAP certification

To understand the rationale of the private standards, it is important to give attention to the role of those standards in the restructuring of the agricultural markets. Understanding the logic of private standards will help us to better situate the current private standards and GAP certification in the context of the Turkish agriculture. Private standards or voluntary standards are being used interchangeably in the food literature to define attributes of products (Henson & Humphrey, 2010). Private standards as a term refers to a non-state sphere in which private organisations take the initiative to regulate. So there seems a distinction between the public and the private which the standard-setting bodies and corporations aim to create. To maintain this distinction, Henson and Humphrey show that private corporations try to create different sets of standards which are composed of different combinations public/private and mandatory/voluntary standards (Henson & Humphrey, 2010). These can be summarized as:

- Public, mandatory standards, which can also be called as regulations initiated by public bodies,
- Public voluntary standards, created by public bodies and optional to adopt,
- Legally-mandated private standards developed by private sector actors and legalized and supported by the public authorities, and

- Voluntary private standards created and enforced by the private bodies.

The focus of this study is GlobalGAP and its introduction in Turkey as a set of "voluntary private standards". ITU certification in Turkey was initiated and enforced by the large supermarkets through third-party certification bodies. Third-party certification, in this sense, is the result of the rise of the private governance of supermarkets in the agricultural sector which has shifted the monitoring and the control of food production to retailer-driven third-party standards (Hatanaka et al., 2005).

4.3.4 GAP: From voluntary to mandatory

The shift from a significantly public to a relatively private governance was experienced in a period when the structures of welfare states were being dismantled and transformed into a neoliberal model. Despite the public/private distinction, the relationality of and interplay between the public and private governance is a significant point of emphasis in the analysis of the authorisation of the third-party certification bodies in food governance (The Interplay of Public and Private Standards, 2011). While they appear as private in terms of the implementation, states and public authorities play an important role in the process in which the voluntary standards turns into mandatory standards in practice due to the requirements and limitations regarding the market access of the agricultural producers.

The private agri-food standards are becoming mandatory in the sense that they define the procedures of standard setting, adoption, implementation, conformity assessment, and enforcement of the agricultural production processes for the rural producers (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). While there is no legal restriction or direct pressure to conventional producers, marketing channels are becoming more and more

differentiated and conventional marketing channels are melting away gradually in the wake of agicultural neoliberalisation. In that sense, private standards are gaining a mandatory status for agricultural producers. The private governance does not work in the same way as the public regulations. While the public regulations work through formal obligations, the private standards operate either through sanctions or rewards such as disqualification from quality certification or qualification for easier access to marketing channels. As a result, there emerge mutual expectations between the buyers and the producers. Depending on the inclusion in the supermarket-driven commodity chains, producers are required to meet certain set of standards. In return for meeting the quality standards and compliance with production procedures, they are awarded with easier access to markets (Anders, Monteiro, & Rouviere, 2010). The resulting dynamic of producer dependency on supermarket-driven private standards is described as structural power in the sense that it takes into account the broader influence of corporate actors in setting agendas and making proposals within context of the states and the global economy in general (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). In the context of a relatively globalized agricultural market, other alternative marketing channels for producers are also formed by big retailers and supermarkets, which have more say in establishing the rules of agri-food sectors.

The structural power of supermarket-driven private governance in the global context also originates from the buying power of big retailers in terms of their influence over the import/export balance of FFV producing countries. For instance, certified agricultural companies are preferred to non-certified ones in the export markets. Supermarkets even avoid or relocate investments to countries which introduce private food governance in their agricultural sectors. In this respect, the structural power of corporations put them in a position to push the individual

producers and producer companies to re-arrange their production according to the demands of private governance. The push towards private food standards has been shifting the conditions and patterns of agri-food production. Many producers have been shifting to certified production and adjusting their production and processing methods according to private standards. Private governance, which is transforming agricultural production, is expanding also in Turkey. The number of GAP-certified producers and the volumes of certified production have been increasing in Turkey as shown in Table 2[6].

Table 2. GAP Certification in Turkey

	Number of Cities	Number of Producers	Production Area (da)
2007	18	651	53,607
2008	19	822	60,231
2009	42	6,020	1,702,804
2010	48	4,540	781,741
2011	49	3,042	499,632
2012	47	3,676	837,171
2013	56	8,170	985,099
2014	53	21,332	2,147,705
2015	61	39,740	3,465,695

Based on the statistics, it is seen that the process of privatization of food governance gradually replaces the conventional order, which is characterized by the replacement of conventional agricultural methods with new ones in Turkey. While the conventional order dictated intensive pesticide and fertilizer use to increase the quantity, the new order has brought about the standards to define quality through controlled input use. It is becoming a widespread phenomenon and an ever-developing process in Turkish agriculture which is transforming agricultural

[6]Turkish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 2016

production to an activity governed by the global market demands. Although GAP certification is not a mandatory practice, its seen that, based on the increasing number of producers in the statistics and in my interviews, it has been turning into a de facto requirement for many export-oriented producers and supermarket supplier producers to access global marketing channels. The producers I interviewed in Antalya also stated similar reasons for shifting to certified production. Bülent Kalender, the owner of Kalender Tarım, stated:

> We have been doing GAP-certified production for 3-4 years. We are producing especially for European countries like Germany, Holland and Britain. The buyer companies in Europe requested product certification from us and we applied to a certification company here. [Appendix, 3]

Another interviewee, Hanife, the agricultural engineer of Erüst Tarım, explained their shift to GAP certification:

> I have been working in this company for three years. Erüst Tarım has been doing certified production since 2003. Our fresh vegetables are bought mostly by big supermarket chains like Migros and Metro, which are A class supermarkets. Luxury restaurants such as Big Chef's and Reina also procure their vegetables from us. This is how we market our produce more easily than conventional producers. [Appendix, 4]

I discovered that the scale of GAP-certified producers are mostly company type in Antalya, which is one of the main agricultural production hubs in Turkey. The globalisation of food production and the re-orientation of agricultural sectors of developing countries towards export markets brings about de facto mandatory certification schemes and private standards into the production. In terms of marketing channels, third-party certification becomes a facilitative tool for many producers for market access.

The structural power of private governance, from my point of view, originates also from the policy-making power of the state in regulating the agricultural sector as well as from supermarket expansion and rising concerns for food safety. While the

globalisation of the economy is believed to hamper the power and hegemony of the nation-states in the economic sphere, state action still remains as the principal locus of political regulation and mediation of conflicting interests (Bonanno, 1994). Also, while global capital is believed to surpass nations and is mostly examined in terms of its transnational character, the power of the state apparatus is significant as a regulatory mechanism in terms of the (re)allocation and (re)distribution of the resources. The state, as an actor in the economic sphere, mediates the interests and demands of other actors, relocating the government resources and enforcing new laws. While some actors have a bigger say in the mediation of conflicting interests, the state has an agency for receiving concents, balancing power relations and maintaining the legitimacy and the efficient operation of the restructured relations. Apart from the conflicting demands of the domestic actors, international pull and push originated from transnational organisations (e.g. the WTO, IMF, global capital) transform the power balances in favor of corporate interests. Corporations themselves do not perform the role of the state due to the fact that the state has the monopoly of power over the legislation, resource allocation, consent acquisition (Bonanno, 1994). A further examination of the role of the Turkish state in terms of legislation and support mechanisms within the context of increasing structural power of supermarket-driven third-party certification would reveal how the mediations work in the legislative and economic sphere.

4.3.5 Government subsidies for Good Agricultural Practices and cheap credit opportunities

The economic reforms after the 2001 economic crisis brought along direct income support (DIS) as a transitory support in the course of agricultural neoliberalisation.

The advisory policies of the World Bank and IMF included combining differentiated support schemes under the single Direct Income Support mechanism. The WB and IMF programs aimed at ending direct income support after a short transitionary period. However, the Turkish case has not worked in the same way that as the WB and IMF foresaw. In 2008, the Direct Income Support scheme was abolished as advisory policies foresaw, but the government returned to previous differentiated support policies in the same year. Cultivated area-based supports continued with increasing volumes, differentiating the support according to organic agriculture, ITU, and conventional agriculture. Apart from area-based subsidies, input subsidies have been differentiated covering diesel, fertiliser, certified seeds and seedlings. In order to access to the subsidies, an agricultural producer should register its production with Farmer Registration System and have minimum 1 decare of cultivated-area. In terms of ITU-certified production, the state subsidies are observed to have increased gradually since its introduction, as shown in Table 3[7]:

Table 3. Good Agricultural Practices Statistics

	Number of Producers	Subsidized Cultivated Area (da)	Total Amount of Subsidy TL/da		Total Amount of Subsidy
2009	146	18,975	18		341,541
			FFV	Greenhouse	
2010	796	112,418	15	75	1,803,519
2011	2,069	250,789	20	80	5,339,000
2012	2,011	293,787	20	80	6,368,114
2013	2,847	392,030	25	100	10,793,366
2014	6,142	690,539	50	150	18,801,681
2015	18,765	1,558,210	50	150	81,145,435

[7] Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 2016

Despite the fact that the EU accession negotiations and WB and IMF financial policies prescribed cutting the subsidies, the Turkish state has kept on subsidizing agriculture generally and GAP-certified production specifically. Since 2009, the number of producers increased at a significant level with the increasing cultivated area. Since 2010, the subsidy for greenhouse certified production has doubled.

GAP-certified producers I interviewed in Antalya were mostly greenhouse producers. Despite the increasing amounts of government subsidy to ITU production, the low levels of government support represents one of the major challenges in their cost budgets. Hasan, a small-scale producer in Demre said:

> I am producing tomatoes. I have four decares of cultivated land. I tried to become an ITU-certified producer but I couldn't cope with the costs. The cost of constructing a greenhouse is very high. For instance, I constructed a greenhouse in 1985 and we even made profit just in one year. Today, you can't do that. It doesn't make any money. You have to have more land to make a profit from this job and from the state subsidies. The costs are so high. Think of it, I have four decares of land and the subsidy is 600 TL a year. Its nothing. [Appendix, 5]

Small scale producers complained about the high costs of greenhouse construction emphasizing the lack of state support. On the other hand, I did not hear the same complaints from the large-scale greenhouse owner producers. Although large-scale producers enjoy the governent subsidies, the continuity and performance of their production actually does not depend on these subsidies. One of them, İlhan, owner of a local agricultural company, stated:

> We constructed a 40-decares modern greenhouse system here. Everything is controlled, the heating, watering, fertilization... We had the capital to invest in this sector. I think you have to have capital to do this business. If not, you can't be competitive. [Appendix, 6]

The support mechanisms are effective and not limited to government subsidies for ITU-certified producers. Cheap credit opportunitis for certified producers are another significant part of the facilitative role of the state in the expansion of supermarket-driven certified production. ITU-certified producers are provided with cheap credits from the state-owned Ziraat Bank (Agricultural Bank). In 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Livestock issued a decree regarding credits provided to agricultural producers (The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Livestock, 2016). According to the decree, ITU-certified producers can benefit from credits at a maximum of 5,000,000 TL with 50% interest reduction. The decree can be seen as an opportunity for ITU-certified agricultural producers to make investment in their farming activities. During my interviews, I also asked if the producers were benefitting from cheap credit opportunities. Among all I interviewed, the large and medium-scale producers are preferring credits. Celal Subaşı, the owner of Subaşı Agricultural Company said:

> I am not a conventional producer now. Before investing more in agriculture, I was also in the construction sector. Then, a friend of mine told me that Ziraat Bank was providing cheap credits to certified producers and decided to shift all my production to ITU. The bank provided us with 50% cheaper credit and we modernized our production methods. Today, I have 200 decares of certified land cultivated with apples and grapes. Its good to have that opportunity. [Appendix, 7]

Bülent, the owner of Kalender Agriculture company, stated:

> There is no advantage that certification creates for us. We heard about cheap Ziraat credits and learned that we have to be a certified producer to get them. Then, we applied for certification. The only reason for us to get certification was that credit. I didn't put an effort on the detailed and trivial procedures of ITU without credit opportunities. They also provide subsidies to ITU-certified lands but you are already spending half of that money for the procedural stuff. Not just me, but most of the people do that for cheap credits. [Appendix, 8]

On the other hand, a small-scale producer from Demre, Hasan, recounted:

> We were informed by the bank that there was a cheap credit opportunity. I applied and got 190,000 TL from Ziraat Bank. The annual repayment is

> 40,000 TL. It's with the interest rate, sure. I couldn't handle it because I couldn't earn that much from the harvest. I couldn't pay and the 1% interest rate increased to 5%. I got another credit from Finansbank to pay Ziraat's debt. The following year, I got another credit from Denizbank and paid it to Ziraat and Finansbank. If you can't pay on time, they also add commission tax to your debt. Now, I am stuck in such a difficult situation that the bank even put a lien on my land title. All small farmers here are indebted to banks, to commissioners, to fertilizer companies... [Appendix, 9]

Mehmet Emin, another small-scale producer who abondoned ITU certification in recent years said:

> I have five decares of land here in Finike. I constructed a greenhouse with Ziraat's cheap credit. But then I could't pay it back. I am not profiting from my greenhouse. Its too small. If it goes like this, I won't be able to pay it back. The interest is increasing day by day. If I had not been indebted before, I could have used the Ziraat credit to invest in my land. But, I used it to pay my previous debts. The government is indebting us through the state-owned bank credits. People are being indebted and voting for this government thinking that if another government comes, things can get worse. We have become dependent and needy. [Appendix, 10]

As can be seen from the statements above, there emerges a contrast between the large and small scale agricultural producers doing FFV production. While large-scale producers take advantage of cheap credits and utilise it for further investments, small-scale producers are observed to be unable to cope with sustaining their debts. Trying to sustain their indebtedness by getting more credits is dragging the small-scale producers into a deadlock and leaving them in a vicious cycle of indebtedness, which will be examined in detail in the next chapter. On the other hand, by utilising the cheap credit opportunities and increasing their profit, large-scale producers are transforming certified agricultural production to a professional business model. The long-term consequence of this process in terms of certified-agricultural sector can be predicted as a more concentrated market dominated by large-scale producers with a more professional structure of production and marketing.

The government support and subsidy policies also contribute to the differentiation of food products. By focusing on the process more than the outcome,

private standards and third-party certification change the course of production from quantity to quality. Good Agricultural Certification standards define various characteristics of the product and the production processes. In addition, it covers certain health conditions and the work environment for the labour force. As such, supermarket-led third-party certification regime situates itself as a as a "corporate-environmental food regime" coinciding with "green capitalism" (Burch & Lawrence, 2009). Within this context, the state plays an important role in enhancing the private governance of the agri-food sector.

4.3.6 The discursive and moral authority of third-party GAP certification

Covering the rules to regulate different aspects of food production, private standards also gain political and moral authority over the agricultural sectors. The multifaceted authority of the tripartite private standards (TPS) regime allows supermarkets to re-arrange agricultural production and re-shape the distribution of resources. The market power of supermarkets translates into political power as they impose their discursive, instrumental and moral authority over other actors in the sector (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2009).

The translation of market power into political and moral legitimacy in rule-setting can be analyzed by focusing on the utilisation of raising concerns on health, sustainability and environment. Supermarkets impose their power mostly through advertisement campaigns. The media, as part of the corporate interests, is utilised as a means of establishing the discursive authority both over the producers and the consumers. This authority is generally established by triggering people's demand for food quality and safety and making the producers believe in the prestige of certified production. In the Migros case, Good Agricultural Practices, the discursive and

moral power established through health and safety, can be seen easily from one of Migros's video commercials. In the video, we see Haluk and Meltem, a married couple who are characters of one of the most famous family TV series in Turkey. They go to a Migros store to buy some fresh fruit and vegetables. While shopping, a conversation takes place between them:

> Haluk (the husband)*:* Those were the days we were eating these fruit with our minds at peace, without worrying.
> Meltem (the wife): Still you can.
> Haluk: How can we eat? Who knows how they are produced?
> Meltem: This is Migros, my love, relax. These fruits and vegetables are being controlled from farm to shelf. Even the water used in production is analyzed. They are GAP-certified products.
> Haluk: Can you also feed children with these?
> Meltem: Sure.
> Haluk: Then, let's have the third baby.

The TV commercial of Migros's Good Agricultural Practices reveals the discursive and moral authority that the private governance builds over the consumers and the agricultural market. Haluk and Meltem represent an urban upper-middle class family that shows concern for food quality and safety. Meltem, having the belief in the moral and discursive authority of GAP, informs her husband about the reliability of those products they are buying. The emphasis on children is also a crucial point in terms of the context within which the private food standards finds a place. Ultimately, child-care as an important component of a healthy and conscious family is also included into the TV commercial as part of the discursive power of private food standards. Migros, as an important introducer of the GAP private standards, utilizes TV commercials and campaigns as instrumental power to get the upper hand in the private food governance. Its instrumental power translates into discursive and moral authority, which transforms both the consumer demands and the producers' perception of food production.

The hegemonic discourse of third-party certification and ITU is not limited to consumers. It is also being enforced as a hegemonic discursive power over agricultural producers. This kind of a hegemonic discourse is enforced through the media, training programs, everyday talk and financial subsidies. Especially the training programs of the Ministry and supermarkets are utilized to make the producers recognize the superiority of certified production and private food governance. However, based on my field interviews in Antalya's different districts, I observed that just a minority seem to be influenced by the discursive power of certification. The ones who used this so-called moral discourse of certification seemed to transform the global discourse into a matter of personal prestige. Ali Kurt, a supplier of Migros stated:

> We have become like brothers with Migros. Migros is paying for our certification fees. I am willingly applying good practices in my land. ITU has become my honour. If there is an improper implementation or a wrongdoing, it turns into my dishonor. My father and grandfather were also farmers. I can't debase their memory. [Appendix, 11]

Even though Ali Kurt used the moral discourse of certification during the interview, he was transforming it into a matter of personal honour and not limiting his personal honour with the borders of Good Agricultural Practices. It is the prestige and honour of his family which was constructed by his grandfathers as a farmer family.

Apart from a few examples like Ali Kurt, the majority of the producers seemed uninfluenced by the moral and discursive superiority of supermarkets and GAP certification. Most of them stated other reasons for shifting to ITU-certified production. Their statements are mostly related to their financial concerns such as marketing, cheap credits and government subsidies. Şükrü Arslan, a Migros supplier, said:

> I am a certified producer because it provides more accessible marketing channels. If you are a conventional producer, you have to find a trader in the wholesale market. If you are an ITU producer, you are directly sending your harvest to Migros storehouses. They are packing them and distributing to supermarkets. Apart from this, government subsidies for certified farming are higher than for other farming. [Appendix, 12]

Olcay Öztürk, the owner of İmöz Agriculture and a FFV exporter explained their reason for doing certified production:

> We are a family company. We have both ITU and GlobalGAP certification. While we use ITU for Migros and Şok, we use GlobalGAP for the export markets. We decided to certify our farming activities for cheap bank credits and marketing reasons. [Appendix, 13]

Based on my fieldwork, I observed that credit opportunities, easier access to marketing channels and government subsidies were the main concerns of the certified producers in Antalya. In this respect, the moral and discursive authority that Fuchs and Clapp express as part of the structural power of the private food governance is not commonly observed among the GAP-certified producers in Antalya. Economic concerns appear as the main drivers of certification without the ideological, discursive and moral hegemony of private governance. On the other hand, during my farm visits with Migros's agriculture engineer, I also observed that Migros is striving for the indoctrination of certified producers into the moral discourse of good production. While I was asking a producer about the motivation for getting certification, Mesut Öztürk interrupted and said:

> We are prioritising ITU-certified fruits and vegetables in terms of our procurement policies. We are informing the producer about the advantages of certification. Today, we are procuring from 4,474 producers who know the significance of food security. ITU ensures healthy and planned production through its standards and procedures. Each and every tomato in this greenhouse is traceable. [Appendix, 14]

In addition, Levent Üstün, the regional procurement director of Migros stated:

> We favour certified producers. We make quality agreements with them. We are paying their certification fees so long as they sell their produce to us. It is also for their benefit. We are spending millions of dollars for TV and newspaper commercials to raise awareness among consumers and producers.

> For as long as consumers demand certified healthy food, we are ready to provide it. Everything on a Migros supermarket shelf is traceable and controlled. At first, the certification company controls the production, then we, as Migros, do the laboratory analysis of the products we will sell. There is a strict quality control and filtering mechanism. [Appendix, 15]

Based on my interviews and observations in the field, I claim that the structural power of private governance lacks the moral and discursive hegemony and that it comprises the economic power in terms of producers in Antalya. Producers are encouraged to shift to ITU production through economic rewards such as market access, credit opportunities and government subsidies. They left conventional methods and implement certification-based farming activities through a private governance mechanism, but they either lack the ideological hegemony of private food governance or translate it into a matter of personalized and individualized honour or prestige.

The words of Mesut Öztürk, Migros's engineer working in procurement centre, reveal that Migros is also aware of the producers' lack of awareness and underestimation of the idea of health and food security as part of a discursive tool of hegemony of the private food governance. Private standards not only work for economic interests, but these very standards need an ideological component for supermarkets. If necessary, new complementary discourses are created. To fill ideological gaps, Migros representatives and engineers specifically place emphasis on this lacking part of the structural power of private standards.

As a corporate actor, Migros is trying to draw the ideological framework of private governance through the TV commercials, training and awareness raising activities for farmers and visits to the producers. Apart from these, in many cases, supermarket chains issue annual corporate social responsibility reports to present the efforts they have made on environmentally-friendly production, health, sustainability

and social responsibility. Migros presents its agricultural activities in the retail sector as exemplary cases in terms of sustainability standards:

> The "Good Agricultural Practices" (GAP) project launched by Migros in conjunction with the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock in 2010 is a project which aims to ensure that Turkish consumers consume the best agricultural products with confidence, that future generations eat a healthy diet, and to bring about more efficient and productive use of agricultural land in Turkey through environmental practices. Through the practice, Migros was the first retail company to apply a control system based on reliable criteria regarding pesticide analysis, traceable products and a farming model that protects human, animal and environment health with the highest quality fruit and vegetables through the GAP. (Corporate Social Responsibility, 2016)

The ideological framework based-on the given moral superiority of food security, sustainability and health reveals itself as an important means of exercising power over other actors operating in the agricultural sector. Through the mobilisation and creation of financial and ideological frameworks, private governance emerges as a legitimate power in itself in the agri-food sector. Standards in that sense should be seen as the set of norms and regulations which are fluid and subject to change by different actors through various mechanisms as it is the case in Turkish GAP-certified agricultural sector.

Supermarkets as new food authorities have been increasing their power over the food sector. This authority is constructed financially and ideologically and with the help of various factors such as the facilitative policies of the state. Their role and hegemony cannot be explained only by looking at the rising authority of transnational capital and globalisation of the agri-food sector. The state, as is the case in Turkey, contributes and sometimes initiates changes in the course of supermarketization in the agricultural sector. The next chapter will help to explicate how GAP works as a mechanism of social differentiation among the producers. To do this, I will examine the interplay between local conditions, national policies and international factors which intersect and affect the agricultural producers. It will also

draw a picture of the role of the government as a mediating mechanism in the acceleration of private GAP certification by looking at the changing legal structure in the agricultural sector.

CHAPTER 5

GOOD AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES AS A SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION MECHANISM AMONG PRODUCERS

Supermarket-driven third party GAP certification in the context of private food governance has been sharpening the social differentiation among the agricultural producers in Turkey. The interconnection between the growing influence of private food control/auditing schemes and neoliberal governance are contingent, but neoliberalism is seen as a process which facilitates the acceleration of private audit systems (Campbell & Le Heron, 2007). As discussed above, in the context of a globalized agri-food market, major supermarket chains are more and more influential on the agricultural producers through their hegemonic power by re-defining the food production and processing standards, food product attributes and procurement conditions. As an audit mechanism, GlobalGAP and its implementation in Turkey (ITU) is a complex mechanism directly linking the agricultural producers, supermarket supply chains, and third-party certification bodies through a set of private food standards. Internationally, the interconnections expand to cover importers, exporters, international organisations, governments and other different actors. The reconciliation among these actors' conflicting interests, however, results in a differentiation among the agricultural producers in Turkey. Supermarket-driven third party ITU certification affects different scales of producers in different ways such as price pressure, product quality and volume, consistency and services.

Considering the scale of ITU-certified producers in Antalya, I observed that the majority of the producers are large-scale individual and company-type agricultural producers. Smallholder production in Turkish agriculture is dominant

and the average land ownership is 6 decares. According to the survey of our TUBITAK research project survey conducted in Antalya, İzmir, Aydin and Adana, only 19% of the 98 ITU-certified producers have less than 19 decares of land (Yenal, 2016). On the other hand, 34.7% of ITU-certified producers have more than 70 decares of land and 24.5% of producers own 40-60 decares of land. Beyond the survey, I also observed that the majority of ITU-certified producers are professional agricultural producers having more land than the average land size. The smallest ITU-certified producer among the ones I interviewed in Antalya has 20 decares of cultivated greenhouse land. He was a humble farmer who had left ITU certification for various economic reasons. Based on my interviews with the producers, the district directorate of agriculture, Migros engineers, and cooperatives, I argue that ITU certification has been sharpening the inequalities among the producers in terms of market access, subsidy policies, input and certification costs, and indebtedness. While some producers are more capable of meeting the requirements of certified production, others are facing a process of exclusion in the agricultural sector.

The exclusion of small-scale producers works in various ways, such as capacity insufficiency, lack of stable market conditions, high costs of input prices and indebtedness. When I inquired about land sizes and required capacity and capital for ITU certification, almost all agreed on the necessity of seed capital to invest in certified agricultural production. Ismail, an officer in the Serik Directorate of Agriculture said:

> In Serik, the ITU-certified producers are 20% of all agricultural producers. Generally it was large-scale producers who shifted to ITU and soilless agriculture. They are using cocopeat instead of soil. In general, some middle and large-sized producers prefer certification. It requires a significant amount of investment at the beginning. [Appendix, 16]

Another interviewee, Hakan, an agriculture engineer working in the Antalya Directorate of Agriculture, explained it in the following way:

> ITU is a high cost business. You have to have a considerable amount of land and make enough profit to counterbalance the high costs. Some small-scale producers are coming to learn about ITU. We are informing them and advising group certification. It may be a better way for them to meet the requirements and handle the costs of ITU. On average, you have to have about 20 decares of greenhouse land to make a profit with ITU. Otherwise, it is an economic burden. Even the larger-scale producers are considering the costs but it turned into a matter of agricultural market and also a symbol of prestige. [Appendix, 17]

The minimum land size required to make a profit from ITU varies from one producer to another. However, the certain thing is that large-scale landowners are more interested in certification than the smaller ones. ITU comes with a couple of re-arrangements in production and processing methods, and creates new requirements in terms of land, water and input use as a set of standards, which increases the costs of certified production. Most of the producers I interviewed suggested that they invested lots of money in their farms and greenhouses before shifting to ITU certification. Olcay, the owner of İmöz Tarım, stated:

> We decided to invest in agriculture in 2008. Before that, we were in the construction sector. First, we constructed 17 decares of greenhouse. Today, we have 38 decares of greenhouse farms. Even though we had capital to invest, we still have not made a profit from the certification and have only covered our establishment costs. In total, we spent 5 million liras. [Appendix, 18]

Having substantial start-up capital seems to be the initial requirement and facilitating factor for large-scale producers in the agricultural sector. Even though the government subsidy exists to encourage a shift to certified production, large-scale producers seem to be lacking the trust in the agri-food sector. They mostly described the agricultural sector as an insecure game, even likening it to gambling in terms of the instabilities in the sector. Cemil Avşar, the owner of Tat Tarım, said:

> Agriculture is a business of gambling. The price of tomatoes can be high this year. But you can't trust it. If you look at that the price of this year and plant hundreds of decares of tomatoes next year, you can suffer next year when the tomato prices fall to 50 kuruş (cents). You sink or swim. A total gamble. Agriculture is like the stock market, like foreign currency. No one knows what will happen. [Appendix, 19]

As Yenal and Keyder (2011) claim, supermarkets' preference for large suppliers and government regulations favouring the large producers exacerbate the insecurity of smaller producers. However, I found out that insecurity is not only a matter for small producers. Price fluctuations and uncertain market conditions also contribute the insecurity of large-scale producers. In such circumstances, ITU certification is understood as a helping hand for producers in a market where there is no leg to stand on. The supply-demand mechanism and lack of stability in the globalized agricultural sector force some producers to differentiate themselves from the other producers through certification in search of easier access channels to the markets. Almost all producers stated that ITU certification provides them with easier access to marketing channels even if it is not a guaranteed way. Migros, however, does not guarantee full procurement for all the produce that are supplied by the producers. The contract system between Migros and ITU-certified producers is referred to as a bilateral quality contract arranged mostly according to the Migros demands. In terms of the contract, a predicted volume of production is written on the contract at the beginning of each year. Throughout the year, Migros procures from the contracted producer based on the conditions of the contract. However, Migros is free to refuse procurement if there is surplus production. In addition, Migros implements a selective procurement process that it buys only if the quality and shape of the product meets the non-formal requirements of Migros. Sometimes Migros refuses the produce of some contractors and the producers are forced to resort to wholesale markets and commissioners. Şükrü Arslan, a Migros supplier, said:

> We are happy with Migros because it provides us with regular cash on the line payment and also market access. We don't have to go to wholesale market. If Migros says 'its enough for us' we have nothing to do other than going to the wholesale market and finding a trader or a commissioner. Sometimes it happens and we sell our cucumbers as conventional produce in the wholesale market. Migros pays the same price as the wholesale market but it is much easier to work with Migros. You spend a lot of time if you search for a commissioner. Also, the commissioners do not pay cash on the line payment (*peşin*), whereas Migros works that way. [Appendix, 20]

The bilateral quality contract mostly works to the advantage of Migros. However, producers seem to enjoy the benefits stemming from easier market access and regular payment. This kind of a relationship was best described by Migros engineer Tolga in an ironic way: "it's a bilateral quality agreement as long as the producer obeys the rules". In addition to their inability to sell their surplus production to Migros in some cases, many producers complained about the strict selection process of Migros. Mehmet Emin, a small-scale producer in Finike, said:

> Migros pays your money on a regular basis. You don't have to wait long. But it pays the same as the wholesale market. The price is determined on a daily basis in the wholesale that Migros bases its prices on. However, Migros is very selective and picky. You might take one ton of produce but they might refuse 300 kilos of it saying that those did not meet their quality requirements. So, you are in a loss again. If you are a large-scale producer, you can standardize the shape and quality of your product and Migros does not select that much, but if you are a small producer, it's difficult to catch that standardization. [Appendix, 21]

While increasing reliance of supermarkets chains on direct procurement and centralized distribution centers seems to offer opportunities for all, the procurement mechanisms usually impose strict quality certification conditions, which consequently result in the small-scale producers' exclusion from the supply chain (Biles, et al., 2007). Small-scale producers are facing an indirect type of exclusion from the certification-based supermarket supply chain due to their inability to standardize their production. Apart from the strict quality standards and the capital-intensive character of the ITU certification, small-scale producers face difficulties in

meeting the regular product supply volumes required by Migros. Together with compliance with the quality standards, Migros and other supermarkets require consistent volumes of product supply from its producers. Small-scale producers who are not able to provide consistent and regular volumes of supply due to their smallholder character are excluded from the supermarket-driven GAP certification systems. Migros engineer Mesut Öztürk said:

> We generally prefer large-scale agricultural producers. It is important to work professionally, and the small-scale farmers are doing this job with the methods that they learned from their fathers and grandfathers. We can maintain a regular and consistent product supply only if we have large-scale producers. Their ability to keep pace with our product flow and provide standardized quality FFV is our concern here. [Appendix, 22]

The discrepancy between the small producers' capacity and the Migros requirements in terms of regularity and consistency reveals the exclusion of small farmers. To become a preferred supplier, producers need to be in line with the certification and procurement standards both qualitatively and quantitatively. While the contracts between Migros and producers seem to encourage the growers to professionalize their production in line with global standards, only large-scale capital owner producers have the capacity to fully meet the quality-based supply chain requirements. As an alternative to individual certification, which is mostly preferred by large-scale producers, there is another certification model which was introduced to enhance smallholder participation; this is called ITU group certification.

5.1 ITU Group Certification for Small-Scale Producers: An Advantage or a Barrier?

Group certification is an alternative if a producers union or an agricultural entrepreneur (a company, a large producer, a commissioner, or a retailer) organizes smaller-scale producers under a group certification (Ecocert-İyi Tarım Uygulamaları Sertifikasyon Programı, 2016). The producers under ITU group certification are

responsible to the certification owner-entrepreneur[8] regarding the maintenance of the quality standards and procedures. All rights and responsibilities of ITU belong to the certification owner-entrepreneur. Individual producers under a group certification contract cannot use the certification for any purpose without the permission of certification owner. However, those producers have the right to benefit from the government subsidies and other services individually. In terms of group certification, entrepreneurs are responsible for establishing and maintaining a quality control and monitoring mechanism. Like individual certification owners, group certification owner-producer unions and entrepreneurs are monitored at least once a year by the third-party certification body. In terms of the ITU certification audit, the TPC body takes samples from the producers and does a laboratory analysis of the samples (İyi Tarım Uygulamaları Sertifikasyon Programı, 2016). The audits can be either with or without notice. The number of producers from whom product samples are taken is decided by taking the square root of the total number of the producers under the ITU contract.

During my interviews and field visits in Antalya, I had the opportunity to interview producers doing farming under group certification. Producers who work under a group contract are mostly organized by Migros or large-scale export-oriented producer companies in Antalya. As I learned from Deniz Emiroglu, the controller of the ECAS Certification Company, group certification mostly consists of 20-25 small and medium-scale producers in the Antalya region. She also added:

> When you look at their profiles, you will see that they are mostly involved in group certification to decrease their costs. There is no minimum or maximum land ownership limit to participate in a group certification. A group of producers can apply for the group certification under the name of a union, a

[8] During my fieldwork in Antalya, I found out that it was common for small producers to be organized under a company-type producer's group certification. Agricultural companies and company-type producers assume intermediary role for small producers to access to markets.

> cooperative or a retailer company. Once they are contracted under a group certification, they are recognized as a legal entity. [Appendix, 23]

While there is an option for producers to establish a cooperative to be recognized as a legal entity and work through ITU group certification, I was unable to find an exemplary cooperative operating through ITU group certification. Also, the ECAS certifier said that most of the registered certification owner producers are individual or company -ype large-scale producers. Migros engineers Mesut and Tolga also explained their preference for individual certification:

> The majority of our suppliers have individual certification and most of them are large-scale producers. There is a tendency towards individual certification among the large-scale producers. We also want it, we are happy with it. It is very difficult to monitor and audit ITU production if it is a group certification. You have to visit different farms of different producers to ensure compliance with the quality standards. [Appendix, 24]

Apart from ITU group certification under the name of Migros, some of the large-scale company-type producers gather a group of small-scale producers under the name of the company. In places where agricultural companies dominate the rural production, small-scale producers can choose to organize under a company to ensure their products are marketed. While I was in Finike, producers talked about a big agricultural company, Meysan. Because most of the producers referred to Meysan as the "Croesus" of Finike and also Antalya, I communicated and arranged an appointment with one of Meysan's managers. After a short minibus trip and about two kilometers walking, I arrived at a spectacularly big company with high technology storage, packaging facilities and numerous workers. As I was taken in, I went upstairs to the manager's office. She was from Antalya and one of the shareholders of the company. When I talked about my research, she showed great interest. She first talked about the history of the company and their operations as if she was on a TV programme:

> Meysan has 35 years of history. We have thousands of thousands decares of cultivated land in different regions of Antalya. Meysan is a brand which is known globally. We were honored by the French Michelin certificate. Meysan is also a Valencia Orange Institute member. Meysan supplies both domestic and international markets. We have had our own markets for long years, so we don't have to work with commissioners or traders. In the domestic market, we supply to Migros, Macro, and Metro supermarkets. Apart from our own production, we also have our own producers that we certified under ITU group certification. Small producers who have 10-15 decares of land can't do it individually because of the procedures and the high costs. Because of that, we are coordinating them under the Meysan brand. We don't leave them in the lurch. Meysan is their guarantee in these conditions (referring to the new wholesale market law). [Appendix, 25]

Her emphasis on the long history of their professional operations denotes the importance of the power of capital and know-how in terms of the implementation of the private standards. Her statements also reveal that the big companies, having the capacity to operate in both domestic and international markets, have gained an edge over the small-scale producers by organizing them under group certification. Considering the conditions in the agri-food sector, smallholder farmers' alternatives are restricted to these kinds of agreements with agri-food companies. Farmers who are self-sufficient enough not to fall into the vicious cycle of indebtedness to commissioners rely on private agricultural companies by participating in the private governance. In this context, the risk mitigation mechanism for relatively self-sufficient farmers becomes contract-like agreements with large agricultural companies under third-party certification. This kind of relationship increases the financial and informational asymmetry of power due to the fact that small producers are increasingly left to the mercy of the buyer companies for regular and guaranteed market access.

5.2 Cooperatives: Can they be an opportunity?

Migros's tendency to contract with larger suppliers and their avoidance of dealing with smallholder producers — inasmuch as it maintains consistent volumes of FFV supply from the larger suppliers — weakens smallholder participation in the certified FFV supply chain. At the same time, the financial inadequacy and lack of capacity of the agricultural sales cooperatives vitiate their entrepreneurial potential in terms of being the representatives of the collective power of the small farmers. The interview with a Demre Agricultural Cooperative is an exemplary case to illustrate the inadequacy of the cooperatives. The head of the cooperative said:

> We are trying to provide the farmers with credits in the form of fertilizer, seeds and seedlings. We don't have sufficient financial resources to provide cash credit. Our job here is to lessen the high input costs burden on the farmers' shoulders. The retailers are making agreements with our general directorate. It's business. We want to procure FFV from the producers and sell them to retailers like Migros, but we are not able to do that. We don't have cold storage rooms and packing facilities. If you don't have those facilities, you go broke when the FFV remain unsold that day. Also, Migros is so picky that it returns 300 of 1000 kilograms. I want to tell you a real story. A Kumluca cooperative tried to procure from the producers as a union. They ventured forth. I was in a meeting of Kumluca cooperatives and Mehmet Ali, our friend, was complaining that Migros returned 400 kilos of his aubergines. He was murmuring as 'what am I going do with that?' and I said jokingly 'lets take them to Demre and make it mousaka' (musakka). Mehmet Ali delivered the aubergines to the Kumluca cooperative and Migros returned it. Finally, the aubergines went to waste. [Appendix, 26]

As I asked if there was a success story of any different cooperative that I could interview, they could not refer me to anyone or any cooperative. Capital inefficiency and lack of modernized storage facilities restrict their operations to credit the farmers for their input purchases. To make an account for the capacity insufficiencies of the agricultural sales and credit cooperatives, we need to take a look at the legal framework regulating the structure of them.

The ARIP (Agricultural Reform Implementation Project), which foresaw the restructuring of Turkish agriculture between 2001 and 2008, aimed at a set of

structural reforms for the agricultural sales cooperatives in Turkey. It claimed that the previous period had been characterized by protective state intervention as unproductive and fiscally unsustainable (ARIP, 2016). Their labelling as unproductive and fiscally unsustainable has become a powerful discourse in the course of the reformation of "sticky institutions" (Güven, 2009). With the new law on Agricultural Sales Cooperatives, their annual funding from the state budget was cut (Tarım Satış Birlik ve Kooperatifleri Hakkında Kanun, 2016). The law was enacted for the purpose of "creating financially autonomous, independent and self-managed organisations dedicated to serving their farmer members by selling and processing crops on their behalf" as was stated in the project paper (ARIP, 2016). The project characterized agricultural sales cooperatives and cooperative unions as lacking the institutional capacity to restructure themselves and survive in the new business environment. The law aimed at forming a Restructuring Board as an advisory mechanism in terms of implementing the restructuring policies. While these cooperatives were operating with the aim of maintaining high prices for certain products in the market, the new law brought along the simple business principle of purchasing only as much as can be sold and at a price which covers all the costs of the cooperatives (Lundell, et al., 2004). The reform aimed at the reduction of costs and state subsidies to agricultural cooperatives in liberalizing market conditions. Although it legitimated itself as making village-level cooperatives the real owners and masters of their powerful unions, agricultural sales cooperatives came to a situation where they were deprived of their financial resources and state funding.

Apart from Agricultural Sales Cooperatives, Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) were also included in the restructuring process. ACCs which provide credits and agricultural inputs to suppliers were funded by the state-owned Ziraat Bank until

2001. However, changing banking laws prohibited Ziraat Bank from providing funds to ACCs which have outstanding debts (Lundell, et al., 2004). As a result, many of the cooperatives lost their financial resources under the name of independence and financial autonomy (Aydin, 2010; Atasoy, 2013).

The head of the Demre Agricultural Credit Cooperative emphasized the need for a legal change in the Agricultural Cooperatives Law. He explained it as:

> The cooperatives should be financially supported to construct cold storages and to provide the farmers with more credits and services. Cooperatives Law should be changed. We should be allowed to export FFVs to foreign markets. In the past, the cooperatives were operating under Ziraat Bank both legally and institutionally. Now they have turned into place of business (ticarethane). [Appendix, 28]

The process of financial deprivation of agricultural cooperatives has accelerated in a context where the state changed its course of policy to a market-oriented neoliberal rationality. While state subsidies to farmers continued on the one hand, previously state-subsidized institutions such as the cooperatives were cut from government support. Apart from that, these institutions were rationalized according to business interests. Their operations were transformed in terms of the business rationality. The state intervention was constrained in favour of a free agricultural market, leaving the cooperatives autonomous and financially independent. Thelen describes this process as the turning of the institutional and functional character of institutions on their head and the redeployment of old institutions to new purposes in terms of neoliberal rationality (Thelen, 2003). In such circumstances, smallholder producers which are excluded from the supermarket-driven supply chains are not fully represented by the cooperatives to be included in the private governance and ultimately are forced to the traditional marketing channels such as wholesale markets.

5.3 Wholesale Markets and Commissioners as Alternatives for Small Producers

> A wholesale market is a very particular type of socio-economic institution. In some ways it can be seen as a market par excellence because it is only a place for buying and selling. In the market itself, none of the buyers are prospective consumers, not even the intermediary consumers buying inputs to be consumed in production. The buyers are buying in order to sell (either directly as retailers, their agents, or indirectly as secondary wholesalers who in turn sell on to retailers). (Harvey, Quilley & Beynon, 2002; 34)

Limited access to financial resources to shift to ITU-certified production and low preferability by Migros have different impacts on rural producers. Their marketing opportunities become more and more restricted to FFV wholesale markets in conjunction with other financial restrictions such as indebtedness and dependency to commissioners. The wholesale markets are still the main actors in the FFV sector, despite the expanding role of the supermarkets. In Turkey, 70% of FFV sales are done through wholesale markets (Atasoy, 2013). According to 2013 statistics, there were 195 wholesale terminals in Turkey. As a major FFV-producing region, Antalya has 25 terminals which account for 12% (Canik & Alparslan, 2010, in Atasoy, 2013, 557). There are 11,303 offices in wholesale terminals, 9,864 of which are active. In addition to commissioners in the wholesale markets, there are also wholesale traders (*toptancı tüccar*), producers themselves, and producers' unions where the Regulation of Fresh Vegetable and Fruit Trade and Wholesale Markets Law of 1995 allows renting or leasing offices in wholesale markets (Atasoy, 2013, 557). In total, there are 9,444 commissioners and 1,859 wholesale traders renting these offices (Benli, 2013).

Commissioners in the wholesale markets are the main players who maintain FFV procurement and retailing. The majority of the commissioners I talked to in the Antalya wholesale markets are usually not involved in FFV production but only act as intermediaries between the producers and the bigger buyers, namely, traders. Their operations include selling FFV in the name of agricultural producers. If a

trader buys from a commissioner, he/she delivers it to supermarkets, various wholesale markets of different cities or export markets as the owner of that produce. After spending two days in the Antalya wholesale market, I observed that the number of commissioner and trader offices was considerably higher than that of producer unions or cooperatives. The reasons for the absence of cooperatives in the wholesale markets can be deduced from the financial, legal and organisational difficulties that I analysed above. The scarcity of producers' unions in the wholesale markets, on the other hand, is analysed by Atasoy, based on field research conducted in wholesale markets. In her study, she argues that the smallholder dominance in Turkish agriculture is the main reason for the lack of well-organized modern producers' unions. Due to the fact that FFVs are not durable goods and smallholder farmers do not have the chance to store them, they need to be marketed on a daily basis. This results in the dependence of smallholder producers on the commissioners. Due to the capacity inefficiencies and financial hardships that the cooperatives experience, the dominance of smallholder production in the agricultural sector prevents the emergence of well-organized producers' unions; the supermarkets' favouring large scale producers over the smaller ones and the wholesale markets are still the most important market access channel for small producers.

In this context, Migros eliminates wholesale markets and the intermediaries and offers direct procurement for producers who are capable of meeting its private conditions and ITU certification standards. A new law passed in 2010 that came into effect in 2012 made it possible for the producers' unions and producers to sell their produce without the wholesale market transfers (Law No. 5957). The abolition of the obligation of the wholesale market transfer served the supermarkets' interests. As the law aimed at providing cheaper food to consumers by eliminating the 8%

commissioner tax, supermarkets have had an edge over the agricultural sector by discarding intermediaries in the food chain.

Another change serving supermarket interests is the obligation of tag use to identify the name of the producer, place of production, class and quality of the product, certification, and the technical and hygiene conditions of the production process (Law number 5957). This legal obligation evidently favours the certified producers who are able to keep up with the private food standards and traceability procedures introduced by supermarket chains. Considering the small producers' inability to meet the standards of food security, food quality and traceability due to low level of professionalization and capital inefficiency, the new law would work as an exclusionary mechanism against the small producers while it would boost the supermarket hegemony over the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the same law would strengthen the ties between certified agricultural producers and the supermarkets outside the wholesale markets. In this respect, wholesale markets as the main and most suitable marketing channels for small producers have been experiencing a transformation which, on the one hand, favours large producers doing quality production and discourages the conventional smallholders by narrowing their marketing opportunities.

5.4 Indebtedness of small-scale producers

While the elimination of wholesalers brings advantages for supermarkets and their preferred suppliers, it also results in the elimination of small-scale producers from the supermarket value chains. This kind of exclusion results mostly from the indebtedness of the small producers to the commissioners and the resulting

dependency on the commissioners in the wholesale markets. Migros engineer Mesut explained indebtedness as a major problem:

> One of the problems we have in the agricultural sector is the indebtedness of producers. Once a producer is indebted, you can't convince him to do certified production. You can't convince him because he has to sell his produce to the creditors, who are mostly commissioners in the wholesale markets. [Appendix, 28]

For small and middle-scale farmers, indebtedness is a major problem despite the government subsidies and cheap Ziraat Bank credits. During my fieldwork in Antalya, Serik, Demre, and Finike, the small and some of the middle scale producers emphasized their inability to repay their debts. Probing the reasons for their insupportable indebtedness, they stated a number of reasons such as fluctuations in prices, uncertainty in the agricultural market, rising input and land prices. Halil, a Migros supplier under group certification, explained:

> If you are a small farmer and don't have capital, you are a loser. You always start the year incurring debts from banks or the commissioners. Think of it, you don't have money to buy seed, fertilizer or pesticide. You have to go into debt to buy them. You go to your commissioner and he refers you to a pesticide and fertilizer vendor. Then you buy the inputs on credit. When it comes to harvest season, you have to deliver your produce to the commissioner in return for the debt. It is how these things work here. [Appendix, 29]

Indebtedness to commissioners and banks is a vicious circle into which farmers fall (Keyder & Yenal, 2011). In an agricultural market where the previously effective protectionist policies were dismantled, producers make an effort to sustain their budget with credits from commissioners, banks, usurers and credit cooperatives. Once they are indebted to Ziraat Bank and cannot afford to pay it back, for instance, they resort to private bank credits with higher interest rates and get in a deeper cycle of indebtedness. The increasing indebtedness of farmers is seen by most of the farmers during my fieldwork as an effect of increasing input costs. Hasan, a small-scale farmer who left certification in the last years, stated:

> Input prices are increasing constantly. I have nothing to do other than incur debt. It's trouble, you get 1,000 TL credit, you pay 1,300 TL back. Your profit is already gone for the credit interest. On the other hand, tomato prices are not increasing as much as the input prices are. [Appendix, 30]

The deepening of financial insecurity and indebtedness of smallholder producers are barriers to their participation to supermarket-driven ITU certification. As Migros does not work with an advance payment system, it turns into an exclusionary mechanism for farmers who have less land, less capital and more dependence on and indebtedness to commissioners. Despite the increasing inclusion of large-scale producers into the certification system through supermarket value chains, the volatility of the market and the fragility of the product pricess create a system of "gambling" and deepens the small-scale producers' dependence on the middlemen as their main access channel to the market. In this respect, the relationship between small producers and commissioners tends to continue based on interpersonal trust relations. Hüseyin Kuşlu, a small-scale producer owning a conventional type greenhouse, said:

> I shifted to certified agriculture because of cheap credit opportunities. If you are a small producer, you either get credit from the commissioner or a bank. I heard that Ziraat Bank provides cheaper credit to ITU-certified producers and applied for certification. I deliver my produce to a commissioners whom I am working with for long years. We know and trust each other. When I want credit and say I will pay back three months later, he gives the money without any contract. I can't work with different commissioners because they give 50 and want 60 back. Even if the prices are very unstable in the wholesale market, having a relationship with a trustworthy commissioner is good. [Appendix, 31]

The wholesale market law, foreseeing the outside-of-wholesale market exchange between buyers and suppliers and traceability requirements strengthens a more professional type of agri-food business. While some producers qualify for participating the professional business cycle, others become excluded from this new mode of agri-food business due to their indebtedness.

All in all, indebtedness as a major obstable to market access exacerbates the vulnerability of small-scale producers. It is a vicious cycle in the sense that it both constrains the farmers in terms of market access and increases their dependency on credits provided by banks, commissioners and credit cooperatives.

5.5 The Professionalization of Agricultural Production and Social Differentiation among the Peasantry

Private certification introduces traceability, documentation, labaratory analysis of products and modern production methods to agricultural sector. In that sense, ITU certification in Antalya surpasses the conventional production methods. Apart from that, while small and middle-scale producers rely on bank credits and cash advances from commissioners to maintain their production, larger-scale producers utilize bank credits for more investment in their business. As large-scale producers increase their investments in their farms and greenhouses, agricultural production becomes more and more a professional business. Furthermore, establishing more direct relations with foreign markets through the means of certification necessitates a more professionalized agri-food business. Therefore, these factors together contribute to the transformation of agricultural production into a business which requires modern, professional and advanced methods from production to provisioning and marketing. During my fieldwork in Antalya, I observed how these aforementioned processes intersect and change the conventional character of agricultural production. Mehmet Çiftçi, a citrus producer who has his own citrus company and packaging and storage facilities stated:

> I sell my GAP-certified produce to A-101 in the domestic market. I also have direct access channels to foreign markets. Its an opportunity for me to directly export to foreign markets. If there were citros producers' unions, it would be advantegous for us to widen our access to export markets. [Appendix, 32]

The increase in competition and differentiation among producers reveals itself as the increasing professionalization of agricultural production. Mehmet Çiftçi, like the other large-scale certified producers I interviewed, invited me to his office that he had built close to his farm. As I arrived for the interview, I found myself in a professional business office with a computer, a bookshelf filled with trade and export documents and an accountant. He answered my questions in detail in the manner of a businessman by referring to jobs his accountant officer does and legal regulations of certification and the conditions in the international agri-food sector. He described agriculture as a collective business in which big producers unions operate.

The degree of professionalization is much more observable from the expressions of İlhan Ulu, owner of Ulu Tarım. I conducted the interview in his office, which he also uses for his construction business. To emphasize the level of seriousness of the agri-food business, he emphasized the financial aspects of agricultural production and the amount of investment he made for establishing an agriculture company. He explained his agricultural production:

> It's a modern greenhouse that we built here. We have 30-35 regular employees whose social security insurance is covered. The vegetables in the greenhouse are treated according to certification standards as if they are babies in an intensive care unit. Do not take this greenhouse as a farm, it is more of a factory. It is not like farming. As a matter of fact, we don't use soil, we use cocopeat to increase the productivity. [Appendix, 33]

The use of cocopeat is much more common among the large-scale producers like İlhan Ulu who perceive agriculture as an "industrial manufacturing" done in factory-like greenhouses. In that sense, the automatization of the irrigation, lighting and input organization of the greenhouses resemble a factory more than rural production. Even the land is replaced by cocopeat, which is used for more reproductivity and perceived as more controllable in the face of the uncontrollable nature of the soil.

The conception of agricultural production and farming is being transformed by the introduction of modern production methods and private certification schemes. The professionalization reveals itself in a paradoxical manner. While recent investors in the agricultural sector are coming mostly from other sectors such as construction, they claim to professionalize agricultural production with modern production and processing methods. Furthermore, while artisanal conventional farmers' main source of subsistence is agriculture and their profession is farming, they fall behind the degree of professionalization in agriculture. In this sense, their ancestral agricultural knowledge is being invalidated in that their family farming activities are conceived as backward and unprofessional in the context of the private governance. This undervaluation is not limited to large-scale producers, it is rooted in the very discursive and economic hegemony of private governance and agricultural certification. In this context, Migros engineer Mesut said:

> As Migros, we are taking a social responsibility, the responsibility of encouraging healthy production. We even go to villages in the middle of nowhere and to inform and educate the rural producers in those places.[Appendix, 34]

The private governance, creating a new regime of knowledge through professionalization, has rearranged the agricultural sector for producers in two ways. On the one hand, artisanal family farming is being undervalued at a discursive level, as the previous quotes reveal. On the other, a professional understanding of agricultural production is being introduced through technical training and campaigns. These training sessions are organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Livestock, chamber of agricultures[9], banks[10], municipalities[11] and Migros[12]. It shows

[9] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dalamanli-ciftcilere-iyi-tarim-sertifikasi-37244720
[10] http://bakayrinti.com/haber-akbanktan_burdurlu_ciftcilere_iyi_tarim_egitimi-5878.html
[11] http://www.ankara.bel.tr/haberler/buyuksehir-bilincli-ciftciler-yetistiriyor/#.V_l9PeWLRdg

us the alignment of the private and public sectors in enhancing the ITU certification along with a professionalized agri-business in Turkey.

This kind of professionalization reveals itself in the perceptions of the agricultural producers in aforementioned ways. Accordingly, the perceptions of the state and state policies also differ from one producer to another.

5.6 Perceptions of the neoliberal state as a mechanism of social differentiation

Considering all the above-mentioned developments and changes, I have found it intriguing to examine how actors operating in the agri-food sector perceive the changing role of the state and its transformative role. Most of the studies in this field focus on the objective and macro aspects of agri-food transformations, excluding the individual subjective perceptions of the actors. However, I think that the individual perceptions of the actors, especially of the producers, would contribute to our understanding of the changes and consequent social differentiations in the agricultural sector. This kind of analysis will also provide an insight into the conflictual perceptions of the actors in the face of neoliberal state.

During my interviews in Serik, Antalya, Finike and Demre, I was surprised by the state perceptions of the producers, supermarkets, government officers and certification employees having both similarities and differences in terms of the changing role of the state in the context of neoliberalism. I claim that the perceptions of the actors in the agricultural sector differ mainly because of mixed and complex forms of state presence and interventions in the agricultural sector (Keyder and Yenal, 2011). As neoliberal restructuring has transformed the role and responsibilities of the state, producers seem more confused in terms of their

[12] http://www.migroskurumsal.com/EN/Basin-Aciklamasi.aspx?BasinAciklamasiID=45&height=500&width=600

expectations, both from the market and the state. Before unpacking the conflicting expectations of different actors in the agricultural sector from the neoliberal state, an exploration of the role of the neoliberal state is necessary. For Harvey:

> ...the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. (Harvey, 2007: 64)

In that respect, freely negotiated contracts between differing and sometimes conflicting interest-owners creates differing perceptions and expectations regarding the state.

5.6.1 Expectations of Migros

During the days I spent with Migros engineers in the procurement centre and on producers' farms, I began to realize that Migros engineers expect direct state intervention in the agricultural sector in favour of supermarket/corporate interests. As Migros coordinates small producers under the group certification of Migros brand, it also has the responsibility to pay for the costs of certification. Migros, on the one hand, perceives its operations as social responsibility in terms of providing the consumers with healthier food and improving the production and processing methods with the new private governance regime introduced through ITU certification by paying the costs of certification. On the other hand, it claims that this kind of a social responsibility should be performed by the state. Migros engineer Mesut explained it as follows:

> Migros is paying for the group certification. We should be supported by the state, the costs of group certification should be covered by the state. We don't show ingratitude, but we need more support and incentive from the state to strengthen the links between producers and supermarkets. [Appendix, 35]

While neoliberal restructuring guarantees free and voluntary contracts between the actors in the market, Migros, as one of the actors engaging in contractural relationship, searches for state subsidies to smallholder farmers' participation in the certified agriculture. It in fact reveals the paradox between neoliberalism in theory and neoliberalism in practice. Mesut's statements coincide with Harvey's terms that the "neoliberal state is expected to take a back seat and simply set the stage for market functions" on the one hand, and "it is supposed to be activist in creating a good business" on the other (Harvey D. , 2007).

5.6.2 Expectations of producers

During my farm and office visits in Antalya, I had the opportunity to listen the producers of different scales who engage in ITU certified production. As I examined the conditions of different types and scales of producers participating in third-party certification and the resulting impacts of certified production on those producers, I also heard differing expectations from different scales of producers.

Small producers who are trying to develop survival mechanisms through group certification expect direct state intervention in terms of price setting, planning, unionization and subsidies to protect them from the risks of the agri-food sector. In the context of the supply-demand oriented neoliberal agri-food market, price fragilities are having adverse effects on the small producers. Almost all producers stated price fluctuations as a source of uncertainty. To cope with the uncertain market conditions, they expect intermediary and interventionist actions from the state. Şükrü Arslan, a Migros supplier, said:

> In the wholesale market, the prices are determined by 10-15 powerful traders and commissioners. For instance, a big trader can change the daily price of a product by supplying or removing the supply. Take Erten Tarım as an example. It has 600 tons of aubergines. Its supply or removal of the supply

> changes everything in the wholesale market. The state has no say in it. It is not setting the minimum price. On the other hand, I have to sell my harvest even at a loss because I don't have storage facilities. The state should do something in terms of price setting. [Appendix, 34]

Coupled with the lack of financial capacity to invest in storage facilities, the small producers face fragile minimum prices determined by big buyers in the agricultural market. In the face of the actual supply-demand mechanism, small producers perceive themselves as more and more vulnerable. As their vulnerability deepens, they only fall back upon the state and its protectionist policies.

Apart from price fluctuations and market uncertainties, increasing input costs also challenge the perceptions of the producers. As their budgets are harmed by input costs, their perception, once again, contradicts the rationality of the neoliberal state and resembles a mourning for state-governed agriculture. A small-scale ITU producer stated his expectation in terms of inputs:

> The yearly cost of input is extremely high. I can't cope with it. The state should manufacture cheaper fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and sell to us. Each year, the input costs are increasing. [Appendix, 35]

The expectations of producers from the state is not limited to price setting and input; they also see a cheaper input supply from the state as a solution to their financial bottlenecks. It should be said that the expectations of small producers from the state both overlap with and differ from the larger ones. For instance, while large-scale producers did not complain about the increasing costs of inputs as the small producers did, both small and large-scale producers emphasized the need for a unionized and government-planned agricultural production. Mehmet, who has 700 decares of citrus farm as a large-scale citrus producer, expressed the need for state planning and unionization:

> Small producers will be eliminated because you decrease costs as much as you increase the unit area of production. So they need cooperatives and unions. Its not only for small producers; big producers also need unionization.

> Even traders go bankrupt in these conditions. Unions would help us to increase capacity and productivity. The state should take the initiative for unionization and production planning. [Appendix, 36]

The instability of the agricultural market reveals itself not only among smallholder producers, but also among large-scale producers. Although large-scale producers are enjoying cheap bank credits, state subsidies and the competitive advantage of direct market access, they still express concerns about potential risks regarding the fluctuating nature of agri-food sector. However, these concerns can be observed more commonly among smallholder producers. For instance, Mustafa, who has 20 decares of cultivated land as a smaller-scale producer, said:

> In Demre, the average unit area of production is 3-4 decares. You can find many people who have 1-2 decares of greenhouses. These small producers should organize and establish cooperatives. The state, as in the case of urban gentrifications, should take the initiative for a rural transformation. It should unite the smallholders, enable their collaboration, provide cheap or interest-free long-term credits. There can be cooperatives or unions comprised of 100 decares of greenhouses. If the state announces these kinds of incentives, the producers can easily do it themselves. In this way, the unions or the cooperatives can supply cheaper inputs to the producers. If not, the smallholders will disappear. [Appendix, 37]

As is seen from the statements, the expectations of small-scale producers such as cooperation and unionization are also shared by some of the large-scale producers. Small-scale producers mostly expressed a nostalgic perception of the state and common expectations regarding subsidies, planning and price setting intervention. Differing from the shared expectations, some large-scale producers advocated the idea of increasing state subsidies, especially for the large agri-food businesses, claiming that agricultural companies which operate in the export market should be subsidized by the state to help them gain competitive advantages in the foreign markets.

Considering both the overlapping and the differing expectations from the state, I claim that the state as an actor has a pivotal position in the agricultural sector.

Its policy-making power and the previous protectionist policies locate it in the imageries of the producers as a heroic actor that contradicts the changing role of the state in a neoliberal agricultural market. However, given the legal regulations on wholesale markets, supermarkets, certification, subsidies and bank credits, the Turkish state cannot be said to withdraw from the agri-food sector. Rather, the state continues to play a central role in promoting the new set of policies and regulations associated with neoliberal food regime (Otero, 2014). At this point, the expectations of producers turn into a nostalgia for a state that calls for the protectionist agricultural policies of previous periods. The state, as a figure, signifies an all-powerful actor with memories of the protectionist policies of the previous periods, on the one hand, but also a missing benevolence with its new neoliberal face, on the other.

To sum up, I claim that private governance in the agri-food sector led by big retailers is exacerbating the social differentiation among the producers. This differentiation is widening the gaps between small-scale and large-scale producers, according to their level of participation in the certification schemes. It is also understood that this differentiation is constituted through legal arrangements and subsidy mechanisms of the governments. The nature of the state, in this sense, is being transformed into a liberal model that is perceived differently by different actors who have conflicting interests.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I attempted to understand the impacts of supermarketization and private agri-food governance on agricultural producers in Antalya. For this purpose, I studied Good Agricultural Practices and claimed that supermarket expansion and privatization of agri-food governance are two parallel processes that have direct impacts on agricultural producers. Focusing on the case of Antalya , I argued that the rise of private food governance and Good Agricultural Practices sharpen social differentiations among the agricultural producers. These differentiations are sharpened through subsidy policies, laws and regulations. In this respect, the state has a pivotal role in terms of the redistribution of resources, reconstituting the power relations and drawing the legal boundaries in the agri-food sector.

To examine the impacts of Good Agricultural Practices and supermarketization on agricultural producers, I utilized different theoretical frameworks. These theoretical frameworks included both macro and micro perspectives in terms of situating Antalya in a broader global context and examining the local interconnections and interplays between various actors. I did not choose to follow a single theoretical approach because I argue that both Turkey and Antalya have their own specificities that cannot be generalized according to certain macro perspectives. In this respect, I also tried to benefit from the insights of the actor network theory to focus on the specificities of localities, local interdependencies and interconnections and not to overlook anomalies and exceptions.

Because transnational and global trends are embedded in particular localities, the contests in specific contexts matter in the constitution of global networking. It

should be noted that there is not a single, all-encompassing logic of capitalism. The character of the actors, localities, codes and artefacts define how the networks are constituted. In that sense, I have attempted to examine the changing laws, institutions, and wholesale markets as spaces of contestation in order to comprehend and explicate how global trends diffuse in Turkey.

Antalya, the focus of this study, has also its own specific characteristics that cannot be generalized, not even for Turkey as a country. Turkey is a geographically vast country where agricultural trends and integration into global markets differ from one region to another. On the other hand, Antalya is unique in the sense that it shows how globalization and global markets diffuse to semi-peripheral countries like Turkey. Its high volume of fresh fruit and vegetable production, high levels of access to export markets and modern production techniques differentiate Antalya from many other cities of Turkey. Thus, it was a good fit for my fieldwork that would help me understand how the expansion of supermarketization and private governance affect and transform agricultural producers.

In the third chapter, I gave an historical overview of the transformation in the Turkish agriculture. As various theoretical approaches to agriculture differ from each other, I tried to examine both micro and macro processes to show how the localities intersect with global trends. In this sense, the transformation of Turkish agriculture conforms to the global trends if we look at the changing patterns of food production and the resulting global food regimes. Turkish agriculture has experienced transformations similar to those of other developing countries that depend on interaction with global markets. On the other hand, the populist agricultural policies of the Turkish government have created country-specific characteristics for the transformation of Turkish agriculture. Unlike in many countries, subsidy policies and

protectionist barriers were sustained by the government for a long period that ended with the 2001 economic crisis. Another anomaly in terms of Turkey's agri-food transformation began in recent years. This anomaly was characterized by the re-diversification of subsidy policies. Direct income support policy, which was implemented after the 2001 economic crisis, emerged as a temporary subsidy model for the transition to a neoliberal agriculture. The World Bank and IMF plans predicted the withdrawal of DIS when the economic transition was completed. However, successive AKP governments, instead of withdrawing subsidies, have made a return to previous diversified agricultural subsidy policies, which have been criticized by business environments (Çakmak, Akder, Levent, & Karaosmanoğlu, 2008). At first glance, one can claim that the Turkish state has returned to previous protectionist policies of the import-substitutionist period. However, an examination of the subsidies, regulations and changing laws reveals the opposite. The state, instead of returning to a protectionist policy, is acting as a market-maker by re-regulating and re-constituting the power balances in the agricultural sector. Looking at the subsidy policies and changing laws, it can easily be observed that the liberalization of the agricultural markets requires direct state involvement and intervention.

The third chapter explicates how global private governance diffusion intersects with local developments in terms of the expansion of private food governance. With the global rise of private governance, the diversification of state subsidies began to favour certified production, which enabled the increase in the number of certified producers. In that sense, the state as the pivotal actor has been the facilitator of all this process, which has also been strengthened by the rising discursive hegemony of the private governance. Therefore, this chapter helped

understand how global and local intersects and supermarketization and private governance have a common ground to flourish onto.

In the last chapter, I focused on how supermarketization and private agri-food governance translate into a social differentiation mechanism for agricultural producers. As I was conducting interviews in Antalya, I kept the range of the interviewees as wide as possible so as to grasp the degree and patterns of differentiation. In-depth interviews, in this respect, provided me with the chance to probe different aspects, causes and impacts of differentiation. I also integrated legal regulations into this chapter to show how state and private capital cooperate in sharpening the social differentiation among the producers. Despite the understanding which places the state and private capital in opposite conflicting positions, my approach shows the pivotal role of the state in strengthening the private governance and market relations in favour of supermarkets.

However, as I said before, it should always be remembered that this study focuses specifically on Antalya, whose agricultural trends cannot necessarily be generalized for the whole country. Therefore, a quantitative survey covering the whole country is necessary to see the general picture of private agri-food governance and its impacts on agricultural producers. This kind of quantitative study will also show the ways in which different regions integrate into global markets. It will also help us figure out the degree of the impacts of government policies and subsidy mechanisms on the country level. I advocate the idea of a country-wide quantitative research because many of the producers I interviewed claimed that subsidies are more effective in the southeastern and central Anatolia regions due to the fact that the cultivated areas in these regions are larger than in Antalya. Therefore, a county-wide study, if it is conducted, will enrich our insights about the localities, local

networkings among the actors and response mechanisms that are utilized by the producers in the face of private agri-food governance.

Apart from a country-wide quantitative research, an institutional research is necessary to explicate the transformative power of the private agri-food governance over the institutions. I think it is necessary to examine the changing structures of institutions and the evolutions of rules, laws and norms that shape and constitute the working of markets. As Scott says, institutions are constituted by different types of actors and rules differently in each specific context (Scott, 1995). Because Turkey deviates from the global trends and expectations in many aspects such as subsidy policies, an institutional approach will contribute our understanding of the institutional and organizational transformations in terms of wholesale markets and cooperatives. Because this study focused on the retailer-driven private agri-food governance and its impacts on agricultural producers, an in-depth analysis of institutional changes was beyond the scope of my research. However, I think that a further study is needed to probe further the changing nature of agricultural institutions in terms of private food governance and rising hegemony of supermarkets.

In addition to the need for a more detailed research on the transformation of agri-food institutions, I strongly argue for research on the legitimacy of private governance. Because private actors are not legitimized through elections, there is a need for employing alternative criteria of democratic legitimacy for the consideration of private governance (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011). In cases where democratic legitimacy is not provided by elections, alternative criteria such as participation by different actors, transparency and accountability are included by Fuchs and others. All these three need to be researched by scholars in the context of

supermarket expansion and the rise of private food governance in Turkey. In addition to these criteria, I suggest that the role of the governmental and non-governmental institutions should be examined to see how institutions play a role in constituting the legitimacy of the private food governance. In the third chapter, I briefly focused on the rationale of third-party certification and the discursive and economic pillars of the private food governance. However, a further research is needed to widen the scope of discussion through an analysis of the institutional, moral, governance and decision-making dimensions of private agri-food governance by looking at all stakeholders (including the consumers) involved in the food chain processes.

By conducting this research, I have attempted to understand the impacts of the supermarket expansion and third-party agri-food certification on agricultural producers. In addition to that, I have tried to put forward that the forces that bring the rising hegemony of private agri-food governance are complex and cannot be reduced to the mere results of globalisation. Another point which I have taken into consideration is the impossibility of a mere distinction between public and private in terms of agri-food governance. Therefore, I tried to avoid overlooking the hybridities, networkings, interdependences and context-specific developments that are parts of the contestations and negotiations among actors. This study, in this respect, has been an attempt to understand the spaces of contestation among disparate actors, the transformation of the role of the state and the resulting impacts of these contestations and transformations on the producers. Further comparative scholarly studies on private agri-food governance can help situate Turkey in the global arena, which would also show the shared and conflicting dynamics with other cases in other developing countries.

APPENDIX

FIELD INTERVIEW EXCERPTS (TURKISH)

1. Biz her sene tonlarca ilaç ve gübre alıyoruz. Eğer ilaç almazsan böceklerle mücadele edemezsin. Gübre almazsan para azanamazsın çünkü verim alamazsın. Bunlara bir sürü para harcıyorum.
2. Biyoloji mücadele profesyonel ve sağlıklı bir yol. Biz kimyasal yerine bunu kullanıyoruz. Devlet destekleri de daha sağlıklı mücadele modellerine geçmek için teşvik edici. Devlet desteği olmasa, inanın bana, üreticilerin çoğu babalarından öğrendiği eski metotları kullanmaya devam eder.
3. Biz İyi Tarım sertifikalı üretimi 3-4 yıldır yapıyoruz. Özellikle Almanya, Hollanda ve İngiltere gibi Avrupa ülkeleri için üretim yapıyoruz. Avrupa'daki alıcı firmalar bizden sertifika istediler, biz de sertifikalı üretimi uyguluyoruz.
4. Bu şirkette üç yıldır çalışıyorum. Erüst Tarım da 2003'ten beri sertifikalı üretim yapıyor. Sebzelerimiz Migros ve Metro gibi A sınıfı süpermarketlerce satın alınıyor. Bigchef's ve Reina gibi lüks restoranlar da sebzelerini bizden satın alıyor. Bu şekilde ürünlerimizi konvansiyonel üreticilere göre daha kolay pazarlıyoruz.
5. Ben domates üretiyorum. Dört dekar ekili arazim var. İTU'lu üretici olmak istedim ama masraflarını kaldıramadım. Sera yapma masrafları çok yüksek. Mesela, 1985'te bir sera yapmıştık ve bir senede masraflarını çıkardık. Bugün bunu yapamazsın. Para etmiyor. Hem bu işten hem de devlet desteklerinden kar edebilmek için daha fazla arazin olması lazım. Masraflar çok fazla. Düşün mesela, benim dört dönüm arazim var ve yıllık destek 600 lira. Hiçbir şey.

6. Biz burada 40 dekarlık modern bir sera sistemi inşa ettik. Burada her şey kontrollü, ısıtma, sulama, gübreleme... Bu sektöre yatırım yapmak için sermayemiz vardı. Bnece bu işi yapmak için de sermayen olmalı. Eğer yoksa rekabet edemezsin.
7. Ben şimdi konvansiyonel üretici olmuyorum. Tarıma daha fazla yatırım yapmadan önce biz inşaat sektöründeydik. Ondan sonra bir arkadaş bize Ziraat Bankası'nın sertifikalı üreticilere verdiği ucuz krediden bahetti ve biz de tüm üretimi İTU'ya geçirmeye karar verdik. BANka bize yüzde 50 indirimli ucuz kredi sağladı ve üretimi modernleştirdik. Bugün 200 dönümlük sertifikalı üzüm ve elmamız var. Bu fırsata sahip olmak güzel.
8. Sertifikasyonun bize bir avantajı yok. Ziraat'in ucuz kredilerini duyduk, bu yüzden sertifikasyona başvurduk. Yoksa bu kadar detaylı ve saçma İTU prosedürleriyle uğraşmazdım. Sertifikalı araziye destek veriyorlar ama o paranın yarısını zaten prosedürlere harcıyorsun. Sadece ben değil insanların çoğu bunu ucuz kredi için yapıyor.
9. Devlet desteği var dediler gittik Ziraat'ten kredi aldık. Şimdi taksitleri ödeyemiyoruz. 190.000 kredi çekmiştik. Yıllık 40 bin ödemesi var. Faizli tabii. Başa çıkamadım, çünkü hasattan o kadar kazanamıyorum. Yüzde 1 faizini ödeyemeyince yüzde 5'e çıktı. Ziraat'in taksidini ödeyemedik Finansbank'tan kredi çektik Ziraat'e ödedik. Bir sonraki sene Denizbank'tan çektik. Zamanında ödemeyince bir de borcuna komisyon vergisi ekleniyor. Şimdi öyle zor durumdayım ki tarlanın tapusu ipotek altında. Buradaki çiftçiler bankaya borçlu, ilaççıya borçlu, gübreciye borçlu, komisyoncuya borçlu.
10. Finike'de beş dönümlük bir arazim var. Ziraat'in ucuz kredisiyle bir sera yaptım ama geri ödeyemedim. Seramdan kar etmiyorum. Çok küçük. Böyle giderse geri ödemeyemeyeceğim. Faizi günden güne artıyor. Daha önceden borçlu olmasaydım

Ziraar kredisiyle araziye yatırım yapardım. Ama şimdi önceki borçları ödüyorum. Devlet de bizi kendi bankalarıyla borçlandırıyor. İnsanlar da hem borçlanıyor hem de bu hükümete oy veriyor çünkü bunlar giderse işler daha kötü olur diye düşünüyorlar. Bağımlı ve muhtaç duruma geldik.

11. Migrosla abi kardeş gibi olduk. Migros bizim sertifika ücretlerini ödüyor. Ben İTU'yu kendi isteğimle uyguluyorum. ITU benim onurum oldu. Eğer yanlış uygulama veya bir hata olsa bu benim şerefsizliğim olur. Benim babam da dedem de çiftçiydi. Onların hatırasına saygısızlık yapamam.
12. Ben sertifikalı üreticiyim çünkü daha kolay Pazar imkanı sağlıyor. Eğer geleneksel üreticiysen tüccarı halde kendin bulman gerekir. İTU'lu üreticiysen hasadını direkt Migros deposuna yolluyorsun. Onlar paketliyor ve süpermarketlere dağıtıyor. Bundan başka devletin sertifikalı çiftçiliğe verdiği destek diğerinden daha fazla.
13. Biz bir aile şirketiyiz. Hem İTU hem de GlobalGAP sertifikamız var. İTU'yu Migros ve ŞOK için, GlobalGAP'i ihracat pazarı için kullanıyoruz. Sertifika işine ucuz kredi ve pazarlama sebepleriyle geçtik.
14. İTU'lu meyve ve sebzelere alım politikamız gereği öncelik veriyoruz. Üreticiyi de sertifikasyonun avantajlarıyla ilgili bilgilendiriyoruz. Bugün sertifikasyonun önemini bilen ve ertifikalı olan 4474 üreticiden ürün alıyoruz. ITU sağlıklı ve planlı üretimi garantiliyor. Bu seradaki her bir domates izlenebilir.
15. Biz sertifikalı üreticileri tercih ediyoruz. Bunlarla nitelikli anlaşmalar yapıyoruz. Ürünlerini bize sattıkları müddetçe sertifika masraflarını da karşılıyoruz. Üretici ve tüketicilerde bilinci artırmak için gazete ve TV reklamlarına milyon dolarlar ödüyoruz. Tüketici bizden sağlıklı ürün talep ettiği müddetçe biz sağlamaya hazırız. Migros marketlerin raflarında her şey izlenebilir ve kontrollü. Öncelikle sertifikasyon

şirketi kontrol eder, ondan sonra biz Migros olarak satacağımız ürünün labaratuvar analizini yaparız. Bu sıkı bir kalite kontrol ve filtreleme mekanizması.

16. Serikteki sertifikalı üreticiler tüm üreticilerin yüzde 20'si kadar. Çoğunlukla büyük üreticiler topraksız ve sertifikalı tarıma geçti. Toprak yerien kokopit kullanıyorlar. Bazı orta ölçekli ve çoğunlukla büyük ölçekli üreticiler sertifikasyonu tercih ediyor. Bu başlangıçta önemli bir yatırım gerektiriyor
17. ITU masrafı yüksek bir iş. Masrafları karşılayabilmen için ciddi bir arazin olmalı ve yeterli kar etmelisin. Bazı küçük üreticiler de İTU'yu öğrenmek için geliyor. Biz de onları bilgilendirip grup sertifikasyonunu öneriyoruz. Bu onların İTU gerekliliklerini karşılayıp masraflarını karşılaması için daha iyi bir yol. ITU'dan kar edebilmen için ortalama 20 dönüm seranın olması gerek. Yoksa ekonomik yük. Daha büyük üreticiler bile bu masrafları düşünüyor ama İTU artık tarım piyasasının bir gerçeği ve aynı zamanda bir prestij meselesi.
18. Biz tarıma yatırım yapmaya 2008'de karar verdik. Ondan önce inşaat sektöründeydik. Önce 17 dönümlük bir sera yaptık. Bugün 38 dönüm seramız var. Yatırım yapak için sermayemiz vardı ama hala kar edemedik, sadece kurulum masrafını karşılayabildik. Toplamda beş milyon lira harcadık.
19. Tarım, kumar işi. Domatesin fiyatı bu sene yüksek olabilir. Ama güvenemezsin. Bu sene fiyata bakıp seneye yüzlerce dönüm domates ekersen domates fiyatları 50 kuruşa düşünce batarsın. Ya batarsın ya yüzerin. Tam bir kumar. Tarım borsa gibi, döviz gibi. Ne olacağını kimse bilmez.
20. Biz Migros'tan memnunuz çünkü hem pazar imkanı hem de düzenli ve anında para sağlıyor. Eğer Migros "bu bizim için yeterli"derse hale gidip komisyoncu ya da tüccar bulmaktan başka yapacak bir şeyimiz yok. Bu bazen oluyor, biz de salatalıkları halde geleneksel üretici gibi satıyoruz. Migros da halle aynı parayı

ödüyor ama Migros'la çalışmak daha kolay. Hale gittiğinde komisyoncu bulmak için zaman kaybediyorsun. Ayrıca Migros peşin ödeme yapıyor, komisyoncu öyle değil.

21. Migros düzenli ödeme yapıyor. Uzun süre beklemene gerek yok. Ama halle aynı fiyatı veriyor. Fiyatlar halde günlük olarak belirleniyor ve Migros da bunu baz alıyor. Ama, Migros çok seçici. Sen bir ton mal alırsın ama onlar 300 kilosunu kalite standartlarını karşılamıyor diyerek reddeder. Yani yine kayıptasın. Eğer daha büyük üreticiysen ürününün şeklini de kalitesini de standardize edersin ve Migros da o kadar seçici olmaz, ama küçük üreticiysen bu standardizasyonu yakalamak zor.
22. Biz çoğunlukla büyük ölçekli tarım üreticilerini tercih ediyoruz. Profesyonel çalışmak önemli ve küçük üreticiler bunu babalarından dedelerinden öğrendiği yöntemlerle yapıyor. Biz ancak büyük üreticilerle çalışınca düzenli ürün akışı sağlıyoruz. Bizim dikkate aldığımız şey üün akışını sağlayıp standart kaliteye ayak uydurmak.
23. Profillerine baktığın zaman bunların masrafları azaltmak için grup sertifikasyonu yaptığını görürsün. Grup sertifikasyonuna katılmak için minimum ya da maksimum bir limit yok. Bir grup üretici bir birlik, şirket ya da ooperatif olarak grup sertifikasına başvurabiliyor. Bir kez grup sertifikasyonu altında sözleşme yaptılar mı ondan sonra yasal olarak tanınıyorlar.
24. Tedarikçilerimizin çoğu bireysel sertifikaya sahip ve büyük üreticiler. Büyük üreticilerar arasında bireysel ertifikaya bir eğilim var. Biz de bunu istiyoruz, bundan memnunuz. Grup sertifikasyonu oldu mu taip edip denetlemek çok zor. Farklı farklı tarlaları ziyaret etmek zorunda kalıyorsun kalite standartlarına uyumu kontrol etmek için.
25. Meysan'ın 35 yıllık bir tarihi var. Antalya'nın farklı bölgelerinde binlerce dönüm ekili arazimiz var. Meysan global olarak bilinen bir marka. Bizim Fransız Mişel

sertifikamız var. Meysan ayrıca Valencia Portakal Enstitüsü üyesi. Meysan hem ulusal hem de uluslararası pazarlara tedarikçilik yapıyor. Bizim yıllardır kendi markamız var, bu yüzden komisyoncu veya tüccarlara ihtiyacımız yok. Yerel pazarda Migros, Macro, Metro gibi süpermarketlere tedarik yapıyoruz. Kendi üretimimiz dışında İTU grup sertifikasyonu altında sertifikalandırdığımız üreticilerimiz var. On on beş dekar toprağı olan küçük üreticiler prosedür ve yüksek giderler yüzünden bunu yapamıyor. Bu yüzden biz bunları Meysan markası altında koordine ediyoruz. Biz onları zorda bırakmıyoruz. Meysan bu koşullarda bir garanti.

26. Biz çiftçilere gübre, tohum ve fide şeklinde kredi sağlamaya çalışıyoruz. Nakit kredi sağlamak için yeterli finansal kaynağımız yok. Bizim burada işimiz çiftçinin omzuna binen yüksek girdi maliyetlerinin yükünü hafifletmek. Tedarikçiler de genel müdürlüğümüzle anlaşmalar yapıyor. Bu bir iş. Biz üreticilerden taze sebze meyve alıp Migros gibi tedarikçilere satmaya çalışıyoruz, ama bunu yapamıyoruz. Soğuk hava depomuz ve paketleme imkanlarımız yok. Bu imkanların yoksa sebze meyveyi o gün satamayınca elinde kalır ve batarsın. Migros da 1000 kilonun 300'ünü seçip ayırıyor. Size bir olay anlatmak istiyorum. Kumluca kooperatifi birlik olarak üreticilerden ürün almaya kalkıştı. Ben Kumluca kooperatifinin bir toplantısındaydım ve arkadaşımız Mehmet Ali 400 liko patlıcanı Migros'un seçip geri gönderdiğinden şikayet ediyordu. Bununla ne yapacağım diye söyleniyor. Ben de getir onları Demre'ye musakka yapalım dedim. Mehmet Ali Kumluca kooperatifine patlıcanını veriyor ve Migros geri gönderiyor. En sonunda patlıcan ziyan oldu.
27. Kooperatifler soğuk hava depoları yapmak ve çiftçilere hizmet ve kredi sağlamak için finansal olarak desteklenmeli. Kooperatifler kanunu değiştirilmeli. Sebze ve meyveyi yabancı pazarlara ihraç etmemize izin verilmeli. Geçmişte kooperatifler

hem yasal hem de kurumsal olarak Ziraat Bankası'na bağlı olarak işliyordu. Şimdi ticarethaneye döndüler.

28. Tarım sektöründeki sorunlarımızdan biri üreticilerin borçluluğu. Bir üretici bir defa borçlandı mı onu sertifikalı üretim yapmaya ikna edemezsin. İkna edemezsin çünkü halde genellikle kendisine kredi veren komisyonculara ürününü satmak zorunda kalıyorlar.
29. Küçük üreticiysen ve sermayen yoksa eziksin. Seneye komisyoncudan ya da bankadan aldığın borçla başlarsın. Düşün, tohum, gübre ve ilaç alacak paran yok. Bunları almak için borca girmek zorundasın. Komisyoncuna gidersin ve o seni bir ilaççı ya da gübreciye gönderir. Sen de vadeyle gübre ilaç alırsın. Hasat sezonu gelince de borcu ödemek için ürününü o komisyoncuya teslim etmek zorundasın. Bu işler burada böyle yürüyor.
30. Girdi fiyatları durmadan yükseliyor. Borca girmekten başka yapacak bir şeyim yok. 100 0 lira kredi alıp 1300 lira ödersin, dert. Karın borç faizine gitti bile. Öbür tarafran da domates fiyatları girdi fiyatları gibi yükselmiyor.
31. Sertifikalı üretime ucuz kredi fırsatı var diye geçtim. Küçük üreticiysen ya komisyoncudan ya da bankadan kredi alırsın. Ben Ziraat Bankası'nın İTU'lu üreticilere ucuz kredi verdiğini duydum ve sertifikaya başvurdum. Ürünleri uzun yıllardır çalıştığım bir komisyoncuya veriyorum. Birbirimizi biliyoruz ve güveniyoruz. Gidip bor. İsteyip üç ay sonra vereceğim dediğimde kontrat yapmadan verir. Başka komisyoncularla çalışmıyorum çünkü 50 verip 60 isterler. Halde fiyatlar çok dengesiz olsa da güvenilir bir komisyoncuyla bağlantın olması iyi.
32. Migros olarak biz sosyal sorumluluk alıyoruz, sağlıklı üretimi teşvik etmenin sorumluluğu. Dağ başında köylere bile gidip oralardaki köylüleri eğitiyoruz.

33. Migros grup sertifikasyonunu ödüyor. Biz devlet tarafından desteklenmeiyiz, devlet grup sertifikasyonunu karşılamalı. Burada değer bilmezlik yapmıyoruz ama üreticilerle süpermarketler arasındaki bağı güçlendirmek için teşvik ve desteğe ihtiyacımız var.
34. Halde fiyatlar 10-15 güçlü tüccar ve komisyoncularca belirlenir. Mesela büyük bir üretici piyasaya mal sürerek ya da geri çekerek günlük fiyatları değiştirebilir. Erten Tarım mesela, 600 ton patlıcanı var. Bunun piyasaya sürülmesi ya da piyasadan çekilmesi haldeki her şeyi değiştirir. Devletin burada söz hakkı yok. Taban fiyat belirlemiyor. Öte yandan ben de malımı satmak zorundayım çünkü depolama imkanım yok. Devlet fiyat belirleme konusunda bir şeyler yapmalı.
35. Yıllık girdi masrafı çok yüksek. Baş edemiyorum. Devlet ucuz gübre ilaç, tohum üretip bize satmalı. Girdi fiyatları her sene yükseliyor.
36. Küçük üreticiler elenecek çünkü arazi küçüldükçe masrafların düşüyor. Bu yüzden kooperatif ve birliklere ihtiyaçları var. Bu sadece küçük üreticiler için değil, büyük üreticiler de birlikleşmeli. Bu koşullarda tüccarlar bile batıyor. Birlikler kapasite ve verim artırmak için bize yardımcı olur. Devlet de bunun için inisiyatif almalı ve üretimi planlamalı.
37. Demre'de ortalama arazi büyüklüğü 3-4 dönüm. Bir iki dönüm arazisi olan bir sürü insan bulabilirsin. Küçük üreticiler birleşip kooperatif kurmalı. Devlet de kentsel dönüşümde olduğu gibi kırsal dönüşümde de inisiyatif almalı. Küçük üreticileri birleştirmeli, işbirliğini kolaylaştırmalı ucuz ve uzun vadeli kredi vermeli. Yüz dönümlük seralardan oluşan kooperatif veya birlikler oluşturulmalı. Devlet böyle teşvikler yapacağını duyursa üreticiler zaten kendisi de yapar. Bu şekilde birlikler ya da kooperatifler üreticiye ucuz girdi sağlayabilir. Bunlar olmazsa küçük üretici ortadan kalkar.

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